IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DANIEL WOODS, § § No. 259, 2018 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID Nos. 1702009428 (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § 1702009077 § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. § Submitted: November 26, 2018 Decided: February 14, 2019

Before VALIHURA , SEITZ , and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER

This 14 th day of February 2019, upon consider ation of the brief under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), appellate c ounsel’s motion to withdraw, and the State’s response, it appears to the Court that: (1) On February 14, 2017, at approxi mately 8:30 a.m., the Delaware State Police responded to a 911 call rega rding a suspicious vehicle in the area of Blackbird

Station Road in Townsend. The caller descri bed the vehicle as a black Jeep Wrangler and provided a Delaware tag number. Corporal Raymond Shatley drove to the area and spotted the Jeep. Corporal Shatley activ ated his patrol vehicle’s lights and siren and attempted to initiate a stop.2 (2) The driver of the Jeep—who turned out to be the appellant, Daniel Woods—disregarded the police signal and fled , with Corporal Shatley in pursuit. Trooper Edwin Ramirez and Corporal William Wa lker joined in th e chase with Trooper Ramirez’ vehicle taking the lead . At one point, the Jeep came to a st op at the entrance of the Saint Anne’s Golf Course, where the driver opened his door and discarded several items. Corporal Walk er returned to that spot la ter that morning and retrieved the discarded items, which turned out to be DVDs. (3) The chase lasted about twenty-five minutes and ended when the Jeep overheated and came to a complete stop. At the direction of Trooper Ramirez, Woods got out of the Jeep with his hands up a nd got on the ground. When conducting a pat down search of Woods, Trooper Ramirez removed a pocket knife from Woods’ front pants pocket. Also, Trooper Ramirez saw severa l bracelets, other jewelry, and multiple DVDs on the floor of, and scattere d inside, the Jeep. (4) At approximately 1:00 p.m. on February 14, 2017, Laura Campbell returned home from work after receiving a call from her husband that their home (located at 505 Dogtown Road in Townsend) had been broken into. Laura Campbell

noted that the front door of the home was damaged, and th at a number of items were missing from inside the home, including her laptop, two Xbox syst ems, jewelry, and DVDs. Unfortunately for the Campbells, their home was burglarized again on3 February 16, 2017. In the second break-in, the intruder entered the home through a kitchen window and stole a scope mounting k it for a firearm and a clarinet. (5) Some of the property taken in the February 14 burglary—namely, the jewelry and some of the DVDs —were returned to the Campbe lls on February 14, 2017. The laptop and Xbox systems were returned to the Campbells on February 23, 2017, when Corporal Walker retrieved those items from a construction worker who had called the police to report finding the items when working at the Saint Anne’s Golf

Course. (6) Woods was indicted and tried for offenses arising from the vehicle chase and the February 14 burglary of the Campbell residence. On Janua ry 5, 2018, the jury convicted Woods of Burglary in the Second Degree, Felony Theft, Criminal Mischief, Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal, Res isting Arrest, and Ca rrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. (7) Immediately after the verdict was read, Woods interrupted the proceedings to tell the Superior Court that he wanted to move “f or an acquittal on the charges.” 1 The trial judge denied the request as follows: Mr. Woods, you have chosen up to this point to allow Mr. Buckworth to represent you. If you decide at this poi nt to go pro se, the Court needs to have a hearing and address a motion to proceed pro se. It’s not one that I would suggest that you make, but you’ re free to do so. But I’m not going

1 Trial Tr. at 147 (Jan. 5, 2018).4 to consider an oral motion at this time. It’s a motion that you need to make in writing and the Court will address it at a later time. 2 Woods did not revisit the matter of proceeding pro se , and he did not file a written motion for judgment of acquittal. On April 27, 2018, the Superior Court declared

Woods a habitual offender and sentenced him to fourteen years of Level V incarceration for the second-degree burglary conviction and to c oncurrent probation

for the other convictions. 3 This is Woods’ direct appeal. (8) On appeal, Woods’ appellate couns el has filed a brief and motion to withdraw under Rule 26(c). Appellate counsel asserts th at, based upon a complete and

careful examination of the r ecord, there are no arguably appealable issues. Woods has supplemented the Rule 26(c) brie f with claims he would like us to consider on appeal. The State has responded to the position take n by Woods’ appellate counsel, the claims raised by Woods, and has moved to affi rm the Superior Court’s judgment. (9) When considering a Rule 26(c) brie f and motion to withdraw, our standard and scope of review is twofold. 4 First, we must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel

has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could

2 Id. 3 In the same sentencing proceeding, the Superi or Court sentenced Woods in Cr. ID No. 1701019682 for convictions he received in September 2017 for Receiving Stolen Property and Selling Stolen Property. 4 Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin , 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).5 arguably support the appeal. 5 Second, we must conduct our own review of the record to determine whether the appeal is so tota lly devoid of at least arguably appealable

issues that it can be decided wi thout an adversary presentation. 6 (10) Fairly read, Woods’ supplement to th e brief raises nine claims. First, Woods claims that Trooper Ramirez did not read him his Miranda rights. Second, Woods claims that he was charged, in part, for stealing property that was taken in the second burglary of the Campbells’ residenc e on February 16, 2017. Third, Woods

claims that the indictment misstated the brand name of the laptop that was reported missing on February 14, 2017 and found on February 23, 2017. Fourth, Woods claims that the prosecutor misrepresent ed the evidence in the State’s opening statement. Fifth,

Woods claims that there was insufficient ev idence to support the Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon conviction because his pocket knife was clipped to the outside of his pants. Sixth, Woods claims that there wa s insufficient evidence to support the Felony Theft conviction because the jury did not determine that the value of the property was over $1,500. Seventh, Woods cl aims that he was denied th e right to cross-examine the construction worker who found the laptop and the Xbox systems. Eighth, Woods claims that the Superior Court erred when denying his post-verdict pro se request for an acquittal. Last, Woods claims that his trial counsel was ineffective.

5 Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. at 83. 6 Id.6 (11) We have not considered Woods’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a general rule, we will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when the claim was not raised in th e Superior Court in the first

instance. 7 Typically an ineffective counsel claim is pursued through a motion for postconviction relief unde r Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and is adjudicated on the basis of the record developed during the postconviction proceeding. 8 (12) Turning to the other claims, we conc lude, first, that the Superior Court did not err or abuse its discretion when denying Woods’ pro se request for a judgment of acquittal. Before allowing a cr iminal defendant to proceed pro se, the Superior Court must conduct a hearing to inform the defenda nt of the risks inherent in going forward

in a criminal trial without the assistance of legal counsel and to determine that the defendant’s decision to proceed without c ounsel is a knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. 9 The Superior Court’s re fusal to consider Woods’ request for a judgment of acquittal without first conducting the required hearing on Woods’ request to proceed pro se , and the court’s ruling that Woods must file a written motion for acquittal, were entirely appropriate. To the extent Woods attempts to argue

7 Desmond v. State , 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 8 Id. 9 Hartman v. State , 918 A.2d 1138, 1140–41 (Del. 2007).7 the basis of his request for an acquittal here, we will not consider his claim in the first

instance. 10 Woods will have to make the ar gument in a postconviction proceeding. (13) Because none of the other claims on a ppeal were raised at trial, we have reviewed the claims for plain error. 11 Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fa irness and integrity of the trial process.” 12 (14) Woods claims that Trooper Ramirez did not give him Miranda warnings.

The claim is without merit. No statem ent by Woods was introduced at trial. Consequently, whether or not Woods was read his Miranda rights is irrelevant. 13 (15) Woods’ claims of errors in the indi ctment are also without merit. Woods was indicted for the February 14, 2017 burgla ry of the Campbells’ residence, not the second burglary on February 16, 2017. The la ptop’s brand name wa s not an essential element of any of the crimes charged, and the indictment gave Woods sufficient notice of the charges. Any discrepancy in the i ndictment concerning the brand name of the laptop, and any variance between the indictment and the eviden ce adduced at trial, were not prejudicial. 14 (16) Woods claims that the prosecuto r misrepresented the evidence in the State’s opening statement when he told the jury that the laptop and the Xbox systems

10 Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8. 11 Wainwright v. State , 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 12 Id. 13 Malin v. State , 2008 WL 2429114, at *2 (Del. June 17, 2008). 14 Del. Super. Ct. Crim . R. 7(c)(1), (2).8 were located “[w]hen the police officer went b ack and retraced the path of flight of the

defendant.” 15 On plain error review, the claim is without merit. To the extent the prosecutor suggested in error that the ev idence would show that the laptop and the Xbox systems were among the discarded items that Corporal Walker retrieved from

the entrance of the Saint Anne’s Golf Court on February 14, 2017, Woods makes no

reasoned effort to show that the misstatem ent was prejudicial, and we have discerned no prejudice. (17) Woods claims that he was de nied the right to cross-examine the construction worker who found the laptop a nd Xbox systems. His claim is without

merit. The Confrontation Cl ause of the Sixth Amendmen t guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine an adverse witness at trial. 16 It does not require the State to call any particular individual to testify as a witness. 17 To the extent Woods complains that

the substance of statements attributed to the construction worker by other trial witnesses was impermissible h earsay and thus was admitted in error in violation of his right to confrontation, the record reflects that the parties, through counsel, stipulated to

the admission of those statements. 18

15 Trial Tr. at 17 (Jan. 3, 2018). 16 Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974). 17 Salaberrios v. State , 2017 WL 443721, at *3 (Del. Jan. 20, 2017) (citing Charbonneau v. State , 904 A.2d 295, 302 (Del. 2006)). 18 Trial Tr. at 54–55 (Jan. 5, 2018).9 (18) Finally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods was guilty of Carrying a Conceal ed Weapon and Felony Theft. Trooper Ramirez testified that he found Woods’ pocket knife inside of Woods’ right front pants pocket. 19 Detective Bridget Harris and Laura Ca mpbell testified that the value of the property taken in the February 14 burglary was “over $2,000.” 20 (19) Having carefully reviewed the record , we conclude that Woods’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoi d of any arguably appealable issue. We are satisfied that Woods’ appellate counsel made a consci entious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that Woods could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of convictions is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

19 Id. at 44. 20 Id. at 80; Trial Tr. at 52 (Jan. 3, 2018).