COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 14, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1923 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV2156

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

PETITIONER,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

SAM RAHDER,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: 

JOHN D. HYLAND, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP1923

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Samuel Rahder, pro se, appeals a harassment 

injunction order entered by the circuit court. On appeal, he challenges the court’s 

finding that he was not a credible witness, argues that his due process rights were 

violated, and argues that the circuit court judge was biased against him. We reject 

these arguments and affirm the order of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On August 13, 2018, the petitioner filed a petition for a harassment 

injunction against Rahder, who was her friend and co-worker. The petitioner 

alleged that Rahder harassed her over several months with calls, texts, and emails. 

The circuit court held an injunction hearing at which it took testimony from both 

the petitioner and Rahder. At the close of the hearing, the court granted the 

injunction to the petitioner for a period of four years. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶3 A circuit court’s decision to grant a harassment injunction is 

reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Board of Regents-UW Sys. v. 

Decker, 2014 WI 68, ¶19, 355 Wis. 2d 800, 850 N.W.2d 112. 

DISCUSSION

¶4 We turn first to Rahder’s argument that the circuit court erred in 

finding that he was not a credible witness. The transcript of the injunction hearing 

shows that the petitioner and Rahder differed in their views of the events that led 

to the filing of the injunction petition. The petitioner testified that, in December 

2017, she informed Rahder by email that she no longer wished to have contact 

with him. Rahder testified that he thought the petitioner’s email was ambiguous 

because it said she wanted to stop communication “for now” without specifying 
No. 2018AP1923

3

how long “for now” would be. The petitioner then testified that she contacted the 

police on February 27, 2018, for assistance in ceasing Rahder’s contact with her. 

Rahder testified that the police, or someone else calling on petitioner’s behalf, 

advised him by phone in March 2018 that the petitioner did not want contact with 

him.

¶5 According to the petitioner, contact from Rahder stopped for a 

period of time. Then, in June 2018, she received a package and letter from him. 

The petitioner testified that she again contacted the police, who gave her 

information about restraining orders and served Rahder on June 10, 2018, with a 

letter directing him not to contact the petitioner. Then, in August 2018, when the 

petitioner was participating in a theater performance at an art gallery, Rahder 

showed up at the location of the performance. The petitioner called 911, which 

resulted in Rahder being questioned about the incident. Rahder testified that he 

had been rollerblading in the neighborhood of the art gallery and was thirsty and 

had a blister, so he went into the gallery and helped himself to water and looked 

around the gallery. Rahder testified that he did not know the petitioner was there 

and did not see her. 

¶6 The court found that the December 2017 email from the petitioner 

stating that she wanted to stop communication “for now” could be considered 

ambiguous. However, the court did not find credible Rahder’s statement that he 

did not know that the call he received in March 2018 was from the police. The 

court further found that the June 10, 2018 letter from the police to Rahder was not 

ambiguous. The court acknowledged that Rahder’s appearance at the art gallery in 

August 2018 “may well have been random,” but reasoned that it may have 

prompted the petitioner to feel that it was necessary to go to court to prevent 

further contact. 
No. 2018AP1923

4

¶7 “When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate 

arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each 

witness’s testimony.” Plesko v. Figgie Int’l, 190 Wis. 2d 764, 775, 528 N.W.2d 

446 (Ct. App. 1994). Here, the circuit court’s findings demonstrate that it credited 

certain of Rahder’s statements but found other statements to not be credible. The 

circuit court, unlike this court, had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and 

their demeanors on the witness stand. See Pindel v. Czerniejewski, 185 Wis. 2d 

892, 898–99, 519 N.W.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1994) (circuit court is in far better 

position than appellate court to make credibility determinations). This court will 

not overturn credibility determinations on appeal unless the testimony upon which 

they are based is inherently or patently incredible or in conflict with the uniform 

course of nature or with fully established or conceded facts. Global Steel Prods. 

Corp. v. Ecklund Carriers, Inc., 2002 WI App 91, ¶10, 253 Wis. 2d 588, 

644 N.W.2d 269. That is not the case here, and we therefore reject Rahder’s 

argument that the circuit court erred when it did not find all of his testimony to be 

credible. 

¶8 We next turn to Rahder’s argument that his due process rights were 

violated. On the issue of due process, Rahder cites several legal authorities, all of 

which are criminal cases. Rahder fails to develop his argument to explain how the 

authorities he cites apply in this civil case. For example, Rahder refers to the 

“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof for criminal convictions, citing State 

v. Stawicki, 93 Wis. 2d 63, 286 N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1979). However, proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt is not required for the issuance of a harassment 

injunction. The standard for issuance of a harassment injunction is set forth in 
No. 2018AP1923

5

WIS. STAT. § 813.125(4)(a)3. (2017-18),

1 which states that an injunction may be 

granted if “[a]fter hearing, the judge or circuit court commissioner finds 

reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment with 

intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner.” The record reflects that the judge 

properly applied that standard. 

¶9 “‘A party must do more than simply toss a bunch of concepts into 

the air with the hope that either the trial court or the opposing party will arrange 

them into viable and fact-supported legal theories.’” State v. Butler, 2009 WI App 

52, ¶17, 317 Wis. 2d 515, 768 N.W.2d 46 (quoted source omitted). While we 

make some allowances for the failings of parties who, as here, are not represented 

by counsel, “[w]e cannot serve as both advocate and judge,” State v. Pettit, 171 

Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992), and will not scour the record 

to develop viable, fact-supported legal theories on the appellant’s behalf, Butler,

317 Wis. 2d 515, ¶17. Here, Rahder fails to apply relevant legal authority to the 

facts of record; therefore, we reject his due process argument on that basis. 

¶10 Finally, we address Rahder’s argument that the circuit court judge 

was biased against him. In analyzing a claim of judicial bias, we begin with the 

presumption that a judge is “fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing 

influences.” State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶20, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 

N.W.2d 114. To overcome that presumption, a party must demonstrate the 

objective existence of “actual bias” or the “appearance of bias.” Id., ¶¶20-24. 

Opinions formed by a judge based upon facts introduced or events occurring 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2018AP1923

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during the course of a current or prior proceeding involving a party do not 

constitute the basis for a claim of judicial bias unless they display “‘a deep-seated 

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’” State v. 

Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, ¶36, 295 Wis. 2d 801, 722 N.W.2d 136 (quoted 

source omitted).

¶11 Here, Rahder has not alleged that the circuit court judge had any 

personal interest or stake in the outcome of the proceedings. In addition, the 

record does not contain any comments by the judge that would indicate deepseated favoritism or antagonism. Rahder asserts that the judge began the 

injunction hearing with an assumption that everything in the petition was true. 

While the record reflects that the judge noted at the outset of the hearing that the 

petition was signed under oath, it is clear from the rest of the transcript that the 

judge did not simply accept the allegations in the petition as true. The judge 

questioned both Rahder and the petitioner extensively about the allegations in the 

petition, and provided each of them ample opportunity to explain their own 

perceptions of the events discussed in the petition. Additionally, as discussed 

above, the circuit court found credibility in some portions of Rahder’s testimony 

and discredited other portions, thereby demonstrating that the judge did not simply 

accept all of the allegations in the petition as the basis for issuing the injunction. 

In light of these facts, we are not persuaded that the record supports a claim of 

judicial bias. 

¶12 In sum, we are satisfied that the circuit court properly exercised its 

discretion in issuing the injunction. 
No. 2018AP1923

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By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.