--- 

DNA-TR-83-07 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, TASK

FORCE RAZOR 

Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot 

Science Applications, Incorporated 

P.O. Box 1303 

McLean, VA 22102 

15 July 1983 

Technical Report 

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ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, TASK FORCE RAZOR Technical Report

Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 

SAI-83/1006 7. AUTHOR(s) 8.CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) 

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B350083466 U99QMAXMOOOOl H2590D. 

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on wverse side if necessary and identify by block number) 

Shot Apple II Radiation Protection 

Radiation Exposure Assessment Armored Vehicle Shielding 

Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Operation Teapot 

Task@rce RAZOR Desert Rock VI 

BSTRACT (Continue on reverse side ll necessary end identrfy by block number) 

The radiation dose to Task Force RAZOR personnel participating in Shot 

I Apple II of Operation Teapot, Exercise Desert Rock VI, is reconstructed. Task a7 force personnel were exposed to initial radiation while in their vehicles or / 

4 

in trenches at the time of Apple II detonation. They were also exposed to 

residual radiation during their subsequent manuever and during an inspection 

of the equipment display area. The calculated total garnna doses to fullyparticipating Task Force RAZOR personnel range from about 0.8 rem to 1.8 rem. 

C The highest dose was received by personnel of the armored infantry platoon on 

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20. ABSTRACT (Continued) 

right flank nearest ground zero. Internal radiation dose commitments to maximally exposed personnel inside vehicles are estimated to be about 0.4 rem to 

the thyroid, 0.003 rem to the whole body, and 0.002 rem to the bone. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page Section 

LIST OF 2 ILLUSTRATIONS 

3 LIST OF TABLES 

5 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

7 2 OPERATIONS 

7 2.1 Shot Data 

2.2 Participants 7 

2.3 Concept of Operations 7 

2.4 Pre-shot Operations 14 

2.5 Shot Scenario 14

2.6 Post-Attack Activities 18 

INITIAL RADIATION 20

3.1 Computational Method 20 

3.2 Initial Dose Summary 24 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 26 

4.1 Residual Gamma Exposure 26 

4.2 Internal Dose to Tank Occupants 28 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND 

TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 32 

5.1 Uncertainties in Initial Radiation Dose 32 

5.2 Uncertainties in Residual Radiation Dose 34 

5.3 Total Mean Dose Summary 36 

6 CONCLUSIONS 38 

7 REFERENCES 40 

Appendices 

I MOVEMENTS OF TASK FORCE RAZOR 45 

II ARMORED VEHICLE SHIELDING 55
Figure 

2-1 

2-2 

2-3 

3-1 

3-2 

4-l 

I-l 

II-1 

II-2 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Operation Teapot Shot Locations 

Task Force RAZOR Maneuver Area 

Task Force RAZOR Attack Formation 

Calculated Neutron Free-Field Dose, Shot Apple II 

Gamma Free-Field Dose, Shot Apple II 

Apple II Residual Radiation at H + 0.35 Hours 

Assumed Walk-Through Path 

Positions of Tank Crew Members 

M-59 Armored Personnel Carrier 

Page 

8 

11 

12 

21 

22 

27 

54 

56 

58 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

2-1 Task Force RAZOR Schedule of Operations 15 

3-1 Initial Dose for Elements of Task Force RAZOR 25 

4-1 Residual Gamma Dose for Elements of Task Force RAZOR 29 

5-1 Task Force RAZOR Dose Summary 37 

I-l Task Force RAZOR Locations During Attack Phase 46 

I-2 Truck Ride from Objective to Equipment Display Area 50 

I-3 Walk-through of Equipment Display Area 51 

I-4 Truck Ride From the Equipment Display Area Back to the 

Parked Vehicles 53
4 
Section 1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

This report presents an analysis of the nuclear radiation exposure for the 

personnel of the Task Force RAZOR during their participation in Operation Teapot. 

This troop test was known as Project 41.2 of Exercise Desert Rock VI. The armwed 

task force maneuvered in conjunction with Shot Apple II, 5 May 1955, at the Nevada 

Test Site. 

The troop test took place over a period of slightly more than two weeks, during 

which time the personnel trained, rehearsed, and conducted the assault maneuver after 

the shot. The maneuver consisted of an attack on an objective by a reinforced tank 

battalion and a provisional aviation company. The attack began 8 minutes after the 

shot. 

The task force activities are traced from arrival at Camp Desert Rock on 21 

April 1955 until departure on 7 May 1955. The shot was originally scheduled for April 

26, but was postponed twice due to weather conditions. The detonation finally took 

place the following week on 5 May 1955. Time-dependent position information is 

determined from records, reports, interviews, and photographs. External (and internal 

as appropriate) doses are reconstructed, and the uncertainties associated therewith are 

calculated. 

The analysis uses an automated procedure for determining dose due to residual 

radiation. All available radiological survey data are fit, in a statistical regression 

model, to space-time models of residual radiation intensity, from which isointensity 

contours (isopleths) are then developed. These data are stored for subsequent combination with the time and space factors associated with troop operations in contaminated 

areas. Derived parameters that characterize soil activation or fission product decay 

permit continuous adjustment of the radiation field in order that an integrated 

radiation dose for a given operation can be determined. A major feature of the 

automated procedure is that variations in the time and space factors associated with 

troop operations can be introduced to determine the sensitivity of the calculated dose 

to any inconsistencies of the operational histories. It was only after this automated 

procedure was developed and thoroughly tested that there now exists the confidence to 

analyze an operation for which no film badge data exists. 

5 
Major findings of this report are: 

0 The troops of Task Force RAZOR were exposed to initial radiation from 

Shot Apple II. The initial dose was less than 0.2 rem (gamma), and less than 

0.4 rem (neutron) for the shot. 

0 Task Force personnel who participated in the maneuver and viewed the 

equipment display thereafter received estimated total mean gamma doses 

that ranged from 0.8fi*z rem to 1.8_+00*~rem. . . 

0 The 50-year whole body dose commitment due to possible inhalation of 

tank-lofted and helicopter-lofted contamination was no more than 0.003 

rem. The corresponding bone-dose commitment was approximately 0.002 

rem, while that of the thyroid was 0.4 rem. 
Section 2 

OPERATIONS 

Task Force RAZOR, a reinforced tank battalion, completed its movement to the 

Nevada Test Site on 21 April 1955. Plans called for participation in maneuvers in 

conjunction with Shot Apple II, scheduled for 26 April 1955 (see Figure 2-1 for relative 

location of Shot Apple II). The shot was postponed twice due to weather conditions and 

was detonated on 5 May 1955. 

2.1 SHOT DATA 

Date: 5 May 1955, 0510 hours (PDT) 

Location: Area T-l, UTM Coordinates 798009 

Yield: 29 KT 

Height of Burst: 500’ (steel tower) 

2.2 PARTICIPANTS 

Task Force RAZOR had a troop strength of about 1000 (Reference 3) and was 

comprised of the following units: 

From Camp Irwin, California 

723rd Tank Battalion (minus one company) 

From Fort Hood, Texas 

Company C, 510th Armored Infantry Battalion 

First Platoon, Company B, 510th Armored Infantry Battalion 

Battery A, 22nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

First Platoon, Company C, 24th Armored Engineer Battalion 

First Combat Aviation Company (Provisional), First Armored Division 

2.3 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

The purpose of the exercise was to determine the capability of a reinforced tank 

battalion, in immediate exploitation of a nuclear attack, to seize an objective by 

capitalizing on the combined shock action and casualty effects of attacking armor in 

conjunction with the nuclear detonation. An additional purpose was to determine the 
ESS I

•

I 

I 

I APPLE II 

I 

MlneMountal n I 

I 

TEST I 

I 

I 

SITE 

10 

1 1L,‘, 3 km 

0 ‘0

miles 

Camp Desert Rockii L:*‘A:4 

Figure 2-l. Operation Teapot Shot Locations 

8 

-

L 
capability of a combat aviation company to support a reinforced tank battalion. The 

original objectives of the test were to determine: 

(1) The feasibility of having a reinforced tank battalion in motion and its 

rnotion so timed that no delay will result in advance of the task force into 

a blast area. 

(2) The capability of a reinforced tank battalion to pass through or near ground 

zero in a rapid follow-through of a nuclear detonation without endangering 

personnel inside the vehicles. 

(3) The maximum time delay following a nuclear detonation before an armored 

unit can enter the affected area in exploitation of the weapon effects. 

(4) The possibility of refining personnel safety precautions (taken during this 

exercise) by elements of a reinforced tank battalion in exploitation of a 

nuclear attack. 

(5) Field expedients that should be developed or employed to facilitate passage 

through a blast area. 

(6) The effect of the detonation on the formation, speed, and direction of 

attack in moving through a target area of a nuclear attack. 

(7) The most effective organization for cornbat of a reinforced tank battalion 

in exploitation of a nuclear attack. 

(8) The most effective use of artillery and tactical aircraft in conjunction with 

a nuclear attack and armored exploitation of such an attack. 

Some of these objectives could not be tested as originally envisaged because the 

Atomic Energy Commission placed several restrictions on the exercise. Large segments of the area around ground zero were assigned to other test participants. Some 

of the restrictions were: 

9 
(1) No task force movement was permitted in the test area after 2200 hours 

the day before the shot. This restriction prevented the normal tactical 

movement from the assembly area to the attack position just before the 

shot. Therefore, a static position was adopted for the detonation. 

(2) The task force was required to maintain radio silence from 30 minutes 

before until after the detonation. This restriction necessitated the use of 

telephone (wire) communications between elements of the task force. 

(3) Vehicle engines were not permitted to operate within 30 minutes prior to 

the shot. This restriction necessitated restarting the engines after the 

shot. 

(4) The task force was not permitted to pass through the ground zero area. 

Test instrumentation and the possibility of exceeding stringent safety 

limits for vehicle contamination were the reasons for this restriction. 

(5) The task force was not permitted to continue the attack in a single 

direction. Instruments and cameras located northwest of ground zero 

forced the task force to attack an objective located to the west of ground 

zero. 

The final plan was for the task force to be in attack formation at the time of the 

shot, with troops in their armored vehicles (a few troops were in trenches), and to 

attack an objective immediately thereafter. Upon completion of the maneuver, the 

troops were to be transported, by truck, back to the trench area. After viewing the 

equipment and fortifications in the display area, the task force troops would be 

returned to the objective area, where they would remount their vehicles for the nontactical movement back to the Mine Mountain Junction assembly area. 

An overview of the Task Force RAZOR operations area is provided in Figure 2-2. 

The task force was to be prepositioned facing north, with the leading tanks about 3200 

yards (2930 meters) south of the shot tower. The task force used a line of tank 

companies in a wedge formation with the right flank just west of the 185 degree radial 

and with the front extending to the west (see Figure 2-3). Other elements of the task 

force were behind the tanks as shown. 

10 
I I 

I 

-

_C 

*TURNING POINT FOR TUO 

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERSTtlAT OVERSHOT f@iCORRECT TURNING POINT PARTICIPANTS 

Figure 2-2.Task Force RAZOR Maneuver Area 

II 
WWMW 

4 

LEGEND 

MM48 TK 

OM59 ARM0 INF VEH 

Wt441TK 

INTERVAL--BETWEEN UNITS, 100 YD: 

BETWEEN VEH. 50 YD 

&ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION 

@ARMORED ENGINEER BATTALION 

ooca ro TO CNO ICmJ 

. . . !

B 

Source: References 1,2 

Figure 2-3. Task Force RAZOR Attack Formation 

12 
The tank personnel were to be located in 55 M-48 and 2 M-41 tanks (Figure 2-3) 

at the time of the shot with all turrets rotated to the rear to prevent damage to the 

optical systems. Additionally, drivers’ and commanders’ sight prisms were to be taped 

to prevent damage during the blast. Reference 4 states the following: “Twenty (20) 

monitors will be provided for the Armored Force Test for continuous area and vehicle 

monitoring during the advance of the armored force and after the objective is reached. 

The monitors will be positioned mainly in the lead and right flank armored vehicles, 

with the remaining monitors dispersed throughout the formation. The lead tank will 

proceed toward ground zero from the IP until a radiation intensity reading inside the 

tank of one roentgen is reached (this will indicate approximately eight roentgens on 

the outside of the tank) and then veer to the left toward the objective.” 

Company C, 510th Armored Infantry, was to be in line behind the tank 

companies, about 3900 yards (3570 meters) from ground zero, with personnel mounted 

in M-59 armored personnel carriers. Sight prisms were to be taped as with the tanks. 

The company consisted of three platoons. The one on the right would trail behind 

Company A of the tank battalion. The center platoon was to guide on the right 

platoon and trail behind Company C of the tank battalion. The platoon on the left 

would trail behind Company B of the tank battalion. 

The First Platoon of Company C, 24th Armored Engineer Battalion, was to be 

located directly behind the command group tanks but far to the rear, at about 5000 

yards (4570 meters) from ground zero, with personnel in their M-59 armored personnel 

carriers at the time of the shot. After the shot, the platoon would trail the command 

group of the task force by 1800 yards. Battery A, 22nd Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion, was to be located behind the center armored infantry platoon and directly 

left of the armored engineer platoon, about 5000 yards (4570 meters) from ground 

zero. The lack of overhead cover on the M-7 self-propelled howitzers precluded 

positioning the artillery in a more advanced position. The artillery personnel were to 

be in trenches to the rear of the vehicles at the time of the shot (Reference 36). 

After the shot, the personnel were to mount their four vehicles, guide on the engineer 

platoon to the right, and trail about 1800 yards behind Company C of the tank 

battalion. 

13 
The battalion reconnaissance platoon and the simulated battalion martar platoon 

were not planned to be in the forward position because the wheeled vehicles organic to 

these units were unarmored. Their vehicles were parked in the assembly area to the 

rear and were not used during the attack. 

It should also be noted that the M-74 tank recovery vehicles, shown on 

Figure 2-3, are not addressed as a separate element in this report. These vehicles are 

similar to the tanks themselves in shielding characteristics, and they trailed to the 

rear of all tank elements during the attack. Their conditions of exposure were similar 

to those of Company B of the tank battalion. 

The First Combat Aviation Company and the First Platoon of Company B, 510th 

Armored Infantry, were to be positioned at the Yucca Lake Airstrip where, after the 

shot, the H-19 helicopters would airlift the infantrymen to an area 6000 yards 

southwest of the attack objective. 

2.4 PRE-SHOT OPERATIONS 

The elements of Task Force RAZOR assembled at Camp Irwin, California, from 

9 March to 13 March 1955. The task force conducted training until 17 April in 

preparation for the exercise. On 18 April, Task Force RAZOR departed Camp Irwin 

for the 160-mile overland march to Nevada Test Site. It arrived at its assembly area 

near Mine Mountain Junction (See Figure 2-l) on 21 April 1955. The schedule of 

operations while at the test site is shown in Table 2-l. 

From 21 April to 4 May the task force engaged in rehearsals for the exercise, 

training for the atomic test, and maintenance of equipment. The Apple II shot was 

originally scheduled for 26 April but was postponed twice due to weather conditions. 

Consequently, the task force moved to the shot area for the night on three occasions 

during the period from 25 April to 4 May 1955. 

2.5 SHOT SCENARIO 

The following synopsis of events is based on the plan for the operation 

(Reference I), the after action reports (References 2 and 3), and interviews of Dr. 

John J. SaaIberg (Reference 36). 

14 
Table 2-l. Task Force RAZOR Schedule of Operations 

DAY TIME EVENT 

21 April 55 1200 Arrive Nevada 

Junction) 

Test Site assembly area (Mine Mountain 

22 April 55 1000-1500 Dry-run. Move from 

position. The attack 

occupied. Return to 

(about 3500 yds. south 

the assembly area to the attack 

is carried out and the objective 

vicinity of the observer trenches 

of CZ). 

23 April 55 0430-1030 Final 

run. 

rehearsal--movements essentially as in the dry25 April 55 1300 Move into position--personnel 

Personnel tour equipment display 

remain with vehicles. 

area in the afternoon. 

26 April 55 H-hour (0510) Shot APPLE II 

~+0:06 (0516) Task Force RAZOR move to attack. 

H-23 helicopters depart Yucca Lake airstrip to provide 

aerial observation and furnish aerial evacuation of 

simulated casualties. Aircraft fly below 300 feet. 

Simulated casualties evacuated directly to Media Hill 

(located in proximity to News Nob) for “first impression 

interviews.” 

L-19 observers and recon planes depart 

column cover for task force. Maintain 

1000 feet above terrain. 

airstrip 

altitude 

and fly 

500 to 

H+O:l8 (0528) H-19s take off from Yucca 

infantry platoon to an area 

objective. Altitude 300 feet. 

Lake airstrip to transport 

southwest of the attack 

L-20 aircraft depart airstrip. 

infantry platoon then cover 

force to attack objective. 

1000 feet. 

Cover 

forward 

Fly at 

H-19 movement of 

movement of task 

altitude of 500 to 

H+O:45 (0555) Task Force RAZOR to reach and secure objective. 

L- 19s, L-2Os, and H-19s depart airstrip for objective to 

resupply task force, H-19s fly under 300 feet. Fixed 

wing aircraft fly at 500-1000 feet. 

H+2:00 (0710) Return 

through 

to trench area--personnel 

display area. 

dismount and walk 

H+4:00 (09 10) Return to objective area. 

move to assembly area. 

Decontaminate vehicles and 

28 April 55 Depart assembly area for Camp Irwin. 

15 
On 5 May 1955, the task force conducted its maneuver in conjunction with the 

nuclear detonation. The total manning of Task Force RAZOR was approximately 1000 

personnel, but only an estimated 500 were in the vehicles that participated in the 

attack. Because of the excess personnel, maneuver participation was on a voluntary 

basis (except for essential personnel). The others observed the shot from Mine 

Mountain (see Figure Z-Z), to the west of the task force (Reference 36). They were in a 

protected location about 5750 yards (5260 meters) from ground zero at the time of the 

shot. After the shot, the observers moved forward about 500 yards to bleachers to 

observe the armored task force test. 

The shot was detonated at 0510 hours, just before sunrise. There was no damage 

to tanks of the task force from the shot. However, most of the engine and fan access 

panels on the armored personnel carriers were dislodged. This damage was minor and 

required straightening and replacement of the panels. Tank turrets were then rotated 

to the forward positions. The tape was removed from sight prisms and from other 

optics. Permission was received from the Atomic Energy Commission to turn on 

engines and radios, and radio communication was established three minutes after the 

shot (References 2,3). 

There was some initial movement within the task force at about 4Yz minutes; this 

was probably the staff element vehicles moving into attack formation. The task force 

as a whole did not get underway until about eight minutes after the shot (Reference 7). 

The dust conditions reduced visibility for the first IO-15 minutes to about 500 to 800 

yards. Driving lights were turned on by some tanks to enable those vehicles in the rear 

to establish their relative positions. Radios functioned perfectly. Moving at an 

average speed of 2-6 miles per hour (Reference 21, the task force experienced no 

major difficulty until about 975 yards (890 meters) from ground zero, where the 

radiation monitoring equipment in the lead tank of Company A registered the 

maximum permissible reading of one Roentgen per hour.* At this time, all tanks made 

a left wheel turn away from ground zero so as not to receive higher readings. 

*Note: Reference 3 indicates that the tank received 12 R (sic) inside, estimated 130 -

160 R outside, at the turning point. This is refuted in all other references, and even 

later in the same reference. The limit of I R/hr inside the tank was rigidly adhered to. 

Captain Saalberg, who was commander of the lead tank of Company A, supports this 

contention (Reference 36). 

16 
All lead elements of the Task Force slowed or stopped to guide on Company A 

after making the turn and heading northwest. However, when the armored infantry 

reached the turning line, two armored personnel carriers missed the turn and moved to 

within 900 yards (820 meters) of ground zero before they could be turned toward the 

attack objective behind Company A of the tank battalion. Radiation readings were 

continued as the task force moved northwest, and the direction of travel was adjusted 

to the left (more westerly) as the readings approached one Roentgen per hour. The 

task force headed northwest to Tippipah Spring Road and then through the defile to 

the objective (see Figure 2-2). The earliest task force element reached the objective 

at 54 minutes after the shot, and the last element reached there at 1 hour and 5 

minutes after the shot (Reference 2). 

See Appendix I for times and routes for each platoon and company during the 

maneuver. 

The task force personnel at Yucca Lake were able to watch the shot in the open, 

merely protecting their eyes from the initial flash by turning away. As a safety 

measure, aircraft doors and sliding windows were opened before the shot. There was 

no damage to the aircraft, except that windows in the cargo compartments of the H19s were dislodged by the blast wave. These windows were easily pushed back into 

position. 

All aircraft remained on the ground until three minutes after the shot. At this 

time, one L-19 took off to provide observation and radio relay for the task force 

(Reference 21, and two H-23s took off to evacuate simulated casualties from the task 

force. One H-19 was used to mark the task force objectives as a control measure. At 

nine minutes after the shot, six H-lVs, each carrying six combat troops, airlifted the 

armored infantry platoon of Company B, 510th Armored Infantry Battalion, to an area 

located 6000 yards southwest of the attack objective. At 40 minutes after the shot, 

five H-19, two L-2Os, and one L-19 commenced the aerial resupply operation from 

Yucca Lake to the task. force objective. (Note that some of the events described 

above did not occur at the planned times indicated on the schedule shown in Table 

2-I). 

17 
2.6 POST-ATTACK ACTIVITIES 

After the tactical maneuver ended at the objective, the vehicles were parked 

and the task force initiated radiological decontamination procedures. All personnel 

were swept off with brooms, and then surveyed for radiation contamination. Rad-Safe 

personnel conducted the survey, augmented by a ZO-man monitoring team with 

AN/PDR-Z7A radiac instruments. The maximum permissible intensity level was 20 

mR/hr. AIthough it was not required, there was a contingency plan to take personnel 

to a decontamination station near Yucca Lake if field decontamination failed to lower 

the intensity below 20 mR/hr. Vehicle decontamination was postponed until after the 

personnel returned from the equipment display area (Reference 36). 

The decontamination was completed by approximately two hours after the shot. 

Personnel then loaded aboard trucks for transport to the display area. The drive took 

about twenty-five minutes, and the walk-through started about 0740 hours, 2K hours 

after the shot (Reference 36). The Desert Rock equipment display area was located to 

the south of ground zero starting at 500 yards (460 meters) and extending to 2000 

yards (1830 meters) (see Appendix I, Figure I-l). The task force personnel who had 

participated in the maneuver were joined here by the other members of the task force 

who had observed the shot and the task force maneuver from Mine Mountain. The 

personnel detrucked at the trench area, walked forward to the display area, observed 

the displays, and returned to the trucks. The route of their progress is described in 

Appendix I. Calculations show that all the displays could have been visited without 

exceeding the 5 R/hr intensity restriction imposed (Reference 4). After the walkthrough, personnel were swept off with brooms and surveyed before entrucking. 

Again, the maximum tolerance for personnel contamination was 20 mR/hr. In no 

instance after being swept off was further decontamination required (Reference 3). 

Under the assumptions discussed in Appendix I, it would have taken about one 

hour and forty minutes to walk through the entire display area. Thus, the walkthrough ended about 0910, four hours after the shot. After loading of the trucks and 

the twenty-five minute drive back to the parked vehicles, the time was about 0945. 

The task force vehicles were then decontaminated using the same procedures that had 

been used for personnel. The vehicles were brushed off to remove any possible 

contamination, even though rad-safe surveys of vehicles and personnel showed that 

this was unnecessary (Reference 36). The task force then returned to the assernbly 

area by the most direct route, through Tippipah Spring. 

18 
On the afternoon of 5 May (the day of the shot), the aviation company was 

released from task force control and began preparation for the return to Fort Hood, 

Texas. Three L-19s remained to support the task force during its return march to 

Camp Irwin, California. Task force departure from the Nevada Test Site was on 7 

May. 

19 
Section 3 

INITIAL RADIATION 

Shot Apple II is investigated to determine the possible exposure of Task 

Force RAZOR to initial neutron and gamma radiation. This section discusses the 

method used to compute the initial radiation dose to personnel and summarizes 

the doses to all distinct elements of the task force. 

3.1 COMPUTATIONAL METHOD 

At the time of the Apple II detonation, various elements of Task Force 

RAZOR were positioned in M-48 tanks, M-59 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 

and trenches. Initial radiation doses for these personnel are determined from the 

free-field neutron and gamma environments at relevant ranges, the shielding 

afforded by the appropriate vehicle or trench, and the associated gamma film 

badge dose and neutron dose equivalent for personnel. 

In the first step, the free-field neutron and gamma radiation environments 

for Apple II are determined with computer codes ATR4 (Reference 12) and 

ATR4.1 (Reference 131, as described in References 15, 33, and 44. The resulting 

neutron and gamma free-field doses as functions of range are displayed in 

Figures 3-l and 3-2, respectively. No neutron dose or fluence measurements at 

Shot Apple II are available (Reference 10) for comparison with the calculated 

neutron dose curve. The effect of this on the neutron doses determined from 

Reference 15 is discussed in Section 5. Gamma dose measurements taken at the 

shot agree with the calculated gamma dose curve out to approximately 2700 

yards, as shown in Figure 3-2. Beyond that range, the measured data show 

systematically larger doses than the calculated values. A conservative (i.e., 

high-sided) dose is determined by extrapolating from data at ranges greater than 

2700 yards. The extrapolation used in these calculations is indicated in the 

figure. 

The radiation environments inside the M-48 tanks and M-59 APCs are 

calculated from the free-field environment by means of transmission factors 

synthesized from analytical calculations and past field experiments. This 

determination is described in Appendix II. A summary of the values used is given 

below. 

20 
lo5-

102 _ 

13 

Tr 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-l. Calculated Neutron Free-Field Dose, Shot Apple II 

21 

- _- -- -P -I-
1o1O 

lo5 

0 loco 

\ \

\

\

\ \ measurements \

\

\ - \

\ \ \ 

\

\ \ \ \

\ \ \

\

\ \ \ \ \ 

2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-2. Gamma Free-Field Dose, Shot Apple II 

22 
Transmission Factors 

Initial Gamma Neutron 

M-48 (crew average) .lO .5 

M-59 .6 .8 

Trenches .04 .25 

The trench shielding factors utilized to calculate the in-trench radiation 

environment from a free-field environment (for the artillery personnel) are 

identical with those used for other Shot Apple II personnel in trenches at 4900 

yards, as reported in Reference 15. The trench factors are defined as the ratio 

of dose (neutron or gamma) in the trench to the dose (neutron or gamma) above 

the trench; their derivation is discussed in Appendix I of Reference 33. In 

developing these factors, it is assumed that personnel remained crouched in the 

trenches until approximately three seconds after passage of the blast wave, at 

which time they stood upright in the trench. In so doing, they would have 

exposed themselves to the the debris gamma radiation emitted from the rising 

fireball. 

A film badge conversion factor must be applied to all gamma dose 

calculations. This conversion factor converts the free-field gamma dose to the 

dose that would have been recorded by a film badge worn on the chest. In 

Reference 45, a discussion is presented of the use of the MORSE code (see also 

References 34 and 46) to calculate the conversion factor for a film badge worn 

on the chest of a man-phantom model located in an infinite, uniform fallout 

field. It is found that, for any realistic fission debris gamma spectrum, a 

conversion factor of 0.7 is accurate to within 10 percent, which is approximately 

the accuracy of the film badge itself. Inside a tank, this factor is also applicable 

because of the retained azimuthal symmetry; the increased scattering into the 

vertical plane has only a minor effect. The question remains, however, as to the 

appropriateness of 0.7 as a conversion factor for initial radiation. 

Calculations have been made (Reference 48) to obtain film badge conversion factors for initial gamma radiation for a man standing with various 

gimuthal orientations with respect to CZ. These calculations were done for the 

free-air case with a gamma spectrum similar to that incident on Task Force 

23 
RAZOR personnel. The range of values obtained was 0.6 (facing away from CZ) 

to 1.0 (facing toward CZ). For a person inside a tank or APC, the scattering of 

the gamma radiation by the vehicle armor makes the radiation more nearly 

isotropic than in the free-air case. Thus, one would expect a conversion factor 

of less than 1.0 for a man in the vehicle facing CZ, and greater than 0.6 for a 

man in the vehicle facing away from GZ. In either case, 0.8 is the appropriate 

value for the average orientation (e.g., for men in APCs facing sideways) and 

likely good to within 0.1 for those in tanks facing toward or away from GZ. The 

use of 0.8 is approximately correct as an overall factor for personnel in the 

trenches, as based on the specific scenario of crouching and then standing. 

The rad-to-rem conversion factor has been discussed extensively in the 

literature (References 25, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43). The neutron dose (in rads) is 

converted to an equivalent tissue dose (in rem) using the quality factors and 

methods prescribed in Reference 41. The rad-to-rem conversion factor for 

neutrons, derived from calculations utilizing computer codes DOT (Reference 42) 

and MORSE (Reference 341, is an alrnost constant value of 13 for the weapon 

type and ranges of interest. The rad-to-rem conversion factor for gamma 

radiation of all energies is taken to be unity. 

3.2 INITIAL DOSE SUMMARY 

The results of these initial dose calculations for the elements of Task 

Force RAZOR are shown in Table 3-l. The free-field doses are interpolated/extrapolated from Shot Apple II observer calculations as presented in Reference 

15. The transrnission factors are as discussed above and in Appendix II. The 

uncertainties associated with these values are discussed in Section 5. The film 

badge and rad-to-rem conversion factors are as discussed above. Air support 

personnel were too distant to accrue an initial radiation dose. 

24 
Table 3-1. Intial Dose for Elements of Task Force RAZOR 

Dose (*I 

GZ Free-Field Transmission Equivalent 

Distance Shieldin& ‘) Dose (mrad) Factor (mrem) 

Task Force Element (yds) At H-Hour Y n Y n y n 

Company A 3220 M-48 2100 60 0.1 0.5 170 390 

Command Group 3300 M-48 1700 41 0.1 0.5 140 270 

Company C 3430 M-48 1200 22 0.1 0.5 100 140 

Company B 3960 M-48 320 2 0.1 0.5 26 13 

Armored Inf. Plt. (Rtfi3) 3920 M-59 350 3 0.6 0.8 170 31 

N

ul Staff Element 3960 M-59/M-41(4) 320 2 0.6 0.8 150 21 

Armored Inf. Plt. (Ctr) 4100 M-59 230 1 0.6 0.8 110 10 

Armored Inf. Plt. (Left) 4330 M-59 120 0.4 0.6 0.8 58 4 

Engineer Pit. 5060 M-59 21 0.013 0.6 0.8 10 cl 

Artillery Bty. 5160 Trenches 17 0.008 0.04 0.25 -=I <l 

Observers(5) 5750 Trenches 4 0.001 0.04 0.25 <I (1 

NOTES: 

M-48 and M-41 Tanks, M-59 Armored Personnel Carriers 

I;; Rad-to-rem conversion factor used: 13 for neutrons, 1 for gamma; film badge conversion factor used: 0.8 

(3) A subdivision of this element occurs in the analysis of residual radiation exposure. 

(4) Shielding calculated only for the thinner-walled M-59; this overestimates the dose for personnel in the M-41s 

(5) Task Force personnel who observed the attack phase from Mine Mountain. 
Section 4 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 

4.1 RESlDUAL GAMMA EXPOSURE 

In the appendix to Reference 15, a computerized methodology for the estimation 

of residual gamma radiation from nuclear detonations is described. The computer 

program combines the gamma intensity data from all radiation surveys of a particular 

shot to construct the gamma environment within confidence limits. Doses are then 

determined for any specified position and time scenario. 

Gamma doses are reconstructed for each of the elements of Task Force RAZOR. 

The detailed time/position information shown in Appendix I is combined with the 

residual fallout field of Shot Apple II. Consideration is given to the possibility of some 

residual radiation from other shots affecting the results. From inspection of the 

residual radiation plots from previous Teapot shots (Reference 15), it can be seen that 

the fallout from all of these, except Shot Turk, blew away from the area of operations. 

The Shot Turk residual radiation plot does not indicate the radiation levels in the area 

of task force operations; however, data from Reference 5 do so indicate. Readings 

taken about 3 hours after Shot Turk were 100 mR/hr in and overlooking the defile near 

the objective; lesser intensities were encountered to the east. Based on these data and 

the overall Turk fallout pattern, it is estimated that the intensity at the objective (at 

the same time) could have been a few hundred mR/hr. Shot Turk was detonated on 7 

March, 59 days before the Task Force RAZOR operation. The decrease in activity 

over this period is by a factor of approximately 1600 (using t -la*). Th us, the residual 

activity in the objective area was less than 1 mR/hr (and still less elsewhere) on 5 

May. Since the task force personnel remained in the area only slightly more than one 

hour, their dose was less than 1 mrem, and can be neglected. 

Figure 4-1 shows the Shot Apple II residual radiation field at H + 21 minutes 

after the shot and the task force route to the objective. The *l-minute time is chosen 

because that was the approximate time that the task force turned, following the 1 

R/hr reading inside the lead tank of Company A. The approximate turning point of 

this vehicle is shown (rightmost “turning” arrow) in Figure 4-1, and the residual 

radiation at that point is reasonably consistent with a reading of 1 R/hr inside the 

tank. The residual field was derived by the computer program from radiation survey 

26 
OBJECTIVE ( 

76 82 83 

Figure 4-1. Apple II Residual Radiation at H-C 0.35 Hours 

27 
plots in Reference 5. That the track of the “A” company tanks on the right flank 

crosses the 10 R/hr contour in Figure 4-l near coordinate 770020 does not necessarily 

indicate that this intensity was exceeded. Not only are there uncertainties involved in 

the residual field activity calculations and in the times and positions of the task force 

movements, but also the contours drawn in Figure 4-l represent a “snapshot” in time, 

at H+21 minutes. The task force did not reach the 770020 location until about H+41 

minutes, by which time the fallout intensity had decayed to less than half of its value 

at H+21 minutes. 

The results for the residual gamma exposure are shown in Table 4-l. The 

residual dose is seen to range from about 0.4 to 1.5 rem, larger than the initial gamma 

dose for all elements of the task force. A discussion of the transmission factors 

associated with vehicle shielding is presented in Appendix II. The film badge 

conversion factor of 0.7 is used, as discussed in Section 3.1. 

Air support personnel received essentially no radiation dose. Landing sites were 

uncontaminated, and transport and observation operations did not require overflight of 

the Shot Apple II fallout field. 

4.2 INTERNAL DOSE TO TANK OCCUPANTS 

Resuspension of radioactive fallout may lead to contamination within a tank. 

While no data are available for activity levels in a tank while driving into a 

contaminated area, related studies of dust infiltration into tanks provide a means for 

bounding the airborne activity levels. 

It has been observed that dust levels in a closed tank, in an open tank, and 

outside the tank are all similar (Reference 49). Engine operation causes dust to 

infiltrate a closed tank through leaks in the hull. Therefore, a resuspension factor (the 

ratio of airborne to surface activity) relevant outside a tank should also be appropriate 

for tank occupants. The suggested value in the reference, for dust raised by vehicles 

traversing a fresh fallout field, is 10m3 Ci/m3 per Ci/m’, or 10-3 

m 

-1 . 

Another approach involves the amount of activity that could possibly be 

associated with dust levels measured inside a tank. Of the measurements reported in 

Reference 49, the following, made under desert conditions, is very pertinent to the TF 

28 
Table 4-l. Residual Gamma Dose for Elements of Task Force RAZOR 

Integrated 

Intensity (mR) Integrated Intensity (mR) Residual 

Free-Field Trans- Film Badge Gamma 

(11 During Post-attack Conversion Dose 

Task Force Element Shielding Attack TRI

-- WT TR2(3)(4)

- Factor (mrem) 

Company A M-48 2250 .06 135 270 590 140 .7 790 

Command Group M-48 570 .06 34 270 590 140 .7 720 

Company C M-48 230 .06 14 270 590 140 .7 710 

Company B M-48 47 .06 3 270 590 140 .7 700 

Armored Inf. Plt. (Rt) M-59 2160 -55 1190 270 590 140 .7 1530 

Two APCs off course M-59 2190 .55 1200 270 590 140 .7 1540 

Staff Element M-59/M-4115) 730 .55 400 270 590 140 .7 980 

Armored Inf. Pit. (Ctr) M-59 200 .55 110 270 590 140 .7 780 

Armored Inf. Pit. (Left) M-59 44 .55 24 270 590 140 .7 720 

Engineer Ph. M-59 420 .55 230 270 590 140 .7 860 

Artillery Bty. M-7 170 .55 94 270 590 140 .7 770 

0bservers(6) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 590 N/A .7 410 

NOTES: (1) M-48 and M-41 Tanks, M-59 Armored Infantry Vehicles, M-7 Self-Propelled Howitzer 

(2) See Appendix II 

(3) TRl: Truck ride from objective to trench area (See Appendix I, Table I-2) 

WT: Walk-Through of equiprnent display area (Table I-3) 

TR2: Truck ride from display area to parked vehicles (Table I-4) 

(4) Transmission factor of 1.0 assumed for these activities 

(5) Shielding calculated only for the thinner-walled M-59; this overestimates the dose for personnel in the M-41s 

(6) Task Force personnel who observed the attack phase from Mine Mountain. 
RAZOR exposure; five tanks in a wedge resulted in 18 mg of dust per ft3, or about 0.6 

g/m3, inside a sixth center tank. Because the fallout particles, despite fields as high 

as 10 R/hr, are sparsely distributed on the ground, a great amount of soil must 

accompany the resuspension of fallout. For particles to remain airborne long enough 

to be inhaled, the diameter must be less than about 100 m. While most close-in 

fallout particles are considerably larger, they may have been fragmented by lead 

tanks. The relative resuspension of fallout particles is greatest if the top 100 pm of 

soil is lofted (Actually, tanks loft particles from far deeper, but the treads do not 

cover the entire surface area; thus, the activity/mass ratio is lower than calculated). 

For a soil density of 1.5 g/cm3, the mass of lofted soil from the top 100 pm is 150 

g/ m2. If the lofted soil is distributed vertically over 3m, then the airborne dust 

concentration is 50 g/m’, or about two orders of magnitude in excess of that actually 

measured in the tank. For these conditions, the activity would follow proportionally, 

so that instead of about 0.3 m-l for the presumed complete lofting of fallout particles, 

10 -3,-l the resuspension factor would be about 4 x . At any lesser depth of scouring, 

both mass and activity would be left unlofted to comparable degrees; therefore, the 

implied resuspension factor would be about the same. For any greater depth of 

scouring, the implied resuspension factor would decrease in inverse proportion to that 

depth. Because tank treads can fragment soil and scour rather deeply, the latter 

situation must be the case and, therefore, a resuspension factor of -3 -1 10 m is 

definitely high-sided. 

For an exposure at about H + .5 hr, a total free-field integrated intensity of 2250 

3 mR (for Company A), and a breathing rate of 1.3 m /hr, Reference 51 (using inhalation 

dose factors) gives a whole body dose of (.OOl rem/m2 per mR/hr)(2250 mR) 

(l.3m3/hr)(10-3 m-‘) = 3 mrem. The bone dose is about 2 mrem, and the thyroid dose 

is about 400 mrem. Thus, the internal and external thyroid doses are similar, but the 

external dose dominates otherwise. 

The following order-of-magnitude estimate is sufficient to demonstrate that the 

contamination within the tank contributes negligibly to the gamma intensity read 

inside the tank; thus, radiation survey readings require adjustment by the tank 

transmission factor only to obtain the intensity within the tank. 

There is about 0.1 Ci/m2 per R/hr, free-field, at the early time of exposure 

(Reference 51). For the intended maximum intensity to be encountered by the tanks, 

30 
10 R/hr, this implies 1 Ci/m*. At a resuspension of 1O-3m-l (approximate for inside 

and outside the tank), the concentration in air is 1 mCi/m 3. The internal volume of a 

tank is on the order of 10 m3; therefore, the activity inside the tank is about 10 mCi. 

The intensity at a point within the tank is readily obtained from an estimate of a 

single effective distance from the source to that point. For activity frown fallout at a 

distance of 0.5 m, Reference 37 indicates an intensity on the order of I mR/hr per 1 

rnCi. Thus, the intensity in a tank from this source could have been as much as about 

10 mR/hr, but no more than a few percent of the intensity transmitted through the 

armor from the fallout field. 

31 
Section 5 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

The sources of error in the calculation of initial and residual doses are examined 

in order to quantitatively estimate the uncertainty in the total dose for each element 

of Task Force RAZOR. In the following discussion, error factors are expressed in 

terms of 90-percent confidence limits. 

5.1 UNCERTAINTIES IN INITIAL RADIATION DOSE 

5.1.1 Neutron Dose 

The sources of error in the calculation of neutron dose for cases where neutron 

data exist include: uncertainties in doses derived from foil measurements, uncertainty 

in neutron output spectrum of the device, errors associated with the use of ATR4 to 

extrapolate beyond the range of measured data, and errors in relating doses outside 

vehicles or above trenches to the doses inside the vehicles or trenches. 

For Shot Apple II, there are not sufficient neutron data to determine dose versus 

range experimentally. Without the capability to normalize to measured data, the 

uncertainties in neutron output spectra and environrnentai factors dominate. These 

uncertainties were estimated in Reference 15 by examining the distribution of dose 

versus range curves for six Teapot shots for which full neutron foil data were taken, 

after normalization to common yield and air density. The error factors determined in 

this manner were 2.8-3.7 for ground ranges of 3200-5000 yards. The ATR4 extrapolation error factor was 1.15. The uncertainties in vehicular shielding and trench factors 

are discussed in Section 5.1.3. 

5.1.2 Initial Gamma Dose 

Sources of error in the calculation of initial gamma dose include: uncertainty in 

experimental film badge readings, extrapolation/interpolation techniques to determine 

dose at vehicle and trench locations, errors in relating doses outside vehicles or above 

trenches to the doses inside the vehicles or trenches, uncertainty in converting intrench dose to film badge reading for the artillery personnel in trenches in a fixed 

position, and uncertainty in the artillery personnel reorientation (i.e., standing up) in 

the trench. 

32 
The error factor associated with experimental film badge readings is determined 

to be approximately 1.4, based on estimates made in Reference 9. The error in 

interpolation/extrapolation techniques used to determine gamma doses is rangedependent, with estimated values from 1.2 at 3200 yards to 1.7 at 5000 yards. The 

remaining sources of error are discussed in the following section. 

5.1.3 Vehicular and Trench Shielding Factors for Initial Radiation 

Appendix II discusses the subject of shielding of initial and residual radiation by 

vehicles. For neutrons, the values reported in the references for the transmission 

factors for the M-48 are reasonably consistent, and show a spread equivalent to an 

error factor of about 1.3. There were no values reported for the M-59, but an error 

factor of around 1.2 is consistent with the value estimated as described in Appendix II. 

The neutron trench factor used for the artillery personnel in trenches at just beyond 

5000 yards is the value 0.25 calculated in Reference 15. The error factor associated 

with that calculation is 1.25. 

For initial gamma radiation, the analysis for the M-48 is described in Appendix 

II. The error factor in the transmission value is estimated by assuming a reasonable 

level of accuracy in the effective M-48 shielding thickness that emerged from the 

analysis. It is determined that a 4-inch effective shielding thickness is in rough 

agreement with the transmission factor analysis. A reasonable level of accuracy in 

this thickness is estimated at about +yZ inch, which leads to an approximate error 

factor of 1.3. An analogous approach to the M-59 shielding leads to an effective 

shielding thickness of W’Z inch and an error factor of about 1.3. 

It is estimated that the uncertainty in the gamma trench factors, which relate 

the above-trench dose to in-trench dose, introduce an error factor of 1.2 for 2-foot 

wide trenches. In addition, there is an uncertainty in relating the in-trench gamma 

dose to film badge reading, due primarily to variations in body orientation among 

individuals in the trench and the placement of the film badge on the body. This error 

factor for the artillery personnel in the trenches is estimated to be 1.5. There is 

another uncertainty in initial gamma dose due to the probability that the artillery 

troops stood up in the trenches to observe the rising cloud soon after the blast effects 

of the weapon had subsided. As discussed in Reference 15, the error factor due to the 

uncertainty in time of stand-up is about 1.2. 

33 
5.1.4 Summary of Initial Radiation Dose Uncertainties 

The error factors discussed above are combined by summing the squares of the 

logs of the component error factors, and then computing the antilog of the square root 

of that sum. The combined error factor for neutron radiation ranges from 3.0 to 3.8 

for ground distances of 3200-5000 yards. The overall factors for initial gamma 

radiation range from 1.6 for the tanks at 3200 yards to 2.0 for the elements at 5000 

yards. 

5.2 UNCERTAINTIES IN RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE 

The uncertainty in calculated residual radiation doses arises from three basic 

sources: the gamma radiation environment, the space-time scenario of troop movements, and uncertainties in vehicle shielding. The 90-percent confidence limits in the 

gamma intensity, including the uncertainty in the decay parameter, are provided by 

the automated procedure described in the appendix to Reference 15. For clarity, the 

following discussion is organized into subsections on vehicular shielding, the attack 

phase, and the post-attack phase. 

5.2. I Vehicular Shielding for Residual Radiation 

Essentially no radiation protection was provided by the trucks during the rides to 

and frorn the display area. Because of the minimal shielding by this type of vehicle, it 

has not warranted the study afforded to armored vehicles. Consequently, the highsided transmission factor of unity is assumed for the trucks. For the attack phase, 

the values determined for transmission factors for the NI-48 and M-59 are as discussed 

in Appendix II. The uncertainty considerations for these vehicles discussed in Section 

5.1.3 apply here, and result in error factors of 1.3 for these transmission factors as 

well. 

5.2.2 Attack Phase 

The three attack-phase scenarios discussed in Appendix I were all processed by 

the automated procedure. The results each have an uncertainty associated with the 

computerized fallout field calculation (gamma radiation environment). These 

uncertainties are combined with the uncertainties in troop movements embodied in the 

three scenarios. The latter results in an effective error factor that is in the 1.2-1.6 

34 
range for each of the task force elements. The radiation environment error factors 

are less consistent, ranging from 1.7 to 3.3 for integrated intensity. Moreover, the 

upper confidence levels of the right-most elements of the task force are truncated in 

view of the fact that rad-safe personnel were in the right-most tanks of A Company 

with instruments to ensure that 1 R/hr inside the tanks was not exceeded. These 

truncations result in a reduction of the error factors associated with the upper 

confidence levels of integrated intensity to approximately 1.8. For personnel in APCs, 

who had the most significant attack-phase exposure, the overall attack-phase error 

factors are about 1.9 (upper) and 3.4 (lower). 

5.2.3 Post-Attack Phase 

As described in Appendix I, this portion of the task force operation is divided 

into the truck ride to the display area, the walk through the display area, and the truck 

ride back to the objective area. The routes assumed for each segment are given in the 

appendix. The resulting dose calculations each include 90-percent confidence limits 

from gamma environment uncertainties. The upper confidence limit for the walkthrough is truncated because of the presence of rad-safe personnel to ensure 

compliance with the 5 R/hr limit. The error factors for the truck ride to display, 

walk-through, and truck ride back are approximately 3.0, 2.7, and 2.4, respectively 

(except that the error factor associated with the truncated upper confidence level for 

the walk-through is around 2.2). These error factors include uncertainties in the times 

and speeds, as well as the uncertainties in the radiation field. The uncertainties in 

time and speed are estimated by assuming a maximum possible error of 30 minutes in 

the times reconstructed for the post-attack events. For instance, the truck ride to the 

equipment display area (TRI in Table 4-l) is estimated as traversing the most intense 

portion of the fallout field at 2.3 hours after the detonation. If a maximum error of 

-+30 minutes is assumed, the earliest (worst case) that the traversal could have 

occurred would have been 1.8 hours. Using a t -Ia2 decay factor, the dose received 

would have been 1.34 times the most probable dose computed. The gamma field error 

factor for the upper limit of TRl is 2.89. The combined error factor is thus 3.0. 

Because the estimated doses for the post-attack phase dominate those of the 

attack phase (except for APC personnel), while the error factors are of the same 

magnitude, uncertainties in residual radiation dose primarily reflect those from the 

post-attack phase. The multiple contributions to dose within that phase result in error 

35 
factors (as opposed to magnitudes of error) on the total dose that are less than on each 

separate contribution. 

5.3 TOTALMEAN DOSESUMMARY 

The reconstructed neutron and gamma doses for the elements of Task Force 

RAZOR are presented in Table 5-l. These are totals of the best-estimate doses of 

Sections 3 and 4 and are presented in the table with estimated 90-percent confidence 

limits. The doses are not added further because the neutron dose would not have been 

recorded by film badges. Values of mean dose are additionally determined from the 

error distributions of this section. Only for the larger error factors and untruncated 

distributions is the mean much different from the best estirnate. This is the case for 

the neutron dose and the post-attack contributions to the residual gamma dose. Upper 

and lower limits are unaffected. 

Not discussed in the foregoing analysis is the possibility of variation in dose 

among personnel occupying the various crew positions of an armored vehicle. There 

have been some measurernents and calculations of these variations, but none for the 

conditions (range, particular shot) of Task Force RAZOR. The reported variations 

have been as much as 20 percent frorn the mean for a given vehicle exposure, but 

there is little consistency among experirnents. Only APC drivers and vehicle 

commanders could be inferred to accrue doses higher than the mean, and then for 

initial gamrna radiation only. If the magnitude of the variation with position is similar 

for the conditions of Task Force RAZOR, the uncertainties in total dose introduced for 

personnel in specific positions are much less than those analyzed in this section. 

36 
Table 5-l 

Task Force RAZOR Dose Summary 

Task Force Neutron Dose Initial Gamma Residual Gamma Total Gamma 

Element (mrem)(l) Dose (mrem) Dose (mremN2) Dose (mremX2) 

+I00 “A” Company 390+780 790+620 960;;;; -260 “O-60 -300 

t80 +620 Command Group 270+530 720;;;; -180 140-50 860- 300 

t60 t620 +620 YY Company 140+290 -90 ‘OO_q0 “O-290 “‘-290 

+620 lrB” Company 13+31 26;;; 730:;;; -9 7oo-290 

+980 Armored Infantry 31+7’ 170+f20 1530+970 -22 -70 -670 1700_6’0 

Platoon (Right) 

t’l + 1000 Two AFCs 170+12o 1540+990 31-22 -70 -660 17’0_660 off course 

t48 +I10 Staff Element 98Of;;; 1130;;;; 21-15 ’ 50_60 

t23 Armored +640 Infantry 110+80 ‘O-7 780;;;; -50 890-300 Platoon (Center) 

+42 t620 +620 Armored Infantry “-24 720-290 “‘-290

Platoon (Left) 

t10 +670 Engineer Platoon <l 870t6” ‘O -4 860-310 -310 

+620 +620 Artillery <I cl 770-300 “O-300 Battery 

t490 +490

Observers <l Cl 410-260 “‘-260 

(1) Mean dose is 30 percent greater than the best estimate for the first three entries; 25 

percent greater for the remainder. 

(2) Values shown are best estimate doses. The mean dose is approximately 100 mrem greater 

than the best estimate for each entry except for the observers, for whom it is about 50 

mrem greater. It should be noted that the 90 percent confidence limit numbers relate to the 

best estimate values, and must be adjusted accordingly if used with mean values. For example, 

the total gamma mean dose for the two ARCS off course would be expressed as 181Or796o,o 

mrem. 

37 
Section 6 

CONCLUSIONS 

Personnel of the Armored Task Force RAZOR participated in an exercise in 

conjunction with Shot Apple II on May 5, 1955, and were exposed to radiation as a 

result. The main body of the task force maneuvered through the Apple II fallout field 

enroute to an objective in an uncontaminated area. Some elements of the task force 

participated in airborne support of the maneuver, while some personnel observed the 

attack from Mine Mountain before joining the main body in a walk-through of the 

equipment display area. These personnel received lower doses than those who 

participated in the task force maneuver. 

For most of the elements of the task force, the post-attack phase (including the 

truck rides to and from the equipment display area and the walk-through of the display 

area) of the exercise contributed the predominant share of the total gamma dose 

received. However, personnel in the armored personnel carriers on the right flank also 

received a comparable amount of gamma dose from residual radiation during the 

attack. These personnel received the highest dose of all the elements of the task 

force--a total mean gamma dose of approximately 1.8 rem, with 90 percent confidence 

limits of 1.0 and 2.7 rem. Only one-tenth of their total dose was from initial gamma 

radiation. The prime reasons that the personnel of the armored infantry platoon on 

the right flank received a higher radiation dose than the other Task Force RAZOR 

personnel are that task force elements on the right flank went through a more intense 

portion of the radiation field during the attack than did the elements of the center and 

left, and that M-59 armored personnel vehicles provide less effective radiation 

shielding than do M-48 tanks. 

The remaining elements of Task Force RAZOR that participated in the attack 

received total mean gamma radiation doses that range from about 0.8 rem to about 1.2 

rem. These elements received initial neutron mean doses that range from less than 

0.001 rem to about 0.5 rem. The inhalation dose due to resuspension of radioactive 

fallout and the resulting contamination within the M-48 tanks is based on related 

studies of dust infiltration into tanks. The estimated inhalation dose is about 0.4 rem 

to the thyroid, 0.003 rem to the whole body, and 0.002 rem to bone. 

38 
The uncertainties in the calculated doses originate from uncertainties in the 

times and positions of the task force elements, the intensity of the radiation field, and 

the shielding values of the armored vehicles. This latter uncertainty includes 

variations in the locations of the various crew members within the vehicles. 

39 
Section 7 

REFERENCES 

1. “Armored Task Force, Desert Rock VI, Detailed Plan of Test,” Combat Developments Group, The Armored School, Fort Knox, KY, March 1955. 

2. “Armored Task Force, Desert Rock VI, Report of Test,” Headquarters, The 

Armored School, Fort Knox, KY, 1 August 1955. 

3. “Exercise Desert Rock VI, Final Report of Operations,” Headquarters, Exercise 

Desert Rock VI, Las Vegas, Nevada, 23 May 1955. 

4. “Operation Order No. 9 (Shot Apple II),” Headquarters, Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

25 April 1955. 

5. “Radiological Safety, Operation Teapot,” WT-1166, Headquarters, Field Command, AFSWP, May 1955. 

6. “Report of the Test Manager, Joint Test Organization, Operation Teapot,” 

Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site, Spring 1955. 

7. “Operational Summary, Operation Teapot,” Nevada Test Site, WT-1158, Headquarters, Field Command, AFSWP, July 1955. 

8. “Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Nuclear Test Detonations 1945-1962,” 

Volume I - Continental U.S. Tests, DNA 1251-I-EX, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

1 May 1979. 

9. “Initial Gamma Data from Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1948-1962,” U.S. Army 

Nuclear Defense Laboratory, (unpublished). 

10. “Neutron Flux Measurements,” Project 2.2, Operation Teapot (unpublished). 

11. “Physical Measurement of Neutron and Gamma Radiation Dose from High 

Neutron Yield Weapons and Correlation of Dose with Biological Effect,” Project 

39.7, Operation Teapot, Civil Effects Test Group, (unpublished). 

12. “Version 4 of ATR (Air Transport of Radiation),” DNA 3995, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, January 1976. 

13. “Energy Dependent Air/Ground Correction Factors for the ATR (Air Transport of 

Radiation) Code,” BRL Report No. 345, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, August 1977. 

14. “Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Final Report of Operations,” Headquarters, 

Sixth US Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California, January 1958. 

15. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

Operation Teapot,” DNA 5354F, Defense Nuclear Agency, 15 July 1980. 

16. “Expected Radiation Doses for Tank Crews in Nuclear Combat ,‘I ORO-SP-120, 

Johns Hopkins University, December 1959. 

40 
17. “Development of a Code System for Determining Radiation Protection of 

Armored Vehicles (The VCS Code),” ORNL-TM-4664, October 1974. 

18. “Nuclear Weapons Radiation Doses in Armored Vehicles,” NR-82, LockheedGeorgia, July 1960. 

19. “A Study of Radiological Shielding for Personnel Carriers and Special Purpose 

Military Vehicles,” 2 Vols, STC-TS-1 and STC-TS-2, March and August 1969. 

20. “Attenuation of Neutrons by an M-48 Tank,” BRL-MR-1443, Ballistic Research 

Lab., Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, November 1962. 

21. “Computations of Gamma Ray and Neutron Transmission Factor for the M-48 

and JS-11 Tanks for Nearby Point Sources,” BRL-M-R-1434, Ballistic Research 

Lab., Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, September 1962. 

22. “Armored Vehicle Shielding Against Radiation,” Nuclear Notes Number 8, U.S. 

Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, Ft. Belvoir, VA, May 1979. 

23. “Attenuation of Gamma Rays by an M-48 Tank,” BRL-MR-1176, Ballistic 

Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, November 1958. 

24. “Test of Combat Vehicles in Operation Teapot,” Report, APG.ORD Proj-TT l696, Rpt 80., Aberdeen Proving Grounds, November 1955. 

25. “Radiation Transmission Factors for U.S. Military Armored Vehicles,” GETempo, (unpublished). 

26. “Nuclear Radiation Characteristics for Armored Vehicles,” Lockheed Nuclear, 

(unpublished). 

27. “An Interim Study on the Gamma and Neutron Dose Transmission Factors for the 

M-48 Tank,” BRL 1269, Ballistic Research Laboratory, (unpublished). 

28. “The Vulnerability of Armored Vehicle Crews to Prompt Nuclear Radiation,” 

BRL MR 900-RD, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 

June 1955. 

29. “Criteria for the Hardening of Armored Vehicles Against Initial Radiation,” 

ARBRL-MR-02845, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

MD, June 1978. (S). 

30. “Operation Teapot, Project 2.7, Shielding Studies,” WT-1121(EX), 1 January 1981, 

Headquarters Field Command AFSWP, Sandia, 1 January 1981. 

32. “Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons,” DNA EM-I, July 1972. 

32. “Neutron and Initial-Gamma Shielding,” Operation Plumbbob, Project 2.4, 

(unpublished). 

33. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock V, 

Operation Upshot-Knothole,” DNA 5742F, Defense Nuclear Agency, 28 April 

1981. 

41 
34. “The ,2IORSE !Monte Carlo Radiation Transport Code System,” ORNL-4972, Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory, February 1975. 

35. “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” United States Department of Defense and 

United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1977. 

36. Private Communications, Dr. John J. Saalberg, former Assistant S-3, 723rd Tank 

Battalion, June, 1979. 

37. “Radiological Health Handbook,” U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare, Revised, January 1970. 

3%. “The Control of Exposure of the Public to Ionizing Radiation in the Event of an 

Attack,” Proceedings of Symposium (April 1981, Reston, VA) National Council 

on Radiation Protection and Measurements, 15 May 1982. 

39. Science Applications, Inc./Ballistic Research Laboratory calculations. (DOTenvironment; MORSE-shielding). 

40. “Radiation Environments from Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” DNA 4267F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, July 1976. 

41. “Protection Against Neutron Radiation,” National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP Report No. 38, January 1971. 

42. “The DOT III Two-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Transport Code,” ORNL-TM4280, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, September 1973. 

43. “Basic Radiation Protection Criteria,” National Council on Radiation Protection 

and Measurements, NCRP Report No. 39, 15 January 1971. 

44. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure, 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise 

Brigade, Exercise Desert Rock VII, Operation Plumbbob,” DNA 5774F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 15 June 1981. 

45. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot Smoky, Exercise 

Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob,” DNA 4747F, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, 31 May 1979. 

46. “The MORSE Code with Combinatorial Geometry,” DNA 286OT, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, ,May 1972. 

47. “Operation TEAPOT, Project 2.3b, Gamma Radiation Field Above Fallout 

Contaminated Ground,” HQ Field Command, DASA, 28 October 1959. 

48. “Dosimeter and Bone [Marrow Doses in Tactical Nuclear Environments,” SAI 

Report 113-80-269-LJ, 15 February 1980. 

49. “Infiltration of Radioactive Contamination into Armored Vehicles: A Review,” 

ARBRL-MR-02986, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

MD, February 1980. 

42 
50. “Fallout 

21584, 

Shielding Characteristics 

Nuclear Defense Laboratory, 

of Combat 

September 

Vehicles,” 

1965. 

NDL-TR-45, DASIAC 

51. “Fallout Inventory 

tions, Inc., 1982. 

and Inhalation Dose to Organs (FIIDOS),” Science Applica43 
_ -- - 

44 
Appendix I 

MOVEMENTS OF TASK FORCE RAZOR 

This appendix describes the movement of Task Force RAZOR in time and space. 

Spatial parameters that define the locations for each platoon and company are given in 

UTIM coordinates. Times are based on the various delay times and speeds of the task 

force given in the after-action reports (References 2 and 3) and telephone interviews 

of Dr. John J. Saalberg (Reference 36). 

A. THE TASK FORCE MANEUVER 

Based on the above references, there are three options the task force could have 

taken during the attack on the objective. The first option is based on the most likely 

course of action, which would have the task force starting the attack at 0518 hours, 

eight minutes after the shot, and moving at an average speed of six miles per hour 

until reaching the objective. This value follows from the distance traveled by the rear 

elements and from the statement in Reference 2 that the entire task force reached 

the objective 57 minutes after departure. Table I-l presents the times and locations 

for 10 sub-units of the task force. In addition, two APCs from the armored infantry 

platoon on the right side of the formation missed the turning point and moved to 

within 900 yards (520 meters) of ground zero (Reference 2); the data for these two 

vehicles are shown separately. 

The second option assumes that the task force conducted the attack at the 

slower rate of four mph until it reached the turn, at which time it increased its rate to 

more than six mph to arrive at the objective in 57 minutes. The start of the attack 

remains the same as the first option, eight minutes after the shot. This option 

provides lower residual radiation levels because of the increased speed after the turn, 

resulting in a shorter time required to cross the contaminated area. 

The third option assumes that the attack began at 4y2 minutes after the shot* at 

an initial rate of eight mph to the turning point and a commensurate decrease in speed 

*Reference 2 states that “movement occurred” after 4% minutes. It is not stated, 

however, that this was the departure of the task force as a whole; it was probably an 

adjustment in the formation prior to departure, such as the movement of the staff 

element vehicles to their forward position (See Figure 2-3). 

45 
Table I-l 

Task Force RAZOR Locations During Attack Phase 

Task Force 

Element 

“A” Company 

Tanks 

Command Group 

Tanks 

“C” Company 

Tanks 

“B” Company 

Tanks 

Armored 

Infantry 

Platoon 

(Right) 

Time* 

(PDT) 

0510 

0518 

0531 

0536 

0540 

0551 

0604 

0510 

0518 

0531 

0536 

0542 

0551 

0604 

0510 

0518 

0531 

0537 

0544 

0551 

0604 

0510 

0518 

0531 

0541 

0547 

0552 

0607 

0510 

0518 

0535 

0540 

0544 

0555 

0608 

0 

8 

21 

26 

30 

41 

54 

0 

8 

21 

26 

32 

41 

54 

0 

8 

21 

27 

34 

41 

54 

0 

8 

21 

31 

37 

42 

57 

0 

8 

25 

30 

34 

45 

58 

UTM 

Coordinates 

79298 1 

79298 1 

79400 1 

788006 

780006 

77002 1 

750032 

788981 

78898 1 

790002 

785005 

776006 

768019 

750032 

784981 

784981 

786002 

783004 

772006 

766016 

750032 

780978 

780978 

782999 

778003 

768006 

764013 

750032 

792974 

792974 

79400 1 

788006 

780006 

770021 

750032 

Distance from GZ 

(Meters/Yards) 

2940/3220 

294013220 

890/970 

1090/1190 

1820/1990 

3030/33 10 

529015780 

3020/3300 

3020/3300 

1110/1210 

1320/1440 

2230/2430 

3110/3400 

529015780 

3140/3430 

3 140/3430 

1410/1540 

1570/1710 

2630/2880 

3230/3530 

529015780 

3620/3960 

362013960 

1930/2110 

2090/2290 

3000/3280 

3360/3680 

529015780 

3580/3920 

3580/3920 

890/970 

1090/l 190 

1820/1990 

3030/3310 

529015780 

46 
Table I-l (Continued) 

Task Force 

Element 

Staff Element 

Vehicles 

Armored 

Infantry 

Platoon 

(Center) 

Armored 

Infantry 

Platoon 

(Left) 

Engineer 

Platoon 

Artillery 

Battery 

Two APCs 

off-course 

Time* 

(PDT) 

0510 

0518 

0533 

0538 

0544 

0553 

0606 

0510 

0518 

0535 

0541 

0548 

0555 

0608 

0510 

0518 

0533 

0543 

0550 

0555 

0609 

0510 

0518 

0541 

0547 

0552 

0601 

0615 

0510 

0518 

0541 

0547 

0554 

0601 

0615 

0510 

0518 

0535 

0540 

0544 

0555 

0608 

U-TM 

km: tes) Coordinates 

0 788974 

8 788977 

23 790002 

28 785005 

34 776006 

43 768019 

56 750032 

0 784975 

8 784975 

25 786002 

31 783004 

38 772006 

45 766016 

58 750032 

0 780974 

8 780974 

23 782999 

33 778003 

40 768006 

45 764013 

59 750032 

0 787965 

8 787965 

790002 

:: 785005 

42 776006 

768019 

:; 750032 

0 783965 

8 783965 

31 786002 

37 783004 

44 772006 

51 766016 

65 750032 

0 792974 

8 792974 

25 794002 

30 788006 

34 780006 

45 77002 1 

58 750032 

Distance from Gi! 

(Meters/Yards) 

3660/4000 

3360/3680 

1110/1210 

1320/1440 

2120/2320 

31 IO/3400 

529015780 

3740/4100 

3740/4 100 

1410/1540 

1560/1710 

2630/2880 

3230/3530 

529015780 

3960/4330 

3960/4330 

1930/2110 

2090/2290 

3000/3280 

3360/3680 

529015780 

4630/5060 

4630/5060 

1110/1210 

1320/1440 

222012430 

3110/3440 

5290/5780 

4710/5160 

4710/5160 

1410/1550 

1570/1710 

263012880 

3230/3530 

529Of 5780 

3580/3920 

3580/3920 

820/900 

1020/1120 

1820/1990 

3030/3310 

5290/5780 

* Based on the most likely scenario (Option 1). 

47 
thereafter for consistency with the 57-minute maneuver duration. This option 

provides the highest residual readings in conjunction with the longer time required to 

cross the contaminated area. 

The tracks presented for each tank company represent the lead tank of each 

unit. For Company A it is assumed that the vehicles to the right-rear of the lead tank 

turned in such a manner as to not come closer to GZ than did the lead tank. Each tank 

on the right flank carried rad-safe personnel (see Section 2.3 and Reference 2). For 

other types of units, the tracks represent the centroid of each unit. 

B. POST-ATTACK MOVEMENT OF THE TASK FORCE 

This section presents the movement of the task force personnel after the attack 

on the objective had been completed and the troops had boarded trucks to return to 

the equipment display area. 

Table I-2 presents the route and time at each location along the route to the 

display area based on a truck speed of fifteen mph and the quickest route to the rear 

of the trenches, as stated by Dr. Saalberg (Reference 36). The trucks used Tippipah 

Spring Road and then turned south on the 185degree radial road until they reached the 

rear of the trench area (See Figure 2-2). There, they were joined by the other 

members of the task force who had observed the shot and the attack phase from Mine 

Mountain. The twenty-five minute drive to reach the display area would have the 

troops arriving about 0740 hours, two hours and thirty minutes after the shot. 

Table I-3 presents the data for the walk-through of the equipment display area. 

The itinerary shown is based on inspection of pre-shot aerial photographs of the display 

area, descriptions of the displays in Reference 2, interviews (Reference 36), and 

calculations of the residual radiation field (see Section 4). There is some uncertainty 

as to which displays were visited. The sole item specifically mentioned as having been 

viewed (Reference 36) is the tank turret discussed below. However, the calculations 

show that all displays could have been visited without exceeding the 5 R/hr restriction, 

so it is assumed that all displays were visited. Inspection of the pre-shot aerial 

photographs of the GZ looking south helped to determine the locations of the displays. 

A light tank was located at 1000 yards from GZ. The blast blew its turret 600 yards 

(Reference 3). The tank was identified in the photograph, and the position of the 

48 
turret was thus determined to be along the same radial from GZ at 1600 yards. Part 

of the walking path of the troops was along roadways. The walking speed of the troops 

is assumed to have been 100 yards per minute along the roads and 50 yards per minute 

across the unprepared areas. Figure I-l shows the assumed walk-through path and 

display equipment locations. The walk-through took about one hour and forty minutes 

and was completed about 0920 hours, four hours and ten minutes after the shot. 

Table I-4 presents the time and space parameters used for the truck ride back to 

the parked vehicles, which required another twenty-five minutes. The personnel 

reached the parked vehicles at about 0945. This was their last exposure to any 

contamination from the shot. The return to the task force assembly area was by the 

most direct route, likely through Tippipah Spring, to avoid interference with other 

activities at the test site. 

49 
Table I-2. Truck Ride from Objective to Equipment Display Area 

Location UTM 

Azimuth 

from 

cz

-

Dist. 

(meters) 

from GZ 

(yards) 

Distance 

Traveled 

(meters) 

Travel 

Time 

(hrs) at 

15 mph 

Total 

Travel 

Time 

(hrs) 

Time 

After 

Shot 

(hrs) -- PDT 

Objective area 750032 295 5288 5783 -o- -o- -o- 2.083 0715 

Bend in Road 763026 296 3870 4233 1420 ,058 .058 2.141 0718 

Bend in Road 772019 290 2760 3020 1110 .046 .104 2.187 0721 

u-l 

0 “Y” in Road 772017 287 2649 2897 170 .007 0.111 2.194 0722 

Turn East 790995 208 1693 1852 2875 0.119 0.230 2.314 0729 

Turn South 

(on 1850 Road) 

Turn East 

796992 

795971 

185 

184 

1768 

3844 

1933 

4203 

694 

2078 

0.029 

0.086 

0.259 

0.345 

2.343 

2.429 

0731 

0736 

East End 

Trenches 

of 806972 168 3844 4203 1073 0.044 0.390 2.473 0738 

Park Behind 806977 166 3383 3700 478 0.020 0.410 2.493 0740 

3500 yd -I_._-I___ 
Table I-3. Walk-Through of Equipment Display Area 

Time 

Azimuth Distance Walking Travel Total After 

From Dist. from GZ Traveled Speed Time Travel Shot 

Location UTM GZ (meters) (yards) (meters) (m/min) (hrs) Time (hrs) (hrs) PDT --

Unload 806977 166 3383 3700 -o- -o- -o- -o- 2.50 0740 

Turn in 806979 165 3182 3480 201 91 0.037 0.037 2.537 0742 

Road 

Road 803989 165 2123 2322 1059 91 0.193 0.230 2.730 0754 

Intersection 

2000 yds 800991 175 1829 2000 1353 91 0.085 0.315 2.815 0759 

VI Observe 800991 175 1829 2000 -o- -o- 0.033 0.348 2.848 0801 

Displays 

1600 yds 800995 173 1463 1600 366 46 0.134 0.482 2.982 0809 

Turret of 

I Light Tank 

I Observe 800995 173 1463 1600 -o- -o- 0.033 0.515 3.015 0811 

I Turret 

1000 yd 799000 176 914 1000 600 46 0.200 0.715 3.215 0823 

Displays 

Observe 799000 176 914 1000 -o- -o- 0.065 0.780 3.280 0827 

Displays 

500 yd 798005 185 457 500 500 46 0.167 0.947 3.447 0837 

Displays 
Table I-3. Walk-Through of Equipment Display Area (Continued) 

Time 

Azimuth Distance Walking Travel Total After 

from Dist. from GZ Traveled Speed Time Travel Shot 

Location UTM cz (meters) (yards) (meters) (m/min) (hrs) Time (hrs) (hrs) -- PDT 

Observe 

Display 

798005 185 457 500 -o- -o- 0.033 0.980 3.480 0839 

Rejoin east 

perimeter 

road 

802996 165 I372 1500 952 91 0.167 1.147 3.647 0849 

ulN 

Road 

Intersection 

Trucks 

803989 

806977 

165 

166 

2123 

3383 

2322 

3700 

1810 

201 

91 

91 

0.330 

0.037 

1.477 

1.514 

3.977 

4.014 

0909 

0911 

Load 806977 166 3383 3700 -o- -o- 0.167 1.681 4.181 0921 
Table I-4. Truck Ride From the Equipment Display Area 

Back to the Parked Vehicles 

Location UTM 

Azimuth 

from 

GZ 

Dist. from CZ 

(meters) (yards) 

Distance 

Traveled 

(meters) 

Travel 

Time 

(hrs) at 

15 mph 

Total 

Travel 

Time (hrs) 

Time 

After 

Shot 

_(hrs) _PDT 

Load Area 806977 166 3383 3700 -o- -o- -o- 4.183 0921 

East End of 

Trenches 

806972 168 3844 4203 478 0.020 0.020 4.203 0922 

u-l 

w 

Turn North 

(Behind 

Trenches) 

79597 1 184 3844 4203 1073 0.044 0.064 4.248 0925 

Turn West 

(Off 1850 

Road) 

796992 185 1768 1933 2078 0.086 0.150 4.334 0930 

Turn Northwest 790995 208 1693 1852 694 0.029 0.179 4.362 0932 

Join Tippipah 

Spring Road 

773102 287 2649 2897 2875 0.119 0.298 4.483 0939 

Bend in Road 772102 290 2760 3020 170 0.007 0.305 4.490 0940 

Bend in Road 763103 296 3870 4233 1110 0.046 0.351 4.536 0943 

Attack 

Objective 

750103 295 5288 5783 2688 0.058 0.409 4.594 0946 
LI-,GZ 

rst Cenlcr 

I 

500 vd 

\ AT 1600 YARDS.++ 

, 

-O HETFRS 

Figure I-l. Assumed Walk-Through Path 

54 

i 
Appendix II 

ARMORED VEHICLE SHIELDING 

There has been a significant amount of work done to determine the shielding of 

nuclear radiation by tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). Work of potential 

relevance to the exposure of Task Force RAZOR is in References 16-32. However, 

most of the measurements and calculations are for other shots and different ranges 

than was the case for the task force. Summary documents inadequately synthesize the 

data. EM-l (Reference 31) provides guidance for generic vehicle types only, often 

with a wide range of shielding factors. Therefore, the transmission factors chosen 

reflect careful interpretation of the literature. Physical bases are established that 

account for the considerable variations among data and permit extrapolation to the 

conditions relevant to Task Force RAZOR. 

A. INITIAL RADIATION 

Neutron. Transmission factors for neutrons were measured for the M-48 tank 

during Operation Plumbbob at Shots Wilson (632 yd slant range) and Hood (1120 yd 

slant range) (Reference 18). Values for the driver, gunner, and loader were around 0.4 

and for the commander around 0.6 (Figure 11-l shows the relative positions of the M-48 

tank crew members). For this analysis 0.5 is used. No values for the M-59 APC were 

obtained. Since the M-48, with a transmission factor of about 0.5, is certainly a better 

shield than the M-59, a value for the M-59 of about 0.8 with a suitably estimated 

uncertainity appears to be appropriate. For reference and comparison, one can 

consider the M-l 13 APC, for which Reference 22 instructs operations personnel to use 

0.8, and Reference 39 calculations obtained 0.8 for the driver and 0.64 for the squad 

members. 

Gamma. A wide range of values has been reported for transmission of gamma 

radiation into tanks. Few measurements were made under sufficiently similar 

circumstances to afford a just comparison, however. Reference 27 analyzed the 

available data for M-48 tanks in an attempt to separate the contributions to dose of 

transmitted (including scattered) gamma radiation from those of gamma radiation 

from neutron interactions with armor and other tank materials. Using measurements 

made during Operation Plumbbob, the authors obtained the equation c = 0.05 + O.l5R, 

where c is the apparent gamma transmission factor, and R is the shot- and range55 
c 

COMMANDER‘S CUPOLA COMMANDER 

TURRET 

Figure 11-l. Positions of Tank Crew Members 

56 

-- _ _ 
dependent ratio of the free-field (outside the tank) neutron dose to the free-field 

gamma dose. ,%lost of their data were obtained at ranges from GZ of roughly 1000 

yards, where the neutron fluence from certain shots significantly augmented the 

apparent gamrna transmission factor. However, the impact of neutrons on the factor 

decreases with distance from GZ. For a range of 3200 yards (closest Task Force 

RAZOR distance to GZ at shot-time), Reference 15 calculations for Apple II give 

R~0.03. Thus, neutrons at this range result in only a small perturbation to the gamma 

transmission factor. 

The Reference 27 analysis did not consider the effect of the gamma spectrum on 

the transmission factor, which becomes the dominant effect beyond the range of 

neutron influence. ATR4 (Reference 12) calculations show that for Apple II at about 

1000 yards, the contribution of fission product (debris) gamma radiation is about 70 

percent of the total gamma free-field dose; at 3200 yards only about 40 percent is 

from debris gamma radiation. The remainder is almost entirely from secondary 

gamma radiation, for which the higher energy spectrum results in increased transmission. Calculations of transmission through a 4-inch-thick steel slab for debris and 

secondary gamma result in transmission factors of 0.05 and 0.13, respectively. These 

values are applied to the contributions of each gamma source to determine the overall 

transmission factor with range. For the Task Force RAZOR tanks, the factor is 0.10. 

The only initial gamma data specific to the M-59 APC are those of Reference 

30. These were obtained at Shots Wasp, Turk, and MET of Operation Teapot, at ranges 

from CZ of less than 1000 yards. Average transmission factors at the troop positions 

(see Figure R-2) were 0.84 for Wasp, 0.71 for Turk, and 0.53 for MET. The commander 

and driver positions had factors about 20 percent higher except at MET, where the 

APC was rear-on toward GZ. As indicated for the M-4S data, the variation among 

shots may result from a neutron contribution to the apparent transmission factor at 

close ranges; however, neutron fluence data and transport calculations are unavailable 

for confirmation. Consequently, a calculated value is adopted. For an estimated oneinch effective thickness of steel (half from the hull, half from internal materials), the 

transmission factor is about 0.6 for both secondary and debris gamma radiation. The 

neutron contribution at the range of the APCs from Apple II is too small to augment 

this value as the effective gamma transmission factor. Agreement with the data 

appears suitable for the different circumstances of exposure. 

57 
-- 

TOP VIEW 

I I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

FRONT 

Figure 11-2. M-59 Armored Personnel Carrier 

58 
B. RESIDUAL RADIATION 

Reference 50 reports residual radiation transmission factors of about 0.02 for 

the M-48 tank. The data were obtained through a simulation of a fallout field by 

moving Cobalt-60 sources. Film badges were placed on man-phantoms within the tank; 

consequently, the reported transmission factors include the film badge (as worn) 

conversion factor of 0.7. The free-field transmission factor would have been about 

0.03. Reference 30 reports several values from measurements at Operation Teapot 

that display dependences on shot and time after burst. The values are scattered about 

0.1, except at Apple II, where anomalously high readings within the tanks are ascribed 

in the reference to contaminated dust that had infiltrated the tanks. For M-59 APCs 

the following values are given: 0.3, compensated for effect of film badge conversion 

(Reference 50), and 0.6 (Reference 30). The differences between the field data and 

the simulations, as well as the non-ideal applicability of each to the task force 

traversal of the Apple II fallout area, motivated the calculation of transmission 

factors. Effective shielding thicknesses of 4” (M-48) and 1” (M-59), as for the initial 

radiation calculations, and a fallout gamma spectrum representative of the early 

fallout time frame, are used to arrive at transmission factors of 0.06 (M-48) and 0.55 

(M-59). These values are reasonably consistent with the references and are used in 

this report. 

No values for the M-7 self-propelled howitzer were found, but because those of 

other self-propelled artillery vehicles are roughly the same as for the M-59 APC, a 

value of 0.55 is assumed. 

59 
60 
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ATTN: FCTXE, Maj Evinrude 

ATTN: FCTXE 

ATTN: FCTT, W. Sunxna 

2 cy ATTN: FCLS 

Interservice Nuclear Weapons School 

ATTN: TTV 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Department of the Army 

5 cy ATTN: DAAG-AMR, ANTPR 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

ATTN: DELHD-TA-L 

Office of the Chief of Staff 

ATTN: DACS-DMZ-A, T. Green 

US Army Ballistic Research Labs 

ATTN: DRDAR-BLV-R, J. Maloney 

US Army Medical Rsch & Dev Cmd 

ATTN: SGRD-SD 

US Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency 

ATTN: MONA-ZB, C. Davidson 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center 

ATTN: Library 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 

ATTN: NM&S-09 

ATTN: NM&S-O0 

ATTN: NM&S-3C22 

National Naval Medical Center 

ATTN: Medical Library 

ATTN: Dept of Radiology 

Naval Medical Rsch Institute 

ATTN: Tech Ref Library 

Naval Ocean Systems Center 

ATTN: Research Library 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

ATTN: SEA-08, M. Miles 

Naval Surface Weapons Center 

ATTN: Code F31, D. Levine 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility 

ATTN: G. Binns 

Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

5 cy ATTN: W. Loeffler 

Oft of the Deputy Chief of Naval Ops 

ATTN: NOP 098, VADM Monroe 

ATTN: NOP 0455, CDR Bell 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Aerospace Medical Division 

ATTN: Library,SCL-4 

Air force Institute of Technology 

ATTN: ENP, J. Bridgeman 

ATTN: Library 

61 

-_-
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (Continued) 

Air Force Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

4 cy ATTN: Co1 Gibbons 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

ATTN: NT 

ATTN: SUL 

ATTN: DYT 

Air University Library 

ATTN: AUL-LSE 

HQ USAF 

ATTN: SG, M. Chesney 

US Air Force Occupational & Env Health Lab 

ATTN: CC 

4 cy ATTN: TSNTPR 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Department of Energy 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

ATTN: R. Cuddihy 

Department of Energy 

Human Health & Assessments Div 

ATTN: Technical Info Center 

ATTN: W. Burr 

ATTN: C. Edington 

ATTN: J. Whitnah 

ATTN: J. Blair 

ATTN: N. Barr 

ATTN: H. Hollister 

ATTN: J. Thiesen 

Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

ATTN: Health Physics Div 

ATTN: L. O'Neal 

ATTN: B. Church 

ATTN: Public Affairs 

Department of Energy 

Office of Military Application 

GTN 

ATTN: OMA, C. Morris 

ATTN: OMA, DP-22 

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 

Cancer Center, NIH 

ATTN: A. Knudson 

Centers for Disease Control 

ATTN: K. Choi 

ATTN: Consolidated Surveillance 

2 cy ATTN: G. Caldwell 

Central Intelligence Agency 

ATTN: Office of Medical Services 

Consumer Product Safety Commission 

ATTN: P. Pruess 

ATTN: M. Bloom 

Department of Agriculture 

ATTN: R. Jarrett 

Department of Agriculture 

ATTN: M. Carter 

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

Department of Commerce 

ATTN: J. Hubell 

ATTN: C. Kuyatt 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: Oft of Regulation Review 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: R. Murphy 

Department of Labor 

ATTN: S. Weiner 

Department of Transportation 

ATTN: H. Reighard 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: J. Villforth 

ATTN: G. Johnson 

ATTN: C. Silverman 

Environmental Protection Agency 

ATTN: N. Nelson 

ATTN: D. Rosendaum 

ATTN: W. Mills 

ATTN: W. Ellett 

Environmental Protection Agency 

ATTN: T. Thorslund 

ATTN: P. Magno 

Environmental Protection Agency 

ATTN: J. Knelson 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

ATTN: Asst Assoc Dir for Rsch. J. Kerr 

ATTN: Oft of Rsch/NP, D. Ben& 

ATTN: C. Siebentritt 

Library of Congress 

ATTN: Science E Technology Div 

NASA Headquarters 

ATTN: M/S SB-3, G. Soffen 

ATTN: M/S SBR-3, P. Rambaut 

National Cancer Institute 

ATTN: A. Rabson 

ATTN: J. Wyngaarden 

ATTN: D. Pistenmaa 

National Cancer Institute 

ATTN: G. Beebe 

ATTN: R. Miller 

ATTN: 0. Nyguard 

ATTN: J. Rall 

ATTN: S. Stever 

ATTN: V. Zeve 

ATTN: J. Murray 

ATTN: M. Knipmayer 

ATTN: E. Stonehill 

National Cancer Institute 

ATTN: W. Blot 

ATTN: J. Fraumeni 

ATTN: C. Land 

National Cancer Institute 

ATTN: J. Gart 

62 
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

National Institute for Occupational 

Safety & Health 

ATTN: W. Murray 

National Institutes of Health 

ATTN: Library 

National Library of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

National Science Foundation 

ATTN: Kin-Ping Wong 

ATTN: P. Harrlman 

Nat1 Heart, Lung & Blood Institute 

ATTN: W. Zukel 

Office of Technology Assessment 

ATTN: P. Sharfman 

Office on Smoking & Health 

ATTN: J. Pinney 

US Senate 

ATTN: J. Curtiss 

US House of Representatives 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Health & Envir 

US House of Representatives 

ATTN: Subcorrmittee on Mil Per & ComP 

US House of Representatives 

ATTN: M. Fleming 

ATTN: F. Stover 

ATTN: C. Graves 

ATTN: R. Wilson 

ATTN: C. Moore 

ATTN: J. McDonnell 

ATTN: R. Shultz 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Comp, Pension & Ins 

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Attention R. Whipp for 

ATTN: F. Arsenault 

ATTN: W. Mills 

ATTN: R. Minogue 

US Public Health Service 

ATTN: Library 

US Public Health Service Hospital 

ATTN: E. Nishimura 

US Public Health Service Hospital 

ATTN: T. Robertson 

US Senate 

ATTN: C. Cowart 

US Senate 

ATTN: S. Ulm 

Veterans Admin Medical Center 

ATTN: K. Lee 

Veterans Admin Medical Center 

ATTN: D. McGregor 

DTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

US Senate 

ATTN: W. Brew 

ATTN: T. Harvey 

ATTN: J. Susman 

ATTN: S. Wallace 

ATTN: V. Raymond 

ATTN: K. Burdick 

Veterans Admin Medical Center 

ATTN: C. Tessmer 

Veterans Admin Wadsworth Hospital Ctr 

ATTN: T. Makinodan 

Veterans Administration 

ATTN: L. Hobson 

ATTN: J. Smith 

ATTN: J. Donsbach 

ATTN: R. Polcary 

2 cy ATTN: D. Starbuck 

The White House 

ATTN: Oft of Policy Dev, DP 

FOREIGN AGENCIES 

Canadian Embassy 

ATTN: Library 

French Engr Bureau 

ATTN: Library 

Indian Council of Medical Rsch 

ATTN: A. Taskar 

Japan-Hawaii Cancer Study 

ATTN: G. Glober 

French Engineering Bureau 

ATTN: M. Delpla 

McGill University 

ATTN: R. Oseasohn 

Comitato Nazionale per L'Energia Nucleare 

ATTN: Library 

University of Puerto Rico Sch of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

United Kingdom Scientific Mission 

ATTN: Mil Liaison for D. Fakley 

2 cy ATTN: Publications 

OTHER 

Brookhaven National Laboratory 

ATTN: V. Bond 

ATTN: Technical Library 

ATTN: E. Cronkite 

ATTN: M. Bender 

ATTN: A. Brill 

Califor;+;NInstitute.of Technology 

: E. Lewis 

ATTN: R. Christy 

University of Chicaqo 

ATTN: P. Meier 

63 

-
OTHER (Continued) 

Columbia University 

ATTN: A. Bloom 

ATTN: Library 

Cornell University 

ATTN: W. Federer 

Medical College of Georgia 

ATTN: L. Stoddard 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN: R. Reed 

ATTN: Library 

Harvard University 

ATTN: W. Cochran 

University of Hawaii 

ATTN: Y. Matsumoto 

Indiana University 

ATTN: F. Putnam 

Iowa State University 

ATTN: T. Bancroft 

Johns Hopkins University 

ATTN: A. Kimball 

ATTN: R. Seltser 

ATTN: A. Lilienfield 

Kansas University of Agri & Applied Science 

ATTN: H. Fryer 

Kingston Hospital 

ATTN: K. Johnson 

Memorial Hospital for Cancer & Allied Diseases 

ATTN: P. Lieberman 

Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center 

ATTN: J. Laughlin 

ATTN: P. Marks 

Merck, Sharp & Dohme Intl 

ATTN: A. Bearn 

University of Miami 

ATTN: P. Hodes 

University of Michigan Medical School 

ATTN: J. Neel 

University of Michigan 

ATTN: F. Moore 

University of Michigan 

ATTN: R. Cornell 

University of Minnesota 

ATTN: J. Bearman 

ATTN: L. Schuman 

ATTN: Library 

Nat1 Council on Radiation Protection & Measurements 

ATTN: W. Sinclair 

New York University Medical Center 

ATTN: N. Nelson 

OTHER (Continued) 

University of New Mexico 

ATTN: R. Anderson 

ATTN: C. Key 

University of North Carolina 

ATTN: B. Greenberg 

ATTN: Library for Dean 

Northwestern University 

ATTN: H. Cember 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

ATTN: 0. Lushbaugh 

ATTN: E. Tompkins 

ATTN: J. Totter 

University of Oklahoma 

ATTN: P. Anderson 

University of Oregon 

ATTN: R. Pirofsky 

Pacific Northwest Laboratory 

ATTN: S. Marks 

Pennsylvania University Hospital 

ATTN: S. Baum 

University of Pennsylvania 

ATTN: P. Nowell 

University of Pittsburgh 

ATTN: E. Radford 

ATTN: Library 

University of Pittsburgh 

ATTN: N. Wald 

Rochester University Medical Center 

ATTN: C. Odoroff 

ATTN: G. Casarett 

University of Rochester 

ATTN: L. Hempelmann 

Saint Francis Hospital 

ATTN: R. Blaisdell 

University of Southern California 

ATTN: J. Birren 

Stanford University Hospital 

ATTN: D. Dorfman 

Texas A&M University 

ATTN: R. Stone 

University of Texas at Austin 

ATTN: H. Sutton 

University of Texas 

ATTN: G. Taylor 

Stanford University Medical Center 

ATTN: J. Brown 

Stanford University 

ATTN: L. Moses 

64 
OTHER (ContiM) 

University of Texas 

ATTN: W. Sutow 

University of Texas 

ATTN: R. Stallones 

University of Utah 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: C. Mays 

ATTN: E. Wrenn 

ATTN: L. Lyons 

Vanderbilt University 

ATTN: R. Quinn 

University of Washington 

ATTN: D. Thompson 

University of Washington 

ATTN: A. Motulsky 

University of Wisconsin 

ATTN: J. Lrow 

Yale University School of Medicine 

ATTN: J. Meigs 

ATTN: Library 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN: B. MacMahon 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS 

University of California 

Lawrence Liver-more National Lab 

ATTN: Tech Info Dept Library 

ATTN: L. Anspaugh 

ATTN: Y Ng 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

ATTN: MS218, P. Whalen 

ATTN: M/S634, T. Dowler 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: J. Dummer 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

ATTN: T. Jones 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

ATTN: C. Clifford 

ATTN: J. Auxier 

ATTN: G. Kerr 

ATTN: C. Richmond 

Reynolds Electrical and Engr Co, Inc 

ATTN: Dot Con Facility 

ATTN: J. Brady 

Sandia National Laboratories 

ATTN: Div 1314, S. Durpee 

ATTN: C. Aldridge 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

Advanced Research & Applications Corp 

ATTN: R. Armistead 

BDM Corp 

ATTN: J. Braddock 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

Colorad~T:~teMUn;;ra;',ity 

8: . 

Energy Systems, Inc 

ATTN: T. Gates 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: E. Weary 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J. Ozeroff 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J. Sperling 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASIAC 

3 cy ATTN: E. iiiartin 

Kaman Tempo

ATTN: IS. Alfonte 

ATTN: S. Jones 

ATTN: DASIAC 

Louisiana Univ Sch of Med. Shreveport 

ATTN: Library 

National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: S. Jablon 

ATTN: National Mat Advisory Ed 

7 cy ATTN: C. Robinette 

Nebraska, University of 

ATTN: Library 

Ohio State University 

ATTN: Library 

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp 

ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE 

R&D Associates 

ATTN: J. Marcum 

ATTN: C. Lee 

ATTN: P. Haas 

R&D Associates 

ATTN: A. Deverill 

Radiation Research Associates, Inc 

ATTN: N. Schaeffer 

Rand Corp 

ATTN: B. Bennett 

Rand Corp 

ii:;: Library 

: P. Davis 

Science Applications International Corp 

ATTN: J. Cockayne 

ATTN: W. McRaney 

2 cy ATTN: J. Klemm 

2 cy ATTN: J. Goetz 

2 cy ATTN: R. Edwards 

5 cy ATTN: J. McGahan 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: 0. Kaul 

6.5 
- - 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: E. Straker 

ATTN: G. Reynolds 

ATTN: W. Woolson 

ATTN: W. Scott 

Science Information Svcs, Inc 

ATTN: Library 

Tech Reps, Inc 

ATTN: 6. Collins 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: J. Novotney 

66 
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