alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|                                      |
|--------------------------------------|
|                                      |  |
| Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas | BNY Mellon Trust of Delaware |
| As Indenture Trustee                 | As Owner Trustee |
| Attn:  Michelle H.Y. Voon  | Attn: Robert Castle / Kristine Gullo |
| 100 Plaza One 6th Floor         | 100 White Clay Center, Suite 102 |
| Jersey City, NY 07311                | Newark, DE  19711 |

|                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 |  |
| The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. | Ally Auto Assets LLC |
| Attn:  Robert Castle                  | Ally Financial Inc. |
| 2 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1020              | 500 Woodward Ave |
| Chicago, IL  60602                    | Mail code:  MI-01-20-TRES |
|                                            | Detroit, MI 48226 |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |
| Re:    | Ally Auto Receivables Trust 2014-3 |
|   | Annual Statement as to Compliance |

|    |
|----|
|    |  |
| a. | A review of the activities of the Servicer during the period of January 1, 2016 through   December 31, 2016, and of its performance under the Servicing Agreement has been made under his supervision, and |

|    |
|----|
|    |  |
| b. | To the best of his knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement throughout such period. |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |
|   | Very truly yours, |
|   |   |
|   | /s/ David J. DeBrunner |   |
|   | David J. DeBrunner |
|   | Vice President, Controller and Chief Accounting Officer |
|   |   |
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8437 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8437

 To extend the authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to treat 
certain programs of education converted to distance learning by reason 
  of emergencies and health-related situations in the same manner as 
       programs of education pursued at educational institutions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 29, 2020

 Mr. Schrader introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
  Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to treat 
certain programs of education converted to distance learning by reason 
  of emergencies and health-related situations in the same manner as 
       programs of education pursued at educational institutions.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS EDUCATIONAL 
              ASSISTANCE BENEFITS.

    Section 1(b) of Public Law 116-128 (134 Stat. 221; 38 U.S.C. 3001 
note prec.) is amended by striking ``December 21, 2020'' and inserting 
``December 21, 2021''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2021088EN.01003701.xml

| 15.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 88/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88/37

---

Action brought on 20 January 2021 — Apple v EUIPO — Swatch (THINK DIFFERENT)

(Case T-28/21)

(2021/C 88/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Apple Inc. (Cupertino, California, United States) (represented by: I. Junkar, I. Fowler, M. Petersenn and B. Lüthge, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Swatch AG (Biel, Switzerland)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark THINK DIFFERENT — European Union trade mark No 4 415 063

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 November 2020 in Case R 2013/2018-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the defendant and by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal if it joins as intervener. |
| --- | --- |

—

order that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the defendant and by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal if it joins as intervener.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of The Jones Financial Companies,
L.L.L.P. on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 30, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Steven Novik, Chief Financial Officer of the Partnership, certify to the best
of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results
                  of operations of the Partnership.

                                        /s/  Steven Novik
                                        ---------------------------------------
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P.
                                        May 11, 2007
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     QUARTERLY REPORT
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                0000816958         
<NAME>                        ABCOR PRODUCTS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAY-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   AUG-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       299,964
<OTHER-SE>                                     (299,964)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   0
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                                CERTIFICATION OF
                            CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                              OF VCA ANTECH, INC.


     This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and accompanies the quarterly report on Form 10-Q
(the "Report") for the period ended June 30, 2002 of VCA Antech, Inc. (the
"Issuer").

     I, Robert L. Antin, the Chief Executive Officer of Issuer certify that to
the best of my knowledge:

     (i)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
           section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
           78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

     (ii)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
           material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
           of the Issuer.

Dated: August 14, 2002.
                                             /s/ ROBERT L. ANTIN
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Name: Robert L. Antin


Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 14th day of August, 2002.

/s/ Lauren Simmons
----------------------------------
Name: Lauren Simmons
Commission# 1281246
Title: Notary Public -- California

My commission expires: October 21, 2004









                                       1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7504

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TERRY KERMIT JOHNSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (5:98-cr-00289-6; 5:03-cv-00049)

Submitted: November 17, 2006 Decided: December 19, 2006

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry Kermit Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C. F. Shappert,

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Terry Kermit Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Johnson has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability, dismiss the appeal, and deny Johnson’s motion for

the appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Hugo JACOBO-HECTOR, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70312

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 21, 2018

Hugo Jacobo-Hector, Pro Se

John Beadle Holt, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Scott Michael Marconda,' Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The-panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hugo Jacobo-Hector, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motions to reopen and reconsider. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider, and review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jacobo-Hector’s motions to reopen and reconsider as untimely where the motions were filed over two years after the agency’s final order of removal. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (90-day deadline to file a motion to reopen); (6)(B) (30-day deadline to file a motion to reconsider).

We reject Jacobo-Hector’s contentions that the BIA ignored evidence, failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its actions, or applied an incorrect legal standard. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the BIA adequately considered evidence and sufficiently announced its decision).

Jacobo-Hector’s contention that the BIA’s denial of the motions violated his children’s constitutional rights is foreclosed by *Urbano de Malaluan v. INS,*577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the contention that a parent’s “deportation order would amount to a de facto deportation of the child and thus violate the constitutional rights of the child”).

We lack jurisdiction to review Jaeobo-Hector’s request for prosecutorial discretion. See *Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder,*688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (order).

We do not reach Jacobo-Hector’s contentions regarding eligibility for relief, sua sponte reopening, and changed circumstances in Mexico. See *Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 986 (review is limited to the actual grounds relied upon by the BIA); *Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

*716PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 ThiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Christopher L. Jarratt, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Christopher L. Jarratt
Chief Executive Officer
May 19, 2005


                                       29
#### Sherman T. Taylor, *et al.,*v. C. B. Reeves.

154 So. 927.

Opinion Filed April 24, 1934.

Petition for Rehearing Denied May 18, 1934.

*Sherman T. Taylor,*for Appellants;

*Huffaker & Edwards,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

— Appellee filed Creditor’s Bill and procured decree for a sum of money which debtor attempted fraudulently to convey to his wife.

No error.

Decree affirmed.

Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
No. 11-10237.

#### Scott *v.*Internal Revenue Service.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 5.1

                   [VINSON & ELKINS LETTERHEAD APPEARS HERE]


                                August 11, 1997


Southwest Bancorporation of Texas, Inc.
4400 Post Oak Parkway
Houston, Texas 77027

Ladies and Gentlemen:

    We have acted as counsel to Southwest Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., a Texas
corporation (the "Company"), in connection with the preparation of the Company's
Registration Statement on Form S-8  as filed by the Company with the Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"Registration Statement"), which Registration Statement relates to the proposed
offer and sale by the Company to certain of the former employees of Pinemont
Bank of an aggregate of up to 190,625 shares of the Company's common stock,
$1.00 par value (the "Shares"), which are issuable upon exercise of certain
options (the "Options") granted under the Pinemont Bank Incentive and
Nonqualified Stock Option Plan, which Plan was assumed by the Company effective
as of the opening of business on August 1, 1997.  In such connection, we are
passing on certain legal matters in connection with the sale of the Shares.  At
your request, this opinion is being furnished to you for filing as an exhibit to
the Registration Statement.

    In connection with rendering this opinion, we have examined such
certificates, instruments and documents and reviewed such questions of law as we
have considered necessary or appropriate for the purposes of this opinion.  In
addition, we have relied as to factual matters on certificates of certain public
officials and officers of the Company.

    Based upon the foregoing examination and review, we are of the opinion that
the Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when the Registration
Statement has been declared effective and the Shares are issued in accordance
with the provisions of the option agreements relating to the Options (as
amended, effective August 1, 1997), such Shares will be validly issued, fully
paid and non-assessable.

    This opinion is rendered as of the effective date of the Registration
Statement.  We hereby consent to the filing of this opinion as an exhibit to the
Registration Statement and to the reference to our name in the Registration
Statement.  In giving this consent, however, we do not hereby admit that we are
within the category of persons whose consent is required under Section 7 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission thereunder.

                                           Very truly yours,



                                           VINSON & ELKINS L.L.P.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 8, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50770

Summary Calendar

 

JOHN T. JOSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; JIMMY R. MORGAN;

NIX, Trooper; KELLI WILLIAMS, Deputy; MILAM COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-03-CV-39

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pretrial detainee John T. Josey appeals the dismissal for

failure to state a claim of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. The district court determined that Josey’s

allegations were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

Josey argues that no probable cause existed for his arrest for

driving while intoxicated and that the exclusionary rule was
No. 03-50770

-2-

violated when he was not read his rights under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Josey does not argue that the Heck

bar does not apply. Consequently, Josey has waived that

argument. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.

1994).

Josey asserts that he was only required to give fair notice

of his claims in his complaint, but he also concedes that the

district court was required to screen his suit. To the extent

that Josey argues that he was entitled to notice before the

dismissal of his claims, his argument fails. See Graves v.

Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 318 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other

grounds, Arvie v. Broussard, 42 F.3d 249, 250 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Josey also argues that he was denied his right to a speedy

trial. The district court implicitly denied Josey the

opportunity to amend his action by not expressly addressing and

resolving this issue that Josey raised for the first time in his

objections. However, by raising his speedy-trial argument, Josey

is contesting his continued confinement. Because Josey’s

continued confinement has not been remedied by any of the

procedures listed in Heck, his speedy-trial claim also is not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to allow such an amendment. See United States v.

Riascos, 76 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). 
No. 03-50770

-3-

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Josey’s

motion to strike from the record any “rulings, judgments,

and[/]or orders” entered by the district court after his notice

of appeal was filed and motion entitled “Violation of 5th Cir.

R. 46.3 by attorney Carlos D. Lopez” are DENIED.