NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-2120

___________

LUIS ANDRES COELLO-UDIEL,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

_____________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A043-172-142)

Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 8, 2019

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Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Filed February 5, 2019)

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OPINION*

______________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Luis Andres Coello–Udiel petitions for review of the decision of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 

petition for review.

I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), 

but because Coello–Udiel is subject to removal based on an aggravated felony 

conviction, that jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 

which we review de novo, and does not extend to factual or discretionary 

determinations. Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(D).

1 Although we review the 

BIA’s decision, we also consider the IJ’s opinion where the BIA “has substantially 

relied on that opinion.” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009).

II. Discussion

Coello–Udiel argues that he was denied due process in his removal proceedings. 

In particular, he objects that the merits hearing was “incredibly short and fast,” Pet. Br. 

 

1

In this regard, the Government has moved to dismiss Coello–Udiel’s petition for 

review for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that he has failed to raise a colorable 

constitutional or legal claim. While we conclude for the reasons below that Coello–

Udiel’s claim ultimately fails on the merits, we do not consider it to be “immaterial and 

made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or otherwise “wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous.” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)).
3

at 14, and asserts that the IJ did not give him an opportunity to address the IJ’s concerns

before denying relief. The IJ erred, he contends, by “not asking more questions when 

[he] had concerns, providing [Coello–Udiel] the opportunity to further develop and 

clarify the [IJ’s] confusion regarding why [his supporting] facts are not speculative.” 

Pet. Br. at 18.

Aliens facing removal are entitled to due process, Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 

671–72 (3d Cir. 1990), meaning “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 

a meaningful manner,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation 

marks, alterations, and citation omitted). To ensure due process in removal proceedings, 

“[a]n alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the 

decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on 

his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination of his or 

her interests.” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks, 

alterations, and citations omitted). And to prove a denial of due process on the ground 

that he was prevented from presenting his case to the IJ or BIA, the alien must show: 

“(1) that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case and (2) that substantial 

prejudice resulted.” Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the record does not support Coello–Udiel’s claim that he was prevented 

from reasonably presenting his case. Coello–Udiel not only had the opportunity to argue 

before the IJ and BIA through counsel but also presented testimony and documentary 

evidence, including news articles and country condition reports. Following the hearing, 
4

the IJ discussed that testimony and evidence—observing that Coello–Udiel was a 

credible witness, that he feared being tortured and killed by MS-13, and that he had 

twice been threatened by gang members in the United States—but the IJ ultimately 

concluded that Coello-Udiel’s fear of torture with the consent or acquiescence of 

Honduran officials was merely speculative. 

Nor does the record support Coello-Udiel’s assertion that the IJ failed to ask 

follow-up questions. Following Coello–Udiel’s testimony and counsel’s argument, the 

IJ specifically asked counsel for additional case law supporting the notion that the 

Honduran government acquiesces in torture, but counsel was unable to cite to such case 

law. While it is true that the IJ did not recess the proceedings for counsel to conduct 

further research, due process does not require an IJ, after the conclusion of a merits 

hearing, to provide counsel with additional time to search for cases or gather unspecified

evidence. See Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that 

IJ did not deny alien due process by denying motions to continue). 

In any event, even assuming some error by the IJ or BIA in the extent of evidence 

or argument permitted, Coello–Udiel has failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice, as 

he does not identify what evidence he would have provided or what arguments he would 

have made. See id. at 235. Instead, he merely rehashes the evidence he presented to the 

IJ and argues that it was indeed sufficient to demonstrate that the risk of torture with the 

acquiescence of Honduran officials was more than speculative. Such sufficiency-of-theevidence arguments, however, are beyond our purview. See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515.

Finally, Coello–Udiel argues that the IJ and BIA, as a common-sense matter, 
5

should have taken judicial notice that he would inevitably be targeted by MS-13 

members upon return to Honduras. He asserts as “commonly acceptable [sic]

circumstances” that corruption is rampant in Honduras, that MS-13 operates with 

impunity there, and that, due to the “street code” under which the gang operates, Coello–

Udiel would nearly certainly be labeled a “snitch” and would be murdered. Pet. Br. at 

13, 20. To the extent these arguments challenge the determination that he was not likely 

to be tortured in Honduras with the acquiescence of government officials, they challenge

a factual finding over which we lack jurisdiction. See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515. And 

taking the IJ’s factual findings as true, the IJ and BIA did not commit legal error by 

denying Coello-Udiel’s application on the basis that he was not likely to be tortured in 

Honduras with the acquiescence of the Honduran government. See Kamara v. Att’y 

Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Respondent’s motion to dismiss and 

Coello–Udiel’s petition for review.