SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1695-16T1

IN THE MATTER OF FAHEEM MURPHY,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES.

Submitted May 2, 2018 – Decided June 15, 2018

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission, Docket No. 2016-3928.

Nash Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

Faheem Murphy (William A. Nash, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent Civil Service Commission 

(George N. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, on 

the statement in lieu of brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent Ann Klein Forensic Center, 

Department of Human Services (Melissa Dutton 

Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Emily M. Bisnauth, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Faheem Murphy, who had been employed as a senior medical 

security officer at the Ann Klein Forensic Center, Department of 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Human Services, appeals from the November 30, 2016 denial of 

reconsideration by the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The 

underlying order denied Murphy's request for a hearing regarding 

his removal from employment on September 1, 2015. 

Two final notices of disciplinary action (FNDA) were issued 

regarding Murphy's criminal charges of fourth-degree obstructing 

administration of law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 

2C:29-1(a), his failure to report the arrest on the charges, and 

subsequent conviction. Defendant properly and timely filed 

appeals of the first two FNDAs, however, he did not respond to the 

third and final FNDA removing him from employment. Accordingly, 

since no timely appeal was made of the third FNDA, Murphy's 

petition seeking a hearing was denied as untimely and the first 

two appeals were dismissed as moot. After our review of the record 

and relevant law, we affirm.

Defendant grounded his application for reconsideration on

questions regarding the mailing of the third FNDA. On January 9, 

2016, delivery was attempted, but the certified mail was eventually 

returned to the appointing authority. The first two FNDAs had 

been served in the same manner——by ordinary mail and certified 

mail return receipt requested. Although Murphy never signed return 

receipt for any of the notices, none of the three ordinary mailings 

were returned as undeliverable. All were sent to the same address.
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Because the Deputy Attorney General handling the file had not 

received an appeal of the third FNDA, he contacted Murphy's 

counsel. Attached to that inquiry was the third FNDA, which was 

mailed on February 25, 2016. On February 29, 2016, Murphy's 

counsel responded that he would look into the matter. 

On March 30, 2016, the Deputy again asked whether a third 

appeal had been timely filed. Receiving no reply, the appointing 

authority on April 7, 2016, moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. 

Murphy objected and filed an appeal of the third FNDA the following 

day. On April 27, 2016, the Commission issued a decision 

dismissing the appeal as untimely. The application for 

reconsideration followed. 

Murphy's certification acknowledged that the mailing had been 

sent to the correct address. He claimed that he received the 

third FNDA from his attorney on April 21, 2016, and filed an appeal 

the following day. He neither admitted nor denied that he had 

received the third FNDA prior to that date. 

Citing to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.6(b), the Commission observed that

it could not reconsider prior decisions unless the moving party 

demonstrated a clear material error, presented new evidence, or 

offered additional information that would alter the outcome not 

included in the original proceeding. The Commission noted Murphy's

disciplinary action was controlled by N.J.S.A. 11A:2-13. 
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Furthermore, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.8 established a twenty-day limit for 

appeals, which is jurisdictional and cannot be relaxed. Mesghali 

v. Bayside State Prison, 334 N.J. Super. 617, 622 (App. Div. 2000). 

As the Commission went on to state:

[Murphy] does not dispute that the certified 

mail was sent to his home. . . . [H]e 

acknowledges that notice was left at his home 

and no one was there to receive the FNDA. The 

petitioner cannot benefit from refusing to 

pick up the certified mail at the post office 

when he clearly received notice of the 

attempted delivery. . . . [T]he certified 

mail was returned to the appointing authority 

on February 4, 2016. Therefore, the 

petitioner should have filed his appeal no 

later than February 24, 2016.

Regardless, the appointing authority 

indicates that its ordinary practice is to 

send the FNDA by both certified and regular 

mail when an employee is not on duty. The 

record in this matter does not indicate that 

the regular mail containing the FNDA was 

returned. There is a presumption that mail 

correctly addressed, stamped and mailed was 

received by the party to whom it was 

addressed. See SSI Medical Services, Inc. v. 

State Department of Human Services, 146 N.J. 

614 (1996); Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. 

Super. 347, 354 (App. Div. 1962); In the 

Matter of Joseph Bahun, Docket No. A-1132-

00T5F (App. Div. May 21, 2001). Although the 

appellant submits an affidavit, he does not 

specifically state that he did not receive the 

FNDA by regular mail or that it was his first 

time receiving the FNDA when it was handed to 

him by his attorney. Given the foregoing and 

the appointing authority's undisputed method 

of service of the petitioner's other two FNDAs 

by certified and regular mail, the petitioner 

has not persuasively rebutted the presumption. 
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It is emphasized that even though one of the 

prior FNDAs sent by certified mail was 

returned as undeliverable, the petitioner 

timely appealed that removal.

Furthermore, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.8(a) 

provides that "an appeal from a [FNDA] must 

be filed within [twenty] days of receipt of 

the Notice by the employee. Receipt of the 

Notice on a different date by the employee's 

attorney or union representative shall not 

affect this appeal period." Although the 

critical issue regarding this regulatory 

provision is when the petitioner received the 

notice, it cannot be ignored that the 

petitioner's attorney had notice of the third 

removal on February 29, 2016 when he responded 

to Hahn. He was again contacted on March 30, 

2016. It is suspect that the petitioner's 

attorney would not have conveyed this 

information to the petitioner at any time 

during this time period. Thus, the filing of 

the petitioner's appeal on April 22, 2016 was 

not made within a reasonable time. As noted 

above, if the appointing authority fails to 

provide the employee with a FNDA, an appeal 

may be made within a reasonable time. See

N.J.S.A. 11A:2-15 and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.8.

The Commission correctly concluded no material error 

occurred, and no new evidence was presented which would change the 

outcome of this case. There was no basis upon which to grant 

reconsideration of the Commission's prior decision.

On appeal, Murphy argues only that there was insufficient 

evidence that the third FNDA was correctly addressed to the 

appellant, that proper postage affixed to it, that the return 

address was correct, and that the mailing of the third FNDA was 
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deposited in a proper mail receptacle. A certification was 

submitted by the appointing authority that standard practice is 

to mail FNDAs by ordinary and certified mail.

It is undisputed that Murphy appropriately filed appeals of 

the first and second notice he received while not acknowledging

receipt of the registered mailings. Nothing in the record suggests 

he did not receive the third FNDA since the same procedure was 

followed. We consider this argument to be so lacking in merit as 

to not warrant much discussion in a written decision. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Murphy has not established that the Commission's 

determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that 

it lacked fair support in the record as a whole. Karins v. 

Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998). The strong presumption 

of reasonableness attached to a decision of the Commission is 

warranted in this case. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437

(App. Div. 2001). 

Affirmed.