Filed 7/27/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JAYDEN M., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B321967

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 20LJJP00040D)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHANNA R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * *

When a child is removed from a parent in a juvenile 

dependency case, the court is required to order reunification 

services for the parent unless one of several statutory exceptions

allowing for “bypass” applies. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. 

(a) & (b).)1 As pertinent here, a juvenile court may bypass 

reunification services when (1) a juvenile court has previously 

terminated reunification or parental rights over a sibling or half

sibling to the child in the current case, and (2) the parent has not 

subsequently made a “reasonable effort” to treat the problems 

that led to that previous termination of services or parental 

rights. (Id., subds. (b)(10)(A) & (b)(11)(A).) But what is the 

appropriate starting point in time from which to gauge the 

reasonableness of the parent’s effort? Is a court only to look to 

the parent’s effort since the filing of the instant case, or may it 

look to the parent’s effort (or lack thereof) since the sibling or half

sibling was initially removed from the parent in the prior case 

where reunification services or parental rights were terminated? 

We hold that it is the latter. Applying this rule, the juvenile 

court properly examined the mother’s minimal effort to address 

her drug addiction in the 20 years since a half sibling was 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

removed from her custody and reunification services were also 

terminated (rather than focusing solely on the mother’s less 

inconsistent effort in the four months since this case was filed). 

We accordingly affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. Mother struggles with drug addiction since 

2001, and loses custody of several of her children

Johanna R. (mother) has seven children by several different 

fathers: Cynthia R. (born 1997), Damion R. (born 2001), Brianna 

R. (born 2003), Francisco R. (born 2004), Gael V. (birthdate 

unknown), Emma R. (born 2020), and—the child at issue in this 

case—Jayden M. (born 2021).

Prior to Jayden’s birth, the juvenile court had exerted 

dependency jurisdiction over all but one of Jayden’s six half

siblings.2

Since the 2001 juvenile dependency case involving theninfant Damion, mother’s drug use has been the underlying cause 

of the juvenile court’s exertion of dependency jurisdiction over her 

children. Specifically, Damion was born with cocaine in his 

bloodstream in 2001; both mother and Brianna tested positive for 

cocaine when Brianna was born in 2003; and both mother and 

Emma tested positive for illegal narcotics when Emma was born 

in 2020—Emma, for amphetamine, and mother, for both 

amphetamine and opiates.

None of these cases ended with mother reuniting with the 

child. The juvenile court in Damion’s case granted mother 

2 Gael was the subject of an investigation, but was 

apparently released to his father’s care before any juvenile 

dependency petition was filed.
4

reunification services, but ultimately terminated those services 

as well as mother’s parental rights over Damion. The juvenile 

court in Brianna’s case terminated its jurisdiction by placing 

Brianna back in mother’s custody, but three weeks later, mother 

“gave [Brianna] back” to the caregiver who had custody of 

Brianna during the years that case was open. The juvenile court 

in Emma’s case also exerted dependency jurisdiction over then16-year-old Francisco, but bypassed reunification services for 

both children and eventually terminated mother’s parental rights 

over Emma (Francisco was placed in a legal guardianship). As of 

2023, mother did not have custody over any of her children.3

During the two decades between 2001 and 2021, mother 

admitted to long periods of repeated use of illegal narcotics, and 

made only sporadic effort to address her drug addiction. Mother 

attended a drug rehabilitation program in 2003 as well as 

attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings and a class at an 

outpatient treatment center in 2020, but repeatedly relapsed into 

drug use and failed to comply with juvenile court orders to 

undergo drug treatment and participate in drug testing.

B. Jayden is born

In late 2020, mother became pregnant by Ramon F. 

(father), a 17-year-old working as a security guard for the liquor 

store mother regularly frequented. While pregnant, mother 

continued to use amphetamines, methamphetamines, and heroin. 

3 Cynthia remained a dependent until she reached the age of 

21 in 2018. Brianna’s caregiver continued to care for Brianna 

since 2005 and was granted custody of Brianna in 2012; as of 

2023, that caregiver was also caring for Emma and Jayden. Gael 

was apparently released to his father’s care. And, as noted 

above, maternal grandmother became Francisco’s legal guardian 

in 2021. 
5

Mother gave social workers various reasons for why she relapsed 

into drug use while pregnant and claimed that she was taking 

Suboxone to help her stay off heroin, but both she and Jayden 

had opiates in their blood at the time of Jayden’s birth in 

November 2021 and testing of Jayden’s umbilical cord indicated 

he had also been exposed to morphine and amphetamines in 

utero. Jayden began suffering from withdrawal symptoms and 

was taken to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, where he 

remained for five weeks. Father was incarcerated in a juvenile 

detention center at the time Jayden was born and not released 

until Jayden was four months old.

II. Procedural Background

A. A petition is filed to declare Jayden a dependent

On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) 

filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over 

Jayden on two grounds: (1) mother’s drug use “endangere[d]” 

Jayden’s “physical health and safety” and “place[d]” him “at 

serious risk of serious physical harm and damage,” as evidenced 

by his positive toxicology screen at birth and mother’s “extensive

history” of drug abuse, which “render[ed]” her “incapable of 

providing regular care and supervision” (rendering jurisdiction 

appropriate under subdivision (b) of section 300); and (2) five of 

Jayden’s older half siblings were or had been dependents of the 

juvenile court due to mother’s substance abuse (rendering 

jurisdiction appropriate under subdivision (j) of section 300).

4

4 The petition also alleged that jurisdiction was proper under 

subdivision (b) of section 300 due to father’s abuse of marijuana, 

and jurisdiction was sustained on this basis, but father has not 

appealed.
6

The petition further noted that the Department “may seek” an 

order that no reunification services be provided, under 

subdivision (b) of section 361.5. 

B. Mother makes intermittent effort to address her 

drug problem

In mid-December 2021, mother applied to participate in an 

outpatient drug treatment program. When applying, mother 

admitted to using heroin “about 15 days out of the last 30 days,” 

and a drug test on December 20, 2021 confirmed heroin use.

Mother began the three-month outpatient program in late 

December 2021. For the first two months, mother’s participation 

was unsatisfactory. In January, mother’s treatment counselor 

reported that mother was “not complying with the program” 

during its first two weeks; mother had arrived late for group 

sessions and would leave at the halfway mark; and mother had 

not started her drug testing. In February, mother was not 

participating appropriately in group sessions and was instead 

just “going through the motions,” was not following the program’s 

rules, was “exhausting” the counselors with a barrage of 

“excuses” and finger-pointing, and was endangering or 

distracting other attendees; mother was on the verge of being 

dropped from the program—or, at a minimum, denied permission

to proceed to “phase two” of the program—because the counselors 

had “exhausted all their efforts” in trying to get mother to attend 

group sessions, follow the rules, and “keep the group a safe 

environment for the other attendees.” The treatment center

ultimately allowed mother to continue to phase two because that

phase involved fewer and shorter sessions, so mother would place 

less of a burden on the staff. In “the last few weeks” of the 

program in March, mother’s “attendance and participation” 
7

improved dramatically and she “ma[de] great strides in staying 

committed to long term recovery.” Mother completed the 

program on April 4, 2022, with all negative drug tests from midJanuary 2022 until her date of completion.

Mother had also attended six parenting classes by that 

time.

C. Jurisdictional hearing

On April 1, 2022, the juvenile court held the jurisdictional 

hearing, where it sustained all allegations against mother in the 

Department’s petition.

D. Dispositional hearing

On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional

hearing.

The court removed Jayden from mother’s custody and also 

bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and 

(b)(11) of section 361.5.5 More specifically, the court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under 

these provisions because (1) mother’s reunification services or 

parental rights for Jayden’s older half siblings had been 

terminated, and (2) mother’s most recent four months of effort to 

address her drug addiction—while “commend[able]”—did not 

eliminate the court’s “concern[s]” in light of her 20-year history of 

drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. The court also 

found that bypassing those services was in Jayden’s best interest. 

5 The Department had also argued that bypass was 

appropriate under subsection (b)(13) of section 361.5, but the 

record is conflicting as to whether the court bypassed 

reunification services under that provision. Because we conclude 

that bypass was appropriate under subsections (b)(10) and 

(b)(11), we need not decide whether bypass would have also been 

proper under subsection (b)(13) of section 361.5.
8

Because the court was granting father six months of reunification 

services, however, the court told mother that if she showed 

“consistent consecutive clean tests” and “consistent visitation” by 

the next court date, such efforts “would be a good indicator” of 

mother’s commitment to her sobriety, and thus may warrant 

revisiting its order bypassing reunification services under section 

388.

E. Appeal

Mother filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile 

court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported 

by the record.6

6 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by not 

making “specific finding[s]” regarding “why [her] efforts to treat” 

her drug addiction “were not reasonable,” although in her reply 

brief she asserts that she was merely noting the lack of 

explanation rather than seeking reversal on that basis. In any 

event, this argument lacks merit because specific findings are not 

required absent a statute so requiring (Laabs v. City of Victorville 

(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1273; cf. Yamada Brothers v. 

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112, 123 

[when statute “mandates a specific finding,” “failure to make 

such a finding renders” the decision “fatally defective”]; In re J.S. 

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078 [same]), and subdivision (b) of 

section 361.5 does not so require (accord, In re Jasmine C. (1999) 

70 Cal.App.4th 71, 76-77 [upholding juvenile court’s bypass of 

reunification services even though it did not make specific 

findings that reunification would be detrimental to the minor]). 

Indeed, this subdivision’s silence on this issue is both deafening 

and dispositive when contrasted with other subdivisions and

statutes explicitly requiring juvenile courts to make specific 

findings to support other rulings in dependency proceedings. 
9

A juvenile court is generally required to order reunification 

services for a parent “whenever a child is removed” from that

parent’s custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 

Cal.App.4th 470, 474 (Baby Boy H.); Cheryl P. v. Superior Court 

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 95-96 (Cheryl P.).) Our Legislature 

has, in certain statutorily enumerated situations, nevertheless 

granted juvenile courts discretion to decide whether reunification 

services are “in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subds. (b)

& (c)(2); In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.) These 

provisions are known as the “‘“bypass” provisions.’” (In re G.L. 

(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1163 (G.L.).) Consonant with the 

general presumption in favor of mandatory reunification services, 

the bypass provisions are “narrow in scope” and reach situations 

where “‘the likelihood of reunification’” is “‘so slim’” due to a 

parent’s past failures that “expend[ing]” the Department’s 

“‘scarce’” resources on reunification services is likely to be 

“fruitless,” or when “attempts to facilitate reunification” would

otherwise not “serve and protect the child’s interest.” (Baby Boy 

H., at pp. 474, 478; Cheryl P., at p. 96; In re Lana S. (2012) 207 

Cal.App.4th 94, 107 (Lana S.); In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th

19, 23 (I.A.); In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 196

(Gabriel K.); Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th

(See, e.g., §§ 361.5, subd. (k) [requiring the court to specify the 

“factual findings used to determine that the provision of 

reunification services” to the parent “would not benefit the child” 

in the case of “severe sexual abuse”]; 361, subd. (e) [requiring the 

court to “state the facts on which the decision to remove the 

minor is based”]; 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D) [if making a 

determination that the “termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental,” the court “shall state its reasons” “on the record”]; 

In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156 [same].)
10

67, 70 (Randi R.); Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 741, 750 (Deborah S.).) By making the grant of 

reunification services discretionary in these situations, the 

bypass provisions aim to “focus reunification efforts” and 

resources on the cases “most likely to succeed” with reunification. 

(In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 471.)

This case involves two bypass provisions. The first is 

subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5, which provides that 

“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent” if the 

juvenile “court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,” that (1) 

“the parent . . . failed to reunify with [a] sibling or half sibling” of 

the child now at issue and the juvenile court in the prior 

dependency case “ordered termination of reunification services,” 

and (2) the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable 

effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or 

half sibling . . . from that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).) The 

second is subdivision (b)(11) of section 361.5, which provides that 

“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent” if the 

juvenile court “finds, by clear and convincing evidence,” that (1) 

the parent’s “parental rights . . . over any sibling or half sibling”

of the child now at issue “ha[ve] been permanently severed,” and 

(2) the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to 

treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half 

sibling . . . from the parent.” (Id., subd. (b)(11)(A).)7 

7 Under either provision, the order terminating reunification 

services or parental rights over the sibling or half sibling need 

not be “final”; entry of that order by the juvenile court is enough, 

even if the order still is subject to attack on appeal. (In re T.G. 

(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 987-988.) 
11

When read as a whole, section 361.5 erects a two-step, 

burden-shifting procedure for bypassing reunification services 

under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). 

In the first step, the Department bears the burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the juvenile 

court had ordered termination of reunification services (under 

subdivision (b)(10)) or had severed parental rights (under 

subdivision (b)(11)) in a prior case involving a sibling or half

sibling of the child in the current case;8 (2) the “problem[] that 

led to the removal” of the sibling or half sibling is the same 

problem at issue in the current case, insofar as the problem 

involves the same “theme” even if it is not identical; and (3) the 

parent has “not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat 

th[at] problem[].” (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(10)(A) & (b)(11)(A); I.A., 

supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 23-24; In re Albert T. (2006) 144 

Cal.App.4th 207, 217; Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 96; 

Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 108 [“recurrent theme”

sufficient]; cf. In re D.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 807, 815-816 

8 Although the text of these provisions specifies that the 

prior case involve a sibling or half sibling of the child in the 

current case, some—but not all—appellate courts have held that 

they also reach prior cases involving the same child as the one in 

the current case. (Compare I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 26-

27 [bypass provision applies when same child is subject of 

successive dependency cases involving same parent and same 

problem] and Gabriel K., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 196 [same] 

with J.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 279, 284 

[bypass provision requires involvement of a sibling or half sibling; 

does not apply when same child involved in successive cases] and 

In re B.L. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1115-1116 [same].) 

Because the prior cases here involve Jayden’s half siblings, we 

need not weigh in on this split. 
12

[“problem” not “same” when one case involved substance abuse 

and another involved “unsafe and unhealthy [living] 

conditions”].)

In the second step, which presupposes the Department has 

carried its initial burden, the burden shifts to the parent to prove 

that it is in the child’s best interest for the juvenile court to 

exercise its discretion to provide reunification services in this 

case. (I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 24; Lana S., supra, 207 

Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) In exercising this discretion, the court 

may consider a variety of factors relevant to the child’s best 

interest, including (1) the parent’s “‘“current efforts and fitness,”’”

(2) the parent’s “‘“history,”’” (3) the “‘“gravity of the problem”’”

that led to the assertion of dependency, (4) the “‘strength of the 

bonds’” between the child and the parent and between the child 

and the current caregiver, and (5) the “‘“child’s need for stability 

and continuity.”’” (G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.) One 

factor that is essential—and hence necessary—to the assessment

of a child’s best interest is whether there is “‘some “reasonable 

basis to conclude”’” that reunification is possible; if it is not, 

offering reunification services that are destined to fail is not in 

the child’s best interest. (Ibid.)

We review a juvenile court’s determination that the 

Department has carried its initial burden in the first step for 

substantial evidence. (In re J.J. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 455; 

In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839-840 (Harmony 

B.).) In so doing, we ask whether there is sufficient evidence in 

the record that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

determination—for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the 

Department carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence. 
13

(Harmony B., at pp. 839-840; G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1164; In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154-155; see 

generally, Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1004-

1005.) We review a juvenile court’s assessment of what is in the 

child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion. (Baby Boy H., 

supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.) 

Mother does not dispute that the juvenile court had 

previously terminated reunification services and parental rights 

over several of Jayden’s half siblings or that those prior cases 

involved the same problem—namely, mother’s drug addiction—

that underlies Jayden’s dependency proceeding. Because mother 

also does not contest the juvenile court’s analysis of what is in 

Jayden’s best interest, the propriety of the juvenile court’s order 

bypassing reunification services in this case turns on whether the 

court’s finding that mother did not make a reasonable effort to 

address her drug addiction is supported by substantial evidence. 

Mother insists that she “made significant and very reasonable 

efforts to treat her substance abuse problem,” and for support 

points solely to the efforts she made in the four months since the 

Department filed its petition in this case. This appeal therefore 

presents two questions. The first is legal—namely, should a 

juvenile court in assessing a parent’s reasonable efforts under 

subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5 focus solely on the 

time since the current case was filed? Because this question is 

one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. (In re 

Brianna S. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 303, 311 (Brianna S.); In re 

Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1059.) The second is 

factual—namely, was the juvenile court’s finding of no reasonable 

effort supported by substantial evidence?
14

I. How Far Back May a Juvenile Court Look in

Assessing Whether a Parent Has Made a “Reasonable 

Effort” to Solve the Problem?

We hold that, in assessing whether a parent made a 

reasonable effort to address a problem from a prior dependency 

case involving the current child’s sibling or half sibling and where 

reunification services or parental rights were terminated under 

subdivisions (b)(10) or (b)(11) of section 361.5, the juvenile court 

should consider the entire time span between, at the one end, the 

earliest time a sibling or half sibling was removed from the 

parent’s custody due to that problem and, at the other end, the 

dispositional hearing in the current case. This holding rests on 

three grounds.

First, this holding is dictated by the plain text of 

subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5, and the plain 

text of a statute is typically dispositive. (See Brianna S., supra, 

60 Cal.App.5th at p. 313; Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 268, 272 [“the plain meaning of the language governs”].) 

Both subdivisions specify that the court is to assess whether the 

parent has “subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the 

problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling.” (§ 

361.5, subds. (b)(10)(A) & (b)(11)(A), italics added.) The italicized 

language unambiguously establishes that the reasonableness of 

the parent’s effort is to be measured from the point at which the 

first sibling or half sibling is removed for the same reasons that 

underlie the current case.9

9 Because there are two decades between Damion’s removal 

from mother’s custody in 2001 due to her drug abuse and 

Jayden’s dispositional hearing in 2022, this case does not present 

the question of what a juvenile court should do when there is no 
15

Second, this holding is consistent with a uniform wall of 

precedent. Every published decision we have found evaluates the 

reasonableness of a parent’s effort going back to the time of the 

removal of the first sibling or half sibling; none has limited a 

juvenile court’s inquiry to the period following the filing of the 

petition in the current case. (E.g., Harmony B., supra, 125 

Cal.App.4th at p. 842 [court should consider the parent’s efforts 

“toward correcting the underlying problems” “in the meantime” 

between the prior and current cases]; Cheryl P., supra, 139 

Cal.App.4th at p. 97 [same]; Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1117-1118, 1123-1124 (Jennifer S.) 

[considering parent’s entire history between the initial removal of 

the older siblings in 2006 and the subsequent removal of the 

younger sibling in 2017]; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 

Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464 (Renee J.) [court could have “focused on 

the fact that [mother] had made significant changes in her 

lifestyle since the removal of her other children”]; R.T. v. Superior 

Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 915 (R.T.) [considering events

“in . . . totality” between the termination of parental rights over 

older sibling in 2006 and younger sibling’s second removal in 

gap in time between the termination of the reunification services 

or parental rights over the sibling or half sibling, and the 

dispositional hearing in the current case. The appellate courts 

are divided over how to proceed where there is no time gap. 

(Compare Harmony B., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 842-843 

[court may consider events occurring only after termination in 

sibling or half sibling’s case, such that there will be no 

opportunity for the parent to make “reasonable efforts”] with 

Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 98-99 [court should 

consider parent’s “reasonable efforts made since the removal of 

the sibling”], italics added.) 
16

2011]; Gabriel K., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 196-197 

[considering events between minor’s first removal in 2007 and 

the subsequent removal of him and his younger sibling in 2011].)

Third, this holding is consistent with the public policy 

animating the bypass provisions. As alluded to above, the bypass 

provisions seek to balance two competing policies: On the one 

hand, the bypass provisions grant a juvenile court the discretion 

to bypass services as a means of reserving a social service 

agency’s finite resources for those cases where reunification is 

likely rather than “fruitless” (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th

at p. 96; I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 23; Gabriel K., supra, 

203 Cal.App.4th at p. 196; Baby Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at

p. 478; Randi R., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 70; Deborah S., 

supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 750), and thus as a means of avoiding 

the “tragedy” of “delay[ing] permanency for [a] dependent child” 

in such circumstances (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 

1127); on the other hand, the provisions seek not to be too “harsh” 

by making this discretion available only if the parent has made

no reasonable effort to address the problem at issue (Harmony B., 

supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 842). The bypass provisions try to 

walk that line by granting parents who have made a reasonable 

effort a further opportunity to reunify, while denying parents 

who have “failed to address” longstanding problems yet “another 

opportunity to do so.” (Id. at p. 843; Randi R., at p. 73.) The best 

way to walk this line and calibrate this balance of competing 

policies is to allow courts to look at the parent’s full relevant 

history. This broader focus in one way gives a parent’s efforts in 

the current case short shrift, but the dependency law framework 

already provides a parent with the opportunity to bolster the 

current efforts: If those efforts are commendable but too short-
17

term at the time of the dispositional hearing for the juvenile 

court to conclude they are “reasonable” when viewed through the 

prism of the total relevant time period, the parent can always 

seek to modify the bypass order and obtain an order granting 

reunification services by filing a petition under section 388. (§ 

388, subd. (a)(1); In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.) 

II. Substantial Evidence Supports Bypass

When, as we have concluded is proper, mother’s effort to 

treat her drug addiction is viewed starting from the time of 

Damion’s removal from her custody in 2001 due to that addiction 

through the dispositional hearing for Jayden in 2022, substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that her effort was 

not “reasonable.” 

A “reasonable effort to treat” a problem means just that.10 

The question is not whether the parent has “‘“cure[d]”’” or 

“‘abolished’” the problem (Cheryl P., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 

97; Renee J., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464; K.C. v. Superior 

Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393 (K.C.)), or whether the 

parent has “attained” a “‘certain level of progress’” (R.T., supra, 

202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914). Instead, the focus is on the parent’s 

10 Renee J. seemed to articulate a different test, which is more

difficult to meet, when it suggested that bypass is inappropriate 

unless the Department shows that “further efforts [by the parent] 

to deal with the problem would” be “‘fruitless’” and admitted that 

this would be a “pretty high standard.” (Renee J., supra, 96 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1464.) We agree with Cheryl P. that the bypass 

provisions “do[] not impose a ‘fruitless’ standard” (Cheryl P., 

supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 97) and reject Renee J. to the extent 

that it adopted “fruitless” as the standard for the parent’s efforts 

(rather than merely articulating the policy underpinning that 

standard).
18

effort. It is not enough to show “any” effort, even a genuine one. 

(Ibid.) “[L]ackadaisical or half-hearted efforts” will also not do. 

(Cheryl P., at p. 99; K.C., at p. 1393.) Instead, the effort must be 

reasonable, and reasonableness is assessed by looking to (1) the 

duration of the parent’s effort, (2) the “extent and context” of the 

parent’s effort, and (3) other factors related to the “quality and 

quantity of those efforts.” (R.T., at p. 914, italics omitted.) The 

parent’s progress, or lack thereof, “both in the short and long 

term”—while not dispositive—is nevertheless relevant “to the 

extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.” (Ibid.) 

It is undisputed that mother made some effort to address 

her longstanding drug abuse problem, at least after the petition 

involving Jayden was filed: She completed a drug treatment 

program, attended six parenting classes, and “tested negative for 

all substances” from mid-January through the beginning of April 

2022. But substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that this effort was not reasonable against the backdrop 

of her entire drug history dating back to the removal of Damion 

from her custody in 2001. As a threshold matter, mother’s effort 

since the filing of this case—while a commendable start—was not

wholehearted: Mother struggled to attend her drug treatment 

sessions consistently and to participate fully, so much so that the 

treatment center considered discharging her from the program 

multiple times for being disruptive to the other participants;

mother’s “attendance and participation” was “[a]bove 

[s]atisfactory” only “in the last few weeks” of the program; and 

she only started “making great strides in staying committed to 

long term recovery and being compliant with all her 

requirements” in those final few weeks. More significantly, 

however, mother’s four months of uneven effort is a drop in the 
19

bucket when viewed in the larger context of a 20-year history of 

serious and consistent drug abuse. Against this backdrop, the 

juvenile court had ample grounds to find that mother’s recent 

effort to treat her drug addiction was not “reasonable.” (See, e.g., 

Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124 [in the context of a 

“long-term substance abuse issue” lasting for “years,” father’s 

“minimal efforts” in substance abuse treatment “mere weeks”

before a hearing were “not a reasonable effort to treat th[e]

problem for purposes of a section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) 

bypass”]; R.T., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 915 [upholding 

bypass under subsections (b)(10) and (b)(11) because there was 

“no evidence in the record that mother, in the month or two of 

services” provided after second removal, “had engaged in th[e] 

services in any meaningful way”]; Randi R., supra, 64 

Cal.App.4th at p. 73 [upholding bypass and stating that child’s 

future “should not be sacrificed” to give a parent “another chance 

to try to get and stay sober”].) The juvenile court’s finding is 

further supported by evidence that mother has repeatedly 

relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. 

This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and 

practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are 

often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and 

relapse. (See, e.g., In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415,

423-424 [200 days insufficient to convince juvenile court that a 

relapse would not occur]; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th

681, 686-687 [relapse following 300 days of sobriety].) Thus, 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the 

effort underlying mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of 

drug abuse is not “reasonable.” 
20

Mother resists this conclusion, minimizing her drug use 

and urging us to accept her proffered reasons for her minimal 

effort to combat her addiction: She attributes her February 2021 

relapse to her father’s death (even though she also attributed her 

relapse before Emma’s birth in 2020 to her father’s death),

brushes aside her relapse only two weeks before Jayden’s birth by 

saying that she “attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to enroll” in 

treatment, and downplays the extent to which she failed to fully 

engage with the treatment program by saying merely that she 

“struggled at times.” In doing so, mother asks us to ignore the 

governing standard of review and reevaluate the evidence in the 

light most favorable to her, which we may not do. (In re R.T. 

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [we “‘review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s determinations’” and leave “‘issues of fact 

and credibility’” to the trial court]); G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1164 [we “presume ‘in favor of the order, consider[] the 

evidence in the light most favorable’” to the order, and “‘resolv[e] 

all conflicts in support of the order’”].)
21

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ