Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Michael B. Troemel

Lafayette, Indiana

Harold E. Amstutz

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the ParentChild Relationships of:

X.S., A.S., L.S., and Ar.S. 

(Minor Children)

and 

M.S. (Mother) and A.S. (Father),

Appellants-Respondents,

v. 

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner. 

January 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-1915 

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Faith A. Graham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

79D03-1711-JT-124, 79D03-1711-

JT-125, 79D03-1711-JT-126, and 

79D03-1711-JT-127 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 2 of 22

Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants-Respondents, M.S. (Mother) and A.S. (Father), (collectively, 

Parents), appeal from the trial court’s Order terminating their parental rights to 

their minor children, X.S., A.S., L.S., and Ar.S. (collectively, Children). 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Parents present seven issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as the 

following two issues:

(1) Whether the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in removal would not be 

remedied or that continuation of the parental relationship posed a 

threat to Children was clearly erroneous; and 

(2) Whether the trial court’s conclusion that it was in Children’s best 

interests to terminate Parents’ rights was clearly erroneous.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and Father were married in March 2009 and have four minor children, 

X.S., born August 2009, A.S., born January 2011, L.S., born April 2013, and 
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Ar.S., born October 2015.1

 Parents’ and Children’s involvement with the 

Department of Child Services (DCS) dates back to 2012. Children have been 

declared children in need of services (CHINS) on two occasions prior to the 

instant proceedings for conditions including Mother’s incarceration for habitual 

theft, Father’s incarceration for fraud, Children being left with strangers, 

Mother giving Children adult medication so she could sleep, and Mother 

providing L.S. with Klonopin. In 2015, the family became homeless after some 

of Children set their house on fire playing with a lighter. 

[5] Mother has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder I, Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD), and Borderline Personality Disorder. As a result of these 

conditions, Mother has experienced mood swings, irritability, mania, 

aggression, difficulty in concentration, and anxiety, among a host of symptoms. 

Mother has also experienced episodes of psychosis and hallucinations. On 

January 25, 2016, Mother was arrested following a physical altercation with her 

sister, who had been allowing the family to stay with her. Following her release 

from jail, Mother’s mental health deteriorated, and she attempted suicide by 

running into traffic. Mother was hospitalized following this attempt. On 

February 8, 2016, a third CHINS proceeding involving Children was initiated 

because of Mother’s mental health status and the fact that the family was 

homeless with Parents having no viable plan to acquire housing. That CHINS 

 

1

 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to an older child in August 2009. Parents had a fifth 

child during the underlying CHINS proceeding. That child has also been removed from Parents’ care but is 

not subject to the instant appeal. 
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proceeding resulted in an informal adjustment. Parents were offered a number 

of services, including mental health services and Homebuilders, an intensive 

four-week program to improve Parents’ ability to provide a stable and secure 

home environment for Children. 

[6] During this period of informal adjustment, Father was convicted of traffic 

offenses and was again incarcerated. Father did not have a valid legal status in 

the United States. Upon his release from incarceration on the traffic offenses, 

Father was detained by the immigration authorities. Children were in Mother’s 

sole care. While she was participating in Homebuilders, Mother leased a home 

that had multiple safety and habitability issues, including no running water, 

peeling paint, broken windows, and an unstable second story. While the family 

was staying in the living room of the home, part of the ceiling collapsed. After 

a city inspection of the property, the landlord gave notice to Mother that she 

would be evicted. 

[7] On August 2, 2016, a fourth CHINS proceeding was filed, and Children were 

placed with a foster family, where they resided throughout the instant 

proceedings. As part of the dispositional order of the CHINS, Parents were 

directed to procure and maintain stable housing. Parents were offered a variety 

of services, including individual and couple’s counseling, medication 

management services, home based case management, and supervised parenting 

time. The permanency plan was reunification. On March 14, 2017, Father was 

provided bond funds by a community resource and was released from the 

custody of the immigration authorities. 
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[8] Parents initially made progress in their services and were allowed to care for 

Children on overnight visits. However, Mother’s mental health declined during 

those overnight visits, as she experienced psychosis and hallucinations. Father 

was employed, and Mother was the sole provider of care for Children when 

Father was at work. Mother provided Children with sleeping pills that were 

inappropriate for their age. Mother was directed by DCS to cease medicating 

Children, but she did not. On a home visit, two of the Children were observed 

to be incapable of standing up as a result of having been administered this 

medication. In addition, a safety plan to prevent inappropriate touching 

between two of Children was not being followed, and Children reported that 

domestic violence was occurring between Parents. Visitation reverted to being 

fully supervised in a facility and remained so during the remainder of the 

instant proceedings. 

[9] Mother attended individual counseling and engaged in medication 

management. In May 2017, Mother ingested an amount of Adderall that was 

inconsistent with her prescription, causing her to believe she was having a heart 

attack. Subsequent investigation revealed that Mother was storing some of her 

medication loose in a tool box and was not taking her oral medications as 

prescribed. Mother was placed on a management regime and was dispensed 

her oral medications on a weekly basis. As a solution to her inconsistency in 

taking her oral medications, in September 2017 Mother began receiving an 

injection of an anti-psychotic medication that greatly relieved her episodes of 

psychosis and hallucinations. 
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[10] After Children were removed from her care, Mother had no fixed address until 

December 2016, when she procured a small apartment with financial assistance 

from a community resource. She subsequently moved to a two-bedroom and 

then to a three-bedroom apartment around September 2017. Based on an 

inaccurate report that she had no income and that Children were living with 

her, Mother’s rent and her electricity were entirely subsidized. Upon his release 

from immigration custody, Father began living in the three-bedroom apartment

with Mother even though he was not allowed to be on the lease or live there 

because of his immigration status. 

[11] Parents’ DCS case was periodically reviewed, and a concurrent plan of 

adoption was added. On November 15, 2017, DCS filed a petition seeking to 

terminate the parental rights of Parents (TPR). Reports generated by one of 

Parents’ service providers covering December 2017 and January 2018 revealed 

the following facts. Mother was arrested on November 28, 2017, for failing to 

appear at an initial hearing for a probation revocation proceeding. Mother was 

reportedly “shutting down and becoming desperate and depressed” in 

contemplation of the TPR proceedings. (Mother’s Exh. B, Vol. III, p. 5). 

Mother was responsible for scheduling her appointments to receive her 

injection of the anti-psychotic medication but had received one injection a week 

late. Mother and Father continued to downplay concerns that their housing 

was in jeopardy. In January 2018, Father requested assistance in contacting a 

free immigration clinic. FCM Reggie Brown (FCM Brown) met with Parents 

and the director of the immigration clinic, and Father completed the forms to 
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file FOIA requests pertinent to his immigration case. Father’s next 

immigration hearing was scheduled for December 2019. 

[12] On February 12, 2018, and March 21, 2018, the trial court held TPR hearings. 

FCM Brown, who had been with the family since July of 2016, testified that he 

had ongoing concerns about Mother’s mental health diagnosis and her ability to 

parent in that her mental health “appears to decline with the responsibility of 

being a primary care-giver, [C]hildren being in her care, um, has been my 

observation and a pattern that’s been identified throughout the duration of the 

case.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 137). FCM Brown recounted that due to the 

severity and gravity of the safety concerns DCS had for Parents after the failed 

overnight visitation, DCS never attempted a trial home visit or unsupervised 

visitation for Children and that as recently as February 2018, Mother had been 

observed attempting to coach Children not to disclose unfavorable information. 

FCM Brown testified that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate 

Parents’ rights because Children “deserve permanency” and “this is a pattern 

behavior and cyclical thing with [Parents] that we’ve seen with . . . [Parents] 

having instability, not just housing . . . despite the intervention of services, 

[Parents] have not been successful in their services to rise to a level needed for 

reunification to take place.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 143). FCM Brown related that 

Children’s current foster family had not rejected the possibility of adoption and 

that other families had expressed interest in adopting Children. He was 

confident that Children were adoptable and reported that their ages and history 

had not been a barrier to interest in adopting them. 
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[13] The Court Appointed Child Advocate, Mary Quinn (CASA Quinn), who had 

been with the family since the inception of the case, reported that Children were 

all on track with their educational and developmental milestones. CASA

Quinn, who had observed Children in the family home, at school, in their foster 

home, and with Parents during supervised visits, testified that it was in 

Children’s best interests to terminate Parents’ rights due to Children’s need for 

permanency and Parents’ history of inability to “sustain adequate housing and 

adequate income and a safe environment for [Children].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 115-

16). CASA Quinn felt Children were doing better since removal from Parents’ 

home because “although the foster parent [and] biological parent [sic] have very 

different parenting styles, [Children] can live with that. They have a harder 

time living with all the uncertainty that they had before they were removed 

from the home.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 116). 

[14] Mother testified that for two months she had worked doing cleaning from 7:00 

a.m. to 10:00 a.m., seven days a week, earning $400 every two weeks. Mother 

felt that she had not been offered services throughout the case and that it was 

never in the best interests of children for their parents’ rights to be terminated 

“if you’ve done nothing wrong.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 162). Mother felt that her 

mental health issues were “more emotional than anything.” (Tr. 166). Father 

testified that he worked from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Mondays and 

Tuesdays and that he worked from 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. Thursdays through 

Saturdays. Father earned approximately $1,200 per month. 
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[15] On July 10, 2018, the trial court entered its Order terminating Parents’ rights to 

Children. The trial court entered thirty-two detailed findings, including the 

following:

8. The reasons for the third CHINS case also included 

instability. [Summary of circumstances of third CHINS]. 

9. The reasons for the fourth CHINS case included the same 

instability, incarceration, and mental health issues. [Summary of 

circumstances of fourth CHINS]. 

* * * 

13. Pursuant to the dispositional order and parental participation 

decree issued in the fourth CHINS case, Mother was offered the 

following services: individual therapy, group therapy, medication 

management, case management, random drug screens, and 

parenting time. Father was offered case management, random 

drug screens, and parenting time. These services have been 

exhaustive and have been designed to address the difficulties of 

the family. 

* * * 

16. Mother reports current employment at Marshall’s cleaning 

Monday through Sunday from 7:00 [a.m.] to 10:00 [a.m.] 

making $400.00 every two (2) weeks. Mother reports having 

such employment for approximately two (2) months. Mother has 

historically been unemployed due to inability to cope with the 

responsibility and stress of employment. Father reports current 

employment at Red Seven cooking in the mornings and washing 

dishes in the evenings as well as occasional employment at 
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Marshalls cleaning with Mother. Father has historically 

remained employed as the primary earner. 

17. Both Mother and Father have a history of incarceration as 

noted above. At the onset of the fourth CHINS case, Father was 

incarcerated at the Tippecanoe County Jail. Father was 

transferred to a detention facility by immigration where he 

remained until May 2017. Mother is currently on probation. 

18. There have been multiple moves since the third CHINS case. 

[Summary of moves].

* * *

20. Mother and Father then relocated to the current three (3) 

bedroom apartment via subsidized housing. Mother reported no 

employment/income resulting in $0.00 rent and the addition of

an electric subsidy. Mother also reported [Children] would soon 

be residing in the home. Mother has not corrected such 

information with the subsidized housing authority. The home 

itself is appropriate. However, the stability of the home is at risk. 

Father is prohibited from leasing the apartment due to his illegal 

immigration status. Mother reports an agreement with the 

landlord to allow Father to reside in the residence and to 

continue to reside in the residence herself without [Children] but 

has failed to provide any documentation regarding said 

agreement.

21. Mother has historically struggled with mental health issues 

and treatment compliance.

* * * 
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24. In September 2017, Mother reluctantly began monthly 

injections along with oral medication. Mother is currently 

prescribed a long acting antipsychotic injection for mood 

stabilization. Mother is also prescribed oral medication 

including Adderall as a stimulant to remain focused, Propranolol 

as an anti-hypertensive to control anger, Lamictal as an anticonvulsive to act as a sedative for sleep and to control mood, and 

Topamax as an anti-convulsive to control mood . . . Mother 

agrees that the injections have improved the stability of Mother’s 

mood since October 2017 and that her mental health is more 

stabilized. Mother reports a desire and intention to continue 

therapy and medication, including injections. 

25. A pattern has developed indicating the status of Mother’s 

mental health is, in part, directly correlated to responsibility and 

stress. Mother’s mental health tends to suffer with increased 

responsibility of employment and/or parenting. Mother will 

require ongoing medication and therapy throughout her life. 

Mother’s ability to parent is dependent upon Mother’s strict 

compliance with treatment. Although Mother agrees she has and 

will always have mental health issues, Mother believes the issues 

are generally just emotional problems. Mother still struggles with 

insight regarding termination of parental rights often becoming 

angry and depressed followed by crying. 

26. As recently as March 2018, Mother’s therapist reported that 

Mother is shutting down emotionally and mentally noting 

Mother is unable to think straight due to anxiety. Mother has 

become increasingly desperate and depressed without a family 

plan if parental rights are terminated and appears very unstable. 

Mother did not schedule her injection appropriately and received 

it one (1) week late. 

* * * 
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30. CASA, Mary Quinn, supports termination of parental rights 

in the best interests of [Children]. [Children] are in foster care 

and are doing very well individually and as a sibling group . . . 

[Children] otherwise have no special needs and are adoptable. 

[Children] need continued consistency in parenting and 

education. [Children] need permanency for their future now. 

CASA [Quinn] specifically notes that “[h]istory shows it 

unlikel[y] they will be able to provide and maintain a safe and 

stable environment.” 

31. Although Mother and Father love [Children], continuation 

of the parent-child relationships would be detrimental to 

[Children]. Mother continues to believe [Parents] have done 

nothing wrong. On the contrary, [Children] have been involved 

with the child welfare system over the span of six (6) years and 

have been adjudicated CHINS twice. Any progress the parents 

have been able to make is routinely short-lived.

32. The historical pattern of instability for [Children] who have 

spent more than half of their young lives as CHINS outweighs 

any such short-term progress. Despite services provided to 

benefit the family and improvement in Mother’s mental health, 

concerns remain regarding long-term stability and permanency 

for [Children]. [Parents] currently reside in subsidized housing at 

risk due to Father’s immigration status and dishonesty regarding 

income and [C]hildren residing in such housing. Visits with 

[Parents] remain fully supervised and safeguards have been 

added to ensure all [C]hildren are supervised at all times. 

Mother’s mental health has improved with injections but Mother 

is becoming increasingly depressed and unstable surrounding the 

termination proceeding.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. I, pp. 38-41). The trial court found that there 

was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in removal 
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of Children or the reasons for continued placement outside the home 

would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent-children 

relationships posed a threat to the well-being of Children, DCS had a 

satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children, and that it was 

in Children’s best interests that Parents’ rights be terminated. 

[16] Parents now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[17] It is well-settled that when reviewing the evidence supporting the termination of 

parental rights we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of 

witnesses. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). In addition, we consider 

only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to 

be drawn from that evidence. Id. “We confine our review to two steps: 

whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then 

whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. We 

must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of 

witnesses firsthand, and we do not set aside the trial court’s findings or 

judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 

II. Termination of Parents’ Rights

[18] “[O]ne of the most valued relationships in our culture” is that between a parent 

and his or her child. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 14 of 22

Indeed, “[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her 

children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id.

(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Accordingly, the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards “the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. 

Nevertheless, parental interests are not absolute; rather, termination of parental 

rights is appropriate when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities. In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[19] Termination of parental rights is an extreme sanction that is intended as a “last 

resort” and is available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. In re

C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). As such, before a termination of 

parental rights is merited, the State is required to prove a host of facts by clear 

and convincing evidence, the most relevant for our purposes being that there is 

a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the child’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by the 

parents and that termination is in the best interests of the child.2

 Ind. Code §§ 

31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), (C); 31-37-14-2. We address each of those factors in turn. 

 

2

 Parents filed separate Appellant’s Briefs in which they both assert that the trial court’s conclusion that they 

pose a continued threat to Children’s well-being was clearly erroneous. However, neither develops an 

independent argument on the issue. Given that we conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the 

conditions meriting removal would not be remedied, we decline to address the issue. See In re A.P., 882 

N.E.2d 799, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the termination statute is written in the disjunctive and 

declining to address Father’s argument regarding his continued threat to the child where the evidence 

supported trial court’s conclusion that the conditions meriting removal had not been remedied). 
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A. Reasonable Probability Conditions Will Not Be Remedied

[20] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that the conditions that resulted in 

the child’s removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. 

E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-43. First, we must identify the conditions that led to 

removal; second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that 

those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. When engaging in the 

second step of this analysis, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the 

time of the TPR proceeding, taking into account evidence of changed 

conditions, and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of 

conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect 

or deprivation. Id. This delicate balance is entrusted to the trial court, and a 

trial court acts within its discretion when it weighs a parent’s prior history more 

heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. “Requiring trial 

courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from 

finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” 

Id. 

[21] Here, the conditions resulting in Children’s removal and continued placement 

were instability, incarceration, and Mother’s mental health. The main issue of 

instability for Parents was maintaining stable housing. Although Parents were 

residing in an appropriate three-bedroom home at the time of the TPR hearing, 

the trial court’s finding that this housing was at risk was supported by evidence 

that in order to procure their subsidized housing, Mother had misrepresented 

the household’s income and reported that Children were living in the home 
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when they were not. In addition, Father was living in the home where he was 

not allowed due to his immigration status. Housing acquired by fraud is not 

stable housing, and the trial court acted within its discretion when it concluded 

that Parents’ latest housing was part of an ongoing pattern of instability that 

indicated a substantial probability of future housing instability. Id. 

[22] The second reason for removal and continued placement outside of the home 

was Parents’ incarceration. At the time of the TPR hearing, neither Parent was 

incarcerated. However, the trial court found that Parents had a history of 

incarceration, which the trial court could, within its discretion, consider in 

making its TPR determination. See In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015) 

(noting that when assessing changed conditions against patterns of habitual 

conduct, a trial court may consider a parent’s criminal history). In addition, as 

recently as November 28, 2017, Mother had been arrested for failing to appear 

at an initial hearing on a petition to revoke her probation. The probation 

revocation court continued Mother on probation, subject to her completing a 

driving course, which, as of the TPR hearing, she had not completed. In 

addition, Father is not in the country legally. He had been married to Mother 

since 2009 and had his first child with her that year. Despite the length of time 

he had been in the country and his detention by immigration authorities, Father 

took no proactive steps to address his immigration status until January of 2018, 

after the TPR petition was filed. A trial court may “disregard the efforts . . . 

made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily [a parent’s] 

history of conduct prior to those efforts.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 
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(Ind. 2013). We see no clear error in the trial court’s findings or conclusions on 

this condition of removal. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[23] The last condition which resulted in removal of Children and their continued 

placement was Mother’s mental health. Neither party disputes that Mother has

grave mental health issues. The trial court found that Mother’s mental health 

had improved since she began receiving injections in September 2017. 

However, the trial court weighed this recent improvement against Mother’s 

marked mental health decline at the time of the TPR hearings, Mother’s pattern 

of declining mental health when faced with the increased responsibility of work 

and childcare, and the fact that she exhibited a lack of insight regarding her 

mental health, as Mother felt that her mental health issues were simply 

emotional in nature. The trial court found that “[t]he historical pattern of 

instability for these [C]hildren who have spent more than half of their young 

lives as CHINS outweigh any such short-lived progress.” (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 41). Thus, the trial court took into account evidence of Mother’s 

improvements but found that her past patterns weighed more heavily in favor of 

termination, which was within the trial court’s discretion. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 

643. 

[24] Father’s main argument regarding the conditions of removal centers on 

Mother’s mental health, as he argues that “[t]here can be no doubt that the 

primary reason for both parents [sic] parental rights being terminated was based 

on the mother’s mental health issues (DCS Exhibits 3, 5).” (Father’s Brief p. 

11). We find that Father’s characterization of the trial court’s decision to 
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terminate Parents’ rights to be overly narrow, as it appears from the many 

detailed findings entered by the trial court regarding Parents’ housing instability 

that Parents’ inability to provide stable housing was at least as important to its 

decision as Mother’s mental health. Thus, it is inaccurate, as Father contends 

on appeal, that the trial court impermissibly terminated his rights based solely 

on Mother’s mental health status or his unwillingness to live separately from 

Mother. 

[25] Parents also direct our attention to evidence in the record that does not support 

the trial court’s determination. These arguments are unavailing given our 

standard of review which precludes us from considering such evidence. See id. 

at 642; see also In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (holding that a 

reviewing court may not “reverse a trial court’s judgment based on a belief that 

the parent-child relationship should be preserved and support that 

determination by rummaging through the record to obtain evidence that may

support the denial of a petition to terminate”). Because the trial court’s findings 

and conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions 

which merited removal and continued placement of Children would not be 

remedied were supported by the record, we find no clear error. See E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 642.

B. Best Interests of Children

[26] Both Parents make a cursory challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that 

termination of their parental rights was in Children’s best interests. Our 

supreme court has recently recognized that one of the most difficult aspects of a 
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termination of parental rights determination is the issue of whether the 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 647 (noting that the question 

“necessarily places the children’s interest in preserving the family into conflict 

with their need for permanency”). The trial court’s determination that 

termination was in the child’s best interests requires it to look at the totality of 

the evidence of a particular case. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004), trans. denied. “In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests 

of the parents to those of the children involved.” Id. We have held that a 

recommendation by both the case manager and the CASA to terminate parental 

rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not 

be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

[27] Here, the evidence established that Parents had a pattern of inability to provide 

for the safety and security of Children. Parents moved six times after the third 

CHINS proceeding was initiated. Mother provided inaccurate information to 

procure the subsidy that allowed Parents to live rent-free in the home where 

they intended to bring Children. Father was not allowed to be living in the 

home due to his immigration status, but he was living there regardless. The one 

attempt during the pendency of the case to return Children to Parents’ care for 

overnight stays ended when two Children were inappropriately medicated, a 

safety plan to prevent inappropriate touching between two Children was not 

followed, and Children were exposed to domestic violence. Although Parents 
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engaged in services, they never made sufficient progress so that they could have 

unsupervised visits with Children. 

[28] Mother’s progress on her mental health was just beginning as a result of her 

injected medication. The injections were not a cure-all, and Mother had

exhibited a pattern of decline in her mental health when she was the sole 

caretaker of Children. Because of Parents’ work schedules as of the TPR 

hearing, if Children were returned to Parents’ care, they would be in Mother’s 

sole care for long periods of time while Father worked. There was no evidence 

in the record that a plan had been put into place to ensure Children’s safety 

during those periods. This is particularly troubling since Mother implied at the 

TPR hearing that she felt she had done nothing wrong in parenting Children. 

[29] On the other hand, Children were doing well in foster care and were meeting 

their educational and developmental milestones. FCM Brown and CASA 

Quinn were both in favor of termination. CASA Quinn in particular felt that 

Children had benefitted from the consistency afforded by their foster placement, 

as opposed to the uncertainty they had experienced in their life in Parents’ 

homes. We find the opinions of FCM Brown and CASA Quinn should be 

accorded great weight, as both were rendered after having had long-term 

involvement with this family in a variety of circumstances. 

[30] Both Parents contend that it was not in Children’s best interests to terminate 

their rights because DCS had not yet found Children an adoptive home. While 

recognizing that Indiana law does not require that an adoptive home be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 21 of 22

identified at the time of the TPR proceedings, they argue that termination of 

their rights would not provide greater permanency for Children and that they 

should be afforded more time to parent Children. However, Children’s current 

foster parents had not ruled out adoption, other families had expressed interest, 

and FCM Brown felt confident that Children would be adopted. In addition, 

we note that this is not a case where Children have been placed with a relative 

for years. See, e.g., In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 630 (Ind. 2016) (noting that 

delaying adoption would not negatively impact the child’s need for permanency 

where the child was in a stable placement with a relative who planned to 

adopt). The trial court weighed the interests of Parents and Children and 

concluded that the circumstances merited termination in order to provide 

Children with the permanency Children required. Given the totality of the 

evidence and the opinions of FCM Brown and CASA Quinn, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in Children’s 

best interests was clearly erroneous. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59; E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 642. 

CONCLUSION

[31] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s conclusions that there was 

a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal would not be 

remedied and that termination was in Children’s best interests were not clearly 

erroneous. 

[32] Affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 22 of 22

[33] Kirsch, J. and Robb, J. concur