* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-40949

Summary Calendar

LEONARD REED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Warden, Warden II, Coffield Unit; BERNIE L. BUSH, Captain,

Coffie l d Unit; WAYNE ASBERRY, Lieutenant, Coffield Unit; LISA MARTIN, Co. II, Coffield Unit;

RONNIE GOFF, Co. II, Coffield Unit,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

(6:96-CV-366)

October 20, 1997

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

On April 26, 1996, Leonard Reed, a Texas prisoner, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging

that his constitutional rights were violated by prison o fficials dur i ng three separate disciplinary2 James v. Hyatt Corp. , 981 F.2d 810, 812 (5th Cir. 1993).

3 Eason v. Thaler , 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).

4 Burrell v. New some , 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).

5 Id . at 419.

2 hearings. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge as authorized by 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). The magist rat e held a hearing on July 24, 1996 to develop the facts underlying Reed’s

complaint. On September 13, 1996, the magistrate judge dismissed this suit as frivolous under 28

U.S.C. §1915. Reed appeals.

This court reviews a judgment rendered by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) using

the same standards applied to final decisions by a district court judge. 2 Accordingly, the magistrate

judge’s decision to dismiss this suit as frivolous is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 3 We have

examined Reed’s arguments and the record. We find that the magist rat e judge did not abuse her

discretion.

Reed’s first two claims stem from disciplinary hearings held in November of 1993 and on

March 12, 1994. The magistrate judge found these claims barred by the statute of limitations. We

agree . The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is borrowed from the forum state’s general

personal injury limitations period. 4 In Texas, the forum state of this suit, the period is two years. 5

The injuries Reed allegedly suffered in the November 1993 and March 1994 hearings occurred more

than two years before this § 1983 action was commenced on April 26, 1996. As a result, both of these

claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Reed also alleges that prison o fficials violated his rights in a third disciplinary hearing held on

October 27, 1994. At the hearing, Reed was found guilty of sexual misconduct. He lost 14 days of6 Ordaz v. Martin

, No. 93-4170 at 11 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993) (unpublished opinion).

7 In Wolff v. McDonnell

, the Supreme Court found that prisoners are entitled to notice,

a hearing, and an opportuni ty to present witnesses before prison o fficials take away good time credits

or impose a sentence of solitary confinement upon the prisoner. 418 U.S. 539, 563-6 (1974). That

right to call witnesses is not absolute Members of the disciplinary committee may refuse to allow

a witness to testify if that testimony would be irrelevant, unnecessary, or hazardous to institutional

safety and correctional goals. Id . at 566-7.

8 Ordaz v. Martin

, No. 93-4170 at 12 (5th Cir., Sept. 15, 1993) (unpublished opinion).

3 good time credit, had his status reduced from “SAT-4" to “line class 2", and was placed into solitary

confinement for 15 days. First, Reed maintains that prison officials violated his right to privacy by

punishing him for acts performed in the privacy of his own cell. There is no merit to this contention.

“[M]asturbation does not qualify as a basic human need or a fundamental right protected under the

penumbral right to privacy.” 6

Reed also argues that prison o fficials vi o lat ed his procedural due process rights during the

third disciplinary hearing because a porti on of the hearing was conducted outside of his presence and

b ecause he was denied the testimony of a key witness, Officer Hart. 7 We disagree. Reed has

provided no factual basis to support these contentions. He has offered no theory to show that Officer

Hart possessed evidence that would help his cause. Nor has he shown that prison officials presented

any evidence outside of his presence. As a result, we find Reed’s procedural due process claim

meritless.

Finally, Reed maintains that his rights were violated by the filing of a false disciplinary report

against him. To succeed on this claim, Reed must show that the disciplinary proceedings terminated

in his favor. 8 They did not, and Reed’s argument must fail.

Reed’s appeal is DISMISSED.