DNA-TR-82-03 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, 2ND 

MARINE CORPS PROVISIONAL ATOMIC 

EXERCISE BRIGADE, EXERCISE DESERT 

ROCK V, OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 

Science Applications, Inc. 

P.O. Box 1303 

McLean, Virginia 22102 

5 February 1982 

Technical Report 

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ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, 2ND MARINE CORPS Technical Report 

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b y 

Operation Upshot-Knothole Radiation Exposure Assessment 

Exercise Desert Rock V Nuclear 'Test Personnel Review (NTPR) 

Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade 

Shot Badger 

ABSTRACT 

The radiation dose to Marine Brigade participants in Exercise Desert Rock V 

(Operation Upshot-Knothole, 1953) is reconstructed for each major brigade 

element" The exercise was centered around Shot Badger, from which almost 

all of the radiation dose resulted. Calculations and limited film badge 

dosimetry indicate typical doses of 3 to 4 rem for brigade personnel; however, some personnel of one battalion exceeded the 6 rem dose limit during 

an aborted maneuver, 

DD EDITION OF NOV I5 OBSOLETE , 1473 UNCLASSIFIED ‘N L F 

SECURITY OF PACE 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY OF Data 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SEC UR I T Y CLASSIFICATION OF 
Section 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

OF CONTENTS 

Page 

List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ........................... 3 

OPERATIONS . . . . . . . ..*.................................... 6 

2.1 Shot Data ............................................ 6 

2.2 Participants .......................................... 6 

2.3 Concept of Operations ................................. 7 

2.4 Pre-Shot Operations ................................... 9 

2.5 Shot Scenario ......................................... 10 

INITIAL RADIATION . ..*................................... 13 

3.1 Computational Method ................................. 13 

3.2 Results .............................................. 16 

RESIDUAL RADIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

4.1 Radiological Safety and Radiation Measurements .......... 18 

4.2 Pre-Shot Radiation Exposure ............................ 22 

4.3 Shot Day Exposure ..................................... 22 

4.4 Summary of Residual Radiation ......................... 30 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE 

DETERMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

5.1 Uncertainty Analysis ................................... 32 

5.2 Total Dose Summary ................................... 37 

DOSIMETRY ............................................... 38 

6.1 1st Rattalion, Sth Marines .............................. 38 

6.2 2nd Battalion, 3rd Warines .............................. 40 

6.3 Marine Air Group-16 ................................... 41 

6.4 Headquarters ......................................... 41 

CONCLUSIONS . . . . ..*..................................... 42 

References ........................,..................... 44 

1 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure Page 

l-l Selected Shot Locations, Operation Upshot-Knothole ............ 4 

2-l Planned Marine Brigade Maneuver, Shot Badger ................. 8 

2-2 Actual Marine Brigade Maneuver, Shot Badger .................. 11 

3-l Shot Badger Initial Gamma Dose .............................. 17 

4-1 Shot Badger Residual Radiation and Troop Movements ........... 31 

2 
SECTION 1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

This report presents an analysis of nuclear radiation exposure for personnel of 

the 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade during their participation in 

Exercise Desert Rock V (Operation at Nevada Proving Grounds (now 

Nevada Test Site) in 1953. These units were part of a brigade maneuver that was 

controlled by command and staff elements of a Marine division and brigade, the other 

maneuver units of which were simulated. The exercise took place over a period of a 

week, during which time the marines trained, rehearsed, observed the nuclear burst 

designated Badger, conducted their maneuver, and viewed the effects of the nuclear 

burst on typical military equipment. 

The brigade activities are examined for the period of residence at Camp Desert 

Rock in mid-April 1953. Figure shows the features of relevance to brigade 

activities in Nevada Proving Grounds. Although there was general participation in 

only one actual burst, the residual radiation from all previous bursts in Operation 

Upshot-Knothole was examined to determine the dose contribution to the marines 

during all their activities. Time-dependent position information is determined and 

presented in order that a complete exposure analysis can be performed. External dose 

is reconstructed and the uncertainties associated therewith are calculated. 

Several documents were available from which to piece together a description of 

the events and activities in sufficient detail to facilitate meaningful analysis. 

action reports of the Marine Brigade (including comments, recommendations, and 

endorsements) and Exercise Desert Rock V describe the operations as they occurred, 

both for the maneuver elements and for other units that related to brigade activities. 

Planning documents were used to augment activity descriptions and to assist in the 

interpretation of some unclear passages. The above were supplemented by military 

judgment for some of the unstated details of troop movements necessary for exposure 

analysis. 
BADGER 

NANCY 

I News Nob, 

Control 

Point 

NEVADA 

PROVING 

GROUNDS 

•

RUTH 

@ANNIE 

Check Points 

MILES 

2 I 0 2 4 6 8 

I i 

Figure l-l Selected Shot Locations, Operation Upshot-Knothole 

4 
 

A major obstacle to the preparation of this report was the lack of systematic 

radiological survey data for the area of brigade operations. The usual survey data 

were demonstrably inadequate for resolution of the radiation environment encountered 

by the marines. Yowever, the limited rad-safe data reported by the marines and by 

other Desert Rock V participants proved sufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of 

the dose to major elements of the Marine Brigade. Either mean or high-sided dose 

estimates are provided for all major elements. Reasonable constraints on the 

maneuvers and the radiological environment form the basis for an uncertainty analysis. 

Important data for this exercise exist in the form of film badge dosimetry. 

Although film badges were issued to the marines on a limited basis only, a significant 

and representative portion of these dose records is available. These data are used to 

verify the calculations and to identify certain details of brigade activities. 

Major findings of this report are: 

0 The radiation exposure to troops of the 2nd Warine Corps Provisional 

Atomic Exercise Brigade was due almost entirely to residual radiation from 

Shot Badger. 

0 Personnel of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, have film badge 

readings as high as 7.1 rem, which exceeds the Exercise Desert Rock V 

dose limit of 6 rem. The calculated gamma dose for the most-exposed 

personnel of the battalion is 4.7 3 rem. These doses were accrued during . 

close passage of the nuclear cloud stem and while seeking areas less 

contaminated by the fallout. 

0 Personnel of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, have calculated 

gamma doses of 3.0 rem, resulting from their tour of the equipment 

display area. Corresponding badge readings averaged 3.3 rem, and no 

badges exceeded the 6 rem limit. 

0 Brigade personnel received doses calculated to be 3.7 

rem. This compares well with the corresponding average of 3.5 rem from 

limited records. 

5 
 

-

SECTION 2 

OPERATIONS 

Shot Badger was the sixth in a series of eleven nuclear tests conducted 

at the Nevada Proving Grounds in 1953. The series of shots is known as Operation Upshot-Knothole. Military exercises conducted in conjunction with this 

operation were named Exercise Desert Rock V. Battalion-size units conducted 

post-shot maneuvers in conjunction with several of the shots. Shot Badger was 

the only shot in which personnel of the 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic 

Exercise Brigade (MCPAEB) participated in a tactical operation. 

2.1 SYOT DATA (References 1, 2) 

Date: 18 April 1953, 0435 hours, Pacific Standard Time 

Location: Area T-2; UTM Coordinates 784104; 

Yield: 23 KT on a 300’ steel tower 

2.2 PARTICIPANTS 2nd Marine Corps Provisional 

Atomic Exercise Brigade” 

Approximate 

Personnel 

Headquarters, 2nd MCPAEB 152 

1st Battalion 8th Marine Regiment 862 

H&S Company 

Company A 

Company B

Company C 

2nd Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment 907 

H&S Company 

Company D 

Company E 

Company F 

Marine Air Group 16 (Helicopter Transport) 

220 

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 162 

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 163 

Helicopter Transport Squadron 361 

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 362 

Helicopter Transport Squadron 363 

TOTAL 2,167 [sic] 

*Activated on 2 March 1953. Subordinate units placed under the brigade’s 

operational control on the following dates: 2nd Marines, 25 March 1953; 

1st Marines, 1 April 1953; 25 March 1953. 

**Reference 5 
2.3 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

The exercise was designed to achieve the following objectives 

(Reference 5). 

To familiarize personnel with the effects of nuclear weapons. 

To test and further develop tactics and techniques for placing 

helicopter-borne forces on objectives immediately following a 

nuclear burst. 

To afford commanders and staffs realistic training in planning and 

conducting operations that are supported by nuclear weapons. 

To provide realistic training in radiological survey operations. 

To familiarize personnel with the individual and collective means 

of protection from the effects of nuclear weapons. 

Because of the short time interval between the activation of the 2nd 

MCPAEB (2 March 53) and the originally scheduled date (11 April 1953) for Shot 

Badger, maneuvers planned for this shot were not very complex. The basic 

maneuver plan called for all marines (except helicopter crews) to observe the 

shot from trenches in a simulated beachhead 4000 yards SSW of GZ. Ten minutes 

after the detonation, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (on the right) would begin a 

ground assault toward an objective area approximately 2000 yards from ground 

zero (see Figure 2-l). Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd (less 

Company E) would start a ground assault along the left (west) flank toward a 

second objective area, 2000 yards to their front. The brigade headquarters would 

follow the advancing battalions, maintaining a position between the two units. 

When the maneuver ended, the assault troops were to assemble and move 

administratively on foot through the display area. Equipment was located in 

groups placed at 500-650, 1000-1090, and 1700-1730 yards from GZ. Uniformed 

mannequins were located at the latter range and at 2600 yards (Reference 3). 
 - I

Planned Marine Elaneuver, Shot 
Within minutes after the shot, 39 helicopters from MAC-16 would move 

from the helicopter staging area (at the airstrip on Yucca to the helicopter 

loading zone, south of the trench area (see Figures l-l and 2-l). Upon landing, 

two helicopters would embark radiation survey teams and transport them to a 

third objective area, located to the west of the two battalion objectives. When 

the area was declared radiologically all helicopters would embark 

Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, and transport them to that objective. 

Upon completion of the airlift, the helicopters were to return to the 

vicinity of the trenches. From there the air group personnel would be 

transported by bus through the equipment display area, where they would view 

the effect of the detonation on the equipment and materials. 

2.4 PRE-SHOT OPERATIONS 

On April 6, 1953, 75 Marine Corps personnel, members of the advance 

party of the 2nd MCPAEB, observed Shot Dixie from Yews Nob, miles away. 

This weapon, with a yield of 11 KT, was detonated at a height of 6020 feet over 

area T-7(3) (coordinates 87 1045). The men returned to Camp Desert Rock 

shortly after the detonation. 

On April 11, 1953, 25 brigade officers witnessed the detonation of Shot 

Ray, a 0.2 KT device atop a tower in Area 4, coordinates 806060. They 

saw the shot from News Nob, miles from GZ, and returned to Camp Desert 

Rock shortly thereafter. 

Three days after the arrival at Camp Desert Rock of the main body of 

the 2nd MCPAEB, a complete rehearsal of the operations for Shot Badger was 

conducted on 16 April 1953. All brigade personnel arrived in the trench area by 

1005 hours in preparation for a simulated detonation at 1051 hours. Immediately 

after the simulated detonation, the troops attacked north toward their assigned 

objectives. The Company E airlift to its objective was completed by 

approximately 1130 hours, and the helicopters returned to Camp Desert Rock at 

1220 hours. The ground attacks were halted at a pre-designated location; the 

9 
troops then moved through the equipment display area to note its pre-shot 

condition prior to their departure for Camp Desert Rock at 1345 hours. 

At the conclusion of the rehearsal, it was determined that the operation 

plan was basically sound. The only changes made were in connection with the 

helicopter lift. These changes involved reducing each helicopter load to three 

men (plus crew) instead of five because of the density altitude and atmospheric 

conditions at the maneuver area (Reference 5). 

2.5 SHOT SCENARIO 

Marine troop movement began at 1700 hours on D-l April) when 39 

helicopters flew from Camp Desert Rock to the staging area at Yucca Lake. 

They remained at this location until after the shot. At 2317 hours on D-l, all 

maneuver troops and the ground echelon of MAG-16 departed Camp Desert Rock 

by vehicular convoy up Mercury Highway (see Figure 1-l). They arrived in the 

trench area at approximately 0255 hours on 18 April. Prior to entering the 

trenches at 0425 hours, the troops received a final orientation on the effects of 

nuclear weapons and the safety procedures to be observed (Reference 5). 

Shot Badger was detonated on schedule at 0435 hours. After the shock 

wave passed the trenches, the troops (the 1st and 2nd Rattalions) prepared for 

the attack on their respective objectives (see Figure The 1st Battalion, 

which -was attacking on the right flank, turned west after encountering a highly 

contaminated area within 500 yards of the trenches. Because the cumulative 

dose received by some personnel during this detour, as noted by pocket 

dosimeters, exceeded the maneuver guideline, the battalion was ordered to 

terminate its maneuver. They returned to the trench area, where they remained 

until the exercise was completed. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion (less Company 

advanced in its zone of action (left flank) as planned (Figure 2-2) and reached 

its objective by 0605 hours (Reference 3). 

10 
I

SHOT BADGER 

Area , 

YARDS 

Figure 2-2. Actual Erigade Shot Badger. 

11 
At 0446 hours, two pathfinder helicopters arrived at the trenches and 

embarked the radiation monitor teams that preceeded the Company airlift to 

the objective area. The objective was declared radiologically safe at 

approximately 0455 hours, and the airlift was completed at 0525 hours 

(Reference 5). 

completion of the airlift, the helicopters returned to the 

embarkation area behind the trenches. From there, the helicopter crews and 

ground echelon were transported through the display area via bus convoy 

(Reference 5). It is estimated that the tour of the display area was completed 

shortly after 0600 hours, at which time the crews returned to Camp Desert Rock 

via helicopter. The ground echelon probably remained in the vicinity of the 

trenches with the 1st Battalion. 

Brigade Headquarters personnel, who had departed the trenches at 0445 

hours, preceeded the 2nd Battalion through the equipment display area along the 

same route as that designated for the 2nd Battalion. They arrived back at the 

trench area at approximately 0700 hours, where they joined the Battalion and 

the ground echelon of securing its objectives, the 2nd Battalion 

formed for the administrative move through the display area. It is estimated 

that the tour through the display area was completed by 0800 hours. Entrucking 

the brigade for the return trip probably accomplished before 0830 hours, 

with the last march unit departing the trench area at about 0900. The movement 

to Camp Desert was completed at 1103 hours (Reference nearly on 

schedule. 

The times estimated above are based on plans (Reference 4) that must 

have been adhered to (except for the 1st Battalion) because the arrival at Camp 

Desert Rock was nearly on schedule. The presence of contamination of the 

planned return route, noted in Reference 5 and discussed in Reference would 

have only minimally delayed the brigade. After earlier (non-Marine) march units 

had encountered the an efficient detour would have been 

arranged in time for the Marine march units. 

12 
SECTION 3 

INITIAL 

Shot Badger is investigated to determine the possible exposure of Marine 

participants to initial neutron and gamma radiation. This section discusses the 

general method used to compute the initial radiation dose to personnel. 

3.1 COMPUTATIONAL METHOD 

Because the personnel were located in trenches at the time of 

detonation, the calculation of the radiation doses for Marine participants is 

accomplished in two steps. First, the free-field radiation environment above the 

trenches is determined. This environment is then used to calculate the radiation 

doses to personnel in the trenches. This methodology is similar to that used in 

References 9 and 

In the first step, the neutron and gamma radiation environment is 

determined with computer codes ATR4 (Reference 12) and ATR4.1 (Reference 

13). These codes predict free-field neutron and gamma doses in the vicinity of a 

nuclear detonation. The first code contains provisions to correct for the 

presence of Nevada soil at the air-ground interface; the second, although based 

on a West German soil type, contains improved source-energy-dependent 

correction factors to account for the air-ground interface. is 

generally used to calculate neutron and neutron-induced gamma radiation, which 

are sensitive to the hydrogen (water) content of the soil (Reference while 

is used to calculate fission product gamma and prompt gamma (emitted 

directly from the fission reaction) radiation, neither of which is sensitive to the 

presence of hydrogen in the soil. Neutron doses are calculated from 

tissue kerma factors, while the Henderson tissue response function is used to 

determine gamma doses (Reference 12). 

Required input to the computer code includes the neutron output 

spectrum of the device, and geometrical and meteorological data. The neutron 
output spectrum for Shot Badger was developed by Los Scientific 

Laboratory (Reference 17) for use in these calculations. Meteorological and 

geometrical (e.g., height of burst, ground zero elevation) data are taken from 

References 19 and The output of ATR --neutron and gamma doses as a 

function of range--can be compared with existing dose measurements for each 

shot to gauge the accuracy of the results. Unfortunately, insufficient neutron 

activation foil measurements were made during this shot to allow experimental 

confirmation of calculated neutron doses. Only gold foils (to measure low energy 

neutrons, 0.3 sulfur foils (to measure fast neutrons, 3 and various 

experimental materials (i.e., iodine, indium, and zirconium) were used as neutron 

detectors (References 21, 22, 23). There is an abundance of free-field gamma 

dose data available (References 24, 25, 26, 3) however, and these are utilized to 

verify the ATR results. 

The second step of the calculation uses the free-field radiation 

environment to determine the dose within the trench. It is convenient to define 

a trench factor as the ratio of dose (neutron or gamma) in the trench to dose 

(neutron or gamma) above the trench. These factors must be calculated for each 

of the major components of radiation--neutron, secondary gamma (created by 

neutron capture or inelastic scattering in the atmosphere and ground), local 

gamma (created locally be neutron capture in the trench walls), and fission 

product (debris) gamma. It is found that the trench factors depend also on 

ground range, height of burst, weapon yield, trench dimensions, and depth in the 

trench. For Shot Badger, the Marine participants were in trenches 

approximately two feet wide and a minimum of five feet deep. The in-trench 

free-field neutron and gamma doses for personnel in a crouched position are 

calculated at a depth of 2.33 feet below the lip of the trench, which corresponds 

approximately to the mid-torso depth for personnel in this position. For 

personnel standing upright in the trench, as probably occurred soon after passage 

of the shock wave, free-field doses are calculated at a point six inches below the 

lip at the mid-trench position; this corresponds approximately to the location of 

a properly-worn film badge for a standing observer. discussions of the 

derivations of the various trench factors are presented in Appendix I of 

Reference 10. 

14 
The in-trench dose (in rads) is converted to an equivalent tissue dose (in 

rem) using the quality factors and methods prescribed in Reference 15. The 

to-rem conversion factor for neutrons, derived from calculations utilizing 

computer codes DOT (Reference and MORSE (Reference is an almost 

constant value of 13 for the weapon types and range of interest. The quality 

factor for gamma radiation is taken to be unity. Finally, representative film 

badge readings for personnel in the trenches are estimated. The factors that are 

used to the in-trench free-field doses to chest-worn film badge readings 

were developed from calculations utilizing the mode of the computer 

code MORSE. These film badge conversion factors are strongly dependent on the 

posture and orientation of the personnel in the trench; mean values of these 

parameters were determined from MORSE calculations involving extreme 

variations in individual posture and orientation. The “dose equivalent in trench” 

values reported below are the equivalent tissue dose for neutron radiation and 

the film badge dose for gamma radiation. 

The neutron, secondary gamma, and local gamma doses are accrued 

rapidly (essentially within the first second) after detonation. Thus, the posture 

in a trench could not be altered significantly during this exposure. The debris 

gamma dose, however, is delivered over a period of many seconds. Therefore, 

the possibility of individual reorientation (e.g., standing up) in the trench must be 

considered. It is unlikely that a person crouched in the trench at the time of 

detonation would have attempted any significant movement until after the shock 

wave had passed and the blast winds had subsided. Therefore it is assumed that, 

within a few seconds after passage of the shock wave, most of the observers 

were standing upright in the trench, watching the rising cloud. This 

reorientation changed both the trench factors and film badge conversion factors 

for such an individual. The methodology used to determine the debris gamma 

contribution to personnel film badge doses is described in References 9 and 10. 

It is assumed in these calculations that the participants stood upright in the 

trenches at three seconds after the shock wave passed their positions, or 13 

seconds after the detonation. 

15 
3.2 RESULTS 

The initial radiation dose to those who observed Shots Dixie and Ray 

from News Nob, than 10 miles from the burst, was insignificant. The 

calculated gamma dose-range curve for Shot Badger is shown in Figure 3-1, along 

with data from References 24, 25, and 3. It is seen that the calculated dose 

curve agrees well with the Project data beyond 1500 yards, but that the 

general trend of the data indicates that the calculated curve may underpredict 

at the range of the troop trenches (4000 yards). Therefore, the gamma dose for 

the range of these trenches is developed by extrapolating from the Project 10.3 

data, thereby insuring a conservative (high-sided) estimate. The total gamma 

dose thus derived is then proportioned among secondary, debris, and prompt 

gamma contributors using ratios derived from the ATR4 calculation. 

Appropriate factors (trench and film badge conversion) are applied to each of 

these components to calculate the total film badge dose (dose equivalent in 

trench). 

The estimated radiation environment at the troop trenches is presented 

below: 

Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench 150 

Oose equivalent in trench 6 

16 
 10.3 East Lin 

10.3 North 

Rock Data 

-Calculated (ATR) 

e 

ne 

1000 

Data 

Data 

2000 3000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-l Shot Badger Initial Gamma Dose 

17 
SECTION 4 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 

Residual gamma doses for brigade elements are reconstructed from the 

available descriptions of their activities in the post-shot radiation environments. 

Those environments cannot be determined solely from official radiation surveys 

because the surveys inadequately characterize the fallout field in the brigade 

area of operations. Moreover, the surveys did not reflect the intensities 

encountered by one battalion during passage of the nuclear cloud stem and during 

fallout deposition. Some other reports of radiation readings are available, 

fortunately, for estimation of the real-time radiation environments. 

Film badge dose estimates must reflect the presence of the human body 

in the measured radiological environment. Despite the penetrating ability of 

gamma rays from fission and activation products, the body affords some 

shielding; hence, the gamma dose to any organ depends on the geometry of the 

radiation source and the body position. In order to represent reconstructed film 

badge readings, gamma doses are calculated for the surface of the chest, where 

a film badge is normally worn. The calculated film badge dose is derived from 

the integrated free-field gamma intensity through the conversion factor r-O.7 

rem as used in previous reports (e.g., Reference 

Because of the limited data concerning the details of troop activities, 

estimates are required for rates of movement and the stay times at various 

displays. Rates of movement are generally as described in or inferred from 

plans, allowing for inertial aspects of large groups as well as terrain and 

visibility factors. A reasonable and consistent set of parameters is 70 yds/min 

walking speed and 5 minutes stay time at each Marine equipment display 

grouping encountered. Additional assumptions are noted as required. 

4.1 SAFETY AND RADIATION MEASUREMENTS 

The Brigade participating in Shot Badger operated under a set of 

radiological procedures somewhat different from those for other Desert Rock V 

18 
participants. Although Desert Rock rad-safe personnel provided their usual 

service of surveying the area of operations, Marine personnel also had a role in 

rad-safe activities. The Marine Brigade Rad-Safe Section was responsible for 

decontamination and the issue of film badges (Reference 7). In addition, 

monitors were to record radiation levels in front of the maneuvering battalions. 

Although the Exercise Desert Rock rad-safe limit was 2.5 for pedestrians 

(Reference the Marine maneuver troops were allowed to traverse areas up to 

5 (Reference No one was to receive more than 6 rem total dose for the 

exercise. Additional guidance for the Marines was for the battalion commanders 

to take evasive action if pocket dosimeter readings reached 3 rem. 

Control of film badges was a primary function of the Brigade Rad-Safe 

Section. Operation Plan 1-53 (Reference 7) indicates that film badges were to 

be issued to all personnel going to the forward area. However, this was 

superseded by a Camp Desert Rock policy, instituted after Shot Nancy, under 

which film badges were to be issued to only one person per platoon (Reference 

3). Careful records were to be kept from issue on the day before the shot to 

badge return on shot day. Partial dose records are available; these are discussed 

in Section 6. 

The measurements of three groups are used for gamma dose reconstruction: (1) the Rad-Safe Unit organized under the auspices of the Atomic Energy 

Commission and assigned to Camp hlercury for Operation 

Knothole, the Camp Desert Rock Rad-Safe Section, supported by the 50th 

Chemical Platoon, which provided radiation safety services to Desert Rock 

military personnel participating in Operation Upshot-Knothole, and the 

volunteer observers, who measured gamma intensities along the west boundary of 

the display area after witnessing the shot from trenches 2000 yards from 

(Reference 

The AEC Rad-Safe Unit was responsible for monitoring the overall 

radiological conditions, both on- and off-site. Post-shot data from this group 

included residual radiation intensity mappings of the test site. These are 

19 
 

 

available for four times within five days after the Badger detonation (Reference 

8). Shot contours do not sufficiently resolve the fallout 

pattern in the maneuver area to allow their use in dose reconstruction 

(References 3, 5, and Although the contours reflect the high intensity levels 

that necessitated the 1st Rattalion’s withdrawal at about 3500 yards 

they greatly overestimate the intensity at 1000 yards where the 

service observers were able to view the displays (References 6 and The 

contours are some use, however, in that they provide information regarding 

the gradient of the intensity along the western boundary of the display area. 

Only two statements are available regarding measurements by the 

Desert Rock Rad-Safe Section. The first team of the 50th Chemical Platoon to 

survey along the eastern boundary of the display area encountered an intensity of 

40 to 50 shortly after the shot. This unusually high reading, associated with 

passage of the nuclear cloud stem, quickly fell to 14 (Reference 3). Not 

:nentioned is the fallout that resulted in the residual reading. The Reference 

also reports a transient reading of 1 the trench area.” This would have 

been noted in the center of the trench area, between the Marine battalions, 

where the Desert Rock Group was located. 

Other Desert Rock rad-safe data consist of dose readings from film 

badges located at five types of positions at 500-yard intervals 

(Reference Although intended to provide a measure of the dose from initial 

radiation, these badges also recorded a residual radiation dose until such time as 

they could be recovered. From aerial photographs and Desert Rock V photographs (Reference 3) for several shots, it is noted that the positions ranged from 

stakes in open terrain at the eastern edge of the display area to bunkers near the 

midline of the display area. 

On the stakes, the badges were fully exposed to the initial radiation. 

The badge readings at 2000, 2500, 3000, and 3500 yards from were 110, 53, 

56, and 8 rem, respectively. the range-dose curve in Figure 3-1, the initial 

radiation contribution is subtracted, leaving residual radiation doses of 35, 39, 53 

20 
 

and 7.5 rem for the four distances, respectively. (At ranges closer to the 

initial radiation dose masks any residual dose to these). Fallout 

gamma intensities can be inferred from these readings if badge recovery times 

can be determined, if the dose contribution from stem passage can be estimated, 

and if the time of fallout deposition is identified. 

Doses for the other four types of position also demonstrate the influence 

of residual radiation (ascertained by comparison with doses obtained at other 

shots). These positions were shallow and deep slit trenches and one-and two-man 

bunkers. Radges in the bottom of the positions were shielded to varying (but 

undetermined) degrees from initial radiation, stem-borne activity, and fallout. 

However, in all four cases, the readings at 3000 yards were considerably 

higher than those at 2000, 2500, and 3500 yards. It is possible that intensities at 

3000 yards were not much greater, but enough to further delay badge recovery at 

that distance, resulting in a longer period of dose accrual. The film badge 

readings do not permit a quantitative assessment of the intensity field. The 

major conclusion to be drawn from these data is the location and extent of an 

anomalous region of fallout deposition. 

The radiation measurements from the volunteer observers (Reference 

provide the most dependable information about intensities along the west 

boundary of the display area. They noted intensities as high as 50 as the 

nuclear cloud passed over their trench, 2000 yards from at about 

minutes, but no longer noted these high intensities after they had walked to the 

west boundary. There, still at 2000 yards, the observers reported readings of 

about 1 at nine to eleven minutes after the shot. While walking back toward 

the main trench area, they reported intensities of 0.5 at 2100 yards, 0.32 

at 2500 yards, and 0.12 at 3000 yards from GZ. Corresponding times 

were 14, 19, and 25 rninutes after the shot. The reading at 25 

likely represents the level of activity remaining after the cessation of fallout. It 

therefore is the most useful measurement for use in dose reconstruction along 

the west boundary radial. 

21 
4.2 PRE-SHOT RADIATION EXPOSURE 

Participants in the Marine Brigade Exercise were exposed to residual 

radiation from Shot Nancy on two occasions. The first was during the rehearsal 

conducted on 16 April, two days before Shot Badger. The second occurred on 

shot day when the exercise was conducted in the Nancy field. In both 

cases, the dose received was small compared to that from Shot Badger. 

During the rehearsal, Marine radiation monitors reported residual intensities of 10 to 90 (Reference 5). An examination of post-shot surveys of 

the Nancy fallout field indicates that the residual intensity in the vicinity of the 

Badger trenches was about 10 mr/hr. Intensities within the exercise area are not 

resolved by data from the Rad-Safe Unit; however, it should be noted that 100 

readings had not been reported in the vicinity for more than a week 

(Reference and thus peak readings rather less than the marines’ are implied. 

In either case, most of the rehearsal was at or near the trenches, so that 

the total film badge dose was likely about 50 mrem (25 mrem at a minimum). 

In the to 3-hour wait at the trench area for the Badger detonation, the 

troops would have accrued up to an additional 20 mrem from the Nancy fallout. 

Thereafter, the residual radiation from Nancy was masked by that from Badger 

and is not calculated separately. 

4.3 SHOT DAY EXPOSURE 

The residual radiation exposure of the Marine Brigade is calculated for 

each of the major brigade elements that engaged in distinct activities and for 

which sufficient information concerning the radiation environment is available. 

The spacing of the brigade elements within the maneuver area warrants 

individual dose reconstructions for the four major participating groups: the 1st 

Battalion, 8th Marines; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines; Marine Air Croup-16; and 2nd 

Headquarters. 
4.3.1 1st Battalion, 8th Marines 

The 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, operated in the eastern portion of the 

display area, where it experienced high gamma intensities associated with the 

passage of the nuclear cloud stem and subsequent fallout deposition. Doses 

accumulated early in its advance exceeded the 3 rem level above which the 

battalion was required to move out of a contaminated area (Reference 7). 

to proceed more than 500’ yards toward the assigned objective, it 

nevertheless accrued significant additional dose in evading the area of greatest 

perceived contamination. As some elements of the battalion exceeded the 

allowable dose limit of 6 rem during this evasion, the battalion withdrew to the 

trench area and was not permitted to continue the maneuver or to tour the 

display area. 

Reconstruction of film badge doses for the 1st Battalion is possible only 

for those elements whose movements can be related to the limited rad-safe data 

introduced previously. Only the troops on the right flank of the battalion would 

have both walked near the road (east radial) used by the 50th Chemical Platoon 

survey team and advanced as far as 500 yards (to near the film badge on the 

stake). A dose reconstruction for the right flank personnel provides a high-sided 

dose estimate for the 1st Battalion, as gamma intensities were increasing with 

distance to the north and east. That the right flank personnel accrued the 

greatest dose is confirmed by Marine dosimeter readings (Reference 5). 

As the limited rad-safe data do not explicitly relate a gamma intensity 

to a position and time, auxiliary data are used to develop this relationship. The 

50th Chemical Platoon survey data require augmentation with respect to position 

and duration of the intensities cited. For the film badges at positions, the time 

dependence of intensity must be unraveled from the total badge reading, which 

represents the time-integrated intensity. 

Peak intensities and their duration are related to the movement and 

dimensions of the nuclear cloud stem. The relevant portion of the stem drifted 

with the near-surface winds, which were 9 knots at the time of burst 

23 
 

 

 3). After a slight shift in wind direction, the MCPAEB estimated a speed of 

to 15 knots. The low figure, used as being more consistent with the scenario 

of brigade events, corresponds to movement of about 300 yd/min. At higher 

speeds, the attack, scheduled for minutes after burst, would 

not have gotten underway before the stem reached its position 4000 yards from 

such time, the stern diameter was roughly 1 mile. Because the stem 

passed over only part of the display area, the Battalion would not have 

experienced radiation from the full diameter. Perhaps mile, or about 3 

minutes worth, of stem passed over them. It is assumed that the radiation dose 

from the stem is reasonably obtained by associating that duration with the peak 

intensity (edge effects neglected). 

In order to utilize the intensities reported by the 50th Chemical Platoon 

survey team, it is to demonstrate that these readings were obtained 

close to the maneuvering 1st Battalion. The survey teams witnessed the 

detonation from Parking about 3 miles behind the trenches. At 

minutes, or on order of the Exercise Director (Reference they were to move 

by jeep to locations on either side of the display area at 3500 yards from 

where they were to begin surveying toward Their speed in approaching the 

display area is not known, is unlikely to have been as great as 30 mph on the 

unsurfaced roads. Even at that speed, the team on the east would have taken 8 

minutes to travel the approximately road miles to its initial surveying point. If 

the departed on schedule, it would have encountered the stem radiation in 

the 13th minute after burst, between 3500 and 4000 yards from at which 

range the 1st Battalion was already maneuvering. Thus, the peak intensity of 

50 encountered by the survey team must have been about the same as 

encountered by the right flank of the battalion. 

Once the survey team encountered radiation, its advance would have 

been more circumspect. Taken unawares by intensities ten times their 

perrnitted of 5 the rad-safe teams may have been uncertain how 

to proceed. They probably did not progress far in any direction while the stem 

passed over them. When the intensity subsided only to 14 with no 

24 
 

 

----

immediate prospects for its dropping to 5 they would have withdrawn from 

the display area. The survey team could not have continued toward without 

encountering still higher intensities (as can be demonstrated from the high film 

badge readings on closer-in stakes, regardless of the time of badge recovery). 

Consequently, both the 50 and 14 readings appear to have been relevant 

to the 1st Battalion’s (right flank) exposure. 

The statement in Reference 3 regarding the 14 reading does not 

clarify whether fallout was essentially complete by the time the stem had 

passed, in which case decay could be applied to the intensity at subsequent 

times, or whether fallout deposition persisted, keeping the intensity near 14 

for an extended interval. That fallout deposition continued for a brief interval is 

deduced from the residual radiation contribution (7.5 rem) to the stake reading 

at 3500 yards. The aforementioned intensities should roughly apply to this 

position. Camp Desert Rock evaluators, seeking to recover film badges from the 

positions, would have arrived when intensities had diminished to 5 If 

14 applied at about minutes, then recovery could have been as soon as 

minutes, if t-1.2 decay were immediately applicable. The dose from this 

exposure in addition to the 50 for 3 rninutes from stem passage is only 5.2 

rem. The 7.5 rem is obtained if 14 persisted until minutes (from 

continued fallout), and t decay applied thereafter (recovery at 5 at 

minutes)*. 

These results are applied to scenario of 1st Rattalion activities to 

determine the dose to the right flank. Although the stem was observed heading 

toward the trench area by minutes (Reference the import of this 

phenomenon was evidently unrealized; no command decisions are documented 

therefrom. As initial radiological reconnaissance in front of the battalion would 

have detected no contamination, the maneuver would have begun as scheduled at 

minutes. From about to minutes, the battalion would have been 

exposed to the passing stem. At about minutes, the battalion had advanced 

about 500 yards to the line, where it halted, evidently because of a 

3.5 rem pocket dosimeter reading (Reference 5). The calculated film badge dose 

rem for the unshielded film badge on the stake. 

25 
to this point is 2.1 rem. After a wait of about 5 minutes to effect a change of 

direction, the battalion proceeded westward, likely at a slower pace in order to 

better apprised of the radiological situation. It had time to progress to the 

midline of the display area and halt when doses in excess of the 6 rem limit were 

reported, before beginning to withdraw to the trench area at the minutes 

cited in Reference 5. Even at the midline of the display area, 3500 yards from 

intensities remained high, as evidenced by the film badge reading from the 

bunker there. The intensity encountered by the 1st Rattalion is assumed to have 

remained constant, except for decay, throughout its westward march. The 

applicability of this assumption, in light of the readings at the various positions, 

is examined in Section 5. the time that withdrawal began, dosimeters read as 

high as 7.5 rem; the calculated film badge dose to that point is 4.4 rem. In the 

500 yards back to the trenches, the intensity dropped dramatically to the 

insignificant levels encountered by the rest of the MCPAER. The dosimeters 

indicated no further dose accrual; the maximum reading back at Camp Desert 

Rock was still 7.5 rem (Reference A reasonable in intensity gives an 

additional calculated film badge dose of 0.2 rem, for an exercise total of 4.6 

rem. 

With regard to the remainder of the 1st Battalion, it is evident that the 

left flank and rear elements would have accrued far lesser doses. When the stem 

passed, some elements would have been no closer to the right flank, at 50 

than to the Desert Rock Control Group, at I in the center of the trench 

area. With some type of logarithmic interpolation likely applicable, these troops 

would have been exposed to less than those elements that did 

not advance the full 500 yards before turning would have had less exposure to 

fallout than the forward companies. 

Available documents do not indicate the relative positioning of the 

companies for the battalion maneuver; this is determined empirically from the 

dosimetry data and is discussed in Section 6. 

26 
4.3.2 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines 

This battalion completed the entire exercise as planned. The first phase, 

to secure an objective 2000 yards north of the trenches and just west of the 

display area, was accomplished within 90 minutes of the detonation (Reference 

5). Radiation levels along the west boundary of the display area (west radial) are 

estimated from the volunteer observer measurement of 0.12 at 3000 yards 

from 25 minutes after the shot; the shot-day contours plotted 

by the Rad-Safe Unit, which imply a factor-of-ten variation in intensity for each 

1200 yards; and decay. 

After securing the objective, the battalion proceeded through the display 

area, stopping at the Marine display groupings. Starting at 2000 yards from 

the battalion moved northward along the west radial until it reached the displays 

between 500 and 650 yards from the service observers, whose earlier 

minute) movements were limited to the displays (Reference 

the 2nd Battalion was probably able to view the closest displays without 

exceeding its 5 rad-safe limit at their approximate arrival time of H+ 135 

minutes. 

The battalion then proceeded to the east radial and turned south toward 

the trench area, stopping again at each major display grouping. Radiation levels 

along the east radial are estimated from four sources -- the known observation 

of the displays at 1000 and 1700 yards by the service observers (within their 2.5 

rad-safe limit), the assumption of similar intensities along the radials at 

corresponding close-in distances, exponential intensity gradient along the east 

radial, and t -1.2 decay. At roughly 2800 yards, the battalion had to detour to 

the west to avoid the heaviest fallout region. Its course likely followed the 5 

limit until intensities decreased near the trenches. The exposure to 5 is 

assumed to have persisted to near the trenches. 

That intensities would have reached 5 as calculated, during the 

return along the east radial is confirmed by analysis of the film badge reading 

from the stake at 3000 yards. the method described previously, the portion of 

27 
the dose due to residual radiation, 53 rem, is consistent with recovery (at 5 

at about hours, roughly the time at which the 2nd Battalion passed nearby. 

Readings from other positions at that distance appear to indicate (with badge 

shielding taken into account! that still higher intensities were present in the 

vicinity. 

The 2nd Battalion is estimated to have received a film badge dose of 2.9 

rem during its maneuvers. Almost all of this dose was accrued during the tour of 

the display area. The largest portion was received while returning to the 

trenches along the 5 line. Company E, although airlifted from the trenches 

to its objective, is calculated to have received a dose of 2.8 rem, similar because 

it moved through the displays with the remainder of the battalion. 

4.3.3 Marine Air Group-16 

The dose received by MAG-16 personnel can be estimated from their 

movements, except regarding the route used by the helicopters in moving from 

their staging area at Yucca Lake to the Company E loading area to the south of 

the trenches. 5 states that the helicopters had to “select alternate 

routes around the atomic and dust area The reference further states that 

two pathfinder helicopters arrived at the loading area eleven minutes after the 

shot to airlift the rad-safe teams to the vicinity of the objective. This time is 

too early for these helicopters to have encountered the radioactive stem, which 

was nearer the line at that time. Any route adjustments required of 

the main body of VAG-16 helicopters would have been to the southeast of the 

trench area, involving only the helicopter crews to the trench area. The 

stem was easily visible; thus few, if any, crews would have flown sufficiently 

close to it to receive more than a transient exposure. 

In transporting Company to the objective (see Figure the 

helicopter unit would have transported the troops in two lifts. Ground 

intensities along the flight path ranged from a few to 0.5 as 

suggested by the volunteer observers’ measurements (assumed applicable, as far 

west as the objective area, at corresponding ranges). At the maximum permitted 
height for helicopter flight, 400 feet (Reference the intensity would have 

been one-fifth as great (Reference 27). For the actual flights, most of the dose 

was accrued while the helicopters were landed at the objective area. With about 

10 minutes total ground time there, it is estimated that the film badge dose 

during the airborne phase of the operation totaled 50 mrem. 

Upon completion of the airlift and return of the helicopters to the trench 

area, MAG-16 personnel were bused through the display area. For an assumed 

convoy speed of 15 miles per hour, except 5 mph along displays, the dose 

received during the time in the buses is estimated at 360 mrem. It is calculated 

(in the manner described for the 2nd Battalion) that during the return along the 

east radial, the convoy encountered intensities of 5 the rad-safe limit for 

vehicular traffic, near 2000 yards from GZ. The crossroad at that distance 

would have provided a return route to the west radial, and thus to the trenches, 

at lower intensities. The total estimated film badge dose for MAG-16 is about 

400 mrem. 

4.3.4 Headquarters 

Information on the movements of 2nd Headquarters is limited 

to the pre-exercise schedule of events (Reference 4). Dose reconstruction is 

based on the assumption that their movement proceeded as planned. 

Headquarters personnel were to leave the trenches 10 minutes after the shot and 

return by 145 minutes after the shot. They were to precede the troops through 

the display area, moving toward on the west radial and returning along the 

east. It is assumed that they viewed the displays at 500 yards (tad-safe 

conditions are calculated to have permitted this), although a survey updating the 

rad-safe limit line may not have been completed by the time of their passage. 

The return to the trenches most likely required a detour, as described for the 2nd 

Battalion, beginning around 2500 yards from GZ. The film badge dose received 

by Headquarters is estimated to be 3.6 rem, the majority of which was received 

during the return to the trenches. 
4.4 SUMMARY OF RESIDUAL RADIATION 

Figure 4-l depicts the radiological situation in the equiprnent display 

area at one hour after Shot Badger, based on the foregoing analysis. It should be 

noted that pertinent activities of the 1st were prior to one hour after 

burst, while those of the 2nd Battalion were somewhat thereafter. 

The total calculated film badge doses from residual radiation during the 

rehearsal and on shot-day are summarized for the various elements of the 2nd 

as follows: 

Film Badge 

Group Dose 

1st Rattalion, Marines 4.7” 

2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines 

Marine Air Group-16 0.5 

Headquarters 3.7 

*Right flank company only; less for other elements. 

30 
- -

I - , , 

. . 

 

/

_ -

_ -

j -- --

I -

Area 

Badge 

Positions 

YARDS 

figure 4-1. Shot Badger, Residual Radiation Troop 

31 
SECTION 5 

CJYCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

The sources of error in the calculation of the more significant doses are 

examined in order to estimate the uncertainty in personnel dose resulting from 2nd 

MCPAEA activities. Doses from all activities are summed as applicable to determine 

the mean total dose to the various units within the brigade. 

5.1 ANALYSIS 

The group activities resulting in the most significant doses were the aborted 

maneuver for the 1st and the equipment display tours for the 2nd Rattalion, 

Brigade Headquarters, and In addition, a significant dose could have been 

received by MAG-16 helicopter crews if they had flown close to the nuclear cloud 

stem. The uncertainty in dose accrued from these activities arises from the 

uncertainties in the gamma radiation environment and in the space-time scenarios of 

troop movements. in position, time, and gamma intensity are not necessarily 

independent; where the rad-safe limit line had been established, troops were 

constrained to intensities of less than 5 

The various sources of error are assessed to determine reasonable upper and 

lower limits of dose. These limits are taken to represent uniform, high levels of 

confidence in the dose calculations. Accordingly, uncertainties from multiple sources 

are combined as for continuous (e.g., normal) error distributions. Because the dose 

limits determined in this section are nearly symmetric around the 

estimate doses from Section 4, the error distributions are assumed to be symmetric. 

Rest-estimate doses are then equivalent to mean doses, which may be legitimately 

added for multiple exposures to find the mean total dose; this may be compared to 

film badge data or assigned as a personnel gamma dose. 

5.1.1 1st Battalion, 8th 

Despite the many assumptions and uncertain parameters used in arriving at a 

dose estimate for the right flank of the 1st the range of possible doses 

depends on only a few. In determining that range, the measurements by the 50th 

32 
Chemical Platoon, with all their attendant uncertainties, are not required. Other than 

the timing of stem passage (with brief duration), which is well established, information 

regarding the stem and associated gamma intensities is not required. Film badge data 

from positions in the equipment display area are instead utilized to arrive at a dose 

range. The reading from the stake at 3500 yards implies a relationship at that position 

between the dose resulting from stem passage and that from the fallout field. Data 

from other positions provide an indication of how the intensity may have varied to the 

west of the stake. 

The stake reading assumes a central importance in the determination of the 

possible dose range because it is quantifiably relatable to the radiation environment 

and because the right flank reached and halted at its location. Moreover, the 

(unshielded) badge on the stake lacks the uncertain shielding factor of the other types 

of position. The implied radiation environment is dependent on the tirne of badge 

recovery. The assumption of recovery as soon as the local intensity had decayed to 5 

is supported by the motivation for early recovery -- to minimize the influence of 

residual radiation on the badge readings, which were intended to be measures of the 

initial radiation dose. Any later recovery implies lower calculated doses. 

To assess the dose from the remainder of the maneuver, intensities at other 

positions are related to that at the stake. Although the battalion was still approaching 

it while the stem passed, the residual radiation field, as known, strongly suggests that 

the marines were less, if not nearly equally, exposed to the stem. While proceeding 

westward, the battalion was exposed to radiation levels that cannot be assessed 

directly from the readings at other positions, for which the shielding factors are 

unknown. Co:nparison with readings at closer-in positions where initial radiation 

dominated is not fruitful because of the different shielding of initial and residual 

radiation. Lirnited data from Shot in which residual radiation dominated 

(Reference with a weak azimuthal dependence of intensity, suggest that intensities 

at the other positions 3500 yards from the Badger were likely within a factor of 

two of the intensity at the stake. Because the locations of the intermediate 

positions are not known, nothing more restrictive than the following can be stated: 

the average intensity along the westward portion of right flank’s track was within a 

factor of two of that (normalized in time) at the stake. 
The range of possible doses to the right flank of the 1st Battalion is thus 

obtained from consideration of all possible partitions of dose at the stake between 

stem and fallout, and from the range of intensity applicable elsewhere relative to that 

at the stake, as indicated above. The mathematical combination of these relationships 

results in a single polynomial expression for dose in terms of a normalized intensity; 

the expression is maximized using the high side (x2) of intensities west of the stake 

and minimized using the low side A maximum film badge dose 2.1 rem in excess 

of that calculated in Section 4 results from a mixed exposure to stem and fallout 

radiation; a minimum dose 2.3 rem less than that in Section 4 results from exposure to 

fallout only. This latter condition is unrealistic in that the marines surely accrued 

some dose as the stem passed by, but tends to cover the possibility that they were less 

exposed to the stem than was the stake. The intensities encountered during the 

battalion’s withdrawal would have been similar for the maximum and minimum dose 

conditions. Consequently, the last increment to dose, during the return to the 

trenches, would have been similar in either case. Its intrinsic uncertainty is negligible 

compared to the magnitude of those discussed. The total film badge dose to the right 

flank of the 1st Battalion is thus calculated to have been 4.7 rem. . 

5.1.2 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines 

The three main types of uncertainty in doses calculated for tours of the 

equipment display area are with regard to the gamma intensity field, the route taken, 

and the timing of the tour. For groups touring the Badger display area, the upper limit 

in dose is obtained from consideration of the uncertainty in the gamma field, and the 

lower limit is from consideration of alternate routes. For the 2nd Rattalion, the 

planned and reported timing of movements considerably constrains estimates of timing 

of its tour. Associated uncertainties have a negligible impact on the dose limits, once 

the other types of uncertainties are considered. 

Uncertainty in the gamma field provides an upper limit because the 

extrapolation of intensity toward along the west boundary of the display area may 

underestimate the close-in intensities, The extrapolation, based on intensity data 

from wind-transported fallout, does not account for the contribution to the gamrna 

field near from fallout associated with the nuclear cloud rise. That intensities 

34 
 

near 500 yards from were likely higher than calculated in Section 4 is suggested by 

the isointensity contours of Reference derived from the rad-safe surveys of 

Reference 8. It is possible that the 5 rad-safe limit was reached during the tour, 

either at 500 yards or slightly farther from The maximum dose is obtained from 

calculations with the limit at 500 yards. An increased exponential gradient between 

2000 yards and 500 yards is consistent with the service observers having viewed the 

display at 1000 yards within their rad-safe lirnit at about hours 

(Reference Corresponding adjustments to the exponential gradient on the eastern 

boundary of the display area are constrained by the observers’ known walk-through of 

the displays there. The film badge dose resulting from these considerations is rem 

in excess of that calculated in Section 4. 

Variations in the route taken by the 2nd Battalion tend to reduce the time spent 

near the tad-safe limit. Apart from not advancing as far forward as radiologically 

permissible, the major likely variation is that, while returning to the trench area, the 

battalion crossed over to the west radial on the road at 2500 yards from rather 

than skirted the high-intensity area cross-country. Once having left the east radial by 

a few hundred yards, the marines would have noted rapidly decreasing intensities. 

Very little dose would have been accrued thereafter. The reduction in calculated dose 

resulting from this scenario is 1.2 rem. 

The range of total calculated film badge dose to the 2nd Battalion is 3.0 rem 

(0.1 rem less for Company E). 

5.1.3 Marine Air Group -16 

Most of the dose to the helicopter crews was from the bus tour through the 

display area. Because they are calculated to have been near 5 while passing the 

innermost displays, the uncertainty in the gamma field results in a possible additional 

dose of less than 0.1 rem. For the field as calculated, the possibility exists that, when 

the buses reached the displays at 1000 yards from GZ, rad-safe personnel had not 

updated the limit line so as to permit further progress. In this case, the calculated 

dose is reduced by 0.2 rem. The timing of the bus tour is less certain than for those on 

foot. The available references provide no indication of when the buses were to return 

35 
 

 

to the trench area. A modification of the scenario described in Section 4 that has an 

impact on the dose is the addition of a two-minute stop at each display grouping for 

control personnel to summarize the damage to the displays. An additional dose of 0.3 

rem results, significant relative to the calculated dose because of a large fractional 

increase in the time assumed for the tour. The total film badge dose to the helicopter 

crews is calculated as 0.5 2 rem. 

. 

The possible encounter of a helicopter with the nuclear cloud stem is also 

considered. Other Marine helicopter crews airborne at Badger and other shots 

reported accidentally encountering intensities of 50 on more than one occasion 

while probing near the stem (Reference It is therefore conceivable that a 

16 helicopter also did so while evading the stem to the trench area. An 

indication of the variation of intensity with distance from the stem is given by the 

data of ground personnel. The peak intensities of 1 at the command trench and 

50 along the east radial, about 600 yards distant, provide an estimate of an 

exponential gradient likely applicable to a helicopter pass. For a helicopter 

approaching the stem radially at 70 knots, the total time from to 50 and 

back would be about a half minute. The film badge dose resulting from that excursion 

in an exponential gamma field would be less than 0.1 rem. Even with ten extra 

seconds for a turnaround or for a tangential approach, the dose would be only 0.2 rem. 

Thus, the range of total film badge dose derived above is not materially affected by 

the inclusion of this uncertainty. 

5.1.4 Headquarters 

The uncertainty analysis for Brigade Headquarters parallels that of the 2nd 

Virtually the same reduction in calculated dose results from leaving the 

east radial at 2500 yards from to cross to the west radial. As for the 2nd 

Rattalion, the tight schedule of movements implies minimal uncertainty in dose 

resulting from uncertainty in timing. However, the uncertainty in the gamma field 

leads to less of a possible increase in dose. the 2nd 

through the display area, it was subject to higher intensities; a smaller 

variation in the gamma field would have resulted in reaching the rad-safe limit at the 

innermost displays. The associated increase in calculated dose is 0.8 rem. Thus, the 

total film badge for Yeadquarters is calculated as 3.7 rem. . 

36 
---- -

5.2 TOTAL SUMMARY 

The mean and range of total calculated film badge doses are below 

for the major elements of the 2nd It should be noted that the contribution 

from initial radiation was too to be reflected in the totals to the number of 

significant digits presented. 

Unit: 

1st Battalion, 

8th (Marines 

2nd Battalion, 2nd 

3rd Marines Headquarters 

Marine Air Group -16 

Helicopter 

Total Film 

Badge Dose: rem* rem 0. rem 

It is to be concluded from these ranges that rnost brigade personnel accrued in 

excess of 2 rem and that personnel of the 1st Battalion nay have exceeded the 

rem maximum authorized dose for Rock V personnel. 

*Right flank only; less for other 

rem less for Cornpany 

37 
6.1 

SECTION 6 

DOSIMETRY 

Film badge dose records for participants in Shot Badger maneuvers are 

incomplete. Film badges were not issued to all troops as intended in the 

Operation Plan; after the previous Desert Rock V maneuver, it was decided to 

reduce the film processing workload by reducing the issue to one badge per 

platoon 3). However, Reference 5 states that two badges were issued 

per platoon. A film badge roster for the 2nd Battalion lists the 38 persons from 

all four companies to whom badges were issued. No comparable roster is 

available for the other brigade elements. Additional dosimetry from Marine 

Corps medical records lists doses for nineteen 1st Battalion and eight Brigade 

Headquarters individuals. It is not clear if the rehearsal dose was reflected in 

these film badge readings. As indicated earlier, badges for shot day were 

distributed the day before the shot. The residual radiation from the Shot Nancy 

display area was not large enough to significantly affect the film badge dose in 

either case. 

Complementing the film badge data are pocket dosimeter data, 

as appear in Reference 5. Not only were pocket dosimeter readings 

the main -ion diagnostic reported by the brigade during maneuvers, but they 

were also form in which the Marines reported aggregate dose totals (prior to 

film badge processing). 

1st BATTALION, 8th MARINES 

Dose records for the 1st Battalion are limited to 19 individual medical 

records, including four to six from each of the four companies. The doses vary 

significantly within each company and from one company to the next. H&S 

Company troops received 1.0 to 3.29 rem, averaging 2.0 rem. The readings for 

Company B ranged from 1.59 to 3.5 rem, averaging 2.9 rem, while Company A 

recorded 3.41 to 6.2 rem, averaging 4.5 rem. The highest readings were 

Company C’s 4.2 to 7.1 rem, averaging 5.4 rem. These dose ranges are 

qualitatively consistent with the radiation field and maneuver route if the 1st 

38 
Battalion was arranged as follows: Company A forward and on the left, 

Company back and in the center, Company C forward and on the right, and 

H&S Company in the rear. 

Dose reconstruction for the 1st Battalion right flank provides a shot-day 

estimate of 4.6 rem. The upper limit associated with this mean value, 6.7 rem, 

approaches the highest doses on the right flank. For comparison, pocket 

dosimeter readings for the battalion after the maneuver were reported to 

average 4.8 rem and to have a high value of 7.5 rem (Reference 5). From the 

available film badge readings, with each company weighted equally, the average 

dose to the battalion was 3.7 rem. It is not known whether the pocket dosirneter 

average was similarly obtained. 

Both forms of dosirnetry indicate that some personnel accrued doses in 

excess of the 6 rem exercise limit; calculations also indicate this possibility. 

The immediate cause of these overexposures is that the battalion commander 

was to react to actual dosimeter readings rather than to project dose totals with 

the aid of intensity meters. Because it took a finite time to withdraw from the 

contaminated area once the dose limit had been reached, some overexposure 

inevitably occurred. That dose levels reached the limit at all is largely because 

the 1st Battalion operated for an extended interval (0.4 hour) in intensities 

exceeding its 5 rad-safe limit. However, there is no indication in the 

operation orders that the troops even knew of an intensity limit; the manuevers 

were to have been constrained by rad-safe limit lines posted (at 5 by the 

50th Chemical Platoon. Such posting was not possible for transient radiation 

from the passing cloud stem, during fallout deposition, and before rad-safe’teams 

had surveyed the area. Unfortunately, there was no provision for the survey 

to otherwise indicate to the 1st Battalion the import of the radiological 

situation. the overexposures would have been prevented if an 

evacuation had been ordered upon realization that the stem might pass over 

some of the troops. However, there was likely an unwillingness on the part of 

the Desert Rock V Exercise Director to implement the evacuation plan, which 

would have aborted the entire exercise, when any affected units had an obvious 

route (west along the trenches) to evade the contamination, if necessary. 

39 
 

 

6.2 2nd BATTALION, 3rd 

The 2nd Battalion film badge roster appears to be complete because the 

entries, in blocks company, have consecutive badge numbers. Six to twelve 

badges were issued to each company, likely representing the issue of 

platoon (the companies, as constituted for the exercise, had different numbers of 

platoons). Average film badge doses for E, and H&S Companies were 3.8, 

2.9, 3.1, and 3.3 rem, respectively (not included in these averages are film badge 

doses for four individuals who are discussed below). The similarity of these 

average doses reflects the degree to which the companies stayed together while 

touring the display area. Somewhat lower (pocket dosimeter) readings averaging 

2.3 for the battalion were reported in Reference 5. No explanation is 

offered for the discrepancy with film badge readings. 

The reconstructed (Section 4) 2nd Battalion shot-day dose of 2.9 

for Company) matches dosimeter and film badge data about as well as

possible. The range of uncertainty in the dose estimate (2.9 rem) . 

reasonably accounts for the variations among reported doses. 

An mination of individual badge readings shows that four persons 

received doses of about 5.2 rem, at least I rem higher than other doses in the 

battalion. These four were from and H&S Companies. Among the more 

senior badged individuals, they were likely damage evaluators of the 

equipment display. The damage evaluation team would have had to return to the 

area at a later when all displays were radiologically accessible and thus 

would have accrued more dose. 

Those few 2nd Battalion personnel with dose data in their medical 

records appear on the film badge roster; apparently only the personnel who wore 

the film badges ever had doses logged in their records. That the doses are in 

agreement give credence to dose data in medical records of other brigade 

personnel. the yield medical records is 
6.4 

MARINE AIR GROUP-16 

No filrn badge data are available medical records for this group; 

however, Reference 5 states that MAG-16 personnel received total (shot-day) 

dose of about rem. That this inexact value is greater than the calculated dose 

of 0.4 rem may reflect a longer than stay tirne in the display area. . 

A final comparison can be made between dose records and the 

reconstructed doses for 2nd Yeadquarters. Of the eight film badge 

readings available from medical records, four are 3.42 rem, two are 3.X rem, and 

two are 5.7 rem. The latter, including the dose for a chemical warfare 

radiological defense officer, are likely for display evaluators, as discussed for 

the 2nd The remainder are in excellent with the calculated 

shot-day dose of 3.6 rem, but well in excess of the reported (Reference pocket 

dosimeter dose of about 2 rem. 

41 
 

 7 

Elements of the 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Exercise Exercise 

Desert Rock V, participated in Shot Badger while at the Nevada Proving Grounds 

during Operation Upshot-Knothole. Two battalions witnessed the shot from trenches 

4000 yards (3660 meters) south-southwest of ground zero. 

After the shot, the initiated an attack on objectives 2090 yards 

ground zero. The 1st Battalion, 8th Marine did not achieve its objective 

because of radiation dose levels accrued and was barred further action. 

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, reached its objective and then toured the 

equipment display area. One company of this battalion airlifted to its objective 

by helicopters Air Group-16. 

Initial radiation totaled less than 0.01 rem for the brigade at Shot 

Badger. Advance party personnel witnessed Shots Dixie and but received no dose 

either. The entire brigade rehearsed its exercise in the residual radiation field 

from Shot Nancy and accrued less than rem. 

Almost all of the radiation exposure of brigade personnel was due to residual 

radiation from Shot Aadger. Typical doses for personnel in both battalions were 3 to 4 

rem. The 1st Battalion had a greater range doses, with film badge readings up to 

7.1 rem, in excess of the prescribed dose for Exercise Desert V of 6 rem. 

These doses resulted during their aborted maneuver in an area of high radiation levels. 

Doses to the 2nd were accrued entirely during the tour of the 

equipment display area. 

The overexposures to members of the 1st Battalion were fundamentally the 

result of plans not well geared toward the unexpected radiological situation and not 

providing for the proper of the pertinent radiological information. 

experienced personnel would have been ahle to anticipate the adverse 

situation and make appropriate adjustments. 
Film badge dosirnetry and other records of activities for 2nd MCPAEB are 

sufficient to identify the personnel who had the greatest potential for exposure and to 

determine their specific activities. data correlate well with calculated 

dose, providing the necessary confidence in the calculated doses, and group 

activities, for those personnel with no dosimetry records. 
-

QEFERENCES 

1. “Operational Summary, 1 March 9 June 1953,” Operation

Knothole, Nevada Proving Grounds, Headquarters, Field Command,

AFSWP, August 1953. 

2. “Qeport of the Deputy Test Director,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, 

Nevada Proving Grounds, WT-816, Los Scientific 

Laboratory, June 1954. 

3. “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V,” Yeadquarters, Camp Desert 

Rock, Nevada, 16 July 1953. 

4. Operations Order No. 3 Shot Badger, Exercise Desert Rock V, 

Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 14 April 1953. 

5. “Marine Corps Report on Exercise Desert Rock Headquarters, 2nd 

Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, Camp Pendleton, CA, 19 May 1953. 

6. “Observers’ Report of Desert Rock V,” Marine Corps Educational Center, 

Quantico, VA, 1 May 1953. 

7. “Operation Plan No. l-53,” 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic

Exercise Brigade, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 14 April 1953. 

8. “Radiological Safety Operation,” Report to the Test Director, Operation 

Upshot-Knothole, Nevada Proving Grounds, Headquarters, 

Field Command, AFWSP, June 1953. 

9. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert 

 VI, Operation Teapot, DNA Defense Nuclear Agency, 

15 July 1980. 

10. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert 

V, Operation DNA Defense Nuclear 

Agency, 28 April 1981. 

II. “Report of Helicopter Participation in Exercise Desert Rock V,” 

Headquarters, 2nd Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise 

Brigade, Camp Pendleton, CA, 18 June 1953. 

12. “Version 4 of (Air Transport of Radiation),” DNA 3995, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, January 1976. 

13. “Energy Dependent Air/Ground Correction Factors for the ATR (Air 

Transport of Radiation) Code,” BRL Report No. 345, Army 

Ballistic Research Laboratory, August 1977. ADA043807. 
 

14. “Radiation from Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” DNA 

Agency, July 1974. 

15. “Protection Against Neutron Radiation,” NCRP Report No. 38, January 

1971. 

16. “The MORSE Carlo Transport Code System,” ORNL 

4972, Oak Ridge Laboratory, February 1975. 

17 “Preliminary Yeutron and Gamma-Ray Output for Letter 

Los Scientific Laboratory, 15 October 1980. 

18. “The DOT III Two-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Transport Code,” 

Oak Ridge Laboratory, September 1973. 

19. “Summary of Preliminary of the Diagnostic 

Performed on [Jpshot-Knothole,” Los Scientific 

Laboratory (Unpublished). 

20. “Air Weather Service Participation,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, 

703, Air Force Special Weapons Center July 1953. 

21. “Neutron Flux Measurements, Project 2.3, Operation Upshot-‘Knothole, 

Naval Laboratory (Unpublished). 

22. “External Neutron Measurements with Threshold Project 

17.1, Alarnos ti 

Laboratory 

23. “Physical of Gamma and Neutron Radiation in Shelter and 

Evaluation,” Project 24.2, tion 

Knothole, WT-739, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, August 1953. 

24. “Initial Gamma Exposure Versus Distance,” Project Operation 

[Jpshot-Knothole, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories 

(Unpublished). 

25. “Gamma Radiation as a Function of Distance,” Project 10.3, 

[Jpshot-Knothole, Los Scientific Laboratory 

26. “Initial Gamma Data Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1948-1962,” 

Army Nuclear Defense Labora-tory (Unpublished). 

27. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, States Department of 

and States of Energy, Washington, 1977. 
46 
 

 

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