NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

JACKIE RAY MANUEL, JR., Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0099 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR202100494

The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

DM Cantor, Phoenix

By Courtney R. Sullivan

Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott

By Amy C. Drew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 10-31-2023
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 The State appeals the superior court’s order granting Jackie 

Ray Manuel, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence seized after an unlawfully 

extended traffic stop. Because the State has shown no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Deputy Camacho served as a K-9 officer in the Criminal 

Interdiction Unit within the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, which is 

specifically tasked with stopping the flow of contraband across Arizona’s

interstate highways. Deputy Camacho understood his role in the Criminal 

Interdiction Unit was not to enforce traffic laws but instead to “catch 

smugglers.” In the course of his duties, Deputy Camacho stopped Manuel 

for a traffic violation, conducted a warrantless search of his rental vehicle, 

and located cannabis-infused edibles and methamphetamine.

¶3 The State charged Manuel with one count each of sale or 

transportation of dangerous drugs, a class 2 felony, sale or transportation

of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 

class 6 felony. Before trial, Manuel moved to dismiss the charges as based 

on an unlawfully extended traffic stop, which the superior court treated as 

a motion to suppress evidence. Manuel argued Deputy Camacho lacked 

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and that all evidence seized from 

the vehicle should be suppressed. The State opposed the motion and 

argued, as it does before us, that Deputy Camacho had reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity, did not unlawfully extend the stop, and 

secured Manuel’s consent to the search.

¶4 On the morning of April 13, 2021, Deputy Camacho observed 

Manuel driving too closely behind another vehicle on Interstate 40. He 

observed no other traffic violations. Deputy Camacho approached the 

passenger side window of Manuel’s vehicle and explained the reason for 

the traffic stop. He told Manuel he would be giving him a warning. Manuel

handed Deputy Camacho his driver’s license and rental agreement, then 
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

3

added “that he was going to be shipped out” for military training in a few 

weeks and pointed to a military-style bag in the backseat. Deputy Camacho

claimed he suspected Manuel’s “unsolicited” reference to his military 

service and travel plans to be a “cover story.” He did not observe anything

suspicious about Manuel’s demeanor, paperwork, or vehicle.

¶5 Deputy Camacho repeated that he would issue a warning to

Manuel, directed him to get out of his vehicle, and had him sit in the 

passenger seat of the patrol vehicle. Despite that, Deputy Camacho agreed

he could have safely conducted the traffic stop from Manuel’s passenger 

side window. Once in the patrol vehicle, the deputy said a third time he

would be giving Manuel a warning. While running “checks” on Manuel’s 

paperwork, Deputy Camacho asked him questions aimed at learning more

about what he viewed as his “cover story.” During this interaction, the 

deputy had his K-9 in the backseat of the patrol vehicle.

¶6 Manuel answered Deputy Camacho’s questions about the 

training and travel plans, explaining he traveled from Mississippi to 

California to visit family before shipping out for his service. Under the 

pretense of checking Manuel’s paperwork, the deputy searched the route 

from Mississippi to California and questioned Manuel’s motivation for 

traveling that distance. Deputy Camacho explained his role in catching 

“smugglers” and asked if Manuel was traveling with any contraband. 

Manuel said no to all drugs, except when the deputy “got to marijuana he 

said, do edibles count as marijuana.” Deputy Camacho said it depended 

on the amount of edibles Manuel possessed, continued to ask for specifics 

about the edibles, and explained how criminal arrests and charges work in 

Arizona. Manuel eventually admitted to having a large quantity of edibles 

and consented to a search of his vehicle.

¶7 After Deputy Camacho testified, the superior court took a 

recess to watch his body-worn camera footage from the traffic stop. In that 

footage, the deputy told Manuel he would be receiving a warning. Deputy 

Camacho ordered Manuel to move to the patrol vehicle. Manuel was calm

and respectful throughout this interaction. When the K-9 began barking

from the backseat, Deputy Camacho joked that he hoped Manuel was not 

afraid of dogs. The deputy asked a number of questions about Manuel’s 

travel plans, military service, and the rental vehicle. Manuel responded 

politely to these questions, consistently answering “yes sir” or “no sir.” 

Over 10 minutes into the stop, Deputy Camacho explained his role as a 

criminal interdiction officer and asked whether Manuel was traveling with 

any contraband. When Manuel eventually admitted to having edibles in 
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

4

the vehicle, additional deputies can be seen arriving. Appearing reluctant, 

Manuel consented to a search of his vehicle.

¶8 In a detailed ruling, the superior court granted the motion to 

suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop. The court found that, 

although there was a lawful basis to conduct the stop, Deputy Camacho did 

not (1) have a reasonable basis to direct Manuel to sit in the patrol vehicle

and speak with him “in an attempt to find holes in [his] story or 

inconsistencies in statements,” (2) need to have him in the patrol vehicle to 

effectuate the stop, and (3) develop arguably reasonable suspicion to

investigate him for criminal activity until after directing him to sit in the 

patrol vehicle and engaging in that unjustified conversation. 

¶9 The superior court found that, based on the evidence 

presented, Deputy Camacho directed Manuel to sit in the patrol vehicle to 

investigate him “under the guise of writing a citation.” The court heard 

Deputy Camacho’s testimony and evaluated his credibility, viewing it 

“with much skepticism,” and found it “difficult to believe” that this 

particular deputy forces “every single driver of every demographic” to exit 

their vehicle and speak to them for 10 to 15 minutes while he processes their 

citations. Based on the court’s assessment of the deputy’s credibility, the 

court found it more likely “that there was something specific about”

Manuel, a black man, that resulted in his conduct. The court did not accept

that Manuel volunteering information regarding his military service, the 

sole reason for Deputy Camacho’s concerns, gave him reasonable suspicion 

to extend the traffic stop. The court noted that there could be many reasons 

for a driver to volunteer information or “paint themselves in a more 

positive light,” including trying to avoid a citation.

¶10 The superior court considered the body-worn camera footage 

in determining the “length and scope of the stop,” finding that the 

conversation in the patrol vehicle lasted about 10 minutes with the K-9

breathing and barking in the background. By the end of the conversation, 

when Manuel “gave hesitant consent” to search his vehicle, the court noted 

that a “multitude” of other deputies had arrived on scene. Thus, the court 

concluded that Deputy Camacho acted in a way that “was more intrusive 

than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention,” and suppressed all 

evidence seized as a result of the search.

¶11 On the State’s motion, the superior court dismissed the case 

without prejudice, and the State timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-

4032(6).
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

5

DISCUSSION

¶12 The State challenges the superior court’s suppression order, 

arguing Deputy Camacho had reasonable suspicion to believe Manuel was 

engaging in criminal activity, did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop, and 

conducted a consensual search of the vehicle. We review the court’s ruling 

on a motion to suppress for a clear abuse of discretion, State v. Atwood, 171 

Ariz. 576, 603 (1992), considering only the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing and viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the court’s ruling. State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 11 (2011). We defer to 

the court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the officer’s

“credibility and the reasonableness of inferences that he drew.” State v. 

Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996). We review the court’s ultimate 

legal conclusions de novo. Id.

¶13 A traffic stop cannot last “longer than necessary to effectuate 

the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). An

officer’s authority to conduct a stop “ends when tasks tied to the traffic 

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Such tasks include checking the 

driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, as well as the time 

required for officers to “attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at 354–55.

“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the 

traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a 

lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the 

duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). Once the 

purpose of the stop is fulfilled, the officer cannot continue to hold the driver 

“unless (1) the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes 

consensual, or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Sweeney, 

224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 17 (App. 2010). The officer, however, must not use

pretextual “safety precautions” designed to facilitate an investigation into

other crimes absent sufficient reasonable suspicion to do so. Rodriguez, 575 

U.S. at 355–57.

¶14 Although a lower standard than probable cause, reasonable 

suspicion still requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 

7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The officer must

“articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory 

detention.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23, ¶ 25 (App. 2007). To determine 

whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop, the 

superior court must look at all relevant factors, each of which could have a 
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

6

potentially innocent explanation, and examine them collectively. Id. at 24, 

¶ 25. “But circumstances or factors that do not reliably distinguish between 

suspect and innocent behaviors are insufficient to establish reasonable 

suspicion because they may cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to 

‘virtually random seizures.’” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 22 (quoting Reid 

v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)).

¶15 The State bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Deputy Camacho lawfully seized evidence in the

warrantless search of Manuel’s vehicle. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b)(1); 

Rodriguez v. Arellano, 194 Ariz. 211, 215, ¶ 12 (App. 1999). The State failed 

to meet that burden, and for three reasons, has failed to show error on 

appeal.

¶16 First, we find no error in the superior court’s findings of fact. 

The court reviewed Deputy Camacho’s body-worn camera footage at the 

suppression hearing. As the footage shows, Deputy Camacho said he 

would be issuing a warning, directed Manuel to get into the patrol vehicle, 

and engaged in conversation unrelated to the traffic violation. That 

conversation lasted over 10 minutes. Throughout this interaction, Manuel 

appeared calm, treated Deputy Camacho with respect, and answered 

questions appropriately. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 23 (considering 

demeanor in determining reasonable suspicion, including signs of 

nervousness and ability to answer questions). As noted by the court, 

Deputy Camacho’s K-9 could be heard barking and breathing in the 

backseat of the patrol vehicle. 

¶17 The superior court compared the footage with Deputy 

Camacho’s testimony, finding that he lacked any justification for moving

Manuel to the patrol vehicle. The court viewed Deputy Camacho’s 

testimony that he treated all drivers similarly “with much skepticism,” 

finding it more likely that “there was something specific” about Manuel

fueling his motivations. Here, the court reasoned that Deputy Camacho

had, to some degree, profiled Manuel and used pretextual tactics designed 

to facilitate his investigation into other crimes. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 

356–57. When we defer to the superior court’s assessment of Deputy 

Camacho’s credibility, as we must, we find ample support in the record for 

the court’s factual findings. See Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118.

¶18 Second, we find no error in the superior court’s legal 

conclusions. As the court concluded, Deputy Camacho did not need to 

order Manuel out of his vehicle and make him sit in the patrol car to safely 

effectuate the traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. Before doing so,
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

7

Deputy Camacho’s only reason for suspecting Manuel of criminal activity

was that he volunteered information regarding his military service. The 

deputy conceded that he did not have any safety concerns, did not observe 

weapons or contraband in the vehicle, and did not observe anything

suspicious about Manuel’s demeanor. Deputy Camacho could have 

completed the stop without ordering Manuel into the patrol vehicle and 

engaging in a conversation designed to ferret out criminal activity. Such

steps exceeded what was reasonably required to issue a warning, and 

Deputy Camacho needed reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond 

its original purpose. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 

¶19 Accordingly, the superior court acted within its discretion 

when it found Deputy Camacho’s self-serving assertion that Manuel gave 

him a “cover story” did not amount to reasonable suspicion. There could 

have been an innocent explanation for Manuel’s “unsolicited” statements 

to Deputy Camacho. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 25. The court soundly 

reasoned that many drivers may be motivated to “paint themselves in a 

more positive light” to avoid a citation. Because Manuel’s behavior could 

be typical of “a very large category of presumably innocent travelers,” it 

could not, on its own, establish reasonable suspicion. Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The sole factor relied upon by Deputy 

Camacho in extending the traffic stop “did not give rise to objective 

reasonable suspicion of anything” and a “reasonably prudent person’s 

suspicions would not be raised.” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 24. The court 

did not err in finding Deputy Camacho lacked the reasonable suspicion he 

needed to extend the stop.

¶20 Third, the State’s contention that the traffic stop evolved into 

a valid consensual search is likewise unavailing. “Evidence seized 

following consent to a search must be suppressed if the consent is tainted 

by a prior constitutional violation.” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 13

(2010). “In other words, the unconstitutional acts of an officer taint a 

consensual search unless there are sufficient intervening circumstances 

between the unlawful conduct and the consent to truly show that it was 

voluntary.” State v. Kempton, 166 Ariz. 392, 398 (App. 1990). Deputy 

Camacho took Manuel’s paperwork, directed him to sit in the patrol 

vehicle, and subjected him to questions unrelated to the stop. All the while, 

Deputy Camacho’s K-9 could be heard from the backseat, prompting an 

uncomfortable joke about whether Manuel feared dogs, and other deputies 

arrived on scene. Within this factual context, Deputy Camacho obtained 

Manuel’s “hesitant consent” to search the vehicle. The superior court did 

not err when it found Deputy Camacho’s unlawful extension of the stop 
STATE v. MANUEL

Decision of the Court

8

tainted, and therefore invalidated, Manuel’s consent. See Guillen, 223 Ariz. 

at 317, ¶ 13.

CONCLUSION

¶21 Because the superior court did not err in suppressing the 

evidence seized during the search of the vehicle, we affirm the superior 

court’s suppression order.