Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Dorsey, 2016 IL App (4th) 140734

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

CHAD L. DORSEY, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-14-0734

Filed October 31, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 13-CF-362; the 

Hon. Scott Daniel Drazewski, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Akshay Mathew 

(argued), of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for 

appellant.

Jason Chambers, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, 

David J. Robinson, and Luke McNeill (argued), of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Holder White and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Chad L. Dorsey, files this direct appeal from his conviction of home invasion 

after a bench trial. He claims the trial court erred when it held the victim’s psychological injury 

was sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement of the home-invasion statute absent evidence of 

physical contact. He also claims the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt when the State failed to prove he intentionally caused the victim’s 

psychological injury. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In March 2013, the State filed a three-count information against defendant, charging him 

with (1) home invasion for entering the home of Trisha Convis (at trial, she was referred to as 

Trisha Baker), knowing someone was present, and armed himself with a dangerous weapon, a 

Taser (count I) (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1) (West 2012)); (2) home invasion for entering Convis’s 

home, remaining there after knowing someone was present, and intentionally injuring Normal 

police officer Ronald Stoll, who was inside (count II) (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2012)); 

and (3) disarming a peace officer by taking Officer Stoll’s Taser while the officer was arresting 

him (count III) (720 ILCS 5/31-1a(a) (West 2012)). The grand jury filed superseding 

indictments on all three charges. 

¶ 4 Initially, defendant entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to count III. The trial 

court set counts I and II for a jury trial. A few days later, defendant filed a pro se motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, alleging his attorney gave him “inaccurate legal advice.” The court 

did not rule on defendant’s motion. Thereafter, the State charged defendant by indictment with 

another count of home invasion, alleging defendant entered Convis’s home, remained in the 

home after knowing someone was present, and intentionally caused injury to Convis, who was 

inside (count IV) (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2012)). This count is subject of this appeal. 

¶ 5 The trial court conducted a bench trial. The State presented testimony from Marcie Taylor, 

Matthew Baker, Trisha Baker, Ronald Stoll, Todd Van Hoveln, and Shane Bachman. 

Defendant did not present any evidence. The following is a summary of the witnesses’ 

testimony. 

¶ 6 Normal police officers Stoll, Van Hoveln, and Bachman were called upon to serve an arrest 

warrant on defendant. Defendant was inside Taylor’s second-floor apartment when police 

arrived. As Taylor was talking to Stoll, defendant ran from the bathroom out the back door. 

Stoll chased him. Van Hoveln was standing near the back door of the apartment building, so 

defendant turned and ran downstairs to the lower-level apartments. Defendant tried to enter 

apartment number two. Stoll caught up to defendant and ordered him to place his hands behind 

his back. Defendant lowered his shoulder and broke into apartment number two. 

¶ 7 Matthew Baker testified he and his wife, Trisha Baker, live in apartment number two. On 

the night of the incident, they were home watching television with Trisha’s two daughters, 

ages 14 and 10. Defendant broke into their apartment from the back door and ran through the 

apartment, toward the front door. He was unable to unlock the deadbolt to get out. Stoll chased 

defendant through the apartment, caught him at the front door, and a struggle ensued in the 

living room. 
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¶ 8 Matthew said Trisha was “[f]reaking out,” saying, “oh, my God; oh, my God; oh, my God,” 

and the two children were “[s]cared out of their minds.” The children had “shocked 

expressions on their face[s].” Trisha said her younger daughter was “screaming and shocked,” 

while her older daughter had a look on her face like “ ‘I can’t believe this is happening.’ ” 

Trisha moved her children into the kitchen to keep them “out of harm’s way.” 

¶ 9 Stoll pulled out his Taser and ordered defendant to the ground. Defendant feigned 

cooperation, but he turned around and knocked the Taser out of Stoll’s hand. Defendant 

grabbed the Taser and shot it at Stoll, hitting the wall. Stoll pulled out his service pistol and 

ordered defendant to drop the Taser. Defendant complied but ran into the kitchen. Bachman 

had entered the apartment to assist Stoll. They both struggled with defendant, attempting to 

gain control over him. A garbage can had been knocked over and the officers were slipping on 

whatever was on the floor. Defendant broke the kitchen window and jumped through. The 

officers chased him and eventually took him into custody. 

¶ 10 When the struggle moved to the kitchen, Matthew, Trisha, and the children ran upstairs to 

their neighbors’ apartment. When Matthew and Trisha returned to their apartment, they found 

their back door, kitchen window, and furniture broken. Shattered glass and garbage were on 

the floor in the kitchen. Trisha testified: “Myself and my youngest [daughter], we were crying, 

very scared, very shaken. I actually was really, really, really shaken.” Stoll said the family 

members “were very frightened, it was obvious.”

¶ 11 Trisha said, at the time of trial, she was “still actually shaken” and “really scared.” She 

arms herself with a butcher knife when she hears noises in the apartment. Her youngest 

daughter will not sleep in her own bedroom and she gets scared at the sound of any “little 

noise.” 

¶ 12 Thereafter, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court reserved its decision 

until the close of the trial. After the parties’ closing arguments, the court granted defendant’s 

motion for a directed verdict on counts I and II, but found defendant guilty on count IV. The 

court noted psychological injury qualified as “any injury” for the purposes of the 

home-invasion statute. 

¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, raising the issues he now raises in this appeal. The 

trial court denied defendant’s motion and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 7 years 

on count III (the count to which he had pleaded guilty) and 16 years on count IV. 

¶ 14 This appeal followed. 

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 16 A. Whether the Victim Suffered an Injury 

¶ 17 Defendant appeals his conviction on count IV, claiming the State failed to prove the victim 

suffered “any injury” within the meaning of the home-invasion statute. Defendant argues, 

because he never made physical contact with Trisha, the State could not prove Trisha was 

injured. Defendant concedes our supreme court has held the phrase “any injury” in the statute 

refers to both physical and psychological injury or harm. See People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 

181, 195 (2008) (The fact the home-invasion statute can be found in the “Bodily Harm” 

portion of the Criminal Code of 1961 does not mean the legislature chose to restrict the 

requisite harm to physical injury.). However, defendant questions whether Trisha can be 
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considered “injured” when she suffers only a psychological injury, absent any physical contact 

between defendant and the victim. 

¶ 18 According to defendant, the relevant Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction supports his position 

that at least some physical contact is required before a psychological or emotional injury, 

resulting from the physical contact, qualifies under the statute. Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.53B (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53B) 

states as follows: 

“The term ‘injury’ in the definition of home invasion may include physical injury. 

It also includes psychological or emotional trauma if that trauma was the result of some 

physical contact.”

Further, defendant points to the instruction’s committee note, which cites three cases in 

support—all of which involve the presence of some physical contact between the defendant 

and the victim. See People v. Garrett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 535, 542 (1996) (the Fifth District 

determined physical evidence of bodily harm was not required; painful penetration qualified as 

an “injury” given “an injury is an act that hurts” or “causes bodily pain”); People v. Garza, 125 

Ill. App. 3d 182, 189 (1984) (the First District held the State was required to prove “some 

physical injury” from the rape to sustain the home-invasion conviction; proving only that a 

rape occurred was insufficient); People v. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1072 (1988) (this 

court held psychological trauma constitutes “injury” within the meaning of home-invasion 

statute). 

¶ 19 In Ehrich, this court considered whether a victim in a home invasion must suffer physical 

injury, or whether emotional trauma constitutes an “injury.” Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1071. 

There, the defendant entered a family’s home in the middle of the night. The father awoke 

when he heard his seven-year-old daughter crying. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. The father 

found the defendant holding his daughter on his lap, covering her mouth. The father struggled 

with the defendant and the mother called the police. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. 

¶ 20 On appeal, this court considered whether the trial court erred in considering the child’s 

emotional trauma as an “injury” within the meaning of the home-invasion statute. Ehrich, 165 

Ill. App. 3d at 1072. The defendant claimed there must be some type of pain or physical harm 

endured by the victim in order for there to be an “injury” for the purposes of a conviction of 

home invasion. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. We disagreed. 

¶ 21 In addressing the issue, this court noted the legislature’s use of the broad term “any injury” 

when establishing the elements of criminal liability under the home-invasion statute. Ehrich, 

165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. That is, the statute sets forth guilt if a defendant “[i]ntentionally 

causes any injury *** to any person or persons within the dwelling place.” (Emphasis added.) 

720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2012). This language differs from, and is much broader than, 

other criminal statutes that require an “injury” before liability is imposed. For example, the 

offenses of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2012)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(a)(b) (West 2012)), aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(2) 

(West 2012)), and battery of an unborn child (720 ILCS 5/12-3.1(a), (a-5) (West 2012)) all 

require “bodily harm” before criminal liability attaches. For the offense of intimidation, the 

legislature specifically required “physical harm” (720 ILCS 5/19-5(b) (West 2012)); and for 

the offense of criminal fortification of a residence or building, the legislature specifically 

limited criminal liability when the design of a “booby trap” intended to cause “physical 

injury.”
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¶ 22 The comparison of the language of the different statutes tends to demonstrate that when the 

legislature intends to require physical injury, it so specifies. See Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 

1072. It is clear the legislature “obviously intended a range of injuries broader than only 

physical or bodily harm” in contemplating criminal liability under the home-invasion statute. 

Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. In fact, the pain of mental or emotional injuries often exceeds 

the pain of physical injuries. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. For that reason, this court held 

“psychological trauma constitutes an injury for purposes of the home[-]invasion statute.” 

Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. 

¶ 23 Our supreme court in Hudson held the same. There, the teenage victim found the defendant 

in her home in the middle of the night. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 183. The defendant grabbed the 

victim and pushed her against the door. She began screaming for her mother. Hudson, 228 Ill. 

2d at 183-84. He then wrapped the victim’s hair around his hand and began dragging her 

toward the door. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 184. The defendant ran from the house when the 

victim’s mother appeared in the kitchen. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 184. At the jury trial, the 

teenage victim testified to various physical injuries and the psychological trauma she suffered 

from that incident. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 184. 

¶ 24 After he was convicted of home invasion, the defendant appealed his conviction, arguing 

the trial court erred in (1) allowing the State to present evidence of the victim’s psychological 

trauma, and (2) instructing the jury that evidence of psychological trauma could satisfy the 

injury element of the offense. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 190. The supreme court stated as follows: 

“The internal language of the home[-]invasion statute itself indicates that legislators 

were familiar with the word ‘bodily,’ as they use that word in subsection (a)(5) of the 

same statute, referring to ‘bodily harm.’ ‘Harm’ is a synonym of ‘injury.’ As defined 

by Webster’s, ‘harm’ means ‘physical or mental damage: INJURY.’ Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary 1034 (1976). ‘Injury’ means ‘an act that damages, harms, 

or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering or harm.’ Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 1164 (1976). If, as defendant suggests, the legislators intended 

to limit the otherwise expansive phrase ‘any injury,’ they could have simply used the 

phrase ‘bodily injury’ or ‘bodily harm,’ as they did in subsection (a)(5) of section 

12-11, and as they have done in myriad other instances throughout the Criminal Code 

[of 1961]. When the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and 

different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended. 

[Citation.] We assume there was significance to the use of the broader term ‘any

injury.’ Use of the more inclusive term in this context could only mean that the phrase 

refers to both physical and psychological injury or harm.” (Emphases in original.) 

Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 193. 

¶ 25 The court went on to analyze the sentencing scheme of certain crimes that have the 

potential of inflicting more psychological harm than physical harm. For example, the court 

noted residential burglary was graded and punished more harshly than commercial burglary. 

Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 194 (citing Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, 

and the Societal Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 335 (2006)). The Hudson 

court further stated: 

“Indeed, it seems to us little more than a matter of common sense that a perpetrator’s 

violation of the sanctity of one’s living space, with the intent to cause injury, carries 

with it the potential for psychological injury or trauma. The legislature’s use of the 
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broad term ‘any injury’ in subsection (a)(2) of the home invasion statute appears to 

recognize that potential.” Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 194. 

The court held “proof of psychological injury or trauma satisfies the injury element of section 

12-11(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 [(now 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2012))]. 

Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err when it allowed evidence of psychological 

harm and it instructed the jury with IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53B.” (Emphasis in original.) 

Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 195. 

¶ 26 Defendant does not refute this reasoning, but he claims in each case previously relied upon, 

there existed some form of physical contact. We acknowledge this distinction but conclude this 

is a distinction without a difference. The supreme court in Hudson did not qualify its holding 

with a physical-contact requirement. Likewise, our analysis in Ehrich did not rely upon the 

defendant’s physical encounter with the child. This court noted the trial court had considered 

the defendant’s physical contact with the child, finding that contact was the cause of the child’s 

psychological trauma. Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. However, this court clearly found the 

psychological or emotional trauma, standing alone, could support a conviction for home 

invasion. We held “emotional trauma is an injury within the meaning of the statute defining 

home invasion.” Ehrich, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. We did not qualify our holding in Ehrich

with a requirement that there be some kind of physical contact, nor do we do so here. Rather, 

we are guided by the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute. See People v. 

Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 21 (“Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain 

and give effect to the intent of the legislature, bearing in mind that the best evidence of such 

intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.”). Thus, “any injury” 

within the meaning of the home-invasion statute means just that—any physical, emotional, 

psychological, or traumatic injury intentionally caused by the defendant to a person inside the 

dwelling is sufficient to satisfy this required element, with or without physical contact. 

¶ 27 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 28 Defendant next contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s 

evidence pertaining to the alleged psychological injury suffered by Trisha. He claims there was 

no evidence tending to prove he had the requisite intent. 

¶ 29 Matthew testified Trisha was “freaking out” and the two girls were “scared out of their 

minds.” Defendant had shoved Trisha’s 14-year-old daughter as he made his way through the 

apartment. Trisha testified her two daughters were in the same room with defendant when he 

initially struggled with Stoll. She said they were screaming and in shock during the incident. 

She said at the time of trial, she was still shaken by the incident. She said she did not feel safe in 

her apartment and was scared of answering the door. She often armed herself with a knife for 

protection while in her apartment. However, during cross-examination, Trisha testified she did 

not seek medical or psychological treatment for her fears. 

¶ 30 Nevertheless, the trial court found the State had presented sufficient evidence of Trisha’s 

psychological injury. The court specifically found defendant had intentionally caused Trisha’s 

psychological injury based solely on defendant’s conduct within the apartment.

¶ 31 In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are guided by the 

following: 
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“ ‘Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a 

reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond 

a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime.’ [Citation.] When considering a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will not retry the defendant. [Citation.] 

We will not reverse a conviction unless it is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or 

inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. 

Daniels, 2016 IL App (4th) 140131, ¶ 94 (quoting People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, 

¶ 48). 

In a bench trial, the trial court is responsible for determining the credibility of the witnesses, 

weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences 

therefrom. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). 

¶ 32 As charged in this case, home invasion has two elements: the unauthorized entry of a 

dwelling and the intentional injury of a person therein. People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 

333 (2005). Defendant does not dispute the unauthorized-entry evidence. He claims only that 

the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he intentionally caused injury to Trisha. He 

contends “[t]here is no testimony on record to establish that [he] had a conscious objective to 

cause psychological injury to [Trisha].” This may be a true statement, but it does not accurately 

characterize what the State is required to prove. 

¶ 33 The State need not prove defendant intended to cause Trisha psychological injuries. 

Rather, the State must first prove defendant possessed a criminal intent at the time he entered 

her apartment. See People v. Dryden, 363 Ill. App. 3d 447, 450 (2006). See also People v. Hill, 

294 Ill. App. 3d 962, 973 (1998) (the defendant must possess the intent to perform a criminal 

act at the time of entry); People v. Hopkins, 229 Ill. App. 3d 665, 672 (1992) (the State can 

prove a defendant’s intent by inferences drawn from his conduct and from surrounding 

circumstances). Next, although the State must prove defendant knowingly or intentionally 

caused injury to a person in the dwelling, the State’s evidence need not come from direct 

evidence of the defendant’s intent. See People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 64 (1995) (“Because 

intent is a state of mind, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence.”). 

¶ 34 A person acts “knowingly when he is consciously aware that his conduct is practically 

certain to cause the result”—here, Trisha’s psychological injury. People v. Psichalinos, 229 Ill. 

App. 3d 1058, 1067 (1992). Intent can rarely be proved by direct evidence because it is a 

mental state. People v. Witherspoon, 379 Ill. App. 3d 298, 307 (2008). Instead, it may be 

proven by circumstantial evidence, in that it may be inferred from surrounding circumstances 

(Witherspoon, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 307) and the character of the defendant’s acts (People v. 

Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 484 (1995)). “The defendant is presumed to intend the natural and 

probable consequences of his acts ***.” People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 204 (1989). 

¶ 35 Although defendant’s state of mind may not have been to cause Trisha psychological 

injury, her injury was a natural and probable consequence of defendant’s conduct. Defendant 

broke into her home while attempting to escape from the police. He saw Trisha, her husband, 

and the two children. Nevertheless, he shoved one of the girls out of his way, fought with a 

police officer in the living room, broke the kitchen window while fighting with the officer, 

disarmed the officer, and shot a Taser into Trisha’s living room wall. Given these 

circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that defendant knew his 

conduct while in the family’s home was practically certain to cause Trisha psychological 
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injury. That is, defendant is “presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his 

acts.” Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d at 204. He knew he was breaking into someone’s home and saw the 

family, including the children, in the apartment, yet he continued fighting with the officers, 

eluding his arrest, and caused damage to the home. He armed himself with the Taser after 

knocking it from Stoll’s hand; discharged the Taser, not knowing where it would strike; and 

forced Stoll to pull a gun on him. Yet, he still refused to submit to the officers. 

¶ 36 Given the circumstances of the incident, the trial court could reasonably infer that the 

natural and probable consequences of defendant’s conduct while inside Trisha’s apartment 

caused her psychological harm. This is so even without expert testimony of the resulting injury 

or evidence of treatment. We find the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s intent to 

injure Trisha. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we 

award the State its $75 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.