ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

In re Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837

Appellate Court

Caption

In re Rita P., Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Medication (The

People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Rita P.,

Respondent-Appellant).

 District & No. First District, First Division

Docket No. 1-11-2837

Filed February 19, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Although respondent’s appeal from the order authorizing the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication was technically moot as a

result of the expiration of the 90-day duration of the order, the collateral

consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applied, and due to the

trial court’s failure to make the factual findings in writing as required by

section 3-816(a) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities

Code, the order was reversed to protect respondent from collateral

consequences.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2011-COMH-2560;

the Hon. Paul A. Karkula, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Veronique Baker and Ann Krasuski, both of Guardianship and Advocacy

Commission, of Hines, for appellant. 

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,

Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Cunningham and Rochford concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order authorizing the

administration of involuntary psychotropic medication to respondent, Rita P., for 90 days.

On appeal, respondent contends that the order should be reversed because the trial court

failed to make findings of fact, as required by section 3-816(a) of the Mental Health and

Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-816(a) (West 2010)). Respondent

also contends that the instant appeal falls within three recognized exceptions to the mootness

doctrine. We find that the case is not moot, and reverse.

¶ 2 In August 2011, respondent was a 51-year-old voluntarily admitted patient at a mental

health facility. One of her treating physicians, Dr. He Yuan, filed a petition requesting a court

order authorizing involuntary treatment, specifically, the administration of the drug

Risperidone for up to 90 days.

¶ 3 At the September 2, 2011 hearing on the petition, respondent’s son, Mayjourio P.,

testified that prior to respondent’s admission to the mental health facility, he was living with

her in Evanston, where she ran a daycare facility. In January 2008, Mayjourio P. noticed that

respondent was becoming angry and isolated, and she discussed how she was going to harm

the people who had wronged her. In March 2009, respondent started to talk to herself. In

December 2009, respondent was involved in choir practice at her church, and Mayjourio P.

noticed that she developed different personalities that she said were members of her church.

Respondent started using different voices to talk to herself. Shortly thereafter, respondent

stopped going to choir practice and told Mayjourio P. in February 2010 that she was

“spiritually raped” by members of the church in her house, although these people had never

physically been to the house.

¶ 4 As respondent’s condition deteriorated, she neglected her responsibilities and had

conversations with herself using up to 15 different voices at a time. Although respondent

continued running the daycare, one of her own children had to be with her in case she

became distracted and could not provide proper care. In September 2010, when Mayjourio

P. witnessed respondent choking herself, she claimed that “the voices” or “the church” was

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choking her. Respondent attempted to obtain a gun license and told Mayjourio P. that she

was going to kill the church members because theywere choking her. In February and March

2011 respondent placed open containers of gasoline in her house and stated that it was for

“experiments.”

¶ 5 One day in late July 2011, Mayjourio P. came home from work at about 6 p.m. and saw

respondent lying in bed. Mayjourio P. thought she was dead because she was not responding

to him. He shook her and told her to get out of bed. After about 10 minutes, respondent

replied in a man’s voice that “Rita [is] dead,” and Mayjourio P. lifted her out of bed. He told

respondent that he was taking her to the hospital, and she resisted by punching and kicking

him. Mayjourio P. called the police, who took her to the hospital.

¶ 6 Dr. He Yuan testified that he was a psychiatrist at Chicago Read Mental Health Center

(Read) and that respondent was admitted there on August 3, 2011. Yuan first saw respondent

on August 5 and then saw her almost daily. He believed that respondent suffered from

“schizophrenia paranoid type” disorder. Specifically, respondent suffered from delusions

regarding members of her church that she claimed embodied her and that she attempted to

choke herself because she wanted to kill the people inside of her. Based on her delusions,

which sometimes were expressed through anger, Yuan believed respondent might be

dangerous. He sought to medicate respondent with the antipsychotic medication Risperidone

to treat her schizophrenia.

¶ 7 Respondent testified that she had a home daycare business that she closed due to the bad

economy. She subsequently filed for bankruptcy and was awarded general assistance.

Respondent was on several boards in the community, including the Community Economic

Development Association, of which she was nominated as the treasurer between April and

June 2011. Beginning in 2009, church members threatened respondent with bodilyharm, and

she filed numerous police reports to that effect. Respondent noted that when police removed

her from her house, she initially went to Evanston hospital before going to Read.

¶ 8 Following argument, the court granted the petition. In doing so, the court stated, “The

testimony here is overwhelming in support of the State’s petition. All three witnesses and all

the observations of the Court made in open court today so I am going to grant the petition.”

This appeal followed.

¶ 9 There is no dispute that the case underlying the instant appeal is technically moot, as the

circuit court’s 90-dayinvoluntarymedication order expired on December 1, 2011. However,

respondent contends that her appeal falls within several exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

In particular, respondent argues that three exceptions apply: the collateral consequences

exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capable of repetition yet

avoiding review.

¶ 10 The collateral consequences exception allows a reviewing court to consider a case that

is otherwise moot where an order for involuntary treatment “could return to plague the

respondent in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent’s life.”

In re Val Q., 396 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159 (2009); see also In re Dawn H., 2012 IL App (2d)

111013, ¶ 13. For example, reversal of an involuntary treatment order could provide a basis

for a motion in limine in a future proceeding that would prohibit any mention of the prior

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treatment. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 362 (2009). The exception applies to a first

involuntary-treatment order (In re Linda K., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1150 (2011)), but not

where the respondent has previously been subject to involuntary treatment, since in those

circumstances, any collateral consequences would have already attached (Alfred H.H., 233

Ill. 2d at 362-63).

¶ 11 In this case, the parties correctly agree that respondent has not been previously subject

to an order for involuntary administration of medication or other involuntary treatment. In

addition, given her diagnosis, it is likely respondent maybe subject to future proceedings that

would be adversely impacted by past involuntary treatment. Given these circumstances, we

conclude that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

¶ 12 In so finding, we reject the State’s contention that respondent’s mental illness and

hospitalization indicate collateral consequences have already attached. Although the State

cites In re James H., 405 Ill. App. 3d 897, 903 (2010), in support of its argument, the court

in that case primarily relied on the fact that respondent had a record with the Secret Service,

which respondent does not. Moreover, this court has applied the collateral consequences

exception because the fact respondent has a mental illness and is a danger to herself means

she will likely be subject to future proceedings that could be adversely affected by her first

involuntary order. In re Gloria C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 271, 276 (2010). In light of our

determination, we need not address the public interest exception to mootness or the

exception for issues capable of repetition yet avoiding review. See In re Vanessa K., 2011

IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 16.

¶ 13 Respondent filed a motion before oral argument seeking leave to cite In re Madison H.,

215 Ill. 2d 364 (2005). The State had no objection to the motion. We now grant the motion

and turn to the merits of the case.

¶ 14 Respondent contends that by failing to state on the record or in a written order its

findings of fact, the trial court failed to comply with section 3-816(a) of the Code, which

provides that courts ordering involuntary treatment shall do so in writing and shall state the

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. 405 ILCS 5/3-816(a) (West 2010).

¶ 15 We initially note that the trial court may announce an oral on-the-record statement of

factual findings, enter a sufficiently detailed written order containing factual findings, or

both. Here, respondent properly relies on In re James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d 1102 (2009), in

maintaining that because the trial court failed to do either, its order must be reversed.

¶ 16 In James S., the circuit court entered an order for the involuntary administration of

psychotropic medication. James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1105. In doing so, the trial court stated

only that after hearing the testimony and observing the witnesses, it found by clear and

convincing evidence that the respondent was subject to involuntary medication. James S.,

388 Ill. App. 3d at 1105. On appeal, this court reversed based on a finding that the circuit

court’s statement was insufficient to satisfysection 3-816(a) because, in essence, it contained

no facts. James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1107.

¶ 17 Here, in delivering its ruling, the court’s only statements were, “The testimony here is

overwhelming in support of the State’s petition. All three witnesses and all the observations

of the Court made in open court today so I am going to grant the petition.” This statement

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is as lacking in factual detail as the statement at issue in James S. In our view, it does not

meet the requirement of section 3-816(a) that an order for involuntary treatment shall be

accompanied by a statement on the record of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Similarly, the court’s written findings in this case are conclusory and not tailored to the

specific facts of respondent. The written order tracks the language of section 2-107.1 of the

Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2010)) nearlyverbatim and constitutes, at best, conclusions

of fact with no supporting detail. For example, to support involuntarymedication, the statute

requires “[t]hat the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.” 405

ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) (West 2010). The written order states “[t]he recipient has a

serious mental illness/developmental disability.” The statute requires “[t]hat the recipient

lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a5)(4)(E) (West 2010). The written order states, “[t]he recipient lacks the capacity to make

a reasoned decision about the treatment.”

¶ 18 As in James S., the circuit court in the instant case failed to make findings of fact on the

record and failed to enter a written order that met the statutory requirements. Accordingly,

we reverse the order authorizing the administration of involuntarymedication. James S., 388

Ill. App. 3d at 1107; see also In re Joseph M., 405 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 1183 (2010) (reversing

where the circuit court made no express factual findings related to whether the respondent

met the statutory criteria for involuntary admission, but merely noted that there was “some

evidence” he would be “a risk to the community” if not medicated).

¶ 19 We also find that Madison H. supports this conclusion. In that case, the supreme court

affirmed the appellate court’s remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing

the trial court to entermore specific findings because the trial court’s preprinted dispositional

order, as well as the court’s oral statements on the record, lacked the trial court’s factual

basis for its decision. Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 378. The supreme court specifically found

that the trial court’s oral statements “mirror the statutory language,” and “no meaningful

specific factual basis is evident.” Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 378.

¶ 20 In reaching this conclusion, we find unpersuasive the State’s argument that reversal is

not required here because the statutory requirements of section 3-816(a) of the Code, i.e., that

courts ordering involuntary treatment shall state on the record their findings of fact and

conclusions of law, can be viewed as discretionary rather than mandatory. We disagree and

find that the requirement is mandatory. In support of its position, the State primarily relies

on two criminal cases. See People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 82-83 (1988); People v. Davis,

93 Ill. 2d 155, 162 (1982) (construing sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

and the Unified Code of Corrections as discretionary rather than mandatory). We do not

believe these cases are properly applied to the instant mental health case. See In re

Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 553-56, 560-61 (1977) (discussing the differences between

criminal and mental health cases).

¶ 21 Unlike the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, and the Unified Code

of Corrections analyzed by the Porter and Davis courts, the provisions of the Code here must

be narrowlyconstrued to protect the respondent’s significant libertyinterest in remaining free

from unwanted treatment. In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 274-75 (2008) (citing In re

Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 498 (1998)). We have specifically held that “ ‘[b]ecause *** the

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involuntary administration of medications affect[s] important liberty interests, strict

compliancewith the Code’s procedural safeguards is required to insure that the mental health

system does not become a tool to oppress rather than to serve society.’ ” James S., 388 Ill.

App. 3d at 1107 (quoting In re Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1025-26 (2001)). Morever, the

use of the word “shall” “ ‘dictates the necessary components of an order authorizing the

involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medications.’ ” James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1107

(quoting In re Williams, 305 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510 (1999)).

¶ 22 To meet the applicable statutory requirements, the trial court in this case could, for

instance, have found that respondent required medication because she had a “schizophrenic

paranoid type disorder.” However, because the trial court failed to make any findings of fact,

it did not adhere to the statute. Had the passage of time not rendered the order technically

moot, we could remand the case for entry of appropriate findings of fact. However, since the

90-day administration period has expired, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the order to

protect respondent from the order’s collateral consequences.

¶ 23 Reversed.

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