NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOHNNY R., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0056 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015JD202107007

The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, Flagstaff

By Sarah Snelling

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 1-19-2023
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Johnny R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his son (“Child”). For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Samantha S. (“Mother”) are Child’s parents. 

In March 2021, Mother was visiting Arizona from California when she went 

into labor. She and Child tested positive for amphetamines after the birth. 

Child had difficulty feeding, so he required a six-day stay at the hospital. 

¶3 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) met with Mother at 

the hospital. She told DCS that Father was not there because he was “doing 

something for work.” DCS then spoke with Father at his residence. He said 

he had been in Arizona for months to prepare for the baby’s birth, but DCS 

noted that “no baby items were observed” other than a crib that was still in 

its box. After Child was discharged from the hospital, he was placed in 

foster care. 

¶4 DCS promptly filed a petition for dependency. As to Father, 

DCS alleged (1) he was unwilling or unable to provide proper and effective 

parental care by neglecting Child’s basic needs, (2) he had not been 

involved with the Child since birth and did not visit him in the hospital, (3) 

he had been advised to provide identification to facilitate a “rule out hair 

follicle and urine test” but had not done so, and (4) he could not properly 

care for Child due to suspected substance abuse “because common 

symptoms of methamphetamine use include erratic and paranoid behavior 

and impaired decision making.”

¶5 In its initial dependency report, DCS reported that despite 

Father’s denial of any recent substance use, he appeared jittery, spoke fast,

did not answer the questions asked, and closed his eyes while being spoken 

to. DCS expressed concern that Father was “not an appropriate support”

for Mother due to, among other things, his suspected substance use. DCS 
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

3

was also concerned that Mother and Father were not parenting Mother’s 

other two children, who were living in California with their maternal 

grandmother, the youngest of whom is also Father’s child (“J.S.”). Those 

children were the subject of a 2019 dependency case in California, which 

began when Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine,

and marijuana at J.S.’s birth. 

¶6 After denying the allegations of the dependency petition, 

Father failed to appear at a pretrial conference and placement hearing. DCS 

requested that his non-appearance be deemed an admission to the 

allegations in the petition, and the juvenile court found Child dependent as 

to Father. 

¶7 DCS offered both parents reunification services, including 

substance-abuse testing and treatment, supervised visitation, and family 

support services. The parents were both resistant to the services offered

and missed about 50 to 60 percent of their scheduled visits with Child, 

which led to cutting the number of visits in half. The parents told DCS they 

missed visits due to transportation issues, but when DCS set up 

transportation, they declined to use it. Father participated in only one drug 

test, which had not been randomly scheduled; the result was negative. 

Father was unsuccessfully closed out of substance-abuse services twice due 

to his inaction and resistance to services. 

¶8 In October 2021, DCS filed a motion for termination of 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights based on chronic substance abuse and 

six months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b). Following a 

termination hearing held in January 2022, the juvenile court granted DCS’s 

motion on both grounds and found that termination was in Child’s best 

interests. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 8-235(A).1

1 In the termination order, the juvenile court stated that “[p]aternity

has not been established.” But Father is listed on the birth certificate, which 

means he is the presumptive father. See A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(3). For reasons 

that are not clear from the record, DCS moved to dismiss alleged father John 

Doe without having served him by publication and the juvenile court 

granted the motion. In this appeal, we address only the termination of 

Father’s parental rights.
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶9 To terminate parental rights, a court must find (1) by clear and 

convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)

has been proven, and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). We will affirm an order 

terminating parental rights so long as reasonable evidence supports the 

order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). 

“The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the 

best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). If the evidence 

supports any one ground for terminating parental rights, we need not 

address whether sufficient evidence supports the other grounds. Id. at ¶ 3.

A. Six Months’ Time-In-Care

¶10 To meet its burden of proving the time-in-care ground, DCS 

was required to establish that (1) Child was in an out-of-home placement 

for a “cumulative total period of six months or longer;” and (2) Father 

“substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the [Child] to be in the out-of-home placement, including 

refusal to participate in reunification services offered by [DCS].” A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(8)(b). Father argues the only circumstance that caused Child to 

remain out of his care was “DCS’s unsubstantiated belief” concerning his 

substance abuse. He contends there is no evidence supporting DCS’s 

allegations of substance abuse and the “dependency finding itself is 

tenuous” because it was based on his non-appearance. 

¶11 DCS explained its concerns about substance abuse at the 

outset of the case and included specific allegations of those concerns in the 

dependency petition. The significance of the court’s dependency finding is 

not weakened by his failure to appear; instead, he is deemed to have 

admitted all allegations in the petition, including his use of 

methamphetamine. See A.R.S. § 8-844(F) (stating that if a parent does not 

appear at a pretrial conference, a court may find that the parent “is deemed 

to have admitted the allegations of the petition by the failure to appear”).

Father’s admission undercuts his contention that DCS’s decision to require 

him to participate in substance-abuse testing was unsubstantiated. And he 

does not dispute that he displayed behavior consistent with a person who 

is under the influence of drugs. 
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Moreover, the record supports the court’s finding that Father 

refused to engage in substance-abuse services. Shortly after the birth of the 

child, DCS informed both parents that they needed to provide a “rule out” 

hair follicle and urinalysis test. Several weeks later, Father provided a urine 

analysis that “wasn’t a random test, it was . . . “on a day that he agreed to 

go.” He did not participate in any further testing, notwithstanding DCS’s 

repeated requests. Concerning the hair follicle test, he initially suggested it 

could not be done because he lacked hair on top of his head. However, the 

DCS case manager later informed him the test could be done with facial or 

body hair. Even though Father had many months before the termination 

hearing to obtain a hair follicle test, he substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to do so. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 

379, ¶ 27 (App. 2010) (noting parent’s failure to submit to drug testing for 

two months among evidence of ongoing substance abuse). 

¶13 Further, we reject Father’s argument that the court 

improperly placed the burden on him to prove he was not using drugs. 

His reliance on Donald W. v. Department of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9 (App. 

2019) is not persuasive. There, this court vacated a termination judgment 

in part because the dependency petition allegations were not supported by 

any evidence. Id. at 18, ¶¶ 27, 30. And the juvenile court in that case had 

been unable to identify any “circumstance” causing the out-of-home 

placement, which necessarily meant the court could not properly decide 

whether diligent efforts had been made or whether the parent had been able 

to remedy the circumstance. Id. at 17, ¶ 26. Given Father’s admission to the 

allegations of the petition, coupled with evidence supporting DCS’s 

concerns about his suspected substance abuse, the multiple problems 

outlined in Donald W. are not present here. 

B. Reunification Services

¶14 DCS also had to prove it made diligent efforts to provide 

appropriate reunification services to Father. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), (D).

(court must consider the availability of reunification services to parents and

their participation in those services). DCS must provide services and give 

the parent an opportunity to engage in the services, Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 37 (App. 1999), but it is not required 

to wait an indefinite period before requesting termination of parental 

rights, Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 

1994). DCS has no obligation to provide services that would be futile or 

ensure parents participate in the services offered, but it must give them the 

time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help parents 
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

6

effectively parent. Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, 

¶¶ 14–15 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).

¶15 Father argues that DCS failed to make diligent efforts to 

provide reunification services because it failed to provide sufficient 

documentation supporting the case manager’s testimony about his lack of 

compliance with services. He argues that his counsel subpoenaed records 

from two agencies, both of which responded that they had no records for 

Father. The case manager testified, however, that Father was given two 

referrals and that both were closed out. The juvenile court was in the best 

position to resolve that conflict in the evidence, and we will not reweigh it 

on appeal. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018) 

(noting that the juvenile court is entitled to resolve conflicting evidence 

even when facts are sharply disputed). Moreover, Father did not testify 

that he was never given referrals to those agencies, and he fails to

acknowledge that DCS records show he was not always referred to by the 

same name, which could explain the discrepancy. 

¶16 The DCS case manager testified that both parents were 

offered referrals for several services, including substance abuse, but both 

parents “were very resistant to the services.” She explained that although 

there were issues with Father’s social security number, it did not prevent 

him from drug testing. The record supports the court’s finding that DCS 

“made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services” under 

the unique circumstances present in this case, which included parents “who 

were choosing not to engage, choosing not to call back, [and] choosing not 

to show up to appointments.” 

C. Best Interests

¶17 Termination is in a child’s best interests if either “(1) the child 

will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is 

denied.” Id. at 150, ¶ 13. The juvenile court may consider various factors 

concerning the presence of a harm or benefit. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6 (1990). The court’s primary concern is the “child’s 

interest in stability and security.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12 (citation 

omitted). The juvenile court considers the “totality of the circumstances

existing at the time of the severance,” id. at ¶ 13, including a parent’s 

rehabilitation efforts, id. at 151, ¶ 15.

¶18 The juvenile court found that Child is in an adoptive 

placement meeting all his needs and that “another adoptive placement 

could be located should the current placement be unable to adopt.” The 
JOHNNY R. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

7

court also found that continuing Father’s parent-child relationship with 

Child would be detrimental to him “because it would delay permanency, 

leaving the child to linger in care for an indeterminate period since the child 

does not have parents who are able to care for him.” The court explained 

that Child does not have a strong bond with Father, and although severance 

is traumatic, Child is almost a year old and Father had made no progress in 

services, sobriety, or the ability to care for Child. The court thus concluded 

that termination would serve the child’s best interests. 

¶19 Father argues the court’s adoptability finding is speculative

but does not challenge the court’s findings that continuation of the parentchild relationship would be detrimental. Because Father has waived any 

challenge to those findings, we need not address his argument on the 

adoptability finding. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, 

¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role 

to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G., 227 

Ariz. at 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (recognizing that the failure to develop an argument 

on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver of the issue). The 

evidence supports the court’s best-interests determination. 

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights.