IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2024 WY 90

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2024 

 August 21, 2024 

WADE JEFFERY REGAN,

Appellant 

(Defendant), 

v. 

TANYA JEAN REGAN, 

Appellee 

(Plaintiff).

S-24-0074 

 

Appeal from the District Court of Weston County

The Honorable Stuart S. Healy III, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Michael Stulken, Newcastle, Wyoming. 

Representing Appellee:

No appearance.

Before FOX, C.J., and BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Wade Jeffery Regan (Husband) appeals the district court’s order dividing the marital 

property between him and Tanya Jean Regan (Wife) after the court granted the parties a 

divorce. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Husband raises two issues we rephrase as one:

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it divided 

the marital property.

FACTS

[¶3] In 2014, Wife and her two children from another relationship moved in with 

Husband. Wife had a child with Husband in 2018. The parties married in 2019. During 

the marriage, Husband ran a trucking business and Wife assisted him with bookkeeping. 

Wife also briefly worked at a mental health facility and later as a secretary at a hospital. 

The parties separated in March 2022. Wife filed for divorce soon after. 

[¶4] In January 2023, the parties filed, and the district court entered, a stipulated decree 

of divorce, settling child custody, visitation, and child support. The parties disputed the 

disposition of marital property. The district court held a bench trial in April and ruled from 

the bench. In November, the court entered its final order dividing the marital property. 

The court considered the equitable value in the parties’ marital home, rental property,

livestock, personal vehicles, personal property, and debts. The court then divided the 

parties’ separate debts and assigned them their personal vehicles and other personal 

property, assigned Husband the marital home, and assigned Wife her retirement funds and 

an equalization payment from Father.

[¶5] Husband timely appealed and filed a W.R.A.P. 3.03 statement of the evidence with 

the district court because the bench trial was unrecorded.1

 The court settled the statement 

of evidence for the record on appeal. 

1 W.R.A.P. 3.03 states, in part: “If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, 

or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 

best available means including appellant’s recollection. The statement shall be filed in the trial court . . . . 

The trial court shall, within 10 days, enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which 

shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.”
2

DISCUSSION

[¶6] We review the district court’s division of marital property for an abuse of discretion, 

focusing on whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Hyatt v. Hyatt, 2023 

WY 129, ¶ 11, 540 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2023) (citations omitted). “We do not disturb a 

property division in a divorce except on clear grounds, because ‘the trial court is usually in 

a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties’ needs and the merits of their 

positions.’” Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, ¶ 26, 550 P.3d 537, 547 (Wyo. 2024) (citation 

omitted). An abuse of discretion will be found if the property division shocks the 

conscience of this Court and appears “so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people 

cannot abide by it.” Bailey, 2024 WY 65, ¶ 26, 550 P.3d at 547 (quoting Hyatt, 2023 WY 

129, ¶ 11, 540 P.3d at 880).

[¶7] In reviewing a district court’s factual findings after a bench trial, we have stated:

The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited 

review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are 

presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of 

the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 

given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 

credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail 

reweighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set 

aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In 

considering a trial court’s factual findings, we assume that the 

evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 

party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably 

be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial 

court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 

unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a 

matter of law.

Koch v. Gray, 2024 WY 41, ¶ 10, 546 P.3d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 2024) (citation omitted). 

Because the record contains no transcript of the relevant proceeding below, our review is 

limited to the statement of evidence supplied under W.R.A.P. 3.03.

2

 See id. at ¶ 9; 

Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 2022 WY 164, ¶ 19, 522 P.3d 156, 162 (Wyo. 2022) (“To the 

2 In cases where an appellant fails to obtain a statement of evidence under W.R.A.P. 3.03, this Court has

had “no choice but to assume that the evidence supports the district court’s findings.” McGill v. McGill, 

2022 WY 149, ¶ 16, 520 P.3d 1129, 1133 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Nw. Bldg. Co. v. Nw. Distrib. Co., 2012 

WY 113, ¶ 17, 285 P.3d 239, 243 (Wyo. 2012)); Kruse v. Kruse, 2010 WY 144, ¶ 12, 242 P.3d 1011, 1014 

(Wyo. 2010).
3

extent that we can assess the district court’s exercise of discretion based on the limited 

record before us, we shall do so.” (citation omitted)).

[¶8] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a) (2023) states:

[I]n granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition 

of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, 

having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the 

condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party 

through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 

imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and 

children. 

“There are no specific guidelines as to the weight the district court must afford the statutory 

considerations when making a property division.” Innes v. Innes, 2021 WY 137, ¶ 15, 500 

P.3d 259, 262 (Wyo. 2021) (citations omitted). The statute does not require an equal 

division of property. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, ¶ 26, 550 P.3d at 547 (citations omitted). 

Rather, a “just and equitable” division is likely to be unequal. Id. (citation omitted). We 

evaluate the equity of the district court’s property division “from the perspective of the 

overall distribution rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 

disposition.” Id. (quoting Innes, 2021 WY 137, ¶ 17, 500 P.3d at 262).

[¶9] Husband challenges the district court’s factual findings in its property division 

order. He first argues the court clearly erred when it failed to allocate any portion of a debt

owed to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to Wife. The record shows no such error. At 

the outset of the bench trial, the parties presented a joint property summary to the court, 

indicating an IRS debt in the amount of $210,000. Husband testified the debt was a back 

tax penalty he incurred for failing to pay business taxes. He also testified the debt 

accumulated between 2011 and 2016 and can be attributed solely to him. In its written 

order, the court found it was unable to calculate the IRS debt because “there was not any 

credible evidence produced at trial.”

[¶10] Husband contends this finding is inconsistent with Wife’s testimony that she 

generally agreed with the values in the joint property summary, which included the IRS 

debt. The statement of the evidence, however, indicates the testimony regarding the IRS 

debt was “unclear.” Beyond Father’s testimony and the joint property summary, the record 

contains no further evidence pertaining to the IRS debt. In other words, the record does 

not contradict the district court’s finding. Therefore, we conclude the court did not clearly 

error when it found no credible evidence of the IRS debt was produced at trial. See Koch, 

2024 WY 41, ¶ 10, 546 P.3d at 1099 (citation omitted). 

[¶11] Husband next argues the district court clearly erred when it considered a portion of 

his business to be marital property for purposes of calculating the parties’ total assets and 
4

that this value is unsupported by the record. The district court found the total value of 

Husband’s trucking business is $182,310. It then found $35,000 of that value constituted 

marital property based on Wife’s contribution to the business and her role in helping raise 

the children and maintaining the marital home. Contrary to Husband’s assertions, the 

record supports these findings. Wife testified she performed bookkeeping work for 

Husband’s business and was the primary caretaker of the marital home and the children

because Husband was often at work. Husband also testified that he worked long hours and

Wife performed work for the business. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a) all the 

parties’ property may be subject to division upon divorce. Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 8, 

125 P.3d 284, 287 (Wyo. 2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, the district court did not 

clearly error when it established a value for the marital portion of Husband’s business in 

its calculation of the parties’ total assets.

[¶12] Husband further argues the district court abused its discretion because it did not 

appropriately consider the factors under the property division statute when it ordered him 

to make a $138,000 equalization payment to Wife.

3

 He contends the court did not consider 

his IRS debt and other financial obligations such as his mortgage and child support

payments when it required him to make the equalization payment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-

2-114(a) does not require the court to specifically address and make findings for each 

factor. It merely requires the court to have “regard” for each factor when making a property 

division. Id.; see also Stoker v. Stoker, 2005 WY 39, ¶ 22, 109 P.3d 59, 65 (Wyo. 2005) 

(“There are ‘no hard and fast rules’ governing property divisions.” (citation omitted)). A 

review of the district court’s order demonstrates it gave appropriate regard to the statutory 

factors. 

[¶13] Indeed, the district court expressly stated it considered all the factors under the 

statute. After identifying, valuing, and setting over various asset categories to one party or 

the other, the court found (1) the total value of assets set over to Husband totaled $299,545

which included the marital home, rental property, livestock, bank account, and his business, 

and (2) his debts totaled $24,000. As discussed above, the court found no credible evidence 

pertaining to Husband’s IRS debt. The court found Wife’s equitable share of the total 

assets was $149,435; her share of debt was $14,960. It also found Husband’s business 

income in 2021 was $112,00 and rose to $120,000 in 2022. Husband earned upwards of 

$4,000 a month in net income. Wife earned less at $17 an hour with a net income of $2,000 

a month but had a future earning capacity of $25 an hour. The court then determined an 

equitable distribution of the marital estate required an equalization payment from Husband 

3 Husband also argues the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider the seven-month 

delay between its oral ruling and the entry of the final order as it relates to his ability to pay the equalization 

payment, citing to Castellow v. Pettengill, 2021 WY 88, ¶ 9, 492 P.3d 894, 897–98 (Wyo. 2021) (analyzing 

whether a district court’s delay in issuing a final custody decision constituted reversable error under 

U.R.D.C. 902). Yet, Husband states in his brief that “[t]here is nothing in the record which would indicate 

how this delay would effect [his] ability to pay” the equalization payment. Because Husband’s argument 

admittedly lacks any support in the record, we need not consider it further. 
5

to Wife in the amount of $138,000. It is clear the court had regard for the condition the 

parties would be left in after the divorce. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a). It is also 

clear the court had regard for the party through whom the property was acquired and the

burdens imposed on the property for the benefit of either party when it assigned Husband 

the marital home, which included the mortgage, and credited him $50,000 for the down

payment he made when he purchased it. See id.

[¶14] Husband also asserts the district court failed to consider the merits of the parties—

particularly, Wife’s “fault” in taking $27,900 from their joint bank account prior to filing 

for divorce. See Conzelman v. Conzelman, 2019 WY 123, ¶ 20, 453 P.3d 773, 779 (Wyo. 

2019) (“As our precedent plainly provides, a trial court may consider fault of the parties 

when dividing marital property[.]” (citations omitted)). Husband is mistaken, as the order 

makes clear the court considered Wife’s post-separation cash withdrawal. After finding

Wife had received $27,900 at separation, leaving Husband with $14,100 in the joint bank 

account, the court set over $20,000 to Husband. The court thus considered the merits of 

the parties. See id.

[¶15] Because the district court reasonably considered each of the statutory factors under 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a), its property division is not so unfair and inequitable that 

reasonable people cannot abide by it. Moreover, the court’s ruling does not shock our

conscience. We affirm.