J-S10034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTY LYNN WILLIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1169 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal 

Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001710-2019

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2022

Christy Lynn Willis (Appellant) appeals from the judgments of sentence, 

following her convictions for obstruction in a child abuse case, hindering 

apprehension or prosecution, and false reports to law enforcement 

authorities.1 She challenges a deferred ruling denying her pre-trial motion for 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4958(b.1), 5105(a)(5), and 4906(b)(1), respectively. 

Appellant also purports to appeal from the orders denying her pre-trial 

motion for a change of venue and her post-sentence motion. We have 

corrected the caption to reflect that Appellant’s appeal properly lies from the 

judgments of sentence entered, rather than the orders denying her pre-trial 

and post-sentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 

1122, 1125 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (noting correction of a caption to 

reflect that a direct appeal was an appeal from an order entering judgments 

of sentence rather than an order denying a post-sentence motion); see also

Commonwealth v. Swanson, 225 A.2d 231, 232 (Pa. 1967) (holding that, 

in general, the defendant in a criminal case can appeal only from the judgment 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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a change of venue, the denial of her change of venue claim in her postsentence motion, and the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her 

convictions. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarizes the factual history of the case as follows:

[Appellant] was charged with one count of Obstruction of a Child 

Abuse Investigation, one count of Hindering Apprehension or 

Prosecution, and one count of False Reports to Law Enforcement 

Authorities. The charges stemmed from a child abuse 

investigation. [Appellant’s] son, Jahrid Burgess, was the subject 

of an investigation of the abuse of his girlfriend’s [three-year-old]

daughter, [A.P.], which resulted in the child’s death. Allegedly, 

Mr. Burgess, in a fit of anger, threw his girlfriend’s daughter which 

caused the child to strike her head. Almost immediately after the 

child began having seizures[,] Samantha Delcamp, the child’s 

mother, attempted to help her daughter and begged Mr. Burgess 

to call 911. Mr. Burgess repeatedly refused to call 911 but did call 

his mother, [Appellant]. [Appellant] arrived approximately twenty 

to thirty minutes later. Eventually, [Appellant] did call 911 after 

Ms. Delcamp repeatedly requested they do so. 

After 911 was called[,] Ms. Delcamp rode with her daughter in the 

ambulance to Geisinger Medical Center (GMC). Jahrid Burgess 

and [Appellant] drove to GMC in [Appellant]’s vehicle. While at 

the hospital[,] Ms. Delcamp, Jahrid Burgess[,] and [Appellant] 

went outside so Mr. Burgess could smoke a cigarette. It was then 

Ms. Delcamp first heard [Appellant] state to Mr. Burgess that he 

should not worry [and] that she would say that she was there so 

there was another witness. She also overheard [Appellant] tell 

Mr. Burgess that she would say she was there the whole time so 

no one would get in trouble.

Brittany Duke-Williams, a caseworker for Northumberland County 

Children and Youth Services testified for the Commonwealth at 

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of sentence, and an appeal from any prior order, such as an order denying a 

change in venue, will be quashed as interlocutory); Commonwealth v. 

Chamberlain, 658 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. 1995) (in a criminal action, an 

appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial 

of post-sentence motions).
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trial. Ms. Duke-Williams was the on-call caseworker [on] October 

10-11, 2019. She responded to a call regarding [A.P.] and went 

to [GMC]. Ms. Duke-Williams introduced herself to Samantha 

Delcamp, Jahrid Burgess[,] and [Appellant], and informed them 

she was there to investigate a report of possible child abuse, but 

there were no named perpetrators at that time. [Appellant] told 

Ms. Duke-Williams that Ms. Delcamp was doing dishes, Jahrid 

Burgess was eating, [A.P.] was at her table and [Appellant] was 

folding laundry, and that she heard [A.P.] fall and saw her on the 

floor. 

Dr. Paul Bellino testified as to the nature and extent of [A.P.]’s 

injuries. Dr. Bellino is an expert in pediatric medicine with a 

specialty in identifying pediatric abuse. Dr. Bellino was asked to 

evaluate [A.P.] because of a suspicion she was the victim of 

abuse. Dr. Bellino testified that[,] within a reasonable degree of 

certainty[,] that her injury was the result of trauma. Indeed, Dr. 

Bellino indicated that had the medical team known of the trauma 

upon her arrival at the hospital her treatment would have been 

sooner and possibly enabled her to survive her injuries. 

Pennsylvania State Trooper Jessica Nashke was assigned to the 

Criminal Investigation Unit on October 11, 2019. As part of her 

duties, Trooper Nashke took photographs of [A.P.] The 

Commonwealth introduced three photographs into evidence. 

Exhibit Number 4 was a photo of [A.P.] sedated in her hospital 

bed. Exhibit Number 5 was another photo of [A.P.] that was more 

[of] a full body shot of her in her hospital bed. The last 

photograph submitted by the Commonwealth was Exhibit Number 

six, which was another photograph of [A.P.] in her hospital bed. 

All three of these photographs were admitted into evidence 

without an objection by [Appellant’s] counsel.

The Commonwealth next called Corporal Jeffrey Kowalski[,] who 

was a Trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of 

Criminal Investigation assigned to the Computer Crime Unit. 

Counsel for [Appellant] stipulated to Corporal Kowalski testifying 

as an expert in the forensic investigation of cell phones and 

computers. 

Corporal Adrian Bordner of the Pennsylvania State Police testified 

that [Appellant] came to the barracks at Stonington while Jahrid 

Burgess was being questioned. She was looking for information 

as to what was going on. When asked about what she knew about 
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the incident[,] she told [C]orporal Bordner that she was at the 

residence at the time. Corporal Bordner further testified that he 

later interviewed [Appellant] with Trooper Seibert. During that 

interview[, Appellant] again stated that she was present in the 

home when [A.P.] had a seizure, in direct contradiction to Ms. 

Delcamp’s testimony and the forensic evidence recovered from 

the phones. 

Trooper Brian Seibert was the last witness produced by the 

Commonwealth. Trooper Seibert testified that he was present 

when [Appellant] initially spoke to Corporal Bordner in the lobby 

of the State Police Barracks. Trooper Seibert’s testimony 

confirmed Corporal Bordner’s testimony about the initial 

conversation with [Appellant]. Trooper Seibert also testified as to 

Exhibits 8, 9, 10[,] and 11, which were the records of the data 

extracted by Corporal Kowalski from the cell phones of Samantha 

Delcamp and [Appellant]. Trooper Seibert testified that on the 

date of the incident there was a search on Ms. Delcamp’s phone 

at 8:59 p.m. [for] “[W]hat do you do for a seizure.” It was not 

until 9:47 p.m. that 911 was called from [Appellant’s] phone. 

Trooper Seibert testified that [Appellant] received a phone call 

from Ms. Delcamp’s phone at 9:31 p.m. This evidence 

contradicted [Appellant’s] statement that she was present in the 

home when the child had a seizure. Additionally, Trooper Seibert 

testified that [Appellant’s] statement that she was present when 

her son, Jahrid Burgess was searching on Ms. Delcamp’s phone 

for what to do during a seizure was contradicted by the fact that 

the phone logs showed that there was a two[-]minute phone call 

from Ms. Delcamp’s phone to [Appellant]. Ultimately, Trooper 

Seibert testified that [Appellant’s] statement [that] she was 

present at the time [A.P.] had a seizure was not possible given 

her phone records.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/21, 1-5 (references to minor abuse victim changed 

to initials; reformatted text in brackets; citations omitted; opinion is 

unpaginated).

Relevant to this appeal, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion 

requesting, inter alia, a change of venue because of local newspaper coverage 
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of Appellant and the circumstances of her criminal charges. Omnibus PreTrial Motion, 1/27/21, ¶¶ 17-22. The court issued an order noting that the 

motion for a change of venue would be “reserved for jury selection.” Order, 

3/4/21, 1; see also Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/21, 5-6 (“[President Judge 

Charles] Saylor deferred ruling on that motion until the jury selection had 

begun. If a jury could not be empaneled, he would grant the Motion. Jury 

selection took place before Judge Paige Rosini and the jury was seated without 

issue.”).

Appellant proceeded to be tried by a jury before the Honorable Hugh A. 

Jones on April 14-15, 2021. After hearing the evidence summarized above, 

the jury found Appellant guilty of the above-referenced charges and indicated 

a finding that Appellant “employed deception upon the reporter, witness or 

victim or employed such tactics with reckless intent or knowledge upon any 

other person.” Verdict Sheet, 4/15/21, 1 (original in all caps). 

The court sentenced Appellant to fourteen months to ten years of 

imprisonment for obstruction in a child abuse case, to be followed by three 

months to seven years of imprisonment for hindering apprehension or 

prosecution, and one year of probation for false reports to law enforcement

authorities. Sentencing Orders, 7/9/21. Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion, challenging a verbal order denying her pre-trial motion for a change 

of venue. Post-Sentence Motion, 7/13/21, ¶¶ 5-12. Appellant timely filed a 

counseled notice of appeal following the denial of her post-sentence motion. 

Order, 8/2/21, 1; Notice of Appeal, 8/27/21, 1. She thereafter filed a timely 
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concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Order, 9/1/21, 1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/13/21, 1-2.

Appellant presents the following questions for our review: (1) “Whether 

the Trial Court erred or abused its discretion in denying the Appellant’s Motion 

of Change of Venue?” and (2) “Whether the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain the convictions of the Appellant for obstruction, hindering 

apprehension, and false reports to law enforcement?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

In her first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred or abused 

its discretion by denying her motions for a change of venue that were included 

in her omnibus pre-trial motion and her post-sentence motion. Appellant’s 

Brief at 11-14. She claims that she was entitled to a change of venue under 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 584(A) because of publicity from pre-trial local newspaper 

coverage that she alleges was “sensational, inflammatory, slanted toward 

conviction, and saturated the community within a sufficient proximity of time 

before jury selection.” Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. 

The trial court recommends that this claim is moot because Appellant 

supposedly withdrew the motion preserving the claim. Trial Court Opinion, 

11/5/21, 5-6 (“The Court beliefs [sic] that this matter is moot. Indeed, on a 

Motion in Limine before this court defense counsel indicated he was 

withdrawing the Motion. (Motion in Limine, April 13, 2021, pg. 1 lines 13-

25).”). Before embarking on our own analysis, we decline to accept the trial 

court’s reasoning as to mootness. While Appellant filed a motion in limine on 

March 5, 2020, that motion did not include a request concerning a change of 
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venue. Appellant withdrew that motion in limine with a praecipe filed on June 

16, 2020, and the change of venue was then subsequently raised in an 

omnibus pre-trial motion. Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 1/27/21, ¶¶ 17-22. The 

certified record does not support the notion that Appellant ever withdrew the 

pre-trial motion raising the venue claim. An order issued by the court prior to 

trial separately addressed four sub-parts of the omnibus pre-trial motion and 

indicated that the motion for a change of venue would be “reserved for jury 

selection.” Order, 3/4/21, 1.

The denial of claims for a change of venue based on pre-trial publicity 

are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and the nature of the 

content of the publicity can yield a presumption of prejudice to the defendant 

that can be negated by a “cooling off period” in between the time of the 

publicity and the time of trial:

In Pennsylvania, a trial court must grant a change of venue where 

a fair ... trial cannot otherwise be had in the county where the case 

is currently pending. Ordinarily, an accused challenging a trial 

court’s failure to grant a motion for a change of venue on the basis 

of pretrial publicity must demonstrate on the record that the 

publicity at issue caused one or more of the seated jurors to form 

a fixed opinion prejudicial to her defense. However, as noted 

supra, we have recognized that pretrial publicity may be so 

inflammatory or inculpatory in nature, and so sustained and 

pervasive in the community, as to relieve the accused of her 

burden in this regard, whereupon, regardless of the seated jurors’ 

indications that they could perform their duties fairly and 

impartially, this Court will presume prejudice and order retrial.

In determining whether pretrial publicity is sufficiently 

inflammatory or inculpatory as to implicate this presumption, we 

have consistently looked to whether the publicity’s content is likely 

to cause readers to become prejudiced against the accused, 
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identifying as particularly suspect publicity which is sensational, 

inflammatory, and slanted toward conviction, rather than factual 

and objective; reveal[s] the defendant’s prior criminal record, if 

any[;] referred to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the 

crime by the defendant, or is derived from official police or 

prosecutorial reports. In determining whether publicity is 

sustained and pervasive in the community, we have looked, inter 

alia, to the time between the publicity and trial, the nature and 

size of the community, opinion polling, and/or the statements of 

actual venire as elicited during the jury selection process. 

However, we have noted that, even where inflammatory or 

inculpatory public is disseminated in a sustained fashion and 

pervasively throughout the community where that publicity is 

followed by a “cooling off” period sufficient to dissipate its 

prejudicial effect, a change of venue is unnecessary. 

In reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether pretrial 

publicity requires a change in venue, because the trial court is in 

the best position to assess the atmosphere of the community and 

to judge the necessity of any requested change, we reverse the 

determination only where it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 269-70 (Pa. 2015) (citations, and 

quotation marks omitted). This Court, upon review of a trial court’s order 

denying a change of venue “must very carefully scrutinize such an order to 

ensure that a sound discretion has been exercised,” and, in doing so, this 

Court has “the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Cohen, 413 A.2d 1066, 1073 (Pa. 1980). 

Here, Appellant asserts that she “brought to the [trial] court’s attention 

that over 120 articles had been published in the local newspaper related to 

[her] case,” and that, “[a]t no point, did the trial court review any of these 

articles referenced.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. This Court is unable to 

materially respond to this claim for multiple reasons. 
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First, there does not appear to be any information in the certified record 

that reflects the trial court’s ruling on the pre-trial venue motion. Appellant 

has not directed this Court to a location in the certified record which reflects 

the lower court’s ruling. By virtue of the fact that the trial court reserved any 

ruling on the motion until jury selection, this Court would expect that the 

ruling occurred during the voir dire that occurred on April 12, 2021. 

Defendant, however, has failed to ensure in the certified record the notes of 

testimony from that proceeding. Additionally, the trial judge did not preside 

over the voir dire session so the lower court’s opinion does not reflect the

circumstances and reasoning for the court’s denial of the pre-trial venue 

motion, if a ruling was issued. Based on the current state of the certified 

record, this Court is unable to glean anything about the trial court’s pre-trial 

ruling in question or even confirm that it occurred.2 By extension, there is 

nothing in the record to support or contradict Appellant’s complaint about the 

trial court’s supposed lack of pre-trial review of news articles.

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2 Appellant asserted in her post-sentence motion that the trial judge issued a 

“verbal order” denying the venue motion on the first date of trial on April 14, 

2021. Post-Sentence Motion, 7/13/21, ¶ 7. The notes of testimony for that 

date start with a reference to the swearing of the jury and the court’s 

introductory instructions to the jury, but does not reflect any ruling on a venue 

change motion. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, referred to a ruling 

on the pre-trial motion by the voir dire judge during its arguments concerning

Appellant’s post-sentence motion. N.T. 8/2/21, 3 (“[The Commonwealth:] ... 

I believe the Court’s decision at the time of jury selection not to grant this 

motion was proper...”). The trial judge’s opinion does not refer to any ruling 

and only mentions that the “jury was seated without issue” before another 

judge. Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/21, 5.
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Second, even assuming arguendo that there was a denial of the pretrial venue motion that remains de hors the record, this Court is unable to 

conduct any independent review of the denial of a change of venue motion

because Appellant has not supplied us with any of the newspaper articles that

her pre-trial and post-sentence motions generally addressed. To the extent 

that Appellant asserts that she “brought to the court’s attention ... over 120 

articles,” this Court is unable to confirm that. Her pre-trial and post-sentence 

motions only referred to the existence of “over a dozen articles” by a local 

newspaper called The Daily Item Newspaper, however, in both pleadings, she 

never offered citations to any of those articles or appended any copies of the 

articles. Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 1/27/21, ¶ 18; Post-Sentence Motion, 

7/13/21, ¶ 8.

At the hearing on her post-sentence venue change claim, her counsel 

referred to “over 120 [articles] published by the Daily Item that have 

referenced this case and the circumstances surrounding [it],” and mentioned 

that he had printed out six of the articles. N.T. 8/2/21, 2. The court indicated 

that it was not in possession of the six articles that counsel supposedly printed 

out. Id. at 3 (“[The Commonwealth:] Your Honor, I have been provided with 

proposed exhibits. I am not sure if the Court has those, the six articles. The 

Court: I do not.”). While the Commonwealth referred to the six articles as 

“proposed exhibits,” Appellant’s counsel never marked and moved them into 

the evidentiary record. Accordingly, they were never incorporated into the 

record certified for this appeal. In the alternative, to extent that Appellant 
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faults the trial court for not reviewing any newspaper articles, our review of 

the notes of testimony from the hearing on the post-sentence motion does 

not reflect any instance where Appellant’s counsel offered the trial court copies 

of the six articles he supposedly printed out.3

In the absence of any record of the pre-trial ruling in question or copies 

of the articles generally references by Appellant’s claims below, this Court is 

unable to make any determination as to whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s venue motions or whether the pre-trial 

publicity would have had any bearing on the ability of the jurors to render an 

unbiased verdict in this case. By presenting this claim on appeal based only 

on a diminished, if not absolutely incomplete, record, Appellant waived the 

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3

In the absence of any evidentiary proffer as to this claim, the trial court

relied on the rulings of his pre-trial counterparts and the absence of any issues 

with the jury during the trial in denying the post-sentence venue claim:

THE COURT: I just wanted to -- I reviewed the whole record in 

the case prior to this hearing. I just want to point out I did not 

conduct the Voir Dire in this case, it was conducted by Judge 

Rosini. 

The first Motion for Change of Venue actually was ruled upon by 

Judge Saylor. So, all of my colleagues in the Northumberland 

County Court have had a hand in this case one way or the other, 

and all of them, including myself, believe that there was no 

prejudice by any of the jurors that were selected for the jury pool. 

I conducted the trial. I had no problems with any of the jurors 

during the entire trial, as counsel themselves knows. So that 

being the case, I am going to rule right from the bench and deny 

the Motion for Change of Venue and/or New Trial. That’s all.

N.T. 8/2/21, 4.
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instant claim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowser, 624 A.2d 125, 132

(Pa. Super. 1993) (defendant waived a challenge to the denial of his request 

for a change of venue due to pre-trial publicity, where the alleged pre-trial 

publicity, consisting of several newspaper articles, was not included in the 

record on appeal). 

In her remaining issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. In support of this claim, she alleges 

that: (1) “no witness stated that [she] contradicted her statement or created 

confusion with PSP Stonington’s investigation;” (2) “[t]he only evidence the 

Commonwealth offered to pro[ve her] obstruction and hinderance of the 

investigation was a cell phone log, which was circumstantial to the elements 

of the crimes;” (3) there was “no direct evidence” of her guilt; and (4) “the 

one piece of evidence suggesting [that she] committed any of the offenses 

charged [wa]s circumstantial.” Id. Appellant fails to demonstrate an 

entitlement to relief because the Commonwealth was able to fully sustain the 

charges through the presentation of circumstantial evidence and, in any event, 

Appellant fails to review the evidence pursuant to applicable standard of 

review.

The standard of review utilized in sufficiency claims is well-settled:

[O]ur standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we 

evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict 

winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be 

deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each 

material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof 
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by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with the 

defendant’s innocence. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Lynch, 242 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted; alterations in original). The Commonwealth is permitted to “sustain 

its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence, and we must evaluate 

the entire trial record and consider all evidence against the defendant.” 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

To prove Appellant’s guilt for obstruction, the Commonwealth needed to 

demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, “with intent to prevent a public 

servant from investigating or prosecuting a report of child abuse under 23 

Pa.C.S. Ch. 63, [Appellant] by any scheme or device or in any other manner 

obstruct[ed], interfere[d] with, impair[ed], imped[ed] or pervert[ed] the 

investigation or prosecution of child abuse.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4958(b.1).

To prove Appellant’s guilt for hindering apprehension or prosecution, the 

Commonwealth needed to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, 

“with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or 

punishment of another for crime[, Appellant] provide[d] false information to 

a law enforcement officer.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5105(a)(5).
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To prove Appellant’s guilt for false reports to law enforcement 

authorities, the Commonwealth needed to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable 

doubt that, Appellant “report[ed] to law enforcement authorities an offense or 

other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur.” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4906(b)(1).

Here, the scheme for obstruction that Appellant engaged in with the 

intent to prevent a public servant from investigating or prosecuting a report 

of child abuse was that she would say that she was present in the home at 

the time of A.P.’s injury so she could claim that she was an additional witness 

that could allege that A.P. sustained her injuries through a naturally occurring 

seizure rather than as a result of abuse committed by her son, Mr. Burgess. 

The evidence sustained the existence of the scheme because Ms. Delcamp 

testified about the circumstances of Mr. Burgess’s abuse of A.P., just prior to 

the seizure and during the absence of Appellant in their home, Appellant’s 

arrival to the home between twenty and thirty minutes after the seizure 

started, and Appellant’s assurances at the hospital to Mr. Burgess that she 

would claim to having been present at the home at the time of the seizure. 

N.T. 4/14/21, 50-54, 56-60, 63-65. Ms. Delcamp recalled that, while they 

were outside the hospital with Mr. Burgess, Appellant “said to not worry 

because she will say that she was there so there is another witness.” Id. at 

65; see also id. at 94-95 (“Don’t worry, I’ll say that I was there, too, and I’ll 

be another witness.”). Ms. Delcamp confirmed that Appellant made that 

statement after her son had told her about him throwing A.P. Id. at 94-95.
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Ms. Delcamp also testified that she overhead Appellant telling Mr. 

Burgess in a waiting room in the hospital “that she would say that she was 

folding clothes the whole time so no one would get in trouble and there’s 

another witness to the story.” N.T. 4/14/21, 68-69 (emphasis added). The 

“story” that Appellant alluded to was the false information and reports that 

she would offer to the caseworker and law enforcement personnel

investigating the circumstances of A.P.’s death.4

Multiple parties investigating the circumstances of A.P.’s injuries 

recounted that Appellant offered them accounts of her presence in the child’s 

home at the time of the start of her seizure. Brittany Duke-Williams, a 

caseworker for the Northumberland Children and Youth Services testified that, 

at the hospital in the early morning hours following A.P.’s admittance, 

Appellant told her that she was in A.P.’s home and folding laundry at the time 

that A.P. had the seizure while A.P. was supposedly eating at a children’s table 

by herself. N.T. 4/14/21, 30, 36-37. 

____________________________________________

4 Ms. Delcamp also offered testimony reflecting that Appellant had engaged in 

an earlier scheme to hinder the investigation of abuse of A.P. in the months 

leading up to the seizure incident during which Appellant would loan her car 

to Mr. Burgess and Ms. Delcamp to help them evade impending visits from 

Children and Youth caseworkers on four or five occasions when A.P. had black 

and blue bruising. N.T. 4/14/21, 100-02 (“Q. Did [Appellant] know why you 

needed her car? A. Yes. Q. Why did you need to leave? A. Because there 

was bruises on us and they couldn’t have Children and Youth see it. ... Q. 

Was [Appellant] aware why you needed her car in order to evade Children and 

Youth? A. Yes. ... Q. When did she loan you the car in order to evade Children 

and Youth? A. Every time he asked.”).
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Corporal Adrian Bordner and Trooper Brian Seibert of the State Police 

related similar accounts from Appellant about her supposed presence in the 

home during two interviews. N.T. 4/14/21, 162 (Corporal Bordner addressing 

the first interview of Appellant: “She stated while she was at the residence in 

Trevorton, at that point in time she was in a living room/dining room area. 

[A.P.] was in the kitchen at her little table eating a sandwich. She said at 

some point she heard a thump, and she heard her son yelling, “Mom” for her 

help, at which time she came in and observed [A.P.] having what she believed 

to be a seizure.”); Commonwealth Exhibit 13, Transcript of Second Interview 

with Appellant, 10/11/19, 12 (Appellant: “So I heard him say ‘[A.P.’s first 

name].’ And Jahrid was screaming, “Mom.” And I went in there. And she 

was like, flopping really hard like -- I don’t know. It wasn’t just the arms or 

the legs. It was the whole body. And then Jahrid -- I called 911.”), repeated 

at N.T. 4/14/21, 175-76; id. at 213 (Trooper Seibert addressing the first 

interview: “[Appellant] stated she was there at the residence. She stated that 

[A.P.] was eating a sandwich at her little table. She stated [A.P.] got up. She 

stated [A.P.] then fell and hit her head and started seizing.”). 

In the second interview, Appellant changed her account such that she 

was supposedly not present when A.P. fell and started having the seizure. 

N.T. 4/14/21, 203 (Corporal Bordner addressing changes in Appellant’s 

account during the second interview: “Well, when she was pressed on some 

things, some discrepancies in stories, then it was a little more wish washy ... 

she would say she was there. Then when she was asked to give a specific, 
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well, what time did you get there? What happened prior to hearing the thump, 

you know, then it was evasiveness.”); id. at 213 (Trooper Seibert: “During 

the second interview her story changed ... She said that she was not there 

when [A.P.] fell. She said that her son had called her and asked her to come 

back to the house.”).

The Commonwealth sought to corroborate Appellant’s absence from the 

victim’s home at the time of abuse/seizure incident through information that 

the state police had obtained from the phones that Mr. Burgess and Appellant 

were using on the night in question. An extraction report for a cellular phone 

recovered from Appellant’s car revealed that, on the night of the abuse/seizure 

incident, someone conducted a search on the phone at 9:39 p.m., for “How 

long does a child have a seizures [sic]?” N.T. 4/14/21, 153-54. That phone 

also received two incoming calls from a combined contact entry for Ms. 

Delcamp and Mr. Burgess (“Samm N Jahrid”) at 9:15 p.m. and 9:31 p.m. Id.

at 156. That phone was then used to make a 9-1-1 call at 9:47 p.m. Id. at 

156, 216; see also id. at 147-48 (Corporal Kowalski discussing his extraction 

of data from the cellular phone recovered from Appellant’s car and his act of 

providing that information to Trooper Seibert).

An extraction report for a cellular phone that Ms. Delcamp confirmed 

that Mr. Burgess used on the night of the abuse/seizure incident revealed that 

that phone was used for conducting the following searches at the referenced

times: (1) “What do you do during a seizure?” at 8:59 p.m.; (2) “How do you 

get a seizure to stop?” at 9:12 p.m.; (3) “How long do seizures last?” at 9:15 
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p.m.; and (4) “What do you do during a seizure?” at 9:18 p.m. N.T. 4/14/21, 

216; see also N.T. 4/14/21, 97-98 (Ms. Delcamp confirming Mr. Burgess’s 

use of the phone she turned over to the police), 142-46 (Corporal Jeffrey 

Kowalski discussing his extraction of data from the phone turned over to him 

by Ms. Delcamp and his act of providing that information to Trooper Brian 

Seibert). The extraction report also confirmed that that phone had placed the 

calls to Appellant’s phone at 9:15 p.m. and 9:31 p.m.; the former call lasted 

twenty-four seconds, and the latter call lasted two minutes and five seconds. 

Id. at 217, 220-21. 

The Commonwealth also sought to corroborate Ms. Delcamp’s account 

that A.P. had a seizure after an incident of abuse, in contrast to Appellant’s 

version of the events that had the seizure occurring while the child was 

supposedly eating by herself. Dr. Paul Bellino, an expert in pediatrics with a 

specialty in identifying pediatric abuse, testified concerning his opinions that 

a seizure would not have caused the injuries that were sustained by A.P., the 

injuries were “from [A.P.] being beaten,” and “a seizure after such a trauma 

would be fairly expected.” N.T. 4/14/21, 105, 113-14 (“There is absolutely 

no doubt that she was just beaten to the point where she succumbed from the 

neurologic devastation that occurred during that beating.”); see also id. at 

119-20 (Dr. Bellino recounting that he documented “about 45 different 

discrete areas of bruising” on A.P. and that A.P. had fractures of both of her 

collar bones, one rib fracture on her right side, six different rib fractures on 

her left side, and fractures of her legs, arms, and wrists).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as the verdict winner (as dictated by the standard of review), it supported the 

verdict reached by the jury. Ms. Delcamp’s testimony about Appellant’s 

statements at the hospital demonstrated the scheme by which Appellant 

intended to obstruct an investigation into the abuse of A.P. by falsely claiming 

that she was present at the time of the start of A.P.’s seizure. The expert 

testimony from Dr. Bellino and the information extracted from the cellular 

phones gave rise to the reasonable inference that Appellant was not in A.P.’s

home at the time that Appellant had claimed to the county caseworker and 

the state troopers. Dr. Bellino’s expert opinion established the infliction of 

traumatic abuse that was absent from Appellant’s account and that account 

was inconsistent with the information gleaned from the phones. If Appellant 

was present in the home at the time of the start of A.P.’s seizure as she alleged 

then the phone used by her son would not have been calling her phone at 

9:15 p.m. and 9:31 p.m. Moreover, the fact that the phone used by 

Appellant’s son was searching for information about seizures at least fifteen 

minutes before the 9:15 p.m. call to Appellant’s phone supported the 

conclusion that her son was summoning her to the home after-the-fact. 

This evidence amply proved that Appellant offered false information to 

law enforcement authorities for the purpose of preventing an abuse 

investigation of her son, and thus sustained the verdicts. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Holt, 270 A.3d 1230, 1235-36 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[O]ne 

who makes false statements in response to a police inquiry ‘provides’ false 
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statements, and the legislature’s amendment of the statutory language was 

designed to include such statements within the ambit of Section 

5105(a)(5).”); Commonwealth v. Hlatky, 626 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 

1993) (false statements made in response to questions by the police when the 

defendant had knowledge of the true nature of the incident was sufficient to 

sustain a conviction for making false reports).

Judgments of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/06/2022