```

[Federal Register: May 5, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 86)]
[Notices]               
[Page 24599-24606]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr05my10-53]                         

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

 
Order Finding That the ICE Dominion-South Financial Basis 
Contract Traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Does Not Perform 
a Significant Price Discovery Function

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final Order.

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SUMMARY: On October 9, 2009, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(``CFTC'' or ``Commission'') published for comment in the Federal 
Register \1\ a notice of its intent to undertake a determination 
whether the Dominion-South Financial Basis (``DOM'') contract, traded 
on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (``ICE''), an exempt commercial 
market (``ECM'') under sections 2(h)(3)-(5) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (``CEA'' or the ``Act''), performs a significant price discovery 
function pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. The Commission 
undertook this review based upon an initial evaluation of information 
and data provided by ICE as well as a Commission report on ECMs. The 
Commission has reviewed the entire record in this matter, including all 
comments received, and has determined to issue an order finding that 
the DOM contract does not perform a significant price discovery 
function. Authority for this action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the 
CEA and Commission rule 36.3(c) promulgated thereunder.
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    \1\ 74 FR 52190 (October 9, 2009).

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DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory K. Price, Industry Economist, 
Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581. 
Telephone: (202) 418-5515. E-mail: gprice@cftc.gov; or Susan Nathan, 
Senior Special Counsel, Division of Market Oversight, same address. 
Telephone: (202) 418-5133. E-mail: snathan@cftc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 (``Reauthorization Act'') \2\ 
significantly broadened the CFTC's regulatory authority with respect to 
ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, a new regulatory 
category--ECMs on which significant price discovery contracts 
(``SPDCs'') are traded--and treating ECMs in that category as 
registered entities under the CEA.\3\ The legislation authorizes the 
CFTC to designate an agreement, contract or transaction as a SPDC if 
the Commission determines, under criteria established in section 
2(h)(7), that it performs a significant price discovery function. When 
the Commission makes such a determination, the ECM on which the SPDC is 
traded must assume, with respect to that contract, all the 
responsibilities and obligations of a

[[Page 24600]]

registered entity under the Act and Commission regulations, and must 
comply with nine core principles established by new section 2(h)(7)(C).
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    \2\ Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 110-246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18, 
2008).
    \3\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).
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    On March 16, 2009, the CFTC promulgated final rules implementing 
the provisions of the Reauthorization Act.\4\ As relevant here, rule 
36.3 imposes increased information reporting requirements on ECMs to 
assist the Commission in making prompt assessments whether particular 
ECM contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to filing quarterly reports of 
its contracts, an ECM must notify the Commission promptly concerning 
any contract traded in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3) of 
the CEA that averaged five trades per day or more over the most recent 
calendar quarter, and for which the exchange sells its price 
information regarding the contract to market participants or industry 
publications, or whose daily closing or settlement prices on 95 percent 
or more of the days in the most recent quarter were within 2.5 percent 
of the contemporaneously determined closing, settlement or other daily 
price of another contract.
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    \4\ 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became effective on 
April 22, 2009.
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    Commission rule 36.3(c)(3) established the procedures by which the 
Commission makes and announces its determination whether a particular 
ECM contract serves a significant price discovery function. Under those 
procedures, the Commission will publish notice in the Federal Register 
that it intends to undertake an evaluation whether the specified 
agreement, contract or transaction performs a significant price 
discovery function and to receive written views, data and arguments 
relevant to its determination from the ECM and other interested 
persons. Upon the close of the comment period, the Commission will 
consider, among other things, all relevant information regarding the 
subject contract and issue an order announcing and explaining its 
determination whether or not the contract is a SPDC. The issuance of an 
affirmative order signals the effectiveness of the Commission's 
regulatory authorities over an ECM with respect to a SPDC; at that time 
such an ECM becomes subject to all provisions of the CEA applicable to 
registered entities.\5\ The issuance of such an order also triggers the 
obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed in Commission rule 
36.3(c)(4).\6\
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    \5\ Public Law 110-246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory Statement of 
the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 110-627, 110 Cong., 2d 
Sess. 978, 986 (Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 75888, 
75894 (Dec. 12, 2008).
    \6\ For an initial SPDC, ECMs have a grace period of 90 calendar 
days from the issuance of a SPDC determination order to submit a 
written demonstration of compliance with the applicable core 
principles. For subsequent SPDCs, ECMs have a grace period of 30 
calendar days to demonstrate core principle compliance.
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II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC Determination

    On October 9, 2009, the Commission published in the Federal 
Register notice of its intent to undertake a determination whether the 
DOM contract performs a significant price discovery function, and 
requested comment from interested parties.\7\ Comments were received 
from the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (``IECA''), Working 
Group of Commercial Energy Firms (``WGCEF''), ICE, Platts, Economists 
Incorporated (``EI''), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (``FERC''), 
Natural Gas Suppliers Association (``NGSA'') and Financial Institutions 
Energy Group (``FIEG'').\8\ The comment letters from FERC \9\ and 
Platts did not directly address the issue of whether or not the DOM 
contract is a SPDC; IECA concluded that the DOM contract is a SPDC, but 
did not provide a basis for its conclusion.\10\ The other parties' 
comments raised substantive issues with respect to the applicability of 
section 2(h)(7) to the DOM contract, generally asserting that the DOM 
contract is not a SPDC as it does not meet the material price 
reference, price linkage and material liquidity criteria for SPDC 
determination. Those comments are more extensively discussed below, as 
applicable.
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    \7\ The Commission's Part 36 rules establish, among other 
things, procedures by which the Commission makes and announces its 
determination whether a specific ECM contract serves a significant 
price discovery function. Under those procedures, the Commission 
publishes a notice in the Federal Register that it intends to 
undertake a determination whether a specified agreement, contract or 
transaction performs a significant price discovery function and to 
receive written data, views and arguments relevant to its 
determination from the ECM and other interested persons.
    \8\ IECA describes itself as an ``association of leading 
manufacturing companies'' whose membership ``represents a diverse 
set of industries including: plastics, cement, paper, food 
processing, brick, chemicals, fertilizer, insulation, steel, glass, 
industrial gases, pharmaceutical, aluminum and brewing.'' WGCEF 
describes itself as ``a diverse group of commercial firms in the 
domestic energy industry whose primary business activity is the 
physical delivery of one or more energy commodities to customers, 
including industrial, commercial and residential consumers'' and 
whose membership consists of ``energy producers, marketers and 
utilities.'' ICE is an ECM, as noted above. McGraw-Hill, through its 
division Platts, compiles and calculates monthly natural gas price 
indices from natural gas trade data submitted to Platts by energy 
marketers. Platts includes those price indices in its monthly Inside 
FERC's Gas Market Report (``Inside FERC''). EI is an economic 
consulting firm with offices located in Washington, DC, and San 
Francisco, CA. NGSA is an industry association comprised of natural 
gas producers and marketers. FERC is an independent federal 
regulatory agency that, among other things, regulates the interstate 
transmission of natural gas, oil and electricity. FIEG describes 
itself as an association of investment and commercial banks who are 
active participants in various sectors of the natural gas markets, 
``including acting as marketers, lenders, underwriters of debt and 
equity securities, and proprietary investors.'' The comment letters 
are available on the Commission's Web site: http://www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/federalregister/federalregistercomments/2009/09-018.html.
    \9\ FERC stated that the DOM contract is cash settled and does 
not contemplate actual physical delivery of natural gas. 
Accordingly, FERC expressed the opinion that a determination by the 
Commission that a contract performs a significant price discovery 
function ``would not appear to conflict with FERC's exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) over certain sales of 
natural gas in interstate commerce for resale or with its other 
regulatory responsibilities under the NGA'' and further that, ``the 
FERC staff will continue to monitor for any such conflict * * * 
[and] advise the CFTC'' should any such potential conflict arise. CL 
07.
    \10\ IECA stated that the subject ICE contract should ``be 
required to come into compliance with core principles mandated by 
Section 2(h)(7) of the Act and with other statutory provisions 
applicable to registered entities. [This contract] should be subject 
to the Commission's position limit authority, emergency authority 
and large trader reporting requirements, among others.'' CL 01.
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III. Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA

    The Commission is directed by section 2(h)(7) of the CEA to 
consider the following factors in determining a contract's significant 
price discovery function:
     Price Linkage--the extent to which the agreement, contract 
or transaction uses or otherwise relies on a daily or final settlement 
price, or other major price parameter, of a contract or contracts 
listed for trading on or subject to the rules of a designated contract 
market (``DCM'') or derivatives transaction execution facility 
(``DTEF''), or a SPDC traded on an electronic trading facility, to 
value a position, transfer or convert a position, cash or financially 
settle a position, or close out a position.
     Arbitrage--the extent to which the price for the 
agreement, contract or transaction is sufficiently related to the price 
of a contract or contracts listed for trading on or subject to the 
rules of a designated DCM or DTEF, or a SPDC traded on or subject to 
the rules of an electronic trading facility, so as to permit market 
participants to effectively arbitrage between the markets by 
simultaneously maintaining positions or executing trades in the 
contracts on a frequent and recurring basis.
     Material price reference--the extent to which, on a 
frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions in a

[[Page 24601]]

commodity are directly based on, or are determined by referencing, the 
prices generated by agreements, contracts or transactions being traded 
or executed on the electronic trading facility.
     Material liquidity--the extent to which the volume of 
agreements, contracts or transactions in a commodity being traded on 
the electronic trading facility is sufficient to have a material effect 
on other agreements, contracts or transactions listed for trading on or 
subject to the rules of a DCM, DTEF or electronic trading facility 
operating in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3).
    Not all criteria must be present to support a determination that a 
particular contract performs a significant price discovery function, 
and one or more criteria may be inapplicable to a particular 
contract.\11\ Moreover, the statutory language neither prioritizes the 
criteria nor specifies the degree to which a SPDC must conform to the 
various criteria. In Guidance issued in connection with the Part 36 
rules governing ECMs with SPDCs, the Commission observed that these 
criteria do not lend themselves to a mechanical checklist or formulaic 
analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has indicated that in making its 
determinations it will consider the circumstances under which the 
presence of a particular criterion, or combination of criteria, would 
be sufficient to support a SPDC determination.\12\ For example, for 
contracts that are linked to other contracts or that may be arbitraged 
with other contracts, the Commission will consider whether the price of 
the potential SPDC moves in such harmony with the other contract that 
the two markets essentially become interchangeable. This co-movement of 
prices would be an indication that activity in the contract had reached 
a level sufficient for the contract to perform a significant price 
discovery function. In evaluating a contract's price discovery role as 
a price reference, the Commission will consider the extent to which, on 
a frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions are 
directly based on, or are determined by referencing, the prices 
established for the contract.
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    \11\ In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register release, the 
Commission identified material price reference, price linkage and 
material liquidity as the possible criteria for SPDC determination 
of the DOM contract. Arbitrage was not identified as a possible 
criterion. As a result, arbitrage will not be discussed further in 
this document and the associated Order.
    \12\ 17 CFR part 36, Appendix A.
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IV. Findings and Conclusions

a. The Dominion-South Financial Basis (DOM) Contract and the SPDC 
Indicia

    The DOM contract is cash settled based on the difference between 
the bidweek price index for a particular calendar month at the Dominion 
Transmission, Inc.'s, Appalachia hub, as published in Platts' Inside 
FERC's Gas Market Report, and the final settlement price of the New 
York Mercantile Exchange's (``NYMEX's'') physically-delivered Henry Hub 
natural gas futures contract for the same calendar month. The Platts 
bidweek price, which is published monthly, is based on a survey of cash 
market traders who voluntarily report to Platts data on their fixed-
price transactions for physical delivery of natural gas at Dominion 
Transmission, Inc.'s, Appalachia hub conducted during the last five 
business days of the month; such bidweek transactions specify the 
delivery of natural gas on a uniform basis throughout the following 
calendar month at the agreed upon rate. The Platts bidweek index is 
published on the first business day of the calendar month in which the 
natural gas is to be delivered. The size of the DOM contract is 2,500 
million British thermal units (``mmBtu''), and the unit of trading is 
any multiple of 2,500 mmBtu. The DOM contract is listed for up to 72 
consecutive calendar months.
    The Henry Hub,\13\ which is located in Erath, Louisiana, is the 
primary cash market trading and distribution center for natural gas in 
the United States. It also is the delivery point and pricing basis for 
the NYMEX's actively traded Henry Hub physically-delivered natural gas 
futures contract, which is the most important pricing reference for 
natural gas in the United States. The Henry Hub, which is operated by 
Sabine Pipe Line, LLC, serves as a juncture for 13 different pipelines. 
These pipelines bring in natural gas from fields in the Gulf Coast 
region and move it to major consumption centers along the East Coast 
and Midwest. The throughput shipping capacity of the Henry Hub is 1.8 
trillion mmBtu per day.
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    \13\ The term ``hub'' refers to a juncture where two or more 
natural gas pipelines are connected. Hubs also serve as pricing 
points for natural gas.
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    In addition to the Henry Hub, there are a number of other locations 
where natural gas is traded. In 2008, there were 33 natural gas market 
centers in North America.\14\ Some of the major trading centers include 
Alberta, Northwest Rockies, Southern California border and the Houston 
Ship Channel. For locations that are directly connected to the Henry 
Hub by one or more pipelines and where there typically is adequate 
shipping capacity, the price at the other locations usually directly 
tracks the price at the Henry Hub, adjusted for transportation costs. 
However, at other locations that are not directly connected to the 
Henry Hub or where shipping capacity is limited, the prices at those 
locations often diverge from the Henry Hub price. Furthermore, one 
local price may be significantly different than the price at another 
location even though the two markets' respective distances from the 
Henry Hub are the same. The reason for such pricing disparities is that 
a given location may experience supply and demand factors that are 
specific to that region, such as differences in pipeline shipping 
capacity, unusually high or low demand for heating or cooling or supply 
disruptions caused by severe weather. As a consequence, local natural 
gas prices can differ from the Henry Hub price by more than the cost of 
shipping and such price differences can vary in an unpredictable 
manner.
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    \14\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf.
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    Dominion Transmission Inc.'s Appalachia hub is a gateway for 
natural gas flowing from the Midwest bound for the Mid-Atlantic and 
Northeast markets (excluding New England). According to Platts' 
methodology, deliveries include those into a transmission line running 
northeast from Warren County, Ohio, midway between Cincinnati and 
Dayton, and merges with the second line northeast of Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania. The second line runs from Buchanan County, Virginia, on 
the Virginia/West Virginia border north to the end of the zone at 
Valley Gate in Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. The major stations in 
the South Point system include interconnections with ANR Pipeline 
(Lebanon station), Columbia Gas Transmission (Windbridge and Loudoun 
stations), Tennessee Gas Pipeline (Cornwell station), Transcontinental 
Gas Pipe Line (Nokesville station) and Texas Eastern Transmission 
(Lebanon, Oakford, Chambersburg, Perulack and Windridge stations). 
Storage pools in the South Point system include South Bend, 
Murrysville, Oakford, Gamble, Hayden, Webster, Colvin, North Summit, 
Bridgeport, Lost Creek, Kennedy, Fink and Rocket Newberne.
    The Dominion Market Center, which includes the Dominion hub, had an 
estimated throughput capacity of 2.5 billion cubic feet per day in 
2008. Moreover, the number of pipeline interconnections at the Dominion 
Market Center was 17 in 2008, up from 16 in 2003. Lastly, the pipeline

[[Page 24602]]

interconnection capacity of the Dominion Market Center in 2008 was 8.3 
billion cubic feet per day, which constituted a 42 percent increase 
over the pipeline interconnection capacity in 2003.\15\ The Dominion 
Market Center is far removed from the Henry Hub but is directly 
connected to the Henry Hub by an existing pipeline.
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    \15\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf.
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    In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission 
identified material price reference, price linkage and material 
liquidity as the potential SPDC criteria applicable to the DOM 
contract. Each of these criteria is discussed below.\16\
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    \16\ As noted above, the Commission did not find an indication 
of arbitrage in connection with this contract; accordingly, that 
criterion is not discussed in reference to the DOM contract.
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1. Material Price Reference Criterion
    The Commission's October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice 
identified material price reference as a potential basis for a SPDC 
determination with respect to this contract. The Commission considered 
the fact that ICE sells its price data to market participants in a 
number of different packages which vary in terms of the hubs covered, 
time periods, and whether the data are daily only or historical. For 
example, ICE offers ``East Gas End of Day'' and ``OTC Gas End of Day'' 
with access to all price data or just current prices plus a selected 
number of months (i.e., 12, 24, 36 or 48 months) of historical data. 
These two packages include price data for the DOM contract.
    The Commission also noted that its October 2007 Report on the 
Oversight of Trading on Regulated Futures Exchanges and Exempt 
Commercial Markets (``ECM Study'') \17\ found that in general, market 
participants view the ICE as a price discovery market for certain 
natural gas contracts. The study did not specify which markets 
performed this function; nevertheless, the Commission determined that 
the DOM contract, while not mentioned by name in the ECM Study, might 
warrant further study.
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    \17\ http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/pr5403-07_ecmreport.pdf.
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    The Commission will rely on one of two sources of evidence--direct 
or indirect--to determine that the price of a contract was being used 
as a material price reference and therefore, serving a significant 
price discovery function.\18\ With respect to direct evidence, the 
Commission will consider the extent to which, on a frequent and 
recurring basis, cash market bids, offers or transactions are directly 
based on or quoted at a differential to, the prices generated on the 
ECM in question. Direct evidence may be established when cash market 
participants are quoting bid or offer prices or entering into 
transactions at prices that are set either explicitly or implicitly at 
a differential to prices established for the contract in question. Cash 
market prices are set explicitly at a differential to the section 
2(h)(3) contract when, for instance, they are quoted in dollars and 
cents above or below the reference contract's price. Cash market prices 
are set implicitly at a differential to a section 2(h)(3) contract 
when, for instance, they are arrived at after adding to, or subtracting 
from the section 2(h)(3) contract, but then quoted or reported at a 
flat price. With respect to indirect evidence, the Commission will 
consider the extent to which the price of the contract in question is 
being routinely disseminated in widely distributed industry 
publications--or offered by the ECM itself for some form of 
remuneration--and consulted on a frequent and recurring basis by 
industry participants in pricing cash market transactions.
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    \18\ 17 part CFR 36, Appendix A.
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    Following the issuance of the Federal Register release, the 
Commission further evaluated the ICE's data offerings and their use by 
industry participants. The Dominion Transmission, Inc.'s, Appalachia 
hub is a significant trading center for natural gas but is not as 
important as other hubs, such as the Henry Hub, for pricing natural gas 
in the eastern half of the U.S. marketplace.
    Although the Dominion hub is a major trading center for natural gas 
in the United States and, as noted, ICE sells price information for the 
DOM contract, the Commission has found upon further evaluation that the 
cash market transactions are not being directly based or quoted as a 
differential to the DOM contract nor is that contract routinely 
consulted by industry participants in pricing cash market transactions 
and thus does not meet the Commission's Guidance for the material price 
reference criterion. In this regard, the NYMEX Henry Hub physically 
delivered natural gas futures contract is routinely consulted by 
industry participants in pricing cash market transactions at this 
location. Because both the Dominion hub is directly connected to the 
Henry Hub via the Gas Transmission interstate pipeline, it is not 
necessary for market participants to independently refer to the DOM 
contract for pricing natural gas at this location. Thus, the DOM 
contract does not satisfy the direct price reference test for existence 
of material price reference. Furthermore, the Commission has found that 
the sale by ICE of the DOM contract's prices is not indirect evidence 
of material price reference. The DOM contract's prices are published 
with those of numerous other contracts, which are of more interest to 
market participants. Due to the lack of importance of the Dominion hub, 
the Commission has concluded that traders likely do not specifically 
purchase the ICE data packages for the DOM contract's prices and do not 
consult such prices on a frequent and recurring basis in pricing cash 
market transactions.
i. Federal Register Comments
    As noted above, WGCEF,\19\ ICE,\20\ EI,\21\ NGSA \22\ and FIEG \23\ 
addressed the question of whether the DOM contract met the material 
price reference criterion for a SPDC.\24\ The commenters argued that 
because the DOM contract is cash-settled, it cannot truly serve as an 
independent ``reference price'' for transactions in natural gas at this 
location. Rather, the commenters argue, the underlying cash price 
series against which the ICE DOM contract is settled (in this case, the 
Platts bidweek price for natural gas at this location) is the authentic 
reference price and not the ICE contract itself. The Commission 
believes that this interpretation of price reference is too limiting in 
that it only considers the final index value on which the contract is 
cash settled after trading ceases. Instead, the Commission believes 
that a cash-settled derivatives contract could meet the price reference 
criterion if market participants ``consult on a frequent and recurring 
basis'' the derivatives contract when pricing forward, fixed-price 
commitments or other cash-settled derivatives that seek to ``lock in'' 
a fixed price for some future point in time to hedge against adverse 
price movements. As noted above, the Dominion hub is a significant 
trading center for natural gas in North America. However, traders do 
not consider the Dominion hub to be as important as other natural gas 
trading points, such as the Henry Hub.
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    \19\ CL 02.
    \20\ CL 04.
    \21\ CL 05.
    \22\ CL 06.
    \23\ CL 08.
    \24\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the DOM 
contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide 
its reasoning.
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    ICE argued that the Commission appeared to base the case that the 
DOM contract is potentially a SPDC on a disputable assertion. In 
issuing its notice of intent to determine whether

[[Page 24603]]

the DOM contract is a SPDC, the CFTC cited a general conclusion in its 
ECM Study ``that certain market participants referred to ICE as a price 
discovery market for certain natural gas contracts.'' ICE stated that, 
CFTC's reason is ``hard to quantify as the ECM report does not 
mention'' this contract as a potential SPDC. ``It is unknown which 
market participants made this statement in 2007 or the contracts that 
were referenced.'' \25\ In response to the above comment, the 
Commission notes that it cited the ECM study's general finding that 
some ICE natural gas contracts appear to be regarded as price discovery 
markets merely as an indicia that an investigation of certain ICE 
contracts may be warranted, and was not intended to serve as the sole 
basis for determining whether or not a particular contract meets the 
material price reference criterion.
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    \25\ CL 04.
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    Both EI \26\ and WGCEF \27\ stated that publication of price data 
in a package format is a weak justification for material price 
reference. These commenters argue that market participants generally do 
not purchase ICE data sets for one contract's prices, such as those for 
the DOM contract. Instead, traders are interested in the settlement 
prices, so the fact that ICE sells the DOM prices as part of a broad 
package is not conclusive evidence that market participants are buying 
the ICE data sets because they find the DOM prices have substantial 
value to them. As mentioned above, the Commission has found that the 
sale by ICE of the DOM contract's prices is not indirect evidence of 
routine dissemination. The DOM contract's prices are sold as a package 
with those of numerous other contracts, which are of more interest to 
market participants. Due to the lack of importance of the Dominion hub, 
the Commission has concluded that traders likely do not specifically 
purchase the ICE data packages for the DOM contract's prices and do not 
consult such prices on a frequent and recurring basis in pricing cash 
market transactions.
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    \26\ CL 05.
    \27\ CL 02.
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ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Price Reference
    Based on the above, the Commission finds that the DOM contract does 
not meet the material price reference criterion because cash market 
transactions are not priced on a frequent and recurring basis at a 
differential to the DOM contract's price (direct evidence). Moreover, 
while the ECM sells the DOM contract's price data to market 
participants, market participants likely do not specifically purchase 
the ICE data packages for the DOM contract's prices and do not consult 
such prices on a frequent and recurring basis in pricing cash market 
transactions (indirect evidence).
2. Price Linkage Criterion
    In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission 
identified price linkage as a potential basis for a SPDC determination 
with respect to the DOM contract. In this regard, the final settlement 
of the DOM contract is based, in part, on the final settlement price of 
the NYMEX's Henry Hub physically-delivered natural gas futures 
contract, where the NYMEX is registered with the Commission as a DCM.
    The Commission's Guidance on Significant Price Discovery Contracts 
\28\ notes that a ``price-linked contract is a contract that relies on 
a contract traded on another trading facility to settle, value or 
otherwise offset the price-linked contract.'' Furthermore, the Guidance 
notes that ``[f]or a linked contract, the mere fact that a contract is 
linked to another contract will not be sufficient to support a 
determination that a contract performs a significant price discovery 
function. To assess whether such a determination is warranted, the 
Commission will examine the relationship between transaction prices of 
the linked contract and the prices of the referenced contract. The 
Commission believes that where material liquidity exists, prices for 
the linked contract would be observed to be substantially the same as, 
or move substantially in conjunction with, the prices of the referenced 
contract.'' The Guidance proposes a threshold price relationship such 
that prices of the ECM linked contract will fall within a 2.5 percent 
price range for 95 percent of contemporaneously determined closing, 
settlement or other daily prices over the most recent quarter. Finally, 
the Commission also stated in the Guidance that it would consider a 
linked contract that has a trading volume equivalent to 5 percent of 
the volume of trading in the contract to which it is linked to have 
sufficient volume potentially to be deemed a SPDC (``minimum 
threshold'').
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    \28\ Appendix A to the Part 36 rules.
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    To assess whether the DOM contract meets the price linkage 
criterion, Commission staff obtained price data from ICE and performed 
the statistical tests cited above. Staff found that, while the 
Dominion-South price is determined, in part, by the final settlement 
price of the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas futures contract (a 
DCM contract), the Dominion-South price is not within 2.5 percent of 
the settlement price of the corresponding NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas 
futures contract on 95 percent or more of the days. Specifically, 
during the third quarter of 2009, 11 percent of the Dominion 
Transmission, Inc.'s, Appalachia hub natural gas prices derived from 
the ICE basis values were within 2.5 percent of the daily settlement 
price of the NYMEX Henry Hub futures contract. In addition, staff finds 
that the DOM contract fails to meet the volume threshold requirement. 
In particular, the total trading volume in the NYMEX Natural Gas 
contract during the third quarter of 2009 was 14,022,963 contracts, 
with 5 percent of that number being 701,148 contracts. The number of 
trades on the ICE centralized market in the DOM contract during the 
same period was 54,107 contracts (equivalent to 13,527 NYMEX contracts, 
given the size difference).\29\ Thus, centralized-market trades in the 
DOM contract amounted to less than the minimum threshold.
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    \29\ The DOM contract is one-quarter the size of the NYMEX Henry 
Hub physically-delivered futures contract.
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i. Federal Register Comments
    WGCEF, ICE, EI, NGSA and FIEG addressed the question of whether the 
DOM contract met the price linkage criterion for a SPDC.\30\ Each of 
the commenters expressed the opinion that the DOM contract did not 
appear to meet the above-discussed Commission guidance regarding the 
price relationship and/or the minimum volume threshold relative to the 
DCM contract to which the DOM is linked. Based on its analysis 
discussed above, the Commission agrees with this assessment.
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    \30\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the DOM 
contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide 
its reasoning.
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ii. Conclusion Regarding the Price Linkage Criterion
    The Commission finds that the DOM contract does not meet the price 
linkage criterion because it fails the volume and price linkage tests 
provided for in the Commission's Guidance.
3. Material Liquidity Factor
    As noted above, in its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, 
the Commission identified material price reference, price linkage and 
material liquidity as potential criteria for SPDC determination of the 
DOM contract. To

[[Page 24604]]

assess whether a contract meets the material liquidity criterion, the 
Commission first examines trading activity as a general measurement of 
the contract's size and potential importance. If the Commission finds 
that the contract in question meets a threshold of trading activity 
that would render it of potential importance, the Commission will then 
perform a statistical analysis to measure the effect that the prices of 
the subject contract potentially may have on prices for other contracts 
listed on an ECM or a DCM.
    Based upon on a required quarterly filing made by ICE on July 27, 
2009, the total number of DOM trades executed on ICE's electronic 
trading platform was 347 in the second quarter of 2009, resulting in a 
daily average of 5.4 trades. During the same period, the DOM contract 
had a total trading volume on ICE's electronic trading platform of 
38,872 contracts and an average daily trading volume of 607.4 
contracts. The open interest as of June 30, 2009, was 97,240 contracts, 
which includes trades executed on ICE's electronic trading platform, as 
well as trades executed off of ICE's electronic trading platform and 
then brought to ICE for clearing.
    In a subsequent filing dated November 13, 2009, ICE reported that 
460 separate trades occurred on its electronic platform in the third 
quarter of 2009, resulting in a daily average of 7.0 trades. During the 
same period, the DOM contract had a total trading volume on its 
electronic platform of 54,107 contracts (which was an average of 819 
contracts per day). As of September 30, 2009, open interest in the DOM 
contract was 97,213 contracts. Reported open interest included 
positions resulting from trades that were executed on ICE's electronic 
platform, as well as trades that were executed off of ICE's electronic 
platform and brought to ICE for clearing.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Supplemental data supplied by the ICE confirmed that block 
trades in the third quarter of 2009 were in addition to the trades 
that were conducted on the electronic platform; block trades 
comprised 67.4 percent of all transactions in the DOM contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As indicated above, the average number of trades per day in the 
second and third quarters of 2009 was only slightly above the minimum 
reporting level (5 trades per day). Moreover, trading activity in the 
DOM contract, as characterized by total quarterly volume, indicates 
that the DOM contract experiences trading activity similar to that of 
other thinly-traded contracts.\32\ Thus, the DOM contract does not meet 
a threshold of trading activity that would render it of potential 
importance and no additional statistical analysis is warranted.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Staff has advised the Commission that in its experience, a 
thinly-traded contract is, generally, one that has a quarterly 
trading volume of 100,000 contracts or less. In this regard, in the 
third quarter of 2009, physical commodity futures contracts with 
trading volume of 100,000 contracts or fewer constituted less than 
one percent of total trading volume of all physical commodity 
futures contracts.
    \33\ In establishing guidance to illustrate how it will evaluate 
the various criteria, or combinations of criteria, when determining 
whether a contract is a SPDC, the Commission made clear that 
``material liquidity itself would not be sufficient to make a 
determination that a contract is a [SPDC], * * * but combined with 
other factors it can serve as a guidepost indicating which contracts 
are functioning as [SPDCs].'' For the reasons discussed above, the 
Commission has found that the DOM contract does not meet either the 
price linkage or material price reference criterion. In light of 
this finding and the Commission's Guidance cited above, there is no 
need to evaluate further the material liquidity criteria since it 
cannot be used alone as a basis for a SPDC determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Federal Register Comments
    As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, NGSA and FIEG addressed the 
question of whether the DOM contract met the material liquidity 
criterion for a SPDC.\34\ These commenters stated that the DOM contract 
does not meet the material liquidity criterion for SPDC determination 
for a number of reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the DOM 
contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide 
its reasoning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    WGCEF,\35\ ICE \36\ and EI \37\ noted that the Commission's 
Guidance had posited concepts of liquidity that generally assumed a 
fairly constant stream of prices throughout the trading day, and noted 
that the relatively low number of trades per day in the DOM contract 
did not meet this standard of liquidity. The Commission observes that a 
continuous stream of prices would indeed be an indication of liquidity 
for certain markets but the Guidance also notes that ``quantifying the 
levels of immediacy and price concession that would define material 
liquidity may differ from one market or commodity to another.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ CL 02.
    \36\ CL 04.
    \37\ CL 05.
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    WGCEF, FIEG \38\ and NGSA \39\ noted that the DOM contract 
represents a differential, which does not affect other contracts, 
including the NYMEX Henry Hub contract and physical gas contracts. FIEG 
and WGCEF also noted that the DOM contract's trading volume represents 
only a fraction of natural gas trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ CL 08.
    \39\ CL 06.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ICE opined that the Commission ``seems to have adopted a five 
trade-per-day test to determine whether a contract is materially 
liquid. It is worth noting that ICE originally suggested that the CFTC 
use a five trades-per-day threshold as the basis for an ECM to report 
trade data to the CFTC.'' Furthermore, FIEG cautioned the Commission in 
using a reporting threshold as a measure of liquidity. In this regard, 
the Commission adopted a five trades-per-day threshold as a reporting 
requirement to enable it to ``independently be aware of ECM contracts 
that may develop into SPDCs'' \40\ rather than solely relying upon an 
ECM on its own to identify any such potential SPDCs to the Commission. 
Thus, any contract that meets this threshold may be subject to scrutiny 
as a potential SPDC but this does not mean that the contract will be 
found to be a SPDC merely because it met the reporting threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 73 FR 75892 (December 12, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ICE and EI proposed that the statistics provided by ICE were 
misinterpreted and misapplied by the Commission. In particular, ICE 
stated that the volume figures used in the Commission's analysis (cited 
above) ``include trades made in all months of each contract'' as well 
as in strips of contract months, and a ``more appropriate method of 
determining liquidity is to examine the activity in a single traded 
month or strip of a given contract.'' \41\ A similar argument was made 
by EI, which observed that the five-trades-per-day number ``is highly 
misleading * * * because the contracts can be offered for as long as 
120 months, [thus] the average per day for an individual contract may 
be less than 1 per day.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ In addition, both EI and ICE stated that the trades-per-day 
statistics that it provided to the Commission in its quarterly 
filing and which were cited in the Commission's October 9, 2009, 
Federal Register notice includes 2(h)(1) transactions, which were 
not completed on the electronic trading platform and should not be 
considered in the SPDC determination process. The Commission staff 
asked ICE to review the data it sent in its quarterly filings; ICE 
confirmed that the volume data it provided and which the Commission 
cited includes only transaction data executed on ICE's electronic 
trading platform. As noted above, supplemental data supplied by ICE 
confirmed that block trades are in addition to the trades that were 
conducted on the electronic platform; block trades comprise about 65 
percent of all transactions in the DOM contract. The Commission 
acknowledges that the open interest information it provided in its 
October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice includes transactions made 
off the ICE platform. However, once open interest is created, there 
is no way for ICE to differentiate between ``on-exchange'' versus 
``off-exchange'' created positions, and all such positions are 
fungible with one another and may be offset in any way agreeable to 
the position holder regardless of how the position was initially 
created.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is the Commission's opinion that liquidity, as it pertains to 
the DOM contract, is typically a function of trading activity in 
particular lead months and, given sufficient liquidity in such months, 
the ICE DOM contract

[[Page 24605]]

itself would be considered liquid. In any event, in light of the fact 
that the Commission has found that the DOM contract does not meet the 
material price reference or price linkage criteria, according to the 
Commission's Guidance, it would be unnecessary to evaluate whether the 
DOM contract meets the material liquidity criterion since it cannot be 
used alone for SPDC determination.
ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Liquidity
    For the reasons discussed above, the Commission does not find 
evidence that the DOM contract meets the material liquidity criterion.
4. Overall Conclusion
    After considering the entire record in this matter, including the 
comments received, the Commission has determined that the DOM contract 
does not perform a significant price discovery function under the 
criteria established in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. Specifically, the 
Commission has determined that the DOM contract does not meet the 
material price reference, price linkage and material liquidity criteria 
at this time. Accordingly, the Commission will issue the attached Order 
declaring that the DOM contract is not a SPDC.
    Issuance of this Order indicates that the Commission does not at 
this time regard ICE as a registered entity in connection with its DOM 
contract.\42\ Accordingly, with respect to its DOM contract, ICE is not 
required to comply with the obligations, requirements and timetables 
prescribed in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) for ECMs with SPDCs. However, 
ICE must continue to comply with the applicable reporting requirements.
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    \42\ See 73 FR 75888, 75893 (Dec. 12, 2008).
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V. Related Matters

a. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \43\ imposes certain 
requirements on Federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of 
information as defined by the PRA. Certain provisions of Commission 
rule 36.3 impose new regulatory and reporting requirements on ECMs, 
resulting in information collection requirements within the meaning of 
the PRA. OMB previously has approved and assigned OMB control number 
3038-0060 to this collection of information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Cost-Benefit Analysis

    Section 15(a) of the CEA \44\ requires the Commission to consider 
the costs and benefits of its actions before issuing an order under the 
Act. By its terms, section 15(a) does not require the Commission to 
quantify the costs and benefits of an order or to determine whether the 
benefits of the order outweigh its costs; rather, it requires that the 
Commission ``consider'' the costs and benefits of its actions. Section 
15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated 
in light of five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission may in its discretion give 
greater weight to any one of the five enumerated areas and could in its 
discretion determine that, notwithstanding its costs, a particular 
order is necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest or to 
effectuate any of the provisions or accomplish any of the purposes of 
the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When a futures contract begins to serve a significant price 
discovery function, that contract, and the ECM on which it is traded, 
warrants increased oversight to deter and prevent price manipulation or 
other disruptions to market integrity, both on the ECM itself and in 
any related futures contracts trading on DCMs. An Order finding that a 
particular contract is a SPDC triggers this increased oversight and 
imposes obligations on the ECM calculated to accomplish this goal. The 
increased oversight engendered by the issue of a SPDC Order increases 
transparency and helps to ensure fair competition among ECMs and DCMs 
trading similar products and competing for the same business. Moreover, 
the ECM on which the SPDC is traded must assume, with respect to that 
contract, all the responsibilities and obligations of a registered 
entity under the CEA and Commission regulations. Additionally, the ECM 
must comply with nine core principles established by section 2(h)(7) of 
the Act--including the obligation to establish position limits and/or 
accountability standards for the SPDC. Section 4(i) of the CEA 
authorizes the Commission to require reports for SPDCs listed on ECMs. 
These increased responsibilities, along with the CFTC's increased 
regulatory authority, subject the ECM's risk management practices to 
the Commission's supervision and oversight and generally enhance the 
financial integrity of the markets.
    The Commission has concluded that ICE's DOM contract, which is the 
subject of the attached Order, is not a SPDC; accordingly, the 
Commission's Order imposes no additional costs and no additional 
statutorily or regulatory mandated responsibilities on the ECM.

c. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \45\ requires that 
agencies consider the impact of their rules on small businesses. The 
requirements of CEA section 2(h)(7) and the Part 36 rules affect ECMs. 
The Commission previously has determined that ECMs are not small 
entities for purposes of the RFA.\46\ Accordingly, the Chairman, on 
behalf of the Commission, hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) 
that these Orders, taken in connection with section 2(h)(7) of the Act 
and the Part 36 rules, will not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
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    \45\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \46\ 66 FR 42256, 42268 (Aug. 10, 2001).
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VI. Order

a. Order Relating to the Dominion-South Financial Basis Contract

    After considering the complete record in this matter, including the 
comment letters received in response to its request for comments, the 
Commission has determined to issue the following Order:
    The Commission, pursuant to its authority under section 2(h)(7) of 
the Act, hereby determines that the Dominion-South Financial Basis 
contract, traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., does not at 
this time satisfy the material price reference, price linkage and 
material liquidity criteria for significant price discovery contracts. 
Consistent with this determination, the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 
is not considered a registered entity \47\ with respect to the 
Dominion-South Financial Basis contract and is not subject to the 
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act applicable to registered 
entities. Further, the obligations, requirements and timetables 
prescribed in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) governing core principle 
compliance by the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., are not applicable to 
the Dominion-South

[[Page 24606]]

Financial Basis contract with the issuance of this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This Order is based on the representations made to the Commission 
by the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., dated July 27, 2009, and 
November 13, 2009, and other supporting material. Any material change 
or omissions in the facts and circumstances pursuant to which this 
order is granted might require the Commission to reconsider its current 
determination that the Dominion-South Financial Basis contract is not a 
significant price discovery contract. Additionally, to the extent that 
it continues to rely upon the exemption in Section 2(h)(3) of the Act, 
the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., must continue to comply with all of 
the applicable requirements of Section 2(h)(3) and Commission 
Regulation 36.3.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on April 28, 2010, by the Commission.
David A. Stawick,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010-10332 Filed 5-4-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
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