DNA 5742F 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR 

TROOP OBSERVERS, EXERCISE DESERT 

ROCK V, OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 

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Final Report for Period ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR TROOP OBSERVERS, 

EXERCISE DESERT ROCK V, OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 1 Mar 80-28 ADr 81

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I KEY wORCS fc-frnue on PTI.~I* a1.5. II neresre md rdrnr’fy b-y blOCA t-us-J 

Operation Upshot-Knothole Radiation Exposure Assessment 

Exercise Desert Rock V Automated Dose Reconstruction 

Volunteer Observers Trench Factors 

Service Observers Neutron Dose 

) AB-STRAC- (Ccnlrn”~ cn l-ever,. ‘rd. rf neccr*srl l nd Iarnrify b” bIOCJl nrr=t.r) 

The'radiation doses to observers, including volunteer observers, for Exercise 

Desert Rock V are reconstructed for each applicable shot of Operation UpshotKnothole (1953). Initial neutron and gamma doses are determined from radiation 

transport codes. The several components of initial radiation are evaluated separately in order to consider the cloud dynamics and the effect of body positions 

on initial doses. Residual doses are determined through an automated procedure 

that utilizes raw data in regression analyses to fit space-time models. 

Observer activity data are combined with the refined radiological data to deter-

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mine integrated dose. Uncertainties are calculated for each parameter. The 

relationship of internal dose to the radiological environment is also discussec 

The highest calculated doses received by volunteer observers was 14 rem gamma 

and 28 rem neutron at Shot Simon. The highest gamma dose received by other 

observers was 1.3 rem at Shots Badger and Harry. Neutron doses for all other 

observers was less than .02 rem at any shot. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TH,S PAGEIW’hen Data Enieredj 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section Page 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................... 2 

LIST OF TABLES 3 ............................................ 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ............................. 5 

OPERATIONS ............................................... 11 

2.1 SHOT DATA .......................................... 11 

2.2 PARTICIPATION ...................................... 11 

2.3 CONCEPT ............................................ 15 

2.4 ACTIVITIES ........................................... 17 

INITIAL RADIATION ......................................... 41 

3.1 COMPUTATIONAL METHOD ............................ 41 

3.2 QESULTS ............................................. 47 

RESIDUAL RADIATION ...................................... 61 

4.1 RESIDUAL GAMMA EXPOSURE ......................... 61 

4.2 INTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE ..................... 80 

4.3 RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE SUMMARY ................ 84 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION . 87 

5.1 UNCERTAINTIES IN INITIAL RADIATION DOSE ........... 87 

5.2 UNCERTAINTIES IN RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE ........ 90 

5.3 TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY ............................... 94 

Appendices 

II THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNAL DOSE TO EXTERNAL 

III RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNAL DOSE TO GAMMA INTENSITY 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY .................................... 97 

CONCLUSIONS .............................................. 99 

REFERENCES ............................................... 101 

I CALCULATION OF TRENCH FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 

DOSE FROM AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 

FROM INDUCED ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

l-l Shot Locations, Operation Upshot-Knothole ..................... 

2-1 Shot Annie Area ............................................. 

2-2 Shot Nancy Area ............................................. 

2-3 Shots Ruth, Dixie, Ray, and Climax Areas ....................... 

2-4 Shot Badger Area ............................................ 

2-5 Shot Simon Area ............................................. 

2-6 Shot Encore Area ............................................ 

2-7 Shot Harry Area ............................................. 

2-8 Shot Grable and the 280mm Cannon”Amazon Annie” .............. 

2-9 Shot Grable Area ............................................ 

3-l Debris Gamma Intensity at 2000 Yards as a Function of 

Time, Shot Badger ........................................... 

3-2 Gamma Dose Adjustment Factors 

for Volunteer Observers ...................................... 

3-3 Shot Annie Gamma Dose ...................................... 

3-4 Site Layout, Shot Nancy ..................................... 

3-5 Shot Nancy Gamma Dose ...................................... 

3-6 Shot Badger Gamma Dose ..................................... 

3-7 Site Layout, Shot Simon ..................................... 

3-8 Shot Simon Gamma Dose ...................................... 

3-9 Shot Harry Gamma Dose ...................................... 

3-10 Shot Grable Gamma Dose ..................................... 

4-1 Shot Annie Residual Radiation and Observer Routes .............. 

4-2 Shot Nancy Residual Radiation and Observer Qoutes .............. 

4-3 Shots Dixie, Ray Residual Radiation ............................ 

Page 

7 

20 

22 

25 

26 

29 

33 

35 

37 

38 

46 

48 

49 

51 

52 

53 

55 

57 

58 

60 

63 

66 

67 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) 

Figure Page 

4-4 Shot Badger Residual Radiation and Observer Routes . . . ...**.**.. 70 

4-5 Shot Simon Residual Radiation and Observer Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 

4-6 Shot Encore Residual Radiation and Observer Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 

4-7 Shot Harry Residual Radiation and Observer Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

h-8 Shot Grable Residual Radiation and Observer Routes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

I- 1 Debris Gamma Trench Factors for Volunteer Observer Trench, 

Shot Badger . . . . . . . . . . ...*.**............*................*.. 110 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

2-l Upshot-Knothole Shot Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

2-2 Observer Participation, Exercise Desert Rock V, Operation 

Upshot-Knothole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*...*.................... 13 

2-3 Observer-Ground Zero Distance Summary, Exercise Desert 

Rock V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

5-l Observer Dose Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
Section 1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

This is a continuation of the series of reports on the reconstruction of 

nuclear radiation dose for military participants in the atmospheric nuclear 

weapons program. This report on troop observers is the first of several pertaining 

to military participation in Operation Upshot-Knothole. 

There were four types of military participation in Exercise Desert Rock V, 

conducted at Nevada Proving Grounds in conjunction with Operation UpshotKnothole in the spring of 1953. The first consisted of troop observers, who were 

military personnel sent to Camp Desert Rock for the specific purpose of observing 

one or more nuclear shots. This is the military participation addressed in this 

report. 

The second type of military participation consisted of battalion-size 

maneuver units that moved to Camp Desert Rock for the purpose of engaging in 

tactical exercises to test doctrine and tactics being developed for the nuclear 

battlefield. Several such exercises were conducted: a Marine Brigade Exercise at 

Shot Badger and Army multiple-battalion exercises at Shots Annie, Nancy, Simon, 

Encore, and Grable. Air Force ground units also maneuvered at Shot Encore. 

Each of these exercises, and the associated radiation exposure, are to be treated 

in a separate report. 

The third type of military participation centered around service equipment 

tests and operational training associated with the employment of nuclear 

weapons. There were several projects engaged in tnese activities, for which the 

radiation exposure also will be treated separately. 

Finally, there were the personnel assigned to Camp Desert Rock, usually for 

the entire exercise, who planned, supported, and administered the overall exercise. The activities of the Camp Desert Rock personnel and the associated 

radiation exposures will also be analyzed subsequently. 

5 
It should be noted that a fifth major category of military participation, not 

a part of the four Exercise Desert Rock groups described above, consisted of 

projects conducted under the sponsorship of Field Command, Armed Forces 

Special Weapons Project. These efforts, as well as the support provided by 

Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to other test groups and to the overall 

operation, are to be analyzed as necessary to supplement available film badge 

dosimetry. 

Of the eleven nuclear shots (Figure l-l) of the Upshot-Knothole series, 

Exercise Desert Rock observers participated to some degree in nine. This report 

addresses the radiation doses to observers during their activities at Nevada 

Proving Grounds in conjunction with these nine shots. The observer program is 

described and the observer activities for each of the shots are traced from the 

pre-shot orientation through the shot activities to the post-shot equipment 

inspection, where appropriate. Time-dependent position information is presented 

in order that an exposure analysis can be performed to determine the integrated 

dose from all contributing sources, including the initial neutron and gamma 

radiation dose from the shot being observed and the external (and internal as 

appropriate) dose due to residual radiation from applicable preceding shots. 

A major obstacle to the initial radiation dose determination was the lack of 

radiation output data for several of the atypical devices being tested in operation 

Upshot-Knothole. Two courses of action were adopted to solve this problem. 

First, when available, output data from related devices were used where similarities permitted. Second, for those shots when the first option was not viable, 

output calculations were performed on request by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Procedures for specific shots are described in the section on initial 

radiation. A supporting appendix describes the extensive effort required to 

provide a more reliable estimate of the shielding effect of trenches from the 

several types of initial radiation examined in this report. 

The analysis described herein utilizes an automated procedure, developed 

for the ?eapot (Exercise Desert Rock VI) observer report, for determining the 

external dose due to residual radiation. Radiological survey data is fit, in 
I 

I 

I SIMON e 

I t ANNIE 

ARRY 

I 

I 

I 210 2 4 6 8 

COHTROL POlftT 

I 

I HNADA I FROVING 

I GROUNDS 

I 

I

I 

L em-- o Check Points 

CAMP DESERT . . 

Figure l-l Shot Locations, Operation Upshot-Knothole 

7 
statistical regression analyses, to space-time models of residual radiation intensity, from which isointensity contours (isopleths) are then developed. A variance 

from the prior procedure is required for this analysis, because the available AEC 

radiological survey reports had no raw data, but only isopleths that were not fully 

time-resolved. Thus early surveys in particular (where time sensitivity is high) 

are unreliable for use in the regression analyses. This necessitates the use of 

isolated random data from Desert Rock activities to provide time resolution of 

AEC isopleths at corresponding locations, which narrows the time uncertainty of 

the AEC data at the coincident points while broadening the utility of the 

isopleths. 

As in the previous report, the methodology also considers the effect of soil 

activation in the residual radiation analysis. This is particularly important for 

Shots Encore and Grable, where the residual contamination of the post-shot times 

of interest was primarily due to the induced activity of Manganese-56 and 

Sodium-24. For some other shots, the induced contribution was evident near 

ground zero, but at greater distances it was small compared to the contribution 

from fission products. In all cases, the decay model is representative of actual 

shot conditions, verified by correlations with available data. 

The potential for an internal dose commitment from inhaled radionuclides is 

assessed for several situations encountered by Upshot-Knothole observers. An 

expanded methodology for internal dose determination considers induced activity 

as a source of contamination and allows for the possible mobility of airborne 

contamination. These are accomplished by relating measured gamma intensities 

and properties of the actual contaminants to other parameters of the observer 

activity scenarios. 

Due to the lack of film badge dosimetry data for most personnel of Exercise 

Desert Rock V, only minimal comparison of calculated dose with film badge dose 

is possible. No personnel film badge data are used in the calculations. The 

methodology for determining personnel dose is not significantly different than 

that used in previous analyses (References 17, 18, 321, in which comparisions with 

dosimetric data established a high degree of confidence. The uncertainties in the 
results are due primarily to the uncertainties in both the radiological surveys and 

the time-position descriptions of troop activities. Automation of the dose 

estimation procedure facilitates the determination of confidence levels and aids 

in subsequent exposure analyses of other troop operations in the same radiologically contaminated areas. 

Major findings of this report are: 

0 The troop (including volunteer) observers of nuclear shots in Operation 

Upshot-Knothole were exposed to initial radiation from neutrons and 

gamma rays, and residual gamma radiation from fallout and neutronactivated soil. 

a Mean neutron doses of 0.63, 2.4, and 28 rem and mean initial gamma 

doses of 0.64, 3.9, and 9.8 rem are calculated for the in-trench 

positions of the volunteer observers at Shots Nancy, Radger, and 

Simon, respectively. Neutron and initial gamma doses for other 

observers in the troop trenches at greater ranges were all less than 

0.02 rem. 

0 The typical scenario of service observer activities resulted in a dose 

far less than the maximum dose permitted for Desert Rock V 

participants. Only for Shot Badger, at which considerable time was 

spent near the rad-safe limit, and Shot Harry, for which the gamma 

intensity restriction on movement was removed, are the calculated 

mean film badge doses as high as 1.3 rem. The dose associated with 

other shots was significantly less. 

0 The inhalation of radioactive dust resulted in only a trivial addition to 

the dose of observers at Exercise Desert Rock V. 

9 
10 
Section 2 

OPERATIONS 

2.1 SHOT DATA 

A summary of the eleven test shots of Operation Upshot-Knothole is 

contained in Table 2-l. Exercise Desert Rock observers participated in only nine 

shots, as shown in Table 2-2. All shots, regardless of Desert Rock participation, 

are considered for any residual radiation that might have contributed to total 

radiation dose. 

2.2 PARTICIPATION 

During Operation Upshot-Knothole, there were four categories of observer 

personnel participating in Exercise Desert Rock V. In addition, other military and 

civilian observers, sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission or the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project, witnessed shots but generally did not participate 

in shot activities to the same extent as those in Exercise Desert Rock. The 

categories of Desert Rock observers were as follows: 

A. Service Observers. This group consisted of personnel selected from all 

four military services. They were sent to Camp Desert Rock from 

military bases throughout the United States, as well as from some 

overseas areas, to become familiar with nuclear weapons and their 

effects. They usually observed a shot, from close-in (3500-5000 yards) 

trenches if possible, and inspected the resulting damage to equipment 

exposed to the shot. The participation of the service observers is 

shown in Table 2-2. It should be noted that, due to possible 

participation in more than one shot, the numbers in each category are 

not necessarily additive. This is explained in Section 2.3. It should 

also be noted that the service observers did not engage in any 

maneuvers or other similar exercises while at Nevada Proving 

Grounds. Those troops who did are treated in a separate report. 

11 
Table Z- 1. Upshot-Knothole Shot Data 

SHOT DATE LOCAL LOCATION BURST 

DESIGNATION Actual TIME COORDINATES HEIGHT* * YIELD 

AEC DESERT (Schedl (PST)* (UTM) (ft) (K-0 

ROCK 1953 

ANNIE v- 1 17 March 

(17 March) 

0520 Area 3 

871004 

300 T 16 

NANCY v-2 24 March 

(24 March) 

0510 Area 4 

797056 

300 T 24 

RUTH v-3 31 March 

(31 March) 

0500 Area 7(5a) 

868042 

300 T 0.2 

DIXIE v-4 6 April 

(6 April) 

0730 Area 7(3) 

871045 

6020A 11 

RAY V-6 I I April (18 April) 0445 Area 4a 

806060 

100-T 0.2 

BADGER v-5 18 April (11 April) 0435 Area 2 

784104 

300 T 23 

SIMON v-7 25 April 

(25 April) 

0430 Area 1 

798009 

300 T 43 

ENCORE v-9 8 May 

(7 May) 

0830 

(PDT) 

Frenchman 

956726 

Flat 2423 A 27 

HARRY V-8 19 May 

(2 May) 

0505 

(PDT) 

Area 3a 

867996 

300 T 32 

GRABLE v-10 25 May 

(21 May) 

0830 

(PDT) 

Frenchman 

956728 

Flat 524""* 15 

CLIMAX 4 June 

(31 May) 

0415 

(PDT) 

Area 7(3)

872048 

1334 A 61 

*Unless noted as Pacific Daylight 

**T - Tower; A - Air Drop 

***Fired from 280 mm Cannon 

Time (PDT). 

Source: References 1, 5, 6 

12 
Table 2-L 

Observer Participation 

Exercise Desert Rock V 

Operation Upshot-Knothole 

Army 

Observers 

Navy 

Observers 

Marine 

Corps

Observers 

Air Force 

Observers 

Volunteer 

Observers 

Camp Desert Rock 

Observers’ 

Civilians 

(DOD) 

Total 

Observers 

Annie 303 152 9 41 30 535 

Nancy 308 86 17 79 9 16 515 

Ruth 0 

Dixie 75 60 135 

Ray 1 25 4 33 63 

Badger 260 122 106 101 12 10 611 

Simon 198 13 1 340 8 24 584 

Encore 135 92 12 113 180 21 553 

Harry 99 14 2 255 526 7 903 

Grable 606 70 29 13 31 749 

Climax 0 

1Camp Desert Rock personnel participated in the exercise as both observers and as maneuver troops. 

This column reflects only those who participated as observers. Other reports of maneuvers will address 

those CDR personnel who participated as maneuver troops. 

21ncludes 160 officers and enlisted personnel from the 9th Ordnance Battalion (SWS), 

Sandia Base, N.M. (Reference 13). 

Source: References 1, 5, 6. 
B. Volunteer Observers. For three shots (Nancy, Badger, Simon), volunteers were positioned in trenches well forward of other observers and 

troops. Officers from all services were represented in this category. 

Each volunteer had been trained to determine the effects of nuclear 

weapons. A safe distance from the burst was calculated and agreed on 

by the volunteer group. Calculations were based on standard military 

reference manuals (e.g., TM 23-ZOO), using the highest expected yield 

of the particular device. For Shot Nancy, the trench was located 2500 

yards from ground zero. For Shots Badger and Simon, the trenches 

were 2000 yards from the tower--the closest that any personnel had 

experienced a nuclear burst in a training situation. The number of 

volunteers for each applicable shot is shown in Table 2-2. 

C. Camp Desert Rock (CDR) Observers. This group consisted of Army 

personnel assigned to Camp Desert Rock as the permanent party--that 

is, those who planned, administered, and supported the maneuvers and 

programs (including the observer program) that comprised Exercise 

Desert ‘Rock V. Either in the course of their duties or when integrated 

with the service observers, they were permitted to observe one or 

more shots during their stay at Camp Desert Rock. Those who did so 

in connection with their duties (e.g., instructors, truck drivers) as well 

as those who participated as maneuver troops, will be treated in a 

separate report. Those shown in Table 2-2 thus represent only the 

CDR personnel who participated in the same manner as the regular 

service observers. 

0. Civilian Observers. The number of observers in this category was 

relatively small (Table 2-2); these apparently represented civil service 

employees from the various army areas who were sent to Camp Desert 

Rock in the same manner as other military service observers. There 

were many other civilian observers at NPC, not sponsored by Desert 

Rock, who likely participated in various shot-related activities. Their 

participation is not addressed in this report. 

14 
2.3 CONCERT 

The purpose of Exercise Desert Rock V was to provide indoctrination and 

training in military operations featuring tactical employment of nuclear weapons; 

to demonstrate to participating troops and observers the effects of nuclear 

explosions on prepared positions, equipment, and animals; and to observe individual psychological effects resulting from nuclear explosions. The missions of 

Desert Rock V were a continuation of those of the four previous Desert Rock 

exercises. However, because several restrictions placed by the AEC on military 

participation in earlier operations were removed for Upshot-Knothole, more 

realistic training was conducted. This resulted in a number of changes for Desert 

Rock V. These included: 

0 Two Battalion Combat Teams were positioned in trenches 3500 yards 

from CZ - the nearest any large number of troops had been permitted 

to observe a nuclear burst. 

0 Volunteer observers were in trenches at 2000 yards from two shots, 

the closest any personnel had ever been in a training situation. 

0 The US Army had full responsibility for the radiological safety of 

Desert Rock-sponsored military participants. 

0 Troops were permitted to maneuver near ground zero, so long as such 

exercises did not interfere with other tests and scientific experiments. 

The services were invited to send observers to the tests. Each service was 

informed of the reporting date for each shot as well as the records and equipment 

to be brought to Camp Desert Rock by individual observers. Army observer 

allocations were to be divided between commissioned officers and enlisted 

personnel. * When possible, the enlisted observers were to be formed into 

*Reference 4 suggests a 50/50 mix of personnel, but Reference 3 (which probably 

superseded the former) indicates that the observers were to be primarily officers, 

while enlisted personnel were to participate in the troop maneuver exercises. 

15 
provisional units by Army commanders for movement to Camp Desert Rock. This 

was to alleviate the administrative and logistical problems associated with the 

moves (Reference 4). 

After arrival at Camp Desert Rock, the observers followed a scheduled 

routine that, while varying from shot to shot, included a series of standard 

activities. The schedule prepared for participating military personnel generally 

included the following: 

0 Pre-shot classroom instruction. 

Subjects included basic nuclear theory, characteristics and effects of 

nuclear weapons, protective measures to employ against a nuclear 

attack, tactical use of nuclear weapons, and a plan of operation for 

the upcoming shot. Eight hours of instruction were planned. For those 

observers who did not arrive at Camp Desert Rock in time for the 

instruction, a one-hour orientation was conducted on the evening 

preceding the shot. 

0 Rehearsal of shot day activities. 

Observers visited the trenches, had a “dry run” of the detonation, and 

then viewed the display area established for the shot. In some cases, 

they were taken to the display area of a previous test to see the postshot effects. 

0 Shot observation. 

Approximately one hour before the scheduled shot, observers arrived 

at the trench area, were briefed on what to expect, and were checked 

for proper safety procedures. A few minutes before the shot, they 

entered the trenches and assumed a crouching position. 

0 Guided tour through display area. 

Under the direction of the Desert Rock control group, observers 

toured the equipment display area to see and have explained the 

effects of the detonation on anirnals, equipment, and prepared positions. 

16 
Circumstances altered this general schedule in many of the shots. In some 

instances, weather conditions or fallout contamination precluded the tour of the 

display area after the shot. In others, shot delays resulted in changes to some 

observer activities. For example, no observers were originally scheduled for Shot 

Ray, but when Shot Badger was postponed and Shot Ray was moved ahead one 

week, the Marine Corps advance party was able to take advantage of the situation 

and view the detonation from News Nob. In other cases, some observers may have 

had to return to their home station without having seen a shot. 

Several procedures were established for the nine shots in which military 

personnel participated: observers remained in a group that facilitated control of 

their activities; prior to H-hour, all personnel were briefed on what to expect; at 

approximately H-10 minutes, all personnel entered the trenches (except for the 

two shots where the distance was sufficient to permit observers to remain above 

ground); after the shot, observers were permitted to tour the equipment display (if 

any), supervised by the control group and accompanied by rad-safe monitors. 

2.4 ACTIVITIES 

The test shots and attendant observer participation went as scheduled in the 

majority of the shots. Observers departed Camp Desert Rock for the trench areas 

in convoys of buses and trucks. With the exception of the volunt’eer observers, all 

observers occupied the same set of trenches at a given shot. When observers 

inspected post-shot equipment displays, their movement to and through the 

display area was accomplished as a single group. Ground zero locations, the 

approximate trench locations, and the display areas are identified on the figures 

accompanying the discussion of each shot. Significant distances of interest, as 

used in the exposure analysis, are summarized in Table 2-3. The following 

paragraphs describe the observer activities for each shot at which Desert Rock 

observers were present. 

2.4.1 Shot Annie 

The first shot in the series was witnessed by 535 observers (Table 2-2) from 

trenches located 3500 yards (3200 meters) south-southwest of ground zero on an 

17 
Table 2-3 

Observer-Ground Zero Distance Summary 

Exercise Desert Rock V 

Shot 

Annie (V- 1) 

Nancy (V-2) 

Dixie (V-4) 

Ray (V-6) 

Radger (V-5) 

Simon (V-7) 

Encore (V-9) 

Harry (V-8) 

Grable (V- 10) 

Observer Distance 

3500 yds (3200 m) 

4000 yds (3660 m) 

2500 yds (2300 m) 

10 mi (16 km) 

11 mi (18 km) 

4000 yds (3660 m) 

2000 yds (1830 m) 

4000 yds (3660 m) 

2000 yds (1830 m) 

10,000 yds (9150 m) 

4000 yds (3660 m) 

5000 yds (4570 m) 

Post-Shot Approach 

700 yds (640 m) 

1000 yds (910 m) 

None 

None 

1000 yds (910 m) 

2000 yds (1830 m) 

GZ 

450 yds (410 m) 

1100 yds (1000 m) 

18 
azimuth of 200 degrees. In addition to the observers noted above, there were 

other civilian observers present for this “open” (to selected civilians and news 

media) shot. Two battalion combat teams, comprised of troops from Camp Desert 

Rock, also observed the shot from adjacent trenches and performed an assault 

maneuver thereafter. This and other troop maneuvers are treated in a separate 

report. 

The observers had arrived at Camp Desert Rock on 13 March 1953. A full 

dress rehearsal was held in the shot area on 14 March, observers and maneuver 

troops having departed Camp Desert Rock at 0800. They arrived at the trench 

area about 1K hours later. The rehearsal consisted of assigning trenches to 

specific groups and having the participants practice the procedures, including the 

method of entering the trenches, the crouch for the shot, the rise to observe the 

fireball, and the exit from the trenches. They then toured the display area. This 

gave them the opportunity to view the equipment in its pre-shot condition for 

later comparison with its condition after the shot. The locations of the major 

observer activities are shown in Figure 2- 1. 

On 17 March, the morning of the test, the observer group departed Camp 

Desert Rock at 0230 and arrived at the trench area at 0400. The pre-shot 

orientation began at about 0420 (H-l hour), during which safety instructions were 

repeated, communications were checked, and muster was taken. At H-10 

minutes, the observers entered the trenches. At H-2 minutes, they crouched as 

the final countdown began for the 0520 shot. 

Eight seconds after the shot, the shock wave passed and the observers were 

permitted to stand in the trench and observe the rising fireball. The rad-safe 

survey teams immediately set out to monitor the display area and to mark the isointensity lines of importance--the 1, 2, and 2.5 r/hr lines in particular. At 

approximately 0545, the observers began the tour of the display area under the 

direction of the control group. After walking east from the trench area to the 

3500-yard display line, where they viewed the effects of the detonation, they 

proceeded north through the display area, stopping briefly (approximately five 

minutes) every 500 yards to note the progressively increasing effects on the 

displayed equipment. At 700 yards from ground zero they were halted due to rad13 
_--

-

I

, 

Figure 2-l 

Shot Annie Area 
safe criteria--they had reached the 2.5 r/hr line, which was not to be crossed 

(Reference 7). They then returned to the lOOO-yard line, mustered, brushed off 

their clothes and loaded onto the vehicles, which had been brought up from the 

parking area. At about 0800 (H+2.7), they loaded up for the return trip to Camp 

Desert Rock. 

2.4.2 Shot Nancy 

Service observers, volunteer observers, and DOD civilians, totaling 515 

personnel (Table 2-21, witnessed Shot Nancy from trenches south-southwest 

(azimuth 205’) of ground zero as shown in Figure 2-2. The nine volunteer 

observers were in a trench 2500 yards (2290 meters) from ground zero. The other 

observers, as well as two battalion combat teams that maneuvered after the shot, 

were in trenches at 4000 yards (3660 meters) from the tower. 

The observers had arrived at Camp Desert Rock on 20 March 1953. After 

classroom orientation the next day, they conducted a rehearsal in the shot area on 

22 March. In a pattern similar to that of the previous shot rehearsal, they 

departed Camp Desert Rock shortly after 0800 and arrived at the trench area at 

1045. After the simulated shot about an hour later, they viewed the equipment 

display to the north of the trenches. They then visited the Shot Annie display 

area to see the effects of the previous detonation, arriving there in the early 

afternoon, staying about an hour, and departing at about 1500. They arrived back 

at Camp Desert Rock at 1630. On the following day, 23 March, the remainder of 

the pre-shot instruction was held. 

On shot day, the observers departed camp after midnight and arrived in the 

trench area at 0340. The observers and maneuver troops were given their preshot orientation and safety checks shortly after 0400. The nine volunteer 

observers, who had previously agreed on the distance at which they would be 

positioned, were taken to their revetted trench, 1500 yards (1370 meters) closer 

to ground zero. 

The location and dimensions of the volunteer observer trench are not welldocumented. From an inspection of the display area and the graphic portrayal in 

21 
- ,l, I 

\I l’-J Ih\vJ i\ 

Figure 2-2 

1 Shot Nancy Area 
Reference 6, it appears that the trench was near Orange Road, a north-south road 

cutting through the display area. Its azimuth (from GZ) was therefore 205 

degrees, not 200 as stated in the same reference. Moreover, the reference 

describes the trench variously as three and four feet in width. Photographs of the 

trench indicate the width as four feet. This width, as well as the azimuth of 205 

degrees, is used in the analysis. 

Following the pre-shot briefing and about ten minutes before detonation, the 

observers entered the trenches. The shot went off as scheduled at 0510. A 

portion of the cloud stem passed near the trenches, and resulted in detectable 

(18mr/hr) radiation levels in the main trench area for a brief period. This was 

apparently caused by a wind shift just before the shot that caused the slight wind 

to come from the north rather than the west, as it had previously (Reference 1). 

The volunteer observers were able to view the rising fireball for only a few 

seconds before dust obscured their vision for the next minute. Gamma radiation 

levels noted in the volunteer trenches were as high as l-2 r/hr on the floor of the 

trench and 4.5 r/hr at shoulder height, about a foot below ground level, at the 

entrance ramp. Seeing the approaching cloud, they decided to evacuate the 

trench and return to the main observer area to the rear. The intensity at that 

time was 90 mr/hr. After a walk of 500 yards, their vehicle met them and 

returned them to the control trench. The intensity at the time of pick-up (at the 

3000-yard line) was 20 mr/hr. 

At 0630, the observers (not including the volunteer observers) departed the 

trench area for a tour of the display area. They likely stopped for about five 

minutes at each 500-yard display line from 3500 yards to 1000 yards from ground 

zero. Because the rad-safe limit line (2.5 r/hr) was established at 850-1250 yards 

(depending on azimuth), it is unlikely that observers would have proceeded beyond 

the lOOO-yard display line. After a brief stay of five minutes at this line, they 

would have returned to the main trench area, arriving there at about 0730. At 

0800, the return trip to Camp Desert Rock began. The last unit reached camp at 

about 1030. 

23 
2.4.3 Shot Ruth 

There was no Desert Rock observer participation in this event. The location 

of this shot is shown in Figure 2-3. There was no impact on subsequent Desert 

Rock operations due to this shot. 

2.4.4 Shot Dixie 

Originally, no observer participation was planned for this event. However, . 75 Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel (the advance party of Marines for 

the Shot Badger exercise) from Camp Pendleton, California, and 60 Camp Desert 

Qock personnel observed the shot from News Nob, 10 miles south of ground zero. 

There was no equipment display, and no post-shot inspection of the area. Within a 

half-hour after the shot, the observers departed for Camp Desert Rock. The 

location of the shot is shown in Figure 2-3. 

2.4.5 Shot Ray 

This shot, the fifth in the series, was originally scheduled as number 6. 

Because of the high residual radiation levels in the Shot 5 (Radger) area due to 

Shot Nancy fallout, shots 5 and 6 were interchanged. Some Marine Corps 

personnel who had already arrived at Camp Desert Rock to begin preparations for 

Shot Badger were thus afforded the additional opportunity to view this shot. 

Some 25 Marines, as well as other service personnel as shown in Table 2-2, 

observed Shot Ray from News Nob, 11 miles south of the tower. There was no 

equipment display for post-shot inspection. The location of the shot is shown in 

Figure 2-3. 

2.4.6 Shot Badger 

A total of 611 observers (Table 2-2) witnessed this shot from trenches south 

(195’ azimuth) of ground zero. Of this group, 12 volunteers were in a trench 2000 

yards (1830 meters) from the shot, while the other observers were in trenches 

4000 yards (3660 meters) away. Figure 2-4 depicts the trench areas and the shot 

area. In addition to the observer program, a Marine exercise was conducted in 

conjunction with this shot, starting from trenches adjacent to the observer 

trenches. The exposure analysis of this maneuver unit, the Second Marine Corps 

Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, is treated in a separate report. 

24 
- - - - 

: ] ‘.<’ ,; * -, , / ,,

P C’ h . 

- - I! ,I ,;/ j' 

Fiaure 2-3 

I Shots Ruth,Dixie, Ray, 

and Climax Areas 

Nil 

-
I-, .r/ I / .I I I I \ I . - , - Y. 

I/ /I 1 ;I; I (’ I/’ F- I\ \ \ 1 IRM I t ‘I 

Figure 2-4 

shot Badger Area 

4 
The observers arrived between 13 and 17 April. Most were able to attend 

the rehearsal on 16 April, conducted in conjunction with the brigade maneuver 

rehearsal. For the rehearsal, they departed Camp Desert Rock shortly after 0700 

and arrived at the trench area at about 1000 hours. Simulated H-hour was at 

1051, and shortly thereafter the manuever units began their attack. At this time, 

the observers toured the display area to note the pre-shot condition of the 

equipment. Based on the plan, they were in the display area for about an hour 

after the simulated shot (Reference 9). They then boarded their vehicles at about 

1200 hours and began their return trip to Camp Desert Rock. On the way, they 

stopped at the Shot Nancy display area to view the post-shot condition of that 

equipment. After an estimated stay of one hour, they re-boarded their vehicles 

and continued back to camp. 

Observers were given a full day’s instruction on 17 April, the day before the 

shot. Those who arrived too late were briefed in the evening. Just before 

midnight, the observers loaded up for the three-hour ride to the shot area. They 

arrived at the trench area about 0300 on the morning of 18 April. The usual preshot orientation was given about an hour before shot time, and at H-10 minutes 

the observers entered the trenches for the final countdown. The shot was fired at 

0435 hours. 

After the shot, the volunteer observers experienced radiation levels greater 

than 500 r/hr, as indicated by instruments that they were using (References 15 

and 33). This level was sustained for IO-15 seconds, then began to drop. They 

decided to evacuate the position, and at about seven minutes after the burst they 

began walking toward the west radial road, about 200 yards away. The radiation 

intensity was about 50 r/hr at this time, but decreased to 1 r/hr by the time they 

reached the west radial, about two minutes later. They apparently waited there 

for a few minutes for transportation before starting toward the main trench area, 

2000 yards to the south, where they arrived about 20 minutes later. It is unlikely 

that they joined the other observers in the post-shot inspection of the display 

area, since they were involved in interviews and tests relating to their 

experiences. 

27 
The service observers departed the trench area about 35 minutes after the 

shot. Because of the contamination on the east radial, they moved northward up 

the west radial. Both Desert Rock and Marine displays were located at varying 

distances from the shot, the first (outermost) at 3500 yards (3200 m) from ground 

zero. They proceeded up the west radial until they reached the lOOO-yard display 

line (Reference 151, the last display before the rad-safe limit line. They moved 

eastward along the lOOO-yard line to the east radial, where they turned south 

toward the trench area. They continued down the east radial as far as 

radiological conditions permitted, detouring to the west as necessary to avoid 

areas contaminated in excess of 2.5 r/hr. They reached the trench area shortly 

before 0700. Following the prescribed procedures, they underwent field 

decontamination before boarding their vehicles for the return trip to Camp Desert 

Rock. The observer vehicles departed the trench area at about 0735. Because of 

contamination on the planned return route, some rerouting of the convoy was 

necessary, likely to avoid that in the extended east radial. This also necessitated 

a final stop to check for contamination before leaving Yucca Flat. No 

decontamination was required, and the group reached camp at 1000 hours 

(Reference 1) approximately an hour behind schedule (Reference 9). 

2.4.7 Shot Simon 

The seventh shot produced the largest yield (43 kt) of any shot in Nevada up 

to that time. It was the fourth shot in which Desert Rock observers and maneuver 

troops participated from trenches. Approximately 584 observers witnessed the 

shot, as shown in Table 2-2. The eight volunteer observers were in two adjacent 

trenches 2000 yards (1830 meters) south of the shot at an azimuth of 180 degrees. 

All others were in trenches 4000 yards (3660 meters) south, as shown in Figure 

2-5. Maneuver units, who would perform a tactical exercise after the shot, were 

in adjacent trenches. Their activities are treated in a separate report. 

The observers arrived at Camp Desert Rock during the period 21-24 April. 

Pre-shot instruction was conducted on 22 April, although less than half of the 

observers had arrived. On 23 April, a full scale dress rehearsal was held in the 

shot area. This was primarily for the benefit of the tactical maneuver troops, but 

those observers who had arrived also participated. The observers departed Camp 

28 
- - 

.

1 I I 

Figure 2-5 

Shot Simon Area , 

-
Desert Rock shortly after 0800 (the first work unit, comprised of the control 

group, had begun the trip at 0700) and arrived at the trench area at 0945 hours. 

During the pre-shot orientation, it was explained that the display area might be 

contaminated on shot day to the extent that displays closer than 1500-2000 yards 

from the tower may be denied. After the simulated shot at 1030 and the 

beginning of the tactical maneuver five minutes later, the observers began their 

walk-through of the display area to note the pre-shot condition of the equipment 

and animals. This activity lasted from about 1100 hours to just before noon, at 

which time the observers loaded onto their vehicles for the trip north to the 

display area for Shot Badger, fired five days earlier. At approximately 1315 

hours, they departed the Badger area for the return trip to Camp Desert Rock, 

arriving there shortly after 1500 (Reference 1). 

On 24 April, the observers received the final four-hour segment of their 

instruction. That evening, late arrivals were given a four-hour orientation 

briefing on what to expect the next day. It was anticipated that these late 

arrivals would receive assistance from those who had attended the full orientation 

and the rehearsal (Reference I). 

On 25 April, the observers departed Camp Desert Rock at 0135 hours 

(Reference 10) and arrived at the trench area at 0315. The volunteer observers 

probably arrived at their trenches, 2000 yards (1830 meters) closer to the shot 

tower, a few minutes later. Five volunteers occupied a revetted trench (4 feet 

wide, 6 feet deep), while three chose to occupy an unrevetted trench (same 

dimensions) having only a sandbag parapet. Constant telephone communication 

was maintained with the control group at the main trench area. After the 

standard pre-shot orientation, all observers entered the trenches at H- 15 minutes, 

where they stayed for the 0430 shot. 

After the shot, the volunteer observers experienced radiation intensity 

levels of 100 r/hr. This was probably a few seconds after the burst, when the light 

level had subsided. The observed intensity dropped rapidly to 50 r/hr, then to 

20-25 r/hr in another minute. They decided to exit the trenches. In the next four 

minutes, they examined some of the animal positions nearby, as the intensity 

again increased to about 50 r/hr. They then moved toward the planned vehicle 

30 
pick-up point, 200 yards to the west (Figure 2-5). When they reached the west 

radial road, they turned south and met their vehicle at the 2500-yard line (500 

yards south of their trenches). As they continued south in the vehicle, the 

intensity dropped to about 1 r/hr by the time they had travelled another 500 yards 

(References 1 and 16). 

At the main trench area, the initial radiation transient was noted to be 

about 5 r/hr at a few seconds after the shot. Later, as the cloud stem passed, the 

level rose to 120 mr/hr before dropping again to about 30 mr/hr. The total early 

dose was reported to be less than 25 mr (Reference l), which probably indicates 

no discernable reading on a pocket dosimeter. 

Thirty minutes after the shot, the service observers began the walk-through 

of the display area. Their route likely followed the path of the maneuver troops, 

who had previously begun their attack to the northwest. After reaching the 

western boundary of the display area, the observers proceeded toward ground zero 

until stopped by the rad-safe limit (2.5 r/hr) at the 2000-yard line. After a brief 

description of the close-in damage (as observed by control personnel from a 

vehicle), the observers returned to the trench area, probably by way of the east 

radial, arriving at the vehicle loading area at 0600, ninety minutes after the shot. 

Within a half hour, they mustered, loaded up, and began the return trip to Camp 

Desert Rock. The convoy stopped enroute for final rad-safe monitoring and 

personnel brushing-off; this routine procedure was not accomplished at load-up 

due to low level contamination in the shot area, but occurred enroute to Camp 

Desert Rock and resulted in an overall delay in the return trip of about an hour 

(Reference 1). Arrival at camp was at about 0900 hours rather than at 0800 as 

planned. 

2.4.8. Shot Encore 

This shot was witnessed by 553 observers, including 180 observers from the 

Camp Desert Rock permanent party. Shot Encore was the first of the series to be 

conducted at Frenchman Flat, the site of the major military effects experiments. 

Because of the uncertainties associated with air-delivery of the weapon, the 

observer trenches were located 10,300 yards (9,420 meters) south-southwest (200’ 

31 
azimuth) from intended ground zero. As in several previous shots, a post-shot 

tactical maneuver was conducted. This is the subject of a separate report. Figure 

2-6 shows Frenchman Fiat, the intended and actual burst points, the display area, 

and the observer trenches. 

Observers arrived at Camp Desert Rock during the period 2-6 May. 

Maneuver troops, who would conduct the post-shot exercise, arrived during the 

same period. A rehearsal of shot day activities was held on 5 May, although not 

all observers had yet arrived. As in previous shots, late arrivals were apparently 

assisted by those who had attended all pre-shot activities. The rehearsal began at 

Camp Desert Rock when the troops and observers entrucked after 0600 for the 

short ride (7 miles) to the trench area. By 0755, all participants had arrived at 

the trenches. After the simulated shot at 0830, the maneuver elements began 

their attack while the observers were transported to the display area. From about 

0900 to 1040, observers inspected the equipment, fortifications, and animal 

positions located from ground zero out to 3500 yards to the south. Shortly after 

1100, they began the 13-mile trip back to Camp Desert Rock, arriving there 

before noon. 

The next day, 6 May, the observers received classroom instruction in 

preparation for the shot, scheduled for the following day. A 24-hour shot 

postponement due to unfavorable meteorological conditions was filled by another 

day of instruction on 7 May. 

On 8 May, the observers departed Camp Desert Rock at 0640 and arrived at 

the trench area shortly after 0700. After the usual pre-shot orientation, the 

observers entered the trenches for the shot. The B-50 aircraft released the bomb, 

and detonation occurred at 0830 hours, 2423 feet (740 meters) above Frenchman 

Lake, about 280 yards (250 meters) south of the aim point. Five minutes later, 

the maneuver troops began their attack toward ground zero. When the troops had 

cleared the trench area, the observers loaded onto their vehicles and were 

transported to the display area. They dismounted at the left (west) boundary 

radial, near the 2000-yard display line, about 45 minutes after the burst. Their 

tour through the display area likely would have included an inspection of each 

500-yard line from the dismount point to (intended) ground zero, then back out to 

32 
-

I 

---I-
the waiting vehicles. After muster and decontamination, the observers loaded up 

and departed for Camp Desert Rock shortly after 1100 hours, arriving back at 

camp an hour later. 

2.4.9 Shot Harry 

Over 900 observers witnessed this shot from trenches 4000 yards (3660 

meters) from the tower, as shown in Table 2-2. The display area was located 

south of the burst while the trenches were more to the west (Figure 2-7). 

Due to contamination from Simon fallout, Shot Harry was postponed two 

weeks from its scheduled date of 2 May. Other delays due to unfavorable 

meteorological conditions caused further postponements, resulting in a shot date 

of 19 May. Except for those from the Camp Desert Rock permanent party, the 

observers arrived during the period 12-l 5 May. Because there was no troop 

maneuver for this shot, there were no rehearsals and no pre-shot inspection of the 

display area. During the postponements , observers were provided additional 

orientation and classroom instruction. Some were also afforded the opportunity 

on 15 May to observe the first registration firing of the 280 mm cannon that was 

to be used for Shot Gable in Frenchman Flat. 

On the morning of Shot Harry, observers departed Camp Desert Rock at 

0145 and arrived at the trench area two hours later. Shortly after 0400, the usual 

pre-shot indoctrination was conducted, after which the observers entered the 

trenches for the final countdown. The shot went off at 0505 hours. Within 15 

minutes, the vehicles had arrived at the trench area to transport the personnel to 

the display area, at its nearest about a mile away. Because of the limited time 

allowed (Reference I), they likely were transported up the left (west) side of the 

area to the lOOO-yard line, where they continued on foot to the 500-yard line. 

The actual limit of advance was 450 yards from ground zero, where the radiation 

intensity was reported to be 6 r/hr (Reference 1). It should be noted that this was 

the first shot at which Desert Rock rad-safe criteria did not provide for an 

intensity limitation. The 5 r/hr line was used as a caution, but the only 

substantive limit was 6r total dose as indicated by pocket dosimeters. 

34 
P IHARRY 

Figure 2-7 

Shot Harry Area 
At this point, about 45 minutes after the shot, the observers proceeded back 

toward the outer areas of the display, stopping briefly at each 500-yard line until 

they reached the 2500-yard display at about 0630 hours. There, they mustered 

and loaded up for the return trip to Camp Desert Rock. They departed the shot 

area at 0651 hours and arrived back at camp at 0900. 

2.4.10 Shot Grable 

Shot Grable was the first (and last) atomic projectile fired by the 280 mm 

cannon, “Amazon Annie” (Figure 2-8). Many high-level officials, including the 

Secretary of Defense, were on hand for the shot. Two battalion combat teams, 

comprised of troops from the six continental armies, maneuvered after the shot. 

This and other troop maneuvers are treated in a separate report. 

Observers sponsored by Desert Rock arrived during the period 18-24 May. 

Pre-shot orientation was provided on 22 May. This included four hours of 

classroom instruction, a trip to the gun position to watch registration firing, and a 

trip to the display area for Shot Harry, fired three days earlier. This inspection 

likely occurred during the afternoon of 22 May, and would have taken about two 

hours in the shot area, ranging from 2500 to 500 yards from ground zero. 

A full dress rehearsal of the shot activities was held on 23 May in 

Frenchman Flat. The troops and observers were in the trenches, 5000 yards (4570 

meters) from ground zero, for the 1000 hours simulated shot, after which the 

tactical exercise began. The observers were then transported to the display area 

shown in Figure 2-9. However, due to a severe sandstorm, the time spent in the 

display area was limited. Within 1% hours after the simulated shot, the observers 

were returning to Camp Desert Rock. The next day was D-l. Shot preparations 

continued and orientation was provided for late arrivals and high-level officials. 

On shot day (25 May), the observers departed Camp Desert Rock at 0610 and 

arrived in the trench area (Figure 2-9) at 0700. The pre-shot orientation, 

conducted from 0735 to 0810 hours, included an address by the Army Chief of 

Staff. Meanwhile, the 280 mm cannon continued to register with conventional 

36 

( Ii1 

l.I.71 m

Figure 2-9 

Shot Grable Area 

c I J 1 I I --7 
ammunition. Nineteen seconds before H-hour, the nuclear projectile was fired; it 

detonated on schedule at 0830 hours, only 54 yards (49 meters) short of its target 

(Reference 34). 

After the shot, the maneuver troops begain their attack. The observers then 

loaded onto their vehicles and were transported to the display area, the same one 

used previously for Shot Encore. At 45 minutes after the burst, they reached the 

dismount point near the 2000-yard line. They inspected the 2000- 3nd 1500-yard 

lines before severe dust conditions caused the inspection to be terminated, 

possibly as close as 1100 yards (1000 meters) from ground zero. They returned to 

their vehicles near the 2000-yard line, where they waited for almost an hour 

before it was decided at 1100 hours to return to Camp Desert Rock. 

2.4.11 Shot Climax 

There was no Desert Rock participation in this event. It may be noted that, 

at 61 KT, Shot Climax was the largest shot fired in the continental IJnited States 

up to that time. Figure 2-3 depicts the shot area. 

39 

Section 3 

INITIAL RADIATION 

Of the eleven shots in the Upshot-Knothole series, six are investigated to 

determine the dose resulting from possible exposure to initial gamma and neutron 

radiation. These shots are Annie, Nancy, Badger, Simon, Harry, and Grable, the 

details of which are given in Table 2-1. For the remaining five shots, observers were 

not present, or were at distances such that initial radiation doses were insignificant. 

This section discusses the general method used to compute the initial radiation dose to 

personnel, and the specific treatment of each of the six shots of interest. 

3. I COMPUTATIONAL METHOD 

Because the personnel were located in trenches at the times of detonation, the 

calculation of the radiation doses for volunteer and service observers is accomplished 

in two steps. First, the free-field radiation environment above the trenches is determined. This environment is then used to calculate the radiation doses to personnel in 

the trenches. 

In the first step, the gamma and prompt neutron radiation environment is 

determined with computer codes ATR4 (Reference 19) and ATR4.1 (Reference 20). 

These codes, developed from two-dimensional discrete ordinates radiation transport 

calculations, predict free-field neutron and gamma doses in the vicinity of a nuclear 

detonation. The first code contains provisions to correct for the presence of Nevada 

soil at the air-ground interface; the second, although based on a West German soil 

type, contains improved source-energy-dependent air-ground correction factors. 

Hence, ATR4 is generally used to calculate prompt neutron and neutron-induced 

gamma radiation, which are sensitive to the hydrogen (water) content of the soil 

(Reference 211, while ATR4.1 is used to calculate fission product gamma and prompt 

gamma (emitted directly from the fission reaction) radiation, neither of which is 

sensitive to the presence of hydrogen in the soil. Neutron doses are calculated from 

(Ritts) tissue kerma factors, while the Henderson tissue response function is used to 

determine gamma doses (Reference 19). 

41 
Several adjustments are applied to the neutron doses calculated with ATR4. 

Improved methods of cross-section weighting and grouping, developed since the ATR 

data base was compiled, are incorporated, and allowance is made for a representative 

air moisture content (humidity). The numerical correction factor is derived by 

comparing infinite air calculations of the one-dimensional discrete ordinates code 

ANISN (Reference 261, which incorporates these improvements, with ATR-generated 

infinite air calculations. This factor varies approximately from 0.8 to 1.5 over the 

distances of interest. The second adjustment to the ATR neutron doses corrects for 

inaccuracies in the air-ground correction factor used in ATR for ranges greater than 

1500 meters (the factors used in ATR are considered accurate at smaller ranges). 

Recent transport calculations with the discrete ordinates code DOT (Reference 29) 

provide the best estimate of these correction factors in the range 1500-3300 meters. 

This correction results in a reduction in calculated neutron doses at ranges greater 

than 1500 m, with the magnitude of the reduction increasing with range. 

Required input to the ATR code includes the neutron output spectrum of the 

device, and geometric and meteorological data. For each of the six shots of interest, 

the general source of neutron spectral information for the device is given in the 

detailed discussion for the shot. Meteorological and geometric (e.g., height of burst, 

ground zero elevation) data are taken from References 40 and 41. The output of 

ATR-- neutron and gamma doses as a function of range--can be compared with 

existing dose measurements for each shot to gauge the accuracy of the results. 

Unfortunately, insufficient neutron activation foil measurements were made during 

this nuclear test series to allow experimental confirmation of calculated neutron 

doses. Generally, only gold foils (to measure low energy neutrons, 4.3 eV), sulfur foils 

(to measure fast neutrons, >3 MeV), and various experimental materials (e.g., iodine, 

plutonium, tantalum, and zirconium) were used as neutron detectors (References 42, 

43, 44). There is an abundance of free-field gamma dose data available (References 

45, 46, 47, 11, however, and these are utilized to verify the AT!? results. 

For certain devices the prompt neutron output was strongly suppressed by 

absorption within the device itself. In these cases, the delayed neutrons, which are 

emitted by the fission products after the device disassembles and are not subject to 

42 
such absorption, may deliver doses that are comparable to the doses due to prompt 

neutrons. It must be emphasized that this effect was important only for specific 

devices (e.g., those with a thick layer of high explosives surrounding the fissile 

material), and that, for most devices of this and later series, the delayed neutron dose 

was negligible compared to that of prompt neutrons. Moreover, the air attenuation of 

neutrons is such that delayed neutrons were significant only for locations fairly close 

to ground zero (e.g., at the volunteer observer trenches). Computer code NUIDEA 

(Reference 49) is used to calculate the delayed neutron environment in the vicinity of 

the volunteer observer trenches for Shots Nancy, Radger, and Simon. 

The second step of the calculation uses the free-field radiation environment to 

determine the dose within the trench. It is convenient to define a trench factor as the 

ratio of dose (neutron or gamma) in the trench to dose (neutron or gamma) above the 

trench. These factors must be calculated for each of the major components of 

radiation --neutron, secondary gamma (created by neutron capture or inelastic scattering in the atmosphere and ground), local gamma (created locally by neutron capture in 

the trench walls), and fission product (debris) gamma. It is found that the trench 

factors depend also on ground range, height of burst, weapon yield, trench dimensions, 

and depth in the trench. Brief discussions of the derivations of the various trench 

factors are presented in Appendix I. 

For the shots of interest, two trench sizes were utilized. The volunteer 

observers (shots Nancy, Badger, and Simon) were in trenches approximately four feet 

wide and six feet deep, and at ranges of 2000-2500 yards from ground zero. The 

service observers (all six shots) were in trenches approximately two feet wide and five 

feet deep, and at ranges of 3500-5000 yards. The in-trench free-field neutron and 

gamma doses are calculated at depths of four feet in the four-foot wide trench and 

2.33 feet in the two-foot wide trench. These depths correspond approximately to the 

mid-torso depths of personnel crouched in each of the trenches. It is coincidental that 

the fractions of solid angle subtended by the trench openings, when viewed from the 

referenced depths, are nearly the same for these two cases. Consequently, most of 

43 
the factors are similar. The following trench factors are used in this report: 

Volunteer Observer Service Observer 

Radiation Type Trenches Trenches 

Neutron 0.25 0.25 

Secondary gamma 

Local gamma 

Debris gamma 

0.0 19-0.025* 

0.08 

** 

0.015 

0.08 

** 

The in-trench dose (in rads) is converted to an equivalent tissue dose (in rem) 

using the quality factors and methods prescribed in Reference 22. The rad-rem 

conversion factor for neutrons, derived from calculations utilizing computer codes 

DOT and MORSE (Reference 231, is an almost constant value of 13 for the weapon 

types and ranges of interest. The quality factor for gamma radiation is taken to be 

unity. Finally, representative film badge readings for personnel in the trenches are 

estimated. The factors that are used to convert the in-trench free-field doses to 

chest-worn film badge readings were developed from calculations utilizing the adjoint 

mode of the computer code MORSE. These film badge conversion factors are strongly 

dependent on the posture and orientation of the personnel in the trench; the ranges of 

values shown below reflect extreme variations in individual posture and orientation. 

The conversion factor for the standing position is based on a badge depth of 1.5 feet 

centered in a 4-foot wide trench and 0.5 feet centered in a 2-foot wide trench. The 

geometric means of these ranges, where applicable , are used to determine bestestimate film badge doses. 

Film Badge Conversion Factors 

Radiation Type Range Mean 

Neutron NA NA 

Secondary gamma 0.34-0.83 0.53 

Local gamma -0.7 0.7 

Debris gamma, crouched position 0.26-0.81 0.46 

standing position 0.95 0.95 

*Dependent on range. 

**The debris gamma trench factors are time and orientation-dependent; they are 

discussed in detail in Appendix I. 

44 
The “dose equivalent in trench” values reported for each shot in section 3.2 are the 

equivalent tissue dose for neutron radiation and the film badge dose for gamma 

radiation. 

The prompt neutron, secondary gamma, and local gamma doses are accrued 

rapidly (essentially within the first second) after detonation. Thus, the posture in a 

trench could not be altered significantly during this exposure. The delayed neutron 

dose, of importance only for the volunteer observers, is accrued during the first few 

seconds after detonation and before any significant reorientation is likely to have 

occurred. The debris gamma dose, however, is delivered over a period of many 

seconds, as illustrated in Figure 3-l for Shot Badger. Therefore, the possibility of 

individual reorientation (e.g., standing up) in the trench must be considered. It is 

unlikely that a person crouched in the trench at the time of detonation would have 

attempted any significant movement until after the shock wave had passed and the 

blast winds had subsided. For the volunteer observers (Shots Nancy, Badger, and 

Simon), this occurred at approximately five to seven seconds after detonation. 

Therefore it is likely that, by fifteen seconds after detonation, most of the volunteers 

were standing upright in the trench, watching the rising cloud. This reorientation 

changed both the trench factors and film badge conversion factors for such an 

individual. For an observer crouched in the trench at times t <t o, and standing upright 

in the center of the trench facing the rising cloud at times t > to, his film badge dose 

due to debris gamma is calculated by: 

al t 

Dd(to) = Fc o Tc(t)Id(t)dt + F Tu(t)Id(t)dt, J 0 J t 

0 

where: Fc = film badge conversion factor, debris gamma, crouched position, 

FU = film badge conversion factor, debris gamma, upright position, 

Tc(t) = debris gamma trench factor, crouched position, 

TU(t) q debris gamma trench factor, upright position,

I,(t) = debris gamma free-field intensity. 

The trench factors Tc(t) and T,(t) are discussed in Appendix I; these functions are 

shown in Figure I-l for Shot Badger. Intensities I,(t) are calculated with computer 

45 
Source: Calculated from 

References 19 and 49 

-^ 10 _k 

'ine !sec! 

Fiqure 3-l Debris Gamma Intensity at 2000 Yards 

as a Function of Time, Shot Badger 
codes NUIDEA (Reference 49) and ATR4 for the shots of interest; this is plotted in 

Figure 3-l for Shot Badger. The film badge conversion factors F, and F, were 

discussed previously. 

When calculating the dose for Upshot-Knothole volunteer observers, it is 

assumed that they stood upright in the trenches at 10 seconds (to = 10) after 

detonation. The calculated dose is sensitive to the value of to, as indicated in Figure 

3-2, which gives a gamma dose adjustment factor as a function of to for the volunteer 

observers at Shots Nancy, Badger, and Simon. To determine the gamma dose 

equivalent (film badge dose) for standup time t the gamma dose equivalent reported 0’ 

in the following section (for to = 10 seconds) is multiplied by the appropriate 

adjustment factor. Because the service observer trenches were located significantly 

farther from ground zero than the volunteer observer trenches, the shock wave took 

longer to pass these positions. It is assumed in these calculations that the service 

observers stood upright in their trenches at three seconds after passage of the blast 

wave. The incremental dose due to this action was only a few millirem. 

3.2 RESULTS 

The results of the computations are discussed in the following subsections for 

each of the six shots of interest. 

3.2.1 Shot Annie 

A suitable neutron output spectrum for this shot is available in Reference 24. 

Project 6.8a and Desert Rock free-field gamma dose measurements, taken from 

References 45 (as modified in Reference 47) and 1, respectively, are plotted in 

Figure 3-3 together with the ATR-derived gamma dose curve. The quality of the 

Desert Rock (Reference 1) data is uncertain; deviations from the Project 6.8a data 

may be due to differences in film type, film holder configuration, and/or calibration 

procedure. 

47 
LY J” I” 

Standup Time (seconds after detonation) 

Figure 3-2 Gamma Dose Adjustment Factors 

for Volunteer Observers 
3 

log n 

10E 

)Project 6.8a Data 

IDesert Rock Data 

-Calculated (ATR) 

0 

0 

0 \ 0 

10; 

-

1000 2000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-3 Shot Annie Gamma Dose 

49 
For this shot, where service observers were located in trenches 3500 yards 

from ground zero, the doses are as follows: 

Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) 5 300 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem) 16 11 

3.2.2 Shot Nancy 

The Nancy device was asymmetrical, with the axis in the north-south 

direction. Volunteer observer trenches at 2500 yards and service observer trenches at 

4000 yards from GZ, were oriented approximately 20’ west of the south axis, as shown 

in Figure 3-4. The device was shielded on the east side by a thick limonite shield 

placed on the tower platform. In an apparent oversight (Reference 45), the Project 

6.8a film badges were placed along the east axis, in the shadow of the shield. Thus, 

the applicability of the gamma data is questionable. Using a neutron output spectrum 

suggested by the sponsoring laboratory (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), the ATR 

code produces the gamma dose curve shown in Figure 3-5. The discrepancy between 

this and the Project 6.8a data is probably due to the presence of the shield. 

The estimated radiation doses at the trench locations for Shot Nancy are as 

follows. Delayed neutrons contribute approximately 9 percent of the volunteer 

observer neutron dose. 

Volunteer Observer Service Observer 

Trenches Trenches 

Neutron Gamma Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose abo

Dose equivalent 

ve trench (mrad) 

in trench (mrem) 

180 

590 

10500 

570 

<l 

<I 

90 

4 

3.2.3 Shot Badger 

A neutron output spectrum for Shot Badger was developed by Los Alamos 

Scientific Laboratory (LASL) (Reference 25) for use in these calculations. The 

calculated gamma dose-range curve is shown in Figure 3-6, along with data from 

50 
SCALE (yards) 

0'00 

OFilm Badge Locatlons 

x Neutron Foil Locations 

x x Y h -x kxxxxxxxxxyylx l&l 

GZ 

I 1 I 

Detector 

Statlon 

I IO w 

VP 

Magnetite Concrete 

(Approximate 

Colllmeters 

Locations) 

N 

Volunteer 

Observer Trench 

Service Observer 

Figure 3-4 Site Layout, Shot Nancy 
\ 0 

lo3 _ I -

-

0

0

0 T 0 

0 

108 ‘-

0 

0 

)Projed 6.& Data 

4

I 

3 Desert RockData - 0 -calculrtd (ATR) 

0 

0 \ r, 0 

10’ _ -

-

y 

-

106 * L

0 lwo 2000 3000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-5 Shot Nancy Gamma Dose 

52 
1010' 

106 L 

0 1000 2000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-6 Shot Badger Gamma Dose 

53 
References 45, 46, 47, and 1. It is seen that the calculated dose curve agrees well 

with the Project 6.8a data beyond 1500 yards, but that the general trend of the data 

indicates that the calculated curve may underpredict at the range of the service 

observer trenches (4000 yards). Therefore, the gamma dose for the range of these 

trenches is developed by extrapolating from the Project 10.3 data, thereby insuring a 

conservative (high-sided) estimate. 

The estimated radiation doses at the locations of the volunteer observer 

trenches (2000 yards) and service observers trenches (4000 yards) are presented below. 

Delayed neutrons contribute approximately 44 percent of the volunteer observer 

neutron dose. 

Volunteer Observer Service Observer 

Trenches Trenches 

Neutron Gamma Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose abo

Dose equivalent 

ve trench (mrad) 

in trench (mrem) 

720 

2300 

78000 

3700 

4 

4 

150 

6 

3.2.4 Shot Simon 

The unique design of the Simon device produced rather unusual initial radiation 

characteristics. The neutron output from part of the device was strongly suppressed, 

resulting in a large ratio of gamma dose to neutron dose at points external to the 

weapon. The device axis was in the general direction of the observer trenches (Figure 

3-7). Due to device asymmetry, two neutron output spectra were calculated by LASL 

(Reference 27). The first (spectrum Ll) represents neutron output, perpendicular to 

the device axis, in the direction of largest case thickness; the second (spectrum L2) is 

of the bare device, without case material. The actual case thickness in the direction 

of the observers was between these two extremes (the unusual case design prevented 

an exact determination of the case thickness in the relevant direction). Therefore, 

each spectrum was used in the ATR4 computer code to calculate the prompt neutron 

and secondary gamma doses at the trench locations (2000 yards for volunteer 

observers, 4000 yards for service observers), and a mean value taken as the 

representative dose. The neutron doses derived for the two spectra, and the mean 
-M- I 

*, 

0 Film 

4 0 

Badge 

BOO 1200 

Locations 1 

UON Platfom 

llagnetite 

(Approximate 

0 

Concrete 

number 

Coll1matorS 

and location) 

Volunteer 

Observer 

Trenches 

Service Observer 

Trenches 

Figure 3-7 Site Layout, Shot Simon 

55 
dose, are presented below for the volunteer observers. The neutron foil measurements 

taken at the detector station east of the tower are insufficient to resolve this 

uncertainty. 

Free-Field Prompt Neutron Doses (2000 yards) 

Above-trench In-trench In-trench dose 

Spectrum dose (rads) dose (rads) equivalent (rem) 

Ll 3.2 0.8 10.4 

L2 10.1 2.5 32.5 

Mean 6.7 1.7 21.5 

Delayed neutrons contribute an additional 1.0 rad’ to the free-field neutron 

dose. The gamma doses calculated from the two spectra are virtually identical, since 

the total gamma dose was dominated by debris gamma radiation, which is independent 

of neutron output spectrum. The ATR-calculated gamma dose-range curve is shown in 

Figure 3-8, together with gamma doses measured with film badges along a line in the 

direction of the trenches (Reference 45). The limonite shield in the tower perturbed 

the gamma and neutron fields to the east of ground zero, but should have had a 

negligible effect on doses at the observer locations. 

The results of the dose calculations at the trench locations are as follows: 

Volunteer Observer Service Observer 

Trenches Trenches 

Neutron Gamma Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) 7700 160000 1 200 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem> 25000 9000 3 11 

3.2.5 Shot Harrv 

The neutron output spectrum from a similar device was used to calculate the 

neutron and gamma doses at the observer trench location, 4000 yards from ground 

zero. The results of these calculations are presented below. The ATR-derived gamma 

dose curve and data from Reference 47 are shown in Figure 3-9. Although the fit is 

apparently not as good as for other shots, ATR does tend to overpredict the dose. 

Moreover, the prediction tends to converge with the data of the ranges of interest. 
2 

4 

0 

0 

3 

B 

C 

IProject 6.81 Data 

]Oasart Rock Data 0 

-Calculated (ATR) 

0 t 

1000 2000 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Figure 3-8 Shot Simon Gamma Dose 

57 
f 

0 

C 

0 

0 

0 \ 

I 

0 k0

0 

0 

0 

0 

\ 

)PrOJeCt 6.8a 

-Calculated (ATR) 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-9 Shot Harry Gamma Dose 

58 

0 
Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) 4 210 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem) <l 8 

3.2.6 Shot Grable 

The neutron output spectrum for Shot Grable, a gun-assembly device, was 

obtained from Reference 28. The ATR-generated gamma dose curve and the gamma 

film badge data from References 46 and 47 are shown in Figure 3-10. The estimated 

radiation environment at the trench location, 5000 yards from ground zero, is given 

below. 

Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) <l 4 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem) <l 4 

59 
log _ 

>Project 6.8a bua Lln* ba 

IProject 6.86 West Line DaU 7 L Project 10.3 NW Linr fhtr e1curla

IProject 10.3 ysy LIm 08ta

-r 

z 

A 

1 L 

1000 2000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-10 Shot Grable Gamma Dose 

60 
Section 4 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 

4.1 RESIDUAL GAMMA EXPOSURE 

Gamma doses are reconstructed for military observers, based on their 

activities in the fallout and neutron-induced activity fields of various shots of 

Operation Upshot-Knothole. A computerized methodology, described in Reference 32, determines the radiological environment for each shot of interest. 

From this, doses are calculated based on the scenario of troop activities. Isointensity contours with superimposed troop tracks are displayed for Shots Annie, 

Nancy, Badger, Simon, Encore, Harry, and Grable. Other shots, which did not 

contribute to observer doses, have gamma fields depicted to show their 

relationship to the observer positions. 

. The computer-calculated doses do not reflect the presence of the human 

body in the radiological environment. Despite the penetrating ability of gamma 

rays from fission and activation products, the body affords some shielding; 

hence, the gamma dose to any organ depends on the geometry of the radiation 

source and the body position. In order to represent reconstructed film badge 

readings, gamma doses are calculated for the surface of the chest, where a film 

badge is normally worn. The calculated film badge dose rate is related to the 

free-field gamma intensity through the conversion factor developed in Reference 

17: 1 r/hr -0.7 rem/hr (the calculated film badge dose is identical to the “film 

badge equivalent dose” of Reference 17). This conversion is applicable to an 

erect individual wearing a film badge on his chest and standing in a uniform, 

plane fallout field. These conditions are met in the observer scenarios except 

that there are intensity gradients in the gamma fields. These gradients have a 

negligible effect on film badge readings for randomly-oriented personnel. 

Observer dose calculations are categorized by the shot in which each 

observer group participated. Contributions from previous shots to the dose are 

noted as they arise. 

61 
Because of limited data concerning the details of display inspection and the 

timing involved, estimates were required for various parameters. Rates of 

movement were estimated from planned times or the few reported times, the 

number of displays viewed, the calculated or reported position of radiological 

safety limits, and the consequent distance to be traversed. A reasonable and 

consistent set of parameters is 50 yds/min walking speed between displays 

(including the starting and stopping of troops), 5 minutes at each display and at 

the limit of march toward GZ, and 70 yds/min on the return. Motor movements 

in the display area are taken to be at 15 mph. Unless otherwise specified, the 

walk-through route is assumed to be on the same azimuth as the trenches for 

shots in Yucca Flat. The stay time at each display arc allows for some lateral 

spread of the observer group to see a variety of equipment. For the military 

effects shots in Frenchman Flat, the greater number of displays would have 

warranted walking the length of each display arc. For these, a slow walking rate 

of 50 yds/min is assumed along display arcs, without stops, and a faster pace of 

70 yds/min is assumed between arcs. 

The radiation surveys from which the gamma intensity field is calculated 

were performed by the Rad-Safe Unit under the AEC (Reference 21, and thus had 

no connection with the Desert Rock rad-safe effort. Few data reflecting 

specific radiation measurements by Desert Rock personnel are available. However, reported locations of rad-safe limits and other random mentions of 

intensities in Reference 1 are sometimes sufficiently coupled with position/time 

data to be of use in dose reconstruction. While the Desert Rock data are far too 

few to define an intensity field, they do permit comparisons with the AEC data 

at specific locations. Lack of agreement can result where the latter must be 

interpolated. Consequently, if the AEC data insufficiently resolve the intensity 

field in the Desert Rock display sector, Desert Rock data are used to the extent 

possible to refine the reconstructed doses. 

4.1.1 Shot Annie 

Observers of Shot Annie (see Figure 4-l) are estimated to have reached the 

prescribed radiation safety limit of 2.5 r/hr at about two hours after the shot. 

Along the western edge of the display sector (the planned route of advance), this 

62 
I j 

6. 

Ii ! 

Figure 4-l 

Shot Annie Residual Radiation 

(r/hr @ H+l) 

and Observer Routes A 
is calculated to have been at 710 yards from CZ. According to Reference 1, the 

closest approach to CZ was 700 yards, at the rad-safe limit. The reference is 

internally inconsistent -- it also refers to rad-safe limits at 500 yards on the west 

and 700 yards on the east side of the display sector. The only satisfactory 

explanation is that these directions are reversed. An inverted (south at top) map 

of the planned rad-safe monitoring movement in Reference 7 is the likely source 

of the error. 

A rad-safe limit at 700 yards at both the time of early monitoring (some 20 

minutes post-shot) and when the observers reached it (after 2 hours) indicates 

only slight radiological decay in the interval. This could be true only if the 

radiation encountered was from neutron-induced activity. If the activity were 

from fallout, the 2.5 r/hr line would have receded some 250 yards. In this case, 

the accompanying monitors could have overruled the previously posted rad-safe 

limit and permitted the observers to view the equipment display at 500 yards 

from GZ. Comparisons of day-to-day rad-safe survey data do indicate better 

agreement with the indclced activity model. The resulting displacement of the 

2.5 r/hr line would have been only about 30 yards for the interval in question. 

There would have been no motivation to cross the early rad-safe line, where the 

intensity would have decreased only to 1.9 r/hr. IJnder these conditions, the 

calculated film badge dose for the Annie observers is 0.50 rem. 

4.1.2 Shot Nancy 

The volunteer observers were exposed to residual radiation in addition to 

the initial radiation described in Section 3. Because the fallout had not yet been 

deposited when they evacuated their trench, the subsequent radiation surveys 

cannot be used in reconstruction of the volunteers’ residual radiation dose. The 

only relevant data are given in Reference 1, which cites a 90 mr/hr reading as 

the cloud approached and a 20 mr/hr reading when the volunteers were picked up 

after a 500-yard walk to the rear. The former is presumed to have been a peak 

reading at about five minutes after detonation; the latter would have been about 

five minutes later. Consequently, the total residual radiation dose to the 

volunteer observers was less than 0.01 rem. 

64 
Prior to Shot Nancy, the service observers were exposed to residual 

radiation when they viewed the Annie equipment display. By five days after 

Annie, significant contamination was limited to within a few hundred yards of 

GZ. Since there was virtually nothing to see closer than 500 yards from CZ, it is 

presumed that the observers did not walk any closer. Their dose from this 

excursion would have been less than 0.01 rem. 

While in the Nancy equipment display area (see Figure 4-21, the service 

observers were exposed to residual radiation primarily from fallout. The early 

rad-safe limits posted by the Desert Rock monitors were at 1250 yards from GZ 

on the west boundary of the display sector and at 850 yards on the east 

(Reference I). By the time the observers approached these limits, the 2.5 r/hr 

line would have receded some 200 yards. Whether or not the early survey would 

have been superseded in practice should not have affected the observers’ closest 

approach to GZ. In either case, they would have been able to view (at least part 

of) the lOOO-yard display, but not the 500-yard display. Consequently, the 

observers are assumed to have reached the lOOO-yard display while 

approximately maintaining their original azimuth from GZ. The calculated film 

badge dose for the Nancy service observers is then 0.32 rem. A reading of 

18 mr/hr at their trench area during cloud passage (Reference 1) would have 

been too short in duration to contribute more than negligibly to the dose. 

Fallout deposition in the display area should have been complete by the time that 

the observers left the trenches. 

4.1.3 Shots Dixie and Ray 

Shots Dixie and Ray were observed from News Nob, more than 10 miles 

distant. In neither case did the observers advance toward the shot area. No 

exposure resulted from fallout because Dixie had no measurable fallout and 

because fallout from Ray passed to the west of the control point (Reference 21, 

and therefore also west of News Nob (see Figures l-l and 4-3). Consequently, 

no dose was accrued by observers of those shots. 

65 
i 

I/l-4 \ . u I/i . ,! I , ; . 

8 
;’ ’ I 

Figure 4-3 

Shots Dixie, Ray 

Residual Radiation 

. (r/hr @ H+l) *em )(u mm24 I-m 
4.1.4 Shot Badger 

The residual radiation dose to the volunteer observers of Shot Badger was 

from the nuclear cloud passage and early fallout; therefore, the later radiation 

surveys are not required for dose reconstruction. The two available sources of 

pertinent information (References 15 and 33) are somewhat contradictory and 

internally inconsistent. For the portion of the accounts involved with residual 

radiation (defined as radiation at least one minute after burst), a reasonably 

consistent version is as follows. The gamma intensity, which had been at least 

500 r/hr in the early seconds after burst, would have reached its miminum 

reported value of 30 r/hr by the end of the first minute (at which time the 

volunteers were likely out of their trenches). As the radioactive stem of the 

nuclear cloud approached and passed over, the intensity rose to 50 r/hr, 

presumably at about seven minutes, at which time they evacuated the trench 

area. As they walked westward along the 2000-yard arc of the display area, the 

intensity dropped rapidly. After a walk of about 200 yards to the junction with 

the boundary road of the display area, the volunteers waited four minutes, 

recording intensities averaging just under 1 r/hr. While subsequently walking to 

the rear, they also recorded readings of 0.5 r/hr at H+14 min, 0.32 r/hr at H+19 

min, and 0.12 r/hr at H+25 min. With a power-law relationship between intensity 

and time used to fit these data, the volunteer observers’ film badge dose 

resulting from residual radiation is calculated to be 3.7 rem prior to leaving the 

trench area, 0.3 rem while walking along the 2000-yard display arc, and 0.1 rem 

thereafter, totaling 4.1 rem. 

Service observers of Shot Badger were exposed to residual radiation on two 

occasions before the shot. While rehearsing the shot-day operation, personnel 

were in the 23-day old Nancy fallout field. With gamma intensities of no more 

than 30 mr/hr, the calculated film bage dose from this activity is less than 0.03 

rem for the observers. The observers also visited the Nancy equipment display 

on the same day. Because there was little to see closer to GZ than 500 yards, 

the observers are assumed not to have proceeded any closer. At this distance, 

the intensity was less than 100 mr/hr, including a contribution from Shot Ray, 

fired five days previously. The calculated film badge dose for this excursion is 

about 0.01 rem. 

68 
On shot day, residual radiation exposure first occured as the nuclear cloud 

stem approached and passed to the east. A 1 r/hr transient was reported “at the 

trench area”, probably by rad-safe personnel at or near the central command 

trench. Because the observer trenches were also in the central portion of the 

trench area, the intensity is considered appropriate for calculation of the 

observers’ dose. For an assumed three-minute exposure to the peak intensity, 

the calculated film badge dose is 0.035 rem. 

Reconstruction of the additional dose to the service observers on shot day 

is encumbered by the condition of the AEC rad-safe data, which consist merely 

of drawn contours for each survey; there is no indication of the roads along 

which the data were taken. The absence of time data also complicates the 

interpretation of the initial survey, which required some three hours to complete 

(Reference 2). The reference states that six roads were intended for survey use 

around GZ. In order to utilize the AEC data, photographs of the shot area in 

1953 were examined to determine tracks along which the surveys might have 

been taken. This estimation introduces an additional, unquantifiable uncertainty 

into the iso-intensity contours calculated for Shot Badger (Figure 4-4). 

From remarks regarding the radiological situation in the Desert Rock 

display area for Shot Badger (References 1, 15, 33), it is evident that the radsafe contours (and therefore Figure 4-4) do not sufficiently define the intensity 

field to justify its use in dose reconstruction. Along the western boundary of the 

display area, gamma intensities were low,as evidenced by the volunteer observer 

data and the ability of the regular observers to proceed to within 1000 yards of 

GZ. Near the eastern boundary, however, intensities were so high as to require 

withdrawal of a Marine battalion (of the troop exercise) at 3500 yards from GZ. 

Film badges in emplacements at 2500, 3000, and 3500 yards from GZ, in the 

eastern half of the display area, recorded large doses from fallout. However, at 

1000 yards, the observers were able to view displays on the eastern boundary. 

The AEC survey plots do indicate high intensities toward the southeast corner of 

the display area that are reasonably consistent with the Marine withdrawal, but 

they considerably overpredict intensities in areas traversed by the volunteer and 

service observers. 
Figure 4-4 
Although there is considerable uncertainty concerning the time of the 

initial AK survey, there are adequate Desert Rock data upon which to base dose 

calculations for observers and others whose activities in the display area 

correspond to the general times at which the data were obtained. The 

traditional decay rate of t -1.2 is used to adjust for the small time differentials 

involved. 

The gamma dose to observers during their walk through the display area is 

estimated as follows. Along the western boundary of the display, values of the 

intensity are obtained from the volunteer observer data and the average spacing 

of contours on the survey plots at appropriate distances and azimuth. The H+25 

minute, 3000-yard reading of 0.12 r/hr is most useful because fallout deposition 

is more likely to have been complete than at the times of earlier readings. 

Along the boundary road, the intensity appears to have increased tenfold in 1200 

yards. Based on the above, observers would have been able to keep within the 

2.5 r/hr rad-safe limit upon their arrival at the lOOO-yard display (within 90 

minutes after the shot). Even if the permissible limit of advance had been 

recently adjusted for the decaying fallout, observers would not have been able to 

view the innermost displays. Because of the tight scheduling for the walkthrough, it is assumed that the observers did not attempt to advance closer to 

GZ than 1000 yards. On the return, they saw the displays along the eastern 

boundary road until the gamma intensity reached the rad-safe limit at an 

estimated 2000 yards from GZ. It is assumed that the observers then followed 

the 2.5 r/hr contour cross-country until they reached the vicinity of the 

trenches. The service observers’ film badge dose, calculated in accordance with 

these assumptions, is 1.4 rem. 

Another possible exposure to residual radiation occurred during the return 

trip to Camp Desert Rock. Reference 33 states that the level of contamination 

forced a detour from their planned route and required an unscheduled stop for 

personnel monitoring. Reference 1, however, states that the return movement 

to camp was completed without incident. The greatest level of contamination 

encountered on the planned route of return would have been near the eastern end 

of the trenches. However, even the AEC survey data do not suggest intensities 

approaching the 5 r/hr limit for vehicular movement. It is therefore unlikely 

71 
that the observers accrued a dose while in trucks that was of any significance in 

comparison to their previous dose. 

4.1.5 Shot Simon 

The volunteer observers of Shot Simon encountered residual radiation in 

the same manner as did the Badger volunteers-- from nuclear cloud passage and 

early fallout. Again, the later radiation surveys are not relevant to the dose 

reconstruction. Reference 16, an eyewitness account, provides some data from 

which a dose can be calculated. The volunteers exited the trenches at 

approximately one minute after the shot. The intensity, then 40 r/hr, increased 

to 50 r/hr in the next four minutes as they moved to the west before they began 

walking away from GZ. These high intensities may be ascribed to the approach 

of the nuclear cloud stem and the onset of fallout deposition. Fallout continued 

as they walked from the 2000-yard to the 2500-yard line, where the intensity was 

10 r/hr. The volunteer observers were trucked to the rear from this point, and 

on the way they noted an intensity of 1 r/hr at the 3000-yard line (Reference 1). 

With a power-law relationship between intensity and time used to fit these data, 

the volunteer observers’ film badge dose resulting from residual radiation is 

calculated to be 2.1 rem for the time along the 2000-yard line, 1.6 rem for the 

walk away from GZ, and less than 0.1 rem for the truck ride, totaling 3.8 rem. 

Prior to Shot Simon, the service observers were exposed to residual 

radiation when they viewed the Badger equipment display. No details are 

available regarding the equipment seen. Because of the short time available for 

the visit (see Section 2.4.71, any walk-through would have been limited. A 

reasonable excursion within the time constraint, that involved the most comprehensive view of equipment, would have been a loop around the 500 and 1000 yard 

display lines. The gamma intensities would have been sufficiently low five days 

after Badger to permit vehicle and personnel movement to these distances from 

GZ. Rased on the intensities deduced in Section 4.1.4 and fallout decay behaving 

as t-l-O5 (the exponent computed from the fit of the AEC data), the observers 

would have been exposed to about 30 mr/hr maximum and received a film badge 

dose of approximately 0.01 rem. 

72 
The AEC radiation survey data for Shot Simon are so inadequate as to 

introduce considerable uncertainty as to their reliability. The survey lines are 

not specified on the isointensity contour plots and the initial survey required 

over two hours to complete. However, Desert Rock rad-safe monitors reported 

intensities of 2.5 r/hr at 2500 and 2200 yards from GZ on the west and east 

boundary roads of the display area, respectively, and 5 r/hr at 2100 and 2200 

yards. A reasonable estimate of the time of this survey is about one-half hour 

after the shot. The distances, the implied gradients, and the weak azimuthal 

dependence are supportive of the AEC survey, particularly if it is assumed that 

the southern sectors were surveyed before the less accessible northern area. A 

second AEC survey, taken on the afternoon of shot day, yielded contours not 

compatible with those from either the initial AEC survey or the Desert Rock 

survey. Moreover, there is no evidence in Reference 2 that any subsequent 

surveys were conducted in Yucca Flat until 20 days later. Consequently only the 

initial AEC survey (see Figure 4-51, as augmented by Desert Rock data, is 

utilized for dose reconstruction. 

An early rise in intensity at the trench area (4000 yards from CZ) to 120 

mr/hr (Reference 1) resulted from the approach of the cloud stem. This 

transient exposure resulted in a dose inconsequential when compared with the 

observers’ subsequent dose. Fallout from the stem resulted in a more persistent 

30 mr/hr intensity, subject only to radioactive decay. It is estimated that fallout 

deposition in the trench area occurred about 15 minutes after the shot. 

Reference I reports that the observers could not view displays closer to GZ 

than 2000 yards because of the rad-safe limit. At this distance, the intensities 

originally measured were at least 5 r/hr. However, by the time observers 

reached the area, the fallout had decayed sufficiently so that the earlier radsafe limit line could be bypassed. For an arrival time of about one hour after the 

shot, the observers would have encountered intensities on the 2000-yard line of 

at least 2.2 r/hr. The AEC data, for approximately the same time, indicate 

roughly 3 r/hr along that line. The service observers’ dose is calculated from the 

time of fallout deposition in the trench area until they left the shot area in 

trucks; the total film badge dose from residual radiation is 0.50 rem. 

73 
. . . 

A---

98 

YUCCA 

, .I(. 

c ‘G, L. , 

F-IL A’ T- - _ -..-- ._..W.".. a3.L ...+- */:,“ 1_L,'iu 

Figure 4-5 
4.1.6 Shot Encore 

The radiation levels from Shot Encore were sufficiently low (due to the 

height of burst) to warrant only one AEC radiation survey. The nearly circular 

isointensity contours, indicative of the neutron-induced soil activation, were 

offset from the intended GZ; the actual GZ was 280 yards to the south. Several 

readings at intended GZ, from different sources, are used to determine the 

relative intensity of gamma radiation from Mn 56 and Na24 for all times. The 

one survey plot (see Figure 4-6) is used in conjunction with this radioactive 

decay function to determine the intensities encountered by the observers during 

their inspection of the display. Even though the observers passed near the actual 

GZ, they never exceeded one-tenth of their rad-safe limit. Their calculated film 

badge dose is 0.10 rem. 

4.1.7 Shot Harry 

The observers (both the service observers and Camp Desert Rock observers 

followed virtually the same scenario) for Shot Harry reportedly walked to 450 

yards from GZ, at the 6 r/hr line (Reference 1). Because the 6 r/hr line had no 

official status under the revised rad-safe procedures, this intensity is open to 

question. The total dose limit remained at 6 rem, but the maximum permissible 

intensity consistent with this dose limit was up to the discretion of the officerin-charge. While it is possible that the Control Group chose to halt upon 

encountering 6 r/hr, it is also possible that the above reference mistakenly 

ascribed the numerical value of the dose limit to an intensity limit. 

As for Badger and Simon, the AEC radiation survey data for Harry are 

deficient. After shot day and the following day, there is no evidence of surveys 

(at least in Reference 2) for ten days. With unmarked survey roads on an 

insufficient number of plots, which also have serious inconsistencies, statistical 

analysis is impossible. The inconsistencies appear to result from the mixed 

nature of the radiation field and the liberties taken in sketching the intensity 

contours. The area upwind of GZ, in which the observers operated, was subject 

to neutron-induced activity. Only this region of Figure 4-7 is drawn with any 

confidence. The considerable winds which blew heavy fallout offsite appear, 

75 
u . - -./ - \ ’ J , I .r .rt I ti I I 

I‘ -a?- . .- - I C.!. I I I -I -tt 4 

I -_ - - __ ) - -_ _. .~ K-m.. 

I ._ . .\ 

Figure 4-6 

Shot Encore Residual Radiation 
I I 'I I 1 

Figure 4-7 
from the plots, to have spared the Desert Rock display area from this form of 

contamination. 

Because the initial survey was made at about an hour after the shot, at 

roughly the same time the observers were in the display area, the dose estimate 

is relatively insensitive to radioactive decay rates. Therefore, the determination 

of the relative intensity from Na24 and Mn56, which requires multiple surveys, is 

not as important in this case. For both service observers and Camp Desert Rock 

observers, the calculated film badge dose is 1.2 rem. The calculated maximum 

intensity encountered at 450 yards is 8.9 r/hr, within the uncertainty of which 

the alleged 6 r/hr of Reference 1 falls. 

4.1.8 Shot Grable 

The observers for Shot Grable are presumed to have visited the Shot Harry 

display area, as did the maneuver troops (Reference 14). The timing most 

consistent with their activities reported in Reference 1 places them in the Harry 

area three days after that shot. It is assumed that they walked only to the 

display line at 500 yards from GZ, for there was virtually nothing to see at closer 

ranges (it is not apparent why the Shot Harry observers moved any closer). Even 

if the original induced activity had all been Na24 , the intensity encountered by 

the Shot Grable observers at any given range would have been about one-fortieth 

of that for the Shot Harry observers. The film badge dose to the Grable 

observers in the Harry area is calculated to be 0.03 rem; it would be less if the 

contribution to the original activity from hnn56 could be considered. 

Because of the dust (not fallout-bearing) at Shot Grable, the observers 

were not able to view equipment at any range closer than 1500 yards from GZ 

(see Figure 4-8). Even if they had been turned back from a position arbitrarily 

close to the next display, say at 1100 yards from GZ, their calculated film badge 

dose (from induced activity) is only 0.04 rem. Thus, with these high-sided 

assumptions, the total film badge dose to the Shot Grable observers is estimated 

as 0.07 rem. 

78 
- -- 

- h -. 74 . I 

hes 

Figure 4-8 

shot k-able Residual Radiation 

I Irlhr @ H+l) 

and'observer Rbutes 

,YO‘ 
4.2 INTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 

While operating in residual radiation fields, personnel were subject to an 

internal dose commitment from the inhalation of airborne radionuclides. The 

scenarios for Desert Rock V observers indicate several different situations in 

which airborne contamination was encountered. Each situation is analyzed for 

the case that results in the greatest dose. Dose commitments to the whole body 

and bone are considered, as these are of current interest with regard to 

radiologically-induced disorders. 

The basic methodology used for calculating internal dose commitments is 

that used in Reference 18, which is based on the following expression: 

“j = GC X K X RR X T X C PiDFij 

i 

where: D. = Dose commitment (rem) to organ j 

CL = Ground Contamination (Ci/m2) 

-1 K = Resuspension Factor (Ci/m3 per Ci/m2, or m )

BR = Breathing Rate (m3/hr) 

T = Duration of Exposure (hr) 

Pi = Activity fraction of isotope i 

DF.. = Dose Factor (rem/Ci) for organ j restilting from an ‘J intake of isotope i 

Variations of this expression are developed as required for utilization of the 

measured radiological parameters. Except where noted, the particle size distribution of airborne contamination is assumed to be consistent with that for which 

the dose factors were developed. This distribution provides a more nearly 

optimal particle retention than does any distribution likely encountered by 

Desert Rock observers; thus, the calculated dose commitments are high-sided. 

4.2.1 Volunteer Cibservers During Fallout Deposition 

The primary example of personnel being showered by fallout was at Shot 

Simon, where the volunteer observers noted fallout deposition especially at 2000 

80 
to 2500 yards from GZ at about 5 to 10 minutes after burst. In order to arrive so 

rapidly, these fallout particles must have been too large to be respirable. 

Consequently, no internal dose would have resulted. 

4.2.2 Volunteer Observers Walking in Fresh Fallout 

The Simon volunteers provide the best example of personnel walking in an 

intense gamma field from fresh (and presumably the most resuspendable) fallout. 

Although the fallout particles were large during their descent, some would have 

fragmented or liberated small scavenged particles on impact with the ground. 

Reference 37, for example, reports that particles of respirable size were detected 

much nearer to ground zero than was compatible with their own fall rates. 

Although the fraction of activity associated with respirable particles was small, 

the following calculation assumes all particles as respirable in order to upperbound the dose commitment. 

Because of the effort involved in weighting the dose factors for all fission 

product isotopes by the time-dependent activity fractions for each, a computer 

code was developed to provide these data for the common fissile materials. 

Reference 38 provides the relationship between 50-year dose commitment to 

various organs and (external) gamma intensity for various times after burst. The 

mix of Simon fission products and unfissioned weapon debris is used to determine 

that the relationship at approximately 0.1 hour after burst is 0.3 mrem (whole 

body) per mr/hr for unit resuspension factor (m -‘), breathing rate (m3/hr), and 

time of exposure (hr). The gamma intensity and time factors may be combined in 

the form of a time-integrated intensity, which for the volunteers’ evacuation was 

5.4 r (corresponding to the film badge dose of 3.8 rem). For a resuspension factor 

of 10m5rnm1 (used in Reference 18 for walking) and a breathing rate of 1.3 m3/hr, 

the 50-year whole body dose commitment for Simon volunteers is calculated as: 

0 = (0.3M5400)(1.3)(10-5) = 0.02 mrem. 

The bone dose commitment is about the same. 

81 
4.2.3 Service Observers Walking in Aged Fallout 

The 2%day Nancy field in which the Badger observers operated was the 

oldest Upshot -Knothole shot area revisited by observers. Although gamma 

intensities in the area had decreased markedly since shot day, the potential for 

internal dose had not. The total time-integrated intensity from Nancy fallout 

encountered by the Badger observers on Badger shot day and during the rehearsal 

two days previous was about 100 mr. From Reference 38, the relationship 

between 50-year dose commitment and gamma intensity at 25 days is: 1010 mrem 

(whole body) per mr of integrated intensity for unit resuspension factor (m-l) and 

breathing rate (m3/hr). Despite the aging of the fallout, the resuspension factor 

is still taken as order 10-5 m 

-1 . The whole body dose commitment is then: 

I7 = ~1010~~100~~1.3)(10~5)= 1.3 mrem 

The corresponding bone dose commitment is 2.8 mrem. 

4.2.4 Service Observers in an Induced Field 

A neutron-induced field would not ordinarily be considered as a potential 

internal radiation hazard because the activated soil is distributed to a depth of 

several inches. However, in circumstances of extreme dust lofting, significant 

contamination could conceivably be inhaled. Such was the case at Shot Grable, 

where a dust storm curtailed the observer activities. 

The observers at Grable are calculated to have received a film badge dose 

of 40 mrem, for which the corresponding time-integrated intensity is 58 mr. At 

the time of the observers’ principal exposure, about one hour after burst, Mn56 

and Na24 contributed about equally to the intensity (as determined from the 

Grable radiation survey data using the methodology of Reference 32). Thus, the 

time-integrated intensity from Na 24, (t rrvially) . adjusted to zero time after burst, 

would be about 30mr. 

The quantitative relationship between the gamma intensity and internal dose 

is developed in Appendix III. For the indicated soil composition, the 50-year dose 

commitment to the whole body is principally from intake of Na24 , with small 

82 
contributions from K42 and Mn56. A ten percent additional dose commitment to 

bone results from Ca45 and P32. The whole body commitment for exposure at one 

hour after burst is 2.6 mrem per mr of time-integrated intensity for unit 

suspension factor (m -‘) of activity in the top centimeter of soil and unit breathing 

rate (m3/hr). During the dust storm, the suspension factor may conceivably have 

been as great as 10e2me1, the upper limit of measured lofting for any activity. 

The whole body dose commitment is then given as: 

n = (2.6)(30)(1.3)(10-2) = 1.0 mrem 

It is tacitly assumed in the above that the dust remained in the vicinity 

where lofted. If dust had instead been transported from areas of greater 

intensity, the internal dose commitment would be correspondingly greater. 

However, any approaching contamination would have been detectable by virtue of 

its addition to the local gamma intensity. 

The radiation surveys for Grable (Reference 2) indicate that there was no 

significant redistribution of induced activity. For all surveys, the roughly circular 

isointensity contours indicative of the original neutron activation are present. 

Because the initial survey was performed at about the time the observers were in 

the area, even the remote possibility of highly contaminated dust passing by the 

observers (to be deposited only in offsite areas where it might not be detected) 

may be discounted. The minor irregularities that do exist in the Grable intensity 

plots from survey to survey could include some contribution from transported 

contamination. However, the magnitude of these irregularities makes it most 

unlikely that more than half of the intensity encountered at any location could 

result from transient airborne contamination. 

For an upper-limited internal dose calculation, it is assumed that half (about 

30 mr) of the observers’ time-integrated intensity resulted from airborne activity. 

In Appendix II, a relationship is developed between the concentration of activity 

in the air and the associated gamma intensity. The airborne activity concentration is then related to internal dose. With these expressions combined, the 

internal dose is the product of the time-integrated intensity, the breathing rate, 

and a composite (activity-averaged) dose factor, all divided by the average 

83 
gamma energy per radiological decay. With the activity concentration data, dose 

factor data, and units as in Appendix II, the 50-year whole body dose commitment 

is given (in the limit of time zero) as: 

D = (1.7)(1.27)+(0.35)(0.65)+(3.7)(0.066) (l.3)(30) = 8 mrem , (1.7)(4.12)+(0.35)(0.28)+(3.7)(1.68) 

where 4.12, 0.28, and 1.68 are the average gamma energies (MeV) per decay of 

Na24, K42, and Mn56, respectively. The bone dose commitment, from Ca45 and 

P32 in addition, is 9 mrem. 

4.2.5 Volunteer Observers in an Early Induced Field 

Because of their proximity to nuclear bursts, the volunteer observers were 

exposed to radiation from an additional radionuclide, Al 28 ($=2.3 min), which 

decayed to insignificance before other personnel reached comparable distances 

from ground zero. The dose commitment from Al 28 (and all other activated 

nuclides) was negligible, however, even at high suspension (as from the shock 

wave), largely because the volunteers were at the fringes of the induced fields 

(which were quickly masked by fallout). Even in the lung, where the aluminum 

would decay before distribution throughout the body, the dose was far less than 1 

mrem. 

4.3 RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE SCJMMARY 

The calculated film badge doses (rem) to Operation Upshot-Knothole 

observers from residual gamma radiation are summarized as follows: 

t I 

Associated Shot: Annie Nancy Dixie Ray Badger Simon Encore Harry G-able 

Service Observers 0.50 0.32 0 0 1.4 0.50 0.10 1.2 0.07 

Volunteer Observers -- ~0.01 -- -- 4.1 3.8 -- -- --

84 
For all observer activities in conjunction with shots other than Grable, the 

50-year dose commitment to the whole body or bone from inhaled radionuclides is 

calculated to be less than 0.003 rem. During the dust storm at Grable, observers 

could have inhaled neutron-activated dust, resulting in a commitment of from 

0.001 rem to possibly as high as 0.008 rem to the whole body and 0.009 rem to 

bone. Almost all of the dose would have been accrued within a few days following 

exposure. 

Section 5 

UNCFRTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

The sources of error in the calculation of initial and residual doses are 

examined in order to quantitatively estimate the uncertainty in the total dose for 

each group of observers. 

5.1 UNCERTAINTIES IN INITIAL RADIATION DOSE 

5.1.1 Neutron Dose 

The sources of error in the calculation of neutron dose include: (1) 

uncertainty in the neutron output (magnitude and spectrum) of the device, (2) 

deviations from radial symmetry in the neutron output due to device asymmetry, 

(3) error in neutron transport from the burst point to a location above the trench, 

and (4) uncertainties in neutron trench factors. For the shots of interest, error 

factors representing 90-percent confidence limits are estimated for each of these 

sources. 

The error factors for neutron output are based on the estimated reliability of 

the calculations and/or assumptions made to model the output characteristics of 

the device. The asymmetry error factors were developed by considering the degree 

of device asymmetry and the orientation of the device with respect to trench 

locations. Two devices (those for Shots Nancy and Simon) were highly asymmetric 

in design and therefore have large factors. An asymmetry error factor of 1.0 is 

assigned for radially symmetric devices. The transport error factor reflects the 

uncertainty in calculating the neutron dose at a trench location for a given neutron 

output of a symmetric device. This range-dependent factor varies from 1.3 at 

2000 m to 1.5 at 5000 m. The uncertainty in the calculation of neutron trench 

factors results in error factors of 1.2 for service observer trenches (2-foot wide) 

and 1.3 for volunteer observer trenches !4-foot wide). 

Neutron dose error factors are displayed below. The combined neutron error 

factors for the shots of interest range from 1.6 to 2.2. 

87 
Source of Uncertainty Combined 

Neutron Trench Error 

Shot Output Asymmetry Transport Factor Factor 

Annie 2.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 2.2

Nancy 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.9 

Volunteers 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.8 

Badger 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.6 

Volunteers 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.7 

Simon 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.2 2.2 

Volunteers 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 2.1 

Harry 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.7 

Grable 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.6 

5.1.2 Initial Gamma Dose 

Sources of error in the calculation of initial gamma dose include: (1) 

uncertainty in experimental film badge readings, (2) extrapolation/ interpolation 

techniques to determine dose at trench locations, (3) errors in relating abovetrench dose to in-trench dose, (4) uncertainty in converting in-trench dose to film 

badge reading for personnel in a fixed position, and (5) uncertainty in personnel 

reorientation (i.e., standing up) in the trench. While the other sources of error are 

systematic, the latter two uncertainties provide an indication of the spread in film 

badge readings expected due to the various orientationa factors. 

The error factor associated with experimental film badge readings is 

estimated to be approximately 1.4 when data were taken along one radial line, and 

1.2 when consistent film badge data were obtained along multiple radial lines by 

two different experimental groups, as for Shots Badger and Grable. For Shot 

Nancy, the large error factor (liS) reflects the uncertainty in the experimental 

data due to shielding in the direction of the experimental line, as discussed in 

Section 3.2.2. The error in interpolation/extrapolation techniques used to determine the gamma doses at trench locations is range-dependent, with estimated 

values of 1.1-1.4. It is estimated that the uncertainty in the gamma trench 

factors, which relate the above-trench dose to in-trench dose, introduce error 

88 
factors of 1.2 for service observer trenches and 1.3 for volunteer observer 

trenches. The uncertainty in relating the in-trench gamma dose to film badge 

reading (for stationary personnel) is due primarily to variations in body orientation 

among individuals in the trench and the placement of the film badge on the body. 

This error factor for all observers is estimated to be 1.5. 

The final uncertainty in initial gamma dose results from the probability 

that the observers stood up in the trenches to observe the rising cloud soon after 

the blast effects of the weapon had subsided. For volunteer observers, it is 

considered unlikely that anyone stood up before eight seconds after detonation, 

since the blast effects and fireball luminosity would have been significant prior to 

this time (Reference 16). It is also considered probable that most volunteer 

observers were standing by 15 seconds after the shot. The values of eight and 15 

seconds are therefore considered the 90-percent confidence limits on standup time 

for volunteer observers. Compared to the ten-second standup time assumed in 

Section 3, an eight-second standup time results in a gamma dose 20 percent greater 

while that for a standup time of 15 seconds is 26 percent less (Figure 3-2). In order 

to combine the uncertainty in standup time with other uncertainties, a lognormal 

distribution, consistent with the 90-percent confidence limits, is assumed. The 

associated error factor is about 1.3 and reflects a median standup time near 

eleven, rather than ten, seconds (the volunteer observer doses shown in Table 5-1 

reflect this lognormal distribution). 

These gamma dose error factors for shots of interest are as follows: 

Source of Uncertainty Combined 

Experimental Extrapolation/ Trench Trench Standup Error 

Shot Data Interpolation Factor Posture Time Factor 

Annie 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.9 

Nancy 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.2 

Volunteers 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 2.2 

Badger 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7 

Volunteers 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.8 

Simon 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.9 

Volunteers 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.3 2.0 

Harry 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.9 

Gable 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.8 

89 
5.2 UNCERTAINTIES IN RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE 

The uncertainty in calculated residual radiation doses arises from two basic 

sources: (1) the gamma radiation environment, and (2) the space-time scenario of 

troop movements. The 90-percent confidence limits in the gamma intensity, 

including the uncertainty in the decay parameter, are provided by the automated 

procedure described in Reference 32. Parametric studies are made using the 

automated procedure to determine the influence of scenario vakiations on personnel dose. 

Errors in position, time, and gamma intensity are not independent because 

of the rad-safe constraint that limited troops to intensities of less than 2.5 r/hr 

(with the exception of Shots Harry and Crable). Troop positions are well known 

except, in some cases, with regard to the limit of advance in the display areas. 

When the references do not report which equipment display lines were inspected by 

the observers, the assumption is made that all of the displays within rad-safe limits 

were inspected. Consequently, the upper limit on dose is not necessarily obtained 

by considering the upper confidence limits in field intensity or by maximizing the 

number of display lines visited; it is instead found by considering the scenario 

variation that maximizes the time spent at or near the rad-safe limit. 

Except for the limit of troop advance, there is essentially no error in dose 

resulting from uncertainty in troop position. The bounding azimuths of the 

equipment display sector have been well identified for all shots from operation 

plans, shot area maps, and shot area photographs. For all shots except Badger, the 

uncertainty in angle of troop position within the display sectors has a minor 

influence on dose. That the distances from GZ of the display lines are known 

identifies where observers would linger and limits the position of farthest advance 

to a few discrete possibilities. 

The timing of the observers’ march is generally based on the planned time 

of movement from the trenches and arrival at the pickup point. Reasonable march 

speeds and display area stay times are assumed to construct a scenario consistent 

with the known times. The most important influence of timing on the uncertainty 

in dose is the time spent at the position of greatest gamma intensity. Conse90 
quently, this duration is emphasized in the uncertainty analysis. The uncertainty of 

doses of 0.01 rem or less is not discussed. 

Each shot for which the observers encountered residual radiation is 

considered separately. The various sources of error are combined approximately; 

they cannot be combined rigorously due to disparity of their associated distributions. These distributions may be normal (e.g., a stay time l 5 minutes), lognormal 

(as for the gamma intensity), or truncated (due to the rad-safe limit). The bestestimate doses from Section 4 are used together with the error distributions to 

determine the mean dose from residual radiation for each shot. Only for 

significantly skewed distributions is the mean much different from the best 

estimate. For multiple exposures, the means may be legitimately added to find the 

mean total dose, which may be compared to film badge data or entered as an 

individual’s assigned gamma dose. Ninety-percent confidence limits are estimated 

for each calculated dose. Confidence limits for totaled doses can only be 

approximated; they are obtained as for normal distributions, except that upper and 

lower confidence intervals are considered separately. 

5.2.1 Shot Annie 

The observers apparently went to the rad-safe limit although there was no 

display at that position. The only uncertainty of consequence is the time spent at 

the rad-safe limit. An error factor of 2 is estimated for the assumed stay of 5 

+o. 14 minutes. The contribution to dose at that position is O.14-o o7 rem. The uncer- . 

tainties in stay time at the displays and in walking speed affect the remaining dose 

estimate by roughly 10 percent, 

+0.15 badge dose is then 0.50mo o8 rem. . 

or 0.36 2 0.04 rem. The calculated total film 

5.2.2 Shot Nancy 

For the service observers, both the available survey data and calculations 

indicate that part of the lOOO-yard display line was outside the rad-safe limit. 

Because the radiation intensity was not constant along that display line, there is 

greater than usual uncertainty in the time the observers ‘spent at the rad-safe 

limit. An error factor of 3 is estimated for that time to reflect the possibilities 

91 
that the observers briefly skirted the radiation-restricted area before reaching the 

display line, or that most of their time on the lOOO-yard display line was spent at 

levels well below the rad-safe limit. The calculated total film badge dose at Nancy 

is then 0.32 $0297 rem. Other uncertainties are negligible in comparison. 

5.2.3 Shot Badger 

The most significant uncertainties in the volunteer observers’ residual 

radiation dose were the time spent and the intensity at the trench area. Based on 

the reported position-time data for the volunteers’ evacuation, the time of leaving 

the trenches is estimable to the nearest minute. To that time, the residual film 

badge dose is then 2.9 * 0.3 rem. Uncertainty with regard to gamma intensity, 

with the reported residual values of 30 to 50 r/hr at the trenches and a probable 

average over the interval within 5 r/hr of that estimated, results in an estimate of 

about 2.9 f 0.4 rem. These uncertainties combined, with the other contributions to 

the volunteer observers, give a total residual radiation film badge dose of 3.3 * 0.5 

rem. 

The service observers’ dose estimate is dominated by the time spent at or 

near the rad-safe limit. This time would have been less than assumed if the 

observers headed toward the western boundary road upon reaching the rad-safe 

limit; it would have been more if they encountered the limit at the lOOO-yard 

display and had remained near the limit line for their entire return walk. The 

resulting uncertainty in the film badge dose is about 1.4 +0.4 

-0.8 rem* 

5.2.4 Shot Simon 

The Simon volunteer observers had substantial contributions to their 

residual radiation dose from walking along the 2000-yard display line and from 

walking to the rear. Along the display line, the dominant uncertainty is the 

reported time. If correctly reported to the nearest minute, the resulting dose 

contribution is 2.1 f 0.3 rem. For the walk to the rear, the average intensity might 

be in error by a factor of as much as 1.3 because of the substantial intensity 

gradient and the continuing fallout deposition. The uncertainty in walking speed, 

even without an end-time constraint, should be within a factor of 1.2. With the 

92 
uncertainties combined, the dose contribution from the walk to the rear is 1.6 $*t . 

rem. The total residual film badge dose for the Simon volunteer observers is then 

calculated as 3.8::;; rem. 

Despite the lack of sufficient rad-safe survey data to associate uncertainties with the Simon radiation field, the calculated dose to the service observers is 

not highly uncertain. All pertinent evidence indicates that the observers must have 

been very close to an updated rad-safe limit line to reach the 2000-yard display. 

The dominant uncertainty affecting dose is the time spent there. With the same 

uncertainty estimation as for Shot Annie, the observers’ total film badge dose is 

computed to be 0.50 ~$~~ rem. . 

5.2.5 Shot Encore 

The observers accrued most of their dose in the portion of the display area 

near GZ, where the radiation field was nearly uniform over a considerable spatial 

extent. Intensity measurements during the early hours after burst at the intended 

GZ are consistent to within 20 percent (after accounting for decay); the calculated 

dose should be similarly accurate for the given scenario. Because approximately 

one-half hour was spent in the area of highest intensity, the uncertainty in timing 

cannot introduce much additional error. The estimated film badge dose to the 

observers is 0.10 f 0.03 rem. 

5.2.6 Shot Harry 

Recause the movement of the observers was no longer constrained by a 

maximum gamma intensity, the uncertainty in the calculated radiation field cannot 

be reduced with auxiliary information. With respect to gamma intensity, the 

+1.3 calculated dose is uncertain to within a factor of 2.1, or 1.2 -o 6 rem. A factor of 

2 uncertainty in the time spent at the innermost display that was viewed implies a 

dose of 1.2 r,“*z rem. The overall uncertainty in the observers’ film badge dose is 

l 2 +1.4 . 4.6 rem* l 

93 
5.2.7 Shot &-able 

The dose calculated for the Grable observers is high-sided because the 

intensity at the Harry area is based on the presumption of Na24 as the sole 

contributor at early times and because of the presumption that the observers went 

forward from the 1500-yard display at Grable. The range of possible film badge 

dose to the Grable observers is about 0.02 to 0.07 rem. 

5.3 TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

The reconstructed neutron and gamma doses for Operation Upshot-Knothole observers are presented in Table 5-l. From the best-estimate doses of 

Sections 3 and 4 and the error distributions of Section 5, the mean neutron and 

gamma doses for each observer group are calculated. These are presented along 

with estimated 90-oercent confidence limits. 

94 
Table 5-1. Observer Dose Summary 

Shot 

Annie 

Nancy 

Volunteers 

Badger 

Volunteers 

Simon 

Volunteers 

Encore 

Harry 

Grable 

* Reconstructed 

** Uncertainties 

Residual 

Gamma* 

Dose kern) 

+0.14 

0.51-0.09 

o 35+0.*4 

. -0.12 

< 0.01 

+0.5 

lo3-o.7 

3.3*0.5 

+0.13 

o.51-0.08 

+0.7 

3*8-o.5 

0.10+0.03 

+1.3 

1*3-0.7 

0.04+0.02 

Total 

Gamma* 

Dose (rem) 

+0.14 

0.52-0.09 

+0.24 

0935-o. 12 

+0.61 

o*64-0.80 

l 3+o.5 

l -0.7 

+2.8 

7*2- 1.9 

+0.13 

o*52-0.08 

+8.2 

13-6-5.3 

O.lO+-0.03 

+1.3 

l*3-.0.7 

0.04+0.02 

Neutron 

Dose (rem) 

0 018+0.017 

. -0.011 

< 0.001 

0 63+0.43 

. -0.30 

< 0.001 

+1.5 

2*4- 1.0 

0.001 

+25 

28- 16 

< 0.001 

< 0.001 

< 0.001 

film badge dose 

Initial 

Gamma* 

Dose (rem) 

0.012”” 

0.004 

+0.61 

o*64-0.38 

0.006 

+2.8 

3*9- 1.8 

0.012 

+8.2 

998-5.3 

< 0.001 

0.008 

< 0.00 1 

less than 0.01 rem not displayed 

95 
96 
Section 6 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

Because dosimetry records for Desert Rock V have not been located, few 

data are available with which to compare reconstructed doses. An occasional 

dose report has been found in Marine Corps medical records; however, none of 

these appear to be for service observers. Volunteer observer doses, either 

individually or en masse, are recorded in several references because of their 

greater interest. 

The volunteer observer doses are compared to calculated mean doses and 

dose ranges. A range of film badge readings is expected largely because of the 

likely variation in body position among the observers in a trench. The error 

factors of 1.5 for original trench posture and 1.3 for standup time, estimated for 

volunteer observers in Section 5.1, are applied to the calculated initial gamma 

dose (in Section 3, as modified for standup time in Section 5.1) to obtain the 

range in which 90 percent of the film badge readings are expected to lie. 

For Shot Nancy, Reference 1 indicates that the range of film badge 

readings for the volunteers was from 0.3 to 0.545 rem. However, an individual 

volunteer’s medical records indicate a dose of 0.787 rem. As the exposure to the 

Nancy volunteers was almost entirely from initial radiation, these data may be 

compared to the calculated range of initial gamma dose, 0.26 to 1.25 rem. 

The Badger volunteer observers are known to have worn several sets of 

film badges. Reference 1 places greatest credibility on a set of recorded doses 

from 5.2 to 9.5 rem. Reference 6 lists individual readings ranging from 4.1 to 

9.6 rem and averaging 6.1 rem. It cannot be determined which set is more 

representative; neither source indicates where on the body each set was worn. 

The calculated film badge dose range of 5.3 to 10.0 rem (including 3.3 rem from 

residual gamma) is similar to the range of both sets of film badge readings. The 

calculated mean dose of 7.2 rem is also consistent with these readings. 

97 
Reference 15 provides pocket dosimeter readings taken during and after the 

exercise. These could be used to check the relative contributions of initial and 

residual radiation, except that the reference does not clarify the times at which 

the intermediate readings were taken. 

Volunteer observers at Shot Simon also wore multiple film badges, but 

Reference 16 provides chest readings for everyone. These range from 9.5 to 17.5 

rem, with a mean of 12.7 rem. The range of calculated doses, 8.3 to 21.8 rem, 

(including 3.8 rem residual) and the calculated mean of 13.6 rem both indicate a 

fortuitous level of agreement. 

These results establish confidence in the calculation of initial gamma 

doses, but are insufficient to provide correlation with neutron and residual 

gamma doses. 

98 
Section 7 

CONCLUSIONS 

Exercise Desert Rock V observers participated in nine of the eleven test 

shots of Operation Upshot-Knothole. Of the nine, seven were observed by 

significant numbers of observers from trenches as close as 3500 yards (3200 

meters) from ground zero. For three shots, officer volunteers observed from as 

close as 2000 yards (1830 meters). 

From the standpoint of initial radiation, neutron dose was insignificant for 

all but the volunteer observers at Shots Nancy, Badger, and Simon. Upper 

confidence limits for neutron dose are 1 and 4 rem for Shots Nancy and Badger, 

respectively, and as high as 53 rem (28 rem calculated mean) for Shot Simon (due in 

part to its higher-than-expected yield). Initial gamma doses were again significant 

only for the volunteers, the upper confidence limits for initial gamma calculated to 

be 1.25. 6.7, and 18 rem for Shots Nancy, Badger, and Simon, respectively. 

Residual gamma radiation was more apparent from the tower shots than 

from the air bursts, likely due primarily to the increased burst height of the latter. 

The troop observers were exposed to the highest residual radiation at Shots Badger 

and Harry, where upper limit doses are calculated to be 1.8 and 2.6 rem, 

respectively. For volunteers at Shots Badger and Simon, the corresponding doses 

are 3.8 and 4.5 rem, respectively. 

Despite high dust levels in contaminated areas, causing troop activities to 

be curtailed, the inhalation and ingestion hazard was not significant. At early 

times, an internal dose hazard in a residual radiation field would be accompanied 

by a corresponding external dose hazard. This is not the case for later times. The 

slower-decaying nuclides that contribute significantly to internal dose can present 

a hazard of inhaled or ingested, even when routine radiological surveys would 

indicate no significant external hazard. 

99 
Of all Desert Rock observers who participated in Operation UpshotKnothole, only the volunteer observers at Shot Simon received a total radiation 

dose that exceeded established criteria. Their calculated mean doses were 13.6 

rem gamma and 28 rem neutron, considerably exceeding the 10 rem volunteer 

observer limit mainly because of the neutron exposure, which was not recorded on 

their film badges. No regular observers exceeded their dose limit of 6 rem. 

Although film badge dosimetry is not available for most observers, the 

volunteer observer film badge data correlates well with calculated gamma doses 

for all three shots at which the volunteers participated. 

100 
REFERENCES 

1. “Final Report, Exercise Desert Rock V,” Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, 

Nevada, 16 July 1953. 

2. “Radiological Safety Operation,” Report to the Test Director, Operation 

Upshot-Knothole, Nevada Proving Grounds, WT-817, Headquarters, Field 

Command, AFSWP, June 1953. 

3. “Directive for Exercise Desert Rock V,” Office of the Chief of Army Field 

Forces, Ft. Monroe, Virginia, 5 February 1953. 

4. “Letter of Instruction No. 1,” Exercise Desert Rock V , Headquarters, Sixth 

Army, Presidio of San Francisco, 5 January 1953. 

5. “Operational Summary, 1 March - 9 June 1953,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, 

Nevada Proving Grounds, Headquarters, Field Command, AFSWP, August 

1953. 

6. “Report of the Deputy Test Director,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, Nevada 

Proving Grounds, WT - 816, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 1954. 

7. Operations Order No. 1 (Shot Annie), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 9 March 1953. 

8. Operations Order No. 2 (Shot Nancy), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 16 March 1953. 

9. Operations Order No. 3 (Shot Badger), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 14 April 1953. 

10. Operations Order No. 4 (Shot Simon), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 1 I May 1953. 

101 
11. Operations Order No. 5 (Shot Encore), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 3 May 1953. 

12. Operations Order No. 6 (Shot Harry), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, 

Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 11 May 1953. 

13. Operations Order No. 7 (Shot Grable), Exercise Desert Rock V, Headquarters, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 17 hday 1953. 

14. “Operational Report, 7 May - 3 June 1953,” Headquarters, First Army Desert 

Rock V Battalion (Provisional “Y”), Ft. Totten, NY, 3 June 1953. 

15. “Observers’ Report of Desert Rock V,” Marine Corps Educational Center, 

Quantico, VA, 1 May 1953. 

16. “Report of Participation in Selected Volunteer Program of Desert Rock V-7,” 

Headquarters , Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 25 April 1953. 

17. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot Smoky,” 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob, DNA 4747F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 31 May 1979. 

18. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force BIG BANG, Shot Galileo,” 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob, DNA 4772F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 9 April 1980. 

19. “Version 4 of ATR (Air Transport of Radiation),” DNA 3995, Defense Nuclear 

Agency, January 1976. 

20. “Energy Dependent Air/Ground Correction Factors for the ATR (Air Transport of Radiation) Code,” BRL Report No. 345, U.S. Army Ballistic Research 

Laboratory, August 1977. 

102 
21. “Radiation Environments from Tactical 

Defense Nuclear Agency, July 1976. 

Nuclear Weapons,” DNA 4267F, 

22. “Protection Against Neutron Radiation,” NCRP Report No. 38, January 1971. 

23. “The MORSE Monte Carlo Radiation Transport 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February 1975. 

Code System,” ORNL 4972, 

24. “DNA Nuclear 

(unpublished). 

Weapons Output Handbook,” Defense Nuclear Agency, 

25. “Preliminary Neutron and Gamma-Ray Output for (Badger),” 

Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 15 October 1980. 

Letter from Los 

26. “A User’s Manual for ANISN, A One-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Transport Code with Anisotropic Scattering,” Union Carbide Corporation, 1967. 

27. “(Simon) Output”, letter from Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 6 June 1980. 

28. “Capabilities 

ber 1977. 

of Nuclear Weapons,” EM-I, Defense Nuclear Agency, Decem29. “The DOT III Two-Dimensional Discrete 

TM-4290, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 

Ordinates Transport 

September 1973. 

Code,” ORNL30. “The MISC Code and Marrow Dose in an Initial Radiation 

78-967-LJ, Science Applications, Inc., November 1978. 

Environment,” SAI31. “Compilation of Local Fallout 

1962,” Volume I - Continental 

Agency, 1 May 1979. 

Data from Nuclear Test Detonations, 1945-

U.S. Tests, DNA 1251-l-EX, Defense Nuclear 

103 
32. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers,” Exercise Desert Rock 

VI, Operation Teapot, Draft Final Report, Science Applications, Inc., 

McLean, VA, 15 July 1980. 

33. “Marine Corps Report on Exercise Desert Rock V,” Headquarters, 2d Marine 

Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, Camp Pendleton, CA, 19 May 

1953. 

34. “Activities of the Artillery Test Unit,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, Nevada 

Proving Grounds, WT-709, U.S. Army Artillery Center, Ft. Sill, OK, 

September 1953. 

35. “Soil Activation by Neutrons,” Project 2.1, Operation Plumbbob, WT-1410, 

Field Command, AFSW P (DASA), May 1960. 

36. “Test Director’s Report on Operation Plumbbob,” Nevada Test Site, 

UCRL 5166, November 1957. 

37. “Distribution Characteristics and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation 

Plumbbob,” Projects 37.1, 37.2, 37.2A, 37.3, and 37.6, Nevada Test Site, 

WT-1488, Civil Effects Test Group, July 1966. 

38. “Fallout Inventory and Inhalation Dose to Organs (FIIDOS),” Science 

Applications, Inc., 1981. 

39. “ORIGEN Isotope Generation and Depletion Code--Matrix Exponential 

Method,” CC-217, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, June 1977. 

40. “Summary of Preliminary Results of the Diagnostic Measurements Performed 

on Operation Upshot-Knothole,” Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 

(unpublished). 

104 
41. “Air Weather Service Participation,” Operation Upshot-Knothole, WT-703, 

Air Force Special Weapons Center, July 1953. 

42. “Neutron Flux Measurements,” Project 2.3, Operation Upshot-Knothole, WT720, Naval Research Laboratory, December 1953. 

43. “External Neutron Measurements with Threshold Detectors,” Project 17.1, 

“Operation IJpshot-Knothole, WT-826, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 

March 1955. 

44. “Physical Measurements of Gamma and Neutron Radiation in Shelter and 

Instrumentation Evaluation,” Project 24.2, Operation Upshot-Knothole, WT789, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, August 1953. 

45. “Initial Gamma Exposure Versus Distance,” Project 6.8a, Operation UpshotKnothole, WT-756, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, April 1955. 

46. “Gamma Radiation as a Function of Distance,” Project 10.3, Operation 

Upshot-Knothole, WT-827, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, February 1956. 

47. “Initial Gamma Data from Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1948-1962,” NDL-TR-53, 

U.S. Army Nuclear Defense Laboratory, July 1965. 

48. “A Methodology for Calculating Radiation Doses from Radioactivity Released 

to the Environment,” ORNL-4992, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, varch 

1976. 

49. “NUIDEA--A Computer Code for the Prediction of Radiation, Blast, and 

Thermal Environments from Nuclear Weapons,” Science Applications, Inc., 

19 November 1975. 

105 
106 
APPENDIX I 

CALCULATION OF TRENCH FACTORS 

Trench factors are used to predict an in-trench radiation environment from 

a known or calculated above-trench radiation environment. It is necessary to 

calculate trench factors for each major component of radiation--neutrons, 

secondary gamma (produced by neutron capture and inelastic scattering in the 

atmosphere and ground) local gamma (produced by (n,?‘) reactions in the trench 

walls), and debris (fission product) gamma. The factors are found to depend on 

weapon yield, height of burst, range of trench from GZ, trench dimensions, and 

depth in the trench. This appendix provides brief descriptions of the methods 

used to calculate the various trench factors. The calculations are currently in a 

preliminary state; therefore, factors used in this report are tentative. 

A. Neutron Trench Factors 

The neutron trench factor is defined as the ratio of the neutron dose in the 

trench to the neutron dose above the trench. Two-dimensional air-over-ground 

transport of neutrons is calculated by the discrete ordinates code DOT (Reference 29). The DOT calculations predict the angular neutron fluences above the 

ground. The neutron dose in the trench can be calculated either by a selection of 

the uncollided (from above-trench to detector location) angular rays which 

contribute to the dose, or by coupling the output of the Monte Carlo adjoint 

transport code MORSE (Reference 23) with the DOT results through a MISC 

program (Reference 30). The first method determines the dose in the trench 

from each angular neutron fluence ray. Scattered contributions to the dose are 

not included. This method underpredicts the neutron trench factor by about 0.07 

compared to that obtained from a MORSE-MISC-DOT coupling. The MORSE 

adjoint calculation includes the scattered neutron dose contribution, which 

accounts for most of the difference. 

107 
B. Secondary Gamma Trench Factors 

Two-dimensional air-over-ground transport of the secondary gamma radiation is also calculated by the discrete ordinates code DOT (Reference 29). To 

calculate the dose in the trench from secondary gamma radiation, a proper 

selection of the downward DOT gamma angular fluence is made. This selection 

depends on the dimensions of the trench. The gamma radiation above the trench 

is transmitted into the trench by performing special tests to select that portion 

of the angular distribution that contributes to the dose inside the trench and, 

when necessary, to determine the attenuation of the gamma radiation through 

the ground material surrounding the trench. Gamma scattering off of the trench 

walls contributes only a few percent to the dose in the trench and is thus not 

included in the calculation of the trench factor. The secondary gamma trench 

factor is, then, the ratio of the gamma dose inside the trench (due to secondary 

gamma above the trench) to the total secondary gamma dose above the trench. 

C. Local Gamma Trench Factors 

To calculate the dose in the trench from gamma radiation produced locally 

by the (n,Y) reaction in the trench soil, an output of the LMonte Carlo adjoint 

transport code MORSE is again coupled with the DOT neutron results using the 

MISC program. This MISC coupling is successful with the neutron fluences 

because they are nearly isotropic. (However, MISC coupling with gamma 

fluences cannot be used because the gamma fluence computed by DOT is more 

directional than the MORSE angular responses.) Thus, the local gamma trench 

factor is defined as the ratio between the gamma dose inside the trench from 

(n, 7’) reactions in the surrounding soil to the neutron dose above the trench. 

D. Debris Gamma Trench Factors 

One-dimensional atmospheric transport of radiation, known as infinite air 

calculations, are performed accurately by the discrete ordinates code ANISN 

(Reference 26). In calculating the free-field doses above the trench from debris 

gamma radiation, the presence of the soil material may be taken into account by 

108 
utilizing a proper set of air-over-ground correction factors, such as those used in 

the ATR4 (Reference 19) computer code. Furthermore, by properly selecting the 

ANISN downward angular fluence, an estimate of the doses inside the trench may 

be made, noting that the angular fluence along some paths would suffer 

attenuation while traversing the soil material surrounding the trench. A set of 

trench factors, defined as the ratios of the doses inside to those above the 

trench, may then be calculated as a function of range for a given source height 

and spectrum. 

Because the height of the debris gamma radiation source is increasing with 

time, it is necessary to calculate these trench factors as a function of fireball 

height. The debris gamma radiation spectrum is assumed to be constant during 

the period of initial fireball rise. The fireball rise model utilized in computer 

code NUIDEA (Reference 49) is then used to develop trench factor-versus-time 

curves for the shots of interest. In order to allow for personnel reorientation 

(i.e., standing up) in the trench during the output of debris gamma radiation, 

trench factor-time curves are determined for two locations within the trench, 

one corresponding to the film badge location of a person crouching in the trench, 

and the second at the film badge position of an observer standing upright in the 

trench, facing the rising cloud. The resulting curves for Shot Badger are shown 

in Figure I- 1. 

109 
1.1 

.9 

.8 

Upright Position 

LU IV . 

Time after Detonation (set) 

Figure I-l Debris Gamma Trench Factors for Volunteer 

Observer Trench, Shot Badger 

110 
APPENDIX II 

THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNAL DOSE TO EXTERNAL DOSE FROM 

AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION 

Airborne contamination that may result in an internal dose from inhaled 

radionuclides also results in an external dose from gamma emitters (if any). 

Because radiation monitoring at Nevada Proving Grounds (also known as Nevada 

Test Site) concentrated primarily on surveys of gamma radiation intensity, it is 

useful to be able to determine inhalation doses from the gamma intensity 

environment. 

Internal and external dose are most simply related if the airborne contamination is of uniform concentration over an effectively infinite distance (large 

compared to the mean free path of the gamma radiation). In this case, the 

volumetric rate of energy emission equates to that of energy absqrption. The 

former may be expressed as: 

7x1O4 dis/sec ~ci ) l (E [z]} j1.6~10-~ a) l (3600 F) = 213*C*E [y] 

where C is the airborne activity concentration and E is the mean energy of 

gamma emissions per disintegration. For absorption, 

where I is the gamma intensity from airborne contamination, and the air density is 

at standard temperature and pressure. Combining these expressions results in: 

I(mr/hr) = 2.0 C(pCi/m3) l E(MeV/dis). 

For an effectively infinite source of airborne contamination over a ground 

surface, it may be considered at ground level that half of the energy source is 

effectively absent, and thus that 

111 
I (mr/hr) = 1.0 C (pCi/m3) l E (MeV/dis). 

This is a useful approximation for ground personnel if the airborne activity 

concentration is sufficiently uniform. The computation of the general case is 

much more complex, involving radiation transport computer codes that effectively provide weighting factors for all gamma emission energies. A separate 

computer study would be required for each activity distribution of interest. 

A basic expression for internal dose from some radioisotope to some organ 

is: 

D(mrem) = C(pCi/m3) l BR(m3inhaled/hr) l T(hr) l DF(mrem/pCi inhaled)

where BR is the breathing rate, T is the duration of exposure, and DF is the dose 

factor relating the specific radioisotope and organ. In terms of the airborne 

intensity, which may vary with time, the expression may be recast as: 

D(mrem) = DFhredCrCi) . BR(m3/hr) l JIdt (mr) E(MeV/dis) 

Each radioisotope j contributes a factor cjEj/ yciEi to the total airborne intensity 

(only relative activity concentrations (c) need be considered). Thus, the total 

internal dose to some organ is expressed as: 

&c.DF.(mrem/pCr) 

D(mrem) =,&lE (heV/dis) l BQ(m3/hr) . /Idt (mr)

i ii 

For other than standard conditions, the above should be modified by a factor of 

actual density/standard density. In practice, the breathing rate at altitude rnay 

change so as to roughly compensate for any density correction. 

112 
The preceding expression may be used for fission products in conjunction 

with a computer code such as ORIGEN (Reference 391, which provides the gamma 

energy data and relative activities for any time of interest. For neutron-induced 

activity, relative concentrations in the air may be assumed proportional to those 

in the ground, the determination of which is described in Appendix III. The timeintegrated intensity in the expression is found from correlation of personnel 

movement data with applicable rad-safe surveys or can be related to film badge 

readings resulting from airborne contamination. 

113 
114 
APPENDIX III 

RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNAL DOSE TO GAMMA INTENSITY FROM 

INDIJCED ACTIVITY 

Estimates are made of the ground concentration of neutron activation 

products in Nevada Test Site soil from measured gamma intensities. Experimental 

data are used in both the construction and validation of the methodology. The 

induced radioisotopes that are the largest potential contributors to whole body and 

bone doses are identified. 

The relationship between activity in soils and gamma intensity is developed 

from the dependence of each on the thermal neutron fluence. Soil activity is 

computed theoretically from the thermal neutron capture cross-sections and the 

radiological decay rates of the soil constituents. Correlation between gamma 

intensity and thermal neutron fluence can be found from data reported in 

Reference 35. The best correlation is obtained by considering only the gamma 

intensity from Na24 , the predominant contributor at Nevada Test Site from about 

one through five days after the burst. The direct readings of intensity from Na24 , 

extrapolated to time zero, are found to imply, for a thermal neutron fluence of 

109n/cm2 (measured at the surface), 1.0 mr/hr for each 2 percent by weight of 

sodium in the soil. In this form, the correlation is applicable to most soils of 

density similar to the typical NTS value of 1.3 g/cm3. 

For the radioisotopes calculated to be of significance as potential whole 

body and bone dose contributors, the relationship between soil activity and Na24 

intensity at time zero is shown below. Values in the preceding columns are 

multiplied to obtain these results. The highest values of weight fraction from 

References 28, 35, and 36 are used for each soil constituent. 

115 
--- ------- -- 

Thermal Thermal 

Specific Neutron Neutron Activity 

Activity Cross- Isotopic Weight Fluence (P Wg 

(P Ci/g Section Fraction Fraction (n/cm*) of soil) 

Radio- of the of Parent of in for 1 mr/hr for I mr/hr 

isotope isotope) (cm*) Parent Soil Na24 at t Na24 at to 

0 

Na24 8.71 + 12* 5.3 - 25 1 2-2 1.0 + 9 9.2 - 5 

P3* 2.85 + 11 1.9 - 25 1 4-4 1.0 + 9 2.2 - 8 

K4* 6.02 + 12 1.5-24 6.9-2 3-2 1.0 + 9 1.9 - 5 

Ca45 1.76 + 10 1.2 - 24 2.1 - 2 6.7 - 2 1.0 + 9 3.0 - 8 

Mn56 2.17 + 13 1.3 - 23 1 7-4 1.0 + 9 2.0 - 4 

Data from Reference 35 permit comparison with the calculated activity-intensity 

(from Na24) ratio for Na24, Mn56, and K4*. The measured activity-was about 30 

percent greater for Na24 and about 50 percent greater for Mn 56 . These 

discrepancies exist because of a build-up of thermal neutrons within the soil and a 

minor contribution to activation from higher-energy neutrons. The presence of 

K42 .

in roughly the predicted amount is evidenced by spectra. Although unidenti42 fied in the reference, the peak corresponding to the gamma energy of K is

consistent with the calculated activity of K42 for different soils and different 

times after burst. P3* and Ca45 do not appear in the spectra because they are not 

gamma emitters. 

It is concluded that for NTS soils, correlations involving thermal neutron 

fluences and capture cross-sections are of use in determining levels of induced 

activity. A correction factor of 1.4, applied to match selected data, should be 

roughly applicable to activated nuclides in general. 

*Read as 8.71 x 1012 

116 
The calculated activity-intensity ratios are converted below to the form 

used for internal dose calculations in the main body of the report (a soil density of 

1.3 g/cm3 and the correction factor of 1.4 are included). Dose factors for 50-year 

dose commitments to the whole body or bone are given. The product of these two 

items provides normalized values of dose commitment. The relative importance of 

the listed radionuclides varies with the time after burst through their radiological 

decay. Half-lives are presented in the last column. 

Surface Dose Normalized 

Activity Factor 50-Y ear Dose 

Radio- (pCi/m’ , in (mrem/p Ci Commitment Radiological

is0 tope top cm)* inhaled)* * * (mrem/m$*,**Half-Life 

-g2-&- ---------- 1.7 1.27 WB 2.2 --- 15.0 h 

P32 4.0-4 1.65+2 B 0.066 14.3 d 

K42 3.5-l 6.53-l WB 0.23 12.4 h 

Ca45 5.5-4 3.65+2 B 0.20 163 d 

Mn56 3.7 6.6 - 2 WB 0.24 2.58h 

*per 1 mr/hr from Na24 at time zero 

**mrem per unit resuspension factor (m - ‘), per unit breathing rate 

(m3/hr), per unit time (hr) 

*** Reference 48 

WB = whole body 

B = bone 

117 

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ATTN: IAX-ADT 

U.S Army Materiel Dev D Readiness Cmd 

ATTN DRCDE-3 

U 8 Army Materlel Sys Analysis Actvy 

ATTN X5 (W3JCAA) 

ATTN DRXSY-DS 

ATTN DRXSY-S 

U 5 Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency 

ATTN MONA-ZB 

ATTN Library 

3 cy ATTN MONA-OPS 

U 8 Army War College 

ATTN Library 

ATTN AWCAC, COL Robb 

USAFACFS 

Department of the Army 

ATTN: ATZR-MG 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Postoraduate School 

ATTNa Code 1324, Library 

ATTN Code 56PR 

Naval Rsch Lab 

ATTN: Code 2627 

ATTFI Code 1240 

Ilaval War College 

ATTpj Code E-11, Tech Service 

ATTN Document Control 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Faclllty 

ATTN G. Binns 

ATTN Tech Dir 

DEPARTMENT or THE AIR FORCE 

Headquarters 

Air Force Systems Comm.lnd 

ATTN DL 

ATTh XR 

ATTN 5D 

Air Force Weapons Lab 

Air Force Systems Command 

ATTN NSSB 

4TTN SUL 

Air 2nlverslty Library 

Department of the Air Force 

ATTN AUL-LSE 

Depxt; Chief of Staff 

Rsc':, 3ev, 5 Acq 

DeGart:wnt of the Air Force 

4TTii AFRDQR 

ATTN. AFRDQI 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (Continued) 

U S Air Force Academy 

ATTN. Library 

USAF School of Aerospace Medlclne 

ATTN Radiation Sciences Div 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Department of Energy 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

ATTN. CTID 

Department of Energy 

ATTN: OMA 

OTHER GjyERNMENT AGENCIES 

Central Intelligence Agency 

ATTN: OSR/SE/F 

ATTN: OSWR/NED 

ATTN. NlO - Strategic Sys 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

ATTN. Deputy Director, J Noclta 

ATTN- D Bensen 

ATTN. Assistant Associated Dir 

U S Arms Control & Disarmament Agcy 

ATTN C Thorn 

ATTN A Lleberman 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTDRS 

Lawrence Llvermore National Lab 

ATTN L-153, W Hofer 

ATTN L-9, L Barker 

ATTN L-21. M Gustavson 

ATTN Tech'info Dept, Library 

ATTN L-49, W Hogan 

ATTN L-8. F Barrlsh 

ATTN L-35. J Imele 

ATTN L-96 

ATTN L-21 

ATTN L-24 

Los Alamos Natlonal Lab 

ATTN R Stolpe 

ATTN M/5634, T Dowler 

ATTN E Chapln 

ATTN Reports Library 

ATTN Sandoval/Chapln/Lyons/Best/Dowler 

ATT14 R Sandoval 

Lovelace Blamed & Envrn Rsch Inst. Inc 

ATT? D Richmond 

Sandla Natlonal Labs 

Llvermore Lab 

ATTN 8324, J Struve 

Sandra platlonal Lab 

A T T I'! 5612. J Kelzur 

ATTN 5613. R Stratton 

ATTN 1131 

120 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS -

Academy for Intersclence Methodology 

ATTN N. Pointer 

Advanced International Studies Institute 

ATTN M Harvey 

Advanced Rsch & Applications Corp 

ATTN Document Control 

Aerospace Corp 

ATTN. Library 

Analytical Assessments Corp 

ATTN A. Wagner 

Analytical Tech Applications Corp 

ATTN J. Scharfen 

Atmospheric Science Assoc 

ATTN H Normeat 

Boeing Aerospace Co. 

ATTN J. Russel 

ATTN: D. Choate 

Boeing Co 

ATTN L Warding 

66th MI Group 

ATTN. K. Moran 

Computer Sciences Corp 

ATTN F Eisenbarth 

Decision-Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN. Dr Pugh 

GarJak Rsch, Inc 

ATTN. G Jacobson 

General Rsch Corp 

ATTN. H. Schroeder 

ATTN: P. Lowry 

ATTN A Berry 

ATTN: Tactical Warfare Operatlons 

Hudson Institute, Inc 

ATTN. C. Gray 

ATTN H Kahn 

IIT Rsch, Institute 

ATTN Dot Library 

Institute for Defense Analyses 

ATTN: Classlfled Library 

ATTN. J Grote 

IRT Corp 

ATTN. J Hengle 

ATTN W Macklin 

JAYCOR 

ATTN E. Almquist 

ATTN R. Sullivan 

Kaman Sciences Carp 

ATTN u. cox 

ATTN F. Shelton 

Kaman 

Kaman 

Mantech 

Martin 

Martin 

McDonnell Douglas 

ATTN. Tech Library 

McLean Rsch Ctr, Inc 

ATTN 

McMillan Science 

ATTN. 

Mission Research 

ATTN 

ORI, Inc 

ATTN 

ATTN 

Pacific-Sierra 

ATTN 

ATTN 

Pacific-Sierra 

ATTN 

ATTN 

R & D Associates 

2 cy 

2 cy 

R & 

Rand 

D 

Science Corp 

ATTN. T Long 

ATTN. E. Daugs 

Tempo 

ATTN. DASIAC 

International Corp 

ATTN. President 

Marietta 

ATTN F 

ATTN: M 

Marietta 

ATTN J 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN. 

ATTN. 

ATTN 

ATTN 

Associates 

ATTN 

ATTN 

ATTN. 

Corp 

ATTN. 

ATTN. 

ATTN. 

ATTN 

Raytheon Co 

ATTN 

Corp 

Marion 

Yeager 

Corp 

Donathan 

Corp 

W Schllling 

Assoc, 

W. McMillan 

Corp 

Tech Library 

B But 

R. Wiles 

Rsch Corp 

G Lang 

H Brode, 

Rsch Corp 

G 

D 

A. 

A 

R 

R. 

W 

J 

t 

P 

5 

Dot 

W. 

J. 

J 

J. 

V 

T 

Moe 

Gormley 

Lynn 

Field 

Port 

Montqomery 

Graham 

Lewis 

Carson 

Haas 

BorJon 

Control 

Houser 

Begston 

Thompson 

Dlqby 

Jackson 

Parker 

Library 

II Brltton 

Svc 

Inc 

Chairman SAGE 

121 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) __.-

SRI International University of Rochester 

ATTN W. Jaye ATTN NAVWAG 

ATTN G Abrahamson 

ATTN J. Naar Rockwell International 

ATTN R. Tldwell ATTN J Howe 

SRI International S-CUBED 

ATTN J Scholz ATTN K Pyatt 

System Planning & Analysis, Inc Santa Fe Corp ATTN P Lantz ATTN. D Paoluccl 

System Planning Corp 

ATTN W Robertson 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN J Martin 

ATTN: G. Parks ATTN: M Drake 

ATTN J Ballentine ATTN. Document Control 

ATTN: J. Jones ATTN J Warner 

ATTN: C Whittenbury T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc ATTN. J Beyster ATTN T Dupuy 

Science Applications, Inc 

Tetra Tech, inc ATTN J Goldstein 

ATTN F. Bothwell ATTN L Goure 

ATTN: J Shannon 

TRW Electronics & Defense Sector ATTN. J. McGahan 

ATTN. D Scally ATTN. W Layson ATTN. R Burnett ATTN J Foster 

ATTN R. Craver ATTN N Lipner 

ATTN B. Bennett 

TRW Electronics & Defense Sector ATTN: Dot Control 

ATTN P Da1 4 cy ATTN J. Goetz 

4 cy ATTN S. Jones 

TRW Electronics & Defense SeCtOr 4 cy ATTN J. Klemm 

ATTN R Anspach 4 cy ATTN T. McCartin 

4 cy ATTN R. Weitz 

Vector Research, Inc 

ATTN S Bonder Science Appllcatlons, Inc 

4 cy ATTN D Kaul 

122