PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH A. KARPEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 97-1279

INOVA HEALTH SYSTEM SERVICES, t/a

INOVA Health System, t/a

Cameron Glen Care Center,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CA-96-347)

Argued: December 3, 1997

Decided: January 27, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Ervin wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Murnaghan and Judge Luttig joined.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Cheryl Kornblatt Brunner, Manassas, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen William Robinson, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE &

BOOTHE, L.L.P., McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

Elizabeth Karpel, an African-American nurse, sued her former

employer, Inova Health System Services, on claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment

for Inova on all counts. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

In January 1992, Ms. Karpel was hired as a Licensed Practical

Nurse (LPN) by Cameron Glen Care Center, an affiliate of Inova.

Karpel had 18 years of experience as an LPN.

The incident that Karpel believes precipitated her employment

problems took place in February 1993. In the "Gonzalez incident,"

Karpel filled out a Quality Care Control Report indicating that a white

LPN failed to resuscitate Garcia Gonzalez, a patient at the facility,

even though there was no Do Not Resuscitate order. An Advanced

Directive was found later, indicating that Gonzalez did not want

resuscitation, and the hospital only gave the white LPN verbal counseling regarding the breach of hospital policy. Karpel claims that the

white nursing staff reacted negatively to a black nurse criticizing a

white nurse, and began a "campaign of harassment" directed against

her.

In March of 1993, Karpel received a verbal warning for prepouring medication, although she denied pre-pouring it. Later that

month, she had an unsatisfactory "medpass" (observation by a nursing

supervisor of a nurse passing medications to residents) with a 22%

error rate. In April she received a written warning (later reduced to

verbal) as a result of her unsatisfactory medpass and for miswriting

a DNR order. In May 1993 Karpel filed a charge of discrimination

with the EEOC.

On July 8, 1993, Karpel received a written warning for eating in

the lounge. On July 12 a memo was issued to clarify the eating policy.

It stated that, effective July 14, there would be no eating allowed on

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the unit. On July 13, however, the day before the clarified policy was

to take effect, Karpel received another written warning for eating in

the lounge on that day.

On July 23, 1993, the "Kaopectate incident" took place. In violation of general nursing practice, Karpel charted the medication prior

to administering it. She also violated nursing practice by destroying

that page on the patient's chart and by failing to report her errors

properly. Karpel claims that she destroyed the notes and rewrote them

because they were too messy to read, and alleges that white nurses

have destroyed nursing notes without being disciplined for this violation of policy.

As a result of the Kaopectate incident, Karpel was placed on

administrative leave on July 23 and the incident reported to the Virginia Department of Health Professionals. Karpel was given a written

warning about the incident on August 16, but it was eventually

removed from her file as part of the grievance procedure. In addition,

in January the Acting Administrator of Cameron Glen informed the

Department of Health Professionals that the incident should never

have been reported.

In August 1993, Karpel was transferred from the Shepard's Way

unit to the Williamsburg unit. There was no reduction in wages or

benefits, but the transfer adversely affected Karpel's shift schedule

and forced her to work in a smoking environment, aggravating her

hypertension. Inova claimed that the transfer was made so that Karpel

could receive closer supervision and so there would be other LPNs

available to relieve her for meals. Karpel had complained from the

beginning of her employment that white nurses were relieved for

meals and breaks, while she was not. According to Regina Freestone,

the Director of Nursing, Karpel could not be relieved while on Shepherd's Way because she was the only LPN on duty there; multiple

LPNs worked in the Williamsburg unit.

Karpel requested in writing that she be transferred back to Shepherd's Way. Although the letter did not mention her problem with

smoke, the administration heard of her difficulties with the smoke

through Human Resources. Karpel was told there were no openings

on the Shepherd's Way unit immediately available. Karpel argued

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that because a smoker was transferred from Williamsburg to Shepherd's Way in order to move her onto that unit, the switch could

merely have been undone. According to Inova administrators, this

was not considered.

On January 5, 1994, Karpel discussed with Freestone the possibility of a transfer to another unit because of her concerns about the

smoke on the Williamsburg unit. According to Freestone, Karpel

refused the suggested transfer, and no other openings for LPN became

available on any other unit before Karpel's termination.

On January 12, 1994, Karpel received a verbal warning for continued medpass errors, and on January 19 had a medpass with a 17%

error rate. Also in January, she was counseled about her repeated tardiness. On February 14, Karpel received an unsatisfactory evaluation.

Her tardiness, eating in the lounge, poor medication passes, and failure to complete monthly summaries were all identified as areas in

which she needed to show improvement. Her written comments to the

evaluation indicate that she believed it to be a result of racial discrimination and retaliation, and that she was one of the best nurses at Cameron Glen.

On February 15, Karpel was given a day of decision-making leave;

she indicated on her return that she would continue her employment

at Cameron Glen. Later in February, Karpel was told she needed to

take leadership classes. She indicated to her supervisors that they

needed to inform her attorneys why she should attend the classes and

that she did not plan to attend them -- although she did later agree

to attend on the advice of her attorneys. The earliest date she would

have been able to attend the classes was in April. On February 28,

Karpel sent a letter to Freestone, indicating that further correspondence from Inova should be sent to her attorneys. In her deposition,

Karpel explained that she did not intend this to apply to job-related

communications.

On March 14, Karpel was terminated by Inova. The reasons given

for her termination were her refusal to participate in her employee

development plan, refusal to discuss her employment development

with her supervisor, failure to complete monthly summaries, and

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excessive tardiness. Karpel was the only nurse who failed to complete

any monthly summaries.

To support her claim of racial harassment, Karpel points to a number of incidents in which she alleges Inova responded differently

according to the race of the nurse involved. She first points to the

Gonzalez incident, described above, in which the white LPN allegedly at fault was given only verbal counseling. She also directs us to

the "Chapman incident," in which a white male nurse abused a young,

black, quadriplegic patient by roughing him up and taking his temperature rectally against his wishes. Karpel alleges that Inova refused to

take any action until 45 days later, when it received corroborating testimony from two staff members. The male nurse was then reported to

the state board and terminated by Inova. Finally, she points to the

Kaopectate incident, described above, following which Karpel was

put on administrative leave and reported to the state board.

After being terminated by Inova, Karpel worked as a nurse at Camelot Hall. She was terminated there when the administration at Camelot Hall discovered that she had failed to list her employment at

Cameron Glen on her application. Karpel claims that she did not disclose her employment at Inova to Camelot Hall because she feared

what her former employers might say about her.

Karpel brought suit against Inova, alleging violation of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866, violation of Title VII, and other claims. Inova

moved for and, after oral argument, was granted summary judgment

on all counts. Karpel appeals, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her hostile work environment, racial discrimination, and retaliation claims.

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

See Higgins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167

(4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In determining whether a genu-

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ine issue of material fact is in dispute, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986).

III.

Karpel contends that her complaint set forth a claim for relief for

racial harassment based on a hostile work environment, citing language in her complaint alleging that Inova engaged in "unlawful

employment practices" and that she was "continually harassed." She

further argues that this claim should proceed to trial because Inova

failed to move for summary judgment on the claim. Because Karpel

failed adequately to set forth her hostile work environment claim in

the district court, we affirm summary judgment on the claim.

Under the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to set out in detail

the facts upon which her claim is based. All that is required in a

pleading is a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The main

purpose of the complaint is to provide the defendant"fair notice of

what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Comet Enters. Ltd. v. AirA-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 860 (4th Cir. 1997).

Even under the liberal standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a plaintiff "must at least set forth enough details so

as to provide defendant and the court with a fair idea of the basis of

the complaint and the legal grounds claimed for recovery." Self

Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466

(9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Karpel's complaint notably failed

to include any details by which defendant Inova or the district court

could have been put on notice that she intended to pursue a hostile

environment claim. Indeed, not until after summary judgment had

already been granted by the district court did Karpel submit the depositions which include the factual allegations upon which such a claim

might be predicated. Consequently, the district court's grant of summary judgment properly included Karpel's hostile environment claim.

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Karpel's failure to raise this claim in the district court means that

this court will not consider it. We have repeatedly held that issues

raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered.

See, e.g., Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993);

National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 318 (4th Cir.

1988). "Exceptions to this general rule are made only in very limited

circumstances, such as where refusal to consider the newly-raised

issue would be plain error or would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Muth, 1 F.3d at 250 (citing Hanson, 859 F.2d at

318). We can find no evidence in the record that such circumstances

exist here.

IV.

Karpel next contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her race-based discrimination claim under Title

VII. We find, however, that Karpel failed to establish the necessary

element of intentional discrimination on the part of Inova, and therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states

that:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

--

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual's race....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the

initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by raising an inference that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Wileman v. Frank, 979 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1992). This can be done

either through direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or by using the

four-part McDonnell Douglas scheme which provides an inference of

discriminatory intent. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). In this case, that would require Ms. Karpel

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to show: "(1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she

was qualified for her job and her job performance was satisfactory;

(3) that, in spite of her qualifications and performance, she was fired;

and (4) that the position remained open to similarly qualified applicants after her dismissal." Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d

452, 455 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;

Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).

Karpel fails to make a prima facie showing of discrimination under

either approach. The record is devoid of any direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Karpel alleges that intent can be inferred from

Inova's attempts to "build up a file" on her. She fails to present evidence, however, that Inova's recording of her deficiencies as an

employee was racially motivated or that she was written up differently from other similarly situated employees. Cf. Few v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1988) (discriminatory intent found where record showed dramatic increase in write-ups

and that plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated male

employees).

Because the record clearly demonstrates that Karpel's job performance was unsatisfactory, we are also unable to infer discriminatory

intent under the McDonnell Douglas scheme. Karpel was repeatedly

tardy, had multiple inadequate medpasses, and failed to submit any of

her required monthly summaries. Karpel does present evidence that

there were other employees who were late, or had inadequate medpasses, or were delinquent in submitting their monthly summaries.

This does not nullify the fact that Karpel's job performance was inadequate. As the district court correctly observed in its grant of summary judgment, "It would defy logic to look at each sort of

attendance, disciplinary, or performance problem in a vacuum; it is

the conglomeration of these issues that made Ms. Karpel an unsatisfactory employee that Inova was justified in terminating." See also

Cook v. CSX Trans. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]o

focus on one piece of the record without considering the whole would

distort the permissible inferences to be drawn."). Karpel presents no

evidence that any other employee had nearly the same problems as

she did across the board. Neither does she dispute the evidence showing that she was the only nurse who failed to complete any of the

required monthly summaries. In short, the evidence that Karpel's job

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performance was unsatisfactory is overwhelming. Any attempt to

infer discriminatory intent on the part of Inova therefore fails on the

second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.

V.

Finally, Karpel argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her retaliation claims. Two such claims were

advanced: retaliatory actions during her original employment with

Inova and retaliatory action that caused her to be discharged from her

subsequent job with Camelot Hall.

Under section 704(a) of Title VII, it is an "unlawful employment

practice for an employer to discriminate against any[employee] ...

because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

(1994). The series of proofs and burdens outlined in McDonnell

Douglas apply to retaliation claims. See Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). Therefore, in order to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took

adverse action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the

two. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the

employer does so, the plaintiff then bears the burden of showing that

the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. Id.

A

Karpel successfully established a prima facie case of retaliation

during her employment at Inova. She clearly engaged in protected

activity when she filed her EEOC complaint, and Inova took adverse

actions when it transferred her to a smoking unit, investigated her for

allegedly wrongfully administering medication, and later terminated

her. Although Karpel presents little or no direct evidence of a causal

connection between her protected activity and Inova's adverse action,

little is required. See, e.g., McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 980

(4th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff stated prima facie case even though there

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was no evidence of causal connection other than the fact that plaintiff

was fired after bringing a lawsuit). Karpel therefore established a

prima facie case of retaliation based on Inova's actions while she was

employed with them.

Inova, however, has also met its burden by advancing legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse actions. Inova stated that it

transferred Karpel to a smoking unit so she could receive increased

supervision and to allow her to be relieved for meals, as she had

requested. Inova stated that she remained in the smoking unit because

it had no suitable position open for her in a non-smoking unit, and the

record shows that Freestone did offer Karpel a transfer after Freestone

became aware of Karpel's problems with smoke, but Karpel refused

this transfer. According to Inova, no other suitable openings became

available before her termination. Karpel has presented no evidence to

rebut the reasons given by Inova for her transfer to a smoking unit or

to show them to be pretextual. Karpel alleges that pretext could be

inferred from Inova's failure to consider simply undoing the original

transfer. This allegation is unsubstantiated, especially in light of the

fact that Inova made at least some effort to transfer Karpel onto a

non-smoking unit once it became aware of her preference. Because

she presented no evidence that the reasons given for her transfer were

pretextual, Karpel failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

The obvious, non-retaliatory explanation for investigating the incident in which Karpel was alleged to have wrongfully administered

medication (the "Kaopectate incident"), is that Inova reasonably

believed that the allegations could be true. In addition, Karpel admits

to destroying a page in the patient's chart, in violation of nursing

practice. Karpel seeks to establish that reporting this incident to the

state board was pretextual by pointing to the Gonzalez and Chapman

incidents. These incidents involved very different types of professional breaches and are therefore difficult to compare. However, in

the Gonzalez incident, the white nurse involved was disciplined, even

though she was not reported to the state board. The white nurse who

assaulted Chapman was reported as soon as Inova confirmed that the

incident had occurred. Because any differences in reporting these

three incidents can be credited to the differences in the incidents

themselves, Karpel fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.

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Inova's termination of Karpel was based on her unsatisfactory job

performance, including her tardiness and failure to complete her

monthly summaries. Karpel's problems in these areas are welldocumented, and she presented no evidence showing that the reasons

given by Inova for her termination were pretextual. Because she is

unable to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion that the legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons Inova proffers for its adverse actions during the course of her employment there are pretexts, we affirm the

district court's grant of summary judgment.

B

Karpel also argues that Inova retaliated against her after her termination by informing her next employer that she had worked at Cameron Glen. The district court held that this could not have constituted

an adverse employment action because Karpel's employment with

Inova had terminated by that time. Since the district court's decision,

however, the Supreme Court has overturned the case upon which this

holding was based, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, rev'd, 117

S. Ct. 843 (1997). In Robinson the Supreme Court, reversing this circuit, held that the term "employees" in § 704(a) of Title VII is to be

construed to include former employees. 117 S. Ct. at 849.

We do not need to decide whether the Supreme Court's Robinson

decision applies retroactively to Inova's actions against Karpel after

she had been terminated because, even assuming arguendo that the

decision is retroactive, Inova's action in informing Camelot Hall of

Karpel's former employment at Cameron Glen does not constitute

"adverse action." There is no evidence that Freestone did anything

more than disclose that Karpel had worked for Inova; Freestone did

not reveal anything about Karpel's employment history or any pending litigation. Karpel's subsequent termination from her Camelot Hall

employment was based on the fact that she had fraudulently failed to

reveal her period of employment at Inova to her new employer. In the

absence of any adverse action on the part of Inova, Karpel fails to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation after her termination.

VI.

In conclusion, we hold that because Karpel failed to raise her hostile work environment claim in the district court, she is precluded

 11
from bringing this claim on appeal. In addition, because Karpel failed

to establish the necessary element of intentional discrimination on the

part of Inova, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on her race-based discrimination claim. Finally, we affirm summary judgment on Karpel's retaliation claims because she was unable

to rebut Inova's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse

actions during the course of her employment and failed to show Inova

took any adverse action against her after her termination. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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