In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1500

RONALD BATES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 1564 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2013 — DECIDE AUGUST 9, 2013

Before MANION and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and BARKER,

District Judge.

*

Honorable Sarah Evans Barker, District Judge for the Southern District of *

Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 No. 12-1500

MANION, Circuit Judge. Ronald Bates, a black firefighter

with the Chicago Fire Department, was demoted one level

from his at-will position as a District Chief to a Deputy District

Chief position. The Fire Commissioner who demoted him and

the firefighter who replaced him were also black. Nonetheless,

Bates claims that his demotion was based on racial discrimination. The district court dismissed several of Bates’s claims

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then granted

summary judgment against him on the remaining claims. We

affirm.

I. Facts

Ronald Bates is a black firefighter who joined the Chicago

Fire Department in 1977 and gradually rose through the ranks.

He was promoted to Lieutenant in 1980, Captain in 1987,

Battalion Chief in 1989, and Deputy District Chief in 1998. In

2000, Fire Commissioner James Joyce appointed Bates to one of

seven District Chief positions in the Chicago Fire Department.

A District Chief is a member of the Fire Commissioner’s

personnelmanagement teamandholds an at-will position with

no expectation of continued employment. During Bates’s 

tenure as a District Chief, Joyce had no complaints about

Bates’s job performance. Indeed, Bates instituted a diversity

program in his district and was involved in a training program

for newly appointed chiefs, and his work appears to have been

well received within the Chicago Fire Department. 

But Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and

Cortez Trotter became the newFireCommissioner.Trotter, like

Bates, is black. Trotter chose his own management team, and

on May 24, 2004, he issued a personnel order that contained a
No. 12-1500 3

list of thirty promotions, demotions, and lateral reassignments

for at-will positions in the Chicago Fire Department. These 1

appointments consisted of eighteen promotions (eight black,

ten non-black); eight demotions (three black, five non-black);

and four lateral reassignments (two black, two non-black).2

Bates was one of the demotions. Trotter demoted him to a

Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a

floating assignment not associated with any particular district.

Among the seven District Chiefs, Bates was the only one

demoted. The other six District Chiefs were either promoted

(one black, four non-black) or laterally reassigned (one nonblack).

Trotter promoted Nicholas Russell to Bates’s District Chief

position, and like Bates and Trotter, Russell was also black.

Russell had started working with the Chicago Fire Department

just a few years after Trotter began working there, and Russell

had been a Battalion Chief when Trotter promoted him to

Bates’s District Chief position. Significantly, Russell had been

the president of the African American Firefighters League for

more than a decade, and had led protests against racial

discriminationwithinthe Chicago Fire Department during that

time. Overall, Trotter’s new appointments to the District Chief

The order initially contained a list of thirty-one appointments, but an

1

addendum dated May 26, 2004, deleted a name from the list.

The district court’s opinion and the briefs contain minor discrepancies in

2

these numbers, but these discrepancies are not significant enough to affect

the outcome of this appeal. 
4 No. 12-1500

positions increased the number of black firefighters serving as

District Chiefs from two to three. 

Bates worked in his new Deputy District Chief position for

a few months, then took a year-long medical leave. At the end

of his leave, Bates was unable to continue his work, and he

retired from the Chicago Fire Department on November 13,

2005. On March 16, 2005, during his medical leave, Bates filed

a pro se complaint, which he subsequently amended with the

assistance of counsel on September 27, 2005. The amended

complaint containedfour counts alleging that Bates’s demotion

had been motivated by racial discrimination. It named Joyce,

Trotter, and two District Chiefs as defendants in their individual capacities and as agents of the City of Chicago in their

official capacities. Bates sued Trotter because Trotter had made

the decision to demote him, and Bates also sued Joyce and two

District Chiefs because they had allegedly influenced Trotter’s

decision. Count I was a Title VII claim against the City of

Chicago, Count II was a § 1983 claim against all defendants,

Count III was a § 1981 claim against the individual defendants,

and Count IV was a state law claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress against all defendants. 

The district court ultimately resolved all counts in favor of

the defendants. The court dismissed Counts II and III under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for all defendants

except Trotter, and dismissed Count IV for all defendants. The

court allowed discovery forthe remaining counts, then entered

summary judgment on Count I in favor of the City of Chicago

(the only defendant named in that count) and on Counts II and

III in favor of Trotter (the only defendant remaining in those

counts). Bates filed a timely appeal of these rulings.
No. 12-1500 5

II. Discussion

We first examine whether the district court erred in

granting summary judgment on Count I in favor of the City of

Chicago and on Counts II and III in favor of Trotter. We then

examine whether the district court erred in dismissing Counts

II and III against the other defendants under Rule 12(b)(6).3

A. Claims Resolved on Summary Judgment

Bates alleges that Trotter and the City of Chicago demoted

him because of racial discrimination that violated Title VII

(Count I), § 1983 (Count II), and § 1981 (Count III). The district

court granted summary judgment on these claims in favor of

the defendants. We review a district court’s grant of a motion

for summary judgment de novo, and we view all facts and

inferences in favor of the non-moving party (here, Bates). Good

v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Bates argues that he has presented sufficient evidence of

racial discrimination to survive summary judgment under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).4

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “a plaintiff must

produce evidence that he (1) belongs to a protected class, (2)

met his employer’s legitimate performance expectations, (3)

 Bates does not contest the district court’s dismissal of Count IV. 3

Even though Bates was replaced by another black firefighter, that fact is

4

not dispositive, and we must still analyze Bates’s arguments through the

McDonnell Douglas framework. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d

157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“An employee may be able to show

that his race ... tipped the scales against him, without regard to the

demographic characteristics of his replacement.”). 
6 No. 12-1500

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated

worse than similarly situated employees outside the protected

class.” Rodgers v. White, 657 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2011). If the

plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the burden shifts to the

defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the employment action. Id. And if the defendant offers such a

reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant’s reason was merely a pretext. Id. The McDonnell

Douglas framework applies equally to claims under Title VII,

§ 1983, and § 1981. Id.

The district court concluded that Bates could not establish

a prima facie case because he failed to prove the fourth

McDonnell Douglas element: whether Bates was treated worse

than similarly situated firefighters who were not black. We

have held that “[t]he similarly situated inquiry is a flexible,

common-sense one that asks, at bottom, whether ‘there are

enough common factors ... to allow for a meaningful comparison in order to divine whether intentional discrimination was

at play.’” Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Barricks v. Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir.

2007)). “[T]he comparator must still be similar enough ‘to

eliminate confounding variables, such as differing roles,

performance histories, or decision-making personnel, [so as to]

isolate the critical independent variable: complaints about

discrimination.’” Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 526 F.3d 1054, 1061

(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474

F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)).

We agree with the district court that Bates failed to prove

the “similarly situated” element because “the numbers do not
No. 12-1500 7

support the claim of race discrimination.” Across the board,

Trotter’s promotions, demotions, and lateral transfers did not

demonstrate any clear racial bias. Of the eight demotions, five

were for non-black firefighters, which suggests that Trotter

demoted both black and non-black firefighters without regard

to race. Bates therefore lacks evidence that he was treated

worse than similarly situated firefighters. See Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] pattern,

in which blacks sometimes do better than whites and sometimes do worse, being random with respect to race, is not

evidence of racial discrimination.”). 

Bates contends that we shouldlimit our “similarly situated”

comparison to the appointmentsofthe other six District Chiefs.

Of the seven District Chiefs, Bates was the only one demoted.

The other six District Chiefs had either been promoted (one

black, four non-black) or laterally reassigned (one non-black).

But we see no need to exclude Trotter’s other appointments

from our analysis. Trotter made all thirty appointments in the

same personnel order, and they consisted of a comprehensive

scheme to change the leadership in the at-will positions within

the Chicago Fire Department. And if we were to scrutinize the

District Chief comparisons more closely, we would note that

the other District Chiefs had qualifications and experiences that

distinguished them from Bates. For example, Trotter promoted

District Chief James Kehoe to a position that Kehoe had held

under a former Commissioner. Bates, however, had never held

a rank higher thanDistrict Chief. Trotter also promoted District

Chief William Donohue because Donohue had demonstrated

an aggressive management style while handling a scandal in

his district. Bates does not assert that he had similar experi-
8 No. 12-1500

ence. Therefore, if we were to closely scrutinize the records and

accomplishments of the other District Chiefs, we would still

find that Bates is unable to show that he was treated worse

than a “similarly situated” group of non-black District Chiefs. 

Even if Bates were able to satisfy the “similarly situated”

element and establish a prima facie case, Trotter asserted a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to explainhisdecisionto

demote Bates. Trottertestified during a deposition that he had

demoted Bates because Bates’s management style did not align

with his own:

In looking at the goals and looking at my needs for

the Fire Department, specifically [Bates’s] District, I

felt that the person that I was appointing was better

able to carry out my goals and reflect my management style. ... 

... 

... I have an aggressive management style. I look for

high energy, enthusiasm. I look for people that

are—that appear, at least to me, to be engaged in

what they’re doing.

When asked specifically about Bates, Trotter testified that

he remembered “not being impressed by the overall demeanor

or the enthusiasm that I saw.” We have readily accepted such

concerns about an employee’s performance and leadership

skills “as legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons; indeed, they

are a staple of employer responses in these situations.” Sattar

v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998).
No. 12-1500 9

Bates would then have to show that Trotter’s reason for

Bates’s demotion was merely a pretext. To show pretext, a

plaintiff “must identify such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, or contradictions in [the defendant’s] proffered

reasons that a reasonable person could find them unworthy of

credence and hence infer that [the defendant] did not act for

the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Boumehdi v. Plastag

Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can

do this by showing that the defendant’s reason for the adverse

employment action (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually

motivate the adverse employment action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the action. Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc.,

289 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002). “The focus of a pretext

inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason was honest,

not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered.” 

Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Bates attempts to establish pretext by arguing that Trotter’s

reason for his demotion had no basis in fact. First, Bates claims

that Trotter changed his reason for the demotion, and Bates

argues that this alleged inconsistency demonstrates the

unreliability of Trotter’s explanation. Bates claims that Trotter

testified that Bates was a “good fit” for Trotter’s management

team in his second deposition, even though Trotter had

previously testified that Bates was not a “good fit” in his first

deposition. But Trotter’s statements did not create an inconsistency in his position; they merely reflected Trotter’s desire to

keep Bates within his management team, but not at the level of

aDistrict Chief. Bates further argues that his work performance

and management skills could not have been Trotter’s reason

for the demotion because, even though Trotter demoted Bates,
10 No. 12-1500

Trotter still retained Bates in an at-will position and invited

him to a management retreat. But again, Trotter’s actions

simply demonstrated that Trotter wanted to keep Bates in his

management team, but not as a District Chief.

Second, Bates argues that Trotter’s reason for his demotion

is based on factual inferences that are impermissible on

summary judgment. Bates cites conflicting evidence in the

record about the extent of his relationship with Trotter, and he

claims that these discrepancies are genuine issues of material

fact that preclude a summary judgment ruling. But any

inconsistencies in the depositions regarding the relationship

between Trotter and Bates are not material to the resolution of

this case. The record established that Trotter and Bates had met

in person at least several times, and they had worked together

in the Chicago Fire Department for decades. Trotter therefore

had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire

Department to support his assertionthat Bates’s demeanor and

level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management

style. 

Finally, Bates argues that we should not infer that Trotter

opposes racial discrimination simply because he is black, and

therefore would not discriminate against another black

firefighter. Although it is possible for employers to discriminate against members of their own race, Bates provided no

evidence that Trotter was racially biased against black

firefighters. Instead, the record shows that Trotter promoted

many black firefighters to at-will positions in the Chicago Fire

Department. He promoted eight black firefighters in the

personnel order dated May 24, 2004, and he increased the

number of black District Chiefs from two to three. Indeed,
No. 12-1500 11

Trotter replaced Bates with Russell, who was also a black

firefighter. And not only did Russell and Bates share the same

race, Russell had been the president of the African American

Firefighters League for more than a decade. Trotter was well

aware of Russell’s advocacy for the African American

Firefighters League, and Trotter and Russell had even been on

a television show together and discussed Russell’s work

against racial discrimination. Russell’s activism is likely what

Trotter referred to as the “high energy [and] enthusiasm” that

the Fire Department needed “to carry out [his] goals and

reflect [his] management style.” Therefore, we affirm the

district court’s ruling that Bates failed to establish a prima facie

case, and even if Bates were able to do so, he would be unable

to show that Trotter’s reason for Bates’s demotion was merely

pretext. 

B. Dismissed Claims 

Bates further alleges that “Trotter was influenced by” Joyce

and two District Chiefs, and that Trotter demoted Bates as a

result of this influence. The amended complaint therefore

named Joyce and the two District Chiefs as defendants to the

§ 1983 claim (Count II) and the § 1981 claim (Count III). The

district court dismissed these claims against Joyce and the two

District Chiefs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

because it concluded that these defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity from a “cat’s paw” theory of liability.

But Bates denies that he is invoking the “cat’s paw” theory

of liability. The amended complaint, however, specifically

alleged that “Trotter was influenced by” Joyce and two District

Chiefs, which is a classic example of a “cat’s paw” theory of
12 No. 12-1500

liability. Joyce and the two District Chiefs lacked the authority

to demote Bates on their own, and the amended complaint

even conceded that only “Defendant Trotter made the decision

to demote Bates.” Therefore, the amended complaint alleged

a theory of “cat’s paw” liability, but Bates has since waived

that theory.

5

On appeal, Bates seems to frame his argument as one of

direct liability, in which Joyce and the two District Chiefs were

“actively involved” in Bates’s demotion. This hardly helps his

case. Even if these were the allegations in the amended

complaint (which they were not), we would find that the

amended complaint failed to specifically allege how Joyce and

the two District Chiefs were “actively involved” in Trotter’s

decision to demote Bates. The amended complaint was vague,

never explained its case, and lumped the defendants together

without sufficient detail.

Joyce was the outgoing Fire Commissioner who was replaced by Trotter, 5

and the two District Chiefs were promoted further up into Trotter’s

management team in the May 24, 2004, personnel order. All three were

white. Because of Joyce’s experience in managing the Chicago Fire

Department, and the policy-making roles of the two promoted District

Chiefs, we assume that Trotter would naturally have considered the advice

of these defendants (among others) as a necessary part of reorganizing the

Department. But Bates alleges that this advice was based not on the

defendants’ professional judgment, but on the defendants’ alleged racial

biases. The amended complaint made nothing but vague and generalized

allegations about the racial attitudes ofthese defendants, and failed to make

any specific allegations about how racism was the basis for any advice these

defendants gave to Trotter.
No. 12-1500 13

But even if Bates had not waived his claims against Joyce

and the two District Chiefs, and even if the district court had

erred by dismissing the § 1983 and § 1981 claims against them

because of qualified immunity, such an error would be

harmless under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61. The § 1983

and § 1981 claims proceeded to summary judgment against

Trotter, and as discussed in Section II.A, Trotter asserted a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that explained his

decision to demote Bates. Trottertestified in his deposition that

his decision was based on his own goals and management

style, and he gave no indication that he had received any

racially motivated advice from Joyce orthe two District Chiefs.

III. Conclusion

The district court correctly determined that Bates was

unable to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, and even if he could establish such a case,

Bates would be unable to show that Trotter’s reason for Bates’s

demotion was merely pretext. Additionally, the district court

correctly dismissed the § 1983 and § 1981 claims against Joyce

and the two District Chiefs for allegedly influencing Trotter’s

decision to demote Bates. We therefore AFFIRM the district

court’s rulings.