Filed 8/28/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Robert Harrison, Judge. Affirmed.

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, County 

Counsel, Rosanne Wong, Assistant County Counsel, and William 

C. Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

Conservatorship of the Person and 

Estate of K.P.

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF THE 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

K.P.,

Objector and Appellant.

 B291510

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ZE032603)
2

Conservatee K.P. (K.P.) appeals from a judgment entered 

following a jury trial on the petition by the Public Guardian of 

the County of Los Angeles (public guardian) for reappointment as 

K.P.’s conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPSA) 

(Welf. & Inst. Code § 5000 et seq.).1 After a three-day trial, the 

jury found that K.P. was gravely disabled pursuant to the LPSA, 

and the trial court granted the public guardian’s petition for 

reappointment. K.P. argues that the court erred in instructing 

the jury pursuant to California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 

4000, which sets forth the elements of a claim that an individual 

is gravely disabled. Specifically, K.P. contends that the trial 

court erred in omitting a third element from CACI No. 4000, 

which required a finding that the individual “is unwilling or 

unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment.” We find no 

reversible error and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

The LPSA

“The [LPSA] governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, 

and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are 

dangerous or gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.)” (Conservatorship 

of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 (John L.).) Under the 

LPSA, the court may “appoint a conservator of the person for one 

who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.), so that 

he or she may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and 

placement (§ 5350.1).” (John L., at p. 142.) The LPSA defines a 

person who is “gravely disabled” as one who is “unable to provide 

for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” 

(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)

____________________________________________________________

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & 

Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
3

“An LPSA conservatorship automatically terminates after 

one year, and reappointment of the conservator must be sought 

by petition. (§ 5361.)” (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 143.)2

Conservatorship reappointment pretrial proceedings

On April 19, 2018, the public guardian filed a petition for 

reappointment as conservator of K.P. under sections 5350 

through 5368. On May 5, 2018, K.P. filed a demand for jury trial.

At the trial readiness conference on June 14, 2018, the 

public guardian filed a memorandum dated June 12, 2018, 

containing information from Dr. Sara Mehraban, Program 

Coordinator at Gateways Satellite, where K.P. was being treated. 

Dr. Mehraban observed that recently K.P. had become paranoid. 

In May 2018, he was sitting outside and was accidentally 

“grazed” by a basketball. He then charged a fellow resident who 

he attempted to stab with a pen because K.P. believed the other 

individual had intended to hit him with the basketball. K.P. 

continued to try to attack the other resident even with staff 

intervention, and had to be hospitalized because he would not let 

go of the situation and still wanted to attack the other resident 

later in the day.

Dr. Mehraban reported that K.P.’s mother was of the view 

that K.P. does not have a mental illness. K.P.’s mother also 

____________________________________________________________

2 We note that the reappointment at issue terminated on 

June 3, 2019. Because the conservatorship from which K.P.

appeals has terminated, this appeal is technically moot. 

(Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 709.) 

However, because a conservatorship is brief in comparison with 

the appellate process, this issue is one that is “‘capable of 

recurring, yet of evading review because of mootness.’” (Ibid.) 

We therefore conclude it is appropriate to address the issue in 

this case.
4

believed that K.P.’s medications were making him act as he did, 

and she did not believe that the recent reported incident of 

aggression took place. Dr. Mehraban thought mother’s visits 

were negatively affecting K.P. and intended to revoke them until 

K.P. improved. Dr. Mehraban was aware of the upcoming trial 

and wanted the court to be aware of this information.

Trial

A three-day jury trial commenced on June 20, 2018. K.P. 

appeared with his counsel.

Preliminary matters

Prior to trial the court addressed the ground rules for trial, 

emphasizing the need to focus the jurors on the question of 

whether K.P. was gravely disabled. The court asked counsel not 

to talk about the length of, or results of, a conservatorship. K.P.’s 

counsel argued that the jury should be made aware of the length 

of the conservatorship and that forced medication could be 

administered against a person’s will. The court said counsel 

should remain within the framework of CACI No. 4000. K.P.’s 

counsel objected to the instruction. The court ordered K.P.’s 

counsel not to refer to the time limits of a conservatorship.

K.P.’s counsel then addressed CACI No. 4000, by arguing,

“there was a time where for decades we would have that element 

three.” K.P.’s counsel conceded that the third element had 

dropped out of consistent use in CACI No. 4000. However, he 

advocated for its inclusion here because he intended to show that 

K.P. was “willing to voluntarily accept treatment.” K.P.’s counsel 

acknowledged that there had been a “so-called ‘Missouri 

Compromise’” where the element of willingness and ability to 

voluntarily accept meaningful treatment had been added to CACI 

No. 4002, in the very last sentence. K.P.’s counsel argued that 
5

this was insufficient because it was “thrown in at the bottom of 

some other less consequential later jury instruction.”

The court observed that case law indicated that the version 

of CACI No. 4000 the court would provide, properly laid out the 

elements that the public guardian needed to prove in order to 

show that an individual was gravely disabled. However, the jury 

should be able to consider willing, voluntary acceptance of 

treatment, therefore it was included in CACI No. 4002.

Opening arguments

The parties provided their respective opening statements to 

the jury. The public guardian said it would prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that K.P. had a mental disorder, and that as a 

result of that disorder, K.P. was gravely disabled.

K.P.’s counsel outlined the evidence that he would provide 

to show that K.P. was not gravely disabled. Counsel argued, “If 

anything, the evidence will show that he has a plan to take care 

of himself.” Counsel stated:

“So just keep in mind when you’re hearing all 

this evidence, and then, ultimately, you deliberate, 

it’s the county that’s got to convince you beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he’s gravely disabled which 

means, look, if he’s off conservatorship, he won’t have 

a stable place to stay; that he can’t take care of his 

basic food, clothing, or shelter and because it’s going 

to be an issue here, there is no viable alternative. By 

‘alternative’ meaning, look, what his family is able to 

do to help him out, it’s not enough. He’s still gravely 

disabled. So they have that extra burden here of 

showing there is no third-party assistance to help 

him out and that, ultimately, he’s unwilling to seek 

treatment.”
6

K.P.’s counsel finished with “If anything, the evidence 

shows he’s willing to continue with his treatment.”

Trial testimony

K.P.’s mother

K.P.’s counsel called Karen Celestine (mother), K.P.’s 

mother.3 On direct examination, mother testified that she 

believed her son had a mental illness; that she was willing to 

help him see a psychiatrist and help him fill prescriptions; that 

she believed he needed to continue taking his medications; and 

that she would insist that he take his medications if he resisted 

taking them.

Mother could not provide housing for K.P. However, she 

would help him find an apartment or board and care. She agreed 

to take him to a mental hospital if his symptoms returned or he 

was resisting taking his medications.

On cross-examination, mother was asked about her 

immediate plan for finding K.P. housing if he were to win his jury 

trial. Mother indicated that she “would find housing,” by “looking 

for him and going to talk to the people and . . . getting quotes and 

stuff.” When asked where K.P. would be staying during the 

“interim” period while she looked for housing, she responded, 

“Well, he’s at the facility right now. So I don’t know how that 

works.” K.P.’s medical doctor was still in place, and for his 

psychiatric and mental health issues, she testified “They refer 

him. He has referrals.” On redirect, mother indicated that she

would work with K.P.’s current social worker on discharge 

____________________________________________________________

3 The court had been advised, outside of the presence of the 

jury, that mother was starting a new job the following day and 

would not be available to return to court and testify. The court 

agreed that the witnesses would be called out of order.
7

planning. She typically worked during the week and visited K.P. 

on the weekends.

Dr. Sara Mehraban

Dr. Mehraban, the licensed clinical psychologist employed 

by the residential agency where K.P. was residing, was called by 

the public guardian to offer her expert opinion. She normally 

saw K.P. five days a week for nearly eight hours a day. She met 

with him individually and in groups.

Dr. Mehraban’s most recent examination of K.P. had been 

earlier that morning at the facility. Dr. Mehraban testified that 

K.P. had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a result of this 

disorder, K.P. experienced auditory hallucinations. During 

auditory hallucinations, he believes he is hearing voices, and 

responds to them. In addition, K.P. suffered from delusions, 

which are false beliefs that are in contradiction to reality. The 

false beliefs are considered bizarre. Dr. Mehraban testified that 

K.P.’s delusions tended to be paranoid, where he believed people 

were out to get him and people were out to hurt him. K.P. was 

often scared of people hurting him.

K.P. had experienced some delusions that morning. He 

requested to be in the witness protection program because he 

believed that a peer who had been standing near him was trying 

to attack him. K.P. expressed a desire to enter the witness 

protection program because he was afraid of that peer.

In addition to the above described symptoms of auditory 

hallucinations and delusions, K.P. also experienced symptoms of 

schizophrenia, such as not being motivated, not being able to 

socialize with other people, difficulty speaking, and poverty of 

speech.
8

Dr. Mehraban described the recent incident which resulted 

in K.P.’s hospitalization. She explained that K.P. believed he had 

been intentionally hit with a basketball, pursued an individual 

with a pen and was unable to be redirected. Dr. Mehraban 

explained that K.P.’s paranoia and fear could be so extreme that 

it caused him to act in ways that K.P. believes are self-defense, 

but which are not appropriate.

Dr. Mehraban informed the jury of the medications that 

K.P. takes for schizophrenia and heightened anxiety. She also 

explained her conversation about the medications with K.P., in 

which he had been inconsistent about his willingness to continue 

if he were to be released from the conservatorship. Dr. Mehraban 

was of the opinion that K.P. was not capable of providing for his 

basic food, shelter, and clothing without taking the medication. 

Nor did she expect he would continue taking the medication 

without the supervision of a conservator.

Dr. Mehraban explained “insight” as it relates to a 

mentally ill person. K.P. had the basic level of insight, meaning 

that he had some understanding that he had symptoms, however, 

he “minimizes them and doesn’t really understand where they 

come from.” K.P. had suggested at times the symptoms came 

from his medications, and that the medications were causing the 

symptoms.4 The highest level of insight would be the ability of 

an individual to effectively manage his or her symptoms, and 

K.P. did not meet that level. K.P. had declined to take his 

medications when he was not feeling well, even though he had 

____________________________________________________________

4 K.P.’s mother had also expressed to Dr. Mehraban that she 

believed K.P.’s medications were causing his hallucinations.
9

been told that taking his medication was “the most important 

thing” even when he did not feel well.

Dr. Mehraban had discussed with K.P. his plans if he were 

to be released from his conservatorship. He told her that he 

wanted to live in an apartment, and that his mother would help 

him. To Dr. Mehraban’s knowledge, K.P. had not been to look at 

any apartments. Dr. Mehraban did not believe that K.P. had a 

viable plan for self-care. In the year and a half that he resided at 

the facility, he had never gone into the community without his 

mother or his therapist, despite having the opportunity. Dr. 

Mehraban was concerned that K.P. would not have anyone for 

support, and in her opinion, at this time, he needed constant 

supervision. K.P.’s mother had not spoken to Dr. Mehraban 

about K.P.’s plans if he were to be released from conservatorship.

Dr. Mehraban was of the opinion that K.P. did not have 

sufficient insight to be a voluntary patient, which would involve 

making appointments, getting to appointments, and calling the 

pharmacy. K.P. had not demonstrated a capacity to manage 

these tasks. He had expressed to Dr. Mehraban that he wanted 

to get off his medications, and then tended to waffle between 

wanting to be on the medications and not wanting to take them. 

Dr. Mehraban found this concerning given the importance of the 

medications.

On cross-examination Dr. Mehraban agreed that it is 

important for a patient to acquire insight regarding medication. 

There is no cure for schizophrenia, but the symptoms can be 

controlled through treatment. Dr. Mehraban believed that K.P. 

was presently telling her he would take his medications because 

he would have a secondary gain. She did not believe that he had 

insight into his medications. About a month earlier Dr. 
10

Mehraban asked K.P. whether he would follow up with treatment

if released. K.P. responded that he would think about it.

On re-direct examination, Dr. Mehraban related an 

incident with K.P.’s medication from the previous day. Dr. 

Mehraban gave K.P. his medication before he went to court. The 

patients are handed their pack of medications, and they are 

supposed to know what day it is and how to administer the 

medication. Dr. Mehraban was monitoring K.P., and he almost 

gave himself a double dose of one of his medications that can 

cause toxicity. When Dr. Mehraban stopped him and told him 

that he had already taken it, K.P. disagreed.

K.P.

K.P. was asked whether he was willing to stay at his 

current placement until he and his mother could find a place for 

him. He responded, “no.” When asked the same question a 

second time, he responded, “yes.”

K.P.’s counsel asked him, “If you get out of the hospital, are 

you willing to continue to take psychiatric medications?” K.P. 

responded, “No.” K.P.’s counsel again asked him, “You don’t want 

to take medications?” K.P. responded, “No.” K.P. acknowledged 

that he needed a psychiatrist. When asked if he thought he had 

a mental illness, he responded, “No.” When asked if he had 

schizophrenia, K.P. responded, “No.” When asked if he wanted to 

continue taking “psych medications,” K.P. responded, “I feel like 

I’m doing better without them.” When asked a second time, K.P. 

provided the same answer.

On cross-examination, K.P. was asked about the incident 

involving the basketball. He described it as an “attack.” He 

admitted that he became “outraged.” K.P. repeated that he did 

not believe he should take medication anymore. “I’m at a point 
11

where I’ve taken them enough -- where I feel like I’ve taken them 

enough that I need to stop.” K.P. did not believe that he had 

schizophrenia, but that he experienced brain trauma as a child. 

K.P. received $800 every month in social security benefits but 

nothing else. He indicated that upon his release he intended to 

become a businessman. When asked about his previous 

experience, K.P. stated that he sold candy in 1995.

When K.P. was asked about his mother, he indicated that 

she was previously his conservator. When asked why that ended, 

K.P. stated, “I think it’s because she moved away, and she was 

homeless.”

Jury instructions/closing arguments

The jury instructions were read but not recorded. The 

court gave the following relevant instructions:

“CACI No. 4000. Conservatorship--Essential 

Factual Elements

“The Office of the Public Guardian claims that 

[K.P.] is gravely disabled due to a mental disorder 

and therefore should be placed in a conservatorship. 

In a conservatorship, a conservator is appointed to 

oversee, under the direction of the court, the care of 

persons who are gravely disabled due to a mental 

disorder. To succeed on this claim, the Office of the 

Public Guardian must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt all of the following:

“1. That [K.P.] has a mental disorder; and 

“2. That [K.P.] is gravely disabled as a result of 

the mental disorder.”
12

“CACI No. 4002. ‘Gravely Disabled’ Explained

“The term ‘gravely disabled’ means that a 

person is presently unable to provide for his or her 

basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter because of a 

mental disorder.

“Psychosis, bizarre or eccentric behavior, 

delusions or hallucination are not enough, by 

themselves, to find that [K.P.] is gravely disabled. 

He must be unable to provide for the basic needs of 

food, clothing, or shelter because of a mental 

disorder.

“If you find [K.P.] will not take his prescribed 

medication without supervision and that a mental 

disorder makes him unable to provide for his basic 

needs for food, clothing, or shelter without such 

medication, then you may conclude [K.P.] is presently 

gravely disabled.

“In determining whether [K.P.] is presently 

gravely disabled, you may consider evidence that he 

did not take prescribed medication in the past. You 

may also consider evidence of his lack of insight into 

his mental condition.

“In determining whether [K.P.] is presently 

gravely disabled, you may not consider the likelihood 

of future deterioration or relapse of a condition.

“In determining whether [K.P.] is presently 

gravely disabled, you may consider whether he is 

unable or unwilling voluntarily to accept meaningful 

treatment.”
13

“CACI No. 4007. Third Party Assistance

“A person is not ‘gravely disabled’ if he can 

survive safely with the help of third party assistance. 

Third party assistance is the aid of family, friends, or 

others who are responsible, willing, and able to help 

provide for the person’s basic needs for food, clothing, 

or shelter.

“You must not consider offers by family, 

friends, or others unless they have testified to or 

stated specifically in writing their willingness and 

ability to help provide [K.P.] with food, clothing, or 

shelter. Well-intended offers of assistance are not 

sufficient unless they will ensure the person can 

survive safely.”

In closing argument, counsel for the public guardian 

reminded the jurors that he had identified three factors that he 

would prove beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that K.P. suffers

from a mental disorder; second, that as a result of the mental 

disorder, K.P. cannot provide for his basic needs of food, shelter, 

and clothing; and finally, that there were no reasonable viable 

alternatives to conservatorship for K.P. He added that the public 

guardian had shown that K.P. lacked sufficient insight into his 

mental disorder, and would not continue to take his prescribed 

medications unless he was under a conservatorship. Counsel 

then discussed the relevant evidence supporting the position that 

these factors had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his closing argument, K.P.’s counsel argued that the 

“third-party assistance” instruction was an important one. He 

asked that the jury consider whether K.P. is gravely disabled 

given that he could survive with the help of a third party. K.P.’s 

counsel also pointed out instruction CACI No. 4002, specifically 
14

the language indicating that the jury may consider whether he is 

unable or unwilling voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment. 

Counsel stated, “currently, he is taking his medication. He is in 

his treatment. He does have his mother to assist him if he gets 

out so that he can take his medications, follow up with the 

doctors.” Counsel argued that K.P. was able to accept meaningful 

treatment.

Verdict

On June 22, 2018, the jury found that K.P. was gravely 

disabled. The court reappointed the public guardian as 

conservator of K.P.’s person and estate.

Appeal

On July 5, 2018, K.P. filed his notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

K.P. contends that the trial court erred by omitting a third 

element from the CACI No. 4000 instruction provided to the jury. 

We find no error. We further find that even if instructional error 

had occurred, any such error would be harmless under the 

circumstances of this case.

I. Standard of review

LPSA proceedings are civil in nature, but individuals 

subject to conservatorship proceedings are entitled to certain due 

process protections similar to a criminal defendant because 

significant liberty interests are at stake. (Conservatorship of P.D.

(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1163, 1166-1167 (P.D.).)

We review the propriety of the jury instructions de novo. 

(Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 

Cal.App.5th 31, 44-45; P.D., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167.) 

“In considering the accuracy or completeness of a jury 
15

instruction, we evaluate it in the context of all of the court’s 

instructions. [Citation.]” (Caldera, at p. 45.)

II. The instruction was not error

K.P. contends that the trial court failed to properly instruct 

the jury with a third element in CACI No. 4000, which would 

have required the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

K.P. was “unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful 

treatment.”5 The parties have cited and discussed the relevant 

case law. Our review of the relevant cases leads us to the 

conclusion that the trial court’s instruction was not erroneous.

K.P. points out that the use note to CACI No. 4000 states:

“There is a split of authority as to whether element 3 

is required. (Compare Conservatorship of Symington 

(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1467 [‘[Many gravely 

disabled individuals are simply beyond treatment’] 

with Conservatorship of Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 

313, 328 [jury should be allowed to consider all 

factors that bear on whether person should be on LPS 

conservatorship, including willingness to accept 

treatment].)”

(Use Note to CACI No. 4000 (Rev. 2006) (2019) p. 964.)

____________________________________________________________

5 The two elements that the trial court included in the 

instruction were “1. That [K.P.] [has a mental disorder/is 

impaired by chronic alcoholism]; [and] [¶] 2. That [K.P.] is 

gravely disabled as a result of the [mental disorder/chronic 

alcoholism].” (CACI No. 4000.) The third element, which

K.P. argues should have been included, is: “[3. That [K.P.] 

is unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful 

treatment.]” (Ibid.)
16

K.P. argues that this statement is incorrect, and there is no 

split of authority. On the contrary, K.P. argues, the law supports 

his position that, where there is evidence that the conservatee is 

willing and able to voluntarily accept meaningful treatment, the 

court must give the third element of CACI No. 4000. In making 

this argument, K.P. relies primarily on Conservatorship of Davis 

(1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313 (Davis).

First, we note that Davis is distinguishable in that it 

involved a petition to establish a conservatorship, not a petition 

for reappointment. (Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 317.) The 

petition had been filed as to a 39-year-old woman, who had been 

married for 18 years. Her husband testified at the trial that he 

was willing to have respondent live at his home and she would be 

welcome at their family home if she returned to it. (Ibid.) The 

woman testified to the jury that she would continue taking her 

medication as long as the doctor felt it was necessary. She also 

testified to her personal habits of self-care, cooking, and grocery 

shopping. (Id. at p. 319.)

The jury was instructed, over the public guardian’s 

objection, that “‘[B]efore you may consider whether Mary Davis is 

gravely disabled you must first find that she is, as a result of a 

mental disorder, unwilling or unable to accept treatment for that 

mental disorder on a voluntary basis. If you find that Mary 

Davis is capable of understanding her need for treatment for any 

mental disorder she may have and capable of making a 

meaningful commitment to a plan of treatment of that disorder 

she is entitled to a verdict of ‘not gravely disabled.’”’ (Davis, 

supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 319.) The jury found her not gravely 

disabled. (Id. at p. 317.) The public guardian appealed, arguing 

that the trial court erred in delivering this instruction. The 
17

Court of Appeal disagreed, finding no prejudicial error. (Id. at 

pp. 329, 331.)

In so finding, the Davis court analyzed section 5352, which 

provides that when a professional “determines that a person in 

his or her care is gravely disabled . . . and is unwilling to accept, 

or incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily, he or she may 

recommend conservatorship to the officer providing 

conservatorship investigation . . . prior to his or her admission as 

a patient in such facility.” Section 5352 is not at issue in the 

present appeal, as the petition here is not a petition to establish a 

conservatorship. Nor is a conservatorship investigation at issue. 

Instead, this was a petition for reappointment.6 Thus, we find 

Davis unpersuasive here.

Conservatorship of Early (Early) (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, is 

also distinguishable. Early, like Davis, involved an initial 

conservatorship proceeding, not a reappointment. The primary 

issue was whether the conservatee should have been permitted to 

introduce evidence that he could meet his needs for food, clothing, 

____________________________________________________________

6 K.P. was subject to a reappointment petition pursuant to 

section 5361, which provides that “[i]f upon the termination of an 

initial or a succeeding period of conservatorship the conservator 

determines that conservatorship is still required, he may petition 

the superior court for his reappointment as conservator for a 

succeeding one-year period.” Section 5361 requires an opinion by 

two licensed professionals that “the conservatee is still gravely 

disabled as a result of a mental disorder.” (§ 5361; see also 

Conservatorship of Dierdre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312 

[reestablishment of conservatorship requires state “to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee remains gravely 

disabled” (italics added)].) Thus, section 5352 would not apply in 

this context.
18

and shelter with the assistance of family and friends. (Early, at 

p. 249.) No particular jury instructions were analyzed, although 

the conservatee also appealed the “failure to instruct that a 

person is not gravely disabled if he can meet his basic needs with 

the assistance of others.” (Id. at p. 248.) The Early court did not 

weigh in on the necessity of including such language in the 

instruction setting out the essential factual elements of a 

conservatorship. It merely held, in general, that “a jury is 

entitled to consider the availability of third party assistance to 

meet a proposed conservatee’s basic needs for food, clothing and 

shelter.” (Id. at p. 247.) Such consideration was appropriately 

made here, with the court permitting evidence, and providing 

instruction, on third party assistance. In addition, the court 

explicitly instructed the jury, in CACI No. 4002, that in 

contemplating the term “gravely disabled,” the jury could 

consider the element of willingness and ability to voluntarily 

accept meaningful treatment. Thus, Early does not support the 

claim of instructional error in this case.

Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1082 

(Walker), involved an erroneous instruction that advised a jury 

that conservatorship was inappropriate only if the potential 

conservatee “can provide for his needs and is willing to accept 

treatment.” (Id. at p. 1092, fn. omitted.) This instruction was 

error because “if persons provide for their basic personal needs 

(i.e. are not gravely disabled) or are able to voluntarily accept 

treatment, there is no need for a conservatorship.” (Ibid.) The 

Walker court found the instructional error harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt because the conservatee “admitted he would not 

take medication on his own.” Thus, “as a matter of law no jury 

could find [the conservatee], on his own or with family help,
19

capable of meeting his basic needs for food, clothing or shelter.” 

(Id. at p. 1094.)

We find the analysis in Conservatorship of Symington 

(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464 (Symington), relied upon by the 

public guardian, to be persuasive. In Symington, the conservatee 

argued that reversal of the finding of grave disability was 

required due to the trial court’s failure to make a finding that the 

conservatee was unwilling or unable to voluntarily accept 

treatment for her mental illness. (Id. at p. 1467.) The Symington 

court held that “gravely disabled,” as defined in section 5008, 

subdivision (h)(1) is a “‘condition in which a person, as a result of 

a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal 

needs for food, clothing, or shelter[.]’” (Symington, at p. 1468.) 

The court noted that this definition makes no mention of a 

conservatee’s refusal or inability to consent to treatment, and 

that the language concerning a proposed conservatee’s refusal or 

inability to consent to treatment appeared only in section 5352. 

(Symington, at pp. 1467-1468.) The court determined that 

section 5352 was enacted to allow treatment facilities to initiate 

conservatorship proceedings at the time of admitting a patient 

when the patient may be uncooperative. (Symington, at p. 1467.) 

The section was not enacted “as an additional element to be 

proved to establish the conservatorship itself.” (Ibid.)

We agree with Symington. Section 5352, which allows a 

professional to initiate conservatorship proceedings for a patient 

that is unwilling to accept treatment, does not add an additional 

requirement, to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to establish 

a conservatorship.
20

Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in instructing 

the jury as to the definition of “gravely disabled” in CACI No. 

4000.

III. Any error would be harmless

We further find that, even if the trial court had committed 

error in its instructions to the jury, any error would be harmless 

as a matter of law in this case because the evidence was 

overwhelming that K.P. was unwilling or unable to accept 

treatment. Specifically, K.P. testified that he did not have a 

diagnosed mental disability and did not intend to continue taking 

his medications if he were released because he believed he was 

better off without them. Thus, K.P. admitted that he was 

unwilling or unable to accept appropriate treatment.

The parties point to differing authorities regarding the 

standard of prejudice applicable to the instructional error at 

issue. The public guardian advocates for the civil standard, 

which requires that, to be reversible, any error must result in a 

miscarriage of justice. (Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P. (2014) 

224 Cal.App.4th 601, 613.)7 In support of the use of this 

standard, the public guardian cites Conservatorship of George H. 

____________________________________________________________

7 Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution 

provides that “[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or a new trial 

granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury 

. . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the 

evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error 

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” This 

prohibits reversal unless there is “a reasonable probability that 

in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the 

appealing party would have been reached. [Citation.]” (Soule v. 

General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.)
21

(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 164-165 [“given that LPS 

conservatorship proceedings are not criminal proceedings, the 

sua sponte duty to instruct . . . does not apply to jury trials under 

section 5350”].) K.P., on the other hand, advocates for the 

criminal standard of constitutional error, citing Early, supra, 35 

Cal.3d 244 at page 255 [holding that error in conservatorship 

proceeding was “not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].8

We need not resolve the question of the appropriate 

standard of prejudice applicable in this matter. Given K.P.’s 

admission that he was unwilling to accept meaningful treatment, 

any purported error was harmless under either standard. 

(Walker, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1094 [holding that where 

conservatee admitted he would not take medication, “as a matter 

of law no jury could find [the conservatee], on his own or with 

family help, capable of meeting his basic needs for food, clothing 

or shelter”].)

____________________________________________________________

8 The requirement in criminal cases that constitutional error 

be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was set forth in 

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“before a 

. . . constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 

able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt”].)
22

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

__________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST