2023 WI 3

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2020AP2119-CR

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Larry L. Jackson,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 841, 967 N.W.2d 311

(2021 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED: January 20, 2023 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: September 30, 2022 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit 

COUNTY: Milwaukee 

JUDGE: Jeffrey A. Wagner 

JUSTICES:

DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 

Court.

 

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

 

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Frederick A. Bechtold and Frederick A. Bechtold 

Attorney at Law, LLC, Minnesota. There was an oral argument by 

Frederick A. Bechtold.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Eric M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney general, with whom on 

the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 

oral argument by Eric M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney 

general. 
2

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melinda A. Swartz and 

the Law Office of Melinda Swartz, LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of 

the Wisconsin Association of criminal Defense Lawyers. 
2023 WI 3

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2020AP2119-CR

(L.C. No. 2015CF004698)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Larry L. Jackson,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

FILED

JAN 20, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 

Court.

ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed in 

part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. A defendant is entitled to 

a Machner1 hearing if his postconviction motion sufficiently 

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and the record fails 

 

1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 

1979). A Machner hearing is "[t]he evidentiary hearing to 

evaluate counsel's effectiveness, which includes counsel's 

testimony to explain his or her handling of the case." State v. 

Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

2

to conclusively demonstrate that he is not entitled to relief. 

See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶37, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 

N.W.2d 432. Although one of Larry Jackson's three 

postconviction claims met both of these requirements, the 

circuit court2 denied his motion without a hearing and the court 

of appeals affirmed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand to the circuit court with instructions to hold a Machner

hearing regarding that claim.

I

¶2 In 2015, Richard King was shot and killed in front of 

a duplex on North 60th Street in Milwaukee. Jackson was 

subsequently charged with first-degree intentional homicide and 

possession of a firearm by a felon. 

¶3 King and his wife, C.W., lived in the duplex along 

with their upstairs neighbors Gerald Tucker and his wife, 

Tiffany. The two couples did not get along, and on the day of 

the homicide, King was upset with Gerald over some broken glass 

he found near his car. King and his friend Andre Dorsey 

confronted Gerald and Tiffany with a gun. The tension was 

momentarily defused, however, when the Tuckers' kids came 

outside. According to Gerald, after getting inside, Tiffany 

called their friend Jackson and asked him to come over. Later 

on, King confronted Gerald again after he stepped outside to 

smoke a cigarette. Dorsey, who was now standing off to the 

 

2 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner of the Milwaukee County 

Circuit Court presided.
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

3

side, saw a man with a medium complexion who he later identified 

as Jackson walk up to Gerald. The two whispered to each other 

and then entered the front of the duplex. Moments later, Dorsey 

heard gunshots and saw King fall to the ground. He then saw a 

hand with a light complexion pointing a gun through a crack in 

the doorway fire two shots in his direction. After the shooting 

stopped, C.W. saw a young African American man with a dark 

complexion run past her ground floor window. She was never able 

to positively identify him. 

¶4 Gerald was arrested as a suspect in the homicide. 

While he was in custody, he told police that he did not know who 

shot King. Months later, he identified Jackson as the shooter 

after learning that police had recovered the murder weapon. 

That weapon, a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol, belonged to 

Jackson's friend, Joe Brown, and was matched by ballistics 

experts to a bullet and several casings found at the scene. At 

trial, Brown testified that he loaned the gun to Jackson on the 

day of the shooting. Jackson returned thirty to forty-five 

minutes later with rubber gloves and the gun, which had some

bullets missing. The two men boiled the gloves to destroy any 

evidence. After changing his clothes, Jackson left. The two 

men met up the next day and Jackson allegedly confessed to being 

involved in a shooting, although he did not mention King or the 

Tuckers by name. Brown's friend, Anthony Boone, testified that 

he had once seen Jackson at Brown's house standing outside of 

the bathroom with what appeared to be a bag of clothes, but gave 

conflicting accounts as to when that occurred. 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

4

¶5 Jackson's defense at trial focused on his alleged 

alibi: that he was at his mother's house on the evening of the 

homicide. The only defense witness was Jackson's mother, Carol. 

She testified that she remembered the night well, and that she 

knew Jackson stayed at her house all night because her alarm 

system would have gone off if any of the doors to the house were 

opened.

¶6 The jury found Jackson guilty of both charges, and he 

filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel. In it, Jackson contended that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to contact two potential alibi witnesses 

or call them at trial. Those two witnesses, Jackson's exgirlfriend, JaNikka Marsh, and his sister, Crystal Jackson, 

submitted affidavits stating that they were with Jackson the 

evening of the homicide, that they were not contacted by trial 

counsel, and that they would have testified at trial if they 

were called to do so. We discuss Marsh's and Crystal's specific 

factual claims in further detail below. Jackson's 

postconviction motion also contended that trial counsel was 

ineffective in two additional respects: for failing to interview 

his mother or prepare her to speak to detectives or testify, and 

for incorrectly advising Jackson that the law required him to 

testify first. 

¶7 The circuit court denied Jackson's postconviction 

motion without a hearing. Regarding trial counsel's failure to 

contact Marsh or Crystal, the court discounted their proffered 

testimony due to their preexisting relationship with Jackson and 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

5

concluded that he had not sufficiently alleged deficient 

performance and that the record conclusively demonstrated that 

he was not prejudiced. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984) (setting forth the two requirements for an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, deficient performance 

and prejudice). Additionally, the court held that Jackson's 

claim that counsel did not interview Carol or prepare her to 

speak to detectives or testify was conclusory, and that the 

record conclusively demonstrated Jackson was not entitled to 

relief on his claim that counsel incorrectly advised him that 

the law required him to testify first. The court of appeals 

affirmed. See generally State v. Jackson, 2020AP2119-CR, 

unpublished slip op., ¶¶23-29 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2021).

II

¶8 When we review a decision denying a postconviction 

motion without a Machner hearing, we evaluate two issues de 

novo. See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶¶27-28. First, we assess 

whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material and 

non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant 

to relief. See id., ¶27. Second, we determine whether the 

record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 

entitled to relief. See id., ¶28. If the defendant's motion 

alleges sufficient and non-conclusory facts which would entitle 

the defendant to relief and the record does not conclusively 

establish otherwise, then the circuit court must hold a Machner

hearing. See id., ¶¶37-38; see also State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

6

53, ¶50, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citing State v. Allen, 

2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433). Conversely, 

"[i]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the 

defendant to relief, or if it presents only conclusory 

allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 

defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 

discretion to grant or deny a hearing." Ruffin, 401 

Wis. 2d 619, ¶28 (citing Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9).

III

¶9 Jackson's postconviction motion alleges that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate or call 

alibi witnesses; (2) not interviewing Carol or preparing her to 

speak to detectives or testify; and (3) incorrectly advising him 

that the law required him to testify first. Before analyzing 

whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing on any of these 

claims, we review some general principles applicable to claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel and Machner hearings. 

A

¶10 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has two 

prongs: deficient performance and prejudice. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687. "To demonstrate deficient performance, a 

defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness considering all the 

circumstances." State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶34, 383 Wis. 2d 

147, 914 N.W.2d 120. In evaluating counsel's performance, we 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

7

are highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions, but 

counsel nevertheless "has a duty to reasonably investigate or to 

make a reasonable decision that renders particular 

investigations unnecessary." Id., ¶¶34-35 (citing State v. 

Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶23, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695). As 

for the prejudice prong, a defendant must show "a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." State v. Guerard, 2004 

WI 85, ¶43, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12 (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694). A "reasonable probability" in this context 

means "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome." Id. 

¶11 With these general principles in mind, to determine 

whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must decide 

two questions. First, does Jackson's motion allege sufficient 

material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle 

him to relief? See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶27. Because 

Jackson's motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, that 

means he must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy both the 

deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland. See

Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50. If we answer that first question 

in Jackson's favor, we move on to the second and ask——regardless 

of the sufficiency of his allegations——whether the record 

conclusively establishes that Jackson is not entitled to relief. 

See id. In other words, does the record conclusively 

demonstrate either that Jackson's counsel's performance was not 

deficient or that he was not prejudiced? See id.; see also
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

8

Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶47. Jackson is entitled to a Machner

hearing only if we answer both of these questions in his favor. 

B

¶12 We begin with Jackson's claim regarding two alibi 

witnesses, his then-girlfriend Marsh and his sister Crystal. 

According to Jackson's motion and the attached affidavits, he 

gave their names to his attorney but neither were contacted. 

Had they been contacted, both Marsh and Crystal stated they 

would have testified at trial that Jackson was at his mother's 

house at the time of the homicide.

¶13 Marsh's affidavit states that on the day of the 

homicide, Jackson got off work at 4:30 p.m. Jackson and Marsh 

picked up her children from daycare before 5:00 p.m. and got 

dinner. They arrived at Jackson's mother's home sometime after 

5:00 p.m. After they arrived, Jackson took a shower while 

Marsh, who was not feeling well, laid down for a nap. After his 

shower, Jackson joined Marsh in bed. Marsh slept until 9:30 

p.m. when Jackson woke up and the two scrambled to get Marsh to 

her job in time for the night shift. 

¶14 Crystal's affidavit corroborates parts of this account 

and provides additional details. According to her affidavit, 

she was watching television at her mother's house on the evening 

of the murder. When Marsh and Jackson arrived, Marsh was not 

feeling well and she and Jackson went to his room so she could 

nap. According to Crystal, the couple stayed in the room until 

Jackson drove Marsh to work. Both Marsh's and Crystal's 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

9

affidavits place Jackson at his mother's home at the time King 

was killed. 

¶15 We have little trouble concluding that, if these facts 

are true, Jackson's motion sufficiently alleges a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the State does not 

dispute that counsel's failure to contact these witnesses or 

potentially call them at trial would constitute deficient 

performance. See also State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶41, 355 

Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786 ("[I]n a swearing match between two 

sides, counsel's failure to call two useful, corroborating 

witnesses, despite [potential bias as a result of] the family 

relationship, constitutes deficient performance." (quoting

Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). And Jackson's motion sufficiently 

alleges prejudice as well because it explains that counsel 

failed to investigate Marsh and Crystal at all, let alone call 

them at trial. See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶¶23-24 (explaining 

that a post-conviction motion contains sufficient facts when it 

alleges "the name of the witness (who), the reason the witness 

is important (why, how), and acts that can be proven (what, 

where, when)."); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 

630-35 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that counsel's failure to 

contact or produce possible alibi witnesses at trial was 

constitutionally deficient performance and prejudicial).

¶16 Rather than focus on the sufficiency of Jackson's 

allegations, the State argues that the record conclusively

establishes that Jackson was not prejudiced for two reasons. 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

10

First, according to the State, weaknesses in Marsh's and 

Crystal's proposed testimony and inconsistencies with Jackson's 

mother's testimony mean that "neither [witness] could have 

provided Jackson with an alibi." And second, "given the 

overwhelming evidence against Jackson, there is no reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 

different." 

¶17 As to the weaknesses and inconsistencies in testimony, 

the State contends that because Marsh was asleep at the time of 

the homicide, "she lacked personal knowledge of where Jackson 

was at the time [King] was shot." The State also points out 

that Marsh's and Crystal's stories differ from Carol's testimony 

in two respects. First, Marsh says she laid down for a nap 

before 6:00 p.m., but Carol testified that she had a serious 

argument with Marsh around 6:30 p.m. Second, Crystal says that 

Marsh and Jackson stayed in their room the whole evening, 

whereas Carol testified that Jackson came in and out of the 

bedroom several times.

¶18 The problem with these arguments is that, in assessing 

whether a defendant is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must 

assume that the factual claims made in support of the motion are 

true. See State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶37, n.15, 284 

Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62. That Marsh was asleep at the 

precise time of the murder or that Crystal's account may have 

conflicted with Carol's trial testimony might be reasons for a 

jury to discount their testimony. But we cannot know, nor 

should we try to predict, how a jury might have weighed Marsh's 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

11

and Crystal's credibility. See id. at ¶42 ("The general rule is 

that credibility determinations are resolved by live 

testimony."). Moreover, had Marsh and Crystal been contacted by 

counsel, counsel might have made a different decision about 

which alibi witness or witnesses to call at trial. In any case, 

the jury would have had to determine what weight to give to 

their accounts and might ultimately have convicted Jackson 

anyway. But the failure of trial counsel even to contact Marsh

and Crystal is enough to "undermine [our] confidence in the 

outcome." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶19 We also disagree with the State's assertion that the 

overwhelming evidence of Jackson's guilt conclusively 

establishes that he was not prejudiced. See Ruffin, 401 

Wis. 2d 619, ¶40 (explaining that the record conclusively 

establishes that the defendant is not entitled to relief if it 

shows that there is "no reasonable probability that the outcome 

would have been different"). In fact, the State's case was not 

so overwhelming. The State's best evidence of Jackson's 

involvement came from witnesses with serious credibility issues. 

Gerald Tucker, the primary witness against Jackson, was arrested 

as a suspect in the homicide and had the clearest motive to kill 

King given their argument earlier that night. He told police on 

two occasions that he did not know the shooter and even claimed 

to have not seen the shooting. He changed his story and 

identified Jackson as the shooter after serving a six-month 

sentence on a revocation of probation, and only when he learned 

the police had found the murder weapon. This disclosure 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

12

resulted in a second probation revocation for obstructing the 

investigation. At trial, he testified that in exchange for his 

testimony, he hoped to reduce the 15-year sentence he was 

serving as a result of that revocation. 

¶20 Joe Brown, who said that Jackson confessed to him 

after he returned Brown's gun, was a felon with three prior 

criminal convictions facing state and federal charges with a 

potential sentence of 15 years to life in prison for possessing 

the murder weapon. At trial, he acknowledged that he too hoped 

to minimize his time in prison by testifying against Jackson. 

And in exchange for cooperation in Jackson's case, the State 

ultimately dismissed the felon in possession of a firearm charge 

and federal prosecutors agreed to recommend a reduced sentence 

on his federal charge. 

¶21 Andre Dorsey identified Jackson as the person who went 

into the house with Gerald, but he was standing 15 feet away at 

the time of the shooting and said that he saw only the shooter's 

hand. Moreover, he described the shooter's hand as having a 

light complexion but described Jackson as having a medium 

complexion. Dorsey was also a felon with three prior criminal 

convictions and on the evening of the homicide a gun was found 

in his car. Although he was arrested, he was not charged as a 

felon in possession of a firearm. 

¶22 The only witnesses who were not potentially involved 

in the shooting and whose credibility was not undermined by 

prior convictions or other potential criminal exposure were C.W. 

and Anthony Boone. C.W. did not see the shooter. Instead, she 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

13

testified that she saw a man with a dark complexion run by the 

front window after the shooting, but she did not positively 

identify Jackson as that man when shown a photo array. And 

although Boone testified that he saw Jackson at Joe Brown's 

house, he gave conflicting accounts as to when that occurred. 

Given these weaknesses in the State's case, and the existence of 

multiple alibi witnesses that were not investigated by defense 

counsel, let alone called to testify at trial, the record fails 

to conclusively establish that Jackson is not entitled to 

relief. 

¶23 In sum, Jackson's motion alleges sufficient material 

and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to 

relief on this claim. Moreover, the record fails to

conclusively show that Jackson is not entitled to relief. Had 

Marsh and Crystal been contacted by counsel, they may have 

testified, and the jury would have had to weigh their 

credibility, and perhaps that of Jackson's mother, against the 

State's witnesses, many of whom had credibility issues of their 

own. Given that, we cannot say the record conclusively 

demonstrates that there is no reasonable probability of a 

different outcome. As a result, the circuit court did not have 

discretion to deny Jackson a Machner hearing on this claim. See

Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶37. 

C

¶24 Turning to Jackson's claim that counsel did not 

interview Carol or prepare her to speak to detectives or 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

14

testify, we conclude that Jackson is not entitled to a Machner

hearing. That is because Jackson's motion is conclusory: it 

does not explain how counsel should have prepared her and what, 

if any, effect this might have had on her statements to 

detectives or her testimony. See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 

¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it 

"fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a 

court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting 

State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))). 

Without that information, Jackson's motion fails to allege 

sufficient material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, 

would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.

¶25 Jackson is likewise not entitled to a Machner hearing 

on his claim that his counsel was ineffective when she told him 

the circuit court would require him to testify first. After the 

State rested, Jackson's counsel told the court that Jackson's 

mother and Jackson would testify, in that order. When the 

circuit court questioned the order of witnesses, counsel 

responded "I know the Court's aware of the logistical issues we 

have with him. Let me just talk to him about that, about if it 

would be okay if he testifies first." Jackson alleges that he 

then met with his counsel who told him "that the trial court was 

going to require him to testify before any of the other defense 

witnesses were called." 

¶26 Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing on this

claim because he has not sufficiently alleged that counsel's 

performance was deficient. See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

15

¶63. Although Jackson's motion alleges what counsel said 

regarding the order of witnesses, it fails to demonstrate that 

counsel's statement "was incorrect, much less unreasonable." 

See Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984-85 (7th Cir. 

2002) (rejecting allegations of deficient performance because 

the advice of counsel that led the defendant to decide not to 

testify was neither incorrect nor unreasonable); see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (in order to show deficient 

performance, a defendant must allege "that counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."). All that 

Jackson alleges his counsel told him was that the circuit court 

would require him to testify first. But Jackson does not 

explain how that statement was incorrect. Instead, Jackson 

asserts that the circuit court was required to allow him to 

testify in his preferred order under Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 

U.S. 605 (1972), because "there were no circumstances in his 

case where having the other defense witnesses testify first 

would have impeded the orderly progress of the trial." 

¶27 Counsel's statement was not unreasonable because the 

circuit court would not necessarily have violated Brooks by

requiring Jackson to testify first. After all, Brooks held only 

that a statute requiring a defendant to testify first or not at 

all violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 612. 

And as numerous courts have concluded, Brooks does not restrict 

the wide latitude trial courts have in managing the presentation 

of evidence at trial on a case-by-case basis, including by 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

16

"determin[ing] generally the order in which parties will adduce 

proof." Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976); see 

also United States v. Singh, 811 F.2d 758, 762-63 (2d Cir. 

1987); United States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1982). 

Although Jackson alleges that allowing him to testify in his 

preferred order would not have resulted in delay or otherwise 

"impeded the orderly progress of the trial," those are not the 

only circumstances in which it is permissible for a trial court 

to require a defendant to testify first. See Singh, 811 F.2d at 

762-63 (upholding an order requiring the defendant to testify 

first to lay foundation for subsequent testimony). Thus, even 

if everything alleged in Jackson's motion is true, it might 

still have been permissible for the circuit court to require him 

to testify first. And in that case, counsel's performance would 

not have been deficient since her statement would have been 

accurate, or at least not unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-88. Accordingly, the circuit court was correct to 

deny this part of Jackson's motion without a Machner

hearing. Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶63.

IV

¶28 In sum, Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing 

on his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to

interview or prepare his mother to speak to detectives or 

testify and for incorrectly advising him that the law required 

him to testify first. But on his claim that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate or call two alibi 
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

17

witnesses, his motion alleges sufficient material and nonconclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, and 

the record fails to conclusively establish that he is not 

entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse 

in part the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the 

circuit court with instructions to grant Jackson a hearing on 

his alibi-witnesses claim.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 

the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

¶29 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.
No. 2020AP2119-CR 

1