UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________

)

SALAME M. AMR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 13-707 (RWR)

)

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

______________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pro se plaintiff Salame M. Amr was terminated from the 

faculty of Virginia State University (“VSU”) and unsuccessfully 

sued in federal district court in Richmond. He now brings 

claims against the Commonwealth of Virginia, the federal 

district judge who dismissed his suits, and an engineering 

education society under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 

U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986, as well as common law 

claims of negligence, fraud, conspiracy, tortious interference 

with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

alleging that the defendants conspired to injure Amr’s 

reputation, colluded to deny Amr his rights, and acted 

individually to prevent Amr from successfully pursuing his 

previous litigation. The defendants have each moved variously 

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 
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12(b)(3), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for 

lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, for improper 

venue, for insufficient service of process, and for failure to 

state a claim. United States District Judge Robert Payne has 

also moved to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default. 

Because the District of Columbia is an improper venue for 

Amr’s claims, the complaint will be dismissed as to all 

defendants. Additionally, because Amr has made no showing that 

this court has personal jurisdiction over the Commonwealth of 

Virginia or Judge Payne, and because the court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over Amr’s claims against the Commonwealth 

of Virginia, their motions to dismiss will also be granted on 

those grounds. Because Judge Payne has a meritorious defense, 

he did not willfully default, and there is no prejudice to Amr, 

Judge Payne’s motion to set aside the default judgment will also 

be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Salame Amr was an employee at VSU from 2002 to 2008 where 

he served as Vice-Chair and Secretary of the Faculty Senate. 

Compl. ¶ 17. VSU alleged that Amr engaged in academic 

misconduct related to a paper he submitted to the American 

Society for Engineering Education (“ASEE”), Compl. ¶ 18-20, and 

he was eventually terminated, id. ¶ 84. Amr filed a number of
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lawsuits against VSU and other parties, over which Judge Payne 

presided. Id. ¶ 26. 

Amr’s instant complaint makes the following factual 

allegations.1 Throughout the first litigation, Amr’s counsel, 

Scott Crowley,2 conspired with Attorney General Ronald Regnery 

“for perfecting VSU’s decision to terminate [Amr.]” Id. ¶ 28.

Crowley fraudulently advised Amr with respect to his case and 

failed to diligently and properly pursue Amr’s case, which 

resulted in Amr’s case being dismissed with prejudice. Id.

¶¶ 30-52, 54-55, 57, 59-62, 65, 69, 71-74. The defendants 

falsely promised to compromise with Amr, which prevented him 

from trying his case. Id. ¶ 76. Sometime later, Judge Payne 

granted ASEE’s motion for sanctions against the plaintiff to 

“intimidat[e] him from exercising an opinion and detained him 

 1

 Amr’s complaint also asserts a number of legal 

conclusions, but courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 It appears that Amr refers to his former counsel, Crowley 

and Carolyn Carpenter, as “defendants,” see e.g., Compl. ¶ 63 

(“Defendants performed in a manner to ensure the Plaintiff’s 

expressed interests were not achieved, as is described of 

conduct already performed by Counsel Carpenter.”), but Amr lists 

neither as a party. See id. ¶¶ 2-5. At parts throughout the 

complaint, it is unclear who the relevant actors are for Amr’s 

claims and allegations. Nevertheless, because all defendants 

will be dismissed, it is unnecessary to untangle the specifics 

of each particular alleged claim. 
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from seeking available remedies to clear his name out of 

unfounded charge of academic misconduct.” Id. ¶¶ 80, 83. 

Amr also alleges that several of the actors discriminated 

against him on the basis of race, religion, and national origin,

e.g., id. ¶ 77, conspired against him, e.g., id. ¶ 75, and 

engaged in fraud, e.g., id. He also contends that Judge Payne 

acted to “protect the interests of the other parties in 

Plaintiff’s lawsuits that had been filed there.” Id. ¶ 79.

The defendants now each move to dismiss the case under Rule 

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 12(b)(2) for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, 12(b)(3) for improper venue, 

12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, and/or 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim. The Commonwealth also contends 

that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit because the Commonwealth 

has not waived immunity, and that res judicata bars suit because 

these facts have already been litigated. Commonwealth of 

Virginia Mot. to Dismiss Mem. of P & A (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 1-9. 

ASEE also argues that the complaint is untimely because Amr’s 

claims stem from acts committed six years ago and that the 

judicial proceedings privilege bars suit. ASEE’s Supp. Mot. to 

Dismiss at 2-3.
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DISCUSSION

I. VENUE

Venue is appropriate in the district (1) where any 

defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state,

(2) where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 

rise to the claim occurred,” or (3) where any defendant may be 

found if there is no district in which the action may otherwise 

be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Not all of the defendants are domiciled in the District of 

Columbia, so venue is not appropriate under § 1391(b)(1). 

Further, Amr has not alleged that any of the pertinent acts 

occurred in the District of Columbia, see Compl., thus venue is 

not appropriate under § 1391(b)(2). Amr seems to rest on 

§ 1391(b)(3) because he argues that the case could not have been 

brought in the Eastern District of Virginia because of bias. 

See Compl. ¶ 6; Reply at 1. However, the text of § 1391(b)(3) 

states, “if there is no district in which an action may 

otherwise be brought as provided in this section,” then the case 

may be brought in “any judicial district in which any defendant 

is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(b)(3). Here, there is another district in which the 

action “may otherwise be brought as provided in this section”: 

the Eastern District of Virginia. E.g., Ananiev v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 968 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing a 
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case for improper venue because “the predicate requirement” was 

not met to apply 1391(b)(3) since the action would be 

appropriately brought in another district); Corbett v. Jennifer, 

888 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding venue under 

1391(b)(3) inappropriate “because there is another district in 

which the action may be brought”); Smith v. U.S. Investigations 

Servs., Inc., Civil Action No. 04-0711 (RMU), 2004 WL 2663143, 

*4 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2004) (finding that § 1391(b)(3) “is only 

applicable if there is no district in which venue is proper 

under one of the venue statute’s first two provisions”). 

Accordingly, venue is not appropriate in the District of 

Columbia under any part of § 1391(b).

Upon a showing that venue in this district is improper, a 

court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could 

have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406. While a transfer is 

favored, particularly when the plaintiff is pro se, James v. 

Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009), 

transfer to the proper venue of the Eastern District of Virginia

is not in the interests of justice here. That court found Amr’s 

allegations in his multiple law suits about his termination to 

be meritless and vexatious, and barred him from filing there any 

further actions that in any way relate to or involve his 

termination or the subsequent litigation that arose out of his 
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denial of tenure and termination from VSU. Commonwealth of 

Virginia Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A; see also Amr v. Attorney Gen. of 

Va., Civil Action No. 3:11cv423, 2011 WL 10621803, *1 (E.D. Va.

Sept. 22, 2011) (entering an order “prohibiting the plaintiff 

from filing in this Court any action involving the subject 

matter of this action and the three cases mentioned herein 

previously filed by the plaintiff”). The allegations in the 

subsequent cases and this case both involve his employment 

relationship with VSU and the subsequent litigation. Compare

Compl. with Amr v. Attorney Gen. of Va., Civil Action No. 

3:11cv423, 2013 WL 1499066 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2013), Amr. v. Va. 

State Univ., Civil Action No 3:10cv787, 2011 WL 4407429 (E.D. 

Va. Sept. 21, 2011), Amr v. Eddie N. Moore, Civil Action No. 

3:09cv667, 2010 WL 3154567 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2010), and Amr v. 

Va. State Univ., Civil Action No. 3:07cv628, 2009 WL 112829 

(E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2009). Providing Amr an end-run around the 

barring order would be inappropriate. Accordingly, Amr’s case 

will be dismissed, rather than transferred.

II. CLAIMS AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND JUDGE PAYNE

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a 

federal court must dismiss a case when it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “‘Before a court may 

address the merits of a complaint, it must assure that it has 
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jurisdiction to entertain the claims.’” Cornish v. Dudas, 715 

F. Supp. 2d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Marshall v. Honeywell 

Tech. Solutions, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 2009)). 

Thus, a court must even raise on its own any questions it 

perceives about its subject matter jurisdiction. Douglass v. 

District of Columbia, 605 F. Supp. 2d 156, 168-69 (D.D.C. 2009). 

It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate subject matter 

jurisdiction. Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff cannot meet that burden, the court 

must dismiss the action. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 

506, 514 (1968)). 

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, a court “treat[s] the complaint’s factual 

allegations as true” and “grant[s] plaintiff ‘the benefit of all 

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” 

Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 671 F.2d 605, 608 

(D.C. Cir. 1979)). However, “[b]ecause subject matter 

jurisdiction focuses on the court’s power to hear the 

claim, . . . the court must give the plaintiff’s factual 

allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion[.]” 

Aref v. Holder, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (D.D.C. 2011).
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The Commonwealth argues that Amr’s claims against it are 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the constitution. That 

amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. 

amend. XI. When the amendment was passed, however, the ability 

to sue a state without its consent “was a thing unknown to the 

law.” Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890). Despite its 

literal language, the amendment was intended not to create a new 

right in a state’s citizens to sue their state, but rather to 

make clear that an unconsenting state could not be sued by 

citizens of other states. The amendment was a reaction against 

a Supreme Court decision, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 

(1793), that allowed the opposite. The Supreme Court has since

“consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from 

suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as 

by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 

662-63 (1974).

Amr’s claims against the Commonwealth are barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment because Amr failed to sufficiently plead that 

the Commonwealth either consented to a suit or waived immunity.3 

 3 Moreover, the Commonwealth asserts that it has not waived 

its immunity for any of Amr’s claims. Def.’s Mem. at 8, 8 n.1.
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See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978); Morris v. 

Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 583 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (D.D.C. 

1984) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] poses a bar to suits against a 

state agency as well as the state itself and applies to claims 

of constitutional dimension.”). Amr presents no factual 

allegations in his complaint dispelling the Commonwealth’s 

immunity, see generally Compl., and offers only a cursory 

assertion that his claims “are not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment of the United States Constitution,” Am. Response to 

Def.s’ Mots. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 27. Thus, because Amr has 

not established subject matter jurisdiction since his claims 

against Virginia are barred by sovereign immunity, the 

Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss will be granted also on that 

ground. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a 

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima 

facie showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants. First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 

1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988). To meet his burden, “[a] plaintiff 

must plead specific facts providing a basis for personal 

jurisdiction.” Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 
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2010). Even pro se plaintiffs must plead adequate 

jurisdictional facts for their claims. Id.

A District of Columbia court has personal jurisdiction over 

a defendant “domiciled in, . . . or maintaining . . . it’s

principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to 

any claim for relief.” D.C. Code § 13-422. If the plaintiff 

does not allege that the defendant is domiciled in or maintains 

his principal place of business in the District of Columbia, a 

court employs a two-part test to determine whether it has 

personal jurisdiction. First, the District of Columbia’s longarm statute must reach the defendant. See GTE New Media Servs. 

Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

Under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, a court in 

the District of Columbia has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for a claim arising from the defendant’s 

conduct in:

(1) transacting any business in the District of 

Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of 

Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of 

Columbia by an act or omission in the District of 

Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of 

Columbia by an act or omission outside the 

District of Columbia if he regularly does or 

solicits business, engages in any other 

persistent course of conduct, or derives 

substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, 

or services rendered, in the District of 

Columbia[.]
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D.C. Code § 13-423.

Second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be 

consistent with the requirements of due process. GTE New Media 

Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347. The Due Process Clause requires that 

the plaintiff show that the defendant has sufficient “minimum 

contacts” with the District of Columbia such that “the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under this principle, personal jurisdiction is proper 

where “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 

State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled 

into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 

U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The defendant’s minimum contacts with the 

District of Columbia must arise from “‘some act by which the 

defendant purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws.’” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 

v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)

(plurality opinion) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

Amr has not alleged an adequate basis for asserting 

personal jurisdiction over the Commonwealth of Virginia or Judge 
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Payne under D.C. Code § 13-422. Amr has not alleged that either 

is domiciled in the District of Columbia since all Amr provides 

for Judge Payne and the Commonwealth of Virginia are Virginia 

addresses. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4. Nor has Amr pled an adequate basis 

to assert personal jurisdiction over either the Commonwealth of 

Virginia or Judge Payne under the District of Columbia long-arm 

statute. There is no allegation that either committed any act 

or caused any harm in the District of Columbia. Amr does not 

allege that his claim against either arose from their conduct in 

transacting business in the District of Columbia, contracting to 

supply services in the District of Columbia, or causing a 

tortious injury in the District of Columbia. Instead, Amr 

claims that they conspired against him throughout his previous 

litigation in Virginia. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 20-21, 37-71. Because 

Amr has not alleged an adequate basis for asserting personal 

jurisdiction over the Commonwealth of Virginia or Judge Payne, 

their motions to dismiss will be granted also on that ground.4

III. JUDGE PAYNE’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

Under Rule 55(c), a court has discretion to “set aside an 

entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(c). 

 4 The parties also raise a number of other arguments to 

support their motion to dismiss. Because the motions to dismiss 

will be granted because of improper venue, and lack of personal 

jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, the other 

arguments raised are not addressed.
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Default judgments are generally disfavored by courts “perhaps 

because it seems inherently unfair to use the court’s power to 

enter and enforce judgments as a penalty for delays in filing.” 

Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Webb 

v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(“[A] default judgment must be a sanction of last resort, to be 

used only when less onerous methods . . . will be ineffective or 

obviously futile.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A court 

considering whether to set aside an entry of default must 

balance three factors: “‘whether (1) the default was willful, 

(2) a set-aside would prejudice the plaintiff, and (3) the 

alleged defense was meritorious.’” Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836 

(quoting Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co, 627 F.2d 

372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980). When balancing these factors, “all 

doubts are resolved in favor of the party seeking relief.” 

Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836.

Balancing the Jackson factors favors setting aside the 

entry of default. First, Judge Payne has raised a meritorious 

defense that favors setting aside the entry of default.5 See

Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836; Canales v. A.H.R.E., Inc., 254 F.R.D. 

1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (requiring that the asserted defense be one 

 5 Additionally, Judge Payne has other meritorious defenses, 

as is discussed above, because Amr has failed to show personal 

jurisdiction over Judge Payne and because the District of 

Columbia is an improper venue.
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that “may be proven at trial,” but not mandating that the 

defendant prove the defense in a motion to set aside default). 

Judge Payne asserts that Amr has failed to effect proper proof 

of service. This defense is meritorious because Amr has failed 

to provide proof of service required for a case filed in this 

district. To properly serve Judge Payne, who is an employee of 

the United States, Amr must also have served the United States 

Attorney for the District of Columbia. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(i)(1)(A)(i). He has offered no evidence that he has done so. 

Nor is it clear that Amr properly served Judge Payne in his 

individual capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3) (explaining 

that United States employees sued individually must also be 

served under Rule 4(e)). The summons and complaint were not 

delivered to Judge Payne personally, or left at his dwelling or 

usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and 

discretion who resides there. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)-(B). 

Moreover, it is unclear whether the person who was served --

Sharon Cooke, denominated as a division manager6 at 701 East 

Broad Street, 7th Floor, Richmond, VA -- is “an agent authorized 

by appointment or by law to receive service of process,” Fed. R. 

 6 Indeed, the first summons was returned as unexecuted 

because Sharon Cooke refused service of process. See ECF No. 

18.
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Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C), or if the service otherwise followed state 

law for serving a summons in Virginia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). 

There is also no evidence of a willful default. “The 

boundary of willfulness lies somewhere between a case involving 

a negligent filing error, which is normally considered an 

excusable failure to respond, and a deliberate decision to 

default, which is generally not excusable.” Int’l Painters & 

Allied Trades Union & Indus. Pension Fund v. H.W. Ellis Painting 

Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2003). Here, as is 

discussed above, Judge Payne may not have been properly served 

and his obligation to respond therefore may not have yet begun. 

E.g. Scott v. District of Columbia, 598 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 

(D.D.C. 2009) (“Although default may be entered upon a 

defendant’s failure to plead or otherwise defend, a defendant’s 

obligation to respond to a complaint arises only upon service of 

the summons and complaint.” (internal citation omitted)). 

Without an obligation to respond, there can be no willful 

default. 

Amr also has not shown that he would be prejudiced by 

setting aside the entry of default. In his opposition to Judge 

Payne’s motion to set aside entry of default, Amr failed to 

allege any prejudice. In any event, it is unclear that Amr 

could make such a showing. A plaintiff can be prejudiced 

because of the “accompanying dangers” of delay, Capital Yacht 
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Club v. Vessel AVIVA, 228 F.R.D. 389, 393–94 (D.D.C. 2005) 

(quoting KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 

1, 15 (1st Cir. 2003)), or because setting aside default would 

require the plaintiffs “to try their . . . claim a second time.” 

Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1995). There is 

no apparent danger from the delay since the case is still in the 

preliminary stage. E.g., Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 658 F. 

Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2009). Additionally, though Amr filed 

for entry of default judgment, he did not provide any 

substantive proof along with that motion, see Mot. for Default 

Judgment, to show that he has a viable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. 

Pro. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against the 

United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the 

claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that 

satisfies the court.”).

Accordingly, on balance, the Jackson factors favor setting 

aside default. Judge Payne’s motion to set aside entry of 

default will be granted and Amr’s motion for default judgment 

will be denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

Amr’s claims against all the defendants will be dismissed 

for improper venue. Amr’s claims against the Commonwealth of 

Virginia must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Amr’s claims against Judge Payne and the 
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Commonwealth of Virginia must also be dismissed for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Judge Payne’s motion to set aside entry 

of default will be granted and Amr’s motion for default judgment 

will be denied. A final Order accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion. 

SIGNED this 15th day of July, 2014.

 /s/ 

RICHARD W. ROBERTS

Chief Judge