J.A22045/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

 v. : 

 : 

 : 

LEWIS TODD WATKINS, : 

 : 

 Appellant : No. 2270 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 16, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-36-CR-0003573-2013 

BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 

Appellant, Lewis Todd Watkins, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench 

trial and his conviction for criminal mischief.1

 Appellant contends that 

because the property he damaged was part of his leasehold,2 he could not 

be convicted of damaging another person’s property. We affirm. 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5). 

2

“A leasehold interest is ‘[t]he interest held by the lessee (the tenant or 

renter) through a lease transferring the rights of use and occupancy for a 

stated term under certain conditions.’” Tech One Assocs. v. Bd. of Prop. 

Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cnty., 53 A.3d 685, 689 

n.13 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 
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Appellant rented a room in a house owned by Jeffrey Wool, which Mr. 

Wool did not occupy himself.3

 N.T., 11/19/13, at 7, 15-16. According to Mr. 

Wool, Appellant stopped paying rent, so Mr. Wool traveled to the house to 

remove Appellant’s property and change the back door lock. Id. at 12, 17. 

Mr. Wool was under the impression that Appellant had vacated the premises. 

Id. at 12. After Mr. Wool changed the lock but before he left the property, 

Appellant returned, tried to use his key, and when that failed, kicked the 

door, damaging it. Id. at 8, 13, 23. Mr. Wool unlocked the door, let 

Appellant into the home, and contacted the police. Id. at 8. After the police 

arrived, Mr. Wool reentered the home and discovered damage to two 

windows and a kitchen cabinet. Id. at 9. Appellant admitted causing the 

damage. Id. at 21. 

Appellant was arrested and tried for the aforementioned crimes. The 

court found Appellant guilty on November 19, 2013, and sentenced him that 

day to one year of probation and restitution of $1,500. Id. at 36. According 

to the docket,4

 Appellant filed a timely appeal on December 19, 2013. 

Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

Appellant raises the following issue: 

 

3

 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as it 

was the verdict-winner. Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 

1237 (Pa. 2007). 

4

 The record does not contain the notice of appeal. 
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Could [Appellant] be convicted of criminal mischief where 

the property he damaged was part of his leasehold and 

should not have been construed as “property of another”?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. In support of his issue, Appellant argues that the 

Commonwealth conceded he had a legal right to be present and that Mr. 

Wool improperly locked him out. Thus, Appellant maintains, the property he 

damaged belonged to him as it was part of his leasehold. We hold Appellant 

is due no relief. 

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is 

de novo, as it is a question of law. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235. 

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the

evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to 

support the verdict. 

Id. at 1235-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether 

the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are 

sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 1237. 

Criminal mischief is defined by Section 3304 of the Crimes Code: 

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of criminal 

mischief if he: 

* * * 
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(5) intentionally damages real or personal property of 

another[.] 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5). 

“Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our standard of 

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply 

the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., 

which provides that the object of interpretation and 

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly. A statute’s plain 

language generally provides the best indication of 

legislative intent. Only where the words of a statute are 

not explicit will we resort to other considerations to discern 

legislative intent. 

Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 105. 

No Pennsylvania case construes “property of another” in Section 

3304(a)(5). Arson, a different Chapter 335

 crime, however, defines 

“property of another”:

“Property of another.” A building or other property, 

whether real or personal, in which a person other than the 

actor has an interest which the actor has no authority to 

defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have an 

interest in the building or property. 

 

5 The Crimes Code defines Chapter 33 as “Arson, Criminal Mischief and 

Other Property Destruction.” See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-3313. 
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18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(j). Chapter 396 of the Crimes Code, which addresses 

theft and related offenses, also defines “property of another,” as well as 

“property”:

“Property.” Anything of value, including real estate, 

tangible and intangible personal property . . . . 

“Property of another.” Includes property in which any 

person other than the actor has an interest which the actor 

is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the 

actor also has an interest in the property . . . . 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3901. 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “real property” and “personal property” 

as follows: 

real property. Land and anything growing on, attached 

to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be

severed without injury to the land. 

personal property. 1. Any movable or intangible thing 

that is subject to ownership and not classified as real 

property. . . . 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1254 (8th ed. 2004). “Another” is defined as, inter 

alia, “one other than oneself.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 89 

(1971). 

In Fuller v. State, 230 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2010),7

 the Wyoming 

Supreme Court construed the phrase “property of another,” which was in 

 

6 Both Chapter 33 and Chapter 39 are categorized under Article C: “Offenses 

Against Property.” See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-4120. 
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Wyoming’s property destruction statute: “A person is guilty of property 

destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, injures or destroys 

property of another without the owner’s consent.” Id. at 310 (quoting 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (2014) (emphasis added)). 

In Fuller, 

Mr. Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in 

Casper, Wyoming. After an argument with his wife, Mr. 

Fuller drove his pickup through the closed garage door,

striking his wife’s car inside. He backed up his pickup and 

then rammed the car again, this time pushing it through 

the rear wall of the garage. Both the garage and the car 

were damaged. . . . 

Mr. Fuller was charged with the crime of property 

destruction and defacement for damaging the car and the

garage. At the close of the prosecution’s case, Mr. Fuller 

moved for acquittal, asserting that he could not be 

convicted for damaging the car he owned or the garage he 

leased. The district court granted the motion as it related 

to his wife’s car because the State failed to prove who 

owned it. The district court denied the motion as it related 

to the garage on the basis that, despite Mr. Fuller’s lease 

of the property, the State had offered sufficient evidence 

that the landlords owned the garage. The jury convicted 

Mr. Fuller, and after sentencing, he filed this appeal. 

* * * 

Mr. Fuller focuses on the phrase “property of another,” 

contending that it is ambiguous when applied to property 

in which a defendant has an ownership interest. Because 

the lease entitled him to sole possession of the garage at 

 

7

 This Court, although not bound by the decisions of our sister states, may 

adopt their reasoning if we find it persuasive. See Commonwealth v. 

Grife, 664 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Super. 1995) (adopting analyses of courts of 

sister states). 
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the time it was damaged, Mr. Fuller asserts that the 

garage could be considered his property as well as 

“property of another.” On this basis, he claims that the 

statutory language is subject to varying interpretations, 

and is therefore ambiguous. 

Id. at 310-11.

The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the phrase 

“property of another” is unambiguous:

the word “property” means “anything of value whether 

tangible or intangible, real or personal, public or private.” 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–1–104(a)(viii). The word “another” is 

commonly understood to mean “being one more in 

addition . . . one that is different from the first or present 

one.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 88 

(1991). The garage was “property,” the landlords were 

“another,” and they had a property interest in the garage. 

When Mr. Fuller damaged the leased garage, he destroyed 

or defaced “property of another.” Because the words have

a clear and unambiguous meaning, we will give effect to 

the plain language of the statute. 

Id. at 311. Thus, the Court affirmed Mr. Fuller’s conviction. Id. at 312. 

Instantly, Section 3304 does not define “real property,” “personal 

property” or “of another.” Thus, we resort to construing the plain language 

of the phrase. See McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166. We hold that in Section 

3304, the term “real property” is “land and anything growing on, attached 

to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury 

to the land” and the term “personal property” is “any movable or intangible 

thing subject to ownership and is not real property.” See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1254. These definitions are also in accord with the definition of 

“property” in Section 3301(j), which addresses the property destruction 
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offense of arson, and Section 3901, which defines theft. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 

3301(j) (defining property as including real or personal property), 3901 

(describing property as real estate and tangible personal property); accord 

Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311. It follows that our definition of “real property” 

encompasses the instant damaged items of two windows, kitchen cabinet, 

and back door. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1254; cf. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(j), 

3901. 

We next ascertain whether the damaged property is “property of 

another.” We hold that “another,” as used in Section 3304, is commonly 

defined as “one other than oneself.” See Webster’s Third International 

Dictionary 89 (1971); accord Fuller, 230 P.3d at 312. Similar to the 

landlord in Fuller, Mr. Wool owns the instant home and the fixtures within. 

See N.T. at 7, 15-16; cf. Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311. Mr. Wool, therefore, has 

a property interest. See Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311. Thus, it follows that 

because Mr. Wool has a property interest, the damaged property is 

“property of another.” Cf. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301 (defining “property of another” 

as including real or personal property that actor and person other than actor 

has an interest), 3901 (defining “property of another” as encompassing 

personal or real property in which non-actor and actor has an interest); 

Fuller, 230 P.3d at 311 (holding landlords had interest in property tenant 

leased and thus, property was “property of another” under Wyoming statute 

criminalizing property destruction). Because the Commonwealth established 
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that Mr. Wool had an interest in the damaged property, we perceive no error 

of law in Appellant’s conviction for criminal mischief and thus affirm the 

judgment of sentence. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/10/2014