J-A19016-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

OMAR S. HARRISON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2130 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0007067-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: Filed: November 25, 2020

Omar Harrison appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a 

jury found him guilty of two counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse 

(person less than 16 years of age) and one count each of Statutory Sexual 

Assault, Institutional Sexual Assault, Indecent Assault, and Corruption of 

Minors.

1 Harrison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, trial court 

evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial statements, and the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. We affirm.

Harrison, a dean at a charter elementary school, was charged with 

crimes related to his relationship with, and assault of, a student, Z.R, including 

an encounter that occurred at an Econo Lodge on June 12, 2017. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1, 3124.2, 3126(a)(8), and 

6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.
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Prior to trial, Harrison filed motions in limine, including: (1) a motion to 

preclude the Commonwealth from using the term “grooming,” as the 

Commonwealth did not intend to provide expert testimony on “grooming”; (2)

a motion to preclude the testimony of a motel manager, who intended to 

testify that the front desk clerk that was working at the motel on June 12, 

2017, was fired later that summer for renting hotel rooms without 

documentation; and (3) a motion to admit a prior conviction of Z.R.’s mother 

as a crimen falsi conviction. The court denied the motions.

The court held a jury trial. Both the Commonwealth and the defense 

mentioned “grooming” in their opening statements. The Commonwealth 

stated:

Now, you all are going to be able to see why we have these 

laws, and you’re going to personally see what it’s like for 

someone who’s in an authority position, an adult, to groom, 

to sexualize, and to monopolize on the vulnerabilities of a 

child for their own sexual gratification.

N.T., 10/31/18, at 27.

Harrison stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to hear the term was 

used during the course of the argument “grooming,” that 

Mr. Harrison groomed [Z.R.]. Let’s talk about this because 

part of the issue you’re going to have to decide through the

course of this trial is – it’s 2018. Can an individual of a 

certain age have any kind of interaction with someone who’s 

much younger? That’s part of your decision here. And you’re 

going to hear where Mr. Harrison explains exactly what was

going on as far as his relationship with [Z.R.], that he 

checked her. When she would become sexual in terms of 

her conversations, he stepped back. You’re going to hear 

the information that, well, Mr. Harrison was grooming [Z.R.] 
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for this sexual activity. The Commonwealth presented a 

PowerPoint, the map, all right? You’re going to see that 

[Z.R.] lived approximately half a mile from the house [sic]. 

Well, you know what, Mr. Harrison, over the course of a few 

months, gave [Z.R.] rides to school. You’re not going to hear

about anything regarding what took place during the course 

of those rides to school. You’re not going to hear anything 

about any inappropriate touching, any inappropriate 

contact, [or] inappropriate escalation of the relationship. 

When you talk about it – when you’re going to hear about 

grooming, what is the whole purpose of grooming? To 

ultimately get them to the point -- get the juvenile to the 

point of sexual interaction and they control -- conceal the 

relationship, the sexual aspect of it so that they continue. 

What’s the problem with this? Graduation’s the problem. Six 

months later is a problem. A single incident is the problem. 

If this is supposedly grooming, this is not a one-and-done 

situation. This is something that is designed to be carried 

forth and to go forward, keeping it concealed to whatever 

date, and that’s part of the problem here, ladies and 

gentlemen, if this is that, one time. 

Id. at 37-38.

Z.R. testified at trial and said that Harrison was the dean of the 

elementary school she attended. Id. at 48. She testified that she met him 

when she was in the seventh grade and that at first he “was a father figure,” 

but the relationship turned sexual. Id. at 50. She testified that when she was 

in the eighth grade, Harrison would drive her to school when her mother was 

unable to do so due to her work schedule. Id. at 51-52. He also sometimes 

drove her home from school. Id. at 53. She said they communicated through 

Instagram and on her house telephone, and that Harrison would pull her from 

her classes and they would have conversations in his office. Id. at 54-55.

Z.R. testified that Harrison “would come on to me and tell me how good 

I look and things like that,” and that he told her that she was better than his 
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wife. Id. at 75. She stated that Harrison told her that he wanted to have 

threesomes with other students in the school. Id. at 76. She explained that 

he would pull her out of class and have her log into her Instagram account 

from his phone to make sure she had deleted the messages they exchanged. 

Id. She also said he also showed her pictures of his penis and of naked 

females. Id. at 76-77.

Z.R. testified that one day “at the end of [her] eighth-grade year before 

graduation,” which was on June 23, 2017, Harrison got her to tell her mother 

that she would be attending a boxing class after school. Id. at 80. He then 

drove her to a motel, an Econo Lodge. Id. at 85. She waited in the car while 

Harrison rented a room. Id. at 86. After they went in the room, Z.R. went into 

the bathroom to freshen up and to take off her clothes, and when she came 

out, Harrison was naked. Id. at 87. She testified that she and Harrison then 

had sex, where his “penis went inside” her, and after they had intercourse, he 

“ate her vagina and [she] sucked his penis.” Id. at 89, 91. She testified that 

“his tongue was on [her] vagina, and it was moving,” and that he licked the 

lips of her vagina. Id. at 91-92.

Z.R. also testified that Harrison told her he had rented a room for them 

on the day of her graduation, but they did not go to the motel. Id. at 99. She 

said she and Harrison continued to communicate after she graduated from the 

elementary school. Id. at 102-04. 

Z.R. testified that following her graduation, in October 2017, her mother 

discovered that Z.R. had an Instagram account and saw messages exchanged 
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between Z.R. and Harrison. Id. at 48. She stated that, when her mom asked 

her about it, “I kept denying it to protect him because I was in love with him.” 

Id. at 57. Her mom went to the school to confront Harrison, and she called 

the police. Id.

The messages included the following, which Z.R. and Harrison

exchanged in October 2017:

[Z.R.] [I]’m coming up there Wednesday after school...when 

you gonna to take us out?

[Harrison]: Maybe this weekend. Whatchu have goin’ on??

[Z.R.]: iont got nothing going my per[io]d gonna be off then 

yayy lol

[Harrison]: “[Laugh, cry face emoji] i wasn’t talking bout 

that, lol

[Z.R.]: Oohh i was thinking we could slide that in

[Harrison]: Haaaa! #Maybe

Commonwealth Exh. C2. 

The following exchange also occurred in October 2017:

[Z.R.] You a weirdo bye boy you a whore lol

[Harrison]: And u being w the dean over there makes u a 

what??? [laugh face emoji]

[Z.R.]: [numerous laugh face emojis] Wallahi I don’t talk to 

him lol he is fine, but I’m over here chillin’ and he not fucking 

me so I’m not a whore dummy I’m a baby thot there’s a 

difference, duhh [four laugh face emojis]

[Harrison]: Ever!! [three laugh, cry face emojis]

[Harrison] You my baby thot right?

[Z.R.]: Ever the baby Thot dh [four laugh face emojis]. 
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[Z.R.] Naw but I’m ya baby lol [heart emoji, laugh face 

emoji]

Id. Z.R. testified that “thot” was slang for “that ho over there.” N.T., 

10/31/18, at 71.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Sergeant James Young 

Simpkins, Jr. He stated that after Z.R. reported the relationship to the police, 

he spoke with Harrison. Sergeant Simpkins said that Harrison told him he took 

Z.R. to Econo Lodge once, but was there to meet another girl, whom he did 

not want to involve in the investigation. Id. at 173-75. Sergeant Simpkins 

further testified that the police determined from cell phone records that the 

incident at the Econo Lodge occurred on June 12, 2017. N.T., 11/5/18, at 12-

13.

The general manager of the Econo Lodge, Prad Sayal, testified that the 

Econo Lodge had records for Harrison for three dates in 2017, but not for June 

12. N.T., 10/31/18, at 240. He said that on June 12, 2017, a former employee 

of the Econo Lodge was working the front desk, and he explained that in 

August 2017, the former employee was fired because he had been selling 

rooms without paperwork and pocketing the money. Id. at 244-48. On crossexamination, Harrison’s counsel asked if there was any other reason for the 

employee’s firing, and Sayal answered, “No.” Id. at 252.

Z.R.'s mother, A.G., testified next. Id. at 259. She stated that Harrison 

worked at the school, and sometimes drove Z.R. to school. Id. at 262. She 

further testified that Harrison spoke on the phone with Z.R. and another 

student. Id. at 263. She said that in October 2017, she was looking on the 
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tablet Z.R. used and discovered Instagram messages between Z.R. and 

Harrison. Id. at 267-68. She retrieve a bat and she and Z.R. drove to the 

school. Id. at 269. Z.R. then told the police about the relationship. Id.

Following the encounter, A.G. and Harrison exchanged text messages, where 

he claimed he and Z.R. never had sex.

The Commonwealth and Harrison stipulated that “[o]n the day of the 

offense at issue, . . . Harrison was 41 years old[ and Z.R.] was 14 years old.” 

N.T., 10/31/18, at 45.

In his closing argument, Harrison again mentioned grooming:

I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, the term His Honor 

already talked about a little bit -- grooming. This is not 

consistent behavior if that is the case. All right. This is a 

single incident. Now, if someone is grooming someone it’s

for prolonged period of time, done in such a way as to avoid 

discovery. You’re not going to do it in an open school. You're 

not going to do it where there – you’re surrounded by 

professionals, trained, dedicated, who are obligated under 

the law to report that. You’re not going to do -- and one 

time and done over the summer? Free time for everybody. 

Nothing further. New school year, nothing further.

N.T., 11/5/18, at 29-30.

The jury convicted Harrison of the above-referenced offenses. At 

sentencing, the court heard from Z.R. and A.G., and also from Harrison and 

Harrison’s mother. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 123⁄4 to 

251⁄2 years’ imprisonment. It provided the following reasons:

Now the [c]ourt wants to put on the record numerous 

factors. First of all, the [c]ourt has heard from both the 

defense and from the Commonwealth, the various 

witnesses, the victim impact statements. The [c]ourt notes 
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that as reflected from the county PSI the background of Mr. 

Harrison. He has two prior adult arrests in Philadelphia in 

2013, both guilty verdicts from trials from jury verdicts, one 

for Recklessly Endangering Another Person and another one 

for Possessing an Instrument of Crime. I did study his 

employment history. He was a teacher’s assistant at Don 

Guanella for a little bit and then became Dean of Students 

at . . . the school that’s the subject of this case. During Mr. 

Harrison’s allocution during his statement to the [c]ourt, the 

[c]ourt is struck by the fact and has read in the PSI that 

again Mr. Harrison seems to -- he doesn’t seem to 

understand, doesn’t seem to get it. After 12 jurors found 

him guilty, 12 jurors found him guilty, he still denies 

culpability. He doesn’t take responsibility. His comments to 

the [c]ourt today are that again first in the PSI he blamed 

the police for setting him up as for some reason there was 

some crazy rationale that the police, who did an excellent 

job in this case who were just investigating what they were 

told as if they were at fault. Then after that he blames his 

attorney because he didn’t do a good job. And then he 

seemed to blame the victim and the family for a lot of 

coaching going on. During his allocution he mentioned this

is a huge misunderstanding. However, this is not a huge 

misunderstanding. This is a huge crime. You don’t seem to 

understand what’s going on here. You’re either in complete 

denial of what’s happened here or you're the most arrogant 

bluster of a pathological liar I’ve even seen. All 12 people 

found you guilty of this, not 1, not 2, not 3, all 12 people 

found you guilty of all the charges. As [Z.R.] testified, you 

destroyed and wrecked a very important part of her life 

which she can never get back. You were in a position of 

authority. You were the Dean of Students and you ended up 

being the Dean of Deception for [Z.R.] and her family. 

You’ve taken absolutely no responsibility for this. You were 

in a position of authority and you destroyed her. You 

violated every decent professional moral standard that 

anybody would hold. The [c]ourt must respect the jury’s 

verdict. I have a duty. This [c]ourt has a duty for protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense, these are felonies, 

felony 1’s, most of them, and relation to the impact of the 

victim, . . . and her family, and the rehabilitative needs of 

[Harrison]. But as this report states the rehabilitative needs 

of [Harrison] are almost useless if [Harrison] is in a 

complete state of denial or pathologically lying about what 
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happened here. Mr. Harrison would ask this [c]ourt to 

completely disregard the verdict of the jury because Mr. 

Harrison knows better where the [c]ourt should have 

listened to [Harrison] and not the 12 jurors. Again, this is 

the height of arrogance and it’s unbelievable to th[e] 

[c]ourt. Th[e] [c]ourt does not relish or enjoy sentencing 

people, and I know your family is broken and so is [Z.R.’s]

family, and the only person who took a hammer to 

everybody’s life was you, Mr. Harrison. So in relation to all 

those factors the [c]ourt is going to sentence as follows. 

Count 1, Statutory Sexual Assault, 24 to 48 months. Count 

2, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, 57 to 114 

months. That will be consecutive to Count 1. Count 3, 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, 57 to 114 months. 

That will be consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. Count 4, 

Institutional Sexual Assault, that will be 12 to 24 months 

consecutive to Counts 1, 2 and 3. Count 5, Indecent Assault, 

merges with the other counts I have mentioned, 1, 2, 3 and 

4. And Count 6, Corruption of Minors, 3 to 6 months. This 

runs consecutive to all the other counts. It's a total of 153 

months to 306 months for an aggregate of 12.75 years to 

25-1/2 years. That’s the sentence. That’s the reason for the 

sentence. And I’m sorry for everybody here in the 

courtroom, both your family and [Z.R.’s] family. Perhaps 

time will heal some wounds but this is an appropriate 

sentence considering all the factors mentioned in this court

and in this case. Thank you. That’s it.

N.T., 3/25/19, at 40-44.

Harrison filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. 

Harrison filed a timely appeal. Harrison raises the following issues:

[1.] Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

verdict of guilty of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse 

on the allegation that Mr. Harrison performed oral sex on 

the complainant because the Commonwealth did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Harrison] engaged in 

deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less 

than 16 years of age and [Harrison] is four or more years 

older than the complainant and the complainant and 

[Harrison] were not married to each other?
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[2.] Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

verdict of guilty of Statutory sexual assault because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Mr. Harrison and the 

complainant were not married to each other?

[3.] Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

verdict of guilty of Indecent assault because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Mr. Harrison and the 

complainant were not married to each other?

[4.] Whether the Trial Court erred when it allowed the 

Commonwealth to use the term “grooming” in opening and 

closing when that term is a term of art reserved for use by 

expert witnesses. The term inflamed the jury, suggested 

that there would be evidence that was more prejudicial than 

probative, and the term suggested evidence that was 

irrelevant to the case at hand?

[5.] Whether the Trial Court erred when it allowed the 

Commonwealth to elicit testimony that a hotel clerk was 

fired five months after the allegations arose for 

surreptitiously renting rooms in the hotel in question, to 

cover the Commonwealth’s failure to prove that the 

allegations could have materialized in the hotel?

[6.] Whether the Trial Court erred when it disallowed 

Defense Counsel to cross examine Commonwealth witness 

Alisha Gambrell using a prior crimen falsi conviction? 

[7.] Whether the Trial Court erred when it denied Mr. 

Harrison’s motion for reconsideration challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence because the sentence 

is harsh and excessive under the circumstances?

Harrison’s Br. at 11-12.

In his first three issues, Harrison argues the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence to support the verdict. “When reviewing a 

sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether, when viewed 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that 
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each element of the crime charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa.Super. 2019). “The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id.

(quoting Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc)). “[T]he 

uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of 

fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 

A.2d 554, 562 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 650 

A.2d 452, 455 (Pa.Super. 1994)).

Harrison first claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove penetration

sufficient to establish one of the convictions for IDSI. He claims that Z.R.

answered “no” when asked if Harrison’s tongue penetrated her vagina. He 

claims that, although the testimony stated there was contact “on” the victim’s 

vagina and “on the lips of [her] vagina,” the testimony did not establish 

penetration. He claims that the testimony did not establish he “entered in the 

labia,” or that he engaged in acts of oral or anal intercourse that involved 

penetration, however slight. Harrison’s Br. at 24.

A person commits IDSI with a Person Less Than 16 Years of Age when 

the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant “who is 

less than 16 years of age and the person is four or more years older than the 

complainant and the complainant and the person are not married to each 

other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7). “Deviate sexual intercourse” includes

“intercourse per os or per anus between human beings.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
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“In addition to its ordinary meaning,” sexual intercourse “includes intercourse 

per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight[.]” Id. “[A] person 

can penetrate by use of the mouth or the tongue.” Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

L.N., 787 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Pa.Super. 2001)). However, IDSI does not require 

penetration of the vagina; oral contact with the labia is sufficient. 

Commonwealth v. Trimble, 615 A.2d 48, 50 (Pa.Super. 1992).

Z.R. testified that Harrison’s “tongue was on [her] vagina, and it was 

moving,” and that he licked the lips of her vagina. N.T., 10/31/18, at 83-84.

This was sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, penetration. In 

Interest of J.R., 648 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa.Super. 1994) (finding penetration 

occurred where defendant licked victims vagina).

Harrison next claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove Harrison 

committed IDSI, statutory sexual assault or indecent assault because it failed 

to prove that Harrison and Z.R. were not married. He argues that there was 

no testimony about the absence of marriage of Z.R. and Harrison, and,

although there was testimony about Harrison’s wife, that alone does not prove 

the absence of marriage to Z.R., as he could have been referring to an exwife.

A person commits a crime of IDSI at the statutory provision relevant 

here where the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a 

complainant “who is less than 16 years of age and the person is four or more 

years older than the complainant and the complainant and person are not 
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married to each other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7). Further, the crime of 

statutory sexual assault occurs where the person “engages in sexual 

intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16 years and that person is 

11 or more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the 

person are not married to each other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b). “A person is 

guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the 

complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person 

or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal 

fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or 

the complainant and . . . (8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and 

the person is four or more years older than the complainant and the 

complainant and the person are not married to each other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3126(a)(8). Therefore, to establish the convictions for IDSI, statutory sexual 

assault, and indecent assault, the Commonwealth had to prove Harrison and 

Z.R. were not married.

Here, the testimony established that Z.R. and Harrison lived at different 

residences, that Harrison was the dean at Z.R.’s school, and that A.G. was 

unaware of the extent of the relationship. Further, Z.R. was 14, and Harrison 

was 41, and Z.R. testified that Harrison mentioned his wife to Z.R. This was 

sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 14-year-old victim 

was not married to Harrison. The Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to establish the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Harrison next claims that the court erred when it allowed the 

Commonwealth to use the term “grooming” in its opening statement. He 

argues the term is a term of art reserved for experts, and that it inflamed the 

jury and suggested evidence that was irrelevant. He claims that “[d]riving a 

student is not grooming, nor is texting, nor is conversing.” Harrison’s Br. at 

31. He argues “[g]rooming is driving a complainant to an adult bookstore or 

saloon, texting sexually explicit material or language, talking to a complainant 

about sex or plans to have sex of the complainant’s history regarding same.” 

Id. He claims “[n]either cunning diction nor cross examination can cure the 

error here because what was promised in opening never appeared in the 

record.” Id. at 32.

We review a trial court’s decision to overrule an objection to a 

prosecutor’s statements for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 311 (Pa.Super. 2010). “In reviewing prosecutorial 

remarks to determine their prejudicial quality, comments cannot be viewed in 

isolation but, rather, must be considered in the context in which they were 

made.” Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Correa, 664 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa.Super. 1995)). 

“Generally, comments by the district attorney do not constitute reversible 

error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice 

the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant 

so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true 

verdict.” Id. (quoting Correa, 664 A.2d at 609).
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The trial court found that the “Commonwealth’s usage of the term 

‘grooming’ was merely to add more color to their argument, as permitted 

under Sampson.” Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 15, 2019, at 7 (“1925(a) 

Op.”). It reasoned there was “no indication that the Commonwealth’s use of 

the term negatively impacted the jury against [Harrison],” and that there was 

“no evidence that the jury, upon hearing the term, [was] unable to fairly weigh 

all of the evidence and render a verdict based upon the evidence presented.” 

Id. This was not an abuse of discretion. We further note that Harrison was 

able to present his definition of grooming, and argue that the conduct here 

did not constitute grooming. 

In his next two issues, Harrison challenges the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings. We review a trial court ruling on admission of evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 55 (Pa.Super. 2020). 

“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching 

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, 

as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Id. (quoting 

Geise v. Nationwide Life and Annuity Co. of America, 939 A.2d 409, 417 

(Pa.Super. 2007)). Further, “for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible 

error, it must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Id.

(quoting Geise, 939 A.2d at 417).

Harrison claims the court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to 

elicit testimony that a motel clerk was fired months after the allegations arose. 
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He argues the Commonwealth was not able to prove Harrison was at the hotel, 

because there were no record showing his presence. He claims the court used 

its “discretion by filing the hole in the Commonwealth’s case with the 

testimony of the . . . firing allowing the Commonwealth a location of the 

allegations.” Harrison’s Br. at 33-34. He notes that the manager did not know 

Harrison and did not know whether the former employee rented a room to 

Harrison. He claims the evidence was more prejudicial than probative because 

it “proved nothing, but the prejudiced was overwhelming.” Id. at 34-35.

Relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided by law. 

Pa.R.Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact 

is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.Evid. 401. “The court may 

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of 

one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.Evid. 403. Further, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 

602 provides: “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the 

matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 

own testimony.” Pa.R.Evid. 602. On cross-examination, a party may question 

a witness about matters raised during direct examination, and “any facts 

tending to refute inferences arising from matters raised during direct 
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testimony.” Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 322 (Pa. 2003)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 627 (Pa. 2001)). 

The trial court concluded it did not err, reasoning:

At trial, counsel argued that due to a lack of documentation, 

there was no indication as to what the employee in question

was actually fired for. In response, th[e] [c]ourt held that 

the testimony concerning the reason for the employee’s 

firing would be permitted and that [Harrison’s] remedy 

would be to cross-examine the witness in question. Defense 

counsel did cross-examine the witness and asked if there 

was any other reason, bedside the ex-employee selling 

rooms under the table, that he was fired, to which the hotel 

manager answered “no.” There is no case law to suggest 

that a hotel manager, who has firsthand knowledge, cannot 

testify to the reasons an employee was fired without 

documentation.

1925(a) Op. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The manager had personal 

knowledge as to why the employee was fired and the testimony that the 

former employee, who was working on the day of the incident, was fired for 

selling rooms without documentation was relevant to the case. Further, any 

prejudicial effect did not outweigh the testimony’s probative value.

Harrison next claims the court erred in precluding him from using A.G.’s 

prior conviction during cross-examination. He alleges the conviction was a 

crimen falsi conviction. He argues that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245 (Pa.Super. 2009), a federal conviction for tampering 

with a witness is a crimen falsi conviction. He maintains that A.G.’s conviction 

is similar and therefore is a crimen falsi conviction. 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 provides that crimen falsi crimes may 

be used to attack the credibility of the witness:

(a) In General. For the purpose of attacking the credibility 

of any witness, evidence that the witness has been 

convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty 

or nolo contendere, must be admitted if it involved 

dishonesty or false statement.

Pa.R.Evid. 609(a). A crimen falsi crime “involves the element of falsehood, 

and includes everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect the 

administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud.” 

Cascardo, 981 A.2d at 253 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 5 A.2d 804, 

805 (Pa. 1939)).

The criminal docket for A.G. attached to Harrison’s motion in limine

provides that A.G. pled guilty to retaliation against a witness, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4953(a), and harassment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(4). Motion in Limine, filed 

Oct.29, 2018, at Exh. B. Although she was charged with intimidation of a 

witness, that charge was nolle prossed. Id. In his appellate brief, Harrison 

argues that A.G. had a prior conviction for intimidation of a witness. At the 

hearing on the motion in limine, the court noted “[t]he third issue is a

conviction for one of the . . . prosecution witnesses about a prior conviction 

for retaliation against a witness.” N.T., 10/31/18, at 8-9. When denying the 

motion, the court stated, “counsel had indicated he wishes to impeach the 

witness with a prior conviction for intimidation of a witness.” N.T., 10/31/18, 

258. Similarly, in its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a), it stated that it “[could not] find any case law that would 
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indicate that a conviction for intimidation of a witness would satisfy the 

requirements of R. Evid. 609(a).” 1925(a) Op. at 8.2

____________________________________________

2 Retaliation against a witness provides:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he 

harms another by any unlawful act or engages in a course 

of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which threaten 

another in retaliation for anything lawfully done in the 

capacity of witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953(a). Intimidation of a witness provides:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, 

with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will 

obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts 

to intimidate any witness or victim to:

(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge concerning 

any information, document or thing relating to the 

commission of a crime.

(2) Give any false or misleading information or testimony 

relating to the commission of any crime to any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge.

(3) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing 

relating to the commission of a crime from any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge.

(4) Give any false or misleading information or testimony or 

refrain from giving any testimony, information, document or 

thing, relating to the commission of a crime, to an attorney 

representing a criminal defendant.

(5) Elude, evade or ignore any request to appear or legal 

process summoning him to appear to testify or supply 

evidence.
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It is unclear what crime—retaliation against a witness or intimidation of 

a witness—the trial court considered when addressing this motion, and the 

record includes evidence of a conviction for retaliation against, but not 

intimidation of, a witness.3 We conclude that we need not address whether 

the conviction should have been precluded because, even if the court erred in 

not permitting Harrison to question A.G. regarding her prior conviction, the 

error would be harmless. 

An error is harmless where: 

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the 

prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted 

evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence 

which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted 

evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial 

effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that 

the error could not have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 398-99 (Pa. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d 52, 69 n.18 (Pa. 2003)). Here, Z.R. 

testified as to Harrison’s conduct, Sergeant Simpkins testified regarding the 

investigation, including Harrison’s statement that he brought Z.R. to the Econo

Lodge, and A.G. testified about finding messages exchanged between Harrison 

and Z.R. Harrison cross-examined all witnesses, including A.G. Further, the 

____________________________________________

(6) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to 

which he has been legally summoned.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a). 

3 We note that in its brief the Commonwealth also states the crime at issue is 

intimidation of a witness.
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Commonwealth entered into evidence some of the messages exchanged 

between Harrison and Z.R. Considering the overwhelming evidence presented 

at trial, the failure to question A.G as to the prior conviction did not result in 

prejudice to Harrison.

Harrison next raises three challenges to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence: (1) his sentence was harsh and excessive, and the court failed to 

mention the guidelines or Harrison’s rehabilitative needs, including that he 

was an educator with two misdemeanors; (2) the court improperly considered 

his failure to take responsibility for the conduct; and (3) the court failed to 

consider whether a sentence of total confinement was necessary. 

“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence

is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018). Before 

reviewing the merits of Harrison’s claim, we must determine whether: “(1) 

the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief 

includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the 

concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is 

inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 

A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Harrison filed a timely appeal, and included a concise statement of 

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. We must therefore determine 
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whether he raised the issues in a post-sentence motion and whether he has 

raised a substantial question for our review.

Harrison first claims that the sentence is harsh and excessive, and the 

court failed to consider his background and rehabilitative needs. He raised this 

issue in his post sentence motion. Further, the issue raises a substantial 

question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (en banc) (claim of excessiveness coupled with failure to consider 

rehabilitative needs raises substantial question). We will therefore address it.

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse 

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1162-63 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875 

(Pa.Super. 2012)). “[T]o establish that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion, [the defendant] must establish, by reference to the record, that 

the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 

735, 741 (Pa.Super. 2013)) (alteration in original). “Where the sentencing 

court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report (‘PSI’), we can 

assume the sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors.’” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988)).
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The court considered the PSI, the testimony from the sentencing hearing 

and Harrison’s allocution. The court stated its reasons for the sentence 

imposed, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence. This issue 

is meritless. 

In his appellate brief, Harrison also claims the court erred because the 

trial court “expressed surprise that Mr. Harrison maintained his innocence, a 

stance that Mr. Harrison cannot be forced by the government to yield.” 

Harrison’s Br. at 26.

Harrison failed to include this claim in his post-sentence motion and 

therefore waived the claim. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 

1030, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (finding discretionary aspect of 

sentence claim waived where not raised in post-sentence motion). Further, 

even if he had preserved the claim, we would conclude it lacks merit.

This Court has concluded that it is “undoubtedly appropriate for a trial 

court to consider a defendant’s lack of remorse as a factor at sentencing, 

provided that it is specifically considered in relation to protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense, and the defendant’s rehabilitative needs.” 

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa.Super. 2009). We 

further held that “silence at sentencing may not form the basis of finding that 

a defendant failed to take responsibility for his crimes, and that silence at 

sentencing may not be the sole basis for finding that a defendant lacked

remorse.” Id. at 1127.
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Here, Harrison did not remain silent at sentencing. Rather, he addressed 

the court and continued to blame others for his crimes. The court did not use 

his silence, but rather his allocution and his statements contained in the PSI, 

when determining that he lacked remorse and failed to take responsibility.

Further, the court considered Harrison’s failure to take responsibility and lack 

of remorse in relation to protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, 

and his rehabilitative needs. The court did not an abuse its discretion. 

Harrison further “demands the protection” of the total confinement 

sentencing provision, and argues the court made no statements as to whether 

he had been convicted for another crime, whether he would be likely to commit 

another crime if not incarcerated, or whether incarceration was required to 

vindicate the authority of the court.

Harrison did not raise this claim in his post-sentence motion and 

therefore waived the claim. See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1043. Further, even if 

he had raised it, we would conclude it lacks merit. 

Section 9725 provides:

The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if, 

having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime 

and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, 

it is of the opinion that the total confinement of the 

defendant is necessary because:

(1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or 

partial confinement the defendant will commit another 

crime;

(2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that 

can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an 

institution; or
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(3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 

crime of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725.

In imposing the sentence of total confinement, the court considered the 

PSI, and the testimony and allocution at the sentencing, when imposing 

sentence. Further, Harrison fails to explain why a sentence of anything but 

total confinement would have been appropriate for the convictions in this case. 

The court did not abuse its discretion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/20