J-S04044-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: D.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 :

APPEAL OF: A.G., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 1179 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order July 8, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000064-2014 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2016 

A.G. (Mother) appeals from the order entered July 8, 2015, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated involuntarily 

her parental rights to her minor son, D.G. (Child).1 We affirm. 

Child was born in October of 2012. Immediately after his birth, Child’s 

blood tested positive for opiates and he was removed from Mother’s care by 

the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF). Child 

was adjudicated dependent on December 14, 2012 and placed in foster 

care.2 

 

* Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 The identity of Child’s natural father is unknown. His parental rights were 

terminated on June 30, 2014. 

2

 Mother had a prior history with CYF which, to some extent, precipitated 

CYF’s dependency petition on behalf of Child. Her older daughters, Child’s 

half-sisters, were adjudicated dependent before Child’s birth and placed in 

the permanent care of their paternal aunt. Additionally, Mother was 

incarcerated on a driving-under-the-influence (DUI) charge while she was 

pregnant with Child. She was released two months prior to Child’s birth. 
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CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) 

on April 11, 2014. On June 30, 2014, the orphans’ court denied the petition, 

finding that CYF had not met its burden of proving that grounds for 

termination existed as to Mother. However, the court ordered Mother to 

participate in dual-diagnosis treatment and comply with the goals of the 

Family Service Plan (FSP) provided by CYF. Specifically, “CYF was ordered to 

refer Mother to mental health treatment and Mother was to take a copy of [a 

psychological evaluation completed by Dr. Neil Rosenblum] to her treatment 

provider to insure that the issues raised by Dr. Rosenblum were being 

addressed in treatment. Mother was to provide proof of her mental health 

treatment.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2015, at 2.

A permanency review hearing was held on September 14, 2014. At 

that hearing, Mother indicated that she had enrolled in mental health 

treatment as ordered, but had not provided Dr. Rosenblum’s report to her 

new therapist. The goal change hearing was continued to November 14, 

2014, pending an updated assessment by Dr. Rosenblum. 

On November 14, 2014, the orphans’ court found that Mother’s 

compliance with the permanency plan was minimal, stating as follows. 

The court previously denied a TPR because the agency did 

not establish grounds. Dr. Rosenblum was not called as a 

witness at that time. Since the TPR denial, the court added an 

additional goal of mental health treatment to [Mother’s] goals 

 

During those two months, Mother repeatedly refused to cooperate with CYF’s 

request for urine screens. 

 
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which she has not consistently attended. Additionally, concerns 

about [Mother’s] continued contact with her family and the fact 

that her other children were in her care and at her mother’s 

residence raise additional concerns. Additionally, [Mother] was 

present at her mother’s residence when her sister who was 

subject to a warrant was arrested. Dr. Rosenblum re-evaluated 

[Mother] and continues to opine that, although [Mother] has 

some good skills with [Child], her mental health and personal 

situation is such that she is not currently stable enough to 

assume care for [Child], nor will she be stable enough within a 

reasonable period of time given the length of time [Child] has 

been in care. 

Id. at 3. Based on these findings, the orphans’ court changed the 

permanency goal to adoption. 

A second TPR petition was filed on December 19, 2014. On January 

23, 2015, Mother filed a motion requesting that the orphans’ court recuse 

itself from the termination proceeding. That motion was denied, following a 

hearing, on January 30, 2015. 

A termination hearing was held on June 29 and July 1, 2015. On July 

8, 2015, the orphans’ court entered its decree terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Mother now raises the following issues for our review. 

1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and 

(a)(5)? 

2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving 

by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s 
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parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)? 

3. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion by failing to 

recuse [itself]? 

Mother’s Brief at 5 (orphans’ court answers omitted). 

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the [orphans’] court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the [orphans’] court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

The [orphans’] court’s decision, however, should not be reversed 

merely because the record would support a different result. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to [orphans’] courts 

that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 
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standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (b). We need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to any one subsection of subsection 2511(a), as well as 

subsection 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to 

terminate under subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows. 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

* * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

 Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in terminating her 

parental rights under subsection (a)(2) where Dr. Rosenblum testified that 

she “possesses good parenting skills”, and CYF caseworker Lawrence Walter 

stated that her interactions with Child are appropriate. Mother’s Brief at 9. 

 The orphans’ court addressed Mother’s claim as follows. 

 With respect to Mother’s first issue, following the hearing 

on CYF’s first TPR petition, [the orphans’ court] ordered Mother 

to engage in mental health treatment and to provide her treating 

provider with a copy of Dr. Rosenblum’s report so that the issues 

Dr. Rosenblum had identified would be addressed in treatment. 

One such issue that Dr. Rosenblum identified was that Mother 

needed to participate in intensive dual-diagnosis therapy. At the 

June 29th termination hearing, Dr. Rosenblum testified that 

Mother’s “poor judgment, poor problem solving, how drugs and 

alcohol relate to that ... troubled relationships with others, [] lack 

of ownership and responsibility, limited independence in her 

personal functioning, and difficulty accepting and responding to 

feedback from others” necessitated the intensive dual-diagnosis 

treatment. Yet, in spite of [the orphans’ court’s] June 30, 2014 

Order, Mother failed to provide her therapist, Ms. Wilkinson, with 

a copy of Dr. Rosenblum’s report in a timely manner and 

subsequently ceased attending her therapy sessions only after 

three short months.5 

___________________________________________________

5

 Although Ms. Wilkinson testified that it was not 

Mother’s fault that Mother’s services were delayed 

from July until November, it was Mother’s decision to 

terminate the therapy only after ten individual 

sessions. 

___________________________________________________

 Furthermore, Mother only attended a little over 75 percent 

of her appointments during those brief months in which she was 

involved in therapy. Although Mother did attend weekly dual 
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diagnosis group therapy sessions during that time period,6

Mother never engaged in any individual dual diagnosis treatment 

with Ms. Wilkinson per Dr. Rosenblum’s recommendation. 

___________________________________________________

6 The group therapy sessions were labeled as “dual 

diagnosis” because the individuals in treatment were 

engaged in either individual mental health or drug 

and alcohol treatment or both. However, the group 

therapy sessions were not necessarily targeted at 

treating individuals with dual diagnoses per se. 

___________________________________________________

At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she “quit” 

attending her individual and group therapy sessions at Mercy 

Behavioral Health because she felt that she was not “getting 

anywhere with the therapists and the groups.” Mother further 

testified that she began “to look into better programs that would 

meet the goals of what Dr. Rosenblum wanted [her] to work on.” 

Yet, at the time of the July 1, 2015 termination hearing, Mother 

was not engaged in any form of mental health treatment. 

Although Mother testified that she participated in mental health 

treatment at the Northside branch of Mercy Behavioral Health 

from April to June of 2015, Mother did not offer into evidence 

any proof of her treatment, nor did she sign releases for CYF to 

have access to her records from the Northside branch. 

Furthermore, neither Ms. Wilkinson nor Mr. Williams had any 

record that Mother was being treated at the Northside branch. 

Even if [the court] had found Mother’s testimony regarding 

her most recent treatment to be credible, the fact remains that 

in the year since [the court] ordered Mother to engage in mental 

health treatment, by her own admission, she only engaged in 

roughly five months of therapy. Moreover, for the entire year 

prior to the termination hearing, Mother never sought the dualdiagnosis treatment that Dr. Rosenblum stated was needed to 

remedy her incapacity and neglect. Further, based upon Dr. 

Rosenblum’s evaluation, even if Mother had consistently 

attended therapy, there would be no assurance that the 

treatment would result in the type of change necessary for 

Mother to parent on a full[-]time basis. 
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Following the dependency adjudication, [Child] has never 

returned to Mother’s care or had any unsupervised visitation with 

Mother because of Mother’s continued incapacity. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2015, at 5-6 (citations omitted). 

 The court’s analysis is supported by the record. During the TPR 

hearing, CYF adoptions caseworker Gregory Williams testified that since June 

of 2014 the agency’s “nonnegotiable goals” for Mother were visitation with 

Child and Mother’s participation in mental health treatment. N.T., 

7/1/12015, at 25-26. Mother was also instructed to address her housing 

situation, maintain sobriety and “positive mental health,” and locate 

employment. Id. at 26. Mr. Williams testified that Mother has attended her 

scheduled supervised visitations with Child, but has not followed through on 

participation in mental health treatment. Id. at 29, 31. Mr. Williams further 

indicated that, as of the date of the hearing, Mother was not participating in 

drug and alcohol counseling, although her recent urine screens were 

negative. Id. at 34-35. Mr. Williams stated that, due to Mother’s lack of 

follow-through with the nonnegotiable goal of seeking mental health 

treatment, her history of drug and alcohol dependence, and her general 

inconsistency with participating in court-ordered services, CYF was 

concerned with Mother’s stability and ability to parent Child. Id. at 39-40. 

Dr. Rosenblum testified that, when he initially evaluated Mother, he 

believed she had “skills and talent” as a parent and that reunification with 

her children was possible “if she could deal with her impulse control, her 
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anger, and her need for dual-diagnosis treatment.” N.T., 6/29/2015, at 11. 

However, he testified that in the two and a half years since his initial 

evaluation he had not seen an appreciable change in Mother’s behavior, 

particularly in her lack of independence and ownership over her decisions. 

Id. at 10-11. 

 Moreover, Debbie Wilkinson, Mother’s Mercy Behavioral Health 

outpatient therapist testified that Mother unilaterally decided to stop 

attending individual therapy and dual-diagnosis group sessions there in 

February of 2015. N.T., 7/1/2015, at 11-15. Ms. Wilkinson testified that 

Mother attended approximately 75% of her scheduled sessions before 

discharging herself from the programs. Id. at 18. 

 CYF caseworker Lawrence Walter testified that, while the agency 

believed that Mother’s interaction with Child during supervised visitations 

was appropriate, concerns remained over Mother’s long-term mental health, 

sobriety, and personal stability. Id. at 58-59, 64. He testified that CYF has 

had the same goals in place for Mother since 2011, when her older children 

were declared dependent. Id. at 63. Those goals have not been addressed 

adequately in that time, leading CYF to conclude that “the length of this case 

and the assorted efforts ... made to resolve these issues without success 

suggests that they are unlikely to be resolved any time in the near future.” 

Id. at 63. 
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 During her testimony, Mother admitted that she left Mercy Behavioral 

Health in February of 2015 because she did not believe she was “getting 

anywhere with the therapists and the groups that [she] had so [she] started 

to look into better programs” that would meet her dual-diagnosis goals. Id.

at 75. As of the TPR hearing, Mother was not receiving any mental health or 

drug dependency treatment, although she testified that she had sought 

referrals from CYF, but admitted that she had not followed-up. Id. at 78. 

Mother testified that she was sober, having weaned herself off of opiates, 

including methadone. Id. at 80-81. 

 Despite Mother’s progress in achieving sobriety in the months leading 

up to the TPR hearing, the record reveals that Mother has not addressed the 

nonnegotiable goal of obtaining and maintaining mental health treatment, 

despite being given ample opportunities to do so. In fact, Mother unilaterally 

discharged herself from her dual-diagnosis program. While she claims to 

have sought a better program, she had not enrolled in treatment in the four 

months between her voluntary discharge and the TPR hearing. Further, 

despite listing a few referrals, Mother failed to indicate when, if at all, she 

intended to enroll in a new program. Accordingly, because the record 

supports a determination that Mother cannot or will not remedy her 

incapacity, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that CYF met its 

burden under subsection 2511(a)(2). See, e.g., In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]f we were to permit Mother 
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further opportunity to cultivate an environment where she can care for 

C.L.G., we would be subjecting a child, who has been waiting for more than 

two years for permanency, to a state of proverbial limbo in anticipation of a 

scenario that is speculative at best.”). 

We now turn our attention to subsection 2511(b). We have discussed our 

analysis under that subsection as follows. 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some 

citations omitted). 

 Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child: 

Mother argues that termination “permanently and unnecessarily 

deprives [Child] of the love, companionship and affection of his 

biological mother with whom he is bonded.” Dr. Rosenblum 

testified that [Child’s] primary attachment is to his foster 

parents, as they are the individuals to whom his sense of trust 

and comfort is clearly connected. Dr. Rosenblum further testified 

to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that 

termination met [Child’s] needs and welfare. [Child] does not 

look to Mother as the individual he can rely on to meet his 

emotional needs. Moreover, [...] not visiting with Mother would 
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not appear to have any adverse impact on [Child], as [Child] has 

spent the most vital years of his attachment period with his 

foster parents and has lived his entire life out of Mother’s care. 

Yet, were [Child] to be removed from his foster parents, it 

appears that he would suffer “a major emotional trauma.” 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2015, at 9. 

We again conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. 

The testimony of Dr. Rosenblum was corroborated by that of CYF caseworker 

Walter, who testified that Child has resided with his pre-adoptive foster 

parents since being adjudicated dependent in December of 2012. N.T., 

7/1/2015, at 63-64, 68. While he recognizes Mother and interacts with her 

appropriately, he has never had unsupervised contact with Mother. Id. at 

68-69. Child is bonded with his foster parents, he looks to his foster parents 

to meet his daily needs and he is thriving in their care. Id. Mr. Walter 

opined that Child’s best interest would be served by terminating Mother’s 

parental rights, so that he can be adopted by his foster parents. Id. at 64. 

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that it 

would best serve Child’s needs and welfare to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. Allowing Mother to preserve her parental rights would deny Child the 

opportunity for permanence and stability. No relief is due. 

Finally, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in failing to recuse 

itself from the termination proceeding. Mother’s Brief at 19-20. 

Generally, a party must seek to have a judge recused from 

a case, by first bringing the petition for recusal before that jurist, 

thus enabling the judge to evaluate the reasons for recusal 

firsthand. This is, in part, to allow the requested judge to state 
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his or her reasons for granting or denying the motion and, as the 

allegedly biased party, to develop a record on the matter. The 

final determination by that judge may then be reviewed by an 

appellate court, but may only be reversed upon an abuse of 

discretion. 

In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1112 (Pa. 2011) (citations and 

quotations omitted). “We recognize that our trial judges are ‘honorable, fair 

and competent,’ and although we employ an abuse of discretion standard, 

we do so recognizing that the judge [her]self is best qualified to gauge [her] 

ability to preside impartially. Hence, a trial judge should grant the motion to 

recuse only if a doubt exists as to his or her ability to preside impartially or if 

impartiality can be reasonably questioned.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 892 

(Pa. Super. 2014). 

 On appeal, Mother contends that the orphan’s court “denied the first 

TPR petition filed against Mother ... reluctantly and visibly expressed [its] 

unhappiness with [the] decision saying that CYF could have prevailed.” 

Mother’s Brief at 19.3 Mother further contends that the court’s familiarity 

 

3

 Mother’s issue on appeal differs from that argued during the January 30, 

2014 hearing on her motion to recuse. At that time, counsel for Mother 

indicated that the basis for the motion was statements made by the court 

during a November 14, 2014 permanency review hearing involving Mother’s 

older children. N.T., 1/30/2015, at 6-8. Counsel stated that a colleague of 

his was present at the hearing on Mother’s behalf and believed the court was 

advising CYF “how to present their case at [Mother’s] next TPR hearing.” Id.

at 7. These comments prompted the other attorney to seek a recusal, which 

was denied. Id. Mother has failed to provide this Court with a transcript of 

the November 14, 2014 hearing at issue, or a statement in lieu of that 

transcript as prescribed in Pa.R.A.P. 1923. Accordingly, to the extent that 

Mother relies on this transcript in her argument, this issue is waived. In re 

G.T., 897 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“Absent a re-creation of the 
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with, and negative opinions of, Mother’s family affected the partiality of her 

decision in this matter. Id.

 The court addressed Mother’s issue as follows. 

As the party seeking recusal, Mother had the burden to prove 

that [the court] exhibited some form of “bias, prejudice or 

unfairness” that rendered [it] incapable of presiding impartially. 

The only evidence which Mother can point to of [the orphans’ 

court’s] alleged bias is that [it] appeared to have “demonstrated 

express displeasure” in not terminating her rights at the first TPR 

hearing, that [it] had the “express intention” to terminate her 

rights at the subsequent TPR hearing, and was swayed by [its] 

knowledge of extra-judicial information regarding Mother’s 

family. 

With respect to Mother’s first argument, [the court] did not 

express displeasure in not being able to terminate Mother’s 

rights at the first TPR hearing. [It] merely denied making a 

finding in favor of Mother. Because denial of the first petition 

was used affirmatively in the [siblings’] case, [the court] simply 

commented that CYF did not establish grounds for termination, 

but that the petition was not denied due to any actions or efforts 

by Mother to improve her situation. [The court’s] comment in no 

way signified any degree of displeasure or bias towards Mother. 

In response to Mother’s second and third arguments, Mother has 

failed to demonstrate any evidence that [the court] intended to 

terminate her rights prior to the second hearing, other than her 

belief that [the court] allowed extra-judicial knowledge of her 

family to impact [its] impartiality. As [the court] stated at the 

motions hearing on January 30, 2015, despite all of the 

information that [it] was aware of during the first termination 

hearing, [it] denied CYF’s petition, finding the agency did not did 

not establish grounds for termination. Furthermore, all of the 

information ... learned about Mother’s family was obtained in [the 

court’s] role as a jurist and not from any “pretrial bias or 

personal disdain.” Contrary to Mother’s belief, trial judges are 

 

content of the alleged missing transcript, it is as if the transcript was not 

filed. Under those circumstances, adequate appellate review is not possible 

without such crucial testimony.”). 
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capable of “disregarding inadmissible evidence and considering 

only competent evidence.” 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2015, at 10-11 (citations omitted). 

 We discern no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s decision to 

deny Mother’s motion. Put simply, Mother has failed to meet her burden of 

establishing that the court’s comment was evidence of “bias, prejudice or 

unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside 

impartially.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d at 894. Moreover, we recognize, and the 

orphans’ court aptly notes, that the court’s familiarity with Mother’s family is 

a necessary result of the one-judge/one-family system employed by 

Allegheny County and the court’s apprehension about allowing Mother, and 

Child, to be involved with Mother’s family is not in and of itself evidence of 

bias. 

 Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

involuntarily, we affirm the order of the orphans’ court. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/29/2016 
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