alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

### Troutman, Jake (FAA)

From: Troutman, Jake (FAA)

Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 9:55 AM

To: 'lipocharge@gmail.com'

Cc: Pappas, Rob (FAA)

Subject: Request for Additional Information - ESRUAS, LLC

Dear Mr. Brett E. Lisa:

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket No. FAA

‐ 2015

‐ 0860). This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your petition.

• Describe the aircraft makes, models, and types (i.e., fixed wing, rotorcraft, lighter than air) for the proposed UAS

operation. The descriptions should include the maximum weight (including payload). This information can be located in

the aircraft manuals.

• Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which is required by Order

8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to proceed without this manual and remove closed set filming

from your proposed operation please inform of us of your intention by the requested response date listed below.

Please submit the additional information (non proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit any

proprietary information to the FAA Headquarters or electronically via email to 333exemptions@faa.gov

. If you want us

to process your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 7/24/2015. If we do not

receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267

‐ 9521.

Sincerely,

Jake J Troutman

Program Analyst | Rulemaking

FAA Office of Aviation Safety

Airmen and Airspace Rules Division

202

‐ 267

‐ 9521
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 23.1

                         Independent Auditor's Consent

The Board of Directors
Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.

   We consent to the use of our reports dated January 21, 2002, except for Note
I, as to which the date is March 7, 2002, with respect to the consolidated
balance sheets of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. and subsidiaries as of
December 21, 2001 and 2000, and the related consolidated statements of income,
shareholders' equity, cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period
ended December 31, 2001, incorporated herein by reference and to the reference
to our firm under the heading "Experts" in the prospectus.

                                          KPMG LLP

New Orleans, Louisiana
February 21, 2003
#### Eric H. MOODY, AKA Abdul Wahid, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jimmy CRUZEN, individually and in his official capacities as Correctional Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16058

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 20, 2017

Eric H. Moody, Pro Se

Erin Ganahl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGCA — Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, CA, Chad Allen Stege-man, Esquire, Attorney, California Department of Justice, Sari Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Eric H. Moody, AKA Abdul Wahid, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action related to congregational prayer. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Moody failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether there was “something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” *Albino v. Baca,*747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en baric); *see also Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (requiring proper exhaustion, which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (empha*887sis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moody contends that he exhausted under a “continuing violation” theory, but even if this court were to adopt such a theory, it would not apply in this case.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### Abel Sanchez LINARES, AKA Abel Hernandez, AKA Angel Hernandez, AKA Abel Sanchez, AKA Abel Linares Sanchez, AKA Angel Sanchez, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71969

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 20, 2017

Abel Sanchez Linares, Pro Se

Margot L. Carter, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, *881Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Abel Sanchez Linares, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s adverse credibility determination, and review de novo questions of law. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, where Sanchez Linares’ testimony regarding his entry to the United States was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the documentary evidence he provided. *See id.*at 1046-48 (adverse credibility determination supported under the totality of the circumstances). Because Sanchez Li-nares’ testimony was not credible, and he did not provide sufficient documentary evidence regarding the time, place, and manner of his entry, the agency properly determined that he failed to meet his burden of establishing that he entered the United States lawfully. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(2), 1361; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Sanchez Linares’ unexhausted contentions regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or his eligibility for relief. *See Tijani v. Holder,*628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court lacks jurisdiction to consider legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the agency); *Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (new evidence may be added to the record through a motion to reopen with the agency).

We also lack jurisdiction to consider Sanchez Linares’ request for prosecutorial discretion. *See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder,*688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (order).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 6667

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. ELLISON LAKELL COOPER , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. ( 4:12

- cr - 00520

- TLW

- 1 ; 4:16

- cv - 02418

- TLW )

Submitted : September 16, 2020 Decided: September 22, 2020

Before AGEE, FLOYD, and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by un published per curiam opinion

. Ellison Lakell Cooper , Appellant Pro Se. Everett E. McMillian, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , OFFICE OF THE UNI TED STATES ATTORNEY , Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ellison Lakell Cooper seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Be fore addressing the merits of Cooper’s appeal, we must first be assured that we have jurisdiction. Porter v. Zook , 803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015)

. We may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545

- 46 (1949). “Ordinarily, a district cour t order is not final until it has resolved all claims as to all parties.” Porter , 803 F.3d at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record reveals that the district court did not adjudicate all of the claims Cooper raised. Specificall y, the court failed to address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which Cooper raised in a supplemental filing that the district court entered on its docket as “additional attachments” to his § 2255 motion. We conclude that t he order Cooper seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order

. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for consideration of the unresolved claim

. We express no opinion regardi ng the merits of that claim. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED AND REMANDED
# VVSG 2.0 Introduction and Guide

# Principle 1

# Principle 2

# Principle 3

# Principle 4

# Principle 5

# Principle 6

# Principle 7

# Principle 8

# Principle 9

# Principle 10

# Principle 11

# Principle 12

# Principle 13

# Principle 14

# Principle 15

# Appendix A Glossary

# Appendix B Requirements Listing

# Appendix C References

# General Remarks

http://www.nased.org/http://www.nased.org/
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 851 

To reinstate requirements pertaining to electronically controlled pneumatic 

brake systems on high-hazard flammable unit trains, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 29, 2019 

Ms. HERRERA BEUTLER introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To reinstate requirements pertaining to electronically controlled pneumatic brake systems on high-hazard flammable unit trains, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Oil and Flammable 

5 Material Rail Transportation Safety Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REINSTATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS. 

7 On and after the date that is 90 days after the date 

8 of enactment of this Act— 

9 (1) the final rule of the Department of Trans10 portation dated September 25, 2018, and titled 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 851 IH

1 ‘‘Hazardous Materials: Removal of Electronically 

2 Controlled Pneumatic Brake System Requirements 

3 for High Hazard Flammable Unit Trains’’ (83 Fed. 

4 Reg. 48393) shall have no force and effect; and 

5 (2) each regulation removed or otherwise 

6 amended by such final rule shall be restored and re7 vived as if such final rule had not been issued. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-82,323-03

EX PARTE WILLIE DAVIS, JR., Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 18672 IN THE 329 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM WHARTON COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant pleaded guilty and was convicted

of possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone and sentenced to twenty-five years’

imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction.

Applicant contends, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he failed to investigate, failed to litigate the pre-trial motions such as the motion to suppress,

failed to challenge the drug report which showed a lack of evidence, and failed to file a motion to
2

dismiss due to lack of evidence. 

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In these

circumstances, additional facts are needed. As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294

(Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court

shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The

trial court may use any means set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d).

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the

performance of Applicant’s trial counsel was deficient and, if so, whether counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced Applicant. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and

conclusions of law that it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for

habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: April 22, 2015

Do not publish
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Windswept Environmental
Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 28, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, Michael O'Reilly, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Charles L. Kelly, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

              (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                   13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

              (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                   all material respects, the financial condition and results
                   of operations of the Company.


                                                  /s/ Michael O'Reilly
                                                --------------------------
                                                Michael O'Reilly
                                                President and
                                                Chief Executive Officer


                                                  /s/ Charles L. Kelly, Jr.
                                                --------------------------
                                                Charles L. Kelly, Jr.
                                                Chief Financial Officer



                                                 Dated: February 10, 2005
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Gundle/SLT Environmental, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 (the "Report"),
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I Roger
J. Klatt, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
(S)1350, as adopted pursuant to (S)906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that

     2. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

     3. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company.

 /S/ Roger J. Klatt
-------------------
Roger J. Klatt
Chief Financial Officer

Date  October 24, 2002
     -----------------
**Exhibit 13.2**

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Videocond2h Limited (the “Company”) hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that: 

(i) the accompanying annual report onForm 20-F of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2015 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company. 

Date: July 28, 2015 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, and is not being “filed” either as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure statement, and is not to be incorporated by reference into the Report or any other filing of the Company, whether made before or after thedate hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing. The foregoing certification shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subjectto the liabilities of Section 18 or Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
### Supreme Court ofthe United States Office ofthe Clerk 

### Washington, DC 20543-0001 Scott S. Harris Clerk ofthe Court 

### April 20, 2015 (202)479-3011
Clerk 

### Court ofCriminal Appeals ofTexas P.O. Box 12308 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 Re: Cecil Ray Garcia v. Texas No. 14-9369 (Your No. WR-61,850-03)
Dear Clerk: The petition for a writ ofcertiorari in the above entitled case was filed on 

### November 25, 2014 and placed on the docket April 20, 2015 as No. 14-9369.
Sincerely, Scott S. Harris, Clerk by Clayton Higgins Case Analyst

RECEIVED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

### APR 23 2015 

### AbelAcosta, Clerk
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                              CAUTIONARY STATEMENT


         Reality Interactive, Inc. (the "Company"), or persons acting on behalf
of the Company, or outside reviewers retained by the Company making statements
on behalf of the Company, or underwriters, from time to time make, in writing or
orally, "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of Section 27A of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended. When used in conjunction with an identified
forward-looking statement, this Cautionary Statement is for the purpose of
qualifying for the "safe harbor" provisions of such sections and is intended to
be a readily available written document that contains factors which could cause
results to differ materially from such forward-looking statements. These factors
are in addition to any other cautionary statements, written or oral, which may
be made or referred to in connection with any such forward-looking statement.

         The following matter, among others, may have a material adverse effect
on the business, financial condition, liquidity, results of operations or
prospects, financial or otherwise, of the Company. Reference to this Cautionary
Statement in the context of a forward-looking statement or statements shall be
deemed to be a statement that may cause actual results to differ materially from
those in such forward-looking statement or statements:

         DISCONTINUATION OF CURRENT OPERATIONS. The Company ceased its business
operations effective April 30, 1999. Management of the Company believes this
action was necessary in light of the Company's current liquidity needs and lack
of short-term revenue opportunities. The Company is currently exploring
potential uses for the Company in its current form as an inoperative public
company. In the meantime, the Company intends to comply with all SEC filing
requirements in order to maintain the Company's good standing under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. In the event the Company is unable
to find a suitable acquisition or merger candidate or other suitable use for the
Company in the near future, the Company will be liquidated and its remaining
assets will be distributed to its creditors in satisfaction of its then-current
obligations and, if any assets remain thereafter, to its shareholders. There can
be no assurance that any such candidate or other suitable use for the Company or
its assets will be found.












                                       11