NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

PRESCILLA M. ARROZAL, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2010-7069 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in 08-1597, Chief Judge William P. 

Greene, Jr. 

____________________ 

Decided: October 7, 2010 

____________________ 

PRESCILLA M. ARROZAL, of San Rafael, Bulacan, Philippines, pro se. 

DAWN E, GOODMAN, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attor-
ARROZAL v. DVA 2

ney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and MARTIN 

F. HOCKEY, JR., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the 

brief were DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant General 

Counsel, and BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, Attorney, Office of the 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before GAJARSA, LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

This is an appeal by a veteran’s surviving spouse, 

Prescilla M. Arrozal, seeking dependency and indemnity 

compensation (“DIC”) benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1310. 

The Board of Veterans Appeals (“Board”) denied entitlement to VA service-connection for the cause of Mrs. Arrozal’s husband’s death and the United States Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirmed 

the Board’s denial. Arrozal v. Shinseki, No. 08-1597, 2009 

WL 4282836, at *4 (Vet. App. Dec. 2, 2009). Because Mrs. 

Arrozal is appealing factual determinations, or at most, 

the law as applied to the facts of the case, this court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider her claims and the appeal is 

dismissed. 

BACKGROUND

Mrs. Arrozal’s husband, Pedro M. Arrozal, served on 

active duty in the Philippine Commonwealth Army from 

December 1941 to February 1942, and from May 1945 to 

May 1946. In April 1985, Mr. Arrozal died of a cerebral 

hemorrhage due to hypertension. Mr. Arrozal was not 

receiving any VA benefits at the time of his death. His 

service medical records (“SMRs”) do not indicate that he 

had cardiovascular disease, cerebral vascular disease, 

cerebral hemorrhage, or hypertension. His military 
3 ARROZAL v. DVA

discharge examination revealed that he had a normal 

cardiovascular system.

In October 2004, Mrs. Arrozal filed a claim with the 

Manila VA Regional Office for DIC benefits under 38 

U.S.C. § 1310 claiming that her husband’s death resulted 

from his military service. The Regional Office denied the 

claim in July 2005 and Mrs. Arrozal appealed. An affidavit was submitted in October 2005, which asserted that 

Encarnacion Arrozal was the “attendant” of a physician 

who had been treating Mr. Arrozal for hypertension since 

1947. Appellee App. 59. The Board held a video conference hearing, after which it denied service-connection for 

the cause of Mr. Arrozal’s death. The Board found no 

medical evidence showing cardiovascular disease, cerebral 

vascular disease or hemorrhage, or hypertension until 

twenty-seven years after service and found that there was 

no competent evidence of a nexus between any of Mr. 

Arrozal’s diseases and his military service.

Mrs. Arrozal appealed to the Veterans Court claiming 

that VA failed in its duty to notify as required by 38 

U.S.C. § 5103(a) because VA never informed her that lay 

evidence and the competency of lay witnesses could be 

considered in the absence of medical evidence. The Veterans Court found that the Board’s determination that 

the Secretary fully complied with his section 5103(a) duty 

to notify Mrs. Arrozal through a November 2004 letter 

was not clearly erroneous because “the Secretary is not 

required to inform her of evidence specific to her individual claim.” Arrozal, 2009 WL 4282836, at *2. Moreover, 

Mrs. Arrozal’s submission of lay evidence demonstrated 

actual knowledge, making “any notice error in that regard 

not prejudicial.” Id. at *3.

Next, Mrs. Arrozal asserted that the Board erred in 

considering the long period of time lacking any complaint 
ARROZAL v. DVA 4

of hypertension by her husband. The Veterans Court held 

that the Board did not commit error when it considered 

Mr. Arrozal’s twenty-seven year gap between his separation from service and initial treatment for hypertension 

along with other factors as part of the overall record.

Mrs. Arrozal also questioned the Board’s decision not 

to give weight to the affidavit of Encarnacion Arrozal. 

She argued that Encarnacion Arrozal’s evidence should 

have been considered because as an attendant to the 

doctor who was treating Mr. Arrozal in 1947, she “heard” 

that Mr. Arrozal’s blood pressure was high. The Veterans 

Court, citing Jeandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2007), recognized that in some situations lay 

evidence may be sufficient to establish a diagnosis. 

However, the Veterans Court concluded that because 

none of the situations outlined in Jandreau were present 

in this case, the affidavit was insufficient evidence to 

establish a service-connection. 

Finally, Mrs. Arrozol argued that the May 2007 Board 

video conference hearing was not conducted properly. She 

claimed that the hearing officer erred in only asking her 

two to three questions and that the officer failed to inquire about the exact date of Mr. Arrozal’s diagnosis for 

hypertension. Mrs. Arrozal also maintained that she was 

interrupted by a lady in the video room that prevented 

her from discussing evidence in her possession, and that 

despite her age and poor health, she was not given priority at the video conference hearing. Upon reviewing the 

transcript, the Veterans Court determined that the hearing officer fulfilled his duty under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) 

by properly asking Mrs. Arrozal whether she was aware 

of any outstanding medical records not within the Board’s 

possession and by giving Mrs. Arrozal ample opportunity 

to present arguments and evidence. The Veterans Court 

also found that Mrs. Arrozal failed to show prejudice 
5 ARROZAL v. DVA

caused by the interruption and lack of priority, and that 

she did not specify what additional questions the hearing 

officer failed to ask.

Mrs. Arrozal timely appealed the Veterans Court’s decision to this court. 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 

1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) 

(2006), this court has jurisdiction over rules of law or the 

validity of any statute or regulation, or an interpretation 

thereof relied on by the Veterans Court in its decision. 

This court may also entertain challenges to the validity of 

a statute or regulation, and may interpret constitutional 

and statutory provisions as needed for resolution of the 

matter. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). In contrast, except where an 

appeal presents a constitutional question, this court lacks 

jurisdiction over challenges to factual determinations or 

laws or regulations as applied to the particular case. 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). All the issues presented here fall 

within the latter proscribed categories listed in § 

7292(d)(2). 

On appeal, Mrs. Arrozal first argues there was evidence crucial to her claim that was omitted from the 

Record of Proceedings and thus certain documents were 

not before the Veterans Court. Not only were these 

documents cited as part of the Record Before the Agency 

(“RBA”) and thus considered by the Veterans Court in its 

finding, but to the extent that Mrs. Arrozal is arguing the 

Veterans Court should have added evidence outside the 

RBA to the record, the Veterans Court may not review 

findings of fact by the Secretary or the Board de novo. 38 

U.S.C. § 7261(c). Furthermore, this court may not reevaluate the weight given by the Board or the Veterans 
ARROZAL v. DVA 6

Court to certain pieces of evidence, as this raises an issue 

of fact beyond our jurisdiction. Maxon v. Gober, 230 F.3d 

1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Second, Mrs. Arrozal contends that the November 

2004 notice letter violated the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (“VCAA”) because it failed to inform her that lay 

evidence and the competence of a lay witness could be 

considered by VA. She also argues that “VCAA of 2000 is 

a constitutional law” and thus attempts to frame her 

argument as involving a constitutional issue. Appellant 

Br. 2. However, the question of whether the language of 

the 2004 letter satisfied VCAA notice requirements under 

38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) is one of fact not raising any constitutional issues, and thus we do not have jurisdiction to 

entertain this matter. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 

1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This court is also without 

jurisdiction to review the factual finding by the Veterans 

Court that Mrs. Arrozal was not prejudiced by VA’s 

alleged failure to inform her that she could submit lay 

evidence because she showed actual knowledge by submitting such lay evidence before the Board. See

Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). 

Mrs. Arrozal next challenges the extension of time 

granted to the Secretary before the Veterans Court. 

Because this is simply an application of the relevant facts 

justifying an extension of time applied to the court’s 

procedural rules, this issue is beyond this court’s jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

Mrs. Arrozal also suggests there was some impropriety between the Secretary and the Chief Judge of the 

Veterans Court. Mrs. Arrozal points to the short time 

between the filing of the Supplemental Record in the 

Veterans Court on November 30, 2009 and the issuance of 
7 ARROZAL v. DVA

the Memorandum Decision on December 2, 2009, as well 

as similarities between the Secretary’s brief and the 

Memorandum Decision as evidence of some impermissible 

complicity. Mrs. Arrozal’s concerns are without justification. The Veterans Court clearly considered the Supplemental Record and the fact that the Veterans Court 

agreed with the legal analysis of the VA does not suggest 

any wrongdoing. To the extent that Mrs. Arrozal is 

arguing that there are incorrect statements of fact considered by the Veterans Court, this is a factual issue not 

within this court’s jurisdiction. 

Similarly, this court is precluded from reviewing Mrs. 

Arrozal’s argument that the transcript from the video 

hearing is factually inaccurate and that the Veterans 

Court erred by considering it because it is an issue of fact 

beyond this court’s jurisdiction. 

Finally, Mrs. Arrozal’s bald assertion that there existed a nexus between her husband’s 1945 in-service 

medical record and his death is unsubstantiated. In fact, 

the RBA shows that Mr. Arrozal had normal blood pressure readings in the May 1945 examination cited by the 

appellant and even had normal readings prior to discharge in May 1946. Under § 7292(d)(2) we are without 

jurisdiction to review the findings of fact that none of the 

medical evidence shows cardiovascular disease, cerebral 

vascular disease or hemorrhage, or hypertension until 

approximately twenty-seven years post-service and that 

there is no competent evidence of a nexus between either 

of the veteran’s fatal diseases and any incident of service. 

CONCLUSION

Because Mrs. Arrozol’s appeal involves neither the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation, nor a 

Constitutional challenge, this court is statutorily pre-
ARROZAL v. DVA 8

cluded from considering her claims. Accordingly, the 

appeal is dismissed. 

No Costs.