DNA 5354F 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR 

TROOP OBSERVERS 

Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot 

Science Applications, Inc. 

P.O. Box 1303 

McLean, Virginia 22102 

15 July 1980 

Final Report for Period 1 March 1980-15 July 1980 

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-80-C-0052 

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DNA 5354F I 

1 TITLE (ad Subf/tle) 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR TROOP 

OBSERVERS 

Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation Teapot 

5 TYPE OF REPORT 5 PERIOD COVERED 

7. AUTHOR(a) 

J. Goetz 

D. Kaul 

J. Klemm 

J. McGahan 

R. Weitz 

6 CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(a) 

DNA 001-80-C-0052 

I 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK 

AREA b WORK UNIT NUMISERS 

Science Applications, Inc. 

P.O. Box 1303 

McLean, Virginia 22102 

Subtask V99QAXNA100-03 

1 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 

Director 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Washington, D.C. 20305 

12 REPORT DATE 

15 July 1980 

13. NUMBER OF PAGES 

98 

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a 

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9. KEY WORDS (Contlnu. on rev.,.. l ldm if n.c...y md Idmftfy by block numb.rl 

Teapot Radiation Exposure 

Desert Rock VI Automated Dose Reconstruction 

Volunteer Observers 

Troop Observers 

10. ABSTRACT (Continua m r.“.,.. aId, ff “.c...uy md ldmtffy by block mrm5.r) 

The radiation doses to troop observers and volunteer observers for Exercise 

Desert Rock VI are reconstructed for each applicable shot of Operation Teapot 

(1955). Initial neutron and gamma radiation doses are determined from transport codes ATR4 and ATR4.1. Residual radiation contours and decay rates are 

established through a new automated procedure that utilizes raw data in 

regression analysis to fit space-time models. Troop operations data are 

combined with the radiological data to determine integrated dose. Uncertainties are calculated for each parameter. The volunteers received the highest 

DD 1 ::?I3 1473 EDITION _ OF 1 NOV 55 IS OBSOLCTE 

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20. ABSTRACT (Continued) 

observer dose--l.6 rem gamma and 4.5 rem neutron. The highest dose 

received by troop observers was 1.4 rem gamma and 1.4 rem neutron at 

Shot Tesla. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF tl4lS PAOEFM Dmfa Bntmmd) 
DEFENSENUCLEAR AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C 20305 

1 SEP 1982 

NATD 

SUBJECT : DNA Report, “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for 

Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation 

Teapot” 

SEE DISTRIBUTION 

1. The Defense Nuclear Agency, as the Department of Defense 

(DoD) executive agency for matters relating to low-level 

ionizing radiation, is conducting an extensive review of radiation exposures to military personnel who have participated in 

the United States nuclear weapons development programs. This 

program, termed the Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR), began 

in 1977 in response to concern over possible health risks as a 

result of very low level radiation exposures. A major objective 

of the NTPR is the assessment of radiation exposure for participating troops. 

2. Accurate radiation exposure data for individuals and units 

are essential to fulfill the objectives of the NTPR program. 

Because film badge data are not always available (some badges 

were lost or unreadable, some records are no longer available, 

not all personnel were badged for a given shot, etc.) DNA has 

developed procedures for reconstructing, with confidence, both 

external and internal exposures for DOD test participants. 

3. The enclosed report by Science Applications Inc., written 

under contract to DNA, provides estimates of the radiation doses 

that would have been possible for troop observers on Operation 

Teapot (1955). These dose reconstructions are based upon: (1) 

Patterns of residual activity measured, documented and published 

shortly after the tests, (2) Extensive calculation and analysis 

of prompt radiation doses, (3) The documented movement histories, 

including arrival and departure times for each unit which operated in the vicinity of the tests, and (4) Current dose calculation methodologies. 
NATD 

Subject: DNA Report, "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for 

Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock VI, Operation 

Teapot" 

4. DNA believes this report accurately represents a conservative approach to dose estimation, and that the estimations are 

reasonable and appropriate. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

1 Enclosure 

as 

Y 

lonel, USA 

Director for Biomedical Effects 

DISTRIBUTION 

(See Page 3) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section 

List of Illustrations ............................................. 

List of Tables ................................................. 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ............................... 

OPERATIONS ................................................. 

2.1 Shot Data ................................................ 

2.2 Participation 

.............................................. 

2.3 Concept .................................................. 

2.4 Activities ................................................ 

INITIAL RADIATION ........................................... 

3.1 Computational Method .................................... 

3.2 Results .................................................. 

RESIDUAL RADIATION ........................................ 

4.1 Residual Gamma Radiation Exposure ......................... 

4.2 Internal Radiation Exposure ................................ 

4.3 Residual Radiation Dose Summary ........................... 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION ...... 

5.1 Uncertainties in Initial Radiation Dose ........................ 

5.2 Uncertainties in Residual Radiation Dose ....................... 

5.3 Total Mean Dose Summary ................................... 

CONCLUSIONS ................................................. 

REFERENCES .................................................. 

APPENDIX: AUTOMATED PROCEDURE FOR EXTERNAL RESIDUAL 

GAMMA DOSE RECONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Page 

2 

4 

5 

9 

9 

9 

11 

14 

33 

33 

38 

53 

53 

65 

65 

67 

67 

70 

73 

77 

79 

81 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

l-1 

2-1 

2-2 

2-3 

2-4 

2-5 

2-6 

2-7 

2-8 

2-9 

2-10 

3-l 

3-2 

3-3 

3-4 

3-5 

3-6 

3-7 

3-8 

3-9 

4-1 

4-2 

4-3 

4-4 

Operation Teapot Shot Locations ................................. 7 

Shot Wasp Area ............................................... 16 

Shot Moth Area ............................................... 18 

Shot Tesla Area ............................................... 19 

Shot Turk Area ............................................... 21 

Shot Bee Area ................................................ 23 

Observers at Shot Ess .......................................... 25 

Shot Ess Area ................................................. 26 

Shot Apple I Area .............................................. 27 

Shot MET Area ................................................ 29 

Shot Apple II Area ............................................. 31 

Shot Moth Neutron Dose ....................................... 40 

Shot Moth Gamma Dose ........................................ 41 

Shot Tesla Neutron Dose ........................................ 42 

Shot Tesla Gamma Dose ........................................ 44 

Shot Turk Gamma Dose ........................................ 45 

Shot Bee Neutron Dose ........................................ 47 

Shot Bee Gamma Dose ........................................ 48 

Shot Apple I Gamma Dose ...................................... 50 

Shot Apple II Gamma Dose ..................................... 51 

Shot Moth Residual Radiation and Observer Position ............... 55 

Shot Tesla Residual Radiation and Observer Routes ................. 56 

Shot Turk Residual Radiation and Observer Routes (D+l) - l . l - - - - - - - l 57 

Shot Bee Residual Radiation and Observer Routes .................. 59 
Figure 

4-5 

4-6 

4-7 

4-8 

4-9 

A-i 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) 

Shot Ess Residual Radiation, Shot Turk Residual 

Radiation, and Observer Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

Shot Apple I Residual Radiation and Observer Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

Shot MET Residual Radiation and Observer Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

Shot Apple II Residual Radiation and Observer Routes ............... 63 

Composite Plot of Residual Radiation, Yucca Flat .................. 64 

Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure . . . . . . . . . 86 

3 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table 

2-l Teapot Shot Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

2-2 Observer Program Participation, Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

Operation Teapot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

2-3 Observer-Ground 2 ero Distance Summary, Exercise 

Desert Rock VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*............. 15 

3-l Initial Radiation Dose, Shot Apple II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 

5-l Observer Dose Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
Section 1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

This is the third in a series of reports concerned with radiation dose 

reconstruction for military participants in the atmospheric nuclear weapons 

testing program. The first two reports were based on the exercises conducted in 

conjunction with Shot Smoky in Operation Plumbbob in 1957. This report is the 

first of several pertaining to military participation in Operation Teapot. 

There were four types of military participation in Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

conducted at Nevada Test Site in conjunction with Operation Teapot in 

winter/spring 1955. The first type of participation consisted of troop observers, 

that is, military personnel who were sent to the test site for the specific purpose 

of witnessing one or more nuclear shots and who returned to their home stations 

immediately after this “indoctrination.” This is the military participation 

addressed in this report. 

The second type of military participation consisted of battalion-size 

maneuver units that moved to the site to engage in tactical exercises that tested 

doctrine and techniques being developed for the nuclear battlefield. The two 

such exercises conducted during Operation Teapot were the Marine Brigade 

Exercise at Shot Bee, and the Armored Task Force (TF RAZOR) maneuver at 

Shot Apple II. These two exercises, and the radiation exposure associated 

therewith, will be the subject of separate reports. 

The third type of military participation centered around service equipment 

tests and operational training associated with nuclear warfare. There were 

several projects engaged in these activities, for which the radiation exposure will 

be treated separately. 

Finally, there were the personnel who were assigned to Camp Desert Rock, 

usually for the duration of the exercise, who planned, supported, and administered the overall exercise in order that the other participants mentioned above 

5 
could concentrate their efforts on their particular missions. These activities and 

the associated radiation exposures will also be analyzed subsequently. 

It should also be emphasized that a fifth type of major military participation, not a part of the four Exercise Desert Rock groups mentioned above, 

consisted of the Weapons Effects Test Group from Field Command, Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project. This group measured, analyzed, and documented the effects of nuclear weapons for the Department of Defense. Their 

exposures are to be analyzed only if film badge dosimetry is incomplete or 

inconclusive. 

The thrust of this report centers around the external radiation dose to 

observers during the course of their activities in contaminated areas of Nevada 

Test Site. Of the fourteen nuclear shots (Figure l-1) of the Teapot series, 

Desert Rock observers participated in nine. The observer program is described 

in general, and the observer activities for each of the nine shots are traced from 

the pre-shot orientation through the shot activities to the post-shot equipment 

inspection, where appropriate. Time-dependent position information is presented 

in order that an exposure analysis can be performed to determine the integrated 

dose from all contributing sources, including the initial radiation dose from the 

shot being observed and the dose due to residual radiation from applicable 

preceding shots. 

The analysis described herein utilizes, for the first time, an automated 

procedure for determining the dose due to residual radiation. This procedure 

utilizes raw radiological survey data in statistical regression analyses to fit 

space-time models of residual radiation intensity from which isointensity 

contours are then derived. The derived contours as well as the decay parameters 

are shown for the appropriate shots for which the procedure was used. Time and 

space factors associated with personnel movements (operations) through 

contaminated areas are combined with the refined and stored radiological data 

to determine the integrated radiation dose for a specific troop track through the 

defined area. A major feature of the automated procedure is that, once the 
i 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

r' 

l - c 

HA l 

/ 

N EV 

TURK 

0 

News Nob,, 

CONTROL POINT ‘ 

BEE, ZUCCHINI 

0 

/ 

.WASPs 

r 

OTH 

-%ORNET 

/ 

ADA 

/---- 

YUCCA I’ 

\ - 

TEST 

\ 

:y, x ,i 

MILES 

210 2 4 6 a 

? I 

S I TE 

L -- 'Check Points 

DESERT ROCK 

Figure l-l Operation Teapot Shot Locations 
radiological environment is defined, variations in the time and space factors 

associated with troop operations are introduced to determine the sensitivity of 

the final integrated dose to the omissions and inconsistencies of the operational 

histories. The computer-based procedure facilitates such a sensitivity analysis 

and aids considerably in the overall uncertainty determination. 

Due to inadequate film badge dosimetry data for Exercise Desert Rock VI, 

no significant comparison of calculated dose with film badge doses is possible. 

However, the methodology for determining dose is not significantly different 

than that used in previous analyses in which a comparison with dosimetric data 

established a high degree of confidence. Automation of the procedure has 

refined the confidence levels, and thus will facilitate subsequent exposure 

analyses of other troop operations in the same radiologically contaminated areas. 

Major findings of this report are: 

The observers of nuclear shots in Operation Teapot were subjected to 

external radiation from prompt neutrons and gamma rays, and 

residual gamma radiation from fallout and neutron-activated soil. 

The reconstructed mean film badge dose for observers of Shot Tesla 

is +0.4 1.4 _o.5 +0.9 rem; for Shot Turk observers, 1.3 _. 5 rem; for Shot Bee 

. 

observers, 0.85 2 0.35 rem; for volunteer observers of Shot Apple II, 

+I.0 

lo6 -0.7 rem. Observers of other shots accrued much lesser doses. 

+0.6 Free-field mean neutron doses of 1.4 _. 3 rem and 4.5 +5.4 

. -3.0 rem are 

calculated for the in-trench positions of Shot Tesla observers and 

Shot Apple II volunteer observers, respectively. Neutron doses to 

other observers were much lower, on the order of 0.1 rem and less. 

The inhalation and ingestion of radioactive dust resulted in only a 

trivial addition to the dose of Operation Teapot observers. 
Section 2 

OPERATIONS 

2.1 SHOT DATA 

Data for all nuclear shots of Operation Teapot are shown in Table 2-l. It 

should be noted that Desert Rock observers participated only in those shots 

marked with an asterisk. The other shots are shown for information and for 

investigation of residual radiation that could have contributed to the observers’ 

radiation dose (Section 4). 

2.2 PARTICIPATION 

For Operation Teapot, there were four categories of the observer program 

conducted by Camp Desert Rock as a part of Exercise Desert Rock VI. These 

were as follows: 

A. Volunteer Observers (Project 40.22). This group, consisting of nine 

officers and one civilian (GS-12) from various Army service schools, 

participated in Shot Apple II. They each calculated the minimum 

safe in-trench observer distance for the upper limit of anticipated 

shot yield, and the consensus of the group determined the distance at 

which the shot would be observed from a trench. 

0. Troop Packets (Projects 4 1.3 and 41.7). This group, consisting of 523 

personnel from the Army and 25 from the Air Force, participated in 

Shot Apple II. The Army personnel, part of Project 41.3, were from 

the six continental armies. The Air Force personnel were designated 

Project 4 1.7. 

C. Service Observers (Projects 40.11, 41.3, 41.4, 41.8). This group 

consisted of visitor observers from all services. The Army observers 

were also known as official observers, and were those personnel from 

Project 41.3 who were not in troop packets. They came to Camp 

9 
Table 2-l Teapot Shot Data 

Shot 

Name 

Date HOB 

Actual Local Location Coord 

(Planned) 

(Ft) Yield 

Time NTS Area (UTM) (Note 1) (KT) 

*Wasp 

*Moth 

*Tesla 

*Turk 

Hornet 

*Bee 

*ESS 

*Apple I 

Wasp Prime 

HA 

Post 

*MET 

*Apple II 

Zucchini 

18 FEB 

(18 FEB) 

1200 

22 FEB 

(21 FEB) 

0545 

1 MAR 

(25 FEB) 

0530 

7 MAR 

(15 FEB) 

0520 

12 MAR 

(8 MAR) 

0520 

22 MAR 

(18 MAR) 

0505 

23 MAR 

(15 MAR) 

1230 

29 MAR 

(18 MAR) 

0455 

29 MAR 

(20 MAR) 

1000 

6 APR 

(4 MAR) 

1000 

9 APR 

(1 MAR) 

0430 

15 APR 

(1 MAR) 

1115 

5MAY 0510 

'(26 APR) (PDT) 

15 MAY 

(1 APR) 

0500 

(PDT) 

T-7(4) 

T-3 

T-9b 

T-2 

T-3a 

T-7(la) 

T-1Oa 

T-4 

T-7(4) 

T-5 

T-9c 

FF 

T-l 

T-7(la) 

* Exercise Desert Rock Observer participation 

Note 1: A - Air T - Tower U - Underground 

10 

869047 

871004 

844090 

784104 

867996 

867056 

849138 

797056 

869047 

860086 

956728 

798009 

867056 

762A 

300T 

300T 

500T 

300T 

500T 

-67U 

500T 

737A 

32,582A 

300T 

400T 

500T 

500T 

1 

2 

7 

43 

4 

8 

1 

14 

3 

3 

2 

22 

29 

28 
D. 

Desert Rock mostly as individuals rather than in groups, from various 

locations throughout the U.S. and overseas. The Navy and Marine 

Corps observers, Projects 41.4 and 40.11 respectively, followed 

essentially the same pattern. Their participation, however, was 

heavily slanted toward Shot Bee, at which the Marine Brigade 

exercise was conducted. The Air Force observers, Project 41.8, 

likely came from various bases in a manner similar to the other 

services. 

The shot participation of the service observers is shown in Table 2-2. 

It should be noted that, due to possible multiple shot participation, 

the numbers in each project column are not necessarily additive. 

This is explained in Section 2.3. 

Camp Desert Rock (CDR) Observers. This group of observers was not 

associated with a particular project. It consisted of individuals 

assigned to the Camp Desert Rock permanent party, likely sent to 

the forward area in increments that varied in size somewhat 

inversely as the participation of other observer and troop maneuver 

projects. It can be assumed that everyone in the CDR organization 

was given the opportunity to observe one shot on a non-interference 

basis with other observers. With a station complement of approximately 2000, it would appear from Table 2-2 that virtually everyone 

took advantage of the opportunity to observe one of the shots. 

Because the priority for viewing a shot would have gone to those who 

had not yet seen one, the number of CDR personnel participating as 

observers on more than one shot would have been small. 

2.3 CONCEPT 

The purpose of the observer program was to indoctrinate service members 

at all grade levels by the observation of an actual detonation of a nuclear device, 

followed whenever possible by an examination of the effects of the device on an 

11 
Table 2-2 Observer Program Participation 

Exercise Desert Rock VI 

Operation Teapot 

Shot Name -- 

Project 

1 Wasp 

2 Moth 

3 Tesla 

4 Turk 

5 Hornet 

6 Bee 

7 Ess 

8 Apple I 

9 Wasp Prime 

10 HA 

11 Post 

12 MET 

13 Apple II 

14 Zucchini 

-_ 

* Observers and troop packets originally scheduled for participation in Shot 

MET were postponed to Shot Apple II. 

Source: References 1,13,14. 

‘2 

- 
array of equipment. Volunteer observers and troop packets were scheduled to 

observe only one shot, Apple II. Service observers were scheduled for nine shots. 

They were programmed to arrive at Camp Desert Rock in groups, a day or two 

before the shot that the group was to observe. A new group was scheduled to 

arrive shortly after the previous group had departed. The observer population 

fluctuated considerably due to such factors as shot delays, which caused groups 

to overlap. Each group participated in an orientation program which included 

lectures and films on general nuclear weapon characteristics, a security briefing, 

a description of the exercise, and a pre-shot tour of the equipment display area. 

This pre-shot tour was probably conducted in conjunction with the AFSWP tour 

for its official observers and other VIPs. Observation of the nuclear shot was to 

be from trenches, if possible, as close to ground zero as safety criteria 

permitted. At approximately one hour before each shot, the observers were to 

be positioned in trenches (when appropriate), briefed on what to expect, and 

checked for proper safety procedures. After the shot, the group was to tour the 

equipment display area to see the effects of the detonation. The tour would be 

conducted by an instructor group, who would describe the effects at the various 

distances from the burst. The observer program was planned for each participation according to the following priority: 

I - One shot of 1OKT or more. 

II - Two shots, one less than 1OKT followed by one of 1OKT or 

more, if feasible. 

III - One shot of less than 10 KT. 

The plan for observer participation changed frequently due to shot 

postponements influenced by unfavorable weather conditions and other technical 

factors. Thus, the established priorities could not be met in many cases. Most 

observers were limited to one shot of any size and, in some cases because of the 

delays involved, many observers departed for their home station without 

witnessing any shot (Reference 13). 

13 
2.4 ACTIVITIES 

Within each category of observers-- Volunteer Observers, Troop Packets, 

Service Observers, and CDR Observers--the activities were essentially the same 

for a particular shot. That is, each category remained as a group before, during, 

and after each shot in which it participated. Moreover, the last three categories 

all behaved as a single unit for each shot in which they participated. With the 

exception of the volunteer observers, all other participating categories for each 

shot were in the same trenches and viewed the same equipment display. In this 

section, observer activities are treated on a shot-by-shot basis. Time and space 

variances of the activities, due to the number of participants and the size of the 

areas, are considered in the uncertainty analysis (Section 5). Significant 

distances of interest, as used in the exposure analysis, are summarized in Table 

2-3. 

2.4.1 Shot Wasp. Two categories of observers were planned for this shot. 

Service Observers and CDR Observers, totaling 888 personnel (Table 2-21, 

intended to view the event from trenches 5000 yards from ground zero and to 

tour the equipment display thereafter. Based on overall observer schedules in 

References 13 and 14, it appears that they inspected the equipment display on 

14 February, four days before the shot. Because the observer trenches and the 

display area were in the path of possible, if only slight, fallout, the observation 

point was shifted to News Nob and the post-shot tour of the display area was 

cancelled. Figure 2-l shows the locations of the planned and actual observer 

activities relative to the shot. Due to the actual distance involved (10 miles), 

the observers were not exposed to significant nuclear radiation. This being the 

first shot of the series, there was no residual radiation from previous shots. No 

further analysis of the observer program for Shot Wasp is required. 

2.4.2 Shot Moth. Service Observers and CDR Observers, totaling 193 personnel 

(Table 2-21, observed the shot, as planned, from trenches 2500 yards WSW (258’ 

azimuth) of ground zero. From the applicable operation order (Reference 3) it 

can be assumed that the observers arrived at the detrucking area on schedule 

between 0420 and 0430. The trench area was adjacent to the dismount area. 

Using other shot plans as a basis, the observers would have entered the trenches 

14 
Shot 

Wasp 

Moth 

Tesla 

Turk 

Bee 

Ess 

Apple I 

MET 

Apple II 

Table 2-3. Observer to Ground Zero Distance Summary 

Exercise Desert Rock VI 

Observer Distance 

10 miles (16 km) 

2500 yards (2290 m) 

2400 yards (2 190 m) 

5500 yards (5030 m) 

3500 yards (3200 m) 

9000 yards (8230 m) 

3500 yards (3200 m) 

10,200 yards (9330 m) 

3500 yards (3200 m) 

2600 yards (2380 m) 

Post-Shot Approach 

None 

None 

1000 yards (910 m) 

1000 yards (910 m) (D+l) 

600 yards (550 m) 

None 

1000 yards (910 m) 

None 

1000 yards (910 m) 

1000 yards (910 m) 

15 

- -_ 
I 

’ ’ 

i 

y ,__ 

\ ,’ 

Figure 2-1 

Shot Wasp Area 4 -NB _. 

0 -00 YARDS .’ -.- ~ fj- ‘$J.--_ 

I 

t J 0 METERS 3000 l+F- _ -s- 

-( -2 

Observer Position 
almost immediately in order to await the countdown. At H-l hour, orientation 

and safety instructions were provided and attendance rosters were checked. The 

countdown was repeated over a loudspeaker system for all personnel to hear. At 

H-Z minutes, the observers were instructed to turn in one direction, crouch in 

the trenches, and shield their eyes. This position was to be maintained during 

the shot and until the blast wave had passed, after which they were allowed to 

rise to view the rising fireball. Within ten minutes the observers could have 

exited the trenches to prepare for the arrival of the vehicles (they had been 

parked about five miles to the south), which likely arrived by H+20 minutes. All 

personnel, other than the observer control group, would have departed for Camp 

Desert Rock by H+30 minutes. The locations of all observer activities are shown 

in Figure 2-2. 

2.4.3 Shot Tesla. A total of 523 observers, most of whom were from Camp 

Desert Rock (Table 2-21, observed the shot from trenches 2400 yards* southwest 

(235’ azimuth) of ground zero. They had inspected the display area on 28 

February, the day before. In accordance with the usual planned procedure, the 

observers arrived at the detrucking area shortly after 0400 (H-l.5 hours) and 

moved to the trench area, about 100 yards from the road (see Figure 2-3). After 

the orientation and the safety, communications, and attendance checks were 

accomplished, the observers moved into the trenches at about H-15 minutes, 

where they remained through the countdown to the shot at 0530 and for an 

additional 5- IO minutes thereafter. By H+20 minutes, Desert Rock tad-safe 

monitors had cleared the way for the walk to the equipment display, located 

almost a mile toward ground zero. It is evident from the rad-safe situation map, 

however, that little of the planned tour could be accomplished, possibly due in 

part to the higher-than-expected shot yield. The limit of advance for all 

observer personnel was the Sr/hr line, which was established by rad-safe 

personnel at about 1000 yards from GZ. The equipment displays were located at 

500 and 1000 yards from ground zero (Reference 1, Annex Q). Thus, only the 

lOOO-yard line could have been viewed by the observers. They would have 

*The planned distance was 2500 yards. Inspection of shot area photographs, 

however, places the trenches at this azimuth and distance. 

17 
. . 

.’ I 

I- ’ 

4 i -‘ .:f 3 

I - J._ $g -y _i 

_-A\ji- 7_” 7_ I 

, -- 

--- c 

.,_ _ 

Y_’ TJ _ sq. / \ 

‘>,’ ,...--_$ - _ _ , ;A- 

-/ +“:’ -, 

-/ - 

_. _ 

I ’ 

.+‘ - - 1 _ + /\ 

I 

-: i 

. I -J L 

, 

I - - ’ - “Q 

i / 

2 ’ 

:/ ubserver 

. Trcmrhacx 

Figure 2-2 

Shot Moth Area 

-NI 

t 4 

0 YARDS 3000 

I 1 

0 YETERS 3000 
Fiqure 2-3 

Shot Tesla Area 

c . 

0 YARDS 3000 

Lo 4 

0 METERS 3000 

_ - 
arrived there approximately 30 minutes after leaving the trench area, or at 

about 0620. After a stay of IO-15 minutes, they had to return to the trench area 

(verified by Army photograph) to meet their vehicles rather than use the planned 

loading area near the 500-yard display line. Arrival at the trench area was about 

0700, at which time the observers mounted and returned to Camp Desert Rock. 

2.4.4 Shot Turk. A total of 464 observers witnessed the shot on 7 March from 

trenches located 5500 yards SE (120’ azimuth) of ground zero (Figure 2-4). Some 

observers had toured the display area on 14 February, the day before the original 

readiness date. Others toured the display on 2 March. As in the previous shot 

(Tesla), most of the observers consisted of the Camp Desert Rock permanent 

party (Table 2-2). This may have been due, in part, to the long delay of Shot 

Turk, the planned first shot of Operation Teapot, which could have caused some 

observers to depart before the shot. The trenches were the same ones used for 

Shot Tesla because the trenches prepared for Shot Turk, 3500 yards south of 

ground zero, were in the path of expected fallout. The observers, following the 

operation plan already used for Shot Tesla, arrived at the trenches between 0410 

and 0420, in time for the usual pre-shot orientation and checks to begin at 0420 

(H-l). It had been determined beforehand that, due to expected fallout, the 

forward area would be evacuated immediately after the shot. The vehicles, 

parked about 5 miles to the south, would have arrived at the trench area by 0535 

(H+15 minutes), at which time they would have loaded and departed the area, 

possibly by 0545. They likely arrived back at Camp Desert Rock before 0700. 

As it turned out, because the cloud veered to the west, the trench area was not 

in the fallout path. However, the display area was contaminated to an extent 

that would have precluded an inspection on shot day, had the observers remained 

in the forward area. 

On the following afternoon, observers returned to the shot area to view the 

equipment display, as evidenced by U.S. Army photographs. The photographs 

indicate levels of damage to equipment that are consistent with those to be 

expected as close as 1000 yards from a 43 KT burst. Recause of the 20 mr/hr 

rad-safe limit for vehicular movement, the observers had to disembark just short 

20 
,. . -r . 

.I. - . 

I 

1 

16 

15 

5’ 

04 

a3 

la2 

‘01 

w 

99 

%a 

Shot Turk Area 

- -- - 
of the unused trench area. Their inspection, up to the IOOO-yard displays, would 

have required about the two hours indicated in the operation order. 

2.4.5 Shot Hornet. There was no Exercise Desert Rock observer participation in 

this event. 

2.4.6 Shot Bee. A total of 525 service observers witnessed this shot from 

trenches located 3500 yards SW (220’ azimuth) of ground zero. Because of the 

large number of planned participants, including some of the maneuver troops 

from the Marine Brigade Exercise (Project 41.61, there were no Camp Desert 

Rock permanent party observers. Of those from the Marine Brigade Exercise, 

142 stayed with the observers for the post-shot tour and did not participate in 

the maneuver. As for previous shots, it is assumed that the exercise observers 

joined the other official observers to inspect the pre-shot condition of the 

equipment in the display area on 15 March, three days before the planned shot 

date of 18 March. On 22 March, the actual shot date, the observers arrived in 

the trench area (Figure 2-5) at about 0335, thirty minutes before the usual H-l 

hour orientation and safety checks were begun. Shot Bee was detonated at 0505 

hours. It was 0535 before the 

the equipment display area, the 

trenches (2800 yards from CZ). 

on Reference 7) was as follows: 

Depart trenches 

observers were given clearance to move toward 

first line of which was 700 yards forward of the 

Their itinerary through the display area (based 

0535 H+.5 

Arr 2800-yard display 

Arr 2300-yard display 

Arr 1900-yard display 

Arr 1 loo-yard display 

Arr 700-yard display 

(includes displays to 500 yards) 

Dep 700-yard display 

Arr trench area, load vehicles 

Dep for Camp Desert Rock 

0545 H+.7 

0555 H+.8 

0605 H+l 

0625 H+1.3 

0650 H+1.8 

0705 H+2 

0740 H+2.6 

0750 H+2.8 

The observers would have arrived back at Camp Desert Rock at 0920, if it is 

assumed that they adhered to their itinerary in the same manner as they had for 

the entire operation. 

22 
h- 
2.4.7 Shot Ess. There were 356 observers for this shot, a test of the Army’s 

Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM). About half of the observers were from the 

Camp Desert Rock permanent party, as shown in Table 2-2. Recause of the 

distance, and because the shot was detonated at a depth of 67 feet, no trenches 

were necessary for the observers. There was no Desert Rock display area, 

hence, no pre-shot inspection. They witnessed the shot from 9000 yards 

southwest (248’ azimuth) of ground zero, coordinates 773104. It is assumed that 

they arrived at the observer area at 1100 hours (H-1.51, having approached the 

area from the south, through Area 4. After the usual pre-shot checks and 

orientation, they waited through the countdown to the shot at 1230. After the 

shot (Figure 2-61, they would have boarded the vehicles within 20 minutes for the 

return trip to Camp Desert Rock. The return route was the reverse of the route 

used before the shot. Figure 2-7 shows the significant roads and areas of 

interest. 

2.4.8 Shot Apple I. Table 2-2 shows the breakdown of the 608 exercise 

observers, most of whom were from the Camp Desert Rock permanent party. 

They had visited the shot area on 28 March, the day before the shot, to conduct 

the usual pre-shot equipment display inspection. On shot day, they arrived at the 

detrucking area at 0325 hours (H-l.5 hours). The pre-shot activities were 

essentially the same as for previous shots. They entered the observer trenches, 

located 3500 yards SSW (205’ azimuth) of ground zero, at 0355 hours (H-l hour). 

Within twenty minutes after the shot, they began the tour of the equipment 

display area, walking forward to the displays between 2500 and 1000 yards from 

ground zero. They then returned to the bus loading area at approximately 2000 

yards from ground zero. They loaded the buses at 0615 for the return trip to 

Camp Desert Rock. Figure 2-8 shows the significant points and roads involved. 

2.4.9 Shot Wasp, HA, and Post. There was no Exercise Desert Rock observer 

participation in these events. 

2.4.10 Shot MET. The pre-shot tour of the equipment display area was 

conducted on 10 April, almost a week before the shot. A sizeable observer 

24 

Figure 2-7 

Shot Ess Area 

1 . 

0 YARDS 3000 

F 2 

0 YETERS 3000 
f _J - 1 

\ 

Shot Apple I Area 
program was planned for this Military Effects Test (MET) shot, the only one of 

the series conducted on Frenchman Flat. Due to the danger from pilotless drone 

aircraft, observer participation, probably programmed for the old (Desert Rock 

V) trenches 5000 yards WSW (225O azimuth) of ground zero, was cancelled, as 

well as planned tours of the equipment display area. The only observers to 

participate were 163 members of the Camp Desert Rock permanent party, who 

witnessed the shot from 10,200 yards to the southwest, as shown in Figure 2-9. 

A few minutes after the shot, they boarded the buses and returned to Camp 

Desert Rock, just seven miles south of the observer point. 

2.4.11 Shot Apple II. For this shot, all four categories of observers participated, 

together with Task Force RAZOR, Project 41.2. All observers had inspected the 

pre-shot equipment display on 25 April. On shot day, 5 May, ten volunteer 

observers (Project 40.22) witnessed the shot from a trench located 2600 yards 

south (175’ azimuth) of ground zero. The main group of observers were in 

trenches 900 yards farther south, 3500 yards from ground zero. A last group of 

observers, to include VIPs, was in trenches almost 4900 yards southwest (210’ 

azimuth) of ground zero. All observers had left Camp Desert Rock shortly after 

0100 and had arrived at their respective observer areas at approximately 0300, 

almost two hours before the shot. At H-l hour, all observers were in position, 

and the pre-shot checks and orientation had begun. The observers remained in 

their positions through the countdown to the shot at 0510. After the shot, the 

volunteer observers likely remained in their trench for about five minutes, after 

which they walked back to the command trench at the 3500-yard line. They 

would have arrived by H+15 minutes. At about this time, rad-safe monitors were 

completing their initial survey of the display area. At H+20 minutes, the 

observers from the trench area began their walk-through of the equipment 

display. Due to rad-safe considerations, the observers would have been allowed 

to view the equipment only up to 1000 yards from ground zero. The observers 

also could have watched the tank exercise which was underway to their left 

(west). At H+l h our, the inspection was complete and the observers were 

assembled at the bus loading area for the return trip to Camp Desert Rock. The 

bus pick-up point was at the 20 mr/hr line (Reference IO), probably in the 

28 
_iL ’ 

, 

, -i- ,jC---_- , 

i’ , 

i > 

S [I T Z---,--, 

Figure 2-9 

Shot MET Area 

29 +- 

/ ,x .:2-E B”L\:~IvI _ 

METERS 3000 

-- 
vicinity of the volunteer observer trench. By 0640 (H+90 minutes), the observers 

had mustered, brushed off, loaded into buses, and departed for Camp Desert 

Rock. Figure 2-10 shows the significant areas of interest for the observer 

participation in Shot Apple II. 

Although it could be assumed that the volunteer observers would not have 

joined the other observers in the equipment inspection, the possibility cannot be 

ruled out. Because of the necessity for timely follow-up tests on their post-shot 

condition, the volunteer observers probably would have been evacuated immediately after their return to the command trench. If they had stayed to inspect 

the equipment, they would have accrued an additional dose from this activity. 

For the purpose of this report, this is assumed for an upper limit of dose. 

There is no evidence to suggest that the observers back at the 4900-yard 

area were brought up to inspect the equipment display after the shot. They 

presumably stayed near the VIP observer area until about 0610 (H+l hour), at 

which time the buses from the vehicle park arrived to load up and return to 

camp. 

2.4.12 Shot Zucchini. There was no observer participation in this event, the last 

shot of Operation Teapot. 

30 
- _--. APPLE II 

--l-l4 Figure 2-10 -II- Shot Apple II Area 

i-ii ’ 

4” 1 II 

4 0 YARDS 3000 

a 

UETERS 3000 

- 
32 
Section 3 

INITIAL RADIATION 

Of the nine shots at which observers participated in Exercise Desert Rock 

VI, six are investigated to determine the possible exposure to initial gamma and 

neutron radiation. These are Shots Moth, Tesla, Turk, Bee, Apple I, and Apple II, 

the details of which are listed in Table 2-l. The other three shots (Wasp, Ess, 

MET) require no further investigation of initial exposure, because the distances 

at which observers were actually positioned for these shots were well beyond the 

range of significant initial radiation. This section discusses the general method 

used to compute the initial radiation dose to personnel, and the specific 

treatment of each of the six shots of interest. 

3.1 COMPUTATIONAL METHOD 

Because the observers were located in trenches at the times of detonation, 

the calculation of the radiation dose for observer personnel is accomplished in 

two steps. First, the free-field radiation environment above the trenches is 

determined. This environment is then used to calculate the radiation doses to 

personnel in the trenches. 

In the first step, the neutron and gamma radiation environment is determined with radiation transport codes ATR4 (Reference 22) and ATR4.1 

(Reference 23). The first code contains provisions to correct for the presence of 

Nevada soil at the air-ground interface; the second, although using a West 

German soil type, contains improved source-energy dependent ground correction 

factors. Hence, ATR4 is used to calculate neutron and neutron-induced gamma 

radiation, which are sensitive to the hydrogen (water) content of the soil 

(Reference 241, while ATR4.1 is used to calculate fission product gamma and 

prompt* gamma radiation, neither of which is sensitive to the presence of 

hydrogen in the soil. Neutron doses are calculated from tissue (Ritts) kerma 

factors, while Henderson tissue doses are used for gamma radiation. 

*Defined as from the fission reaction. 

33 
A required input to the ATR codes is the weapon neutron output spectrum. 

This is not available, however, for any of the six shots considered. Therefore, 

the neutron spectrum is estimated for each shot by first choosing a trial neutron 

spectrum based on specific weapon design characteristics (e.g., boosting, high 

explosive thickness) and known spectra for similar weapons. This spectrum is 

used in ATR4 to calculate the neutron dose as a function of range, which is then 

expressed in the form 

where D is the dose, R is slant range, and A and B are constants. The 

parameters A and B are determined by a least squares fit to the calculated doses 

in the range 400-l 300 yards. The trial spectrum is then systematically modified 

to obtain agreement with initial radiation measurements taken at the time of the 

shot. Neutron fluence measurements were made for several shots, using fission 

(plutonium, neptunium, uranium) and activation (gold, sulfur) foils. These foil 

measurements are converted to neutron dose using an equation which was 

derived by collapsing tissue (Ritts) kerma factors to conform to the foil energy 

boundaries. This was done using published kerma (Reference 22) and neutron 

fluence (Reference 30) values, the latter calculated at one meter above the 

ground, 1500 meters from a bare fission source located at a height of 50 feet. 

The resulting expression for free-field tissue dose is: 

rad (tis) = 4Au (9.36x10-12) + ( 4Au +$Ru, (1.73~10-~‘) 

+ ‘+Ru -+Np) (7.69~10-~‘) + ($Np - $$ (2.17~10-~) 

+ c4”- +S’ (3.00~10-~) + ~$~(4.464xlO-~) 

where d is a fluence value measured with the appropriate foil. The epithermal 

contribution to the dose (second term) is estimated by assuming that 52 percent 

of the total neutron fluence is in the range .3 eV to 10 KeV, as suggested in 

Reference 19. Dose range points derived in this manner from foil data are fit 

with an analogous exponential expression, DR2 = e 

-A’R+B’ 

, and the parameters A’ 

34 
and B’ are compared with those developed from the trial spectrum. If necessary, 

the neutron distribution in the trial spectrum is adjusted so that the slope 

parameter A agrees with the observed value A’ (the reciprocal of which is the 

neutron dose relaxation length) over the range of 400-1300 yards, where most 

foil data are available. After this adjustment, the total neutron output (or, 

equivalently, the neutron normalization in neutrons per KT yield) is adjusted as 

necessary to obtain agreement in the “B” parameter. The spectrum so derived, 

when used in ATR4, predicts a neutron dose which agrees with the dose 

calculated from foil data over the range 400-1300 yards. 

A final neutron spectrum adjustment is then made, if necessary, to obtain 

agreement between the measured and the ATR-calculated gamma dose-range 

curves. Gamma doses are calculated as described previously, using ATR4 for 

neutron-induced (secondary) gamma and ATR4.1 for prompt and fission product 

(debris) gamma. The total calculated gamma doses are then compared with dose 

measurements. Because a significant gamma component is due to secondary 

gamma from radiative capture of thermal neutrons, the low energy portion of 

the trial neutron spectrum may be adjusted, within reasonable limits, to obtain 

better agreement between the two gamma dose curves. This adjustment does 

not significantly alter the neutron dose curve in the range 400- 1300 yards; thus, 

the neutron dose need not be readjusted. The final adjusted spectrum is used in 

ATR4 to determine both neutron and neutron-induced gamma doses at the 

distances of the observer trenches (generally 2500-3500 yards). 

The gamma dose-range curves calculated in this manner generally agree 

well with the measured dose-range curves in the range 1000-2000 yards. 

However, for many Teapot shots, the measured gamma data display a rather 

abrupt change in slope at approximately 2000 yards, as shown for Moth in Figure 

3-2 (at 1500 yards), Bee in Figure 3-7 (2000 yards), Apple I in Figure 3-8 (2050 

yards), and Apple II in Figure 3-9 (2400 yards). The ATR calculations are unable 

to duplicate this behavior, which is unclear. The locations of the discontinuities 

in slope correspond to ranges at which film types were changed--film types 1290 

and 606 were used at closer distances, while types 510 and 502 were used farther 

out. Film types 510 and 502 were used sparingly in the Tesla and Turk shots, 

where no slope change is evident. Therefore, it appears that the 

35 
slope change and consequent discrepancy between measured and predicted 

gamma doses may be related to the sensitivity and/or processing of film types 

510 and 502. On the other hand, examination of gamma dose data from 

Operations Tumbler-Snapper, Upshot-Knothole, and Plumbbob reveals examples 

of similar changes in slope that occur either in the range of a single film type or 

as measured with chemical dosimeters. Recause the ATR gamma doses are 

consistently lower than the measured doses at ranges beyond this change in 

slope, a high-sided estimate of dose at the trench location is obtained by 

extrapolation from measured data. This method is applied to obtain the gamma 

dose for those shots displaying this effect. Individual gamma dose components 

(prompt, secondary, and debris gamma) are then estimated by increasing the 

ATR-predicted component doses proportionally to agree with the extrapolated 

total dose. 

The second step of the calculation uses the free-field radiation environment to determine the dose within the trench. It is convenient to define a 

trench factor as the ratio of dose (neutron or gamma) in the trench to dose 

(neutron or gamma) above the trench. These factors must be calculated for each 

of the major components of radiation--neutron, secondary gamma (created by 

neutron capture or inelastic scattering in the atmosphere and ground), local 

gamma (created locally by neutron capture in the trench walls), and fission 

product (debris) gamma. It is found that the trench factors depend also on 

ground range, height of burst, weapon yield, trench dimensions, and depth in the 

trench. For the shots of interest, two trench sizes were utilized. The volunteer 

observers at Shot Apple II were in trenches three feet wide with an estimated 

depth of five feet. All other observers were in trenches approximately two feet 

wide and five feet deep. The in-trench free-field neutron and gamma doses for 

personnel in the crouched position are calculated at a depth of 2.33 feet below 

the lip of the trench, which corresponds approximately to the mid-torso depth 

for personnel in this position. For personnel standing upright in the trench, as 

probably occurred soon after passage of the shock wave, free-field doses are 

calculated at a point .5 feet below the lip at the mid-trench position; this 

corresponds approximately to the location of a properly-worn film badge for a 

36 
standing observer. Brief discussions of the derivations of the various trench 

factors are presented in Appendix I of Reference 31. 

The in-trench dose (in rads) is converted to an equivalent tissue dose 

(in rem) using the quality factors and methods prescribed in Reference 32. It is 

found that the “effective” quality factor for this rad-to-rem conversion for 

neutrons is an almost constant value of 13 for the weapon types and ranges of 

interest. The quality factor for gamma radiation is taken to be unity. Finally, 

representative film badge readings for personnel in the trenches are estimated. 

The factors that are used to convert the in-trench free-field doses to film badge 

(chestworn) readings were developed from calculations utilizing the adjoint mode 

of the computer code MORSE (Reference 26). These film badge conversion 

factors are strongly dependent on the posture and orientation of the personnel in 

the trench; mean values of these parameters were determined from MORSE 

calculations involving extreme variations in individual posture and orientation. 

The “dose equivalent in trench” values reported for each shot in Section 3.2 are 

the equivalent tissue dose for neutron radiation and the film badge dose for 

gamma radiation. 

The neutron, secondary gamma, and local gamma doses are accrued 

rapidly (essentially within the first second) after detonation. Thus, the posture 

in a trench could not be altered significantly during this exposure. The debris 

gamma dose, however, is delivered over a period of many seconds. Therefore, 

the possibility of individual reorientation (e.g., standing up) in the trench must be 

considered. It is unlikely that a person crouched in the trench at the time of 

detonation would have attempted any significant movement until after the shock 

wave had passed and the blast winds had subsided. Therefore it is assumed that, 

within a few seconds after passage of the shock wave, most of the observers 

were standing upright in the trench, watching the rising cloud. This reorientation changed both the trench factors and film badge conversion factors for such 

an individual. For an observer crouched in the trench from to until tU, and 

standing upright in the center of the trench facing the rising cloud at times 

t > t,, his film badge dose, Dd, due to debris gamma is calculated by: 

37 
/ 

t” 

Dd(tu) = Fc 

t 

Tc(t)Id(t)dt + F Tu(t)Id(t)dt , 

0 

where Fc = film badge conversion factor, debris gamma, crouched position, 

FU q film badge conversion factor, debris gamma, upright position, 

Tc(t) = debris gamma trench factor, crouched position, 

T,(t) = debris gamma trench factor, upright position, 

Id(t) = debris gamma free-field intensity. 

The trench factors T,(t) and T,(t), which are time-dependent due to the rising 

source, are discussed in Appendix I of Reference 31. Intensities Id(f) are 

calculated with computer codes NUIDEA (Reference 33) and ATR4 for the shots 

and ranges of interest. The film badge conversion factors Fc and FU were 

discussed previously; their values for debris gamma calculations are taken as 

Fc = .46, Fu = .95. In calculating the debris gamma dose, it is assumed that the 

observers stood upright in the trenches at three seconds after the shock wave 

passed their position. The values of debris gamma trench factor given in the 

following section are the results of this calculation. These parameters are used 

to convert from above-trench debris gamma dose to film badge reading for a 

person standing up at the reference time, and thus include the effects of both 

trench shielding and film badge conversion. 

3.2 RESULTS 

The results of the computations are discussed in the following subsections 

for each of the six shots of interest. Due to lack of required input data for some 

shots, some deviation from the general computational method discussed above 

was required. When such deviations were necessary to perform the analysis for a 

given shot, the details are presented. 

3.2.1 Shot Moth. The general computational method was used, as described in 

Section 3.1. Neutron fluences derived from foil measurements were taken from 

References 20 and 21, corrected by factors given in Reference 27 to reflect 

improved knowledge of reaction cross section, and converted to free-field tissue 

doses using spectral-averaged kerma factors. The ATR fit to these “measured” 

38 
doses is displayed in Figure 3- 1. Only one complete set of foil data exists for 

the ranges of interest. However, many individual foil measurements were taken 

at various distances, so that accurate fluence versus distance curves can be 

constructed for individual foils. These can be used to analytically determine 

neutron dose at any desired distance within the range spanned by the foil 

measurements. This method was used to determine the parameters A and B to 

which the ATR neutron dose was fit. 

The gamma dose measurements from Reference 19 are shown in Figure 

3-2, together with the ATR-derived gamma dose curve and an extrapolation 

from measured data. At the trench location (2500 yards from ground zero), the 

gamma dose obtained by extrapolation is 36 percent higher than the dose 

calculated with ATR. This higher dose value is used as the dose estimate. 

The results of the dose calculations at the trench location are as follows: 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 40 480 240 - 760 49 

Trench Factor .06 .020 .22 .08 - .25 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 .53 - .7 - 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) 1” 5” 53” 3” 62” 160 

*Film Badge Dose 

3.2.2 Shot Tesla. In addition to the gold and sulfur neutron foil measurements 

reported in Reference 20, two nearly-complete sets of foil data are given in 

Reference 34. Doses derived from the latter data (and shown in Figure 3-3) 

were fit with an ATR calculation; the source spectrum so derived was used to 

determine the free-field neutron environment at the trench location (2400 yards 

from ground zero). Gamma dose data are presented in Reference 19, and 

39 
\ 

0 @ Ci 

- Ci 

\ 

culated 

measurer 

culated 

ATR 

rom 

nts 

rom 

t 

Slant Range (yards) 

I 

Figure 3-l Shot Moth Neutron Dose 

40 
\ 0 

-$t 

a rti e 

'al 

--Ext 

. 

\ 

. 

sured 

ulated I 

apolatec 

measurer 

Slant Range (yards) 

TR) 

from 

nts 

\ 

Figure 3-2 Shot Moth Gamma Dose 

41 
lola 

log_ 

108L 

107- 

0 

\ 

i 

c 

.ooo 

0 Cal slated 'om Meas semen& 

- Cal Alated 'om ATR 

\ 

2000 

Slant Range ,Yards) 

\ 

3000 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Figure 3-3 Shot Tesla Neutron Dose 

42 

_ - _- _ _~ ---- 
displayed in Figure 3-4, together with the ATR-calculated gamma dose. The 

agreement is generally good. 

Tesla was an asymmetric device with its axis generally in the north-south 

direction (So azimuth). The neutron data from Reference 20, taken along lines 

O”, 45’, and 90’ to the weapon axis, show only minor variations with azimuth. 

The neutron data from Reference 34 were taken along an aximuth of 65’; the 

gamma data in Reference 19 were taken along the device axis; the trenches were 

located approximately between the azimuths 230°-240’. Since asymmetries in 

the radiation output of this device do not appear to be significant, it is assumed 

in performing these calculations that the output was approximately symmetrical. 

The estimated radiation environment at the trench location for Shot Tesla is as 

follows: 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 80 760 1220 - 2060 400 

Trench Factor .06 .021 .20 .08 - .25 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 .53 - .7 - 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) 2” 8* 240” 20” 270” 1310 

*Film Badge Dose 

3.2.3 Shot Turk. No neutron foil data were taken for Shot Turk; gamma dose 

data (uncorrected due to lack of foil data) are provided in Reference 19. A 

neutron source spectrum was chosen based on weapon design characteristics. 

Because of the distance of the trench from ground zero (5500 yards), the neutron 

dose above the trench is found to be negligible (less than 1~10~~ rads). The ATRcalculated gamma dose is approximately 60 percent higher than the measured 

gamma dose as shown in Figure 3-5. Due to the very small doses involved and 

the apparent conservativeness inherent in these ATR calculations, further 

refinements were not attempted. 

43 
lo9 

108 

107 

0 

l . -25 

‘0 ‘b 

‘0 

b( 

OF’ 

-C 

lsured 

culated WR i 

1000 2000 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Fisure 3-4 Shot Tesla 

3000 

Gamma Dose 
Y 0 

0 

Q 

0 

0 c 

o Me 

- Ca 

\ 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Slant Range (yards) 

;ured 

:ulated \TR) . 

Figure 3-5 Shot Turk Gamma Dose 

45 
The estimated radiation dose at the trench location is as follows: 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) <I 3 1 - 4 <I 

Trench Factor .03 .015 .13 .08 - .25 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 .53 - .7 - 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) <l <l <I <1 <I <I 

3.2.4 Shot Bee. Neutron fluence measurements were taken from References 20 

and 21, corrected by the factors in Reference 27, and converted to dose. The 

ATR fit to these doses is displayed in Figure 3-6. The measured gamma doses, 

from Reference 19, the ATR gamma dose curve, and the extrapolation from 

measured data are shown in Figure 3-7. The gamma dose obtained by 

extrapolation is 95 percent higher than the ATR-calculated dose at the trench 

location (3500 yards from ground zero). This higher gamma dose value is used as 

the dose estimate. 

The results of the dose calculations at the trench location are as follows: 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 10 235 85 - 330 3 

Trench Factor .03 .015 .19 .08 - .25 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 .53 - .7 - 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) <1 2” 16” ~1 18” 10 

*Film Badge Dose 

46 
\ 

I 

0 

\ 

B 

\ 

\ 

Ci 

i 

\ 

2( 

culated 

measurer 

culated 

ATR 

L 

0 

Slant Range (yards) 

'ram 

!nts 

'ram 

3c 

Figure 3-6 Shot Bee Neutron Dose 

47 
\ 

B 

0 

0 

0 0 %rI . 

. . 

@ Meas 

- Calc 

_ Extr' 

. 1 . . 

Oed 

iated (A 

lolated 

neasurem 

h 

Slant Range (yards) 

-0m 

1ts 

I 

Figure 3-7 Shot Bee Gamma Dose 

4s 
3.2.5 Shot Apple I. Only gold and sulfur foils were used to measure neutron 

fluences for Apple I (Reference 20), and therefore doses from measured data 

cannot be calculated. A representative neutron source spectrum, based on 

weapon parameters, was chosen from Reference 28 for use in ATR to perform 

dose calculations. The gamma dose data from Reference 19 and the ATR fit are 

displayed in Figure 3-8. The ATR slope appears to be correct and the values 

somewhat on the high side over the range 1400-2200 yards. Beyond 2200 yards, 

where film types 510 and 502 were used, the change in slope of the measured 

gamma data causes an apparent anomaly, as noted previously. An extrapolation 

from the data was used to estimate the gamma dose at the trench location, 3500 

yards from ground zero. 

The results are as follows: 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 10 360 150 - 520 7 

Trench Factor .03 ,015 .17 .08 - .25 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 .53 - .7 - 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem> <1 3” 25” ~1 28 23 

*Film Badge Dose 

3.2.6 Shot Apple II. No neutron foil data are available for Apple II (Reference 

20); gamma dose data are given in Reference 19. Because the Apple I and Apple 

II devices were similar, the same neutron source spectrum was used for both. 

Figure 3-9 depicts the generally good agreement between the measured gamma 

dose and the ATR-calculated gamma dose. For the Apple II shot, trenches were 

located at distances of 2600, 3500, and 4900 yards from ground zero. The 

gamma doses were estimated by extrapolation from the data for the latter two 

distances. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3-1. 

49 
108 

0 

0 

\ 

0 

0 

0 

0 

c 

. 5 . x 0 

s 

Q Me, 

- Ca' 

-- Ex. 

ured 

ulated 

apolatec 

measure 

,TR) 

from 

lents 

1000 2000 

Slant Range (yards) 

3000 

Figure 3-8 Shot Apple I Gamma Dose 

50 

- ._- -- 
Q Me; 

- Cal 

-1 Exl 

\ 

ured 

ulated ( 

apolatec 

measure 

. 

. 

t 

0 

,TR) 

from 

lents 

0 . 1 Q. 

0 

1000 2000 

Slant Range (yards) 

Figure 3-9 Shot Apple 

a . 

_ 

\ - 

b 

\ - 1 \ 

_ 

_ 

3000 

I Gamma Dose 
Table 3-1. Initial Radiation Dose, Shot Apple II 

Prompt Secondary Debris Local TOTAL 

Gamma Gamma Gamma Gamma GAMMA NEUTRON 

TRENCHES AT 2600 YARDS (VOLUNTEER OBSERVERS): 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 310 

Trench Factor .07 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) 10* 

TRENCHES AT 3500 YARDS: 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) 20 

Trench Factor .03 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) <l 

TRENCHES AT 4900 YARDS: 

Tissue Dose above 

Trench (mrad) <I 

Trench Factor .03 

Film Badge Conversion Factor .46 

Dose Equivalent in 

Trench (mrem) <l 

5700 

.030 

.53 

90* 

630 

.015 

.53 

5* 

20 

.015 

.53 

<I 

5800 - 

.18 .08 

.7 

11800 1080 

.27 

1040” 60” 1200” 3800 

350 

.14 

48” 

5 

.13 

<I 

.08 

.7 

1* 

.08 

.7 

<l 

1000 

54” 

25 

<l 

16 

.25 

50 

<l 

.25 

<l 

*Film Badge Dose 

52 
Section 4 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 

4.1 RESIDUAL GAMMA RADIATION EXPOSURE 

Gamma doses are reconstructed for military observers, based on their 

activities in the fallout and neutron-induced activity fields of various shots of 

Operation Teapot. A computerized methodology, described in the appendix, 

determines the radiological environment encountered by the observers. From 

this, doses are calculated based on the scenario of troop activities. Iso-intensity 

countours with superimposed troop tracks are displayed in Figures 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 

4-6, and 4-8 for Shots Tesla, Turk, Aee, Apple I, and Apple II, respectively. 

Other shots, which did not contaminate the observers, have gamma fields 

outlined in Figures 4-1, 4-5, and 4-7 to show their relationship to the observer 

positions. A composite plot of residual radiation from applicable Teapot shots in 

Yucca Flat is shown in Figure 4-9. 

The computer-calculated doses do not reflect the presence of the human 

body in the radiological environment. Despite the penetrating ability of gamma 

rays from fission and activation products, the body affords some shielding; 

hence, the gamma dose to any organ depends on the geometry of the radiation 

source and the body position. In order to represent reconstructed film badge 

readings, gamma doses are calculated for the surface of the chest, where a film 

badge is normally worn. The free-field gamma intensity is converted to a film 

badge dose rate through the factor developed in Reference 17: 1 r/hr 0.7 

rem/hr. This conversion is applicable to an erect individual wearing a film badge 

on his chest, and standing in a uniform, plane fallout field. These conditions are 

met in the observers’ scenarios except that there are intensity gradients in the 

gamma fields (the calculated film badge dose is identical to the “film badge 

equivalent dose” of Reference 17). 

Observer dose calculations are categorized by the shot in conjunction with 

which each observer group participated. Contributions from previous shots to 

the dose are noted as they arise. 

53 
4.1.1 Shot Wasp. As indicated in Section 2.4.1, observers proceeded no closer to 

the shot area than News Nob, and received no dose at this ten-mile distance. 

4.1.2 Shot Moth. Observers of Shot Moth may have encountered very light 

fallout before departing the trench area within a half hour after the shot. No 

radiological survey data were reported as far from GZ as the trenches; however, 

a reading of 10 mr/hr was obtained at H+42 minutes at a position about 600 

meters nearer GZ. Any fallout in the trench area, even if as early as H+lO 

minutes, would not have had an intensity greater than several mr/hr. The dose 

to the observers, then, was probably on the order of 1 mrem. A dose this small 

would have been below the threshold of a film badge. Figure 4-l shown the 

residual radiation area and the observer trenches. 

4.1.3 Shot Tesla. The observers encountered fresh fallout, beginning a few 

hundred yards in front of their trenches. Most of their dose, however, resulted 

from their inspection of the equipment display line at 1000 yards from GZ. The 

gamma intensity during their 10-l 5 minute inspection of this display is 

calculated to have decreased from about 5 to 4 r/hr. Thus, the observers were 

still near the rad-safe limit, and would not have attempted to approach the 500- 

yard display line, 

(see Figure 4-2). 

to be -1.16. The 

mrem. 

4.1.4 Shot Turk. 

which is calculated to have been at about 50 r/hr at H+l hour 

The decay exponent associated with the isopleths is calculated 

total film badge dose calculated for the Tesla observers is 1100 

Observers for this shot received no residual dose on shot day. 

Both their pre-shot tour of the equipment display and the Tesla trenches from 

which they witnessed the shot were in uncontaminated areas. The anticipated 

fallout from Turk at their trench position did not materialize (although it came 

close--see Figure 4-3), so that no dose would have resulted even if the observers 

had not been evacuated. The calculated decay exponent associated with the 

isopleths in the figure is -1.04. 

On the day after the shot, the observers could view the equipment display 

as close as the lOOO-yard line within the 5 r/hr rad-safe limit. Available 

photography shows that the observers walked toward GZ along the eastern 

boundary road of the display area. They would have accrued most of their dose 

54 
11 and Observer PositIon 

Figure 4-1 

Shot Moth Residual Radiation 

(mr/hr @H+l) 

1 0 IL 0 z METERS YARDS 3000 3000 3 
_,_,/_ , , 

r 2--. ic 4 _ ’ .I 

and Observer Routes 
,- Ii \ I\ 

, \~_ \I I, ‘I/ I -I ‘1 , 

b -NII 

Figure 4-3 

Shot Turk Residual Radiation 

(mr/hr @ H+l) 

and Observer Routes 

iD+l) 

. + 

0 YARDS 3000 

c , 

0 YRERS 3ooo 
while returning along the (assumed) western road, which, paralleling the direction of fallout, had little decrease in intensity with distance. The calculated 

film badge dose for this circuit is 1240 mrem. 

4.1.5 

from 

were 

Shot Bee. The radiation field encountered by Shot Bee observers resulted 

neutron activation of the soil. Entering from the southwest, the observers 

well removed from the light fallout that drifted to the east (see Figure 4- 

4). It is assumed that the observers reached their rad-safe rate limit because the 

display line that ranged 700 to 500 yards from GZ crossed the 5 r/hr line at about 

600 yards. The calculated film badge dose for Bee observers is 830 mrem. 

4.1.6 Shot Ess. Observers of Shot Ess were well removed from its fallout (see 

Figure 4-5), and thus accrued no dose from this source. However, they observed 

Ess from positions in the 16-day old Turk fallout field (Figure 4-3). While being 

trucked to and from their position, they crossed the Turk hotline, calculated to 

have had an intensity of nearly 200 mr/hr at that time. Much of their calculated 

film badge dose, 43 mrem, resulted from the longer time spent at the observer 

positions, although the intensity there was less than 20 mr/hr. No correction is 

made for truck shielding or for the close spacing of the personnel within. 

4.1.7 Shot Apple I. This shot resulted in a mixed gamma field. Although there 

was moderate fallout to the northeast (Figure 4-6), induced activity 

predominated elsewhere (as determined from fitting the data). Consequently, 

the observers, who entered the contaminated area from the southwest, are 

assumed to have encountered no fallout. Because the shot yield was far less than 

anticipated, the observers were able to view the innermost display line without 

being close to the rad-safe limit. Their calculated film badge dose is 84 mrem. 

4.1.8 Shot MET. Observers were well distant from the Shot MET contamination 

(Figure 4-7), and thus accrued no dose. Moreover, the Frenchman Flat area was 

uncontaminated during the pre-shot equipment inspections. 

4.1.9 Shot Apple II. Measurable fallout from Apple II reached about 3000 yards 

in the direction of the trenches (Figure 4-8). The volunteer observers would have 

withdrawn beyond this distance within ten minutes, at which time fallout had 

probably not arrived. Therefore, the volunteers accrued a residual radiation dose 

58 
-- 
Figure 4-5 

Shot Ess Residual Radiation 

(mr/hr @ H+l) 

Shot Turk Residual Radiation 

(mr/hr @ D+16) 

and Observer Position 

0 100 YARM 

, 

I 

0 VETEm 3000 
I 

Figure 4-6 

Shot Apple I Residual 

(mr/hr @ H+l) 

-Nand Observer Routes 

Radiation w 

t 

* 

r . 

0 IARDS 3000 

43 

‘ 1 

0 YETERS 3Doo 

t 

-- 
I Figure 4-7 

Shot MET Residual Radiation 

-n- 

(mr/hr @ H+l) 

and Observer Position 

1 

‘ 

0 YARDS 3000 

t 

0 YETEa 

3 

3000 

__- I 
/ I I 

ver I/ II I Figure 4-8 

4 Shot Apple II Residual Radiation 

(mr/hr D H+l) 

-Nand Observer Routes 

- 

ioi 

ioo 
4 Figure 4-9 

Composite Plot of 

-I(- Residual Radiation, 

Yucca Flat 

(13 mr/hr @ cl+!) 

b VARDS do0 

m 4 

0 YETERS 3000 
only if they went forward to view equipment with the main body of observers. 

Observers would have encountered contamination at about H+25 minutes. 

Fallout deposition most likely had occurred by then; if not, the calculated dose is 

slightly high-sided. If it is assumed that the observers did not pass the lOOO-yard 

display line in an attempt to reach the 500-yard line (which was too 

contaminated, with an intensity approaching 10 r/hr), the calculated film badge 

dose is 180 mrem. The calculated decay exponent associated with the isopleths 

in Figure 4-8 is -0.94. 

4.2 INTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 

The only situation for Operation *Teapot observers in which a potential 

internal radiation hazard need be considered is the trucking of the Shot Ess 

observers across the Shot Turk fallout field (the breathing of dust therefrom). 

An estimate of their dose is obtained by comparison with the internal dose 

calculation for Task Force BIG BANG in Operation Plumbbob (Reference 18). 

This task force had one source of exposure on their exercise day similar to Shot 

Turk at D+ 16 days: Shot Shasta at D+l5 days. The time-integrated gamma 

intensity for the Shot Ess observers while being trucked is calculated as 24 mr; 

for TF BIG BANG from Shot Shasta, it was 0.83 mr (Reference 18, p. 28). The 

Shot Shasta contribution to the BIG BANG internal dose on D+l5, excluding the 

infiltration course, was 0.08 mrem, based on a resuspension factor of 10 -5 -1 m 

(Reference 18, p. 40). Resuspension factors for dust raised by vehicles has also 

been reported as being on the order of 10 -5 m -1 (Reference 29). By proportionality, the 50-year internal bone dose commitment for the Shot Ess observers is 

estimated to have been about 2 mrem. 

4.3 RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE SUMMARY 

The calculated film badge doses to Operation Teapot observers from 

residual radiation are summarized as follows: 

Shot Wasp Moth Tesla Turk Bee Ess* Apple I MET Apple II 

Dose (rem) 0 0.001 1.1 1.2 0.83 0.043 0.084 0 0.18 

*Also, a 0.002 rem 50-year bone dose commitment. 

65 
- 
Section 5 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

The sources of error in the calculation of initial and residual doses are 

examined in order to quantitatively estimate the uncertainty in the total dose 

for each group of observers. 

5.1 UNCERTAINTIES IN INITIAL RADIATION DOSE 

5.1.1 Neutron Dose. For those shots (Moth, Tesla, Bee) for which neutron data 

exist, the sources of error in the calculation of neutron dose include: (1) 

uncertainties in doses derived from foil measurements, (2) uncertainties in 

neutron output spectra of the devices, (3) errors associated with the use of the 

ATR4 to extrapolate beyond the range of measured data, and (4) errors in 

relating above-trench dose to in-trench dose equivalent. A detailed analysis of 

the neutron dosimetry techniques employed in Operation Teapot indicates that 

the major sources of uncertainty in foil measurements are due to error in the 

reactor thermal neutron fluence used to calibrate the fission and gold detectors, 

and to foil activity counting precision and technique. The error factor, 

expressed in terms of 900percent confidence limits, is determined to be 

approximately 1.25. The error due to neutron output spectral uncertainty is 

estimated by calculating neutron doses at a typical trench range resulting from 

various output spectra, all of which match the measured doses over the range of 

neutron measurements. It is found that the error factor associated with spectral 

uncertainty is about 1.15 for those ranges at which significant doses are possible. 

The error in using ATR4 to extrapolate from the range of measured data to 

trench locations is estimated by comparing ATR results with those of recent 

two-dimensional discrete ordinates calculations; this error factor is determined 

to be approximately 1.15. Finally, the error factor associated with relating the 

above-trench environment to the in-trench dose equivalent is estimated to be 

1.25. The combined error factor for the neutron dose from Shots Moth and Bee 

is therefore 1.45. For Shot Tesla, an additional uncertainty due to device 

asymmetry must be considered. It is estimated that the error factor associated 

with this uncertainty is approximately 1.20, resulting in a combined error factor 

of 1.51 for Shot Tesla. 

67 
For those shots (Turk, Apple 1, Apple II) lacking sufficient neutron data to 

determine experimental dose versus range, the uncertainty increases 

significantly. Without the capability to normalize to measured data, the 

uncertainties in neutron output spectra and environmental factors dominate. 

These uncertainties are estimated by examining the distribution of dose versus 

range curves for six Teapot shots for which full neutron foil data were taken, 

after normalization to common yield and air density. It is felt that this 

distribution is representative of Teapot-era devices, and that the prediction of 

dose versus range from a best-estimate output spectrum without normalization 

to measured data will probably conform to such a distribution. The error factors 

determined in this manner are estimated to increase from 2.2 at 2000 yards to 

3.2 at 4000 yards. Including the ATR4 extrapolation error factor (1.15) and the 

trench calculation error factor (1.25) results in combined error factors of 2.3-3.3 

for ground ranges of 2000-4000 yards. 

5.1.2 Initial Gamma Dose. Sources of error in the calculation of initial gamma 

dose include: (1) uncertainty in experimental film badge readings, (2) 

extrapolation/interpolation techniques to determine dose at trench locations, (3) 

, 

errors in relating above-trench dose to in-trench dose, (4) uncertainty in 

converting in-trench dose to film badge reading for personnel in a fixed position, 

and (5) uncertainty in personnel reorientation (i.e., standing up) in the trench. 

While the other sources of error are systematic, the latter two uncertainties 

provide an indication of the spread in film badge readings expected due to the 

various orientational factors. 

The error factor associated with experimental film badge readings is 

determined to be approximately 1.4, based on estimates made in Reference 19; a 

somewhat larger factor is estimated for Shot Turk, since neutron data were not 

available to allow correction of the gamma data. The error in 

interpolation/extrapolation techniques used to determine the gamma doses at 

trench locations is range-dependent, with estimated values from 1.1 (when 

interpolation is required) to 2.0 (for the long-range extrapolation required for 

Shot Turk). The factors used for Shots Moth, Bee, Apple I, and Apple II (3500- 

and 4900-yard trenches) reflect the uncertainty in extrapolating from the 502- 

and 510-type film data, as discussed previously. It is estimated that the 

uncertainty in the gamma trench factors, which relate the above-trench dose to 

68 
in-trench dose, introduce error factors of 1.2 for 2-foot wide trenches and 1.3 

for the 3-foot wide volunteer observer trench in Shot Apple II. The uncertainty 

in relating the in-trench gamma dose to film badge reading (for stationary 

personnel) is due primarily to variations in body orientation among individuals in 

the trench and the placement of the film badge on the body. This error factor 

for all observers is estimated to be 1.5. 

The final uncertainty in initial gamma dose results from the probability 

that the observers stood up in the trenches to observe the rising cloud soon after 

the blast effects of the weapon had subsided. It is considered unlikely that 

anyone stood up before one second after the blast wave passed the trench 

location, because the blast effects and fireball luminosity still would have been 

significant. It is also considered probable that most observers were standing by 

six seconds after passage of the blast wave. The values of one and six seconds 

after passage of the blast wave are therefore considered the 90-percent 

confidence limits on standup time. Using a reference standup time of three 

seconds after passage of the blast wave, these limits introduce error factors of 

1.1-1.3 in the total initial gamma doses. 

These gamma dose error factors for shots of interest are as follows: 

Source of Uncertainty 

Experimental Extrapolation/ Trench Trench Standup 

Shot Data Interpolation Factor Posture Time 

Moth 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.1 

Tesla 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.2 

Turk 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 

Bee 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.2 

Apple I 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 

Apple II 1.4 

2600 yd 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 

3500 yd 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 

4900 yd 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.2 

Combined 

Error 

Factor 

1.9 

1.8 

2.5 

2.1 

2.0 

1.9 

1.9 

2.2 

69 
5.1.3 Accuracy of ATR. The ATR4 code used for initial neutron and gamma 

radiation environment determination possesses great flexibility in accepting wide 

ranges of burst heights, atmospheric densities, source spectra and other 

parameters affecting such determination. It also is very fast-running, a 

necessary quality for any code used as part of the iterative process described in 

Section 3. The ability of the ATR code to replicate measured neutron and 

gamma ray dose data at slant ranges of up to 2000 meters is demonstrated in this 

and a previous report (Reference 17). However, the ability of the ATR code to 

predict dose values beyond the measurements has not been proven. Further, 

even in the range where measurements are available, some normalization has 

been required to obtain a match between ATR results and such data. Therefore, 

in order to gain confidence in the ATR predictive capability at extended ranges, 

and to improve the understanding of its application in the ranges where 

experimental data exist, a program of comparison between experimental data, 

ATR results, and results of computations using state-of-the-art radiation 

transport methods has been initiated. This program was not finished as of the 

date of publication of this report. Its results will be published in a future report. 

Initial results indicate good agreement (difference ,lO percent) between 

secondary gamma radiation free-field doses predicted by ATR4 and state-of-theart methods at ranges to 3000 meters. On the other hand, initial results for 

neutron free-field dose indicate that, in comparison to state-of-the-art methods, 

ATR4 overpredicts the neutron dose by 30 and 40 percent at ranges up to 2000 

meters for the Teapot (low humidity) and Plumbbob (high humidity) shots, 

respectively. At ranges of 3000 meters the overprediction of ATR for these 

series is as much as 45 and 85 percent, respectively. Therefore, while ATR 

gamma free-field dose is a good representation of that obtained from state-ofthe-art methods, the ATR neutron free-field dose must be regarded as 

conservative. However, the present calculational method of normalizing ATR4 

results to measured neutron doses by adjustment of neutron output spectra 

eliminates much of this discrepancy. 

5.2 UNCERTAINTIES IN RESIDUAL RADIATION DOSE 

The uncertainty in calculated residual radiation doses arises from two basic 

sources: (1) the gamma radiation environment, and (2) the space-time scenario 

of troop movements. The 90-percent confidence limits in the gamma intensity, 

including the uncertainty in the decay parameter, are provided by the automated 

70 
procedure described in the appendix. Parametric studies are made using the 

automated procedure to determine the influence of scenario variations on 

personnel dose. 

Errors in position, time, and gamma intensity are not independent because 

of the rad-safe constraint limiting troops to intensities of less than 5 r/hr. Troop 

positions are well known except with regard to the limit of advance in the 

display areas. Because the references do not report which equipment display 

lines were inspected by the observers, the assumption is made that all of the 

displays within rad-safe limits were inspected. Consequently, the upper limit on 

dose is not necessarily obtained by considering the upper confidence limits in 

field intensity or by maximizing the number of display lines visited; it is instead 

found by considering the scenario variation which maximizes the time spent at or 

near the 5 r/hr line. 

Other than with regard to the limit of troop advance, there is essentially 

no error in dose resulting from uncertainty in troop position. The bounding 

azimuths of the equipment display sector have been well identified for each shot 

from operation plans, shot area maps, and shot area photographs. For the shots 

considered, the uncertainty in angle of troop position within the display sectors 

has a negligible influence on dose. That the distances from GZ of the display 

lines are known identifies where observers would linger and limits the position of 

farthest advance to a few discrete possibilities. 

The timing of the observers’ march is generally based on the planned time 

of moving out from the trenches and arriving at the pickup point. Reasonable 

march speeds and display area stay times are assumed to construct a scenario 

consistent with the known times. The most important influence of timing on the 

uncertainty in dose is the time spent at the position of greatest gamma intensity. 

Consequently, this duration is emphasized in the uncertainty analysis. 

Each shot for which the observers encountered residual radiation is 

considered separately. The various sources of error cannot be combined 

rigorously due to the disparity of their associated distributions. These 

distributions may be normal (e.g., _ +5 minutes), lognormal (as for the gamma 

71 
intensity), or truncated (due to the 5 r/hr limit). Ninety-percent confidence 

limits for each area are approximated to be roughly correct for both normal and 

lognormal distributions, and the upper and lower limits are treated separately, so 

that asymmetrical error bands are permitted. 

5.2.1 Shot Tesla. Because the observers are calculated to have reached 5 r/hr at 

the lOOO-yard display, the uncertainty in the gamma field could contribute only 

to a lower dose. With regard to time, the confidence limits are taken as a fiveminute earlier departure from the trenches to allow five additional minutes at 

the IOOO-yard display, and a five-minute later trench departure, with five fewer 

minutes at 1000 yards. With regard to intensity, the dose is 1100~~4, mrem; 

with regard to time, it is llOO!‘## mrem. The overall 90-percent confidence 

limits are approximately 1 lOO+~~~ mrem. 

5.2.2 Shot Turk. The uncertainty in the intensity field allows the possibility that 

the observers viewed the 500-yard display, despite the absence of photographs at 

that range. If the entire breadth of the 500-yard display was viewed, the 

additional dose could have been as much as 980 mrem. Because of uncertainty in 

the intensity field, the dose resulting from the walk forward to the lOOO-yard 

display could be as much as 600 mrem less than that calculated. Uncertainty in 

timing results in little increase in the confidence limits, which are approximately 

1 240+1000mrem -600 ’ 

5.2.3 Shot Bee. Because the innermost Bee display stretched from 500 to 700 

yards from GZ, the observers would have been able to view some equipment at 

the 5 r/hr line for all intensity fields within the confidence limits. The only 

influence of the uncertainty in intensity is with regard to the walking time 

required to reach the 5 r/hr line. This could have varied +3 minutes, and 

probably would have been reflected in the time spent at the 5 r/hr line. With 

regard to time alone, the same _ +5 minutes perturbation to the scenario is 

assumed as for Shot Tesla. Thus, the confidence limits on intensity imply a dose 

of 830+180 mrem; those on time imply 8302300 mrem. The overall 90-percent 

confidence limits are approximately 83OL350 mrem. 

5.2.4 Shot Ess. The uncertainty in dose to the Ess observers is almost entirely 

due to the uncertainty in the Turk fallout field intensity. For this, the 90- 

72 
percent confidence limits yield a dose calculation of 43 f:T mrem. The truck 

speed while crossing the Turk hotline is probably estimated to within 20 percent, 

and the uncertainty in time spent at the observation position is about 10 percent 

(because the observers were in position a full 1% hours before detonation). 

These, each of which applies only to part of the dose, add negligibly to the 

overall uncertainty in dose. 

5.2.5 Shot Apple I. For Apple I, the innermost equipment display was at an 

intensity of less than 5 r/hr, for all gamma fields within the 90-percent 

confidence limits of intensity. Consequently, the observers are certain to have 

walked to this display, but no farther. For the assumed scenario, the gamma 

intensity uncertainty implies a dose of 84 r,‘,” mrem. For the calculated 

intensity field, _ +5 minutes at the innermost display implies 84230 mrem. The 

overall 90-percent confidence limits are approximately 84:;: mrem. 

5.2.6 Shot Apple II. There is considerable uncertainty in the Apple II intensity 

field. Near the upper intensity limit, the lOOO-yard display which the observers 

are presumed to have reached would have had an intensity of about 5 r/hr. Near 

the lower intensity limit, the observers would have been able to reach the 

500-yard display. In order to obtain a lower limit on dose, it must be assumed 

that the intensity field was such that the 500-yard display was just over 5 r/hr 

(as could have been determined by rad-safe monitors preceding the observers), 

and that the observers did not advance beyond the lOOO-yard line. These imply 

180 +430 

-70 mrem. The planned duration of the walk-through did not allow time for 

stopping at any of the displays. Therefore, only an upper limit on time, allowing 

five minutes at each display, is calculated. For the computed intensity field, 

these stops would increase the dose by 150 mrem. The approximate overall 90- 

percent confidence limits are 180 +450 _70 mrem. See also below. 

5.3 TOTAL MEAN DOSE SUMMARY 

The reconstructed neutron and gamma doses for Operation Teapot 

observers are presented in Table 5- 1. From the best-estimate doses of Sections 

3 and 4, and the error distribution of this section, the mean neutron and gamma 

doses for each observer group are calculated. These are presented in the table 

with estimated 90-percent confidence limits. The doses are not added because 

73 
Table 5-l Observer Dose Summary* 

Shot 

Moth 

Tesla 

Turk 

Bee 

Ess 

Apple I 

Apple II 

Vol. Obs. 

Trp. Obs. 

VIP Obs. 

Neutron 

Dose (rem) 

0 

. 

16 +0.07 

-0.05 

1 4 +0.6 

. -0.5 

0 

0 010 +0.005 

. 

-0.003 

0 

+0.04 1 

o*029 -0.021 

+5.4 

4.5 -3.0 

+0.090 

o*063 -0.047 

< 0.001 

Initial 

Gamma 

Dose (rem) 

0 . 067 +0.051 

-0.034 

0 . 29 +O.*O 

-0.14 

< 0.001 

o 020 +0.018 

. -0.011 

0 

o 031 +0.025 

. -0.017 

1 3. +0.98 

. -0.67 

+0.045 

Ooo5* -0.030 

N 0.001 

Residual 

Gamma 

Dose (rem) 

- 0.001 

+0.4 

lo1 -0.5 

1 3 +0.9 

. -0.7 

0.83 + 0.35 

+0.02 

0*04 -0.01 

+0.072 

‘*09* -0.058 

+0.29 

o*34 -0.23 

o 34 +0.29 

. -0.23 

0 

Total 

Gamma 

Dose (rem) 

+0.05 

0*07 -0.04 

+0.4 

lo4 -0.5 

1 3 +0.9 

. -0.7 

0.85 LO.35 

+0.02 

0*04 -0.01 

o 

. 

12 +0.08 

-0.06 

1 6 +l.O 

. -0.7 

+0.30 

o-4’ -0.23 

0.001 

*Reconstructed mean film badge dose, except for mean neutron dose. 

74 
the neutron dose would not have been recorded by film badges. It should be 

noted that the mean dose and the best estimate dose may differ according to the 

error distribution. For most shots, the difference is on the order of 10 percent. 

For Shot Apple II, however, the highly asymmetric error distribution results in a 

calculated mean that is nearly twice the best estimate. 

75 

Section 6 

CONCLUSIONS 

Of the nine shots of Operation Teapot in which Desert Rock observers 

participated, only four were significant in terms of radiation dose accrued. 

These were Shots Tesla, Turk, and Bee for troop observers, and Shot Apple II for 

the volunteer observers, for which the calculated mean gamma film badge doses 

are 1.4, 1.3, 0.85, and 1.6 rem, respectively. For these shots, the calculated 

mean neutron doses are 1.4, 0, 0.01, and 4.5 rem, respectively. From the neutron 

doses, it is seen that Shot Tesla offered the highest initial radiation dose to troop 

observers, probably due in part to the higher-than-anticipated shot yield of 7 KT 

(vs. 2 KT expected). Shots Tesla and Turk contributed the highest residual dose 

to observers as they inspected the post-shot eqipment displays. When confidence 

limits are applied to the above calculations, the upper limits of gamma dose for 

Shots Tesla, Turk, Bee, and Apple II are calculated to be 1.8, 2.2, 1.2, and 2.6 

rem, respectively. Upper confidence limits for neutron dose are 2.0 and 9.9 rem 

for Shots Tesla and Apple II (volunteers), respectively. 

As might be expected, the volunteer observers at Shot Apple II received 

the highest gamma and neutron radiation doses. Although their exposure criteria 

were higher (10 rem, 5 rem of which could be initial) than for the other 

observers, it would appear that their calculated mean doses of 1.6 rem gamma 

and 4.5 rem neutron did not significantly exceed the regular troop exposure limit 

of 6 rem. If upper limits are considered, the doses of 2.6 rem gamma and 9.9 

rem neutron result in a 25-percent overdose, however improbable. 

Only limited dosimetric information is available for comparison with 

calculated doses. Although no specific details are provided, Reference 13 states 

that the average film badge reading for the volunteer observers at Shot Apple II 

was 1.3 rem. It is noted that the calculated film badge gamma dose of 1.6 

(0.9-2.6) rem compares very favorably with the average reading. Data on Marine 

participants at Shot Bee include 10 officer observers with film badge readings 

(within 10 percent) of 0.54 rem, in reasonable agreement with the calculated 

77 
film badge dose of 0.85 (0.5-1.2) rem. Because of the few personnel involved, 

these comparisons are considered insufficient to establish overall correlation 

with all calculated doses for all shots. 

7% 
Section 7 

REFERENCES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

“Exercise Desert Rock VI, Final Report of Operations,” Headquarters, 

Exercise Desert Rock VI, Las Vegas, Nevada, 23 May 1955. 

Operation Order No. 1 (Shot Turk), Desert Rock VI, 5 February 1955. 

Operation Order No. 2 (Shot Wasp), Desert Rock VI, 15 February 1955. 

Operation Order No. 3 (Shot Moth), Desert Rock VI, 21 February 1955. 

Operation Order No. 4 (Shot Tesla), Desert Rock VI, 5 February 1955. 

Operation Order No. 5 (Shot Apple), Desert Rock VI, 10 March 1955. 

Operation Order No. 6 (Shot Bee), Desert Rock VI, 19 March 1955. 

Operation Order No. 7 (Shot Ess), Desert Rock VI, 21 March 1955. 

Operation Order No. 8 (Shot MET), Desert Rock VI, 6 April 1955. 

Operation Order No. 9 (Shot Apple II), Desert Rock VI, 25 April 1955. 

Operation Plan l-55 (Shot Bee), Headquarters, 3d Marine Corps Provisional 

Atomic Exercise Brigade, Camp Pendleton, California, 23 February 1955. 

“Radiological Safety, Operation Teapot,” Headquarters, Field Command, 

AFSW P, May 1955. 

“Report of the Test Manager, Joint Test Organization, Operation Teapot,” 

Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Test Site, Spring 1955. 

“Operational Summary,” Operation Teapot, Nevada Test Site, WT-1158, 

Headquarters Field Command, AFSWP, July 1955. 

“Report of the Test Director, Operation Teapot,” LA 1966, Los Alamos 

Scientific Laboratory, October 1955. 

“Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Nuclear Test Detonations, 1945- 

1962,” Volume I - Continental U.S. Tests, DNA 1251-I-EX, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 1 May 1979. 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot Smoky, 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob,” DNA 4747F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 31 May 1979. 

“Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force BIG BANG, Shot Galileo, 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob,” DNA 4772F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 9 April 1980. 
19. “Initial Gamma Data from Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1948-1962,” U.S. Army 

Nuclear Defense Laboratory, (Unpublished). 

20. “Neutron Flux Measurements,” Project 2.2, Operation Teapot, Field 

Command, AFSW P (Unpublished). 

21. “Physical Measurements of Neutron and Gamma Radiation Dose from High 

Neutron Yield Weapons and Correlation of Dose with Biological Effect,” 

Civil Effects Test Group (Unpublished). 

22. “Version 4 of ATR (Air Transport of Radiation),” DNA 3995, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, January 1976. 

23. “Energy Dependent Air/Ground Correction Factors for the ATR (Air 

Transport of Radiation) Code,” BRL Report No. 345, U.S. Army Ballistic 

Research Laboratory, August 1977. 

24. “Radiation Environments from Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” DNA 4268F, 

Defense Nuclear Agency, July 1976. 

25. “The MORSE Code with Combinatorial Geometry,” DNA 2860T, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, May 1972. 

26. “The MORSE Monte Carlo Radiation Transport Code System,” ORNL-4972, 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February 1975. 

27. “External Neutron Measurements, 1952 through 1958,” U.S. Army Chemical 

Warfare Laboratory (Unpublished). 

28. “DNA Nuclear Weapons Output Handbook,” Defense Nuclear Agency 

(Unpublished). 

29. “The Resuspension of Particulate Material from Surfaces,” in Proceedings 

of a Symposium on Surface Contamination, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, June 

1964, Pergamon Press, New York. 

30. “Time-Dependent Neutron and Secondary Gamma-Ray Transport in an AirGround Geometry,” ORNL-4289, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 

September 1968. 

31. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers,” Exercise Desert 

Rock V, Operation Upshot-Knothole, Draft Final Report, Science Applications, Inc., McLean, VA, 28 April 1981. 

32. “Protection Against Neutron Radiation,” NCRP Report No. 38, January 

1971. 

33. “NUIDEA - A Computer Code for the Prediction of Radiation, Blast, and 

Thermal Environments from Nuclear Weapons,” Science Applications, Inc., 

19 November 1975. 

34. “Shielding Studies,” Project 2.7, Operation Teapot, Chemical Warfare 

Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, MD (Unpublished). 

EO 
APPENDIX 

AUTOMATED PROCEDURE FOR EXTERNAL RESIDUAL 

GAMMA DOSE RECONSTRUCTION 

A computer-aided methodology for the estimation of the residual gamma 

radiation from nuclear bursts at Nevada Test Site is described. This procedure, a 

generalization of that used in Reference 17, combines the gamma intensity data 

from the several radiation surveys of each shot to construct the gamma 

environment within quantified confidence limits. Dose estimates can then be 

made for personnel at the test site for any specified position/time scenario. 

The methodology was constructed to utilize survey data in whatever form 

available to best model the gamma field so that personnel dose could be 

computed with a minimum of uncertainty. A computer was employed not only to 

rapidly provide dose estimates, but also to evaluate the sensitivity of estimates 

to radiation field modeling, variants of troop scenarios, and outliers among the 

survey readings. In contrast to that of Reference 17, the present methodology 

computes (and graphically displays) analytically determined isointensity 

contours, interpolates anywhere within the range of survey data, models both 

fallout and neutron-induced gamma fields, and models radiological decay in 

addition to spatial variation of intensity. 

As in Operation Plumbbob, most of the radiological survey data for 

Operation Teapot were collected along straight roads, usually radial tracks from 

ground zero (GZ). Consequently, the data are fit to one-dimensional spatial 

models. Intensities at positions between roads are found through a polynomial 

fitting of isointensities from all roads. Gamma decay is assumed to be identical 

throughout the field. The one-dimensional space-time intensity models employed 

for Operation Teapot residual gamma fields are: 

-n -ax+b I=t e for fallout, and 

I = (,-t/l5 + c.2-t/2.58Je-ar+b for induced activity, 

81 
where I = gamma intensity (r/hr) 

t = time in hours after burst 

r = slant range from burst 

x = distance from an arbitrary origin 

a,b,c,n are parameters determined from data fitting. 

The automated procedure permitted fallout data to be combined in the 

absence of independent decay information (that was available from Operation 

Plumbbob for use in Reference 17). The quality and quantity of the survey 

readings determined the level of detail to which power law modeling (t’“) could 

be used for gamma decay. It was not possible to obtain a statistically significant 

value of n for each interval between surveys, nor was it possible (for the entire 

period of surveys) for data along individual roads. Consequently, the one best 

fitting n for all of the given shot’s data was determined; this was done by 

averaging the values found for each road, weighted according to the quantity of 

data available along each road. The data for each road, which had been fit 

according to multiple linear regression of the logarithmic form of the model, 

were then refit with the imposed time decay by linear regression in the spatial 

variable only. 

The model for induced 

radioisotopes of consequence to 

activity incorporates the decay of the only 

military maneuvering in neutron-activated areas 

-_ 

of Nevada Test Site: Na24 (tl,* = 15.0 hr) and Mn56 (t 1,2 = 2.58 hr). As stated, 

the model cannot be linearized; however, linear regression can be performed 

after decoupling the Na and Mn contributions. Because surveys performed from 

one to about five days after the shot reflect almost entirely Na 24 activity, a fit 

is obtained for this isotope alone in this timeframe. With parameters a and b 

already determined, c is found from the best fit to shot-day data. Only a single 

value of c for the entire field is statistically significant. 

The spatial factor in both models is a simple exponential form. For 

induced fields, the actual distance from the point of burst is the appropriate 

scale. Simple physical reasoning based on a uniform, isotropic, neutrona2 
attenuating medium would indicate inclusion of an additional factor of l/r*. 

However, the presence of the ground, its orientation relative to the burst point, 

and the depth distribution of the activated nuclei makes analysis of the 

intensity-distance relationship far more complex. The form chosen fits the data 

at least as well as a more complicated model. For fallout fields, the exponential 

form is purely empirical. It best applies where intensity gradients are large. 

The addition of a quadratic term to the exponent does not significantly improve 

the fit (as reported in Reference 171, but its inclusion is vital to analysis of data 

sets which approach or span the hotline (axis of fallout). For these, the Gaussian 

form so obtained generally provides the best fit of linearizable functions. 

Intensities at positions not on survey roads are found from interpolation of 

the fitted data along neighboring roads. The interpolation is accomplished 

through a three-step procedure: (1) the position of the 10, 100, 1000, and 10000 

mr/hr intensities is determined on each survey road at a standardized time; (2) 

isointensity contours are constructed from analytical functions in which range 

(slant range for induced fields) from GZ is expressed as a cubic polynomial in 

azimuth around GZ; a six-pointed scheme that produces smooth contours is used; 

and (3) the ranges of these contours for the azimuth of any specified position 

define intercepts which determine parameters of the applicable model along that 

azimuth; the intensity at the desired position and time is then obtained directly 

from the model. Contours are displayed graphically so that they can be 

compared with hand-drawn contours accompanying the raw survey data, be 

checked for consistency with personnel dose calculations, and indicate 

contaminated areas of Nevada Test Site that could be relevant to subsequent 

military operations. Contours can be displayed with standardized intensity levels 

for any time of interest. 

Personnel dose is computed by time-integration 

encountered by troops present in a gamma field. The troops 

and time through the field in small, discrete steps. The 

of the intensity 

are traced in space 

intensity and time 

interval associated with each step determine the incremental dose accrued for 

that step. Wide latitude is allowed in the type of position-time data required to 

83 
specify the troop scenario. A sample output of the dose calculation concludes 

this appendix (Figure A-l). 

The automated procedure quantifies uncertainties associated with the 

computed gamma environment. (These are combined with the uncertainties in 

the troop activity scenario to determine overall confidence limits in the 

reconstructed personnel dose). In contrast to Reference 17, in which one 

approximate parameter characterizes an entire gamma field, the computer 

permits a point-by-point determination of uncertainty. The standard error of the 

model, as a function of position and time, is calculated in conjunction with the 

regression along survey roads. Off these roads, standard error is found by a 

linear interpolation along contours followed by a linear interpolation between 

contours on the azimuth of interest. Between roads, an additional source of 

error in the gamma intensity results from the manner in which contours are 

computed. An approximate measure of this error is found by comparison with an 

alternate means of curve fitting, for example the cubic polynomial determined 

by four neighboring isointensity points. The implied deviation in intensity by the 

displaced contour is used to estimate the curve fitting error. The overall 

uncertainty in intensity is used at each step in incrementing the dose. These 

errors are simply added from step to step; this approach is preferred because the 

intensity error along a troop path is much more likely to be systematic than 

random with each integration step. 

It is cautioned that the error analysis is no better than the models to 

which the radiological survey data are fit. Diagnostic printouts of statistical 

parameters ensured that the choice of models was sound and that outliers which 

significantly influenced the regressions and uncertainty analysis could be 

identified and disregarded. Nevertheless, the confidence in the models and the 

statistics associated therewith is minimal beyond the range of times and 

distances at which the surveys were taken. In practice, this is of little 

importance--far from GZ the intensities make an insignificant contribution to 

personnel dose, and rarely did troops penetrate closer to CZ than where surveys 

were made. 

84 
Figure A-l is a printout of a dose reconstruction (for Shot Tesla) that 

displays the variations in uncertainty with position and time. For intensities less 

than 0.1 mr/hr, dose calculations are suppressed. The totals are to be multiplied 

by the conversion factor of 0.7 to obtain film badge dose. 

85 
WtiICh DATA FILE DO YOU WISH TO ACCESS? 

3 

INPUT 1 TO GET INPUT DATA PRINTS 

0 

;NTER I TO GET DOSCAL DEBUGGING PRINTS 

ENTER 1 TO GET DEBUGGING PRINTS 

0 

NTPR INTEGRATION PROGRAM 

VERSION 2 -- CUBIC MODEL 

SELECT OPTION--I. .DEFINE MODEL 

2 

3: ’ 

.DEFINE HOT-LINE SECTOR 

.CRAPHICAL DISPLAY AT REFERENCE TInE 

;* : 

SET PRINT DETAIL 

6: ’ 

PERFORM DOSE INTEGRATION 

. STOP 

1 

THE FOLLOWlNG VALUES HAVE BEEN JNPUT FROn TAPE: 

SLANT RANGE FLAG= 0 HOB= 100 

TIILITARY COORDINATE OF GZ= 844090 

MODEL p = 1 

REFERENCE TIME= 12 

C-VALUETfor flodelP21,FINAL C-VALUETfor nodelnST,or 

DECAY RATElfor Modelal or 3)~ -1 .I633 

ENTER I TO CHANGE VALUES, OTHERWISE ENTER 0 

0 

ENlER CONTOURS TO BE OPEN ENDED BY ENTERING ALL CONTOUR 

INTENS!TIES IN ASCEhOING ORDER ENTERING A 0 FOR CONTOURS 

Tt-iAT ARE OPEN ENDED, EG 0,2,3,4 

0,0.0,0 

Figure A-l. Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure 
87 
rf*START OF TRACKS** 

DEFINE THE FIRST LINE SEGTIENT OF THE TRACK 

ENTER START TIME, IN HOURS AFTER H-HOUR: 

333 

SELECT TlETHOD OF SPECIFYING START POINT 

MILITARY COORDINATE 

~OEGREES FROM N , AND YARDS FROtl GZ 

2 

ENTER START POINT, iN DEGREES FROM N AND YARDS FROtl GZ 

235.2400 

SELECT METHOD OF SPECIFYING DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT 

1 . . . END POINT IN MILITARY COORDINATES 

.END POINT IN DECREES FROM N AND YARDS FROM CZ 

?. 

2’ 

DEGREES FROfl N RELATIVE TO START POINT 

ENTER END POINT IN DEGREES FROM N AND YARDS FROM GZ: 

235,1000 

SELECT nETHOD OF SPECIFYING TIME ON SEGTlENT-- 

I . . . VELOCITY [in TIPHI 

2 . ELAPSED T IME 

3:‘. VELOCITY Iin YARDS PER MINUTE1 

2 

ENTER ELAPSED TIME IN HOURS: 

5 

SELECT STOPPING RULE-- 

1 . . . WHEN REACH END POINT 

2 . . . WHEN EXCEED SPECIFIED DOSE RATE 

3 . * . WHEN FALL BELOW SPECIFIED DOSE RATE 

4 . * . WHEN HAVE CONE SPECIFlED DISTANCE FROM START POINT 

1 

ENTER INTECRATJON INCREMENT IN YARDS: 

10 

Figure A-l. Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure (Continued) 
TIME AT YARDS 

INC INC END FROM 

II [HRS) START 

1 0 34 10 

10 0.37 100 

20 0.40 200 

30 0.44 300 

40 0.48 400 

50 0.51 500 

60 0.55 600 

70 0.58 700 

80 0.62 800 

90 0.65 900 

100 0.69 1000 

I I0 0.73 1100 

120 0.76 1200 

130 0.80 1300 

140 0.83 1400 

ANGLE 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235 0 

235.0 

235 0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

235.0 

YARDS 

FROM 

cz 

2390 

2300 

2200 

2100 

2000 

1900 

1800 

1700 

1600 

1500 

1400 

1300 

1200 

1100 

1000 

JNC DOSE RATES 

(llR/HRI 

START END 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

7 7 

:: ;z 

39 41 

70 74 

128 136 

233 248 

427 454 

785 835 

1448 I540 

2677 2847 

4963 5280 

curl 

DOSE 

lflR1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

: 

; 

14 

26 

47 

87 

161 

297 

ERROR 

FACTOR 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

2.093 

1,989 

1 .897 

1.818 

1 * 754 

1 .705 

1 .672 

1 .657 

1 .660 

1.681 

1 .720 

1 .775 

CONF I DENCE 

LInITS 

LOWER UPPER 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 1 

I 2 

: 4 8

ii 24 14 

15 44 

28 80 

i; 272 147 

173 511 

INTEGRATION ALONG THIS SEGMENT STOPPED WITH 

DISTANCE FROfl START IS 1400.0 YARDS 

CURRENT POSITION IS 235.0 DEGREES 

1000.0 YARDS FROM CZ 

MILITARY COORDINATE IS 837085 

ENTER I.... TO SPECIFY STAY TIME AT THIS POINT 

2 . . * . TO SPECIFY THE NEXT SEGMENT OF THE TRACK 

3 . . * . TO END THIS TRACK 

Figure A-l. Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure (Continued) 
ENTER STAY TIME AND INTEGRATION INCREMENT 

BOTH IN HOURS. 

25, .01 

TIME AT YARDS YARDS INC DOSE RATES CUM CONF SCIENCE 

INC INC END FROM FROM IMR/HRl DOSE ERROR LIMITS 

CT (HRSI START ANGLE CZ START END (MR) FACTOR LOWER UPPER 

I 0.84 1400 235 0 1000 5280 5207 350 1 ,782 203 605 

IQ 0.93 1400 235.0 1000 4686 4628 795 I * 757 454 1391 

20 1 .03 1400 235.0 1000 4158 4111 1233 1.732 706 2156 

26 I .08 1400 235.0 f 000 389 1 389 I 1434 1.719 822 2503 

CURRENT POSITION IS 235.0 DEGREES 

1000.0 YARDS FROM GZ 

MILITARY COORDINATE IS 837085 

s 

ENTER 1. . . . TO SPECIFY STAY TIME AT THIS POINT 

2 # . * TO SPECIFY THE NEXT SEGMENT OF THE TRACK 

3 . . . . TO END THIS TRACK 

2 

SELECT METHOD OF SPECIFYING DIRECTION OF ROVEMENT 

1. . END POINT IN MILITARY COORDINATES 

2 . . . END POINT IN DEGREES FROM N AND YARDS FROM GZ 

3 . . DEGREES FROM N RELATIVE TO START POINT 

2 

ENTER END POINT IN DEGREES FROM N AND YARDS FROM GZ, 

235.2400 

SELECT METHOD OF SPECIFYING TIME ON SEGtlENT-- 

I. . VELOCITY (in MPH) 

2. ELAPSED TIME 

3. VELOCITY Iin YARDS PEP tlJNlJTEl 

2 

Figure A-l. Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure (Continued) 
91 
TIME AT YARDS YARDS INC DOSE RATES 

INC INC EN0 FROfl FROtI (tIR/HR) 

ID IHRSl START ANGLE GZ START EN0 

I I 09 10 235.0 1010 

10 1.12 100 235.0 1100 

20 1.15 200 235.0 1200 

30 I,19 300 235.0 1300 

40 1 .23 400 235.0 1400 

50 1 .26 500 235.0 1500 

60 1 .30 600 23510 1600 

70 1.33 700 235,0 1700 

80 1.37 800 235.0 1800 

90 1.40 900 235.0 1900 

100 1.44 1000 235.0 2000 

110 1 .48 1100 235.0 2100 

120 1.51 1200 235.0 2200 

130 1.55 1300 235.0 2300 

140 1 58 1400 235.0 2400 

389 I 

2060 

1018 

504 

250 

124 

61 

31 

15 

8 

4 

2 

0 

: 

3625 

1920 

949 

470 

233 

115 

57 

28 

14 

7 

; 

: 

0 

CUtJ 

DOSE 

[fIRI 

I448 

1538 

1588 

1614 

1626 

1632 

1635 

1637 

1638 

1638 

1638 

1638 

1638 

1638 

I638 

ERROR 

FACTOR 

1.719 

1.656 

1.606 

1.578 

1.573 

1.592 

1 .633 

1.695 

1.775 

1.873 

1 .988 

2.118 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

CONF I OENCE 

LIMITS 

LOWER UPPER 

830 2526 

883 2677 

915 2760 

930 2800 

938 2820 

942 2830 

944 2835 

945 2837 

946 2838 

946 2839 

946 2839 

946 2840 

946 2840 

946 2840 

946 2840 

INTEGRATION ALONG THIS SEGMENT STOPPED WITH 

DISTANCE FROfl START IS 1400.0 YAROS 

CURRENT POSITION IS 235.0 DEGREES 

2400.0 YARDS FROtl GZ 

MILITARY COORDINATE IS 826077 

ENTER 1. , , . TO SPECIFY STAY TIME AT THIS POINT 

2. . TO SPECIFY THE NEXT SEGflENT OF THE TRACK 

3 , . . TO EN0 THIS TRACK 

3 

u*+E!JO OF TRACp*FS* 

Figure A-l. Sample Computer Printout of Dose Determination Procedure (Continued) 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 

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Central Intelligence Agency 

ATTN: Office of Medical Services 

Oepartment of Commerce 

National Bureau of Standards 

ATTN: J. Hubell 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: Dfc of Regulation Review 

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: R. Murphy 

Department of Health & Human Services 

ATTN: J. Vlllforth, HFX-1 

ATTN: G. Johnson, HFX-4 

Enviromental Protection Agency 

ATTN: T. Thorslund, RO-689 

Environmental Protection Agency 

ATTN: J. Knelson 

Environmental Protection Agency 

ATTN: W. Mills, ANR-460 

ATTN: W. Ellett, ANR-460 

ATTN: D. Rosendaum, ANR-458 

ATTN: N. Nelson, ANR-460 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

ATTN: Emerg Oper Sys Dlv, J. Kerr 

Library of Congress 

ATTN. Science & Technology Dlv 

National Cancer Institute, NIH 

ATTN: R. Miller 

ATTN: G. Beebe 

National Cancer Institute, NIH 

ATTN: W. Blot 

ATTN: J. Fraumeni 

ATTN: C. Land 

National Cancer Institute, NIH 

ATTN: J. Gart 

National Cancer Institute, NIH 

ATTN: A. Rabson 

National Institute of Health 

ATTN. Library, Acq Unit 

National Library of Medicine, NIH 

ATTN Library 

Nat1 Heart, Lung & Blood Institute. NIH 

ATTN: W. Zukel 

Office of Technology Assessment 

ATTN: P. Sharfman 

Office on Smoking & Health 

ATTN. J. Pinney 

State Department of Public Health 

ATTN: R. Paffenberger 

US House of Representatives 

ATTN. Subcommittee on Mil Per & Comp 

US House of Representatives 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Health & Envir 

US Public Health Service 

ATTN: Library 

US Public Health Service Hospital 

ATTN: E. Nlshlmura 

94 
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

US Public Health Service Hospital 

ATTN: T. Robertson 

US Senate 

ATTN: C. Cowart 

US Senate 

ATTN: W. Brew 

US Senate 

ATTN: S. Ulm, Senate Court 

Veterans Admin Medical Ctr 

ATTN: K. Lee 

Veterans Admin Medical Ctr 

ATTN: D. McGregor 

Veterans Admin Medical Ctr 

ATTN: C. Tessmer 

Veternas Admin Wadsworth Hospital Ctr 

ATTN: T. Maklnodan 

Veterans Administration 

ATTN: L. Hobson 

ATTN: J. Donsbach 

2 cy ATTN: D. Starbuck 

The White House 

ATTN: Oft of Policy Dev (DP) 

OTHERS 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

ATTN: M. Garber 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

ATTN: D. Lushbaugh 

ATTN: J. Totter 

ATTN: E. Tompkins 

University of Utah 

ATTN: Library 

University of Utah 

ATTN: Library 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS 

Argonne National Lab 

ATTN: P. Failla 

ATTN: A. Brues 

ATTN: D. Grahn 

Brookhaven National Lab 

ATTN: V. Bond 

ATTN: M. Bender 

ATTN: A. Brill 

University of California 

Lawrence Livermore National Lab 

ATTN: Tech Info Dept, Library 

ATTN: L. Anspaugh 

ATTN. Y. Ng 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

Los Alamos National Lab 

ATTN: J. Dummer 

ATTN: MS218, P. Whalen 

ATTN: M/S634, T. Dowler 

ATTN. Library 

2 cy ATTN. E. Young 

Oak Ridge National Lab 

ATTN: F. Malenshun 

ATTN: J. Auxier 

ATTN: Central Rsch Library 

ATTN: C. Clifford 

ATTN: G. Kerr 

ATTN. X-10. Lab Records Dlv 

ATTN. C. Richmond 

Reynolds Electrical and Engr Co, Inc 

ATTN: Coord & Info Ctr 

ATTN: J Brady 

Sandia National Lab 

ATTN. Div 1314, S. Durpee 

ATTN: D Aldridge 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

Advanced Rsch & Applications Corp 

ATTN: R Armlstead 

BDM Corp 

ATTN: J Braddock 

Energy Systems, Inc 

ATTN. W. Ogle 

JAYCOR 

ATTN. J. Ozeroff 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J. Sperling 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J. Soukup 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASIAC 

3 cy ATTN: E. Martin 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: W. Alfonte 

National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: National Materials Advisory Brd 

ATTN: S. Jablon 

7 cy ATTN: C. Robinette 

Pacific-Sierra Rsch Corp 

ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE 

R & 0 Associates 

ATTN. J. Marcum 

ATTN: P. Haas 

ATTN: A. Latter 

Rand Corp 

ATTN: Library 

Oak Ridge National Lab 

ATTN: T. Jones 

95 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued) 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: E. Straker 

ATTN: W. Scott 

ATTN: G. Reynolds 

ATTN: W. Woolson 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: W. McRaney 

ATTN: J. Cockayne 

2 cy ATTN: J. Goetz 

2 cy ATTN: 3. Klemm 

2 cy ATTN: D. Kaul 

2 cy ATTN: R. Weitz 

5 cy ATTN: J. McGahan 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Contlnued) 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: D. Kaul 

Scientific Info Svcs, Inc 

ATTN: Library 

Sciences Applications, Inc 

ATTN: L. Novotney 

Shields Warren Radiation Lab 

ATTN: H. Kohn 

96