STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

April 23, 2013
 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
 

WILLIAM MICHAEL REESE, SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Claimant Below, Petitioner 

vs.) No. 12-0557	 (BOR Appeal No. 2046406) 

(Claim No. 2009086277) 

WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 

Employer Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner William Michael Reese, by Patrick Maroney, his attorney, appeals the decision 

of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review. The West Virginia Division of 

Environmental Protection, by H. Toney Stroud, its attorney, filed a timely response. 

This appeal arises from the Board of Review’s Final Order dated April 2, 2012, in which 

the Board affirmed a September 1, 2011, Order of the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges. 

In its Order, the Office of Judges affirmed the claims administrator’s December 29, 2010, 

decision denying Mr. Reese’s request for a pain clinic referral and physical therapy of the right 

hip. The Court has carefully reviewed the records, written arguments, and appendices contained 

in the briefs, and the case is mature for consideration. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

Mr. Reese sustained multiple injuries on April 1, 2009, when he slipped and fell at work. 

On October 12, 2010, Dr. Crompton, Mr. Reese’s treating physician, requested authorization for 

a pain clinic referral and physical therapy to work on the range of motion in Mr. Reese’s right 

hip, based on ongoing complaints of right hip, right thigh, and bilateral knee pain. On October 

19, 2010, Dr. Crompton diagnosed Mr. Reese with morbid obesity, stage IV avascular necrosis 

in the right hip with osteoarthritis, and bilateral knee pain secondary to degenerative changes. On 

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November 1, 2010, Dr. Thaxton performed a records review and found that the medical evidence 

of record does not support authorization of Mr. Reese’s request for a pain clinic referral or 

physical therapy for the right hip because neither of the requests are related to the April 1, 2009, 

injury. She found that the request for a pain clinic referral is not related to the April 1, 2009, 

injury because the medical record demonstrates that Mr. Reese suffered from chronic pain prior 

to the injury. She further found that Mr. Reese’s hip condition is not a compensable component 

of the claim. On December 17, 2010, the StreetSelect Grievance Board found that prior to the 

April 1, 2009, injury, Mr. Reese required the use of a cane, was morbidly obese, and had been 

prescribed chronic pain medications; it further found that at the time of the injury, he suffered 

from degenerative disease in both knees and stage IV avascular necrosis in the right hip, both of 

which were pre-existing. The Grievance Board then found that treatment for pre-existing 

conditions, including physical therapy and a pain clinic referral, should not be authorized. On 

May 19, 2011, Dr. Bailey performed an independent medical evaluation and found Mr. Reese to 

be at maximum medical improvement, and further found that additional physical therapy and 

pain management would be aimed exclusively at treating non-compensable pre-existing 

conditions. 

In its Order affirming the December 29, 2010, clams administrator’s decision, the Office 

of Judges held that the preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Mr. Reese’s requests for 

authorization of a pain clinic referral and physical therapy for the right hip are medically related 

and reasonably required for the treatment of the April 1, 2009, injury. Mr. Reese appeals only the 

denial of authorization for a pain clinic referral, and asserts that that the evidence of record 

demonstrates that referral to a pain clinic is medically related and reasonably required for the 

treatment of the April 1, 2009, injury. 

In making its decision to deny Mr. Reese’s request for a pain clinic referral, the Office of 

Judges relied on the opinions of Dr. Thaxton and the StreetSelect Grievance Board, and found 

that their reports show that Mr. Reese’s treatment requests are unrelated to the April 1, 2009, 

injury. In her report, Dr. Bailey also found that Mr. Reese’s request for a pain clinic referral is 

unrelated to the April 1, 2009, injury. Additionally, the Office of Judges found that Dr. 

Crompton’s request for authorization of a pain clinic referral is based on Mr. Reese’s symptoms 

related to bilateral knee pain secondary to degenerative changes, which is not a compensable 

component of the claim. The Board of Review reached the same reasoned conclusions in its 

decision of April 2, 2012. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the Board of Review. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the decision of the Board of Review is not in clear 

violation of any constitutional or statutory provision, nor is it clearly the result of erroneous 

conclusions of law, nor is it based upon a material misstatement or mischaracterization of the 

evidentiary record. Therefore, the decision of the Board of Review is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: April 23, 2013 

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CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Robin J. Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

DISSENTING: 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

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