United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7, 2020*

Decided December 8, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3424

RONALD R. SHEA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DOUGLAS KOEHLER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Western Division.

No. 12 C 50201

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

This is the second appeal in proceedings that arose out of an altercation between 

Ronald Shea and family members. In a prior order, we sorted out a sprawling 

assortment of claims—upholding the dismissal of Shea’s federal claims and some statelaw claims but vacating the dismissal of other state-law claims and remanding for 

further proceedings. Shea v. Winnebago Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 746 F. App’x 541 (7th Cir. 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-3424 Page 2

2018). On remand, the district court concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction and 

relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. In this 

appeal, Shea concedes that diversity jurisdiction is absent but contends that the absence 

requires vacating the entire judgment. We affirm.

As he alleged in his operative complaint, Shea moved in with his elderly mother 

in Roscoe, Illinois, to prevent his sister and her husband from seizing her estate. Shortly 

afterwards, the sister and brother-in-law violently kicked him out and then falsely 

reported him to the police for battery. Shea sued the couple and several other 

defendants, asserting mostly state-law tort claims but also several federal claims, 

including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dismissed all 

claims except a state-law claim for battery against his sister. A jury trial was held on 

that claim, and the jury found against Shea. On appeal, we upheld the dismissal of 

certain claims but determined that several state-law claims (civil conspiracy, assault, 

false imprisonment, battery, and malicious prosecution) should not have been 

dismissed. Shea, 746 F. App’x at 547–50. But we questioned the district court’s diversity 

jurisdiction, so we remanded with instructions for the court to examine whether 

diversity jurisdiction existed and, if it didn’t, to consider relinquishing supplemental 

jurisdiction. Id. at 550.

The district judge adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that diversity 

jurisdiction was lacking and relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 

state-law claims, which he dismissed without prejudice. The judge concluded that Shea 

had established permanent domicile at his mother’s house in Illinois in November 2011

and that he had not shown a physical presence and intent to remain in the two other 

states where he had ties—California and Nevada—at the time he filed his complaint. 

And given that Shea’s federal statutory claims already had been dismissed, the judge 

decided to follow the general presumption that a district court in that situation will 

relinquish jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.

On appeal, Shea now argues that the absence of diversity jurisdiction requires 

vacating all prior decisions in the proceedings—the dismissal with prejudice of some of 

his state-law claims and the entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict against him. If we 

construe his brief generously, he argues that once the district court dismissed his federal 

claims, it abused its discretion by not relinquishing jurisdiction over his state-law 

claims. By proceeding to dismiss some of his state-law claims and enter judgment on 
No. 19-3424 Page 3

the jury’s verdict, the court, he says, produced disfavored “piecemeal adjudication” that 

offends principles of comity.

Shea waived this argument, however, by failing to raise it in the district court. See

Duncan Place Owners Ass'n v. Danze, Inc., 927 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2019). In any event, 

a court’s decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims

after dismissing all federal claims is “purely discretionary.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) 

(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if 

. . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction) 

(emphasis added); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009) (citing 

cases). Although a district court may relinquish supplemental jurisdiction after all 

federal claims have been dismissed, “it is not required to do so.” Bailey v. City of Chicago,

779 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Further, given the substantial 

resources the court invested in Shea’s case (spanning two years and 150 docket entries) 

before it dismissed his federal claims, the district court’s decision to retain supplemental 

jurisdiction was permissible and “does not justify forcing the litigants to start from 

scratch in state court.” See Myers v. Cty. of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d 847, 849–50 (7th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED