AD-A241 846 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Alexandria, VA 22310-3398 

DNA-TR-89-256 

Analysis of Radiation Exposurefor Additional Naval 

Personnel at Operation CASTLE-Supplemental Report 

Charles Thomas, etal. 

Science Applications InternationalCotpcrJMion 

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October 1991 

Technical Report 

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1 fonn*pprov.d REPORT DOCUMENTATFQN PAGE OM8 Na 0704-0IW 

CW(~r.Lm~~kmm(Oucaondm(orm~r..l.rr~~~~~~r~md~Ihtllrwh

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I. AGENCY USE ONLY (Law. blanhj 3. REPORT TYPE AN0 DATES COVERED

Technical 890424-891123 

4. n u AND suenu 5. FUNOINGNUMBERS 

Analysis of RadiationExposure for kdditionalNaval 

Personnel C - DNA 001-89-C-0096 a tO p e r a t i o n CASTLE-Supplemental Report PE - 62715H 

6. AUTHOR(S) PR - OT 

Charles Thomas; Jerald Goetz; Jeffrey Klemm; TA - 00 

Edward Ortlieb WU - CH890096 

7. PERFORMINGORGANlZATlON NAMHS)AN0 AOORes&uJ, . 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 

REPORT NUMBER 

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AGENCY REWRT NUMBER OefenseNuclear Agency 

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1. SUPPCEMENTARr NOTES 

This work was sponsoredbvtheDefenseNuclear Agency under RDT&E RMC Codes 

E1310D OT 00 90019 RARP 3500A 259040 and E1310G OT 00 93020 RARP 3503A 

259040. 

2r. OISTRIBU~ON/AVAILABIUTY STATEMENT 12b. OlSlRl8UTION COOE 

Approved forpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited. 

3. ABSfAAn(M8mmum 2W dd 

Thisreportsupplements DNA-TR-84-5 by a n a l y z i n gt h er a d i a t i o ne x p o s u r ef o r 

t y p i c a lc r e m e m b e r so fe i g h ta d d f t l a n a ls h i p sa tO p e r a t i o n CASTLE in 1954: 

RECLAIMER, SHEA, COCOPA, MENDER, MOLALA, TAWAKONI, PC-1546, andLST-1146. 

Utilizing the reconstructed radiationrnvironments fromdeck contamination, water 

shine,proximateshipshine, andcontamtnated hulls and piping,equivalent film 

badgedoses a r ec a l c u l a t e d andcoinpared withanalyzed f'lm badge dosimetry.

Comparisonsare hampered by a shortage of badge readings and bycohortbadging 

that may haveemphasizednon-representativecrewactivities.Consideringthis, 

agreement is good (within a fewhundredmillirem) when doseswerehighbutless 

when doseswerelow. Inall cases, o v e r a l lt o t a l s appear to be i ne x c e l l e n t 

agreement. 

Compared to DNA-TR-84-6, this report utilizes additional data on lagoon and ship

contamination and analyzesextensivemicrofilmeddosimetryrecords, as well as 

1. SUaJECTTERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 

Joint Task Force Seven (JTF-7) Operation CASTLE 130 

Radiation Exposure AssessmentGroup Task7.3 (TG 7.3) ' 13. PRICECODE

NuclearTestPersonnelReview (NTPR) OceanicNuclearTests 

r. SECURIP~ CLASSIFICATION la. SECURIWCLASSIFWYION 1s. SECURITYCLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF 

OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF A8STRACT ABSTRACT 

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIEO UNCLASSIFIED SAR 

Y 7510-01-2~0-5XIo Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89 I -k AN0 SIS 11s-ta 

2n-102 
UNCLASSIFIED !;EcunrCY cussmxnoN OFws PAC& 

CL&SFIED BV: 

N/A since Unclassified 

3EcLAsSIFY ON: N/A since Unclassified 

13. ABSTRACT (Continued). 

additional sources of exposure, such as frpm proximity to fallout-contaminated 

vessel s. 

Calculated mean doses range from a o f low0.30 rem for the crewof USS RECLAIMER 

to a high of 2.2 rem for the crew of USS COCOPA. The calculated doses should 

be used when badged members of cohorts, due to duties, ratings, and Jocations,

do not appear to be representativeof the cohort as a whoie. 

PTIC TAB 

unannounced 
r 

0 

.-

v)

c., 

E 

a 

0 

c, 

PWW 

%X% 

[I 

8

c 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section Page 

... CONVERSIONTABLE .............................................................. 111 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................................... vi 

LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................... VIU 

... 

1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1 

1.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................. 1 

1.2NAVAL PARTICIPATION ................................................. 5

METHODOLOGY 1.3 ............................................................ 5 

& 

7 RADIATIONENVIRONMENTS ................................................... 8

2.1 RADIOACIlVEFAL.LOUT ............................................... 8 

2.2 SHIPCONTAMINATION MODEL ...................................... 10 

2.3 WATERINTENSITYMODEL ............................................ 13 

2.4BIKINILAGOON WATERINTENSITIES ............................. 14 

3 SHIP OPERATIONS .................................................................. 17 

3.1PROECI'SUPPORT ....................................................... 17 

3.2 USSRECLAIMER (ARS-42).............................................. 20 

3.3 USS SHEA (DM.30) ........................................................ 24 

3.4 USS COCOPA (ATF-101) ................................................. 26 

3.5 USSMENDER (ARSD-2) ................................................. 35 

3.6 USSMOLALA(ATF-106) ................................................. 43 

3.7 USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114) ............................................. 54 

3.8 USS PC-1546 ................................................................ 60 

3.9 USS LST-1146 ............................................................... 62 

4 DOSECALCULATIONS ............................................................. 69 

4.1 DOSECALCULATIONS FORUSS RECLAIMER (ARS-42) ....... 71 

4.2 DOSECALCULATIONS FORUSSSHEA (DM-30) .................. 72 

4.3 DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR USS COCOPA (ATF- 101 )............ 73 

4.4 DOSECALCULATIONS FOR USS MENDER(ARSD-2)............ 75 

4.5 DOSECALCULATIONS FORUSSMOLALA (ATF-106) ........... 76 

iv 
Sect ion 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Appendix 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

Page 

4.6 DOSECALCULATIONS FOR USS TAWAKGNI (ATF-114) ....... 77 

4.7 DOSE CALCULATIONSFORUSSPC-1546 .......................... 78 

4.8 DOSE CALCULATIONS FOR USS LST-1146 ........................ 80 

UNCERTAINTYANALYSIS ....................................................... 81 

FILM BADGEDOSIMETRY ........................................................ 86 

CONCLUSIONS ANDTOTALDOSESUMMARY ............................. 103 

LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................. 105 

AUGMENTATION OF SHIPBOARD RADIATIONENVIRONMENTS ..... 107 

b 

V 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure Page 

1 Northern Islands Marshall ............................................................... 2 

2 Bikini Atoll. Opemion CASTLE shotlocations ....................................... 3 

3 EnellfeLak Aroll. OperationCASTLEshot bcation ................................... 4 

4 Majoranchordgesandoperating areas withinBikiniLagoon ........................ 9 

5 Estimatedtopsideintensityon USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42) following 

Siot UNION ............................................................................... 22 

6 Path cjf USS LST.1157 .29 March1954 ............................................... 25 

7 Topside intensity on USS SYEA (DM-30) following Shot UNION ................ 27 

8 Topsideintensity on USS COCOPA (ATF- 101)following Sbot BRAVO ......... 30 

9 Topsideintensity or! USS COCOPA (ATF-101) following ShotROMEO ......... 32 

IO Topside intensity on USSCOCOPA (ATF-IO1 ) followingShot UNION ......... 33 

1 1 Topsideintensityon USS MENDER (ARSD-2) following ShotROMEO ......... 38 

12 Topsideintensity on USS MENDER (ARSD-2) following Shot UNION .......... 40 

13Estimatedtopsideintensity onUSSMOLALA (ATF-106) following 

ShotBRAVO ............................................................................... 35 

14 Topsideintensity on USS MOLALA (ATF-106) following ShotROMEO ......... 47 

1.5 Estimatedtopsideintensity on USS MOLALA (ATF- 106)following

Shot NECTP.R ............................................................................. 52 

16 Estimatedtopsideintensity on USS TAWAKOM(ATF-I 14) following

Shot ROMEO ............................................................................... 57 

17 Topside intensity on USS PC-1546 following Shot BRAVO ........................ 61 

18 Estimatedtopsideintensityon U3S PC-1546followingShotROIMEO ............ 63 

19Estimatedtopsideintensity onUSS LST-I 146 following Shot ROMEO ........... 66 

20 Film badgedosimetry for USS RECLAIMER(ARS.42) ............................. 91 

21Filmbadge dosirneny for USS SHEA (DM-30)....................................... 92 

22Filmbadgedosimetryfor USS COCOPA (A=-101) ................................ g4 

vi 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) 

Figure Page 

23 Filmbadgedosimetry for USS MENDER (ARS.2) ................................... 95 

24 Filmbadgedosimetry for USS MOLALA (ATF- 106) ................................ 97 

25 Filmbadge dosimeny for USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114) ............................ 99 

26 Filmbadge dosimeny for USS PC-1546............................................... 101 

27 Film badgedosimetry for USS LST.1146 .............................................. 101 

vii 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

1 OperationCASTLEsho:data ............................................................ 5 

7 OpemtionCASTLEshipsaddressed in thisreport .................................... 6 

3 Daily integated intensity. USS RECLAIMER (ARS-32) ............................ 23 

4 Dailyintegratedintznsity. USS SHEA(DM-30) ...................................... 28 

5 Dailyintegratedintensity. USS COCOPA (ATF-101) ................................ 36 

6 Dailyintegratedintensity. USS MENDER(ARSD-2) ................................ 42 

7 Dailyintegratedintensity. USS XlOLALA (ATF-106) ................................ 53 

8 Dailyintegratedintensity. USS TAWAKON (ATF-I 14) ............................ 59 

9 Dailyintegratedintensity. USS PC-1546 ............................................... 64 

10 Daily integnred intensity .USS LST-1146 ............................................. 68 

11 Calculated film badgedose. USS RECLAIXER(ARS-42) .......................... 71 

12 Calculated film badgedose. USS SHEA(DM-30) .................................... 72 

13 Dose calculations for WSS COCOPA (ATF-101) on 1-2 March 1954 ............... 73 

I4 Calculated fiim badgedose. USS COCOPA (ATF-101) .............................. 74 

15 Calculated film badgedose. USS hlENDEk (ARSD-2) .............................. 75 

16 Calculated film badge dose. USS MOLALA (ATF-106) ............................. 76 

17 Calculated film badgedose. USS TAWAKONI(ATF-1!4) ......................... 77 

18 Pose calculations for USS PC-1546 on 1-2 March 1953 ............................. 78 

19 Calculatedfilmbadgedose. USS PC-1546 ............................................ 79 

20 Calculated film badge dose .C‘SS LST-I 146 ........................................... 80 

’1 Uncertainty in waterintensityat operating sites ........................................ 82 

” 

13 Surmary of uncertainties ................................................................. 85 

23 Evaluation of cohon badging of a given unit for a give1 b:ldging period ........... 89 

13 Applicability of a cohort badge reading to an individual in the cohort .............. 90 

... 

VI11 
LIST OF TABLES (Continued) 

Table 

25 

26 

Summary of calculated total doses ....................................................... 

Additional topside exposureon support ships resultingfrom decontamination 

activities and special project participation ............................................... 

104 

1IO 

ix 
1.1 

SECTION 1 

1h'TRODL:CTION 

Operation CAS'TZE W;IE 3 series of atmospheric nuclear tests conducrerf by the rhrnic 

Et1cr;g Commission (AEC) nt the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) during the Spring of 1054. 

K;diological safety procedures generally included the issuance of film badges to ;thout 10 percent 

cd the personnelthroughout the operrition and to individualsduringperiods of potentially 

3ignific;lnt radiation exposure. Cohort badging. defined as group dose determination from one 

IuJ;: ~'ecucr,u;ts the primary means of derermirling individud exposures. Recorded dosinletq 

i\ ;tv;iil;lhle for most personnel assigned to the ships. However, it is noted that available dosinwtry 

t'orms arc incomplcte as to dates and times of recorded exposures. Moreover. recorded dosimetry 

t'rorn cohort badsing has been show to be not always representative of the entire cohort due to 

di.;\imilar rtctivities Hithin the group. Hence. reconsrmcted doses, including unceminty analyses, 

;Ire necessary for well-defined assessments of the doses received by these personnel. Reference 1 

rcports the results of dose reconstructions for personnel on sixteen of the ships participating at 

()p*r;ition CASTLE, ;ISwell ;ISfor island-hased personnel on Eneuetak and Kwrljrtlein Atolls; this 

con1p;lninn report documents the analysis for eight additional ships of interest. The methodology 

(It-Kct'c-rcnce1 is employed herein. Appropriate mrlterial from the reference is repeated for re;!dcr 

L'OI~cr11cm.c. For hrcvitg. detai1c.d derivations. dixussions. and listings cue cited but not repemd. 

As in the case of the silcteen ships evaluated in Reference 1. this report describes the 

opcr;ltion\, the radiological situation. and the time-space relationships of each of the eight ships 

nit11 rchpcct to the radiological environment. The results are ponraycd as equivalent film b;ltige 

h\cs for the crcws of each of thc ships. 

BACK:(;KOUND. 

There ~cresih ?;hot\in the Operation CASTLE test series: BRAVO, ROllEO. KOOS. 

I'SI0.U.Y:\SKiEE. and SECTXR. The first five were dctonatcd on Bikini Atoll; Shot SECT;\R 

W;IS Jetnnated on Enewetak. Figure 1 depicts the locations of Bikini and Enewetak with respect to 

the other atolls comprising the northern "arshall Islands. Figures 2 and 1 show the n1;lin feature5 

~t Rikini and Er1eUet;tk. rcspcctivelg. and the locations of the CASTLE dcton;ltions; the peninent 

details of each test are summarized in table I (Reference2). 
East Lonqitude 

Figure 1. Northem Marshall Islands. 

2 
Shot BRAVO (Surface) 

,- Shot ROMEO (Barge) 

CRATER UNION NAM

BRAVO CRATER 

cShot UNION (Barge) 

Shot YANKEE (Barge) 

COCA 

4, 

ENEU 

ENIDRIK 165O 30' EAST 

LUKOJ PASS 11 30' NORTH 

, E N E UC H A N N E L I 

1 

Shot KWN (Surface) 0 6 

NAUTICAL MILES 

Figure 2. Blkini Atoll, Operation CASTLE shot locations. 

3 
MIKE CRATER 

\ ENJEBI 

Figure 3. Enewetak Atoll, operationCASTLE shot location. 

4 
Table 1. OperationCASTLEshotdata. 

Name Shot Local Date (time) LocaYield - don

BRAVO 1 Mar 54 (0645) 15 Mt Blkini (Sand pit off Nam Island) 

ROMEO 27 Mar 54 (0630) 11 Mt Bikini (Barge, BRAVO crater) 

KOON 7 Apr 54 (0620) 1 IO Kt Bikini(Eneman Island) 

USION 26 Apr 54 (0605j 6.9 Mt Bikini (Barge off lrnij Island) 

YASKEE 5 May 54 (0610) 13.5 Mt Bikini (Barge, UNION crater) 

NECTAR 14 ;May54 (0620) 1.69Mt Enewetak (Barge, MIKE crater). 

1.2 NAVAL PARTICIPATION. 

The nuclear texs were conducted by a joint military organization designated as Joint 

Task Force Seven (JTF-7). Although military in form, it was comprised of military, civil service, 

and contractor personnel. JTF-7 was organized into five main task groups, with Task Group7.3 

being the naval contingent. Most of the approximately 6,000 personnel assigned to TG 7.3 were 

aboarc' the various task group ships; however, approximately 650 were stationed on Enewetak and 

Kwajalein Atolls. Table 2 lists the TG 7.3 ships and the task units to which they were assigned, 

for which dose reconstructions are specifically addressed in this report. Also tabulated are the 

approximate number of personnel assigned to each ship. 

1.3 METHODOLOGY. 

In Reference 1, procedures developed in previous dose reconstruction efforts were 

adapted to the shipboard radiological environments of Operation CASTLE. The basic procedures 

used in Reference 1 have been utilized in this companion report. Each step is pursued to a level of 

derail governed by the availability of data. Sufficient data were recorded at the time and enough 

have survived to understandtheship and land operationsand to characterize the radiation 

environment. Individual ship deck logs (Reference 3) serve as an authoritative source of ship 

position and activity. 

Radiation intensity data and crew activity scenarios are applied to reconstruct the timedependent radiation environment for a typical crewman on each of the eight ships of interest. 

5 
PC-

(ARSD-2)

(ATF-106) 

Table 2. Operation CASTLE ships addressedinthisreport. 

Personnel

ShiD Assimed 

Task Unit 7.3.1 Surface Security Unit 

USS 1546 62 

Task Unit 7.3.5Utility Unit 

MENDER 

USS COCOPA (ATF-101) 

USS 

82 

72 

MOLALA USS 88 

USS TAWAKOM (ATF-114) 80 

Task Element 7.3.7.2Mine Project Efement 

USS SHEA (DM-30)

(ARS-42) USS RECLAIMER

279 

94 

TaskUnit 7.3.9Transport Unit . 

USS LST-1146 95 

Characterization of the radiation environmentstarcs with the determination of on-deck (topside) and 

surrounding water intensities from radiological survey data. The periodic shipboard surveys. in 

conjunction with fallout time-of-arrival data %nd nearby island surveys, sene to define the 

radiological intensity as a function of time. At times foliowing the last reponed shipboard survey, 

a power law function determined fromBikini Atoll radiotogicaldata is utilized. Despite differences 

in decay rate between ship and shore because of prompt washdown, decontamination, and 

weathering, late-time decay, mostly from insoluMt panicles adhering to shipdeck or soil, is taken 

he the same. As ships operated in the contaminated waters of Bikini Lagoon, their hulls and 

.itwaterpiping systems accumulated radioactive rrtatcrials, thus increasing the radiation exposure 

to crew members while below-deck. The radiation environment due to ship contamination is 

derived from a previously-developed ship contamination model (Refemce 4). When ships were 

in contaminated waters, the "shine" of radiation thacfrom exposed topside personnel. Likewise, 

shine from contaminated vessels that were approached led to increased topside radiation levels. 

Both of these types of transient exposure are quantifiedto augment the mean topside intensities. 

Specific data and detailed methodology for the development of the time-dependent radiation 

environments arc presented in section 2 of this report. Section 3 defines theradiation 

6 
environments, as dependent on the movements and operations of each ship, and determines the 

daily exposure potential. 

Shipboard radiation surveys indicated a considerable variation in topside intensities 

because of ship geomeuy, redistribution of fallout during washdown and decontamination, and 

non-uniform adherence of fallout particles to ship materials. If only an average survey reading 

was reported, this value is used. In those cases where readings were taken at many predetermined 

positions on the ship's exposed surfaces, they represent the topside radiation field. The ship's 

crew is presumed to have been located at random positions when on deck; thus, mean survey 

readings, appropriately decayed, are used to determine the mean intensities encountered by the 

crew when topside. Average topside intensities are also used where water shine or ship shine is 

involved. The limited data from Operation CASTLE that relate shine levels to radiation source 

strength are supplemented by radiation transport calculations that accommodate specific ship 

geomemes. 

The analysis of radiation exposure to the crew also requires estimation of radiation 

intensities below deck and the apportionment in time of crew activities below and topside. In 

addition to ship contamination, the fallout on deck has been noted as a conmbutorto below-deck 

intensities. A ship-shielding factor is defined as the ratio of the intensity below to the mean 

intensity topside from fallout. This factor, previously determined for each type of ship of interest 

in Reference 1, is roughly 0.1 and is nearly constant over the usual crew locations within a ship. 

Thus, the time spent topside usually dominates the fallout dose. In some cases, specific durations 

of topside exposure are given in ship logs for shot day (rarely thereafter) when the radiological 

situation altered the normal pattem of duties. Otherwise, the fraction of time spent topside is 

assumed to be 0.4. This follows from reasonable topside intervals such as 0800-1200. 1330-

1700, and 1800-2000 hours. 

The calculated dose to the crew is obtained from time integration of intensity for all 

intervals below and on deck; a conversion factor is used to account for body shielding by the 

badge wearer (Reference 5). Day-by-day and cumulative film badge doses to the average crewman 

of each ship are calculated and presented in section 4. Calculations are continued to the end of the 

opemion and into the post-oFerational period until the dose accrual falls below 1 mrem per day. 

An uncertainty analysis of the dose calculations is provided in section 5. In section 6, the available 

dosimetry recordsare analyzed and compared with the calculated doses. Conclusions and a total 

dose summary are presented in section 7. 

7 
SECTION 2 

RADIATIONENVIRONMENTS 

Since an understanding of theradiationenvironmentsencountered by theships 

participating at Operation CASTLE is essential for the dose reconstructions that arepresented in 

section 4, the discussion thereof in Reference 1 is repeated and augmented. With the exception of 

theoperationalactivities of PC-1546,LST-1146,and MOLALA,activitiesconducted in 

conjunction with project support requirements by the remainder of the ships discussed herein, 

occurred primarily within the confines of Bikini Lagoon. Figure 4 depicts the areas within the 

lagoon where the ships were required to spend momof their time during the operation. Areas Nan 

(off Eneu Island) and Tare (north of Eneman Island) were tLe primary anchorages for all of the 

task force ships throughout the operation. Areas Charlie, Dog, Fox,George, and How in the 

northern lagoon, were visited during technical project support activities. 

2.1 RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT. 

,a All of the ships addressed in this report encountered fallout after one or more of the six 

CASTLE detonations. In most instances, particuJarly where significant fallout was encountered, 

shipboard radiological data are available to define the topside radiation environment. In some 

instances, however, shipboard environmentsmust be inferred from radiological data obtained on 

nearby islands, such as theresidenceislands of Enewerak Atoll. For each ship, an average 

intensity curve is presented showing the free-€Md radiation intensity as a function of time after 

each shot that resultedin significant fallout. The intensity cwes are then time-integrated to yield a 

daily free-field integrated intensity on each ship hgh 31 May 1954, when the roll-up phase was 

complete. 

Extensive radiation intensity readings obtained on Bikini Island (Bikini Atoll) following 

Shot BRAVO indicated decay rates that varied considerably from the traditional t-1.2 rule 

(Reference 6). Average values for the decay exponent, obtained from several gamma ionization 

time-intensity meter measurements onBikini, are as follows: 

3 < t 10 hours; k = -1.19 

10 < t s 48 hours; k = -0.82 

48 < t s480 hours; k = -1.50 

t > 480 hours; k = -1.20 

8 
N 

\ 

165' 30' EAST 

+ 11 30' NORTH 

ENlDRlK 

NAUTICAL MILES 

Figure 4. Major anchorages and operating areas within Bikini Lagoon. 

9 
A varying decay of this type is consistent with the presence of Np-239 (tln = 56 hr) and U-237 

(t,R = 160 hr), which are both generated in significant quantities from neutron capture in uranium. 

After several half-lives, when the presence of these two radioisotopes no longer dominate the 

decay rate, it approaches the traditional t-1.2value. In the absence of radiological survey data, the 

time-dependent decay rate is used in reconstructing the radiation environments on the ships 

covered in this report. Generally, radiological dam on the residence islands of Enewetak and 

Bikini support a t-1-5 decay rate between 48 and 480 hours after detonation; shipboard data indicate 

slightly greater decay rates (t-1.6 to t-1-9) during the same period. The steeper shipboard decay 

rates can be atnibilted to a combination of the increased effectiveness of "weathering" on a ship's 

surfaces (as opposed to island soil), and to decontamination being carried out onboard theships. 

Thetopsideradiationenvironment was perturbedwhen ashipencountered 

Contamination in addition to the fallout on its deck Some of the ships considerrd in this report 

serviced vessels that had remained in heavy primary fallout Mere proximity to such "hot" vessels 

raisedthetopsideintensitiesandthus conaibutd to thedose of typicalcrewmembers. 

Determinations of intensity of the shine from proximte ships are based on the geometries of both 

vessels and radiation transport calculations that are further discussed in the Appendix. Similar 

techniques are used to adapt island intensity curves for shipboard use, as required. 

2.2 SHIP CONTAMINATION MODEL 

The water in BikiniLagoonbecamecontaminatedfollowing the fivedetonations 

conducted there. As ships steamed or anchored in the contaminated water, radioactive materials 

began to accumulate on the hulls below the water line and in the saltwater piping systems within 

the ships. As a result, radiation intensities below deck began to increase, bdding to the crew's 

exposure. However, when compared to the topside radiation environments resulting from Shots 

BRAVO and ROMEO fallout, this radiation was "considered more ofan operational nuisance than 

a hazard" (Reference 7). 

Thesamephenomenonwasobserved on theshipsatOperationCROSSROADS 

conducted at Bikini Atoll in 1946. A model was developed in Reference 4 to determine personnel 

exposure aboard the ;hips at CROSSROADS due to ship contamination. Although only limited 

lagoon water contamination data have been found for Operation CASTLE, water intensities are 

derivablefrom nearby landmeasurements; thus, this model is applied to all of the ships 

participating at this operation. 
Two basic assumptions are made in developing the ship contamination model. The first 

is th;lt the misture of fission products present in the accumulated radioactive material on the hull 

and in the piping of a shipdecayedradiologically as t-I.3. Thisdecay rate ws verified 

espctrimentally for fission prrducts deposited in seawater and on :he decks of targetship.; ;it 

CROSSROADS. The u>eof 1-1.3decay for CASTLE ship contamination calculations is ;I hcttcr 

approximation than the land data suggest. The gamma emissions of the Jctinide radionuclides 

contributing to the variable decay exponent on land are less energetic than the average. Thus. they 

are selectively attenuated in water and through ship hulls, leaving the fission products to dominate 

the intensities peninent to ship contamination calculations. 

The second assumption involves the rate of contamination buildup on the hull and 

interior piping. The radioactive buildup on a previously uncontaminated ship is assumed to be 

initially proportional to the radiation intensity of the water surrounding the ship. but. as buildup 

progresses, a limiting or saturation value of contamination is approached asymptotically. The 

occurrence of such a saturation effect is indicated by hull intensity readings taken on various ships 

after their departure from the lagoon following CROSSROADSoperations. Based on these 

assumptions, the exterior gamma intensity of the hull It,(‘) of a contaminated ship at time t is 

given by: 

Ih(t) = ~t-1.3[I-exp 

where C and S areconstants,and Dw(t), is a parameterproportional to exposurefrom 

contamination-bearing material, 

t 

Dw(t) = I t1-3Iw(t) dt (rnR-da~’.~) . 0 

Here, I,(t) is the intensity of the water in which the ship is operating at time t. It is evident that, 

as a ship spends sufficient time in contaminated water, D, becomes large and the hull intensity 

approaches asaturation value: 

The constants S and C wereevaluatedfromCROSSROADSsupportship intensity data, as 

discussed in Reference 4; derived values of S are 1800 mR-da~O.~ for destroyers, 2240 mR-dayO.3 

11 
for PGMs (patrol craft), and 1570 mR-day0.3 for at1 other ships: C has a value of 1 1.O day-' for a11 

ships. 

The exterior hull gamma intensity (Ih) is then used to determine the average interior ship 

intensity. This analysis, as described in detail in Reference 4, results in an apportionment factor 

Fa, which relates average interior intensities (I$ to exterior hull gamma intensities (Ih) by the 

relation: 

Therefore, the interior intensity at any time t firer the detonation is given by: 

I&t) = FaSt-lm3 [ 1 -exp {-CS"Dw (t)) ] . 

The saturation levels and apportionment factors (from Reference 4) are given below for 

the pertinent CASTLE ship types. 

TypeShip S (mRdap.3) Fa 

-

Am, ARS, ARSD I570 0.39 

DM 1800 0.39 

LST 1570 0.33 

Patrol Craft 2240 0.67 

It was also observed at Operation CROSSROADSthat steaming irl clean water reduced 

the accumulated contamination by about half during;the first day after departing the lagoon. bu~that 

subsequent steaming had a much smaller effect. in the model, it is assumed that both h. !I and 

piping intensities were reduced to half their departure values during the first day after depanure 

from the lagoon, and that subsequent decay while Out of the lagoon followed thet-I.3 decay rate. 

Some elaboration of the steaming factor concept is required for application :o CASTLE. 

where multiple lagoon departures and shots were involved. The first 50 percent achieved of 

saturation is regarded as permanent, whereas subsequent resaturarions are regarded as fully 

removable by steaming thereafter. Thus, once saturation is achieved. levels between SO and 100 

percent of saturation aremaintained thereafter. As steaming removesmaterial that contains 

12 
crmr;tnlin;tnts wher than selectively removing contaminant activity, the intensity is not constrained 

10 rctnain ;I[ lca\t 50 percent of the maximum. This occurs when more intense, fresh contaminants 

o\c*rlic [how from ;In e;lrlir.r \hot. because the former are regarded as fully removable. 

The t'tindament;ll data needed to apply the CROSSROADS ship contamination model to 

C:\S'll-E are water intensitieh, Iw, from exh shot. Although values of IW were infrequently 

rcllortcd. they nx~ybe approximated from the intensities on islands adjacent to the anchorages and 

opcr;lting ;1re;ts tirorn Reference 21, coupled with a measured correlation between land and water 

rc.a~Ilngs. D;II;Iof 6 JIay 1954 indicated that. if local fdlout from Shot YANKEE dominated the 

S,tr1;tIrc.hor;tge wtcr intensity and the Eneu Island intensity, a water intensity of 7 mR/hr at H+24 

hour\ corre\ponded to a 100 Rhr land intensity at H+l (Reference 8). The contribution of 

prc\ ious->hot fallout to the land and water readings was negligible. Neither the similar fallout 

cicpo\ition from Shot BRAVO on the area, decaycd over two months, nor the lesser Shot UNION 

ticpiticm. from ten days previous, would have exceeded the order of 1 percent of these intensities 

or1 land or in the wter. Tberefore, the landwater intensity corrdation is taken from these readings 

\\ lt11ot;t rnrditic;ttlorl. 

Rsfcrcncr: X co~oborittesthe derivedlevels of BikiniLagooncontaminationand 

intlic.;ttes theiryrrsihtcnce.The data, expressed aswateractivityconcentrations, maybe 

intcrpretcd as water intensities through the conversion from Reference 4 of 1 mRhr per IpCi/l. 

The 111;Ixirmlnlmred mater iictivities in the Kan anchorage convert to 8.4 mRhr. In order not to 

cwnt'lIct with YASKEE shot-day water intensities reported in the same reference, this value is 

LI~CII to ;~pplyonly al'ter general ship reentry into the lagoon. It likely refers to the YANKEE 

w ;Iter intensity on D+I (when ships Ranchored), stated above as 7 mR/hr, or to the slightly higher 

V;IIIIC oT I0.S rnRhr derived for the Nan anchorage following Shot BRAVO (see section 2.4). 

The YANKEE shot-daywaterintensity data reflecttherapidverticalmixing of 

~.~~~l[;t~~liri;~~lts !hat Icd to the low ratio of water-to-land intensity that prevailed at the later times of 

\hip\' crew exposures. The decrease from SO0 mR/hr at H4.6 to 22 mR/hr at H+10.8in the Nan 

;rnchnrase was ;rlmost tenfold greater than that from decay alone, but decay accowm for the 

suhattqmu decrease to 7 mRhr at D+1. Similar results were obtained by Project 2.7 (Reference 

9) in the open oct'm. Rapid shot-day mixing progressed in two days down to the thennocline, 

H here the st;rble stratification minimized further venical diffusion during CASTLE. 

13 
In the lagoon, contamination atthe surface was observed to drift slowly westward under 

the action of the uadewinds. The radioactivity either adhzred to the western reef, flowed over it 

into the open ocean, or recirculated at depth in the lagoon. There is no clear indication that the 

latter phenomenon led to a meaningful reappearance of contamination in the Nan area. After Shot 

ROMEO, which among CASTLE shots was uniquely lacking in widespread fallout in Bikini 

Lagoon, no reports of freshcontamination in the anchorages have been found in CASTLE 

documents; after olher shots, rzponed intensity buildupsare explicable by local fallout in the water 

that led to progressive ship contarnination. 

Theonecircumstance that could have replenished the westward-driftingsurface 

ccZt?mination was an influx from the ocean. The east-west radiation isopleths for Shots UNION 

and YANKEE(Reference 2) suggest chis possibility,;however, it wouldhave beenmost 

pronounced for BRAVO, where intensities increased eastward of Nan for some 100 miles. The 

available lagoon data that likely reflect this process x::the 0.1 to 0.3 mR/hr water intensities that 

weretypicallypresentat the Nan anchorageduring CASTLE (Reference 8). Without 

replenishment, lagoon drift would have led to !owcrlevels within the eights weeks between Shots 

BRAVO and UNION. In the mean, the reported levels are roughly consistent with decreased 

intensity from decay alone. 

2.4 BIKINI WATER LAGOON INTENSITIES. 

The foregoing phenomenology and the paucity ofnjiological data suggest that the best 

availablemodelfor time dependence of water intensiti:*sis to assume no net transport of 

contaminants and to diminish the intensities by decay alone. This approach is most applicable for 

the anchorage areas and after qhot BRAVO; it likely high-sides the intensities after other shots. 

For the northern operating areas near surface zeros, where drift is of clearer significance in the 

long term, most exposures were mn enough after the shots so that little drift had occuned. 

Owing tothe complexity of the modelequations, the determination of radiation 

intensities from ship contamination and water shine is accomplished by numerical techniques. AI1 

logged ship movements and reponed or derived water intensities are tracked throughout the 

operation.Thetime-dependent below-deck intensity is so obtained for each ship. Numerical 

integration with a time step of 0.01 day generates the personnel exposures. This time step offers a 

precision compatible with that of the position-time data for the ships. 

14 
The Bikini Lagoon contamination after each shot is discussed below. 

Shot RRt\VO 

Although significantly contaminating the lagoon, BRAVO more immediately impxwd 

ships and islands through heavy fallout; hence, the reponed radiological-safety data emphasize the 

latter. The iIp~!iZlbk land-based intensities (H+1) are 150 R/hr for the San anchorage. 50 Rhr 

for 'Tare, 500 R/hr for How.and 1,000 R/hr for each of the northern operating area\. 

Corrcsponding water intensities (D+I) are 10.5. 3.5, 35 and 70 mR/hr, respectively. 

Shot ROMEO 

Lagoon contamination from ROMEO was significant only in the vicinity of surfrrcr zero. 

Thi\ affected the Charlie area to rou$ly the level of 1,000Rhr (H+1 land value). A D+l water 

intensity of 70 mR/hr is implied. 

Shot KOON 

The Tare anchorage WLF principally affected, yielding land values (Enernan Island) of 

500 Rhr at Ht ;, H+1 land values af 7, 50, 100, 120, and 25 Rhr pertain to the Charlie, Dog, 

Fox. George and How areas, respectlvely. Corresponding water intensities are 35. 0.5. 3.S. 7. 

3.4arld 1.75 mR/hr (D+1). The Nan anchorage was unaffected. 

Shot USION 

Because of low water intensities (0.5 mR/hr, D+1.derived from 7 Rh, H+i on land), 

ship contamination at the Nan anchorage was appreciable only after five days post-shot (Reference 

7). Project activities in the northern lagoon involved much greater intensities. In Areas Fox and 

George, water intensities were at least 14 mR/hr on D+l (200+ R/hr land intensity at H+I). In 

Area How, a land intensity of ' 4 Rhr (H+1) corresponds to a water intendy Gf 10.5 mR/hr 

(D+I). COCOPA. operating in the vicinity of the most intensesurfacezerocontamination, 

recorded a 500 mRhr water intensity on 27 April in Area Dog. South of Dog, ship operations 

were conducted in water intensities of about 7 mR/hr, D+1 (100 R/hr land value, H+l). 

Shot YANKEE 

Aside from the Nan anchorage, only Area Fox was visirpd by any of these ships. The 

COCOPA likely cncountered water intensities of roughly.100 rnwr during its D+1 activity in the 

area (1400 R/hr land value atH t!). 
Shot NECTAR, at Enewetak, did not result in significant lagoon contamination; fillout 

was primarily to the nonh of the anchorageareas (Reference 2). 

The above intensity data suggest that meaningful direct exposures also occurred when 

ships were present in significantly contaminated water. Indeed, measurements obtained onboard 

USS SIOUX (AFT-75) as that ship steamed throughcontaminatedwaterfollowingShot 

YASKEE, indicated that deck level (topside) intensities due to shine from the contaminated water 

were approximately 40 percent of the measured water intensities (Reference 9). 
SECTION 3 

SHIPOPERATIONS 

This section describes the assignments. activities, and movements of the eight TG 7.3 

ships of interest at the Pacific Proving Grounds during Operrttion CASTLE, and correlates these 

movements with the radiation environment following the six detonations in the test series. Ship 

movements are reconstructed primarily from data contained in the deck logs (Reference 3). 

3.1 PROJECT SUPPORT. 

As indicated in the following chronologies. task unit assignments do not fully describe 

the ac!ivities of the various ships. In several cases, ships were called upon to provide assistance 

and senices to projects conducted at several of the events. To the extent that these assignments 

involved radiation exposures, they are documented and included in the dose calculations for the 

personnel. However, such activities that involved boarding of other vessels by limited parties are 

not included in the determination of dose to typical crewmembers. 

.o 

A brief discussion of the projects and activitiesconducted by the variousships 

supporting the projects follows. 

3. I. 1 Project 3.4 - SeaMinefieldNeutralization by Means of a Surface 

DetonatedNuclear Explosion (Reference 10). 

RECLAIMER, SHEA, and LST-1157 participated in this pro;ect. conducted by the 

US. Savy Bureau of Ordnance. The project involved emplacement of a field of 121 naval mines 

in a ht't of "strings" at various distances from surface zero prior to Shot UNION. NOTE: Dose 

ca1cul;ltions for USS LST-I 157 have been provided previously--Reference 1 1.) 

Prior to the ctual mine laying operations, RECLAIMER. assisted by LST- 1 157. laid 

marker buoys for the minefield in Areas Dog andFox (figure 4). The mines, which were inert, 

hadbeen assembled in strings aboard LST-I 157 andwere then transferred to RECLAIMER. 

RECLAIMER planted the first set of 96 mines during the period 10- 13 April in anticipation of the 

ori~inally-s~t~e~t~led date for Sflot UNION (16 April). The remaining 25 mines were origin:rlly 

phnned for ernplacement at Shot YANKEE. Several weather delays reduced the time window 

av;iilable between Shot UNION (ultimately rescheduled for 26 April) and Shot YANKEE (5 May). 

17 
which resulted in a decision to plant all of the mines for Shot UNION; the remaining mines were 

therefore planted by RECLAIMER and LST-1157on 25 April. 

Recover- of the mines by RECLAIMER was accomplished over a period of several 

days. commencing on28 April. The recovered mines were washed down to reduce the levels of 

radioactivity as they were brought aboard. Personnel handling the mines and recovery gear used 

special clothing, gloves and equipment. While on RECLAIMER and later after msfer to LSTI 157, the mines were kept topside and wereconstantly checked for radioactivity; those mineswith 

higher levels of radioactivity were washed or scrubbed down. 

The mines and the mine projectpersonnel were transferred hrnUT-1157 to SHEA on 

3 May; SHEA transported the mines to PearlHarbor for final analysis. 

3.1.2 Project 1.4 - UnderwaterPressureMeasurements(Reference 12). 

This project involved placement, servicing and recovery of several large instrument 

buoys (cans) and was conducted at Shots BRAVO and ROMEO (Area Charlie), Shot UNION 

(Area Dog), and Shot YANKEE (Area Fox), in BikiniLagoon(seefigure 4). COCOPA, 

MENDER and TAWAKONI, along with suppan barges and several small boats, were involved in 

the various project activities. The project was also conducted at Shot NECTAR at Enewetak by 

contractor personnel from Holmes and Narver (H&N). 

After the initial laying of the buoys for Shot BRAVO,all of the laying, servicing, and 

recovery operations were conducted in radiation-contaminated waters; the buoys themselves were 

also contaminated. 

COCOPA was the principal participant in buoy servicing and recovery operations 

through the first three shots. Primarily as a result of recovery operations in Area Dog following 

Shot UNION (see figure 4), the ambient radioactivity levels aboard COCOPA became higher than 

the pernissible limit and the mission was aansfcrrcd to TAWAKONI for the remainder of the 

project participation at Bikini. The project report states that protective clothing was worn while 

handling the contaminated buoys; the same report indicates that swimmers from the support ships 

were also utilized in the recovery operations. 

18 
3.1.3 Project 6.4 - Proof Testing of AtomicWeaponsShipCountermeasures 

(Reference13). 

This project evaluated the effectiveness of washdown systems in reducing the effects of 

fallout on ships. Two converted liberty ships, YAG-39 andYAG-40, were instrumented for 

radiation measurements and equipped with remote controls. A washdown system was installed on 

YAG-39 only. At Shots BRAVO, RO,MEO, UNION and YANKEE, the two ships were sailed 

into areas of anticipated heavy fallout. During Shots BRAVO and ROMEO. both ships were 

unmanned and remotely controlled from a P2V-5 aircraft, with a secondary control pany aboard 

USS BAIROKO (CVE-115). Experience from these tests indicated that manning YAG-39 was 

both desirable and feasible. YAG-39 was manned for Shots UNION and YANKEE by a shielded 

skeleton crew that received instructions as to the course from the secondary control party on 

BAIROKO. The ships were boardedaftereachtestandradiationrecordswereretrieved; 

comparisons of radiation levels onbOalJ each ship indicated the effectiveness of the washdown 

system on YAG-39. 

Two fleet tugs, MOLALA and TAWAKONI, participated in this project by escorting the 

YAGs anddebarkingtheircrewsbeforetheshots and retrievingandtowing the YAGs to 

Enewetak after the shots. At ShotBRAVO,bothYAGswere retrieved by the tugs and towed 

unmanned from Bikini to Enewetak. At Shots ROMEO, UNION, and YANKEE, YAG-39 was 

manned (remanned after Shot ROMEO) and brought to Enewetak under her own power, while 

YAG-40 was towed back by MOLALA. MOLALA was also utilized at Enewetak to aid in the 

decontamination of the YAGs, if necessary, after each test.MOLALAwasinvolved in these 

activities for all of the Bikini tests except Shot KOON. TAWAKONI was involved In supporting 

Project 6.3 for only the first two shots (BRAVO and ROMEO). 

3. I. 4 MiscellaneousSupportActivities. 

As listed in table 2, PC-1546 was a unit of the Surface Security Unit (TU 7.3.1). This 

involved pre- and post-shot security patrols outside the lagoon (primarily ASW patrols) as well as 

screening and exon assignments with major units when they sortied for each shot. PC-1546 was 

also assigned special tasks that involved sorties to other nearby atolls (Enewetak. Rongerik, 

Ailinginae) during the operation. 

USS LST-I 136 was assigned to the Transport Unit (TU 7.3.9) for only a brief period 

during Much and April 1954. Its primary duties were to transport passengers and freight between 

Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. 

19 
The following sub-sections detail the activities of each of the eight ships of interest. The 

activities are superimposedon the radiologicai environments due to both radioactive fallout and 

contaminated lagoon water. Integrated intensities topside (from fallout and from contaminated 

water and contaminated shipsbats) and below(ibm ship contamination) are calculated on a daily 

basis for each ship through 31 May 1954. 

3.2 USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42). 

RECLAIMER was at Pearl Harbor during the first two CASTLE tests and was just 

arriving at Kwajalein Atoll (see figure 1) when She KOON was detonated at 0620 hours, 7 April. 

RECLAIMER departed Kwajalein at approximately nmn the same day and arrived at Bikini at 

0832 hours on 8 April (Reference 3). 

Shortly after RECLAIMER arrived at Bikini, it began mine laying operationsin Ana 

Fox (figure 4) to support Project 3.4. During the period 8- 12 April, RECLAIMER and LST-1 157 

laid approximately 96 mines in preparation for Shot UNION, which was initially scheduled for 16 

April (Reference IO). With mine laying operations completed. divers from RECLAIMER assisted 

in recovering submerged insnumentation in Area Charlie (see figure 4) on 13 April (Reference 3). 

At noon on 15 April, RECLAIMER depaned Bikini Lagoon enroute to its assigned operating area 

for ShotUNION,approximately 25 nmi southeast of the atoll. When Shot UNION was 

postponed due to weather, RECLAIMER reentered the lagoon at approximately 1900 hours, 

16 April. 

During the period 17-24 April, RECLAWR remained in the lagoon performing diving 

and salvage operitions as directed, while unfavorable weather resulted in repeated delays for Shot 

UNION. Project 3.4 personnel became concemd that there would not .be enough time between 

Shots UNION (now scheduled fm 26 April) and YANKEE (5 May) to allow recovery of the first 

mine field and the placement of the second, planned for Shot YANKEE (Reference 10). It was 

therefore decided :o use all 121 mines at Shot UNION and, on 25 April, RECLAIMER and LST1157 plantedthelast 25 mines in Area Fox. At 1639 hours, 25 April,RECLAIMERgot 

underway for its assigned operating area approximately 50 nmi southeast of the Shot UNION 

surface zero. 

Shot UNION was detonated at 0605 hours, 26 April. Approximately 12 hours later 

RECLAIMER reentered the lagoon and anchored inthe Nan anchoragc. During the night of 26-27 

20 
April, some ofthe othershipsanchored off EneuIslandreportedsmallamounts of light, 

secondary fallout as follows (Reference 7): 

Shlr, Datflirne Avo,. (mR/hr) Max. (rnR/hr) 

COCOPA 26/2200 2 4 

MENDER 26/2 100 2 4 

LST-1 157 3 

3 SHEA

2611930 2 

2710730 5 

Considering the location of RECLAIMER relative to the ships reponing fallout, it is assumed 

RECLAMER was exposed to similar fallout. The topside radiation environment on RECLAIMER 

due to Shot UNION fallout is depicted in figure 5 and is oh:ained by avenging the environments 

reported on the other ships anchored in the Nan anchorage. 

Being a surface (barge) detonation, Shot UNION significantly contaminated the lagoon 

water in the vicinity of surface zero (Reference 8). Most of the surface contamination spread to the 

west and southwest; however, by 1 May, even the water in the Nan anchorage off Eneu Island 

showed increased radiation levels (Reference 7). Because of the contamination in the northern 

lagoon. Project 3.3 mine recovery operations did not begin until the afternoon of 28 April when 

RECLAIMER began hoisting the mines from their underwater moorings. Mines that displayed 

sufficient damage to conclude that they were neutralized were cut loose and allowed to fall back 

into the lagoon. Those mines visually undamaged were hosed down to reduce radioactivity prior 

to being brought aboard RECLAIMER. Special clothing, gloves, and equipment were usedby 

personnel who handled the mines (Reference IO). By 1 May, the majority of the mines had been 

recovered and those milles to be shipped back to Pearl Harbor for further analysis were transferred 

from RECLAIMER to LST-1 157. RECLAIiMER continued searching for "lost" mines on 2 and 3 

May; however. there is no indication that more mines were recoveredand transferred to LST-I 157 

after 1 May (Reference 3). At 1445 hours, 4 May, RECLAIMER, having completed mine 

recovery operations, departed Bikini Atoll enroute to Guam. 

Daily contributions tothe integratedfree-fieldradiationenvironment on USS 

RECL,MMER (ARS-32) resulting from Shot UNION fallout, shine from contaminated lagoon 

water, and from ship contarnination during the period 8 April to 31 May 1953 are summarized in 

table 3. 
A A A A A 

27 AQ? 28 Apt YlVlltLt NLCW 31 -7 

Time After Shot UNION (Hours) 

Figure 5. Estimated ropside intensity on USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42) following

Shot UNION. 

22 
v1 

vl 

E) 

YYYrll 

000000000000000000P4Pxm.G -mF U

Lo

L 

u 

w 

u 

C. 

23 
3.3 USS SHEA (DM-30). 

On 1 March 1954, when Shot BRAVO was detonated, SHEA was moored at Long 

Beach, California. On 13 March, SHEA departed Long Beach enroute to Pearl Harbor, where it 

anived on 19 March. SHEA departed Pearl Harbor on 22 March and crossed the International 

Date Line enroute to Bikini Atoll when Shot ROMEO was detonated on 27 March. On 29 March, 

SHEA wasfollowing the same route to Bikini as that of LST-1157 (see figure 6). but was 

appraximately 35 nmi behind; SHEA anchored in Berth B-9 (Tare anchorage), next to LST-1157, 

at i407 hours that day. Shot ROMEO fallout at Bikini had ceased at approximately 0800 hours, 

29 March. Apparently, the cloud drifted off to the west of Biluni, as Enewetak Atoll received 

essentially the same fallout (adjusted for radiologicaf decay) approximately one day later. It is 

unlikely that SHEA received any of this secondary fallout from Shot ROMEO as if approached 

Bikini Atoll from the southeast. 

On 30 March S'!t.iA departed Bikini emute to Enewetak where it arrived during the 

morning of 31 Marc)?. At 1821 hours on 4 April, SHEA,in company with LST-1157, departed 

Enewetak enroutc to their assigned operating area for Shot KOON, scheduled for 7 April. When 

Shot KOON was detonated at 0620 hours on 7 April, SHEA, LST-FI57, and MENDER were in 

their assigned operating area approximately 35-40 nrni southeast of the KOON ground zero on 

Eneman Island, Bikini Atoll (figure 2). At approximately noonthe same day, SHEA entered 

Bikini Lagoon and anchored in the Nan anchorage off Jheu Island. 

During the period 8-12 April, SHEA spent most of the time in the northern lagoon with 

RECLAIMER and LST-I 157, probably assisting with Project 3.4 mine laying operations. With a 

scheduled date of 16 April for Shot UNION, SHEA departed Bikini at 1300hours on 15April for 

its assigned operating area approximately 4C nmi southeast of the UNION surface zero. As 

previously mentioned, Shot UNION was delayed due to unfavorable weather until 26 April. 

SHEA returned to the lagoon during the evening of 16 April and, with the exception of brief (1-2 

day) patrol assignments outside Bikini Lagoon on 19 and 20 April, the ship remained in the Nan 

anchorage area until 23 April. During the morning of23 April, SHEA got underway for8 patrol 

assignment in an area ncrth of Bikini Atoll. The ship mumed to Bikini and anchored in Area Fox 

with KECLAIMER and LST-1157 during the morning of 25 April. After a brief sortie out of the 

lagoon during the afternoon of25 April, SHEA returned to Bikini and anchored in the Nan 

anchorage. At 1715 hours on 25 April, SHEA got underway for its assigned operating area for the 

UNION test. 
1, 
Shot UNION was detonated at 0605 hours, 26 April; StIEA reentered the lagoon md 

anchored in the Nan anchorage at 1726 hours the same day. At 0730 hours on 27 Aptil, Sf1E.h 

reported a small amount of light, secondary fallout with an average intensity of 3 mR/hr and ;I 

mmimum of 5 mR/hr. Other ships in the anchorage reponed average intensities of 2 mR/hr xnd 

nuximums of 3 mR/hr at about 1900-2200 on 26 April (see section 3.2). The topside r:di:ition 

environment on SHEA due to Shot UNION fallout is depictedin figure 7. 

During the period 28 April to 2 May, SHEA assisted RECLAIMER and LST-I 1.57 in 

the Project3.1mine recovery operations in Area Fox. On 3 hiay, the ship mooredalon,.(.de LST1 1.57 in Area How (see figure 4; from 1400-1647 hours to take on those mines that were to he 

returned to Pearl Harbor for further analysis. The mines had been kept topside on the LST and 

were repeatedly checked for radiation. Those indicating“abnOt’m31”radioactivity had been washed 

and scrubbed down prior to being transferred to SHEA (Reference 10). Nine personnel from 

EODU#I and thirty-two personnel from Mine Project Six also transferred to SHEA on 3 >lay for 

further transportation to Pearl Harbor, their duties aboard LST-I 157 being complete (Reference 

1 I). 

During the afternoon of 4 May, SHEA go?underway for Pearl Harbor via Kwajalein 

Atoll. After a brief stop at Kwajalein, SHEA proceeded to Pearl Harbor, amving there on 

I? May. The mines were off-loaded and given a final check for operability on 13,14 and 15 Siay 

(Reference IO). 

Table 3 details the connibuiions to the free-fieldintegrated intensity on USS SHEA 

(DM-30) fromShot UNION fallout,shine from contaminatedlagoonwater,andship 

contamination duringthe period 29 March to 31 May 1954. 

3.4 USS COCOPA (ATF-101). 

When Shot BRAVO was detonated at 0645 hours on 1 March 1954, COCOPA was in 

its operating area approximately 50 nmi southeast of Bikini with two Project 1.3 barges (YCV-0 

and YFN-934) in tow. It remained in this general area until approximately 0800 hours when, due 

to fallout on several of the task force ships (BhIRUKO,ESTES,and PHILIP). a11 ships were 

ordered to proceed on a southerlycourse that would takethem out of the fallout area 

(Reference 7). COCOPA steamed south until approximately 1100 hours. when it was directed to 

proceed on a nonh-northwesterlycourse toward Bikini. The ship began receiving falloutat 

approximately 1300 hours when it was 10nmi south-southeast of the atoll. Fallout continued for 

26 
0 Average Topside 

Yeasurements 

0 Maximum Topside 

Measurements r 

A A 

27 Apr 28 Apr 

Time After Shot UNION (Hours) 

Figure 7. Topside intensity on USS SHEA (DM-30) following Shot UNION. 

27 
a: 

28 
the remainder of the afternoon and early evening and, by 2000 hours, 1 March,when fallout 

ceased, average topside intensities on CGCOPA were 110mR/hr. Figure 8 depicts the topside 

mdiation environment on COCOPA resulting from Shot BRAVO fallout. There is no mention in 

the hhip's log of the washdown system being utilized during fallout; however, the rapid decrease 

in topside intensities between 2ooO and 2400 hours, 1 &larch (H+13.25 to H+17.35),and again 

from 0100 to1200 hours. 2 March (H+21.25 to H+29.25),indicates that someshipboard 

decontamination was likely accomplished prior to COCOPA returning to the Nan anchoraze at 

approximately 1530 hours, 2 March. Reference 8 states that all major ships exposed to BRAVO 

fdlout at Bikini required decontamination. 

During the period 3-4 March, COCOPA spent most of the time in the Nan anchorage 

performing duties to support Project 1.4. These duties included aiding in the decontamination of 

YC-1081.a Project 1.4 barge that had been left in the lagoon for Shot BRAVO. During the 

afternoon of 5 March, COCOPA steamed to Area Charlie (see figure 4) to lay the moor for Project 

1.4 instrument cans being set up for Shot ROMEO. The following day. the ship dep&medBikini 

enroute to Enewetak Atoll, returning '0Bihni at approximately OS30 hours, 9 March. 

On 10and 1 1 hlarch, COCOPA completed laying Project 1.4 buoys and instrument cans 

in Area Charlie and, on 12 March, the ship got underway with the two Project 1.4 barges (YCV-9 

and YFN-934) in tow foritsassignedoperatingarea for ShotROMEO,scheduledfor the 

following day. Shot ROLIEO was postponed due to unfavorable weather and COCOPA returned 

to Bikini and anchored in the Nan anchorage at 1043 hours, 13 March. Continued unfavorable 

weatherdelayedShotROMEO for two moreweeks. During the interim period. COCOPA 

remained in the lagoon performing various duties as directed, primarily in support of Project 1.4. 

Because of the long weather delay, batteries and time clocks in the instrument cans had run down 

and it was necessary to recover the instrument cans for maintenance (Reference 12). At 701 2 

hours on 26 March. COCOPA prxccded to its assigned operating ura for Slwt ROMEO with 

only one project barge (YN-934) in tow (the decision had been made LUleave YCV-9 in the Nan 

anchorlge for Shot ROMEO). 

When Shot ROMEO wasdetonated at 0630 hours, 27 March,COCOPA was 

approximately 40 nmi southeast of surface zero. At approximately 1300 hours. the ship returned 

to Bikini and anchored in the Nan anchorage off Eneu Island. The ship shifted benhs to the Tare 

anchorage just north of Eneman Island (see figure 4) during the morning of 28 March and. during 

the late afternoon, the ship began rtzeiviag secondary fallout fromthe Shot ROMEO cloud. 

Topside intensities peaked at midnight on 28 March when a radiological survey indicated average 

29 
I 

1 

Tine After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 8. Topside intensity on USS COCOPA (ATF- 101) following Shot BRAVO. 

30 
topside intensities of 25 mR/hr. Figure 9 depicts the topside radiation environment on COCOPA 

resulting from Shot ROMEO fallout. On 30 and 31 March, COCOPA recoveredProject 1.4 

instrument cans in Area Charlie, returning to the Tare anchorage each afternoon. During the early 

afternoon of 1 April, COCOPA got underway for Enewetak Atoll where it arrived at 0700 hours, 

2 April. 

When Shot KOON was detonated at Bikini on 7 April, COCOPA was still at anchor in 

EnewetakLagoon. It got underway for Bikini at 1737 hours on 7 April, arriving there and 

mooring alongside YC-IO81 in the Nan anchorage at 0925 hours, 8 April. Entries in the ship's 

log indicate activities associated with Project 1.4 instrument recovery in Area Charlie on 9 April, 

and instrument placement for Shot UNION in Area Dog (see figure 4) from 10 to 15 April. At 

1230 hours, 15 April, COCOPA got underway for its assigned operating area for Shot UNION 

which was scheduled for the following day. As previously mentioned (section 3.2), Shot USION 

wasdelayeddue to unfavorable wtatherand COCOPAreturned to the Nan anchorage at 

approximately 200 hours, I6 April. During the Fend 17-25 April, COCOPA made almost daily 

trips to Area Dog to maintain the Project 1.4 instrument cans in place for Shot UNION, which, 

due to continued unfavorable weather, was rescheduled for 26 April. At approximately 1730 

hours, 25 April, COCOPA got undenuay for its assigned operating area for Shot UNION with 

YFN-934 in tow. 

Shot UNION was detonated at 0605 hours. 26 April, and COCOPA returned to Bikini 

and anchored in the Nan anchorage at 1833 hours the same day. At approximately 2100 hours, 

COCOPA experienced the same light fallout that seven1 other ship in the Nan anchorage reponed 

(see section 3.2). Avenge topside intensities on COCOPA leveled off at2 mWhr with a maximum 

intensity of 4 mR/hr king recorded at 2200 hours; the shipboard radiation environment resulting 

from Shot UNION fallout is depicted in figure 10. 

During the morning o-.27 April, COCOPA was involved in decontaminating YCV-9 and 

YC-108 1, the twoProject 1.3 barges that were left in the lagoon for Shot UNION. At 1345 

hours, COCOPA got underway for Area Dog to recover one of the Project1.4 instrument cans that 

was moored approximately 1 .? nrni southwest of surface zero (Reference 12). Being a barge shot 

over relatively deep water, Shot UNION significantly contaminated the lagoon waterin the vicinity 

of surface zero. The general drift of the surface water in the contaminated pool around surface 

zero was to thewestand southwest, toward AreaDog (Reference 8). At 1538 hours the ship 

approached the instrument can and,by 1640hours, the instrument can was hoisted aboard the ship 

which then departed Area Dog enroute to Nan. It is assumed that the instrument can itself was 

31 
I Ill I 1 "-1 I I 1-

0 Average Topside 

Yeasurements 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figw 9. Topside intensity on USS COCOPA (ATF-101) following Shot ROMEO. 

32 
A A A A A 

YLWEt NJECTAZ 31 !4ay 21 APr 28 Apr 

Time After Shot WION (Hours) 

Figure 10. Topside intensity on USS COCOPA (ATF-101) following Shot UNION. 

33 
brought ahard ship, as opposed to any instruments housed within the can. The intensity of the 

lagoon water in the recovery area was 500 mRhr and that of the instrument can itself, 1200 mR/hr 

(Reference 12). This wasthe only attempt to recover any instrumentation in Area Dog on 77 

Apri!. The Contaminated can was transferred to YC-IO81 in the Nan anchorage at approximately 

1820 hcurs, 27 April. It is estimated the crew was exposed to "shine" from thc contaminated 

lagoon water for approximately 1.2 hours while in Area Dog. Assuming a topside intensity 30 

percent of the water intensity,crewmentopside on COCOPAduringProjeci 1.4 recovery 

operations on 27 April received an integrated exposure of approximately 230 mR due to shine from 

contaminated water. 

COCOPA continued assisting in Project I .4 recovery operations in Area Dog on 29 and 

30 April, and again on 1 May.Although lagoon waterintensities in the recovery area had 

significantlydecreased due to radioactivedecayanddiffusion,continuedoperations in the 

contaminated water had led to a buildup of significant radioactive contamination on COCOPA's 

exterior hull below the water line andin the saltwater piping (Reference 12). In order to reduce the 

ship contaminatiol problem, COCOPA departed Bikini Lagoon for sea at approximately 1800 

hour>. 1 May, where It steamed in "clean" water until 0630 hours the following day. This method 

of decontaminating the ship's exterior hull and internal saltwater systems was employed by many 

of the support ships at Operation CROSSROAD in 1946 when it was found that steaming in clean 

water outside of the lagoon reduced the accumulated contamination by about half during the first 

day after leaving the lagoon,but that subsequent stcaming hada much smaller effect (Reference 4). 

After returning to the lagoon on 2 May and anchoring near TAWAKONI, the captain 

departed the ship for approximately 1 1/2 hours; it is assumed he made arrangements for transfer 

of Project 1.4 support to TAWAKONI at this time (reponed in Reference 12 as being necessuy 

due to accumulated contaminationof COCOPA). 

On 3 and 4 May, COCOPA visited Area Fox in the northern lagoon (see figure 4), 

where it !ikely assisted TAWAKONI in final preparations for Project 1.4 participation at Shot 

YANKEE, scheduled for 5 May. At approximately IW hours, 4 May, COCOPA departed Bikini 

enroute to its assigned operatingarea for the YANKEE detonation. 

Shot YANKEE was detonated at 0610 hours, 5 May. Fallout and contaminated lagoon 

water resulting from Shot YANKEE significantly increased radiation levels in the vicinity of the 

Nan anchorage area off Eneu Island. Consequently, COCOPA did not return to the lagoon until 

approximately 0800 hours on 6 May. By this time, intensity levels of the water in the anchorage 

34 
area had decreased to 7 mWhr (Reference 8). Between 1037 and 1137 hours, COCOPA was 

moored alongside YCV-9 and was probably involved with the decontamination of this barge. 

During the afternoon of 6 May, the ship visited Area Fox for 2 1/2 hours to recover some of the 

Project 1.3 instrumentation, returning to the Nan anchorage at 1832 hours. Between 1850 and 

IYN hours, COCOPAmooredalongsideLCU-637where it was likelyinvolved in the 

decontamination of that boat; TAWAKONI was involved in the decontamination of LCU-638 at 

approximately the same time. Note: All LCUs and barges left in the Nan anchorage for Shot 

YANKEE became contxninated as a result of fallout from that test (Reference 7). 

COCOPA remained in the Nan anchorage until 1735 hours on 8 May, when it got 

underway for Enewetak with YC-737 in tow. After dropping YC-737 off at Enewetak on 9 May, 

it returned to Bikini to pick up YC-1081 and an Army barge. The ship departed Bikini with these 

two barges in tow at approximxely 2030 hours, 10 May, enroute to Enewetak where it arrived on 

11 May. 

COCOPA departed Enewetak during the evening of 11 May on a rehearsal for Shot 

NECI'AR which was scheduled to be detonated at Enewetak on 14 May; the ship returned to the 

lagoon during the morning of 12May. At 1630 hours, COCOPA took YC-I081 in tow and 

departed Enewetak for Bikini Atoll, arriving Bikini at approximately IS0 hours, 13 May. The 

ship remained at anchor in the Nan anchorage for Shot NECTAR on 14 may, and did not depart 

Bikini until 1400hqurs, 17 May,when it got underway forEnewetak.COCOPA anived at 

Enewetak at approximately 0700 hours, 18 May, andgot underway that afternoon for Guam; 

COCOPA did not return to the PPG during the remainder of the opention. 

The daily contributions to the integrated free-field intensity on USS COCOPA resulting 

from Shots BRAVO, ROMEO. and UNION fallout. shine from contaminated lagoon water, and 

f:om ship contamination during the period 1 March to 31 May 1954, are givcn in table 5. Those 

days when COCCPA was moored alongside contaminated LCUs and barges are annotated (*), and 

the resulting conmbution to topside exposure on COCOPA (from the Appendix) is included in the 

shine column. 

3.5 USS MENDER (ARSD-2). 

When Shot BRAVO was detonated on 1 March. MENDER was at anchor in the harbor 

at Sascho, Japan (Reference 3). The same dav, the ship departed Japan enroute to Guam where it 

arrived on 8 Mmh. MENDER remained anchored at tigam until 17 March when, after taking on 

35 
A 

I 

0 

W 

.--

h 

a" 

36 
fresh provisions and fuel, it got underway for Bikini via Enewetak. After a short stop at Enewetak 

on 23 March, MENDER arrived at Bikini Atoll during the late afternoon of 24 March and moored 

alongside USS GYPSY (ARSD-1). 

GYPSY, along with COCOPA, had been involved in laying moors and instmment cans 

and in instrument can recovery operations for Project 1.4 during the period 1-24 March. With 

GYPSY scheduled to depan the PPG on 26 March, MENDER had arrived at Bikini to relieve 

GYPSY of its support functions for Project 1.4. Project equipment was transferred from GYPSY 

to hlENDER on 24-25 March, and, during the afternoon of 25 March, GYPSY accompanied 

MESDER on a familiarization mp to Area Charlie (see figure 4) where Project 1.4 instruments 

were already in place for Shot ROMO, now scheduled for 27 March. 

Duringthelateafternoon of 26 March, MENDER gotunderwayforitsassigned 

operating area for Shot ROMEO, approximately 80 nmi east-southeast of surface zero. Shot 

ROMEO was detonated at 0630 hours on 27 "arch, and MENDER rerunled to the Nan anchorage 

area at approximately 1400 hours the same day. The ship shifted berths to the Tare anchorage area 

just north of Eneman Island (see figure 4) on 28 March. During the late afternoon of 28 March, 

MENDER began receiving secondq fallout from the Shot ROMEO cloud. Topside intensities 

increased during the evening and, by the time fallout ceased at midnight, average intensities of 

27 mR/hr were measured on MENDER'S weather decks. The radiation environment on the ship 

resulting from Shot ROMEOfallout is depicted in figure 11. 

Between 29 March and 5 April, MENDER made several mps between the Tare and Nan 

anchorages and, at approximately nom on 5 April, MENDER got underway for its assigned 

operating area for Shot LOON,35 nmi southeast of the KOON ground zero. 

Shot KOON was detonated ;It 0620 hours on 7 April, and MENDER returned to the 

lagoon and anchored in the Nan anchorage at noon. On 8 April, the ship steamed to Area Dog in 

the northern lagoon (see figure 4) and began laying buoys for Project 1.4 instrument cans for 

participation at Shot UNION, scheduled for 16 April. Between 9 and 14 April, MENDER made 

amost daily mps to Areas Dog and George where it conducted various salvage operations and 

assisted COCOPA with mooring Project 1.4 instrument cans. At approximately 1130 hours on 

15 April, MENDER departed the lagoon for it; assigned operating area for Shot UNION. Due to 

unfavorable weather, Shot UNION was postponed and MENDER returned to Bikini during the 

evening of 16 April. 

37 
1oc 

0 Average Topside 

Xeasurements 

10 

1.0 

0.1 

1 10 100 1000 

A AA A AA 

26 Sf 29 Mar 30 %f KOOY CYION YAWEE 

Time After Shot ROHEO (Hours) 

Figure 11. Tooside intensitv on USS MENDER (ARSD-2) following Shot ROMEO. 

38 
Continued bad weather resulted in delaying Shot UNION until 26 April. MENDER 

remained in the Nan anchorage on 17 and 18 April, conducted salvage operations in Area George 

on !9 and 20 April, and on 21 April, departed Bikini enroute to Enewetak. The ship returned to 

Bikini for approximately one hour on 25 April, prior to getting underway for its assigned operating 

area for Shot UNION. 

When Shot UNION was dctonated at 0605 hours, 20 April, MENDER was steaming in 

an area approximately 35 nmi southeast of Bikini; the ship rL*:urned to the lagoon at 1847 hours 

and moored alongside LCU-1224 in the Nan anchorage until 2006 hours (although not stated in 

the ship'sdeck log, it is likely MENDERwas involved in decontaminatingthisboat). At 

approximately 2100 hours, ,MENDER experienced the same light fallout from the Shot UNION 

cloud that was reponed on several other ships anchored nearby. Average topside intensities on 

MENDER were 2 mRhr at 2100 hours with maximum intensities of 4 mR/hr being reported. 

Shown in figure 12 is the topside radmion environment on MENDER resulting from Shot UhqON 

fallout. 

Between 0800 and 1140 hours the fo!lowing day (27 April). MEhTlER was involved 

with decontaminating "various 1-CUs"that remained in the lagoon for the test and thus received 

primary (early-time)fallout from Shot UNION. At 1445hours, MENDER wasdirected to 

proceed to Area George to conduct salvage operations, arriving and anchoring there at 1555 hours. 

The log is not specific as to which project was supported by this action, but Project 1.4 did have 

twoinstrument cans moored in the Georgearea.MENDER'Sanchoragewasapproximately 

1.6 nmi east-southeast of the UNION surface zero, which was fortunate, since the general drift of 

surface water in the contaminated pool was to the west and southwest. At about the same time, 

COCOPAwasrecoveringaProject 1.4 instrument can thatwasmoored in AreaDog, 

approximately 1.3 nrni southwest of surface zero, and that ship encountered sea water intensities 

of 500 mR/hr--section 3.4. Apparently, lagoon water intensities in Area George never approached 

the levels they were in Area Dog since WNDER remained anchored in this area until the morning 

of 25, April. Divers aboard ,MEhDER did conduct diving operations during much of the day on 28 

April, and could have been exposed to relatively high levels of radiation found in the sub-surface 

lagoon water around surface zero. 

MENDER returned to the Nan anchorage briefly on 29 April, but at 1320 hours the ship 

returned to the northern anchorage to continue its Project 1.4 suppon. The deck log states that at 

1510 hours, MEhDER was "Anchored in area George, Bikini Lagoon," but the anchor bearings 

noted in the log indicate the ship was in Area Dog ("Concrete House on Dog, 063.50T"implies a 

39 
\ 

e 

W 

Time After Shot UNION (Hours) 

Figure 12. Topside intensity on USS MENDER (ARSD-2) following Shot UXION. 

40 
position southwest of that island, whereas Area George is to the southeast-tigure 3). MENDER 

remained ir, this area assistingCOCOPA in salvageoperations !Project 1.3 instrument can 

recovery) until approximately 1530hours, 30 April, when it returned to the SJIIanchorage. 

XIESDER resumed operations in thenorthern lagoon betwela1 1800 hours, 1 May, and 

approximately 1600 hours, 2 May.when it returned to the Nan anchorage. On 3 May, the ship 

departed Bikini for its assigned operating areafor Shot YANKEE, scheduled for 5 May. 

When Shot YANKEE was detonated at 0610 hours, 5 May. MENDER was steaming in 

an area 30-35nmi southeast of the YANKEE surface zero. Fallout and contaminated lagoon water 

resultingfromShot YASKEE significantlyincreasedradiation levels in the Nan anchorage. 

Cnnsequently, 11ESDER did not return to the lagoon until approximately 0300 hours on 6 May. 

By this time intensitylevels of the water in the anchoragearea had decreasedto 7 mR/hr 

(Reference X). Between 1022 and 1837 hours, 6 May. MENDER was utilized to washdown 

"various LCUs" that had remitined in the lagoon during the test and had received primary fallout 

from Shot YANKEE (Reference 3). MESDER continued washing down the LCUs on 7 May 

between 0755 and 1102 hours. and again between 1302 and 1610 hours. Intensities onhoard the 

LCLs on 7 May are reponed ;is ranging front 275 mR/hr (6 LCUs) to 500 rnR/hr (3 LCUs) and 

are in good agreement with the derived value!; of 175 and 310 mRhr used in the ship shine 

calculations (Appendix). 

On 8 May,MESDER gotunderway for Enewetak Atoll where it arrived at 

approximately 0600 hours the following morning. Theshipremained at Enewetak until the 

evenins of 11 >lay. when it departed the atoll on a rehearsal for Shot SECTAR, scheduled for 

14 Jlay. hlESDER returned to Enewetak on themorning of 12 >lay and.after taking on 

provisions. fresh WZicr, and fuel, departed Enwetak at 1755 hours, enroute to Pearl Harbor via 

Johnston Island. The ship arrived at Pearl Harbor on 23 May and did not return to the PPG for 

Operation CASTLE. 

The daily contributions to the integrated free-field intensity on USS MESDER resulting 

from Shots RO11EO and CSION fallout. shine from the contaminated lagoon water, and that due 

to ship contamination are detailed in table 6 for the period 2-1 March to 31 May 1954. Those days 

when XIESDER was moored alongside contaminated LCUs and barges are annotated (*), and the 

contribution to topside exposure on ,CIENDER (from the Appendix) is included in the shine 

column. 

31 
I 

.-

.-a

;r. 

5 

I 

n 
3.6 USS iL!OLALA (ATF-106). 

Brtwwn 0111and 0442 hours on 1 March, .MOLALA embarked the skeleton crews of 

YAG-39 and YAG-40. the two remote-controlled ships supporting Project 6.3 (section 3.1).in an 

;lr.:;r approximately 45 nmi sou:hwest of the Shot BRAVO ground zero. The ship then proceeded 

on ;Isoutheasterly course and, at 064.5 hours *her, Shot BRAVO was detonated, h1OLALA was 

approxim;ltcly 45 nmi south-southwest of the detonation. Following the test, MOLALA steamed 

on an easterly course for approximately one hour and then southeasterly until it rendezvoused with 

TXIVC'AKOSI ill area approximately 45 nmi south-southeast of Bikini Atoll at 104.5 hours. 

'I'l~ehc twoship.;,then steamed on a westerly course to intercept the two YAGs. At approximately 

nmn. the Aeleron crew of YAG-39, which had remained on MOLALAfor the test, was 

uan\ferred to TXWAKONI: the two ships then headed gene.ally west-northwest in the anticipated 

dircction of the YAGs, uhich. by now. were dead in the water. 

At i-X hours, while in an area 30-35 nmi southwest of Bikini. hIOLALA sighted 

YAG-40 at a nnge of 13 nmi. At 1445 hours, MOLALA began its approach to YAG-IO, but prior 

to going alongside to hook up the, tow wire. it approached cautiously in order to determine any 

radiological hazards associated kith towing this vessel. Because of a change in wind direction 

prior to the dctonation. the YAGs were not in an area of anticipated heavy fnllout and topside 

intcnhitics on YAG-40 wereonly 30-40 mR,'hr (Reference13). At 1600 hours. 1 %larch. 

JlOt,XLA took YAG-40 in towwith 1.550 feet of main tow wire. enmute to Enewetsk Atoll 

(Kc!.crc.ncc3). 

By stcrtming in a westerly direction following their reridenous at 1045 hours, hrh 

~IOL\IA :rnd TAWAKOSI avoided tho significant BRAVO fallout cvpcrienccd by many of the 

task force ships (e.g..COCOPA and PC-1546)whcn those ships were directed to proceed northnorthwest toward BiAini ;It 1 I(H) hours. Air sampling data obtainedonhoard ~IOLALA(and 

T:\W;\KONI) does indicate, however. that these two ships received somefallout(although . . Insignificant compared io the other ships) commencing at approximately 1600 hours, 1 %larch 

(Rcfcrcnce 13). Unfortunately, !he air sampling was terminated ;rt approximately 9OW hours on 

hoth ships and the time of cesxation can only hc cstim;wd. On YAG-40, which was king towed 

. by llOL,\lA during the period of interest, the air s;rmpling equipment remained in opcr;ltion ur,til 

7io() hours and, ;~tthat time. ;rirhornc contamination Ievelh were f;tlling off r;ipidly: therefore, it is 

ehtimated that fallout on rhc tuo manned hip\ also ended at this rirnc. 
The available radiological dam forMOLALA and nearby shipson I \larch are air sample 

activities rather than topsideintensities. As only partial measurement ofthe airhorne 

concentrations of radioactive fallout are available during fallout depositionon 5IOLALA. the more 

complete measurements obtained onboard YAG-30 (1,550 feet behind) are used to estimate the 

environnlent on MOLALA. Shot BRAVO wind data ohtained at 14-hour and H+6 hours reveal 

very little change in wind direction and speed in the Iayer from the surface to 6.I km, i.e., easterly 

trade winds of 10 to 15 knots below 2.1 km and west-northwesterly winds of 10 to 15 knots 

bettveen 2.1 and 6.1 km iReference 2). Based on these winds, fallout originating from the 

BR.AVO cloud \ten1 in the upper portion of that layer, a! about a 5 km height, uould have hen 

depositrd in ;I wide xci estendingtens-of-milessouthwest of ground zero. The mid-time of 

fallout drpohition on YI\G"IO was H+12.5 hours. implying an average particle fill1 speed of 

approuimatrly 400 dhr. Airsamples on YAG-40 measured about 0.5 pCi/m3 of activity 

throughout a 7-hour period of fallout deposition, and imply 3 buildup rate of approximately XH) 

pCi/nlz/hr. With decay accounted for, some 1.2 pCi/mz had deposited on the werrthcr decks by 

the time fallout ceased :I[ 11+16 hours. This corresponds to a peak inten\ity of appro.rimately 

6 mRhr at the conclusion of fallout deposition (Reference 14). Figure 13 depicts the cstimatcd 

topside radiation environment of MOLALA based on the YAG-40 air sampling data. Radiological 

dccayafter 2300 hours, 1 March (H+l6),is based on measured decayrates on otherships 

receiving Shot BRAVO fdlout. 

At 1317 hours. 2 hlarch. MOLALA shortened the tow wire to YAG-40 as it prepared to 

enter Enttwetak Lagoon (Reference 3). At 1708 hours, YAG-40 was cast off in berth G-7. 

npprosimately 2 nrni uest of Parry Island (see figure 3); MOLALA anchored approximately S(K) 

yards north in berth F-7. LIOLALA remained st anchor in Enewetak Lagoon until 1I >larch. 

when, after ernbarkittg several Project6.3personnel, it got underway for Bikini Atoll in company 

with YAG-39 and YAG-40. These three ships Yrived at Bikini at OX30 hours on 12 Mxch ;md. at 

1630 hours, they got underway for their assigned operating area for Shot ROMEO. schcduled for 

13 hlarch. Shot ROLIEO was postponed and all three ships reentcrcd Bikini Lagoon durin_r the 

morning of I3 March and anchored in the Nan anchorage area (figure 4). 

On I4 March. MOLALA moored alongside YAG-40 to refuel from 162s to I747 hours. 

Topside intensitics on YAG-40 had decayed to less than 0.5 mRhr hy this time (Rcfcrence 13); 

hence, exposure to MOLALA'S crew while alongside YAG-40 is insignificm (see Appendix). 

Shot ROMEO was delayed until 27 Mmh.and during the interim pcriod 15-25 llarch. 

except for a brief +hour sortie out of the lapon on 21 March. MOLAIA wmaindin the southern 
1. 

0. 

1 !000 

Tine After Shot BRAVO (Hours) 

Figure 13. Estimated topside intensity on USS MOLALA (Am- 106) following 

Shot BRAVO. 

35 
anchorage areas of Nan and Tare (figure 4) until 26March. At 1850 hours, 26 March, MOLALA 

departed Bikini in company with YAG-39 and YAG40 enroute to their assigned operating area for 

Shot ROMEO. 

Between 0300and 0400 hours, 27 March, while in an area zpproximately 25 nmi west 

of Enewetak Atoll, the skeleton crews from YAG-39 and YAG-40 transferred to MOLALA. 

When Shot ROMEO wasdetonated at 0630 hours, MOLALA wasoperating in an area 

approximately 40 nmi southwest of the ROMEO surface zero. After the test, MOLALA steamed 

generally to the south and by 0835 hours, when MOLALA first sighted TAWAKONI. both ships 

were in an areaapproximately 25 nmisouth of Bikini. MOLALA rendezvoused with 

TAhr.4Kr)NI at approximately 0900 hoursand the crew of YAG-39 wastransferred from 

MCILALA to TAWAKONI at 1006 hours. The two ships remained in an area generally to the 

south of Bikini steaming on an east-west racetrack until approximately 1800 hours, when they 

steamed in a northwesterly direction to intercept the YAGs. 

MOLALA continued on a northwesterly course until approximately midnight.27 March. 

At this time the ship was approximately 50 nmi northwest of Bikini and it began receiving 

relatively light fallout from the Shot ROMEO cloud. Topside intensities on the ship increased 

throughout the morning of 28 March and, by 0800 hours, when fallout ceased, average topside 

intensities of 13 mWr were reported. Meanwhile, TAWAKONI had intercepted YAG-39 in an 

area due west of Bikini at 2200 hours. 27 March. at which time it apparently returned to Rikini; by 

doing so, it avoided the fallout encountered by MOLALA northwest of the atoll--see section 3.7. 

Figure 14 depicts the average topside radiation environment on MOLALA resulting from Shot 

ROMEO fallout (Reference 7). 

According to MOLALA's log, the ship remained in an area northwest of Bikini during 

the remainder of the morning of 211 March while conducting a search for YAG-40. YAG-40 was 

first sighted by the crew at 1033 hours and, between 1120 and 1242 hours, 28 March. MOLALA 

maneuvered in the vicinity to determine the radiological h&s associated with towing this vessd 

to Enewetak;iopsideintensities on YAG40 wereapproximately 6.5 R/hr at thistime 

(Reference 13). At 1252 hours, MOLALA had YAG-40 in tow with 1,500feet of main tow wire 

and set a course to Enewetak Atoll. 

MQLALA entered Enewenk Lagoon at approximately 1030 hours, 29 March, and by 

1330 hours, the ship moored in berth B-3. about f nmi west of Parry Island; YAG-40 was then 

moored in the same berth. At 1554 hours, MOLALA got underway for berth C-I, approximately 

46 
I I I I 1111 I I I I I Ill 1 I 1 I I I ,I--

-

- 0 Average Topside 

Heasurements 

A AA 

28 Xsr 29 t(.r 30 Mar 

Time After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 14. Topside intensity on USS MOLALA (ATF- 106)following Shot ROMEO. 

47 
1,000 yards from YAG-30. During the afternoon of 29 Mmh and continuing until approximately 

noon on ?0 March, Parry Island rcceived reiatively light fallout from the Shot ROMEO cloud. 

Topside intensities on MOLALA were measured only one time throughout this period (H+58to 

H+78) and no decrease (or increase) in intensity was noted (see figure 13);it is possible that the 

light fallout wasnot detected on MOLALA3nd radioactivedecay wasbeing offset by the 

Occurrence of this seconday fallout. 

MOLALA remained at anchor in berth C-1 on 30 March but, on 31 March. it moored 

alongside YAG-40 from 0838 to 1502 hours in berth B-3, returning to berth C-1 at 1508 hours. 

The purpose of this "visit" is not specified in the ship's log, but it is likely that efforts to 

decontaminate YAG40 were undertaken at this time; topsideintensities on YAG40 were 

1560 rnR/hr on 31 March (Reference 13). On 1 April, MOLALA towed YAG-40 toa new 

mooring in berth D-1 between 0958 and 1055hours. 

MOLALA remained anchored at Eneweak for Shot KOON on 7 April and, on 9 April, it 

moored alongside Y AG-40 between 0850 and 1102 hours, and again from 1 115 to 1530 hours, 

returning to berth C-l at 1539 hours. By'.this time, topside intensities on YAG-40 had been 

reduced to 106 mR/hr through decontamination. According to Reference 13,9 April was the last 

day before Shot UNION that decontaminationwas carried out on YAG-30. 

b 

On 14 April. after embarking Project 6.4 personnel at 0945 hours, MOLALA go' 

underway for Bikini in company with YAG-39 and YAG-40. The three ships arrived at Bikini at 

approximately 0800 hours on 15 March, and, at 1230 hours, MOLALA got underway for its 

assigned operating area for Shot UNiON, scheduled for the following day. Shot UNION was 

postponed due to unfavorable weather and MOLALA, along with YAG39 and YAG-30, returned 

to Bikini at approximately 2130 hours on 16 A ?I, anchoring in the Nan anchorage area. 

Shot UNION was ultimately rescheduled for 26 April. DurinS the period 17 to 23 

April, MOLALA remained at anchorin the Nan anchorage. On 25 April, after a brief sortie to Area 

Dog (see figure 4) to tow a Project 1.4 barge hack to the Nan anchorage, MOLALA. in company 

with YAG-39 and YAG-40, got underway for their assigned operating areas for Shot UNIOS. 

Between 0300 and 0337 hom, MOLALA embarked personnel from YAG-39 and 

YAG40 while in an area approximately 25 nmi east of Bikini. A skeleton crew remained onboard 

YAG-39 for Shots UNION and YANKEE in order to provide more direct control of the course of 

this ship and that of YAG-40, which was still unmanned and maneuvered by remote control from 
YAG-39. Whell ShotUNIONwasdetonated at 0605 hours on 26 April. hIOLALAwas 

approximately 35 nmi souIheast of the UNION surface zero. MOLALA remained southeast of the 

atoll until approximately 140 hours when it steamed on a nonh-northeasterly courseto intercept 

YAG-39 and YAG-JiJ. At 1725 hours. MOLALA approached YAG-39 in an area approximately 

40 nmi northeast ofBikini to transfer personnel to that ship: the transfer was completed at 1812 

hours. Topside intensities on YAG-39 were approximately 160 mRhr at this time, but the ship 

was equipped with a shielded conml room where all personnel remained wchile the ship returnedto 

Enewetak Atoll under its own power. 

At 1911 hours,MOLALA began approachingYAG-30 to ascertainradiological 

conditions on that ship prior to hooking up the main tow wire. Topside intensities on YAG-10 

were approximately 1 R/hr and no one boarded (Reference 13). At 2015 hours, MOLALA was 

enroute to Enewetak with YAG4 in tow with 1,500 feet of main tow line. 

While recovering the YAGs between 1700 and 2200 hours, MOLALA was steaming in 

water recently contaminated by Shot UNION fallout. Background levels onboard MOLALA due 

to shine from the water were 30 mR/hr when measured by Project 6.3 personnel (Referencc 13). 

Crewmen remaining topside on 'MOLALA during recovery operations on 26 April received an 

integrated exposure of approximately 150mR due to shine from the Contaminated water. 

MOLALA arrived back at Enewetak at approximatelynoon on 28 April. For reasons not 

indicated in the ship's log, it was in the process of entering the lag00n when it returned to sea with 

YAG-40 still in tow. 'Theship steamed in open water in the vicinity of Enewetak /?toll and did not 

reenter the lagoon until approximately loo0 hours, 29 April. After disconnecting the tow at 1 130 

hours, MOLALA proceeded to berth E-1 where it anchored at noon. 

On 1 May. MOLALA moored alongside YAG40 from 0937 to 1203 hours; topside 

intensities on the YAG were 138 mR/hr at this time. Referecce 13 indicates that significant efforts 

to decontamincte YAG-30 were not undertaken following theUNION test. 

During the afternoon of 3 Xlay, MOLALA got underway for Bikini Atoll. Apparently. 

YAG-39 and YAG-40 had departed earlier in the day and XIOLALA did not overtake :hem until 

approximately 2O00 hours, 3 May (Reference 3). At 1035hours on 3 May, the three ships entered 

Bikini Lagoon and anchored in the Nan anchorage area. At approximately 14X) hours, all three 

ships got underway for theirassignedoperatingarea for ShotYANKEE,scheduledfor the 

following day. 

49 
Between 0200 and 033G hours, 5 May. MOLALA embarked personnel from YAG39 

and YAG40 in an area 20 nmi east-nor.heast of Bikini Atoll; by the time shot YANKEE was 

detomted at 0610 hours, MOLALA had steamexito a positicn approximately 50 nmi southeast of 

surface zero. The ship remained in this general area undl approximately 1100 hours when it 

steamednorthward to intercept the YAGs. At 1433hours,thecrewsighted '1'AG-39 

approximately 30 nmi east of the atoll; YAG-39 penonnel were transferred to that ship from 

MOLALA between 1530 and 1630 hours. YAG-40was very close by and, at 1700hours, 

MOLALA was enroute to Enewetak Atoll with YAG-# in tow on 1,600 feet of main tow line. 

Both of the YAGs experienced heavyfallout from the Shot YANKEE cloud. During the 

recovery operations, topside intensities on YAG-39 were approximately 1.3R/hr, while those on 

YAG40 were 16 R/hr (Reference 13). Between approximately 1440 and 1910 hours, MOLALA 

was steaming in watercontaminated by the YANKEE fallout. Backgroundlevelsonboard 

MOLALA due to shine from the water were 6 mWhr throughout this period (Reference 13); 

therefore, crewmen remaining topside during the recovery operations on 5 May received an 

integrated exposure of 27 mR due to shine from the contaminated water. 

MOLALA, with YAG4 still in tow, arrived back at Eneweuk Atoll dui.ng the morning 

of 7 May; at 1135 hours, YAG-40 was moored just south of benh C-1 and, at 1214 hours, 

MOLALA anchored 600 yards south of benh D-4, approximately 1.5 nmi west of Paq Island 

(figure 3). 

The following day, MOLALA moored alongside YAG-40 from 1011 to 1140 hours. 

At this time. topside intensities on YAG-40 averaged 3.7 R/hr (Reference 13). The ship's log 

gives no indicationof why the ship went alongside the YAG on this date, bccause apparently it had 

been decided to let YAG-40 cool-offbefore putting decontamination teams aboard. 

On 9. 10,and 11 May, MOLALA spent a good deal of time moored alongside YAG-39 

while decontamination of that ship was in prog~ss.Ail decontamination operations conducted 

aboard YAG-39 were controlled from MOLALA during this period. A contamination control zone 

was roped off on MOLALA and a contaminationcheck station was set up at the boundary of the 

zone; all movement of personnel and equipment from YAG-39 was through the connol zone on 

MOLALA (Reference 13). 

During the afternoon of 11 May, MOLALA took YAG-40 in tow and departed the 

lagoon for a rehearsal of Shot NECTAR, scheduled to be detonated on a barge over the IVY50 
MIKE cmer on 14 May (see figure3). MOLALA and YAG40 returned to the lagoon during the 

afternoon of 12May, andboth ships moored in berth C-3 (YAG-40 wasstillconnected to 

MOLALA with 700 feet of tow line). On 13 Xlay, MOLALA cast off the tow line from YAG40 

and, between 1039 and 1055 hours, the ship washed down YAG-40's weather decks with high 

pressure hoses (Reference 3). At 1642 hours, 13May. MOLALA. with YAG-40 in tow, depaned 

Enewetak Lagoon for their assigned operating area for Shot NECTAR. 

When ShotNECTARwasdetonated at 0620 hours, i4 May,MOLALAwas 

approximately 40 nmi southeast of surface zero. The ship, still towing YAG-40, returned to 

Enewetak Lagoon during the early afternoon of shotday. YAG40 was moored alongside YAG39 in berth C-3 at 1300 hours, and MOLALA anchored in berth C-4 fifteen minutes later. During 

the period 15-19 ,May, while decontamination experiments were being carried out aboard YAG-40, 

YAG-39 was moored alongside and served as the control station for movementof personnel and 

equipment from YAG-40. While anchored in kr,h C-4 it is assumed MOLALA received the same 

fallout that occurred on Parry Island between 1830 and 2100 hours, 14May; Shot NECTAR 

intensities on Parry Island (Reference 1). as modified for MOLALA geometry (see Appendix),are 

depicted in 5gure 15. On 15 May, MOLALA and SIOUX were utilized to map out the fallout area 

north of Enewetak Atoll resulting from Shot NECTAR. This was accomplished in the same area 

where SIOUX and TAWAKONI had layed out buoys in suppon of the experiment in late April 

(see section 3.7). 

MOLALA returned to Enewetak Lagoon on 16 May andanchored in berth B-1 at 

approximately 0700 hours. Theshipremained in thisanchorage until 25 May. when it got 

underway enroute to Pearl Harbor in company wirh YAG-39 3nd YAG-40. During the period 16-

21 Xlay. decontamination work on YAG-40 was perfcrmed on a daily basis by teams drawn from 

several shipsthatremained at Enewetak Atoll after Shot NECTAR; MOLALA provided 25 

crewmen (named) for this task. 

During the period t March to 13 May 1924, MOLALA was either alongsideor in close 

proximity to thecontaminatedYAGs on 22occasions.Shine from thecontaminatedships 

increased the topside radiation levels on MOLALA and thus the typical crewman's dose on each 

occasion. The details of each exposure and calculations to assess their effect on crew dose are 

described in the Appendix. The daily contributions to the integrated intensity on USS MOLALA 

resulting from Shots BRAVO, ROMEO and NECTAR fallout, and from ship contamination. are 

detailed in table 7 for the period 1 March to 31 May 1954. The topside exposure includes shine 

51 
to 100 1000 

A A A 

15 !fav 16 Xay 17 Xay 

Time After Shot NECTAR (hours) 

Figure 15. Estimated topside intensity on USS MOLALA (ATF-106) following

Shot NECTAR. 

52 
5 

L 

M 

53 
from the contaminated YAGs (from the Appendix) when MOLALA was near those ships on the 

days indicated, and shine from contaminated water. 

3.7 USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114). 

When Shot BRAVO wasdetonated at 0645 hours on 1 March, TAWAKONI was 

approximately 50 nmi east-southeast of ground zero. The ship remained in this general are3 until 

approximately 0800 hours, when, due to fallout on severalof the task force ships at this time. all 

ships in :he area were directed to proceed south in order to avoid the fallout area. TAWAKONl 

turned south and steamed until 1045 hours, when it rendezvoused with MOLALA in an area 

approximately 45 nmi south-southeast of Bikini. These two ships then steamed on a westerly 

course to intercept the two remotely-controlled YAGs that were supporting Project 6.4 (secticn 

3.1). At approximately noon on 1 March, a YAG-39 skeletoncrewwastransferredto 

TAWAKONI from MOLALA; the twoships then headedgenerallywest-northwest in the 

anticipated direction of the YAGS, which, by now, wmdead in the water. 

At approximately 1700 hours,TAWAKONIinterceptedYAG-39 in an area 

approximately 50 nmi southwest of Bikini Atoll. Rior to going alongside to hook up the tow, 

TAWAKONi slowly approached from several direcrions to determine any radiological hazards 

associated with towing this vessel. Because of a change in wind direction prior to the detonation, 

the YAGs werenot in the area of anticipated heavyfallout and topside intensities on YAG-39 were 

only 60-70 mR/hr (Reference 13). At 1845 hours, TAWAKONI was enroute to Enewetak with 

YAG-39 in tow with 1,600 feet of main tow line. 

By steaming in a westerly direction following their rendezvous at 1035 hours, both 

TAWAKONI and MOLALA avoided the significant BRAVOfd!out experienced by many of the 

task force ships (e.g., COCOPA and PC-1546) when those ships were directed to proceed nonhnorthwest toward Bikini at 1100 hours. Air sampling data obtained onboard TAWAKONI (and 

MOLALA)doesindicate,however, that these two ships receivedsomefallout,although 

insignificant compared to the other ships, commencing at approximately 1600 hours, 1 March. 

Unfonunately, the air sampling was terminated at approximately 2OOO hours on both ships and the 

time of cessation can only be estimated. On YAG-#* which was being towed by MOLALA, the 

air samplingequipment remained in operation untif 2300 hoursand, at that time,airborne 

contamination levels were falling off rapidly; rherqfore, it is estimated that fallout on the two 

mannedships also ended at this time. Since airborne activityconcentrations measured on 

TAWAKONI between 16oU and 2OOO hours are about the same as those measured on Y.4G-40 

54 
(approximately0.5 pCi/m3). it is assumed that both ships received similar fallout. The estimated 

topsideradiationenvironment on TAWAKONIis,therefcre, the same as that depictedfor 

51OLALA in figure 13 (refer to disctission in section 3.6). 

At approximately 1300 hours, 2 March, as TAWAKONI was approaching Enewetak 

Atoll, the ship launched a motor whale boat for a crew to board YAG-39. The boarding party was 

like13 the YAG-39 skeleton crew (eight personnel); howem, individuals from TAWAKOir'l may 

have accompanied them. At 1900 hours, TAWAKONI was moored in the anchorage off Parry 

Island (figure 3); with the assistance of two ;"boats and a tug, TAWAKONI completed mooring 

YAG39 ;It 2205 hours, 2 March. Having com?leted its Project 6.4 support for Shot BRAVO, 

TA\WAKONIgot undenvay for Bikini Atoll at 2225 hours. 

TAWAKONI arrived at Bikini at approximately 1300 hours on 3 March. On 4 and 5 

~farc-h.the ship remained in the southern anchorage areas (Nan and Tare) performing duties in 

support of Project 1.1. Between 6 and 9 Xlarch,while COCOPAsortied to Enewc.uk Atoll, 

TAWAKONI spent most of each day in Area Charlie laying buoys and instrument cans in suppon 

of Project 1.4 for Shot ROMEO, scheduled for 13 March. On 12 March, TAWAKONI towed a 

Project 1.3barge (YCV-9) from Area Charlie to the Nan anchorage and, at 1635 hours, the ship 

departed Bikini enroute to its assigned operating area for Shot ROMEO with the barge in tow. 

After departing the lagoon TAWAKONI transferred tow of the barge to COCOPA (see section 

3.4). Shot ROIMEO was postponed due to unfdvorable weather and TAWAKONI returned to 

Bikini and anchored in the San anchorage at 0821 hours, 13 March. Continuedunfavorable 

weather delayed Shot ROlrlEO until 27 March. In the interim,TAWAKONI remained in the 

lagoon performing various duties as directed, primarily in support of Project I .4 in Area Charlie. 

One exception to this routine occurred on 16 ,Marchwhen the ship was involveci with activities 

associated with Project 6.4. At 085 1 hours;, TAWAKONI moored alongside YAG-40 and took on 

fuel. At 11 10 hours, the ship proceededto YAG49 (also anchored at Nan).andmoored 

alongside YAG-39 from 1133-1325 hours and again from 1510 to 1532 hours, when it returned to 

pick up a working pmy. On 16 March. topside intensities on the YAGs were less than 1 mMr; 

hence. any exposureassociated with work performedtopsideon YAG-39 isinsignificant 

(Reference 13). 

At 1820 hours, 26 March. TAWAKONI departed Bikini in company with COCOPA 

enrou!e to their assigned operating areas for Shot ROMEO. When Shot ROMEO was detonated 

the next morning. TAWAKONI was appmximakly 30 nmi southeast of the ROhIEO surface zero. 

Atter the shot, TAWAKOXI rendezvoused with MOLALA at approximately 0900 hours and, at 

55 
t 
1 

57 
Continued bad weatherresulted in repeatedpostponements of the L'XIGS test, 

ultimately rescheduled for 36 April. Retueen 17-23 April, TAWAKOSI remained in an mL+orage 

between Bikini 2nd Eneu (see figure 4) until 73 April, when it got undeway for Enewtak. The 

ship amved at EnewetaL on 15 April and remained anchored in the lagoon until Shot LSIOS was 

detonated at Bikini on 26 April. During the period 27-29 April. TAWXKOSI assisted CSS 

SIOL'X (ATF-75) in laying out buoys in an area north of Enewetak Atoll in suppon of an overwater fallout collectionexperiment for Shot SECTAR. TAWAKOSI gotunderway from 

Enewetrtk at approximately 1700 hours on 30 April, enroute to Bikini Atoll. arriving there during 

the morning of 1 May. 

During the period 1-4 hlay. TAWAKONI provided direct sui ;.. rt for Project 1.4 

prcp;mrions for Shot YASKEE. Transfer of Project 1.4 support to TAWAk <I from COCOPA 

was necessitated by COCOPX becoming radiologically contaminated during Project 1.-Irecovery 

operationsfollowing Shot L'SIOS-sce section 3.4. This included laying moors. bmys. and 

in5trumtnt cans in Areds Fox and Dog (see figure 4)prior to Shot YASKEE. scheduled for 

5 llay. At 1600 hours, 4 Jlay. with Project 1.4 preparations for Shot YASKEE complete, 

T,\WtlKOSI got underw;ly for its assigned operating area approximately 60 nmi southeast of 

surf;tcc zero. 

Shot YXSKEE was detonated at 0610 hours, 5 May. Fallout and contaminated lapon 

water resulting from Shot YASKEE significantly increased ndiation levels in the San ;tnchor;tge 

;1rc;I (Kcfcrcnce 7). As a rcwlt. TAWAKOSIdid not return to Bikini until approxim;ltcly OXO() 

hourh, 6 May; by this time intcn\ity Ic.vels in the San anchorage had decreased to 7 mK/hr 

(Kcfcrcnce X). Rctwcen 1x03 ;tnd 1976 hours, b Shy. and again bctwcen 1 IT0 and 1746 hours 

on 7 >lay, TAWAKOSI joincd COCOPA (wction 3.4)and 51ESDfiR (section 3.3) in u;l\hin; 

down LCUsar?d h;ups that rcmincd in ttlc lagoon for the YASKEIi dcton;ltior!;tnJ hd rrccivcd 

pnrn;~ryf.tllout from the YA?;K;EE cloud (Reference 3). 
L 

Ct 

c, 

E 

._ 

i 
contaminated YAGs, LCLs, and barges when TAWAKON was moored near those vessels on the 

days indicated, and shine from contaminated lagoon water. 

3.8 C'SS PC-1546. 

PC-1546 was approximately 30-35 nmi east-southeast of Bikini Atoll whenShot 

BRAVC was detonated at 0655 hours, 1 March 1954. The ship remained in this general are3 until 

approximately 0809 hours when, due to fallout on several of the task force ships (BAIROKO. 

ESTES, and PHILIP), all ships were ordered to proceed on a southerly course that would take 

them out of the fallout area (Reference 7). Thus, PC-1546 escaped the early BRAVO fallout; 

however, at approximately 1100 hours the ship was directed to proceed northwest toward Bikini 

(Reference 3) andaboutnoon it began receiving significant fallout from the BRAVO cloud. 

Topside intensities increased rapidly and hy the time fallout ceased at 1900 hours, the average 

topside intensity on PC-1546was 90mRhr (Reference 7). When fallout started, the entire crew, 

with rhe exception of the CO who remained topside maneuvering the ship through rainshowers in 

an effort to wash down the weather decks, and members of the Damage Control team that came 

topside to perform hourly radiological surveys, were ordered below (Reference 15). It is assumed 

that, after 1900 hours, crew routines were reestablished since, at about this time. PC-1546besan 

providing screen for PHILIP, BELLE GROVE. GYPSY, and COCOPA (Reference 3). Figure 17 

depicts the avcrsge topside intcnsity on PC-1546from It(Mhours, 1 March (H+5.3).to 0800 

hours, R March (H+169.3). There is no entry in the ship's deck log that the crew engaged in any 

decontamination effons after 1 March; however. accelmred decay rateh between H+2S and Ff+37, 

and again after H+49 (see figure 17), are indicative ofefforts 10 decontaminate the ship on 2 and 3 

>larch. either by hosing down the weather surfaccs or by intentionally maneuvering the $hip 

through rainshowers. 

PC-IS46 reentered Bikini Lagoon briefly to refuel on 2 March, before continuing its 

anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol south of the atoll. The ship was relieved of its patrol duties 

at approximate!y I300 hours on 3 March. and anchod in the Nan anchonge area at 1450 hour.;. 

During the pcriod 3-23 Xiarck, PC-1546 provided ASW patrols outside Bikini Lagoon on 

approximately 10 occasions, each lasting between 12 and 48 hours, anchoring or mooring in the 

lagoon between each patrol. 

At 1830 hours on 23 March, the ship departed Bikini enroute to Enewetak Atoll, 

arriving Enewetak at 0846hours on 24 blmh. It remained at anchor in he lagoon in an un-named 

bedlnorth of Pany Island (5ee figurc 3) from 24 to 31 March. It is assumcd i'C-IS46 receivcd 

the same fallout as Pany Island between 1700 hours, 27 >larch and 1200 hours, 30 March; the 

radiation environment on Parry Island resulting from Shot ROSIEO fdlout, as corrected for 

shipboard use in the Appendix, is depicted in figure 18 (Reference 1). 

At 1714 hours on 31 March, PC-I516 got undenuny for Bikini Atoll, where it made a 

brief stop between 0735 and OR33 hours on 1 April, prior to resuming its ASW patrols around that 

atoll. The ship conducted three such patrols on 1.9, and 10 April, each lasting 1-2 days. On 5 

April, PC-1536 departed Bikini enroute to its assigned operating area for Shot KOON in the 

vicifiity of Ailinginae Atoll. approximately 50 nmi em-southeast of Bikini (see figure 6). Shot 

KOOS was dctonattd OG Eneman Island, Bikini Atoll, at 0620 hours, 7 April; PC-1516 depaned 

Ailinginae Atoll at 0928 hours. 7 April, and anived back at Bikici at 1928 hours the same day. 

Late in the evening of 13 April, PC-1% got underway from Bikini enroute to Rongerik 

Atoll. arriviny Rongerik at 091 X hours on 14 April {see figure I). The ship remained at Rongerik 

for Shot L‘N’ON on 26 Apriland did not rerum to Bikini until approximately 0700 hours, 

27 April. Tt t: light fallout th;lr was detected on sevenl of the ships in the San snchomge durifig 

the evening pi26 April and Tarly morningof 27 April is assumed to have not affected PC- 1546. 

Tfrec more ASW patrols were conducted by PC-15.16in the vicinity of Bikini Atoll 

between 27 *\pi1 and 2 Jlrty. At 1828 hours on 2 May, PC-1546was again underway from 

Btkini for Rongerik Atoll. The ship remained at Zongerik for Shot YANKEE on 5 Jhy, and 8n 

6 >lay prwe:dcd to Kwajdcin Atoll. amving there at 1649 hours. PC-1546dcpancd Kwajalcifi 

on 7 Slay e*;outc IO Pearl Harbor bia Johnston Island. and did not rcturn to Encwetak or Bikini 

during the re:naindcrof Opetxtion CASTLE. 

I-!,: daily contribu!ions to the integrated free-field radiation cnvironmcnt OR USS PCIS46 rehultins from Shots ISRhVO and ROJIEO fallout, shine from contarninatcd lagoon water, 

;Ind from ship conlu~nination are dctailcd in table 9 for the period 1 >larch-31 %lay 1054. 
10 

The After Shot ROXO (ifours) 

Figure 18. Estimated topside intensity on USS PC-1536 following Shot ROMEO. 

63 
X 

z 
where, on 17 March, the ship beached on Eneman Island at 1753 hours. The cargo was offloaded during the evening of 17 >larch and, on 18 \larch, cargo destined for Enewetak 1x3s 

onloaded. LST-1146 dcprrred forEnwetak at 1632 hours on 18 >larchandarrived at 

approximately noon the following day. The ship remained at Enewet;?k until 23 >larch, wt?t.n it 

rnitds aoolher round trip to Bikini, returningto EnewetA on 25 >larch. 

When Shot ROLlEO was detonated at Bikini Atoll on 2'7 >larch, LST-1 146 remained 

anchored at Enewetak. During the early evening of 27 March, Enewetak Atoll received relatively 

minor fallout from the Shot ROMEO cloud. Fallout commenced at approximately 1700 hcurs and 

peaked at 2100 hours with average intensities of 3 mRFhr being reponed on Parry Island; it is 

assumed LST-1146 received similarfdlout during the evening of 27 March. 

Another period of fdlout occurred at Enewerak during the late evening of 28 Xlarch. but 

did not peak until approximately noon on 30 >larch (see figure 18). At 1248 hours, 29 hluch, 

Hhilc t'allout was still occurring at Enewetak. LST-I 146 deputed for Bikini. Since the Shot 

ROJIEO cloud was approaching Enewetak from the east. and LST-1146 was steaming on an 

easterly course. cessation of fallout on the shipoccurred somexhat earlier than it did on Enewetak. 

u here it peaked at noon on 30 March. Funher, since the duration of fdlout on the ship WJS less 

than on Enewerak. there is a corresponding decrease in peak shipboard intensities when compared 

to the 9 mfUhr peak on Enewetak. When the cloud's najxtory and the ship's course and speed are 

superimposed, fallout deposition on LST-I 146 terminates at approxivately 0200 hours on 30 

>larch. with an estimated peak intensity of 7.5 mwr. An enny in the deck log of LST-I 146 31 

1302 hours. 99 March. which states "Secured number 1 fire and flushing pump and put number 2 

on line.",indicates that the crew was aware of the fallout at thistime and was conducting 

Hashdown. At 0700 hours. -3)March. LST-1146 passed LST-551 "akam to FOE on reverse 

course, distance 3 1/2 miles." At :his time radiation inrsnsities onhard LST-551were I2 mWr 

and decreasing (this ship had erwwntered tsllout approximately 24 hours e:lrlier ~hile scchored ut 

Bikini--Rc!crcnce I). The fxt that intensities on LST-551 were decreasing as ir passed LST-I I46 

indicates that neither ship was receiving fallout at this time; therefore. the estim;lted timeof fallout 

cessation on LST- 1 Id6 (0200 hours, 30 March) may be high-sided. The topside radiatio*t 

em ironment on LST-1 I46 resultins from ROMEO Fallout is depicted in figt~r~19; no redxtion ;,I 

the topside intcnsiiy ducto efforts to decontaminate the shipdurirg fallout is assumed. 

LST-I I46 arri~edat Bikini at approximately 1,900 hours. 30 31arch. It remained at 

Bikini in the vicinity of Enrman Island (sce figure 4)until 1x49 tiours. 1 April, when it got 

unclmvay for Enewetclk. LST-1146 remained at Erxwetak until 3 April when. at 1137 hours, it 

65 
1 

Tfme After Shot ROMEO (Hours) 

Figure 19. Estimated topside intensity on USS UT-I 146 following Shot R0,MEO. 

66 
Table 10details the daily contributionsto the integrated free-field radiation environment 

on USS LST-1136 resulting from Shot ROMEO fdlout, shine from contaminated lagoon water, 

and from ship contamination while in Bikini Lagoon during the period 17 “arch to 31 May 1954. 

67 
v)

m

3 

F u 

2 

M 

0, 

(L

C .e 
SECTIOS 4 

DOSE CALCULATIOSS 

To determine the dose to personnel, consideration is given to the time spent topside and 

below decks and the rddiation protection afforded by a ship. Thc daily.free-field integrated 

intensities (topside and below) from section 3 are adjusted to account for crew activities, either 

dtrumented or assumed. The daily e.\posures (mR) are then converted to film badge equivalence 

(nlrem). Results are presented as a daily cumulative dose to personnel through 31 ll~y1951.or 

into [he post-operationdl pen& :IS necessary until shipboard dose accrual falls belo\s 1 mrem per 

dd!.. 

An e:.timateof personnel movements is critical in determining a film h;ldge dose, 

e\pcci;llly during fallout depo3ition and at early times uhen topside intensities are relatively high 

andIntencity levels lire changing through dccon::lmination. Only two of the ships considered 

herein experienced \ignificant f;rllout from Shot BRhVO--COCOP44and PC-1546.A review of 

the \hip'\ logs gives no indication that normal crew duties Here interrupted on 1 and 2 %larchdue 

to the f~llout;however. bccausc intensity levcls u.erc still relatively high on these two ships. it is 

nccw\xy to ;lccount for specific periods of time on deck 'in order to calculate personnel daws. 

Shot ROXlEO f.rllout. on the other hand. peaked at approximately (XW)I-O1(X) hours. 99 %larch.on 

~ sc\crsl of the shlpc u hile anchorcd in Bikini Lagoon. Rad-safe measures, such as turning on the 

\hip'\ ua4hdoun sy\tem, were generally accomplished at a time when virtually ;111 of the crew 

~a\ alresdy below deck. By the time crews weremustered at approximately 0x00, shipboard 

intcn\itylevels hadbeen reduced to where normzl crewduties could be resumed without 

rc\trlition: hence. it is not necessuy to detail personnel movements onbonrd the task sroup ships 

following Sho1 ROXIEO to estimatetheir dose. Fallout from thc remaining four hhots in the 

C..\STI,E wries did not seriously hamper normal crew activities on any of the ships considered 

hrrcin: therefore. dose wimates for the crews of thehe ships are mrlde v:ithout detailing permnnel 

mo\ ements onhwrd ship during pcrinds of fallout deposition. 

With the exception of 1-2 1l;lrch on COCOPA and PC-1546. when actu;rl times top\ide 

anti hc10w are u\cd. the intcgratcd intensities topside due to fallvut (from tahlcs in scction 3) are 

rnuitiplied by J tirw-Jveragcd shielding fdctor 10 account for the time yxnt top3ide;rndbelow 

dunn;;I typic.al work day. As discussed in section 1, the time spent below was 60 perccnt of the 

c!.I> I I1 1/2 hours). While klow. the crew was offered shielding provided by the ship's structure. 

In Reference 1. it was dctcrnlined that ship-41iclding fdcrors van. from approximately 0.06 to 

60 

71 
" I ).I\

Table 14. Calculated film badge dose, USS CQCOPA (ATF-101). 

Cumulative dose imrcm) through: 

b 

21x2 

21x4 


57s 

500 

614 

627 

638 

647 

656 

6N 

672 

6x0 

6x7 

603 

60x 

70-1 

70!1 

713 

71n 

723 

727 

731 

736 

740 

743 

747 

750 

752 

755 

757 

760 

761 

77 
4.7 DOSE CALCL'LATIOSS FOR L'SS PC-1546. 

Dose calculationsforPC-1546 on 1-2 March 1954, when BRAVO fallout H;~S 

encountered. arc detailed in uble 18. Time periods klow deck are inuic:ltsd by 3n asterisk (*). 

After 2 llarch. a daily dose is calculatec!by muhiplying thc integrated intensities topside from 

fallout and bhine (from table 9 ) by 0.46 and 0.4, respectively;the intcgra1ed intensity klo~from 

>hip contamination is multiplied by 0.6. Conmbutions from each some are summcld and 

convened to a film badge doze Cumulative film badge doses are given in table 19 and are carried 

out through 1 1 July 1954, u hen dohe accrusl f~llsbelow 1 mrem pr day. 

Table 18. Dose calculationsfor USS PC-I546 on 1-2 \larch 1954. 

1 >larch fallout dose = (215.4 mR) (0.7 mrem/mR j = 150.8 mrem (table 19) 

78 
Tab!e J9. Calculated film badge dose, USS PC-1546. 

- Julv Dnv 

1 1.530 

-

3 I531 

3 1532 

3 IS33 

5 1534 

6 1535 

7 1 S36 

8 1537 

9 1578 

1 0 1539 

11 i 540 

12 

13 

I4 

15 

16 

17 

18 

I 0 

20 

21 

” 

71 

33 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

79 
Table 20. Calculated film badge dose, USS LST-I 1.16. 

Cumulative dose (mrem) thro,lgh: 
X1 
correlation are xcondq and are not quannfied. Based on intenhities depicted in Reference 2, the 

Table 21. Uncertaintrinwaterintensity at operating sites. 

D+1LVwr 

Intensity 

Location 0 

SAX 1SO 10.5 

TARE SO 3.5 

CII~IRLJE.DOG, 

FOX. GEORGE 1(XK) 70 

t {OW 500 3s 

CHARLIE 70 

TARE 35 

C)IARL.:E 0.5 

Doc 3.5 

FOX 7.0 

GEORGE 8.4 

1low 1.75 

USION NAN 7 0.5 

DOG. Sou!h of 100 7.0 

FOX, GEORGE 20 14 

HOW 150 10.5 

YANKEE NAN 7.0 

FOX I 00 

For the exposures of each crew, the water intensities are taken to have systema~ic rrrors 

by the stated mount$. Thus, the overall uncenainries in shine dose are calculated with all highsided and all low-sided intensities used in sties for the upper and lower limits, re~pcctively.of’the 

total shine dose. 

82 
T??euncenainty in shine from proximity to contaminated ships is dominatcd by the 

uncerrdinty in intrnhity on those ships. Apartfrom YAG-39 and YAG-JO. these vessels wrrr 

u\ually encountered in the San anchorage, and thus have a 50-percent uncertainty in the fallout 

drymition thereon. Withthe ship geometries as obtained from Reference 17and the radiation 

tr.in\port calculations as validated by the YAG-to-YAG shine data. the overall unccrtainty in 

;l\er;lge tnp\ide intensity from ship qhine is a150 about percent. As the YAG-39 to YAG-JO 

intcn5ity ratio was consistent to within 25 percent of the mean on 12 of I4comparisons made from 

Rcfcrence 1.3, and the computedratio was within 20 percent of the observed mean. topside 

in:c.n.ities based on YAG intensities are likely xcurate to about 520 percent. 

The value for the fraction of time spent on deck is estimated to be accurate within SO 

pcrccnt for the avemge crewmemkr. For the typical day, this corresposds to about 8 to 11 1/2 

hom nn deck. The systemztic uncertainty in the time on deck is considered to ht. greater than its 

ranJom variation from day to day md ship to ship. 771e uncertainty in total dose is reasonably 

high-\ided by trcatin_c the unccrtainty in time on deck as a systematic error; as such. the “0 

percent applies to all topside contributions to the total dose as well. Actually, only for.the dose 

from fallout is the topside time fraction the Icading quantified uncenainty. For shine. the rypical 50 

perccnt uncenaintjt in source intensity dominates. While the intensities on YAG-39 and YAG-40 

uere more accurately known, the brief exposures 10 them limit the applicability of long-term 3 

est~matcsof uncertainty in time spent topside. Thus, no such uncen,~inty is quantified for J. typical 

~I0L.XLAcrewmemkr. 

The ship-shielding factor reduces the below-deck crew exposurc 10 fallout to a minor 

contrihution to dose, thus any realistic emor in that panmeter has only a few-percent effect on the 

total dose. For exLmple, for a typical day (60perccnt hclow deck) and a ship-shielding factorof 

0 . IO, with an eror generouslyassumed 10 he 50.0S. the fractional error introducedis 

[0.60(O.OS)]/ [o.60rO.10) + O.JO(111 = 0.065. Such values negligibly incre.lse the uncertainty in 

dose rcsulting from uncenainty in time spent top\ide. 

Rcference 1 invest1ga:ed the impact on rhc .patid variability of topside intensities on the 

distnbution of crewmember doses. While data from YAG-30 and YAG--IO indic:ted concidernhle 

variation in readings across ship decks. the over;lll irnpac:t on pc;sonncl do\e was small--ahout 10 

to 20 percent for the ships analyzed in Reference I. The distribution in personnel dope from this 

source for the \hips of this report is lihewise small. U’ider distributions of personnel dose can ht: 

;~ttrihtedto individud or ratin~-relatedvariations in the rime spent topide. An extrcmc example is 

x3 
the shine dose to MOLALA from the YAGs. Depending on their involvement with YAG-related 

activities, MOLALA crewmembers could have been entirely below to entirely topside during the 

YAG exposures. Thus, shine doses coufd range from nearly 0 to 2 1L2 times the calculated value. 

The uncertainties in the parameters of the ship contamination model, as discussedin 

Reference 4, resulted in factor-of-three uncertainties in dose. However, 3 few data have emerged, 

such as on USS CURTISS as discussed in Reference 1, that suggest a much greater systematic 

accuracy than this for the model. Therefore, the present uncertainty analysis concentrateson the 

random va,iations of the parameters among ships. The largest such uncertainty is that in the 

saturation level of contaminants. The bounding S-values for each type of ship, as determined in 

Reference 4, are used. For destroyers, these are 1257 and 2683; for patrol craft, 1623 and 3092; 

and for all other ships, 1172 and 2820. 

The degree to which the ship apportionment factor, Fa, may be unrepresentative of 

average crew positions below was estimated in Reference 4 as a factor of 1.5. This is used herein 

except for PC-1546,which has an apportionment factor of .67, vice the .39 or .33 of the other 

ship types in this report. Where little shielding is afforded by a ship, its fractional unceminty 

tends to be less. Actually, fractional uncertainties are more constant for the quantity 1-Fa. On this 

basis, a value of A7k.10 is estimated for PC-1546. 

The water intensities affect the time to saturation. However, except where ships moved 

frequently from one environment to another, the rate of buildup of contamination has only a 

modest effect on doses. Compared to the previous uncertainties, that in time spent below also has 

a minor impacton the dose from ship contamination. 

Calculations are made involving coupled treatments of those components of dose based 

on water intensities. All attendant parameters are taken as systematicaIIy high-sided to determine 

an upper limit in dose (or low-sided for the lower limit). Thus, the highest water intensities, 

saturation levels, and apponionment factors are used throughout a crew's operational exposure to 

determine the combinedupper-limit dose from shipcontaminationpluswatershine. The 

uncertainties are taken to be systematic to obtain the greatest credible range of dose as well as to 

facilitate the partition of calculated doses into periods for comparison with film badge dosimetry 

(section 6). 

83 
These dosesare combined with those from fabut and ship shine to determine the total 

dose. By class, the doses are independent, thus'rheir attendant uncertainties are combined as the 

square root of the sum of squares. The upper and lower uncertainties are considered separately, 

reilecting the asymmetry in the ship contamination dose dismbution. The results are presented in 

table 22. Because of the manner of estimation neededfor some of the component uncenainties,no 

confidence level is ascribedto the total uncertainty range. 

Table 22. Summary of uncertainties. 

Uncertaintv in Dose from: 

Water Shine + Total 

Crewmembers in: Fallout Shir, Shine ShiD Contamination Uncertaintv 

+39 1 +390 

USS RECLAIMER 3527 0 266 300 

-124 -120 

+397 +400

USS SHEA 49210 0 320 370 

-160 -160 

+1145 +It00 

USS COCOPA 10272205 128264 1066 2200 

-430 -500 

+503 +500

USS MEXDER 57121 14 215~108 706 1500 

-162 -200 

+262

USS MOLALA 3 12262 12082242 246 1800+300 

-91 

+757 +800

USS TAWAKONI 376575 91+46 541 lo00 

-286 -300 

+406 +500

USS PC- 1546 8652173 0 675 1500 

-282 -300 

+93 +110

USS LST-1146 263253 0 61 320 

-30 -60 
SECTION 6 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

At Operation CASTLE, the issuanceof film badges to personnel generally followed one 

of two basic procedures: (1) individual or "mission" badging, where personnel were issued 

badges when they were expected to enter areas of radioactive contamination other than those 

encountered onboard the ships; and (2) cohort badging, where a group of individuals performing 

duties in the same area ofa ship would be assigned a dose based on the actual reading of one film 

badge worn byan individual within the group. Generally, individual badges reflect higher-thanaverage doses, whereas cohort badges reflect the average exposure of a group of individuals 

during a certain time period. The total dose assigned to an individual was obtained by summing 

the recorded doses of all ?,pplicable cohort badges with any individual (mission) badges assigned 

to that individual. 

In this section, available dosimetry data for each ship are analyzed for the purpose of 

comparison with the reconstructed doses for typicalcrewmembers.Cohortdosimetryis 

emphasized as most commonly reflecting typical activities. In analyzing cohort dosimetry, only 

those film badges whose recorded doses have been assigned to the cohort group are considered; 

lostordamaged badges (where the badge wearer hasan assessed dose) are not included. 

Individual badges are considered during periods only when the entire crew was badged or when it 

is evident that only a portion of thecrew was badged but the recorded doses were intended to be 

applicable to the unbadged portion of the crew (only dosimetry for RECL.4IMER during the 

second badged period falls into this latter category of tadging). The dosimetry data for each ship 

are depicted in this section by histograms, each xpresenting a single badging period. Shown in 

each histogram are the number of film badges in each film badge dose "bin," e+, 0-100 mrem, 

100-200mrem. Film badges recording a zero dose arc accounted for in a separate dose bin. With 

each histogram is a summary of the corresponding dosimetry, including the dose dates for the 

badging period and the number of cohort film badges worn during that period. For comparison, 

the calculated film badge dose for the same period is also depicted. In many cases, badging 

periods are not well defined; detailed investigation was required todevelop reasonable estimates of 

the actual periods represented by film badge records. Such estimated dates of film badge issue and 

turn-in are noted with each histogram. 

86 
Because ofthe above, coupled withthehigh percentage of cohort badging during 

Operation CASTLE, and because such badgingwas used toprovide dcJesforunbadged 

personnel, it is necessary to evaluate the procedures employed for cohort badging, including an 

examination of the apparent irregularities. This evaluation is further prompted by a post-operation 

recommendation from :he CO of USS CURTISS (AV-4) concerning badging procedures at 

Operation CASTLE, that every individual be issued a film badge; otherwise, because ofthe 

varying location of men at different times, there is no way possible of assigning an accurate dosage 

figure to men without badges (Reference 16). The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the 

acceptability and validity for dose determination. It is necessary befare utilizing the dosimetry data 

for comparisons with calculated doses. The analysis includes consideration of the following: 

a) Percentage of the cr:w represented by valid cohort badges. For example, the 42 

badges issued for a crew of 279 personnel in USS SHEA for the period 30 March-2 May reveals 

that 21 badges were listed as wet, missing, or lost. Personnel in these cohorts were apparently 

assigned doses of 200,280, or 360 mrem. 

b) Uniqueexposures of a cohortconsisting of personnelwhoseenlistedratings 

imply involvementin documented activities not typical of the average crew member. For example, 

for a one-day badging period (30 April) for USS COCOPA, there is a cohon of one Boatswain's 

Mate Chief (badged) and nine seamen; the reading is 785 mrem. There is an individual badge for 

the Chief Warrant Boatswain with a reading of 240 mrem. The remainder of valid cohort and 

individual badges for this ship for the same period are all less than or equal to 40mrem. It is likely 

that the twoindividualsweredirectlyinvolved in recoveringinstrumentsforProject 1.4. 

However, because of the difference between the two high readings, it is not clear that the 785 

mrem reading is valid for all of the seamen in the cohort. Lacking further data,it is most prudent 

to assign the 785 mrem reading to these individuals but indicate that it is a high-sided assumption. 

c) Readings of a small group of individual bndges that are much higher than the 

remainder of the crew, when the entire crew was badged and where the enlisted ntings indicate 

that it is likely that these individuals were involved in activities that would have resulted in such 

exposures. For example, there are nine individual badges for the USS RECLAIMERover the 

period 28 April-3 May. These badges, with readings ranging from 760 to 2185 mrem, were 

assigned to several Boatswain's Mates, metalsmiths, a damage controlman and a seaman. This 

identifies them as the personnel directly involved in handling andor securing contaminated mines 

and their doses are not compared to those calculated for the typical crew. 

i 
d) Cohortbadges with readings that aremarkedly different from all other cohorts 

and whose badge wearer appears to be a poor exemplar for the cohort composition. For example, 

for the period 1 through 8 May on COCOPA, the badge wearer for a cohort of twelve enlisted men 

was a Hospital Corpsman First Class. He had a recorded reading of 3150 mrem. The cohort 

consisted of ships cooks, storekeepers, stewardsmen, and one seaman, most of whom were in the 

same cohort for three other badging periods, with readings of 190,0, and 175rnrem (all below the 

overall averages for those periods). It is doubtful that a hospital corpsman could have received 

such a dose. Stipulating that he did, it is very unlikely that the other members of the cohort had 

similar exposures. 

These and other similar examples, such as obvious alphabetical cohorts with disparate 

rating groups, genersted a need to develop a set of mles for interpretation and evaluation of cohort 

badging data. The approach adopted is illustrated in tables 23 and 24. As indicated by the 

wording of the enmes in the tables, the resultant two-step screening process is qualitative and 

requires experienced judgmentin application. As applied in this evaluation, the process is a useful 

tool. 

The first step, indicated in table 23,consists of a general evaluation of the apparent 

statistical validity of the results of cohort badging of a given unit for a given period. The results 

are then compared with the reconsmcted dose for the period. If it is found that the average 

reading of the cohort badging for the period is significantly higher than the reconstructed dose, but 

the overall quality of the badging procedureis evaluated as low in all or nearly all of the criteria in 

the table, the reconstructed dose should be assigned. In all other cases, it may be advisable to 

assign the higher of the two values. 

Table 24 summarizes the results of the cohort dosimetry analysis. In units with more 

than one cohort badging period, there are significant variations in the memberships of cohorts. 

Therefore, the table is applied to each badging period andin the context of the preceding evaluation 

in table 23. Where a cohort badge readingis significantly higher than the average of all the cohort 

badges for the period, but the validity of assignment of the indicated dose to an unbadged 

individual in the cohort is generally low, the calculated dose is morecredible. 

Figures 20 and 21 summarize the cohort dosimetry data available for RECLAIMER and 

SHEA, respectively. These two ships have similar exposure scenarios (both provided support for 

Project 3.4 during the same time-frame), and the radiation environments in which they operated 

88 
2

L 

c

3 

89 
f

P, 

.-e 

C 

a -

3 

em .. E

._

J 

a 

P,

L 

b 

Q c

3 

x 

e # 

90 
.. . 

Figure 20. Film badge dosimetry for USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42). 

91 
LEGEND 

Calcul3led Mean 

wlth Bounds 

10 

91 

m 0 d

=J? 

Calculateddose: 323 mrem 

' 6 E

E 5 

5 4 

f; 

2 1 

0 

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 359 400 453 500 550 600 65U 700 

Figure 21. Film badge dosimetry for USS SHEA (DM-30). 

are similar (light fallout following Shot UNION and working in the same contaminated waters of 

the lagoon); therefore, the dosimetry for these ships wuld be expected to reflect similar exposures 

to radiation during corresponding badging periods. 

There are three badging periods on RECLAIMER, each being approximately one week 

long. During the first two periods (1 3-27 April), minimum expcsure potential existed for the 

crew. Working in the northern lagoon, they were exposed only to very low levels of contaminated 

water. Although Shot UNION did result in somefallouton the shipduring the evening of 

26 April. crew exposure to this fallout is split about equally between the second and third badging 

periods--see table 3. The low potential for exposure is reflected in both the dosimetry data for 

RECLAIMER and calculated film badge doses for thisshipduring the period 13-37 April 

(figure 20). The last badging period for RECLAIMER stms the day thc ship returned tothe 

contaminated nonhern lagoon following Shot UNION to recover the Project 3.3 mines (28 April). 

Virtually the entire crew was badged during this period. A large majority of the film badges 

recorded doses of less than 500 mrem and are consistent with the calculated film badge dose for 

the typical crew of approximately 130 mrem (figure 20). The badges for nine individuds 

(identified previously) with doses greater than 700 mrem are not included in the figure. The 

significant difference in badge readings and the ertlisted ratings of these personnel indicate that 

these men were likely directly involved in handling the contaminated mines as they u'ere hoisted 

. aboard the ship; thus, the doses they received are not typical. 

92 
Figure 21 shows the dose distribution cIf the cohort film badges on SHEA between 

30 >larch and 2 May, the only badging per3d for this ship. The ?I wet, missing, or lost badges 

(reflecting assigned doses as previously discussed) are not inc1u.L.d. The calculated fi:m bad>,: 

dose is higher than the average of the dosimetry dats, which like'y reflects that several of the 

cohorts with missing badges are coqosed of personnel *v' .>se ratkg groups would be expected 

to spena more than the average time topside. The loss of topside badges, wh1c.h tend to show 

higher exposures, weights the average cohon dose toward the lower exposure value typical of 

badges used below-decks. 

Figures 22 and 23 summarize the cohortdosimetryavailablefor COCOPA and 

XIESDER. Thesewere the principd supportships for Project 1.3 (Underwater Pressure 

>le;isdrements). However, as Indicated in the figures, there are significant differences in the 

hadging periods and the doses that represent differences in sFecific activities and exposures. as 

discussed in sectiorl 3. 

Dosimetry for four badging periods for COCOPA is depicted in figure 32. Again. there 

arc badges deletedas atypical that reflect unique activitiesof individuals or the cohorts represented. 

Tuo badges for the period 1-7 ,May with readings from 1300 to 1500 mrem for cohorts of 2 and 3 

personnel are deleted :IS atypical. A third badge with an obviously anomalous readins of 3 150 

mrem is alsodeleted. This badge waswornby the ship's hospitalman and the cohor,of 12 

includes stewards. ship's cooks and storekeepers. While it is conceivable that the hospitalman 

may have uniquely experienced this high exposure, it is clearly not representative of the cohon or 

thc crew. 

A badge for a cohort of four with a reading of 1285 mrem is deleted from thc final 

period for COCOPA (8-18 May). The rating of the badged individual. his badging history, and 

his other cohort assignments strongly indicate that he was one of the ship's divers and would 

therefore have been engaged ir. non-typical activities and exposures during this period. 

As figure 32 shows, there is generally good agreement between the film badge dow md 

thc calculated mean dose in three periods, subject to the observation that. in the second (IO \larch29 April) and third (1-7 May) badge periods, the badge readings are unusally widely distributed, 

thereby suggesting the lack of atypical activity. The dosimetry in !he last period apparently 

reflects some undocumented exposure(s). 

93 
1 

Figure 22. Film badge dosimetry for I'SS COCOPA (Am-IO11. 

94 
5 -

4 -

4mm 

ii N-5 

Wwlm1.d boss:250 mrsm f- 3 -

8 

i;ip 

I 1 1 

0 0 

LEGEND 

wah B0u.n.I~ 

Figure 23. Film badge dosinetry for USS MENDER (ARS-2). 

95 
The 34ENDER dosimetry for three badging periods is shoun in figure 1.7. The first 

period (27 March-37 April) includes an outlier at 1150 mrem for a cohort \vho\e rating iml1lics 

potentla1 unique exposures from mine handling activities. Four higher cohort h:d; "L 5 ;Ire not 

shown in the plot for the final badging period for XlENDER (1- 10 May). One badge. fc,r ;I cohort 

of five seamen, is recorded at 5250 mrem; another, for a cohort of 3 enginemen. 3500 nlrcm. 

l'uo hadges at 1000 and 1560 mrem, worn by a Boatswain's >late md a lletalsmith. arc also 

drlett.d ;ISatypical. 

The dosimetn. data for MOLALA for six badging periods is shokvn in figure 21. All hut 

{he period 13-30 Marchshow widespread badging of essentially the entire cwv. lfost of thc 

badges lack issueor collection dates. but these are inferred from film number issue sequences and 

processing dates. Collection likely occurred one day before processing. The 13-30>larch period 

consistcd of 13cohons; oneis listed as lost and another as wet. The dismhution of the rcminin; 

12 is shown in the plot. The date gap from 6 to 12 Marchis of no consequence as the ship'\ 

activities for this period resultin a reconstructed dose of only 17 mrem. 

Of greatest uncertainty is the 31 ,March-11 April badge period. Hcnvever. ;I\ the 

dominant exposure within this period is shine from YAG-40 on 3 1 hluch, the precise closing cliitc 

is n~t critical.Thisexposule suggests why many film badge readings ;Ire much hclou :fit* 

~.alculated value: those personnel who remained below had little exposurepotential. 

The badging period of 12 April-2 May included three outliers w.ith rcdin;s ot 15SO. 

1620, and 3540 mrem. These were wont by a seaman, a Quanermastcr, and ;I Ro;lt\uain'\ Jl;ttc' 

and are deleted as atypical. Similarly, forthe period 4-7 May, two badges with readinys of I700 

:Ind 12.35 mrem worn by R Boatswain's Mate and aseaman are nor plotted. For X- 16 JIA),. 

Boatswain's Mates' readings of 1610and 1730 mrem are excluded After deletion of high-rcxilng 

outliers as representing unique exposure activities, the nmn of filnl h;ldge doses for thc cntirc 

period of MOLALA's p.micipation is quitc closeto the total reconstructeddow. 

Figure 25 shows the available dosimetry data for TAWAKONI. All thrccr of the pcrind3 

(28 February-7March, 12 March-3,4 May, and 3,4-8 May) utilized cohort batiging. Tl1c 

reconstructed dose for the gap from 8 to 11 March is 91 mrem. An individxll badge uorn h), :I 

' llet:rlsmith with a reading of 1100 mrem is delered from theperiod 2s Fchruary-7 Xl;lrL~ll..1 

cohort badge worn by the Wmant Machinist with ;1 reading of 106.5 mrem is delctcd from the 3.4-

8 M;ly period. 
1 

E 

LEGEND 

Cakulald Mean 

wnh Bounds 

Figure 24. Film badge dosimetry for USS MOLALA (AT-106). 
LEGEND 

Wh Boundr 

7 

Figure 24. Film badge dosimetry for USS MOLALA (ATF-106) (Continued). 

98 
6 -

m8 5 -

€

iz 4. 

t 

e 3 -

2. 

1 -

O* 

LEGEND 

Wh Bourds 

0 

Figure 25. Film badge dosimetry for USS TAWAKONI (ATF- 114). 

99 
. 

As with MOLALA, after deletion of outliers, the mean ofthe film badge doses is 

re;1sonably close to the total reconstructed dose. 

The dosimetry data for PC-1546for two badging periods (24 February6 March and 

7 Mnrch-30 April) is plotted in figure 26. The numbers of valid cohort badges (N=4) for each 

period for the 62 personnel in this small ship weakens any inference that might be drawn from 

cnmpnrisons with the calculated dose for a typical crew member. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy 

that, within the available physical limits of a small PC, large differences in doses strongly imply 

unique activities.This wasfound to be the case in the first badging period for the cohort 

consisting of the Captain and Executive Officer. The Captain's badge, with a reading of 1600 

rnrem. was deleted as a result of recent telephone conversationswith him, in which he stated that: 

Onthe afternoon and earl,, evening of Shot BRAVO day, after tllrrlinl: 

northward to return to Bikini, PC-1536 was alerted by other ships in the 

viciniry to fallout over their intended route. Lacking a washdown spcm and 

the pumping capacity for effective use of hoses to wash down the 

superstructure,i directed the entire crew to go below decks whileI conned rile 

ship alone from the flying bridRe. i wore rain gear and, where possible, 

maneuvered the ship underrain clouds to achieve some degree of wzsldown. 

The Captain further indicated that a group of four individually badged personnel with 

badge readings of 720 to 1175 mrem wm his radsafe monitors who conducted topside surveys 

for him during this period. These are also excluded from the plot. For the remaining badges, 

there is good correlation with the calcufated dose for the first badging period. The correlation for 

the second period is not good, but neither period provides sufficient numbers for valid stalicrical 

inference. 

The film badge dosimetry for LST-I 146 for the period 19 March-3 April is shown in 

figure 27. There were fourteen cohorts. Two of the badges were indicated as wetand are not 

included; the apparent assignment of a dose of 80 mrem to these cohorts is also not included. 

As shown, the calculateddose of 190mrem for ihe typical crewmember of LST-1136 is 

somewhat on the high side of the twefve cohort badges.Thedominantcomponent ofthe 

calculated dose for LST-1146 personnel is from fallout experienced on 29 lMarch while transiting 

from Enewetak to Bikini. As previously detailed in section 3.9, the time of fallout cessation was 

100 
2 

1 

0 

- 2 

1 

0 

Figure 26. Film badge dosimetry for USS PC-1546. 

I' 

LEGEND 

J 

2 

1 

0 

Figure 27. Film badge dosimetry for USS LST-1146. 
likely somewhat earlier than that assumed in the dose reconstruction, thus the calculated dose is 

likely high-sided. The log of LST-1146 also indicates setting Condition Baker and operating the 

fire and flushing pumps over some unspecified periodof time. This implies that the ship probably 

operated the washdown system, but the dose reconstruction assumes no reduction in topside 

intensity due to washdown. It is noteworthy that, of the twelve valid cohort badges, two of the 

three badges indicated in figure 27 with levels at or above the calculated dose (230. 290) wcre 

assigned to cohorts of deck and gunnery personnel, and personnel normally standing bridge 

watches underway. This may imply exposure of the badge wearers of these cohorts during the 

period of fallout, while the washdown reduced the subsequent integrated intensities below those 

used in the dose calculations. In this event, the calculated dose is further high-sided. 

In summary, the film badge dosimeay records for the eight ships discussed herein are 

often incomplete and potentially misleading.As discussed, careful analysis and evaluation of these 

records is required. Notable problems include questionable validity of cohort composition, lack of 

recorded issue and turn-in data, and several cited cases of clearly unique but undocumented 

exposure activities by various individuals. Also, the tendency of badges covering Shot ROMEO 

exposure to read less than the reconstructed doses may reflect some undocumented exposure of the 

control badges, which is suggested by the unusually great optical densities (abut 0.4) from base 

fog during this period. 

It is noteworthy that, with careful application of the methods and logical inferences 

noted in the discussions and plotted results for tach of the ships, the overall film badge doses for 

each ship show reasonable correlation with the reconstmcted doses for the entire periods of 

participation. This is true even in the few cases where there is poor correlation for some of the 

discrete badging periods. 

102 
SECTION 7 

CONCLUSIONSANDTOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

Radiation doses are determined in this report for the crews of ,sight of the ships that 

participated in Operation CASTLE in 1954. Contributions to dose include fallout deposited on 

weather decks, shine while in proximity of contaminated vessels and from contaminated water, 

and accumulated radioactivity on hulls and in saltwater systems. Doses with uncertainties are 

calculated for the typical crewman through 31 May 1954 and thereafter if the daily increment 

exceeds 1 mrem. 

Film badge dosimetry is analyzed to establish its coverage of crew exposures and to 

compare with calculated doses. Cohon badging is assessed to determine its applicability to the 

crewmen involved, special exposures are identified, and periods of badge issue are estimated 

where inadequatelydocumented.Suitabledosimetry is thusextractedforcomparison with 

calculations over discrete periods. For most badge periods. the calculated dose lies within the 

dismbution of typical crew doses, thereby affording confidencethzt all crew-wide exposures are 

adequately incorporated. Where there is a wide distribution of badge readings, it reflects the 

diverseactivities of crewmen. Where dosimetry iscomplete, the totalcalculateddosesare 

generally in good agreement with film badge totals for average crewmembers. Calculations lead to 

larger doses where gaps ir! dosimetry existed, reflecting unbadged radiation risk activities. 

It is concluded that the reconstructed doses well semc to complete the exposure records 

for crewmenwhose1954-totalleddoses do not fully or accuratelyreflecttheirindividual 

exposures. While readings for the film badge wearers are credible, 1954-assigned doses on the 

basis of cohortsor in lieu of missingreadingsshould be considered forreplacement by 

reconstructed values. 

The total calculated dose for each ship is presented in table 25. 

103 
Table 25. Summary of calculated total doses. 

& 

USS RECLAIIMER(AKS-42) 

USS SHEA (DM-30) 

USS COCOPA (ATF-101) 

USS MENDER (ARSD-2) 

USS MOLALA (ATF-1%) 

a 

USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114) 

USS PC-;546 

USS LST- 1146 

Toral 

Dose (rem) 

+O. 39 

0.30 

-0.12 

+0.30

0.37 

-0.16 

+1.2

2.2 

-0.5 

+OS 

1.5 

~ -0.2 

1.8+0.3 

+o.8 

1.o 

-0.3 

+O. 5 

1.5 

-0.3 

+o.1 1

0.32 

-0.06 

b 

104 
SECTION 8 

LIST OF REFERENCES 

1. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation CASTLE," C)NA-TR84-6, Defense Nuclear Agency, 31 January 1984. 

2. "Compilations of Local Fallout Data from NuclearTestDetonations,1945-1962." 

Volume I1 - Oceanic U.S. Tests, DNA-1251-2-EX, Defense Nuclear Agency, 1 May 1979. 

3. Deck Logs for the following ships, 1 March-31 May 1954: USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42); 

USS LST-1157; USS SHEA (DM-30); USS COCOPA(ATF-101); USS MENDER 

('4RSD-2); USS MOLALA (ATF-106); USS TAWAKONI (Am-I11);USS PC-1546; and 

USS LST-1146. 

4. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Units at Operation CROSSROADS," DNA-TR82-05 - Volume I, Defense Nuclear Agency, 3 March 1982. 

5. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot SMOKY,"Exercise 

Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation PLUMBBOB, DNA 4747F, Defense Nuclear Agency,

May 1979. 

6. "Dismbution and Intensity of Fallout," Project 2Sa, Operation CASTLE. WT-915, March 

1956. 

7. "FinalReport,RadiologicalSafety,OperationCASTLE,Spring1954,"Volume 

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, August 1954 (unpublished). 

11, 

b 

8. "Radiological Safety," Operation CASTLE, WT-942 (EX), April 1981. 

9. "Dismbution of Radioactive Fallout by Survey and Analysis of Sea Water," Project 2.7, 

Operation CASTLE, "935 (unpublished). 

10. "Sea Minefield Neutralization by Means of aSurfaceDetonatedNuclearExplosion,"

Project 3.4, Operation CASTLE, WT-922, March 1955. 

11. "Radiation Dose Determination, USS LST-1157, Operation CASTLE," SAIC Memorandum 

to DNA, 24 November 1987. 

12. "Underwater PressureMeasurements,"Project1.4,OperationCASTLE,WT-908 

(unpublished). 

13. "ProofTesting of AtomicWeaponsShipCountermeasures,"Project6.4,Operation

CASTLE, WT-927, October 1957. 

13. "Results of Calculations of External Gamma Radiation Exposure Rates from Local Fallout 

andthe Related RadionuclideCompositions of Selected U.S.PacificEvents," UCRL53505, Lawrence Livemore National Laboratory, February 1984. 

15. Informal telephone conversation between SAIC and Captain Bruce Garlinghouse, USN 

(Ret), Commanding Officer of USS PC-1546 during Operation CASTLE, 22 August 1989. 

105 
16. “Repon of Operatian Castle; submission of,”Commanding Officer, USS CURTISS (AV-4) 

to Commander Task Group 7.3, 14 May 1954. 

17. ”Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1981-82,”Edited by Captain John Moore, RN, Jane‘s Publishing 

Company Limited, London-New York, 1981. 

1 X. “FIIDOS--AComputer Code for the Computation of Fallout Inhalation and Ingestion Dose 

to Organs,” DNA-TR-84-375,December 1985. 
APPEXDIS 

AU(;XIENTATION OF SIIIPBOARDRADIATIOSENVIRONSIENTS 

Ideally, an abundance of shipboard radiation measurements is available to define the 

to'psidecnvironment.Where such dataarelacking,auxiliary infoxmationis used. through 

appmpriute conversions, to quantify topside intensities. The radioactive decay function described 

in section 2 is an example. For those ships totally lacking intensity rcadings, the land-equivalent 

radi;ttion fields depicted in Reference 2 for fallout deposited on Bikini Lagoon provide readily 

convertible substitutes. The intensity curves depicted for all ships in section 3 do not include the 

transient contributionsfrom shine. Asidefromwater shine, which is addressed in section 2, 

exposures occurred from proximity to contaminatedvessels. As thex vessels were often of 

unreported intensities, the forcgoing approach is used for them as well. 

Intensities on contaminated ships differ from land-equivalent intensities bczause of the 

limited extent, flatness, and nonporosity of ship decks. Conversion from!and to ship levels is 

facilitated by a radiological quantity that is invariant to these differences, the surface activity per 

unit area. That quantity has been related to land intensity in Reference 18, and is rslated herein to 

all required ship intensities, through numerical methods of radiation transpon. These calculations 

conven surface activity to intensity (peak or average)on a ship of specified dimensions, and to the 

associated shine on a proximate ship of specified dimensions and separation. The calculatcd ratio 

of shine to source vessel intensity, or shine factor, is confirmed for one ship configuration by the 

available data. 

The radiation transpon calculations assume ideally flat, rectangular deck surfxes with a 

uniform dismbution of surface activity. Gamma intensity is calculated at points 3 feet above the 

deck through a spatial discretization of the radiation source. While the peak intensity is found 

through the summation of all contributions to the center point, the average intensity involves a 

double summation. This amount of computation is facilitated by applying radiation transport at a 

level commensurate with the accuncy of the underlying parameters. The unscattered photon flux, 

with a l/e attenuation length of 300 feet iF air, is computed to a satisfactory resolution for the 

geometry involved. This provides time- and cost-effective solutions that are reasonable for line-ofsight exposures for variously positioned ships. 

Ship dimensions are based on information in Reference 17, which applies to the specific 

ships in this report or to vessels related by type and class; however, estimates are required for the 
With the YAG data providing confidence that the approxim;ltion\ underlying the 

numerical methods are satihfactory, shine factors for other ship interactions are used directly ;I\ 

complwd. The :~alues are considerably less where long ships %'ere:tlon@k short swsels. 111 

these c;Ises. the proximity of the bow and stern to the radiation source is perforce 1i1nitc.d. andthe 

average shine is reduced thereby. Thus, forctn ATF alongside a barge. the shine fitctor is onl!. I/! 

as much as for a YAG radiation source; for MESDER alongside an LCL',it is half as nittch. 

Additional data from Reference I3 ax used to estimate shine factors duriq recover). and 

towing operations. The attendant intensities on MOLALA from shine were measured after Shots 

ROMEO, UNION, and YASKEE, as a function of distance from YAG-40: the clearc>t d;~ta;Ire 

108 
109 
Table 26. Additionaltopsideexposure on supporlshipsresulticgfrom 

decontaminationactivitiesandspecialprojectparticipation. 

I. Shine 

Sho: ERAVO 

COCOPA 

i 

i 

!' 

hlmh 3 

3 

5 

6 

Y 

I4 

16 

21 

Alongside YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-IO8 I 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongside LCU-638 

Alongside YFN-934 * 

4.62 

9.82 

0.40 

0.38 

0.63 

3.90 

0.60 

0.54 

622 

194 

83.0 

59.1 

30.5 

15.3 

23.6 

1.o 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.08 

0.053 

151 

101 

1 .x 

1.2 

1 .o 

3.2 

1.1 

0.03 

Shot C'NION 

I 

I 

L 

Apnl 

\lay 

27 

27 

19 

19 

2 

2 

Alongsidc YC- IO8 l/YCV-9 

Alongside YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongside YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-1081 

Alongsidc YC-IO8 I 

3.4 I 

1.33 

0.90 

1.70 

0.6 1 

5.02 

116 

60.2 

25.2 

22.0 

9.3 

8.6 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

20.9 

3.2 

1.3 

2.0 

0.3 

3.3 

I 

Shot YANKEE 

May 6 Alongsidc YCV-9 

6 Alongsidc LCU-637 

H Alongsdc YC-737 

IO Alongsidc YC-IO81 

I2 Alongsidc YC-1081 

I .o 

0.67 

0.33 

1.52 

0.43 

I580 

1280 

152 

14.4 

47.8 

0.053 

0.08 

0.053 

0.053 

0.053 

83.7 

68.6 

2.7 

6.o 

i.1 

MENDER 

,Chr,: C'STON 

April 

>lay 

26 

37 

30 

.IO 

I 

1 

Alongsidc LCU-I221 

Alongsidcvarious LCUs 

Alongside LCU-1221 

Alongsidc LCU-1224 

Alongsidc LCU- I223 

Alongsidc YC- 1081 

1.32 

3.62 

0.77 

4.8 1 

7.59 

2.60 

209 

115 

14.2 

13.6 

12.5 

11.0 

0.08 

0.08 

0.08 

0.08 

0.OH 

0.053 

22.1 

33.3 

0.9 

5.2 

7.6 

1.5 

Shqlt S.ANKEE 

Slay 6 

7 

7 

Vicinity of various LCUs 

and hxgcs 

Alongsidc various iCUs 

Alongsidc LCU-278 

8.42 

3.12 

3.13 

Id92 

475 

410 

377 

I19 

1O? 

110 
Table 26. Additional topsideexposure onsupport ships resultingfrom 

decontaminationactivitiesand special projectparticipation 

(Cgntinued). 

\larch 1 Vlcinity of YAG40 1.1 36 0.038 1.5 

IJ Alongsldc YAG4 I .30.16 0.3 0.06 

1.37 6500 0.031 276 

7.4 3500 0.03 1 760 

6.3 150 0.16 1597 

0.9 570 0.03 1 15.9 

6.7 lo6 0.16 I I4 

1 .0 25 0.03 I 0.8 

0.7 160 0.16 17.9 

0.R IO00 0 038 30.4 

2.5 138 55.2

75 

1300 

16WI 

36" 

169 

78

fa 

I300 

724 

700 

650 

0.16 

Alongsldc YAG-39 

Vrcrnlly of YAG40 

Alongsrdc YAG4 

AlWtg~~dcYAG-39 

Alongsidc YAG-39 

Alongsidc YAG-39 

Alongsldc YAG4 

Vlclnlty of YAG10 

A:ongsldc YAG4 

Alorrgsldc YAG4 

1.3 

0.9 

0.5 

1.5 

7.6 

1.5 

2.9 

0.25 

0.4 

0.3 

0.7 

0.038 

0.16 

0.0.16 

0.16 

0.16 

0.I6 

0.16 

0.16 

0.046 

0.16 

0.16 

3.7 

187 

368 

886 

206 

93.6 

27.8 

52.0 

13.3 

33.6 

72.8 

111 
Table 26. ;\dtiirion;ll topside exposure on support ships resultingfrom 

decontamination acti\ilirs and special projectparticipation

((:onfiflucd ). 

I .!X 65 0.038 3.9 

7.00 24 o.mn 1.x 

3.43 3.1 0.053 5. I 

4x7 19.3 0.053 5.0 

2.65 9.1 0.053 I .? 

1.67 7.2 0.053 0.6 

6.12 3.7 0.053 1.0 

2.32 0.15 0.16 0.09 

1.H7 0.9 0.16 0.3 

0.36 0.9 0.16 0.05 

2.02 1.4 0.05 3 0.2 

10.3 I .3 0.053 0.7 

1.60 9.0 0.053 0.8 

2.53 7.7 0.053 I .0 

Sty 6 AlOnpldC LCU-636 1.38 1300 0.08 143

7 Alongdc YCV-9 6.43 J13 0.053 I11

8 Alongside YC-1081 1 22 182 0.053 11.8
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