REL: 06/27/2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter . Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions , Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229- 0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter . 

# SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014

____________________

1121443

____________________ Ex parte Larry Webber PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Donald Sherrod et al.

v. Larry Webber) (Pickens Circuit Court, CV-13-900026)

MURDOCK, Justice. Larry Webber petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Pickens Circuit Court to vacate its August 19, 2013, order denying Webber's motion to dismiss an action filed1121443

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against him by Donald Sherrod, Helen Sherrod, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("St ate Farm"). We grant the petition. I. Facts and Procedural History In June 2011, the Sherrods hired Webber t o paint the interior of their house. The Sherrods and State Farm allege that Webber and his employees did not cover objects in the house before painting and that overspraying damaged the walls, floors, countertops, fixtures, appliances, and a numb e r of items of personal property in the house. On Ju l y 1 2 , 2 0 1 1 , D o n a l dS h e r r o ds u e dW e b b e r i n the small-claims court in Pickens County ("the small-claims-court action"). It is undisputed that Sherrod's wife Helen was not a party to the small-claims-court actio n . The complaint alleged t h a t Webber owed Sherrod $3,000 because the "[p]ainting on the inside o f m y home was not completed [and the] overspray paint all over the inside of the house" had caused damage. Following a bench trial, the d i s t r ict court -- the small-claim s court -- entered an order on November 8, 2011, which recounted that the complaint alleged that "the painting1121443

The Sh errods andSt ate Fa rm not e i n t hei r b rie f t hat 1 cop ies ofth e c omp lai nt in the sma ll- cla ims -co urtac tio n, the not ati on tha t W ebb er pai d t he ju dgme nt, andth e o rde r ack now ledgin g s ati sfa cti on of the ju dgmentth at are at tac hed to Web ber 's man damus pet iti on wer e n ot att ach ed to Web ber's mot iontodi smi ss the un der lyi ng act ion . Thu s, tho se it ems wer e not bef ore the cir cui t cou rt. " On man damus rev iew , t his Cou rt has c onsiste ntl y s tat ed tha t w e w ill no t c ons ide r mat eri als tha t hav e not bee n bef ore the tri al co ur t." Ex par te Eas t A lab amaMed. C tr ., 10 9 S o. 3d 111 4, 111 8 n .1 (Al a. 201 2). W ebb er dida tt ac h to his mot iontodi smi ss a cop y o f th e dis tri ct cou rt' s o rde r e nte rin g aju dgmentin favor of D ona ld She rro d f or $3, 136 .09 . Tha t o rde r sub sta nti all y set outth e a lle gat ion s i n t he compla intinth e sm al l-claim s-c our t a cti on. M ore ove r, in his mo tio n t o dis mis s, Web ber sta tedth at he hadpa id the ju dgmentre nde red in the sm all -cl aim s-c ou rt a cti on. I n t hei r b rie f t o t his Cou rt, th e S her rod s a nd Sta te Far m adm it tha t " [t] he sma ll cla ims ju dgmentwa s sat isf ied , butWe bbe r p res ent ed not hin g t o 3 on the inside of [the Sherrods'] home was not completed, and that [Webber] overspraye d paint such that the inside of the house and other items were damaged and had to be cleaned." The district court concluded that Donald Sherrod "is entitled to recover from [Webber] for the damage caused to his home due to overspraying of paint in the amount of $3,000, plus cost in the amount of $136.09." Webber paid the judgment a m o u n t of $3,136.09 on November 21, 2011, and the district court entered an o r d er acknowledging satisfaction of the judgment on Novembe r 2 8, 2011. 11121443

the tr ial co urttoin dic ate wh en or howitwa s s ati sfi ed. " She rro ds andSt ate Fa rm' s b rie f, p. 2. The Sh err ods an d S tat e Farm d o n ot dis put e t he authent ici ty or ver aci ty of the doc ume nts s ubm itt ed to thi s C our t, nordoth ey con ten d t hat the ex clu sio n o f t hos e d ocumen ts from o ur con sid era tio n w oul d aff ectou r d isp osi tio n o f t his pe tit ion . The y mere ly obj ect tha t t hre e o f t hos e d ocumen ts wer e n ot submit tedtothe cir cuit co urtinth e p res entac tio n. Th ey are co rre ct, bu t the su ppl eme nta l d ocumen ts onl y c onf irmin format ionth at was pro vid ed to theci rcu it cou rt. A c opyofth e i nsu ran ce con tra ct bet wee n t he She rro ds and 2 Sta te Farm w as notin clu dedinth e m ate ria ls submit tedfo r o ur rev iew . 4 In a n a f fidavit filed in the present action, Helen Sherrod stated in part that "[m]y husband sued Larry Webber in Small Claims Court. I w as not a party to this Small Claims Court case. After my husband sued Mr. Webber, we made a claim with our homeowner's insurance compan y , State Farm Fire & Casualty Company." In their response to Webber's motion to dismiss this action, the Sherrods and State Farm stated that, "[i]n December 2011, after investigating the Sherrods' claim, State Farm paid $41,996.19 to t h e S h e rrods." In her affidavit, Helen Sherrod stated that State Farm's payment was "for the damage[] to the flooring, walls and interior of the home. State Farm did not pay us for the damage[] to any of the personal property because the damage[] to the per s onal property [was] not covered by our policy." 21121443

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On March 25, 2013, t h e Sherrods and State Farm filed an acti o n i n t h e P i c k e n s C i r c u i t C o u r t a g a i n s t W e b b e r ( " t he circuit-court action " ). The complaint in the circuit-court action stated: "1. Plaintiffs, Helen Sherrod and Donald Sherrod, hired [Webber] to perform certain painting work on their residence in Pickensville, Alabama. "2. On or about June 25, 201 1 , the residence of Helen a n dD o n a l dS h e r r o d , a n dt h e i r c o n t e n t s a nd other personal property loc a ted in such residence, [were] damaged extensively due to paint overspraying, negligence, and/or p o or workmanship committed by [Webber]. "3. As a proximate consequence o f [Webber's] said conduct, the residence, real property and personal property of plaintiffs, Helen Sherrod and Donald Sherrod, [were] rendered damaged and greatly depreciated in value. "4. Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, is subrogated in part to the rights of Helen Sherrod and Donald Sherrod against [Webber] o n account of the matters set forth above. "WHEREFORE, [the Sherrods and State Farm] demand judgment in their favor and against [Webber] as follows: in fav or of the plaintiffs, Helen Sherrod and Donald Sherrod, and against [Webber] in the amount of $35,000.00 plus interest, and in favor of plaintiff, State [Farm], and against [Webber] in the amount of $41,996.19, plus interest, plus the costs accruing in this action." On May 24, 2013, Webber filed a motion t o dismiss the

co m p l a i n t , a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e a c t i o n w a s b a r r e d by the1121443

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doctrine of res judicata and the prohibition against double recovery. On June 14, 2013, the Sherrods filed a response to the motion to dismiss in which they argued that Helen Sherrod owned an undivided one-half interest in the personal property in the Sherr o d s ' r e s i dence, that she was not a party to the small-claims-court acti o n , and that she did not recover anything herself in that action. O n J u ne 21, 2013, the Sherrods and State Farm filed a second response to the motion to dismiss in which they argued that Helen Sherrod and State Farm were not parties to the small-claims-court action, that there was not "substantial identity of the part ies" between the two actions, and that the small-claims court was not a court of competent jurisdiction, for purposes of res judicata. On June 25, 2013, Webber filed a reply to the the Sherrods and State Farm's response to his motion to dismiss. In that reply, Webber noted that, as a subrogee, State Farm " s t e ps into the shoes of its subrogor and that [a] subrogee only gets those rights that i t s s u b r o g or has." On June 27, 2013, the Sherrods and State Farm filed a "Supplemental Response" to the motion to d i smiss in which they argued that Webber's motion

was procedurally flawed because, they said, he should have1121443

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raised the defenses of res judicata and double recovery in a motion for a summary judgment rather than in a motion to dismiss. On August 19, 2013, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss without explaining its reasons. This petition followed. II. Standard of Review In L l o y dN o l a n dF o u n d a t i o n , I n c . v . H e a l t h S o u t hC orp ., 979 So . 2 d 7 84, 79 2 ( Ala . 2 007 ), we obs erv ed: "Al tho ugh Hea lth Sou th' s mot ion add res sin g i ts def ens es of res jud ica ta andco lla ter al est opp el was act ual ly framedas a 'mo tio n t o d ism iss ,' the mo tio n sho uldha ve bee n t rea tedas on e see kin g asumma ry judgme nt bec aus e t he fac e o f t he compla intdi d n ot ref ere nce the priorlitiga tio n .... Fur the rmo re, th e t r i a l c o u r tc l e a r l yc o n s i d e r e dm a t t e r s o u t s i d e th e ple adi ngs inma kin g i ts det erm ina tio n, thu s con ver tin g t he Rul e 1 2(b )(6 ) m oti on to dis mis s i nto a Rule 56 , A la. R. Civ. P ., summary -ju dgment mot ion ." In th is case , t he compla intdi d n ot ack now led ge the exi ste ncean d n atu re of the ju dgmentth at resulte d f romth e

sma ll- cla ims -co urtac tio n. In ste ad, We bbe r s ubm itt ed a c opy of th at judgmen t w ithhi s m oti on to dis mis s. Th e c irc uit

cou rt was du e t o c ons ide r t hatat tachmen t, thu s e ffe cti vel y

con ver tin g Webbe r's mo tio n t o d ism iss toa mot ionfo r a1121443

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summar y j udgmen t. Se e, e.g ., Gra vem an v. Win d D rif t Owne rs' Ass 'n, In c., 60 7 S o. 2d 199 , 2 02 (Al a. 199 2) (st ati ng tha t

con ver sio n o f amo tio n t o di sm is s to a m oti on fora summar y jud gme nt "is pr ope r wher e, as her e, the pa rti es, insu ppo rt of, orinop pos iti on to, the motio n, filematter s outsi de the ple adi ngs an d t hes e matt ers ar e n ot exc lud ed by the co urt "). A pe ti tio n f or a w ritofma ndamus is anap pro pri ate met hodbywh ichtose ek thi s C our t's re vie w o f t he den ial of

a m oti on to di sm iss or fora summar y j udgmen t p red ica tedon the do ctr ine o f res j udi cat a. Expa rte LC S I nc. , 1 2 S o. 3d 55, 56 (A la. 20 08) (citin g E x p art e S ear s, Roe buc k & Co ., 895 So. 2d26 5 ( Ala . 2 004 )). S ee als o E x p art e Jeff ers on Cnt y., 656 So . 2 d 3 82 (Al a. 199 5).

"The standard governing our review of a n issue presented in a petition for the writ of mandamus is well established: "'[M]andamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only whe r e there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to th e o r d e r s o u g h t ; ( 2 ) a n i m p e r a t i v e duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied b y a r e f u s a l t o d o s o ; ( 3 ) t h e l ack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 774

- 7 5 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989)).1121443

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Our standard of rev iew for a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment is as follows:

"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion de no v o , and we use the sa m e s t a n d a r du s e db y t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e t e r m i ne whether the eviden c e presented to the trial court presents a genuine issue of mat erial fact. Bockman v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2006). Once the summary-judgment movant shows there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Id. 'We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.' 943 So. 2d at 795. We review questions of law de novo. Davis v. Hanson Aggregates Southeast, Inc., 952 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 2006)." Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. 2006). III. Analysis Webber's primary a r gument is that the circuit-court action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

"The elements of res judicata are '"(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rende r e d by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented i n both actions."' Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald, 985 So. 2d 914, 919 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998))." Greene v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 13 So. 3d 901, 910 (Ala. 2008) (emphasis added). "'If those four elements are present,1121443

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then any claim that was, or that could have been, adjudicated in t h e p r i o r a c t i o n i s b a r r e df r o mf u r t h e r l i t i g a t i o n . '" Ex pa r t e L C S I n c . , 1 2 S o . 3 d a t 5 7

- 5 8 ( q u o t i n g E q u i t y Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998)).

" '"Res judicata is a broad, judicially developed doctrine, which rests upon the ground that public policy, and th e interest of the litiga nts alike, mandate that there be an end to litigation; that those who h ave contested an issue shall be bound by the rulin g of the court; and that issues once tried shall be considered for e v e r settled between those sam e parties and their privies."'" 12 So. 3d at 57 (quoting Lee L. Saad Con str. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d 507, 516-17 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Hughes v . M a r t i n, 533 So. 2d 188, 190 (Ala. 1988) (emphasis added)). Webber's argument is straightforward. Webber notes that Donald Sherrod filed the small-claims-court action against him as a result of damage to property inside the Sherrods' house allegedly caused by "overspraying" of paint by Webber while he was painting the interior of the Sherrod s ' h o use. Donald Sherrod won a judgment against Webber in tha t a c t ion, and1121443

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Webber paid the judgm e n t . Almost two years later, Donald S h e r r o d , h i s w i f e H e l e n , a n dt h e i r h o m e o w n e r s ' i n s u r a n ce company, State Farm, filed the circuit-court action against Webber, alleging that property inside the Sherrods' house was damaged as a result of Webber's "overspraying" paint inside the house. Webber argues that the same ca u s e of action is presented in both actions, that there was a prior judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the second action was filed by the same party (Donald Sherrod) and parties with substantially the same identity (Helen Sherrod and State Farm). The Sherrods and State Farm do not dispute that there was

a p r i o r j u d g m e n t o n t h e m e r i t s a n dt h a t t h e t w o a c t ions involve the same cause of action. They also make no attempt to contend that Donald Sherrod is not the same party who initiated the small-claims-court action. Instead, they raise two arguments to explain why t h e doctrine of res judicata should not apply to the circuit- c o urt action: First, they contend t h a t the small-claims court was not a court of competent jurisdiction as t o t he claims brought in the circuit

- court action; second, they argue that neither Helen1121443

Sec tio n 12-12-31(a), Ala. Code 1975 , p rov ide s: 3 "The district court shall exercise exclusive juris d i c t i o n o v e r a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s i n w h i c h t he matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed three thou s a nd dollars ($3,000). These actions shall be placed on a small claims docket by each district court and s hall be 12 Sherrod nor State Farm were in privity with Donald Sherrod and thus tha t t h e r e i s n o t a s u b s t a n t i a l i d e n t i t y o f p a r t i es between the two actions. A. Jurisdiction of the Small-Claims Court S p e c i f ically, with regard to their first argument, the Sherrods and State Farm note that, in order for an action to be b a r r e d by the doctrine of res judicata, "'it must, among other things, ... involve a question that could h a v e b een li t i g a t e d i n t h e f o r m e r c a u s e o r p r o c e e d i n g . ' " L e e L . Saad Constr. Co., 851 So. 2d at 517 (quoting Stephenson v . B ird, 168 Ala. 363, 366, 53 So. 92, 93 (1910)). The S h e r rods and State Farm argue that their claims in the circuit-court action could not have been brought in the small-claims court because the damages claimed by the Sherrods and by State Farm in the circuit-court action exceed the $ 3 , 000 jurisdictional limit for the small-claims cou r t . See § 12-12-31(a), Ala. Code 1975. 31121443

processed according to u niform rules of simplified civil procedure as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court." 13 The Sherrods and S t a t e F arm's argument is misguided. A jurisdictional limitation on damages does not affect the res judica t a e ffect of a judgment. "A court of competent jurisdiction is a court with jurisdiction over the su b ject matter. If a court lacks jurisdiction over a claim, then that claim would not qualify as one that 'might have been tried' by that c o u r t . " L l o y d N o l a n d F o u n d . , I n c . , 9 7 9 S o . 2 d at 795 (emphasis added). "'A difference in the element of damages is not grounds for distinguishing two causes of action for res j u d i cata purposes.'" Chiepalich v. Coale, 36 So. 3d 1, 4 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Robinson v. Holley, 549 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 1989)). It is undisputed that the district court had jurisdiction

over Donald Sherrod's claim based on property damage caused by overspraying of paint. The Sherrods presumably k n ew the approximate amount of da m a ge Webber had caused soon after Webber completed the job, yet Donald Sherrod elected to file his claim in the small-claims co u r t , a court with limited jurisdiction as to damages. The fact that almost two y e a rs1121443

Res tat eme nt (Se con d) of Jud gme nts § 24 (19 82) pr ovi des : 4 "(1 ) Whe n a val id and fin al jud gme nt ren der ed in an act ionex tin gui she s t he pla int iff 's cla im pur sua nt to the ru les ofme rg er orba r ( see §§18 , 1 9), th e cla imexting uis hedin clu des al l r igh ts of the pla int ifftore med ies ag ain st the de fen dan t w ith res pec t t o a ll or anypa rt of t he tr ans act ion , o r ser ies ofco nne cte d t ran sac tio ns, out ofwh ichth e act ionar ose . "(2 ) Whatfa ctu al gro upi ng con sti tut es a 'tr ans act ion ', andwh at gro upi ngs co nst itu te a 'se rie s', ar e t o b e det erm ine d pra gma tic all y, giv ing wei ghttosu ch con sid era tio ns as whe ther th e f act s are relate d i n t ime , s pac e, ori gin , o r m oti vat ion , whe the r t heyfo rm a c onv enient tri al uni t, and whe the r t hei r t rea tment as a uni t c onf orm s t o t he par tie s' exp ect ati ons orbu sin ess un der sta ndi ng or 14 after filing that action the Sherrods decided to seek a d a m a g e s a m o u n t t h a t e x c e e d s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a m o u n t of small-claims court for the same act does n ot remove the preclusive effect of the previous judgment. The argument posited by the Sherrods and State Farm would have us approve o f a f orm of "claim-splitting" between different forums. Donald Sherrod sought and r e ceived the maximum amount available in the small-claims court. Now the Sherrods a n dS t a t e F a r ms e e k f u r t h e r d a m a g e s o n t h e s a me claim. A comment to § 24 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments well explains why this is not permissible: 41121443

usa ge. " Thi s C our t h as sta tedth at Ala bam a fol lo ws "ate st tha t in cer tai n r esp ect s i s s imi larto , b ut whi ch is notth e s ame as, the 'same tra nsa cti on' tes t, whi ch is fou nd in Res tat eme nt (Se con d) of Judgm en ts an d whic h i s a ppl iedinth e f ede ral cou rts ." Equit y Res. Mgmt. , I nc. , 7 23 So. 2d at 638 . B eca use the Sh err ods an d S ta te F armco nce de tha t t he twoac tio ns inv olv e t he same c aus e o f a cti on, th e d iff ere nce be twe en the twote sts is ir rel eva nt to the ob ser vat ionma de abo ve. 15 "Th e r u le stated in this Section as to splitting a claimi s a p p l i c a b l e a l t h o u g h t h e f i r s t a c t i o n is brought in a court which has no jurisdiction to give a judgment for more than a designated amount. When the plaintiff bri n g s an action in such a court and recovers judgment for the maximumamount which the cou r t c an award, he is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action for the balance of his claim. ... It is assumed here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same system of courts -- say a court of gene r al jurisdiction in the same state -- where he could have sued for the entire amount. ... The plaintiff, having voluntarily brought his action in a court which can grant him only limited relief, cannot insist upon maintaining another action on the claim." Rest a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) o f J u d g m e n t s § 2 4 c m t . g ( 1 9 8 2 ) . In short, the jurisdictional limitation of the small-claims court as to damages did not affect that court's "competent jurisdiction" over the claim for res judicata purposes. B. Virtual Representation of Helen Sherrod by Donald Sherrod in the Small-Claims-Court Action A question remains as t o whether the small-claims-court

a c t i o n a n dt h e c i r c u i t
- c o u r t a c t i o n s h a r e a " s u b s t a n t i al1121443

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identity of parties." As mentioned above, there is no dispute in this regard with respect to Donald Sherrod; consequently, res jud icata bars his participation in the circuit-court action. The Sherrods and State Farm maintain, however, that neither Helen Sherrod nor State Farm can be closely identified with Donald Sherrod for res judicata purposes. Webber argues that Helen Sherrod s hares an identity of interest in the subject matter of the litigation with Donald Sherrod because she is his wife, because she is a joint owner of the property that allegedly was damaged, and bec a use she and her husband jointly hired Webber to perform the services that damaged their jointly owned property. (We further note that there i s n o dispute that Helen was aware of Donald's previous action against Webber.) Under these circumstances, there is sufficient identity of interest in the subject matter of the litigation that Hele n i s b o u n d by the results of her husband's previous litigation. Th e S h errods and State Farm argue that as a co-owner of the property, Helen Sherrod is entitled to a one-half share of the damages awarded. Because s h e w a s not a party to the small-claims-court action, the Sherrods and State Farm contend1121443

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that Helen Sherrod can maintain a separate action to recover the damages she incurred individually as a result of Webber's actions. For support, the Sherrods and St ate Farm cite McClurkin v. Zie b a c h & W e bb Timber Co., 666 So. 2d 520, 522 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), in which the Court of Civil Appeals observed that, "[i]n the case of Abbot v. Braswell, 289 Ala. 90, 265 So. 2d 871 (1972), the Supreme Court held that where property is owned by joint tenants, one of them a l o n e can main t a i n a n a c t i o n f o r d a m a g e [ ] t o t h e p r o p e r t y s u f f e r ed individually by that tenant." McClurkin merely stands for the proposition that one of two joint tenants may bring an action based on damage to jointly owned real property suffered by that tenant without, in all cases, having to join the other tenant as a coplaintiff. There was no issue in McClurkin as to whether a judgment in such an action would serve as a res judicata bar to some future action by the prevailing party or someone with whom the prevailing party shared a substantial identi t y of interest. This Court has explained: "Our caselaw requires tha t 'there is a substantial identity of parties in the two actions.'1121443

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Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 772 So. 2d 437, 440 (Ala. 2000). Substantial identity requires that the '"parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement."' Stewart v. Brinley, 902 S o . 2 d 1, 10 (Ala. 2004) (quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D. Ala. 1995)). '"An exception is made to this requirement for parties in privity with a party to the prior action."' Stewart, 90 2 S o . 2d at 10 (quoting McMillian, 878 F. Supp. at 1520) (emphasis omitted). A party is deemed to be in privity with a party to a prior action when there is '"'an identity of interest in the subject matter of litigation.'"' Stewart, 902 So. 2d at 11 (quoting Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1988), quoting in turn Issue Preclusio n in Alabama, 32 Ala. L. Rev. 500, 521 (1981)). ".... "This Court has stated: '"'"A person ma y be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligne d w i th his interests as to be his virtual representative."'"' Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So. 2 d 1196, 1203 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Green v. Wedowee Hosp., 584 So. 2d 1309, 1315 ([Ala.] 1991), quoting other cases)." Greene, 13 So. 3d at 912 (emphasis added). In Owe n v. Mille r, 414 So. 2d 889 (A la. 19 81) , t his Co urt sta ted : "A non-party who has an interest sufficiently close to the matter l i t i gated and who had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding, may be bound by the earlier j u d gment. Hudson v. Wright, 164 Ala. 298, 5 1 So. 389 (1909); Moody v. Moody, 339 So. 2d 1 0 3 0 ( A la. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1035 ( A l a . 1976). See1121443

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Parklane Hosiery C o . v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1978); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). This C ourt held in Mitchell v. Austin, 266 Ala. 128, 94 So. 2d 391 (1957), that persons with mutual or successive interests in the same property may be bound by the r e sults of a prior adjudication." 414 So. 2d at 891 (emphasis added). Sim ila rly , i n Mosley v. Builders South , I n c . , 41 So. 3d 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), the Court of Civil Appeals held tha t aco rpo rat ionth at hadbe en sol elyow nedbya div orc ing wif e a nd hus ban d a t t he time o f t hei r divor ce was bou nd by the div orc e judgme nt, des pit e the fac t tha t the cor por ati on had notbe en mad e apa rtytoth e d ivo rce ac tio n, bec aus e t he

cor por ati on was "ano npa rtywh o h ad an int ere st suf fic ien tly clo se to thema tte r l iti gat ed an d who h ad an ade qua te opp ort uni ty to lit iga te the is sue inth e [ div orce ac tio n]. " 41 So. 3dat 812 . See als o S imm ons v. Si mmo ns, 99 So . 3 d 3 16, 321 (A la. Ci v. App . 2 011 ) ( con clu din g t hat, ev en if a dau ght er, anal leg ed joi nt own er of a h ous e w ithhe r m oth er, hadno t been joi nedas a par ty to an act ionbe twe en hermo the r andth e m oth er' s h usb andco nce rni ng ownersh ip of the ho use , the da ugh terwo ul d have be en bou nd by the ju dgmentinth e1121443

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act ion "[b ]ec aus e [th e dau ght er] had act ual not ice of [the hus ban d a nd wif e's ] a cti on an d an ad equ ate op por tun ityto lit iga te theva lid ityofh er claim to ownth e h ous e j oin tly wi th[h er mot her ] a s ajo intte nan t w ithri ghtof

sur viv ors hip "). W e also not e t hatfe der al cou rts ha ve hel d tha t "[a]lthough a familial relationship need not, in and of itself, confer privity status, it does constitute an important fact o r w hen assessing the preclusive effects of a prior adjudication." Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1467 (11th Cir. 1988). S ee als o Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Coniglio, 787 F.2d 1484, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff-wife was precluded from litigating claims her husband previously had litigated); Cotton v. F ederal Land Bank of Columbia, 676 F.2d 1368, 1369–71 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff-husband was precluded from litigating claims his wife previously had litigated); Seamon v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 576 F. Supp. 1458, 1460–61 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff-husband was precluded from litigating claims his wife previously had litigated ) , aff'd, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984). In sum , a s t o H ele n S her rod , a ll the el eme nts ofre s jud ic ata, in clu din g t he nec ess arysu bst ant ial id ent ityof1121443

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par tie s, are pre sen t in thi s c ase . Acc ord ing ly, He lenSh err od is bar redfr om fil ingth e c irc uit -co urtac tio n. C. St ateFa rm' s S tat us Hav ing con clu dedth at bot h D ona ld andHe lenSh err od are bar redbyt he doct rin e o f r es jud ica ta fro m f ili ng the cir cui t-c our t a cti on, we are le ft wit h t he que sti on whe the r Sta te Farm a lsois ba rre d b y t he doc tri ne of res ju dic ata . As Web berco rre ctl y o bs er ves , "[u]nder the equitable doctrine of subrogation, 'a subrogee steps into the shoes of its subrogor and that subrogee only gets those rights that its subrogor has. The s u b r o g ee can have no greater rights.'" Trott v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So. 2d 81, 87 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So. 2d 946, 958 n.5 (Ala. 1991)). Be cau se Sta te Farm's ri ght s a s asu bro gee ex ten d o nly

as faras th e r igh ts of the She rro ds, Sta te Farm als o mustbe bar redfr om fil ingth e c irc uit -co urtac tio n.

"'[ O]u r c our ts hav e a dop tedth e ru le that an ins ura nce co mpa ny' s r igh t t o s ubr oga tio n is los t a s aga ins t a wro ngd oer who , w ith out not ice ofth e i nsu rer 's rig hts , s ett led wit h a nd was releas ed fromliabil itybyth e ins ure d. A s tat eme nt fou nd at 46 C. J.S . Ins ura nce § 120 9 a t 1 55 (1 946 ) e xpr ess es bot h t hatru le andth e n atura l c onv ers e the reo f.1121443

The Sh err ods an d S tat e F arma ss er tedinth eir 5 sup ple men tal re spo nse t o t he mot iontodi smi ss tha t W ebb er sho uldbe es top pedfr om rai sin g t he def ens e o f r es ju dic ata be ca us e, "[a ]t the ti me [th e s mal l-c lai ms- cou rt] ca se was tri ed, [W ebb er] an d [ his ] att orn ey kne w t hatth e S her rod s' tot al da mages g rea tlyex cee dedth e c our t's ju ris dic tio nal lim its . T he pro perpr oce dur e w oul d h ave be en to reques t t hat the ca se be tra nsf err ed to cir cui t c our t f or fin al dis pos iti on. " TheSh err ods an d S tat e F armfa ile d t o o ffe r a ny evi den ce as to Web ber 's kno wle dge , a nd the y failed t o o ffe r anyau tho rit y i ndi ca tin g why it wou ld hav e b eenWe bbe r's res pon sib ili ty to ins istth at the cl aimag ai nsthi m w as too sma ll. W e f indth is arg ume nt to be wit hou t meri t. 22 "'" Whe n awr ong doe r c har gea ble wit h n oti ce of i nsu rer 's rig hts as sub rog ee of the in sur ed mak es a s ett lementwi th ins ure d t o whi ch insu reris not a par ty, th e set tle men t w ill be r ega rde d a s hav ingbe en mad e s ubj ecttoth e ri g h t s o ft h e i n s u r e r , a nd wit hou t d estructionth ere of; bu t a gen era l rel eas e by ins ure d t o a thi rdpe rso n w ith outno tic e o r kn o w l e d g e o ft h e i n s u r a n ce company 's rig hts is a bartoth e c o m p a n y ' s c l aim to sub rog ati on. "'" Commer cia l U nio n I ns. Co . v . B lue Cr oss & Blu e S hie ld of Ala bam a, 540 So . 2 d 1 368 , 1370 (Al a. 1989 ) (quot ingMillerv. Aut o–Owners I ns. Co ., 392 So . 2 d 1 201 , 1 203 (A la. Ci v. App . 198 1)) . 5 One le gal tr eat ise su cci nct ly summar ize d t he pri nci pleat iss ue thi s w ay:1121443

23 "Under equitable subrogation prin c iples, a subrogee h as no greater rights than the subrogor; thus, the s u b r o g ee is entitled to only those r e medies to which the subrogor is entitled, and no greater remedies. No new cause of action is created, because the claim of the subrogee is derivative of the clai m o f the subrogor, and only changes the ownership of the claim. Thus, if a subr o g o r is barred by res judicata from maintain i n g claims or lacks standing, the subrogee is equally barred." 83 C.J. S . Subrogation § 88 (2010) (footnotes omitted). S ee als o 73 Am. Jur. 2d Subrogation § 71 (2012). Unf ort una tel y f or Sta te Farm, it simplyca nno t a voi d t he fac t t hat , b eca use it s c lai m is ba sedso lel y o n i ts rig hts as

a su bro gee , i t " ' s t e p s i n t o t h e s h o e s o f [ t h e S h e r r o d s ] a nd [State Farm] only gets those rights that [th e S h errods] ha[ve].'" Trott, 97 2 S o . 2d at 87 (quoting Star Freight, Inc., 587 So. 2d at 958 n.5). As we expla ine d i n P artII I.B of thi s o pin ion , t he She rro ds are pr ecl ude d b y t he doc tri ne of

res ju dic atafr om bri ngi ng the ci rcu it- cou rt act ionag ain st Web ber . The ref ore , S tat e F armis li kew is e ba rre d f rom par tic ipa tio n i n t he cir cui t-c our t a cti on. IV. C onc lus ion We con clu de bas ed on the fo reg oin g t hatth e do ct rine of

res ju dic ataba rs theSh err ods an d Sta te Farm f rombr ing ing the ci rcu it- cou rt a ct ion . Acc ord ing ly, th e c irc uitco urt1121443

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sho uld hav e gra nte d W ebb er' s m oti on fora summar y j udgmen t o n all th e c lai ms aga ins t h im. B eca use ofou r d isp osi tio n o f thi s c aseonth e g rou nd of res ju dic ata , w e n eedno t a ddr ess Web ber 's dou ble -re cov eryar gument . We gra nt the pe tit ionfo r

a w ritofma ndamus an d d ire ct the Pi cke ns Cir cui t C our t t o

vac ate it s Augu st 19, 20 13, or deran d t o e nte r asumma ry jud gme nt in fav or of Web beras toal l c lai ms. PET ITI ON GRANTE D; WRI T I SSU ED. Stu art , B oli n, Par ker , S haw , Main , W ise , a nd Bry an, JJ ., con cur . Moo re, C. J., di sse nts .