[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6732.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6732

D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v . B ACHMAN
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6732.] Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the C ode of Judicial Conduct—Six-month suspension. (No. 2020-0739—Submitted July 22, 2020—Decided December 18, 202 0.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professiona l Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2019-061.

______________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Louis Bachman, of North Bend, Ohio, Attorne y Registration No. 0017713, was admitte d to the practice of law i n Ohio in 1984. He served as chief magistrate of the Hamilton County Court of Comm on Pleas, General Division, from January 2007 until he resigned on September 10, 2018 (except for a brief period in 2013).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 2} In a December 5, 2019 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that Bachman engaged in judicial misconduct in conjunct ion with an incident involving a woman who ha d disrupted a trial in his cou rtroom by screaming in the hallway. Bachman left the bench to locate the woman, brought her into his courtroom, summarily held her in direct contempt o f court, and when she protested his actions, increas ed her three-day jail sentenc e to ten days. {¶ 3} Based on the parties’ stipulations and evidence presented at a hearing before a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, the board found that Bachman engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended that he be su spended from the practice of law for six m onths, fully stayed on conditions. {¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct but not the
recommended sanction.
Facts and Misconduct {¶ 5} On September 4, 2018, Bachman wa s conducting an asset-forfeitur e trial in his assigned courtroom on the fifth floor of the Hamil ton County courthouse. On that day, K.J. entered the c ourthouse at approximately 7:45 a.m. with the intent to file a petition for a civil protection order. After she com pleted the necessary paperwork, an employee in the cle rk of courts’ office informed her that she had missed the 8:10 a.m. filing deadline for her petition to be hea rd that day and that she would have to return the following day. K.J. proceeded to Bachman’s courtroom in the apparent hope of having her case heard that da y. Video footage shows that in the hallway outsi de the courtroom, Bachman’s cour troom clerk spoke with K.J. Their exchange lasted for approximately two minutes. Bachman’s law clerk, who was watching the two on a video monitor, exited the courtroom and joined the brief exchange. The video shows that as the courtro om clerk turned away, K.J. was still talking, then the law clerk raised his han d and ended the
conversation.January Term, 2020

3 {¶ 6} At that point, K.J. turned away and walked down the hallway tow ard the exit, and Bachman’s law clerk began to walk back toward the courtroom. K.J. then screamed so loudly that it was heard in the courtroom and captured on the audio system that was recording the proceedings. Bachman immed iately said, “Okay, time-out” and stopped the trial. He then left the bench and exited the courtroom. At his disciplinary hearing, he testified that he s topped the trial because he could not hear a questi on asked of a witness. {¶ 7} Seeing that K.J. was walking toward the exit, Bachman ordered h er to stop and return to the courtroom. After running toward K.J. an d catching up with her near a stairwell, Bachman once again ordered her to return to the courtroom. She complied and began to walk back to the courtroom with Bachm an following
her. When K.J. turned toward the main entrance of the courtroo m, Bachman placed
his hand between her neck and her shoulder and redirected her t o a side entrance. With his hand still firmly between her neck and her shoulder, B achman directed
her into the courtroom a nd into the jury box. {¶ 8} The following exchange then occurred:

[Bachman to K.J.]: Have a seat right in that jury box, and don’t move. [Bachman to the clerk]: Get the sheriff up here. [K.J.]: What? Why? [Bachman]: If you open your mouth one more time, you’re adding on to your misery ma’am. [K.J.]: What— [Bachman]: Stop. Now—now—now, let me see who is here for my 8:30 cases.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 9} Bachman then began calling the names of the parties on his 8:30 a.m. docket. Shortly thereafter, deputies arrived. After asking K. J. to state her name, Bachman stated, “Deputies, she’s in your custody for contempt o f court for causing a ruckus which interrupted our hearing. Three days in jail.” {¶ 10} K.J. became upset, started cryin g, and yelled, “No! No!” Bach man stated, “Don’t make it worse ma’am.” After K.J. resisted the d eputies and screamed several times, Bachman said, “Ten days.” While the deputies wr estled with K.J., she yelled, “Why every time I come here to get help, you always send me to jail? You didn’t even hear what it was that I had to say and now I go t to go to jail for three days.” 1 Bachman, replied, “Now it’s ten, m a’am.” As deputies dragged K.J.
from the courtroom at Bachman’s direction, Bachman addressed on e of the deputies to congratulate him on an award th at the deputy had received; a ccording to Bachman, he was attempting to “inject some humanity” into the s ituation. Later that day, Bachman signed an orde r finding K.J. in direct contem pt of court. {¶ 11} Two days after the incident occurred, Judge Kim Burke, the administrative and presiding j udge of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, watched the video footage of the incid ent, issued an order mitigating the penalty, and ordered that K.J. be released from custody. Approximately four day s later, Bachman was informed that the ju dges were aware of his conduct and that the gene ral sentiment among them was th at he should be let go. At his disciplinary hearing, Bachman testified that he sub mitted his resignation after being told that if he r esigned, “this would be quiet and that would be it.” {¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that Bachman’s condu ct violates Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge at all times to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in t he independence, integrity, and impartiality of the

1. K.J.’s statement referred to a contempt finding that Bachman issued against her in August 2017 for knocking a sign off the wall in the hallway outside the cou rtroom after Bachman denied her ex parte application for a civil pr otection order. At his discipl inary hearing, Bachman testified that he did not recall that incident at the time of the events at issue in this case.January Term, 2020

5 judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of improp riety), 2.2 (requiring a judge to uphold and apply the law and perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially), and 2.8(B) (requiring a judge t o be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court s taff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity). We adopt these findings
of misconduct.
Sanction {¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for attorney and judicial misconduct, w e consider all relevant factors, i ncluding the ethical duties tha t the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(1 3), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. {¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that five mitigating factors are present: Bachman did not have a prior disciplinary record, had not acted with a selfish or dishonest motive, had made full and free disc losure to the board or exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, had presented evidence of his good character or reputa tion, and had had other sanction s imposed for his conduct—namely, the loss of his employment. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (6). The parties stipulated and the board agreed that just one aggravating factor is present—the vulnerability of and resultin g harm to the victim,
K.J. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8). We adopt these findings in part. We agree that Bachman did not have a prior disciplinary record, that he made a full and free
disclosure to the board or exhi bited a cooperative attitude tow ard the proceedings, had presented evidence of his good character and reputation, an d had other sanctions imposed for his conduct. However, we disagree with t he finding of the mitigating factor of absence of a dishonest or selfish motive i n this case. We find this to be an aggravating factor in addition to refusal to ackn owledge the wrongful
nature of the misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (7).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 15} The board found that Bachman had demonstrated a clear lack of patience, dignity, and courtesy, created the impression that he was not impartial, and effectively undermined the public’s confidence in the impar tiality of the judiciary. The board also found that he failed to appreciate t he inappropriateness of his actions. Although he testified that he regretted leavin g the bench that day, he expressed no remorse for the harm that he had caused to K.J. —choosing instead
to focus on the effects of his misconduct on his own career and finances. {¶ 16} The board considered three cases in which we publicly reprimand ed judges who, among other things, failed to comply with rules req uiring them to act at all times in a manner that p romotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Oldfield , 140 Ohio St.3d 123, 2014-Ohio-2963, 16 N.E.3d 581 (publicly rep rimanding a judge who presided over 53 cases in which a public defender app eared as counsel while she was living in the judge’s home and riding to the cour thouse with the judge each day); Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley , 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 756 N.E.2d 104 (2001) (publicly reprimanding a judge who talked to a recently arrested person over the telephone, picked her up and drove her home, and later acce pted that person’s guilty plea in the resulting criminal case); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker , 78 Ohio St.3d 92, 676 N.E.2d 870 (1997) (publicly reprimanding a j udge who made derogatory remarks regarding a litigant’s national origin in on e case, ordered marriage as a condition of probation in three other cases, and exhibited a lack of judicial temperament in several others). {¶ 17} Although the board acknowledged that Bachman had engaged in a single, isolated instance of mis conduct, it determined that his misconduct is more egregious than that in Oldfield , Medley , and Mestemaker. The board found that
Bachman’s misconduct is more in line with the misconduct at iss ue in three cases in which we imposed fully stayed six-month suspensions on judic ial officers who had conducted ex parte and other imp roper proceedings in their courtrooms.January Term, 2020

7 {¶ 18} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague , 88 Ohio St.3d 321, 725 N.E.2d 1108 (2000), the judge misused the authority of his judicial of fice to summon to his courtroom the owner and the driver of a vehicle that he had per sonally observed being operated in a reckless manne r. While the owner and the p erson who had been driving the vehicle sat at the defendant’s table, the judge con ducted an arrogant inquisition and reprimanded them from the bench. Having previo usly threatened them with criminal charges, he stated that he was going to repo rt their driving habits to their employer. Hoague later wrote an open letter of apolog y that was published in a local newspaper and was ultimately convicted of a misdemea nor count of coercion. Upon finding that Hoague failed to act in a manner t hat promoted public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, we suspended him from the practice of law for six months but stayed the entire suspen sion on the condition that he engage in no f urther misconduct. {¶ 19} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Porzio , 160 Ohio St.3d 77, 2020-Ohio1569, 153 N.E.3d 70, we imposed the same sanction on a magistra te who, after conducting a hearing on petitions f or civil stalking protection orders, excused one of the pro se parties and then engaged in a lengthy ex parte co mmunication with the remaining party regarding the merits of the pending petitio ns. In addition to violating rules that required her to act in a manner that promo tes public confidence in the judiciary and prohibiting ex parte communications, Porzi o violated a rule requiring her to disqualify herself from any proceeding in whic h her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Porzio had no prior disciplina ry record, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, e xhibited a cooperative attitude t oward the disciplinary proceedings, and lost her job a s a result of her misconduct. {¶ 20} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum , 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012- Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, a judge interceded in a probation ma tter that was within the province of the proba tion department, used vulgar an d intemperate language while lecturing the pr obationer in his courtroom, and did so when neitherS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 the probationer’s counsel nor the prosecutor were present. He also unnecessarily injected himself into an internal police-department investigati on related to a criminal case that was pending in his court and in an open cour troom, accused the police department of engaging in a coverup. We imposed a condi tionally stayed six-month suspension on Elum for his misconduct, which included all three of the
rule violations that Bachma n has been found to have committed i n this case. {¶ 21} Based on these cases, the board recommends that we impose a sanction of a six-month suspension stayed in its entirety. How ever, we find that a stayed suspension is not commens urate with the judicial miscond uct in this case. When a judicial officer’s misconduc t causes harm in the form of incarceration, that abuse of the public trust warrant s an actual suspension from th e practice of law. {¶ 22} The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintai n and enhance public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill , 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio- 4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33 . Sanc tions serve as a deterrent to similar violations by judicial officers in the fut ure, they notify the public of the self-regulating na ture of the legal profession, a nd they build confidence in the legitimacy and integrity of the judiciary. Disciplinary Counsel v.

Horton , 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 561, ¶ 60. {¶ 23} Judicial officers have inherent a uthority to summarily punish f or direct contempt to secure the e ffective administration of justi ce and the dignity of
the court. See Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). And R.C. 2705.01 permits a judicial of ficer to summarily punish a person whose misbehavior in or near the courtroom “obs truct[s] the administration of justice.” But in this case, the scream outsi de Bachman’s courtroom can be characterized only as a distraction at best or a momentary interruption to the proceedings at worst. The only obstruction to the administration of justice that day occurre d due to Bachman’s misconduct.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 24} Bachman testified at his disciplinary hearing that the scream prevented him from being able to hear a question that was being asked of a witness. While the scream may have interrupted the trial occurring in Ba chman’s courtroom, it was a far cry from obstructing the trial. “Trial courts * * * must be on guard against confusing offenses to th eir sensibilities with obstruct ion to the administration of justice.” Brown v. United States , 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958). “The record must demonstrate that the co ntemnor had an intent to obstruct the administration of justice or disobey an order of the court.” DeMoss v. Lappin , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 16428, 16566, 1994 Lexis 2622 (June 15, 1994). Because of the summary nature of punishment for a d irect-contempt conviction, the obstruction must pose an imminent threat to the administration of justice; it is not even enough that the obstruction poses a lik ely or probable threat.

In re LoDico , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003-CA-00446, 2005-Ohio-172, ¶ 48, citin g In
re Little , 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972), and Craig v. Harney , 331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947). There is nothing in the record to suggest that K.J. screamed to prevent Bachman from co nducting the trial. Understandably, the scream likely frustrated or angered Bachman , but under no circumstances could the scream be viewed as rising to the level of obstructing the trial or presenting an imminent threat to the administration of justice. Bachman admitted as much at his disciplinary hearing. And when K.J. pro tested, asking why she was being thrown in jail and causing sheriff’s deputies to physically subdue her and remove her from the jury box where Bachman had seated her, Bachman compounded his misconduct by more th an tripling her jail senten ce. {¶ 25} This court has made clear that the power to punish for contempt is properly used to secure the dignity of the courts, not to demea n and intimidate people. Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox , 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007-Ohio-979, 862 N.E.2d 514, ¶ 41. Abuse of this power “ ‘not only throws doubt s on [the judicial officer’s] impartiality, but also weakens the public’s percepti on of the integrity ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 the judiciary.’ ” Id ., quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto , 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 114, 760 N.E.2d 412 (2002). {¶ 26} In Cox , we imposed an indefinite suspension on a former judge for three counts of misconduct, one o f which involved abuse of his power of contempt. Relative to that count, the judge ordered the arrest of a perso n who, upon learning that his nephew had to pay an additional $200 fee in his case b efore the judge, remarked to a court cashier that “judges can be crooks, too.” Id . at ¶ 5. After the cashier reported the remark to the judge, the judge ordered the person’s arrest and the person was held in custody for three hours. Because the ju dge’s abuse of the contempt power seriously undermined the goals of strengthening public confidence in a fair and impartial judiciar y, we imposed “an equally serio us sanction * * * for the public’s protection and as a deterrent to such subversive c onduct in the future.”
Id . at ¶ 42. {¶ 27} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker , we imposed an 18-month suspension, with six months stayed, on a judge for multiple ins tances of misconduct, one of which involve d jailing a gallery spectator f or contempt without cause. 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635, 876 N.E.2d 556. The incident arose when the judge ordered a woman w ho was watching her daughter’s probationviolation hearing to leave the courtroom because the woman had raised her hand. When she protested slightly, the judge told her to “just leave” and that he had “heard enough” out of her. Id . at ¶ 8. He then threatened to put her “in [her] daughter’s place” if she did not leave. The woman started to leave the co urtroom, muttering, “I can’t believe this,” but the judge called her back and found her in contempt of

court. Id . The judge then sentenced her to 24 hours in jail. In our an alysis of this abuse of judicial authority, we s tated that “[t]he measured and even-handed administration of justice is central to our judicial system.” Id . at ¶ 9. And with respect to this count of misconduct, we found that the judge ha d “stained theJanuary Term, 2020

11 integrity of that system with his intemperate, unreasonable, an d vindictive decision to eject this spectator from th e courtroom and jail her for con tempt.” Id

. {¶ 28} Despite the fact that Cox and Parker both involved multiple acts of judicial misconduct, the two cas es are instructive regarding th e appropriate sanction in this case because they both involved an abuse of the judicia l power to punish for contempt that resulted in a person’s incarceration. {¶ 29} When determining a sanction for professional mis conduct, injury caused by the misconduct is a factor that this court considers. Elum , 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, at ¶ 20, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell , 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53

. K.J. did not testify at Bachman’s disciplinary hearing, and there is not hing in the record to indicate why that was the case. However, the video footage of the incident is revealing and disturbing. It show s Bachman exiting the courtro om in his robe and running down the hallway in pursuit of K.J. He accosts her at the elevators and returns her to his courtroom. Once there, Bachman walks her th rough the crowded courtroom with his hand on her shoulder, places her in a seat i n his jury box, and orders her not to move just befo re summoning the sheriff. Mult iple sheriff’s deputies soon arrive, and Bachman orders them to take K.J. into custody and to jail her for three days for contempt, causing her to cry and attempt to leave the jury
box. {¶ 30} The next 20 minutes of the vide o are difficult to watch. While K.J. resists being arrested and plead s with Bachman to explain why s he is being jailed for three days, she is physically subdued by two deputies, thre atened with being tased, and ultimately dragged from the jury box by several depu ties. Bachman’s only response is to increase her jail sentence to ten days. No t only is the chain of events set in motion by Bachman’s misconduct physically and emo tionally harmful to K.J., the incident exposed the sheriff’s deputies and other court personnel to harm from a violent and unnecessary arrest on full display in front of a courtroom full ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 people who have no other choice but to sit silently and witness such a disturbing sight. Bachman then congratulates a deputy on an award the dep uty had recently received and resumes the proceeding as if nothing out of the or dinary has just transpired. Meanwhile, the vide o footage shows, while K.J. con tinues protesting her arrest, she is dragged, yanked, pinned to a wall, and handc uffed to a chair. Before the video ends, over 20 de puties and members of the cour t staff are involved in jailing K.J.—all because of a scream of frustration in the h allway that lasted one
second. {¶ 31} Although Bachman stipulated that K.J. was the victim of his
misconduct and that she was vulne rable, the board found that Ba chman’s hearing testimony demonstrated his lack of understanding of the harm he had caused. The board report specifically states:

[Bachman’s] testimony demonstrated a lack of insight as to the inappropriateness of his ac tions. His biggest regret was l eaving the bench that day. He did not show any remorse for the effect s of the incident on [K.J.] but rather focused on the impact it had on his career and his resulting financial loss. He defended his actio n as being within the law rather than * * * an appropriate exercise of the contempt power.

Bachman’s sentencing K.J. to ten days in jail for a one-second scream in the hallway as she was leaving his courtroom area and for questioni ng why she was being jailed is outrageous. The spectacle his conduct created was even more appalling and demonstrates his utter indifference to the harm h e caused K.J. and the integrity of the judiciary. {¶ 32} This court has made clear that judicial misconduct that abuses the public trust will result in “significant consequences.” Horton , 158 Ohio St.3d 76,January Term, 2020

13 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 561, at ¶ 77. A fully stayed six-month suspension for Bachman’s judicial misconduct is not a significant consequence. In a unanimous
decision in Horton , this court imposed an indefinite suspension from the practice of law on a former judge who, while in office, sexually harassed memb ers of his staff, created a hostile work environment, misused county resou rces to benefit his judicial campaign, and blamed h is staff for causing his unethic al behavior. Although we rightfully found that Horton’s actions were inappro priate, unethical, and egregious based on the imbalance of power he had over his s taff, the people who were subjected to his misc onduct at least had some ability to extricate themselves from the abuse, imbalance of power notwithstanding. K.J. and others like her who have been imprope rly jailed did not have that abil ity. {¶ 33} The power to summarily punish for direct contempt is not temper ed by the rigors of due process. It is a prodigious power that is not to be invoked for actions that offend one’s sensibilities or when a judicial offi cer feels personally affronted or disrespected. There are other, less severe, ways of handling disruptive courthouse conduct, ranging from a momentary pause (which would have averted this case) to ordering someone’s departure from the courtroom o r the courthouse. And with tremendous powers co me tremendous responsibilities. T he administrative and presiding j udge of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas recognized this when she ordered K.J. released from jail. 2 Disciplinary cases involving an abuse of judicial pow er, particularly one deprivin g a person of his or her liberty, is a significant v iolation of the public trust. E ven considering the

2. As a reminder, Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(a) requires an attorney to s elf-report his or her violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raise a question about the a ttorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy , 140 Ohio St.3d 391, 2014-Ohio3774, 18 N.E.3d 1191, ¶ 14. And Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) requires a ttorneys to report any ethical violation by a judicial officer. See generally Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform , 16 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 259 (2003). This incident occurred in September 2018, but the disciplinary complaint agai nst Bachman was not filed until December 2019. It is unclear from the record how Bachman’s mis conduct was reported.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 mitigating factors present in Bach man’s case and that as a resu lt of his misconduct he resigned his position, a fully stayed six-month suspension i s not a sanction
commensurate with his misconduct. {¶ 34} We recognize the many circumsta nces under which trial-court judges and magistrates can become exasperated with the courthou se conduct of parties, lawyers, and the public . Judicial officers are human beings with the full range of human emotions. But when lawyers become judicial offi cers, they are
held to an additional—and a higher—standard of conduct. See Jud.Cond.R., Preamble [3]. This is particul arly so because of the many ways in which a judicial officer can deprive a person of pr operty and, more importantly, of liberty. {¶ 35} Sending someone to jail is not t he adult equivalent to sending a child to his or her room for a time-out. Yet Bachman and other judic ial officers who
have been sanctioned for similar conduct seem to equate the two . Not only was Bachman’s jailing of K.J. unauthor ized under the contempt statu te, but he exhibited a total disregard for the reason she was at the courthouse in t he first place⸻to get a civil protection order. He al so showed a complete indifferen ce to the circumstances of her life (e.g., whether she had children or ot her family members to care for, employment she mig ht lose, or any other harm she c ould suffer), to the indignity she endured by being physically restrained in a crowd ed courtroom, and ultimately, to the loss of her liberty. {¶ 36} In indefinitely suspending the former judge in Horton , we stated that “[w]e will protect the public by sending a strong message to me mbers of the judiciary that abusing the trust of public employees and the pu blic at large will result in significant consequences.” 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-O hio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 561, at ¶ 77. Thus, a sanction more severe than a fully stayed six-month suspension not only is compelle d by Bachman’s misconduct and th e aggravating factors present in this case but is also necessary to send a st rong message toJanuary Term, 2020

15 members of the judiciary, to deter similar violations in the fu ture, and to make crystal clear to the public that this type of judicial miscondu ct will not be tolerated.
Conclusion {¶ 37} Accordingly, Michael Louis Bachman is suspended from the practice of law for six months. C osts are taxed to Bachman. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and F RENCH , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ.,

concur. K ENNEDY , J., concurs in judgment only.

F ISCHER , J., not participating.

_________________ Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Adam P. Bessler, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. Reminger Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. B orchelt, and Ian D. Mitchell, for respondent.

_________________