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MANIVANNAN SOLAIRAJ ET AL. v. MANNARINO

BUILDERS, INC.

(AC 37988)

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Pellegrino, Js.*

Argued May 19—officially released September 6, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Peck, J.)

Doris B. D’Ambrosio, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

James H. Howard, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiffs, Manivannan Solairaj

and Malini Manivannan, appeal from the judgment rendered after a trial to the court in favor of the defendant,

Mannarino Builders, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim

that the court’s findings underlying its conclusions that

(1) the plaintiffs breached the purchase agreement and

(2) the defendant did not breach the agreement were

clearly erroneous. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court in its

memorandum of decision, and procedural history, are

relevant to our determination of this appeal. On November 20, 2010, the parties entered into a purchase

agreement for the construction of a new house located

in the town of South Windsor (town). Pursuant to the

purchase agreement, the defendant agreed to construct

and sell the house to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs

agreed to purchase the house. The purchase price of

the house was $594,000 to be paid in the following

increments: $2500 at the time of signing the purchase

agreement, $56,800 additional deposit at the time of

signing the final house plan, and $534,700 at closing.1

The purchase agreement provided for a closing date on

or about March 6, 2011. During the construction, the

plaintiffs notified the defendant of their concerns

regarding the quality of the flooring and the water in the

basement. A dispute as to the quality of the construction

ensued and the parties’ relationship deteriorated.

On March 30, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a notice of lis

pendens on the town land records and, shortly thereafter, commenced this action. The defendant filed an

application to discharge the lis pendens, and a hearing

was held on June 7, 2011. At the hearing on the lis

pendens, the court, Aurigemma, J., determined that

the plaintiffs were not ‘‘ready, willing and able to purchase the property as required in order to maintain an

action for specific performance.’’ Therefore, the court

discharged the lis pendens. Shortly thereafter, the

defendant sold the house to a third party.

The plaintiffs’ original complaint alleged the following causes of action: specific performance, breach of

the purchase agreement, a violation of the Connecticut

Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) General Statutes

§ 42-110b et seq., intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer, special

defense and counterclaim alleging tortious interference

‘‘with prospective economic gain.’’ The plaintiffs

amended their complaint to delete the count alleging

specific performance. The trial was held in October,

2013; a hearing on the posttrial briefs was held on

December 8, 2014, at which time the plaintiffs withdrew

their emotional distress claims.
In its April 7, 2015 memorandum of decision, the

court, Peck, J., made the following findings. In January,

2011, the plaintiffs notified the defendant of their concerns regarding the waterin the basement and the vibration of the floor in the family room. On January 31,

2011, Robert Mannarino, the president of the defendant,

sent an e-mail responding to the plaintiffs’ concerns.

Mannarino assured the plaintiffs that he had identified

the issue concerning the water in the basement, which

was leaking in from the water collected in the front

stoop, and he would address it. Mannarino further

stated that he did not find any issue with the flooring,

but it could be inspected at the next site visit.

On February 4, 2011, the site visit took place and

soon after, on February 10, 2011, the plaintiffs e-mailed

the defendant further expressing their concerns regarding the quality of the flooring and the water leaks in

the basement. In the plaintiffs’ e-mail, they demanded

that the defendant meet a list of conditions including

(1) a detailed explanation of the cause of the floor

vibrations and a resolution through engineering means,

(2) waterproofing of the basement to be done from the

exterior of the house, (3) a certificate of inspection on

the waterproofing of the basement walls, (4) a certificate from the engineering team as to the waterproofing

done from the exterior, and (5) an additional ten year

warranty on the structure of the house at no additional

cost and warranting that the defendant will remedy any

issues within one month. The plaintiffs further stated,

in their e-mail, that they were not willing to close on

the house until all their conditions were met and that

they would terminate the purchase agreement and seek

the return of their deposit if the defendant did not agree

to satisfy their conditions.

In an e-mail sent on February 14, 2011, Mannarino

responded to each one of the plaintiffs’ demands. In

response to the plaintiffs’ first demand, Mannarino

stated that he had consulted with the defendant’s structural engineer and confirmed that the floor joist system

exceeded all of the requirements of the South Windsor

Building Code. As to the plaintiffs’ second demand,

Mannarino explained that the defendant had installed

the waterproofing product on the exterior walls. As to

the plaintiffs’ third demand, Mannarino explained that

the waterproofing had passed inspection as required

by the South Windsor Building Department and that

he would not hire an outside source to verify their

inspection. As to the plaintiffs’ fourth demand, Mannarino explained that the defendant’s structural engineer had confirmed that the basement walls were ‘‘wet

due to the pouring of the basement floor [during the

winter and] the wet propane heat . . . .’’ In responding

to the plaintiffs’ fifth demand, that is, their request for

an additional warranty, Mannarino explained that the

waterproofing product came with ‘‘a ten year warranty
and all other state warranties will apply.’’ Mannarino

suggested that the plaintiffs hire a structural engineer

and/or legal counsel to verify these findings, as the

defendant could not meet their demands, but could

‘‘provide documentation that verifies the basement and

floor system [were] built correctly.’’

On February 17, 2011, Attorney Doris B. D’Ambrosio,

the plaintiffs’ counsel, wrote to Attorney Gerald W.

Brady, the defendant’s counsel, explaining that the

plaintiffs would not be closing on March 7, 2011,

because the plaintiffs needed additional time to retain

an expert to verify the statements made by Mannarino.2

D’Ambrosio’s e-mail further stated that the plaintiffs

would not be closing on the house until ‘‘they are satisfied that those conditions have been satisfactorily rectified.’’

On March 3, 2011, Brady replied to the plaintiffs’

counsel and stated that the plaintiffs were in breach of

the purchase agreement, and that unless the plaintiffs

made final selections to the house prior to closing, the

defendant would place the house on the market. The

final selections the plaintiffs were requested to make in

preparation of closing included selecting (1)the kitchen

countertops, (2) the bathroom countertop, (3) the light

fixtures,(4)the fireplace design finish,(5)the bathroom

vanity, (6) the closet shelving and (7) the brick walkway selections.

On April 13, 2011, Attorney James H. Howard, the

defendant’s new counsel, sent a letter that provided the

plaintiffs the option to buy the house if they made ‘‘the

necessary selections by the close of business Friday

(April 15th)’’ and the closing date would be ‘‘on or

before May 6.’’ The plaintiffs neither responded to Howard’s letter nor did they make the necessary finishing

selections requested by the defendant.

Nearly two months later, on June 9, 2011, Howard

and D’Ambrosio began a course of communications

with the plaintiffs’ offering to buy the house ‘‘as is.’’

Howard responded by requesting that the plaintiffs

make a ‘‘very specific proposal’’ setting forth the closing

date, purchase price and conditions. On June 15, 2011,

D’Ambrosio e-mailed Howard not with a ‘‘very specific

proposal’’ of the plaintiffs offer, but rather, stating in

general terms that ‘‘[i]t is urgent we complete this matter as soon as possible . . . my clients are interested

in enforcing the contract.’’ In response, Howard, for a

second time, requested a ‘‘very specific proposal’’ of

the closing date, purchase price and the conditions of

the plaintiffs’ offer. The plaintiffs failed to respond to

this second request.

On June 28, 2011, however, D’Ambrosio corresponded with Howard asking him why she had not heard

anything regarding the sale of the house. On July 1, 2011,

Howard responded stating that because the plaintiffs
‘‘were not ready willing and able to buy the house, the

defendant has decided to sell the house to another

buyer.’’

Based on the preceding findings of fact, the court

concluded that ‘‘the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate by

a preponderance of the evidence that they performed

the contract or that the defendant breached the contract.’’ Accordingly, the court found that the additional

conditions the plaintiffs demanded in February and

March, 2011, ‘‘went well beyond the requirements of the

contract.’’ Therefore, by the time the plaintiffs offered to

purchase the house ‘‘as is,’’ in June, 2011, the court

determined that they had breached the purchase

agreement and the defendant had no obligation to

accept the offer.

The court further determined that because ‘‘the plaintiffs have failed to prove a breach of contract, their

CUTPA claim set forth in count two necessarily also

fail[ed] . . . [and] that there [was] utterly no evidentiary basis for a CUTPA claim.’’ As for the counterclaim,

the court found that the defendant failed to prove its

claim of tortious interference ‘‘with prospective economic gain’’ by the preponderance of the evidence.3

This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court’s factual

findings underlying its conclusions that(1)the plaintiffs

had breached the purchase agreement and (2)the defendant had not breached were clearly erroneous. Thus,

they argue, the court’s conclusions were improper.

We disagree.

At the outset, we set forth the relevant standard of

review that guides our analysis. A finding of breach of

contract is subject to the clearly erroneous standard

of review. Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v.

VitalWorks, Inc., 146 Conn. App. 169, 180, 78 A.3d 167

(2013), rev’d in part on other grounds, 322 Conn. 541,

A.3d (2016). ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous

when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘The resolution of conflicting factual claims falls within

the province of the trial court. . . . The trial court’s

findings are binding upon this court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot retry the

facts or pass on the credibility of the witness.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Carroll v. Perugini, 83 Conn.

App. 336, 339, 848 A.2d 1262 (2004). Moreover, when

the factual basis of the trial court is challenged, this

court reviews the record to determine ‘‘whether the

facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence . . . in the whole record
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola

Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 157 Conn. App. 139, 181, 117 A.3d 876, certs.

denied, 318 Conn. 902, 123 A.3d 882 (2015).

We now set forth the applicable law for breach of

contract. ‘‘The elements of a breach of contract action

are the formation of an agreement, performance by one

party, breach of the agreement by the other party and

damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Treglia

v. Santa Fuel, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 39, 45, 83 A.3d

1222 (2014). In our case law, ‘‘even a mere statement

indicating unwillingness to perform a contractual duty

owed to another may constitute a total breach of contract.’’ Carroll v. Perugini, supra, 83 Conn. App. 341.

Once a party repudiates a contract, the nonbreaching

party is excused from its obligations underthe contract.

Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd.

Partnership, supra, 157 Conn. App. 161.

We are guided further by a case both factually and

legally analogous to the present case. As in the present

case, the plaintiff and defendant in Carroll v. Perugini,

supra, 83 Conn. App. 338, entered into an agreement

for the construction of a house. In Carroll, however,

the contract stated that the defendant was not responsible for any delays that were beyond his control. During

the course of the construction process, due to an architect’s design errors in the placement of the water heater,

heating, ventilation and air conditioning units,the certificate of occupancy was denied and ‘‘[a]s a result, major

revisions were necessary before the certificate of occupancy could be issued.’’ Id., 339. The plaintiff refused

to pay the defendant for the necessary ‘‘corrective work

caused by the architect’s errors,’’ which led to a dispute

between the parties concerning who breached the contract. Id., 340. The trial court found that ‘‘the plaintiff

breached the contract by failing and refusing to pay the

defendant for work necessary to revise and complete

the project as a result of the architect’s errors.’’ Id.,

339. On appeal, this court concluded that there was

evidence to support the trial court’s finding ‘‘that the

plaintiff was in breach due to his refusal to pay the

defendant to complete the job’’ and that the defendant

was not in breach. Id., 341. Therefore this court held

that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly

erroneous. Id.

With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the

specific claims on appeal in the present case. Preliminarily, the plaintiffs contend that it was not clear why

the court found them in breach of the purchase

agreement. The plaintiffs surmise that ‘‘[i]t can be

assumed that Judge Peck has found them in breach of

contract because they did not purchase the premises.’’

The court’s decision, however, sets forth the bases for

its finding the plaintiffs in breach of the purchase

agreement including its finding that the plaintiffs
demanded conditions prior to closing that went beyond

the scope of the purchase agreement. Thus, we disagree

that the reasons for the court’s conclusion that the

plaintiffs breached the purchase agreement are not

clear. Further, we find support in the record for the

court’s factual findings and therefore are not persuaded

that they are clearly erroneous.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly

concluded that they had breached the purchase

agreement. Specifically, the plaintiffs make several

challenges to the court’s factual findings (1) as to

whetherthe plaintiffs breached the purchase agreement

and (2) that the plaintiffs told the defendant that they

would not be purchasing the house.

The following additional facts are necessary for our

determination that the court properly found that the

plaintiffs breached the purchase agreement. On February 10, 2010, the plaintiffs sent an e-mail to the defendant demanding it meet their specific conditions.4

In

its memorandum of decision, the court noted that ‘‘[i]n

their February 20,5 2011 e-mail to Mannarino, in no

uncertain terms, the plaintiffs said: ‘[w]e will not be

closing on the house until all of these conditions are

met, if you were not going to be able to meet these

conditions, we will terminate the contract and look

for an immediate return of our deposits and any other

payments that we have put into the house . . . .’ ’’ The

court found that ‘‘those conditions went well beyond

the requirements of the contract . . . .’’ The basis of

the court’s determination focused on the evidence ofthe

plaintiffs’ conduct presented at trial, including various

e-mails, testimony and the requirements under the purchase agreement.

Pursuant to the purchase agreement, the defendant

was obligated to ‘‘construct a single family residence

in . . . good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with state and local codes and regulations’’ and

the plaintiffs agreed to purchase the house at the agreed

upon purchase price. The purchase agreement

expressly stated that ‘‘[the defendant] makes no warranties under this [a]greement, except those required

by law.’’ The warranties required by law are set forth

in the General Statutes §§ 47-117 and 47-118.6

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude

that the evidence at trial supports the court’s finding

that the plaintiffs’ demands in February and March,

2011, went beyond the scope of the purchase

agreement. First, the additional ten year structural warranty demanded by the plaintiffs was not included in

the purchase agreement. Next, as the defendant

explained in its February 14, 2011 responsive e-mail,

the waterproofing product came with a ten year warranty, the foundations, i.e., the waterproofing, had
passed inspection and that a certificate from the engineering team was beyond the terms of the purchase

agreement. Mannarino further told the plaintiffs’ structural engineer that he would ‘‘double up every other

floor joist’’ to make the floor stiffer, even though he

did not believe there to be a building code violation

with the floor.

Accordingly, based on the evidence and testimony

presented at trial, the plaintiffs were protected by the

waterproofing product’s ten year warranty and entitled

to the express and implied warranties pursuant to §§ 47-

117 and 47-118. In addition, as the plaintiffs indicated

in their February 10, 2011 e-mail ‘‘[w]e will not be closing on the house until all of these conditions are met,

if you were not going to be able to meet these conditions, we will terminate the contract . . . .’’ This

demand for conditions that went beyond the scope of

the purchase agreement constituted the breach at issue

here.7 Forthose reasons, the record supports the court’s

finding that the plaintiffs breached the purchase

agreement by demanding that the defendant satisfy conditions that went beyond the scope of the purchase

agreement.

Next we address the plaintiffs’ challenge to the

court’s finding that they told the defendant that they

would not purchase the house. We are not persuaded

by the plaintiffs’ contention. We conclude that there

was evidence to support the court’s finding. The February 10, 2011 e-mail, sent by the plaintiffs to Mannarino,

the plaintiffs explicitly stated that they would ‘‘not be

closing on the house until all of these conditions are

met, if you were not going to be able to meet these

conditions, we will terminate the contract . . . .’’ In

addition, D’Ambrosio’s February 17, 2011 e-mail stated

that the plaintiffs would not be closing on the house

until ‘‘they are satisfied that those conditions have been

satisfactorily rectified.’’ The conditions demanded in

February and March, 2011, however, were not required

underthe purchase agreement. Thus, the defendant was

not required to meet the plaintiffs’ additional demands

that went beyond the scope of the purchase agreement.

Both of the plaintiffs’ e-mails established that they

would not close on the house unless the defendant

had satisfied their conditions. The record supports the

court’s finding that the plaintiffs stated that they would

not purchase the house, therefore this finding was not

clearly erroneous.8

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the court improperly

found that the defendant did not breach the purchase

agreement. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the

court’s factual findings (1) that the plaintiffs’ structural

engineer admitted that the documents he requested

were not necessary for residential construction, and
(2) that it was ‘‘unconvinced of the sincerity of’’ the

plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant had failed to tell

them the water leak in the basement had been repaired.

We disagree.

The following additional facts are necessary for our

determination that the court properly found that the

defendant did not breach the purchase agreement. In

January, 2011, the plaintiffs communicated to the defendant their concerns regarding the quality of the floors

and the basement. In response to an e-mail sent by the

plaintiffs on February 10, 2011, Mannarino replied and

explained that the defendant identified the issue regarding the water leak in the basement and stated how the

issue would be rectified. Mannarino’s e-mail further

responded to the plaintiffs’ additional concerns regarding the waterproofing, floors and warranties that came

with the waterproofing product and identified the warranties provided by state and local laws.

At trial, however, Solairaj testified that he did not

accept Mannarino’s assurance that there was not a

water issue in the basement.9 As suggested by Mannarino, the plaintiffs decided to hire Robert J. Gambino,

a structural engineer, to verify the defendant’s reason

as to why there was water in the basement and the

quality of the floors. Gambino identified twenty-four

items he believed needed further inspections in the

house. Moreover, the plaintiffs further alleged that the

defendant did not communicate with the plaintiffs that

the repair to the leak in the basement was remedied.

Therefore, the plaintiffs contend that the evidence at

trial showed that the defendant was in breach of the

purchase agreement for not initially providing them a

house without a leak in the basement.

We now address the plaintiffs’ challenge to the court’s

finding that Gambino ‘‘admitted and testified that the

documents he was requesting from the [d]efendant

were not necessary for residential construction and not

required by town or state building codes.’’ Specifically,

the plaintiffs contend that the evidence at trial showed

that Gambino testified that if the house had been built

correctly, ‘‘then there is no reason [as to] why the

[defendant] would not have access to such documents.’’

After reviewing the record, we find support for the

court’s finding, and therefore, we are not persuaded by

the plaintiffs’ challenge.

As the record reveals, Gambino identified twentyfour items that he believed needed further inspection

in the plaintiffs’ house.10 Gambino testified at trial that

the list he provided to the plaintiffs in March, 2011,

was based on his review of the purchase agreement,

contract drawings and specifications. Gambino further

testified that once the plaintiffs had provided Mannarino a copy of his letter, Mannarino called him

expressing concern for the requested information

because of the time, effort, and the costs associated
with putting it all together, and inquiring as to why

Gambino needed all this information.

During the cross-examination, however, Gambino

conceded that approximately one-half of the items were

not required for residential construction and the other

items were only required at the discretion of the town

building official.11 Although Gambino explained that all

the information he requested should have been readily

available if the structure was designed correctly, he

acknowledged that all inspections on the house had

passed the requirements of the town in March, 2011,

when he was conducting his review. Gambino further

agreed that ‘‘despite all this information that [he]

claim[ed was]required and was never done, a certificate

of occupancy was issued on the property.’’ Considering

that Gambino explicitly stated that various information

he requested was not required for residential construction and that the otheritems were discretionary, we find

support for the court’s finding. Therefore, the record

reveals that the court’s finding that ‘‘Gambino’s extensive list of items that he would need to comply with his

engagement with the plaintiffs included items, which by

his own admission, are not necessary for residential

construction,’’ was supported by Gambino’s testimony

and thus not clearly erroneous.

Finally, we address the plaintiffs’ challenge to the

court’s factual finding that the water leak in the basement was repaired by the defendant. Specifically, the

plaintiffs contend that the evidence at trial showed ‘‘that

the [d]efendant never told them that the water problem

had been repaired . . . .’’ The court’s memorandum of

decision, however, states that it’s ‘‘unconvinced of the

[argument’s] sincerity . . . .’’

The basis of the court’s finding was that Mannarino’s

e-mail on February 14, 2011, explicitly stated how the

water leak in the basement would be addressed. Mannarino explained that the waterleak was emerging from

the front stoop and that the leak would be rectified by

removing the water that collected in the stoop and

sealing the holes with an injection grout that would

prevent moisture from entering the basement. Mannarino further explained that the waterproofing product

they were using on the house came with a ten year

warranty.

The court also heard testimony, relating to the basement leak, from Mannarino and the chief building official for the town. In reviewing the testimony presented

at trial, we are mindful that this court is limited in its

review because ‘‘[w]e cannot retry the facts or pass on

the credibility of the witness.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Carroll v. Perugini, supra, 83 Conn.

App. 339. As our case law has recognized, the ‘‘resolution of conflicting factual claims falls within the province of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.
At trial, Mannarino’s testimony explained the process

of how the defendant removed the water from the front

stoop, which he also stated in his e-mail to the plaintiffs

on February 14, 2011. Mannarino testified that ‘‘[w]e

got the water out of the stoop which eventually would

have a concrete cap on it and would notleak. I explained

that to the customer . . . . I mentioned the product in

one of the e-mails . . . and that stopped the leak

instantly . . . .’’ Also, Mannarino testified that he

‘‘could not just immediately stop the leak. I wanted to

make sure that all the water was out of the stoop . . .

and there was no harm in the water leaking into [the]

basement cause it wasn’t a finished product yet.’’ Furthermore, Mannarino testified that the waterproofing

product was used on the exterior of the house and it

came with a ten year warranty that the plaintiffs would

receive at closing.

In addition, the testimony from Christopher Dougan,

the chief building official for the town, established that

the certificate of occupancy was issued on May 12, 2011.

Dougan also testified that other inspections throughout

the construction process of the house passed the

requirements set by the town, including the waterproofing system and the underground drainage system.12

The evidence established that throughout the construction process of the house the defendant had satisfied the South Windsor Building Code for residential

construction at the time the plaintiffs breached the purchase agreement. Because there is evidence to support

the court’s conclusion that the defendant did not breach

the purchase agreement and because only that court

resolves conflicting factual claims, we conclude that

the court’s findings of facts were not clearly erroneous.

See Carroll v. Perugini, supra, 83 Conn. App. 339.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting

of Chief Judge DiPentima and Judges Prescott and Pellegrino. Thereafter,

Judge Prescott recused himself and did not participate in the consideration

of the case. Judge Beach was added to the panel and has read the record

and briefs, and listened to a recording of the oral argument priorto participating in this decision.

1 At the time of dispute, the plaintiffs had paid the initial $2500 deposit

at signing and the $56,800 additional deposit at the time of signing the final

house plan. Therefore, the total deposit paid by the plaintiffs was $59,300.

2 As the court’s memorandum of decision highlights, March 7, 2011 was

one day after the expected closing date stated in the purchase agreement.

3 The defendant did not file a cross appeal challenging the court’s finding

on its tortious interference counterclaim.

4 The conditions that the plaintiffs demanded from the defendant included

(1) a detailed explanation on the cause of the floor vibrations and a resolution

through engineering means, (2) waterproofing of the basement from the

exterior of the house, (3) requiring the defendant to provide a certificate

of inspection on the waterproofing of the basement walls, (4) a certificate

from the engineering team certifying the waterproofing done from the exterior, and (5) an additional ten year warranty on the structure of the house

at no additional cost and warranting that the defendant would remedy any

issues within one month.

5 We assume that the court’s reference to the February 20, 2011 e-mail
was a scrivener’s error and that the court was referencing the plaintiffs’

e-mail dated February 10, 2011.

6 General Statutes §§ 47-117 and 47-118, provided both express and implied

warranties for newly constructed residential houses that terminate one year

after delivery of the deed or taking possession.

7 Similarly, on February 17, 2011, D’Ambrosio sent an e-mail to Brady

further stating that the plaintiffs would not be closing on the house until

‘‘they are satisfied that those conditions have been satisfactorily rectified.’’

8 The plaintiffs challenge other findings of facts as to events that occurred

after the breach of the purchase agreement; we do not address them.

9 Mannarino stated these reasons in his February 14, 2011 e-mail, which

was in response to the conditions the plaintiffs demanded in their February

10, 2011 e-mail.

10 Some of the items identified in Gambino’s twenty-four itemed informational request included further information regarding the ‘‘Design Wind

Speed . . . Design Wind Exposure Category . . . Design Wind Uplift Load

. . . Design Roof Dead Load . . . Design Roof Live Load . . . Design Attic

Dead Load . . . Design Attic Live Load . . . Design Floor Dead Loads . . .

Design Floor Live Loads . . . Load-Bearing Dimensional Lumber Certificate

of Inspection Issued by Lumber Grading or Inspection Agency . . . As-Built

Drawing Defining Structure’s Design ‘Load-Path’ Thru the Structure . . .

As-Build Drawing & Details Defining Structure’s ‘Force-Resistant’ System

. . . Wall Bracing Location & As-Built Details All Braced Wall Locations

From The Foundation Up To The Roof . . . Floor Hazards Classification

Zone . . . Soil Characteristics . . . Design Soil Bearing Capacity . . .

Footing & Foundation Wall Concrete Designs . . . Copy of Concrete Delivery Tickets Showing Conformance with Concrete Designs . . . Footing &

Foundation Reinforcement Drawings . . . As-Built Foundation Drain Layout Plan & Details . . . As-Built Foundation Waterproofing System Design &

Details . . . .’’

11 As to items one through thirteen, Gambino testified on cross-examination that ‘‘it’s up to the town building official to decide whether he wants

this information provided or not . . . .’’ As to item fifteen, Gambino stated

that it ‘‘refers to flood hazard clarification zone.’’ Pertaining to item eighteen,

Gambino testified that it was ‘‘somewhat subjective . . . .’’ As to item nineteen, Gambino testified that itreferred to the concrete delivery tickets which

he conceded were not necessary, but ‘‘Mannarino said he [could] easily

provide [them] . . . .’’ Gambino further testified that item ‘‘[t]wenty, again

[was] subjective. [That] [t]wenty-one, [twenty-two, and twenty-three] . . .

refer[ed] to as-built, which would be after the construction and therefore

do not pertain . . . prior to construction.’’

12 The inspection of the foundations passed on December 2, 2010, and the

inspection of the framing passed on February 16, 2011. Importantly, in the

comments section of the framing inspection sheet, the inspector verified

that he rechecked the family room framing for a bounce, which passed.

Also, in Dougan’s testimony he stated that all elements of the waterproofing

system and underground drainage system passed the requirements for the

town’s inspection on the foundation on December 2, 2010.