## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Rit a P. , 2013 IL App (1st) 112837

Appellate Court Caption In re Rita P., Alleg ed t o be Subject to Involuntary Medica tion (The People of the State of I llinois
, Petitioner-Appellee
, v. R i t a P., Respondent-Appe llant).

District & N o. First District, F irst Division Docke t No. 1-11-2837

Filed Fe bruar y 19, 2013

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Although responde nt’s appea l from the order authorizing the involuntary administration of psy chotropic medication was technic al l y moot as a result of the expiration of the 90-day duration of the order
, the collater al
conseque nces exception to the mootness doctrine applied, and due to the trial court’s failure to make the fac tual finding s in writing as require d by section 3-816(a ) of the Mental Hea lth an d Deve lopmental Disabilities Code, the order was reve rsed to protec t responde nt from collater al
conseque nces.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 2011-COMH-2560; the Hon. Paul A. Ka

rkula, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l Ver onique Ba ker and Ann Kra suski, both of Guar dianship and Advoca cy Commi ssion, of Hines, for a ppellant.

Anita M. Alvare z, State’s At torney , of Chicag o (Alan J

. Spellberg
, Assistant St ate’ s Attorney , of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE DEL ORT delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices Cunningha

m and Rochford concur red i n the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following an evidentiar y hear ing, the circu i t co u rt en t er ed an order authorizing the admini s t ration of involuntary psy chotropic medication to responde nt, Rita P., for 90 day s. On appea l, responde nt contends that the order should be reve rsed beca use the trial court failed to make fi n d i n gs of fac t, as require d by section 3-816(a ) of the Mental Hea lth and Deve lopmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 I L CS 5/ 3-816(a ) (West 2010)). Respondent also contends that the instant appea l falls within three rec og nized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. We find that the c ase is not moot, and re verse

. ¶ 2 I n Aug ust 2011, responde nt was a 51-y ear -old voluntarily admitted patient at a mental health fac ility

. One of her treating phy sicians, Dr. He Yuan, filed a petition reque sting a court order authorizing involuntary treatment, specific ally
, the administrat ion of the drug Risperidone for

up to 90 day s. ¶ 3 At the September 2, 20 1 1 h ea ri n g o n t h e p et ition, responde nt’s son, May jourio P., testified that prior to responde nt’s admission to the mental health fac ility
, he was living with her in Evanston, wher e she ran a daycar e fac ility

. In J anuar y 2008, May

jourio P. noticed that responde nt was becoming angry and isolated, and she discussed how she was g oing to harm the people who had wrong ed h er

. In Marc h 2009, responde nt started to talk to herse lf. In Dec ember 2009, responde nt was involved in choir prac tice at her churc h, and May jourio P. noticed that she develope d differ ent persona lities that she said wer e members of her churc h. Respondent started using differ ent voices to tal k to herse lf. Shortly there afte r, responde nt stopped g oing to choir prac tice and told May jourio P

. in Fe bruar

y 2010 that she was “spiritually rape d” by members of the churc h in her house, althoug h these people had never phy sically

been to the house

. ¶ 4 As responde nt’s condition deter iorated, she n egl ec t ed h er re s p o n s ibilit ies and had

conver sations with herse lf using up to 15 d i ff er en t v o ices at a time. Although responde nt continued runnin g t h e d ay care, one of her own children had to be with her in case she beca me distracted a

nd could not provide proper car e. In September 2010, when May jourio P. witnessed responde nt choking herse lf, she claimed that “the voices” or “the churc h” was

-2-choking her. Respondent attempted to obtain a g un license and told May jourio P. that she

was g oing to kill the churc h members beca use they wer e choking her. In Fe bruar y and Marc h 2011 responde nt place d open con tainers of g asoline i n her house and st ated that it was for “experiments.” ¶ 5 One day in late J uly 2011, May jourio P. came home from work at about 6 p.m. and saw responde nt ly ing in bed. May jourio P. thought she was dead beca use she was not responding
to him. He shook her and told her to g et out of bed. After about 1 0 m i n u t es , responde nt replied in a man’s voice that “Rita [i s] dead,” and May jourio P. lifted her out of bed. He told responde nt that he was taking her to the hospital, a nd she resisted by punching and kicking him. May jourio P. called the police , who took her to the hospital. ¶ 6 Dr. He Yuan testified that he was a psy chiatrist at Chicag o Read Menta l Health Center (Read) and that responde nt was admitted there on August 3, 2011. Yuan first saw responde nt

on August 5 and then saw her almos t d ai l y

. He believed that responde nt suffe red from “schizop h re nia para

noid ty pe” disorder. Specifica lly
, responde nt suffe red from delusions
reg ardingmembers of

her church that she claimed embodied her and that she attempted to choke herse lf beca

use she wanted to kill the people inside of her. Ba sed on her del u sions, which sometimes wer e expressed throug h ang er, Yuan beli ev ed responde nt might be dang erous. He soug ht to medicate responde nt with the antipsy chotic medication Risperidone to treat he r schizophrenia. ¶ 7 Respondent testified that she had a home daycar e business that she closed due to the bad
economy

. S h e subsequently filed for bankruptc y and was awa rded g ener al assistance

. Respondent was on sever al boar ds in the community
, including the Communi ty Economic Deve lopment A ssociation, of which she was nominated as the trea surer betwee n April and J une 2011. Be g inning in 2009, churc h members threatened responde nt w ith bodily harm, and she filed numerous police repor ts to that eff

ect. Respondent noted that when police remove d her f rom her house , she initially went to Evanston hospital befor e g oing to Rea d. ¶ 8 Following argument, the court g rante d the petition. In d o i n g so, the court stated, “The testimony here is overwhelming in support of the State’s petition. All three witnesses and all the observations of the Court made in open court today so I am g oing to g rant the petition.” This appea l followed. ¶ 9 There is no dispute that the case underly ing the instant appea l is technica lly moot, as the circ uit court’s 90-day involuntary medication order expired on Dec ember 1, 2011. Howeve r, responde nt contends that her appea l falls within sever al exceptions to the mootness doctrine. I n particula

r, responde nt argues that three exceptions apply : the collater al conseque nces exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capa ble of repe tition y et avoiding revie w. ¶ 10 The c ollatera l conseque nces e x ception allows a revie wing court to c onsider a c ase that is otherwise moot wher e an order for involuntary treatment “could return to plague t h e responde nt in some future proce eding s or could aff ect other aspec ts of the responde nt’s life.” In r e V a l Q.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 155, 159 (2009); see also In re Dawn H.
, 2012 I L App (2d) 111013, ¶ 13. For example, reve rsal of an involuntary treatment order could provide a basis for a m o t i o n in limine in a future proce eding that would prohibit any mention of the prior

-3-treatment. In re Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d 345, 3 6 2 (2 0 0 9 ). The exception applies to a first

involuntary -trea

tment o rder (

In re Linda K.
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 1146, 1150 (2011))
, but not wher e the responde nt has previously been subject to i n v o luntary treatment, since in those circ umstances, any collater al conseque nces would have alre ady attache d ( Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d at 362-63). ¶ 11 I n this case , the parties corr ectly ag ree that responde nt has not been previously subject
to an order for involuntary administration of m edica tion or other invol untary trea tment. In addition, g iven her diag nosis, it is likely responde nt may be subject to future proce eding s that would be adver sely impacted by past involuntary treatment. Given these circ umstances, we conclude that the collater al conse quence s exception to the mootness doctrine applies. ¶ 12 I n so finding
, we reje ct the State’s contention that resp o n d en t ’s m en t al illness and hospitaliz ation indicate collatera l conseque nces have already at t ached. Alt houg h the S tate cites In re Jame

s H.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 897, 903 (2010), in suppor t of its argument, the court in that case primarily relied on the fac t that responde nt had a rec ord with the Secre t Service
, which responde nt does not. Moreove r, this court has applied the collater al co n s equenc es exception because the fac t responde nt ha s a mental illness and is a dang er to herse lf means she will likely

be subjec t to future proce eding s that could be adver sely aff ecte d by her first i n v o l u n tary order

. In re Gloria C.
, 401 I ll. App. 3d 271, 276 (2010). In light o f o u r deter mination, we need not addre s s t h e public interest exception to mootness or the exception for issues capa

ble of re petition y et avoiding review. S ee In re Vanessa K

. , 2011 I LApp (3d) 100545, ¶

16. ¶ 13 Respondent filed a motion befor e oral argument seeking leave to cite In re Madison H.
, 215 I ll. 2d 364 (2005). The State had no objection to the motion. We now g rant the motion and turn to the mer its of the case

. ¶ 14 Respondent contends that by failing to state on the reco rd o r i n a wr itten order its finding s of fac t, the trial court failed to comply with section 3-816(a ) of the Code, whi ch provides that courts order ing involuntary treatment shall do so in writing and shall state the finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law on the r ecor d. 405 I L CS 5/ 3-816(a ) (West 2010). ¶ 15 We initially note t h at t h e trial court may announce an oral on-the-r ecor d statement of fac tual finding s, en t er a sufficie ntly detailed written order containing fac tual finding s, or both. Her e, responde nt proper ly re l i es o n In r e Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d 1102 (2009), in maintaining that beca

use the trial c ourt failed to do e ither, its order must be r ever sed. ¶ 16 I n Jame

s S.
, the circ uit court enter ed an order for t h e i n v o l u n t ary administration of
psy chotropic medication. Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1105. In doing so, the trial court stated only that afte r hear ing the testimony and observing the witnesses, it found by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the responde nt was subject to inv o l u ntary medication. Jame s S.
, 388 I l l

. App. 3d at 1105. On appea l, this court reve rsed based on a finding that the circ uit court’s statement was insufficient to satisfy section 3

- 8 16(a) beca use, in essenc e, it contained no fac ts. Jame

s S. , 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1107. ¶ 17 Her e, in d el i v er i n g its ruling
, the court’s only statements were, “The testi mony here is

overwhelming in support of the State’s petition. All three witnesses and all the observations of t he C ourt made in open c o u rt today so I am going to g rant the petition.” This statement

-4-i s as l acking in fac tual detail as the statement at issue in Jame s S. In our view, it does n o t meet the require ment o f section 3-816(a ) that an order for involuntary treatment shall be

acc ompanied by a statement on the rec ord of the court’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law. Simi larly
, the court’s written finding s in this case are conclusory and not tailored to the specific fac ts of responde nt. The written order trac ks the languag e of section 2-107.1 of the Co d e ( 4 05 I L CS 5/2-107.1 (West 2010)) near ly verba tim and constitutes, at best, conclusions of fac t with no supporting detail. For example, to support involuntary medication, the statute require s “[t] hat the re cipient has a serious mental illness or developmenta l disabilit y .” 405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(4) (A) (West 2010). The wri t t en o rder states “[t] he rec ipient has a serious mental illness/developmental disability .” The statute require s “[t] hat th e rec ipient lacks the capa city to make a rea soned decision about the treatment.” 405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a5)(4) (E) (West 2010). The written order st ates, “[t ]he rec ipient lacks t h e ca p ac i t y to make

a re asoned de cision about the treatment.” ¶ 18 As in Jame

s S.
, the circ uit court in the instant case failed to make finding s of fac t on the

rec ord and f

ailed to enter

a wr itten order

that met the statutory

require ments. Acc ording ly
, we reve rse the order authorizing the administration of involuntary medication. Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1107; see also In re Joseph M.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 1167, 1183 (2010) (re versing wher e the circ uit court made no e x press fa ctual finding s relate d to whether the respondent
met the statutory criter ia for involuntary admission, but mere ly noted that there was “some evidenc e” he would be “a risk to the community ” if not medicated). ¶ 19 We also find that Madison H. supports this conclusion. I n that case , the s upreme court aff irmed t he appellate cour

t’s rema nd to the t rial court for the limit ed purpose of allowing the trial court to enter more specific finding s beca use the trial court’s prepr inted dispositi onal order
, as well as the court’s oral statements on the rec ord, lacke d the trial co u rt ’s fac tual basis for its dec ision. Madison H.
, 215 I ll. 2d at 378. The supreme court specific ally found th at the trial court’s oral statements “mirror the statutory languag e,” and “no meaning ful specific fac tual basis is evident.” Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d at 378. ¶ 20 I n rea ching this conclusion, we find unpersua sive the State’s argume nt that reve rsal is
not require d here beca

use the statutory require ments of section 3-816(a ) of the Code, i.e.
, that
courts order ing involuntary treatment shall sta t e o n t he rec ord their finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, can be viewed as discretionar y rathe r than mandatory

. We disag ree and find that the requirement is mandatory

. In support of its positi on, the State primarily relies

on two criminal case s. See People v. Porter
, 122 I ll. 2d 64, 82-83 (1988) ; People v . Davis
, 93 I ll. 2d 155, 162 (1982) (c onstruing se ctions of t he C ode of Criminal Procedure of 1963

an d t h e Un i fi ed Code of Correc tions as discretionar y rathe r than mandatory

). We do not believe these case s are proper ly applied to the instant mental health case

. See In re Stephenson
, 67 I ll. 2d 544, 553-56, 560-61 (1977) (discussing the differ ence s betwee n criminal and me ntal health ca ses). ¶ 21 Unlike the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedur e of 1963, and the Unified Code of Correc tions analy

zed by the Porter and Davis courts, the provisions of the Code here must be narr owly construed to protec t the responde nt’s signific ant liberty inte r e s t in r e ma in ing fre e from unwanted treatment. In re Alaka W

. , 379 I ll. App. 3d 251, 274-75 (2008) (citing In re Barbara H.
, 183 I ll. 2d 482, 498 (1998))

. We have specific ally held that “ ‘[b] eca use *** the

-5-involuntary administration of m edications aff ect[s] important liberty interests, strict compliance with the Code’s proce dural safe g uards is require d to insure that the mental health
sy stem does not become a tool to oppress rather than to ser ve society .’ ” Jame

s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1107 (quoting In re Jones
, 318 I ll. App. 3d 1023, 1025-26 (2001))

. Moreve r, the

use of the word “shall” “ ‘dictate s the neces s ar y co m ponents of an order authorizing the involuntary administration of psy chotropic medications.’ ” Jame s S.
, 388 I ll. App. 3d at 1107 (quoting In re W

illiams , 305 I ll. App. 3d 506, 510 (1999)). ¶ 22 To meet the applicable statutory require ments, the trial co u rt i n t h i s case could, for instance, have found that responde nt require d medication beca use she had a “schizophrenic
para noid ty pe disorder.” Howeve r, beca use the trial court failed to make any finding s of fac t, it did not adher e to the statute. Had t h e passag e of time not rende red the order technica lly moot, we could rema

nd the case for entry of appropr iate finding s of fac t. Howeve r, since the 90-day administration period has e x pired, the appropr iate reme dy is to rever se the orde r to protec t respondent f

rom the orde r’s c ollatera l conseque nces.

¶ 23 Reverse d.

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