NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

JESSICA RYDER, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ERIC RYDER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0202

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2009-090035

The Honorable Benjamin R. Norris, Judge

REMANDED

COUNSEL

Jessica Ryder, San Tan Valley

Petitioner/Appellant In Propria Persona

Eric Ryder, San Tan Valley

Respondent/Appellee In Propria Persona 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

G E M M I L L, Judge:
RYDER v. RYDER

Decision of the Court

2

¶1 This is an appeal from a family court ruling altering 

parenting time and child support. For the following reasons, we vacate 

the family court’s parenting time and child support rulings and remand to 

the Honorable Benjamin R. Norris for additional findings and further 

proceedings as appropriate.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Appellant (“Mother”) and Appellee (“Father”) have one 

child. After several years of marriage, Mother filed for divorce in early 

2009. In March 2009, the court adopted a parenting plan appointing 

Mother as the primary custodial parent. Father was given parenting time 

every other weekend and shared holidays. The court ordered Father to 

pay $421.07 per month in child support plus $100 per month to satisfy 

$15,158.52 in arrears.

¶3 In May 2012, Mother filed a petition to modify child support. 

In September 2012, Father filed a petition to modify parenting time and 

child support coupled with a request to consolidate his petition for 

consideration with Mother’s child support petition. Father claimed that 

the current parenting time plan did not provide the kind of parent-child 

relationship or meaningful contact that he desired. Father requested a 5-2-

2-5 parenting plan as well as a modification to child support to reflect his 

increased time. The family court granted Father’s request to consolidate 

the petitions and set an evidentiary hearing for January 2013.

¶4 During the evidentiary hearing, Mother said that although 

she was not opposed to allowing Father more time, she either wanted to 

keep the current parenting agreement or allow Father only one extra day 

per week with daughter. Mother said that she believed the current 

schedule was fair and that it provided Father with frequent, meaningful, 

and continuing contact. Mother said that Father spent quality time with 

their daughter and did not believe he was a bad father for any reason.

Mother also said that Father was not using all of the days available to him 

under the current parenting schedule. Mother acknowledged, however, 

that Father was consistently exercising parenting time every other 

weekend. Father testified that he believed it would be in the child’s best 

interest to have a 5-2-2-5 schedule because it would allow them to spend 

more time together and have more bonding time. Father did not believe it 

would be disruptive for the child to transition to the 5-2-2-5 schedule.
RYDER v. RYDER

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 After considering the testimony of Mother, Father, and 

Father’s wife, the court ordered parenting time on a 5-2-2-5 schedule as 

well as week-on/week-off summer parenting time. The court also 

ordered detailed communication requirements. The court incorporated 

and adopted the Child Support Worksheet and ordered a reduction in 

Father’s child support payments to $229.59 per month starting in June 

2012, the month after Mother filed her original petition to modify child 

support.

¶6 Mother timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and 

-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

¶7 Mother raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the family 

court failed to make specific findings of fact and reasons for awarding a 

change in physical custody as required by A.R.S. § 25-403(B); (2) Father 

did not provide sufficient evidence to show a change in circumstances that 

would make modification of physical custody in the child’s best interest; 

and (3) the family court erred in backdating the modified child support 

payments to June 2012 because between that time and the ruling the child 

was in her primary care. Because we remand based on Mother’s first 

argument, we do not reach her other arguments.1

I. Mother Did Not Waive Her Right to Appeal by Failing to 

Request Specific Findings

 1 In regard to Mother’s argument challenging the effective date of a new 

child support order, however, we note that A.R.S. § 25-503(E) states in its 

relevant part: 

Any order for child support may be modified or terminated 

on a showing of changed circumstance that is substantial 

and continuing . . . Modification and termination are 

effective on the first day of the month following notice of the 

petition for modification or termination unless the court, for 

good cause shown, orders the change to become effective at 

a different date, but not earlier than the date of filing the 

petition for modification or termination.
RYDER v. RYDER

Decision of the Court

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¶8 Mother argues that A.R.S. § 25-403(B) requires the family 

court to set forth its specific findings on the factors set forth in A.R.S. § 25-

403(A) and its reasons supporting its decisions. Father responds that 

Mother waived her right to assert deficient findings on appeal because she 

failed to file a written request with the court for formal findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. The requirement of specific findings by the court 

in this situation, however, arises from A.R.S. § 25-403(B), not from a 

litigant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

¶9 Father additionally cites Trantor v. Fredrickson, 179 Ariz. 299, 

878 P.2d 657 (1994), to support his argument that mother waived her right 

to appeal on this basis. Trantor, however, did not create an absolute rule 

of waiver. See id. at 300, 878 P.2d at 658 (holding “absent extraordinary 

circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on 

appeal.”) (emphasis added). We decline to apply Trantor and find no 

waiver because the issues in this case turn on the best interests of a child. 

See Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 209-10, ¶ 20, 213 P.3d 353, 358-359 (App. 

2009) (declining to find waiver because the most important issue in 

custody disputes is a child’s best interests).

 

¶10 The Reid court noted that had the family court “substantially 

complied” with the statute, the appellate court would have been able to 

perform a reasonable review. Id. at 208, ¶ 16, 213 P.3d at 357

(distinguishing the immediate facts from those in Banales v. Smith, 200 

Ariz. 419, 26 P.3d 1190 (App. 2001)). Similarly, had the family court here 

made findings addressing the A.R.S. § 25-403 factors and the court’s 

consideration of the child’s best interests, as did the family court in

Banales, we would be in a position to reasonably perform an appellate 

review. See Banales, 200 Ariz at 420, ¶ 7, 26 P.3d at 1191. No such 

discussion by the family court appears on this record, however. As such,

this record is more analogous to Reid and we cannot appropriately discern

either the family court’s analysis or evaluation of the § 25-403 factors, 

which precludes reasonable appellate review of the family court’s 

decision. See Reid, 222 Ariz. at 207, ¶ 13, 213 P.3d at 356 (noting the 

inadequacy of a family court’s conclusion that it was in child’s best 

interest that mother retain custody without explaining why or which 

factors influenced its decision). For these reasons, we conclude that

Mother did not waive her right on appeal to challenge the sufficiency of 

the court’s findings. We proceed then to the merits of Mother’s first claim.
RYDER v. RYDER

Decision of the Court

5

II. The Family Court Erred by Not Making Specific Findings of Fact 

on the Record Regarding Relevant Factors and the Best Interest 

Determination.

¶11 In a contested parenting time case, A.R.S. § 25-403(B) 

provides that “the court shall make specific findings on the record about 

all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best 

interests of the child.” This court has previously held that an order failing 

to do so is deficient as a matter of law and may constitute reversible error. 

In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 526, ¶ 5, 38 P.3d 1189, 1191 (App. 

2002); see also Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420-421, ¶ 8, 79 P.3d 667, 

669-70 (App. 2003) (holding that even though the family court referenced 

A.R.S. § 25-403, it erred because it did not elaborate on how it weighed 

any of the factors). 

¶12 In this case the family court summarized witness testimony 

and then “[b]ased on the foregoing” provided its conclusions. The family 

court did not, however, reference A.R.S. § 25-403 or any of its listed 

factors, and neither did the court explain its reasoning. The family court 

erred by not complying with § 25-403, and we are unable to perform an 

appropriate appellate review. Accordingly, we will vacate the family

court’s parenting time and related child support rulings and remand to 

the Honorable Benjamin R. Norris for additional findings in accordance 

with A.R.S. § 25-403(B). The family court also has discretion to determine 

whether additional proceedings are necessary.

III. Request for Costs of Appeal

¶13 Although Mother did not retain an attorney, she requests 

that her costs be paid by the Appellee. Mother is awarded her taxable 

costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-342.
RYDER v. RYDER

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶14 We vacate the family court’s parenting time and child 

support orders and remand to the Honorable Benjamin R. Norris for

additional findings on the record in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-403(B)

and for any further proceedings or rulings as may be appropriate.