RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 20a0127p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ADAMS & BOYLE, P.C. et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III et al.

Defendants-Appellants.

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No. 20-5408

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:15-cv-00705—Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: April 24, 2020

Before: MOORE, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON MOTIONS AND REPLY: Sarah K. Campbell, Steven A. Hart, Alexander S. Rieger, 

Matthew D. Cloutier, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Appellants. ON RESPONSE: Thomas H. Castelli, AMERICAN CIVIL 

LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, Genevieve Scott, 

Autumn Katz, Michelle Moriarty, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, New York, New 

York, Maithreyi Ratakonda, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, New 

York, New York, Richard Muniz, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, 

Washington, D.C., Scott P. Tift, BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC, 

Nashville, Tennessee, Michael J. Dell, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP, New 

York, New York, Julia Kaye, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New 

York, New York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Edward L. White III, AMERICAN CENTER FOR 

LAW & JUSTICE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, Laura Etlinger, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF NEW YORK, Albany, New York, Lisa T. Simpson, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & 

SUTCLIFFE LLP, New York, New York, Kevin H. Theriot, ALLIANCE DEFENDING 

FREEDOM, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Amici Curiae.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which WHITE, J., joined. THAPAR, J. 

(pp. 23–33), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

>
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case arises at the intersection of two 

essential constitutional rights: the right of a woman to control her pregnancy, on the one hand, 

and the right of the state to exercise its “police power” during an emergency, on the other. More 

specifically, we ask, does the Constitution permit a state to bar doctors from performing abortion 

procedures for a three-week period—as part of a widespread temporary ban on “elective” and 

“non-urgent” surgeries—based solely on the state’s assertion that such a bar is necessary to combat 

effectively an ongoing public health crisis? The Governor of Tennessee thought so, and 

accordingly adopted such a temporary ban on April 8, 2020, in response to the ongoing COVID19 global pandemic. The district court, however, disagreed, and accordingly issued a preliminary 

injunction on April 17, enjoining Tennessee from enforcing its general ban on elective and nonurgent surgeries against doctors performing abortion procedures. The State then filed this 

emergency appeal, and also requested that we immediately stay the district court’s injunction 

pending review.

We do not uphold an injunction against state action lightly, much less during a public health 

crisis like the one our nation is experiencing now. It is imperative in such circumstances that 

judges give legislatures and executives—the more responsive branches of government—the 

flexibility they need to respond quickly and forthrightly to threats to the general welfare, even if 

that flexibility sometimes comes at the cost of individual liberties. Affording flexibility, however, 

is not the same as abdicating responsibility, especially when well-established constitutional rights 

are at stake, as the right to an abortion most assuredly is. And, here, although we have great respect 

for the challenges Tennessee faces as it responds to this novel public health crisis, we agree with 

the district court that the State’s response, in this one respect, unduly curtailed constitutional 

liberty, and that judicial intervention was thus warranted. By the same token, however, we also 

conclude that, when it comes to the precise scope of the district court’s injunction, the district court 

went too far in asserting its authority. Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court’s order issuing 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 3

a preliminary injunction but direct the district court to MODIFY the preliminary injunction in the 

manner described below. We also DENY the State’s request for a stay pending appeal as MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

Generally speaking, a Tennessee woman wishing to exercise her constitutional right to a 

pre-viability1abortion, in a legal manner, may do so in one of three ways: (1) receive a 

“medication abortion” within the first 11 weeks from her last menstrual period (“LMP”); 

(2) receive a “procedural abortion” within the first 20 weeks LMP, meaning either (a) an 

“aspiration” abortion (which is a relatively quick clinical procedure, and can be performed up to 

approximately 15 weeks LMP), or (b) a “dilation and evacuation” (“D&E”) abortion (which is a 

more time-consuming procedure—albeit one that generally takes place in a clinical setting, too—

and is performed up to approximately 20 weeks LMP); or (3) travel to a state with more lenient 

abortion regulations. See generally R.232-5 (Looney Dec.) (Page ID #5876–77).2 Tennessee law 

also imposes a variety of other state-specific regulations, such as a 48-hour waiting period and 

mandatory in-person visitation requirements. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-15-202(a)–(h). 

Moreover, if a Tennessee woman wishes (or needs) to have a procedural abortion in-state, there 

are just a handful of providers in a handful of cities where she may do so. See R.232-6 (Terrell 

Dec.) (Page ID #5908–09) (noting that “[a]ccess to abortion care in [Tennessee] is limited to begin 

with, with only eight providers in four cities”). And of these clinics, only Planned Parenthood 

performs abortions after 15 weeks LMP. See R.232-5 (Looney Dec.) (Page ID #5877).

Still, abortion in general, and procedural abortion in particular, remains relatively 

commonplace in Tennessee, with hundreds of Tennessee women exercising their right to seek an 

abortion in any given month. See, e.g., id. at Page ID #5878 (stating that, “[i]n January through 

March 2020, [Planned Parenthood] performed 1,700 abortions in Tennessee, 917 of which were 

1As the Supreme Court clarified in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 

constitutional right to an abortion ends (with some limited exceptions) once the fetus would be “viable” outside the 

womb. 505 U.S. 833, 860, 870 (1992).

2For context, Tennessee bans abortion altogether at “viability,” which it presumes to occur at 24 weeks LMP. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-211(b)(5) (setting this as a “rebuttable presumption”). Plaintiffs do not make clear, 

however, if any recognized in-state clinics or doctors provide abortion services between 20 and 24 weeks LMP.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 4

procedural abortions and 536 of which occurred beyond eleven weeks LMP, when medication 

abortion is not an option”).

With this background in mind, we now turn to the ongoing COVID-19 public health crisis, 

an event with which all but the most secluded of readers should be familiar. Suffice it to say, 

COVID-19 is the virus at the root of an ongoing global pandemic, which, in just a few short 

months, has killed tens of thousands of people worldwide and infected hundreds of thousands 

more. See, e.g., Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, --- A.3d ---, 2020 WL 1847100, at *2 (Pa. Apr. 13, 

2020). The virus has also upended American economic and social life, causing schools and 

businesses to shutter, and even the nominally unaffected to wear masks and stand six feet apart in 

public.

Unsurprisingly, then, medical providers, including Tennessee’s abortion clinics, have had 

to modify their way of doing business, for the safety of both staff and patients. As three of the 

abortion providers involved in this litigation have attested, for instance, COVID-19 has caused 

them to put at-risk staff on furlough, bar patients from bringing companions with them to the clinic, 

cut back work days, curtail the number of personnel staffed on any given procedure, and eliminate 

non-essential wellness appointments, among other social-distancing measures. See R.232-5 

(Looney Dec.) (Page ID #5881–82) (Planned Parenthood of Tennessee and North Mississippi); 

R.232-6 (Terrell Dec.) (Page ID #5911–12) (Memphis Center for Reproductive Health); R.232-7 

(Rovetti Dec.) (Page ID #5922–23) (Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health).

Still, to the Governor of Tennessee’s eye, voluntary measures like these were not enough 

to limit effectively the spread of the virus; more compulsory measures were required. So, in 

addition to instituting a variety of sweeping “shelter-in-place” orders throughout the month of 

March, on April 8, 2020 the Governor issued a targeted directive to “[a]ll healthcare professionals 

and healthcare facilities in the State of Tennessee,” requiring that they “postpone surgical and 

invasive procedures that are elective and non-urgent,” at least until April 30, when the order would 

expire on its own terms. R.240-20 (Order) (Page ID #6115–16). This Order, titled Executive 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 5

Order 25 (“EO-25”), had the twin goals of “preserving personal protective equipment [“PPE”]3for 

emergency and essential needs and preventing community spread of COVID-19 through 

nonessential patient-provider interactions.” Id. at Page ID #6115. Its most relevant portion read 

as follows:

All healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities in the State of Tennessee shall 

postpone surgical and invasive procedures that are elective and non-urgent. 

Elective and non-urgent procedures are those procedures that can be delayed until 

the expiration of this Order because they are not required [1] to provide life 

sustaining treatment, [2] to prevent death or risk of substantial impairment of a 

major bodily function, or [3] to prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse 

consequences to a patient’s physical condition if the surgical or invasive procedure 

is not performed, as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider.

Id. at Page ID #6115–16 (alterations added).

The Order did not contain any provision specifically exempting abortion procedures, or 

suggesting that medical professionals would have leeway to perform a procedure that, in their 

clinical judgment, “would not deplete the hospital capacity or the [PPE] needed to cope with the 

COVID-19 disaster.” Compare with In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 2020) (describing 

this “important” caveat contained in an analogous Texas COVID-19-related surgery ban).

Plaintiffs—more specifically, Adams & Boyle, P.C.; Memphis Center for Reproductive 

Health; Planned Parenthood of the Greater Memphis Region; Planned Parenthood of Tennessee 

and North Mississippi; Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health; and Dr. Kimberly Looney—

subsequently interpreted EO-25 as barring the performance of any procedural4abortions between 

April 8 and April 30 (and potentially beyond that, if the Order was extended), enforceable by 

criminal sanction. See, e.g., R.232-7 (Rovetti Dec.) (Page ID #5921). And, as a result of this 

understanding, Plaintiffs temporarily cancelled all procedural abortions scheduled for that period. 

See, e.g., id. at Page ID #5924 (describing four “devastated,” “crying” clients scheduled for 

procedural abortions on April 9 that the clinic had to turn away because of EO-25); R.232-6 

3The Order defined PPE as “including, but not limited to, medical gowns, N95 masks, surgical masks, 

TYVEK suits, boot covers, gloves, and/or eye protection.” Id. at Page ID #6116.

4The parties agree that EO-25 has no effect on medication abortions, which may continue to be performed.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 6

(Terrell Dec.) (Page ID #5915–16) (describing similar incident at a different clinic, and also noting 

that the clinic had “156 patients scheduled for their mandatory [pre-abortion] in-person counseling 

appointments between [April 13] and April 22”). At the same time, fearing that EO-25 might 

cause their patients to lose their constitutional right altogether, or at least impose an “undue 

burden” on that right, Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, as well as cause them (the providers) to face criminal 

prosecution if they attempted to help their patients procure a procedural abortion, Plaintiffs sought 

in the federal district court a “temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction,” barring 

the State from enforcing “EO-25 as applied to procedural abortions.” R.232 (Pls.’ Preliminary Inj. 

Br.) (Page ID #5782–83).5

Tennessee opposed the request. And notably, in its brief in opposition, the State appeared 

to concede that EO-25 operated just as Plaintiffs thought it would: as a three-week criminal 

prohibition on procedural abortions, albeit with the exception that the provider could perform an 

abortion if it is required to “prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a 

patient’s physical condition” (which the State did not explain in any greater detail). R.240 (Defs.’ 

Opp. Br.) (Page ID #6022).

The district court accordingly held an emergency telephonic conference, which lasted 90 

minutes, and at which both sides explained the evidence undergirding their respective positions.

* * *

5Plaintiffs then highlighted the three groups of patients who most urgently needed protection:

(1) patients who, in the good faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely lose their ability to obtain 

an abortion in Tennessee if their procedures are delayed until after April 30, 2020; (2) patients who, in the 

good faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a lengthier and more 

complex abortion procedure, which is only available at two clinics in Nashville and Memphis, if their 

procedures are delayed until after April 30, 2020; [and] (3) patients who, in the good faith professional 

judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a two-day procedure—which is only available at 

two clinics in Nashville and Memphis, and which requires at least three separate visits to the provider—if 

their procedures are delayed until April 30, 2020. 

R.232 (Page ID #5783).
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 7

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing was as follows:

Harm to Patients. Plaintiffs first pointed out multiple ways in which their patients would 

be harmed by even a three-week bar on procedural abortions, all turning on the basic fact that 

pregnancy, unlike many other medical conditions, progresses on a rapid, and inevitable, timeline. 

First, there were procedural abortion patients who would not be able to obtain an abortion at all, 

either because their pregnancy would advance past 20 weeks LMP by April 30 (when Plaintiffs 

could last provide the procedure), or because overburdened waiting lines following April 30 and/or 

travel limitations would effectively prevent the patient from receiving the procedure. See, e.g., 

R.232-5 (Looney Dec.) (Page ID #5887–88). Second, there were procedural abortion patients who 

would be forced against their will to undergo the more time-consuming, invasive, and expensive 

D&E procedure because, by April 30, they would have “aged out” of the more common aspiration 

procedure. See, e.g., id. at Page ID #5889. And, third, there were procedural abortion patients 

who, even if ultimately able to obtain the same type of abortion procedure they would have sans 

EO-25, would be forced either to travel out-of-state, and face the accordant COVID-19 

transmission risks, see, e.g., id. at 5890, or maintain their pregnancy substantially longer than they 

otherwise would have, and bear the resulting health risks, see, e.g., id. at Page ID #5888–89 (noting 

that, “[w]hile abortion is extremely safe throughout pregnancy, the risks increase as pregnancy 

progresses, and the later in pregnancy a patient accesses a procedural abortion the more likely she 

is to experience a rare complication”). Plaintiffs further pointed out that their patients, like most 

abortion patients nationwide, are predominantly “poor or low-income,” and hence “already 

struggle to raise the money to afford an abortion, and to afford transportation, childcare, and lost 

wages for missed work.” Id. at Page ID #5878, 5890–91.

Harm to the State. Plaintiffs also emphasized the corresponding lack of harm procedural 

abortions posed to the State’s interests in preserving PPE and minimizing person-to-person 

contact. For instance, Plaintiffs observed, because procedural abortions generally are performed 

at clinics—not hospitals—and with limited personnel, they require “minimal” amounts of PPE and 

interpersonal interaction. See, e.g., R.232-6 (Terrell Dec.) (Page ID #5913–14). Indeed, Plaintiffs 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 8

added, their staff do not even use the (much-coveted) N95 respirator masks.6 Id. If anything, 

Plaintiffs continued, requiring a woman either to receive a D&E procedure instead of an aspiration 

procedure, or carry her child all the way to pregnancy (with the accordant mandatory maternal care 

visits), would result in far more PPE usage and interpersonal interaction than simply permitting 

abortions to go forward at an appropriately maintained clinic. See, e.g., R.232-5 (Looney Dec.) 

(Page ID #5882–83).

Statements from Medical Organizations. Plaintiffs also cited statements from prominent 

medical organizations in which those organizations emphasized that, as serious a threat to public 

health as COVID-19 presents, abortion nonetheless remains an “essential,” “time-sensitive service 

for which a delay of several weeks, or in some cases days, may increase the risks [to patients] or 

potentially make it completely unavailable.” Id. at Page ID #5879 (alteration in original) (citing 

statement signed by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, among others).7

Likelihood that EO-25 Would Last Past April 30. Finally, Plaintiffs offered some evidence 

that their fear that EO-25 would last past April 30—thus turning a three-week postponement of 

procedural abortions into something more draconian—was warranted. See, e.g., R.232-5 (Looney 

Dec.) (Page ID #5892) (citing statement from the Surgeon General saying that he expected socialdistancing measures to “be in place beyond April”).

* * *

6Per the Food & Drug Administration, an “N95 respirator is a respiratory protective device designed to 

achieve a very close facial fit and very efficient filtration of airborne particles.” N95 masks are not, however, 

recommended for public usage, as they constitute “critical supplies that must continue to be reserved for health care 

workers and other medical first responders.” See https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/personal-protectiveequipment-infection-control/n95-respirators-and-surgical-masks-face-masks (last accessed Apr. 21, 2020).

7Moreover, after the onset of this appeal, over a dozen leading medical organizations—including the 

American Public Health Organization and (again) the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists—signed 

onto amicus briefs asserting, in no uncertain terms, (1) that abortion is an essential health service, and (2) that 

restricting access to that service will not “save lives,” or otherwise meaningfully halt the spread of COVID-19. See

App. R. 30 (Amicus Br. for Am. Public Health Ass’n and Experts in Public Health); App. R. 42 (Amicus Br. for Am. 

College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Other Nationwide Organizations of Medical Professionals); see also

Appellee Br. at 1 n.1 (citing similar guidance from the American College of Surgeons and the World Health 

Organization).
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 9

The State, for its part, pointed to the following countervailing evidence in response:

Harm to the State. The State first emphasized that, as of April 14, 2020, there were nearly 

6,000 cases of COVID-19 in Tennessee, along with 124 deaths, see R.240-1 (Apr. 14 Count) (Page 

ID #6029), and that, given the intensely contagious nature of the virus, social distancing was 

necessary to prevent those numbers from growing at an exponential rate, especially among 

healthcare professionals themselves, see, e.g., R.240-11 (CDC Release) (Page ID #6076–77) 

(discussing social distancing); R.240-12 (NYT Article) (Page ID #6079–82) (discussing risks to 

health workers). The State also noted that, per guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (“CDC”), the State needed to preserve as much PPE for its front-line hospital 

employees as possible, i.e., those dealing with COVID-19 patients, and that EO-25 was an essential 

element of that plan. See, e.g., R.240-13 (CDC PPE Tips) (Page ID #6083–84). The State further 

pointed out that, although there was evidence that its various social-distancing measures had 

successfully lowered the virus’s growth rate, that evidence simply underscored the importance of 

maintaining those measures to the maximum extent possible. See, e.g., R.240-7 (Vanderbilt Health 

Policy COVID-19 Modeling for Tennessee) (Page ID #6059–65). And, in response to Plaintiffs’ 

contention that their PPE usage was minimal, the State observed that, even if procedural abortions 

constituted a relatively small number of delayed medical procedures, and even if the resulting PPE 

usage was “minimal,” “[e]very procedure that is postponed, and every item of PPE that is 

preserved, furthers the State’s compelling interests in halting the spread of COVID-19 and 

ensuring our healthcare system is equipped to treat—and prevent the death of—those who are 

infected.” R.240 (Defs.’ Opp. Br.) (Page ID #6019–20).

Harm to Patients. In response to Plaintiffs’ statements that EO-25 would inhibit their 

patients’ ability to obtain abortions, the State essentially attempted to show that Plaintiffs’ 

evidentiary showing was a paper tiger. The State first emphasized that, because Plaintiffs had 

neither identified any “actual patient[s] who would be denied an abortion before the order expires 

in two weeks,” nor “estimated what fraction of women could be allegedly denied an abortion by 

operation of [EO-25],” there were presumably very few abortion patients who would be materially 

harmed by the Order. Id. at Page ID #6022. The State then generally asserted that, to the extent 

EO-25 posed any “serious adverse health consequences” to an abortion patient, the clinic could 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 10

perform that abortion “without delay” (although, again, without explaining what that exception 

meant). Id.

Statements from Medical Organizations. The State did not cite any countervailing 

statements suggesting that abortions procedures are not “essential” procedures, or that limiting 

such procedures is necessary to fight COVID-19.

Likelihood that EO-25 Would Last Past April 30. Although the State repeatedly cited EO25’s limited duration as a reason injunctive relief was unnecessary, the State did not appear to offer 

any assurances, in its brief or otherwise, that EO-25 would in fact end on April 30. If anything, 

the general tone of the State’s evidentiary showing—which emphasized the severe consequences 

portended by COVID-19—suggested the opposite.

* * *

The parties also provided the district court with thorough and thoughtful briefing, in which 

they addressed not only the major abortion cases, such as Casey, but also Supreme Court precedent 

concerning the expanded scope of a state’s police power during times of public health crisis, most 

notably Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (affirming the state’s power to make 

vaccination compulsory).

On Friday, April 17—just a few hours after the evidentiary hearing—the district court 

issued a short, but thoughtful, order granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.8 See 

Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, No. 3:15-cv-705, 2020 WL 1905147 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2020). 

In this order, the district court acknowledged that preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary 

relief,” but ultimately found, after considering the evidence, that such an injunction was warranted 

here. Id. at *4. Most importantly, the district court emphasized that because EO-25 was “likely” 

to last past April 30, and because “[d]elaying a woman’s access to abortion even by a matter of 

days can result in her having to undergo a lengthier and more complex procedure that involves 

progressively greater health risks . . . or can result in her losing the right to obtain an abortion 

8Although the district court’s order at times references Plaintiffs’ alternative request for a temporary 

restraining order, read in context, the court clearly granted Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Indeed, neither party 

argues to the contrary on appeal.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 11

altogether,” the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim, per the 

Casey “undue burden” test. Id. at *5–6 (citation omitted). The district court also concluded that, 

“[w]hile the stated goal of EO-25 to preserve PPE [was] unquestionably laudable,” the State 

“presented no evidence that any appreciable amount of PPE would actually be preserved if EO-25 

is applied to procedural abortions.” Id. at *6. To the contrary, the court noted, “procedural 

abortion[s] use[] less PPE and involve[] significantly less patient interaction than carrying a 

pregnancy to term and giving birth.” Id. The court further added that making women travel outof-state for abortion only increased the risks of person-to-person transmission of COVID-19, again 

in contradiction of EO-25’s goals.

The district court accordingly concluded its opinion with the following, brief preliminary 

injunction order: “Defendants are hereby immediately enjoined from enforcing EO-25 as applied 

to procedural abortions.” Id. at *7. And, as a result of this order, Plaintiffs have presumably begun 

providing, and scheduling, procedural abortions again.

In response, the State filed immediately with the district court a request that the court stay 

its injunction pending appeal, followed by a notice of appeal. And, before the district court had a 

chance to respond to the State’s stay request, the State filed a brief in this court entitled, “Combined 

Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Merits Brief,” in which the State requested that 

we, as an initial matter, issue “a temporary administrative stay while [we] consider[] the stay 

motion,” and then that we “grant an emergency stay of the preliminary injunction while [we] 

consider[] the merits of the State’s appeal, and then reverse the district court.” Appellant Br. at 3 

n.1, 27.

On Monday April 20, we denied the State’s request for an administrative stay (with one 

judge dissenting), and asked the parties to provide expedited briefing so that we could consider the 

issues raised in the State’s appeal with the benefit of argument from both sides. App. R. 9.9 The 

parties have now provided that briefing, and the question of whether the district court acted 

properly in enjoining the State’s enforcement of EO-25 is ripe for our review.

9Two days after we issued this order the district court denied the State’s request for a stay. See R.252.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 12

II. DISCUSSION

Because the parties have sufficiently briefed the merits questions before us, and because 

time is of the essence, we forgo consideration of the State’s stay request and instead proceed 

straight to the preliminary injunction analysis.10

A.

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Rather, the party seeking the injunction 

must prove: (1) that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, (2) that they are likely 

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips 

in their favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. A court considering 

whether to grant a preliminary injunction must therefore “balance the competing claims of injury 

and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” 

Id. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). Moreover, 

when crafting an injunction, a district court must take care to “limit the solution to the problem,” 

for example, by “enjoin[ing] only the unconstitutional applications of a [policy] while leaving 

other applications in force.” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 

328–29 (2006). We review a district court’s application of these principles for abuse of discretion. 

Am. Civil Liberties Union Fund of Mich. v. Livingston Cty., 796 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2015).

10We acknowledge the State’s alternative argument that Plaintiffs do not have proper “third-party standing” 

to bring this suit on behalf of their patients. Appellant Br. at 22. But because Plaintiffs unquestionably have standing 

to sue on their own behalf (because EO-25 potentially threatens them with criminal prosecution) we need not address 

third-party standing. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 782 n.17 (“[The plaintiff abortion providers] have standing to sue 

on their own behalf because [the at-issue Executive Order] ‘directly operates’ against them.” (citing Planned 

Parenthood of Cen. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976))).
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 13

1.

We begin by asking whether Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the 

merits of their constitutional claim. We conclude that they are.

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the provision of the 

Fourteenth Amendment establishing that no state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law,” includes within it a substantive guarantee of reproductive 

liberty, that is, a promise that no state shall prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy if 

she so chooses (subject to certain limitations, depending on the trimester of pregnancy). The Court 

then narrowed this right in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, clarifying 

that states could ban abortion after “viability,” see supra n.1, and could also regulate the practice 

of abortion before then, so long as those regulations did not impose an “undue burden,” which the 

Court defined as a “provision of law” whose “purpose or effect [was] to place a substantial obstacle 

in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” 505 U.S. at 878. Still, the Casey court was careful 

to distinguish between regulation and prohibition, emphasizing that, “[r]egardless of whether 

exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from 

making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.” Id. at 879.

Casey’s undue burden framework, and the accordant distinction between regulation and 

prohibition, has not always been easy to apply. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 

136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016) (discussing differing interpretations). But in the context of “time 

regulations” like the three-week measure at issue here, courts appear to have readily distinguished 

between the imposition of a short waiting period, see, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–86 (upholding 

state law requiring 24-hour waiting period prior to abortion); Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. 

Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), and the outright curtailment of the abortion 

right, see, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting 

state law prohibiting abortions, with limited exceptions, after 15 weeks LMP); McCormack v. 

Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015) (same, with respect to a law prohibiting abortions after 

20 weeks LMP). And, notably, although Casey upheld a 24-hour waiting period, the Court 

described the question as “close[],” and noted that the potential of such a policy to prevent lowincome women from seeking an abortion at all was “troubling.” 505 U.S. at 885–86.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 14

Were there no public health crisis, then, the analysis would be relatively straightforward: 

by banning all procedural abortions for a three-week period—limited by only a vague, undefined 

exception for women who needed the abortion to avoid facing “serious adverse health 

consequences”—EO-25 placed “a substantial obstacle in the path of” Tennessee women 

attempting to obtain a procedural abortion during that time period, and thus constituted an undue 

burden. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Indeed, as the evidence presented in the district court elucidated, 

depending on the stage of a woman’s pregnancy, EO-25 functioned not just as a “delaying 

regulation,” the likes of which are generally reviewed under Casey’s undue burden standard, but 

also as an outright ban on pre-viability abortion, which would unquestionably be verboten under 

Casey and Roe. And if that weren’t enough, the women affected by EO-25 (and the Plaintiff 

providers) do not know if EO-25 will even end on April 30, thus making the burden of “planning 

ahead”—a necessity for a time-sensitive procedure like abortion—all the more crushing. Suffice 

it to say, in normal times there is no way that a measure like EO-25 would pass constitutional 

muster.11

But, of course, we are not living in normal times; we are living in pandemic times. And so 

the State points us to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), a century-old case in which 

the Supreme Court held that a city faced with the risk of a viral outbreak could require all of its 

adult residents to be vaccinated against that virus. See Appellant Br. at 12 (contending that 

“Jacobson establishes the legal framework for judicial review of the State’s exercise of its police 

power during public-health emergencies”). Jacobson is an important case, and it is unfortunate 

that the district court did not address it until it issued its order denying Tennessee’s request for a 

stay. See R.252 at Page ID #6267–68 (analyzing Jacobson in denying stay). But we are not 

convinced that this matters because even if Jacobson’s more state-friendly standard of review is 

11True, the Supreme Court has long permitted states to enact parental consent regulations, which can 

sometimes have the effect of delaying an abortion for a weeks-long period. See, e.g., Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 

755 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (making this point). But to the extent parental consent 

laws have a delaying effect, that is for reasons outside a state’s control. The permissibility of such regulations in no 

way suggests that the Supreme Court would countenance a state-mandated three-week delay period, at least in 

ordinary circumstances.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 15

the test we should be applying here—rather than the usual Roe/Casey standard—we still think that 

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim.

In Jacobson, the Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of a five-dollar criminal fine12 on 

a Cambridge, Massachusetts resident who refused to comply with the city’s mandatory vaccination 

regime, which Cambridge had enacted in response to a smallpox outbreak. The resident then 

appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing that the mandatory vaccination statute was 

unconstitutional. Although the Court acknowledged that the statute unquestionably impinged on 

the resident’s individual autonomy, cf. Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 918–22 (6th Cir. 2019) 

(discussing the Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity), the Court ultimately found that 

the statute was justified on public health grounds, and emphasized that the safety and importance 

of vaccines “[w]hile not accepted by all,” were “accepted by the mass of the people, as well as by 

most members of the medical profession.” 197 U.S. at 34 (citation omitted). And in explaining 

the standard of review courts should employ when confronted with such a public health measure, 

the Court held as follows:

If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in respect of 

a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that which the legislature 

has done comes within the rule that, if a statute purporting to have been enacted to 

protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or 

substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable 

invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so 

adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.

Id. at 31 (emphasis added).

Leave aside the myriad factual differences between this case and Jacobson—asking a 

person to get a vaccination, on penalty of a small fine, is a far cry from forcing a woman to carry 

an unwanted fetus against her will for weeks, much less all the way to term—and the challenge of 

reconciling century-old precedent with the Supreme Court’s more recent constitutional 

jurisprudence. The bottom line is that, even accepting Jacobson at face value, it does not 

substantially alter our reasoning here. As of today, a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion is 

12Approximately $140, adjusted for inflation.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 16

a part of “the fundamental law.” And, for the reasons set forth above, EO-25, at least in some

applications—most notably, those that would prevent a woman from exercising her right in-state 

altogether, or would require her to undergo a more invasive and costlier procedure that she 

otherwise would have—constitutes “beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured 

by [that] fundamental law.”

More still, although mandatory vaccination clearly had a “real” and “substantial” relation 

to the state’s public health goals in Jacobson—indeed, as the Supreme Court emphasized, the 

importance of vaccination was widely accepted by the medical community—it is much harder to 

discern that relation here, given the paltry amount of PPE saved, and limited amount of in-person 

contact avoided, by halting procedural abortions for a three-week period (not to mention the lack 

of expert medical opinion in support of the State’s position). And although the State cites language 

in Jacobson stating, “[i]t is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of 

two [responses] [is] likely to be most effective for the protection of the public against disease,” id. 

at 30—and suggests that this means we must defer uncritically to the State’s ipse dixit that a threeweek bar on procedural abortions is necessary to save critical PPE and preclude risky interpersonal 

contact, see supra at 9—neither Jacobson in particular, nor Supreme Court abortion precedent in 

general, requires such abdication. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 34–38 (discussing the 

voluminous medical evidence in support of vaccination); Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (noting 

that uncritical deference to a legislature’s factual findings regarding abortion is inappropriate).

The dissent disagrees with us on this last point, arguing that the State’s three-week bar on 

procedural abortions does have a “real and substantial relationship to the current pandemic,” and, 

indeed, that, if we don’t allow that bar to go into effect, “doctors, nurses, and first responders will 

die . . . .” Dissent at 29, 31. But the dissent roots these bold assertions in nothing more than the 

State’s say-so. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) webpage the dissent 

cites certainly does not support the State’s position. That webpage simply recommends that U.S. 

healthcare facilities preserve PPE and cancel “elective and non-urgent procedures/appointments”; 

it says absolutely nothing about abortion. Id. at 29. And the State has never, at any point in this 

litigation, attempted to support its policy choice with expert or medical evidence. See supra at 10. 

This is unsurprising because, as far as we can tell, every serious medical or public health 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 17

organization to have considered the issue has said the opposite. See, e.g., supra at 8 n.7 (citing 

statements signed by over a dozen leading medical organizations). So, in our view, the dissent’s 

position is not so much deference as it is abdication.

Of course, we do not mean to suggest that abortion rights during a public health crisis are 

identical to abortion rights during normal times. If Jacobson teaches us anything, it is that context 

matters. And as noted in Section B, infra, we have tried to accommodate for that context here. 

What we will not countenance, however, is the notion that COVID-19 has somehow demoted Roe 

and Casey to second-class rights, enforceable against only the most extreme and outlandish 

violations. Such a notion is incompatible not only with Jacobson, but also with American 

constitutional law writ large. See generally, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 76 (1866) (“The 

Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and 

covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 

circumstances.”).

We conclude by acknowledging that orders analogous to EO-25 have generated a flood of 

litigation the past few weeks, and that judges across the country have reached differing conclusions 

as to the orders’ legality. Compare, e.g., In re Rutledge, No. 20-1791 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2020); In 

re Abbott, ---F.3d ---, 2020 WL 1911216 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2020); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th 

Cir. 2020), with Robinson v. Attorney General, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 1952370 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 

2020); In re Abbott, 2020 WL 1911216, at *18–30 (Dennis, J., dissenting); In re Rutledge, No. 20-

1791, slip op. at 24 (Loken, J., dissenting); South Wind Women’s Ctr., LLC v. Stitt, 2020 WL 

1932900 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 20, 2020) (Goodwin, J.). Given the speed at which this issue is 

developing, we decline to address these other opinions in detail; suffice it to say, it is clear that 

there exists profound, but good faith, disagreement as to the constitutional questions involved. We 

will note, however, that the Texas executive order underlying the recent Fifth Circuit decision—a 

decision the State cites repeatedly in its brief here—is fundamentally different than EO-25. This 

is because the Texas order contains an important caveat permitting doctors to perform procedures 

that, in their clinical judgment, “would not deplete the hospital capacity or the [PPE] needed to 

cope with the COVID-19 disaster.” In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 780; see also In re Abbott, 2020 WL 

1911216, at *30 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff abortion providers there had 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 18

“represented that all of their abortion care will fall” under this exception). EO-25, by contrast, 

contains no such caveat, other than the “serious adverse health consequences” exception 

mentioned above. But because a woman could plainly have her right to an abortion undermined 

without her suffering “serious adverse health consequences”—indeed, if a woman is forced to 

undergo an unwanted, but otherwise healthy, pregnancy as a result of EO-25 she would 

presumably fall outside the exception’s scope—this narrow provision does not save EO-25’s 

constitutionality.

In sum, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim.

2.

We now address the remaining three preliminary injunction factors, in turn.

Irreparable Harm. This is not a case that can be remedied with money damages, or a posthoc apology. Rather, if Tennessee is allowed to enforce EO-25 in the sweeping manner that it 

desires, any woman in Tennessee who wishes to have a procedural abortion during the relevant 

time period stands at risk of losing her constitutional rights, or at least of incurring substantial 

physical, emotional, and financial harms en route to exercising those rights; this is especially so 

for the low-income women who disproportionately seek out abortions and who have been 

disproportionately harmed by the economic downturn generated in COVID-19’s wake. And 

Plaintiffs are at risk of criminal prosecution if they attempt to help their patients exercise that 

right.13

13To be sure, as the State emphasized in the district court, and as the dissent hammers home here, Plaintiffs 

have not pointed to specific patients who would be irreparably harmed by EO-25. But cf. R.248-1 (Chism Aff.) (Page 

ID #6168–72) (affidavit filed after the district court issued its injunction, in which a Knoxville woman who was 

13 weeks LMP at the time EO-25 went into effect explained how she risked losing her ability to obtain any abortion 

in Tennessee as a result of the Order). But given the rapid timeline under which Plaintiffs were operating, and the 

obvious reality that any Tennessee woman who would like to have a procedural abortion during the month of April 

would be impacted by EO-25, we can forgive Plaintiffs for not being hyper-specific. And, in any event, Plaintiffs 

provided evidence that hundreds of women in any given month seek procedural abortions because they are past the 

point where medication abortion is an option, and that they (Plaintiffs) had to cancel specific procedural abortion 

appointments because of EO-25, including some where the woman was literally at the clinic. See supra at 3–4, 5–6. 

All of this is to say, there is no reason to think that, in April 2020, Tennessee women suddenly stopped deciding to 

have procedural abortions. Moreover, as Plaintiffs’ amici make clear, the medical risks at stake are anything but 

speculative. See, e.g., Br. of Am. Public Health Ass’n at 2–7.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 19

Balance of Harms. That Plaintiffs have pointed to concrete threats to constitutional liberty 

and bodily autonomy does not guarantee them an injunction, of course. Rather, we must “balance 

the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or 

withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added) (quoting Amoco, 

480 U.S. at 542). Here, though, we find the “competing claims of injury” cited by the State to be 

speculative and abstract; they do not outweigh the tangible harms EO-25 risks wrecking on 

Plaintiffs and their patients.

Most potently, the State raises the specter of further COVID-19 contamination—and the 

accordant risk of yet more Tennesseans dying from the disease—saying that such harms are 

“certain to occur” if procedural abortions are allowed to take place. Appellant’s Br. at 24; see also

R.240 (Defs.’ Opp. Br.) (Page ID #6019–20) (“Every procedure that is postponed, and every item 

of PPE that is preserved, furthers the State’s compelling interests in halting the spread of COVID19 and ensuring our healthcare system is equipped to treat—and prevent the death of—those who

are infected.”). We cannot gainsay the threat posed by COVID-19; as we stated at the outset of 

the opinion, these are extraordinary times calling for extraordinary measures. But, with respect to 

just those procedural abortions affected by the district court’s injunction (as modified below), the 

State’s proffered harm is purely speculative. As the district court noted, the State presented “no

evidence that any appreciable amount of PPE would actually be preserved if EO-25 is applied to 

procedural abortions,” and the State has not remedied that shortcoming on appeal. Adams & Boyle, 

P.C., 2020 WL 1905147, at *6; see also supra at 16–17 (further discussing the lack of medical 

evidence in support of the State’s position).

In response, the State suggests that if we permit this one exemption, surely the jointreplacement surgeons, the cataract-removal specialists, and every other medical provider affected 

by EO-25’s bar on elective procedures will follow, with similar “minimal impact” arguments in 

tow. Cf. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Attorney General of Ohio, 2020 WL 1673310, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 

6, 2020) (Bush, J., concurring) (deeming this “a serious free rider” problem). But this contention 

fails to appreciate that abortion is fundamentally different than a hip replacement or a cataract 

removal: not only is abortion entitled to explicit constitutional protection, but also, as the district 

court appropriately recognized, it is a uniquely “time-sensitive procedure,” both as a biological 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 20

matter and a regulatory matter. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 2020 WL 1905147, at *6. After all, how 

many other elective procedures have mandatory 48-hour waiting periods beforehand, and are 

available in only four cities state-wide? So if there is a slippery slope here, we fail to see it.

Tennessee also emphasizes that a state’s “sovereignty is irreparably harmed anytime action 

taken by its democratically elected leaders is enjoined,” and argues that we should take account of 

that harm here. Appellant Br. at 24 (citing Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018)). But as 

we stressed at the outset of this opinion, we have taken that harm into account. And, in the 

particular circumstances of this case, we find that the affront the Governor of Tennessee will suffer 

from having one small part of a limited-duration executive order enjoined (which itself is just one 

piece of a much more comprehensive state policy) is far outweighed by the harm the individual 

Tennessee women affected by that order will suffer if it is given full effect.

The Public Interest. We need not say much on this point. As the district court correctly 

observed, “it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” 

Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 274 F.3d 377, 400 

(6th Cir. 2001) (quoting G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 

(6th Cir. 1994)).

* * *

For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary 

injunction.

B.

This leaves one final matter: the scope of the district court’s injunction. As noted above, 

the district court’s order is just one sentence long: “Defendants are hereby immediately enjoined 

from enforcing EO-25 as applied to procedural abortions.” The State argues that this perfunctory 

order is overbroad, and that the district court failed to “tailor its injunctive relief” to the 

burdensome situations actually identified by Plaintiffs. Appellant Br. at 21; compare with, e.g., 

Robinson, 2020 WL 1952370, at *8 (in the course of denying state’s request for a stay on appeal, 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 21

citing with approval the district court’s “narrowly tailored” preliminary injunction); cf. Pre-Term 

Cleveland, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (similar conclusion, in TRO context).

On this point, we agree with the State. As explained earlier, because a preliminary 

injunction is an extraordinary remedy, a district court must be careful to “limit the solution to the 

problem.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29. And, here, the undue burden problem identified by 

Plaintiffs encompassed three classes of patients, which Plaintiffs helpfully identified in their 

district court brief seeking injunctive relief:

(1) patients who, in the good faith professional judgment of the provider, 

will likely lose their ability to obtain an abortion in Tennessee if their 

procedures are delayed until after April 30, 2020; 

(2) patients who, in the good faith professional judgment of the provider, 

will likely be forced to undergo a lengthier and more complex abortion 

procedure, which is only available at two clinics in Nashville and 

Memphis, if their procedures are delayed until after April 30, 2020; 

[and] 

(3) patients who, in the good faith professional judgment of the provider, 

will likely be forced to undergo a two-day procedure—which is only 

available at two clinics in Nashville and Memphis, and which requires 

at least three separate visits to the provider—if their procedures are 

delayed until April 30, 2020.

R.232 (Pls.’ Preliminary Inj. Br.) (Page ID #5783).

Consequently, we direct the district court to modify its injunction so that it enjoins the State 

from enforcing EO-25 against Plaintiffs to the extent they provide procedural abortions to these 

three categories of patients. And, to be clear, this second category of patients includes women 

who, in the good faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a 

D&E procedure instead of an aspiration procedure if their procedures are delayed until after April 

30, 2020.

To the extent that Plaintiffs work with patients who can safely delay their procedural 

abortions past EO-25’s April 30 expiration date, in a manner commensurate with the 

aforementioned criteria, however, Plaintiffs must comply with EO-25 and delay those particular 

procedures. To rule otherwise would be to grant Plaintiffs a wholesale exemption from the public 

health dictates of EO-25, which, per our earlier discussion, Jacobson cautions against.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 22

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court order issuing a preliminary injunction 

but direct the district court to MODIFY the preliminary injunction in the manner set forth above. 

We leave it to the district court to address any further developments in the first instance.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 23

_________________

DISSENT

_________________

THAPAR, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Even in ordinary times, the district court’s injunction 

in this case would be deeply flawed. But these are no ordinary times. In the midst of a once-in-acentury pandemic, the district court broadly enjoined the State of Tennessee from enforcing a 

measure at the heart of the State’s response. In doing so, the court committed numerous legal 

errors, made hardly any factual findings, issued an overly broad injunction, and brazenly 

substituted its own policy views for those of the elected officials who are actually fighting the 

pandemic. All because the district court thought that a three-week delay for certain abortions 

might prevent some unidentified person from having an abortion. Most cases of judicial 

aggrandizement have costs. But in few are the potential costs so great. I would reverse. 

I.

Two weeks ago, the Governor of Tennessee issued an executive order—based on guidance 

from various medical organizations—in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Governor’s 

order explains the critical importance of conserving what’s known as “personal protective 

equipment” (e.g., face masks, gloves, protective clothing) and therefore directs “[a]ll healthcare 

professionals and healthcare facilities” in the State to “postpone surgical and invasive procedures 

that are elective and non-urgent.” The order defines “elective and non-urgent” procedures as those 

that “are not required to provide life sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of substantial 

impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse 

consequences to a patient’s physical condition if the surgical or invasive procedure is not 

performed, as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider.” The order will expire just 

after midnight on April 30, 2020—less than six days from now and exactly three weeks after it 

took effect. 

Within days of the Governor’s announcement, the plaintiffs in this case—abortion 

providers in Tennessee—moved to “supplement” a five-year old complaint (six months after trial) 

to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that the 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 24

executive order prohibits most “surgical abortions” in the state and thus will prevent their clients 

from obtaining an abortion. 

A mere four days later, the district court granted the motion to supplement and entered a 

preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of the executive order as to allsurgical abortions 

in Tennessee. The court’s analysis of why the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits 

consisted of two paragraphs. The State then appealed. (Despite the breadth of its ruling, the district 

court recently denied a stay pending appeal.) 

II.

The State now asks us to stay the district court’s decision pending appeal and ultimately to 

reverse the preliminary injunction. Both requests involve the same basic factors: (1) who is likely 

to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the moving party is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

interim; (3) what is the balance of harms; and (4) where does the public interest lie. See Fowler v. 

Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 256 (6th Cir. 2019); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 

341, 343 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The plaintiffs’ failure to show a likelihood of success on 

the merits would itself warrant reversal. See, e.g., Fowler, 924 F.3d at 259–60. But the other 

factors counsel the same outcome. And even if the district court was correct to grant a preliminary 

injunction (it was not), these same factors show that the injunction was much broader than 

permitted under the law.

Success on the Merits. Start with the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. The 

basic question is whether the executive order places an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to 

have an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). As the 

modifier “undue” suggests, not just any “incidental effect . . . making it more difficult or more 

expensive” to have an abortion will do. Id. Rather, the state regulation must create a “substantial 

obstacle” for women seeking an abortion. Id. at 877. But importantly, we do not consider any 

burden in isolation. Instead, we must consider “the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 

together with the benefits those laws confer” and then “weigh[] the asserted benefits against the 

burdens.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309, 2310 (2016) (emphasis 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 25

added). In short, the plaintiffs must show that the order imposes a burden and that this burden 

outweighs the order’s asserted benefits. 

Given this framework, the district court committed two fundamental errors. First, it failed 

to make the necessary factual findings to show that the executive order imposes a burden on 

anyone’s rights. Second, the court failed even to acknowledge the benefits of the executive order 

and thus necessarily failed to balance its speculative burden against these benefits. Either error 

would warrant reversal. Together, they certainly do. 

Begin with the burden. The district court failed to make specific findings about whether 

the executive order creates a “substantial obstacle” for women seeking an abortion. See Casey, 

505 U.S. at 874. At most, the district court pointed out that the executive order will delay certain 

abortions for three weeks. But that doesn’t take the plaintiffs very far. Both the Supreme Court 

and our court have upheld laws that have the effect of delaying abortions for days or even weeks. 

See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) (up to three-week 

delay); Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 366, 372–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (up to 

two-week delay). Indeed, for the last forty years, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly upheld a 

wide variety of abortion regulations that entail some delay in the abortion.” Garza v. Hargan, 874 

F.3d 735, 755–56 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). The 

district court failed to grapple with any of these precedents. Its silence speaks volumes.

(For its part, the majority tries to distinguish these cases by saying those delays were 

outside the state’s control. It doesn’t offer any support for this distinction. But more importantly, 

the distinction seems to assume that a once-in-a-century pandemic is within a state’s control.)

To be clear, the district court enjoined a version of the order that didn’t exist. It acted as if 

the State had banned most pre-viability abortions. But that’s just not the case. Tennessee law 

generally allows women to seek an abortion until the twentieth week of their pregnancy. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 39-15-211, -212. So any woman who was less than seventeen-weeks pregnant when 

the order went into effect would still have time to seek an abortion after the order expires.

The plaintiffs speculate that there might be women out there who were more than 

seventeen-weeks pregnant when the order was issued and who will now be unable to obtain an 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 26

abortion in Tennessee. (Or who otherwise would be unable to obtain an abortion for some reason.) 

But speculation usually doesn’t count for much. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 

972–74 (1997) (per curiam). And there’s no reason it should have counted for so much here. Make 

no mistake—the burden was on the plaintiffs to bring forward concrete evidence (1) that such 

women exist, (2) that they want an abortion, and (3) that they would be unable to obtain one. See 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The majority claims a snippet of 

evidence supports this concern—an affidavit that vaguely states that “some patients” will be 

prevented from obtaining an abortion under the executive order. R. 232-5, Pg. ID 5887. But the 

district court didn’t make any factual findings on this front. Nor do the plaintiffs even cite this 

evidence on appeal. 

Not only that. No one—not the plaintiffs, not the district court, not even the majority—

has made any effort to quantify how this hypothetical pool of women relates to the broader pool 

of women affected by the order—as binding precedent requires. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 

U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); Cincinnati Women’s Servs., 468 F.3d at 367–68 (explaining that courts 

must consider whether a restriction will operate as a “substantial obstacle” in “a large fraction of 

the cases in which the abortion restriction is relevant” (cleaned up)). In fact, the State points out 

that the vast majority of abortions in Tennessee occur before the seventeenth week of pregnancy. 

The plaintiffs haven’t offered any evidence in response. So even if speculation were the stuff of 

winning legal claims, plaintiffs still haven’t made the proper showing. 

But we aren’t even done with speculation. The plaintiffs (and now the majority) say that 

the Governor of Tennessee might extend the executive order beyond the current three-week period. 

This is a smart move—it makes a short, finite burden look like an indefinite one, exaggerating its 

severity. The problem is that the Governor hasn’t said he will impose any restrictions on medical 

procedures after April 30, which is when the order in this case expires. If the Governor issues a 

new order limiting surgeries beyond that date, it is possible that he will extend the existing 

restrictions—but it is just as likely that the new order will contain a different and perhaps more 

tailored set of restrictions. The majority simply assumes it will be the former. Based on what? 

The plaintiffs and majority point to a statement by the Surgeon General of the United States about 

extending certain public-health measures. But in this country, federal officials don’t speak on 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 27

behalf of state leaders. And again, the plaintiffs haven’t pointed to any evidence about what the 

Governor of Tennessee will do. As the crisis facing our country continues to develop, so too will 

government responses. And those who have problems with those responses must wait until actual 

and imminent harms arise. See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2019). 

Federal courts are not in the business of issuing advisory opinions, let alone advisory injunctions.

All that is reason enough to reverse. But the district court also committed another 

fundamental error: it entirely failed to balance these purported burdens against the executive 

order’s benefits. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. The court didn’t even mention 

the benefits of the order in its “undue burden” analysis. That flatly contradicts Supreme Court 

precedent, which “requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 

together with the benefits those laws confer.” Id. Count that as another error warranting reversal.

Perhaps the district court didn’t perform this balance because it couldn’t do so. How does 

one balance a harm to some unspecified number of people? The district court didn’t tell us and 

the majority doesn’t either. 

One could stop there. But in fact, Tennessee’s interests in protecting its citizens from the 

pandemic cannot be overstated. All agree that these are far from ordinary times. Over the past 

few weeks, our entire nation has come together to combat a generation-defining crisis. Many have 

done so at great personal sacrifice. 

In Tennessee, as in so many other states, the Governor has taken extraordinary steps to 

fight the pandemic. He declared a state of emergency, required all residents to remain at home 

except in limited circumstances, and ordered the closure of most businesses. As part of that effort, 

he also signed the generally applicable order at issue here. The Governor’s order allowed the state 

to conserve valuable personal protective equipment for those fighting the coronavirus. The order 

protects those who have undertaken perhaps the greatest personal sacrifice in protecting the 

citizens of Tennessee. There’s no reason to doubt that the Governor took these measures because 

“the safety of the general public” demanded it. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 

197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). 
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Our law has long-protected just these types of decisions from judicial interference based 

on purported violations of substantive due process. In times of emergency, elected officials need 

room to do what they were elected to do—to govern. Sometimes their actions will incidentally 

impact a person’s liberty interests. But the Supreme Court has upheld such actions anyway, 

explaining that “[r]eal liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which 

recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own [person or property], . . . regardless 

of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26. And there’s no abortion exception to this wellsettled principle. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear from the beginning that the 

ability to obtain an abortion is neither “absolute” nor “unlimited.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 

154 (1973) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11).

Of course, this does not mean that the courts should rubber stamp emergency measures—

far from it. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28–29. But it does mean that judges should act with care 

during such times, recognizing the limits of our knowledge, institutional capacity, and lawful 

authority. See id. at 30–31; cf. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163 (explaining that the Supreme Court has 

“given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is 

medical and scientific uncertainty”). 

Remarkably, the district court failed to acknowledge—let alone apply—these principles 

before it granted the injunction. Nor did it acknowledge the State’s heightened interests during 

times of emergency. Based on its decision, one might think that the executive order would be 

unconstitutional no matter how many lives it could save and no matter how few—if any—

abortions it might prevent. Even the majority calls this omission “unfortunate.” 

In a subsequent order denying a stay pending appeal, the district court seems to have 

recognized that it erred by ignoring the State’s primary legal authority for its position, Jacobson 

v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). But rather than correct its mistake, the 

court doubled down, finding the facts of Jacobson to be readily “distinguishable” from the facts 

of this case. In doing so, the district court overlooked the basic principle of Jacobson: that states

may respond to emergencies in the face of substantive-due-process rights, so long as they act 

reasonably and don’t single out specific rights or persons for disfavored treatment. See id. at 28–

30.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 29

No one claims that the State of Tennessee has singled out specific rights or persons in its 

response to the current pandemic. The executive order in this case applies to all non-essential 

medical procedures. And again, the Governor has issued several other orders that apply to all 

persons and that affect every aspect of daily life across the state. 

Nor have the plaintiffs shown that the State has acted unreasonably in requiring its residents 

to postpone non-essential medical procedures for a three-week period. Just contrast this case with 

the facts of Jacobson, where the Supreme Court upheld a state’s authority to forcibly vaccinate 

individuals. See id. at 27–30. If the State can physically invade a person’s body in response to an 

emergency, then it surely may require people to delay certain medical procedures for the same 

purpose. 

On these points the majority, for its part, is conclusory: it does little more than assert that 

the executive order “is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the 

fundamental law.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. Given that plaintiffs haven’t established a 

constitutional violation in the first place, they certainly haven’t done so “beyond all question.”

The majority also dismisses the State’s interests on the ground that the executive order has 

no “real” and “substantial” relationship to the current pandemic. Id. That claim is remarkable 

given that the order follows recommendations from our nation’s leading public-health institution. 

See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): 

Strategies to Optimize the Supply of PPE and Equipment (last visited Apr. 24, 2020), 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/index.html (explaining that 

equipment “shortages are currently posing a tremendous challenge to the US healthcare system” 

and recommending the cancellation of “elective and non-urgent procedures/appointments”). Plus, 

Jacobson clearly tells us that it’s “no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which 

one of two modes [is] likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against 

disease.” 197 U.S. at 30. The majority doesn’t explain why our court is an exception to that rule. 

And the amicus briefs the majority cites to discredit the State’s rationale for the executive order 

“are more formidable by their number than by their inherent value.” Id. One need only open a 

newspaper to appreciate the importance of preserving medical equipment at this time. So if 

nothing else, Jacobson forecloses the plaintiffs’ claim. 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 30

Irreparable Harm. Consider next what (if any) irreparable harm the plaintiffs will suffer 

without an injunction. To be clear, the plaintiffs don’t claim that they themselves will suffer any 

irreparable harm. Rather, the plaintiffs assert that the women they purport to represent will suffer 

irreparable harm without an injunction. But cf. Gee v. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 35 

(2019) (Mem.) (granting certiorari to consider whether traditional third-party standing rules apply 

in abortion cases).

The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs had established an irreparable injury because 

it thought that the executive order would prevent some women in Tennessee from having an 

abortion. But again the district court failed to make any factual findings showing that the order 

would prevent any particular woman from obtaining an abortion. To satisfy the irreparable-injury 

requirement, parties must demonstrate “likely” harm. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. And the plaintiffs 

offer only speculation.

The district court also asserted that delays in the provision of abortions might irreparably 

harm some women by making their abortions more dangerous. But this argument stands in stark 

contrast with the claim that “[a]bortion is one of the safest medical procedures performed in the 

United States.” Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation 

omitted). In fact, the plaintiffs themselves say that “abortion is extremely safe throughout 

pregnancy.” Plaintiffs Br. at 5. Is it an irreparable injury for a medical procedure to be only

“extremely safe”? But again the district court addressed none of these facts on its way to its 

destination.

Meanwhile, the executive order allows doctors to perform an abortion when a woman 

would suffer “serious adverse consequences to [her] physical condition” without the surgery “as 

reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider.” The plaintiffs haven’t made any effort to 

explain why this exception (which contains built-in deference to medical professionals) would not 

give them the flexibility they need during this time of national crisis. And again, it was the 

plaintiffs’ burden to show that the executive order (with its exception) causes an irreparable injury. 

They failed to do so. 
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 31

Balance of Harms. Consider also the irreparable harms created by the district court’s 

injunction. Of course, a state always suffers irreparable injury when it’s wrongfully enjoined from 

enforcing one of its laws. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 & n.17 (2018); Maryland v. 

King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). But that’s far from the only harm 

here. The Governor issued the executive order to preserve critical medical equipment. Every 

piece of equipment used for something besides the pandemic response could cost a life—the life 

of someone who acts selflessly to help others in a time of crisis. Simply put: doctors, nurses, and 

first responders will die without proper equipment. And that’s to say nothing of their family 

members, whose lives will be put at risk too. Given the twin risks of exponential community 

spread and hospital overload, every additional infection among first responders represents a 

significant threat to public health. It’s hard to imagine a scenario in which the harm imposed by 

an injunction would be greater.

The district court brushed off these concerns, saying the plaintiffs have already taken 

measures to reduce their use of medical equipment during surgical abortions. The district court 

apparently thought that the State would be harmed only if surgical abortions used an “appreciable 

amount” of medical equipment. (The Majority seems to think the same.) But neither the district 

court nor the Majority is in any position to second-guess the Governor’s judgment as to the amount 

of equipment that is really necessary to keep healthcare workers alive. 

The district court also asserted that the executive order would be counterproductive for 

various policy reasons. Again the district court’s (and now the majority’s) willingness to 

constitutionalize its own policy judgments—in the midst of a national emergency no less—is 

remarkable. If anything has remained constant over the past hundred years of constitutional law, 

it’s that courts aren’t supposed to second guess policymakers based on their own subjective 

judgments of what makes for good policy. See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 394 (2012) (per 

curiam) (noting that courts must exercise care not to displace “legitimate state policy judgments 

with the court’s own preferences”). All the more when our elected officials are tasked with making 

difficult decisions under conditions of uncertainty, risk, and imperfect information. See Jacobson, 

197 U.S. at 30–31.
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 32

The district court and majority also note that some women might travel to other states to 

have an abortion and that this might further aggravate the current pandemic. But neither the 

plaintiffs nor the district court nor the majority have pointed to a single person who said she would 

need to travel to another state to get an abortion. So again this is nothing more than speculation.

Public Interest. This factor points in the same direction. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 

418, 435–36 (2009); Winter, 555 U.S. at 24–26. Plainly the public interest is served by a state’s 

ability to enforce a regulation whose purpose and effect is to save the lives of healthcare workers. 

The district court and majority assert that the public interest favors a preliminary injunction 

because it’s always in the public interest to prevent the violation of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,

Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). That reasoning 

would have more force if the plaintiffs or district court had shown that the regulation actually 

violates any constitutional rights. But again the majority’s reasoning is only conclusory. 

Scope of the Injunction. Finally, the district court plainly erred in defining the injunction’s 

scope. Preliminary injunctions are an “extraordinary remedy.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. That 

means courts that shouldn’t grant them based on speculative harms, which is what the district court 

did here; and that “the scope of relief should be strictly tailored to accomplish only that which the 

situation specifically requires.” Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation 

omitted). As the Supreme Court put it, “[i]t is neither our obligation nor within our traditional 

institutional role to resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential situation 

that might develop.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168. And an injunction’s proper scope becomes all 

the more important in cases involving government officials—and especially in cases where, as 

here, federal courts enjoin them. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–80 (1976); see also 

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168 (“It would indeed be undesirable for [courts] to consider every 

conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive 

legislation.” (cleaned up)). 

But again the district court disregarded these well-settled legal principles. The district 

court’s injunction doesn’t just apply to women who might lose their ability to have an abortion 

before Tennessee’s twenty-week deadline; it applies to all women who seek a surgical abortion—
No. 20-5408 Adams & Boyle, P.C. et al. v. Slatery et al. Page 33

no matter their ability to obtain an abortion after the order expires. Injunctions should be aimed 

with rifle-scope precision. The district court here used a twelve-gauge.

The majority does acknowledge at least this error and tries to remedy it on appeal. But in 

doing so, the majority doesn’t fix the problem and also creates a problem of its own: it creates 

three “classes” of women—all of them amorphous, and thus likely to sow confusion going 

forward. In effect, the majority has certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) without any request to do 

so or any effort to comply with the Federal Rules. Nor does the majority explain why the executive 

order unduly burdens most of the putative class. It simply announces that the injunction will apply 

to them. 

The district court’s errors here are not unprecedented: Two other circuits have recently 

encountered similar district court decisions, and both circuits promptly corrected them—in one 

case twice. See In re Rutledge, No. 20-1791, 2020 WL 1933122 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2020); In re 

Abbott, No. 20-50296, 2020 WL 1911216 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2020); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th 

Cir. 2020). But cf. Robinson v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-11401-B, 2020 WL 1952370, at *4 (11th Cir. 

Apr. 23, 2020) (denying a stay pending appeal in “an atypical case” because, among other things, 

the state “concede[d] that the substance of the district court’s preliminary injunction is consistent 

with its own . . . interpretation of [its executive order]”). We should have done the same.

***

To sum up: the district court granted an injunction without much effort to apply the 

relevant law, without specific factual findings, and without any attempt to tailor the remedy to the 

purported constitutional violation. If that doesn’t count as an abuse of discretion, I don’t know 

what would. I respectfully dissent.