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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.G., A MINOR 

CHILD 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: R.W. 

No. 1786 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order September 20, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 63-12-354

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., WECHT, J. and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2014 

R.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on September 20, 

2013, that granted the petition filed by the Washington County Children and 

Youth Social Services Agency (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental 

rights to her minor, female child, A.G. (“Child”) (born in December of 2010) 

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1

 We affirm. 

On February 6, 2011, CYS first became involved with this family after 

CYS received a referral that Child was admitted to Children’s Hospital with a 

left clavicle fracture, multiple acute rib fractures on her left side, multiple 

healing rib fractures on her right side, transverse fracture of her right femur, 

____________________________________________ 

1 On December 4, 2012, Child’s father, T.G. (“Father”), signed a consent 

form, voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights to Child. Father does not 

challenge the termination of his parental rights to Child, nor is he a party to 

this appeal. 
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multiple classic metaphyseal lesion (“CML”) fractures of the right tibia, CML 

fractures of the left metatarsal foot, and failure to thrive. Mother has a 

history of mental health issues, and has been involved in mental health 

treatment since she was an adolescent. Mother had been a dependent child 

and the victim of sexual and physical abuse. Mother’s mental health history 

includes self-cutting, suicidal ideation and a history of hearing voices. 

On February 6, 2011, as a result of the referral, CYS entered into a 

Voluntary Placement Agreement with Mother and Father that Child was 

removed from the care of Mother and Father on February 11, 2011. Child 

was placed into CYS shelter care due to the serious injuries she had suffered 

after being assaulted by Father, and by Mother’s failure to protect her. Due 

to the serious injuries inflicted on the child, both Father and Mother were 

charged with criminal offenses. 

On March 7, 2011, an Emergency Shelter Care order was entered 

extending the placement of Child’s shelter care. On March 22, 2011, at the 

time for the scheduled hearing before the Juvenile Hearing Master, Mother 

and Father entered into an agreement that Child would continue in CYS 

foster shelter care until further order of court. Since then, Child has been in 

placement. On April 12, 2011, Child was adjudicated as a dependent child. 
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As a result of the injuries inflicted to Child, Father was charged with 

Aggravated Assault, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and Recklessly 

Endangering Another Person, to which he pled guilty on December 9, 2011.2

For her role in Child’s injuries, Mother was also charged with Endangering 

the Welfare of a Child, to which she entered a plea of guilty on February 13, 

2012. Mother was sentenced to twenty-three months in the Intermediate 

Punishment program. 

On March 16, 2012, CYS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. On August 22, 2012, a hearing was held on that petition. The trial 

court found that CYS did not establish by clear and convincing evidence for 

the termination of Mother’s parent rights to Child. 

 On February 4, 2013, the agency re-filed a petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. On May 24, 2013, June 26, 2013, 

and September 3, 2013, hearings were held on that petition. At the hearing, 

CYS presented the testimony of Heather Miller, a parent educator for the 

Blair Foundation; Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., a licensed psychiatrist; Lindsey 

Syster, a family resource specialist for Justice Works Youth Care; Puja 

Shroff, a therapist; Foster Mother; David Cincinnati, a CYS caseworker; 

Mother’s paramour, R.V.; Mother’s friend, K.G.; and Mother. On September 

____________________________________________ 

2

 In exchange for his plea, Father received a sentence of twenty-two months’ 

to forty-eight months’ incarceration, followed by a period of twenty-four 

months’ probation. At the time of the termination proceedings, Father was 

incarcerated in a State correctional institution. 
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20, 2013, the trial court entered the order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the 

Adoption Act. 

 On November 4, 2013, Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2) and (b).3

 In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two issues, as 

follows. 

1. Did the trial court err in finding that competent evidence 

established the statutory grounds for termination of 

[Mother]’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), (5) and (8)? 

2. Did the trial court err in finding that [C]hild’s best interests

and welfare were served by a termination of [Mother]’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)? 

Mother’s Brief, at 4.

 We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights with the 

following standard. 

 [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

____________________________________________ 

3 On October 21, 2013, the trial court granted Mother’s counsel’s request to 

withdraw as counsel, and granted Mother fourteen days to appeal. On 

January 31, 2014, this Court granted Mother’s motion for extension of time 

to file her brief, and ordered the record to be remanded to the trial court to 

insure that the record is complete. 
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608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 

[613 Pa. 371, 455,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality 

opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might have 

reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett 

v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 

51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 

838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

Id.

 As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012). 

 The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained: 

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we will focus on section 2511(a)(2). 

 Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.ふThe rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

* * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.ふThe court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

 We have stated: 

 In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and 

(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows. 

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.”[].

 This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, 

can seldom be more difficult than when termination is

based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, 

however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded 

that a parent who is incapable of performing parental

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to 

perform the duties. 
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In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986) (quoting

In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978)). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 326-327, 47 A.3d at 827. 

We find the following portion of the trial court’s opinion relevant to our 

inquiry with regard to subsection 2511(a)(2). 

As set forth above, Mother was discharged unsuccessfully 

from the Blair Foundation’s parenting program due to her 

inability to demonstrate the application of parenting skills. 

Mother was unable to apply the skills that she presumably 

learned, and she had to be prompted to have interaction with 

[C]hild. Although Mother did successfully complete Justice 

Works Youth Care "Nurturing Parenting Program" in May of 

2013, the family resource specialist representing that provider 

testified that a parent’s improvement, however slight, triggers 

closure of the program. The family resource specialist further 

testified that there were concerns over Mother’s ability to parent 

on her own: that Mother was not able to apply the lessons that 

she had completed and that Mother did not demonstrate

independent parenting. In the two years since [Child] was 

removed from Mother’s care, Mother continues to demonstrate 

her incapacity as a parent. 

Mother has certainly had a reasonable time to remedy the 

conditions which led to [C]hild’s removal, and clearly, there was 

no evidence that Mother could remedy those conditions if given 

additional time. 

Furthermore, it was apparent from the testimony that 

Mother continues to demonstrate poor decision making. At the 

time of the hearing, Mother was cohabitating with a gentlemen 

who was thirty years her senior, whom she had met three

months before he moved in with her. Mother was also sharing 

her home with another couple whose children are in foster care 

with [CYS]. The father of those children is a registered sex 

offender, for conviction of a sex offense involving a minor. 

Although Mother claimed that the registered sex offender did not 

stay at her home every day, she admitted that he sleeps there, 

and that he changed his address to the address of Mother’s 

residence. 
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Mother further acknowledged during her testimony that

she continues to be unable to accept the nature and cause of 

[Child]’s injuries. Mother harbor[s] the unreasonable belief that 

[C]hild suffered the fractures to her rib cage at birth, that she 

"shot out and the nurse caught her." Mother also stated that 

she had "learned how to be stern with [CYS] when asked if she 

had the ability to keep [C]hild safe and protect her from harm, 

Mother’s only response was "I protect her with my soul."

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 11-12. The trial court found clear and 

convincing evidence in the record that the repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the Mother had caused Child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her 

physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

Mother. Id. at 12. 

 This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to 

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340. The evidence showed that “Mother does not 

have the ability to protect [C]hild and maintain a safe environment for 

[C]hild, and it is beyond Mother’s ability to even establish a parental 

relationship with [C]hild.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 12. The 

evidence also demonstrated that Mother’s continued incapacity, abuse, 
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neglect or refusal to parent could not or would not be remedied, despite 

CYS’s offering of reasonable efforts to assist in her reunification with Child. 

Mother’s argument regarding section 2511(a)(2) essentially seeks for 

this Court to make credibility and weight determinations different from those 

of the trial court. While Mother may claim to love Child, a parent’s own 

feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination 

of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We 

stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or 

her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by 

competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-

326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s 

determinations regarding section 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, 

competent evidence in the record. 

After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection (b) 
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are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child 

pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008. 

 In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

 [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare 

of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 

See also In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

 Mother argues that she has some bond with Child and that Mother was 

willing to do anything necessary for return of Child. See Mother’s Brief, at 

20.

 The trial court found as follows: 

Finally, with respect to Mother’s claim that it was an abuse of 

discretion for the Trial Court to find that termination would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child, the Court submits that 

the record overwhelmingly supported this conclusion. [Child] 

suffered horrific injuries at the hands of her Father and Mother. 

Mother failed to recognize the hazardous environment her child 

was in, failed to protect [C]hild, and continues to have difficulty 

accepting the cause and nature of [C]hild’s injuries. Mother 
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does not have the present ability to parent independently or to 

provide a safe home for [C]hild. Mother has difficulty making 

decisions and makes inappropriate decisions which place herself 

and [C]hild in danger. At the time of the termination 

proceedings, Mother had allowed a registered sex offender to 

reside in her home. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 12-13. 

Further, the trial court found that there is no bond between Child and 

Mother. Id. at 9. 

[C]hild displays anxiety in response to her visits with

Mother, and as a result suffers from hives after the visits. 

Mother never established a primary attachment with [C]hild. 

[C]hild clearly demonstrates a lack of emotional attachment with 

Mother. Mother does not display affection with the child. Mother 

has no bond or meaningful relationship with the [C]hild but, 

rather, only a peripheral relationship with [C]hild. There was no 

evidence of any significant relationship between Mother and 

[C]hild and no evidence presented of any adverse consequences 

should this relationship be terminated. On the contrary, the 

testimony unequivocally demonstrated that the termination of 

Mother’s peripheral relationship with [C]hild would not be 

detrimental to [C]hild. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 13. This Court has observed that no bond 

worth preserving is formed between a child and a natural parent where the 

child has been in foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting 

bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

764 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

 Additionally, as part of its bonding analysis, the trial court 

appropriately examined Child’s relationship with Foster Parents. See In re: 

T.S.M., ___ Pa. at ___, 71 A.3d at 267-268 (stating that existence of a bond 

attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a 
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termination petition, and the court must consider whether the child has a 

bond with the foster parents). The trial court found, as follows: 

[C]hild has a strong primary attachment with her foster mother, 

who is [C]hild’s pre-adoptive resource. Termination of [C]hild’s 

relationship with her foster mother, with whom she is thriving, 

would be traumatic and contrary to [C]hild’s best interests. The 

degree of emotional trauma which [Child] would experience if 

removed from her current placement would be considerable and 

the risk of regression very high. [Child]’s emotional security 

would be considerably undermined if further reunification efforts 

were pursued. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 13-14. 

 As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs and 

welfare, and the absence of any bond with Mother, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See In re 

Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we 

affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child.

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/4/2014