J-S60032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RONALD DAVIS

Appellant No. 397 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003650-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2015

Ronald Davis appeals from the judgment of sentence entered January 

9, 2015, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Davis was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of four and one-half to nine years’

imprisonment, following his jury conviction of burglary, criminal conspiracy, 

and receiving stolen property (“RSP”).1 Contemporaneous with this appeal, 

Davis’s counsel seeks to withdraw from representation and has filed an 

Anders brief.2 The Anders brief identifies five issues for our review, 

including, a challenge to the trial court’s denial of a pre-trial motion and an 

evidentiary ruling, and claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(2), 903(a)(1), and 3925(a), respectively.

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
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Commonwealth’s closing arguments. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On March 8, 2013, 

Marshauna Hinton entered her home on Locust Street in Norristown, 

Montgomery County, and found two men inside the residence. She promptly 

fled and called police. Hinton later identified co-defendant, Justin Johnson, 

from a photo line-up, and he was arrested that same day. Johnson admitted 

his involvement, and informed the police that he and Davis had committed a 

string of burglaries in Norristown in early 2013, including the one at Hinton’s 

home. Davis was initially charged on March 21, 2013, with the Hinton 

burglary. However, that complaint was withdrawn and a revised complaint 

was filed on April 15, 2013, charging Davis with numerous crimes, 68 counts 

in all, including robbery, burglary, RSP, and conspiracy, for the 2013 

Norristown burglaries. 

Davis was originally represented by the Public Defenders’ Office. 

However, on August 16, 2013, the Defenders’ Office was permitted to 

withdraw, because they also represented Davis’s co-defendant, and conflict 

counsel was appointed. On September 9, 2013, Davis filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. The court conducted a habeas hearing on October 

11, 2013, and granted the motion in part, dismissing several charges. That 

same day, Davis filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking both suppression 

of evidence recovered during execution of a search warrant, and severance 

of the charges for crimes committed at distinct locations. On November 4, 
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2013, Davis filed an amended pre-trial motion, which included an additional 

claim seeking suppression of his identification. 

A suppression hearing was held on January 29, 2014. On April 29, 

2014, the trial court entered an order denying Davis’s motion to suppress. 

The next day, the court granted Davis’s request to sever the charges, and 

ordered that the crimes committed at different locations would be tried 

separately. See Order, 4/30/2014. The Hinton burglary case remained on 

the court’s standby trial list until September of 2014. 

On September 2, 2014, Davis filed a motion seeking dismissal of those 

charges based on a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Following a hearing that 

same day, the court denied the Rule 600 motion, and proceeded directly to a 

jury trial. On September 4, 2014, the jury acquitted Davis of one count of 

robbery,3 but, as noted above, found him guilty of burglary, conspiracy and 

RSP. 

Sentencing was deferred on the instant matter. On December 1, 

2014, Davis and the Commonwealth entered into a negotiated plea 

agreement with respect to the outstanding charges. Davis entered a guilty 

plea to two counts of conspiracy and one count of attempted burglary, in 

exchange for which the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining charges. 

____________________________________________

3 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a).
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He was sentenced that same day to three concurrent terms of two and onehalf to five years’ imprisonment. 

On January 9, 2015, Davis was sentenced in the present case to a 

term of two and one-half to five years’ for burglary, and a consecutive term 

of two to four years’ for criminal conspiracy. The trial court ordered the 

aggregate four and one-half to nine year sentence run consecutive to the 

sentence imposed following Davis’s guilty plea.4 This timely appeal follows.5

When counsel files a petition to withdraw and accompanying Anders

brief, we must first examine the request to withdraw before addressing any 

of the substantive issues raised on appeal. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 

124 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2015). Here, our review of the record 

____________________________________________

4 The guilty plea charges are not included in this appeal.

5 On February 10, 2015, the trial court ordered Davis to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

On March 2, 2015, counsel complied with the court’s directive by serving the 

trial court with a statement of his intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Thereafter, Davis filed several pro se objections to 

counsel’s statement, which this Court forwarded to counsel. See

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he proper

response to any pro se pleading is to refer the pleading to counsel, and to 

take no further action on the pro se pleading unless counsel forwards a 

motion.”).

On April 23, 2015, counsel filed a petition seeking permission to 

withdraw before filing an Anders brief, based on his belief that Davis 

intended to assert his ineffectiveness. Davis filed a pro se objection to 

counsel’s petition, and this Court denied the petition by order entered May 

26, 2015. Thereafter, counsel filed the Anders brief which is presently 

before us.
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reveals counsel has substantially complied with the requirements for 

withdrawal outlined in Anders, supra, and its progeny. Specifically, 

counsel requested permission to withdraw based upon his determination that 

the appeal is frivolous,6filed an Anders brief pursuant to the dictates of 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009), furnished a 

copy of the Anders brief to Davis and advised Davis of his right to retain 

new counsel or proceed pro se. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 

1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Moreover, our review of the 

record reveals no correspondence from Davis supplementing the Anders

brief. Accordingly, we will proceed to examine the record and make an 

independent determination of whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.

The first issue identified in counsel’s Anders brief challenges the trial 

court’s denial of Davis’s motion to dismiss the charges based on a violation 

of his speedy trial rights pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

____________________________________________

6 We note that counsel failed to file a separate petition to withdraw, but 

rather, included his request in the Anders brief. As a panel of this Court 

explained in Commonwealth v. Fischetti, 669 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super. 1995),

Although we believe the more desirable practice would be to 

submit a separate withdrawal request to the court, we ... treat 

counsel’s [request] in the brief itself as such a request. 

Consequently, we find that counsel’s motion is properly before 

this Court for review[.]

Id. at 400 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
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Our review of a Rule 600 ruling is well-established:

“In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” 

Further, we review “the facts in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party.” Our scope of review is “limited to the evidence 

on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the 

findings of the trial court.” The Commonwealth has the burden 

of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

exercised due diligence throughout the prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 125 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal 

citations omitted).

Rule 600 protects a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. It provides, in 

relevant part: 

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

* * * *

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed 

against the defendant shall commence within 365 days 

from the date on which the complaint is filed.

* * * *

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage 

of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the 

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be 

included in the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from 

the computation.

* * * *

(D) Remedies

(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the 

time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, 

the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, 

may file a written motion requesting that the charges be 
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dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been 

violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney 

for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall 

conduct a hearing on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim. 600.

In considering whether a defendant has been brought to trial within 

the time constraints of Rule 600, a trial court must first determine the 

“mechanical run date,” which, pursuant to Subsection (A)(2)(a), is 365 days 

after the criminal complaint is filed. Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 

874, 879 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2014).

Nevertheless, 

[a] defendant, however, is not automatically entitled to 

discharge under Rule 600 where trial starts more than 365 days 

after the filing of the complaint. Rather, Rule 600 “provides for 

dismissal of charges only in cases in which the defendant has not 

been brought to trial within the term of the adjusted run date, 

after subtracting all excludable and excusable time.” The 

adjusted run date is calculated by adding to the mechanical run 

date, i.e., the date 365 days from the complaint, both excludable 

and excusable delay. 

Excludable time includes delay caused by the defendant or 

his lawyer. Concomitantly, excusable delay occurs where the 

delay is caused by “circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s 

control and despite its due diligence.” “Due diligence is a factspecific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case 

basis. Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and 

punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth 

that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” 

Additionally, when considering Rule 600, we remain 

cognizant that Rule 600 serves two purposes. While it is 

intended to protect a defendant’s speedy trial right, it also 

protects society’s interest in prosecuting crime. Accordingly, 

where “there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a 
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manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter 

crime.” 

Roles, supra, 116 A.3d at 125 (internal citations omitted).

At the Rule 600 hearing in the present case, Davis argued the 

mechanical run date was March 21, 2014, 365 days after the first criminal 

complaint was filed. The Commonwealth asserted, however, the Rule 600 

time began to run on the date the second complaint was filed, that is, April 

15, 2013. Accordingly, it asserted the mechanical run date was April 15, 

2014. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth, as do we.

In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc), aff’d, 44 A.3d 655 (Pa. 2012), an en banc panel of this Court 

considered how to calculate the mechanical run date when the 

Commonwealth files an initial complaint, which it later withdraws before 

filing a second complaint based on the same criminal incident. The panel 

explained:

[T]he Commonwealth must exercise due diligence before the 

withdrawal of an original complaint; consequently, the proper 

focus of the trial court when two identical complaints are at issue 

should be on whether the Commonwealth exercised due 

diligence in prosecuting the original complaint, not on whether it 

exercised due diligence in re-filing the second complaint. Where 

the Commonwealth exercises due diligence in prosecuting the 

original criminal complaint, the time period between the 

dismissal of the first complaint and the re-filing of the second 

complaint is irrelevant for purposes of Rule 600 and the 

Commonwealth is only required to re-file within the applicable 

statute of limitations. Such a holding is consistent with the 

purpose of Rule 600. 

Id. at 1141.
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Here, Norristown Police Detective David Crawford testified, during the 

Rule 600 hearing, that he filed the initial complaint based on charges related 

solely to the Locust Street burglary. See N.T., 9/2/2014, at 24-25. He 

explained he later withdrew that complaint “so that all of the cases that [he] 

believed [Davis] was involved in with his co-defendant could be put together 

as one Complaint.” Id. at 25. The second complaint, which included 

charges related to multiple burglaries at several locations, was filed less than 

one month later, on April 15, 2013. The trial court concluded that the 

Commonwealth’s withdrawal of the first complaint, and refiling of the second 

complaint, “was not an attempt in any way to avoid Rule 600 implications, 

but was, in fact, in order to try to reduce judicial delay [and] bring all of the 

charges together in an expedient fashion believing that they could, in fact, 

be joined.” Id. at 82.7 Further, our review reveals nothing in the record to 

the contrary. Accordingly, we agree the “mechanical run date” in the 

present case was properly determined to be April 15, 2014.

Our analysis does not end there however because trial did not begin 

until September 2, 2014, 140 days past the “mechanical run date.” 

Therefore, we must consider whether excludable time and excusable delay 

____________________________________________

7 We note the trial court did not file an opinion following the Rule 600 

hearing. 
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warranted an adjusted run date after the trial date. With regard to this 

analysis, the trial court found the following:

Between [April 15, 2013,] and today the Court simply finds 

that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. There were 

certain periods of excludable time relating to either defense 

continuances, defense reasons, or the Court considering pretrial 

matters and having a series of hearings and any kind of court 

backlog in getting the case back in.

Id. at 82-83. Furthermore, the trial court rejected Davis’s contention that 

the delay caused by the conflict with the Public Defenders’ representation of 

both Davis and his co-defendant should be attributed to the Commonwealth. 

Id. at 83. The court specifically concluded it is not the Commonwealth’s 

obligation to notify the court if there is a dual representation issue. Id.

Our review of the certified record, and the transcript from the Rule 600 

hearing, reveals the following: (1) a 16-day delay resulting from a defense 

request continuance (7/8/2013 to 7/24/2013); (2) a 27-day administrative 

delay resulting from the trial court’s recusal (11/7/2013 to 12/4/2013); (3) 

a 91-day delay, during which the trial court considered Davis’s pretrial 

motions (1/29/2014 to 4/30/2014); and (4) an 89-day delay while the case 

remained on the court’s standby trial list (6/5/2014 to 9/1/2014).8 These 

excludable and excusable delays extended the run date 223 days. 

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 

____________________________________________

8 See N.T., 9/2/2014, at 64-65 (trial court explaining the case remained on 

the stand-by list “because of [the] court’s schedule”).
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denying Davis’s motion to dismiss the charges based on a violation of Rule 

600, and agree with counsel’s assessment that this claim is frivolous. 

Next, the Anders brief presents a claim that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence a 

copy of a pawn shop receipt, rather than require it to produce the original 

receipt as mandated by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 1002.9 

Our review of a trial court’s ruling concerning the admission of 

evidence is well-settled: 

Admission of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial 

court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 805 (Pa. Super. 

2013). “Discretion is abused when the course pursued 

represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the 

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not 

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Commonwealth v. 

Martinez, 917 A.2d 856, 859 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).

By way of background, we note Johnson entered a guilty plea for his 

role in the Hinton burglary and testified for the Commonwealth at Davis’s 

trial.10 He testified that he and Davis fled to Davis’s house after the 

homeowner confronted them at the Hinton burglary. Johnson and Davis 

then agreed to go to “Lou’s jewelry store on 69th Street” in Philadelphia, a 

____________________________________________

9 We have reordered Davis’s claims for purposes of disposition.

10 See N.T., 9/3/2014, at 140-142.
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pawn shop, to sell some of the items they stole. N.T., 9/3/2014, at 156. 

However, Johnson testified he never made it to the pawn shop because he 

was arrested. Id. at 157. The Commonwealth then called David Wilson, an 

employee at Lou’s Jewelry, to testify. Wilson explained the procedure by

which the store buys jewelry from customers. Specifically, he described how 

the purchase numbers on the receipts are cross-referenced with the seller’s 

driver’s license. Id. at 212-213. To that end, Wilson produced a copy of a 

receipt, which showed that his employer purchased a diamond ring from 

Davis at 2:51 p.m. on March 8, 2013.11 Davis objected to the admission of 

the photocopy, contending the original receipt was required. Id. at 213, 

219. The trial court overruled the objection. 

Rule 1002 mandates that “[a]n original writing ... is required in order 

to prove its content unless these rules, other rules prescribed by the 

Supreme Court, or a statute provides otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 1002. To that 

end, Rule 1003 permits a party to admit a duplicate “to the same extent as 

the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s 

authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” 

Pa.R.E. 1003. 

Here, the trial court determined that the receipt “is something that is

kept in the normal course of business and the authenticity is not in dispute 

____________________________________________

11 A diamond ring was among the items stolen in the Locust Street burglary. 

Id. at 109.
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at this stage.” N.T., 9/3/2014, at 219. We find no reason to disagree. 

Moreover, we note that, in addition to the copy of the receipt, the 

Commonwealth introduced the “customer data sheet” cross-referenced with 

the ring, which identified Davis as the seller. Id. at 223-225, Exhibit C-9. 

Accordingly, we agree this claim is frivolous. 

The final three issues identified in the Anders brief assert 

prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Specifically, Davis 

contends the prosecutor: (1) mischaracterized the content of an affidavit; 

(2) mischaracterized the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) 

summarized a timeline of the events, which was not supported by the

evidence. See Anders’ Brief at 17-19, 20-24.

When considering a claim of prosecutorial misconduct,

[o]ur standard of review ... is limited to whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. In considering this claim, our attention is 

focused on whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, 

not a perfect one. Not every inappropriate remark by a 

prosecutor constitutes reversible error. A prosecutor’s 

statements to a jury do not occur in a vacuum, and we must 

view them in context. Even if the prosecutor’s arguments are 

improper, they generally will not form the basis for a new trial 

unless the comments unavoidably prejudiced the jury and 

prevented a true verdict.

Commonwealth v. Helsel, 53 A.3d 906, 920 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 

Further, we note that the prosecutor’s closing “statements are 

unobjectionable if they are based on the evidence or proper inferences 

therefrom, or represent mere oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Tedford, 

960 A.2d 1, 33 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). When a defendant challenges 
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the Commonwealth’s closing, the “comment must be evaluated in the 

context in which the comment was made.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 

A.3d 1111, 1181 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

First, Davis challenges the prosecutor’s comments regarding Johnson’s 

post-arrest affidavit. By way of background, when Johnson was first 

arrested, he admitted his involvement in the burglary and identified Davis as 

his co-conspirator. However, on April 8, 2013, he signed a typed, notarized 

statement, in which he attested the following:

I Justin Johnson made statements to the Norristown police about 

myself and Ronald Davis and that I dont remember making 

because I was high off P.C.P. and cocaine at the time of my 

arrested. Everything i said in my statement is not true. I would 

never admit to anything I did not do and everything i said about 

Ronald Davis in my statement is not true. Im doing this on my 

own free will . Nobody is making me do this. In my Affidauit I 

was arrested with cocaine that I was high off of at the time along 

with p.c.p. I dont remember admitting to any robbery or any 

burglarys at all. And everything in my statement about Ronald 

Davis is not true. I never did those burglarys. Those 

statements are not true I was high at the time and the cops 

tricked me.

N.T., 9/3/2014, at 157, Exhibit C-7 (spelling and punctuation errors in 

original). Johnson later explained, however, that Davis typed the statement 

for him, and he signed it only because he was “scared” of Davis. Id. at 187, 

203. 

During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following 

comments:

And then we have this affidavit that [Johnson] wrote – I’m 

sorry, that he testified to that Ronald Davis, the defendant, 
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wrote and had him sign. And so this selfish person who looks 

out for Number 1 at all times, at all costs, despite all risks, in the 

first sentence of his statement says Ronald Davis didn’t do it. 

And then one of the last things he says is, don’t forget, the 

defendant didn’t do it.

So this person who is only interested in himself apparently 

writes this affidavit, according to the defense, and the first thing 

he does is defend Ronald Davis and say he didn’t do it. ...

N.T., 9/4/2014, at 133. Davis objected, claiming the prosecutor 

mischaracterized the content of the affidavit. The trial court immediately 

instructed the jury, “It is your recollection that will control. Not the 

attorney’s recollection of evidence, but your recollection of evidence that will 

control.” Id. 

Davis is entitled to no relief. Although we agree Johnson’s exculpation 

of Davis was not the “first thing” Johnson stated in his affidavit,12 we find 

that the prosecutor’s comments were “mere oratorical flair.” Telford, 

supra, 960 A.2d at 33. More importantly, the court immediately instructed 

the jury that their “recollection of evidence [] will control[,]”13 and “[t]he 

jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” Chmiel, supra, 

30 A.3d at 1147. Accordingly, we agree this contention is frivolous. 

Davis also argues the prosecutor mischaracterized the standard of 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

____________________________________________

12 Anders Brief at 18.

13 N.T., 9/4/2014, at 133.
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Every single one of you as reasonable people should have 

a pause about the evidence when you retire to deliberate. The 

question is not do you have a pause and that is, therefore, a 

reasonable doubt that the man who entered [] Locust Street with 

Justin Johnson was therefore somehow not guilty. The question 

is can you overcome it after examining and analyzing the 

evidence that’s been presented to you during the course of this 

trial?

N.T., 9/4/2014, at 116. After the prosecutor, again, commented that the 

jury had to overcome an “initial pause,” Davis objected, arguing that the 

correct standard is “hesitate” rather than “pause.” Id. at 117. The trial 

court agreed that the prosecutor “might have been misstating the law of 

reasonable doubt,” and immediately instructed the jury that “it will be the 

Court’s statement as to the law that you will follow.” Id. at 117-118, 199. 

See also id. at 168 (court instructed the jury “a reasonable doubt is a doubt 

that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to hesitate before 

acting upon a matter of importance in her or her own affairs.”).

Here, the court clarified any misstatement by the prosecutor when it 

instructed the jury to follow its charge on the law during their deliberations. 

We reiterate: “The jury is presumed to have followed the court’s 

instructions.” Chmiel, supra, 30 A.3d at 1147. Accordingly, this claim is, 

too, frivolous.

Lastly, Davis asserts the prosecutor summarized a timeline of the 

events in the case which was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, he 

refers to the prosecutor’s comments regarding the timeframe between the 

burglary and Johnson’s arrest. The prosecutor stated:
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You’re talking about at best about 15 minutes in total of time 

that this could have occurred based on when the burglary 

happened and Justin Johnson got arrested.

N.T., 9/4/2014, at 135-136.14 

We find this issue is waived. “[T]he lack of a contemporaneous 

objection constitutes a waiver of any challenge to the prosecutor’s closing 

remarks.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1229 (Pa. 2009) 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 909 (2010). Here, Davis failed to 

object to these comments either during or immediately after the 

prosecutor’s closing arguments. Therefore, this challenge is waived.15 See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Because we agree with counsel’s assessment that Davis’s appeal is 

wholly frivolous, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

____________________________________________

14 We note the prosecutor made these comments to refute the defense’s 

argument during opening remarks that Johnson sold the ring to Davis after 

the burglary, and Davis then sold it to the pawn shop. See N.T., 9/4/2014, 

at 134-135.

15 We note that even if we were to address this claim, we would conclude 

that the prosecutor’s statement was supported by the evidence. See N.T., 

9/3/2014, at 154-155 (Johnson testified it took “[p]robably five minutes, not 

even, because we ran” to get from the Locust Street burglary to Davis’s 

house); 160 (Johnson testified they were at Davis’s house “about five 

minutes, five to 10 minutes[,]” and it took “[a]bout five minutes” for him 

then to get to his mother’s house, where he was arrested). 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel 

granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2015