Opinion filed January 30, 2009

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

____________

No. 11-07-00145-CR

__________

JOHN WELDON WEATHERLY, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 49467

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment revoking community supervision. John Weldon Weatherly

pleaded nolo contendere to the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest. The trial court convicted

appellant of the offense and assessed his punishment at confinement for 180 days and a $500 fine.

Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and

placed appellant on community supervision for two years. Later, the trial court extended the term

of appellant’s community supervision for six months. The State filed a motion and an amended
2

motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to the State’s

allegations. Following a hearing, the trial court found that appellant had violated the terms and

conditions of his community supervision, revoked his community supervision, and imposed a

sentence of confinement for 180 days in the Palo Pinto County Jail. We affirm.

Appellant’s community supervision included the following terms and conditions, among

others: that he “[r]efrain use, possession or consumption of marijuana or any other controlled

substance, and use of alcohol”; that he submit to periodic drug testing; that he pay monthly

community supervision fees; and that he successfully complete an outpatient chemical abuse

treatment program. In its amended motion to revoke, the State alleged that appellant had violated

these four terms and conditions of his community supervision. Specifically, the State alleged

(1) that, on or about April 11, 2006, appellant admitted that he had consumed marihuana; (2) that

appellant had refused to submit to periodic testing for the use or consumption of controlled

substances on July 14, 2006; (3) that appellant had failed to pay his community supervision fees in

the amount of $40 for the months of May 2005, October 2005, and November 2005; and (4) that

appellant had failed to successfully complete an outpatient chemical abuse treatment program on or

before July 11, 2006. Appellant pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations at the hearing on the

amended motion to revoke. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court orally announced “true”

findings on the first three allegations listed above and a “not true” finding on the fourth allegation

listed above. However, in its judgment revoking community supervision, the trial court made “true”

findings on all four of the allegations.

Appellant presents two issues for review. In his first issue, he contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. Appellant includes eight points of error

in his first issue. In his first three points of error, appellant attacks the trial court’s finding that he

violated the term and condition of his community supervision that he “[r]efrain use, possession or

consumption of marijuana or any other controlled substance, and use of alcohol.” In his fourth

through eighth points of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial

court’s findings of “true” on the other alleged violations. In his second issue, appellant contends

that, in its judgment revoking community supervision, the trial court erred in finding that alleged
3

violation number four was “true” because the trial court made an oral finding at the hearing that

alleged violation number four was “not true.”

We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion

standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665

S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). At a revocation hearing, the State bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of

community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof of any

one violation of the terms and conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a

revocation. McDonald v. State, 608 S.W.2d 192, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Taylor v. State, 604

S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d).

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he used marihuana during

the term of his community supervision. However, he contends in his first three points of error

(1) that the term and condition of his community supervision to “[r]efrain use, possession or

consumption of marijuana or any other controlled substance, and use of alcohol” is ambiguous and

“failed to provide [him] with a clear expression of what was expected of him,” (2) that there was no

evidence that his community supervision officer clarified the ambiguity, and (3) that the direction

to “refrain use” was unenforceable as written. We disagree with appellant’s contention that “refrain

use” is ambiguous. Despite its grammatical structure, this term and condition of community

supervision clearly and unambiguously required appellant not to use, possess, or consume

marihuana, any other controlled substances, or alcohol.

Appellant signed a statement, dated April 11, 2006, in which he admitted that he had used

marihuana on April 7, 2006. The State introduced into evidence a copy of the statement. Deneise

Thibault, a community supervision officer, testified that appellant admitted that he had used

marihuana on April 7, 2006. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

appellant violated the term and condition of his community supervision that he “[r]efrain use,

possession or consumption of marijuana or any other controlled substance, and use of alcohol.”

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s community supervision.
4

Because proof of one violation was sufficient to support the revocation, we overrule appellant’s first

issue and need not address his second issue.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

January 30, 2009

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.