DNA-TR-83-13 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR NAVAL 

PERSONNEL AT OPERATION SANDSTONE 

Science Applications International Corporation 

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a, 15 August 1983 

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DNA-TR-83-13 

TITLE (met Subtitle) 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR NAVAL 

PERSONNEL AT OPERATION SANDSTONE 

5. TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVERED 

Technical Report 

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 

SAI-8311055 

AUTHOR(a) 6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(e) 

C. Thomas J. Goetz 

J. Stuart J. Klemm 

DNA 001-83-C-0039 

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1. KEY WORDS (Contfnua an *werae aId* if nacamay md ldentfty by block number) 

Operation SANDSTONE Task Group 7.3 

Radiation Exposure Assessment Oceanic Nuclear Tests 

Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Ship Shielding 

/Joint Task Force Seven 

1. A66lTtACT~ m ““r” ci* ff v rrd tdentlfy by block n-bu) 

Radiation environments are reconstructed for Task Group 7.3 ships and the 

residence islands of Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls resulting from the three 

nuclear detonations comprising Operation SANDSTONE (April-May 1948). 

Secondary (late-time) fallout was the source of virtually all of the radioactive contamination on the ships and islands, most of which resulted from 

Shots X-PbtY and YO%. Fallout from Shot ZEBRA was minimal. From the reconstructed free-field radiological environments, an equivalent personnel film 

m ,‘,“,“\ 1473 EDlTlOII OF 1 YOV 6S IS OeSOLETE 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURtTY CLASSIFICATION OF nits PAGE rwhsel Data &ntar.d) 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ECURITY CLASSlFlCATlON OF THIS PAGE man Data t91lU.d) 

20. ABSTRACT (Continued) 

badge dose is calculated and compared to actual dosimetry data obtained 

during the operation. Calculated doses and dosimetry are consistent, 

although most of the calculated and film badge doses are below film badge 

threshold. 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAl5EfWl1.n Data Xntorod) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

LIST OF TABLES 

1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 BACKGROUND 

1.2 NAVAL TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION 

1.3 METHODOLOGY 

2. SHIP OPERATIONS AND RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS 

2.1 SHIP OPERATIONS 13 

2.2 RADIOLOGICAL DATA 21 

2.3 INTEGRATED FREE-FIELD INTENSITIES 25 

2.4 SHIP SHIELDING 26 

DOSE CALCULATIONS 29 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

CONCLUSIONS AND TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

REFERENCES 

Page 

2 

2 

3 

3 

7 

10 

13 

31 

35 

39 

41 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

1-I 

l-2 

l-3 

2-1 

2-2 

2-3 

2-4 

2-5 

Table 

1-I 

1-2 

2-1 Destroyer Patrol Sector Assignments for Operation SANDSTONE 19 

2-2 Ship Participation Summary at Operation SANDSTONE 20 

2-3 Integrated Free-Field Intensities Through 31 May 1948 26 

3-1 Calculated Personnel Film Badge Doses Through 31 May 1948 

4-l Upper Bound Error Factors for Ships and Islands 

5-l Comparison of Dosimetry with Calculated Film Badge Doses 36 

6-1 Summary of Calculated Doses 

Joint Task Force Seven Organization 

Operation SANDSTONE Shot Locations 

Operation SANDSTONE Dose Reconstruction Methodology 

Enewetak Atoll Anchorage Areas 

Destroyer Patrol Sector Chart for Operation SANDSTONE 

Average Free-Field Radiation Intensity for Southern and 

Northern Anchorage Areas - Enewetak Atoll 

Average Free-Field Radiation Intensity on Kwajalein 

Ship Shielding Factor vs. Deck Plating Thickness 

LIST OF TABLES 

Operation SANDSTONE Shot Data 

TG 7.3 (Navy) Organization and Personnel Summary 

Page 

4 

6 

11 

14 

18 

24 

24 

28 

Page 

5 

8 

30 

34 

40 
Section 1 

INTRODUCTION 

Operation SANDSTONE was the second nuclear test series held in the Marshall 

Islands. It consisted of three nuclear weapon tests at Enewetak* Atoll in the spring of 

1948. Operation SANDSTONE was primarily an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 

scientific test series with the armed forces serving in a supporting role. 

The operation was conducted by a joint military and civilian organization, designated 

Joint Task Force Seven (JTF 7). This was a military organization in form, but 

contained military, civil service, and contractor personnel of the Department of 

Defense and the AEC. The commander of JTF 7 was the appointed representative of 

the AEC and reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization of JTF7 

is depicted in Figure l-l. Of over 10,000 people assigned to the task force, 

approximately 7,000 were attached to the Naval element--Task Group 7.3. 

Generally, most of the TG 7.3 personnel remained clear of radiological areas, 

which were well defined. However, radioactivity from secondary (late-time) fallout 

did result in widespread, but low-level exposure. Radiation dose to participants is 

reconstructed from radiological data, ship logs, and crew activity scenarios and 

compared with the available dosimetry data. The results are portrayed for the crews 

of 31 vessels that supported the operation and for the island-based personnel on 

Enewetak Atoll. Because some of the task group personnel were at Kwajalein Atoll 

during periods of fallout, the radiation environment on Kwajalein is also reconstructed. 

1.1 BACKGROUND 

Operation SANDSTONE was conducted primarily to proof-test new weapon 

designs. The Department of Defense participation centered primarily around effects 

*Formerly Eniwetok. 
SECRETARY 0F DEFENSE 

i 

i . 

i - COMMAND JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF 

-='I= TECHNICAL DIRECTION 

. . . . . . . . . COORDINATION 

i I 

i 

COMMANDER 

JOINT TASK FORCE 

SEVEN 

, 

TASK GROUP 7.1 - AEC 

PROVING GROUND GROUP 

TEST DIRECTOR 

DEPUTY COMMANDER DEPUTY COMMANDER 

CHIEF OF STAFF 

TASK GROUP 7.2 _ TASK GROUP 7.3 

ARMY h-AVY 

1 

Source : Reference 1 

TASK GROUP 7.4 TASK GROUF 7.5 

AIR FORCE . JOINT SECURITY 

TASK GROUP 7.6 TASK GROUP 7.7 

RADIOLOGICAL KWJALEIN ISLAND 

SAFETY L COMMANDER 

Figure l-1. Joint Task Force Seven Organization 
experiments and support to the AEC weapon effects experiments. Enewetak Atoll was 

selected because it was large enough for the three shots, and because the trade winds 

would carry fallout from the shots over the open ocean to the north and west 

(Reference I ). Figure l-2 shows the main features of Enewetak Atoll and the 

Operation SANDSTONE shot locations. 

The succession of shots was from Enjebi, on the northern edge of the atoll, 

toward the southeast, to Runit. Winds at Enewetak are usually such that moving the 

shot points progressively from northwest to southeast minimized the possibility of 

personnel working in areas contaminated by prior shots. Shot data is shown in Table 

1-I. 

Table l-l. Operation SANDSTONE Shot Data 

Date (1948) 

X-RAY YOKE 

15 April I May 

ZEBRA 

15 May 

Time (local)* 0617 0609 0604 

Island 

(Site) 

Enjebi 

(Janet) 

Aomon 

(Sally) 

Runit 

(Yvonne) 

Height of Burst 200 ft. 200 ft. 200 ft. 

Yield 37 KT 49 KT 18 KT 

*Local time was 12 hours behind GMT. Source: Reference 2. 

Before each shot, a weather watch was maintained to ensure that the days 

selected for the tests would have favorable weather. Wind direction and velocity at 

all relevant altitudes were critical to minimize the possibility of fallout from the 

radioactive cloud on task force ships and any inhabited islands. Light, variable winds, 

which made forecasting more difficult, and winds with a northerly component 

presented unfavorable conditions for firing. Clouds that would interfere with the visual 

direction of drone aircraft also made firing conditions unfavorable. Additionally, 

heavy cloud cover would interfere with aerial photography, but since this was not 

essential to scientific recording, this condition could be tolerated if other criteria 
ENEWETAK ATOLL 

(ENIWETOK mcmi) 

OPERATION SANDSTONE 

-Na 0 12 3 4 5 

STATUTE MILES 

- -I- ---- 

Island 

DEEP ENTRANCI 

WIDE PASSAGE 

Island 

Figure l-2. Operation SANDSTONE Shot Locations 
were favorable. Rainshowers that could be predicted as few and scattered were 

acceptable, but predicted heavy showers were not acceptable because of possible 

interference with surface photography, which was essential to the scientific effort 

(Reference 1). 

1.2 NAVAL TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION 

The Navy task group (TG 7.3) provided support at Enewetak Atoll for the 

scientific programs and carried out surface and air operations in and around the atoll. 

The main tasks were to: 

Deliver nuclear components to Enewetak Atoll 

Provide mobile facilities for devices at the test site 

Conduct surface and air security operations 

Provide intra-atoll water transportation 

Plan for evacuation of all personnel from the atoll 

Transport personnel and scientific and naval equipment to and from the 

atoll 

Provide living accommodations for task group personnel 

Lay cable 

Provide off shore patrols. 

In order to carry out these tasks, TG 7.3 was organized into seven functional task 

units as shown in Table l-2. The USS MT MCKINLEY (AGC-7) was used as the command ship and also had the Weather Center and Air Operations Office on board. The 

USS CURTISS (AV-4) was a specially modified seaplane tender and was used to 

transport the nuclear devices to the test area. The USS ALBEMARLE (AV-5) was 

modified to be the laboratory ship for TG 7.1 and the USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) was 

used by the radsafe personnel (TG 7.6). The USS COMSTOCK (LSD-191 was the mother 

ship for the boat pool, which provided water transportation for all task units during the 

operation. The USS CARDINERS BAY (AVP-39) and eight destroyers provided for 

continuous surveillance in the ocean areas around Enewetak Atoll. 

7 
Table l-2. TC 7.3 (Navy) Organization and Personnel Summary 

Unit/Ship 

TU 7.3.1 FLAGSHIP UNIT 

USS MT MCKINLEY (AGC-7) 

TU 7.3.2 MAIN NAVAL TEST UNIT 

USS CURTISS (AV-4) 

USS ALBEMARLE (AV-5) 

USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) 

USS WARRICK (AKA-89) 

USS YANCEY (AKA-93) 

USS LST-45 

* USS LST-219 

* uss LST-611 

** USATS FS-211 

** USATS FS-370 

TU 7.3.3 OFF-SHORE PATROL 

USS GARDINERS BAY (AVP-39) 

*** FLEET ACFT SVC SQ 119 (FASRON-119) 

**+ MEDIUM SEAPLANE PATROL SQ 6 (VP-MS-~) 

ESCORT DIVISION 1 

USS GEORGE (DE-6971 

(includes COMCORTDIV 1) 

USS CURRIER (DE-700) 

USS MARSH (DE-6991 

USS RABY (DE-698) 

USS SPANGLER (DE-696) 

DESTROYER DIVISION 52 

USS HENRY W. TUCKER (DDR-875) 

(includes COMDESDIV 52) 

USS ROGERS (DDR-876) 

USS PERKINS (DDR-877) 

MISCELLANEOUS 

*** AVR C-26638 

*** AVR C-26653 

AIR DEVELOPMENT SQ 4 (VX-4) 

(on KWAJALEIN) 

SONOBUOY MONITOR UNIT 

(on ENEWETAK) 

Personnel 

579 

559 

534 

292 

194 

155 

71 

60 

53 

26 

26 

298 

33 

290 

148 

136 

139 

145 

136 

238 

234 

227 

6 

6 

54 

8 
Table I-2 (Continued) 

TU 7.3.4 HELICOPTER UNIT 

USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) 

*** HELICOPTER UNITS 

TU 7.3.5 SERVICE UNIT 

USS PASIG (AW-3) 

USS AREQUIPA (AF-31) 

USS MISPILLION (AO-105) 

YW-94 

YOG-64 

TU 7.3.6 CABLE UNIT 

LSM-250 

LSM-378 

NAVY SIGNAL UNIT fl 

(on ENEWETAK) 

724 

227 

77 

176 

11 

11 

60 

43 

51 

TU 7.3.7 BOAT POOL 

USS COMSTOC’K (LSD-19) 255 

** BOAT POOL 184 

USS ASKARI (ARL-30) 176 

LCI (L)-549 18 

LCI (L)-1054 22 

LCI (L)- 1090 21 

*** LCTs 472, 494, 1194, 1345 -- 

CTG 7.3 * USS DAVISON (DMS-37) 

* USS GULL (AMS-16) 

* USS PELICAN (AMS-32) 

* USS QUICK (DMS-32) 

* USS SWALLOW (AMS-36) 

170 

24 

26 

167 

23 

Total 7113 

* These units received no radioactive contamination at Operation SANDSTONE 

and are not included in the dose reconstruction effort. 

** Army ships attached to TG 7.3. 

*** Movements of these smaller units cannot be followed in sufficient detail to 

permit a dose reconstruction. 

Source: Reference 3. 

9 
Most of the TG 7.3 personnel consisted of crews aboard the more than 30 ships 

operating in the Enewetak area. Some naval units such as the Sonobuoy Monitor Unit 

and Navy Signal Unit 81 lived on Enewetak Island during the entire operation. 

Further, naval air units operated out of both Enewetak and Kwajalein in support of the 

test operation. 

1.3 METHODOLOGY 

The procedures developed in previous dose reconstruction efforts (References 4, 

5 and 6) have been adapted to the shipboard and island radiological environments of 

Operation SANDSTONE. Figure 1-3 depicts the steps taken in calculating personnel 

doses. These steps are pursued to a level of detail governed by the availability of 

data. On only a few ships and islands were sufficient data recorded that are currently 

available for determination of the radiation environment. On most ships, virtually no 

radiological data exist; their environments are estimated based on their positions, i.e., 

proximity to other ships and islands with known environments, and their activities 

when fallout was encountered. Much of the radiological data was obtained from 

Reference 7. Individual ship deck logs are taken to be the authoritative source of ship 

position and activity. 

Radiological data are used to reconstruct the time-dependent radiation environment on each of the thirty-one ships and on the residence islands of Enewetak and 

Kwajalein Atolls. Characterization of the radiation environment starts with the 

determination of free-field intensities from limited radiation intensity data. The 

periodic radiological surveys, in conjunction with fallout time-of-arrival data, serve 

to define the free-field intensity as a function of time. For interpolation between 

readings and for extrapolation beyond the last reading, the intensity is assumed to be a 

power law function of time after burst, determined from fallout decay rates. Shipspecific data regarding the development of intensity curves for the thirty-one ships 

are presented in Section 2. 

The analysis of radiation exposure to the crew also requires estimation of 

radiation intensities below deck and the apportionment of crew activities with time 

10 
SHIPBOARD AND 

SHIP OPERATIONS ISLAND 

(DECK LOGS) RADIOLOGICAL 

SURVEY DATA 

AFTER-ACTION 

FREE-FIELD 

INTEGRATED 

INTENSITY 

7 7 

SHIELDING 

FILM BADGE PERSONNEL 

DOSE ACTIVITIES 

I UNCERTAINTIES 

BOUNDED 

TOTAL DOSIMETRY 

FILM BADGE RECORDS 

DOSE 

Figure l-3. Operation SANDSTONE Dose Reconstruction Methodology 

11 
below and on deck. A ship-shielding factor is defined as the ratio of intensity below to 

the mean intensity topside. This factor is approximately 0.1 (Section 2.4) and is nearly 

constant over the usual crew locations within a ship. Thus, the radiation dose to the 

crew is dominated by the topside exposure. On-deck intervals are taken to be 0800- 

1200, 1330-1700, and 1800-2000 hours, which amounts to 40 percent of a day. To 

facilitate the calculation for shipboard personnel, the daily fractional topside duration, 

rather than the specified intervals, is used. Because the specified intervals are nearly 

centered around midday, this approximation is suitable. Similar calculations are 

performed for island-based personnel to account for the shielding provided by 

buildings. Both are described in Section 3. 

The mean film badge dose to personnel is obtained from time integration of 

intensity for all intervals below or inside (including the shielding factor) and on deck or 

outside. A conversion factor of 0.7 is used to account for body shielding in 

determining the film badge equivalent dose (Reference 8). Total film badge doses are 

calculated and presented in Section 3. Calculations are continued through 31 May 

when the roll-up phase of the operation was nearly complete; dose accrual after 

31 May is less than 1 mrem per day. An uncertainty analysis of the dose calculations 

is provided in Section 4. In Section 5, the available dosimetry records are analyzed, 

and their comparability to the calculated doses is assessed. Conclusions are presented 

in Section 6. 

12 
Section 2 

SHIP OPERATIONS AND RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS 

This section describes the movements of the TC 7.3 ships while at Enewetak 

Atoll during Operation SANDSTONE and a broad picture of the radiological 

environment following the three detonations in the test series. Shipboard radiation 

environments resulting from radioactive fallout are reconstructed based on available 

shipboard data. In the absence of ship-specific radiological data, island data from 

Enewetak and K wajalein Atolls have been used as appropriate to aid in the 

reconstruction effort. Possibly because significant fallout was not apparent from any 

of the SANDSTONE detonations, many of the shipboard measurements taken during 

the operation were either not documented or, if they were, the reports have not been 

located. Although the data are sparse, the radiation environments presented in this 

section adequately reflect the radiation exposure of TG 7.3 personnel during Operation 

SANDSTONE. 

2.1 SHIP OPERATIONS 

Of the 31 task group ships at Enewetak during Operation SANDSTONE, only five 

remained anchored in the lagoon for all three detonations. These were the 

ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS, MT MCKINLEY, and SPANGLER. With the 

exception of the SPANGLER, which provided anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrols 

outside of the lagoon between shots, these ships remained in the lagoon during the 

entire operation. For several weeks prior to Shot X-RAY and two-week periods before 

Shots YOKE and ZEBRA, the ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS, and MT MCKINLEY 

were anchored in the northern anchorage area off the respective shot islands, 

providing personnel and logistical support for the pre-shot activities. The day before 

each shot, they proceeded to their assigned anchorages off Parry Island in the southern 

part of the lagoon, where the crews observed the detonations (see Figure 2-1). 

Shortly after Shots X-RAY and YOKE, these ships returned to the northern anchorage 

area to prepare for the next detonation. After Shot ZEBRA, the ALBEMARLE, 

BAIROKO, CURTISS, and MT MCKINLEY shifted berths to an area off Enewetak Island 

and, on 21 May, departed Enewetak for Pearl Harbor in company with the PERKINS, 

RABY, SPANCLER, and TUCKER, which provided screen for the convoy. 

13 
AXCHORAGE 

Shot ZEBRA 

ENEWETAK ATOL L 

(ENIWIITOK ATOLL) 

OPERATION SANDSTONE 

-NI 012345 

STATUTE MILES 

\ \ Japtan 

Island 

v 

DEEP ENTRANCE 

AXHORAGE 

WIDE PASSAGE 

6 

R Parrv 

Island 

Figure 2-l. Enewetak Atoll Anchorage Areas 

14 
The other 26 task group ships evacuated the lagoon the day before each shot and 

returned to the lagoon several hours after the detonations. While outside of the 

lagoon, these ships were assigned to one of two task units formed for the pre-shot 

evacuations--TU 7.3.5 and TU 7.3.8. Of 12 vessels assigned to TU 7.3.5 (excluding the 

destroyer escort), only nine were at Enewetak for all three shots. These were the 

ASKARI, PASIG, LSM-250, LST-45, LCI-1054, LCI-1090, YW-94, YOG-64, and AFS370. Generally all nine of these vessels followed similar routines before and after 

each shot. They evacuated* the lagoon the day before the test to an area a minimum 

of 17 miles south or southeast of the shot island. While outside of the lagoon, the 

MARSH was assigned to TU 7.3.5 to provide ASW screen. Several hours after the 

detonation, the ships returned to the southern anchorage area off Enewetak and Parry 

Islands. (One exception to this was the LST-45, which anchored in the northern 

anchorage area upon returning to the lagoon). In the two-week periods between shots, 

some of these ships (the LCI-1054, LCI-1090, YW-94 and YOG-64) provided 

transportation and services (fuel, oil, and water) for those in the northern anchorage 

area, but all remained in the confines of the lagoon. The three other ships assigned to 

TU 7.3.5 were the AREQUIPA, LSM-378 and AFS-211. The AREQUIPA participated 

only at Shot X-RAY and departed the lagoon on 20 April, for Pearl Harbor. The AFS211 participated only at Shot YOKE and was at Bikini and Mili Atolls for Shots X-RAY 

and ZEBRA, respectively. It departed Mili on 16 May and arrived at Kwajalein on 17 

May. LSM-378 departed Kwajalein during the evening of 14 April and arrived at 

Enewetak on 16 April; hence, it participated only at Shots YOKE and ZEBRA. 

After Shot ZEBRA, the PASIG, after taking a brief trip to Bikini and Kwajalein, 

departed Enewetak on 24 May in company with the LCI-1054 and LCI-1090 enroute to 

Pearl Harbor. The LST-45, LSM-250, and LSM-378 also departed for Pearl Harbor on 

the same day. On 29 May, the ASKARI departed for Kwajalein in company with YOG64 and YW-94. It is not known how long after Shot ZEBRA that the AFS-370 departed 

Enewetak. 

*YOG-64 remained in the lagoon for Shot YOKE, but its crew was evacuated to the 

ASKARI. 

15 
The five ships assigned to TU 7.3.8 (excluding the destroyer escort) were the 

COMSTOCK, GARDINERS BAY, MISPILLION, PICKAWAY, and W ARRICK. Personnel 

on these vessels observed the detonations from positions a minimum of 15 miles 

southeast of each shot. While the task unit was outside of the lagoon, the CURRIER 

was assigned to provide ASW screen, returning to its off-shore patrol duties shortly 

after each shot. Except for the pre-shot evacuations, a brief trip to Guam on 5-12 

May by the MISPILLION, departure for Kwajalein on 9 May for the WARRICK, and 

brief sorties out of the lagoon by the PICKAWAY, these ships remained in the lagoon 

for the entire operation. After Shot ZEBRA, the MISPILLION, COMSTOCK and 

PICKAWAY departed Enewetak enroute to Kwajalein on 21, 26, and 27 May, 

respectively. The COMSTOCK returned to Enewetak for 3 days on 28 May and, on 31 

May, departed for Pearl Harbor. The CARDINERS BAY departed on 22 May, also 

bound for Pearl Harbor. 

Another ship that evacuated the lagoon for each shot, the LCI-549, was not 

asssigned to either of the two main task units formed for the evacuation. Instead, it 

acted independently as a drone reference vessel and maintained a position just off 

Wide Passage (see Figure 2-l) for each detonation. After each shot, it returned to the 

lagoon and was used as part of the boat pool. After Shot ZEBRA, the LCI-549 

departed Enewetak on 24 May in company with the PASIC, LCI-1054, and LCI-1090, all 

bound for Pearl Harbor. 

Another ship that participated at Enewetak during Operation SANDSTONE was 

the YANCEY. It departed Pearl Harbor sometime after Shot YOKE and did not arrive 

at Enewetak until 16 May, one day after Shot ZEBRA. It unloaded cargo for 

approximately 10 days and, on 26 May, departed Enewetak for Oakland, California. 

There were eight destroyers (DES and DDRs) assigned to TU 7.3.3 that supported 

ship movements to and from Enewetak Atoll and also provided continuous ASW patrols 

around the atoll while the operation was in progess. At shot times, the MARSH and 

CURRIER provided ASW screens for TU 7.3.5, and TU 7.3.8, respectively, while the 

SPANGLER provided screen for the ships that remained in the lagoon. The remaining 

destroyers, the GEORGE, PERKINS, RABY, ROGERS, and TUCKER, were on patrol in 

16 
their assigned sectors around Enewetak Atoll. Figure 2-2 depicts the destroyer patrol 

sector chart for Operation SANDSTONE. When used in conjunction with Table 2-1, the 

movements of all of the destroyers can be detailed from 15 April to 15 May 1948. 

When the destroyers were not on patrol, they remained anchored in the lagoon, where 

they took on fuel, oil, and water in preparation for their next patrol assignment. From 

Figure 2-2 and Table 2-1, it is noted that the immediate ocean area surrounding the 

atoll (Sectors ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE) was under constant surveillance by the 

offshore patrol unit. In addition, both major entrances to the lagoon (Wide Passage 

and Deep Entrance) were also under constant patrol. The outer patrol sectors (Sectors 

DOG, EASY, and FOX) were usually patrolled several days before and after each 

detonation. 

With the exception of the RABY, which took a brief trip to Bikini on l-3 May, all 

of the destroyers remained in the immediate vicinity of Enewetak for the entire 

operation. After the operation, the ROGERS departed the lagoon on 20 May for 

Rongerik Atoll. On 21 May, the PERKINS, RABY, SPANGLER, and TUCKER 

departed Enewetak and provided screen for the ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS, 

and MT MCKINLEY while enroute to Pearl Harbor. The CURRIER and GEORGE 

departed the lagoon on 25 May for Pearl Harbor, while the MARSH 

Pearl Harbor until 3 June. 

did not leave for 

Table 2-2 is a summary of the ships participating at Operation SANDSTONE. It 

should be noted that many of the ships were assigned 

evacuations other than the units they were assigned to 

Table l-2). 

to task units for the pre-shot 

in the TG 7.3 organization (See 

17 
w 

_ 

0 

w 

_ 

0 

18 
Table 2-l. Destroyer Patrol Sector Assignments for Operation SANDSTONE 

PATROL SECTOR 

DATE 

DEEP 

ENTRANCE 

WIDE 

PASSAGE ABLE BAKER CHARLIE DOG EASY FOX 

APRIL 15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

May 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

ii 

9 

IO 

11 

12 

13 

I4 

MAY 15 

ROG 

~~,MAR 

MAR 

MAR 

MAR 

MAR/TUC 

TUC/CUR 

TUCIRAB 

TUC 

TUC/MAR 

MAR 

MAR,ROG 

ROG 

ROC 

ROG 

i%,GEO 

GE0 

GEO/SPA 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA/PER 

PER 

PER 

PER 

PER/CEO 

CEO,ROG 

ROG 

ROG,GEO 

PER TUC,GEO 

PER CEO/SPA 

PER SPA 

PER,ROG SPA 

ROG RAB 

ROG RAB 

ROG RAB 

ROG RAB 

ROG CUR 

ROG RAB 

ROG,PER RAB 

PER SPA 

PER SPA/CEO 

PER CEO 

PER/RAB CEO 

RAB,PER GEO,TUC 

PER GEO,TUC 

PER TUC 

PER/SPA TUC 

SPA/MAR TUC/GEO 

MAR CEO 

MAR CEO 

MAR/CUR GEO,ROG 

CUR ROG 

CUR ROG,TUC 

CUR ROG/TUC 

CUR RCG/TUC 

CUR/SPA ROC;MAR 

SPA/PER MAR/CEO 

PER GEO,TUC 

PER/CUR TUC/GEO 

MAR 

MAR 

MAR 

RAB 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA/CUR 

CUR 

CUR 

CUR 

CUR 

CUR/SPA 

CUR/SPA 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA/MAR 

MAR 

MAR,TUC 

RAB 

RAB 

RAB 

RAB 

RAB 

TUC 

TUC 

TUC 

TUC/PER 

PER/SPA 

SPA 

MAR 

MAR 

RAB 

RAB 

PER 

PER 

PER 

PER/CEO 

GE0 

CEO 

CEO 

CEO/CUR 

GEO’ 

CEO/MAR 

CUR CUR CUR 

CUR CUR CUR 

TUC CEO/CUR CEO/CUR 

TUC CUR CUR 

TUC CUR CUR 

TUC CUR CUR 

TUC/GEO CUR CUR 

CEO CUR CUR 

CUR/MAR 

TUC CUR CUR 

ClJR 

CUR CUR 

TUC CUR CUR 

MAR 

MAR 

MAR/SPA 

MAR 

SPA 

SPA 

SPA 

TUC/GEO 

MAR 

GE0 

GE0 

GEO,ROG 

ROG 

ROG 

ROG 

~~,MAR 

MAR 

Key: CUR-CURRIER, CEO-GEORGE, MAR-MARSH, PER-PERKINS, RAB-RABY, ROG-ROGERS, SPA-SPANGLER, WC-TUCKER 

Source: Ship Deck Logs 
Table 2-2. Ship Participation Summary at Operation SANDSTONE 

TU 7.3.3 

TU 7.3.5 

TU 7.3.8 

Task Units Formed 

For Evacuation Ship 

Ships Remaining ALBEMARLE 

in the Lagoon BAIROKO 

CURTISS 

MT MCKINLEY 

SPANGLER+ 

Ships at Enewetak Atoll Unless Noted 

X-PAY YOKE ZEBRA 

Departure 

Date 

21 May 

21 May 

21 May 

21 May 

21 May 

GEORGE 25 May 

PERKINS 21 May 

RABY 21 May 

ROGERS 20 May 

TUCKER 21 May 

AREQUIPA 

ASKARI 

PASIC 

LSM-250 

LSM-378 

LST-45 

LCI-1054 

LCI- 1090 

YOG-64 

Y w-94 

AFS-211 

AFS-370 

MARSH* 

Pearl Harbor 

Kwajalein 

Bikini 

Pearl Harbor 

Mili 

20 Apr 

29 May 

24 May 

24 May 

24 May 

24 May 

24 May 

24 May 

29 May 

29 May 

Unk 

Unk 

3 Jun 

COMSTOCK 

GARDINERS BAY 

MlSPILLlON 

PICKAWAY 

WARRICK 

CURRIER* 

Kwajalein 

31 May 

22 May 

21 May 

27 May 

18 May 

25 May 

Others Ships LCI-549 24 May 

Arrive Enewetak 

16 May 1948 26 May 

YANCEY Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor 

*These destroyers rejoined TU 7.3.3 following each detonation. Source: Ship deck logs. 

20 
2.2 RADIOLOGICAL DATA 

All three of the SANDSTONE devices were detonated on 200-foot towers over 

coral soil (see Table 1-I). Because the tests were detonated under nearly ideal wind 

conditions (which minimized fallout on the islands in the southern portion of the 

lagoon), none of the task group ships received any primary (early-time) fallout. 

Generally, as the radioactive clouds rose, the stems of the clouds would drift off to 

the west or northwest under the influence of the low level (,<15,000 feet) easterly or 

southeasterly winds; the main portion of the clouds drifted to the east or northeast 

under the influence of westerly or southwesterly winds above 15,000 feet (Reference 

2). The clouds from each shot remained below the high Pacific tropopause; hence, the 

winds continued to carry them in an easterly direction. As the clouds drifted eastward 

and diffused, radioactive particles were continuously falling into the low-level easterly 

winds which would have carried some of them back toward Enewetak Atoll. This 

secondary (late-time) fallout appears to be the source of virtually all of the shipboard 

contamination on ships participating at Operation SANDSTONE. Generally, secondary 

fallout was a widespread phenomenon and probably occurred uniformly (with equal 

intensity) over Enewetak Lagoon and the waters in the immediate vicinity of the atoll. 

Hence, radiological data obtained aboard one ship may, in the absence of contradictory 

information, be applicable to other ships at or near Enewetak during the time when 

fallout was encountered. 

Shortly after Shot X-RAY, the TUCKER and GEORGE, while operating in the 

area east of Enjebi Island, reportedly saw a “mist of very small particles” (from 

passage of the nuclear cloud), but intensities returned to normal background when the 

ships moved away from the visible cloud (Reference IO). The intensities apparently 

resulted from cloud “shine”, i.e., radiation emanating from the cloud in the absence of 

fallout particles, since it was reported that no contamination fell on the ships. 

Topside intensities on the TUCKER were reported to have been 20 mR/hr (B +Y )* for 

one hour and forty minutes while beneath the radioactive cloud; intensities on the 

GEORGE were reported as “twice above background” for approximately fifteen 

minutes (Reference 10). 

*Since no fallout was observed on the ships, the reported reading was probably due to 

gamma only; a beta contribution would suggest the presence of fallout particles, 

21 
Minor fallout did occur on Enewetak Island following the X-RAY detonation. 

Radiological surveys were conducted at three locations on the island during the period 

15-21 April. At two of the locations, the Service Club and “Hut A”, maximum 

intensities of 0.1 mR/hr were noted at 2100 hours, 15 April. At the same time, 

intensities of 0.5 mR/hr were measured in the vicinity of the TG 7.6 building 

(Reference 11). Another brief period of fallout occurred late in the evening of 16 April 

and into the morning of 17 April. Maximum intensities measured on Enewetak during 

this fallout were 0.1 - 0.15 mR/hr at all three locations (Reference 11); somewhat 

higher intensities were observed onboard the four ships anchored in the northern 

anchorage area of the lagoon off Enjebi and Aomon Islands (Reference 10). On 22 

April, two of these ships, the ALBEMARLE and BAIROKO, reported deck intensities of 

0.5 and 0.3 mR/hr, respectively. These intensities were approximately ten times 

higher than those being reported on the other two ships anchored in close proximity to 

them, the CURTISS and MT MCKINLEY. Since no fallout was reported on the 

residence islands of the atoll during this time period, it is assumed that these greater 

intensities were due to contaminated helicopters landing on the flight decks of these 

two ships and that the readings are not representative of the weather deck surfaces on 

the other ships. 

At 1000 hours on 3 May, two days after Shot YOKE, background intensities on 

the BAIROKO’s flight and hangar decks “began to noticably increase, and it soon 

became evident that appreciable fall-out was occurring on the ship” (Reference 7). 

Maximum intensity readings on the BAIROKO were 1.7 mR/hr (P+ Y ) early in the 

afternoon, when the fallout ceased. This fallout also occurred on the other ships, but 

to a lesser extent than on the BAIROKO. Fallout had also occurred on Kwajalein 

during the evening of 2 May where average intensities were reported as 2.0 mR/hr (0.5 

mR/hr gamma) (Reference 7). Maximum intensities of 6-10 mR/hr were reported in 

Reference 2, but these were apparently on canvas (Reference 7) and are not 

representative of personnel exposure. 

After Shot ZEBRA there was apparently some minor fallout in Enewetak lagoon 

but “it decayed rapidly and never approached the tolerance limit” (Reference 7). The 

time that this fallout occurred and the intensity levels it reached have not been found, 

probably because the intensity was considered too insignificant to log. 

22 
The radiation environments on the residence islands of Enewetak and Kwajalein 

Atolls are depicted in Figures 2-3 and 2-4, respectively. Available shipboard data are 

also plotted in Figure 2-3. X-RAY, YOKE, and ZEBRA fallout on Kwajalein is well 

documented on two strip chart recorders that were operated by the New York 

Operations Office of the AEC; the strip chart traces, normalized to the survey 

measurement, are the sources of the intensity curve in Figure 2-4 (Reference 12). 

Shipboard intensity readings on the BAIROKO following Shot YOKE suggest that it 

received the same “wave” of fallout as that which occurred on Kwajalein 

approximately I2 hours earlier. Hence, the YOKE intensity curve for Enewetak 

(Figure 2-3) is obtained from the peak reading on the BAIROKO with subsequent decay 

dictated by the Kwajalein data. Since no intensity data are available for fallout on 

Enewetak following Shot ZEBRA, the high-sided assumption is made that it received 

another minor “wave” of fallout with intensities comparable to those on Kwajalein. 

On 18 May, three days after Shot ZEBRA, all of the task group ships in the 

lagoon were inspected by monitoring parties. Particular attention was paid to the 

blower intake screens, the open decks, the evaporators, the auxiliary condensers, and 

any cargo onboard the ship (Reference 7). The crews were directed to decontaminate 

any areas with intensities greater than 5 mR/day (B+Y) above background. The ships 

were reinspected on 20 May. Final radiological clearance was given to all ships 

reporting maximum intensities of less than 5 mR/day, and an operational clearance 

was given to those ships where isolated intensities in excess of this were still being 

reported. For those ships departing Enewetak under an operational clearance, it was 

directed that the inlet screens to supply blowers be scraped to bare metal, repainted 

and monitored on ,arrival at a shipyard. It was reported that there was “no radioactive 

hazard to personnel on any ship” as of 20 May 1948 (Reference 7). The results of the 

20 May survey are contained in Reference 13; the average gamma intensity on the 

weather surfaces of all ships is also plotted in Figure 2-3. It should be noted in the 20 

May survey data that the vast majority of the shipboard intensity measurements were 

obtained from locations such as air intakes, engine room blowers, vent duct screens, 

and exhaust vents. These locations would be expected to accumulate any radioactivity 

and therefore the readings represent the maximum shipboard intensities at the time of 

the survey. Weather deck intensities, when reported, are generally lower and are more 

representative of average topside intensities. 

23 
Figure 2-3. Average Free-Field Radiation Intensity for Southern 

and Northern Anchorage Areas - Enewetak Atoll 

.I - 

.4 - 

.3 _ 

.2 - 

.L - 

20 22 24 *o 22 21 26 21 20 31 

Figure 2-4. Average Free-Field Radiation Intensity on Kwajalein 

24 
2.3 INTEGRATED FREE-FIELD INTENSITIES 

The intensity curves derived in Section 2.2 are time-integrated to arrive at the 

free-field radiation environment on Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls, and on those ships 

where sufficient radiological data exist to derive their intensity curves. For those 

ships remaining in the southern anchorage area at Enewetak, the free-field radiation 

environment on Enewetak Island is considered to be the topside environment. For 

those ships at Kwajalein at the time of fallout, the Kwajalein environment is 

considered to be the topside environment. Ships that were not at Enewetak or 

Kwajalein in the days immediately following a given shot are assumed to have not 

received fallout from that test (no existing data suggets otherwise). Calculations are 

carried out to 31 May, at which time the daily free-field integrated intensity 

increment is approximately I mR. Subsequent decay would have soon rendered the 

daily increment comparable to normal background. 

The basic expression used to calculate the integrated free-field intensity is given 

by: 

X-RAY~~ + 

s 

i2 Ilt)yO~E dt +~~S’(‘)ZEBRA~~ 

where 

tl, t2 and t3 = Fallout arrival times for Shots X-RAY, YOKE, and 

ZEBRA, respectively, in hours after the shot. 

1(t) = Intensity (mR/hr) with respect to time after Shots 

X-RAY, YOKE, and ZEBRA. 

The upper limit of integration, t, is the end of the period for which it is desired to 

calculate the environment, 31 May 1948. The results are given in Table 2-3. 

25 
Table 2-3. Integrated Free-Field Intensities Through 31 May 1948 

Location 

A tolls 

Enewetak 

Kwajalein 

Ships 

ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS, 

GEORGE, LST-45, MT MCKINLEY 

AFS-211 

AREQUIPA 

LSM-378 

TUCKER 

WARRICK 

YANCEY 

Integrated 

Intensity (mR) 

101 

151 

117 

75 

26 

114 

150 

93 

8 

All other ships: AFS-370, ASKARI, COMSTOCK, 

CURRIER, GARDINERS BAY, LCI-549, LCI- 1054, 

LCI- 1090, LSM-250, MARSH, MISPILLION, PASIG, 

PERKINS, PICKAWAY, RABY, ROGERS, SPANGLER, 

YOG-64, YW-94 101 

2.4 SHIP SHIELDING 

Dose estimates for crewmembers require consideration of the shielding provided 

by the ship structure for radioactive fallout deposited on the weather surfaces of the 

ships. A ship-shielding factor, defined as the ratio of radiation intensity at an interior 

location to an intensity topside, depends on many variables: time after detonation, 

distribution of fallout on the weather surface, amount of intervening material 

(decking, bulkheads, piping, etc.) from weather surface to point of interest, and 

distance from weather surface. Consequently, while ship shielding effects have been 

experimentally and theoretically studied by the Navy since Operation CROSSROADS 

(19461, values of shielding factors remain uncertain. Readings taken on target ships 

26 
during Operation CROSSROADS, and on two test ships (YAG-39 and YAC-40) during 

Operations CASTLE (1954) and REDWING (1956) gave preliminary estimates of 

shielding factors (References 14, 15 and 16). However, a significant fraction of the 

radiation penetrating to the interior of these ships, especially at the lower depths, 

apparently came from radioactive materials in the water and on the hulls of the ships. 

Because this radiation source is insignificant in the extant case, these shielding factors 

are not applicable. 

Experimental results reported by W.F. Waldorf (Reference 17) on radiation from 

Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137 sources on the flight deck penetrating the interior of a light 

aircraft carrier (U_SS COWPENS) indicated that an average shielding factor could be 

correlated with the thickness of deck plating directly above the point of interest in the 

ship. He further showed that the effects of bulkheads, piping, and other miscellaneous 

intervening material could be approximated (somewhat high-sided) by doubling the 

deck thickness in shielding calculations. Results from British experiments on a 

carrier, destroyer, and light cruiser, referenced by Waldorf, verified these conclusions 

and indicated that this factor of two may apply to most ship types. C.F. Ksanda 

(References 14 and 18) performed detailed calculations on an aircraft carrier (USS 

RANGER), presenting the shielding factors graphically as functions of deck plating 

thickness for various times after detonation. He also accounted for miscellaneous 

shielding materials by doubling the deck thickness when performing the calculations. 

The results of the Waldorf experiment and the geometric means of Ksanda’s upper and 

lower limit shielding factors for unfractionated U-235 fission products at one day 

after detonation are displayed in Figure 2-5. Due to geometric attenuation, these 

curves appear to’ approach values less than one as deck thickness becomes small. 

Because of the detailed nature of Ksanda’s effort and the general agreement with 

experiment, the Ksanda mean value is used in the present calculations. 

In the present analysis, it is assumed that, when topside, personnel experienced 

the average external topside intensity, and any shielding provided by the superstructure is neglected. Large variations in personnel activities and shielding factors 

preclude a more accurate assessment of this factor. It is further assumed that, when 

below decks, personnel were located on the second deck, with only the thickness of the 

27 
main deck to provide radiation shielding. Personnel below the second deck, and in 

those portions of the second deck under the superstructure, were afforded additional 

radiation shielding not included in these calculations. The main deck thicknesses for 

the types of ships at Operation SANDSTONE are estimated to range between 0.30 and 

0.75 inches (Reference 5 and 6). From Figure 2-5 this would correspond to a range in 

shielding factors of 0.15 to 0.06, respectively. 

1 

1: .? 

.6 

.5 

.4 

.3 

E 

2 

al .1 

s .09 

.08 

.07 

.06 

.05 

-04 

.03 

.02 

.Ol 

l 

I I I I I I I I I I I I I . 

.Ualdorf Co-60 (1.25 MeV) 

\ 

\ 

\ 

(0.66 t&V) \ 

\ 

\ 

l I I I I I 1 I I I I Ixl I 

c .2 -4 .6 .a 1.0 1.2 1.4 

Total Deck Plating Thickness (in.) 

Figure 2-5. Ship Shielding Factor vs. Deck Plating Thickness 

28 
Section 3 

DOSE CALCULATIONS 

To determine the dose to personnel, consideration is given to the time spent 

topside (outside) and below decks (inside) and the radiation protection afforded by a 

ship (building). The free-field integrated intensities from Section 2 are adjusted to 

account for crew activities, either documented or assumed. The adjusted exposures 

(mR) are then multiplied by a film badge conversion factor to determine a film badge 

dose. This conversion factor, derived in Reference 8, is approximately 0.7 mrem/mR. 

Results are presented as a cumulative dose to personnel through 31 May 1948. 

The average free-field integrated intensity is converted to a film badge dose and 

corrected to account for the shielding provided by the ship’s structure while personnel 

were below decks. Similar protection is afforded by buildings in the case of the islandbased personnel. Normally, during fallout deposition and at early times when 

intensities are relatively high, an estimate of personnel protective measures is critical 

in determining the film badge dose (References 5 and 6). At Operation SANDSTONE, 

however, all fallout was relatively minor, and normal crew routines were probably not 

significantly altered during periods of fallout deposition. To determine film badge 

doses, the time-integrated intensities are adjusted to account for the time spent 

topside (outside) and below (inside) during a typical work day. It is estimated that the 

typical crew on each ship was on deck at the following times: 0800-1200, 1330- 1730, 

and 1800-2000 hours. This amounts to 40 percent of the day (9Yz hours) topside and 60 

percent (14% hours) below. While below, the crew was afforded shielding provided by 

the ship’s structure. In Section 2.4 it is estimated that the ship-dependent shielding 

factors vary from approximately 0.06 to 0.15, depending on the main deck thickness. 

A time-averaged shielding factor is computed as 0.4 + 0.6 x ship-shielding factor, 

where the 0.4 and 0.6 represent the fraction of the day spent above and below deck, 

respectively. The time-averaged shielding factors vary from 0.44 to 0.49. An average 

value of 0.47 is used in the analysis and variations in this value are treated as an 

uncertainty in Section 4. A similar argument is used to obtain a time-averaged 

shielding factor of 0.8 for the land-based personnel. This assumes that 60 percent of 

29 
the day is spent outside and 40 percent inside. While inside, personnel are afforded a 

protection factor of 2, i.e., a shielding factor of 0.5. 

The integrated intensities in Table 2-3 are corrected to account for shielding 

provided by a ship’s structure and buildings on the residence islands, and film badge 

equivalency. Results are personnel film badge doses through 31 May and are given in 

Table 3-1. 

Table 3-l. Calculated Personnel Film Badge Doses Through 31 May 1948 

Location 

Island Based Personnel 

Enewetak A toll 

Kwajalein Atoll 

Film Badge 

Dose (mrem) 

57 

84 

Shipboard Personnel 

ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS, 

GEORGE, LST-45, MT MCKINLEY, 

AFS-2 11 

AREQUIPA 

LSM-378 

TUCKER 

WARRICK 

YANCEY 

39 

25 

9 

37 

49 

31 

3 

All other ships: AFS-370, ASKARI, COMSTOCK, 

CURRIER, GARDINERS BAY, LCI-549, LCI-1054, 

LCI-1090, LSM-250, MARSH, MISPILLION, PASIC, 

PERKINS, PICKAWAY, RABY, ROGERS, SPANGLER, 

YOG-64, YW-94 33 

30 
Section 4 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 

The uncertainty in calculated film badge dose is estimated from the underlying 

parameters. The basic uncertainties include radiation intensities on shipdeck or on 

islands, the time spent on deck or outside, and the shielding afforded to personnel 

below decks or within buildings. 

Intensity levels on deck are determined from limited shipboard radiological 

survey data, supplemented by the more continuous island readings from Enewetak and 

Kwajalein Atolls. The sparsity of the data requires a high-sided approach to the 

assignment of time-dependent ship intensity levels. However, the high-siding does not 

extend to the uncritical incorporation of all maximum readings. Where readings are 

demonstrably unrepresentative of a topside intensity, whether from documented 

hotspots or as deduced from neighboring ship data, they are excluded. The ALBEMARLE and BAIROKO readings of 22 April (D+7) are thus excluded, as are the 20 May 

survey readings of air intakes and the like. 

The most complete and reliable intensity data are those derived from daily 

counting on Kwajalein Atoll. In the weeks following Shots X-RAY and YOKE, the 

activity decays as approximately t -1.1 (minus background). For the periods of 

interest, Reference 19 indicates a nearly constant ratio between activity and gamma 

intensity. With the reported peak gamma reading after YOKE for normalization, the 

gamma intensity is thus implied throughout. The t 

-1.1 decay is taken as appropriate 

for Enewetak Atoll as well and leads to high-sided doses when applied to early 

shipboard readings (because of deck weathering). Two independent types of counting 

are available from K wajalein. The corresponding plots are very similar (up to an 

unknown constant) except near the peak after YOKE. Consequently, the normalization 

of each to gamma intensity is different. The normalization chosen for dose 

computation is that from the depressed peak, thereby implying greater intensities at 

other times by more than a factor of two. Thus, the total dose calculated for 

Kwajalein personnel may be high-sided by about a factor of two. 

31 
Enewetak Island intensity data, as extrapolated by t-l*’ decay, are also applied 

after Shot X-RAY to ships in the adjacent southern anchorage, for which no data are 

available. The resulting doses are considered to be high-sided for shipboard personnel, 

as the island data also decay by t -1.1 after the cessation of fallout. Readings are 

available for three locations on Enewetak Island, several times daily, until four days 

after X-RAY. Peak readings range as high as twice the mean intensities used in dose 

computation and may be considered as leading to a reasonable upper limit of dose. 

For ships in the northern anchorage after Shot X-RAY, intensity data are 

available from four ships for D+4 to D+7. These deck data are consistent to within 

about 50 percent of their mean, with the exception of the D+7 data noted previously. 

The only earlier data are beta/gamma readings on D+2 and D+3 from the BAIROKO. 

These, together with the timing of the fallout deposition on D+l from the island data, 

permit reconstruction of the time-dependent intensity aboard the ships. The ratio of 

beta/gamma to gamma needed for the computation is obtained from analysis of the 

fifty available shipboard measurements of both quantities after Shots X-RAY and 

ZEBRA (References 10 and 13). These ratios form a lognormal distribution with 90 

percent of the data within a factor of two of the geometric mean. Thus, the two 

BAIROKO readings, even if representing a systematic bias in measuring technique, 

should imply a gamma intensity good to within a factor of two with 90-percent 

confidence. An additional uncertainty is with regard to the magnitude of the peak 

intensity on D+l. A high-sided dose is obtained by assuming a rapid deposition such 

that radiological decay alone accounts for the decline in intensity from D+l to D+2. A 

more realistic dose follows from a flatter peak that represents an interval(s) of fallout 

deposition, as suggested by the island data. However, the shape of the D+l peak 

affects the total dose from Shot X-RAY by less than 10 percent. 

The only datum at Enewetak Atoll after Shot YOKE is the peak beta/gamma 

reading onboard the BAIROKO. That reading, the maximum among the ships 

(Reference 7) is taken as a high-sided value for all ships and Enewetak Island. With 

t-l.l decay as on Kwajalein Atoll (minus the background from Shot X-RAY), shipboard 

doses are additionally high-sided. The uncertainty in the ratio of beta/gamma to 

gamma readings implies a peak gamma intensity (and therefore the high-sided dose 

from YOKE fallout) good to within a factor of two with 90-percent confidence. 

32 
No data specific to Shot ZEBRA are available for Enewetak Atoll. Intensities 

were apparently too low to warrant recording; the contribution to dose must have been 

very small, as on Kwajalein Atoll. What data are available, from ship surveys on 20 

May, likely reflect a dominant contribution from Shot YOKE. Of those readings 

representative of topside contamination, 60 percent of the mean intensity is accounted 

for by t-l*l decay of the YOKE fallout on the BAIROKO (including a small 

contribution from X-RAY). The remaining intensity is attributed to Shot ZEBRA and 

implies a dose similar to that on Kwajalein Atoll, or about 10 percent as much as the 

dose contribution from Shot YOKE. In the limit of rapid decay of the YOKE fallout, 

such that the surveys represent almost entirely ZEBRA fallout, the dose from Shot 

ZEBRA could be as great as twice that calculated. However, for ships other than the 

YANCEY, the consequent reduction in the YOKE dose more than offsets this increase. 

In fact, for the upper-limit contribution from YOKE, the ZEBRA contribution that can 

be accommodated is negligible. The only manner in which the ZEBRA contribution 

could be increased independently is through the uncertainty in the mean survey 

reading. The sixteen readings considered to be representative of topside conditions 

ensure that the uncertainty in this mean is low; it is accurate to within 20 percent 

with 90-percent confidence. Consequently, the ZEBRA dose is not more than a factor 

of (.4+.2)/.4=1.5 too low from this source with at least 90-percent confidence; in the 

limit of negligible YOKE contribution it is (2x.4+.2)/.4 = 2.5 too low. 

The above uncertainties in free-field intensities dominate the uncertainties in 

personnel dose calculations. Having less influence are the time-averaged shielding 

factors for shipboard and land exposures. The value of the fraction of time spent on 

deck or outside is estimated to be accurate within a factor of 1.2 with 90-percent 

confidence. Shielding factors below decks and in buildings are estimated to be 

accurate within a factor of 1.5. Overall, the time-averaged ship factor is 0.47 +O.lO 

-0.08 

and the land factor 0.80 + 0.13 to greater than 90-percent confidence. 

Combined, upper-limiting uncertainties are summarized in Table 4-l in terms of 

error factors to at least the 95-percent level (viz., upper 90-percent limit) for each 

discrete exposure analysis, where not already high-sided. 

33 
Table 4-l. Upper Bound Error Factors for Ships and Islands 

Location Shot Error Factor 

Enewetak Island 

Southern Anchorage 

Northern Anchorage 

USS YANCEY 

Kwajalein Atoll 

X-RAY, YOKE 2.5 

X-RAY, YOKE 2.4 

X-RAY: 15-18 Apr 2.4 

After 19 Apr 1.8 

YOKE 2.4 

ZEBRA 3.0 

All 1.2 

These error factors are applied to the average personnel film badge doses 

calculated in Section 3 (Table 3-1). The results of the best-estimate and upper bound 

dose calculations are summarized in Section 6. 

34 
Section 5 

FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 

In order to assess the validity of the dose calculations presented in Section 3, the 

Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company’s (REECO) exposure records for 

Operation SANDSTONE (Reference 20) were reviewed. Of the many personnel film 

badge exposure records maintained on file, approximately 100 were identified as being 

representative of “typical” personnel exposures on the ships and islands of interest. In 

this section, the actual dosimetry records for SANDSTONE personnel are compared to 

the calculated average film badge dose. The periods of badged exposure vary from 

ship to ship; therefore, dose calculations are performed for these specific badged 

periods in order to provide a basis for comparison. 

Generally, film badges were issued to personnel aboard the ships in order to 

obtain a record of exposure in various parts of the ship at the time of, and subsequent 

to, the detonation. These badges were usually issued several days prior to each test. 

These “shot” badges form the basis for the comparison with calculations. Other badges 

were issued to personnel during the periods between shots when they were expected to 

enter, or be in the vicinity of, radioactive areas. These are referred to as “mission” 

badges and represent non-typical exposures; hence, they are not included in the 

comparison. The majority of the badges issued for Operation SANDSTONE appear to 

fall into this category. These badges were issued to rad-safe personnel, members of 

the boat pool, and others who were required to be in contaminated areas. 

Table 5-1 summarizes, by shot, the dosimetry data selected for the comparison 

and the corresponding calculated film badge dose. Also tabulated are the number of 

“shot” badges identified as being issued for each shot on each ship (atoll), where 

available. The average film badge dose (FB) is simply the arithmetic mean of the 

doses derived from the exposed badges; the calculated dose (Calc) covers the 

corresponding badge period. 

35 
BAIROKO 

COMSTOCK 

TUCKER 

ALBEMARLE 

MT MCKINLEY 

PICKAWAY 

SPANGLER 

GEORGE 

ENEWETAK 

KWAJALEIN 

Table 5-I. Comparison of Dosimetry with Calculated Film Badge Doses 

XRAY 

Number Dose (mrem) 

of Badges FB 

- 

(3) 2 

(7) I 

(20) 19 

(2) 0 

-- __ 

(4) 26 

-- -_ 

_- -_ 

(3) 0 

-- __ 

Calc 

3 

3 

14 

4 

__ 

1 

-_ 

-_ 

2 

__ 

YOKE ZEBRA 

Number 

of Badges 

(7) 

(7) 

(1) 

(1) 

(5) 

(5) 

(1) 

(1) 

(6) 

__ 

Dose (mrem) 

FB 

- 

3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

30 

5 

0 

0 

_- 

Calc 

2 

3 

7 

1 

1 

1 

9 

1 

3 

__ 

Number 

of Badges 

(10) 

(10) 

__ 

(3) 

(3) 

-_ 

__ 

__ 

(6) 

(3) 

Dose (m rem ) 

FB 

- 

31 

12 

-_ 

3 

2 

-- 

-_ 

-- 

3 

10 

Calc 

2 

3 

-- 

4 

3 

-- 

-- 

-- 

4 

9 
With the exception of the BAIROKO (Shot ZEBRA) and the PICKAWAY (Shots XRAY and YOKE), calculated doses are consistent with the actual film badge data. It 

should be noted, however, that the maximum dose recorded by any of the “shot” badges 

(with the exception of those onboard the BAIROKO and PICKAWAY) was 40 mrem, 

which was below the film badge sensitivity threshold of approximately 50 mrem. 

Therefore, the only reasonable statement that can be made concerning the dose 

calculations are that the low calculated doses are substantiated by the low film badge 

exposures for the majority of the ships. 

On the BAIROKO, ten film badges have been identified as being “shot” badges 

issued for Shot ZEBRA. The ten readings are as follows: 25, 40, 36, 35, 20, 40, 60, 50, 

0, and 0 mrem. The first five badges have been further identified as being issued to 

either rad-safe officers or members of the boat pool, leaving only five badges as being 

issued to “typical” crewmembers. Of these five, two are zeros and the average of the 

remaining three is 50 mrem. Shipboard radiological data obtained during the 20 May 

survey, extrapolated back to 14-15 May when the badges were worn, do not support the 

atypical 40-60 mrem doses. 

Four film badges were issued to personnel onboard the PICKAWAY for Shot XRAY. These badges recorded exposures of 0, 35, 20, and 50 mrem. The zero dose was 

assigned to a crewmember identified as being a rad-safe officer who would have been 

involved with shipboard radiological surveys. The remaining three badges were issued 

to the Commanding Officer (35 mrem), the Executive Officer (20 mrem) and the 

Damage Control Officer (50 mrem) ---certainly not typical crewmembers. 

For Shot YOKE, five badges were issued to personnel aboard the PICKAWAY. 

Two of the badges were issued to a rad-safe officer and recorded doses of 0 and 40 

mrem. These readings, obtained on the same individual during the same period of 

time, support the premise that readings below the film badge sensitivity threshold of 

approximately 50 mrem are unreliable. The remaining three badges were again issued 

to non-typical crewmembers: the Commanding Officer (40 mrem), the Executive 

Officer (40 mrem), and the Navigator/Operations Officer (30 mrem). 

37 
All of the badges issued to personnel on the PICKAWAY are at, or below, the 

film badge sensitivity threshold. Available radiological data do not support the 

recorded exposures for Shots X-RAY and YOKE. In fact, YOKE fallout, the major 

contribution to the shipboard dose, did not occur until 3 May--two days after the 

YOKE badges were turned in. Fourteen film badges exposed onboard the COMSTOCK 

which was anchored just 500 yards from the PICKAWAY following Shots X-RAY and 

YOKE, recorded exposures of zero mrem (13 badges) and 10 mrem (1 badge). 

38 
Section 6 

CONCLUSIONS AND TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

Of the three shots of Operation SANDSTONE, Shots X-RAY and YOKE 

contributed over ninety percent of the gamma radiation dose to personnel on the 

participating ships and on the islands of Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls; Shot ZEBRA 

contributed the remainder. Personnel on ships that returned to the northern anchorage 

area of Enewetak Atoll following each of the three shots received slightly greater 

doses than personnel on ships that remained in the southern anchorage area. Shipboard 

personnel, in general, received smaller doses than the island-based personnel due to 

effective shielding provided by the ship’s structure when personnel were below decks. 

The crews of the thirty-one vessels participating at SANDSTONE received doses of 

0.05 rem or less. Personnel on Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls received doses of 

approximately 0.06 and 0.08 rem, respectively. 

Because of uncertainties associated with both shipboard and island radiological 

data, as well as those associated with the actual time spent on deck and ship shielding 

provided while below deck, calculations could be approximately twice the best 

estimate calculated in Section 3. This implies an upper-bound dose of less than 

0.10 rem for shipboard personnel. Similar considerations for island-based personnel 

lead to upper-bound doses on Enewetak and Kwajalein of approximately 0.13 and 

0.10 rem, respectively. Calculated doses are summarized in Table 6- 1. 

Available film badge dosimetry supports the reconstructed doses for TG 7.3 

personnel at Enewetak and Kwajalein Atolls during Operation SANDSTONE. Virtually 

all of the actual exposure records obtained from shot badges are below the film badge 

threshold of approximately 0.05 rem. Calculated doses for periods of time corresponding to the badged periods are consistent with these “below threshold” exposures. Film 

badge doses onboard two ships, the BAIROKO and PICKAWAY, indicate higher 

exposures than the reconstructed doses would suggest. This inconsistency ‘may be 

attributed to the fact that the film badge records on these ships represent non-typical 

exposures, since available shipboard radiological data do not support the recorded 

doses. 

39 
Table 6-l. Summary of Calculated Doses 

Location 

Best-Estimate Dose* Upper Bound 

(rem) Dose* (rem) 

Island Based Personnel 

Enewetak Atoll 

Kwajalein Atoll 

0.06 0.13 

0.08 0.10 

Shipboard Personnel 

ALBEMARLE, BAIROKO, CURTISS 

MT MCKINLEY, LST-45, GEORGE 

AFS-211 

AREQUIPA 

LSM-378 

TUCKER 

WARRICK 

YANCEY 

0.04 

0.03 

0.01 

0.04 

0.05 

0.03 

0.01 

All other Ships: AFS-370, ASKARI, 

COMSTOCK, CURRIER, GARDINERS BAY, 

LCI-549, LCI-1054, LCI-1090, LSM-250, 

MARSH, MISPILLION, PASIG, PERKINS, 

PICKAWAY, RABY, ROGERS, SPANGLER, 

YOG-64, Y W-94 0.03 

0.08 

0.06 

0.02 

0.07 

0.09 

0.07 

0.01 

0.07 

*Doses are rounded to the nearest 0.01 rem. 

40 
Section 7 

REFERENCES 

1. 

2. 

3. NNTPR Report No. KB80310A, Run Data 17 January 1983. 

4. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Units at Operation CROSSROADS,” 

DNA-TR-82-05-V& Defense Nuclear Agency, 3 March 1982. 

5. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation 

GREENHOUSE,” DNA-TR-82-15, Defense Nuclear Agency, 30 July 1982. 

6. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Personnel at Operation IVY,” 

DNA-TR-82-98, Defense Nuclear Agency, 15 March 1983. 

7. “Joint Task Force 7, Task Group 7.6 Operations, Operational Report Phases A, B, 

C, D, E,” CDR F. Winant, USN Col. J. Cooney, MC, USA, undated. 

8. “Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot SMOKY, 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation PLUMBBOB,” DNA 4747F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, May 1979. 

9. 

10. 

“Operation SANDSTONE: 1948,” DNA 6033F, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

19 December 1983. 

“Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Nuclear Test Detonations, 1945-1962,” 

Volume II-Oceanic US Tests, DNA 1251-2-EX, Defense Nuclear Agency, 

1 May 1979. 

Annex B to CTU 7.3.3 Operations Order 2-48, 20 March 1948 (Unpublished). 

“Technical Report of Radiological Safety at Operation SANDSTONE,” Tab I, 

TG 7.6 draft report, undated. 

41 
Il. “A Report of Activities of Enewetak Party On and About X-Day,” Letter from 

Senior Rad-Safe Monitor (Enewetak Party) to CTC 7.6, undated. 

12. “ROOF” (Title Classified)--Report on Worldwide Fallout Following Operation 

SANDSTONE, Dept. of the Air Force, undated (Unpublished). 

13. “Monitor Reports of SANDSTONE Vessels,” JTF7 memorandum to Chief, Naval 

Operations, 10 June 1948. 

14. “Proceedings of Tripartite Symposium on Technical Status of Radiological 

Defense in the Fleets,” Volume I, Reviews and Lectures No. 103, US Naval 

Radiological Defense Laboratory, May 1960. 

15. “Proof Testing of Atomic Weapons Ship Countermeasures,” Project 6.4, 

Operation CASTLE, Pacific Proving Grounds, WT-927, US Naval Radiological 

Defense Laboratory, October 1957. 

16. “Ship-Shielding Studies,” Project 2.71, Operation Redwing, Pacific Proving 

Grounds, WT-1321, US Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, July 1959. 

17. “A Correlation Between Theory and Experiment in Ship Shielding Studies,” 

USNRDL-TR-373, US Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, October 1959. 

18. Supplemental material supplied by C.F. Ksanda to Reference 14, September 

1960. 

19. “Fallout Inventory and Inhalation Dose to Organs (FIIDOS),” Science 

Applications, Inc., 1982. 

20. REECo Exposure Records for Operation SANDSTONE (Microfilm CartridgeRoll 2). 

42 
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