DNA 5774F 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, 

4TH MARINE CORPS PROVISIONAL ATOMIC 

EXERCISE BRIGADE, EXERCISE DESERT 

ROCK VII, OPERATION PLUMBBOB 

Science Applications, Incorporated 

P.O. Box 1303 

Mclean, Virginia 22102 

15 June 1981 

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DNA 5774F /2 4 TITLE (end Subtltl~) 

ANALYSIS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, 4th MARINE CORPS 

PROVISIONAL ATOMIC EXERCISE BRIGADE, EXERCISE 

DESERT ROCK VII, OPERATION PLUMBBOB 

7 AU TMOR(e) 

~ ~-----l 

G. Frank, J. Goetz, J. K 1 emm, C. Thomas, 

R. Weitz 

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Science Applications, Inc. 

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19 KEY WORDS (Continue on reveru •Ide It nee•••.,,, -,d Identity by block number) 

Operation Plumbbob Shot Hood 

Exercise Desert Rock VII Radiation Exposure Assessment 

Mar)ne Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Shot Priscilla (NTPR) 

20 ABSTRACT (Conllnue on reveru aide It nee•••_,,. and Identity by block number) 

The radiation dose to Marine Brigade participants in Exercise Desert Rock VII 

(Operation Plumbbob, 1957) is reconstructed for each major brigade element. 

Although the exercise was centered primarily around Shot Hood after the Diab1o 

misfire, there was limited participation in Shot Priscilla also. Moreover, the 

residual radiation from previous shots contributed to the total dose. Residual 

doses are determined through an automated procedure that utilizes raw survey data 

in modeling the radiation field, which is overlaid with specific troop activities 

to arrive at an integrated dose. Despite the lack of definitive troop activity 

!'"ORM OD 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV UIS OBSOLETE 1 JAN 73 UNCLASSIFIED 

S/N 0102-LF-014-6601 

SECUIUTY CLASSIFICATION OF TMIS PAGE (""en Dara •nteredJ 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECURITY CL.ASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dare £nrered) 

20. ABSTRACT (Continued) 

information, the automated procedure facilitates an iterative process to 

correlate possible activities with those inferred from available dosimetry. 

The calculated doses to typical troops range from .58 rem to .66 rem. 

Other participants, notably officers, received higher recorded doses due to 

participation in Shot Priscilla. The calculated doses correlate well with 

available dosimetry. Rad-safe monitor teams were subjected to higher 

exposures due to their duties. This is evidenced by their total badge readingc 

averaging 1.2 rem and ranging as high as 3 rem. 

Initial radiation and internal residual radiation exposures were 

insignificant. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SECUl'UTY CL.ASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(1"hen D•t• .!ntered) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section Page 

List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

List of Tables 3 

1 SUMMARY ................................................. 5 

2 OPERATIONS ............................................. 9 

2.1 Shot Data 9 

2.2 Participants: Project 52.1 Marine Brigade Exercise 10 

2.3 Concept of Operations ......... . 12 

2.4 Pre-Shot Operations ........... . 14 

2.5 Shot HOOD Scenario 19 

3 INITIAL RADIATION ...................................... . 25 

3.1 Computational Method .. . 25 

3.2 Results ............... . 28 

4 RESIDUAL RADIATION 35 

4.1 Residual Gamma Exposure ...... . 35 

4.2 Internal Radiation Exposure ..... . 44 

4.3 Residual Radiation Dose Summary .... . 48 

5 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE 

DETERMINATION 49 

5.1 Uncertainty Analysis 49 

5.2 Total Dose Summary 53 

6 FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 55 

6.1 Film Badge Data .................................... . 55 

6.2 Comparison of Dose Calculations with 

Film Badge Data .................................... . 60 

7 CONCLUSIONS ........................................... . 65 

References 67 

1 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 

1-1 Selected Shot Locations, Operation Plumbbob.................. 6 

2-1 Marine Brigade Exercise Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

2-2 Shot Priscilla Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

2-3 Shot Hood................................................. 21 

2-4 Marine Helicopters over Yucca Lake after Shot Hood . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

3-1 Shot Priscilla Neutron Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

3-2 Shot Priscilla Gamma Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 

3-3 Shot Hood Neutron Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

3-4 Shot Hood Gamma Dose..................................... 33 

4-1 Shot Priscilla Residua! Radiation and Observer Route . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

4-2 Shot Wilson Residual Radiation and Marine Brigade 

Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

4-3 Shot Hood Residua! Radiation and Marine Brigade Movements . . . . 43 

6-1 Distribution of Final Film Badge Readings for Monitor 

Teams Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 

2 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

4-1 Operation Plumbbob Shot Locations for Fallout 

Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 

5- l Dose Summary, 4th MCPAEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 

6-1 Calculated and Actual Film Badge Doses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 

3 
4 
SE<:TION I 

SUMMARY 

This report presents an analysis of nuclear radiation exposure for 

personnel of the 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade during 

their participation in Exercise nesert Rock VII (Operation Plumbbob) at Nevada 

Test Site in 1957. The exercise consisted basically of a battalion combat team 

and helicopter airlift support units in a coordinated air-ground assault of an 

objective following a nuclear strike. These units were part of a brigade 

maneuver that was controlled by command and staff elements of a Marine 

division and brigade, the other maneuver units of which were simulated. The 

exercise took place over a period of slightly more than two weeks, during which 

time the brigade trained, rehearsed, conducted a command post exercise, 

experienced a misfire (Shot OIABLO), observed one nuclear burst (Shot 

PRISCILLA), observed the largest nuclear burst ever detonated in the United 

States up to that time (Shot HOOD), conducted maneuvers, and viewed the 

effects of a nuclear burst on typical military equipment. 

The brigade activities are traced from arrival at Camp Desert Rock 

in late June 1957 until departure in early July. Figure 1-1 shows the major 

features of relevance to the brigade activities at Nevada Test Site. Although 

there were varying degrees of participation in only two actual bursts, the 

residual radiation from all previous bursts in Operation Plumbbob was examined 

to determine the dose contribution to the troops during all their activities. 

Time-dependent position information is determined and presented in order that a 

Complete exposure analysis can be performed. External (and internal as 

appropriate) dose is reconstructed and the uncertainties associated therewith are 

calculated. 

A major obstacle to the preparation of this report was the lack of 

reports from any source that would have described the events and activities in 

sufficient detail to facilitate straightforward analysis. Detailed and exhaustive 

searches of all likely holdings of such reports were fruitless, despite extra5 
I 

NEVADA 

News 

AEC Control 

TEST 

•DIABLO 

---~--~RANKLIN 

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Nob 

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0 10 

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mi I es 

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Figure 1-1 Selected Shot Locations, Operation Plumbbob 

6 

L 10 
ordinary research efforts by several agencies. Several alternatives were 

therefore adopted. First, the three previous Marine Corps exercises, in 1952, 

1953, and 1955, were studied to determine if any patterns of activities would 

emerge. Second, approximately a dozen participants were interviewed, both in 

person and by telephone, to determine significant (or memorable) elements of 

their experiences during the exercise. The participants interviewed were 

generally those in supervisory positions who could have had a broad perspective 

of the activities. Third, several official photographs from Army and \~arine 

Corps files were obtained. These were most useful in determining activities, 

dates, and specific locations of the exercise elements to augment the information from other sources. These sources, supplemented with planning documents 

and military judgment, provide the basis for the descriptions of activities and the 

resulting exposure analysis. The lack of definitive reports, however, is reflected 

in the uncertainty analysis. Despite the uncertainties, there were no unresolved 

inconsistencies or contradictions in the various sources of information used in 

this report. 

The analysis utilizes an automated procedure (Reference 20) for 

determining dose due to residual radiation. All available radiological survey data 

are fit, through statistical regression, to space~time models of residual radiation 

intensity, from which isointensity contours (isopleths) are then developed. These 

data are stored for subsequent combination with the time and space factors 

associated with troop operations in contaminated areas. T)erived parameters 

that characterize soil activation or fission product decay permit continuous 

adjustment of the radiation field, in order that an integrated radiation dose for a 

given operation can be determined. A major feature of the automated procedure 

is that variations in the time and space factors associated with troop operations 

can be introduced to determine the sensitivity of the calculated dose to the 

omissions and inconsistencies of the operational histories. It was only after this 

automated procedure was developed and thoroughly evaluated that there now 

exists the confidence to analyze an operation for which so few facts are 

available. 

7 
One very valuable category of data exists for this exercise, albeit in 

limited form. Of approximately 1900 on-site participants, film badge dosimetry 

records exist for over 600 individuals, representing to varying degrees all of the 

major categories of participants. These data are used to verify the calculations 

and to identify the degree of participation in various brigade activities. 

Major findings of this report are: 

• Troops of the 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise f>irigade 

were exposed to initial radiation from Shots PRISCILLA and Hoon. 

The combined (neutron plus gamma) initial dose, however, was less 

than 0.01 rem for both shots. 

• Exercise troops were exposed to residual radiation from Plumbbob 

shots detonated before their arrival at the test site. Only Shot 

WILSON residual was significant, primarily to the brigade staff, 

which accrued a dose from this source of no more than 0.16 rem. 

• A limited number of brigade personnel observed Shot PRISCILLA 

from trenches and viewed the equipment display thereafter, resulting 

in an estimated gamma dose of 0.46 rem. For those maneuver 

elements of the brigade who entered the contaminated area after 

Shot HOOD, the calculated gamma dose from Shot HOOD, as well as 

residual from Shot WILSON, ranges from 0.58 to 0.66 rem. This is 

the dose' that applies to the great majority of personnel (from the 

maneuver battalion) for whom dosimetry records have not been 

located. 

• The 50-year whole body dose commitment due to possible inhalation 

of helicopter-lofted contamination during airlift operations, including 

rehearsals, was no more than 0.012 rem. The corresponding bonedose commitment was approximately twice that to the whole body. 

8 
2.1 

SECTION 2 

OPERATIONS 

SHOT DATA 

The 4th Marine r.orps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade (MCPAEB), 

which constituted the force for this exercise, completed its movement to the 

Nevada Test Site on 20 June 1957. Their plans called for participation in 

maneuvers in conjunction with 5hot DIABLO, scheduled for 0430 hours, 27 June 

1957. Prior to nIABLO, 311 personnel from the 4th MCPAEB participated as 

observers for Shot PRISCILLA, which was detonated at 0630 hours on 24 June 

1957. On the afternoon of 26 June, a delay of mABLO for 24 hours was 

announced (Reference 1). The shot subsequently misfired on 28 June. After the 

misfire, the decision was made to modify the plans of the 4th MCPAEB and 

perform the exercise in conjunction with Shot HOOD instead of nIABLO. HOOi) 

was scheduled for 0440 hours, 3 July. It was subsequently postponed for 48 hours 

and was detonated on 5 July. The data for these shots are summarized as 

follows: 

a. Shot PRISCILLA 

Oate: 24 June 1957, 0630 hours 

Location: Frenchman Flat (coordinates 956728) 

Yield: 37 KT 

HOB: 700 feet (balloon) 

b. Shot DIA~LO (misfire--no detonation) 

Date: 28 June 1957, 0430 hours 

Location: Area T-2 (coordinates 794117) 

Expected Yield: 11-13 KT 

Planned HOB: 500 feet (tower) 

9 
c. Shot HOOD 

()ate: 5 July 1957, 0440 hours 

Location: Area B-9 (a) (coordinates 852100) 

Yield: 74 KT 

HOE\: 1500 feet (balloon) 

2.2 PARTICIPANTS: PROJECT 52.1 MARINE BRIGADE EXERCISE 

The brigade was organized as a standard Marine Corps air-ground task 

force. The headquarters, or brigade staff, of the 4th MC PAEB was a provisional 

organization of about 120 personnel from both the 1st Marine nivision and 3d 

\.1arine Air Wing required to coordinate the ground and air maneuvers. The 1st 

Marine nivision was represented by members of the division headquarters and 

the headquarters of the 5th Marine Regiment. The 3rd \-1arine Air Wing was 

represented by members of the Wing Headquarters Group and by "1arine Air 

Groups 15 and 36. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, of the 1st Marine 

Division constituted the infantry battalion assault force around which the 

brigade was organized. It was supported by normal combat support elements 

from the 1st l\farine Division. The air support provided by the 3rd \.1arine Air 

Wing consisted of transport and observation helicopters from Marine Air Group 

36 and, for close air support, 24 F9F aircraft from Marine Air Group 15. The 

helicopters were based with the ground troops at the test site while the fixed 

wing aircraft operated from the l\farine Corps Auxiliary Air Station at Mojave, 

California. The complete brigade organization was as follows: 

10 
4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic 

Exercise Brigade (4th MCPAEB) 

Number 

of Pers0nnel* 

1st Marine Division 

Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn 500 

Headquarters, 4th MCPAEB 

Radiation Safety Monitor Teams Group 

Observers 

2nd Bn (reinf), 5th Marine Regiment 1100 

H&S Co 

Company E 

Company F 

Company G 

Company H 

3rd Marine Air Wing 300 

Det, Marine Wing Hq Group 

Marine Air Group 36 

Marine Helicopter Squadron 361 

Marine Helicopter Squadron 362 

Marine Helicopter Squadron 363 

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (-) 

Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (-) 

Headquarters & Maintenance Squadron 36 (-) 

Marine Air Group 15 

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) 

*As estimated from official unit diaries. 

Number of 

Surviving Film 

Badge Records 

120 

178 

44 

120 

171 

11 
2.3 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

The purpose of the l\1arine Brigade Exercise was to provide command and 

staff training, emphasizing the evaluation of techniques relative to the exploitation of nuclear weapons, and to indoctrinate personnel in the effects of these 

weapons. Specific objectives were (1) to provide realistic training, particularly 

for command and staff personnel, in all phases of planning and conducting 

operations supported by nuclear weapons; (2) to test and evaluate doctrine for 

assault operations; (3) to develop new tactics and techniques for the utilization 

of nuclear weapons; (4) to familiarize personnel with the effects of nuclear 

weapons; and (5) to familiarize personnel with passive defense measures used for 

protection in a nuclear environment (Reference 3). 

The exercise consisted of two major elements, both of which were 

planned for execution in conjunction with Shot DIABLO. The first was a 

command post exercise (CPX) starting the day before and ending an hour or two 

before the scheduled shot. The C PX was to be held at a forward Command Post 

in the 5yncline Ridge area of the Nevada Test Site (Figure 2-1 ). The C PX was 

designed to familiarize the brigade staff with the planning requirements 

necessary for employing a nuclear weapon in support of ground operations. After 

the final steps leading to the decision to employ the weapon, some of the brigade 

staff (forward element) would move into the trenches and, along with the 

maneuver units who had already been positioned there, observe the shot. After 

the shot, the forward element would return to the CP to monitor the field 

maneuver that constituted the second phase of the exercise. Afterwards, all the 

brigade staff would be transported to the shot area to view an equipment display. 

The equipment display was designed to demonstrate, evaluate and record 

the effects of a nuclear detonation on a representative sample of items of 

Marine Corps clothing and equipment. These items were divided in'to 15 groups 

according to type and level of damage expected and were placed at 11 distances 

from ground zero that (for the J)IABLO Shot) varied from 230 yards to 2500 

yards (Reference 8). 

12 
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Figure 2-1. Exercise Area, 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade 
2.4 

The post-shot troop maneuver consisted of a coordinated air-ground 

battalion landing team assault on an objective. For safety reasons, the objective 

was some distance removed from the actual shot area. The assault was to be 

accomplished using helicopters and tracked vehicles (LVTP-5) for movement to 

the objective and would be supported by tactical aircraft. Personnel from the 

supporting artillery battery would accompany the battalion during the entire 

period and participate in the exercise. The battalion and its supporting units 

would observe the shot from either trenches or other vantage points to the rear. 

Immediately following the shot, two infantry companies would be air lifted by 

helicopter to Landing Zones Pink and Blue, while a third company would move 

overland to the landing zone area in the L VT P- 51s. The movement to the landing 

zones would be followed by a ground assault of the nearby objective (Figure 2-1 ). 

During this period, the fourth company of the battalion would march from the 

trench area toward ground zero until they reached the radiation safety limit 

(that point where the radiation intensity reached 5 r/hr). At this point, they 

were to return to the trench area to board helicopters for the airlift to Landing 

Zone Pink, where they would act as the battalion reserve. At the conclusion of 

the maneuver, the entire battalion and supporting units would board trucks and 

proceed to the equipment display near ground zero. After viewing the display, 

they would return to Camp nesert Rock (Reference 10). 

PRE-SHOT OPERATIONS 

All of the 4th MCPAEB troops arrived at Camp Desert Rock by 20 June 

1957 for maneuvers that were to be held on 27 June in conjunction with Shot 

DIABLO. Operations were designed to avoid exceeding J)epartment of Defense 

nuclear radiation safety criteria, which limited maximum whole body gamma 

exposure to 5 rem at any one test, of which no more than 2 rem would be from 

prompt radiation (Reference 4). Marine Corps radiation safety personnel from 

Camp Lejeune were employed in 16 monitor teams, to accompany every separate 

element of the brigade during each phase of the exercise (Reference 10). In 

order to assess the exposure to ionizing radiation of all personnel, film badges 

were issued to each individual. After a detonation, monitor teams erected red 

14 
cones connected by white engineer tape at the 5 r/hr line. Teams then surveyed 

back to the 20 mr/hr line and marked it with yellow cones to indicate the 

forward limit for buses and personnel vehicles. The periphery of areas of highintensity contamination within display areas was marked by tape and red cones 

('References 4-7). 

2.4. l DIABLO Rehearsal 

A full rehearsal of all events planned for Shot DIABLO was held on 20-21 

June in the exercise area. The brigade staff, a provisional organization of about 

120 men from the 1st Marine Division and the 3rd Marine Air Wing, departed 

Camp Oesert Rock at approximately 1200 hours on 20 June and went directly to 

the Command Post area (Figure 2-1) where rehearsal of the command post 

exercise commenced at approximately 1500 hours. The C PX rehearsal was 

probably completed between 0200 and 0300 hours on 21 June. At that time, the 

forward element of the staff was trucked to the DIABLO trench area to 

"witness" the simulated detonation scheduled for 0430 hours. The trenches were 

located about 4200 yards southeast of GZ. The rear element remained at the 

C P. Shortly after the simulated detonation, the forward element returned to the 

C P to monitor the maneuver rehearsal and subsequent movements until about 

1100 hours. The entire brigade staff then proceeded to the display area to view 

equipment that was to be exposed to the shot (Reference 9). 

The maneuver troops from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, departed 

Camp Oesert Rock at approximately 2230 hours on 20 June and, with the 

exception of G Company, went directly to the trench area. Most of G Company 

stopped at Loading Zone Ill, near the Control Point and News Nob (Figure 1-1}, 

and joined three helicopter squadrons from MAG-36 that had flown up from 

<:amp Desert 'R.ock earlier that evening. The remaining elements of G Company 

went directly to the trench area. The supporting units for the exercise were 

positioned in the vehicle assembly area near the C P. 

15 
Immediately after the simulated detonation at 0430 hours, E Company 

began marching towards ground zero. During E Company's march, elements of G 

Company were airlifted from Loading Zone Ill to LZ Blue. Concurrently, F and 

H&S Companies marched to Loading Zone 112 and from there were airlifted to LZ 

Pink following the G Company movement. It is not clear how far forward E 

Company went toward GZ during the rehearsal prior to returning to the trench 

area and Loading Zone 112, where they boarded helicopters and were airlifted to 

LZ Pink. Immediately after the helicopter lift was completed, F and G 

Companies began their ground assault on the objective and the helicopters 

returned to Camp Desert Rock. While the airlift and subsequent ground assault 

were in progress, troops from H Company were being transported to the 

objective via armored personnel carriers (LVTP-5's), where they joined F and G 

Companies in their ground assault. During their mechanized movement, H 

Company was preceded by five Ontos (a light anti-tank vehicle) that supported 

the attack. Close air support was provided throughout the rehearsal by 24 F9F 

aircraft from Marine Attack Squadron 223. These aircraft operated out of the 

Marine Corps Auxiliary Air Station at Mojave, California. 

It is estimated that the tactical exercise rehearsal was completed by 

0900 hours, at which time the maneuver troops, including the LVTP and Ontos 

crews, began moving by trucks to the equipment display area set up for Shot 

DIABLO. Here, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, viewed the various equipment 

and material displays to be exposed to DIABLO's scheduled detonation on 27 

June. The tour through the display area was probably completed by 1200 hours, 

at which time the brigade began the trip back to Camp nesert Rock. 

2.4.2 Shot PRISCILLA 

On 24 June, some of the brigade witnessed Shot PRISCILLA, a 37 KT 

device suspended from a balloon 700 feet above Frenchman Flat (Figure 2-2). 

The PRISCILLA shot was to provide, for selected brigade officers and enlisted 

men, additional orientation and indoctrination in the effects of atomic weapons. 

Some of these personnel were from the maneuver battalion; others were probably 

16 
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Figure 2-2. Shot Priscilla Area Frenchman Flat 

17 
from the brigade staff. This test involved no troop maneuvers, but served to 

familiarize troop leaders with the effects of an actual detonation. An eight-hour 

orientation in nuclear weapons was presented to observers prior to the shot. The 

participants observed PRISCILLA from trenches 4250 yards to the southwest of 

Ground Zero (Reference 4). Detonation was at 0630 hours. There were reports 

of some trenches caving in, but no serious injuries were reported. Because of 

persistent dust, the observers remained in the trenches for nearly two hours 

before moving forward in trucks to the equipment display area, 250 to 2500 yards 

south of GZ (see Figure 2). The observers toured the display area until about 

1030 hours, then they were trucked back to Camp Desert Rock. Their walking 

tour was limited by rad-safe restrictions to displays at least 600 yards from G Z 

(5 R/hr line). 

Other personnel witnessed PRISCILLA in the open from the slope 

overlooking Frenchman Flat, about 12 km from GZ. These personnel did not go 

forward after the burst and were not exposed to nuclear radiation. The 311 

Marine participants cited in Reference 4 presumably include both these as well 

as those in the trenches, mentioned previously. 

2.4.3 DIABLO Misfire 

On 26 June, the 4th MC PAEB troops were informed that Shot DIABLO 

was postponed for 24 hours and had been rescheduled for 0430 hours, 28 June. 

The brigade staff departed Camp Desert Rock at approximately 1200 

hours, 27 June, destined for the C P area. The C PX began at 1400 hours and was 

completed at approximately 0300 hours on 28 June. At that time, the forward 

CP element was trucked to the trenches to observe Shot nIABLO. 

As in the rehearsal, the remainder of the troops assigned to the 4th 

MC PAEB departed Camp Desert Rock at approximately 2230 hours on 27 June 

and, with the exception of some of G Company, went directly to the DIABLO 

trench area to witness the detonation. Elements of G Company joined the 

18 
MAG-36 helicopter squadrons at Loading Zone Ill, near the Control Point and 

News Nob, 15 miles south of the DIABLO tower (Reference 10). At 0430 hours 

on 28 June, DIABLO failed to detonate with all troops in position. After a 

30-minute delay, the exercise was terminated and all 4-th MC PAEB troops 

returned to Camp T)esert Rock. 

2.4.4 Modification of Plans for Shot HOOD 

Shot DIABLO was rescheduled for 12 July I 957; therefore, in order to 

save time, a decision was made to have the 4th MC PAEB conduct maneuvers in 

conjunction with Shot Hoon, set for 0440 hours on 3 July. During the period 

between shots, most of the troops were granted weekend liberty in Las Vegas. 

The planning for Shot HOOD required only a few changes to the Shot 

l1IABLO plan. Trenches for Shot SHASTA could be used for Shot HOOD without 

changing other elements of the maneuver plan (see Figure 2-1 ). The equipment 

display, however, did require some major changes because the yield for Shot 

HOOD was to be much larger than that for OIABLO. The distances from G Z for 

the various groups of equipment were scaled up for the higher yield. Because of 

the hilly area to the east, the most distant displays were placed close to the 

trenches. On 2 July, forecast weather conditions precluded the detonation of 

HOOD on 3 July; the shot was rescheduled for 0440 hours on 5 July 1957. 

2.5 SHOT HOOD SCENARIO 

At approximately 2230 hours on 4 July 1957, the entire brigade departed 

Camp Desert Rock for the exercise areas. Because the C PX had been completed 

in conjunction with Shot DIABLO, this element of the tactical exercise was not 

repeated for Shot HOOD (Reference 3). Therefore the forward element of the 

brigade staff was trucked directly to the HOOD trenches to observe the 

detonation. The rear element of the brigade staff went to the r: P area. 

19 
Troops and vehicles from the supporting units went directly to the 

tracked vehicle assembly area in the vicinity of the CP (Figure 2-0, where they 

remained until the post-shot maneuvers began. 

In a virtual repeat of the events for Shot DIABLO, the maneuver troops, 

with the exception of G Company, were trucked to the HOOD trench area, where 

they remained until H-hour. Most of G Company stopped at Helicopter Loading 

Zone Ill (HLZ Ill) at the Yucca Lake airstrip (Figure 1-1}, where they joined the 

helicopter crews from MAG-36 who had moved their helicopters to the forward 

area before dark. The helicopter crews and part of G Company witnessed Shot 

HOOD from that location. 

The nuclear device for Shot HOOD was suspended from a balloon 1500 

feet above Yucca Flat. The troops were crouched in trenches, five and a half 

feet deep (Reference 16), located 5360 yards (from inspection of USGS 

topographic map, Yucca Flat, 1:24,000) to the southwest of GZ. Everyone was 

issued a gas mask to counter the heavy cloud of dust (non-radioactive) expected 

to be raised by the blast wave from the shot (Reference 16). 

Shot HOOD was detonated on schedule at 0440 hours, 5 July 1957. 

Figure 2-3, taken from News Nob, 13 miles away, shows the rising cloud a few 

seconds after the 74 KT burst. Blast from the detonation caused cave-ins in a 

few of the trenches, but no injuries to the men in the trenches were reported. 

Dust raised by the b~ast was extremely heavy in the vicinity of the trenches, as 

expected. Numerous small fires were noted in the vicinity of the trenches. 

By 0455 hours, the dust had subsided sufficiently for the troops to move 

out of the trenches. The forward element of the brigade staff returned to the 

CP while E Company, preceded and flanked by rad-safe monitors, began 

marching northeast toward ground zero in two columns. H&S Col'T)pany and F 

Company marched westward to HLZ/12, where they would be airlifted to LZs 

Pink and Blue. Company H, which joined in the march to HLZ/12, was met there 

by the LVTP-5s and Ontos that had departed the CP area immediately after the 

20 
-

"'

F1iure 2- 1 Shot Hood (US Army Photograph) 
detonation. Here, H Company boarded the LVTP-5s and, preceded by the Ontos, 

began a mechanized movement to the objective (Reference 10). 

Because dust along the helicopter assault route between HLZ/11 and LZ 

Blue was very heavy, the helicopters, with G Company on board, remained at 

HLZ/11 (Yucca Lake) until visibility improved. After approximately an hour's 

delay, the helicopters began their airlift of G Company to LZ fllue. Figure 2-4 

shows the helicopters as they headed north from Yucca lake, with the HOOD 

cloud dissipating beyond. This initial phase of the airlift was completed at 0620, 

one hour and forty minutes after the explosion. The subsequent airlift of 

personnel from HLZ/12 began immediately thereafter. 

Company E, upon returning from its march toward GZ, moved to 

Helicopter Loading Zone 112 at approximately 0700 hours. They joined in the 

heli-lift with the remainder of H&:S Company and proceded to LZ Pink. The final 

phase of the airlift was probably completed by approximately 0830 hours; the 

helicopters then returned to Camp Desert Rock. 

Upon reaching LZ Pink, F Company linked up with H Company (LVTP- 5s) 

and began a ground assault on the objective. Simultaneously, G Company troops 

marched on the objective from LZ fllue. Ouring the heli-lift and subsequent 

ground attack on the objective, close air support was provided by 24 F9F aircraft 

from Marine Air Group 15. These aircraft staged from the Marine Corps 

Auxiliary Air Station, Mojave, California. The objective area was occupied at 

approximately 1100 hours on 5 July, and the battalion exercise was terminated. 

The troops then took a break in the objective area and ate a lunch consisting of 

combat rations. The LVTP-5's and Ontos returned to the vehicle assembly area 

near the CP. Their crews and the brigade staff were trucked to the equipment 

display area northeast of the HOOD GZ, arriving at about 1200 hours. After 

approximately one hour in the display area, these troops departed for Camp 

Desert Rock. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and the remaining supporting 

elements marched eastward from the objective areas to the nearest road, where 

they were picked up at about 1230 hours and trucked to the display area. They 

22 
w - "' • • • 

Fisure 2-4 • Marine Helicopters over Yucca Lake after Shot Hood (US Ar my Photogr aph) 
would have arrived at the display area at about 1300 hours. After viewing the 

effects of the detonation on the displayed equipment, the troops departed for 

Camp Desert Rock at about 1400 hours. Company E evidently did not view the 

display, but was trucked back to Desert Rock after the conclusion of the 

battalion exercise. 

Later that day, the majority of the exercise participants departed from 

Desert Rock for the return trip to Camp Pendleton. The Marine Brigade 

exercise was officially terminated. 

24 
3.1 

Section 3 

INITIAL RAT)IA TION 

Both shots of Operation Plumbbob involving Marine Brigade 

participation are investigated to determine the possible exposure to initial 

neutron and gamma radiation. This section discusses the general method used to 

compute the initial radiation dose to personnel and then treats specifically both 

shots of interest. 

COMPUTATIONAL METHOI) 

The calculation of the radiation dose to personnel (in trenches in both 

cases) is accomplished in two steps: (1) calculate the radiation environment 

above the trench, (2) determine from this the radiation environment in the 

trench. 

In the first step, the neutron and gamma radiation environment above 

the trench is determined with computer codes ATR4 (R.eference 23) and ATR4.l 

(R.eference 24). ATR4 contains provisions to correct for the presence of Nevada 

soil at the air-ground interface; ATR.4.1, although using West German soil, 

contains improved source energy-dependent ground correction factors. Hence, 

ATR4 is used to calculate neutron and neutron-induced gamma radiation, which 

is sensitive to the hydrogen (water) content of the soil ('R.eference 25), while 

ATR4. l is used to calculate fission product gamma and prompt gamma (emitted 

directly from the fission reaction) radiation, neither of which is sensitive to the 

presence of hydrogen in the soil. Neutron doses are calculated from (Ritts) 

tissue kerma factors, while the Henderson tissue response function is used to 

determine gamma doses. 

A required input to the ATR codes is the weapon neutron output spectrum, 

or source spectrum. When this spectrum is not known, it may be estimated by 

first choosing a trial neutron spectrum based on specific weapon design 

characteristics (e.g., boosting, high explosive thickness) and known spectra for 

25 
similar weapons. This trial spectrum is used in ATR4 to calculate neutron dose 

as a function of range, and a comparison is made with the dose-range curve 

derived from neutron fluence measurements for the specific shot of interest. 

These fluence measurements were made with fission (neptunium, uranium, and 

plutonium) and activation (sulfur and gold) foils. If necessary, the neutron 

distribution in the trial spectrum is then adjusted to obtain agreement with the 

observed data. It is important to note that the fluence data are not sufficient 

for dose reconstruction since they were obtained at ranges closer to GZ than the 

trenches. Hence, A TR codes, calibrated to fluence data, are used for extrapolation to the trench location. 

Initial gamma doses are then calculated in the manner described 

previously, using ATR4 for neutron-induced (secondary) gamma and AT'R.4.1 for 

prompt and fission product gamma, and the total calculated gamma doses 

compared with gamma dose measurements. Because a significant gamma 

component is due to secondary gamma from radiative capture and inelastic 

scattering of nE:utrons, the low-energy portion of the neutron spectrum may be 

adjusted somewhat to obtain better agreement between the calculated and 

observed gamma dose curves. This adjustment does not significantly alter the 

neutron dose curves in the ranges of interest. The neutron source spectrum 

(adjusted, if necessary, as described above) is used in ATR4 and AT'R. 4.1 to 

determine the neutron and gamma doses, evaluated for the locations of the 

trenches. 

The second step of the calculation uses the free-field radiation 

environment to determine the dose within the trench. It is convenient to define 

a trench factor as the ratio of dose (neutron or gamma) in the trench to dose 

(neutron or gamma) above the trench. These factors must be calculated for each 

of the major components of radiation--neutron, secondary gamma (created by 

neutron capture or inelastic scattering in the atmosphere and ground), local 

gamma (created locally by neutron capture in the trench walls), and fission 

product (debris) gamma. It is found that the trench factors depend also on 

ground range, height of burst, weapon yield, trench dimensions, and depth in the 

26 
trench. For the shots of interest, the participants were in trenches approximately two feet wide and at a minimum of five feet deep (Reference 4). The intrench free-field neutron and gamma doses for personnel in a crouched position 

are calculated at a depth of 2.33 feet below the lip of the trench, which 

corresponds approximately to the mid-torso depth for personnel in this position. 

For personnel standing upright in the trench, as probably occurred soon after 

passage of the shock wave, free-field doses are calculated at a point six inches 

below the lip at the mid-trench position; this corresponds approximately to the 

location of a properly-worn film badge for a standing observer. Brief discussions 

of the derivations of the various trench factors are presented in Appendix I of 

Reference 21. 

The in-trench dose (in rads) is converted to an equivalent tissue dose 

(in rem) using the quality factors and methods prescribed in Reference 26. The 

rad-to-rem conversion factor for neutrons, derived from calculations utilizing 

computer codes DOT (Reference 27) and MORSE (Reference 28), is an almost 

constant value of 13 for the weapon types and ranges of interest. The quality 

factor for gamma radiation is taken to be unity. Finally, representative film 

badge readings for personnel in the trenches are estimated. The factors that are 

used to convert the in-trench free-field doses to chest-worn film badge readings 

were developed from calculations utilizing the adjoint mode of the computer 

code MORSE. These film badge conversion factors are strongly dependent on the 

posture and orientation of the personnel in the trench; mean values of these 

parameters were determined from MORSE calculations involving extreme variations in individual posture and orientation. The "dose equivalent in trench" 

values reported for each shot in Section 3.2 are the equivalent tissue dose for 

neutron radiation and the film badge dose for gamma radiation. 

The neutron, secondary gamma, and local doses are accrued rapidly 

(essentially within the first second) after detonation. Thus, the posture in a 

trench could not be altered significantly during this exposure. The debris gamma 

dose, however, is delivered over a period of many seconds. Therefore, the 

possibility of individual reorientation (e.g., standing up) in the trench must be 

27 
considered. It is unlikely that a person crouched in the trench at the time of 

detonation would have attempted any significant movement until after the shock 

wave had passed and the blast winds had subsided. Within a few seconds after 

passage of the shock wave, most of the troops would have stood upright in the 

trench to watch the rising cloud. This reorientation changes both the trench 

factors and film badge conversion factors for such an individual. The 

methodology used to determine the debris gamma contribution to personnel film 

badge doses is described in References 20 and 21. It is assumed in these 

calculations that the participants stood upright in the trenches at three seconds 

after the shock wave passed their positions. 

3.2 RESULTS 

The results of the computations are discussed in the following 

subsections for each of the two shots of interest. 

3.2.1 Shot PRISCILLA 

A good approximation of the neutron source spectrum is available for 

the PRISCILLA device. Neutron foil data are taken from Reference 29, and 

gamma dose data from Reference 30. The neutron and gamma doses derived 

from these data and the ATR dose-range curves are displayed in Figures 3-1 and 

3-2, respectively. No spectrum adjustment was necessary to obtain the neutron 

dose fit; however, an adjustment of low-energy neutrons was required for the 

gamma doses. 

The results of the calculations, for a midpoint trench location of 4250 

yards from ground zero, are presented below. 

Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) .6 76 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem) 2 3 

28 
1011 

1010 

N VI 

-0 

s.. 

ro 

>-I 

VI 

-0 

ro 

0::: 

N 109 

(l) 

en 

s:: 

ro 

0::: 

X 

(l) 

VI 

0 

0 

108 

10 7 

\ 

0 

\ 

(:) Doses derived from foil data 

I I I 

\ 

0 

\ 

0 

ATR 4 dose calculation 

0 1000 2000 3000 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Figure 3-1. Shot Priscilla Neutron Dose 

29 
1011 

(:) Chemi ca1 dosimeter measurements 

'0 

\ 

I - ATR dose Ll cul a Jon 

1010 

0 

N (/) 

-0 

r.... 

m 

>-I 

(/) 

-0 

m 

0::: 

109 

N 

(l) 

O"l 

C 

m 

0::: 

X 

(l) 

(/) 

0 

Cl 

108 

10 7 

1000 2000 3000 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Figure 3-2. Shot Priscilla Gamma Dose. 

30 

0 
3.2.2 5'1ot HOOD 

The neutron source spectrum for the HOOD device has been 

calculated by the sponsoring laboratory and is used in this calculation. Neutron 

foil data are taken from Reference 31, and gamma dose data from Reference 30. 

Shown in Figures 3-3 and 3-4 are the neutron and gamma doses derived from 

these data and the ATR dose-range curves. No spectrum adjustment is used for 

either fit. 

The results of the calculations, for a midpoint trench location of 5360 

yards from ground zero, are given below. 

Neutron Gamma 

Tissue dose above trench (mrad) <l 29 

Dose equivalent in trench (mrem) <l <1 

31 
1011 

1010 

N VI 

-0 

>-"' 

s.. 

I 

VI 

10 -0 9

a::: "' 

N 

a., 

CJl 

C: 

a::: "' 

X 

a., 

VI 

0 

0 

108 

107 

0 1000 2000 3000

- Dose curve derived from 

foil data 

- ATR 4 dose calculation 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Figure 3-3. Shot Hood Neutron Dose. 

32 
N V1 

-0 

s... 

>-"'

I 

V1 

-0 

0::: "'

N 

(l) 

0) 

C 

0::: "'

X 

(l) 

V1 

0 

Cl 

1011 -----r-----,,---,----~-----r----ir-----, 

109 

108 

0 Film measurements 

[;) Chemical dosimeter 

measurements 

- ATR dose calculation 

'EJ 

0 

107 

0 1000 2000 3000 

Slant Range (Yards) 

Figure 3-4. Shot Hood Gamma Dose. 

33 
34 
4.1 

SECTION 4 

RESIDUAL RADIATION 

R.ESmUAL GAMMA EXPOSURE 

Gamma doses are reconstructed for brigade personnel based on their 

activities in the fallout and neutron-induced activity fields of various shots of 

Operation Plumbbob. A computerized methodology, described in Reference 20, 

determines the radiological environment for each shot of interest. From this, 

doses are calculated based on the scenario of troop activities. Isointensity 

contours with superimposed troop tracks are displayed for Shots WILSOl\l, 

PRISCILLA, and HOOD. 

The computer-calculated doses do not reflect the presence of the human 

body in the radiological environment. Despite the penetrating ability of gamma 

rays from fission and activation products, the body affords some shielding; 

hence, the gamma dose to any organ depends on the geometry of the radiation 

source and the body position. In order to represent reconstructed film badge 

readings, gamma doses are calculated for the surface of the chest, where a film 

badge is normally worn. The calculated film badge dose rate is related to the 

free-field gamma intensity through the conversion factor developed in R.eference 

18: l r/hr ➔ 0.7 rem/hr. This conversion is strictly applicable to an ~rect 

individual wearing a film badge on his chest and standing in a uniform, plane 

fallout field. However, the conversion is also approximately correct for the 

intensity gradients and induced activity fields also encountered by the marines. 

Because of limited data concerning the details of display inspection and 

the timing involved, estimates are required for various parameters. Rates of 

movement are estimated from planned times or the few reported times, the 

number of displays viewed, the calculated position of radiological safety limits, 

and the consequent distance to be traversed. A reasonable and consistent set of 

parameters is 50 yds/min walking speed between displays (including the starting 

35 
and stopping of troops), 5 minutes at each display and at the limit of march 

toward G~, and 70 yds/min on the return. The stay time at each display line 

allows for some lateral spread of the observer group to see a variety of 

equipment. For PRISCILLA, the military effects shot in Frenchman Flat, the 

greater number of displays would have warranted walking the length of each 

display line. For these, a slow walking rate of 50 yds/min is assumed along 

display lines, without stops, and a faster pace of 70 yds/min is assumed between 

lines. 

The radiation surveys from which the gamma intensity field is calculated 

were performed by the Reynolds Electrical &. Engineering Company (REECo) for 

the AEC (References 11 through 14), and thus had no connection with the Desert 

Rock rad-safe effort. Few data reflecting specific radiation measurements by 

Desert Rock personnel are available, but they do supplement and are generally 

consistent with the REECo data at specific locations. 

Several shots of Operation Plumbbob were potential contributors to the 

residual radiation dose of the 4th MCPAEB. Table 4-1 displays data for all 

Plumbbob shots through the time of the brigade activities. Shots FRANKLIN and 

LASSEN were of no consequence to the brigade (see Reference 18); other shots 

are analyzed as applicable. 

4.1.1 Shot PRISCILLA Fallout 

Observers of PRISCILLA from the troop trenches accrued a sma11 dose 

from fallout within the first two hours. Almost all fallout blew directly away 

from the troops, to the northeast. Even near-surface wind data fail to indicate 

that any fallout would have drifted westward. However, both REECo survey 

data (Reference 13) and intensity readings taken by a participant indicate lowlevel fallout west of GZ. The REECo isointensity contours do not depict this 

fallout because it was genera11y less than the 10 mr/hr indicated by the lowestlevel contour. Isolated readings from the initial survey and shortly thereafter 

show widespread fa11out in the range of 1 to 10 mr/hr as far west as Mercury 

Highway. The reconstructed personnel dose from PRISCILLA fallout is based on 

the following participant data: 

36 
w 

-..J 

Table 4-1. Operation Plumbbob Shot Locations for Fallout Determination 

28 May - 5 July 1957 

BURST 

SHOT DATE TIME LOCATION* HEIGHT YIELD 

NAME (1957) (PDT) (UTM) (FT) (KT) 

BOLTZMANN 28 May 0455 T7c 

867056 500 T** 12 

FRANKLIN 2 June 0455 T3 

870004 300 T 0.14 

LASSEN 5 June 0455 B9a 

852100 500 B 0.0005 

WILSON 18 June 0455 B9a 

852100 500 B 10 

PRISCILLA 24 June 0630 FF 

956728 700 B 37 

DIABLO (Misfire) 28 June 0430 T-2b 

792117 500 T 

HOOD 5 July 0440 B9a 

852100 1500 B 74 

*Location is shown by AEC test area as well as in Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid 

coordinates. 

**T-Tower B-Balloon 
Minutes after Shot Intensity (mr/hr) 

32 4 

33 8 

44 10 

90 11 

120 1. 5 

All but the last reading were taken at the trench area to the southwest of GZ; 

the last entry was taken while observers were en route to the display area. 

Linear interpolation for both time and intensity results in a film badge dose of 

about 9 mrem. Fallout apparently commenced just prior to the first reading. 

4.1.2 Shot PRISCILLA Induced Activity 

Viewers of the PRISCILLA equipment display (see Figure 4-0 were 

exposed almost entirely to neutron-induced activity from the shot. The 

observers left the trench area late in the second hour after burst. Most likely, 

the heavy dust from PRISCILLA was responsible for the late departure. The 

initial time for display inspection is taken as 125 minutes after burst, shortly 

after the time of the last data point shown above. A speed of 70 yd/min 

throughout the display proves consistent with a reading of 2 r/hr taken three 

hours after the burst at 700 yards from GZ. The prescribed walking pattern 

through the area then matches that time and distance very well, and the 

intensity is in agreement with that calculated from the REECo survey data 

(Reference 13). According to calculated intensities, the entire 600-yard display 

line was available to the observers within the 5 r/hr rad-safe limit. Within the 

calculated uncertainty in the gamma field, at least part of the 600-yard display 

would have in most cases been available to the observers. The one item of the 

450-yard display line, actually at 515 yards, would in most cases not have been 

available to the observers. For the walk-through as described, the calculated 

film badge dose is 450 mrem. 

4.1.3 Shot WILSON Fallout 

Most of the time the 4th MCPAEB was in Yucca Flat, it operated in lowlevel fallout from Shot WILSON. Radiation exposure occurred at both the 

DIABLO and HOOD trenches, the helicopter loading zone (HLZ/12), and the 

38 
;: 

·.._ 

/ ! ! 'i./:i.. I ._, 

_ .. \ / ,· / •1 - :., C I I ,, ' 

/ _r l -~:~ ,7 ... .,-: , l ~ :. ,.. : • , / - /_ I \/I ,,,, )' ~ 

;.._j--~ ,,,, ; ·1 / ..:-

/ / 

/ 

,.#,._. ~-

0 

YARDS 

► I 

I / 

I

I ,, 

3000 

Fi ~ure 4-1. Shot Priscilla Residual Radiation (mr/hr@ H+3) 

and Observer Movements 

39 
Command Post. When E Company walked toward the HOOD GZ, it was also 

walking toward the WILSON GZ; however, the dose accrued from HOOD during 

that excursion so completely dominates that from WILSON that the latter is not 

calculated. 

The WILSON fallout field shown in Figure 4-2 is basically that depicted 

in Reference 18, as derived from radiation survey plots in Reference 11. In 

these, however, isointensity contours did not extend to the areas of interest. 

The revision and extension of these contours has been made possible by the 

discovery of the original rad-safe survey data (R.eference 12). f)ata at and near 

the GZs to the west of Mercury Highway (in Areas 1, 2, and 4) and extensive 

surveys along the west leg of Mercury Highway fairly well bracket the areas of 

interest except for the Command Post. The intensities along the west leg 

required adjustment because the initial survey plot did not account for radioactive decay during the period of that survey. Because the CP was well beyond 

the area of radiation surveys for Shot WILSON, the intensity cannot be well 

estimated. The closer-in hotline intensity of about 50 mr/hr (I 12) represents an 

upper limit. 

1-1 + 12 intensities, I 12, for each position of interest are decayed to 

intensities on rehearsal and shot dates through the factors, f, obtained from 

Reference 18. The gamma film badge doses, n, accrued during exercise 

activities are reconstructed as follows: 

. I12 I I) Time J) 

Location (mr/hr) Date f (mr/hr) (mrem/hr) (hr) (mrem) 

DIABLO Trenches ~10 21 June 0.20 2.0 1.4 ~6 8 

28 June 0.05 0.5 0.4 ~5 2 

HOOD Trenches ~45 5 July 0.022 1.0 0.7 ~5 4 

Command Post ~50 20-21 June 0.23 11.5 8.0 13-15 100-120 

27-28 June 0.05 2.5 1.8 13-15 24-27 

5 July 0.022 1.1 0.8 6-11 5-9 

Helicopter Loading ~20 21 June 0.20 4.0 2.8 ~l 3 

Zone (HLZ/12) 28 June 

5 July 

0.05 

0.022 

1.0 

0.4 

0.7 

0.3 

~l 

~1 1 

40 
_,j ___ ( 

'C 'f~< ~1~~·-1;~'.~~-.~,( ·}·~:·.,~;:j ~1f ,·:,_j,~;E.;', I:_.:· .. .i I /7f t-~-1-~\-}-, ~-,;- -.'-.,}-". ,~-\~--~-..-, ~\___ 1-~~- "'"J/" •( (;<••"" T----,' ,. ,. ,, , .:,,,, "' !I.:,:·•~.. / 6' .' (' 'I I I l, 1 I·-\ \ ) - 0. ' ' \ _.., ~- 'J n, ",, ,

1.:.,. \ • I~ ·, ~ ' 1 , ' I , 1 I 1 •. , , . -

,·, ·,,1;:,'\.1•~,, \:--,.,,,' 0;~'.~.. l'l;c._~.--_ , ! ,/•' ,'Ii' l \ ', -,_) , , 1,. -, ~ ·, / II' 

,,_._..~: ._ •• -'- _. ---;.'..-A~IAB~-0 -·--- ~~ ---L -~--'-- --- · _,_ 

l ' { I ' r.\, GZ ·- ' I .t ·---1 ' '- I '-f I ) : \'"' p::1 l J l ·1 I ,.~ \ ~ ·~ ,~.... - I 

! 

I •• ,,_,I, I\"•<, ,1·~•.s-=1•·1,:, '""I .....,., ·1,1:•() '•Ip · 111 'I' I) ' '1C - 1. < < ---...- """7',,-r--~.... •• I I J I/ •.. ' ? I I ; 

,, tt:o:' ·,;>•\I, • • ,' 'LJ /_ .l "

1 I~ 'O ~' - ; ____ ,1 

• ..... _ _,,... .-. • I -:1---r-

·) 

.j::,, 

...... 

1 

·, l\ J I ('\. ~ \ • I 

_, -1:2t..:.. L' - ' )- '~ \ \ 

--J--• _.,.:i.._7 ____\. 

'I ) I • 

'-. 1' I 

. \ I • \ 

10 . . ' ' ' -~'----- -,. l.,,/ 

-\ •. - ••• I\ { \/ 

<1 \ • 

r .I,~ : 

I

I 

I 

I 

I• I 

I\ ' 

\~ --I

---4 

OM 

"-f•,091 l// 

' i ·' 

' l ..,,----fr·-,- \ 

I ..:.!..., -4 -/ 

\ ' 

1 0 I ' m I· .l.. ) c / I rnRUS ____ .._ +-- ·1 ~ I < J

~. LVTP-5 Helo ! BJY /.. . '-1 j J...J __ -1-­ ) -'. Route Route p:: / ' ) ( 

i 7\ .... ) /

') . J r I _.-•-- ('- - - -- ,, 

r 

1P.. ~:,1J\} 

\ ( .1 1 \ 

'i 

i 

'~}/\ 

•., i.i r 

,t.'"f.'\~•~ .< l • ' f '·.«;-1.\," 

f • 

.. 

r 

~01:,••>"/.? 

,~,t ,' . ,'l' t , ) , , 

••~>,'''.~:,o,~/•, '", , 

1 

,. 

i

I ) ' 

,--i ~) " 

'\.-­ -t.:• i I : 11 / - , , • 1 • \ ) l1MI "104! 

Figure 4-2. Shot Wilson Residual Radiation (mr/hr@ H+12) and Marine Brigade Movements 

I 
4.1.4 Shot HOOD Induced Activity 

The only occasions upon which personnel were exposed to residual 

radiation from Shot Hoon were during E Company's march toward G Z and the 

viewing of the equipment display (see Figure 4-3). Essentially all contamination 

was in the form of the neutroh activation products Mn56 and Na24. l)uring these 

excursions only, personnel were also exposed to month-old fallout from Shot 

BOLTZMANN (see ~eference 18) and induced activity from Shot WILSON. The 

other early shots, FRANKLIN and LASSEN, contributed no residual in the 

exercise area. The contamination from HOOT) was so dominant that the small 

contribution to external dose from all previous shots need not be computed. 

Company E is assumed to have moved out from the trench area 

(southwest of GZ) 15 minutes after the shot. Walking at an average of 3 mph, 

they would have reached the calculated position of the 5 r/hr rad-safe limit 49 

minutes later (if they remained on-line with GZ). A five-minute stay at the radsafe limit, 1070 yards from G Z, followed by a return to the trench area at 3 mph 

results in a total calculated film badge dose of 530 mrem. Just over half of this 

dose results from the stay at the 5 r/hr line, the location of which is assumed to 

have been updated for the arriving troops. 

Viewers of the equipment display are assumed to have examined all 

displays outside the rad-safe limit. Because repeated surveys by T)esert Rock 

and later Marine personnel located the display closest to the 5 r/hr line, the 

viewers would not have gone closer to GZ than this display. The distances at 

which the HOOi) displays were positioned are not precisely known; only the 

documentation for the intended 11IABLO display (Reference 8) has been located. 

Those distances were scaled for the intended yield of Shot HOOD to provide the 

same planned damage effects (Reference 4). Rescaled distances for the HOOi) 

display are calculated based on the mean predicted yields and heights of burst of 

DIABLO and HOOD. The scaling information available in 1957 was very close to 

that currently used. Blast scaling is applied to the equipment at (nIABLO) 

distances of 230 through 1350 yards from Gz. Thermal radiation scaling is 

applied to the mannequin displays at 1835 through 2485 yards. Oistances scaled 

to HOOT) range from 260 to 2530 yards for equipment and about 4200 to 5400 

yards for mannequins. 

42 
l ~:~ . '._' 1t,,,1i/'I , • \;'(__ '•w r->.,.<i' 

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Figure 4-3. Shot Hood Residual Radiation (mr/hr@ H+l) and Marine Brigade Movements 
Both the DIABLO and HOOD displays were planned to be northeast of G Z 

(Reference 6 and 7). For HOOD, the great distances for mannequins would have 

put them high in the hills to the east of Yucca Flat. The most likely scenario is 

that the equipment was placed to the northeast, but the mannequins, at much 

greater distances, were placed in line with the trenches. A burning mannequin at 

the trench area was noted after the shot; the trench distance from GZ matches 

the farthest scaled mannequin distance. The other mannequins would have been 

at least several hundred yards distant, and may not have been noticed in the 

midst of other burning vegetation. 

Equipment viewed at HOOD is calculated to have been at approximately 

2530, 1310, 1160, 1070, and 840 yards from GZ. At the latter, the gamma 

intensity upon troop arrival is calculated to have been 3.2 r/hr. The calculated 

film badge dose for viewing displays at these distances after the conclusion of 

the battalion exercise is 610 mrem. 

4.2 INTERNAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 

While operating in residual radiation fields, personnel were subject to an 

internal dose commitment from the inhalation of airborne radionuclides. 

Situations of possible significant inhalation exposure to Marine elements are 

analyzed. Oose commitments to the whole body and bone are considered, as 

these are of current interest with regard to radiologically-induced disorders. 

The basic methodology used for calculating internal dose commitments is that 

used in Reference 19, which is based on the following expression: 

D; =GC X K X BR X T X ~ PiDFij 

l 

where: D- = Dose commitment (rem) to organ j J 

GC = Ground Contamination (Ci/m2) 

K = Resuspension Factor (Ci/m3 per Ci/m2, or m-1) 

BR = Breathing Rate (m3/hr) 

T = Duration of Exposure (hr) 

P·l = Activity fraction of isotope i 

DF·· = Dose Factor (rem/Ci) for organ j resulting from an intake o·f lJ 

isotope i 

44 
Variations of this expression are developed as required for utilization of the 

measured radiological parameters. Except where noted, the particle size 

distribution of airborne contamination is assumed to be consistent with that for 

which the dose factors were developed. This distribution provides a more nearly 

optimal particle retention than does any distribution likely encountered by the 

marines; thus, the calculated dose commitments are high-sided. 

4.2.l Personnel in an Induced Field 

As indicated in Reference 21, the internal dose commitment resulting 

from activities in neutron-activated soil is small compared to the corresponding 

acute external dose unless there is extreme soil suspension. For Shot HOOD, 

what dust was lofted by the shock wave had either settled or blown out of the 

shot area, away from the troops, before the HOOD radiation field was entered. 

Any internal dose commitment from suspension of dust by walking would have 

been far less than 1 mrem. At Shot PRISCILLA, dust did linger in the shot area 

for the duration of the observers' tour. Helicopters were unable to complete a 

survey of the area until midday, when visibility had sufficiently improved for 

their purposes. What dust there was did not impede the observation of the 

display area, but apparently delayed the start of observer activities. The 

suspension factor must have been considerably less than for the dust storm at 

Shot Grable (1953), for which 10-2 m-1 was used (Reference 21). A high-sided 

value of l o-3 m-1 is assumed for the PRISCILLA dust at the time of the display 

observation. Following the analysis of Reference 21, the whole body 

commitment for exposure at three hours after burst (the approximate mid-time 

for the observers' tour) is 2.3 mrem per mr of time-integrated intensity from 

Na24 for unit resuspension factor (m-1) of activity in the top centimeter of soil 

and unit breathing rate (m3/hr). For the calculated film badge dose of 450 

mrem, the time-integrated intensity was 650 mr, of which about 350 mr would 

have been from Na24. At time zero, the Na24 contribution would have been 

about 400 mr. The 50-year whole body dose commitment, with a 1.3 m3/hr 

breathing rate, is then given as 

D = (2.3)( 400)( 1.3)(1 o-3) = 1.2 mrem 

45 
There is no evidence that dust within the area was significantly redistributed; 

neither the rad-safe survey conducted just before the observers' arrival in the 

display area nor intensity readings taken during the tour indicate a level of 

airborne activity that could cause transient irregularities in the radiation field. 

4.2.2 Personnel Exposed to Helicopter-Lofted Fallout 

Personnel waiting to board helicopters at HLZl/2 may have been 

subjected to helicopter-resuspended WILSON fallout for as long as an hour at 

both the DIABLO rehearsal and the maneuver at HOOD. Particularly at the 

former, only three days after WILSON, the fresh fallout might have remained 

loose on top of the ambient soil. The worst case is considered by assuming the 

fallout to be of respirable size, and thus sufficiently small to afford the 

possibility of complete resuspension by the helicopter-induced winds. Because of 

the spacing of the helicopters, only a small portion of the loading zone fallout is 

resuspended. Each landed helicopter would occupy an area of approximately 

50x 100 yards. If each helicopter lofts the fallout directly under the sweep of the 

main rotor (about 300 yd2 for a 60-foot diameter sweep), then only six percent 

of the fallout in the area of landed helicopters is resuspended. If the suspended 

dust attains a depth of about 10 meters, assumed to be of uniform concentration, 

then the effective resuspension factor for the area of landed helicopters is 

6x 1 o- 3 

m - l. It is assumed that the lotted dust diffuses to fill the volume 

corresponding to each helicopter, but does not diffuse out of the area of landed 

helicopters; thus, a uniform concentration of dust over that area is achieved. 

For marines waiting to board for up to an hour just outside of the loading 

area, the dust patch could drift over to them and remain over them if the winds 

were sufficiently light. At the time of the DIABLO rehearsal, the whole body 

50-year dose commitment (Reference 22) is 250 mrem per mr of time-integrated 

intensity for unit resuspension factor (m-1) and unit breathing rate.* From 

Section 4.1, the intensity at the time of rehearsal is 4 mr/hr. For the exercise 

after HOOD, the conversion is about 1400 mrem per mr, but the intensity at that 

*This calculation incorporates both fission product and actinide (e.g., plutonium) 

contamination. 

46 
time is only 0.4 mr/hr. The total 50-year whole body commitment from WILSON 

fallout at the helicopter landing zone is then 

D =(250x4+1400x0.4)(1.3)(6xl0-3) =12 mrem 

If the dust described above, which would be visibly dense, were endured 

without protective masks (as assumed), it follows that the masks worn at the 

trench area during the HOOO detonation probably were not removed until the 

dust level was comparable to that experienced during the rehearsal at HLZ/12. 

For similar intensities (0.4 vs. 1.0) of fallout from the same source (WILSON), a 

briefer exposure to still-dissipating dust at the HOOD trenches would have 

resulted in a clearly lower dose commitment than from proximity to landing 

helicopters. 

4.2.3 Personnel Walking in Fallout Fields 

For personnel walking in fallout fields, a resuspension factor of l0-5m-l 

(as in References 19 and 21) is chosen. It is assumed that the activities of 

Command Post personnel subjected them to a resuspension factor less than 

10-5m-l. Because of the time spent at the CP, these personnel had the greatest 

internal dose potential (except helicopter-related) from WILSON fallout. The 

other Plumbbob fallout field that personnel entered was the BOLTZMANN field 

(see Reference 18), in which the Hoon equipment display lay. Rad-safe 

monitors may have been in the area for as long as six hours. The doses for each 

situation are obtained in the following table (with a 1.3 m3/hr breathing rate in 

all cases): 

Fifty-year Dose 

Intensity Maximum Normalized Commitment 

Location Date (mr/hr) Time (hr) mrem/mr (mrem) 

Command 20-21 June 11.5 15 230 0.52 

Post 27-28 June 2.5 15 800 0.39 

5 July 1. 1 11 1400 0.22 

Equipment 

Display 5 July < 8* 6 2280 <l.42 

*Based on entire area being <1000 mr/hr at H+l2 hours, and decay from Reference 18 

47 
Thus, no individual in the 4th MC PAEB accrued as much as 2 mrem to the whole 

body from these other activities in fallout fields. 

4.3 RESmUAL RADIATION DOSE SU'v1MARY 

The calculated film badge doses to personnel of the 4th MC PAEB from 

residual gamma radiation are summarized chronologically as follows: 

Event Radiation Source Dose (rem) 

C PX Rehearsal WILSON Fallout 0.10 

DIABLO Rehearsal WILSON Fallout o.011 

Shot PRISCILLA: 

Trench Area PRISCILLA Fallout 0.009 

Display Area PRISCILLA Induced Activity 0.45 

CPX WILSON Fallout 0.024 

Shot DIABLO (misfire) WILSON Fallout 0.002 

Shot HOOD: 

Command Post/ 

Trench Area WILSON Fallout 0.009 

Walk Toward GZ HOOD Induced Activity 0.53 

Display Area HOOD Induced Activity 0.61 

For most brigade activities, the 50-year dose commitment to the whole 

body from inhaled radionuclides is calculated to be less than 0.002 rem. A 

greater dose commitment, up to 0.012 rem, could have occurred only for 

personnel having a substantial wait to board helicopters in HLZl/2. The 

calculated dose commitments to bone are approximately double these values. 

48 
5.1 

SECTION 5 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS AND TOTAL DOSE DETERMINATION 

The sources of error in the calculation of the more significant doses are 

examined in order to estimate the uncertainty in personnel dose resulting from 

4th MCPAEB activities. Doses from all activities are summed as applicable to 

determine the total dose to the various units within the brigade. 

UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 

The group activities resulting in the most significant doses were the CPX 

rehearsal, the tours of the PR.ISCILLA and HOOD equipment display areas, and 

the march toward HOOD GZ. For the CPX, the only uncertain parameter of 

importance is the gamma intensity at the Command Post. The uncertainty for 

the other activities arises from both the gamma radiation environment and the 

space-time scenarios of troop movements. For these, for which ample local 

radiation data were available, the 90-percent confidence limits in the gamma 

intensity, including the uncertainty in the decay parameter, are provided by the 

automated procedure described in Reference 20. Parametric studies are made 

using the automated procedure to determine the influence of scenario variations 

on personnel dose. 

Errors in position, time, and gamma intensity are not independent 

because of the rad-safe constraint limiting troops to intensities of less than 

5 r/hr. For both maneuver and observer elements, this limit was enforced by 

rad-safe and control elements who supervised these group activities (Reference 

4). Troop positions are well known except with regard to limits of advance. 

Because· reference material does not adequately report the actual limits of 

advance, the limit is assumed to be the 5 r/hr line or the display line just outside 

it. Consequently, the upper limit on dose is not necessarily obtained by 

considering the upper confidence limits or by maximizing the number of display 

lines visited; it is instead found by considering the scenario variation that 

maximizes the time spent at or near the rad-safe limit. 

49 
The various sources of error are combined approximately; they cannot be 

combined rigorously due to the disparity of their associated distributions. These 

distributions may be normal (e.g., a stay time .:: 5 minutes), lognormal (as for the 

gamma intensity), or truncated (due to the rad-safe limit). The best-estimate 

doses from Section 4 are used together with the error distributions to determine 

the mean dose for each activity. Only for significantly skewed distributions is 

the mean much different from the best estimate. For multiple exposures, the 

means may be legitimately added to find the mean total dose, which may be 

compared to film badge data or entered as an individual's assigned gamma dose. 

Ninety-percent confidence limits are estimated for each calculated dose. 

Confidence limits for totaled doses can only be approximated; they are obtained 

as for normal distributions, except that upper and lower confidence limits are 

considered separately. 

5.1.1 CPX Rehearsal 

The intensity used in the dose calculation for the Command Post was 

based on the high-sided assumptions that the C:P was on the hotline of the 

WILSON fallout pattern and that the intensity along the hotline did not diminish 

with distance from G?.. 'R.eference 15 depicts a faJlout pattern that continues 

straight and narrow offsite to the west-southwest. Thus, it is likely that the CP 

was indeed on or near the hotline, as Figure 4-2 suggests. The decrease in 

hotline intensity with distance from GZ, certain in the absence of precipitation, 

is not known for this shot. Reference 15 shows no isopleth greater than 1 mr/hr 

(H+l 2), almost certainly not the maximum, even offsite. 

The decay rate used from H+12 hours to the time of the CPX rehearsal 

also contributes to a high-sided dose estimate. Although on-site fallout survey 

data are available for about one day after WILSON (Reference 12), there are too 

few data after that to extrapolate a decay rate. For the average time of the 

rehearsal, the H+12 intensity is multiplied by a decay factor of 0.23, as obtained 

from the Plumbbob composite decay from Reference 15. That decay is weighted 

heavily by tower shots and thus is probably not reliable for WILSON. By way of 

50 
contrast, the traditional t- 1•

2 decay (Reference 17) would give a decay factor of 

0.13. If these two decays are regarded as extremes, the film badge dose for the 

CPX rehearsal is between 60 and 100 mrem. 

5.1.2 PRISCILLA Equipment Display 

The calculated film badge dose of 450 mrem for observers of the 

PRISCILLA equipment display has an associated error factor (based on the 90-

percent confidence limits for the calculated value) of 1.9 based on the gamma 

radiation field. Because the maximum intensity calculated on the 600-yard 

display line was 4.8 r/hr, just below the rad-safe limit, the dose could be scarcely 

any hii;her from this source of error. It could be the full factor of 1.9 lower 

because the observers would not have approached closer to GZ than this display. 

The assumed walk-through had no halt. If the observers had waited five minutes 

on the 600-yard display line near the point of maximum intensity, there would 

have been a 60-percent increase in dose. This might have occurred to allow 

stragglers to catch up before all began the return walk. Alternatively, if display 

lines were walked through at the slower pace of 50 yd/min, the additional dose 

would have been 85 mrem. Overall, the observers' film badge dose could have 

been 450 ~}[8 mrem. Because it is difficult to quantify this distribution, no 

mean dose is calculated; however, the 450 mrem is likely on the high side for 

most participants. 

5.1.3 HOOi) Equipment Display 

The most significant uncertainty with regard to the dose accrued at the 

HOOD display area is the time spent at t'1e displays. Because the three 

innermost displays viewed were not far apart, a different stay time at each has 

an impact on the total dose. If an error factor of 2 is assumed for the stay time 

at each, not taken independently, the calculated film badge dose is 610 ~f!8 

mrem. The HOOD gamma field was unusually well defined through frequent 

surveys; for the tour through the display area, the overall error factor from 

gamma field uncertainty is only l.2. Thus, the display at 840 yards was 

51 
definitely available, but no display closer to GZ could have been viewed. With 

the uncertainties from gamma field and stay time combined, the dose is 610 ~[~8 

mrem. Other uncertainties play a much less significant role. If the DIABLO 

display was correctly scaled to HOOO, the calculated display line distances must 

be very close to the actual ones. The exact time of entry into the display has 

little influence on the dose because it was so many hours after burst. The 

precise walking speed also has a minor effeet. 

5.1.4 March Toward HOOD GZ 

The dominant uncertainty with regard to the dose from the march 

toward G Z is the time spent at the rad-safe limit. For an error factor of 2 in the 

stay time, the calculated film badge dose is 530 ~rZ8 mrem. Uncertainty in the 

gamma field has a very minor effect. The position of the 5 r/hr line slightly 

affects the timing of the march, which in turn has a minor effect on dose in an 

induced field. Error in the gradient of the intensity would have some effeet on 

the total dose, but this error is very small. 

The calculated closest approach to GZ, 1070 yards, is at odds with some 

statements in reference material. This in turn makes it worth considering the 

possibility that E Company advanced beyond the 5 r/hr rad-safe limit. 

Reference f./. states that marines moved to 400 yards from Gz, but qualifies this 

as a safe distance. Some maneuver participants believe that the approach was 

nearly this close. Reference 3 states only that the advance was limited by 

safety restrictions. 

The calculated error factor for intensity at 1070 yards at the time of the 

troops' arrival is 1.7. The gradient of the intensity field was such that an error 

of this magnitude would displace the 5 r/hr location by only 100 yards. 

Therefore, the 400-yard distance is definitely inconsistent with a 5 r/hr 

intensity. In fact, the calculated intensity at 400 yards, had the marines 

continued their march, is 120 r/hr. The total dose for their march, even with an 

instantaneous turnaround assumed, would have been no less than 7 .3 rem. 

52 
T-Iowever, no film badges or other indications of doses approaching this value 

have been located for this unit. 

It is most probable that the alleged approach to 400 yards from GZ never 

occurred. This distance would have been difficult for a participant to establish. 

After a balloon shot, such as HOOD, there would have been no clear indication 

where GZ was. The desert would have been denuded of vegetation at 1070 yards; 

there would have been little additional effect at GZ short of cratering, for which 

the burst was too high. Because the marines advanced cross-country, they would 

not have benefited from any marked stakes for other shot activities. No 

landscape features were close enough to permit an accurate sighting. A possible 

source of confusion may have been the tower debris of Shot TESLA (fired in 

1955), which was only a few hundred yards from the line of advance toward G Z 

and, at about 1370 yards from the HOOD GZ, near the calculated limit of 

advance for F. Company (see Figure 4-3). 

5.2 TOTAL DOSE SUMMARY 

The reconstructed gamma film badge doses for 4th MCPAEB participants 

are presented in Table 5-1. From the best-estimate doses of Section 4 and the 

error distributions of Section 5, the mean dose is calculated for elements of the 

brigade. These are presented along with estimated 90-percent confidence limits. 

53 
Table 5-1. Dose Summary, 4th MCPAEB 

Brigade 

Element 

Shot WILSON 

Dose (rem) 

Shot PRISCILLA 

Dose (rem) 

Shot HOOD 

Dose (rem) 

Total Gamma 

Dose (rem) 

Brigade Staff 0.08-0.16 0.46+0.27 * 

-0.21 

0.64+0.25* 

-0.17 0.12.::0.04, 0.58~~:~i, 

0.76+0.25 

-0.17 

2nd Battalion 

E Co. 0.02 0.46+0.27 * 

-0.21 

0 56+0.26 

• -0.17 

0 58+0._26 

• -0.17' 

1 04 +0.37 

• -0.27 

G Co.(-) 0 46 +0.27 * 0 64+0.25 0 64+0.25 1 10+0.37 0.00 • -0.21 • -0.17 • -0.17' • -0.27 

Ul 

+:> All Others 0.46+0.27 * 0 64 +0.25 0 66+0.25 1 12+0.37 0.02 -0.21 • -0.17 • -0.17'. -0.27 

Observers < 0.01 -- 0.00 < 0.01 

Helicopter Crews 0 46+0.27 * 0.01 0 0.01, 0.47~~:~i **

• -0.21 

0 46+0.27 * Rad-Safe Monitors 0.02 o, > 0.5 0.02, 0.4(~:~i' > 0.5** • -0.21 

*Accrued by some members of group; others accrued zero dose 

**Does not include additional undocumented activities 

NOTE: Initial radiation dose was less than 0.01 rem from all sources. 
6.1 

SECTION 6 

FIL"4 BAOGE DOSIMETRY 

FILM BADGE DATA 

Personnel of the 4th MCPAEB were issued individual film badges for 

their stay at Camp nesert Rock. Film badges were of the type described in 

Reference 18. Most brigade personnel had one film badge for the duration of the 

exercise; the rad-safe monitors had two or three. Dosimetry survives for about 

one-third of the brigade. Film badge records appear to be essentially complete 

for the brigade staff, rad-safe monitors, helicopter crews, and observers. For the 

2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, dosimetry is available for only senior personnel. In 

general, very few low-ranking enlisted men are represented in the existing 

dosimetry records. 

It is evident from film badge readings within a unit that personnel did 

not always operate together. In Section 4, it is determined that the major 

sources of radiation exposure to the brigade were the viewing of the PRISCILLA 

and Hoon displays and E Company's march toward the HOOD GZ. Members of 

the brigade staff likely had the opportunity to view the PRISCILLA display, in 

addition to their HOOD activities. The rad-safe monitors, divided into sixteen 

teams performing seven different functions, encountered various levels of 

radiation in the performance of their duties. Also, some of the monitors 

observed the PRISCILLA display. 

The film badge readings for the brigade staff fall into three groups: less 

than 100 mrem (41 personnel), about 300 to 500 mrem (11 personnel, mean of 370 

mrem), and about 900 to 1200 mrem (13 personnel, mean of 1020 mrem). Most 

readings for the 2nd Battalion are in the vicinity of 500 mrem. A few have much 

lower readings. Personnel with higher readings correlate very well with 

individuals appearing on a list of PRISCILLA participants from the 2nd Battalion. 

Company E, despite its walk toward GZ, has readings typical of the rest of the 

battalion. The rad-safe monitors received doses of up to 400 mrem from rad55 
safe training on 20 or 21 June. Half of the monitors received additional doses of 

up to 300 mrem on another badge in the same time frame, presumably for the 

same purpose. Readings covering the period of PRISCILLA and HOOD range 

from virtually O to 2400 mrem. ~fost of the planned rad-safe activities involved 

surveying in areas of significant radiation. Seventy percent of the monitors' 

doses exceeded 800 mrem, normally from HOOD alone. ~~arine observers with 

the 4th MCPAEB all received less than 50 mrem. The majority of the MAG-36 

helicopter crewmen had readings below 100 mrem; most others were below 200 

mrem. Twenty crewmen received 290 to 470 mrem on badges turned in on the 

day after PRISCILLA. Eight others accrued about 1000 mrem for their entire 

stay. 

Because of the numerous subgroups involved, the 2nd Battalion and the 

monitor teams are analyzed in more detail. In the 2nd Battalion, there are minor 

differences in dose among the companies. With the listed PRISCILLA attendees 

excluded, the mean film readings for Companies E, F, G, 1-1, and HμS are 520, 

550, 570, 470, and 540 mrem, respectively. These results are obtained from a 

total of 86 readings. Others not included in the averaging are three below 100 

mrem, four of about 200-300 mrem, and one of 1200 mrem. Companies E and H 

are the most tightly grouped, with standard deviations of about 30 mrem. The 

readings in all companies are clearly distinct from those for personnel who 

attended PRISCILLA in addition to HOOD. The PRISCILLA attendees from the 

battalion as a whole have film badge readings in two clusters, averaging 840 

mrem (18 readings) and 340 mrem (7 readings). There is one outlier of 1220 

mrem. 

The identification and segregation of the PRISCILLA subgroup for the 

2nd Battalion makes it possible to conclude that there was no statistically 

significant difference in dose between officers and enlisted men for the HOOD 

exercise. Although fewer than ten percent of the 2nd Battalion enlisted men are 

represented in the dosimetry, there is no indication that their film badge 

readings are atypical. A strong contraindication is provided by the readings of 

company-level rad-safe monitors. Four low-ranking enlisted men from each of 

56 
E, F, G, and l--1 Companies were specially trained at Camp Desert Rock in the ten 

days prior to the arrival of the 4th MCPAEB to provide rad-safe support to their 

units. These men, for whom dosimetry records are complete, should have 

accrued as much dose as anyone by operating at the head of their units. Their 

doses are very near the average for each company, except that in G Company, 

they exceed the average by about 100 mrem. 

The multiple film badges of the 178-man Monitor Teams Group deserve 

special comment because of the overlap provided by their alleged dates of use: 

20 June to 21 June, 20 June to 6 July, and 21 June to 6 July. Examination of all 

Desert Rock dosimetry shows that recording of film badge exchanges was not 

reliably precise as to the date. For example, the receipt of returned badges may 

not have been logged until the following day. Normally, a film badge log 

remained open until all badges were returned. Early turn-ins were usually not 

noted. The monitors' badge dates are then as follows: Everyone exchanged film 

badges after rad-safe training in Yucca Flat on 20 or 21 June (mean dose of 220 

mrem). Half of the monitors kept their second badge for the duration of the 

exercise. The other half turned in badges on the 21st (mean dose of 130 mrem), 

presumably after additional training, and drew a third badge for the duration of 

the exercise. The turn-in of their second badge was not specially logged because 

the others were still outstanding. This interpretation is supported by the 

readings themselves. All readings on the first badge, except one, were 420 mrem 

or less. For personnel with three badges, if they had a subsequent reading 

greater than 320 rnrem, it was always on the third badge. Personnel with only 

two badges typically had larger readings than 320 mrem on the second. This is 

consistent with the conclusion that the more significant exposures occurred 

during the PRISCILLA- HOOO time frame. 

Only the film badge readings themselves are available to indicate the 

differences between the two- and three-badge monitors. That there are 50 

percent in each category makes it likely that eight monitor teams were issued 

the third badge. It is possible that similar activities were performed by all on 

20-21 June without uniform badge reissue, but not likely because the mean dose 

57 
on the final badge for both groups is identical (920 mrem). However, the doses in 

each group are widely distributed, so the significance of this fact is debatable. 

The dissimilar dose distributions, displayed in Figure 6-1, are not consistent with 

a hypothesis that half the teams for each planned shot-day activity fell into each 

group. 

The planned activities of the monitor teams at HOOD would have 

involved twelve of the teams in areas of significant radiation while surveying the 

equipment display area, surveying around GZ, surveying the path to be followed 

toward GZ by E Company, and accompanying brigade personnel through the 

display area. All of these activities would have resulted in doses at least as 

great as those accrued by E Company and viewers of the equipment display, 

except for any teams that may have surveyed only the outer portion of the 

display area. The other four teams should not have operated any closer to HOOD 

GZ than the trer'tches, and should have accrued a negligible dose from HOOD. 

Their total film badge reading would have been less than 100 mrem, which was 

the case for two teams, as shown in Figure 6-1. How a third team at 300-plus 

mrem and a fourth team (not resolved in the figure) accrued higher levels of 

radiation is not known. The teams with higher dose levels are not readily 

distinguishable. Information regarding certain individuals provides some clues, 

however. A monitor who surveyed in advance of E Company accrued 890 mrem. 

The two teams planned for that activity were probably sufficiently cohesive to 

provide part of the peak in the 900 mrem range. Most of the highest readings, 

including the 2400 and 2300 mrem readings, apparently are for some of the 

display area monitors. Some of these individuals, both officers and enlisted men, 

are known to have participated in PRISCILLA as well. All monitor teams were 

to observe the HOOD equipment display at the conclusion of the exercise 

(Reference 10), but both film badge readings (the very low values) and personal 

accounts offer evidence to the contrary. 

Some dosimetry not worn by 4th MCPAEB personnel is relevant to the 

determination of their dose. A film badge placed on a stake above the HOOD 

trenches read 66 mrem (the reading for a marine in a trench is known to have 

58 
24 

20 

Vl 16 O'l 

C: 

•r-

-a 

,0 

a., 12 

er: 

4-

0 8 

s.. 

a., 

..Cl 

E 4 :::::i 

z 

Total Number=88 

0 

0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 

Film Badge Reading (mrem) 

20 June - 6 July 1957 

Vl 

CJ) 

C: 

•r- 12

-a Total Number=87 ,0 

a., 

0 400 

er: 8 4-

0 

s.. 

a., 4 

..Cl 

E 

:::::i 

z 0 

800 1200 1600 2000 2400 

Film Badge Reading (mrem) 

21 June - 6 July 1957 

Figure 6-1 Distribution of Final Film Badge 

Readings for Monitor Teams Group 

59 
been 0). This provides a useful comparison with initial radiation calculations. 

Dosimetry is available for hundreds of observers from all services who walked 

through the PRISCILLA equipment display. Their doses, which should have been 

similar to those of participants from the brigade, were mostly between 300 and 

500 mrem. The spread likely indicates that the walk-through was not tightly 

controlled; officers were probably permitted to linger at points of interest. 

Of as much interest as the available film badge data is the missing data 

for the majority of marines. Film badge dosimetry is virtually complete for all 

other participants in Exercise Desert Rock VII- VIII. This has been determined by 

analysis of the issuance of film badge series. Film badges in each alphabeticallydesignated series were numbered from 1 to 299. The alphabetic progression of 

issued badge series correlates well with the time progression of badge issue 

dates. All badge series have been accounted for, as have almost all numbers 

within each series, except for one entire series that can be pinpointed to within 

one day of 20 June 1957. Marines are heavily represented in the series both 

immediately before and after. 

Even more enigmatic than the selective disappearance of dosimetry 

records for the 4th MCPAEB is that one 299-badge series cannot account for 

about 1200 marines with missing individual film badges. Everyone else in 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII had individual dosimetry; Marines would have been 

no exception. Statements by Marine participants overwhelmingly indicate that 

everyone did indeed have a film badge. The missing dosimetry, to whatever 

extent it existed, was probably lost in 1957. In an on-going search of medical 

records, Headquarters Marine Corps has found no entry of a 1957 dose that was 

not also in the presently available film badge records. 

6.2 COMPARISON OF DOSE CALCULATIONS WITH FILM BADGE DATA 

Film badge readings confirm that the initial radiation dose from HOOD 

was minimal. The above-ground reading of 66 mrem at the HOOD trench area 

agrees favorably with the calculated above-ground gamma dose of 29 mrem. 

60 
Because the film badge was probably at the command trench, slightly closer to 

GZ than the average troop trench (at which the dose was calculated), the badge 

reading would be expected to be somewhat greater. The calculated dose to 

personnel in the HOOD trenches of 1 mrem (gamma) is beneath the threshold of 

film badge sensitivity. Therefore, the reading of O mrem for an individual known 

to have been in a trench is in agreement with the calculated dose. No 

independent confirmation exists for the calculated initial radiation dose at 

PRISCILLA. Observers in the PRISCILLA trenches subsequently received larger 

residual radiation doses. 

For observers of the PRISCILLA equipment display, the film badge data 

are in agreement with the calculated film badge dose of 460 mrem. Personnel 

from all services, known to have been observers of PRISCILLA only, have 

readings distributed around this value. Marine Brigade personnel known to have 

walked through the PRISCILLA display have readings that are either consistent 

with a PRISCILLA walk-through only (at a mean of 340 mrem, too low for a dose 

from HOOD), or are consistent with walk-throughs for both the PRISCILLA and 

HOOD displays (about 300 mrem greater than the mean HOOD-only dose). 

The calculated mean film badge dose for E Company is 580 mrem, in 

good agreement with the mean film badge reading of 520 mrem. It is evident 

that the company did not also visit the equipment display area, as originally 

planned. Company E personnel have confirmed the elimination of this activity 

from their scenario. That the calculated dose, based on the rad-safe limit of 

5 r/hr, agrees well with actual readings, is strongly suggestive that this 

constraint was not violated in the field. Company E apparently advanced only to 

a "safe" distance from Gz, regardless of what yardage has been subsequently 

associated with that distance. 

For the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, the calculated mean film badge 

dose is 660 mrem, resulting almost entirely from the walk-through of the HOOD 

equipment display. This is in good agreement with the dosimetry data. The 

slight variation in company-averaged dose, especially for H Company, likely 

61 
indicates that each company viewed the equipment somewhat independently at a 

slightly different pace. That these companies accrued about the same dose as E 

Company is not highly coincidental: the scenarios for both included about the 

same walking speed in a radiation field of similar gradient at all azimuths, about 

the same gamma intensity at the point of closest approach to GZ, and about the 

same stay time at that point. 

The calculated dose for members of the brigade staff participating in the 

C PX but not viewing a display area is 130 to 160 mrem. Exactly what that dose 

should be depends considerably upon different functions performed by the staff, 

particularly during the C PX. These likely account for the considerable 

variations in film badge reading observed within the O to 100 mrem range. Those 

film badge readings averaging 370 mrem are consistent with the calculated 450 

mrem dose for observers of the PRISCILLA display. The highest group of doses 

for the brigade staff, averaging 1020 mrem, is not consistent with the rapid 

walk-through of the equipment display assumed for the 2nd Battalion. Perhaps 

all high-dose personnel viewed the PRISCILLA display as well, but the 

composition of the high-dose group, which included the Commanding General, 

4th MC PAEB, provides another explanation for the dose level. The group also 

included low-ranking officers and most enlisted grades, who possibly acted as 

escorts and drivers for distinguished visitors. They probably toured the HOOD 

display area at a different time from the exercise troops and, at a more leisurely 

pace, would have accrued a greater dose. 

The dose to personnel of MAG-36, while small, is greater than the 

estimate for the ground troop rehearsal dose. Undoubtedly, the helicopters 

touched down in areas that have not been recorded. Twenty of the crewmen 

evidently observed the P~ISCILLA display. noses in the vicinity of 1000 mrem 

for eight men cannot be explained in the context of the brigade exercise. One of 

these men claims to have piloted civilian scientists to an old shot area. 

Outliers do not detract from the comparison of calculated doses and film 

badge readings. It is inevitable that certain individual or small-group missions 

were required that were not in the documented mainstream of troop activities. 

62 
That these missions may have resulted in higher than usual doses does not 

necessarily indicate any disregard for radiation safety procedure. Even the one 

anomalously high dose for a marine, 7200 mrem, can be logically explained in 

terms of a military mission. This dose was accrued by the equipment display 

officer, whose extended presence in the HOOD display area was required on shot 

day and on subsequent days. 

Calculated and actual film badge doses for the major groups of the 4th 

MCPAEB (functionally and radiologically) are displayed in Table 6-1. 

63 
Table 6-1. Calculated and Actual Film Badge Doses 

Brigade Calculated Mean Film Mean Film Badge Range of Film 

Element Badge Dose (rem) Reading (rem) Badge Reading (rem) 

Brigade Staff 

Viewed: 

PRISCILLA Display 0.59 0.37 -0.25-0.5 

HOOD Display 0.75 1.02 -0.9-1.2 

No Display 0.14 :<: 0. 1 

2nd Battalion 

E Co. 0.58 0.52 

F Co. 0.66 0.55 

G Co. 0.64 0.57 

H Co. 0.66 0.47 O'I 

+:> H&S Co. 0.66 0.54

F,G,H Co. 

+ PRISCILLA Display 1.12 0.84 

PRISCILLA Display only 0.46 0.34 

Observers <0.01 O; <0.05 

Helicopter Crews 0.01 <0.2 

+PRISCILLA Display 0.46 0.29-0.46 

Rad-Safe Monitors 

20-21 June - 0.22 0-0.42,0. 77 

21 June - 0.13 0-0. 32 

20 or 21 June-6 July 0.02, >0.5 0.92 0.018-2.4 

Total Dose - 1.2 0.253-3.02 
SECTION7 

CONCLUSIONS 

Elements of the 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, 

Exercise Desert Rock VII, participated in two nuclear shots while at the Nevada 

Test Site during Operation Plumbbob. For Shot PRISCILLA, selected officers 

and enlisted personnel were in trenches 4250 yards (3890 meters) southwest of 

ground zero. They also toured the equipment display area after the shot. 

The brigade staff conducted a command post exercise in the forward 

area before the first scheduled detonation of Shot DIABLO. The remainder of 

the brigade also moved to the forward area to witness this shot. Because the 

shot misfired, the only radiation exposure to these personnel was the residual 

from previous shots, the most significant of which was Shot WILSON, fired 10 

days before. 

Although the command post exercise was not repeated, most of the 

brigade participated in Shot HOOD, observing the shot from trenches 5360 yards 

(4900 meters) from ground zero. After the shot, the maneuver elements 

conducted the assault exercise originally planned for post-DIABLO. One 

company of marines also advanced toward ground zero before joining other 

maneuver elements in the assault on an objective over 12 kilometers from ground 

zero. The brigade, not including the helicopters or the company that marched 

toward ground zero immediately after the shot, then toured the display area 

before returning to Camp Desert Rock. 

Initial radiation totaled less than 0.01 rem for participants in Shots 

PRISCILLA and HOOD. Therefore, external exposure was primarily due to 

residual radiation from these and previous shots. Although all four previous 

Plumbbob shots were examined, only Shot WILSON contributed significantly to 

the doses of exercise personnel, both during exercise rehearsals as well as before 

and during the DIABLO misfire, and during the Shot HOOT) activities. The total 

contribution to the dose of any participant due to Shot WILSON was less than 

0.16 rem. 

65 
The major radiation exposure of brigade personnel was due to Shots 

PRISCILLA and HOOD. However, few participants were exposed to both shots in 

the range of either's maximum contribution. Thus, the highest likely dose to a 

typical maneuver troop was 0.66 rem, almost all accrued during the post-shot 

inspection of the HOOD equipment display. 

Due to the possible high levels of dust in the helic0pter loading zone, 

where contaminants could have been lofted, a 50-year whole body dose 

commitment of 0.012 rem could have been received by personnel who may have 

had to wait for as long as an hour for their airlift during both the rehearsal and 

the actual maneuver. For others who were not exposed to these rather extreme 

conditions, the internal dose would be correspondingly less. The bone dose 

commitment is calculated to be about twice the whole body commitment. 

Film badge dosimetry and other records of activities for Exercise Desert 

Rock VII are sufficient to identify the personnel who had the greatest potential 

for exposure and to determine their specific activities. Dosimetry data 

correlate well with calculated doses, thus providing the necessary confidence in 

the calculated doses, and group activities, for those personnel with no dosimetry 

records. 

66 
REFERENCES 

1. "Report of the Test Manager, AEC/NTO, Operation PLUMBPiOB," Nevada 

Test Site, December 1957. 

2. "Test Director's Report on Operation Plumbbob," Nevada Test Site, UCRL 

5166, November 1957. 

3. "Operational Summary, Operation Plumbbob," WT-1444, Headquarters, 

Field Command, DASA, 23 February 1960. 

4. "Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Final Report of Operations," 

Headquarters, Sixth US Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California, 

January 1958. 

5. Operation Order No. 5 (Shot PRISCILLA), Headquarters, Exercise Desert 

'R.ock VII, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 11 June 1957. 

6. Operation Order No. 6 (Shot DIARLO), Headquarters, Exercise Desert Rock 

VII, Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, 23 June 1957. 

7. Operation Order No. 7 (Shot HOOD), Headquarters, Exercise Desert Rock 

VII, Camp J)esert Rock, Nevada, 28 June 1957. 

8. Administrative Plan 1-57, 4th Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise 

Pirigade, Camp Pendleton, CA, 5 June 1957. 

9. Brigade Order 003121.2, subject, "Conduct of CPX ·Phase, Exercise Desert 

Rock VII - Marine Corps," Headquarters, 4th Marine Corps Provisional 

Atomic Exercise Brigade, Camp Pendleton, California, 27 May 1957. 

10. "Schedule of Events," presumably from Operations Plan, 4th Marine Corps 

Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, Camp Pendleton, CA, 1957 

11. "Plumbbob On-Site Rad-Safety Report," OTO-57-2, Nevada Test Site, 

Mercury, Nevada, 'R.eynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., 

undated. 

12. "On Site Rad-Safe Support, Shot WILSON," unpublished file, Reynolds 

Electrical & Engineering Company, lnc.~_Las Vegas, NV. 

13. "On Site Rad-Safe Support, Shot PRISCILLA," unpublished file, Reynolds 

Electrical & Engineering C.ompany, Inc., Las Vegas, NV. 

14. "On Site Rad-Safe Support, Shot HOOD," unpublished file, Reynolds 

Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., Las Vegas, NV. 

15. "Distribution Characteristics and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation 

Plumbbob," Projects 37.1, 37.2, 37.2A, 37.3, and 37.6, Nevada Test Site, 

WT-1488, Civil Effects Test Group, July 1966. 

67 
16. "Biggest Shot," Leatherneck, September 1957. 

17. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, United States Department of Defense and 

United States Department of Energy, Washington, n.c., 1977. 

18. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force WARRIOR, Shot Smoky, 

Exercise Desert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plurnbbob,11 DNA 4747F, l)efense 

Nuclear Agency, 31 May 1979. 

19. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Task Force BIG BANG, Shot Galileo, 

Exercise nesert Rock VII-VIII, Operation Plumbbob," ONA 4772F, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, 9 April 1980. 

20. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Desert Rock 

VI, Operation Teapot," DNA 5354F, Defense Nuclear Agency, 15 July 1980. 

21. "Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Troop Observers, Exercise Oesert Rock 

V, Operation Upshot-Knothole," ONA 5742F, Defense Nuclear Agency, 28 

April 1981. 

22. "Fallout Inventory and Inhalation nose to Organs (FIIDOS), 11 Science 

Applications, Inc., 1981. 

23. "Version 4 of A TR (Air Transport of Radiation)," DNA 399 5, Defense 

Nuclear Agency, January 1976. 

24. "Energy Dependent Air /Ground Correction Factors for the ATR Code," 

BRL Report No. 345, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, August 

1977. 

25. "Radiation Environments from Tactical Nuclear Weapons," DNA 4267F, 

Defense Nuclear Agency, July 1976. 

26. "Protection Against Neutron Radiation," I\JCRP Report No. 38, January 

1971. 

27. "The DOT III Two-Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Transport Code," 

ORNL-T\-1-4290, Oak Ridge l\lational Laboratory, September 1973. 

28. "The MORSE Monte Carlo Radiation Transport Code System," ORNL 4972, 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February 1975. 

29. "Neutron Flux from Selected Nuclear nevices," Operation Plumbbob 

Project 2.3, U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories (unpublished). 

30. "Initial Gamma nose From Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1948-1962," NDL-T~-

53, U.S. Army I\Juclear l)efense Laboratory (unpublished). 

31. "Radiation Dosimetry for '1-fuman Exposures," Operation PJumbbob Pr:oject 

39.5, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, September 19 58. 

68 
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ATTN: Library 

Florida University Libraries 

ATTN: Documents Dept, D-1O3 

£eorge Wash, Sch of Med & Hlth Sciences 

ATTfl: HIMMELFAOAB Hlth Sci Lib 

Georgetown University 

ATTN. Li bra ry 

Medical College of Georgia 

ATTN: Library 

Medical College of Georgia ATTN: L. Stoddard 

Gerontology Research Center 

ATTN· N. Shock 

Hahnemann Med College &Hosp 

ATTN. Library 

Harvard Medical School 

ATTN: Library 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN· Library ATTN: R. Reed 

Harvard School of Public Health 

ATTN: B. MacMahon 

University of Hawaii 

ATTN: Y. Matsumoto 

University of Hawaii 

ATTN: Library 

Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital 

ATTN. J. Yamazaki 

City of Hope, Medical Center 

ATTN: R. Yonemoto 

University Hospital 

ATTN. P. Leinfelder 

University of Illinois 

ATTN· Library 

Johns Hopkins University ATTN: R. Seltser 

ATTN· A. Lilienfield 

ATTN· A. Kimball 

72 
OTHER (Continued) 

Indiana University 

ATTN: Library 

Indiana University 

ATTN· F. Putnam 

Iowa State University 

ATTN: T. Bancroft 

University of Iowa 

ATTN: Library 

Jefferson Med Coll, Thom Jeff Univ 

ATTN: Library 

Johns Hopkins Hospital 

ATTN· R. Heyssel 

Johns Hopkins University 

ATTN: Library 

Univ of Kansas, Coll of Health Sci &Hosp 

ATTtl: Library 

Kansas Univ of Agri &Applied Science 

ATTN: H. Fryer 

University of Kentucky Medical Center 

ATTN: J. Hollingsworth 

University of Kentucky 

ATTN: Library 

Kingston Hospital 

ATTN: K. Johnson 

Loma Linda University 

ATTN: Library 

Louisiana Univ Sch of Med, New Orleans 

ATTN· Library 

University of Louisville 

ATTN: Library 

Loyola Univ of Chicago 

ATTN: Library 

University of Maryland 

AlTN: Library 

University of Massachusetts 

ATTN· Library 

Mayo Medical School 

ATTN: Library 

Meharry Medical College ATTN: Library 

Memorial Hosp for Cancer &Allied Diseases 

ATTN: P. Lieberman 

Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center 

ATTN· J. Laughlin 

ATTN· P. Marks 

OTHER (Continued) 

Merck, Sharp &Dohme Intl 

ATTN: A. Bearn 

Univ of Miami 

ATTN: Library 

Univ Of Miami 

ATTN: P. Hodes 

University of Michigan Medical School 

ATTN: J. Neel 

Michigan State Univ 

ATTN· Library 

University of Michigan 

ATTN: Library 

University of Michigan 

ATTN· R. Cornell 

University of Michigan 

ATTN: F. Moore 

University of Minnesota 

ATTN: Library 

University of Minnesota 

ATTN: Library 

University of Minnestoa 

ATTN: J. Bearman 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN· L. Schuman 

University of Mississippi 

ATTN: Library 

University of Missouri 

ATTN: Library 

University of Missouri 

ATTN: Library 

Mount Sinai School of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

Natl Council on Radiation Prot &Meas 

ATTN: W. Sinclair 

University of Nevada, Reno 

ATTN: Library 

New Jersey College of Med &Dentistry 

ATTN· Library 

New Jersey, College of Med &Dentistry 

ATTN· Library 

University of New Mexico 

ATTN· C. Key 

ATTN: R. Anderson 

University of New Mexico 

ATTN: Library 

73 
OTHER (Continued) 

New York at Buffalo Sch of Med 

ATTN· Library 

N~w York at Stony Brook, HSC St Univ 

ATTN: Library 

New York Medical College 

ATTN: Library 

New York Univ Medical Center 

ATTN: N. Nelson 

New York University 

ATTN: B. Pasternack 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: A. Upton 

State Univ of New York 

ATTN· Library 

Newton-Wellesley Hospital 

ATTN: R Sampson 

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 

ATTN: Library 

University of North Carol ma ATTN: Library for Dean 

ATTN: B. Greenberg 

University of North Dakota 

ATTN Library 

Northwestern Medical School 

ATTN· library 

Northwestern University 

ATTN H. Cember 

Oak Ridge Associated Univ 

ATTN: M. Garber 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

Medical & Health Sciences Div 

ATTN: D. Lushbaugh 

ATTN: J Totter 

ATTN· E Tompkins 

Oak Ridge Operations Office 

ATTrl: Library 

Ohio Medical College at Toledo 

ATTN: Library 

University of Oklahoma 

ATTN: Library 

University of Oklahoma 

ATTN· P. Anderson 

Oregon HSC, Med University 

ATTN: Library 

Oregon State University 

ATTN: Library 

OTHER (Continued) 

University of Oregon ATTN: B. Pirofsky 

Pacific Northwest Laboratory 

ATTN: S. Marks 

Pan American Health Organization 

ATTN: Library 

Pennsylvania Medical College 

ATTN· Library 

Pennsylvania State University 

ATTN: Library 

Pennsylvania Univ Hospital 

ATTN: S. Baum 

University of Pennsylvania 

ATTN • P . Nowe 11 

University of Pennsylvania 

ATTN: Library 

University of Pittsburgh 

ATTN: E. Radford 

ATTN: Library 

University of Pittsburgh 

ATTN: Library 

University of Pittsburgh 

ATTN· N. Wald 

Purdue University 

ATTN: V. Anderson 

University of Rochester 

ATTN: C. Odoroff 

ATTN. G. Casarett 

University of Rochester 

ATrn • Library 

University of Rochester 

ATTN: L. Hempelmann 

Rush Medical College of Rush Univ 

ATTN· Library 

Saint Francis Hospital ATTN R. Blaisdell 

Saint Louis University 

ATTN: Library 

University of South Alabama 

ATTN: Library 

Medical Univ of South Carolina 

ATTN· P. L1u 

South Carolina Medical Univ 

ATTN: Library 

74 
OTHER (Continued) 

University of South Dakota 

ATTN: Library 

University of South Florida 

ATTN: Library 

University of Southern California 

ATTN. Library 

University of Southern California 

ATTN: J. Birren 

Southern Illinois University 

ATTN· Library 

Stanford Univ Medical Center 

ATTN: J. Brown 

Stanford University ATTN: Dept of Prev Med, B. Brown 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: Div of Gastro Enterology, P. Gregory 

Stanford University 

ATTN: L. Moses 

Stanford University Hospital ATTN: D. Dorfman 

Temple University 

ATTN· Library 

University of Tennessee 

ATTN: Library 

Texas A&M University ATTN· R. Stone 

Univ of Texas at Austin 

ATTN: H. Sutton 

Texas Tech University 

ATTN: library 

University of Texas 

ATTN: Library 

University of Texas 

ATTN· library 

University of Texas 

ATTN: Library 

University of Texas 

ATTN: Library 

University of Texas 

ATTN: R. Stallones 

University of Texas 

ATTN: W. Sutow 

University of Texas 

ATTN: G. Taylor 

Yale University Sch of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

ATTN: J. Meigs 

OTHER (Continued) 

Tufts Univ Sch of Medicine 

ATTN: Library 

Tulane University 

ATTN: Library 

University of Utah 

ATTN: Library 

University of Utah 

ATTtl: Library 

Vanderbi It University 

ATTN: Library 

Vanderbilt University 

ATTN: R. Quinn 

University of Vermont 

ATTN: Library 

Medical College of Virginia 

ATTN: Library 

University of Virginia 

ATTN: Library 

Washington University 

ATTN: Library 

University of Washington ATTN: Library 

Washington University 

IITTN: Library 

University of Washington 

ATTN: D. Thoripson 

University of Washington 

ATTN: A. Motulsky 

Wayne State University 

ATTN: Library 

West Virginia University 

ATTN: Library 

Univ of Wisconsin Medical School 

ATTN: Library 

Medical College of Wisconsin 

ATTN: Library 

University of Wisconsin 

ATTN· J. Cro~1 

Yale University 

ATTN: Library 

Yale University 

ATTN· R. Barliner 

ATTN: Library for Dean 

ATTN: Dept of Internal Med, G. Burrow 

75 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS 

Argonne National Laboratory 

ATTN: P. Failla 

ATTN: A. Brues 

ATTN: D. Grahn 

Associates Universities, Inc 

ATTN: V. Bond 

ATTN: M Bender 

ATTN: A. Brill 

University of California 

Lawrence Livermore National Lab 

ATTN: Technical Info Dept Library 

ATTN: L. Anspaugh 

ATTN: Y. NG 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

ATTN: J. Dummer 

ATTN: MS218, P. Whalen 

ATTN: M/S634, T. Dowler 

ATTN: Library 

2 cy ATTN· E. Young 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

Union Carbide Corp-Nuclear Div 

ATTN: F. Maienshun 

ATTN: J. Auxier 

ATTN: Central Rsch Library 

ATTN: C. Clifford 

ATrn: G. Kerr 

ATTN· X-1O Lab Records Div 

ATTN· C. Richmond 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

Health Physics Div 

ATTrl: T. Jones 

Reynolds Electrical and Engr Co, Inc 

ATTN: Doc Con Facility 

Sandia National Lab 

ATTN: Div 1314, S. Durpee 

ATTN: D. Aldridge 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

Advanced Research &Applications Corp 

ATTN R. Armistead 

BDM CorpATTN J. Braddock 

Colorado State University 

ATTN· M. Zelle 

Energy Systems, Inc 

ATrn w. Ogle 

Harvard University 

ATTN: W. Cochran 

University of Hawaii 

ATTN: Library 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J Ozeroff 

Shields Warren Radiation Lab 

ATTN: H. Kohn 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Cont rnued) 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: J Sperling 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: E. Weary 

Kaman Tempo 

3 cy ATTN: E Martin 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: w. Al fonte 

Louisiana Univ Sch of Med 

ATTN: Library 

National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: National Materials Advisory Board 

ATTN: S. Jablon 

7 cy ATTN: C. Robinette 

University of Nebraska 

ATTN: Library 

Ohio State University 

ATTN: Library 

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp 

ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAG[ 

R&D Associates 

ATTN J. Marcum 

ATTN· P. Haas 

Radiation Research Associates, Inc 

ATTN: N. Schaeffer 

Rand Corp 

ATTN: Library 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN· E. Straker 

ATTN: W. Scott 

A.TTN: G. Reynolds 

ATTN: W. Woolson 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: W. McRaney 

ATTN: J. Cockayne 

ATTN: J. Goetz 

4 cy ATTN J. Klemm 

4 cy ATTN: G. Frank 

4 cy ATTN: C. Thomas 

4 cy ATTN· R. Weitz 

5 cy ATTN J. McGahan 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN· D. Kaul 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN· J Novotney 

Scientific Information Svcs, Inc 

ATTN: Library 

Tech Reps, Inc 

ATTN: B. Coll ins 

76 
FOREIGN AGENCIES 

Canadian Embassy 

ATTN: Library 

EDF-RETN 1 

French Engr Bureau 

ATTN: Library 

Indian Council of Medical Rsch 

ATTN: A. Taskar 

Japan-Hawaii Cancer Study 

ATTN: G. Glober 

French Engineering Bureau 

ATTN: M. Delpla 

FOREIGN AGENCIES (Continued) 

McGill University 

ATTN: R. Oseasohn 

Presidente Umberto Colombo 

Comitato Nazionale 

Per L, Energia Nucleare 

ATTN: Library 

University of Puerto Rico Sch of Medicine 

Medical Sciences Campus 

ATTN: Library 

United Kingdom Scientific Mission 

ATTN: Publications, for MRC, SO 128 

77 
78