If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

SPINE SPECIALISTS OF MICHIGAN, PC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

November 17, 2022

v No. 358296

Macomb Circuit Court

MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY,

LC No. 2020-003355-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and BOONSTRA and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC, appeals as of right the trial court’s order 

granting in part and denying in part defendant, MemberSelect Insurance Company, summary 

disposition of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). We affirm. 

I. FACTS

This case is a provider suit brought under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. 

The facts of this case essentially are undisputed. On January 21, 2017, Jeremy Woods was injured 

in an automobile accident. Woods was the insured of defendant under a policy of no-fault 

insurance at the time of the accident. Plaintiff provided medical care to Woods, and Woods 

assigned to plaintiff his right to payment from defendant. Pursuant to the assignments, plaintiff 

sought payment from defendant for the medical care it provided to Woods. Defendant refused to 

pay plaintiff, and plaintiff initiated this action on September 21, 2020, seeking payment under the 

assignments.

Defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 

2.116(C)(7) and (10) on the basis that all or most of the amounts sought by plaintiff were barred 

by the one-year back rule, MCL 500.3145, and/or by a release signed by Woods in connection 

with the settlement of litigation between Woods and defendant. The trial court granted in part and 

denied in part defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Specifically, the trial court granted 

defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims for benefits for services provided to Woods 

before June 11, 2019, the effective date of the amendment to MCL 500.3145, and denied 
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defendant’s motion for summary disposition for plaintiff’s claims for services from June 11, 2019 

through August 12, 2020. The parties resolved the claims arising from June 11, 2019 through 

August 12, 2020, and stipulated to dismissal of those claims. Plaintiff filed this appeal, challenging 

the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims for medical 

care it provided Woods from February 2, 2019 to June 11, 2019. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting in part defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10) on the basis that 

the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 barred plaintiff’s claims. We disagree. 

We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary 

disposition. Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287, 296; 954 NW2d 115 (2020). We also review 

de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich App 

487, 495; 948 NW2d 452 (2019). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) 

should be granted when the claim is barred by a statute of limitations,1or other basis stated in that 

court rule. MCR 2.116(C)(7). When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept 

the allegations of the complaint as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the 

moving party, and consider any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence 

submitted. Estate of Miller v Angels’ Place, Inc, 334 Mich App 325, 330; 964 NW2d 839 (2020). 

When there is no factual dispute, whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred under a basis set forth in 

MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law. Id. 

 A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency 

of a claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). 

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. When 

reviewing a motion for summary disposition granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the 

documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

id., and will find that a genuine issue of material fact exists if “the record leave[s] open an issue 

upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 

NW2d 785 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

MCL 500.3145, known as the one-year-back rule, “is designed to limit the amount of 

benefits recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before 

an action is brought.” Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 203; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). 

Before its amendment, effective June 11, 2019, MCL 500.3145(1), provided, in relevant part:

An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this 

chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after 

the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided 

herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the 

 

1 We observe that the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations, but is instead a limitation 

on damages. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 208; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). 
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insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits 

for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action 

may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable 

expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant 

may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before 

the date on which the action was commenced. . . .

MCL 500.3145 was amended by 2019 PA 21, effective June 11, 2019, and now provides, 

in relevant part:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), if the notice has been given or a payment has been 

made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent 

allowable expense, work loss, or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the 

claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 

year before the date on which the action was commenced. 

(3) A period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the commencement 

of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim 

for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim. This 

subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the 

claim with reasonable diligence. [MCL 500.3145(2), (3).] 

In this case, the claims in question relate to medical care plaintiff provided to Woods in 

April and May 2019. Plaintiff filed its complaint on September 21, 2020, seeking payment for 

those services. Because the claims are for “loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which 

the action was commenced,” under the pre-amendment version of the statute the claim is barred as 

untimely. The amended version of MCL 500.3145 also contains a one-year-back provision, stating 

that “the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year 

before the date on which the action was commenced.” MCL 500.3145(2). However, the amended 

version of the statute includes a tolling provision, stating that the one-year-back rule “is tolled 

from the date of a specific claim for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally 

denies the claim.” MCL 500.3145(3). 

The trial court in this case determined that the pre-amendment version of the statute applied 

because the amended statute does not provide for retroactive application. “Statutes and 

amendments to statutes are presumed to operate prospectively.” Andary v USAA Casualty Ins Co, 

___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 356487); slip op at 2. This 

presumption is overcome only when the Legislature clearly manifests an intent for retroactive 

application. Buhl v City of Oak Park, 507 Mich 236, 244; 968 NW2d 348 (2021). In this Court’s 

recent decision in Andary, although not addressing MCL 500.3145 specifically, this Court held 

that the legislative amendments to the no-fault act in 2019 PA 21 and 2019 PA 22 do not apply 

retroactively because “the Legislature did not clearly demonstrate an intent for the amendments to 

apply retroactively to persons injured in pre-amendment accidents.” See Andary, ___ Mich App 

at ___; slip op at 1. This Court observed that “[i]ndeed, 2019 PA 21 provided an effective date of 

June 11, 2019, and it contains no language referring to retroactive application.” Id. at ___; slip op 

at 2. In the absence of any Legislative statement of retroactive application, and in light of the 

presumption against retroactive application of a statutory amendment, the trial court in this case 
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correctly determined that the amendment to MCL 500.3145 does not apply retroactively. See 

Brewer v A D Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich 50, 56; 782 NW2d 475 (2010) (“[P]roviding a 

specific, future effective date and omitting any reference to retroactivity supports a conclusion that 

a statute should be applied prospectively only” (quotation marks and citation omitted). ) 

Plaintiff argues, however, that the amended statute applies because, at the time the 

amended statute became effective on June 11, 2019, the April-May 2019 claims were still viable 

claims not yet denied by defendant. Plaintiff argues that because the pre-amendment version of 

the statute does not have a tolling provision, applying the amended version of the statute preserves 

plaintiff’s claims while applying the pre-amendment statute takes away claims that were viable on 

June 11, 2019. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the relevant inquiry is not which version of the 

statute preserves plaintiff’s claims. Generally, whether a statute applies depends upon the date on 

which the cause of action arose. Hill v Gen Motors Acceptance Corp, 207 Mich App 504, 513-

514; 525 NW2d 905 (1994). “The substantive rights and liabilities of the parties are determinable 

according to the law as it stood when the causes alleged by the plaintiff accrued.” Jones v Williams, 

172 Mich App 167, 171; 431 NW2d 419 (1988). 

Under the no-fault act, “[p]ersonal protection insurance benefits payable for accidental 

bodily injury accrue not when the injury occurs but as the allowable expense, work loss or 

survivors’ loss is incurred.” MCL 500.3110(4). Our Supreme Court has determined that “incur” 

means “[t]o become liable or subject to, [especially] because of one’s own actions.” Proudfoot v 

State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476, 484; 673 NW2d 739 (2003) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted; alterations in the original). This Court has concluded when applying MCL 500.3110(4) 

that “an expense is incurred or a patient becomes liable when an agreement to pay is executed and 

treatment is received.” Bronson Health Care Group, Inc v USAA Casualty Ins Co, 335 Mich App 

25, 35-36; 966 NW2d 393 (2020) (emphasis omitted); in accord, Clark v Al-Amin, 309 Mich App 

387, 397; 872 NW2d 730 (2015). In this case, Woods’ PIP benefits accrued when each allowable 

expense was incurred; each expense was incurred when Woods received treatment. See Bronson 

Health Care Group, Inc, 335 Mich at 35-36. The April-May 2019 claims therefore accrued when 

they were incurred in April-May 2019, when Woods received medical treatment from plaintiff. 

Plaintiff argues, however, that the “wrong” on which its claims are based is defendant’s 

failure to pay the claims, and that the claims therefore accrued when defendant denied the claims, 

which plaintiff contends was August 13, 2020, after the June 11, 2019 effective date of the 

statutory amendment. Plaintiff relies upon the general accrual statute, MCL 600.5827, which 

provides that generally, a claim accrues “at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was 

done.” In this case, however, plaintiff has filed “an action for recovery of personal protection 

insurance benefits . . . for an accidental bodily injury. . . .” MCL 500.3145(1). Plaintiff, as the 

assignee of Woods, is seeking to assert against defendant Woods’ right to payment of PIP benefits 

under the insurance policy issued to Woods by defendant. 

Contractual terms of a policy of no-fault insurance are governed by the no-fault act. 

Meemic Ins Co, 506 Mich at 302. Specifically, PIP benefits “are mandated by the statute under 

the no-fault act, . . . and, therefore, the statute is the ‘rule book’ for deciding the issues involved in 

questions regarding awarding those benefits.” Id. at 298, quoting Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security 

Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 524-525; 502 NW2d 310 (1993). Because the no-fault act provides for a 

specific accrual statute within the act applicable to the determination of the accrual of PIP benefits, 
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MCL 500.3110(4), that statute is the relevant accrual statute when, as here, plaintiff is seeking 

payment of PIP benefits under the no-fault act. PIP benefits accrue when they are incurred, MCL 

500.3110(4), and are incurred when the insured receives medical treatment and becomes obligated 

to pay. See Bronson Health Care Group, Inc, 335 Mich App at 35-36. 

In this case, the loss was incurred when Woods received medical treatment from plaintiff 

in April-May 2019, and the claims for those services accrued at that time. The law in effect at the 

time the claims accrued was the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3145; the amended version 

of the statute did not take effect until June 11, 2019, and does not apply retroactively. See Andary, 

___ Mich App at ___; slip op at ___. The trial court therefore did not err by applying the preamendment version of MCL 500.3145 to plaintiff’s April-May 2019 claims and granting defendant 

summary disposition of those claims. 

We decline to reach defendant’s argument that it also was entitled to summary disposition 

on the alternative basis that Woods released defendant after defendant paid Woods for the amounts 

in question because plaintiff failed under MCL 500.3112 to notify defendant in writing of the 

assignment. Although defendant argued this basis in its motion for summary disposition before 

the trial court, the trial court did not grant summary disposition on this basis, but instead on the 

basis that the claims were precluded by the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3145. On appeal, 

plaintiff challenges only whether the trial court properly applied the pre-amendment version of 

MCL 500.3145. Defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s claim is barred by Woods’ release 

therefore is not properly before this Court because defendant did not file a cross-appeal raising this 

issue. See Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 140; 602 NW2d 390 (1999). 

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Michael F. Gadola