COURT OF APPEALS OF Virginia 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Coleman 

JEAN A. GANTT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1973-02-3 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 4, 2003 

BARRY GANTT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 

 (Jeffrey A. Ward; Paul A. Dryer; Franklin, 

Denney, Ward & Lawson, PLC, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Danita S. Alt, on brief), for appellee. 

 Jean Gantt (wife) appeals rulings made by the trial court in 

her divorce proceedings. On October 23, 2002, Barry Gantt 

(husband) filed a motion in this Court to dismiss wife's appeal 

for failure to file an appeal bond pursuant to Code § 8.01-676.1. 

On October 25, 2002, husband filed an amended motion to dismiss on 

the same ground. On November 7, 2002, wife moved for leave to 

file the appeal bond and requested that the Court deny husband's 

motion to dismiss. We grant wife's motion to file an appeal bond 

and deny husband's motion to dismiss wife's appeal. 

 On appeal, wife contends the trial court erred: (1) in 

considering post-separation adultery as a factor in establishing 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
spousal support; and (2) in imputing income to wife in calculating 

spousal support. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

See Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 On April 19, 2002, the trial court heard evidence relating to 

equitable distribution and spousal support. After hearing 

testimony from most of the witnesses, the trial court indicated it 

had another case scheduled and continued the matter. On May 30, 

2002, the trial court heard testimony from wife's father and 

additional testimony from wife, after which the parties presented 

closing arguments. 

 After reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court 

classified the parties' property and rendered an equitable 

distribution award. In addition, the trial court indicated its 

decision to award husband spousal support of $800 per month for a 

period of nine years, explaining that it "considered all of the 

evidence in light of the factors set out in [Code §] 20-107.1(E)," 

including the circumstances and "factors which contributed to the 

dissolution of the marriage." Code § 20-107.1(E). The trial 

court noted that wife failed to submit any evidence supporting 

her assertion that she was unable to work full-time. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court directed husband's 

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attorney to prepare an order reflecting its oral rulings. The 

parties voiced no objections at that time. 

 The trial court signed and filed the final order on July 1, 

2002. Husband's attorney signed it "Seen and agreed." In the 

space for wife's signature, the trial judge wrote "Waived 

[pursuant to] Rule 1:13" and initialed it. In the order, the 

trial court directed the clerk to "certify copies of this order 

to counsel of record." 

 On July 30, 2002, wife filed a "Notice of Respondent's 

Objections to Final Order." In it, wife claimed she provided 

husband's attorney with an order in which she objected to the 

trial court's consideration of fault in awarding spousal support 

and to its imputation of income to wife despite her inability to 

work. 

DISCUSSION 

 In her opening brief, wife refers to her July 30, 2002 

"Notice of Respondent's Objections to Final Order" as indicating 

where she preserved the issues for appeal. Although wife 

included in that "Notice" the two issues she now raises, she 

filed it twenty-nine days after entry of the July 1, 2002 final 

decree. 

 In his brief, husband argues, inter alia, that wife failed 

to timely preserve her issues for appeal. 

 Wife submitted a reply brief invoking the ends of justice 

exception to Rule 5A:18. In it, she contends she "overnighted 

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the [signed] order," which contained her objections, to 

husband's attorney on June 28, 2002, "in time to present the 

same to the court on July 1, 2002." She alleges that husband's 

attorney "instead presented the original order [husband's 

attorney] had prepared to the court for entry on July 1, 2002." 

ANALYSIS 

 "All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of 

terms of court, shall remain under the control of the trial 

court and subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for 

twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." Rule 

1:1. 

 Wife filed her objections twenty-nine days after entry of 

the final decree. Because the decree became final twenty-one 

days after the date of entry, the trial court no longer had 

jurisdiction over the case. See Rule 1:1. 

 Moreover, "Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to a trial 

court's action or ruling be made with specificity in order to 

preserve an issue for appeal." Collado v. Commonwealth, 33 

Va. App. 356, 367, 533 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000). The purpose of 

Rule 5A:18 is to ensure that the trial court and opposing party 

are given the opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and 

resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary 

appeals and reversals. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 12 Va. App. 1200, 

1204, 409 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1991); Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 

514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) (en banc). 

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 Wife made no objections to the trial court orally or in 

writing during the time within which the trial court had 

jurisdiction. 

 Although wife suggests opposing counsel submitted the wrong 

last page of the order, she never alleged fraud or explained why 

she never timely filed objections after the order was submitted 

and entered, and copies were sent to counsel. 

 Rule 1:13 allows the trial court to dispense with 

endorsements on orders "in its discretion." "Courts are 

presumed to act in accordance with the law and orders of the 

court are entitled to a presumption of regularity." Napert v. 

Napert, 261 Va. 45, 47, 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001) (citing Beck 

v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 442, 134 S.E. 677, 681 (1926)). 

 Appellant failed to timely submit any objections, and when 

she did so, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the 

case. Therefore, Rule 5A:18 precludes us from addressing her 

issues on appeal. Moreover, because appellant failed to 

indicate why she waited so long to submit her objections and 

because the decree is entitled to a presumption that the trial 

court properly exercised its discretion in dispensing with 

endorsement of the decree, the record does not reflect any 

reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to 

Rule 5A:18. 

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 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.

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