J-A12036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATRICK I. ONESKO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1234 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0005351-2017

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: MAY 27, 2022

Appellant, Patrick I. Onesko, appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that denied his petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 asserting ineffective assistance 

of his trial counsel with respect to a plea offer that Appellant rejected before 

trial. We affirm.

On December 7, 2017, Appellant was convicted by a jury of criminal 

solicitation to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), unlawful 

contact with a minor, and two counts of corruption of minors.2 These 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 902(a) and 3123(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6301(a)(1)(i), respectively.
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convictions were based on communications by Appellant with a 14-year-old 

boy and a 15-year-old boy through the social media platform Snapchat. 

Commonwealth v. Onesko, No. 494 WDA 2018, unpublished memorandum 

at 1-2 (Pa. Super. filed July 3, 2019). When he first communicated with these 

teenagers, Appellant, who was a 27-year-old former assistant football coach 

at their school, represented that he was a high school student. Id. at 2. Later 

in these communications, after he admitted his age and identity, Appellant 

asked the 14-year-old to describe his genitals and propositioned the 15-yearold to engage in oral sex. Id.

Prior to Appellant’s trial, the Commonwealth had made a plea offer 

under which Appellant could plead guilty to two counts of corruption of minors 

graded as first-degree misdemeanors and two counts of third-degree 

misdemeanor harassment with a recommended sentence of probation and no

reporting under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).3 

N.T. Trial at 4. On December 5, 2017, before the start of the trial, the 

prosecutor set forth the terms of this plea offer on the record and Appellant’s 

trial counsel colloquied Appellant at length concerning the plea offer. Id. at 

4-14. In this colloquy, both the prosecutor and Appellant’s trial counsel 

explained that the offenses with which Appellant was charged were felonies 

with standard range minimum prison sentences under the sentencing 

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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
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guidelines of 3 to 4

1/2 years, 4 to 51/2 years, and 3 months to 1 year and that 

SORNA reporting would be required if Appellant was convicted of any of those 

charges. Id. at 5-10. Appellant confirmed that he understood these possible 

penalties and that he was aware of the Snapchat evidence against him, and 

stated he rejected the plea offer and wished to go to trial. Id. at 9-14. 

In this colloquy, Appellant specifically testified under oath that trial 

counsel had discussed this plea offer with him, that he understood it, and that 

he chose to reject the plea offer: 

ATTORNEY MISKO [TRIAL COUNSEL]: All right. And at some point 

in time, actually it was last week, I had sent I believe it was a text 

and maybe later spoke to you in person, I believe it was last 

Friday, about the offer that was made by the District Attorney’s 

Office?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s correct.

* * *

ATTORNEY MISKO: ... The District Attorney’s Office, as of Friday, 

December 1st, made an offer that in essence they would withdraw 

Count 1, which is criminal solicitation, withdraw Count 2, which is 

unlawful contact with a minor, and amend Count 3 from a Felony 

3 corruption of minors and the section would have been

6301(a)(1)(ii) to a Misdemeanor 1 corruption and the offense 

would be 6301(a)(1)(i); do you remember that conversation?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, yes.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And the recommended sentencing from the 

District Attorney’s Office would be a period of probation to be set 

by the Court?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And you also understand, as I explained to 

you, that at Count 3 and 4 the Misdemeanor 1 corruption that was 
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proposed by the District Attorney’s Office were not SORNA 

registration required?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, yes.

ATTORNEY MISKO: In essence, you would not be considered a sex 

offender if you pled guilty to those two counts; do you understand 

that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

ATTORNEY MISKO: In addition, the District Attorney’s Office, I’m 

assuming, would amend the complaint and add Counts 5 and 6 

and you would plead guilty to two counts of harassment.

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And those counts would be misdemeanors of 

the third degree for each of the victims in this case; do you 

understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do, yes.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And, again, the District Attorney’s Office would 

be—the sentence recommendation would be a period of probation 

to be set by the Court.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And I believe also the only other addition that 

the District Attorney’s Office had recommended is no contact with 

the victims in this case as well as some SOC Court or sex offense 

oversee [sic] by the Court.

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

ATTORNEY MISKO: ... Have you reviewed the offers that have been 

made by the District Attorney’s Office?

THE DEFENDANT: I have, yes.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And you had made a decision to reject those 

offers and proceed to trial; is that right?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s correct.

ATTORNEY MISKO: And knowing what the prison—the 

incarceration implications are as the criminal information is now 

and the SORNA registration requirements, it is still your desire to 

plead not guilty and proceed to trial?

THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Onesko, do you have any questions 

regarding anything that has been placed on the record this 

morning with respect to the original charges outlined in the 

criminal information and/or the offer that the Commonwealth has 

made to you?

THE DEFENDANT: I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you wish to take some time now to discuss 

anything with your attorney regarding anything that has been 

placed on the record?

THE DEFENDANT: I do not, Your Honor.

 

N.T. Trial at 11-14.

On March 1, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant on the solicitation 

to commit IDSI and unlawful contact convictions to concurrent terms of 

incarceration of 11 months and 29 days to 1 year, 11 months, and 28 days, 

with the balance of the sentences after time served to be on house arrest, and 

5 years’ probation for each of these convictions, with the probation to run 

concurrently with the sentences of incarceration and house arrest. N.T. 

Sentencing, 3/1/18, at 37-38; Sentencing Order, 3/1/18.4 Appellant timely 

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4 The trial court imposed no further penalty for the corruption of minors 

convictions. N.T. Sentencing, 3/1/18, at 38; Sentencing Order, 3/1/18, at 2.
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appealed and this Court on July 3, 2019 affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

On January 2, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s 

petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Onesko, 222 A.3d 1124

(Pa. 2020).

In May 2018, while the appeals from his March 2018 judgment of 

sentence were pending, Appellant was arrested for violating the conditions of 

his probation by contacting a 16-year-old in West Virginia on a teen dating 

internet app and engaging in oral sex with the 16-year-old. Commonwealth 

v. Onesko, No. 1191 WDA 2020, unpublished memorandum at 3-4 (Pa. 

Super. filed August 19, 2021). After conducting hearings on these violations, 

the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of 3 to 6 years’ incarceration, followed by 4 years’ probation. 

Id. Appellant discontinued an appeal from his revocation of probation

sentence and, on April 1, 2020, filed a PCRA petition alleging that his probation 

revocation counsel was ineffective. Id. at 5. The trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on that PCRA petition and denied the petition on October 

27, 2020. Id. at 5-7. On August 19, 2021, this Court affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of Appellant’s probation revocation PCRA petition and the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal from that 

affirmance on December 22, 2021. Commonwealth v. Onesko, 269 A.3d 

1231 (Pa. 2021).
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On December 31, 2020, while his appeals from the denial of his 

probation revocation PCRA petition were pending, Appellant filed the instant 

PCRA petition asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

competently advise him with respect the Commonwealth’s plea offer. On 

August 20, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this PCRA 

petition at which Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel, and Appellant’s mother

testified.

Appellant testified that trial counsel never discussed a plea bargain with 

him and that trial counsel communicated plea offers only to his mother. N.T. 

PCRA, 8/20/21, at 9-10, 24-25, 30, 33-36, 43-44, 48. Appellant testified that 

he did discuss the case with trial counsel and that trial counsel told him that 

the Commonwealth’s case against him was “a crap case,” that it was 

overcharged, that the district attorney was “grasping at straws,” and that 

Allegheny County judges are “traditionally soft on punishment.” Id. at 9-11, 

31, 38-39. He admitted, however, that he knew that the Commonwealth’s 

evidence against him included Snapchat messages that he sent to the two 

boys lying about his identity, indicating that he would have oral sex with one 

of the boys and asking the other boy about the size of his penis. Id. at 11-

12. Appellant testified that before trial he never saw or was told about an 

email that trial counsel sent his mother on December 2, 2017, the Saturday 

before trial, advising of the misdemeanor and probation plea offer and 

describing this plea offer as a “[g]ood deal, considering [Appellant] has 
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exposure to Felony 3 corruption [of minors] charges.” Id. at 12-13, 15-16, 

18-19. Appellant admitted that he was aware of the plea offer and rejected it 

before trial started, but claimed that trial counsel never told him that the plea 

offer was a good deal or advised him to accept the plea. Id. at 19-20, 22, 

50-52. He admitted that trial counsel never told him to reject the plea offer. 

Id. at 30.

Trial counsel testified that he had two conversations with Appellant 

concerning the offer of a plea to misdemeanor corruption of minors and 

harassment with a sentence of probation prior to the colloquy and start of 

trial, one on the Friday before trial and a second discussion for 20-30 minutes 

at the courthouse on the day of trial. N.T. PCRA, 8/20/21, at 58-68. Trial 

counsel testified that he felt the offer was an excellent plea offer, that he

advised Appellant to take it, but that Appellant turned it down twice. Id. at 

71-72, 80, 82-84, 86-88. Trial counsel testified that Appellant had previously 

made clear that he would not accept a plea to a felony and would plead only 

to an offense not requiring SORNA registration with no incarceration sentence. 

Id. at 72, 82, 86. Trial counsel testified that he advised Appellant to accept 

the plea offer because it satisfied these criteria, because of the trauma to his 

family if he was convicted, and because he would likely be jailed if he was 

convicted of the felony charges against him. Id. at 59, 71, 82-83. Trial 

counsel also testified that he told Appellant that the plea offer was an 

extremely reasonable offer and that if it were him, he would take the plea. 
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Id. at 83-84. Trial counsel testified that Appellant rejected the plea and that 

Appellant told him that he turned it down because he would never be able to 

coach high school or college sports if he pled guilty. Id. at 72, 83. 

Trial counsel testified that with respect to merits of the Commonwealth’s 

case, he told Appellant that the evidence against him was “challenging” and 

that it was difficult to predict what a jury would do. N.T. PCRA, 8/20/21, at 

71. He testified that earlier in his representation of Appellant, probably shortly 

after the preliminary hearing, he would have told Appellant and his mother 

that “when you go to trial you have a 50/50 chance of winning” and that “[y]ou 

never know what a jury is going to do” because he tells that to all of his clients. 

Id. at 79, 84-85. 

Appellant’s mother testified that when she spoke to trial counsel in late 

July 2017, trial counsel said that “the jury would laugh at this case” and that 

in October 2017, trial counsel told her that the Commonwealth’s case “was 

crap.” N.T. PCRA, 8/20/21, at 101, 110. Appellant’s mother testified that she 

was present at the meeting between trial counsel and Appellant the Friday 

before trial and that no plea offer was discussed at that meeting. Id. at 118-

19. She also testified that she was with Appellant the morning of the trial and 

that no meeting between trial counsel and Appellant occurred. Id. at 119-20. 

She testified that she received an email from trial counsel setting forth the 

Commonwealth’s plea offer two days before trial but did not tell Appellant 

about the plea offer. Id. at 124-25. Appellant’s mother denied that trial 
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counsel ever told Appellant that his chances of winning at trial were 50/50. 

Id. at 125. 

On September 21, 2021, the trial court issued an order denying this 

PCRA petition. Trial Court Order, 9/21/21. In its findings of fact

accompanying the order and the opinion that it issued following this appeal, 

the trial court found that trial counsel’s testimony was credible and that trial 

counsel thoroughly discussed the plea offer with Appellant, advised Appellant

that the plea offer was a good offer, and advised Appellant to take the plea 

offer. Trial Court Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 8-9; Trial Court Opinion, 

1/4/22, at 8-9. The trial court found that Appellant’s claim that trial counsel

did not discuss the plea offer with him was contradicted by Appellant’s sworn 

testimony in the colloquy before the start of trial and rejected this claim as 

not credible. Trial Court Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 4-8; Trial Court Opinion, 

1/4/22, at 4-8. The trial court also found Appellant’s and his mother’s 

testimony concerning trial counsel’s statements about the case not credible

and found that trial counsel did not make any representations that the case 

against Appellant was weak or that Allegheny County judges are lenient. Trial 

Court Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 9; Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/22, at 9.

Appellant argues in this appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting his 

claims that trial counsel told him that the case was weak and did not discuss 

the plea offer with him and that even if those claims were properly rejected, 

trial counsel’s statement concerning a 50/50 change of winning made his
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advice concerning the plea offer inadequate. None of these arguments has

any merit.

Our review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to determining

whether the record supports the trial court’s findings and whether the court’s

decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601,

617 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa. Super.

2020) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 831 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). We must view the court’s findings and the evidence of record 

in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and the court’s credibility 

determinations, if supported by the record, are binding on this Court. Mason, 

130 A.3d at 617; Johnson, 236 A.3d at 68; Commonwealth v. Widgins, 

29 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

To be entitled to relief under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the convicted defendant must prove: (1) that the 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction had 

no reasonable basis; and (3) that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

action or inaction. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Grayson, 

212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2019); Steckley, 128 A.3d at 831. The 

defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to obtain relief on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Johnson, 

236 A.3d at 68; Steckley, 128 A.3d at 831.
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A defendant is entitled to competent advice of counsel concerning plea 

offers. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); Grayson, 212 A.3d at

1054. The requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are 

satisfied where the defendant shows that his counsel failed to provide 

competent advice concerning a plea offer by the prosecution and that there is 

a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had 

been competently advised concerning the plea offer. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162-

70, 174 (ineffective assistance of counsel in rejection of plea offer shown

where parties conceded that counsel’s advice that defendant could not be 

convicted of the most serious offense was deficient); Steckley, 128 A.3d at 

832-36 (ineffective assistance of counsel shown where defendant who 

rejected plea offer was incorrectly advised concerning his sentence exposure 

if convicted).

Here, the trial court found that Appellant did not show any deficiency in 

trial counsel’s communications and advice to Appellant concerning the plea 

offer. Trial Court Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 8-9; Trial Court Opinion, 

1/4/22, at 8-9. Those findings are amply supported by the record. Trial 

counsel testified that he discussed the plea offer twice with Appellant, that he 

told Appellant that the evidence against him was “challenging,” and that he 

explained the benefits of the plea offer and advised him to take the plea offer. 

N.T. PCRA, 8/20/21, at 58-68, 71-72, 80, 82-84, 86-88. The trial court found 

trial counsel’s testimony credible. Trial Court Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 8-
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9; Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/22, at 8-9. In addition, the colloquy before the 

start of trial shows that Appellant was fully and correctly advised of the 

sentencing exposure he faced if convicted and confirms that trial counsel had 

discussed the plea offer with Appellant before trial. N.T. Trial at 5-14.

Appellant argues that he and his mother testified that trial counsel 

characterized the Commonwealth’s case as weak and unlikely to result in a 

harsh sentence and that trial counsel did not discuss the plea offer with 

Appellant. The trial court, however, rejected their testimony as not credible 

and specifically found that trial counsel did not make the statements that they 

alleged concerning the strength and likely outcome of the case. Trial Court 

Findings of Fact, 9/21/21, at 4, 8-9; Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/22, at 4, 8-9. 

These credibility findings are also amply supported by the record. As the trial 

court noted, Appellant’s and his mother’s testimony was contradicted by 

Appellant’s own testimony in the plea colloquy that trial counsel had discussed 

the plea offer with him. N.T. Trial at 11-13. In addition, their claims were 

disputed by trial counsel, who not only testified that he discussed the plea 

offer twice with Appellant and advised him to take the plea offer, but also

denied telling Appellant that the case was weak or that a prison sentence was 

unlikely. N.T. PCRA, 8/20/21, at 58-68, 71-72, 76-77, 80, 82-88. Because 

the trial court’s determination that Appellant and his mother were not credible 

is supported by the record, we are bound by that determination and their 

testimony cannot provide a basis for PCRA relief. Widgins, 29 A.3d at 820. 
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Appellant’s remaining argument likewise fails. Contrary to Appellant’s 

contention, trial counsel’s reference to a 50/50 chance at trial does not show 

any deficiency in his advice concerning the plea offer. Trial counsel did not 

testify that he told Appellant in discussing the plea offer that he was likely to 

be acquitted or that he gave Appellant an opinion as to what the outcome of 

a trial would be. Rather he testified that he probably made this statement 

early in the case and described this as a communication of uncertainty based 

on the unpredictability of juries that he makes to his clients in all cases. N.T. 

PCRA, 8/20/21, at 79, 84-85. Given the evidence, found credible by the trial 

court, that trial counsel properly advised Appellant concerning the sentences 

he faced if convicted and the advantages of accepting the plea offer and that 

trial counsel advised Appellant that the evidence against him was challenging, 

that the plea offer was a good offer and that he should take the plea offer, 

such a statement of the inherent uncertainty as to the outcome of a jury trial

does not show any deficiency in trial counsel’s advice. 

As the record supports the trial court’s determination that trial counsel 

competently advised Appellant concerning the Commonwealth’s plea offer,

Appellant’s sole PCRA claim lacks merit. Widgins, 29 A.3d at 820. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2022