J-A23040-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RAVINDER S. RANDHAWA 

Appellant

v.

MANDEEP KAUR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 533 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at 

No(s): S-937-15

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 4, 2022

Ravinder S. Randhawa (“Husband”) appeals from the March 30, 2021

order entering a decree in divorce from Mandeep Kaur (“Wife”) and dismissing 

the bulk of his exceptions to the equitable distribution scheme set forth in the 

master’s third report and recommendation. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts this case, as gleaned 

from the certified record, as follows:

Both parties are originally from the country of India. 

Both had been married previously. [Husband] was 

born December 10, 1976, has a tenth grade 

education, moved to the United States at some

unspecified time prior his marriage to [Wife], lives 

with his parents in Enola, Pennsylvania, works as a 

gas station clerk and claims to earn $7.25 per hour for 

forty hours a week. [Husband] has no retirement 

benefits through his employment, claims to be on 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Medicaid, and suffers from several medical conditions 

including high blood pressure, cholesterol and 

diabetes.

[Wife] was born September 19, 1983, obtained what 

was deemed a general degree from a college in India 

(which she described as education encompassing 

taking care of the home, stitching, cooking, 

physiology — “if you get someone sick,” and playing

a guitar), never worked outside of the home until she 

performed part-time work handing out food samples 

to store customers in 2017, suffers from back 

problems which she attributes to injuries received 

from physical abuse perpetrated by [Husband], is 

what she deems “homeless,” as she lives in housing

provided by WIC (Women In Crisis) in Schuylkill 

County, [Pennsylvania], and has primary custody of 

the parties’ male child, born July 13, 2007. 

([Husband] testified that the date of birth of the child 

was in 2010, while [Wife] testified at the 2018 hearing 

that the child was eleven years old. The child support 

order of October 5, 2017, pursuant to which 

[Husband] was directed to pay $45.60 in basic

support and $20.00 on arrearages per month, 

identifies the child’s birth date as July 13, 2007.) 

[Husband] had been delinquent in paying support.

According to [Wife], she came to the United States 

following her parents arranging a marriage with a man 

she had never met. The marriage was apparently 

short lived. Because her parents knew [Husband’s]

parents, it was deemed satisfactory for [Wife] to live 

with [Husband’s] parents. According to [Wife], 

“India” required that persons be married before 

having children and, as a result, she and [Husband]

married in a mass religious ceremony on December 

18, 2005 at a temple in Los Angeles, California known

as Sant Nirankari Mission. Per [Wife], the parties’

religion does not recognize a court ceremony. 

However, due to a visa problem [Wife] had, the

parties participated later in a government proceeding 

and obtained a certificate indicating they married on 

August 20, 2012.
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[Husband] and [Wife] originally lived in California with

[Husband’s] parents and then moved to a home that 

[Husband] had purchased. Because he failed to 

maintain the loan payments, after a couple of years 

the lender apparently foreclosed or otherwise

obtained possession of the property and the parties 

thereafter moved to Pennsylvania. Due to 

[Husband’s] poor credit resulting from the loan 

default, [Husband] insisted that [Wife’s] name be 

used for financial purposes, both for personal affairs 

and for his business. (Evidence established the 

existence of Bank of America business accounts with 

one titled “Mandeep Kaur — Sole Prop DBA CSR 

Transportation,” which supports this testimony.)

According to [Wife], she had no access to any financial 

accounts; she was not allowed to pay bills; [Husband]

directed that she sign blank checks to accommodate 

the transacting or business; and, she was not allowed 

to inquire about business affairs or he would become 

angry with her and beat her while saying she was a 

wife and had to trust him. [Wife] was generally aware 

that [Husband] had traveled to and engaged in 

purchasing real property and doing banking activities 

in India but she had little information about those 

matters. Additionally, [Wife] claimed that [Husband] 

monitored her activities; she was not allowed to talk 

with her parents unless while supervised and via 

speaker phone; she was not allowed to leave the 

home without his consent, she was not allowed to 

have any money in her possession; and, he kept

jewelry she had received as gifts in his truck.

[Wife] described [Husband] as not only a controlling 

individual but also violent, as he would occasionally 

hit her. Immediately prior to the parties’ final 

separation, [Husband] had threatened to kill [Wife]

and their child. During that incident a neighbor heard 

the commotion and called police, after which the 

police arrested [Husband] and advised [Wife] to seek 

a protection from abuse order. [Wife] did so and 

moved from the parties’ home with the child into WIC 

housing. When she left the parties’ home [Wife] took 
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only her and the child’s clothing, some important 

paperwork, and a vehicle.

[Husband] was an over-the-road truck driver, and 

owned and operated a trucking business during the 

marriage. At separation he owned or possessed a 

tractor, trailers, and van. 

[An accident following the parties’ separation resulted 

in the destruction of Husband’s trailer and loss of his 

commercial driver’s license.]

Trial court opinion, 3/30/21 at 2-5.

The parties separated on March 18, 2014 and Husband filed a divorce 

complaint on May 26, 2015, raising claims relating to the equitable distribution 

of the marital estate. Kent D. Watkins, Esq. (“Master Watkins”) was appointed 

to address the parties’ claims and a hearing was ultimately conducted on 

October 15, 2018. Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed a report and 

recommendation on March 8, 2019. On March 27, 2019, Husband filed 

exceptions to Master Watkins’ report and recommendation. Thereafter, on

May 23, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying Husband’s exceptions 

and remanding this matter with instructions for the parties to clarify and 

supplement the record with additional evidence. 

On July 23, 2019, a second hearing was conducted during which the 

parties were given the opportunity to present additional evidence on their 

assets and liabilities. Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed an amended

report and recommendation on December 6, 2019, detailing his equitable 
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distribution plan. Both parties filed exceptions to Master Watkins’ amended

report and recommendation.

Thereafter, the trial court reviewed the parties’ exceptions and the 

supplemental record and found that several significant issues affecting the 

proper analysis of the parties’ assets and liabilities remained outstanding. On 

May 1, 2020, the trial court again remanded this matter to Master Watkins for 

the submission of additional evidence. A hearing was subsequently held on

June 20, 2020. 

Following the hearing, Master Watkins filed a third report and 

recommendation on November 12, 2020. Specifically, Master Watkins made 

the following recommendations in his report: 

[T]hat [Husband] be awarded the following: 

[Husband’s] clothing ($10,000.00), Household goods 

and furnishings ($5,000.00), ICICI Prudential Life 

Insurance Policy ($11,217.00), Four mobile phones 

($500.00), Four dinner sets ($800.00), Two 

comforters ($275.00), IPad ($200.00), Share of 

pension ($3,700.00), and 1/3 Interest in 11-plus 

acres of land in India – ($200,000.00 – unknown 

increase in value), together with other foreign-held 

land assets. Additionally, the Master recommended 

that Plaintiff be responsible for the unpaid taxes to the 

IRS, hospital bill to Schuylkill Medical Center, credit 

card bill with Capital One, credit card loan, and NHS 

Human Services in Sunbury, Pennsylvania.

[T]hat [Wife] receive the following: 2012 Volkswagen 

Passat ($15,000.00), M&T Bank checking and saving 

accounts #298 ($2,231.30), Bank of Baroda checking 

account #0780 ($13,600.00), ICICI Bank Account

#5572 ($2,952.00), ICICI Bank Account #4838 

($7,000.00), [Wife’s] interest in [Husband’s] pension 

($3,000.00), ICIC Bank Account ($6,190.00), TAB 
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Bank Account ($1,755.00), Bank of America Account 

#5790 ($2,006.00), ICICI Bank Account #2966

($2,700.00), IGIC Bank Account #7600 ($182.00), 

Household goods and furnishings ($5,000.00), Dishes 

and cookware ($1,200.00), One laptop computer 

($300.00), One IPad ($200.00), One Play Station 

game console ($200.00), and [Wife’s] non-marital

jewelry value and its value to be assigned to her 

($25,000.00).

Trial court opinion, 3/30/21 at 15-16; see also Third Amended Master’s 

Report, 11/12/20, at 10-11.

Husband subsequently filed exceptions to this report on November 30, 

2020. On March 30, 2021, the trial court entered an opinion and order 

dismissing the bulk of Husband’s exceptions and adopting the equitable 

distribution scheme set forth in the third report and recommendation. A 

decree in divorce was entered that same day. 

On April 27, 2021, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. 

On April 29, 2021, the trial court directed Husband to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Husband filed his timely Rule 1925(b) statement on May 14, 2021. On June 

3, 2021, the trial court filed a comprehensive, eight-page Rule 1925(a) opinion

which adopted its prior opinion authored in support of the March 30, 2021 

order.

On appeal, Husband raises a litany of issues for our review:

1. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by finding that it was 

incredible that [Wife] would have access to 

[Husband’s] business account, since the 
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undisputed evidence clearly established that 

Wife withdrew significant funds from the bank 

account, as confirmed by her signature on 

various checks, the evidence established that 

[W]ife withdrew $7,600.00 from the TAB bank 

account on February 18, 2014, and $10,000.00 

on March 12, 2014, which were clearly marital 

funds, and by failing to credit the $10,000.00 

which [W]ife withdrew from the TAB account to 

her, and by finding that the $10,000.00 should 

be considered as having been used for payment 

of marital debts and expenses during the 

marriage, since there was absolutely no 

evidence of record which established that the 

funds were used for the payment of marital 

debts and expenses, and the only evidence was 

that these funds were withdrawn by [W]ife?

2. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by finding that the parties 

were married on December 18, 2005, since the 

credible, documentary evidence which existed 

regarding the date of marriage was 

documentary evidence submitted by [H]usband, 

which reflected that the parties were married on 

[A]ugust 21, 2012?

3. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by failing to take into 

consideration that Husband was only holding a 

minimum wage low paying job, and that he did 

not even graduate from high school, but that 

wife holds a bachelor’s degree in arts, 

philosophy, home economics, physiology and 

music, and that as a result she is more qualified 

to obtain suitable employment?

4. Did the Master and [the trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by not only awarding the 

bulk of the marital estate to [W]ife, but by also 

recommending that [H]usband be responsible 

for 100% of the marital debt, without imposing 

any responsibility on [W]ife, although they also 
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recommended that [H]usband receive a 

minuscule portion of the marital estate?

5. Did [t]he Master and [the trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion in formulating their 

equitable distribution scheme since when one 

considers all of the factors enunciated under the 

divorce code since, it is clear that it is [H]usband 

who should have been awarded the bulk of the 

marital estate, since, amongst other things, he 

is being forced to pay 100% of the marital debt?

6. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by concluding that 

Husband did not disclose all of the assets 

required of him by the court order dated [M]ay 

15, 2020, and that he did not disclose the value 

of lands held in India or the increase in value 

between the date of marriage and the date of 

separation, since Wife did nothing in order to 

obtain a valuation of this property, and all 

assets had been disclosed, and the Master and 

the [trial court] used the alleged non-disclosure 

as a reason to award to Wife an unconscionable 

share of the marital estate and the [trial court]

penalized Husband?

7. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion by ignoring one of the 

most significant factors enunciated under the 

divorce code, dealing with who acquired and

preserved the marital estate, and by totally 

ignoring the fact that it was Husband who 

acquired the marital estate, and they only made 

reference to the fact that Wife was the 

homemaker, which establishes clear error?

8. Did the Master and the [trial court] err and 

abuse their discretion in formulating their 

recommended equitable distribution award, and 

misapply the factors enunciated under the

divorce code warrant the distribution requested 

by [H]usband in his exceptions, in the amount 

of 80% of marital property[?]
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9. Did the [trial court] err and abuse it’s (sic) 

discretion by finding that Husband had engaged 

in marital misconduct [and] was controlling and 

physically abused [W]ife throughout the 

marriage, which is not relevant in determining 

how marital property should be equitably 

divided?

10. Did the [trial court] err and abuse its discretion 

by finding that there were two sets of jewelry, 

and by awarding one set to the Husband and the 

other set to Wife, where the Master did not even 

find that there were two sets of jewelry, and the 

record is totally devoid of any evidence that 

there were two sets?

11. Did the [trial court] err and abuse its discretion 

by finding that Husband had numerous Indian 

Bank Accounts, and by taking these accounts

into consideration, when there was no evidence 

of record dealing with these phantom Indian 

Bank Accounts[?]

Husband’s brief at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Preliminarily, we note that the issues presented in Husband’s 

“Statement of Questions Involved” do not align with those raised in the 

“Argument” section of his appellate brief. Although Husband raises 11 distinct 

issues above, the “Argument” section contains only 9 intertwined claims 

delineated by Roman numerals and presented in an entirely different 

sequence.

The record reflects that Husband has waived Issue 2 (Argument IV) 

challenging Master Watkins’ finding with regard to the date of the parties’ 

marriage by failing to file an exception thereto.
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It is well settled that in order to preserve issues for appeal relating to a 

master’s report and recommendation a party must file exceptions. Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a); Lawson v. Lawson, 940 A.2d 444, 450 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating, 

“a party who is dissatisfied with a master’s report [must] file exceptions to the 

report, or waive any such objections.” (citation omitted)), appeal denied, 

951 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2008). The failure to file a timely exception to a finding 

in a master’s report and recommendation, as is the case here, results in waiver 

of the claim. Sebastianelli v. Sebastianelli, 876 A.2d 431, 432 (Pa.Super. 

2005).

We now turn to Husband’s challenges to the equitable distribution 

scheme. Husband avers that the award of the bulk of the martial estate to 

Wife while Husband is held responsible for 100% of the parties’ martial debt 

was unsupported by the record (Issues 4 & 5; Argument V). Husband’s 

brief at 32-34. 

Specifically, Husband argues that Master Watkins and the trial court 

erred in finding that: his contention that Wife withdrew money from his 

business bank accounts and withheld rent money for her own personal use 

lacked credibility (Issue 1; Argument III); that Wife was entitled to the 

value of $25,000 worth of jewelry that was gifted to her by various family 

members during the marriage (Issue 10; Argument VII); and that 

numerous bank accounts in India could be attributed to Husband. (Issue 11; 

Argument VIII). Id. at 29-31, 36-39.
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Our standard of review of awards of equitable distribution is well settled: 

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an 

award of equitable distribution. Our standard of 

review when assessing the propriety of an order 

effectuating the equitable distribution of marital 

property is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to 

follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find 

an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find 

an abuse of discretion unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence in the certified record. In determining the 

propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts 

must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the 

objective of effectuating economic justice between the 

parties and achieving a just determination of their 

property rights.

Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted), 

appeal denied, 62 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2012). 

The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing assets. 

The divorce master and trial court must exercise discretion and rely on the 

estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submitted 

by both parties. Smith v. Smith, 653 A.2d 1259, 1265 (Pa.Super. 1995), 

appeal denied, 663 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1995).

In determining the value of marital property, the court 

is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence as to 

the true and correct value of the property. Where the 

evidence offered by one party is uncontradicted, the 

court may adopt this value even though the resulting 

valuation would have been different if more accurate 

and complete evidence had been presented. A trial 
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court does not abuse its discretion in adopting the only 

valuation submitted by the parties. Absent a specific 

guideline in the divorce code, the trial courts are given 

discretion to choose the date of valuation of marital 

property[,] which best provides for “economic justice” 

between parties.

Baker v. Baker, 861 A.2d 298, 302 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 741 (Pa. 2007).

Here, Husband’s claims hinge in large part on his disagreement with a 

number of Master Watkins’ findings. Specifically, Master Watkins found that 

the evidence established that although Husband had utilized Wife’s name for 

a number of his business accounts, he was in exclusive control of the parties’ 

financial affairs and his testimony to the contrary was not credible. Third 

Amended Master’s Report, 11/12/20, at 5. Master Watkins further found that 

Wife’s credibly testified that she had received approximately $25,000 worth 

of jewelry as gifts from various family members over the course of the 

marriage, and that the evidence established that the jewelry is her non-martial 

property. Id. Additionally, Master Watkins found that the evidence 

established that Husband had accumulated substantial savings from his 

trucking business, which he transferred to multiple bank and retirement 

accounts in India. Id. at 8-9.

In reaching these findings, the record reflects that Master Watkins relied 

on the plethora of exhibits submitted by the parties, as well as the testimony 

of each party at three separate hearings. The trial court found that Master 

Watkins’ findings and credibility determinations were supported by the record, 
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and elected not to believe Husband’s testimony with respect to these claims. 

See trial court opinion, 6/3/21 at 2-3, 7.

We similarly decline to upset the credibility determinations of the factfinder. We have consistently explained that “a master’s report and 

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest 

consideration[,]” as the master is in the best position to observe the testimony 

and demeanor of the parties. Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095. 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Husband’s aforementioned 

challenges to the equitable distribution scheme must fail.

Husband next argues that Master Watkins and trial court erred in failing 

to consider numerous factors under the Divorce Code in fashioning its 

equitable distribution award. Specifically, Husband contends that the fact that 

he held a minimum wage job and did not graduate from high school and that 

Wife had degree from a school in India (Issue 3; Argument VI); and that 

he was the party who had acquired and preserved the martial estate (Issue 

7; Argument II), were not properly considered. Husband’s brief at 27-29, 

35-36. 

Husband further contends that Master Watkins and the trial court erred 

in “adding new factors to its equitable distribution scheme” by improperly 

considering Wife’s allegations of Husband’s “martial misconduct” and abuse

during the marriage (Issue 9, Argument I); and the fact that Husband failed 

to disclose the value of his property in India by the court-ordered deadline
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(Issue 6; Argument I). Id. at 25-27. Husband maintains that Master

Watkins and the trial court used this “nondisclosure and the alleged marital 

misconduct [as] reasons to award Wife an unconscionable share of the martial 

estate.” Id. at 26.

Husband contends that had Master Watkins and the trial court properly 

applied the factors in the Divorce Code, he would have been entitled to 80% 

of the marital property as detailed in his exceptions. (Issue 8; Argument 

IX). Id. at 39-43. We disagree.

This court has repeatedly explained that, “[i]n determining the propriety 

of an equitable distribution award [], we must consider the distribution 

scheme as a whole.” Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 643 (Pa.Super. 

2005). “[W]hen a court divides the marital property, it must do so only after 

considering ‘all relevant factors,’ including eleven specific factors listed in the 

Divorce Code.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 199-200 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a), when fashioning 

equitable distribution awards, the trial court must 

consider: the length of the marriage; any prior 

marriages; age, health, skills, and employability of the 

parties; sources of income and needs of the parties; 

contributions of one party to the increased earning 

power of the other party; opportunity of each party 

for future acquisitions of assets or income; 

contribution or dissipation of each party to the 

acquisition, depreciation or appreciation of marital 

property, value of each party’s separate property, 

standard of living established during the marriage; 

economic circumstances of each party and whether 
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the party will be serving as custodian of any 

dependent children. 

Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). “The weight to be given to these statutory factors depends on the 

facts of each case and is within the [fact-finder’s] discretion.” Schenk, 880 

A.2d at 643 (citations omitted).

Instantly, we find that Master Watkins expressly considered all of the 

relevant factors in making his recommendations as to how the parties’ marital 

property should be distributed. See Third Amended Master’s Report, 

11/12/20. Those factors included the parties’ educational background, 

vocational skill, employability, and future earning capacity. Id. at 2, 6. 

Master Watkins noted that although Husband is currently employed at a gas 

station making $7.25 per hour, he supported the family during the marriage 

and made a good living from the trucking business he owned. Id. at 2, 6-8. 

Master Watkins also considered the fact that Wife was a homemaker and stayat-home mother to the parties’ minor child during the marriage, had never 

worked full-time, and was not permitted by Husband to obtain employment. 

Id. at 2, 7.

Master Watkins also considered the duration of the marriage; the 

parties’ respective ages, their standard of living during the marriage; and the

fact that Wife’s contributions during the marriage allowed Husband to develop

and operate his trucking business. Id. at 6-9. Additionally, Master Watkins

took note of the fact that Wife serves as the primary custodian to the parties’ 
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minor child, whom she is raises alone with a minimal payment of $65 a month 

in child support. Id. at 10.

Master Watkins expressly found that “[w]hile Husband’s future earning 

capacity and ability to acquire capital assets is limited ... his employment 

situation is due to an accident [that] resulted in serious criminal charges ... 

[and the] loss of his CDL license[.]”. Id. at 6-7. Nonetheless, Master Watkins 

concluded that “Wife is in greater need than Husband” given her lack of 

employment history, general college degree from a foreign country, and low 

earning expectation. Id. at 7.

Husband’s contentions on appeal merely challenge the weight to be 

accorded the various factors, and as discussed, this matter was within the 

province of Master Watkins, and not within the appellate court. See Schenk, 

880 A.2d at 643; Moran, 839 A.2d at 1095. 

We further find no merit to Husband’s contention that Master Watkins’

equitable distribution scheme was improperly based upon Wife’s allegations of 

Husband’s “marital misconduct” and abuse during the marriage, nor the fact 

that he failed to disclose the value of his property in India by the court-ordered 

deadline. Master Watkins’ makes no specific mention of his consideration of 

Husband’s misconduct or abuse in his third amended report and 

recommendation, and the trial court specifically noted in its opinion that “[a]ny 

abuse by [Husband] toward [Wife] ... was not considered as an independent 
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factor in the fashioning of [the equitable distribution] award.” Trial court 

opinion, 6/3/21 at 6.

Additionally, Husband has provided no support in his brief for his 

baseless allegation that Master Watkins and the trial court utilized his 

nondisclosure of the value of his property in India as a reason to award Wife 

“an unconscionable share of the martial estate.” See Husband’s brief at 26-

27. On the contrary, the record reflects that Master Watkins and the trial 

court gave due consideration to all of the factors set forth in Section 3502(a) 

in arriving at an equitable distribution scheme which, as a whole, achieved a 

just determination of the parties’ marital property. 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying

the bulk of Husband’s exceptions to the equitable distribution scheme set forth 

in Master Watkins’ third report and recommendation.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/04/2022