J-S15003-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN SAUNDERS

Appellant No. 2818 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001537-2000

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2017

Shawn Saunders appeals from the August 15, 2016 order denying his 

sixth PCRA petition.1 We affirm. 

Based upon the following events, a jury convicted Appellant of second 

degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and possession of a unlicensed firearm. 

On October 18, 1999, Appellant, Omar Davis, and David Burroughs traveled 

together to Ninth and Lincoln Streets in Chester so that Davis could 

purchase marijuana. On the way, Appellant, who was armed with a gun, 

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1

 In the August 15, 2016 order, the court denied a separate PCRA petition 

that Appellant had filed. The appeal from the denial of that petition is also 

pending before this panel. While the appeals are from the same order, that 

order disposed of separate motions for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, 

we have not consolidated them for review. 
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informed his cohorts that he intended to rob the individual who was going to 

sell Davis the controlled substance. When they arrived at their destination, 

Appellant put on a ski cap and covered his face. Appellant, Davis, and 

Burroughs encountered Cleven Pender and Shammer Thomas. Davis rifled 

through Thomas’ pockets, and Appellant told Pender to give him money. 

When Pender started to back away, Appellant shot Pender in the chest, 

killing him. Appellant was twenty-two years old when he murdered Pender. 

Appellant was convicted on March 9, 2001, and was sentenced to life 

imprisonment. On August 27, 2002, we affirmed, Commonwealth v. 

Saunders, 809 A.2d 964 (Pa.Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum), 

and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 2, 2003. 

Commonwealth v. Saunders, 839 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2003). No further review 

was sought. 

Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on February 7, 2005, and 

counsel was appointed. Counsel was allowed to withdraw and relief was 

denied. Appellant did not appeal. On August 14, 2009, Appellant filed a 

second PCRA petition, which was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, we 

affirmed. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 15 A.3d 538 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant filed a third PCRA petition on March 15, 2012, claiming that 

he was entitled to relief under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), 

wherein the United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional, 
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under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment, to sentence a juvenile homicide offender to a mandatory term 

of life imprisonment without parole. Relief was denied, and we affirmed. 

Commonwealth v. Saunders, 102 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(unpublished memorandum). In this third Saunders decision, we concluded 

that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 1, 2004, ninety 

days after our Supreme Court denied review, and that Appellant had until 

March 1, 2005, to present a timely PCRA petition. We observed that 

Appellant’s petition was not timely. We also held that the Miller decision did 

not apply to him because he was an adult when he committed the murder in 

question. See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(Miller does not apply to homicide offenders who are eighteen years of age 

or older when they committed the murder). 

 Next, Appellant filed a motion arguing that the court had no authority to 

impose its sentence and seeking facts regarding its decision. The motion 

was treated as a fourth PCRA petition and denied as untimely. We once 

again affirmed the denial of relief, agreeing that the motion was an untimely 

PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 122 A.3d 1126 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (unpublished memorandum). 

On April 11, 2016, Appellant filed his fifth PCRA petition. He once 

again invoked the Miller decision. On August 15, 2016, an order was issued 

denying the fifth petition. The Court held that Appellant was not entitled to 
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relief under Miller because he was an adult when he committed the murder

and because the matter was already litigated in Appellant’s fourth PCRA 

petition. Appellant appealed that decision, which is pending before this 

panel at docket number 3132 EDA 2016.

After Appellant filed his fifth PCRA petition, he presented the request

for relief at issue in this appeal. Specifically, on May 23, 2016, Appellant 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the civil division of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Delaware County. That motion was transferred to the 

criminal division and filed in this action. The court treated the request for 

relief as Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition, and, after issuing notice, dismissed 

it. In the notice, the PCRA court opined that the petition was untimely and 

the issues it contained were previously litigated. This appeal followed. 

Appellant raises these contentions: 

I. Whether the sentencing court erred in applying the Post 

-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA ") Statute to Appellant's Petition 

For Writ of Habeas Corpus, then denying same as being 

untimely.

Il. Whether the sentencing court erred in denying 

Appellant's Due Process Rights, and Right to appeal, where there 

are no disclosure of 'any' sentencing authorities and statutory 

authorization employed by the court to impose the sentence(s), 

and sentencing conditions upon Appellant.

(a) A Petitioner that qualify under the PCRA 

would be subjected to the pleading, proof, and 

timeliness requirements of the PCRA but claims for 

which there is no remedy under PCRA but which 

otherwise qualify for habeas corpus relief could be 

brought in a habeas petition that would not be 
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subject to the same pleadings, proof, and timeliness 

requirements applicable to PCRA claims.

(b) Where Appellant has a Right to Due 

Process of law, and Right to appeal, guaranteed by 

the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution, 

that mandates due notice and adequate disclosure 

concerning sentences and sentencing conditions that 

is imposed by the court.

Appellant’s brief at 4.

Initially, we note that this Court reviews the “denial of PCRA relief to 

determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the 

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 86 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 

(Pa. 2015)). Herein, Appellant claims that the sentencing court did not have 

the authority to sentence him to life imprisonment and that it erred in 

treating the habeas corpus petition as a PCRA petition and subject to the 

one-year filing requirements outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“Any 

petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, 

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]”). 

We affirm the PCRA court’s decision that Appellant’s petition for 

habeas corpus relief must be considered a PCRA petition. “It is well-settled 

that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction 

relief.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(habeas corpus petition treated as a PCRA petition); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 

(The PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and 
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encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 

purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas 

corpus and coram nobis.”). “Unless the PCRA could not provide for a 

potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus.” 

Taylor, supra at 465-66. Thus, if an issue is cognizable under the PCRA, 

that issue “must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in 

a habeas corpus petition.” Id. at 466. In other words, “a defendant cannot 

escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of 

habeas corpus.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Appellant claims that there was no legal authorization for his sentence 

and thus is challenging the legality of his sentence. Legality-of-sentence 

issues are cognizable under the PCRA and must be brought pursuant in a 

timely PCRA. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) 

(“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, 

[such a claim] must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the 

exceptions thereto.”) Accordingly, the PCRA court properly treated 

Appellant’s habeas corpus petition as a PCRA petition. As we have 

previously ruled, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 1, 

2004, and he had until March 1, 2005, to file a timely petition. The present 

petition is patently untimely. Although there are exceptions to the one-year 

time bar of § 9545(b), Appellant has not invoked one. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2017