IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RALPH GRAHAM AND NICHOLE RENE GRAHAM, 

Appellants, 

v.

Case No. 5D21-2451

LT Case No. 2020-CA-002177

CHERYL BATTEY AND ROLAND TUCKER, 

Appellees. 

________________________________/

Opinion filed September 16, 2022

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Osceola County, 

Robert J. Egan, Judge.

Megan L. Garcia and Kene Henry

Anusionwu, of Law Offices of K.H.A.,

Windermere, for Appellants. 

Ryan James Vescio and Alexander

S. Douglas, II, of Shuffield, Lowman

& Wilson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

EDWARDS, J. 
2

Appellants, Ralph and Nichole Graham, appeal the non-final order 

granting a temporary injunction in favor of Appellee, Cheryl Battey.1 This 

Court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). For the following 

reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion, including entry of an amended 

temporary injunction which shall, inter alia, require Appellee to post an 

appropriate injunction bond.

Background Facts

The underlying lawsuit concerns the use and occupancy of a piece of 

property with a main house and a smaller in-law house. Appellee is the 

record title owner of the property as shown in a recorded deed. Appellants 

are the son-in-law and daughter of Appellee. At one time, the parties 

apparently enjoyed good relationships. There were discussions and vague

oral agreements regarding Appellants being allowed to live in the main house 

in return for, inter alia, contributing to the purchase of the property and

contributing to the monthly mortgage payments. Appellee was to live in the 

in-law house and was to receive water and electricity from the main house. 

There was no written document spelling out the terms of any of these 

1 Roland Tucker was Ms. Battey’s husband, her co-plaintiff, and an 

Appellee. However, he passed away. 
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supposed agreements.2 Appellants did come to reside in the main house 

while Appellee resided in the in-law house.

Eventually, the parties’ good relationships soured, and they were 

unable to peacefully coexist on the property. The parties came to disagree 

about nearly every aspect of their respective rights and obligations 

concerning the property. Appellee gave Appellants written notice to move 

out of the main house based on her allegations that Appellants lived there 

pursuant to an oral, month-to-month lease and then sued to evict them. 

Appellants counterclaimed, alleging that Appellee had breached a contract 

to transfer the property to them, less the in-law house and property 

surrounding it where Appellee lived. Further, Appellants alleged that 

Appellee had orally agreed to devise the entire property to Appellants, 

effective when she passed away.

Next, Appellee moved for a temporary injunction to enjoin Appellants 

from allegedly: (1) making further material alterations to the main house; (2) 

committing waste of the property; (3) interfering with or interrupting 

Appellee’s utility services to the in-law house; (4) interfering with Appellee’s 

2 The trial court described an unsigned document that was represented 

by Appellee to be a written lease; however, it was not legible and lacked 

sufficient detail to set forth the terms and conditions required of an 

enforceable lease. 
4

access to the property; and (5) destroying, taking, and disturbing Appellee’s 

personal property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 

the temporary injunction, which enjoined Appellants from the activities 

outlined in Appellee’s motion.

Standard of Review

“The standard of review of trial court orders on requests for temporary 

injunctions is a hybrid. To the extent the trial court’s order is based on factual 

findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion; 

however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review.” Gainesville 

Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2017) (citation 

omitted). A trial court’s factual findings on the elements of a temporary 

injunction are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence. Fla. Dep’t of 

Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021) (citation 

omitted).

Analysis

“The issuance of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 

which should be granted sparingly.” Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467, 470 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2002). “A temporary injunction may be entered if the party 

seeking the injunction establishes the following criteria: (1) the likelihood of 

irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a 
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substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) considerations of the 

public interest.” Id. “Because the entering of a temporary injunction is an 

extraordinary remedy, strict compliance with the provisions of [Florida Rule 

of Civil Procedure 1.610] is required.” Id. Thus, “compliance with the rule 

requires the trial court to set forth sufficient factual findings to support each 

of the criterion [sic] that must be established to entitle the party to a 

preliminary injunction.” Id. Where a temporary injunction is generally 

supported by facts and law, the court of appeal can affirm it in part while 

remanding with instructions to strike, add, or revise terms and conditions to 

cure any noncompliance. Coscia v. Old Fla. Plantation, Ltd., 828 So. 2d 488, 

490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Animal Rts. Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 

867 So. 2d 451, 463 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (Sawaya, C.J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (“If part of a temporary injunction is improper and the 

remaining portions of the injunction are proper, the appellate court may affirm 

the injunction and strike the improper provisions.” (citing Coscia, 828 So. 2d 

at 488)). 

We hold that the trial court’s order contains sufficient factual findings 

as to the first two elements as to certain conduct. Specifically, it found that 

Appellants’ continued interruption of water and electrical services to Appellee 

in the in-law house would constitute irreparable harm for which there is no 
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legal remedy. Appellee offered evidence to the trial court that Appellants 

had intentionally switched off her electricity and put a lock on the water 

system controls without giving Appellee a key. Given the circumstances 

here, namely that Appellee had no other source of electricity or potable 

water, depriving her of those necessities of modern life would result in 

irreparable harm. To that extent, the temporary injunction is affirmed.

The temporary injunction also prohibits Appellants from interfering with 

Appellee’s ingress and egress to the property and more specifically to the 

common areas. Appellants do not argue a lack of competent, substantial 

evidence to support Appellee’s claim and the court’s order. Instead, they 

first argue that Appellee has no right to access the main house or property 

even if she were determined to be the landlord. Second, they argue that the 

injunction lacks the necessary specificity as to exactly what ingress and 

egress is covered. The trial court’s temporary injunction essentially grants 

Appellee the right to access the common areas of the property without 

interference from Appellants. The injunction does not grant Appellee access 

to the interior of the main house. Further, the trial court’s order notes that 

Appellants replaced the locks on the main house to exclude Appellee 

therefrom and specifically permits maintenance of that status quo. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the temporary injunction to the extent it protects 

Appellee’s rights of ingress and egress.

The trial court also enjoined Appellants from making material 

alterations to the main house and property. The trial court’s findings that 

Appellants, without Appellee’s consent, changed locks on the main house, 

removed locks from and otherwise damaged gates on the property, 

materially altered the main house by attaching cameras to its exterior, 

removed or cut shrubbery, and failed to maintain the swimming pool are 

supported by competent, substantial evidence. Under the facts and 

circumstances developed here, the loss or damage occasioned by each act 

listed by the trial court is the epitome of things that can be replaced or 

repaired. Locks can be replaced, gates can be rehung, cameras can be 

removed with attachment points filled and painted, the swimming pool can 

be repaired or renewed, and the shrubs can be replaced as needed.

Therefore, there was no competent, substantial evidence of irreparable harm 

caused by those material alterations. See Stand Up for Animals, Inc. v. 

Monroe Cnty., 69 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“[I]rreparable harm 

for the purposes of an injunction is not established where the harm can be 

compensated for adequately by money damages.” (citation omitted)). 
8

Furthermore, the trial court’s order enjoining Appellants from materially 

altering the property fails to specify exactly what action is prohibited. Florida 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) provides that an injunction “shall describe 

in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained without reference to a pleading 

or another document . . . .” In an often cited opinion, the Second District 

succinctly explained rule 1.610(c)’s requirements:

An injunctive order should never be broader than is 

necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the 

adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular 

case. An injunctive order should be adequately particularized, 

especially where some activities may be permissible and proper. 

Such an order should be confined within reasonable limitations 

and phrased in such language that it can with definiteness be 

complied with, and one against whom the order is directed 

should not be left in doubt as to what he is required to do.

Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)

(internal citations omitted). We hold that the trial court’s prohibition on 

material alterations could leave Appellants in doubt about what is required of 

them and also note that the trial court’s order enjoining Appellants from 

committing waste suffers from the same lack of specificity.3

Thus, on remand, the trial court is ordered to strike from the temporary 

injunction the prohibition on Appellants making material alterations to the 

3 With regard to enjoining waste, lack of specificity is the only argument 

Appellants raised in their initial brief, thereby waiving any other arguments. 

See Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). 
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property unless it makes findings as to material alterations that would truly 

cause irreparable harm and sets forth specifically what is enjoined. If the 

trial court intends in the amended injunction to enjoin Appellants from 

committing waste, it must specifically describe what acts or omissions 

constitute waste and are therefore prohibited.

Additionally, Appellants argue that the trial court’s order enjoining them 

from destroying, taking, and disturbing Appellee’s personal property cannot 

be sustained because irreparable harm was not established. Appellants 

assert that money damages are available to replace or repair any such 

personal property. “[A]n injunction will not be granted for the return or

retention of personal property unless the property is peculiar or unique.” 

Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Equity can 

intercede when the personal property is of unique character and value, such 

as an antique, and there is no adequate remedy at law.4

 See Mangus v. 

Porter, 276 So. 2d 250, 251 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). The subject injunction 

does not describe the nature or character of Appellee’s personal property. 

On remand, the trial court shall amend the temporary injunction by striking 

4 See DiabloSport, LLC v. Granatelli Motor Sports, Inc., No. 6:05-cv312, 2005 WL 2465019 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2005) (finding that Florida’s 

jurisprudence regarding specific performance of contracts for personal 

property requires consideration of the injunctive factors of irreparable harm 

and no adequate remedy at law). 
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the provision prohibiting Appellants from destroying, taking, and disturbing 

Appellee’s personal property, unless the trial court sets forth its findings that 

Appellee’s at-risk personal property is essentially irreplaceable because of 

its described unique character or peculiar nature.

Regarding the third element, Appellee’s likelihood of success on the 

merits, the trial court’s order details its findings that Appellee has a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In the order granting the 

temporary injunction, the trial court notes that in the absence of any duly 

executed legal agreement, Florida’s statute of frauds concerning real estate 

transactions and testamentary formalities pertaining to transfer of property 

upon death will likely nullify Appellants’ counterclaims against Appellee who 

is the record title holder of the property. 

For the fourth element, considerations of public interest, the trial court 

found that nothing in the injunction would be adverse to the public interest, 

thereby satisfying the fourth element necessary to entitlement to a temporary 

injunction. Indeed, the trial court found that repeating its prior order that the 

parties cooperate in repairing the swimming pool would actually be in the 

public interest. Thus, we hold that both findings are supported by competent, 

substantial evidence.
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Lastly, Appellants justifiably complain about the trial court’s failure to 

require Appellee to post a bond. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b) is 

clear in its mandate that “[n]o temporary injunction shall be entered unless a 

bond is given by the movant in an amount the court deems proper, 

conditioned for the payment of costs and damages sustained by the adverse 

party if the adverse party is wrongfully enjoined.” “Under the compulsory 

language of the rule, the trial court has no discretion to dispense with the 

requirement of a bond.” Pinder v. Pinder, 817 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2002).

5

Indeed, the order granting the temporary injunction makes no mention 

of a bond. Nevertheless, the lack of a bond does not invalidate the injunction 

as Appellants claim. See Ralicki v. 998 SW 144 Ct. Rd, LLC, 254 So. 3d 

1155, 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“Contrary to [the appellants’] position, 

though, the failure to set a bond does not invalidate the injunction.” (citing 

Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. Sea Tow Servs. Int’l, Inc., 778 So. 2d 510 

5 There are certain exclusions to the bond requirement, but none are 

applicable here. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b) (noting bond requirement may 

be dispensed when issued on pleadings of a municipality or the state or any 

officer, agency, or political subdivision thereof; bond prohibited when 

injunction is issued solely to prevent physical injury or abuse of a natural 

person); Tri-Plaza Corp. v. Field, 382 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) 

(stating bond requirement can be waived if showing is made that movant has 

financial inability to obtain bond).
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(Fla. 4th DCA 2001))). Accordingly, we remand this matter for the trial court 

to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the appropriate amount of bond 

Appellee must post. See id. 

Accordingly, as set forth above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED.

LAMBERT, C.J., and COHEN, J., concur.