NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILTON MOREL GIRON RODAS,

Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 23-752

Agency No.

A074-421-887

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 4, 2024** 

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and BADE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,

*** District Judge.

FILED

JUN 6 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Milton Morel Giron Rodas (“Giron”), a native and citizen of Guatemala,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) dismissal of his

appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention against Torture

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.

Because theBIA conducted its own independent review of the evidence and law

in this case, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d

1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and

legal questions de novo. Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). As the

parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary

to provide context to our ruling.

1. The BIA applied the proper standard of review to the IJ’s decision in Giron’s

case. The BIA reviews questions of law de novo and the IJ’s findings of fact for clear

error. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii). The BIA’s decision reflects that it applied the

proper standards of review considering the issues Giron presented in his appeal to the

BIA.

2. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s determination that Giron’s

proposed particular social group—“individuals who have been in the United States for

25 or 30 years who return back to Guatemala”—is not cognizable for purposes of

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asylum or withholding of removal. “[A]n applicant for asylum or withholding of

removal seeking relief based on ‘membership in a particular social group’ must

establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable

characteristic,(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society

in question.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I.&N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). Substantial

evidence supports the IJ’s determination, affirmed by the BIA, that Giron’s proposed

particular social group is insufficiently socially distinct, because Giron did not point

to evidence in the record showing that Guatemalan society perceives that group as a

discrete class of persons. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016).

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Giron is not entitled

to asylum or withholding of removal under the INA based on past persecution or a

well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. §§

1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1). Giron’s failure to establish that his proposed particular

social group is cognizable forecloses his claims for asylum and statutory withholding

of removal based on his membership in this group because even if the harm he

experienced, or might experience in the future, rises to the level of persecution, he

failed to show the requisite nexus to a protected ground. See Barajas-Romero v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358-59 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the protected ground need

only be “a reason” for withholding of removal claims, whereas it must be “one central

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reason” for asylum claims). Additionally, as the BIA noted, the mere existence of a

general political motive “on the part of the guerrillas” does not satisfy the nexus

requirement. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).

4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Giron is not entitled

to CAT protection. Torture is “more severe than persecution.” Guo v. Sessions, 897

F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Giron’s evidence of country

conditions is in itself insufficient to make him eligible for CAT protection, because

it does not indicate any threat of torture that is particularized to him or more likely

than the threat to the populace as a whole. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d

1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226,

1230 (9th Cir. 2016). And he has provided no evidence compelling the conclusion

that it is “more likely than not [that he] would be tortured” at the hands of gangs if

returned to Guatemala. Ramirez-Munoz, 816 F.3d at 1230.

PETITION DENIED.

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