2013 UT App 154

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

S TAT E OF U TAH

, Plainti ff and Appellee,

v. A N G E L O N O E M AR

T I N E Z , Defendan t and Appellant.

Memor andumDeci si on No. 20120297-CA Filed J une 20, 2013

Second Di stric t, Og den Department The Honorable W. BrentWest No. 101900070

Samuel P. New ton, At tor ney for Appellant John E. Swallow and Karen A. Kluczni k, At tor neys

for Appellee

J UD G E M I C H E L E M. C H RI S T I AN S E N authore d thi s Memorandum Deci si on, i n whi ch J UD G E S G RE G OR Y K. O R M Eand C AR OLYN B. M C H UG H

concu rr ed.

CHRIS TIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Defendan t Angelo Noe Mar tin ez appeals hi s convic tions for aggr avat ed assau lt and di strib uti on of a contr olled subs tance in a drug-free zo ne. We affi rm.
¶2 Defendant’s convic tions stem fr om a drug tr ansac tion that too k place at a publi c park in January 2010. During the tr ansac tion, 1 Defendan t stabbed Lui s Torr es after Torr es threat ened Defendan t

1. “On appeal, we reci te the facts in the li ght most favor able to the jury ’s ver di ct.” State v. Burk , 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).State v. M artinez

wi th a gun. At tr i al, defe n s e c oun s e l arg ued that Defendan t stabbed Torr es i n self- defense. Accordingly, the tr i al co urt’s jury i nstructi ons i nclu ded a sum mary of t he l a w of self- defense. The relev ant jury i nstructi on inclu ded the following sentence: “A person i s not justifi ed i n using force

. . . i f the person i s atte mpting to commi t, commi tting, or fl e e ing after the commi ssi on or atte mpted commi ssi on of a felony.” See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2- 402(2)( a)(i i ) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). On Nove mber 18, 2011, the jury 2 convic ted D efendant of aggr avat ed assau lt, a thi rd degree felony, and arr angi ng to di strib ute a contro lled sub stance in a drug-free zone, a second degree felo ny.
¶3 On appeal, Defendan t asserts that the tr i al cour t fa ile d to adequately i nstruct the jury on hi s clai m of self- defense. “‘[W]hen there i s a basis in t he evidenc e

. . . , whi ch would prov i de some reasonable basi s for t he j ur y to conclu de that

. . . the defendant [acted to prot ect hi mself ] from an immin ent threat

. . . , an i nstructi on on self- defense should be given to the jury .’” State v. Luc ero, 2012 UT App 202, ¶ 6, 2 8 3 P.3d 967 (alterat i ons and omi ssi ons i n or i gin al) (quoti ng State v. Knoll , 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985)). Even though the tr i al co ur t di d instruct the jury on the law of self- defense, Defendan t clai ms th a t t he court’s i nstructi ons were flawed becau se they di d not proper ly explain the St ate’s and Defendan t’s relati ve burdens of proo f. See id. (“Once the jury has been instructed on self- defense, the [Stat e] has the burden t o p r o v e beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendan t di d]

. . . not [act] i n self- defense.” (alterat i ons and omi ssi o n in or i gin al) (ci tation and i nternal quotat i on mark s om i tte d)). Defendan t asserts that the tr i al court’s err or in fai ling to prov i de proper instructi ons requires rever sal of hi s convi cti ons.

2. Becaus e the current statuto ry prov i si ons do not materially di ffer from the pr ov i si ons in effec t at t he tim e of the o ffens e, we ci te the current v ersi on of the Ut ah Code for the re ader’s convenienc e.

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¶4 At the outset, we no t e , and Defendant acknowledges, that he di d not preserv e hi s objection to the jury instructi ons before the tr i al court. Therefore , we mus t rev i ew hi s clai m for plain err or

. See Utah R. Cr i m P. 19(e) (“Unless a par ty o bjects to an ins tr ucti on or the fai lure to give an instructio n, the instructi on may not be assi gned as err or except to avo i d a mani fest injusti ce.”) ; s e e also 3 State v. L e e , 2 0 06 UT 5, ¶ 24, 128 P.3d 1179 (permi tting appellate

rev i ew of unpreserved clai ms for plain err or, exceptional ci rcums tances, and i neffec tive assi stance of couns el). A party seeki ng rev ersal under the plain er r o r standard mus t prov e that “‘[1] [a]n err or exis ts; [2] the err or should have been obvious to the tr i al court; and [3] the err or i s harmful.’” See State v. Powell , 2007 UT 9, ¶ 18, 154 P.3d 788 (alterat i ons in or i gin al) (quoti ng State v. Dun n , 850 P.2 d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). A party mus t prov e all three prong s to suc cess fully mount a plain err or challen ge. See State v. Dean , 2004 UT 6 3 , ¶ 15, 95 P.3d 276 (“If any one of these requirements i s not met, plain err or i s no t e st abli shed.” (ci tation and i nternal quotat i on marks omi tte d)). Becaus e resolution of thi s
case turns on the thi rd prong, we li mi t our analysi s to a di scu ssi on of harmfuln ess. To establi sh that an err or i s harmful, a party mus t demonstrate that, “absent the err or, there i s a reasonable li kelih ood of a mo r e favor able outcome.” Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 26 (ci tation and i nternal quot ation marks omi tte d).

¶5 Addi tionally, Defendan t arg ues for the fi rst tim e on appeal th a t his convic tions should be ov ert urned as a result of the i neffec tive assi stance of hi s tr i al couns el. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Defendant arg ues that hi s tr i al

couns el’s fai lure to request speci fi c instructi o ns reg ardin g the bur dens of proo f for a clai m of self- defense was objectively defi ci ent perfor manc e and prej udi ced hi s defense by seri ously undermin ing t he fai rness o f his tr i al. Accordi ng to Defendan t, “i t
seems li kely that wi th proper instructi ons, t he j ury would have

3. “Mani fest i njusti ce i s synonymous wi th the plain err or standard . . . .” State v. Jimenez , 2012 UT 41, ¶ 20, 284 P.3d 640.

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consi dered self- defense to create a reasonable doubt as to [Defendant’s] gui lt.” We rev i ew thi s clai m as a matter of la w. S ee State v. Sell e r s , 2 0 11 UT App 38, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 70. To warrant

rev ersal, Defendan t mus t fi rst “demon strat e that speci fi c acts or
o mi ssi ons of couns el fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See Powell , 2007 UT 9, ¶ 45. Second, Defendan t
mus t show that thi s defi ci ent perfor manc e prej udi ced hi s defense. See S trickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Prejudic e i s establi shed b y showing “that there i s a reasonable p r o ba bi li ty that, but for couns el’s unprofessi onal err or s, the r esult of the proceeding would have been di fferent.” Powell, 2007 UT 9, ¶ 45 (ci tat io n and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Thus, the prej udi ce test for ineffec tive assi stance of c oun s e l c lai ms i s equi valent to the harmfuln ess test for plain err or

. See Du nn, 850 P.2d at 1225.

¶6 We conclude that Defendan t’s clai ms of plain err or and i neffec tive assi stance fai l becau se he cannot demonstrate that the i nstructi ons given to the jury were ha r mful or that hi s couns el’s fai lure to request proper instructi ons resul te d in prej udi ce. Becaus e the analysi s is equi valent on both claim s, we li mi t our analysi s t o whether prov i ding the jury wi th an instructi on setting fo r t h t he ap p r o p r iate burdens of proo f would have created a reasonable p ro babi li ty, i n thi s i nstance, that Defendan t would hav e be e n acqui tte d. 4

¶7 As a gener al matter , self- defense i s not avai lable as a defense to a cri minal act i n several ci rcums tances. See Utah Code Ann. § 76- 2-402(2) (a)( i )–(i i i ) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). One such ci rcums tance occurs when a defendant uses force while atte mpting to commi t,

4. The Utah Supreme Court ha s he l d that lack of prej udi ce i s di sposi tive of a defendant’s plain err or clai m. See Jimenez , 2012 UT 41, ¶ 20. The Uni ted States Supreme Court has also instructed, “If i t i s easier t o di spose o f an ineffec tiveness clai m o n t he gr ound o f lack of suffici ent prej udi ce,

. . . that course should be followed.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).

20120297-CA 4 2013 UT App 154State v. M artinez

commi tting, or fleeing after the commi ssi on or atte mpted commi ssi on of a felony. Id. § 76-2-402( 2)(a) (i i ). Here, the St ate does not di spute that Defendan t was acti ng in what would other wi se be reasonable self- defense when he stabbed To rr es. However , the St ate arg ues that becau se Defendan t’s use of force occurred duri ng Defendan t’s drug tr ansac tion, a second degr ee felony, he i s precluded from clai ming self-d efense. We agree.

¶8 Wi th respect to Defendan t’s drug convic tion, we deter mine that even i f the jury i nstructio ns ha d been prepar ed exactly to Defendan t’s speci ficati on, those instructi ons could not have affec ted the jury ’s deci si on on the drug count becau se self- defense i s not a valid defense to the atte mpted commi ss ion of a drug offense

. S e e id

. § 76-2-401( 1) (“Conduct whi ch i s justifi ed i s a defense to prosecuti on for any offense based on the conduc t. ” (emphas i s added)). Here, the conduc t for whi ch Defendan t clai ms self- defense was hi s stabbing of Torr es. Yet the St ate’s prosecuti on of the drug offense was based on D efendant’s arr angement to sell drugs. Thus, Defendan t i s statuto rily precluded from clai ming selfdefense for the drug offense. Becau s e D e fe n d ant does not challen ge hi s drug co nv icti on on any other gr ounds, we affi rm the jury ’s

ver di ct on thiscount.

¶9 As to the aggr avat ed assau lt ch a r ge, Defendan t has never di sputed that he stabbed Torr es. Indeed, hi s entire defense hinged

on hi s clai m of self- defense, whi ch necess arily involv ed admi ssi on of the u n d e rlyin g a s sault. However , becau se we affi rm Defendan t’s convic tion of the felony drug offense, Defendan t’s use of force again st To r r e s cannot be justifi ed becau se i t occurred duri ng the drug tr ansac tion. See id. § 7 6

- 2 -402(2) (a)( i i ). Accordi ngly, even i f the jury i nstructi ons had been wri tte n as he preferr ed, there is not a reasonable probabi li ty that Defendan t would have been acqui tte d of the agg rav ated assault.

¶10 Defendan t i s cor rect in assert ing that a proper self- defense jury i nstructi on should inform the jury about the burdens of proo f

ne ce ss ary for self- defense to be consi dered. However , Defendan t

20120297-CA 5 2013 UT App 154State v. M artinez

could not have suc cess fully rais ed such a defense in thi s case. That i s, Defendan t’s use of force against Torr es cannot be justifi ed here becau se the stabbing occurred during the commi ssi on of a felony. Therefore , Defendan t cannot demonstrate that the tr i al court’s fai lure to prov i de jury instructi ons setting fort h the appropr i a t e burdens of proo f was harmful under the plain err or standard. Nor

can Defendant d e m on s tr a te th a t h i s tr i al couns el’s fai lure to request
such i nstructi ons prej udi ced hi m, resulti ng in ineffec tive assi stance at tr i a l

. Ac c or d in gly, w e d e c line to rev erse Defendan t’s convic tions

. ¶11 Affi rmed.

20120297-CA 6 2013 UT App 154