NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE KATHRYN STOCKING-TATE, Commissioner and 

Judge Pro Tem of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 

in and for the County of YUMA, Respondent Commissioner,

P.R., Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 21-0020

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400JD20170164

The Honorable Kathryn E. Stocking-Tate, Judge Pro Tempore

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED AND RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Dawn Rachelle Williams

Counsel for Petitioner

Meerchaum & Orduno PLLC, Yuma

By Candice Orduno-Crouse

Counsel for Real Party in Interest

FILED 3-4-2021
DCS v. HON. STOCKING-TATE/P.R.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 In this special action, the Department of Child Safety

challenges Respondent trial judge’s order denying the Department’s 

motion to dismiss the dependency action after establishing a permanent 

guardian for P.R., Real Party in Interest. Special action jurisdiction is 

appropriate because the Department has “no equally plain, speedy, and 

adequate remedy by appeal[,]” see Levinson v. Jarrett ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 

207 Ariz. 472, 474 ¶ 4 (App. 2004), and the issue raised is purely a legal 

question, with statewide importance, see State v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 534, 537 

¶ 6 (App. 2005). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Department removed P.R. from her parents shortly after 

she was born. Respondent adjudicated her dependent and subsequently 

terminated her mother’s and father’s parental rights. P.R. was placed with 

her maternal uncle, Ray F. Respondent appointed a guardian ad litem to 

protect P.R.’s interests throughout the proceedings.

¶3 Because of Ray’s and his significant other’s history with the 

Department in previous dependency proceedings, Respondent did not find 

adoption appropriate. Respondent did, however, “award the legal and 

physical custody of the child” to Ray as her permanent guardian “without 

restriction.” The Department then moved to dismiss the dependency since 

P.R. was no longer a dependent child. Respondent denied the motion at the 

behest of the guardian ad litem, stating that it wanted continued oversight 

of the guardianship, relying on A.R.S. § 8–873.01(A), which states that the 

court shall order reunification services in a pending dependency 

proceeding for the parent “when a dependency petition is filed on a 

permanent guardianship.” The Department moved to reconsider because

A.R.S. § 8–872(J) requires that the “dependency shall be dismissed” on the 

entry of an order of permanent guardianship. Respondent denied the 

motion and this special action followed. 
DCS v. HON. STOCKING-TATE/P.R.

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶4 The Department argues that Respondent was statutorily 

required under A.R.S. §§ 8–872(J) and 8–201(15) to dismiss the child 

dependency action after establishing Ray as P.R.’s permanent guardian. We 

review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Potter, 248 Ariz. 

347, 349 ¶ 9 (App. 2020); see also Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, 264 ¶ 17

(App. 2017). The text of a statute is the most reliable indicator of its 

meaning. Potter, 248 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 9. When the words of a statute are clear 

and unambiguous, we need not resort to other methods of statutory 

interpretation to determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is 

readily discernible from the face of the statute. Id 

¶5 Respondent erred in not dismissing the dependency action 

after making Ray the permanent guardian. Section 8–872(J) requires that 

“[o]n the entry of the order establishing a permanent guardianship, the 

dependency action shall be dismissed.” A.R.S. § 8–872(J). The ordinary 

meaning of “shall” in a statute is to impose a mandatory provision. See HCZ 

Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 199 Ariz. 361, 363 ¶ 10 (App. 2001).

The Legislature clearly and unambiguously mandated that when the 

juvenile court appoints a permanent guardian the juvenile court must 

dismiss the underlying dependency. A.R.S. § 8-872(J). The definition of 

“dependent child” also supports this conclusion. A “dependent child” is 

one who is “[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and 

who has no parent or guardian . . . willing to exercise or capable of 

exercising such care and control.” A.R.S. § 8–201(15)(a)(i). Once Respondent 

appointed the permanent guardianship, P.R. no longer fit within the 

definition of “dependent child” and Respondent had to dismiss the 

dependency. See A.R.S. § 8–201(15)(a)(i). 

¶6 Real Party in Interest argues that Section 8–873.01(A) permits 

Respondent to continue the dependency even when a permanent 

guardianship has been established, but this misreads the statute. Section 

8–873.01(A) applies only when a dependency action is filed after the 

establishment of a permanent guardianship, which is not the case here. 

Furthermore, notwithstanding the mandatory dismissal of the dependency, 

A.R.S. § 8–872(J) provides that the court “may order a report and shall set a 

review to be held within one year following the entry of the final order and 

may set such other and further proceedings as may be in the best interests 

of the child.” Before the review hearing, the court could require “an 

investigation [. . .] surrounding the welfare and best interests of the child.” 

The Legislature thus accounted for any reasonable oversight the court 

desired. 
DCS v. HON. STOCKING-TATE/P.R.

Decision of the Court

4

CONCLUSION

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction, grant relief, 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the 

trial court may exercise its discretion in making any further orders it deems 

necessary under A.R.S. § 8–872(J).