[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12643

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HORACE S. CAUDLE, JR., 

a.k.a. Black, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:09-cr-00157-RDP-SGC-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12643

Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Horace Caudle, pro se, appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). On appeal, he argues that: (1) his heart failure and 

hypertension, in combination with COVID-19, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release; and (2) various 

sentencing issues -- mainly that his mandatory minimum sentence 

would have been 25 years’ imprisonment instead of life imprisonment had he been sentenced under the First Step Act -- constitute 

an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. 

Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583

(2021). However, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term 

of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under 

§ 3582(c). United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 

2015); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step 

Act, that section now provides, in relevant part:

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21-12643 Opinion of the Court 3

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [(“BOP”)], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to 

bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse 

of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the 

warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after 

considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to 

the extent that they are applicable, if it finds 

that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is 

consistent with applicable policy statements issued by 

the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

As we recently explained, to grant a reduction under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find that three necessary conditions are satisfied: “support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary 

and compelling reasons, and adherence to § 1B1.13’s policy statement.” United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 

2021). District courts do not need to address these three conditions 

in any particular sequence, and a defendant’s failure to satisfy any 

one of them forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. at 1237.

The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) is found 

in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The commentary to 

§ 1B1.13 states that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circumstances listed, provided that the court 

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determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any 

other person or to the community. See id., comment. (n.1). The 

commentary lists a prisoner’s medical condition as a possible extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction if he: (1) has a terminal disease; or (2) is suffering from a physical or mental condition that diminishes his ability to provide selfcare in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. 

Id., comment. (n.1(A)). The commentary also contains a catch-all 

provision for “other reasons,” which provides that a prisoner may 

be eligible for a sentence reduction if the Director of the BOP determines there is an extraordinary and compelling reason. Id., 

comment. (n.1(D)). 

The policy statement in § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions 

filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prisoners, 

which means that district courts cannot reduce a sentence under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) unless doing so would be consistent with § 1B1.13. 

Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. Accordingly, district courts are precluded 

“from finding extraordinary and compelling reasons within the 

catch-all provision beyond those specified” in § 1B1.13. United 

States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021). We recently 

held that “the confluence of [a prisoner’s] medical conditions and 

COVID-19” did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling 

reason warranting compassionate release when the prisoner’s medical conditions did not meet the criteria of § 1B1.13, comment. 

(n.1(A)). Id. at 1346.

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21-12643 Opinion of the Court 5

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Caudle’s motion because he did not present any extraordinary 

and compelling reason justifying his release. For starters, Caudle’s 

claim that several sentencing errors constituted an extraordinary 

and compelling reason for release -- including that his mandatory 

minimum sentence would have been 25 years’ imprisonment instead of life imprisonment had he been sentenced under the First 

Step Act -- is foreclosed by our precedent. As we’ve squarely held, 

a district court cannot find extraordinary and compelling reasons 

beyond those specified in § 1B1.13, and § 1B1.13 does not provide 

any relief for sentencing errors like the ones Caudle has raised. See

Bryant, 998 F.3d at 1262; Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347. 

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in determining 

that Caudle’s heart failure and hypertension did not constitute an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1249–50; Giron, 15 

F.4th at 1346–47. Indeed, while § 1B1.13 offers relief to inmates 

who are suffering from a physical or mental condition that diminishes their ability to provide self-care in prison, Caudle, notably, has 

not sought relief on this basis. Instead, Caudle says that his medical 

conditions create an extraordinary and compelling reason for his 

release because they increase the likelihood that he will experience 

severe COVID-19 symptoms, but this claim is too speculative to 

warrant a reduction of his sentence. Section 1B1.13 offers relief to 

inmates who are suffering from a physical or mental condition that 

diminishes their ability to provide self-care in prison; Caudle, 

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however, seeks relief based only on speculation that he is at a high 

risk of contracting COVID-19, and, if he does, that he will suffer

severe symptoms. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)); see 

also Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346–47.

Finally, because Caudle’s failure to show any extraordinary 

and compelling reasons is dispositive, we need not consider 

whether the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of granting him relief. 

See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38. Accordingly, we affirm the denial

of Caudle’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 

AFFIRMED. 

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