NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR T HE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 2 0

- 2 9 4 0

__________

AUDI OF AMERICA, INC., An Organization Unit of Vol kswagen

Group of America, Inc., A New Jersey Corpor ation

v.

BRONSBERG & HUGHES PONTIAC, INC., DBA Wyoming

Valley Audi, a Pennsylvania Co r poration

NORT H AMERI CAN AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.; NAPLETON WYOMING

VALLEY IMPORTS, LLC; MILLENNIUM HOLDINGS, IV, LLC; NAPLETON

INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, LP; EFN WYOMI NG VALLEY PROPERTIES, LLC,

Appellants

(Intervenors in District Court)

____________________________________

On Ap peal from the United States District Court

for the M i d d l e District of P e n n s y l v a n i a

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3

- 1 6

- c v

- 0 2 4 7 0 )

District Judge: Ho norable J o h n E

. J o n e s

, I I I

______________________________ ______

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

o n J u n e 2 1

, 2 0 2 1

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, MATEY and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion f

iled November 16, 2021 )2 ___________

OPINION *

___________

S M I T H

, C

h i e f J u d g e

I

.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l f

r o m a n o r d e r e n f

o r c i n g a c o n s e n t d e c r e e

. W e p r e v i o u s l y

d e s c r i b e d o u r r e v i e w o f t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e a s “ a l o n g d r i v e a c r o s s m i l e s o f d e c e p t i o n

, ”

a n d n e e d n o t s e t f

o r t h a c o m p l e t e h i s t o r y h e r e

. Audi of Am. v. Bronsberg & Hug hes

Pon tiac, In c.

, 8 1 6 F

. A p p ’ x 6 4 4

, 6 4 6 (3d Cir. 2020) (not precedential). I n b r i e f

,

B r o n s b e r g & H u g h e s P o n t i a c

, I n c

. ( “ W y o m i n g V a l l e y ” ) e n t e r e d i n t o a d e a l e r s h i p

a g r e e m e n t w i t h A u d i o f A m e r i c a

, I n c

. ( “ A u d i ” ) i n 1 9 9 7

. U n d e r t h e t e r m s o f t h e

d e a l e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t

, i f W y o m i n g V a l l e y i n t e n d e d t o s e l l i t s A u d i a n d V o l k s w a g e n

d e a l e r s h i p s

, A u d i r e t a i n e d a r i g h t t o a p p r o v e o r r e j e c t a n y c h a n g e i n o w n e r s h i p

. I n J u l y

2 0 1 6

, W y o m i n g V a l l e y e n t e r e d i n t o a n A s s e t a n d R e a l E s t a t e P u r c h a s e A g r e e m e n t

( “ A P A ” ) w i t h N o r t h A m e r i c a n A u t o S e r v i c e s

, I n c

. , a n d i t s a f f i l i a t e d c o m p a n i e s

( c o l l e c t i v e l y “ N a p l e t o n ” )

, a l a r g e m u l t i

- n a t i o n a l d e a l e r s h i p g r o u p

, a g r e e i n g t o s e l l i t s

A u d i a n d V o l k s w a g e n d e a l e r s h i p s

— a l o n g w i t h i t s f i v e o t h e r d e a l e r s h i p s

— t o N a p l e t o n

.

B e c a u s e W y o m i n g V a l l e y d i d n o t o b t a i n A u d i ’ s a p p r o v a l f o r t h e o w n e r s h i p

c h a n g e

, A u d i f

i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t W y o m i n g V a l l e y a n d m o v e d f o r a t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g

o r d e r ( “ T R O ” ) a n d preliminar y injunction

, s e e k i n g t o p r e v e n t W y o m i n g V a l l e y f r o m

* This dispo sition i s not an opinion of the fu ll C o urt and pursu ant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not3

c l o s i n g o n t h e A P A o r o t h e r w i s e t r a n s f e r r i n g a n y o f i t s A u d i d e a l e r s h i p a s s e t s

. T h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d A u d i ’ s m o t i o n

, f i r s t enter i n g a T R O

, a n d t h e n a preliminary

injunction

. W y o m i n g V a l l e y a s s e r t e d c o u n t e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t A u d i

, a n d N a p l e t o n

i n t e r v e n e d i n t h e c a s e t o a s s e r t i t s o w n c o u n t e r c l a i m s

.

I n A p r i l 2 0 1 7

, A u d i m o v e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e x t e n d t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n

u n t i l t r i a l

. T he parties app eared before the District Cou rt for a heari ng o n June 28, 20 17

.

Before th e hearing b e g a n

, t h e D i s t r i c t J u d g e m e t w i t h c o u n s e l to discuss the possibility of

settlem ent

. When the parties reconvened on the record

, t h e D i s t r i c t J u d g e s t a t e d t h a t t h e y

h a d r e a c h e d a n a g r e e m e n t a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h W y o m i n g V a l l e y would b e permitted t o

t r a n s f e r i t s n o n

- A u d i a s s e t s t o N a p l e t o n

, b u t t h e A u d i a n d V o l k s w a g e n d e a l e r s h i p s w o u l d

b e s e v e r e d f

r o m a n y c o n t r a c t o f s a l e t o N a p l e t o n

, a n d N a p l e t o n w o u l d q u i t i t s i n t e r e s t i n

a c q u i r i n g t h o s e d e a l e r s h i p s

. T h e D i s t r i c t J u d g e f u r t h e r n o t e d t h a t e v e n t h o u g h N a p l e t o n

“ h a s q u i t i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e s e d e a l e r s h i p s

, ” A 521

, N a p l e t o n a n d W y o m i n g V a l l e y

r e s e r v e d t h e r i g h t t o p u r s u e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t A u d i c o n c e r n i n g t h e b r e a c h

- o f

- c o n t r a c t

d i s p u t e s

.

The next day, the District Court enter ed an order memorializing the p a r t i e s ’

agreement ( t h e “ J u n e 2 9 o r d e r ” )

. P u r s u a n t t o t h e “ S t i p u l a t e d T e r m s ” i n t h a t o r d e r

, t h e

p a r t i e s a g r e e d that: Nap leton and Wyoming Valley c o u l d proceed with the sale of all t h e

dealerships except Audi and Volkswagen; O r d e r 1

– 2 ¶¶ 1

– 2 ; E C F N o

. 2 1 3 ; t he Audi and

constitute binding precedent.4

Volkswagen dealerships were “ severed from any contrac t of sale t o Napleton

, ” a n d the

preliminary injunction would remain in place with respect to t h o s e dealerships, i d

. a t 2

¶ 3; and, most r e l e v a n t t o t h i s a p p e a l

, Napleton w o u l d “ forever quit i ts interest , if any it

has, in the owne rsh ip of the Wyoming Valley Audi and Volkswagen dea lerships,” i d

. a t 3

¶ 5 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) , and forbear “fr om suing any po tential pro spective p u r c h a s e r ” of

t hose dealerships, i d

. a t 5 ¶ 11. The June 29 order also se t forth the i s s u e s t o b e l i t i g a t e d

a t t r i a l

, i n c l u d i n g w h e t h e r Audi’s right of first refusal h ad b e e n v i o l a t e d

, t h e v a l u a t i o n o f

t h e d e a l e r s h i p s

, a nd Wyoming V alley’s and Napleton’s count erclaims against Audi for

damages. I

d

. a t 3

– 4 ¶¶ 7

– 8

.

The l i t i g a t i o n c o n t i n u e d

, w i t h a l l parties ultimately m o v i n g fo r summary

judgment. On Februar y 16, 2018, the District Cou rt ent ered an order: (1) denying Audi’s

motion as to its claims agai nst Wyoming Valley; (2) granti n g Wyoming Valley’ s motion

as to A u d i ’ s claims against i t ; and (3) lifting the p reliminary inj unctio n. The District

Court later di smissed four of Na pleton’s counterclaims and one of Wyoming Valley’s.

The parti es settled Wyoming Valley’s ot h er counterclaim. At that point, on ly Napleton’s

claims again st Audi for tortious interference remained. On March 16 , 2018, the District

Court e ntered summa ry jud gment in favor of Audi as to those claims. W y o m i n g V a l l e y

a n d N a p l e t o n a p p e a l e d

, b u t w e affi rmed.

On Ju ne 25, 2020, three we eks after w e i s s u e d o u r o p i n i o n affirm i n g the Dis trict

Cour t’s judgment, Wyomin g Valley and Napleton executed new AP As transfe rring5

ownership of the Audi and Volkswagen dealerships from Wyoming Valley to Na pleton.

Aud i immediately moved the District Court to enforce its Ju ne 29 or der and declare the

new APAs void

. A u d i argued that t h e June 29 order

— whic h i t char acterized as a n

enforceable part ial settlement order, or “consent decree”

— makes clear that Naple ton

agreed t o “forever quit” its interest in purch asing the Audi and Volkswa gen dealerships.

According to Wy oming Valley a nd Nap leton, however, Napl eton only q uit its intere st in

the dealersh ips pending resolution of the prior lawsuit ; now that that suit ha d been

res olved, they a r g u e d

, t h e y were free to enter into new APA s. M o r e o v e r , Wyoming

Valley and Napleton a s s e r t e d , bec ause t he June 29 order imposed only a prelimi nary

injunction that diss olved when the Dis trict Court entered final judgment in the cas e, the

District Court lacke d c o n t i n u i n g jurisdicti on to enforce it.

The Di strict Court rejected the arguments mad e by Wyo ming V alley and Napleton

a n d e x p l a i n e d t h a t

, c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r c o n t e n t i o n

, t h e J u n e 2 9 o r d e r m e m o r i a l i z e d a p a r t i a l

s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t p u r s u a n t t o w h i c h N a p l e t o n “ f o r e v e r q u i t i t s i n t e r e s t i n p u r c h a s i n g

t h e A u d i a n d V o l k s w a g e n d e a l e r s h i p [ s ] b u t w a s p e r m i t t e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e p u r c h a s e

o f t h e o t h e r 5 d e a l e r s h i p s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e A P A

. ” O p

. 8

, E C F N o

. 5 9 2

. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t

, “ Napleton’s argument that the June 29, 2017 Order is a preliminary

inj unc tion order is a mischaracterizati on at be st, and i ntellectually dishonest, bord ering

on sanc tionable, at worst. ” I d

. a t 9

. H a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e J u n e 2 9 o r d e r w a s a

c o n s e n t d e c r e e t h a t i t r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n f o r c e

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n agreed with6

Audi that Wyom ing Valley and Nap let on had violated paragraph 5 of that order.

Acco rdi ngly, the District Court granted the motion to e nforce and deem ed the June 25,

2020 APAs between Wyoming Valley and Napleton nu ll an d void. Napleton appeal s

. 1

I I

.

A

.

Napleton asserts that the Dis trict Co urt la cked jurisdictio n to enforce the June 29

o rder

. 2 The Distri ct Cou rt ’s jurisdi ction to enforce that order turns on whether the order

is a “consent d e c r e e ,” which the court retai ned jurisdiction to enforc e, see Holland v

. N

. J

.

D e p ’ t o f C o r r

. , 246 F.3d 2 6 7

, 277 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t a co nsent decree is

, i n

p a r t

, “ in t he form of a judicial o rder that the par ties expect w ill be subject to the rules

generally applicable to other judgments and orders ” ) , or a prelim inary injunct ion, whi ch

dissolv ed on final judgment, s ee Ro driquez v. 32n d Legi slatu re of t h e V

. I

. , 859 F.3d 199,

207 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A preliminary injunction cannot survive the dismissal of a

complaint.” ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )). A c c o r d i n g t o N a p l e t o n

, t h e J u n e 2 9 o r d e r w a s a

p r e l i m i n a r y i n

j u n c t i o n

— n o t a c o n s e n t d e c r e e

— b e c a u s e i t p r o v i d e d o n l y t e m p o r a r y

r e s t r i c t i o n s a n d o t h e r w i s e m a i n t a i n e d t h e s t a t u s q u o

.

W e h a v e e x p l a i n e d t h a t a c o n s e n t decree i s a n o r d e r “ t h a t reflect [ s ] the s e t t l e m e n t

t e r m s a g r e e d b y t h e p a r t i e s a n d c o n t a i n [ s ] a n i n j u n c t i o n

. ” Teamsters Loc. 177 v. United

1 W e h a v e juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 Issues of s ubj ect

- matter juris diction receive plenary r eview. Ramirez v. Vintage

Pharm., LLC

, 8 52 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2017).7

Parcel Serv. , 966 F.3d 245 , 254 (3d Cir. 2020) ; s e e a l s o Christ ina A. ex rel . Jennifer A. v.

Bloomberg , 315 F.3d 990, 99 3 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003) ( “A conse nt decre e is defin ed as ‘ [a]

court decree that all parties a gree to.’ ” ( quoting Black’s Law Diction ary 4 19 (7th ed.

1999)) )

. T h i s d e s c r i b e s p r e c i s e l y t h e J u n e 2 9 o r d e r : i t r e f l e c t s t h e p a r t i e s ’ a g r e e m e n t t o

r e s o l v e c e r t a i n d i s p u t e d m a t t e r s a n d e x t e n d t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n a s t o o t h e r s

. T h e

f a c t t h a t t h e o r d e r d i d n o t f i n a l l y r e s o l v e a l l c l a i m s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t i s n o t a c o n s e n t

d e c r e e

. S e e

, e

. g

. , I

n t ’ l B h d

. o

f T e a m s t e r s v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s

, 4 3 1 U

. S

. 3 2 4

, 3 3 0 n

. 4 ( 1 9 7 7 )

( d e s c r i b i n g a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t n a r r o w e d t h e s c o p e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n a s a “ c o n s e n t d e c r e e ” )

.

T h e r e f o r e

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e o r d e r w a s a c o n s e n t d e c r e e

“ s u b j e c t t o c o n t i n u e d j u d i c i a l p o l i c i n g

. ” Williams v. Vukovich , 720 F.2d 909, 9 20 (6th

Cir. 1983)

.

B

.

1

.

Having det ermined that th e District Co urt r etained juris d iction to enforce the June

29 c o n s e n t d e c r e e

, we now turn to the District Court ’ s substantive determination that

Napleton viol ated the terms of the a g r e e m e n t m e m o r i a l i z e d in that order. We review the

District Court’s order enforcing compliance wi th a consent decre e for abuse of discretion.

Ho ll and , 246 F. 3d a t 281

.

Before we can rev iew whether the District Court abused its discretion , we mu st8

first determine what the u nderl ying orde r re quired o f W y o m i n g V a l l e y . Th is raises a

prelimina ry question conce rning t he standard fo r our review of the District Court’s

con struction of the June 29 c o n s e n t d e c r e e

.

In Holland v. New Jersey Department of Corrections , we explained that

“[b]ecause of the hybri d con tractual/cour t order status of a consent decr ee, ther e is so me

confusion in the cou rt s . . . as to what standard of review” to apply. 246 F.3d at 277. We

recognized that some courts have deferred to a district judge’s in terpretation of consent

decre e pro visions becau se , in their view, “few persons are in a better position to

understand t he meaning of a consent decree than th e district judge who oversaw and

approved it.” Id. (quoting Berger v. Heckler , 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n.32 (2d Cir. 1 985)).

We re jecte d that approa ch , however, and concluded that because a conse nt decree

embodies a co nt ractual agreement between the parties, it “is subject to straightforward

plenary or de novo review.” Id

. ; accord Consumer Fin. Prot. Bure au v. Klopp , 95 7 F.3d

454, 46 3 (4t h Cir. 2020) ( “Abiding by the court’s own sub jective intent rather than an

objecti ve interpretation of the document would violate the first cardinal principle for

interpreting consent orders: meaning is properly to be soug ht within the c onfines of the

judi cially appro v e d documents expressing the part ies’ co nsent.” (quotation marks and

a lte ration omitted)); Frew v. Janek , 820 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Unlike some of

our sister circuits, this Court does not defer to a d istrict court’s interpretatio n of a consent

de c r ee. Instead, we review questio ns of c onsent decree interpretation d e n ovo .” (footnote9

omitted)); see also G ov’t Emps. Ret. Sys. of V

. I

. v

. G o v ’ t o

f V

. I

. , 995 F.3d 6 6

, 78 ( 3 d C i r

.

2 0 2 1 ) (applying de novo review).

T h e r e m a y

, h o w e v e r

, b e g o o d r e a s o n t o q u e s t i o n whether t h e de novo s tanda rd of

review w e d i s c u s s e d i n H o l l a n d sh ou ld appl y h e r e

, s i n c e J u d g e J o n e s h imself drafted the

stipula tions a t i s s u e in th e June 29 c o n s e n t d e c r e e . While i t i s c l e a r t h a t de novo review

is a ppropriate when the parties draft a contract

- like agreement and the d istrict c ourt

merely approve s it, s o m e measure of de feren ce m a y b e due when, i nstead, the d istrict

j udge h i m s e l f d r a f

t s an order memorializing wh at the part ies agreed to during a

conferen ce or hearing t h a t t o o k p l a c e b e f o r e h i m

. C

f

. In re Lazy Days’ RV Ctr. Inc.

, 724

F.3d 418, 4 23 (3d Ci r. 2013) (“[H]ere the Bankruptc y Court was as ked t o reopen

proc eedings to res olve a dispute regarding the Sett lement Agreement it had p reviously

co nfir med. And because the Bankruptcy Cou rt here was well suited to provide the bes t

interpretation of its own order, it had jurisdiction to reopen.” (quot ation marks and

ci tations omitte d)). As t h e S e v e n t h C i r c u i t has observe d, “[w]hen a judge is int erpre ting

his own order, such as a consent de cree that he entered, his interpretation i s entitled to

greater weigh t than when he is interpreting a contr act with the f ormat ion of which he had

nothing to do.” Foufas v. Dru , 319 F.3d 284, 286 (7th Cir. 2003) (dic tum)

. Thus, t h e r e

m a y b e g o o d r e a s o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h Holland

, a s “[i]t is only sen sible to give the court tha t

wrote the consent ju dgment greater defe rence when it is par sing its own work.” Sault10

Ste. Marie Tr ibe o

f C h i p p e w a I n d i a n s v. Engler , 146 F.3d 3 67, 3 71 (6th Cir. 1998 ); see

also Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , 494 F.3d 846, 855 (9th C ir. 2007)

.

We need not re solve

, h o w e v e r

, t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r s o m e d e f e r e n c e

i s d u e t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e c o n s e n t d e c r e e

.

A p p l y i n g e i t h e r a def

erenti al o r de novo standard of r eview

, we would affirm th e District

Court’s j u d g m e n t

.

2

.

E v e n u n d e r t h e m o r e s t r i n g e n t d e n o v o s t a n d a r d

, w e s e e n o e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ’ s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t

, u n d e r t h e S t i p u l a t e d T e r m s o f t h e J u n e 2 9 c o n s e n t d e c r e e

,

N a p l e t o n w a s f

o r e c l o s e d f

r o m e v e r purchasing t h e A u d i a n d V o l k s w a g e n d e a l e r s h i p s

.

“[ S]ince consent decrees

. . . have many o f the attributes of ordinary c ontracts,

they shou ld be constru ed basically as contracts.” United States v. I TT Cont ’ l Baking Co

. ,

420 U.S. 223, 23 6

– 3 7 (1975) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d )

. “ [ A ] provision in a d ecree is ambiguous

onl y when, from an objective standpoint, it is reasonably susceptible to at least two

different interpretations

. ” United States v. New Jersey , 194 F.3d 426, 4 30 (3 d Cir. 1999).

N o t a b l y

, “ [ i ] n a d d r e s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f a m b i g u i t y

, o u r f o c u s r e m a i n s o n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l

l a n g u a g e i t s e l f

, r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e p a r t i e s ’ s u b j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e l a n g u a g e

. ” I d

.

P a r a g r a p h 5 o f t h e “Stipulat e d T e r m s ” s t a t e s i n r e l e v a n t p a r t th at “Napleton

SHALL forever quit its interest, if any it has, in the ownership of the W yoming Valley

Audi and Vo lkswagen Dealerships.” O r d e r 3 ¶ 5

, E C F N o

. 2 1 3

. T h e phrase “shall11

f orever quit its interest ” unambiguously indicates that the provisi on applies indefinitely

and does not expire upon conclusion of the litiga tion

. W h i l e N a p l e t o n i n s i s t s t h a t i t

a g r e e d o n l y t o t e m p o r a r i l y q u i t w h a t e v e r l e g a l i n t e r e s t i t h a d i n t h e d e a l e r s h i p s a t t h a t

t i m e

— w h i c h w a s n o n e

— w e c a n n o t d i s r e g a r d t h e w o r d “ f o r e v e r ” i n p a r a g r a p h 5

. S e e

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc. , 61 9 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1980) ( “ A

court is not authorized to construe a contract in such a w ay as to modify the plain

meaning of its words, under the guise of int erpretation. ” ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ) ; H a l d e r m a n

b y H a l d e r m a n v

. P e n n h u r

s t S t a t e S c h

. & H

o s p

. , 9 0 1 F

. 2 d 3 1 1

, 3 1 9 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 0 ) ( “ T h e

u s e o f t h e w o r d ‘ p e r m a n e n t l y ’ c o n v e y s t h e d e f i n i t e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s d i d n o t

e n v i s i o n t h a t t h e [ r e l e v a n t o b l i g a t i o n s ] w o u l d e n d o n c e r t a i n d a t e s i n t h e f u t u r e ” )

.

T h e r e f o r e

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t e r r

.

3

.

L a s t l y

, h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u e d t h e t e r m s o f

t h e J u n e 2 9 o r d e r

, w e c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r the District Court a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n w h e n i t

c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e J u n e 2 0 2 0 A P A s v i o l a t e d t h a t o r d e r

. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t Napleton’s

attempt to purchase the Audi and Vo lk swagen dealerships u n q u e s t i o n a b l y violate d i t s

a g r e e m e n t t o “ f

o r e v e r q u i t i t s i n t e r e s t ” i n a c q u i r i n g t h e d e a l e r s h i p s . Therefore, the

District Co urt acted within its discretion in grantin g the mot ion to en force tha t order and

b y deeming the APAs void.12 I I I

.

W e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d N a p l e t o n ’ s r e m a i n i n g a r g u m e n t s o n a p p e a l a n d co nclude t h a t

t h e y a r e m e r i t l e s s

. A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e w i l l a f f i r m

.