### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00335- CR

Eve r e tt Sm it h, A ppe lla nt
v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 30208 16, H ONO RAB LE WILF ORD F LOW ERS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant guilty of the felony offe nse of dea dly conduct. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.05 (West 2003)
. Appellant pled “true ” to two enha nceme nt alleg ations involving prior convic tions, and the jury sentenc ed appellant to f ive and one-ha lf y ear s’ imprisonment. I n a single point of err or, appe llant contends that his counsel’s failure to prope rly argue a Batson challeng e duringvoir dire c onstitut ed inef fec tive assistance of counse l. We will af firm the judg ment of convic tion.
DI SCU SSIO N

At the end of

voir dire, the State use d two of its pere m p t o ry challeng es to strike venire persons Scott and W oods. Appellant’s trial counsel objec ted on the g rounds that these strike sWhen a prosec utor offe rs explanations for the challeng ed st rikes and the court rules on the 1 ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether appe llant made a prima fa cie showingis moot. He rn an de z v . Ne w York

, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Although the rec ord does not include Ms. Woods’ criminal history , the re ason g iven by the 2 State for striking Ms. Woods was unc ontradicte d at trial and f acia lly plausible and ther efor e qualifie s as a r ace -neutra l expl anation for the strike. Se e Fo rd

v . S tate , 1 S.W. 3d

69 1, 69 3- 94 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1999). 2 of Afr ican- Americ an j u ro rs we re racia lly motivated and moved to have the prosec utor produce a
rac e-ne utral re ason for

the per empto ry

challeng es. See B atson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Lop e z v . S tate , 94 0 S
. W
. 2d 388, 390 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref ’d) ( when oppone nt of pere mptory strike m akes out prima facie case of rac ial discrimination, burden shifts to proponent of strike to articulate ra ce- neutra l expl anation for pere mptory challeng e). Wit hout waiting f or the c ourt to rule on whe ther a

ppellant had met his initial burden of raising a prima f acie case of discrimination, the prosec utor offe red e x planati o n s for striking the two jurors. The trial court wa s then obligated to decide whether appellant had proved purposeful racial discrimination. Fo rd v . S tate , 1 S.W .3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The cour t imme d i at ely

acc epted the State’ s expl anations and
overr uled the Batson ob

je c tio n. De fe ns e c ouns e l a c c e de d to the jud g e ’s ru lin g wi tho ut a rgume nt. 1 Ap pe l l an t a c c e p t s t h a t t h e S t a t e o f f e r e d a r a c e - n e u t r a l e xp l an a t i o n f o r s t r i k i ng Ms. Sc ott bu t argue s tha t the State ’s re a so n for str iki ng Ms. Woo ds wa s er ro ne ou s. With re g ard

to M s. Woo ds , th e pr os e c uto r e xpla ine d th a t he e xer c ise d his pe re mpt or y c ha lle ng e be c a

us e a re vie w o f M s. Woods’s criminal h istory reve aled that she had a no- insurance ticket, which indicated a lac k of responsibility
. The prose cutor fur ther c laimed that when he questioned Ms. Woods, he had to re peat 2 his question because she wa s not pa y ing attention. The prose cutor be lieved that Ms. Woods failed to give him a straig ht answer and only indicated that she ag ree d with what another juror had sa id.The prose cutor a sked ea ch venir eper son to indi ca t e wh at h e or she felt the primar y and 3 seconda ry g oals of the c riminal justice sy stem should be (e.g ., punishment/retribution, deterr ence , or re ha bil itatio n) . M s. Woo ds ’s ans we rs do no t di ff e r i n f or m f ro m th e ve nir e pe rs on s im me diate ly be fo re or a ft e r h e r: Mr. McNe lis: Mr. Sams, 14. Venire person Sams: Deter renc e, re habilitation. Mr. McNe lis: Ms. Woods , No. 15. Venire person Woods: Deter renc e, re habilitation. Mr. McNe lis: 16, Dr. Stroud. Venire person Stroud: Punishm ent, then re habilitation. Howeve r, the re cord doe s not indicate Ms. Woods’s tone of voice, bo d y l an gu age or fa cial expressions, any

of which ma

y be used to justify

a per emptory

challeng e. Se e Cha mb e rs v . S tate , 724 S.W .2d 440, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, pet. re f’d) (body lang uag e suff

icient rac e-ne utral explanation). We note t hat even if Ms. Woods had not rec eived a no-insuranc e ticket a

nd even if counsel 4 proved that th e p ro s ec utor’s cla im that Ms. W oods had bee n inattentive was w rong , showing that the re as o n gi v en for the strike was e rrone ous does not satisfy appellant’ s burden to prove that the rea son g iven was a

prete x t for a r acia lly

motivated strike. Fo rd , 1 S.W .3d at 694. 3 Appellant points out that the rec ord of the voir dire does not support the prose cutor’s statements that he ha d to repe at a qu es t i o n to Ms. W oods or that she g ave a ny indication of not paying attention. I nstead, the r ecor d shows that the prosec utor asked e ach juror the same que stion
and Ms. Woo ds a

pp e are d to ans we r i t a s d ir e c tly a s o the r jur or s ar ound he r. Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s, 3 there fore , that the State fa iled to raise a leg itimate, rac e-ne utral explanation fo r i ts peremptory
c ha lle ng e of

Ms. Woo ds
. 4 Citi ng to Fo rd

v . S tate , appellant a cknowledg es th a t d efe nse counse l’s failure to rebut the State’s re ason for

striking the pr ospective juror means that a

ppellant cannot succe ssfully pursue his Batson claim on the mer its. See 1 S.W .3d at 693 (if State’ s expl anation is uncontra dicted at tria l4

and fa cially

plausible, it will be upheld as ra ce- neutra l; opponent of strike has bur den of pe rsuasion at trial to show that strike wa s rac ially motivated). Rather , appellant c laims that his attorney ’s fa ilure to cross-e x amine the pr os ec u tor or point out that the rec ord did not support the State’s prof fer ed
e xplanatio n c on sti tut e d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.
Stan dard of Revie w

I n deter mining cla ims of ineffe ctive assist a n c e o f c o u n s e l, T e xas has a dopted the twoprong ed st andar d established by the Unit ed S tates Supreme Court in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He rn an de z v . S tate , 726 S.W .2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To preva il on a
c la im o f ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e , an a pp e lla nt mus t pro ve by a pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e that hi s counsel’s pe rfor

mance fell below a

n objective standard of rea sonablene ss a s define d by preva iling profe ssional norms. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88. Second, appe llant must prove that his counsel’s defic ient repr esentation prejudiced his def ense. Id . at 68 7; Mi tchell v . S tate , 68 S.W .3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This means that appe llant must show a rea sonable proba bility that, but for his counsel’s unprof

essional er

rors, the result of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent. Mi tc he ll , 68 S.W. 3d

a t 64 2. A r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity is a pr ob a bil ity su ff ic ie nt t o und e rm ine c on fi de nc e in the outcome. Id . Absent either showing , we cannot conclude that there has bee n a bre akdown in the adver sarial proce ss that rende rs the re sult unreliable. Tho mp so n v. Sta te , 9 S. W. 3 d 8 0 8 , 8 1 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999).

I n mea suri ngan atto rn e y ’s e ff e c tiv e ne ss, any

jud ic ia l r e vie w mus t be hig hly de fe re nti a l to tr ia l c ouns e l, a nd we a pp ly a str on g pr e sumpt ion

that th e a tto rn e y ’s c on du c t wa s w ith in the ra ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance. Id
. As noted in Strickland , “A f air a ssessment of5

attorn ey perf ormanc e re quires that eve ry eff ort be made to eliminate the distorting e ffe cts of hindsight, to rec on s t ruct the c ircumstance s of counse l’s challeng ed conduc t, and to evaluate the conduct f rom counsel’ s perspe ctive at the time
. . . .” 466 U.S. at 689. To defe at the pre sumption of re asonable profe ssional assistance, the rec ord must affir matively demonst rate any

alleg ed ineffe ctiveness. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d.at 814.

Any al leg ation of ineff

ectivene ss must be firmly founded in the r ecor d. See id. ; Bl e v ins v . S

tate , 1 8 S. W.3 d 26 6, 27 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 , n o p e t.) . In th is c a se , th e re c or d is silent as to why

appellant’ s trial counsel did not continue to pre ss the Batson challeng e af ter the tria l judge o verr

uled the objec tion. Appellant assumes that, g iven counse l’s decision to object to the strikes in the first place , he could have had no reasonable tr ial strateg y in not conducting a fur

ther inquiry into the State’s ex planations or providing evidence to show racial pr etext. This assumpt ion does not equa l proof. He re w e have only the record on direc t appea l, which is undeve loped and f rom which we cannot disce rn appe llant ’s t ri al co unsel’s strate g y . I t is possi ble that def ense c ounsel abandone d the challeng e bec ause he rec eived ne w information lea ding him to find Ms. Woods an undesirable juror, bec ause it would be impossible to persua de the c o urt that the State’s re ason for striking Ms. Woods was a pr etext for rac ial discrimination, or for some othe r re ason. The r ecor d does not show counse l’s trial strateg y , and this a lleg ed err or is not the ty pe that will be evide nt in the
rec ord on direc t appea l. This is not o n e of those r are case s in which the re cord on dire ct appe al adequately

ref lects the fa iling of tria l counsel. See B levins , 18 S.W .3d at 272. Be cause the re cord doe s not affirmatively demonstrate that appellant’s a cts or omissions wer e unguided by rea sonable t ri al strateg y , appellant ha s not overcome the strongOur c ourts have c onsistently rec og nized that habeas c orpus is the pref err ed method of 5 raising an inef

fec tive-assistance claim. Se e Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The g ener al rule forbidding application for a writ of habea s corpus for issues decide d on the me r it s o n d ir e c t a

p p e a l d o e s n o t a

p p ly to d e n ia ls o f in e f

f e c ti v e - a s s is ta

n c e c la im s b a s e d o nthe inadequa cy

of the re cord. Id
. 6 presumption that the attorne y ’s conduc t was within the rang e of rea sonable assistance
. Se e id . at 814 (co u r ts s h o u ld h e s itate to decla

re ine ffe ctive assistanc e base d on single alleg ed miscalc ulation during what amounts t o o t h erwi s e s at i s fa ct o ry re p re s en t at i o n , es p ec i al l y wh en re co rdp ro v i d es no indication of c ouns e l’s moti vatio n) ; Blevins , 18 S.W .3d at 272 (“ I n the abse nce of such a r ecor d, appellant cannot i n t h i s d irec t appea l overc ome the strongpresumption that his trial counsel’s strateg y was
rea sonable fr om counsel’s pe rspec tive at trial.”)
. 5
CO NC LU SION Be cause , on this rec ord, appellant cannot ove rcome the strong presumption that trial
co u n s el ’s per formanc e wa s rea sonable, he cannot mee t the first prongof Strickland , a nd we mus t there fore hold that he has not shown ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. See H ernandez , 726 S.W .2d
a t 57 . We ov e rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s is su e and

a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: January

27, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh