Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 1 of 22 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLANTS Michael B. Troemel Lafayette, Indiana Harold E. Amstutz Lafayette, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the Parent

Child Relationships of: X.S., A.S., L.S., and Ar.S. (Minor Children) and M.S. (Mother) and A.S. (Father), Appellant s-

Respondents,

v. 

### The Indian a Departmen t o f C hild Services, Appellee-P

etitioner. January 30, 2019 Court of Appeals Case No. 18A

- JT -1915 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Faith A. Graham, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 79D03 -1711- JT

- 124, 79D03 -1711- JT

- 125, 79D03 -1711- JT

- 126, and 79D03 -1711- JT -127Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 2 of 22 Riley , Judge.


### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants

- Respondents, M.S. (Mother) and A.S. (Father) , (collectively, Parents), appeal from the trial court’s Order terminating their pare ntal rights to their minor children, X.S., A.S., L.S., and Ar.S. (collectively, Children).

[2] We affirm.


### ISSUES

[3] Parents present seven issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues : (1) Whether the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions t hat resulted in removal would not be remedied or that continuation of the parental relationship posed a threat to Children w as clearly erroneous; and (2) Wheth er the trial court’s conclusion that it was in Children’s best interests to termi nate Parents’ rights was clearly erroneous.


### FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and Father were married in March 2009 and have four minor children, X.S., born August 2009, A.S., born January 2011, L.S., born April 2013, andCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 3 of 22 Ar.S., born October 2015. 1 Parents’ and Children’s involvement with the Department of Child Services (DCS) dates back to 2012. Childre n have been declared children in need of services (CHINS) on two occasions prior to the instant proceedings for conditions including Mother’s incarceration for habitual theft, Father’s incarceration for fraud , Children being left with strangers , Mother giv ing Children adult medication so she could sleep, and Mother providing L.S. with Klon o pin

. In 2015, the family became homeless after some of Children set their house on fire playing with a lighter.

[5] Mother has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder I, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Borderline Personality Disorder. As a result of these conditions , Mother has experienced mood swings, irritability, mania, aggression, difficulty in concentration, and anxiety, among a host of symptoms. Mother has a lso experienced episodes of psychosis and hallucinations. On January 25, 2016, Mother was arrested following a physical altercation with her sister , who had been allowing the family to stay with her. Following her release from jail, Mother’ s mental healt h deteriorated, and she attempted suicide by running into traffic. Mother was hospitalized following this attempt. On February 8, 2016, a third CHINS proceeding involving Children was initiated because of Mother’s mental health status and the fact that t he family was homeless with P arents having n o viable plan to acquire housing. That CHINS

1 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to an older child in August 2009. Parents had a fifth child during the underlying CHINS proceeding. That child has also been removed from Parents’ care but is not subject to the instant appeal.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 4 of 22 proceeding resulted in an informal adjustment. Parents were offered a number of services, including mental health services and Homebuilders, an inten sive four

- week p rogram to improve Parents’ ability to provide a stable and secure home environment for Children.

[6] During this period of informal adjustment, Father was convicted of traffic offenses and was again incarcerated. F ather did not have a valid legal status in the United States. Upon his release from incarceration on the traffic offenses, Father was detained by the immigration authorities. Children were in Mother’s sole care. While she was participating in Home builders, Mother leased a home that had multiple safety and habitability issues, including no runn ing water, peeling paint, broken windows, and an unstable second story. While the family

was staying in the living room of the home, part of the ceiling collapsed

. After a city inspection of the property, the landlord gave notice to Mother that she would be evicted.

[7] On August 2, 2016, a fourth CHINS proceeding was filed, and Chi ldren were placed with a foster family, where they resided throughout the instant proceedings

. As part of the dispositional orde r of the CHINS, Parents were directed to procure and maintain stable housing. Parents were offered a variety of services, including individual and couple ’ s counseling, medication management services, home based case management, and supervised parenting ti me. The permanency plan was reunification. On March 14, 2017, Father was provided bond funds by a community resource and was released from the custody of the immigration authorities.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 5 of 22 [8] Parents initially made progress in their services and were allowed to care for Children on overnight visits. However, Mother’s mental health declined during those overnight visits, as she experienced psychosis and hallucinations. Father was employed, and Mother was the sole provider of care for Children when Father was at work. Mother provided Children with sleeping pills that were inappropriate for their age. Mother was directed by DCS to cease medicating Children, bu t she did not. On a home visit, t wo of the Children were observed to be incapable of standing up as a r esult of having been administered this med ication. In addition, a safety plan to prevent inappropriate touching between two of Children was not being followed, and Children reported that domestic violence was occurring between Parents. Visitation reverte d to being fully supervised in a facility and remained so during the remainder of the instant proceedings.

[9] Mother attended individual counseling and engaged in medication management. In May 2017, Mother ingested an amount of Adderall that was inconsisten t with her prescription, causing her to believe she was having a heart attack. Subsequent investigation revealed that Mother was storing some of her medication loose in a tool box and was not taking her oral medications as prescribed. Mother was placed o n a management regime and was dispensed her oral medication s on a week ly basis. As a solution to her inconsistency in taking her oral m edications, in September 2017 Mother began receiving an injection of an anti

- psychotic medication that greatly relieved her episodes of psychosis and hallucinations.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 6 of 22 [10] After Children were removed from her care, Mother had no fixed address until December 2016, when she procured a small apartment with financial assistance from a community resource

. She subsequently moved to a two
- bedroom and then to a three

- bedroom apartment around September 2017. Based on an inaccurate report that she had no income and that Children were living with her, Mother’s rent and her electricity were entirely subsidized. Upon his release from immi gration custody, Father began living in the three

- bedroom apartment with Mother even though he was not allowed to be on the lease or live there because of his immigration status.

[11] Parents’ DCS case was periodically reviewed, and a concurrent plan of adopt ion was added. On November 15, 2017, DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Parents (TPR)

. R eport s generated by one of Parents’ service providers covering December 2017 and January 2018 revealed the following facts. Mother was arrested on November 28, 2017, for failing to appear at an initial hearing for a probation revocation proceeding. Mother was reportedly “shutting down and becoming desperate and depressed” in contemplation of the TPR proceedings. (Mother’s Exh. B , Vol. III, p. 5 ). Mother was responsible for scheduling her appointments to receive her injection of the anti

- psychotic medication b ut had received one injection a week late. Mother and Father continued to downplay concerns that their housing

was in jeopardy. In January 2018, Father requested assistance in contacting a free immigration clinic. FCM Reggie Brown (FCM Brown) met with P arents and the director of the immigration clinic, and Father completed the forms toCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 7 of 22 file FOIA requests pertinent to his immigration case. Father’s next immigration hearing was scheduled for December 2019.

[12] On February 12, 2018, and March 21, 2018, the t rial court held TPR hearings. FCM Brown, who had been with the family since July of 2016, testified that he had ongoing concerns about Mother’s mental health diagnosis and her ability to parent in that her mental health “ appears to decline with the respon sibility of bei ng a primary care

- giver, [C] hildren being in her care, um, has been my observation and a pattern that’s been identified throughout the duration of the case.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 137). FCM Brown recounted that due to the severity and gr avity of the safety concerns DCS had for Parents after the failed overnight visitation , DCS never attempted a trial home visit or unsupervised visitation for Children and that as recently as February 2018, Mother had been observed attempting to coach Child ren not to disclose unfavorable information. FCM Brown testified that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate Parents’ rights because Children “deserve permanency” and “this is a pattern behavior and cyclical thing with [Pa rents] that we’ve seen with . . . [Parents] having instability, not just housing . . . despite the intervention of services, [Parents] have not been successful in their services to rise to a level needed for reunification to take place.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 143). FCM Brown relate d that Children’s current foster family had not rejected the possibility of adoption and that other families had expressed interest in adopting Children . He was confident that Children were adoptable and reported that their ages and history ha d not been a barrier to interest in adopting them.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 8 of 22 [13] The Court Appointed Chil d Advocate, Mary Quinn (CASA Quinn ) , who had been with the family since the inception of the case , reported that Children were all on track with their education al and developmental milestones

. CASA Quinn , who had observed Children in the family home , at school, in their foster home, and with Parents during supervised visits , testified that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate Parents’ rights due to Children’s need for
permanency a nd Parents’ history of inability to “sustain adequate housing and adequate income and a safe environment for [Children].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 115

- 16). CASA Quinn felt Children were doing better since removal from Parents’ home because “although th e foster p arent [and] biological parent [sic] have very different parenting style s , [Children] can live with that. They have a harder time living with all the uncertainty that they had before they were removed from the home.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 116).

[14] Mother testif ied that for two months she had worked doing cleaning from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., seven days a week, earning $400 every two w eeks. Mother felt that she had not been offered services throughout the case and that it was never in the best interests of children for their parents’ rights to be terminated “if you’ve done nothing wrong.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 162). Mother felt that her mental health issues were “more emotional than anything.” (Tr. 166). Father testified that he worked from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Mondays and Tuesdays and that he worked from 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. Thursdays through Saturdays. Father earned approximately $1 , 200 per month.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 9 of 22 [15] On July 10, 2018, the trial court entered its Order terminating Parents’ rights to Children. The tri al court entered thirty

- two detailed findings, including the following:

8. The reasons for the third CHINS case also included instability

. [Summary of circumstances of third CHINS].

9. The reasons for the fourth CHINS case included the same instability , incarceration, and mental health issues. [Summary of circumstances of fourth CHINS].

* * *
13. Pursuant to the dispositional order and parental participation decree issued in the fourth CHINS case, Mother was offered the followi ng services: individu al therap y, group therapy, medication management , case management, random drug screen s , and parenting time. Father was offered case management, random drug screen s , and parenting time. These services have been exhaustive and have been designed to add re ss the difficulties of the family.

* * *
16. Mother reports current employment at Marshall’s cleaning Monday through Sunday from 7:00 [a.m.] to 10:00 [a.m.] making $ 4 00.00 every two (2) weeks. Mother reports having such employment for approximately two (2) months. Mother has historically been unemployed due to inability to cope with the responsibility and stress of employment. Father reports current employment at Red Seven cooking in the mornings and washing dishes in the evenings as well as occasiona l employment atCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 10 of 22 Marshalls cleaning with Mother. Father has historically remained employed as the primary earner

. 17. Both Mother and Father have a history of incarceration as noted above. At the onset of the fourth CHINS case, Father was incarcerated at the Tippecanoe County Jail. Father was transferred to a detention facility by immigration where he remained until May 2017. Mother is currently on probation.
18. There have been multiple moves since the third CHINS case

. [Summary of moves].

* * *

20. Mother and Father then reloca ted to the current three (3) bedroom apa rtme nt via subsidize d housing. Mother reported no em ploy ment/inco m e resulting in $0.00 rent and the addition of an electric subsidy. Mother also reported [C hildren ] would soon be residing in the home

. Mother ha s not corrected suc h info r mation with the subsidized hous ing aut hority. The hom e itself is appropriate. However, the stability of the ho m e is at risk. Father is prohi bited from leasing the apart m e nt due to his illeg a l immi g r ation status

. Mother reports an ag r ee m e nt with the landlord to allow Father to reside in the residence and to continue to reside in the residence herself without [C hildren ] but has fai led to provide any documentation reg a rding said agree m ent.
21. Mother has historically struggled with mental health issue s and treatment compliance.

* * *Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 11 of 22 24. In September 2017, Mother reluctantly began monthly injections along with oral medication. Mother is currently prescribed a long acting antipsycho tic injection for mood stabilization. Mother is also prescribed oral medication including Adderall as a stimulant to remain focused, Propranolol as an anti

- hypertensive to c ontrol anger, Lamictal as an anti

convulsive to act as a sedative for sleep and to control mood, and Topamax as an an ti

- convulsive to control mood . . . Mother agrees that the injection s have improved the stability of Mother’s mood since October 2017 and that her mental health is more stabilized. Mother reports a desire and intention t o continue therapy and medication, including injections.
25. A pattern has developed indicating the status of Mother’s mental health is, in part, directly correlated to responsibility and stress. Mother’s mental health tends to suffer with increased re sponsibility of employment and/or parenting. Mother will require ongoing medication and therapy throughout her life. Mother’s ability to parent is dependent upon Mother’ s strict compliance with treatment. Although Mother agrees she has and will always h ave mental health issues, Mother believes the issues are generally just emotional problems. Mother still struggles with insight regarding termination of parental rights often becoming angry and depressed followed by crying.
26. As recently as March 201 8, Mother’s therapist reported that Mother is shutting down emotionally and mentally noting Mother is unable to think straight due to anxiety. Mother has become increasingly desperate and depressed without a family plan if parental rights are terminated a nd appears very unstable. Mother did not schedule her injection appropriately and received it one (1) week late.

* * *Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 12 of 22 30. CASA, Mary Quinn, supports termination of parental rights in the best interests of [Children]. [Children] are in foster care an d are doing very well individually and as a sibling group . . . [Children] otherwise have no special needs and are adoptable. [Children] need continued consistency in parenting and education. [Children] need permanency for their future now. CASA [Quinn] specifically notes that “[h]istory shows it un likel[y] they will be able to provide and maintain a safe and stable environment.”
31. Although Mother and Father love [Children], continuation of the parent

- child relationships would be detrimental to [Chi ldren] . Mother continues to believe [P arents ] have done nothing wrong. On the contrary, [Children] have been involved with the child welfare system over the span of six (6) years and have been adjudicated CHINS twice. Any progress the parents have been able to make is routinely short

- lived.
32. The historical pattern of instability for [Chi ldren ] who have spent more than half of their young lives as CHINS outweighs an y such short

- term progress. De s p ite services provided to benefit the family and improvement in Mother’s mental health, concerns remain regarding long

- term stability and permanency for [Children]. [Parents] currently reside in subsidized housing at risk due to Father’s immigration status and d ishonesty regarding income and [C] hild ren residing in such housing. V isits with [Parents] remain fully supervised and safeguards have been added to ensure all [C]hildren are supervised at all times. Mother’s mental health has improved with injections but Mother is becoming increasingly depressed and unstable surrounding the termination proceeding.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. I, pp. 38

- 41). The trial court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in removalCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 13 of 22 of Children or the reasons for continued placement outsi de the home would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent

- children relationships posed a threat to the well

- being of Children, DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children, and that it was in Children’s best interest s that Par ents’ rights be terminated

.

[16] Parents now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.


### DISCUSS I ON AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[17] It is well

- settled that when reviewing the evidence supporting the termination of parental rights we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. In re E.M. , 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). In addition, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id . “We con fine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id . We must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the cr edibility of witnesses firsthand, and we do not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. Id

.
II . Termination of Parents’ Rights
[18] “[O]ne of the most valued relationships in our culture” is that between a parent and his or her child. In re G.Y. , 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009), re h’g denied.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 14 of 22 Indeed, “[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards “the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. Nevertheless, parental interests are not absol ute; rather, termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re A.B. , 887 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[19] Termination of parental rights is an extreme sanction that is intended as a “last resort” and is available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. In re C. A. , 15 N.E.3d 85 , 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). As such, before a termination of parental rights is merited, the State is required to prove a host of fact s by clear and convincing evidence, the most relevant for our purposes being that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the child’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by the parents and t hat termination is in the best interests of the child. 2 Ind. Code §§ 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2)(B)(i), ( C); 31

- 37

- 14

- 2. We address each of those factors in turn.

2 Pa rents filed separate Appellant’s Briefs in which they both assert that the trial court’s conclusion that they pose a continued threat to Children’s well

- being was clearly erroneous. However, neither develops an independent argument on the issue. Given th at we conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions meriting removal would not be remedied, we decline to address the issue . See In re A.P. , 882 N.E.2d 799, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the termination statute is written in the disjunctive and declining to address Father’s argument regarding his continued threat to the child where the evidence supported trial court’s conclusion that the conditions meriting removal had not been remedied).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 15 of 22 A. Reasonable Probability Conditions Will Not Be Remedied
[20] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two

- step analysis. E.M. , 4 N.E.3d at 642

- 43. First, we must identify the conditions that led to removal; second, w e determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id . at 643. When engaging in the second step of this analysis, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the TPR proceeding, taking into account evidence of changed conditions, and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id . This delicate balance is entrusted to the tr ial court, and a trial court acts within its discretion when it weighs a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id . “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them fr om finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id

.
[21] Here, the conditions resulting in Children’s removal and continued placement were instability, incarceration, and Mother’s mental health. The main issue of inst ability for Parents was maintaining stable housing. Although Parents were residing in an appropriate three

- bedroom home at the time of the TPR hea ring, the trial court’s finding that this housing was at risk was supported by evidence that in order to proc ure th eir subsidized housing, Mother had misrepresented the household’s income and reported that Children were living in the homeCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 16 of 22 when they were not. In addition, Fa ther was living in the home where he was not allowed due to his immigration status. Housing acquired by fraud is not stable housing, and the trial court acted within its discretion when it concluded that Parents’ latest housing was part of an ongoing pattern of instability that indicated a substantial proba bility of future housing instability. Id

.
[22] The second reason for removal and continued placement outside of the home was Parents’ incarceration. At the time of the TPR hearing, neither Parent was incarcerated. However, the trial court found that Parent s had a history of incarcerat ion, which the trial court could, within its discretion, consider in making its TPR determination

. See In re K.E. , 39 N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015) (noting that when assessing changed conditions against patterns of habitual cond uct, a trial court may consider a parent’s criminal history). In addition, as recently as November 28, 2017, Mother had been arrested for failing to appear at an initial hearing on a petition to r evoke her probation. The probation revocation court contin ued Mother on probation, subject to her completing a driving course, which, as of the TPR hearing, she had not completed. In addition, Father is not in the country legally. He had been married to Mother since 2009 and had his first child with her that ye ar. Despite the l ength of time he had been in the country and his detention by immigration authorities , Father took no proactive steps to address his immigration status until January of 2018, after the TPR petition was filed. A trial court may “disregard the efforts . . . made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily [a paren t ’ s] history of c onduct prior to those efforts.” In re K.T.K. , 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 17 of 22 (Ind. 2013). We see no clear error in the trial court’s findings or conclusions on this condition of removal. E.M. , 4 N.E.3d at 642

.
[23] The last condition which resulted in removal of Children and their continued placement was Mother’s mental health. Neithe r party disputes that Mother has grave mental health issues. The trial court found that Mother’s mental health had improved since she began receiving injection s in September 2017. However, t he trial court weighed this recent improvement against Mother’s marked mental health decline at the time of the TPR hearings , Mother ’s pattern of dec lining mental health when faced with the increased responsibility of work and childcare , and the fact that she exhibited a lack of insight regarding her mental health , as M other felt that her mental heal th issues were simply emotional in nature . The trial court found that “[t]he historical pattern of instability for these [C] hildren who have spent more than half of their young lives as CHINS outweigh any such short

- lived progress.” (Appellant’s App. Vol . II, p. 41). Thus, the trial court took into account evidence of Mother’s improvements but found that her past patterns weighed more heavily in favor of termination , which was within the trial court’s discretion. E.M. , 4 N.E.3d at 6 43

.
[24] Father’s main a rgument regarding the conditions of removal centers on Mother’s mental health, as he argues that “[t]here can be no doubt that the primary reason for both parents [sic] parental rights being terminated was based on the mother’s mental health issues (DCS Ex hibits 3, 5).” (Father’s Brief p. 11). We find that Father’s characterization of the trial court’s decision toCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 18 of 22 terminate Parents’ rights to be overly narrow , as it appears from the many detailed findings entered by the trial court regarding Parents ’ hous ing instability that Parents’ inability to provide stable housing was at least as important to its decision as Mother’s mental health. Thus, it is inaccurate, as Father contends on appeal, that the trial court impermissibly terminated his rights based sol ely on Mother’s mental health status or his unwillingness to live separately from Mother

.
[25] Parents also direct our attention to evidence in the record that does not support the trial court’s determination. These arguments are unavailing given our standar d of review which precludes us from considering such evidence. See id.
at 642 ; see also In re V.A. , 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (holdin g that a reviewing court may not “reverse a trial court’s judgment based on a belief that the parent

- child relationship should be preserved and support that determination by rummaging through the record to obtain evidence that may support the denial of a p etition to terminate”) . Because the trial court ’ s findings and conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which merited removal and continued placement of Children would not be remedied were supported by the record, we find no clear error. See E.M. , 4 N.E.3d at 642

.
B

. Best Interests of Child ren [26] Both Parents make a cursory challenge to the trial court’ s conclusion that termination of their parental rights was in Children’s best interests. Our supreme court has recently recog nized that one of the most difficult aspects of aCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 19 of 22 termination of parental rights determination is the issue of whether the termination is in the child’s best interest s
. Id. at 647 (noting that the question “necessarily places the children’s interest in pr eserving the family into conflict with their need for permanency”). The trial court’s determination that termination was in the child’s best interests requires it to look at the totality of the evidence of a particular case. In re D.D. , 804 N.E.2d 258, 2 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied . “In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved.” Id

. We have held that a recommendation by both the case manager and the CASA to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
term ination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. , 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158

- 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied

.
[27] Here, the evidence established that Parents had a pattern of inability to provide for the safety and security o f Children. Parents moved six times after the third CHINS proceeding was initiated. Mother provided inaccurate information to procure the subsidy that allowed Parents to live rent

- free in the home where they intended to bring Children. Father was not al lowed to be living in the home due to his immigration status , but he was living there regardless

. The one attempt during the pendency of the case to return Children to Parents ’ care for overnight stays ended when two Children were inappropriately medicate d , a safety plan to prevent inappropriate touching between two Children was not followed, and Children were exposed to domestic violence. Although ParentsCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 20 of 22 engaged in services, they never made sufficient progress so that they could have unsupervised visits with Children.

[28] Mother’s progress on her mental health wa s just beginning as a result of her injected medication. T he injections were not a cure

- all, and Mother had exhibited a pattern of decline in her mental health when she was the sole caretaker of C hildren. Because of Parents’ work schedules as of the TPR hearing, if Children were returned to Parents’ care, they would be in Mother’s sole care for long periods of time while Father worked. There was no evidence in the record that a plan had been put into place to ensure Children’s safety during those periods. This is particularly troubling since Mother implied at the TPR hearing that she felt she had done nothing wrong in parenting Children.

[29] O n the other hand, Children were doing well in foster car e and were meeting their educational and developmental milestones. FCM Brown and CASA Quinn were both in favor of termination. CASA Quinn in particular felt that Children had benefitted from the consistency afforded by their foster placement, as opposed to the uncertainty they had experienced in their life in Parents’ homes. We find th e opinions of FCM Brown and CASA Quinn should be accorded great weight, as both were rendered after having had long

- term involvement with this family in a variety of circum stances.

[30] Both Parents contend that it was not in Children’s best interests to terminate their rights because DCS had not yet found Children an adoptive home. While recognizing th at Indiana law does not require that an adoptive home beCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 21 of 22 identified at the time of the TPR proceedings, they argue that termination of their rights would not provide greater permanency for Children and that they should be afforded more time to parent Children

. However, Children’s curre nt foster parents had not ruled out adoption, other families had expressed interest, and FCM Brown felt confident that Children would be adopted. In addition,

w e note that this is not a case where Children have been placed with a relative for years

. See , e.g. , In re R.S. , 56 N.E.3d 625, 630 (Ind. 2016) (noting that delaying adoption would not negatively impact the child’s need for permanency where the child was in a stable placement with a relative who planned to adopt )

. The trial court weighed the inter ests of Parents and Children and concluded that the circumstances merited termination in order to provide Children with the permanency Children required. Given t he totality of the evidence and the opinions of FCM Brown and CASA Quinn, we cannot conclude t hat the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in Children’s best interests was clearly erroneous. See A.D.S. , 987 N.E.2d at 1158

- 59; E.M. , 4 N.E.3d at 642

. 

### CONCLUSION

[31] Base d on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s conclusions that there w as a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied and that termination was in Children’s best interests were not clearly

erroneous.

[32] Af firmed.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

- JT

- 1915 | January 30, 2019 Page 22 of 22 [33] Kirsch, J. and Robb, J. concur