Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Rebecca L. Lockard

Jeffersonville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Marriage of:

Mark Alan Grube, Jr.,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Brittany P. Grube,

Appellee-Respondent.

December 30, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

10A05-1607-DR-1693

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Andrew Adams,

Judge

The Honorable Joni L. Grayson, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

10C01-1512-DR-619

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Petitioner Mark A. Grube, Jr., married Appellee-Respondent 

Brittany P. Grube on September 19, 2015. On December 4, 2015, Mark filed a 

petition seeking a dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Mark appeals the trial 

court’s division of the parties’ marital estate, arguing that the trial court abused 

its discretion by failing to include a certain debt in the marital estate and in 

ordering an unequal division of the marital estate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At some point, Mark and Brittany became involved in a romantic relationship. 

In approximately of January of 2014, they began to cohabitate. Mark and 

Brittany were married on September 19, 2015. They soon thereafter separated 

and, on December 4, 2015, Mark filed the instant dissolution action. 

[3] The trial court conducted a hearing on the dissolution action on May 2, 2016, 

after which it issued a decree of dissolution and an order dividing the parties’ 

marital estate. The trial court noted in the dissolution order that the parties’ 

debt was greater than their assets. Taking this fact into consideration, in 

dividing the parties’ marital estate, the trial court concluded as follows:

The court has considered all the factors that would warrant an 

unequal division of assets, and finds that the economic 

circumstances of the parties at the time of disposition and the 

earnings or earning ability of the parties are particularly 

significant. In particular, the fact that Brittany is assuming the 

car debt, which far exceeds the value of the car (and will likely 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 3 of 8

continue to exceed the value of the car), while Mark has the use 

of a “company” car, is significant. She has no other vehicle. The 

parties’ incomes are disparate. Additionally, Mark incurred 

significant student loan debt prior to the marriage, and although 

he is paying that debt, the entire debt has been considered in the 

final division of assets and debts, which places Brittany in the 

position of “contributing” to the payment of that large debt even 

though it was incurred almost, if not entirely, prior to their 

marriage. Therefore, the court finds and concludes that an 

unequal division of the marital assets and debts is warranted, and 

Brittany shall receive the sum of $8429.00 from Mark (See

Respondent’s Exhibit 2) to effectuate a “60/40” division. This 

amount will only reduce the overall amount of debt Brittany is 

paying; it will not in any way place her in “positive” territory 

with regard to division of assets and debts. The court does not 

find a “dissipation” of marital assets occurred. The parties 

simply lived beyond their means, and will have significant debt to 

pay as a result.

Order. This appeal follows. 

Discussion and Decision

[4] Mark contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the parties’ 

marital estate. 

When reviewing a claim that the trial court improperly divided 

marital property, we must decide whether the trial court’s 

decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Keller v. Keller, 639 

N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. We 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s 

disposition of the property. Id. We will reverse only if the result 

is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 4 of 8

Capehart v. Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

I. Exclusion of a Claimed Debt from Marital Estate

[5] Mark claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to include a 2015 

tax liability in the martial estate. 

[6] With respect to the inclusion of an asset or debt in the marital estate, we have 

previously concluded as follows: 

Since the marital property must be disposed of at one time, the 

trial court must have before it a fixed, presently ascertainable 

value of the assets. [Waggoner v. Waggoner, 531 N.E.2d 1188, 

1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)]. The parties have the burden to 

produce evidence as to the value of the assets. Neffle v. Neffle, 483 

N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

Therefore, impliedly, the parties also have the burden to produce 

evidence as to the existence of the assets.

Conner v. Conner, 666 N.E.2d 921, 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[7] In the instant matter, the trial court found that there was no evidence proving 

the existence of the claimed 2015 tax liability. Mark testified that he had 

received notification from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) that Mark was 

subject to a 2014 tax liability of $2579.00 because he had claimed an education 

tax credit to which he was not entitled. Mark also testified that his accountant 

had informed him that because he had claimed the same credit on his 2015 

taxes, the same amount would likely be owed in 2015 as well. Mark, however, 

did not testify that, as of the date of the dissolution hearing, the IRS had 

actually informed him that any such tax liability had been imposed in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 5 of 8

connection with his 2015 taxes. In addition, our review of the record does not 

reveal any other evidence indicating that the IRS had actually notified Mark 

that any such liability existed for 2015 or the exact amount which would be 

owed. Mark’s argument is this regard simply appears to be based on his 

accountant’s speculation. 

II. Unequal Division of the Parties’ Marital Estate

[8] Mark also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering an 

unequal division of the parties’ marital estate. 

[9] “In an action for dissolution of marriage, the trial court is required to divide the 

property of the divorcing spouses ‘in a just and reasonable manner.’” Crider v. 

Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-15-7-

4(b)). 

Indiana courts utilize a “one-pot” method for calculating and 

distributing marital property, whereby all property is included in 

the marital pot and subject to division, regardless of whether it 

was

(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

(A) after the marriage; and

(B) before final separation of the parties; 

or

(3) acquired by their joint efforts.

[Ind. Code] § 31-15-7-4(a); Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 

1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 6 of 8

Id. at 1048. “There is a rebuttable presumption that ‘an equal division of the 

marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Ind.

Code § 31-15-7-5).

However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who 

presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the 

following factors, that an equal division would not be just and 

reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition 

of the property, regardless of whether the 

contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by 

each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the 

time the disposition of the property is to become 

effective, including the desirability of awarding the 

family residence or the right to dwell in the family 

residence for such periods as the court considers just 

to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as 

related to the disposition or dissipation of their 

property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as 

related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property 

rights of the parties.

Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.

[10] In ordering a 60/40 division of the marital estate, the trial court noted that the 

parties had agreed to a debt division, with each taking the debt incurred in their 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 7 of 8

name. As part of this agreement, Mark agreed to take responsibility for 

payment of his student loans and Brittany agreed to take responsibility for 

payment of the medical bills which had stemmed from her treatment for 

ovarian cancer. The trial court noted that each of these debts was significant. 

In addition to the significant debt from her medical bills, Brittany agreed to take 

on the significant debt associated with the parties’ Ford Fusion. 

[11] The trial court also found that the parties’ incomes were disparate. The record 

reveals that at the time of the final separation, Brittany earned approximately 

$22,000 per year and Mark earned approximately $40,000 per year. Thus, 

during the course of the parties’ co-habitation and marriage, Mark’s income 

was nearly double Brittany’s. At the time of the dissolution hearing, Mark’s 

income had increased to approximately $44,000 and Brittany had secured new 

employment and was earning approximately $32,000. Even after Brittany 

secured new employment, Mark earned approximately $10,000 more than 

Brittany per year. 

[12] Again, after considering the relevant statutory factors together with the 

evidence presented by the parties, the trial court concluded as follows:

Therefore, the court finds and concludes that an unequal division 

of the marital assets and debts is warranted, and Brittany shall 

receive the sum of $8429.00 from Mark (See Respondent’s 

Exhibit 2) to effectuate a “60/40” division. This amount will 

only reduce the overall amount of debt Brittany is paying; it will 

not in any way place her in “positive” territory with regard to 

division of assets and debts. The court does not find a 

“dissipation” of marital assets occurred. The parties simply lived 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1607-DR-1693 | December 30, 2016 Page 8 of 8

beyond their means, and will have significant debt to pay as a 

result.

Order.

[13] Mark asserts on appeal that the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors 

when ordering an unequal division of the parties’ marital estate. “The party 

challenging the trial court’s division of marital property bears the burden of 

overcoming a strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied 

with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest 

presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Crider, 26 N.E.3d at 

1047-48 (internal quotation omitted). Our review of the instant matter leads us 

to the conclusion that Mark has failed to meet this burden and, as a result, has 

failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court considered and complied 

with Indiana Code sections 31-15-7-4 and 31-15-7-5 when ordering an unequal 

division of the parties’ marital estate. As such, we conclude that Mark has 

failed to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.

[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.