COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

HILDA D. PILLOW 

v. Record No. 2901-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

SERVICE AMERICA CORPORATION MAY 14, 1996 

AND 

EMPLOYER'S INSURANCE OF WAUSAU 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' 

COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Hilda D. Pillow, pro se, on brief). 

 (J. Brian Jackson; Patricia C. Karppi; 

McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, on brief), 

for appellees. 

 Hilda D. Pillow contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in finding that she failed to prove that her 

back symptoms and disability after March 1991 were causally 

related to her compensable April 24, 1990 injury by accident. 

Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Unless we can say as a matter of law that Pillow's evidence 

sustained her burden of proving causation, the commission's 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko v. Michael's 

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 Pillow claimed that she suffered an injury by accident on 

April 24, 1990, and sought temporary total disability benefits 

for the period July 9, 1990 through October 1, 1990, and medical 

benefits. The commission denied Pillow compensation after 

September 14, 1990 on the ground that she failed to prove that 

her back symptoms and disability occurring after that date were 

causally related to her compensable injury by accident. In so 

ruling, the commission made the following factual findings: 

 On April 24, 1990, [Pillow] slipped and fell, 

injuring her right foot and lower back. She 

was taken to the emergency room, where she 

was diagnosed with a lumbar sprain. She came 

under the care of Dr. Joseph W. May, M.D., 

who admitted her to the hospital from July 9, 

1990 to July 12, 1990. She was discharged 

with a diagnosis of lumbar strain with 

sciatica, and excused from work for two more 

weeks. She was hospitalized again on July 

26, 1990, for persistent pain, and treated 

conservatively with bed rest, heat, traction 

and medications. On September 14, 1990, Dr. 

May released [Pillow] to return to work. 

 [Pillow] was evaluated by Drs. 

Schildwachter, Punyanitya, Whitehill, and 

Lee, for continued pain. After tests 

revealed no neurological or operable 

deficits, it was recommended that [Pillow] 

continue physical therapy and medications. 

On March 20, 1991, Dr. May wrote that he 

could find "no observable cause" for 

[Pillow's] pain. 

 [Pillow] was injured in automobile 

accidents on July 3, 1991, and March 23, 

1992. . . . [N]one of the doctors consulted 

by [Pillow] after March of 1991, relate[d] 

[her] back symptoms or disability to her 

compensable accident. 
 3 

 These factual findings are consistent with the medical 

records of Drs. May, Moga, Schildwachter, Whitehill, Jane, and 

Lee and support the commission's decision. In its role as fact 

finder, the commission was entitled to give little weight to Dr. 

Di Benedetto's medical records and opinions. Dr. Di Benedetto's 

opinion was based upon an EMG performed on August 21, 1991, 

following Pillow's July 3, 1991 automobile accident. An EMG 

performed in March 1991, prior to the July 3, 1991 automobile 

accident, was normal. 

 Based upon this record, we cannot find as a matter of law 

that Pillow satisfied her burden of proving that her lower back 

symptoms and disability after September 14, 1990 were causally 

related to her compensable April 24, 1990 injury by accident. 

Accordingly, we affirm the commission's denial of compensation 

benefits after September 14, 1990 and award of medical payments 

as specified. 

 Affirmed.