2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-6-2010

Larry Turetsky v. Melissa Amy Sadek Turetsky

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-3301

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Larry Turetsky v. Melissa Amy Sadek Turetsky" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 149.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/149
1

DLD-026 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-3301

___________

LARRY TURETSKY,

Appellant

v.

MELISSA AMY SADEK TURETSKY; COUNTY SOLICITOR FOR THE COUNTY 

OF BUCKS; ATTORNEY GENENERAL FOR THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-05584)

District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 4, 2010

Before: BARRY, FISHER AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 6, 2010)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Larry Turetsky appeals from an order dismissing his suit as frivolous under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We will affirm.
2

Turetsky is an prisoner in the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On 

November 8, 2004, he filed for divorce from his wife, Melissa Turetsky, in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Family Division, and requested equitable 

distribution of assets. Ms. Turetsky filed a petition for spousal and child support on April 

13, 2005, after which the court consolidated both matters for hearing and later issued 

orders on April 24, 2007. Challenging the outcome, Turetsky filed a pro se appeal from 

these orders, which was denied by the Superior Court. Turetsky v. Turetsky, No. 1587 

Eastern District Appeal 2007 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 22, 2008). The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court declined review. Turetsky v. Turetsky, 962 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2008) (table). 

Proceeding in forma pauperis, Turetsky commenced the present suit in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in November 2009, alleging 

that the state courts misapplied the facts, procedures and law, resulting in an ―improper 

judgment . . . [that] violated [his] Procedural and Substantive Due Process rights, under 

the United States Constitution‘s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖ Compl. ¶¶ 12–16

(emphasis added). He also described the series of state-court judgments as ―an unfair and 

illegal deprivation of [his] property.‖ Compl. ¶ 3.1 He prayed for injunctive relief, 

asking the District Court to enjoin the enforcement of the state judgments and requesting 

 

1

Turetsky does not clarify the connection between the named defendants—his exwife, the County Solicitor of Bucks County, and the Attorney General of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—and the complained-of conduct; the actions 

attributed to Turetsky‘s ―defendants‖ were taken by the state courts.
3

remand to the trial court for recalculation of support, alimony, and lump-sum amounts. 

Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. 

Via order on July 19, 2010, the District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint 

as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court concluded that it ―[did] not have 

subject matter jurisdiction to review State Court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.‖ July 19 Order ¶ 3. Turetsky filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court‘s 

sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e) is plenary, and we must accept as true the 

allegations of fact established in the complaint along with the reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We also review 

determinations of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. See Lightfoot v. United States, 

564 F.3d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 2009). If ―no substantial question is presented‖ by the appeal, 

we may summarily affirm on any ground supported by the record. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 

10.6; United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Tourscher v. 

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,2a losing state-court party is ―barred from 

seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 

States district court, based on [a] claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser‘s 

federal rights.‖ Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994). The doctrine is 

 

2 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
4

jurisdictional in nature, precluding further federal review. See Great Western Mining & 

Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Construing the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), we have recently identified four RookerFeldman prerequisites. First, the federal plaintiff must be a state-court loser; the loss 

need not be total, but the plaintiff must have suffered some adverse result. Second, the 

plaintiff must reference injuries caused by the state-court judgment, as distinct from those

caused by, for example, the unconstitutionality of an underlying statute itself. Third, the 

state judgment must antedate the filing of the federal suit. And fourth, the plaintiff must 

essentially be inviting the federal court to review and reject the state-court judgments. Of 

these four factors, the second and fourth are most crucial, as they distinguish between a 

challenge to a judgment and a challenge to a rule or law. See Great Western, 615 F.3d at 

166. 

All four factors are present here. Turetsky has suffered a loss in state court, his 

complaint refers to the injuries caused by the state-court orders, the state judgment 

predated the instant action, and his requested relief is facially an invitation to review that 

judgment. 

In an attempt to broaden the scope of his complaint, Turetsky asserts on appeal 

that the District Court ―improperly assumed that the  ̳claims of Plaintiff‘s subject matter‘ 

were the county and state Judgments [sic],‖ arguing that the state policies he challenged

―merely arose out of a Domestic Relations arena‖ and that the subject matter addressed 
5

within was ―never previously litigated.‖ Appellant‘s Arg. in Supp. Of Appeal 1, 3. This

attempt to place his suit outside of the boundaries of Rooker-Feldman is unavailing and is 

undermined by the complaint itself, of which even a liberal reading establishes a specific 

challenge to the judgment of the state courts and their application of state laws and 

procedures. Most fatally, his requested relief is, as addressed previously, an explicit 

demand for a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a state-court order and to 

―remand‖ the action to trial court for recalculation of asset distribution. Granting such a 

remedy would be appropriate for a state appellate court sitting in review, but not for a 

federal court exercising original jurisdiction. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.

In summary, we agree with the District Court that Turetsky‘s complaint is 

jurisdictionally barred from consideration by Rooker-Feldman. As this appeal presents 

no substantial issue, we will affirm.