NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANGELIQUE B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, P.B., M.S., A.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0011

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD22468

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Anne M. Williams, P.C., Mesa

By Anne M. Williams

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Laura J. Huff

Counsel for Appellee State of Arizona
ANGELIQUE B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Angelique B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her three minor children, P.B., M.S., and 

A.S.1 She contends the court erred by finding that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we 

affirm. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The Department of Child Safety3 received two anonymous 

hotline reports about Mother and her three biological children, P.B., M.S.,

and A.S. The first report was made on August 3, 2012, and asserted they 

were living in a filthy home, filled with dog feces and urine, and they lacked 

adequate food. The Department later learned that police officers went to 

the house that day because they suspected the occupants were selling 

drugs. The second report was made a few weeks later, and described that 

although Mother had given M.S. and A.S. to their paternal grandmother 

(“Grandmother”) to get them out of the inappropriate home and to keep 

them away from her abusive brother, Mother took them back after arguing 

with Grandmother. 

¶3 The Department subsequently began an investigation and 

discovered that Mother’s boyfriend had physically abused her and the 

children. The Department also learned that Mother was unemployed, had 

no source of income, and lacked stable housing. The Department asked 

Mother to attend a team decision making meeting, but when she failed to 

 

1 Neither father is a party to this appeal. 

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile 

court’s ruling. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376, 

¶ 13, 231 P.3d 377, 380 (App. 2010).

3 The Department of Child Safety has replaced the Arizona Department of 

Economic Security. See S.B. 1001, 51st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). We 

will refer to the agency as “the Department.”
ANGELIQUE B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

attend the meeting, the children were removed from her care and a 

dependency petition was filed. 

¶4 The juvenile court subsequently found the children 

dependent and set the case plan as family reunification. Over the next two 

years, the Department offered Mother random drug testing, four referrals 

for substance abuse treatment, a parent aide, supervised visits, a 

psychological consultation, dialectical behavior therapy counseling, and 

transportation.

¶5 Mother tested positive for amphetamine and 

methamphetamine in February 2013. Although she participated in 

substance abuse treatment from March 2013 to August 2013, she relapsed,

and in July and August 2013 tested positive for amphetamine and

methamphetamine. Mother also failed to participate in counseling and to 

attempt to obtain stable housing or employment.

¶6 The Department moved to change the case plan to severance 

and adoption at a review hearing in November 2013. After the court 

granted the motion, the Department filed a motion to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights alleging substance abuse and fifteen months out-of-home 

placement grounds under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections

8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8)(c).4

¶7 Mother, who continued to test positive for amphetamine and 

methamphetamine,

5 failed to appear for the termination hearing on 

September 12, 2014, and, despite the fact that the hearing was continued 

over the Department’s objection until November 18, 2014, she still did not 

appear.

6 The juvenile court took evidence and, at the conclusion of the 

hearing, terminated Mother’s parental rights to the three children on the 

grounds alleged and found that the termination was in the children’s best 

interests. The court subsequently signed and filed the written findings of 

fact and conclusions of law based on the court’s oral pronouncements.

 

4 We cite the current versions of statutes unless otherwise noted.

5 By the time the case plan was changed, Mother was only participating in 

visits with the children.

6 Mother had notice and signed a Form 3 Notice to Parent in Termination 

Action, and was present when the September 12 termination hearing was 

scheduled. She did not seek to excuse or explain her absence.
ANGELIQUE B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶8 Mother filed a notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her children.7 

We will affirm the juvenile court’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous;

namely, that there is no reasonable evidence to support the factual findings 

upon which it is based. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 

¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). 

¶10 A best interests determination must be supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 

¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005); A.R.S. § 8-533(B). “[A] determination of 

the [children’s] best interest must include a finding as to how the [children] 

would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the 

relationship.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 30, 

231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). The juvenile court can also consider whether: (1) an adoptive 

placement is immediately available; (2) the existing placement is meeting 

the needs of the child; and (3) the children are adoptable. Id. 

¶11 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support 

a best interests finding because “[n]one of the children [were] in adoptive 

homes, and no adoptive homes have been identified despite the fact that 

the children have been in out-of-home placements for over two years.” A

“specific adoption plan” is not, however, a prerequisite to termination; the 

juvenile court may rely on evidence that a child is adoptable and the 

existing placement is meeting the child’s needs. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 511, 200 P.3d 1003, 1008 (App. 2008). 

¶12 Here, the Department presented evidence that all three 

children would benefit from severance and would be harmed if returned to 

Mother. The case manager testified that Mother had moved three or four 

times during the course of the dependency, demonstrating her instability. 

She further testified that Mother had had only a four-month period of 

sobriety over the prior twenty-seven months that the children had been in 

the Department’s custody. And she stated that Mother was possibly still in 

a relationship with the boyfriend who had abused the children and was also 

 

7 Because Mother does not challenge the statutory basis for terminating her 

parental rights, we affirm those findings.
ANGELIQUE B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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using methamphetamine and marijuana. The case manager testified that

the children were adoptable and would benefit from the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.

¶13 The children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed a report that 

the court considered, describing that the children were doing well in their 

foster placements and that their educational, medical, and dental needs 

were all being met. She informed the court that M.S. was in a potential 

permanent placement, and P.B. wanted Mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated.8 The GAL’s report concluded by opining that permanency was 

in the children’s best interests and it could be achieved by terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

¶14 The evidence, as a result, supports the juvenile court’s finding

that termination was in the children’s best interests because “the children 

are adoptable” and “[t]heir needs are being met in foster homes.” 

Therefore, the court did not err. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to P.B., M.S., and A.S. 

 

8 An earlier report indicated that P.B. wanted to be adopted by his foster 

parents.