United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 1, 2011*

Decided November14, 2011

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

   

No. 11‐2015

IN RE:

      MARY ANN HOOD,

         Debtor‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11‐cv‐0028‐MJR

Michael J. Reagan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mary Ann Hood filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in June

2009. She listed “American Express” on her Schedule F as having an unsecured, nonpriority

claim for “credit card debt” totaling $5,021.99. American Express Centurion Bank, a

subsidiary of the American Express Company, timely filed a proof of claim for the

prepetition balance of $5,021.99 on Hood’s credit‐card account. Hood objected, through

counsel, that the proof of claim lacked supporting documentation, included unsubstantiated

charges for interest and penalties, failed to identify the original holder of the claim or

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).
No. 11‐2015 Page 2

explain how it came to be possessed by this American Express subsidiary, and was barred

by the statute of limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). In response, American Express Centurion

Bank (“AMEX Centurion”) amended its proof of claim to add further documentation,

including a 2005 account agreement, billing statements in Hood’s name covering the

months from January 2004 through the filing of the bankruptcy, and copies of several

canceled checks written to American Express by Hood from late 2004 through April 2006.

Hood still objected that the amount of the claim was overstated and that AMEX Centurion

had not produced a signed agreement or records dating back to February 1985 when she

first opened the account. She also maintained—at this point without counsel—that the

unpaid balance no longer was collectable because she was living in Missouri both when she

opened the account and when, she says, it was closed in 2004. By her math that state’s 5‐

year statute of limitations would have run before she filed her bankruptcy petition in 2009.

The bankruptcy court conducted a hearing on Hood’s objection and overruled it.

The court concluded that the proof of claim was valid and had not been undermined in any

way by Hood. And concerning whether the debt was still collectable, the court

acknowledged AMEX Centurion’s contention that its written agreement with Hood

included a choice‐of‐law provision incorporating Utah, not Missouri, law, but the court

reasoned that choosing between these states was unnecessary because under the law of

either state the statute of limitations would not have commenced running until Hood

stopped making payments in April 2006. Further, due to the volume of transactions

extending into August 2005, the court declined to credit Hood’s assertion that she had

closed her account in June 2004. Hood repeatedly sought reconsideration of this ruling, and

the bankruptcy judge construed the last of her motions as a notice of appeal to the district

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The district court rejected all of Hood’s arguments, and this

appeal followed.

A bankruptcy judge’s decision to allow a claim is a “final” order that is immediately

appealable to the district court under § 158(a)(1). See In re Perry, 391 F.3d 282, 285 (1st Cir.

2004); Matter of Wade, 991 F.2d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 1993). In turn, the district court’s ruling is

appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). Our review in a bankruptcy appeal is plenary, so we

examine the bankruptcy judge’s decision in the same manner as the district court. Kovacs v.

United States, 614 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2010). Hood’s arguments are difficult to follow, but

we understand her to contest the bankruptcy judge’s conclusions that the proof of claim

enjoyed an unrebutted presumption of validity and was not subject to a statute‐of‐

limitations defense.

A properly executed and filed proof of claim is prima facie evidence that a claim is

valid. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f); In re Airadigm Communications, Inc., 616 F.3d 642, 659 (7th

Cir. 2010); Matter of Carlson, 126 F.3d 915, 921–22 (7th Cir. 1997). A proof of claim is
No. 11‐2015 Page 3

sufficient if it conforms substantially to Official Form 10, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a), and

gives specific notice of the creditor’s intent to hold the bankruptcy estate liable for a debt or

other right to payment, Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 575 (1st Cir.1997);

In re Chateaugay Corp., 94 F.3d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1996); In re marchFirst, Inc., 431 B.R. 436, 443

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). Claims for credit‐card debt, because they are based on written

instruments, generally must be accompanied by documentation to be prima facie valid.

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c); In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424, 432 (9th Cir. BAP 2005); In re O’Brien,

440 B.R. 654, 661 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010). AMEX Centurion supplied Hood with extensive

documentation, including copies of checks she wrote to the company and several years of

billing statements. Hood argues, though, that she should have been given the written

agreement that governed her very first American Express card in 1985. We cannot agree.

That document had long been superseded, which is why AMEX Centurion submitted the

2005 agreement that Hood would have accepted by continuing to use her credit card, as her

account statements reflect that she did through August 2005. See Anonymous v. JP Morgan

Chase & Co., No. 05 Civ. 2442 (JGK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26083, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,

2005); Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 04‐507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616, at *16 (E.D. Pa.

July 6, 2004). Rule 3001(c)’s purpose is to help debtors determine whether claims are valid,

In re O’Brien, 440 B.R. at 662–63; In re Motels of Am., Inc., 146 B.R. 544, 545–46 (Bankr. D. Del.

1992), and forcing creditors to produce outdated paperwork for revolving charge accounts

opened years before the bankruptcy would be pointless.

Once a creditor has filed a claim of prima facie validity, as AMEX Centurion did in

this case, a bankruptcy court must allow the claim unless a party in interest objects and

produces evidence sufficient to rebut the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b); Matter of Carlson, 126 F.3d

at 921–22. See also Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 894 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining party in

interest to include debtor and anyone else with a legally protected interest that could be

affected). And if an interested party does object, the bankruptcy court must still allow the

claim unless it falls under one of nine statutorily defined exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). One

of those exceptions is for claims that are unenforceable, which Hood apparently means to

invoke by asserting that AMEX Centurion’s proof of claim was time‐barred. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 502(b)(1), (9); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007)

(“[Section 502(b)(1)] is most naturally understood to provide that, with limited exceptions,

any defense to a claim that is available outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in

bankruptcy.”).

Hood did nothing to rebut the challenged proof of claim. Indeed, the bankruptcy

court was entitled to construe as a judicial admission her listing in Schedule F of an

“American Express” debt that matched precisely the indebtedness and account number

identified in the proof of claim. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017; Sovran

Bank, N.A. v. Anderson, 743 F.2d 223, 225 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984). And though Hood tried later to
No. 11‐2015 Page 4

persuade the district court to give credence to credit‐bureau printouts from 2006 showing

the debt to be less than the amount stated in the proof of claim, the bankruptcy court was

entitled as the trier of fact to decide how to weigh the evidence before it, which these

printouts were not. See Matter of Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Nelson, 357

B.R. 508, 511 (8th Cir. BAP 2006). And while Hood now accuses her former bankruptcy

lawyer of scheduling this particular debt without her consent, she was bound by the actions

of the lawyer she retained. See Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1028 (7th

Cir. 2006).

Because Hood made partial payments on her account in April 2006, her statute‐of‐

limitations defense also fails. AMEX Centurion stands by its assertion that Utah law

governs because of a choice‐of‐law clause in the relevant account agreement. Utah’s statute

of limitations is either six years or four, depending on whether Hood’s debt is deemed to be

“based on a writing.” Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B‐2‐309 with id. § 78B‐2‐307(1)(a).

See also In re Cluff, 313 B.R. 323, 336 (Bankr. D. Utah 2004) (“[Credit card] debts are based on

a writing because the debts (the legal obligations) are evidenced by the monthly charges

and fees which were electronically recorded and transmitted into a monthly statement.”).

Even the shorter period, though, would not have commenced until the last payment was

received from Hood in April 2006, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B‐2‐307(1)(a), which was less than

four years before she filed her Chapter 7 case and less than four years before

AMEX Centurion filed its proof of claim in September 2009. Moreover, even if the Missouri

statute did control, see MO. REV. STAT. § 516.120, her partial payments would have tolled the

statute of limitations, see Heidbreder v. Tambke, 284 S.W.3d 740, 746–47 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.

2009) (“Where nothing appears to show a contrary intention, the payment alone prevents

the statute from barring the claim.”); Capital One Bank v. Creed, 220 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2007). Finally, even if the statute of limitations commenced running with the last new

charges to Hood’s account in August 2005, the statute of limitations was tolled by Hood’s

bankruptcy filing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐2‐112; Sittner v. Schriever, 22 P.3d 784, 788

(Utah App. 2001).

Hood’s remaining contentions of error do not require discussion. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.