alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 9, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 128407 & (75) Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 128407 COA: 246922 Wayne CC: 02-005789-01 DARRELL JERROD PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e motion to add issue is c onsidered and it is DENIED. The application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

K ELLY , J., dissents and states as follows:

The corpus delicti rule for felony murder applies h ere. It requires the prosecution to prove the underlying felony before a defendant’s statement of intent to commit the underlying felony can be used against the defendant to establish the felony murder. Because that rule was violat ed, the Court should grant leave to appeal and should reconsider People v Hughey, 186 Mich App 585 (1990).

s1206 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 9, 2005

Clerk
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WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

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<CIK> 0000814926
<NAME> FREEDOM FUNDING, INC.
       
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IA

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 30

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to restrict

annual deficits by limiting the public debt of the United States and

requiring a favorable vote of the people on any law to exceed such

limits.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 9, 1997

Mr. PICKETT introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to

the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United

States to restrict annual deficits by limiting the public

debt of the United States and requiring a favorable

vote of the people on any law to exceed such limits.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
2

•HJ 30 IH

1 States within seven years after the date of its submission

2 for ratification:

3 ‘‘ARTICLE—

4 ‘‘SECTION 1. The public debt of the United States

5 shall not in any fiscal year increase by more than one per6 cent of the amount of the public debt outstanding at the

7 beginning of such year unless authorized by a law ap8 proved by a majority of the Members elected to each the

9 Senate and House of Representatives, which law shall not

10 take effect until it shall have been submitted to the people

11 at an election and a majority of those voting on the ques12 tion shall have approved such law.

13 ‘‘SECTION 2. Section 1 shall not apply to public debt

14 contracted—

15 ‘‘(1) to repel invasion of the United States;

16 ‘‘(2) to defend the United States in time of

17 war;

18 ‘‘(3) to support the Armed Forces of the United

19 States in time of war; or

20 ‘‘(4) to redeem a previous debt obligation of the

21 United States.

22 ‘‘SECTION 3. This article shall take effect beginning

23 with the second fiscal year beginning after its ratifica24 tion.’’.

Æ
#### CITIZENS BANK OF PA. v. RIM, D.

760 EDA 2016

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

09/08/2017

No. 2015-03289 (Montgomery)

Affirmed
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 30, 2013

t0923 

# Order

Clerk September 30, 2013

147317

WILLIAM M. REIDENBACH,

Plaint iff

- Appellee,

v SC: 147317

COA: 306671

MCAC: 11

- 000020

CITY OF KALAMAZOO,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 15, 2013 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED. The Court of Appeals correctly

held that the decision of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC)

mailed on September 19, 2011 is not a final order because it did not dispose of “all the

claims” of the parties. MCR 7.202(6)(a)(1). The Court of Appeals only has jurisdiction

to consider appeals from final decisions or final orders of the MCAC. MCL

418.861a(14); Smith v Eaton Corp Torque Controls, 493 Mich 942 (2013).
Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), I, Ashley C.
Andersen, President and Chief Executive Officer of Trudy Corporation do hereby
certify, to the best of my knowledge that:

     1)  The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June
         30, 2007 being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
         "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

This Certification accompanies this Form 10-QSB as an exhibit, but shall not be
deemed as having been filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or as a separate disclosure document of the Company or the
certifying officer.


                                       /s/ Ashley C. Andersen
                                       -----------------------------------------
Date: August 17, 2007                  Ashley C. Andersen
                                       President, Chief Executive Officer



                                       28
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2


               [WILLIAMSON PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, INC. LETTERHEAD]

                CONSENT OF WILLIAMSON PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, INC.

As independent oil and gas consultants, Williamson Petroleum Consultants, Inc.
hereby consents to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement
on Form S-4, to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about
April 4, 2003, of information from our reserves report dated February 21, 2003
entitled "Evaluation of Oil and Gas Reserves to the Interests of Chesapeake
Energy Corporation in Certain Major-Value Properties in the United States,
Effective December 31, 2002, for Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Williamson Project 2.8923." We also consent to the reference to us
under the heading "Experts" in such Registration Statement.


/s/ Williamson Petroleum Consultants, Inc.
------------------------------------------
    Williamson Petroleum Consultants, Inc.

Midland, Texas
April 4, 2003
#### Asha K. SPAULDING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-11641 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(January 30, 2018)

Asha K. Spaulding, Pro Se

James C. Stuchell, R. Brian Tanner, Edward J. Tarver, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Savannah, GA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Asha Spaulding appeals *pro se*the *sua sponte*denial of her motion to vacate. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied Spaulding’s motion based on her written plea agreement to waive her right to collaterally attack her convictions and sentence in a postconviction proceeding. The Supreme Court instructed in *Day v. McDonough,*547 U.S. 198, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), that “a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions” before disposing of a case on a ground not raised in their filings, *id.*at 210, 126 S.Ct. 1675. Because the district court denied Spauld-ing’s postconviction motion without giving her an opportunity to respond to the effect of her waiver, we vacate and remand for the district court to proceed in accordance with the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED.
No. 11-1467.

#### Nelson, Personal Representative of the Estate of Nelson, Deceased *v.*Aeronautical Accessories, Inc., et al.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Turk K. CAZIMERO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10193

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 13, 2018 *

Filed February 16, 2018

Lawrence Tong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ — Office of the US Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Melinda Yamaga, FPDHI — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Honolulu), Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

MEMORANDUM **

Turk K. Cazimero appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 96-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for wire fraud, in *671violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Cazimero contends that the district court erred and violated his due process rights by imposing an upward variance on the basis of unsworn victim impact statements, the perceived leniency of his prior state court sentence, and his inability to pay restitution. The record reflects that the district court properly based its variance on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Cazimero’s history and characteristics, and the need to provide just punishment for the offense. The court did not violate due process by considering un-sworn victim impact statements, which Cazimero has not shown were materially false or unreliable. *See United States v. Christensen,*732 F.3d 1094, 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court may consider unsworn victim impact statements at sentencing; due process violated only when sentence is imposed on the basis of materially false or unreliable information). Nor did the court engage in impermissible double counting by varying upwards based on the effect of the crime on the victims. *See id.*at 1100-01. Moreover, the court appropriately considered the failure of Cazimero’s prior sentence to deter him, *see*18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), as well as the impact on the victims of his inability to pay restitution. *See United States v. Rangel,*697 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2012) (court’s consideration of inability to pay restitution not error where *‘[t]he court’s discussion made clear that its concern over restitution was based on the impact [defendant’s] crime had on the victims and was not designed to punish [defendant] for his inability to pay”). Finally, in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, the above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### YINXIA ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-71792

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*911Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 20, 2017

Yinxia Zhang, Pro Se

Brendan Paul Hogan, Esquire, Attorney, Kimberly A. Burdge, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Yinxia Zhang, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act, *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on Zhang’s misrepresentations about her place of residence, inconsistencies between Zhang’s testimony and that of her witness regarding church services and Zhang’s church attendance, and Zhang’s initial failure to testify about being fired from her job in China. *See id.,*590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility determination was reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances”). Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Zhang’s corroborative evidence does not independently support her claim for relief. *See Garcia v. Holder,*749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014). In the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Zhang’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Finally, Zhang’s CAT claim fails because it is based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and the record does not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to China. *See id.*at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Miller COREAS, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 17-1074

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 5, 2017

Decided: January 3, 2018

Ronald D. Richey, LAW OFFICE OF RONALD D. RICHEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Chad A, Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Kristen Giuffre-da Chapman, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*784PER CURIAM:

Miller Coreas, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have thoroughly reviewed the record, including the transcript of Coreas’ merits hearing before the immigration court and all supporting evidence. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review the agency’s finding that Coreas’ asylum application is time-barred. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2012); *Mulyani v. Holder,*771 F.3d 190, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we dismiss in part the petition for review.

Concerning the Board’s denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, we conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any of the administrative factual findings, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, *see INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We further uphold the agency’s determination that Coreas cannot demonstrate a violation of his due process rights as he fails to show the requisite prejudice. *See Anim v. Mukasey,*535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). Finally, we conclude that the immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Coreas' motion for administrative closure. *See In re Avetisyan, 25*I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012). We therefore deny the petition for review in part for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Coreas,*(B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2016).

Accordingly, we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DISMISSED IN PART; DENIED IN PART*
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION * IN THE 

OF MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 

OF MARYLAND 

Petitioner Misc. Docket AG 

V. No. 0062 

BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR September Term, 2014 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. 

Respondent Case no. 30519-M 

**********************# 

ORDER 

This matter came before the Court on the parties' Joint Petition for Disbarment by 

Consent in the above entitled matter, it is this 5th day of June, 2015; 

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the Joint Petition be, and it is 

hereby GRANTED; and it is further, 

ORDERED, that the Respondent, Brynee Kyonne Baylor, is hereby disbarred from the 

practice of law in the State of Maryland for engaging in professional misconduct involving 

violations of Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 and 8.4(c); and it is further, 

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall remove the name Brynee Kyonne Baylor 

from the register of attorneys in the Court and certify that fact to the Client Protection Fund of 

the Bar of Maryland and all Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with 

Maryland Rule 16-772(d). 

/s/ Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. 

Senior Judge