IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 11, 2018

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY EUGENE BARNETT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County

No. 34052 Robert L. Jones, Judge

No. M2017-02317-CCA-R3-CD1

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court jury 

convictions of possession with intent to sell alprazolam, possession of a firearm with the 

intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of 

marijuana, and speeding, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the 

trial court’s ruling admitting certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Brandon E. White, Columbia, Tennessee (on appeal); and William Harris, Assistant 

District Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Anthony Eugene Barnett.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ruth Anne Thompson, Assistant 

Attorney General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; and Christi Thompson, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Lawrence County Grand Jury charged the defendant with one count of 

possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, possession with intent to sell 

alprazolam,2possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission 

of a dangerous felony, theft of property valued at $500 or less, speeding, and violating the 

law regarding window tint.

 

1 Upon motion by the defendant, this court consolidated the direct appeal of the defendant’s 

convictions in this case with the direct appeal of the revocation of the defendant’s probation in case 

number M2017-02478-CCA-R3-CD.

2 Alprazolam is commonly known as Xanax.

03/06/2019
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At the April 26, 2017 trial, Tennessee Highway Patrol Trooper Jeremy 

Miller testified that in the early morning hours of September 17, 2015, he observed the 

defendant driving his black Chevrolet pickup truck at 40 miles per hour in a 35-milesper-hour speed zone “right there in the middle of Summertown.” Trooper Miller 

effectuated a traffic stop, and, as he waited for the defendant to obtain his license, 

registration, and proof of insurance, he saw “a clear baggy” between the defendant’s feet 

on the floorboard of the truck. The bag appeared to contain marijuana and “little white 

specks” that might have been “pills or something else.” At that point, Trooper Miller 

ordered the defendant out of the vehicle, and, as the defendant exited the vehicle, Trooper 

Miller “noticed that he had a firearm on his side” that “was in a holster on his . . . belt.” 

Trooper Miller removed the gun, which was loaded, from the defendant’s side and 

removed the clip. He then patted the defendant down and, inside the defendant’s pants 

pocket, Trooper Miller found “two bundles of cash,” the larger of which was bundled 

“with black tape around it.” In total, Trooper Miller recovered $4,906.00 from the 

defendant’s person.

Trooper Miller contacted another trooper, who lived nearby, to assist him in 

searching the vehicle. Inside the defendant’s vehicle, Trooper Miller discovered “the 

marijuana and the pills that were . . . in the floorboard; found a paper ledger in the center 

console area. Reviewing the ledger, it appeared that that was drug transactions . . . .” He 

found “a marijuana roach inside of that ledger.” The “ledger” was just a small, bound 

notebook with a ribbon. The bag in which he had earlier seen the marijuana also 

contained a smaller cellophane bag that contained some pills.

Trooper Miller testified that, as a matter of routine, he ran the serial number 

of the pistol taken from the defendant’s person through the National Crime Information 

Center. The results of his inquiry indicated that the gun was stolen. He later confirmed 

that the gun had been stolen in Lawrence County.

Trooper Miller said that the defendant stated that “he did not smoke 

marijuana and did not have a prescription for Xanax.” The defendant, who had a valid 

permit to carry a handgun, said that he had purchased the firearm several years earlier. 

Trooper Miller said that, despite that the defendant had a valid handgun carry permit, he 

charged the defendant with unlawful weapon possession because he also possessed 

marijuana and Xanax.

During cross-examination, Trooper Miller stated that he chose to charge the 

defendant with possession of marijuana for resale, despite the relatively small amount of 

marijuana recovered from the defendant’s truck, because the defendant said that “he did 

not smoke marijuana.” Trooper Miller said that the defendant told him that the marijuana 
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and pills belonged to a woman he knew, but Trooper Miller “did not think it was the 

truth,” and, as a result, he did not record the woman’s name. The defendant claimed that 

he had such a large amount of cash because “he was self-employed and did odd jobs.” 

Trooper Miller said that he did not count the money in the larger, taped bundle of cash 

separately from the smaller bundle, explaining, “Once we decided it was going to be a 

seizure, we just counted it all together.”

On redirect examination, Trooper Miller testified that he realized that the 

tint on the defendant’s windows exceeded that allowed by the law, explaining that he had 

“a tint meter” that he could use to verify that the tint is too dark, but that “pretty much, if 

you can hold a driver’s license on one side of the window, and you can read it,” the tint is 

legal and “if you can’t read it, it’s definitely too dark.” He added that the defendant’s 

“front windshield was tinted past the manufacturer’s shade band, which is illegal in 

itself.”

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) Special Agent and Forensic 

Scientist Laura Cole testified that she analyzed the “plant material and the tablets in this 

case.” Her testing established that the plant material was 1.32 grams of marijuana. She 

was able to determine that the pill “tablet and fragments” equaled to nine whole 

alprazolam tablets. Agent Cole said that, to her knowledge, each pill contained two 

milligrams of alprazolam, but she cautioned that the total pill count was just an 

estimation.

Daniel Hunt testified that the weapon recovered from the defendant’s 

person was the same weapon that was stolen from Mr. Hunt’s truck eight to ten years 

earlier.

Following Mr. Hunt’s testimony, the State rested.

Lorrie Pewitt testified on behalf of the defendant, whom she described as “a 

real good friend,” that the defendant worked in construction and that he had performed 

cleanup at her mother’s home after it burned and repair work on a place for her and her 

mother to live while the house was being rebuilt. She said that on September 17, 2015, 

she met the defendant in the parking lot of the Burger King at approximately 4:00 a.m. 

and gave him $4,000 cash as payment for the work he performed. She said that she asked 

the defendant to meet her so early in the morning because she was headed out of town 

that day. Ms. Pewitt said that, in addition to giving the defendant the money, she “asked 

his opinion about some marijuana.” She said that she had the marijuana packaged 

“[w]ith some Xanax bars.” She identified the bag containing the marijuana and 

alprazolam pills that had been recovered from the defendant’s truck as the same bag she 

gave to the defendant for inspection. Ms. Pewitt said that after the defendant provided 
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his opinion on the marijuana, she thought she put it into her back pocket, but apparently it 

fell into the floor of the defendant’s truck.

Ms. Pewitt said that she had a prescription for the alprazolam and that she 

had the marijuana because she had “a lot of medical issues” and that she thought that 

using marijuana might help her “get off of some of the narcotics” she was using to treat 

her medical issues. Ms. Pewitt said that she suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, seizures, 

degenerating disc disease, an autoimmune disorder, and fibromyalgia. In addition to 

these ailments, Ms. Pewitt said that she continued to experience pain from injuries she 

sustained in a car accident.

During cross-examination, Ms. Pewitt said that she sought the defendant’s 

opinion on the use of marijuana as a medication as well as the quality of that particular 

bag of marijuana. She said that she believed “he knew a little bit about it” because the 

defendant had previously grown “[m]edical marijuana” “up in Michigan.”

Russell Hicks said that, following the defendant’s arrest in this case, the 

defendant came to Mr. Hicks’s residence looking for Mr. Hicks’s cousin, Colton Rush. 

Mr. Hicks testified that the defendant told him that Mr. Rush had previously sold him “a 

nickel-plated Springfield Armory 1911 .45” pistol that turned out to be stolen. Mr. Hicks 

said that, at that point, “[i]t finally dawned on [Mr. Hicks] that that’s where [his] gun had 

disappeared to.” Mr. Hicks identified the firearm that Trooper Miller took from the 

defendant as having belonged to him. Mr. Hicks explained how he came to possess the 

gun:

There used to be an old man that lived behind my

house, a man named Jack Russell. He was kind of an 

alcoholic, so he would end up with stuff a lot of the time that 

we didn’t know where it came from. He had died back in 

about late 2004 and I just started recently going through his 

trailer about 2013, 2014. I was cleaning out an old dresser in 

his little camper he lived in and I pulled out a drawer and 

when I pulled out the drawer, there was towel stuck behind it. 

And when I pulled out the towel, that gun was wrapped up in 

the towel. So I . . . brought it to my house, showed it to my

grandparents. They told me to go ahead and clean it up and I 

just kept it in the house as self-defense.

Mr. Hicks recalled that the gun “disappeared about the middle of 2014.”
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Based upon this evidence, the jury acquitted the defendant of theft and 

convicted him as charged on the remaining counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the 

trial court imposed a total effective sentence of five years with the effective two-year 

sentence imposed for the drug possession convictions to be served as supervised 

probation following the defendant’s service of 100 percent of the three-year sentence 

imposed for his conviction of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during 

the commission of a dangerous felony.

The defendant filed a timely but unsuccessful motion for new trial followed 

by a timely appeal. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

convicting evidence for his convictions of possession with intent to sell alprazolam and 

possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous 

felony. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence 

the reddish-brown book discovered in the defendant’s vehicle, claiming that the State 

failed to satisfy the prerequisites to its admission.

I. Sufficiency

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions of possession with intent to sell alprazolam and possession of a firearm with 

the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that,

because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he possessed 

alprazolam with intent to sell, it likewise failed to establish that he possessed a firearm 

during the commission of a dangerous felony. The defendant also asserts that, because 

the State failed to establish that the pistol in the defendant’s possession was actually 

operational, it failed to prove that he possessed a firearm as defined in the Code.

We review the defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence mindful that our 

standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). This 

standard applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, 

or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 

370, 379 (Tenn. 2011).

When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should neither 

re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. 

Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the 

evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of 

fact. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Significantly, this court must 
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afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as 

well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. 

Id.

A. Possession of Alprazolam

As charged in this case, “[i]t is an offense for a defendant to knowingly . . . 

[p]ossess a controlled substance with intent to . . . sell the controlled substance.” T.C.A.

§ 39-17-417(a)(4). “A violation of subsection (a) with respect to” a “Schedule IV 

controlled substance is a Class D felony.” Id. § 39-17-417(e)(2). Alprazolam is a 

Schedule IV controlled substance. Id. § 39-17-412(c)(2).

The evidence adduced at trial established that, upon stopping the defendant 

for speeding, Trooper Miller observed a baggy containing marijuana and pills in the 

floorboard of the defendant’s truck. Trooper Miller seized the baggy, and TBI testing 

established that the pills were alprazolam. In addition to the marijuana and pills, Trooper 

Miller seized from the defendant’s person nearly $5,000 in cash, a firearm, and a 

notebook that, as will be discussed more fully below, could have been a ledger. The 

defendant had no prescription for the pills. Although Ms. Pewitt testified that the drugs 

belonged to her, the jury was free to reject this testimony. In our view, this evidence was 

sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to sell 

alprazolam.

B. Possession of a Firearm

“It is an offense to possess a firearm with the intent to go armed during the 

commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.” Id. § 39-17-1324(a). 

“‘Firearm’ means any weapon designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile by the 

action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use.” Id. § 39-11-106(11). 

As used in Code section 39-17-1324, “‘[d]angerous felony’ means,” among other things, 

“[a] felony involving the sale, manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to sell, 

manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.” Id. § 39-17-1324(i)(1)(L). A firsttime violation of Code section 39-17-1324(a) “is a Class D felony, punishable by a 

mandatory minimum three-year sentence to the department of correction,” id. § 39-17-

1324(g)(1), which sentence “shall be served consecutive[ly] to any other sentence the 

person is serving at the time of the offense or is sentenced to serve for conviction of the 

underlying dangerous felony,” id. § 39-17-1324(e)(1).

Here, the evidence adduced at trial established that Trooper Miller 

recovered a firearm from the defendant’s person. Mr. Hunt, the original owner of the 

weapon, testified that it was a Springfield Armory 1911 .45 pistol. Contrary to the 
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defendant’s assertion, the statute does not require a showing that the gun could fire but 

only requires a showing that it was “designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile by 

the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use.” Id. § 39-11-

106(11). The gun in this case clearly satisfied that requirement. Additionally, the 

defendant’s citation of Code sections 39-6-1712 and 39-6-1714 are inapt. First, those 

statutes have been repealed, and the provision regarding the possession of inoperable 

weapons is now found in Code section 39-17-1302:

(c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 

section that the person must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that:

(1) The person’s conduct was relative to dealing with the 

weapon solely as a curio, ornament or keepsake, and if the 

weapon is a type described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(4), that it 

was in a nonfunctioning condition and could not readily be 

made operable . . . .

T.C.A. § 39-17-1302(c). Second, proof that a weapon “was in a nonfunctioning 

condition and could not readily be made operable” is an affirmative defense to 

prosecution for a violation of Code section 39-17-1302; however, the defendant was 

convicted of violating Code section 39-17-1324. Finally, even if Code section 39-17-

1302(c) could be said to apply in this case, the statute clearly provides that it operates as 

an affirmative defense, and, because the defendant did not plead that section prior to trial, 

it would be waived.

II. Admission of Book

The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into 

evidence the reddish-brown book recovered from the defendant’s vehicle, arguing that 

the State failed to lay a proper foundation for its admission and that without the proper 

foundation, the book was irrelevant. The defendant also contends that the State failed to 

satisfy the authentication requirements of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901. The State 

claims that the trial court did not err by admitting the book into evidence and that, even if 

the trial court did err, the error was harmless given the other proof of the defendant’s 

guilt.

During Trooper Miller’s direct examination testimony, he related the 

discovery of the notebook in the defendant’s car, and the trial court cautioned Trooper 

Miller to “just call it a book” until the State could offer more information. In describing 

the book, Trooper Miller said that he “scrolled through it” and saw “what appeared to 
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[be] dollar amounts.” The trial court sustained the defendant’s objection to the witness’s 

giving his opinion about the contents of the book. Nevertheless, when asked to describe 

the entries in the book, Trooper Miller said, “I see numbers and totals, and there is words 

like pills and Viagra, and some other things that made me think this was a ledger.” The 

defendant objected again, and the trial court sustained the objection. The court then 

provided the following curative instruction:

Let me explain to you all, all witnesses are entitled to 

testify about relevant facts that they saw, or actually heard in 

the occurrence of an event. But they’re not allowed to give 

opinions or conclusions based on those facts unless the 

questioning lawyer lays a foundation to show that witness is 

an expert. . . . [B]ut generally, witnesses can’t give opinions. 

The main reason is that’s stepping on the jury’s toes. It’s up 

to the jury to decide what the conclusion is from the facts, but 

now, in some cases, the attorney may be able to lay a 

foundation based on education, training, experience, and 

actually get an opinion from a witness, but now that may be 

harder to do with regard to books and numbers. . . .

At that point, the State sought to introduce the book without further 

examination of its contents. The defendant objected, and the trial court reserved ruling 

until the conclusion of cross-examination. The trial court later admitted the book into 

evidence without further comment on the merit of the defendant’s objection.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901 provides that “[t]he requirement of 

authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 

evidence sufficient to the court to support a finding by the trier of fact that the matter in 

question is what its proponent claims.” Tenn. R. Evid. 901(a). Both Rule 901 and the 

common law designate the trial court as the “arbiter of authentication issues,” and, 

accordingly, that court’s ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court 

clearly abused its discretion. See Tenn. R. Evid. 901, Advisory Comm’n Comments; 

State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court applies an incorrect legal standard or reaches a conclusion that 

is “illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. 

Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. John 

David Patterson, No. M2016-01716-SC-R11-CD, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2018)

(citing Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d. 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006)); see State v. Shirley, 6 

S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999).
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Here, Trooper Miller testified that he discovered a reddish-brown notebook 

during his search of the defendant’s car, and he identified the notebook admitted into 

evidence as the same notebook he found in the defendant’s car. Although the trial court 

sustained the defendant’s objection to Trooper Miller’s classifying the notebook as a drug 

ledger, the court observed that the jury was free to draw that conclusion based upon its 

own examination of the book. That Trooper Miller was prohibited from testifying that 

the notebook was a drug ledger was irrelevant to the determination whether the notebook 

was properly authenticated under Rule 901; it was enough that Trooper Miller testified 

that the notebook was what it purported to be, i.e., the same notebook that Trooper Miller 

seized from the defendant’s truck.

III. Clerical Errors

We observe a clerical error in the judgment that requires the entry of a 

corrected judgment form for count one. The judgment form indicates that the defendant 

was originally charged with possession of marijuana as proscribed by Code section 39-

17-417. The indictment, however, clearly states that the defendant was charged with 

simple possession of marijuana as proscribed by Code section 39-17-418 and includes a 

citation to that statute.

IV. Probation Revocation

The record establishes that four days after the imposition of the five-year 

sentence in this case, the defendant, who was on bond pending the outcome of the motion 

for new trial, was arrested following a traffic stop and charged with possession with 

intent to sell methamphetamine, simple possession of marijuana, and evidence tampering. 

A probation violation warrant issued on the basis of the new charges, and, following a 

revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probationary portion of his sentence. The 

defendant filed a separate notice of appeal for the revocation order but later asked this 

court to consolidate the direct appeal of his convictions in case number W2017-02317-

CCA-R3-CD with the direct appeal of the revocation order in case number W2017-

02478-CCA-R3-CD. This court granted the order and consolidated the cases. In his 

appellate brief, the defendant stated that he no longer wished to challenge the revocation 

of his probation. He did not, however, ask this court to dismiss the appeal in that case. 

Under these circumstances, we will treat the revocation issue as waived. See Tenn. Ct. 

Crim. App. R. 10(b).

V. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court.
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_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE