2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-1-2012

Virginia Kurschinske v. Meadville Forging Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-3364

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Virginia Kurschinske v. Meadville Forging Co" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 896.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/896
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3364

___________

VIRGINIA KURSCHINSKE,

Appellant

v.

MEADVILLE FORGING COMPANY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00087)

District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 1, 2012

Before: AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 1, 2012)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Virginia Kurschinske, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 

granting the defendant’s motion to mark as satisfied the judgments entered against it in 

the underlying action. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
2

I.

In April 2006, Kurschinske commenced a gender discrimination action in the 

District Court against her former employer, Meadville Forging Company. Following a 

jury trial in January 2008, the District Court entered a judgment of $25,000.00 in her 

favor (“Judgment I”). Meadville Forging issued a $25,000.00 check to Kurschinske on 

June 26, 2008. The court subsequently awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Kurschinske 

and her attorney, Susan Mahood, in the amount of $46,763.21 (“Judgment II”).

It appears that a dispute then arose between Kurschinske and Attorney Mahood 

regarding Judgment II. Specifically, Kurschinske claimed that she was entitled to 

$16,094.53 of the attorney’s fee award based on her agreement with Attorney Mahood. 

According to Attorney Mahood, however, no such agreement existed. In March 2009, 

Attorney Mahood commenced an action in the Allegheny County Court of Common 

Pleas against Kurschinske and Meadville Forging seeking to obtain payment of Judgment 

II. Kurschinske filed a counterclaim for her alleged share of the judgment. The state 

court found in Attorney Mahood’s favor and dismissed Kurschinske’s counterclaim. 

Accordingly, Meadville Forging issued a check for $46,763.21 payable to Attorney 

Mahood.

Approximately one year later, on October 5, 2010, Kurschinske returned to the 

District Court and obtained a writ of execution against Meadville Forging for the 

$46,763.21 (Judgment II) that Meadville Forging had already paid to Attorney Mahood,

plus post-judgment interest. In response, Meadville Forging filed an emergency motion 
3

to strike the writ of execution and asked the court to deem both judgments satisfied. The 

District Court construed Meadville Forging’s motion as one pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, following a hearing, determined that: 

(a) Meadville Forging had satisfied both judgments by paying $25,000.00 to Kurschinske 

on June 27, 2008,1 and $46,763.21 to Attorney Mahood on August 25, 2009; and 

(b) Kurschinske was collaterally estopped from prosecuting her claim for a portion of the 

attorney’s fees award by attempting to execute on Judgment II because the state court had 

already considered, and rejected, that claim. Kurschinske filed various motions seeking 

reconsideration, but the District Court denied relief.2

II.

On appeal, Kurschinske first argues that the District Court erred in entering an 

order declaring Judgments I and II satisfied because the court’s judgment in her favor on 

the merits of her gender discrimination claim is entitled to res judicata effect. 

Kurschinske appears to believe that the District Court’s order deeming Judgments I and II 

satisfied somehow provided relief from the jury verdict to Meadville Forging. Contrary 

to her contention, however, the District Court’s order did not disturb its previous ruling 

on the merits of her case. The District Court had authority under Rule 60(b) to grant 

 1 The District Court did determine, however, that Meadville Forging owed 

Kurschinske interest on Judgment I. Kurschinske does not challenge this order or 

contend in her brief that it was not paid.

2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

relief from the judgments, and acted within its discretion in doing so on the ground that 

both judgments had been satisfied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (providing that the court 

may relieve a party from a final judgment if the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged); see also AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.

Kurschinske’s second argument on appeal fares no better. She appears to claim 

that the District Court’s ruling that Meadville Forging had satisfied Judgments I and II 

somehow violates the Supremacy Clause’s limitation on a state’s ability to enact laws 

that conflict with federal law. This argument is both confusing and meritless. As noted 

above, the District Court had authority under Rule 60(b) to deem Judgments I and II 

satisfied.

, 579 

F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that Rule 60(b)(5) “encompasses the power to 

declare a judgment satisfied when damages are paid before trial or a tortfeasor or obligor 

has paid the judgment debt”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III.

We have considered Kurschinske’s remaining arguments and conclude that they 

lack merit. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.3

 3 Kurschinske does not specifically challenge the District Court’s orders denying 

her motions for reconsideration. That said, we have reviewed these orders and see no 

error in the District Court’s decisions denying relief.