J-A11035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAMON DUANE AMISON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 631 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0000713-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAMON DUANE AMISON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 632 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0003003-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: May 15, 2023

Damon Duane Amison (Amison) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (trial court) in these 

consolidated cases after his conviction of persons not to possess firearms, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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possession with intent to deliver (PWID), and related charges. He argues that 

the evidence was insufficient because it failed to establish that he possessed 

a “firearm” as defined by applicable law making the PWID charge 

inappropriate. He also contends that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 

600 motion.1 We affirm.

We take the pertinent facts and procedural history from the trial court’s 

July 14, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the record.

I.

The convictions in this matter relate to events that occurred on August 

5, 2019, at and near Moe’s One Stop convenience store located at 24th and 

Parade Streets in Erie, Pennsylvania. The trial court explains:

The charges in the Information filed on December 11, 2019 

at No. 3003 of 2019 arose from [Amison]’s activities of August 5, 

2019 in the 2400 block of Parade Street, Erie, Pennsylvania when 

Appellant fled from police who were familiar with him and who had 

approached him because there was an outstanding warrant for his 

arrest. When Appellant fled from the store ... he ignored police 

orders to stop; and instead ran from the police into congested 

traffic in the 2400 block of Parade Street, causing several vehicles 

to abruptly stop. After a struggle with the police which involved 

deployment of a Taser, [Amison] was arrested. [He] was charged 

with weapons and flight-related offenses as follows: Count OnePersons Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or 

Transfer Firearms; Count Two-Firearms Not to be Carried Without 

a License; Count Three-Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or 

Punishment; Count Four-Recklessly Endangering Another Person;

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1 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A)(2) provides: (2) Trial shall 

commence within the following time periods. (a) Trial in a court case in which 

a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 

days from the date on which the complaint is filed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2).
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Count Five-Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement; and Count 

Six-Disorderly Conduct.[a]

[a] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1); 6106(a)(1); 5126(a); 2705; 

5104; and 5503(a)(4), respectively.

According to the Criminal Complaint of August 5, 2019 

which led to the charges at No. 3003 of 2019, review of store 

surveillance video at Moe’s One Stop depicted [that Amison]

possessed a handgun at the time. Further review of the store 

surveillance video of August 5, 2019 also depicted [that he]

possessed a clear plastic bag containing a white substance which 

[Amison] discarded and/or concealed inside Moe’s before he fled 

from the police. Laboratory analysis revealed the white substance 

was 14.53 grams of heroin and fentanyl.

On May 14, 2020, the drug charges at Docket No. 713 of 

2020 ensued: Count One, Possession With Intent to Deliver 

(heroin and/or fentanyl) [(PWID)]; Count Two, Possession (heroin 

and/or fentanyl); Count Three, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; 

and Count Four, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

...[b]

[b] 35 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16) and 

780-113(a)(31)(i), [], and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4910(a)(1)[, 

respectively].

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 1-2).

On January 14, 2020, Amison filed a pro se omnibus pretrial motion that 

included, in pertinent part, a motion for writ of habeas corpus and/or motion 

to quash/dismiss the firearms charges. (See Pro Se Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 

1/14/20, at 3-5).2 On August 31, 2020, Amison filed a motion for continuance 

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2 Our review of the docket reflects that Amison was represented by privately 

retained counsel, Attorney Eric Vaughn Hackwelder, at the commencement of 

the litigation. It is not clear when Attorney Hackwelder withdrew his 
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of trial with a waiver of his prompt and speedy trial rights and a motion for 

discovery seeking police dispatch records. The trial court granted both 

motions. On November 30, 2020, Amison filed a counseled omnibus pretrial 

motion for relief/exhibits seeking the production of discovery previously 

ordered and the suppression of cell phone evidence. After the Commonwealth 

filed a brief, the court denied the motion. On July 19, 2021, Amison filed trial 

motions and exhibits again raising, in pertinent part, the unresolved issue of 

the firearms charges. The court held a hearing on the motion in which found 

that the evidence was sufficient to make it a jury question and that it should 

be raised in a motion for judgment of acquittal after the Commonwealth 

presented its evidence. (See N.T. Hearing, 10/20/21, at 10-13). On 

December 22, 2021, Amison filed a renewed motion to dismiss the firearms 

counts, which the trial court again denied. 

On March 18, 2022, three days before trial, Amison filed a motion to 

dismiss on Rule 600 grounds. On March 21, 2022, immediately before voir 

dire, the parties engaged in a contentious argument on the Rule 600 motion 

about who bore the responsibility for the delays. The Commonwealth argued 

that they were caused in large part by Amison’s unavailability due to the 

numerous pre-trial motions he repeatedly represented had to be decided 

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representation, but Attorney Elliot Jay Segal (also privately retained) entered 

his appearance on behalf of Amison on January 29, 2020.
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before he could proceed. Amison relied on Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 

579 (Pa. 1999), for his argument that filing pre-trial motions did not 

automatically make him unavailable for Rule 600 purposes since they did not 

delay the start of trial. (See N.T., 3/21/22, at 11-26). Ultimately, the trial 

court proposed deciding the issue based on the Rule 600 motion and the 

Commonwealth’s brief. Amison’s counsel did not object to this suggestion. 

(See id. at 26). The same day, the trial court issued an order denying the 

motion. (See Order, 3/21/22).

II.

At trial, Amison testified that he was a drug addict and not a dealer. He 

also asserted that the gun shown in the surveillance video was merely a BB 

gun.

Multiple officers, including Officer Strauch (who also testified at the 

preliminary hearing), Officer Schroeck and Detective Suchy of the Erie Police 

Vice Unit, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Officers Schroeck and 

Strauch testified about their attempt to serve the warrant, locating the 

heroin/fentanyl and their realization, after viewing the surveillance video, that 

Amison had possessed and discarded a firearm, which appeared to them to 

be a real gun. They explained the physical factors that made it appear to be 

a semi-automatic handgun and drew inferences from the way Amison was 

moving the firearm around, holding it and using it.
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Detective Suchy, a 22-year veteran of the Erie Police Department and a 

member of the drug task force testified that in his expert opinion, the amount 

of heroin/fentanyl in this case was consistent with PWID. He explained that 

in the hundreds of drug investigations in which he had participated, he had 

never seen a user possess heroin/fentanyl in the amount Amison possessed

which was more than five times the amount that he had ever seen on a user. 

Detective Suchy also testified that people with that much heroin possess it 

with the intent to deliver it for profit. This was bolstered by secondary 

evidence, including Amison’s possession of two cell phones, which the officers

stated is common for drug dealers.

The detective also explained that because drug dealing occurs in a 

violent setting, drug dealers typically carry firearms for their protection. 

Although Amison testified that the object in his possession was a BB gun, the 

detective explained that he has never seen a drug dealer with a “fake” firearm 

or BB gun because they would do very little for the drug dealers who were 

trying to protect their product.

The jury convicted Amison of the foregoing charges on March 23, 2022,

and on April 25, 2022, the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 

incarceration of not less than eight nor more than sixteen years, plus 

probation. Amison did not file a post-sentence motion, but he timely appealed 

at the above docket numbers on May 25, 2022, and filed court-ordered 
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statements of errors. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This Court consolidated the 

appeals sua sponte.

On appeal, Amison claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient where 

it failed to prove the item in his possession met the statutory definition of a 

firearm; (2) the court erred in denying his Rule 600 motion without holding a 

hearing or making findings of fact and accepting the Commonwealth’s 

adjusted run date; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 

Commonwealth to argue that he should be convicted of PWID because he 

possessed a firearm since it failed to prove that the item in his possession met 

the legal definition of a “firearm.”

III.

A.

Amison first argues that the trial court erred in denying his habeas 

corpus motion to dismiss the firearms charges because the Commonwealth 

failed to produce sufficient evidence that he possessed a statutorily defined 

“firearm” to establish a prima facie case. 

3

 The Commonwealth responds that 

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3 Pursuant to our standard of review:

The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus

will be reversed on appeal only for a manifest abuse of 

discretion.... Our scope of review is limited to deciding whether a

prima facie case was established.... The Commonwealth must 

show sufficient probable cause that the defendant committed the 

offense, and the evidence should be such that if presented at trial, 

and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing 
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individuals can be convicted of a firearms offense without direct evidence that 

the weapon was operable because it can be established by circumstantial 

evidence.

For the purpose of a persons not to possess charge, the Crimes Code 

defines “firearm” as “any weapons which are designed to or may be readily 

converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(i). Possessing firearms without a license relies on the general 

definition of firearm contained in Section 6102, which defines firearm based 

on its size, providing in pertinent part that a firearm is “[a]ny pistol or revolver 

with a barrel length less than 15 inches[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102. Under these 

statutes, we have held that “[t]he Commonwealth [] need not show the 

weapon to have been operable until evidence of its inoperability has been 

introduced into evidence.” Commonwealth v. Horshaw, 346 A.2d 340, 342

(Pa. Super. 1975). “[A] reasonable fact finder may ... infer operability ... from 

an object which looks like, feels like, sounds like, or is like a firearm ... without 

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the case to go to the jury. When deciding whether a prima facie

case was established, we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, and we are to consider all 

reasonable inferences based on that evidence which could support 

a guilty verdict. The standard clearly does not require that the 

Commonwealth prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt at this stage.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 954 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 916 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2006) (citation and brackets omitted).
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direct proof of operability.” Commonwealth v. Fitzhugh, 520 A.2d 424, 432

(Pa. Super. 1987) (citation omitted). Thus, “testimony that defendant 

possessed a gun allow[s] a reasonable inference of operability, despite lack of 

direct testimony on this issue.” Commonwealth v. Holguin, 385 A.2d 1346,

1351 (Pa. Super. 1978).

At the argument on the petition for writ of habeas corpus or to dismiss 

the firearms charges, defense counsel argued that the photograph he attached 

to Amison’s motion was inconclusive to prove Amison had a firearm or that it 

was operable. (See N.T., 10/20/21, at 11-12). The Commonwealth 

countered that the photograph was merely one still from the surveillance 

videotape that contained three camera angles that clearly showed Amison was 

holding a gun. Furthermore, based on the circumstantial evidence that

Amison ran when the officers approached to serve the warrant, and he 

removed the weapon that was hidden in his waistband and passed it off to 

another individual who fled, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that 

Amison believed the weapon was an operable firearm, which was sufficient for 

the issue to at least go to trial. (See id. at 13). The court did not abuse its 

discretion when it found that this issue should go to the jury and denied the 

motion for writ of habeas corpus or to dismiss the firearms charges.

B.

Similarly, Amison argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

for judgment of acquittal on the firearms counts at the close of the 
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Commonwealth’s case because it failed to prove the operability of the 

firearms.

4

Officers Strauch and Schroeck testified about their attempt to serve the 

warrant, locating the heroin/fentanyl and their realization, after viewing the 

surveillance video, that Amison had discarded a firearm, which appeared to 

them to be a real gun. They explained the physical factors that made it appear 

to be a semi-automatic handgun and drew inferences from the way Amison 

was moving the firearm around, holding it and using it. (See N.T. Trial, 

3/21/22, at 77-79, 93-97, 100-04); (N.T. Trial, 3/22/22, at 24-30, 32-40, 44, 

47, 52-53).

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4 “A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only in cases in 

which the Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding that 

charge.” Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892, 894 (Pa. Super. 2014).

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court

is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 189 A.3d 389 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
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The evidence also established that Amison was a drug dealer, which 

tended to show that the item in Amison’s possession was an operable firearm 

rather than a BB gun as he testified. Commonwealth expert Detective Suchy 

of the drug task force testified, as he did at the suppression hearing, that the 

amount of heroin/fentanyl was consistent with PWID in the hundreds of cases 

with which he had been involved, had never seen a user possess 

heroin/fentanyl in the amount Amison possessed, five times more than he had 

ever seen on a user. He testified that Amison’s possession of two cell phones 

is common for drug dealers, and because drug dealing occurs in a violent 

setting, dealers typically carry firearms for their protection. The detective had 

never seen a drug dealer with a “fake” firearm or BB gun because they would 

do little for the drug dealers who were trying to protect their product.

Because the jury could infer from the foregoing that Amison discarded 

the gun because it was an operable firearm rather than a BB gun, the trial 

court properly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the 

Commonwealth’s case.5

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5 Amison argues that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to 

argue that he was guilty of PWID because he possessed a firearm since it 

failed to prove the weapon was operable. Again, this fails because the jury

could infer that Amison possessed an operable gun based on the 

circumstantial evidence.
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IV.

We next consider Amison’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his 

Rule 600 motion when it failed to hold a hearing, make findings of fact and 

accepted the Commonwealth’s adjusted run date.6 (See Amison’s brief, at 

48-66).

A.

We first address the claim that the trial court erred when it failed to hold

an evidentiary hearing to determine if an Act 600 violation occurred. The 

purpose of a Rule 600 hearing is for the parties to present factual allegations 

about whether the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial and, if so, 

why. See Commonwealth v. McGeth, 622 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa. Super. 1993). 

Generally, failure to hold a hearing on an appellant’s speedy trial issue 

requires a case to be remanded for the hearing. See Commonwealth v.

Swartz, 579 A.2d 978, 980-81 (Pa. Super. 1990). This is so because our 

scope of review on appeal is “limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 

600 evidentiary hearing and the findings of the trial court.” Commonwealth

v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

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6 The trial court’s rulings as to computation of time under Rule 600 are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 204

A.3d 945 (Pa. Super. 2019). “An appellate court must view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hen 

considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the 

dual purpose behind Rule 600 ... (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy 

trial rights, and (2) the protection of society.” Id.
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However, if the docket entries demonstrate that the defendant was brought 

to trial before the adjusted run date, then failing to hold a hearing is harmless 

error. See McGeth, 622 A.2d at 945.

Immediately before trial commenced, the parties to this matter engaged 

in a contentious argument on the Rule 600 motion about who bore the 

responsibility for any of the delays. The Commonwealth argued that they 

were caused in large part by Amison’s unavailability due to the numerous pretrial motions he repeatedly represented had to be decided before he could 

proceed to trial. Amison relied on Hill, 736 A.2d 579, for his argument that 

filing pre-trial motions did not automatically make him unavailable for Rule 

600 purposes since they did not delay the start of trial. Instead, he maintained 

that the court’s order scheduling a hearing on the motion was the date when 

delay started because only once a hearing was scheduled did he become 

unavailable. (See N.T., 3/21/22, at 11-26). Ultimately, the trial court 

proposed deciding the issue based on Amison’s Rule 600 motion and the 

Commonwealth’s response brief. Neither party objected. (See id. at 26).

First, Amison has waived this argument by failing to object at trial. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, even if not waived, we discern no abuse of 

discretion where the trial court was familiar with the protracted procedural 

history, heard argument on the Rule 600 issue, and decided the matter on 

this basis, thus ensuring that this Court can review the reasons for its decision.
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B.

Next, we determine if the trial court properly denied Amison’s Rule 600 

motion.

Generally, Rule 600 protects the speedy trial rights of the accused, as 

well as society's interest in prosecuting crimes. See Commonwealth v. 

Watson, 140 A.3d 696, 698 (Pa. Super. 2016). The Rule mandates that a 

“[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the 

defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the 

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). The final day of that period is 

called the “mechanical run date.” See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 

1097, 1101-04 (Pa. Super. 2007). “For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of 

delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the [Commonwealth’s failure 

to exercise due diligence] shall be included in the computation of the time 

within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be 

excluded from the computation[]” with the mechanical run date adjusted 

accordingly. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added).

The trial court may exclude time from the Rule 600 calculation if “the 

delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s 

control and despite its due diligence[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. To prove it 

acted with due diligence, the Commonwealth must demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it “put forth a reasonable effort.” 

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). “Where the 
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Commonwealth was prepared to proceed throughout the pendency of a case, 

it demonstrated that it was prosecuting the defendant’s case with due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. 2006), 

appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

In this case, the criminal complaint was filed in case number 3003-2019 

on August 5, 2019,7 making the mechanical run date August 5, 2020. 

Amison’s case went to trial on March 21, 2022, which was 593 days past the 

mechanical run date.

Most of the delay in this matter was caused by emergency judicial orders 

entered in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which are not to be included 

in the Rule 600 calculation. See Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 750 

(Pa. Super. 2022) (Delays caused by a Covid-19 judicial emergency closure 

order are not to be included in Rule 600 calculations); (see also Emergency 

Judicial Order, 3/17/20, at ¶ 1);8 (Amended Emergency Judicial Order, 

____________________________________________

7 Amison withdrew his claim that Rule 600 precludes the prosecution of case 

713-2020 because trial commenced within the mechanical run date. (See

N.T., 3/21/22, at 38).

8 The Emergency Judicial Orders direct:

The operation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 shall be suspended in the Sixth 

Judicial District of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, 

Pennsylvania, during the period of local judicial emergency. The 

time period of the duration of the judicial emergency shall be 

excluded from any time computation pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600. The Court finds that such delay is not chargeable to the 

Commonwealth or the Defendants.
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3/31/20); (Second Amended Emergency Judicial Order, 4/16/20); (Judicial 

Order, 5/06/22). Erie County trials were cancelled from March 17, 2020, until 

August 18, 2020. Although trial was scheduled for the September term, the 

oldest cases were to have preference,9 which did not include Amison’s, and on 

November 11, 2020, Erie County again issued emergency orders postponing 

all criminal trials due to Covid-19, with trials to resume on February 8, 2021. 

(See Emergency Judicial Order, 11/12/20); (Supplemental Emergency 

Judicial Order, 12/21/20); (Administrative Order, 1/05/21).

This 328-day delay was excusable since it involved “circumstances 

beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence.” Martz, 

232 A.3d at 810. Adding this 328-days to the mechanical run date of August 

5, 2020, results in an adjusted run date of June 21, 2021. Trial commenced 

on March 21, 2022, 274 days beyond this date.

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(Emergency Judicial Order, 3/17/20, at ¶ 1); (see also Amended Emergency 

Judicial Order, 3/31/20); (Second Amended Emergency Judicial Order, 

4/16/20); (Judicial Order, 5/06/22).

9

In its response to the Rule 600 motion, the Commonwealth explained that it 

was permitted two trials after the August “soft opening of the Courthouse” 

and that it was instructed that they were to be the oldest cases involving 

defendants who were being held in jail on their charges. Amison was serving 

a sentence on another case at the time. (Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s 

Pretrial Motion, 3/21/22, at ¶ II(a)(iv)).
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Additionally, another 274 days has to be subtracted from the mechanical 

run date because on August 31, 2020, Amison filed a continuance of the 

scheduled September trial for the court to first dispose of a related motion to 

suppress, which ultimately was decided on April 30, 2021. In that motion, he 

waived his speedy trial rights and the court’s order reflected same.10 (Motion 

for Continuance with Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 8/31/20); (Order, 

9/01/20) (continuing trial “from the September 2020 trial term to the end of 

the next available trial term following resolution of the pending [police 

dispatch information] discovery matter” with Rule 600 expiration date “to be 

recomputed pursuant to the defendant’s Rule 600 waiver”). Subtracting these 

241 days from the above 274 days results in a lapse of 33 days.

As to whether there is a valid excuse for those 33 days, the trial court,

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, explains:

On March 21, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a Brief in 

Opposition to Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. Oral argument was 

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10 The record also reflects that Amison filed other continuance motions in 

which he waived his Rule 600 right to a prompt and speedy trial, which the 

trial court granted, observing the waivers. (Motion for Continuance with 

Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 3/03/20); (Order, 3/03/20) (continuing trial 

until end of April 2020 term with “Rule 600 expiration to be recomputed 

pursuant to the Amison’s Rule 600 waiver of time from this date until the last 

date of the April 2020 trial term of court”); (Motion for Continuance with 

Waiver of Prompt or Speedy Trial, 8/03/21); (Order, 8/11/21) (continuing trial 

until outstanding issues resolved with Rule 600 expiration date to be recomputed pursuant to Amison’s Rule 600 waiver); (Motion for Continuance of 

Hearing/[Argument] on Defendant’s Trial Motion, 8/19/21) (stating “time will 

not be charged against Commonwealth”); (Order, 8/20/21) (rescheduling 

hearing to 10/20/21) (delay will not be charged against the Commonwealth 

for Rule 600 purposes).
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held on March 21, 2022. The court concurred with the 

Commonwealth’s calculations as set forth in the Commonwealth’s 

brief, and on March 21, 2022 the court denied [Amison]’s motion.

Contrary to [Amison]’s claims, the court determined the 

Commonwealth acted with due diligence for periods of delay 

identified in [Amison]’s motion. [Amison] filed multiple pre-trial 

motions after the original pro se and follow-up counseled omnibus 

motion was ruled upon. There were numerous e-mail exchanges 

between the Commonwealth and [Amison]’s counsel which, in the 

court’s assessment, demonstrated a conscientious and high level 

of diligence in prosecuting the case. The Commonwealth at one 

or more times requested an earlier trial date, for example, e-mails 

in January of 2022 requested rescheduling the trial from March of 

2022 to February of 2022 to accommodate a potential 

complication in the ADA’s trial schedule and the Commonwealth’s 

concomitant desire to diligently prosecute the case. In that 

instance, as one example, the court determined the time from the 

beginning of the February of 2022 trial term through the start date 

of trial, March 21, 2022, would not be held against the 

Commonwealth. The court concurred with the Commonwealth’s 

position as set forth in its brief and during argument, and denied 

[Amison]’s motion. No abuse of discretion occurred. ...

(Trial Ct. Op., at 5).

Based on the emails submitted by the Commonwealth, the trial court 

found that it attempted in good faith to move the trial from March 21, 2022,

until the beginning of the February term, but Amison refused (after initially 

agreeing), so the court declined to hold the approximately 48 days against the 

Commonwealth for Rule 600 purposes. We discern no abuse of discretion and 

based on the foregoing, there was no Rule 600 violation.

C.

Moreover, for the sake of completeness, we briefly address Amison’s 

reliance on Hill, although this is not material to our disposition where we did 
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not base our decision on his multiple pretrial motions and, even if we did, Hill

would not support his position.

In Hill, the defendant filed four pre-trial motions between May 2, 1994,

and July 17, 1995, one of which was an omnibus pretrial motion that remained 

pending the entire time. In considering whether Hill was “unavailable,” thus 

rendering the time excludable, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed:

[T]he mere filing of a pretrial motion by a defendant does not 

automatically render him unavailable. Rather, a defendant is only 

unavailable for trial if a delay in the commencement of trial is 

caused by the filing of the pretrial motion. If a delay is created, 

in order to establish that the delay is excludable, the 

Commonwealth must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that it exercised due diligence in opposing or responding 

to the pretrial motion. A delay caused by the Commonwealth’s 

lack of due diligence will not constitute excludable time.

Hill, 736 A.2d at 587 (citations omitted).

The record in Hill reflected that the court held multiple hearings in 

considering the pretrial motions and the Supreme Court observed that, 

therefore, “due to Hill's filing of pretrial motions, the commencement of his 

trial was delayed. In order to determine whether the delays caused by the 

pretrial motions should be excluded from the Rule [600] calculation, we must 

consider whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in opposing 

them.” Id. at 588.

Other than two continuance requests by the Commonwealth, it:

attended and was prepared for each of the hearings and other 

proceedings that were conducted by the trial court throughout this 

period. Thus, other than the two instances noted above, the 

Commonwealth was duly diligent during the period between May 
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2, 1994 and July 17, 1995. Consequently, the entire period, less 

four days, constitutes excludable time.

Id. at 588.

Similarly, here, Amison filed several pre-trial motions and the 

Commonwealth exercised due diligence by responding, producing discovery 

and appearing for the hearings. It explained that its failure to produce certain 

items was not due to lack of diligence, but because they were not in its 

possession. The few continuances the Commonwealth did request do not 

appear to have been requested in bad faith, with it ultimately offering to bring 

the case to trial sooner and Amison refusing.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the 

Commonwealth exercised due diligence. Therefore, even had this Court 

decided the Rule 600 issue on the basis of Amison’s multiple pre-trial motions, 

under Hill, Rule 600 time would continue to run where the motions caused 

delays in trial because hearings had to be scheduled.

Viewing the foregoing in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

and recognizing the dual purpose to be served by Rule 600 to preserve an 

accused’s speedy trial rights and the protection of the public, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Amison’s Rule 600 motion. See Carter,

204 A.3d at 945 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2023