COURT OF A PPEAL S EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS

PHI L I P TRAN HARRI S, Appellant,

v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08-10-00103- CR

Appea l from
297th District Court
of Tar rant County , Texas (TC # 0560025D)

O P I N I O N
Ph il li p T r a

n H a r r is a p peals from a judgme nt adjudicating him g uilty of ag g rava ted posse s s io n with intent to deliver more than 28 but less than 200 g rams of ly serg ic acid diethy lamide (L SD) and assessing punishment at a fine of $5,450 and imprisonment for f ifteen y ear s. We affirm.
F ACTUAL SUMMA RY
The indictment alleg ed that Appellant committed the char g ed offe nse on May 25, 1994. On September 24, 1 9 99, Appellant enter ed a plea of g uilty and the trial court place d him on defe rre d adjudication community supervision for a term of ten y ears
. I n 2008, the State filed a motion to adjudicate g uilt alleg ing Appellant violated sever al conditions of co m m u n i t y supervision. The
motion alleg ed that Appellant committed a new offe nse by intentionally and knowing ly possessing

more than four but less than 200 g rams of methamphetamine in 2008, failed to repor t, tested positive
fo r methamphetamine or amphetamine on sever al dates while on community supervision, and he
failed to attend and complete substance abuse assessment order ed by the trial court. At the
conclusion of the hear ing on the State’s motion, the trial court found the evidenc e sufficie nt to prove Appellant had violated the conditions of community supervision. The court gra n t ed the State’smotion, adjudicate d Appellant’s g ui l t , an d assessed his punishment at a fine of $5,450 and

imprisonment for fiftee n y ear s. This appea l follows.
CONSTIT UTIONALITY OF SENTENCE
I n his sole issue on appea l, Appellant contends that his sentenc e is excessive and constitutionally disproportionate in violation of the c o n s ti tu ti o n a l p r ovisions of the United States and
Texas Constit utions prohibiting crue l and unusual punishment. Appellant’s brief does not contain 1

any arg ument or authority explaining how the protec tion provided by the Texas Constit ution differ s from the protec tion provided by the Un i t ed States Constit ution. State and fede ral constitutional
cl ai m s s hould be arg ued in separ ate g rounds, with separ ate substantive analy sis or arg umen t provided for eac h g round. Muniz v. State , 851 S.W .2d 238, 251-52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Heitman

v. State , 815 S.W .2d 681, 690-91 n.23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Be cause Appellant has inadequa tely
briefe d the issue rela

ted to the Texas Constit ution, nothing is prese nted for our revie w. See Muniz , 851 S.W .2d at 251-52; T E X .R.A P P .P. 38.1(I ).
The Eig ht Amendment prohibits crue l and unusual punishment. U.S. C O N S T

. A M E N D VI I I ; Graham v. Florida , --- U.S.

--- -, --- -, 130 S.Ct

. 2011, 2021, 176 L .Ed.2d 825 (2010). I n addition to prohibiting inhere ntly barba ric punishment, the Eig hth Amendment require s that punishment for
crime be g radua ted and proportioned to the offe nse. Graham , 130 S.Ct

. at 2021. Texas courts have traditionally held that, as long as the punishment assessed is within t he rang e presc ribed by the
L eg islature in a valid statute, the punishment is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. Mullins v. Stat e , 208 S.W .3d 469, 470 (Tex.App.--Te x arka na 2006, no pet.), citing Jordan v. State , 495 S.W .2d 949,
952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). At the t ime Appellant was indicted i n 1 9 9 4 , p ossession of L SD with

A p p e l l a n t ’ s b r i e f d o e s n o t i d e n t i f y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s o n w h i c h h e r e l i e s b u t w e a s s u m e h e r e f e r s 1 t o t h e E i g h t h A m e n d m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 1 3 o f t h e T e x a s C o n s t i t u t i o n
.intent to deliver was an ag g rava ted offe nse if t h e ag g reg ate weig ht of the controlled substance,

including any dilutants or adultera nts, w as 28 g rams or more. Acts 1989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 678, § 1, 1989 Tex.Gen.L aws 2230, 2935. The punishment rang e varie d based on the amount possessed. Acts 1989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 678, § 1, 1989 T E X .G E N .L A W S 2230, 2935-36. I n the instant case , the indictment alleg ed that the ag g reg ate weig ht of the L SD was 28 g rams or more but less than 200

g rams. That offe nse was punishable by a prison term of five y ear s to 99 y ear s or life, and a fine not

to exceed $50, 0 0 0

. Ac t s 1 989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 678, § 1, 1989 T E X .G E N .L A W S 2230, 2935. 2 Appellant’s fiftee n y ear sentenc e cer tainly falls within the applicable punishment rang e. That is not dispositi ve of the issue prese nted on appea l beca use a sentenc e which falls within the statutory rang e

m ay s t i l l run afoul of the Eig hth Amendment’s prohibition ag ainst g rossly disproportionat e punishment. See M

ullins , 208 S.W .3d at 470.
I n the context of the issue prese nted on appea l, Appellant challeng es the trial court’s decision

to revoke community supervision and adjudicate him g uilty by arg uing that he was a g ood candida te

to continue on community supervision. Whether Appellant was a g ood candida te for comm unity supervision is not pertinent to our deter mination of this issue. I nstead, when examining whether a
sentenc e for a term of y ear s is g rossly disproportionate for a particula r defe ndant’s crime, we employ

I f t h e a g g r e g a t e w e i g h t w e r e 2 0 0 g r a m s o r m o r e b u t l e s s t h a n 4 0 0 g r a m s , t h e p u n i s h m e n t r a n g e i n c r e a s e d t o 2

a n i m p r i s o n m e n t t e r m o f 1 0 y e a r s t o 9 9 y e a r s o r l i f e , a n d f i n e n o t t o e x c e e d $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0

. A c t s 1 9 8 9 , 7 1 s t L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 7 8 , § 1 , 1 9 8 9 T E X

. G E N

. L A W S 2 2 3 0 , 2 9 3 5

- 3 6

. I f t h e a g g r e g a t e w e i g h t w e r e 4 0 0 g r a m s o r m o r e , t h e o f f e n s e w a s p u n i s h a b l e b y a p r i s o n t e r m o f 1 5 y e a r s t o 9 9 y e a r s o r l i f e a n d a f i n e n o t t o e x c e e d $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0

. A c t s 1 9 8 9 , 7 1 s t L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 7 8 , § 1 , 1 9 8 9 T E X

. G E N

. L A W S 2 2 3 0 , 2 9 3 6

. L S D i s n o w f o u n d i n P e n a l t y G r o u p 1

- A a n d i t i s a n o f f e n s e t o m a n u f a c t u r e , d e l i v e r , o r p o s s e s s w i t h i n t e n t t o d e l i v e r a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n c l u d e d i n P e n a l t y G r o u p 1

- A

. T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N

. § § 4 8 1

. 1 0 2 1 , 4 8 1

. 1 1 2 1 ( V e r n o n 2 0 1 0 )

. U n d e r c u r r e n t l a w , a p e r s o n w h o p o s s e s s e s b e t w e e n 8 0 a n d 4 0 0 0 “ a b u s e u n i t s ” o f L S D w i t h i n t e n t t o d e l i v e r c o m m i t s a f i r s t d e g r e e f

e l o n y
. T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N

. § 4 8 1

. 1 1 2 1 ( b ) ( 3 )

. I f a p e r s o n p o s s e s s e s m o r e t h a n 4 , 0 0 0 a b u s e u n i t s w i t h i n t e n t t o d e l i v e r , t h e o f f e n s e i s p u n i s h a b l e b y i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r l i f e o r f o r a t e r m o f n o t m o r e t h a n 9 9 y e a r s o r l e s s t h a n 1 5 y e a r s a n d a f i n e n o t t o e x c e e d $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0

. T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N

. § 4 8 1

. 1 1 2 1 ( b ) ( 4 )

. “ A b u s e u n i t ” i s d e f i n e d a s a s i n g l e u n i t o n o r i n a n y a d u l t e r a n t , d i l u t a n t , o r s i m i l a r c a r r i e r m e d i u m , i n c l u d i n g m a r k e d o r p e r f o r a t e d b l o t t e r p a p e r , a t a b l e t , g e l a t i n w a f e r , s u g a r c u b e , o r s t a m p , o r o t h e r m e d i u m i f t h e u n i t i s c o m m o n l y u s e d i n a b u s e o f t h a t s u b s t a n c e
. T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N

. § 4 8 1

. 0 0 2 ( 5 0 )

.the approa ch utiliz ed by the Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct

. 2680,

115 L .Ed.2d 836 (1991). See Graham , 130 S.Ct

. at 2022 (stating that Harmelin’s approa ch is suited
for considering a g ross proportionality challeng e). Under that analy sis, a court beg ins by making an objective c omparison of the g ravity of the offe nse with the sever ity of the sente nce. Graham , 130
S.Ct

. at 2022; Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct

. at 2707 (opinion of Kenne dy , J .); Mullins , 208
S

. W

. 3 d at 470. I f t hat t hreshold comparison leads to an inferenc e of g ross disproportionality , the

court should then compar e the defe ndant’s sentenc e: (1) with the sentenc es imposed in other crimes
in the same jurisdiction; and (2) with the sentenc es imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Graham , 130 S.Ct

. at 2022; Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct

. at 2707 (opinion of Kenne dy , J .);
Mullins , 208 S.W .3d at 470.
At the time Appellant committed the offe nse, the Texas L eg islature had deter mined that the aggravated offe nse should be punished as a first deg ree felony but with an incre ased fine. T h e
sentenc e assessed by the trial court falls in the lower end of that punishment rang e. L ooking at the

g ravity of the offe n s e, it is undisputed that distribution and use of illega l drug s continues to be a serious issue in our society

. I n conducting the threshold analy sis in Harmelin , a case involving possession of more than 650 gra m s o r 1.5 pounds of coca ine, the Supreme Court stated that possession, use, and distribution of i lleg al drugs represe nt “one of the gre atest problems aff ecting
the health and welfa

re of our population.” Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S.Ct

. at 2705 (opinion
of Kenne dy , J .), quoting Treasury Employe es v. Von Raab , 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct

. 1384, 1392,
103 L .Ed.2d 685 (1989). I n addition to the pernic ious eff ects on the individual who consumes illega l drug s, such drug s rela te to c rime in at le ast three way s: ( 1) a drug user may commit crime bec ause of drug -induce d chang es in phy siologica l functions, cog nitive ability , and mood; (2) a drug user may commit crime in orde r to obtain money to buy drug s; and (3) a viol ent crime may occur as part ofthe drug business or culture. Har me l i n , 5 0 1 U.S

. at 1002-03, 111 S.Ct

. at 2706. Noting that 650

g rams of pure coca ine has a potential y ield of betwee n 32,500 and 65,000 doses and in lig ht of the problems cre ated by distribution and use of illega l drug s, the Supreme Court reje cted as absurd the
defe ndant’s arg ument that his crime was nonviolent and victimless. Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1002-03,
111 S.Ct . at 2705-06 (opinion of K ennedy , J .).
The recor d does not ref

lect how many g rams of L SD Appellant actually possessed or how

many doses or “ abuse units” we re c ontained in the amount he possessed. I n analy zing the g ravity
of the crime, it is important to keep in mind that dosag es of L SD are measure d in microg rams rathe r
than milli g rams. The United States Supreme Court descr i b ed in Chapman v. United States the 3

nature and manne r of sa le of L SD:
Acc ording to the Sentencing Commi ssion, the L SD in an aver ag e dose weig hs 0.05 milli g rams; there are there fore 20,000 pure dose s in a g ram. The pure dose is such an infinitesimal amount that it must be sold to retail customers in a “ car rier.” Pure L SD is diss olved in a sol vent s uch as alcohol, and either the solution i s spray ed on paper or g elatin, or paper is dipped in the solution. The solvent evapor ates, leaving minute amounts of L SD trappe d in the paper or g el. Then the paper or g el is cut into “one- dose” square s and sold by the dose. Users either swallow the square s, lick them until the drug is r elea sed, or drop them into a bever ag e, there by rele asing the drug

. Although g elatin and paper are light, they weig h much more than the L SD. The ten sheets of blotter paper car ry ing the 1,000 doses sold by p etitioners weig hed 5.7 g rams; the L SD by

itself weig hed only

about 50 milligra

ms . . . . Chapman v. United States , 500 U.S. 453, 457, 111 S.C t. 1919, 1923, 114 L .Ed.2d 524 (1991). Using the fig ures f

rom Chapman for pur

poses of c omparison, 28 g rams of pure L SD ha s a potential y ield of 560,000 doses or “abuse units” in the curr ent terminolog y of the Texas Penal Code
while 200 g rams of pure L SD has a potential y ield of 4 milli on doses or abuse units. Once applied

to a car rier, the number of doses in 28 total gr ams will va ry depending on the weig ht of the blotter

paper , g elatin, sug ar cubes, or other car rier medium. I f we continue the analy sis using the Chapman

T h e r e a r e 1 , 0 0 0 m i c r o g r a m s i n a m i l l i g r a m a n d 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 m i c r o g r a m s i n a g r a m
. 3fig ures as a repr esenta tive example, eac h sheet of blotter paper containing 100 doses of L SD would

have weig hed approximately .57 g rams (5.7 g rams divided by 10 sheets). Fifty sheets would have

we i ghed approx imately 28.5 g rams (50 sheets mul tiplied by .57 g rams per sheet) and would have

y ielded 5 , 000 doses (50 sheets multipl ied by 100 doses on eac h sheet). At the upper end of the
spectrum fo r t his particula r offe nse, 350 sheets of the same blotter paper would have weig hed approximately 199.5 g rams (350 sheets multipl ied by .57 g rams per sheet) and would have y ielded 35,000 doses (350 shee ts mult iplied by 100 doses on ea ch shee t).
Given the continued problem of substance abuse and drug t ra ff i cking , and the multipl e threa ts posed to our society by possession of such a larg e amount of L SD with intent to deliver, the
Texas L eg islature could rea sonably find that this offe nse should be punished as a first deg ree felony

. See Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1003, 111 S.Ct

. at 2706. We co n cl u d e t h at an infere nce of g ross d i s p roportionalit y has not been shown in this case
. Consequently , it is unnece ssary to proc ee d
further with the analy sis. See Graham , 130 S.Ct

. at 2022; Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct

. at
2707 (opinion of Kenne dy , J .); Mullins , 208 S.W .3d at 470. We overr ule Appellant’s sole issue on
appea l and af

firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

J une 8, 2011 ANN CRAWFORD McCL URE, J ustice
Be fore Chew, C.J ., McClure, a nd Rivera, JJ

. (Do Not Publish)