## United States Court of App eals

F O R T H E E I G H T H C I R C U I T

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No. 0 7- 23 57

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Uni te d S ta te s o f Am eri ca, *

*
Pl ai nt iff - App el le e, *

* On Ap pe al fro m

th e Uni te d

v. * St at es Dis tri ct Co ur t fo r th e

* East ern Dis tri ct of M is so ur i. Tay lo r Ja m es Blo at e, *

*
Defen da nt - App el la nt

. *

__ __ __ __ __ _

Su bm it te d: Sep te m

be r 28 , 20 10
Fi le d: Sep te m

be r 09 , 20 11

__ __ __ __ __ _

Befo re RI LEY, Chi ef J ud ge , BENTON, an d GIB SON, Cir cu it Ju dg es

. 1

__ __ __ __ __ _
BENTON, Circu it Ju dg e.

The di st ric t co ur t se nt en ced Tay lo r Ja m es Bl oa te to 360 m ont

hs’ im pr iso nm en t.

He ap pe al ed

, as se rti ng a Sp eed y Tria l Act vi ol at io n an d ot he r tri al an d se nt en ci ng

erro rs

. Thi s co ur t affi rm ed

. S e e U ni te d St at es v. Bl oa te

, 53 4 F.3 d 89 3 (8 th Ci r.

20 08 ) (“ Blo at e I ”). The Su pr em e Co ur t gr an te d cert io rari on th e Sp eed y Tria l is su e,

rev ers ed

, an d rem an de d. Se e Bl oa te v. Unit

ed St at es , 55 9 U.S.

__

_,

__ _, 13 0 S. Ct

.

The Hon or ab le Jo hn R. Gib so n reti red fro m se rv ic e on th is co ur t on Ja nu ary 1

26

, 20 11

. Thi s op in io n is be in g fil ed by th e rem ai ni ng jud ge s of the pa ne l pu rs ua nt

to 8t h C ir. R

ul e 4 7E.13 45

, 13 58 (2 01 0)

. Co nc lu di ng th at th e Sp eed y Tria l Act was vi o l a t e d

, t h is co ur t

no w rev ers es

.

I.

On Aug us t 24

, 20 06

, Bl oa te was in di ct ed

. The in it ia l or de r on pr et ria l m ot io ns

se t a Sep te m

be r 13 de ad li ne fo r fil in g ei th er m ot io ns or a m em or an du m at te st in g th ere

are no is su es fo r p r e t r i a l m ot io ns

. The or de r sc he du le d a Sep te m be r 20 he ari ng on

an y pre tri al m ot io ns or o n t he waiv er o f m ot io ns

.

On Sep te m

be r 7, Bl oa te m ov ed fo r ad di ti on al ti m e to fil e pr et ria l m ot io ns

. The

di st ric t co ur t gr an te d th e m ot io n th at s a me da y , ex te nd in g th e de ad li ne fro m Sep te m be r 13 to Sep te m

be r 25 , ord eri ng :

[I]f th e de fen da nt ch oo se s no t to fil e an y pr et ria l m ot io ns , co un se l fo r th e de fen da nt sh al l fil e wit h th e Co ur t, no t l at er t ha n Sep te m be r 25

. . .

, a m em or an du m at t e s ti ng th at th ere are no is su es th at th e de fen da nt wis he s t o ra is e b y

way of p ret ria l m ot io n.

The sa m e or de r sc he du le d an Octo be r 4 he ari ng “ on an y pr et ria l m ot io ns or a he ari ng

on th e waiv er of m ot io ns .” Bl oa te fil ed a “ W AIVER OF PRETRIAL MOTIONS” on Sep te m be r 25

, sa y in g “ Tay lo r Bl oa te

. . . ad vi se s th e Co ur t t h e re are no is su es he

wis he s to rai se by way of pr et ria l m ot io ns .” On Octo be r 4, th e d i s t r i c t co ur t

co nd ucte d a he arin g. Fi nd in g th e waiv er kn owi ng an d in te ll ig en t, th e co ur t “ gr an t[e d]
[Bl oa te ] le av e to waiv e [h is ] rig ht to fil e m ot io ns .”

The go ve rn m en t fil ed m ot io ns in li m in e o n F eb ru ary 2 3 an d Mar ch 2, 20 07

. The co ur t g ran te d b ot h m ot io ns aft er a h eari ng on Marc h 5 , th e fi rs t d ay of t ria l.

Bl oa te ap pe al ed th e di st ric t co ur t’s refu sa l to di sm is s hi s in di ct m en t fo r a
vi ol at io n of th e Sp eed y Tria l Act, arg ui ng th at th e co ur t erro ne ou sl y ex cl ud ed cert ai n

-2

-pe rio ds in co un ti ng th e da y s fro m hi s in di ct m en t un ti l hi s tri al

. Thi s co ur t di sa gr eed

an d affi rm ed

. Bl

oa te I

, 53 4 F.3 d at 89 7- 90 0. The Su pr em e Co ur t he ld th at th e ti m e

to p r e p are pr et ria l m ot io ns is no t au to m at ic al ly ex cl ud ed un de r 18 U.S.C. §

31 61 (h )(1 ), an d rev ers ed th is co ur t’s au to m at ic ex cl us io n of th e 28 -d ay pe rio d fro m Sep te m be r 7 th ro ug h Octo be r 4. Bl oa te , 13 0 S . Ct. at 13 58 . On rem an d, t hi s co ur t

or de red su pp le m en ta l b rie fs on th e pe rio ds (1 ) fro m Sep te m be r 25 th ro ug h Oct ob er 4, an d (2 ) fro m

Feb ru ary 23 th ro ug h M arch 5.

II.

The Sp eed y Tria l Act req ui res th at a de fen d a n t ’s tri al be gi n wit hi n 70 da y s

fro m th e in di ct m en t or th e de fen da nt ’s in it ia l ap pe aran ce. Se e 18 U.S.C. §

31 61 (c)( 1)
, (h)

. If no t, th e di st ric t co ur t m us t, on th e de fen da nt ’s m ot io n, di sm is s th e

in di ct m e n t

. S e e 1 8 U.S.C. § 31 62 (a )(2 )

. The Act au to m at ic al ly ex cl ud es “ de la y

res ul ti ng fro m an y pr et ria l m ot io n, fro m t h e f i l i ng of th e m ot io n th ro ug h th e

co nc lu si on of th e he ari ng on , or ot he r pr om pt di sp os it io n of

, su ch m ot io n.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 31 61 (h)( 1) (D) ; se e Unit ed St a t e s v. Tink le nb er

g ,

__ _ U.S.

__ _,

__ _, 13 1 S. Ct

. 2

20 07

, 20 16 (2 01 1) (h ol di ng th at whe th er a pr et ria l m ot io n act ua ll y ca u s e d o r i s

ex pe ct ed to cau se de la y of tri al is irr el ev an t to th e S p e e d y Tria l Act)

. Thi s co ur t

rev ie ws de no vo th e di st ric t co ur t ’s l e g al co nc lu si on s, it s fin di ng s of fact fo r cl ear

erro r, an d it s ul ti m at e de te rm in at io n fo r an ab us e of di sc ret io n. Se e Unit ed St at es v.

Luca s , 49 9 F .3d 76 9, 7 82 (8t h C ir. 2 00 7) (en ba nc ).

Afte r Blo at e I

, th e Sp eed y Tria l Act was am en de d. Se e Pub L. No. 11 0- 40 6, 2 § 13
, 12 2 Sta t. 42 91

. Prev io us ly co di fie d at 18 U.S.C. § 31 61 (h )(1 )(F)

, th e pr et ria l

m ot io n ex cl us io n pr ov is io n is no w co di fie d at 18 U.S.C. § 3 1 6 1 ( h ) ( 1 )(D). As no

su bs ta nt iv e ch an ge s were m ad e to pr ov is io ns rel ev a n t h e r e, th is co ur t ci te s to th e

cu rren t v ers io n o f th e Act

.

-3

-In th is cas e, 48 no n- ex cl ud ab le da y s are no t di sp ut ed

. Se e Bl oa te I

, 53 4 F.3 d

at 89 7- 98

. The 17 -d ay pe rio d fro m Sep t e mb e r 8 t hr ou gh Sep te m be r 24 is no n- 3

ex cl ud ab le pr et ria l-moti on -p rep arat io n ti m e, as t h e di st ric t co ur t di d no t “ gr an t[] a

co nt in ua nc e fo r th at pu rp os e ba se d on reco rd ed fin di ng s ‘tha t th e en ds of jus ti ce

s erv ed by ta ki ng su ch act io n ou twei gh th e be st in te res t of th e pu bl ic an d t h e

de fen da nt .’ ” Se e Bl

oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. 13 58

, qu ot in g 18 U.S.C. § 31 61 (h ) (7 )(A)

. If

ei th er pe rio d he re – Sep te m be r 25 th ro ug h Octo be r 4, or Feb ru ary 23 th ro ug h Mar ch

5 – is no n- ex cl ud ab le , th e Sp eed y Trial Act was vi ol at ed

.

A.

The go ve rn m en t fil ed m ot i on s in li m in e on Feb ru ary 23 an d Mar ch 2. The

di st ric t co ur t gr an te d bo th m ot io ns in a he ari ng on Mar ch 5, th e fir st da y of tri al

. The

ti m e whi le a m ot io n in li m in e is pe nd in g is ex cl ud ab le un de r th e Sp eed y Trial Act.

U n it ed St at es v. Tit lb ac h

, 33 9 F.3 d 69 2, 69 9 (8 th Ci r. 20 03 ). The pe rio d be twe e n

Feb ru ary 23 an d M arch 5 i s t he refo re ex cl ud ed fro m th e 7 0- da y

li m it

.

B.

In ex cl ud in g th e ti m e fro m Sep te m be r 7 th ro ug h Octo be r 4 fo r pr et ria l m ot io n

pr ep arat io n, th is co ur t rel ie d on th e op en in g cl au se of § 31 61 (h )(1 ). Se e Bl oa te I

, 53 4

F.3 d at 89 7- 98

. In rev ers in g, th e Su pr em e Co ur t di d no t co ns id er “ whe th er an y ot he r

ex cl us io n wou ld ap pl y to al l or pa rt of th e 28 -d ay pe rio d.” Bl oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. at 13 58

.

Sep te m be r 7 is ex cl ud ed be cau se th at da y Bl oa te m ov ed to ex te nd th e pr et ria l- 3

m ot io n de ad li ne , whi ch th e di st ric t co ur t im m ed ia te ly gr an te d. Se e Unit ed St at es v. Mo se s , 15 F.3 d 77 4, 77 7 (8 th Ci r. 19 94 ) (“ bo th th e da t e o n w h i c h th e m ot io n was fil ed an d th e da te on whi ch th e m ot io n was d e c i d ed ” are ex cl ud ed un de r

su bp arag rap h (D) ).

-4

-The go ve rn m en t arg ue s th at th e pe rio d fro m Sep te m be r 25 th ro ug h Octo be r 4

is ex cl ud ab le un de r § 31 61 (h )(1 )(D) be cau se Bl oa te ’s waiv er was a “ m ot io n fo r le av e

to waiv e hi s rig ht to fil e pr et ria l m ot io ns .” Bl oa te fir st co un te rs th at th e go ve rn m en t

waiv ed th is arg um en t b y n o t pr es en ti ng it in th e di st ric t co ur t in res po ns e to hi s

m ot io n to di sm is s. Th e d efen da nt be ars th e b ur de n o f pr oo f on a m ot io n to di sm is s

un de r th e Sp eed y Tria l Act, “ wit h th e ex cep ti on of th e ex cl u s i o n o f ti m e un de r 18

U.S.C. § 31 61 (h )(3 ) co nc ern in g th e un av a i l a b i l i ty of th e de fen da nt or an es se nt ia l

wit ne ss .” Unit

ed St at es v. Al da co , 47 7 F.3 d 10 08

, 1 0 17 (8 th Ci r. 20 07 ), ci ti ng 18

U.S.C. § 31 62 (a )(2 )

. Bl oa te ’s m ot io n to di sm is s d oe s n ot m en ti on th e fi li ng of h is

waiv er of pr et ria l m ot io ns on Sep te m be r 25

, or th e he ari ng on Octo be r 4; Bl oa te to ok

th e po si ti on th at th e en ti re pe rio d of ti m e fro m Sep te m be r 7 to Nov em

be r 8 was no ne x c l u d a bl e ti m e. The go ve rn m en t’s res po ns e arg ue d th at th e en ti re pe rio d fro m Sep te m be r 7 th ro ug h Octo be r 4 was ex cl ud ab le fro m th e sp eed y tri al cl oc k. The

go ve rn m en t di d no t waiv e it s arg um en t th at th e su bs id ia ry pe rio d fro m Sep te m be r 25

th ro ug h Oct ob er 4 was e xc lu da bl e ti m e u nd er t he Sp eed y Trial Act.

Bl oa te ne xt ob

jects th at th e go ve rn m en t fai le d to rai se th is arg um en t in th e fir st

ap pe al

. “ The ge ne ral ru le is th at , wh ere an a r g u men t c o u l d ha ve be en rai se d on an

i ni ti al ap pe al

, it is in ap pr op ria te to co ns id er th at arg um en t on a se co nd ap pe al

f ol lo win g rem an d.” Unit ed St at es v. Ca st

el la no s , 60 8 F.3 d 10 10

, 10 19 ( 8 t h C i r

. 20 10 ), qu ot in g Kes sl

er v. N a t ’ l Ent er pr is es , In c ., 20 3 F.3 d 10 58

, 10 59 (8 th Ci r.

20 00 ) (ad di ti on al qu ot at io n m ark s om it te d)

. Thi s pr ud en ti al ru le ap pl ie s le ss rig id ly

ag ai ns t ap pe ll ees , be cau se do in g so “ wou ld m ot iv at e ap pe ll ees to rai se ev ery po ss ib le

al te rn at iv e gr ou nd an d to fil e ev ery co nc ei va bl e pr ot ect iv e cro ss -ap pe al

, t h ereb y

ne ed le ss ly in crea si ng th e sc op e an d co m pl ex it y of in it ia l ap pe al s.” Ca st el la no s , 60 8

F.3 d at 10 19

. In hi s fi r s t ap pe al

, Bl oa te arg ue d th at th e di st ric t co ur t erre d in

ex cl ud in g th e en ti re pe rio d fro m Sep te m be r 7 th ro ug h Octo be r 4 “ as no pr ov is io n in

th e Sp eed y Tria l Act a l l o ws fo r th e ex cl us io n of th e ti m e du rin g whi ch pr et ria l

m ot io ns were no t fi le d .” (Orig in al App el la nt ’s B r. 13 ) (em ph as is in or ig in al ). The

-5

-go v e rn m en t co ns is te nt ly arg ue d th at th is en ti re pe rio d was ex cl ud ab le un de r §

31 61 (h )(1 )(D).

Rat he r th an rai si ng a ne w is su e on rem an d, th e go ve rn m en t i s f o r mu la ti ng a

ne w arg um en t in su pp or t of it s po si ti on

. Se e Ca st el la n o s , 60 8 F.3 d at 10 19
(d is ti ng ui sh in g be twee n rai si ng a ne w is su e on rem an d an d m ak in g a ne w arg um en t

wit hi n th e sc op e of a hi gh er co ur t’s r em an d: “ Alt ho ug h pa rti es sh ou ld pr es en t

al te rn at iv e arg um en ts whe ne ve r so un d st rat eg y di ct at es , th e go ve rn m en t in th is cas e

was n o t req ui red to an ti ci pa te ev ery po ss ib le ou tc om e on ap pe al an d fo rm ul at e a

res po ns iv e arg um en t fo r each al te rn at iv e.”); se e al so Unit ed St at es v. Tob in

, 15 5 F.3 d

63 6, 64 1 & n.5 (3 d Ci r. 19 98 ) (rejec ti ng arg um en t th at go ve rn m en t waiv ed a Sp eed y

Tria l-Ac t ex cl us io n be cau se ev en if th e go ve r n men t ha d no t rai se d th e is su e, “ ou r

affi rm an ce of th e de ci si on can be pr em is ed on an y le gi t i mat e gr ou nd , e ve n on e no t

ad va nc ed be lo w.”). Im

pl ic it in an or de r di rect in g a lo wer co ur t to en ga ge in fu rth er

p r oc eed in gs co ns is te nt wit h an op in io n is th e ex pe ct at io n th at a lo wer c o u r t w i l l

c o n s i d e r a r g um en t fro m bo th pa rti es as to is su es wit hi n th e sc op e of th e rem an d.

Ca st el la no s , 60 8 F.3 d at 10 20 ; se e al so Bl oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. at 13 58 (rem an di ng to th is

co ur t fo r fu rth er pr oc eed in gs to co ns id er th e go ve rn m en t’s “ arg um en t” th at th e pe rio d

fro m Sep te m be r 25 to Octo be r 4 i s st il l excl ud ab le in li gh t of the Co ur t’s o pi ni on ).

The go ve rn m en t h as no t wai ve d i ts arg um en t.

In a rel at ed arg um en t, Bl oa te co nt en ds th at th is co ur t’s pr ev io us st at em en t th at

“ Bl oa t e n e ve r fil ed a pr et ria l m ot io n” is th e la w of th e cas e, th us pr ecl ud in g th e

go ve rn m en t’s arg um en t he re th a t h is waiv er was th e fu nc ti on al eq ui va le nt of a

pr et ria l m ot io n. Bl

oa te I

, 53 4 F.3 d at 89 7. “ The la w of th e cas e do ct rin e pr ev en ts th e

rel it ig at io n of a se tt le d is su e in a cas e an d req ui res co ur ts to ad he re to de ci si on s m ad e

in earl i e r pr oc eed in gs in or de r to en su re un ifo rm it y of de ci si on s, pr ot ect th e

ex pe ct at io ns of th e pa rti es , an d pr om ot e jud ic ia l eco no m y .” Unit ed St at es v. Ba rt sh

, 69 F.3 d 86 4, 86 6 (8 th Ci r. 19 95 ). The do ct rin e ap pl ie s on ly to act ua l de ci si on s – no t

di ct a – in pr io r st ag es of th e cas e. Se e Unit ed St at es v. Ba te s , 61 4 F.3 d 49 0, 49 4 (8 th

-6

-Ci r. 20 10 ) (s ta te m en t in pr io r de ci si on was no t th e la w of th e cas e whe re th e co ur t

“ [was ] no t as ke d t o n or di d [i t] c on si de r” th e qu es ti on in it s p rio r de ci si on ); Unit ed

St at es v. Mo nt

oy a , 97 9 F.2 d 13 6, 13 8 (8 th Ci r. 19 92 ) (s am e). In th e fir st ap pe al

, th e

pa rti es as su m ed th at no m ot io n was fil ed

, an d th is co ur t acco rd in gl y he ld th at pr et ria l

m ot io n pr ep arat io n ti m e is ex cl ud ab le un de r th e op en in g cl au se of § 31 61 (h )(1 ). Se e

Bl oa te I

, 53 4 F.3 d at 89 8. The st at em en t th at Bl oa te ne ve r fil ed a pr et ria l m ot io n is

di ct a, an d n ot th e la w of t he cas e.

Turn in g to th e m eri ts

, th e is su e in th is cas e is whe th er Bl oa te ’s w a i v e r o f

pr et ria l m ot io ns is “ an y pr et ria l m ot io n” un de r su bp arag rap h (D). Su bp arag rap h (D)

ex cl ud es “ de la y res ul ti ng fro m an y pr e t r i a l moti on , fro m th e fil in g of th e m ot io n

th ro ug h t h e c o nc lu si on of th e he ari ng on , or ot he r pr om pt di sp os it io n of

, su ch

m ot io n.” 18 U.S.C. § 31 61 (h)( 1) (D)

.

The go ve rn m en t’s in te rp ret at io n of Bl oa te ’s waiv er – “ a m o t i o n f o r le av e to

waiv e hi s rig ht to fil e pr et ria l m ot io ns ”
– ha s se ve ral fau lt s. Fi rs t, Bl oa te ’s “ W ai ve r

of Pret ria l Mo ti on s” do es no t ap pe ar to be a m ot io n. It st at es th at “ th ere are no is su es
he wis he s to rai se by way of pr et ria l mo t i o ns ,” an d th at he ag rees , aft er di sc us si on

wit h hi s at t o r n e y, “ no t to rai se an y is su es by way of pr et ria l m ot io n.” Cf

. Unit ed

St at es v. Bo ni ll

a- Fi lo m eno , 57 9 F.3d 85 2, 85 6- 57 (8 th Ci r. 20 09 ) (“ m ot io n to se t a

sp eci fic tri al da te ” is a pr et ria l m ot io n) ; Unit ed St at es v. Ro jo -Al va re z , 94 4 F.2 d 95 9,

96 6 (1 st Cir . 19 91 ) (h ol di ng th at “ whe n t he co ur t i s p res en te d wi th pa pe rs st yl ed as

a m ot io n, whe th er it ul ti m at el y de te rm in es th at th e fil in g is a pr et ria l m ot io n o r a n

“ ot he r pr oc eed in g” un de r [cu rren t § 31 61 (h )(1 )(H)], th e co ur t is en ti tl ed to ex cl ud e 4

at lea st th e p eri od of t im e d ur in g wh ic h i t co ns id ers ho w to tre at th e fi li ng .”).

§ 3 16 1( h) (1 )(H) co nc ern s m ot io ns th at req ui re n o h eari ng , whi ch m ay on ly 4
be “ un de r ad vi se m en t” for 30 da y s o f ex cl ud ab le ti m e. Se e Hend er so n v. Uni te d
St at es , 47 6 U.S. 3 21 , 32 9 (1 98 6)

-7

-Seco nd

, th e di st ric t co ur t tre at ed th e waiv er as no t be in g a m ot io n. Se e Unit ed

St at es v. Rus h

, 73 8 F.2 d 49 7, 50 6 (1 st Ci r. 19 84 ) (“ The di st ric t co ur t di d no t tre at th e

pr of fer as a pr et ria l m ot io n fo r pu rp os es of (h )(1 )[(D)], an d we se e no reas on to do

so .”). Und er th e di st ric t co ur t’s or de r on pr et ria l m ot io ns , Bl oa te ha d un ti l Sep te m be r

25 to fil e “ an y pr et ria l m ot io ns ” or “ a m em or an du m at te st in g th at th ere are no is su es

th at th e de fen da nt wis he s to rai se by way of pr et ria l m ot io n.” Th e or de r al so

sc he du le d an Octo be r 4 hea rin g “ on an y pr et ria l m ot io ns or a he ari ng on th e waiv er

of m ot io ns .” At th e Octo be r 4 he ari ng , th e co ur t swo re Bl oa te in

, co nf irmed he was
waiv in g hi s rig ht to fil e pr et ria l m ot io ns , in fo rm ed hi m of th e co ns eq ue nc es of hi s
waiv e r , an d co nc lu de d, “ [th e] Co ur t wil l gr an t y ou le av e to waiv e y ou r rig ht to fil e

m ot io ns .” Eve n at th e he ari ng , th e di st ric t co ur t co nt in ue d to di st in gu is h be twee n “ a

m em or an du m ” an d “ an y pr et ria l m ot io ns

. ” Th e c o u r t di d no t sa y it was gr an ti ng a

mot io n

.

The go ve rn m en t ci te s no au th or it y th at a de fen da nt ne ed s th e pe rm is si on of th e

co ur t to waiv e th e rig ht to fil e pr et ria l m ot io ns un de r Ru le 12 of th e Fed eral Ru le s of

Cri m in al Pro ced ur e, or th at a co ur t is req ui red to fin d whe th er an y waiv er is kn owi ng

an d vo lu nt ary. Cri m in al Ru le 12 (e) st at es : “ A pa rty waiv es an y Ru le 12 (b )(3 )
[“ Mo ti on s Tha t Mu st Be Mad e Befo re Tria l” ] de fen se , ob jecti on , or req ue st no t rai se d
by th e de ad li ne th e co ur t se ts un de r Ru le 12 (c) or by an y ex te ns io n th e co ur t pr ov id es

. F o r go od cau se , th e co ur t m ay gr an t rel ie f fro m th e waiv er.” Se e Unit e d S t a t e s v

. Fr az ie r , 28 0 F.3 d 83 5, 84 5 (8 th Ci r. 20 02 ) (n ot in g th at “ th e fai lu re to rai se [an is su e

th at m us t be as se rte d in a p r e t r i al m ot io n ] in a ti m el y pr et ria l m ot io n res ul ts in

‘w ai ve r’ of th e m at te r”); se e al so Unit ed St at es v. Ho hn

, 8 F.3 d 13 01

, 13 05 (8 th Ci r.

19 93 ) (n ot in g th at “ m ot io ns ex cl ud ab le un de r [s ub pa rag ra ph (D )] inc lud e any pretr ia l

mo t i o n an d are no t li m it ed to th os e m ot io ns en um erat ed ” in Ru le 12 ) (em ph as is in

or ig in al ). Howev er, th is co ur t ha s ne ve r ch arac te riz ed a pr et ria l-moti on “ waiv er” as

th e in te nt io na l rel in qu is hm en t or ab an do nm en t of a kn own rig ht

, rat he r th an an

in ad ve rte nt fo rfei tu re. Se e Unit ed St at es v. Thom

ps on , 40 3 F.3d 53 3, 53 7 n.4 (8 th

Ci r. 20 05 ) (n ot in g th at th e Eig ht h Ci rcu it ha s no t de ci de d whe th er a “ waiv er” cau se d

-8

-by th e fai lu re to rai se a su pp res si on m at te r in a ti m el y pr et ria l m ot io n pr ecl ud es pl ai n

erro r rev ie w), ci ti ng Fr az ie r , 28 0 F.3 d at 84 5; se e al so 1A Ch arl es A. W rig ht

, et al

., Feder al Pra cti ce an d Pro cedu re Crim. § 19 3 (4 t h e d. 20 10 & Su pp

. 20 11 )
(d es cri bi ng as “ pe rs ua si ve ” th e Sev en th Ci rcu i t ’s vi ew th at “ th e wor d ‘w ai ve r’ in

Ru le 12 (e) d oe s n ot carr y th e st ric t im

pl ic at io n of an ‘int en ti on al rel in qu is hm en t of

a kn own rig ht ,’ ” an d no ti ng th at th e fact th at th e Ru le al lo ws a co ur t fo r go od cau se

to gr an t rel ie f fro m t h e waiv er “ m ak es it so un d m or e li ke wha t we wou ld no rm al ly

ca ll fo rfei tu re.”)

, qu ot in g Unit ed St at es v. Jo hns on , 41 5 F.3 d 72 8, 73 0 (7 th Ci r.

20 05 ).

Thi rd , “ th e te rm

m ot io n ge ne ral ly m ean s ‘[a] n a pp li cat io n m ad e to a co ur t o r jud ge fo r pu rp os e of ob ta in in g a ru le or or de r di rect in g so m e act to be do ne in fav or

of th e ap pl ic an t.’” Mel

end ez v. Unit ed St at es , 51 8 U

. S

. 1 2 0, 12 6 (1 99 6)

, qu ot in g

Bl ac k ’s La w Dict io na ry 10 13 (6 th ed

. 19 90 ); cf

. Ho hn

, 8 F.3 d at 13 04 (“ A m ot io n

is an ap pl ic at io n to th e co ur t fo r an or de r.”). A pa rty’ s su bm is si on – whe th er ex pr es s

or im pl ie d, form al or in fo rm al – c an be co ns id ered a “ m ot io n” fo r Sp eed y Tria l Act

pu rp os es if it co nt ai ns a req ue st fo r rel ie f th at req ui res co ur t in te rv en ti on

. Se e Unit ed

St at es v. Ar be la ez , 7 F.3 d 34 4, 34 7- 48 (3 d Ci r. 19 93 ) (co ns tru in g a le tt er fro m
de fen se co un se l se nt to a jud ge ’s ch am be rs req ue st in g a co nt in ua nc e as “ an y pr et ria l

m ot io n” be cau se it co nt ai ne d a req ue st fo r rel ie f th at req ui red co ur t in te rv en ti on an d

was tre at ed by th e pa rti es as a m ot io n) ; se e al so Unit ed St at es v. Wi ll ia m s , 55 7 F.3 d

94 3, 95 1 n.3 (8t h C ir. 2 00 9) (co ns tru in g p ro se b rie fs in su pp or t of an earli er pro se

m ot io n to di sm is s fo r a Sp eed y Tria l Ac t v i o l a t io n as pr et ria l m ot io ns ), ci ti ng

Ar be la ez , 7 F.3 d a t 3 45

.

Bl o a t e ’s waiv er di d no t req ue st le av e to do an y th in g, or in an y way se ek a

ru li ng , de te rm in at io n, or ot he r res po ns e fro m th e co ur t – ei th er ex pr es sl y or im

pl ie dl y

. Se e Rus h

, 73 8 F.2 d at 50 5– 50 6 (f i n d i n g th at th e fil in g of a m em or an du m an d an

of fer of pr oo f is no t a “ pr et ria l m ot io n” wit hi n t h e meani ng of § 31 61 (h )(1 )(D):

-9

-“ In st ead

, it is a su bm is si on of ev id en ce whi ch ne ed no t be ad m it te d or ex cl ud ed un ti l

tri al .”); Unit

ed St at es v. Ri cha rd

so n , 42 1 F.3 d 17

, 28 -2 9 (1 st Ci r. 20 05 ) (n ot in g th at

“ ‘im pl ie d’ req ue st s f

o r a ne w tri al da te ” are pr et ria l m ot io ns fo r pu rp os es of

su bp arag rap h (D)). The go ve rn m en t’s in te rp ret at io n of Bl oa te ’s waiv er ha s no li m it s,
b e c a u s e it al lo ws an y fil in g wit h th e co ur t to be de em ed an im pl ie d m ot io n. Se e

Unit ed St at es v. Ha rr is

, 49 1 F.3 d 44 0, 44 3- 44 (D.C. Ci r. 20 07 ) (“ [T]he go ve rn m en t’s

no ti ce [o f in te nt to us e ev id en ce] was no t a m ot io n, b ut [d efen da nt ’s] res po ns e ‘requ es t[i ng ] th at th e Co ur t pr ecl ud e th e ad m is si on of th e ab ov e m en ti on ed ev id en ce

at tri al ’ was on e, an d it to ll ed th e cl oc k

. . . f ro m th e da te of it s fil in g

. . . .” ); Rus h

, 73 8 F.2 d at 50 5- 06 (“ If suc h su bm is si on s [a m em or an du m an d of fer of pr oo f ] were
he ld to be pr et ria l m ot io ns

. . . th e Sp eed y Tria l Act co ul d eas il y be ci rcu m ve nt ed by

fil in g of fers of pr oo f at an earl y st ag e an d th en fai li ng to pr es s fo r pr om pt

di sp os it io n.” ).

The go ve rn m en t’s ex pa ns iv e in te rp ret at io n of “ pr et rial m ot io n” co nt rad ic ts th e

Su pr em e Co ur t’s an al y si s of § 31 61 (h )(1 ) ( D )

. I n rev ers in g, th e Su pr em e Co ur t

cau ti on ed ag ai ns t read in g to o m uc h in to th e st at ut e, “ be cau se Co ng res s kn ew ho w to

de fin e th e bo un da ri e s o f an en um erat ed ex cl us io n br oa dl y whe n it so de si red .”

Bl oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. at 13 53 ; se e al so id

. at 13 54 -5 5 (reject in g a read in g of the st at ut e

th at wou ld “ ren de r ev en th e cl eare st of th e su bp arag rap hs in de te rm in at e an d vi rtu al ly

su pe rfl uo us .”). In th e Su pr em e Co ur t’s m os t rece nt in te rp ret at io n of § 31 61 (h )(1 )(D),

it ad vi se d th at su b p a r a g rap h (D) is “ be st read ” as m eas ur in g th e ti m e “ act ua ll y

co ns um ed by co ns id er at io n of th e pr et ria l m ot io n,” an od d read in g if the co nt en t of

a “ m ot io n” ha s no th in g fo r a co ur t to co ns id er. Tink le nb er g , 1 3 1 S. Ct

. at 20 14
(em ph as is ad de d)

. Thi s co ur t reject s a de fin it io n of “ m ot io n” so br oa d th at an y fi li ng

can be de em ed a m o t i o n

. C f. Bl oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. at 13 54 -5 5 (n ot in g th at a st at ut e

sh ou ld be co ns tru ed so th at no wor d sh al l be “ su pe rfl uo us , v oi d

, o r in si gn ifi can t” ),

qu ot in g Dunca n v. Wa lk er , 53 3 U.S. 1 67 , 17 4 (2 00 1)

.

-1 0-In th is cas e , th e Su pr em e Co ur t reject ed ex pa nd in g th e “ pr et ria l m ot io n”

ex cl us io n b ey on d a reas on ab le read in g o f it s te xt , f av or in g en ds -o f-jus ti ce fi nd in gs

fo r de la y s th at do no t fit sq u a r e l y in to th e “ pr et ria l m ot io n” ex cl us io n. Se e Bl oa te

, 13 0 S. Ct

. at 13 57 (“ All owi ng di st ric t co ur ts to ex cl ud e au to m at ic al ly su ch de la y s

wou ld red es ig n th is st at ut or y fram ewo rk .”). On rem an d, t h i s c o u rt ho ld s th at th e

pe rio d fr om

Sep te m be r 25 th ro ug h Oct ob er 4 was “ pr et ri al mot io n- re la te d de la y

. .

. ex cl ud ab le on ly whe n acco m pa ni ed by dis tri ct co ur t fi nd in gs .” Bl oa te , 13 0 S . Ct.

at 13 53 (em

ph as is ad de d)

. As no su ch fin di ng s were m ad e, th is te n- da y pe rio d is no t

e x c l u d a b l e. A to ta l of 75 no n- ex cl ud ab le da y s el ap se d fro m Bl oa te ’s in di ct m en t

th ro ug h th e da te hi s tri al be ga n. Due to th is vi ol at io n o f t h e S pe ed y Tria l Act, th e
di st ric t co ur t er red in de nyin g B lo at e’s m ot io n t o d is m is s h is in di ct m en t.

III.

Alt ho ug h th e Act req ui res di sm is sa l of th e in di ct m en t, th e di st ric t co ur t m ay
de te r mi n e , u n d er 18 U.S.C. § 31 62 (a)( 1)

, whe th er th e di sm is sa l is wit h or wit ho ut

pr ejud ic e. Se e Unit

ed Sta te s v. Dez el

er , 81 F.3d 86 , 89 (8t h C ir. 1 99 6)

.

The jud gm en t is rev ers ed

, an d th e cas e rem an de d to th e di st ric t co ur t to di sm is s

th e in di ct m en t an d de te rm in e whe th er di sm is sa l sh ou ld be wit h or wit ho ut pr ejud ic e.

___________________________

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