IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Marriage of

PHILLIP EUGENE JONES,

Respondent,

and

SHARON LEE HOKE JONES,

Appellant.

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No. 35309-5-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIDDOWAY, J. — Sharon Jones appeals the denial of her motion to modify the 

maintenance awarded by the 2010 decree dissolving her marriage to Dr. Phillip Jones. 

The trial court found that she had not established a substantial change of circumstances. 

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sharon Jones and Dr. Phillip Jones were married for 30 years before separating in 

November 2008. Phil1is a cardiologist. For a time during their marriage, Sharon worked 

 

1 Given the common last name, we refer to the parties by their first names for 

clarity. We intend no disrespect.

FILED

APRIL 2, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35309-5-III

In re Marriage of Jones

2

as a registered nurse, but she ceased working in 1989. Sharon received treatment for 

bipolar disorder and depression from David Dunner, M.D. beginning in 1996 and 

continuing through 2005. She has been treated for her mental health issues by David Bot, 

M.D. since 2007. Dr. Bot has diagnosed her as suffering from mood disorder, 

depression, and anxiety. 

When the parties divorced in July 2010, Phil was ordered to pay maintenance for 

five years beginning on August 1, 2010, and to pay child support until their youngest 

child graduated from high school. The maintenance amount was initially to be $4,600 a 

month, and child support was another $1,400 a month. Upon the youngest child’s high 

school graduation, the maintenance amount would increase to $5,750 per month through 

the July 2015 termination of the obligation. 

In dividing the marital property in 2010, the court placed no value on the family 

residence in Cheney, which had been destroyed in a fire, nor did it place a value on real 

estate in Alaska owned by the couple. According to Phil, that is because neither property 

had any value. What was left of the family residence was distributed to Phil, who

allowed it to be foreclosed. He sold the Alaska property for a $150,000 capital loss. His 

uncontested characterization of the value of marital assets distributed to the parties by the 
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2010 decree is that Sharon received $1,533,000 in value and he received $1,018,900 in 

value. 

Six days after the divorce decree was entered, Sharon filed for Social Security 

disability benefits based on her disabling mental health problems. She alleged an onset 

date of June 1, 1996. She filed a request for a hearing in March 2011, and her case was 

heard in January 2012. Benefits were awarded her in February 2012. The order 

awarding benefits found that Sharon had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

June 1, 1996,” and that she suffered from “migraine headache with vision changes; 

thyroid disorder; and bipolar disorder.” Sealed Clerk’s Papers (SCP) at 210. The 

administrative law judge found that she had not worked as a nurse for 20 years “in part 

because of her bipolar disorder.” SCP at 211. Ms. Jones receives $924 a month in Social 

Security disability payments.

A couple of weeks before Phil’s otherwise-final maintenance payment was due, 

Sharon petitioned for modification. She alleged the following substantial change of 

circumstances since entry of the decree:

I have been found to be disabled by Social Security and only receive a 

small amount a month. I supported Dr. Jones for more than 30 years. We

established a standard of living that I cannot maintain without his financial 

help. He earns what I have in savings in just 2 years and can afford

maintenance.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 16. 
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Phil opposed the petition, arguing that while he had an annual base salary of 

$700,000, he was almost 65 years old and nearing retirement, and it had taken him many 

years to “even begin to recover” financially from the divorce. CP at 50. Among Phil’s

circumstances cited by his lawyer were that Sharon received over $500,000 more in 

assets than Phil in the property distribution, he had paid her more than $345,000 in 

maintenance over the years, and he had paid the post-secondary education expenses of 

the parties’ two children. Phil argued that despite his employment, his net worth 

remained lower than Sharon’s. 

In response to Phil’s declaration, Sharon filed a declaration of her own, in which 

she claimed that at the time the divorce decree was entered, she thought she would be 

able to return to her prior employment as a nurse. She also stated that the parties had 

“agreed to reserve maintenance,” because Phil was aware of her mental health issues, and 

the reservation was needed to ensure that she would have the necessary financial 

resources. CP at 183. She accused Phil of being dishonest about his finances. 

At the hearing on the modification request, the court commissioner cited Sharon’s 

petition, in which she identified the substantial change in circumstances as being the 

finding by the Social Security Administration that she was disabled. The commissioner 

rejected that as a “new or different set of circumstances,” explaining:

The fact that she was found to be disabled and received an award from 

Social Security is new and different. But the fact that her situation with her 

mental health, that wasn’t new; that was something that had going on—
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been going on clear back to 2007 that was existing at the time the parties 

negotiated, settled upon, and/or had an award from Judge Sypolt in 2010. 

That situation with Ms. Jones’ mental health was existing at that point in 

time. 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 34-35. The commissioner rejected Sharon’s reliance on 

Phil’s increased income following the divorce and his marriage and property acquisitions, 

stating that without a substantial change of circumstances, “The fact that Dr. Jones has 

remarried, has increased his assets post-divorce, is not relevant at all to this case.” RP at 

37.

The commissioner denied the request for modification. Sharon appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Sharon argues that her inability to work is a substantial change in circumstances 

not contemplated by the parties at the time the divorce decree was entered. 

Maintenance awards can only be modified upon a showing of a substantial change 

in circumstances not within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the dissolution 

decree. In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 346, 28 P.3d 769 (2001); see also

RCW 26.09.170(1). The change must have been one “that was not within the 

contemplation of the parties at the time the decree was entered.” In re Marriage of 

Ochsner, 47 Wn. App. 520, 524, 736 P.2d 292 (1987). “The phrase ‘change in 

circumstances’ refers to the financial ability of the obligor spouse to pay vis-à-vis the 

necessities of the other spouse.” Id. at 524. Regarding the financial ability of the obligor 
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spouse, “[a] former wife may not obtain additional alimony on the theory that such is in 

keeping with her former husband’s present station in life.” Gordon v. Gordon, 44 Wn.2d 

222, 228, 266 P.2d 786 (1954).

The party petitioning for modification bears the burden of demonstrating the 

change of circumstances. In determining whether she or he has met this burden, “the 

basic test, absent the most exceptional circumstances, is: Could and should the facts now 

relied upon as establishing a change in the circumstances have been presented to the court 

in the previous hearing?” Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn.2d 503, 509, 403 P.2d 664 (1965). 

Determining whether there has been the required change in conditions and circumstances, 

is a question addressed to, and that rests within, the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Gordon, 44 Wn.2d at 226. “Unless it can be said that the trial court has abused its 

judicial discretion in this regard, its exercise thereof will not be disturbed.” Id. at 227.

A substantial change of circumstances can be demonstrated where the expectation 

at the time of divorce is that the spouse receiving maintenance will become selfsupporting during the term of the obligation, and the expectation does not come to pass

through no substantial fault of the receiving spouse. Bowman v. Bowman, 77 Wn.2d 174, 

175, 459 P.2d 787 (1969). At the same time, where it is believed that one spouse will 

“have a more difficult time adjusting her lifestyle than will [the other],” a trial court may 
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“choose[ ] a disproportionate division of the property in lieu” of ordering maintenance for 

an extended period of time. In re Marriage of Estes, 84 Wn. App. 586, 593, 929 P.2d 

500 (1997). “The trial court may properly consider the property division when 

determining maintenance, and may consider maintenance in making an equitable division 

of the property.” Id. (citing In re Marriage of Rink, 18 Wn. App. 549, 552-53, 571 P.2d 

210 (1977). 

The issue for the commissioner presented by Sharon’s primary contention below

was whether Sharon demonstrated that the parties and the court expected in 2010 that she 

would resume working within five years—or whether, as Phil contends, they recognized

she was not likely to become self-supporting and for that reason she was awarded

$500,000 more in value of the parties’ assets.

The record demonstrates that both parties were completely aware of Sharon’s 

mental health issues at the time the divorce decree was entered and were aware that her 

mood disorder and depression had been debilitating in the past. Sharon’s claim that she 

expected to go back to work as a nurse at the time the decree was entered is not easily 

reconciled with her application for Social Security disability benefits six days later. It is 

not easily reconciled with her allegation in the disability benefit proceedings that her 

disability onset date was June 1, 1996. 

Sharon’s alternative and inconsistent theory is that she foresaw future financial 

difficulty and obtained Phil’s agreement “to reserve maintenance.” CP at 183. Phil
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denies the issue was reserved. Sharon’s lawyer appears to rely on a handwritten notation 

on the decree in contending that the issue was reserved, but the notation cannot 

reasonably be read as reserving the issue or as otherwise circumventing the requirement 

to show a substantial change of circumstances.2 Her disputed assertion that “Phil agreed

to reserve” is not easily reconciled with the trial court’s disproportionate distribution of 

the marital assets. Id. If it was understood that Phil would pay maintenance as long as 

needed to maintain Sharon’s historic standard of living, there would have been no reason 

for the court to award her $500,000 more in assets than it awarded to Phil.

 

2 Sharon’s lawyer appears to rely on the handwritten language in this, the 

“Maintenance” provision of the decree:

CP at 11.
No. 35309-5-III 

In re Marriage of Jones 

We find no abuse of discretion in the commissioner's determination that Sharon 

failed to show a substantial change of circumstances. Its order is affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

Siddoway, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

LA, .. I< .. (.~ - g'iN, \ 1 Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. c.. ~. 

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Kor s mo, J. 

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