NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 1 9

- 2072

_____________ AUDI OF AMERICA, An Organization Unit of Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., A New Jersey Corporation;

v. BRONSBERG & HUGHES PONTIAC, INC., DBA Wyoming Valley Audi ,

NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.; NAPLETON WYOMING VALLEY IMPORTS, LLC; EFN WY OMING VALLEY PROPERTIES, LLC; MILLENNIUM HOLDINGS, IV, LLC; NAPLETON INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, LP, Appellants (Intervenors in District Court)

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3

- 1 6

- c v - 0 2470 ) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

_______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a) April 2 , 2020 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

. (Filed : June 4, 2020)2 _______________ OPINION *

_______________
MATEY, Circuit Judge

. North American Automotive Services, Inc., and its affiliated companies (collectively “Napleton”) allege Audi of America (“Audi”) got in the way of an agreement to open a new car dealership. But, as the District Court concluded, Audi offered ample justifi cation s for invoking its con tractual rights

. For that reason, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against Napleton

. I. B ACKGROUND Although we write only for the parties, even our limited review of the facts require s

a long drive across miles of deception. Audi import s and distribut es Audi vehicles , operating as a division of Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“VWGoA”). Since 1997, Audi had a franchise agreement (the “Franchise Agreement”) with Wyoming Valley
Motors ( “ WV M ” ), a Pennsylvania dealer. 1 The F ranchise A greement gave WV M the right to sell and service Audi vehicles only at a particular , specified location. It also gave Audi the right to sign off on significant changes to WVM’s business including any proposed transf er of its “principal assets or change [in] owners.” 2 (App. at 391

– 92.)

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. 1 WVM is not a party to this appeal. 2 The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act governs this agreement. 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 818.1 (renumbered as § 818.1 01). The Act allows a contractual right of first refusal if, among other things, a distributor notifies the dealer in writing within a specified tim e ,3 All was well until Audi informed WVM that franchise locations must become exclusive Audi dealerships, or risk losing financial incentives. 3 That posed a problem for
WVM , which operated its Audi dealership at a facility shared w ith several other dealership s. So WVM bought property at a new location ( the “Relocation Property”) to house a new Audi showroom

. But WVM also planned to exit the car business by selling its dealerships, r eal properties, and liabilities to Napleton, a large multi

- state dealership group

. To facilitate the sale, Napleton and WVM drafted an Asset and Real Estate Purchase Agreement ( “ APA ” ) valuing the total combined assets at $17 million

. The APA required th at WV M obtain written consent from its distributors, including Audi, allowing Napleton
to move the dealerships to the Relocation Property.
WV M formally requested Audi’s approval of the relocation plan, but , fearing transparency, did not mention the APA or Napleton. The plan worked, and Audi agreed to the relocation, conditioned on, among other things, WV M maintaining ownership (the “Relocation A greement”)

. But Audi retained the right to revoke the Relocation Agreement if WVM “fail[ed] to perform any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. ” (App. at 933 .) With Audi’s approval in hand , WV M finally disclosed the APA.

and the distributor is willing to “assume the dealer’s lease

. . . on the same terms as those on which the real property or lease was to be sold.” 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 818.16 (2)(i) (renumbered as § 818.315 (a)(2)(i) ). The Act also prohibits a distributor from “unreasonably withhold[ing] consent” to a sale, transfer, or relocation. Id. § 818.12(b)(3)

– (4) (renumbered as § 818.310(b)(3)

– (4)). 3 This change was not a surprise. In 2011, Audi outlined the new policy and gave W VM until 2017 to transit ion its facility

.4 Audi was not pleased . It w arned WV M and Napleton that “[a]ny actions taken

. . . in anticipation of [Audi’s] consenting to the proposed acquisition .

. . [were] strictly at their own business risk , ” and sta r ted search ing for buy ers for all of WVM’s assets in the APA

. (App. at 878.) That prompted Audi to ask WVM for a “good faith break

- down” of the terms of the APA attributable to Audi ’s assets

. (App. at 885.) WV M responded with a break

down that, it acknowledge d , did not precisely “determine the separate value of [Audi’s] assets.” 4 (App. at 980.) Audi then filed a breach of contract action against WV M asking for injunctive relief
to prevent the transfer outlined in the APA. In response, WVM and Napleton amended the
APA to drop the Audi dealership from the deal . But not really, as the profits from the Audi dealership would still flow to Napleton courtesy of “management fees.” (App. at 1263

– 64 .) Persuaded that Audi faced irreparable harm, the District Court granted Audi a preliminary injunction. Undeterred, WV M then transferred its interest in the Relocation Property to an intermediary retained by Napleton. They hid th at agreement too. Once dis covered, Audi notified WV M that it was rescinding the Relocation Agreement (the “Rescission Notice”)

. The Rescission Notice left open the possibility that Audi would consider a different relocation request with the same property but made clear that WV M nee ded to u nwind the deal with Napleton. Instead, Napleton intervened in the litigation bringing various counterclaims against Audi , including tortious interference . At WV M ’s request, the

4 Nor was WVM’s calculation a ccurate because, when combined with allocations it provided for two other distributors, the figures surpassed the $17 million valuation

.5 District Court issued an order permitting WV M to transfer the non

- Audi and non

Volkswagen assets to Napleton but also requiring Napleton to “forever quit its interest” in owning t he Audi and Volkswagen assets and maintain the status quo during litigation. (App. at 14 7 .) Meanwhile, work on the new fac ility at the Relocation Property marched on, with Napleton and WVM inking yet another deal to relocate the disputed Audi dealership there on completion

. And, predictably, neither disclosed this agreement despite a status conference before the District Cour t three days later. Once notified, the District Court invalidat ed the transfer

. 5
Audi ultimately moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted against all of Napleton’s tortious interference claims. It held that Napleton had not shown Audi acted without cause and, for two claims, could not prove causation and damages. 6 Now, Napleton appeals , and we will affirm

. 7

5 An interlocutory appeal by Napleton and WVM brought the matter briefly here , but we remanded at Audi’s request. 6 Only the tortious interference claims remain. Napleton originally brought eight counterclaims, but the other four claims have been dismissed (Counts I, II, VII, and VIII). The District Court dismissed one of WVM’s counterclaims as well; its other counterclaim has been settled. 7 The District Court had jurisdi ction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R . Civ. P. 56(a). “[R]eview of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.” Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc. , 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).6 II. D ISCUSSION To prevail on its tortious interference claims, Napleton must show, among other things , that Audi’s conduct was not “ privilege[d] or justif i [ed] .” Crivelli v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 215 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton , 700 A.2d 979, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997))

. That turns on “whether the defendant’s conduct is sanctioned by the rules of the game which society has adopted.” Phillips v. Selig , 959 A.2d 420, 4 30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). And our analysis gives “substantial deference to defendants ” when their conduct “ protects an existing legitimate b usiness concern.” Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. , 986 F.2d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 1993). A. The APA Napleton raises a host of arguments about Audi’s conduct under the APA, but each
act is justi fiable given Audi’s right of first refusal. First, Napleton points to Au di ’s request for a price break

- down of the APA, but that was a necessary first step in determining whether to exercise its right s . Without a price for the Audi assets, Audi did not have the option of “assum[ing] the dealer’s lease . . . on the same terms as those on which the real property or lease was to be sold,” as guaranteed by its right of first refusal. 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 818.16 (2)(i) ( renumbered as § 818.315 (a)(2)(i) ). Likewise, Audi ’s effort to find potential buyers for all WVM’s assets was a logical next step

. Relatedly, Napleton suggests it was improper for Audi to tell W VM it would need to withdraw from the entire APA. But again, context shows Audi did not have feasible alternatives. WVM thwarted Audi’s prior attempt to exercise its right of first7 refusal. Its attempts to avoid the difficulty through outside help had reache d a dead end. Justifiably, t he only remaining path to protect its right s was to refuse the deal. Napleton also raises two arguments under the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, neither with much m erit. First, it contends that Audi “unreasonably with h [e]ld consent

. ” 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 818.12(b)(3)

– (4) (renumbered as § 818.310(b)(3)

– (4))

. That does not address Audi’s right of first refusal , and that right is enough to justif y Audi’s conduct. See Crivelli , 215 F.3d at 390. Second, Napleton claims Audi did n ot exercise its right of first refusal in time. But the only basis for that argument is Audi’s decision to not exercise the right pending litigation , a decision protected by t he Noerr

- Pennington doctrine. 8 S ee , e.g. , We, Inc. v. City of Phila delphia , 174 F.3d 322, 326

– 27 (3d Cir. 1999) ; Cheminor Drugs, Ltd . v. Ethyl Corp. , 168 F.3d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) ( holding “immunity extends to persons who petition all types of government entities

— legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts ” )

. Finally, Nap leton accuses Audi of working against the APA to punish Napleton for its past litigation in a diesel emissions suit. True, the APA would have transferred WVM’s rights in a lawsuit between Volkwsagen dealers, including Napleton as the lead litigant, and Audi’s parent company, VWGoA. But as the District Court explained, there w ere many reasons Napleton was not an ideal partner for Audi

. Napleton had been involved in other litigation against Audi and at least one other manufacturer and had tried to keep Audi in

8 Napleton would also struggle to show causation for this timing issue because the District Court’s vario us orders to maintain the status quo were seemingly an intervening cause of any delay.8 the dark about the APA. As the District Court properly concluded, the justifications for Audi’s conduct requires consideration of all “the circumstances presented.” 9 Phillips , 959 A.2d at 429. Audi ’s right to “control the selection of its franchisees” would prove hollow if forced to accept Napleton under these conditions

. Crivelli , 215 F.3d at 390. For all these

reasons, Audi’s conduct was proper.
B. The Relocation Agreement Napleton also alleges that Audi acted in bad faith in rescinding the Relocation Agreement. The core of this argument is timing: Audi always knew it would decline to approve the proposed relocation, but it w aited until Napleton had constructed most of the

n ew facility. Napleton’s argument is unpersuasive. Audi only learned about the details of
WV M ’s plans with N apleton after approving the Relocation Agreement. Once aware of that deal, Audi warned WV M and Napleton that the Relocation Agreement might not stand

. And, once Audi discovered the property transfer to Napleton’s intermediary, it timely disapproved

. 10 O n those facts, there is no evidence on which “ a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party , ” making summary judgment for Audi proper. Sovereign

9 I mpropriety tuns on the factors in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979) including “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct; (b) the actor’s motive; (c) the interests of the others with which the actor’s conduct interferes; (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other; (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference; and (g) the relations between the parties.” Phillips , 959 A.2d at 429

– 30. 10 And as noted, m uch of Audi’s alleged mis conduct occurred as part of ongoing litigation. We, Inc. , 174 F.3d at 326

– 27

.9 Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. , 533 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ). III. C ONCLUSION For these reasons , we will affirm the Distr ict Court

.