[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 

re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with 

Delinquent Tax Liens, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3656.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3656 

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LIENS FOR DELINQUENT LAND TAXES BY ACTION IN 

REM; DONAKER, TREASURER, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. PARCELS OF LAND 

ENCUMBERED WITH DELINQUENT TAX LIENS;

VANDERBILT MORTGAGE & FINANCE, INC., APPELLANT. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes v. 

Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens, 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3656.] 

R.C. 5721.25 permits a mortgage holder to redeem the mortgaged property when 

it is the subject of a tax foreclosure proceeding. 

(No. 2013-0713—Submitted April 29, 2014—Decided September 2, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Coshocton County, 

No. 2012CA0001, 2013-Ohio-1400. 

____________________ 

 O’CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether R.C. 5721.25 permits a 

mortgage holder to redeem the mortgaged property when it is the subject of a tax 
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2 

foreclosure proceeding. We hold that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the 

decision of the court of appeals. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} On June 14, 2003, Brandi L. Wagner and Troy Wagner financed 

the purchase of a manufactured home (“mobile home”) by executing a “Retail 

Installment Contract—Security Agreement.” That agreement was assigned to 

appellant, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. (“Vanderbilt”), and gave 

Vanderbilt a security interest in the mobile home and real property located in 

Coshocton County. The same day, the Wagners executed a promissory note in 

favor of Vanderbilt in the amount of $85,271.49 plus interest and executed a 

mortgage as security for payment of the promissory note, recorded in Coshocton 

County. Vanderbilt is the holder of both the promissory note and the mortgage. 

{¶ 3} As a result of the Wagners’ failure to pay taxes on the property, the 

treasurer of Coshocton County initiated a tax foreclosure proceeding for 

delinquent taxes in the amount of $825.84. The complaint named the last known 

owners of the property as Brandi and Troy Wagner and also named Vanderbilt as 

a “lienholder or other person with an interest in the parcel.” Pursuant to R.C. 

5721.18, the clerk of court for Coshocton County sent Vanderbilt by certified mail 

the required statutory notice advising Vanderbilt of the tax foreclosure action. 

{¶ 4} No responsive pleadings were filed, and the trial court granted the 

treasurer’s motion for default judgment. Pursuant to the treasurer’s request, the 

court ordered the sheriff to sell the property. Although not clear in the record, the 

court of appeals found, and the parties do not dispute, that the sheriff held two 

sales in October 2011; one at which Vanderbilt purchased the mobile home. At 

the other sale, James M. Matchett purchased the parcel of real property for the 
January Term, 2014 

3 

winning bid of $15,100. Matchett then deeded the property to Alan and Janette 

Donaker.1

{¶ 5} Before the sale of the real property was confirmed, however, 

Vanderbilt filed a notice of redemption. In that notice, Vanderbilt advised the 

court that in accordance with the redemption procedure in R.C. 5721.25, it had 

deposited $6,000 with the clerk of court to cover the delinquent taxes, 

assessments, penalties, interest, and charges on the real property purchased by 

Matchett at the sheriff’s sale and to cover the costs incurred in the foreclosure 

action. The notice included an attorney’s affidavit stating that the property was in 

compliance with all applicable zoning regulations, land-use restrictions, and 

building, health, and safety codes. The same day, Vanderbilt moved the trial 

court to stay confirmation of the sale and vacate the sale and entry of foreclosure 

upon a finding that the property was redeemed pursuant to R.C. 5721.25. 

{¶ 6} Also on November 2, 2011, the trial court granted Vanderbilt’s 

motion, thereby staying the confirmation of the sheriff’s sale and vacating and 

setting aside the sale and entry of foreclosure. But two days later, the treasurer 

filed a memorandum opposing Vanderbilt’s motion, and the trial court entered an 

order vacating its November 2 order, for the first time finding that a question of 

law existed as to whether Vanderbilt had the right to redeem. 

{¶ 7} On December 5, 2011, the trial court found that Vanderbilt was a 

“person entitled to redeem” under R.C. 5721.25. The court granted Vanderbilt’s 

motion to stay the confirmation of sale and to vacate and set aside the sheriff’s 

sale, dismissed with prejudice the tax foreclosure proceeding, and ordered the 

 

1

 The parties agree that appellee Alan Donaker is the father of Brandi Wagner and appellee Janette 

Donaker is both Brandi Wagner’s stepmother and the treasurer of Coshocton County who initiated 

this tax foreclosure proceeding. Those facts are not relevant to our analysis and disposition. 
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4 

clerk of court to pay the treasurer, from the funds deposited by Vanderbilt, the 

amounts due and payable on the property and to pay the court costs. 

{¶ 8} Alan Donaker and the Coshocton County treasurer appealed. The 

sole issue presented to the court of appeals was whether Vanderbilt had the right 

to redeem the property under R.C. 5721.25. The Fifth District Court of Appeals 

held that Vanderbilt was not entitled to redeem the property, reversed the 

judgment of the trial court, and remanded the cause with instructions to confirm 

the sheriff’s sale. 

{¶ 9} We accepted Vanderbilt’s appeal from the court of appeals’ 

judgment. 136 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2013-Ohio-3790, 993 N.E.2d 777. The issue 

before us is whether Vanderbilt, as a mortgage holder, qualifies as “any person 

entitled to redeem the land” under R.C. 5721.25. 

ANALYSIS

{¶ 10} Our analysis begins with the relevant statutory language, which is 

found in the second paragraph of R.C. 5721.25: 

After a foreclosure proceeding has been instituted under 

Chapter 323. or this chapter of the Revised Code with respect to 

delinquent land, but before the filing of an entry of confirmation of 

sale pursuant to the proceeding or before the expiration of the 

alternative redemption period as may apply under section 323.78 

of the Revised Code, any person entitled to redeem the land may 

do so by tendering to the county treasurer an amount sufficient, as 

determined by the court, to pay the taxes, assessments, penalties, 

interest, and charges then due and unpaid, and the costs incurred in 

any proceeding instituted against such land under Chapter 323. or 

this chapter of the Revised Code, and by demonstrating that the 
January Term, 2014 

5 

property is in compliance with all applicable zoning regulations, 

land use restrictions, and building, health, and safety codes. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 11} Appellee Alan Donaker contends that the only reasonable 

interpretation of the statute is one precluding anyone but the property owner from 

being a “person entitled to redeem” under R.C. 5721.25 and that broadly 

interpreting the phrase “any person” would undermine sheriff’s sales by 

permitting mortgage holders to “sit on their hands” until after the sheriff’s sale. 

Vanderbilt contends that when read in conjunction with other provisions on tax 

foreclosure proceedings—namely, R.C. 5721.181, which provides the form of 

notice required—the phrase “any person entitled to redeem the land” under R.C. 

5721.25 includes “any owner, or lienholder of, or other person with an interest in” 

the property.2

 Vanderbilt also contends that as a mortgage holder, it had vested 

legal title to the real property because the loan was in default, and that it redeemed 

the property by advancing tax payments on behalf of the property owner. 

Because the appeal can be resolved as a matter of statutory construction, we need 

not address these arguments. 

{¶ 12} Our role in cases of statutory construction is to determine 

legislative intent by looking to the language of the statute and the purpose to be 

accomplished by the statute. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio 

St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20. Where the statute’s meaning 

 

2

 As an initial matter, Alan Donaker contends that Vanderbilt waived this argument by failing to 

specifically raise below that the statute should be read in pari materia with R.C. 5721.18 and 

5721.181. But he concedes that Vanderbilt argued below that it was a “person entitled to redeem” 

under the statute. Based on our review of the record, it is evident that Alan Donaker presented to 

the court of appeals the issue whether Vanderbilt was a “person entitled to redeem” under the 

statute and that Vanderbilt contended that applying the rules of statutory construction, the phrase 

“any person entitled to redeem” in R.C. 5721.25 does not refer only to the property owner. We 

decline to put form over substance to find that Vanderbilt waived such an argument here. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is properly before us on appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written. Id. This court must 

give effect to the words used, refraining from inserting or deleting words. 

Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53-54, 524 N.E.2d 441 

(1988). “ ‘No part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly 

required, and the court should avoid that construction which renders a provision 

meaningless or inoperative.’ ” Boley, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer 

Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917). 

In the absence of a definition of a word or phrase used in a statute, the words are 

to be given their common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Wachendorf v. 

Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), paragraph five of the syllabus. 

{¶ 13} Alan Donaker relies on the interpretations of the statute by the 

court of appeals below and by the First District Court of Appeals in Wilke v. Secy. 

of Hous. & Urban Dev., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-840077, 1984 WL 7141 (Dec. 

26, 1984), a case in which a stranger to title attempted to redeem the land in a tax 

foreclosure proceeding. According to the court of appeals, Wilke held that “the 

clear meaning and intent of the [relevant] paragraph of R.C. 5721.25 is that only 

the former owner has the right of redemption.” (Emphasis added.) 2013-Ohio1400, ¶ 10. We disagree with the assertion that Wilke should be read so broadly. 

Applying such a reading in this case would lead to the absurd result that even the 

Wagners would not be entitled to redeem their property because they are the 

current, not the former, owners until a confirmation of sale is approved. 

Nonetheless, relying on Wilke, the court of appeals held that “the intent of the 

statute is to provide the owner with an opportunity to redeem the property if they 

so desire.” 2013-Ohio-1400, ¶ 11. We conclude that neither reading of R.C. 

5721.25 gives effect to the words used in the statute. 

{¶ 14} The plain language of the statute permits “any person” entitled to 

redeem the land to do so. R.C. 5721.25. The phrase “any person” is not defined 

in the statute. However, previously we have pointed out that the ordinary 
January Term, 2014 

7 

meaning of “any” is “every” or “all.” State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 

2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 33 (lead opinion). The meaning of “any” is 

flexible and must be interpreted in light of its context. Wachendorf at 239. 

Although the meaning of “any” is flexible, it is not so pliable that we can simply 

ignore it. Giving effect to the plain meaning of the phrase “any person” in the 

context in which it is used, we cannot delete the words “any person” and 

substitute the word “owner” as appellee would have us do. We find the absence 

of such specificity or other limiting language indicative of the legislative intent. 

{¶ 15} In R.C. Chapter 2329, which governs judicial foreclosure 

proceedings such as mortgage foreclosure, the General Assembly specifically 

limited the right of redemption to “the debtor.” R.C. 2329.33. But in R.C. 

5721.25, the legislature instead utilized broader language by granting the right of 

redemption in a tax foreclosure proceeding to “any person entitled to redeem.” 

Given the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “any person” in R.C. 5721.25, 

we hold that it did not intend to restrict the right of redemption in a tax 

foreclosure proceeding to only the property owner as it did for mortgage 

foreclosure proceedings. Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of R.C. 

5721.25 is one that gives a purpose to the use of the word “any” in the phrase 

“any person entitled to redeem the land.” 

{¶ 16} Looking at R.C. Chapter 5721 as a whole, we find additional 

insight into the legislature’s intent. R.C. 5721.181(B), which prescribes the 

language to be used in giving notice of tax foreclosure proceedings, states: 

The forms of caption, notice of foreclosure, and notice to 

property owners, lienholders, and other interested persons to be 

utilized in a foreclosure proceeding instituted pursuant to division 

(B) of section 5721.18 of the Revised Code shall be in substance as 

follows: 
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* * * 

(B) Form of notice of foreclosure: 

* * * 

At any time prior to the filing of any entry of confirmation 

of sale, any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an 

interest in, a parcel listed in the complaint may redeem the parcel

by tendering to the treasurer the amount of the taxes, assessments, 

charges, penalties, and interest due and unpaid on the parcel, 

together with all costs incurred in the proceeding instituted against 

the parcel under section 5721.18 of the Revised Code. 

(Emphasis added.) This required notice language describes that to which R.C. 

5721.25 gives effect. To limit “any person” described in R.C. 5721.25 to the 

property owner, current or former, renders meaningless the notice language in 

R.C. 5721.181 that “any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an interest in 

[the property] may redeem [it].” It would be illogical for the legislature to require 

that a party be notified under R.C. 5721.181 that it is entitled to redeem the land 

but then deny the party that right by the language in R.C. 5721.25. Such an 

interpretation would cause the language and meaning of the notice provision to be 

superfluous, thereby offending the well-established rules of statutory construction. 

In contrast, our interpretation gives meaning to the plain language of the statute 

and the chapter as a whole. 

{¶ 17} Our holding is not at odds with the appellate court’s conclusion 

that “the intent of the statute is to provide the owner with an opportunity to 

redeem the property if they so desire,” 2013-Ohio-1400, ¶ 11. Nor does it 

undermine the integrity of sheriff’s sales. The statutory provisions demonstrate 

that the legislature recognized multiple competing interests at a sheriff’s sale, 

including those of the owner. The purchaser at a sheriff’s sale is on notice that 
January Term, 2014 

9 

the sale is not final until confirmation. Before confirmation, the owner can 

redeem the property just as a lienholder or other person with an interest in the 

property can, even if the owners—or lienholders—“sit on their hands” until after 

the sheriff’s sale. Any perceived inequity caused by our holding to purchasers or 

property owners like the Wagners must be balanced against the rights of others 

with competing interests, including those of a mortgagee, or lienholder, to protect 

its interest in the property where a mortgagor, or property owner, has fallen 

delinquent in tax payments. This tension presents a public-policy concern that is 

the purview of the legislature. Our role is to apply the language of the statute that 

is the legislature’s expression of public policy. 

{¶ 18} Accordingly, we hold that “any person entitled to redeem the land” 

under R.C. 5721.25 includes “any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an 

interest in” the subject property as set forth in R.C. 5721.181. Therefore, the 

statute permits a mortgage holder to redeem the land. 

{¶ 19} Under our construction of the statute, Vanderbilt, as mortgage 

holder, was entitled to redeem the land. We must next determine whether 

Vanderbilt complied with the remaining requirements of R.C. 5721.25, i.e., 

whether it tendered to the treasurer an amount sufficient to cover the delinquency 

and demonstrated that the property was in compliance with all applicable codes 

and regulations. 

{¶ 20} Although the record reflects that Vanderbilt deposited funds with 

the clerk of court and submitted an attorney’s affidavit regarding the compliance 

of the property, it is unclear from the record that the court made a determination 

whether the amount was sufficient to satisfy the redemption and whether the 

treasurer was paid. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court to make 

that determination and order the clerk to pay the treasurer, if payment has not 

already been made. 

 
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CONCLUSION

{¶ 21} We hold that “any person entitled to redeem the land” under R.C. 

5721.25 includes “any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an interest in” 

the property as set forth in R.C. 5721.181. Thus, Vanderbilt, as a lienholder, was 

entitled to redeem the land. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and remand the cause to the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton 

County to determine Vanderbilt’s compliance with the remaining requirements of 

the statute. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 

concur. 

____________________ 

 Samuel H. Shamansky Co., L.P.A., and Samuel H. Shamansky, Donald L. 

Regensburger, Colin E. Peters, and Krystin N. Martin; and James R. Skelton, for 

appellee Alan Donaker. 

Carlisle, McNellis, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich Co., L.P.A., and Eric T. 

Deighton, for appellant. 

_________________________