2015 IL App (1st) 140076 FIRST DIVISION MARCH 30, 2015 No. 1

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- 0076 JOSEPH DURICA and MARTA DURICA , ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of P laintiffs

- Appellants , ) Cook County. ) ) v . ) No. 12 CH 39283 ) COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO MPANY and ) ABC PROFESSIONAL TREE SERVICES, INC. , ) Honorable ) Franklin U. Valderrama , Defendan ts

- Appellees

. ) Judge Presiding

. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM deli vered the judgment of the court , with opinion

. Justice s Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion. O PINION ¶ 1 Plaintiffs

- appellants Josep h and Marta Durica (the Duricas) appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of their complaint pursuant to s ection 2

- 619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2

- 619(a)(1) (West 2010) )

. The circuit court concluded that the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) had exclusiv e jurisdiction over the Duricas' claims against defendants

- appellees Commonwealth Edison Co mpany (ComEd) and ABC Professional Tree Services, Inc. (ABC)

. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in dismissing the Duricas' complaint. ¶ 2 BACKGROUND ¶ 3 The Duricas are owners of property in LaGrange Park, Illinois, which abut s railroad tracks often used by freight trains . ComEd is a public utility company that , pursuant to an1

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2 easement , 1 owns and maintains electrical lines on the Duricas' property that run s alongside the railroad tracks. ¶ 4 According to the Duricas , freight train traffic generates no ise, dust, and unsightly views that interfe re with their enjoyment of the property . To mitigate those problems, the Duricas grew vegetation on their property, including several 25

- foot

- tall pine trees. For many years, Co mEd periodical ly trim med these trees in order to prevent their interference with ComEd 's power lines. That practice abruptly ended in September 2011, the Duricas claim, when ComEd decided to completely remove the Duricas' tree s and those of other property owners. ¶ 5 ComEd contracted wi th ABC to carry out the removal. According to the Duricas, on Septe mber 26, 2011, ABC asked Marta Durica for permission t o remove the pine trees , but she refused. Nonetheless , the following day ABC proceeded to cut down th e p ine trees without authorization. ¶ 6 On October 24, 2012, the Duricas filed a complaint in the circuit c ourt , which pleaded a putative class action on behalf of property owners whose veget ation had been removed by ComEd and ABC. The complaint alleged that C omEd's tree removal violated section 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act, which requires that an electrical utility "[f] ollow the most current tree care and maintenance standard practices" set forth by the American National Standards Institute and requires the utility to provide notice to property owners about such "vegetation management activities." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a)(1) , (2) (West 2010)

. However, the complaint acknowledged that "[t] he Illinois Commerce Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear co mplaints of

1 ComEd argues on appeal that the terms of its easement expressly permits the tree removal complained of in this action, but that question was not the basis of the trial court's dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and the scope of the easement is not at issue in this appeal.1

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3 violati ons of " that section. T hus, t he complaint specifically pleaded that the Duricas did not seek
to recover damages for violati on of section 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act , but alleged that

" the Defe ndants' violation of that statute il lustrates their blatant disregard for the rights of property owners. " ¶ 7 Instead of seeking damages on the basis of the Public Utilities Act, t he Duricas' complai nt went on to plead three separate causes of action against ComEd and ABC . Count I

as serted a cl aim of trespass, alleging that ABC, on behalf of ComEd, had entered the Duricas'
prop erty and removed tree s wit hout authorization

. Coun t II asserted a claim for convers ion, all eging that ABC on behalf of ComEd wron gfully assumed c ontrol, dominion, and own ership over the Duricas' trees

. Finally, c ount III alleged that ABC and ComEd had violated the
W r ongful Tree Cutting Act. See 740 ILCS 185/2 (West 2010) ("Any party found to have intentionally cut *** any timber or tree which he did not have the full le gal right to cut or caused to be cut shall pay the owner of the timber or tree 3 times its stumpage value.")

. The complai nt's prayer for relief requested a judgment for damages on behalf of the purported cla ss of property

owners . ¶ 8 On January 11, 2013, ComE d moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, only one of which is relev ant to this appeal. Speci fic ally, seeking dismissal p ursuant to section 2

- 619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure , ComEd argued that only the ICC, not the circuit court, had s ubject matter jurisdiction over th e Duricas' claims

. 2 See 735 ILCS 5/2

- 619 (a)(1) (West

2 ABC also filed a motion to dismiss on January 11, 2013, in which it adopted the arguments contained in ComEd's motion to dismiss as being equally applicable to ABC. AB C has similarly adopted ComEd's arguments on appeal.1

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4 2010). N otwithstand ing the complaint's statement that the Duricas did not seek damages under

s ection 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act, ComEd argued that the ICC's e xclusive jurisdiction over the dispute was mandated by that statute's statement that "[t] he Commission shall have sole authority to investigate, issue, and hear complaints against the utility under this subsecti on (a)." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010). ComEd argued that notwithstanding the Duricas' "artful pleading," the essence of the complaint was that " ComEd's vegetation management services were inadequate" in violation of s ection 8

- 505.1(a) and argued that only the ICC , not the court, could properly evaluate the adequacy of ComEd's vegetation management services

. ¶ 9 ComEd 's motion also relied on our supreme court's decision in Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co

. , 2011 IL 110166, which held that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction where plaintiffs sough t " compensation f or ComEd's allegedly inadequate service, which dire ctly relates to the Commission's rate

- setting functio n s for electrical power services." Id. ¶ 53. Com Ed argued that the ICC likewise had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the adequacy of vegetation management services, which ComEd claimed were " inextricably intertwined with whether ComEd's facilities are safe and operating properly ." ¶ 10 The Duricas' response to the motion to dismiss argued that the ICC "does not have exclusive jurisdiction o ver everything that Com Ed does

. " The Duricas argued that, just a s I CC would not have jurisdiction over " tort claims for car crashes ComEd causes or employee wage or disc rimination claims brought against ComEd, it does not have jurisdiction over tor t cl aims for ComEd's trespassing, conversion, or violations of the Illinois Tree Cutting Act." The Duricas contended that circuit court jurisdiction was supported by section 5

- 201 of the Public Utilities1

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5 Act, which contemplates damage awards against a public utility for violation of the Public Utilities Act. 220 ILCS 5/5

- 201 (West 2010). ¶ 11 The Duricas further argued th at the Sheffler decision did no t mandate I CC jurisdiction, as that decision had recognized a distinction between c laims for reparations that ar e subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC and claims for civil damages that may be heard in circuit court. The Duricas thus argued that the key question was whether their complaint sought "reparations"

or civil d amages, noting Sheffler 's stateme nt that "a claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility ha s charged too much for a service , while a claim is for civil dam ages whe n the essenc e of the complaint is that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff. " Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166 , ¶ 42

. ¶ 12 The Duricas acknowledged that section 8

- 505.1(a) gave the ICC jurisdiction over allegations of f ailure to comply with tree maintenance standards or t he specified notice provisions , but argued that "no thing in [s ection 8

- 505.1] suggests that no other caus e of action can be brought on the same fac t s." In support, t he Duricas cited the last paragraph of s ection 8

- 505.1, which states that the statute does not " diminish or replace other civil or administrative remedies ." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). ¶ 13 In its reply brief, ComEd maintained that, notwithstanding its "artful pleading" of tort claims , the essence of the complaint was "whether C omEd's execution of its vegetation

ma nagement services was a ppropriate and necessary" and thus subje ct to ICC's jurisdiction under

s ection 8

- 505.1. ComEd argue d that as its v egetation management was "inextricably intertwined with ComEd's delivery of electricity , " the ICC should apply its knowledge a nd expertise in

oversee ing the dispute.1

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6 ¶ 14 O n Apr il 18, 2013, the Duricas moved to supplement their response with material from a proceeding pending before the ICC in a separate matter, DeKing v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , ICC Docket No. 13

- 0186 ( DeKing ) , t hat similarly involved a prope rty owner (DeKi ng) seeking damages for ComEd's removal of trees

. The Duricas submitted a transcript from the DeKing proceeding in which ComEd h ad argued that the ICC lacked authority to awa rd damages to DeKing and that his " cause of action lies in the Circuit Court." T he Duricas thus claimed ComEd had argued a contrary po sition on jurisdiction in the ICC from the stance it had take n in its motion to dismiss the Duricas' complaint. ¶ 15 Shortly thereafter , Co mEd filed a reply in which it characterized its counsel's statements in the DeKing matter before the ICC as an "informal discussion " regarding " what remedies are available in the ICC." ComEd submitted its moti on to dismiss the property owner's complaint in the DeKing matter, and claimed that its arg ument to the ICC regard ing the availability o f remedies in DeKing was consistent with C omEd's position in this lawsuit

. In that submission to the ICC, ComEd argued that the ICC lacked the authority to a ward money damages to the property owner for the wrongful removal of h is tre es. However, c iting th e "sole authority" language of s ection 8

- 505.1 (a) , ComEd nonetheless maintained that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction and that DeKing could not sue in circuit court. ComEd thus argued that the property owner in the DeKing matter w as subject to the exclusive juri sdiction of the ICC, but could not

rec over any damages

. ¶ 16 On July 9, 2013, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting ComEd's motion to dismiss the Duricas' complaint, agreeing that the Duricas ' claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC. C iting Sheffler , the trial court stated that the question of1

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7 jurisdict ion required examination of the role of the ICC, which "exists to maintain a balance between the rates charged by utilities and the servic es performed." The court quoted Sheffler that "in mat ters relating to services and rates of utilities [,] technical data and expert opinion , as wel l as complex technological and scientific data, make it essential that the matter be consider e d by a tribunal that is itself capable of passing u pon complex data." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166 , ¶ 40. ¶ 17 The trial court recited the provisions of s ection 8

- 505.1(a) requiring utilities to follow national tree maintenance standards , to p rovide adequate noti ce of ve getation management activities, and the statement that the ICC " shall have sole authority to investigate , issue, and hear complaints ag ainst the utility under this subsection (a)." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010). Notably , h owever, the trial court did not refer to any other language contained in s ecti o n 8

- 505 .1

. The trial court found that the "plain language " of s ection 8

- 505.1 (a) gives the ICC " sole authority " over complaints f or violation of that subsection. The court rea soned that the ICC h ad jurisdiction in this case as "[t]he gravamen of the Duricas' claim is that ComEd, in exercising its vegetation management services , injured the Duricas " by removing trees without notice in violation of s ection 8

- 505.1 (a)

. ¶ 18 Although the complai nt had pleaded additional causes of action , t he court found "[t] he fact that the Duricas do not specifically allege a cause of action for violation of the [Public]
Ut ilities Act [was] of no moment," because "[t]he essence of the Duricas' Complai nt challenges the adequacy of ComEd's vegetation management services and as such, belongs before the ICC." The trial court reasoned that "ComEd's delivery of electrical service and vegetation management services are inextricably tied together " and that e xercisi ng jurisdiction would improperly pla ce1

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8 the court " in the position of assessing what constitutes appropriate vegetatio n m anagement services." With respect to the Duricas' argument that ComEd had taken an inconsistent position
in the DeKing matter be fore the ICC, the trial court found the argument " unpersuasive" and declined to address it. Concluding that the ICC had sole j urisdiction , the trial court dismissed the complaint. ¶ 19 The Duricas filed a motion t o reconsider on August 7, 2013, which again ref erenced the DeKing matter in the ICC. The Duricas contended that shortly after the trial court's July 9, dismissal of the Duricas' complaint, the ICC had issued an order in the DeKing proceeding concluding t hat the property owner could sue ComEd for dama g es in the circuit court

. The Duricas argu e d that this demonstrated that the ICC would not exercise jurisdiction over their claims, and thus they would be left "without a remedy" if the circuit cou rt dismissed their complaint

. The Duricas submitted a July 10, 2013 "Proposed Order" from the DeKing matter which stated that the ICC " ha[s] no general authority to f ashion an award of damages," and that section 5

- 201 of the Public Utilities Act "establishes [DeKing's] remedy for monetary damages in the circuit c our t." DeKing , ICC Docket No. 13

- 0186, Proposed Order (July 10, 2013). The
ICC's propose d order stat ed that it would dismiss the DeKing petition because the ICC " does not have the statutory authority to grant the requested relief." Id. ¶ 20 ComEd's response to the Duricas' motion to reconsider explained that the DeKing order at issue was merely a proposed , not final, order, and that the DeKing matter remained pending

. ComEd noted that on September 4, 2013, the ICC had issued another order in which the IC C
sp ecifically requested further briefing as to whether the ICC could award monetary dam a ges. See DeKing , ICC Docket No. 13

- 0186, Interim Order (Sep. 4, 2013). ComEd also argued that1

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9 although the ICC in DeKing had questioned its ability to award certain reme dies , that issue was distinct from whether the ICC had jurisdiction over such disputes. ¶ 21 Notably, the interim ICC order in DeKing referenced by ComEd not only requested briefing as to whether the ICC had authority to issue mon etary dam ages or other remedies ; it also requested briefing as to whether s ecti o n 8

- 505.1 "strips the courts of jurisdiction over such claims for damages." Id. The ICC remarked that it found " seemingly contradictory language " in the statute, id. , comparing the final sentence of subse c t ion (a) that "the Commission shall have sole authority to investigate, issue, and hear complaints " with the statute's subsequent statement that it " shall not in any way diminish or replace other civil or admi nistrative remedies ." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2 010). ¶ 22 The Duricas filed a rep l y in support of their motion to reconsider , which acknowledged that the ICC had not issued a final order and the DeKing matter remained pending

. A lthough the Duricas recognized the distinction between jurisdiction and remed ies , they argue d that if the ICC lacked authority to award damag es , as ComEd had argued to the ICC , then they shou ld be able to seek damages in circuit court. The Duricas urged that , absent more explicit language in the Public Utilities Act , it could not be implied that the legisl ature had intended to make property owners harmed by tree removal "a unique cl ass of tort victims who are not entitle d to money damages. " ¶ 23 On December 3, 201 3 , the tri al court denied the Duricas' motion to reconsider. T he court

re

jected the Duricas' reliance on the ICC's statements in its nonfinal DeKing order , noting that the ICC had "not entered any order that the DeKing action was improperly brought before the ICC and instead belongs in the circuit court." Rather , the court ma i ntained that it lacked1

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10 jurisdiction due to " the plain language of the [Public] Utilities Act " giving the ICC " sole authority to investigate, i ssue, and hear complaints against the utility under subsection (a)." See 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010) . The trial court reiterated its conclusion that "[t]he essence of the Duricas' Complaint challenges ComEd's vegetation management services and as such, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the ICC." ¶ 24 The Duricas filed a notice of appeal on January 2, 2014 , within 30 days of the final order. Thus we have jurisdiction. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. May 30 , 2008). ¶ 25 ANALYSIS ¶ 26 The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismis sing the Duricas'
comp laint on the basis that the claims fell within the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction. As the complaint was dismissed pursuant to section 2

- 619 (a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2

- 619(a)(1) (West 2010)), we review the trial court's decision de no vo . Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166, ¶ 23. Our review of the trial court's interpretation of the Public Utilities Act is also de

novo . See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 219 Ill. 2d 182, 235 (2005) ("Statutory construction is a question of law, subject to de no vo review."). ¶ 27 We turn to the relevant statutory provisions. "The Public Utilities Act creates the Illinois Commerce Commission and charges it with 'general supervision of all public utilities.' " State of Illinois ex rel. Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. , 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 12 (quoting 220
ILCS 5/2

- 101, 4

- 101 (West 2008)). Section 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act governs "Non

emergency v egetation management activities " by an electric public utility such as ComEd. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010)

. In particular , s ection 8

- 505.1(a) (1) obligates an electric public utility to " [f] ollow the most current tree care and maintenance standard practices set forth in1

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11 ANSI A300 published by the American National Standards Institute and the most current appli cable Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations regarding worker safety. " 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a)( 1 ) (West 2010). Section 8

- 505.1(a)(2) obligates a utility to " [p] rovide direct notice of vegetation management activities no less than 21 day s nor more than 90 d ays before the activities begin, " and specifies the accompanying in formation that must be provided to customers and property owners

. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a)(2) (West 2010). Following the se notice requirements, the final sentence of s ect ion 8

- 505.1(a) states : "The Commission shall have sole authority to investigate, issue, and hear complaints a gainst the utility under this subsection (a)."
220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010). ¶ 28 Following subsections (b),(c), and (d), which ar e not relevant t o this appeal, s ect ion 8

- 505.1 concludes with the following paragraph: "The provisions of this Section shall not in any way diminish or replace other civil or administrative remedies available to a customer or class of customers or a property owner or cla ss of property owners under this Act. This Sectio n does not alter the jurisdiction o f the Illinois Commerce Commission in any manner
excep t to obligate the Commission to investi gate, issue, and hear complaints against an electric public utility as provide d in subsection (a)( 3 ) and to hear and resolve d is puted matters brough t to it as provide d in this s ubsection. Vegetation management activities by an electric public utility shall not alter, trespass upon,1

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12 or limit the rights of any property owner." 220 I LCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010).
¶ 29 Distinct from the "vegetation management activities" provision s of s ection 8

- 505.1 , the Public Util ities Act elsewhere provides that a utility may be subject to clai ms for damages in circuit court. Specifically, s ection 5

- 201 p rovides: "In case any public utility shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited , forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done eith er by any provision s of thi s Act or any rul e, re g ulation, order or decision of the Commission, issued under authority of this Act, the public utility shall be liable to the
person s or corporation s affected ther e by for all loss, d amages or injury caused ther e by or resulting therefr om , and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the court may in addition to the actual damages, awa r d damages for the sake of example and by the way of punishment. An action to recover for such loss, d a mage or injury may be brought in the circuit court by any person or corporation." 220 ILCS 5/5

- 201 (West 2010). ¶ 30 The trial court's decision on ComEd's motion to dismiss acknowledged s ection 5

- 201 , but nevertheless held that the ICC ha d jurisdictio n over this matter pursuant to s ection 8

- 505.1 's provisions regarding a utility's "vegetation management activities." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). T he trial court relied largely on the statement in s ection 8

- 505.1(a) that "[t] he1

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13 Commission shall have sole authority to investigate, issue, a nd hear complaints " under that subsection. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010). The trial court found that the "plain language" of this provisio n brought claims regarding veg etation management services within the sole jurisdiction of the ICC. Likewise, C omE d argues on appeal that the "sole authority" language is unambiguous and requires that "the ICC alone has jurisdiction to hear complaints about Co mEd's

non - emergency vegetation management activities ." ¶ 31 In our view, however, the trial court erred in its anal ysis of the Public Utilities A ct because it failed to consider s ection 8

- 5 05.1's concluding paragraph, particularly the section that
states: " The provision s of this Section shall not in any way diminish or replace other civil or administrative remedies av ailable to a customer or class of customers or a prope rty owner or class of property owners under this Act." (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). ComEd's appellate brief also fai ls to acknowledge this portion of the statute , notwithstanding that this language is clearly indicative of the legislative intent which is contrary to ComEd's position. This statutory language , particularly when read in conjunction with section 5

- 201 's recognition of circuit court jurisdiction over claims for damage s , leads us to co nclude that, notwithstanding the earlier "sole authority" clause , section 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act does not preclude propert y owners from pursuing other claims in circuit court arising from a utility's "vegetation management act ivities ." Thus, we conclud e that the trial court erred in dismissing the Duricas' complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. ¶ 32 We recognize that the clause giving "sole authority" to the ICC arguably conflict s with the subsequent statement that section 8

- 505.1 "shall not in any way diminish or replace other civil or administrative remed ies ." 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). That is, if the "sole1

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14 authority" clause was interpreted broadly as giving the ICC ex c lusive jurisdiction over any and all claims arising fr om conduct that constitutes a violation of section 8

- 505.1, it could conflict with the statute's subsequent recognition that " other civil or administrative remedies " may be pursued

. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). However, recognizing the principle of s tatutory construction that all provisions are to be given effect if reasonably possible , w e will interpret the
statute i n a manner that reconciles any apparent conflict s . See Land v. Board of Educ ation o f the City of Chicago , 202 Ill. 2d 4 1 4, 422 (2002) ( recognizing that in statutory interpretation "each section should be construed with every other part or section of the statute to produce a harmonious w hole" such that "no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless"); Ferguson v. McKenzie , 202 Ill. 2d 304 , 311 (2001) ("Where there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a court has a duty to interpret those statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where suc h an interpretation is reasonably possible.")

. ¶ 33 In th is case, the seemingly contradictory statements within section 8

- 505.1 can each be given effec t by recogniz ing that conduct which violates the statute may also give rise to independent claim s , such as the common law tort claims alleged in this case

. That is, the ICC is expressly granted "sole authority" over complaints that the specific requirements of section 8

- 505.1 (a) have been violated

— for example, that a utility has not followed national tree maintenance standards or failed to give proper notice of it s vegetation management activity

. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1(a) (West 2010). However, the ICC's jurisdiction over those complaints does not "diminish or replace" a plaintiffs' right to pursue " other civil or admi nistrative remedies , " such as a tort lawsuit, that may be warranted by the utility's conduct. 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). This interpretation is supported by the final statement in section 8

- 505.1's concluding paragraph1

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15 tha t "[v] egetation management activities by an electric public utility shall not alter, trespass
upon , or limit the rights of any property owner. " (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010). That language indicates that in drafting section 8

- 505.1, the legislature sought to
preserve , rathe r than pre empt , a property's owner's op tion to pursu e independent claims against a public utility where vegetation management activity harms private property rights

. ¶ 34 In its orders granting ComEd's motion to dismiss and denying the Duricas' motion to reconsider , the trial court simply failed to acknowledge s ection 8

- 505.1's concluding paragraph whatsoever. Thus , the court did not consider the statutory language explicitly p reserving "other civil or administrative remedies , " notwithstanding the prior statement giving the ICC "sole authority" over complaints for violation of section 8

- 505.1(a). As a result of this oversight, we believe the trial court erred in concluding t hat section 8

- 505.1 precludes the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over any causes o f action arising out of ComEd's v egetation management activities. ¶ 35 Furthermore, to the extent the trial cour t relied on our supreme court's decision in Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 2011 IL 110 1 66, our analysis of that decision leads us to conclude that its holding does not bar the circuit court's jurisdiction over the Duricas' claims

. The plaintiffs in Sheffler alleged damages as a result of power outages to their homes following

sever e storms

. Id. ¶ ¶ 36

- 37. Among other allegations, the Scheffler plaintiffs claimed ComEd had negl igently failed to restore p ower to their homes in a timely manner and had failed to prevent or adequately prepare for such power outages

. Id. ¶ 52. The appellate court had concluded that t he ICC rather than the circuit court had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs ' claims for damages were " predicated on allegations that ComEd was not providing adequate service1

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16 u nder the [Public Utilities ] Act

. " Id. ¶ 18. As the plaintiffs alleged that ComEd's level of service

was substandard , the appellate court found t he claims were " directly relate [d] to the Commission 's r ate

- setting function s for electrical power services, which raised a regulatory question of how ComEd should recover the costs of raising the leve l of service it provides

. " Id

. ¶ 24. Th e appellate co urt reasoned that "[a] llowing plaintiffs ' claims to proceed would place the circuit court in the position of having to determine what constitutes adequate service " which was

" a d etermination wi thin the Commission's jurisdiction pertaining to rates." Id. ¶ 25

. ¶ 36 In affirming the appellate court, o ur s upreme court first explained that the role of the ICC

" is to determine that a utility's rates are just and reasonable and that its services are adequate." Id

. ¶ 40. The cour t recognized that section 9

- 252 of th e Public Utilities Act established the ICC's

" exclusive jurisdiction over rates ." Id. ¶ 41. That section of the Public Utilities Act provides that if a utility " has charged an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for it s product, commodity or serv ice , the Commission may order that the public utility mak e du e reparation to the complainant therefor." 220 ILCS 5/9

- 252 (West 2010). The Sheffler court thus explained that "if a claim is for reparation s , jurisdiction is in t he Commission, while jurisdic tion of an action for civil damages lies in the circuit court." Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166 , ¶ 42. The court elaborated that "a claim is for reparations when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charge d too much for a service, while a claim is for civil dam a ges when the essence of the complaint is that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff. " Id. (citing Flournoy v. Ameritech , 351 Ill. App. 3d 583, 585 (2004)). The Sheffler court further observed that "courts focus on the natu re of the relief sough t rather than the basi s for seeking relief in determining whether an action falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission. " Id. ¶ 50.1

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17 ¶ 37 Under Sheffler 's facts, our supreme co u rt concluded that , although the plaintiffs' complaint pu rported to seek civil damages, " the relief sought by plaintiffs goes directly to ComEd's service and infrastructure, which is within the Commission's or i ginal jur is d i ction." Id. ¶ 50

. The court explained that "the nature of the relief sough t by plaintiff s is compensation for ComEd's allegedly inadequate service, which directly relates to the Commiss ion's rate

- setting function s ," as "rates and service are inextricably tied together." Id. ¶ 53. The court went on to hold that "complaints concerning the ade quacy of ComEd's services fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission and fall within the rubric of 'reparation s .' " Id. ¶ 5 5

. Our supreme court h as recently reaffirmed Sheffler 's distinction between claims for civil damages and claims for reparation s subject to ICC jurisdiction

. S tate of Illinois ex rel. Pusateri v. Peoples G as Light & Coke Co. , 2014 IL 116844, ¶¶ 18

- 19 (holding that suit under False Claims Act (740 ILCS 174/1 et seq . (West 2008)) t hat utility "used fraudulent means to get the State (and others) to pay too much for natural gas" sought reparations and thus was subject to ICC 's exclusive jurisdiction). ¶ 38 Unlike the trial court, we do not believe that Sheffler 's holding mandates ICC jurisdiction

over this action. First, we note that the statutory basis of ComEd's argument for ICC jurisdic tion in this case is different than that at issue in Sheffler . I n Sheffler , the discussion of whether plaintiffs' claims were within the ICC 's jurisdiction followed the recognition that section 9

- 252 of the Public Utilities Act gives the ICC ex clusive jurisdiction over claim s of excessive rates and empowers the ICC to order a utility to "make due reparation to the complainant therefor." 220 ILCS 5/9

- 252 (West 2010). From that proposition, t he Sheffler c ourt reason ed th at customer complaints of inadequate service implicate ICC jurisdiction becau s e "rates and service are inextricably tied together." Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166 , ¶ 53 ("[I] t is essential that the Commission1

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18 consider matters relating to service s and rates of utilities , given the complex data underlying those matters.")

. ¶ 39 In this case, however, the trial court d id not find that ICC jurisdiction arose from section
9

- 252 ; likewise, the court d id not suggest that ComEd's vegetation management activ ity relates to the ICC's rate

- setting functions or that damages sought for wrongful tree removal constitute "reparations." Rather, relying on section 8

- 505.1(a) 's "sole authority" clause and Sheffler , the trial court reasoned that the ICC had jurisdiction because it found that "delivery of electrical service and vegetation management services ar e inextricably tied together." ComEd likewise asserts on appeal that its vegetation management activities are "inextricably intertwined with whether ComEd's facili ties are safe and operating properly." ¶ 40 Although we recognize Sheffler 's holding t hat claims of inadequate electrical service fall within the ICC 's jurisdiction, we do no t find that the Duricas' allegations of wrongful tree removal fall within the scope of "reparations" claims within the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, we find that the Duricas' complaint states a claim for civil damages that is properly maintained in the circuit court. See Sheffler , 2011 IL 110166, ¶ 42 ("[A] claim is for reparatio ns when the essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much *** while a claim is for civil damages when the essence of the complaint is that the utility has done something else to wrong the plaintiff.")

. ¶ 41 There is a significant difference in the nature of the claims in Sheffler from those alleged here. The allegations in Sheffler were directly related to ComEd's failure to provide adequate service to the plaintiffs, as ComEd's customers

. Yet the al legations here do not arise from the relationsh ip between ComEd as a provider of electricity and the Duricas as cu s tomers ; thus they1

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19 do not implicate the ICC's role of overseeing rates. Th at is, th e Duricas do not allege that they

were overcharge d by ComEd or that ComEd failed to provide adequate elec tric ity services. Rather, they allege that Com Ed trespassed upon their property and seek to recover civil damages in tort , not reparations for rate overcharges or inadequate service . Thus, the holding of Sheffler that the ICC has jurisdiction over compla ints seeking reparations for inadequate service does not compel exclusive ICC jurisdiction in this case. ¶ 42 T he trial court found that Sheffler applied because the "essence of the Duricas ' Complaint challenge s the adequacy of ComEd's vegetation management s ervices

. " Y et we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that ComEd's vegetation management activity , under these facts, is so "inextricably tied" to ComEd's delivery of electricity , that a property owner injured by such activity is barred from asserti ng any related claims in the circuit court. In our view, t his is an overbroad application of Sheffler . T he trial court's holding suggests that ICC jurisdiction extends to claims arising from any activity relating to ComEd's delivery of electricity

. A s a practical
matter, m ost, if not all, of ComEd's activit ies could be found to have so me relation to the overall goal of providing electricity to customers

. However, w e do not believe the legislature intended to create such a broad scope of actions within t he ICC's exclusive jurisdiction in drafting the Public Utilities Act

. To the contrary, such a broad view of the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction directly conflict s with the l egislative intent expressed in s ection 8

- 505.1's recognition of "other civil or ad ministrative remedies" (220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010)) as well as section 5

- 201, which explicitly permits actions for damages against a public utility in circuit court. 220 ILCS 5/5

- 201 (West 2010).1

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20 ¶ 43 Our pre cedent also supports circuit court jurisdiction over claims unrelated to reparations for inadequate service

. For example, in a post

- Sheffler decision, we held that a consumer lawsuit alleging that a utility engaged in improper debt collection activities had "nothing to do with the utility's infrastruct ure, adequacy of service, or rate structure" and thus the circuit court, not the
ICC , had jurisdiction

. See Thomas v. Peoples Gas Light & Co k e Co

. , 2011 IL App ( 1st ) 102868, ¶ 22 ( finding "[t] he issue raise d in [plaintiff's] claim is not committed to the Commission 's expertise," but was "committed to the jurisdiction of th e cir c uit court under section 5

- 201 of the [ Public Utilities] Act")

. In addition , the Third District of our court previously held that th e cir cuit court had jurisdiction over an inmate' s claim of fraud and negligence against a telephone service provider , notwithstanding th e defendant's assertion that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction , because the inmate sought civil damages rather than reparations

. Flournoy v. Ameritech , 351 Ill. App. 3d 583 , 585

- 86 (2004). Flournoy was in fact approvingly cited by our supreme court in Sheffler

. See Sheffler , 2 011 IL 110166, ¶ 42. Moreover, albeit in a pre

- Sheffler decisio n that did not explicitly address the issue of jurisdiction , this court found Co mEd was liable to property owners in a factually analogous case to this, seeking damages f or ComEd's removal of plaintiffs' vege tation . See Duresa v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 348 Ill. App. 3d 90 (2004). ¶ 44 Furthermore , we agree with the Duricas ' argument tha t section 8

- 505.1 of the Public Utilities Act does not suggest any legislative intent to deprive tort victims of a common law

r emedy against ComEd . We recognize that "[r]epeal or preemption of an existing common

- law remedy by implication is not favored." Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center,
Inc. , 374 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634 (2007). "A legislative intent to abrogate the common law must be1

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21 clearly and plainly expressed , and such an intent will not be presumed from ambiguous or doubtful language ." Maksimovic v. Tsogalis , 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997). "Illinois courts have limited all manner of statutes in derogation of the common law to their express language, in order to effect the least

– rather than the most

– change in the common law." Adam s v. Northern Illinois Gas Co

. , 211 Ill. 2d 32, 69 (2004). Thus, although s ection 8

- 505.1(a) states that the ICC has "sole authority" to hear complaints for violation of that portion of the Public Utilities Act, we will not presume that the legislature ad ditionally intended to repeal or preempt property owners' rights to assert independent tort claims arising from the same conduct, or to preclude the common law remedy of monetary damages which would otherwise be available . This conclusion is al l the more apparent in view of s ection 8

- 505.1 's statement that it does not "diminish or replace other civil or administrative remedies" (220 ILCS 5/8

- 505.1 (West 2010)), as well as s ection 5

- 201 's recognition that damages may be sought against public utilities in ci rcuit court (220 ILCS 5/5

- 201 (West 2010)). ¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismiss ing the Duricas ' complaint pursuant to section 2

- 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure and remand the case for further pr oceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 46 Reversed and remanded

.