SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1466-15T1

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

COMPANY, as Trustee for Morgan 

Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 

2006-HE4,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ATHENA KARAYANIS and WACHOVIA

BANK, N.A.,

Defendants,

and

NICHOLAS KARAYANIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

Submitted September 11, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Ostrer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, General Equity, Bergen 

County, Docket No. F-028792-09.

Nicholas Karayanis, appellant pro se.

Reed Smith LLP, attorneys for respondent 

(Henry F. Reichner, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

September 18, 2017
2 A-1466-15T1

This is an appeal from the Chancery Division's December 2, 

2015 order denying appellant's motion for relief from a Final 

Judgement of Foreclosure issued on October 1, 2010 and an Amended 

Final Judgment dated November 10, 2014. We affirm.

In February 2006, Nicholas and Athena Karayanis ("the 

borrowers") borrowed $428,000 from Dana Capital Group, Inc. ("Dana 

Capital") as part of a residential purchase. To secure the loan, 

the borrowers executed a mortgage for that same amount which named 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the 

nominee for Dana Capital. The mortgage was recorded on March 10, 

2006. 

On June 1, 2009, the mortgage was assigned to plaintiff, 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. That assignment was recorded 

on July 15, 2009. 

The borrowers defaulted on their mortgage in January 2009, 

and failed to make any payments thereafter. As a result, plaintiff 

initiated foreclosure proceedings in June 2009, notice of which 

was served on the borrowers.

Despite that notice, the borrowers failed to file any 

responsive pleading and remained in default on the mortgage loan. 

The trial court accordingly entered default judgment against the 

borrowers. The borrowers participated in foreclosure mediation, 
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which was unsuccessful. A final judgment was entered in 

plaintiff's favor on October 1, 2010. 

Thereafter, plaintiff served on the borrowers a supplemental 

notice of its intent to foreclose in August 2012. At plaintiff's 

request, the judgment was amended on November 10, 2014. 

The borrowers moved to vacate the final judgment in December 

2015, over three years after they had first received notice of the 

intent to foreclose. The trial court denied that motion as 

"without merit." 

The borrowers moved for leave to file an emergent appeal with 

this court, an application which we denied on January 5, 2016. 

Meanwhile, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. The 

borrowers moved to vacate the sale, but the trial court denied 

that motion as well. 

The present appeal by Nicholas Karayanis, the co-borrower, 

ensued. Appellant seeks to reverse the trial court's denial of 

the motion to vacate the judgment. He apparently wishes to rescind 

the sheriff's sale and somehow reclaim the foreclosed property.

In his brief, appellant essentially argues two core points. 

First, he contends the trial court erred in denying his postjudgment motion under Rule 4:50-1 because there was "excusable 

neglect" for his delay in taking action, stemming from the alleged 

inattentiveness of the attorney he had previously retained to 
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represent his interests in this matter. Second, appellant 

maintains he had meritorious defenses to the complaint because, 

among other things, plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose on the 

mortgage, and because plaintiff violated consumer protection laws 

in its interactions with him and the co-borrower. 

Our scope of review of the trial court's ruling on the Rule

4:50-1 motion is exceedingly narrow. As the Supreme Court has 

observed in a foreclosure context, a trial court's decision under 

Rule 4:50-1 "warrants substantial deference, and should not be 

reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. 

Bank Nat'l Assn. v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, where, as here, a litigant delays more than one 

year after the entry of a judgment in moving to set it aside, the 

available grounds for relief under Rule 4:50-1 are more restrictive 

and do not include claims of "excusable neglect" under subsection 

(a) of that provision. See R. 4:50-2 (expressing the one-year 

limitation for motions filed under subsections (a), (b) and (c) 

of Rule 4:50-1); Orner v. Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. 

Div.) (recognizing this prescribed "outermost time limit"), 

certif. denied, 208 N.J. 369 (2011).
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Applying these standards to the record presented, we readily 

affirm the Chancery Division's denial of the motions to set aside 

the final judgment. 

Even if it was not too late for appellant to assert a claim 

of excusable neglect, his former attorney's alleged 

inattentiveness provides him with no recourse against plaintiff. 

See Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 394 (1984) (holding that 

"mere carelessness or lack of proper diligence on the part of an 

attorney is ordinarily not sufficient to entitle his clients to 

relief from an adverse judgment") (quoting In re T., 95 N.J. Super.

228, 235 (App. Div. 1967)). 

We also agree with the trial court that appellant has failed 

to put forth meritorious defenses that could justify unraveling 

this final judgment years after its entry. Plaintiff's standing 

to bring this foreclosure complaint is clearly supported by the 

July 2009 recorded assignment of the mortgage. Deutsche Bank 

Trust Co. Americas v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 

2012) (observing that either possession of the note or an 

assignment of the mortgage predating the foreclosure complaint 

confers standing). 

There is no viable claim of consumer fraud presented, despite 

appellant's undocumented contention that an unnamed loan servicing 

agent allegedly told him that if he were in arrears he would be 
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provided with financial assistance. The unrefuted key fact is 

that the borrowers made no payments on this mortgage for over 

seven years. They were not legally entitled to a loan modification 

by the mortgagee, despite their unfortunate financial distress. 

See Nat'l Cmty. Bank of N.J. v. G.L.T. Indus., Inc., 276 N.J. 

Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1994). 

To the extent that we have not already discussed them, 

appellant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

comment here. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.