HAROLD L. Eil3DE 

DNA 6321F 

OPERATIONS 

FLINTLOCK AND LATCHKEY 

EVENTS 

RED HOT, PIN STRIPE, DISCUS 

THROWER, PILE DRIVER, DOUBLE 

PLAY, NEWPOINT, MIDI MIST 

5 MARCH 1966-26 JUNE 1967 

United States Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 

Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

Prepared by Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agenv -.-~ 

‘DMLW 

as35 
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4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 

DNA 6321F 

6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZAT’ION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION 

(If app/icable) 

Engineering Co, Inc. Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Reynolds Electrical and 

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS (City, State. and ZIP Code) 

P.O.Box 14400 I FCLS (Mai J.A. Stinson) 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 Kirtland-AFB, NM 871 lj 

Ea. NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUF __ 

ORGANIZATION [/f applicable~ 

EC. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIPCode) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS 

PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT 

ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO 

11 TITLE (Include Security Cfassrftcation) 

OPERATIONS FLINTLOCK AND LATCHKEY EVENTS RED HOT, PIN STRIPE, DISCUS THROWER, PILE DRIVER, 

DOUBLE PLAY, NEW POINT, MIDI MIST 5 Mar 1966 - 26 Jun 1967 

12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S Karen K. Horton Bernard F. Eubank 

Wil 1 iam J. Brady 

13a TYPE OF REPORT I3b TIME COVERED 15 PAGE COUNT 

Technical Report FROM~ Mar 66 ~026 Jun 6 

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 

17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse rf necessary and rdentrfy by block number) 

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Underground Nuclear Test Personnel Review(UNTPR) 

18 Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency(FCDNA)

6 1: Defense Nuclear Agency(DNA) 

19 ABSTRACT (Contmue on reverse If necessary dfld Identify by block number) 

This report is a personnel-oriented history of DOD participation in underground nuclear 

weapons testing during Operations FLINTLOCK and LATCHKEY, test events RED HOT, PIN STRIPE, 

DISCUS THROWER, PILE DRIVER, DOUBLE PLAY, NEW POINT,and MIDI MIST, from 5 March 1966 to 

26 June 1967. It is the second in a series of historical reports which will include all 

DOD underground nuclear weapons tests and all DOE underground nuclear weapons tests with 

signif icant DOD participation from 1962 forward. In addition to these historical volumes, 

a later restricted distribution volume will identify all DOD participants (military, 

civi 1 ian, and civilian contractors) and will list their radiation dosimetry data. 

20 DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

n UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED @ SAME AS RPT. 0 DTIC USERS UNCLASS I FI ED 

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE [hchde AreJ Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL 

Maior Joe A. Stihson (50s) 844-9186 FCDNA, ATTN: FCLS 

DD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edItIon mdy be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

All other edItIons dre obsolete. 

UNCLASS I FI ED 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continued) 

Nevada Test Site 

Underground Test 

DISCUS THROWER 

PILE DRIVER 

(NTS) 

(UGT) 

DOUBLE PLAY 

PIN STRIPE 

FLINTLOCK 

NEW POINT 

MIDI MIST 

LATCHKEY 

RED HOT 

UNCLASSIFIED 
SUMMARY 

Seven Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground test 

events were conducted from 5 March 1966 to 26 June 1967 to study 

weapons effects. Three were shaft-type and four were tunnel-type 

nuclear tests. The following table summarizes data on these 

events: 

-- _ 

OPERATION FLINTLOCK r LATCHKEY 

7-

df 

TEST EVENT Q 

DATE 6h4ARBB ?5 APR 88 7 MAY 84 2 JUN 66 I5 JUN SB 3 DEC StI P‘6 JUN 61 

LOCAL TIME (hours) 101.5 PST 1135 PDT 300 PDT OS30 PDl IO00 PDl 13oa PST I3000 PD1 

NTS A,)IEA 16 AREA II AREA I2 LOCATION AREA I2 AREA II AREA S AREA I6 

TYPE TUNNEL SHAFT SHAFT TUNNEL 5UNNEL SHAFT TUNNEL

DEPTH 1.330 B70 1,105 l.(ilS 1.076 826 1.230 (feet) 

YIELD (kilotons) Low* low* 22 82 Low* Low* Low* 

-

t 

INDICATES LESS THAN 22 KILOTONS 

1 
Releases of radioactivity to the atmosphere were detected 

both onsite and offsite after RED HOT (tunnel-type), PIN STF!IPE 

(shaft-type), DOUBLE PLAY (tunnel-type), and MIDI MIST (tunneltype). Releases of radioactivity were detected only within the 

confines of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) after the PILE DRIVER 

(tunnel-type) event. No release of radioactivity was detected 

onsite or offsite after the DISCUS THROWER (shaft-type) and NEW 

POINT (shaft-type) test events. 

As recorded on Area Access Registers, 15,443 individual entries to radiation exclusion areas were made after the above DOD 

test events. Of this number 1,259 were by DOD-affiliated personnel (including military personnel, DOD civil servants, and DOD 

contractor personnel). The remainder were United States Atomic 

Energy Commission (AEC), other government agency, and contractor 

personnel. 

The average gamma radiation exposure per entry for all personnel was 33 mR. The average gamma radiation exposure per entry 

for DOD-affiliated personnel was 83 mR. The maximum exposure of a 

non-DOD individual during an entry was 1,955 mR. The maximum exposure of a DOD-affiliated individual was 1,855 mR. These exposures occurred on 15 December 1966 during reentry and recovery 

operations after the NEW POINT event. 

2 
PREFACE 

The Un.ited States Government conducted 194 nut lear device 

tests from 1945 through 1958 during atmospheric test series at 

sites in the United States and in the Atlantic and Pacific 

Oceans. The United States Army Manhattan Engineer District implemented the testing program in 1945, and its successor agency, 

the AEC, administered the program from 1947 until testing was 

suspended by the United States on 1 November 1958. 

Of the 194 nuclear device tests conducted, 161 were for 

weapons development or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted 

from December 1954 to February 1956 in Nevada. These experiments 

were physics studies using small quantities of fissionable material and.conventional explosives. 

President Eisenhower had proposed that test ban negotiations 

begin on 31 October 1958, and had pledged a one-year moratorium 

on United States testing to commence after the negotiations 

began. The Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests 

began at Geneva on 31 October 1958; the U.S. moratorium began on 

1 November, and the AEC detected the final Soviet nuclear test of 

their fall series on 3 November 1958. Negotiations continued until May 1960 without final agreement. No nuclear tests were conducted by either nation until 1 September 1961 when the Soviet 

Union resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The United 

States began a series of underground tests in Nevada on 15 

September 1961, and U.S. atmospheric tests were resumed on 25 

April 1962 in the Pacific. 

The United States conducted several atmospheric tests in 

3 
Nevada during July 1962, and the last United States atmospheric 

nuclear test was in the Pacific on 4 November 1962. The Limited 

Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in 

outer space, and underwater was signed in Moscow on 5 August 

1963. From resumption of United States atmospheric testing on 25 

April 1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 

weapons development and weapons effects tests were conducted as 

part of the Pacific and Nevada atmospheric test operations. The 

underground tests, resumed on 15 September 1961, have continlled 

on a year-round basis through the present time. 

In 1977, 1.5 years after atmospheric testing stopped, the 

Center for Disease Control (CDC)* noted a possible leukemia 

cluster within the group of soldiers who were present at the 

SMOKY test event, one of the Nevada tests in the 1957 PLUMB130B 

test series. After that CDC report, the Veterans Administration 

(VA) received a number of claims for medical benefits filed by 

former military personnel who believed their health may have been 

affected by their participation in the nuclear weapons testing 

program. 

In late 1977, the DOD began a study to provide data for both 

the CDC and the VA on radiation exposures of DOD military ,lnd 

civilian participants in atmospheric testing. That study has 

progressed to the point where a number of volumes describing DOD 

participation in atmospheric tests have been published by the 

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) as the executive agency for the DOD. 

On 20 June 1979, the United States Senate Committee on 

Veterans' Affairs began hearings on Veterans' Claims for Dis-

*The Center for Disease Control was part of the U.S. Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services). It was renamed The Centers for Disease Control on 1 October 1980. 

4 
abilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing. In addition to requesting and receiving information on DOD personnel participation and 

radiation exposures during atmospheric testing, the Chairman of 

the Senate Committee expressed concern reqarding exposures of DOD 

participants in DOD-sponsored and Department of Energy (DOE)* 

underground test events. 

The Chairman requested and received information in an 

exchange of letters through 15 October 1979 regarding research on 

underground testing radiation exposures. In early 1980, the DNA 

initiated a program to acquire and consolidate underground testing radiation exposure data in a set of published volumes similar 

to the program underway on atmospheric testing data. This volume 

is the second of several volumes regarding the participation and 

radiation exposures of DOD military and civilian personnel in underground nuclear test events. 

SERIES OF VOLUMES 

Each volume of this series will discuss DOD-sponsored underground test events, in chronological order, after presenting introductory and general information. The volumes will cover all 

underground test events identified as DOD-sponsored in Announced 

United States Nuclear Tests, published each year by the DOE 

Nevada Operations Office, Office of Public Affairs, except events 

conducted as nuclear test detection experiments where reentries 

and, subsequently, exposure of participants to radiation did not 

occur. 

*The U.S. Department of Energy succeeded the U.S. Energy Research 

and Development Administration (ERDA) in October 1977. ERDA had 

succeeded the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on 19 January 1975. 

5 
An additional volume will discuss general participation of 

DOD personnel in DOE-sponsored underground test events, with 

specific information on those events which released radioactive 

effluent to the atmosphere and where exposures of DOD personnel 

were involved. 

A separate volume will be a census of DOD personnel and 

their radiation exposure data. Distribution of this volume will 

necessarily be limited by provisions of the Privacy Act. 

METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THE VOLUMES 

Information for these volumes was obtained from several 

locations. Security-classified documents were researched at 

Headquarters, DNA, Washington, DC. Additional documents were 

researched at Field Command, DNA, the Air Force Weapons Labcratory Technical Library, and Sandia National Laboratories in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Most of the radiation measurement data 

were obtained at the DOE, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), and 

its support contractor, the Reynolds Electrical & Engineering 

Company, Inc. (REECO), in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Unclassified records were used to document underground testing activities when possible, but, when necessary, unclassified 

information was extracted from security-classified documents. 

Both unclassified and classified documents are cited in the List 

of References at the end of each volume. Locations of the reference documents also are shown. Copies of most of the unclassified references have been entered in the records of the Coordination and Information Center (CIC), a DOE facility located in Las 

Vegas, Nevada. 

Radiation measurements, exposure data, event data, and offsite reports generally are maintained as hard copy or microfilm 

6 
at the REECo facilities adjacent to the CIC, or as original hard 

copy at the Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel, 

California. A master file of all available personnel exposure 

data for nuclear testing programs on the continent and in the 

Pacific from 1945 to the present also is maintained by REECo for 

DOD and DOE. 

ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 

A Summary of this test event volume appears before this 

Preface and includes general objectives of the test events, 

characteristics of each test event, and data regarding DOD 

participants and their radiation exposures. 

An Introduction following this Preface discusses reasons for 

conducting nuclear test events underground, the testing organization, the NTS, and locations of NTS underground testing areas. 

A chapter entitled Underground Testing Procedures explains 

the basic mechanics of underground testing, purposes of effects 

experiments, containment features and early containment problems, 

tunnel and shaft area access requirements, industrial safety and 

radiological safety procedures, telemetered radiation exposure 

rate measurements, and air support for underground tests. 

A chapter on each test event covered by the volume follows 

in chronological order. Each test event chapter contains an 

event summary, a discussion of preparations and event operations, 

an explanation of safety procedures implemented, and listings of 

monitoring, sampling, and exposure results. 

Following the event chapters are a Reference List and appendices to the text including a Glossary of Terms and a list of Abbreviations and Acronyms. 

7 
-- 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

SUMMARY ......................... 

PREFACE ......................... 

Series of Volumes .................. 

Methods and Sources Used to Prepare the Volumes ... 

Organization of this Volume ............. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................... 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................. 

LIST OF TABLES ..................... 

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ............... 19 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .............. 19 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES ......... 20 

1.3 TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME ........... 21 

1.4 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES . . 22 

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency .............. 22 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization ...... 24 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support . 26 

1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND 

CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS ............ 29 

1.5.1 Weapons Test Division (STWT, DASA) and 

the Nevada Operations Office (AEC/NVOO) . 29 

1.5.2 Test Organizations ............ 30 

1.5.3 Support Contractors ........... 33 

1.6 THE NEVADA TEST SITE .............. 34 

CHAPTER TWO - UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES ...... 39 

2.1 EMPLACEMENT TYPES ................ 39 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type ................ 39 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type ............... 41 

2.2 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES .............. 41 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements .......... 44 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements ........ 44 

2.2.3 Line-of-Site (LOS) Pipes ......... 45 

2.3 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS ............... 45 

a 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.4 CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PROBLEMS ........ 46 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment ............ 47 

2.4.2 Tunnel Containment ............ 48

2.5 TUNNEL AMD DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS . . 50 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control .......... 51

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control ....... 52 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ........ 53 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES ......... 55 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Mevada Test 

Site Organization - Standard Operating 

Procedure, Chapter 0524, 

Radiological Safety . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the 

Radiological Safety Department, REECo, 

dated January 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

2.7.3 REECo Radiological Sciences Department 

Information Bulletins . . . . . . . . . . 56 

2.7.4 Detailed procedures as outlined in REECo 

Radiological Sciences Department Branch 

Operating Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

2.7.5 Implementation of radiological procedures: 

required equipment, devices and capabilities 

for monitoring radiation levels in the 

environment: and monitoring external and 

internal exposures of personnel . . . . . 56 

A. Portable Radiation Detection 

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

R. Air Sampling Equipment . . . . . . . . 57 

c. . Laboratory Analysis Capability . . . . 57 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures . . 58 

2.7.6 Additional methods used for control 

of radex areas . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 60 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS . . 62 

9 
-- 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

2.8.1 Evaluation and Development of Telemetry 

Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 

A. Remote Area Monitoring Station (RAMS). 6 3 

B. Radio-Link Telemetry . . . . . . . . . 6 3 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring 

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . , . , . , IS7 

2.9.1 Changes In Air Support Requirements . . . 6 7

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFB . . 1;8 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters . . . . . (59 

CHAPTER THREE - RED HOT EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘74 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 74 

3.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 74 

3.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 76 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 76 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 78 

C. Security Coverage ...... .L. .. 78 

D. Air Support ............. 81 

3.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 82 

3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 83 

3.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Monitoring ...... 85 

3.3.2 Surface Reentry Activities ........ 87 

3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES ....... : ...... 91 

3.4.1 PHS Ground Monitoring Support ...... 91 

3.4.2 Tunnel Reentry .............. 92 

3.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 93 

3.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities ...... 93 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 94 

CHAPTER FOUR - PIN STRIPE EVENT ............. 96 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 96 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 96 

4.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 96 

10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 97 

A. Construction and Experiment 

Readiness .............. 97 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 100 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 101 

D. Security Coverage .......... 102 

E. Air Support ............. 102 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 103 

4.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 103 

4.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Sampling, and Offsite 

Monitoring ................ 105 

4.3.2 Radiation Surveys and Reentry 

Activities ................ 111 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 114 

4.4.1 Subsidence Crater Reentry ........ 114 

4-4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 116 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 116 

4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 117 

CHAPTER FIVE - DISCUS THROWER EVENT ........... 118 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 118 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 118 

5.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 118 

5.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 119 

A. Construction and Test Readiness ... 119 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 119 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 120 

D. Security Coverage .......... 121 

E. Air Support ............. 122 

5.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 122 

5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES .............. 123 

5.3.1 Radiation Surveys and Reentry 

Activities ................ 124 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 124 

11 
-- 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

5.4.1 Postevent Drilling ............ 124 

5.4.2 Industrial Safety ............ 12.5 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 126 

CHAPTER SIX - PILE DRIVER EVENT ............. 12 7 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY .................. 127 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 131 

6.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 131 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 131 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 131 

R. Telemetry Support .......... 132 

C. Security Coverage .......... 134 

D. Air Support ............. 134 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 134 

6.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 135 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring ........... 135 

6.3.2 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry 

Activities ................ 136 

6.3.3 Surface Experiment Recoveries ...... 137 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 137 

6.4.1 Radiation Area Requirements ....... 137 

6.4.2 Shaft Reentry Activities ......... 137 

6.4.3 Tunnel Reentry Mining and Experiment 

Recovery Activities ........... 138 

6.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities ...... 139 

6.4.5 Industrial Safety ............ 140 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 140 

CHAPTER SEVEN - DOUBLE PLAY EVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

7.2.1 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . 144 

A. Radiological Safety Support . . . . . 144 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 145 

12 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

C. Security Coverage .......... 145 

D. Air Support ............. 145 

7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 148 

7.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 148 

7.3.1 Effluent Releases ............ 150 

7.3.2 Test Area Monitoring ........... 151 

7.3.3 Data Recovery .............. 154 

7.3.4 Aerial Radiation Surveys ......... 154 

A. EG&G/NATS Mission .......... 154 

B. PHS Missions ............. 155 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 157 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery . . 157 

7.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 161 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 161 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 162 

CHAPTER EIGHT - NEW POINT EVENT ............. 164 

8.1 EVENT StJMMARY .................. 164 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 164 

8.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 164 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 166 

A. Construction and Experiment 

Readiness .............. 166 

B. Radiological Safety Support ..... 171 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 172 

D. Security Coverage .......... 173 

F.. Air Support ............. 173 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 174 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 175 

8.3.1 Surface Reentry and Recovery Activities . 177 

a.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 179 

8.4.1 Experiment Recovery ........... 179 

8.4.2 Postevent Drilling ............ 180 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety ............ 180 

13 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 180 

CHAPTER NINE - MIDI MIST EVENT ............. 183 

9.1 EVENT SIJMMARY .................. 183 

9.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES ............... 183 

9.2.1 Responsibilities ............. 183 

9.2.2 Planning and Preparations ........ 185 

A. Radiological Safety Support ..... 185 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support . . 187 

C. Security Coverage .......... 189 

D. Air Support ............. 190 

9.2.3 Late Preevent Activities ......... 191 

9.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES ....... 191 

9.3.1 Surface Reentry Activities ........ 192 

9.3.2 Experiment Recovery ........... 193 

9.3.3 Initial Tunnel Reentry ......... 194 

9.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES .............. 194 

9.4.1 Tunnel Reentry .............. 194 

9.4.2 Postevent Mining and Experiment Recovery . 195 

9.4.3 Postevent Drilling ............ 196 

9.4.4 Industrial Safety ............ 196 

9.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 197 

REFERENCE LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 

APPENDICES 

A. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 

B. Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . 231 

C. General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department 

of Defense and Sandia Laboratory Nuclear Tests . 235 

D. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Standard Operating 

Procedure Chapter 0524 - Radiological Safety . . 249 

14 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FIGURE 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4 

2.5 

2.6 

2.7 

2.8 

2.9 

3.1 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

7.1 

8.1 

Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests .................... 

Nevada Test Site Organization ........... 

Continental Test Organization ........... 

Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada ..... 

The Nevada Test Site ............... 

A Typical Subsidence Crater and Postevent Drilling 

Operation ..................... 

Portal of Typical DOD Tunnel Complex ....... 

NTS Combination Personnel Dosimeter and 

Security Credential Holder ............ 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site ...... 

Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Tunnel-Type Emplacement Site ...... 

Typical Permanently Established Remote Radiation 

Detector Stations Operated Continuously throughout 

theNTS ...................... 

Air Force Personnel Decontaminating a R-57 Cloud 

Sampling Aircraft ................. 

Air Force and Radsafe Personnel Monitoring a B-57 

after Decontamination ............... 

Radsafe Monitor Measuring Exposure Rate on a B-57 

Aircraft ..................... 

RED HOT EVENT ................... 

PIN STRIPE Test Configuration ........... 

End View of Cloud at 1220 Hours - Looking North . . 

Crater Entry, Ullh, 11 May 1966 .......... 

PILE DRIVER Underground Tunnel Complex ...... 

Vertical Section of PILE DRIVER Complex ...... 

PILE DRIVER EVENT - Tunnel Layout ......... 

U16a Tunnel Complex ................ 

NEW POINT Test Configuration ........... 

PAGE 

23 

25 

27 

35 

37 

42 

43 

59 

64 

65 

66 

70 

71 

72 

75 

98 

107 

115 

128 

129 

130 

143 

165 

15 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded) 

FIGURE PAGE 

8.2 NEW POINT Area Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 

9.1 MIDI MIST Event U12n.02 in U12n and 

Extension Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 

16 
LIST OF TABLES 

___-

TABLE PAGE

2.1 DOD Test Events 5 March 1966 through 26 June 1967 . 40 

3 . 1 RED HOT EVENT - Telemetry Array Underground . . . . 79 

3.2 RED HOT EVENT - Telemetry Array Aboveground . . . . 80 

3.3 RED HOT EVENT - Initial Radiation Survey Data . . . 89 

4.1 PIN STRIPE EVENT - Initial Radiation Survey Data . 112 

4.2 PIN STRIPE EVENT - Radiation Survey Data . . . . . 113 

7.1 DOUBLE PLAY EVENT - RAMS Unit Locations . . . . . . 146 

7.2 DOUBLE PLAY EVENT - Air Sampling Array . . . . . . 147 

7.3 DOUBLE PLAY EVENT - Initial Radiation Survey Data . 153 

9.1 NEW POINT EVENT - Initial Radiation Survey Data . . 178 

17 
18 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The first United States nuclear detonation designed to he 

fully contained underground was the RAINIER tunnel event conducted in Nevada on 19 September 1957. This was a weapons related 

experiment with a relatively low yield of 1.7 kilotons (kt). The 

second tunnel event was a safety experiment on 22 February 1958 

also conducted in Nevada. This experiment, the VENUS event, resulted in a yield less than one ton. These two tests were the 

beginning of a United States underground program that is currently the only method of testing permitted by treaty. 

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

While technical conferences between the United States and 

the Soviet Union on banning nuclear detonation tests continued, 

and concern regarding further increases in worldwide fallout 

mounted, a number of nuclear tests were conducted underground 

during 1958 in Nevada. Prior to the United States testing moratorium, six safety experiments in shafts, five safety experiments 

in tunnels, and four weapons development tests in tunnels were 

conducted. 

However, radioactive products from several of these tests 

were not completely contained underground. Containment of nuclear detonations was a new engineering challenge. Fully understanding and solving containment problems would require years of 

underground testing experience. 

When the IJnited States resumed testing 1.S September 1961, 32 

of the first 33 test events were underground and the other was a 

19 
cratering experiment with the device emplaced 110 feet below the 

surface. The DOMINIC I test series in the Pacific and the DOMINIC 

II test series in Nevada during 1962 were the last atmospheric 

nuclear detonation tests by the United States. 

The commitment of the United States to reduce levels of 

worldwide fallout by refraining from conducting nuclear tests in 

the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater was finalized when 

the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 

5 August 1963. 

1.2 UNDERGROUND TESTING OBJECTIVES 

The majority of United States underground tests have been 

for weapons development purposes. New designs were tested to 

improve efficiency and deliverability characteristics of nuclear 

explosive devices before they entered the military stockpile as 

components of nuclear weapons. 

Safety experiments with nuclear devices were conducted in 

addition to weapons development tests. These experiments tested 

nuclear devices by simulating detonation of the conventional high 

explosives in a manner which might occur in an accident during 

transportation or storage of weapons. 

Weapons effects tests utilized device types equivalent to 

weapons, or actually to be used in weapons, to determine the 

effects of weapon detonations on structures, materials, and 

equipment. The devices generally were provided by one of the 

weapons development laboratories. However, the DOD sponsored 

weapons effects tests, and such tests usually involved greater 

numbers of participants and were more complex than the other 

categories of tests previously mentioned. 

20 
Effects of shock waves on rock formations, buildings, other 

structures, materials, and equipment have been tested. Effects 

of other detonation characteristics such as heat and radiation 

have been studied in the same manner. The most complex weapons 

effects tests have been those simulating high altitude detonations by using very large evacuated pipes hundreds of feet in 

length and containing experiments. 

1.3 TEST EVENTS IN THIS VOLUME 

Weapons effects tests conducted from 5 March 1966 to 26 ,June 

1967 during Operation FLINTLOCK and Operation LATCHKEY are discussed in this volume. Test events and objectives are listed 

below. 

1. RED HOT, 5 March 1966, to study ground shock. 

2. PIN STRIPE, 25 April 1966, to study the effects of a 

nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. 

3. DISCUS THROWER, 27 May 1966, to study ground shock 

transmission and characteristics in a specific type of 

geologic structure. 

4. PILE DRIVER, 2 June 1966, to study nuclear detonation 

effects on underground structures. 

5. DOUBLE PLAY, 15 June 1966, to investigate the effects of 

a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. 

6. NEW POINT, 13 December 1966, to determine the effects of 

a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. 

21 
7. MIDI MIST, 26 June 1967, to investigate the effects of a 

nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. 

1.4 DOD TESTING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIRILITIES 

Administering the underground nuclear testing program at NTS 

was a joint AEC-DOD responsibility. The parallel nature of the 

AEC-DOD organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the Defense Atomic Support Agency 

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was activated on 1 January 1947 (when the Atomic Energy Commission was 

activated) to assume residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer 

District. The DOD nuclear weapons testing organization was within AFSWP until 1959 when AFSWP became the Defense Atomic Support 

Agency (DASA)*. The responsibilities of Headquarters, DASA, in 

Washington DC, included providing consolidated management and 

direction for the DOD nuclear weapons effects and nuclear weapons 

testing program. The technical direction and coordination of DOD 

nuclear weapons testing activities was delegated to Field Command, DASA (FCDASA) until 1 August 1966 and then to Test Command, 

DASA (TCDASA), headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

The responsibilities of FCDASA and TCDASA in 1966 and 1967 

regarding DOD nuclear weapons testing activities were: 

1. exercising technical direction of nuclear weapons effects tests of primary concern to the Armed Forces, and 

weapons effects phases of developmental or other tests 

of nuclear weapons involving detonations within the continental United States and overseas; 

*DASA became the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) on 1 July 1971. 

22 
-------- 

PRESIDENT 

I t 

MILITARY 

LIAISON 

AEC COMMITTEE ~---m---B 

COMMISSIONERS 

JOINT 

CHIEFS 

OF 

STAFF 

I . . 

DIRECTOR 

DIVISION OF CHIEF, 

MILUARY DASA 

APPLICATION -1-i COMMANDER 

HELD COMMAND.

MANAGER, 

NEVADA --------- (UNTIL WUG.i966) 

OPERATIONS COMMANDER, OFFICE IEST COMMAND, 

AEC 

TEST MANAGER 

(MANAGER, 

NVOO) 

COMMAND 

_ _ _ LIAISON AND COORDINATION 

Figure 1.1 Federal Government Structure for Continental 

Nuclear Tests (During 1966) 

23 
2. coordinating and supporting all DOD activities and assisting in the support of the AEC in the conduct of 

joint tests involving nuclear detonations within the 

continental United States: 

3. completing detailed plans, preparing for and conducting 

technical programs, and assisting in the preparation of 

technical and operational reports on tests; and 

4. coordinating military operational training, and the DOD 

aspects of official visitor and public information programs. (The official visitor and public information 

programs were integrated with the AEC organization during joint AK-DOD continental tests). 

These missions were accomplished for DOD underground nuclear 

tests through the Test Command Weapons Effects and Tests Group 

(TCWT), its predecessor, FCWT, and its Continental Test Organization (CTO). 

The FCWT (and later TCWT) testing organization included Task 

Unit 8.1.3 for Pacific operations; administrative operations at 

Sandia Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico; and operations at the 

Nevada Test Site. The CT0 conducted DOD underground nuclear tests 

in conjunction with the AEC weapons development laboratory test 

groups. 

1.4.2 Nevada Test Site Organization 

In the joint AEC-DOD testing program, FCWT (later TCWT) and 

CT0 were a part of the Nevada Test Site Organization (NTSO) as 

shown in Figure 1.2. The Military Deputy to the Test Manager was 

the Deputy Chief of Staff, TCWT, and TCWT personnel provided DOD 

coordination and support. 

24 
----- 

TEST MANAGER 

, 1 DEPUTY TEST MANAGER 

MILITARY DEPUTY 

I’ 

I 

r 

CONTRACTOR COORDINATOR FOR 

REPRESENTATIVES BASE SUPPORT 

I 

LOS ALAMOS LAWRENCE 

SCIENTIFIC RADIATION 

LABORATORY I LABORATORY

COMMAND 

_ _ _ LIAISON AND COORDINATION 

Figure 1.2 Nevada Test Site Organization (In 1966) 

25 
The CT0 was a Test Group along with the J,os Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL), 

Sandia Corporation (SC), and the Civil Effects Test Organization 

(CETO). The CT0 is shown in Figure 1.3. In addition to his position as Military Deputy to the Test Manager, the Deputy Chief of 

Staff, TCWT, was also the CT0 Test Group Director. 

The Programs Division was responsible for scientific programs conducted by the CTO. Engineering and construction of test 

facilities and experiment installations were administered by the 

Support Division. The Operations Division was responsible for 

preparing technical and operations plans, and coordinating air 

support operations with the Air Force Special Weapons Center 

(AFSWC), the Tactical Air Command, and the AEC. 

1.4.3 Air Force Special Weapons Center Support 

The commander of AFSWC was requested by TCDASA to provide 

air support to the NTSO during nuclear tests at NTS. Direct support was provided by the Nuclear Test Directorate, the Special 

Projects Division, and the 4900th Air Base Group of AFSWC. The 

4900th Air Base Group provided C-47 aircraft for shuttle service 

between Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and Indian Springs AFB (ISAFB). 

The 4900th also provided U-3A aircraft and crews to perform lowaltitude cloud tracking, and C-47 aircraft and crews for radio 

relay and courier missions. 

Other Air Force organizations providing support to the NTSO 

under AFSWC control on a temporary basis were as follows: 

1. Elements of the 1211th Test Squadron (Sampling), Military Air Transport Service, McClellan AFB, were detached 

to ISAFB. Their primary task was cloud sampling. This 

included maintaining the B-57 sampling aircraft, conducting cloud sampling, removing the sample filters, and 

26 
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

WEAPONS EFFECTS TESTS 

ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, 

WEAPONS EFFECT TESTS 

J 

TECHNICAL 

MEDICAL INFORMATION CHAPLAJN PHOTOGRAPHY

SECTION BRANCH 

I 

IC

I I 1 

IO I 

I II--l 

PROGRAM 3 PROGRAM 4 PROGRAM 

I I I PRoGRAM8 I I I , 

Figure 1.3 Continental Test Organization (In 1966) 

7 
packaging and loading the samples onto courier aircraft. 

Personnel from this unit also assisted NTSO radiological 

safety personne-1 in providing support at ISAFB, including decontamination of aircraft, crews, and equipment. 

2. Elements of the 4520th Combat Crew Training Wing, Tactical Air Command, Nellis AFB, provided support functions, 

such as housing, food, and logistics, to the units operating from ISAFB and Nellis AFB. In addition, they conducted security sweep flights over NTS, and control tower operations, fire-fighting, and crash rescue services 

at ISAFB. They also maintained and provided equipment 

for the helicopter pad at the NTS Control Point and 

other helicopter pads at Forward Control Points. 

3. The 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Military Air 

Transport Service, McClellan AFB, supplied one aircraft 

and a crew to perform high-altitude cloud tracking. 

4. The Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems 

Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, provided aircraft and 

crews to perform technical projects. 

Complete Air Force support as described in this section was 

available for the DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, discussed in 

Chapter 4 of the Eirst volume of this series and during the last 

atmospheric nuclear weapons tests at NTS in July 1962. As the 

DOD underground testing program continued, and the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased, less 

cloud sampling and tracking support was required. However, air 

support for security sweeps of areas surrounding test locations 

and for photography missions during events was a continuing 

requirement. 

28 
1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOD, THE AEC, AND CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS 

The DOD was responsible for establishing nuclear weapons 

criteria, developing and producing delivery vehicles, obtaining 

military effects data, and defense against nuclear attack. 

The AEC was responsible for development, production, and 

supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in quantities and 

types specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The AEC, in 

association with the DOD, also was responsible for providing 

field nuclear test facilities in the continental United States 

and overseas. 

1.5.1 Weapons Test Division (STWT, DASA) and the Nevada Operations Office (AEC/NVOO) 

The principal points of Eield coordination between the AEC 

and the DOD were at Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site. The 

STWT, DASA, represented the Director, DASA, and DOD; and the 

AEC/NVOO represented the AEC in the field for continental tests. 

Each oE thssc organizations' primary interest was field testing 

of nuclear weapons. Daily close liaison was maintained between 

the STWT, DASA, and the AEC/NVOO during planning phases for field 

test proqrarns of primary interest to the DOD. 

During test operations, military and AEC personnel were 

combined into a single tes;t organization. Normally, the senior 

member of the combined test organization was the Manager, NVOO. 

His rleptity was the Director, Weapons Test Division, DASA. Other 

personnel in this joint t_es;t organization were selected from 

those available on a best-qualified basis. In accomplishing 

this, personnel were drawn not only from STWT and NV00 but Erom 

other agencies of DASA, the Armed Forces, military laboratories, 

military contractors, universities, civilian laboratories, AEC 

29 
laboratories, AEC contractors, other government agencies, and 

from other sources when special qualifications or knowledge were 

required. 

The Nevada Test Site was an AEC installation. The Manager, 

NVQO, was responsible Eor operation of this installation. The 

DOD and the AEC laboratories were the principal users of the Test 

Site. The Weapons Test Division, DASA, was the single military 

agency and point of contact for the Manager, MVOO, for all matters pertaining to DOD field test programs, and supported all DOD 

agencies operating at the Test Site. 

To accomplish these two major responsibilities, STWT, DASA, 

had an office, the Nevada Operations Branch (NOB), in the AEC 

Building in Las Vegas. The Nevada Operations Rranch, STWT, DASA, 

maintained daily liaison with NV00 at the top management level on 

all DOD matters pertaining to field operations and had under its 

control the Nevada Test Site Section to support DOD agencies at 

the site. For DOD agencies, the office also provided a point oE 

contact to assist in matters of interest with NV00 and to provide 

transportation and quarters in Las Vegas. All DOD personnel an'd 

DOD contractor personnel connected with nuclear field tests were 

under administrative control of this office while in Las Vegas 

and at the Nevada Test Site. 

The Nevada Test Site Section coordinated activities and supported DOD agencies operating at the Test Site. This section was 

located at the DOD Compound in Kercury (see section Y.5) and provided office and laboratory space, transportation, test equipment, and logistical and aclministrative support. 

1.5.2 Test Organizations 

Before 1957, the Test Director for each series had been a 

representative OE the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. For the 

30 
1957 PLUMBBOB series, a staff member of the Lawrence Radiation 

Laboratory was appointed to the position, reflecting the growing 

participation by Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in test operations. After 1961, the Test Director for events of primary interest to the DOD was an officer from one of the Services. The 

Test Director was responsible for overall coordination and scientific support for the entire scientific test program; for planning and coordination; and for positioning, arming, and detonating test devices. Generally, the AEC weapons laboratories provided the nuclear devices for DOD test events. 

Other officials of the joint test organization were responsible for various functions, such as logistical support, weather 

prediction, fallout prediction, blast prediction, air support, 

public information, radiological safety, industrial safety, and 

fire protection. 

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY was established early in 

1943 at Los Alamos, New Mexico, for the specific purpose of developing an atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists supervised the 

test detonation of the world's first atomic weapon in July 1945 

at the TRINITY site in New Mexico. The Laboratory's continuing 

assignment was to conceive, design, test, and develop nuclear 

components of atomic weapons. The Laboratory was operated by the 

University of California. 

LAWRENCE RADIATION LARORATORY was established as a second 

AEC weapons laboratory at Livermorc, California, in 1952. The 

Laboratory's responsibilities were essentially parallel to those 

of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Devices developed by LRL 

were first tested in Nevada in 1953, and they have been tested in 

each continental and Pacific series since. The contract under 

which the LRL performed work for the AEC was administered by the 

Commission's San Francisco Operations Office. This Laboratory 

also was operated by the University of California. 

31 
- -- SANDRA LABORATORY (later Sandia Laboratories) at Sandia 

Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, was the AEC's other weapons laboratory. It was established in 1946 as a branch of the Los 

Alamos Scientific Laboratory, but in 1949 it assumed its identity 

as a full-fledged weapons research institution operated by the 

Sandia Corporation, a non-profit subsidiary of b7estern Electric. 

Sandia Laboratory's role was to conceive, design, test, and 

develop the non-nuclear phases of atomic weapons and to do other 

work in related fields. In 1956, a Livermorc Branch of the Laboratory was established to provide closer support to devclopmental work of the LRL. Sandia Corporation also operated ballistic 

test facilities Eor the AEC at the Tonopah Ballistics Range near 

Tonopah, Nevada. 

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY was located in Washington, 

D .c. and was composed of personnel of the Armed Services and 

civilian DOD employees. It was activated on 6 May 1959 to 

assume certain residual functions of the Manhattan Engineer 

District and to assure continuity of technical military interest 

in nuclear weapons. The broad mission of DASA was planning specified technical services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps in the military application of nuclear energy. Among the 

services performed were maintaining liaison with the AEC laboratories in the development of nuclear weapons, planning and supervising the conduct of weapons efEects tests and other field exercises, providing nuclear weapons training to military personnel, 

and storing and maintaining nuclear weapons. Early in the program for testinq nuclear devices and weapons, DASA was charged 

with the responsibility for planning and integrating with the AEC 

for military participation in full scale tests. After the Nevada 

Test Site was activated, this planning responsibility was broadened to include conducting experimental proqrams of primary concern to the Armed Forces and coordinating other phases of military participation including assistance to the AFC. The Director, DASA, was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Secretary of nefense. 

32 
Weapons Test Division (STWT) at Sandia Base, New Mexico, 

carried out the weapon field testing responsibilities and seismic 

research responsibilities (VELA-UNIFORM) for the Director, DASA. 

This organization maintained close liaison with the AEC Nevada 

Operations Office. Personnel from the STWT became the military 

members of the Joint AEC-DOD test organization at the Nevada Test 

Site and other continental [Jnited States test areas. All participation of DOD agencies and their contractors in nuclear field 

tests was coordinated and supported by STWT. 

Nevada Operations Branch (NOB) located in Las Vegas, Nevada, 

maintained daily liaison with the AEC/NVOO, and supervised the 

STWT Test Site Section at the Nevada Test Site. In addition to 

the continental test responsibilities, STWT provided key personnel for the military scientific test unit, and managed the technical and scientific programs for DOD agencies and contractors 

during overseas tests. 

1.5.3 Support Contractors 

In keeping with its policy, the Atomic Energy Commission 

utilized private contractors for maintenance, operation, and 

construction (including military and civil defense construction) 

at the Nevada Test Site. Personnel of the Nevada Operations 

Office administered all housekeeping, construction, and related 

services activity, but performance was by contractors. The major 

contractors were the following: 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo) was the 

principal AEC operational and support contractor for the NTS, 

performing community operations, housing, feeding, maintenance, 

construction, and scientific structures support services. REECo 

maintained offices in Las Vegas and extensive facilities at the 

NTS. 

33 
Edgerton, Germeshausen 6 Grier, Inc., (EG&G) of Boston, 

Massachusetts, was the principal technical contractor, providing 

control point functions such as timing and firing, and diagnostic 

functions such as scientific photography and measurement of detonation characteristics. EG&G facilities were maintained in Las 

Vegas and at the NTS. 

Holmes & Narver, Inc., (H&N) performed architect-engineer 

services for the NTS and was the principal support contractor for 

the Commission's off-continent operations. H&N had a home office 

in Los Angeles, and also maintained offices in Las Vegas and at 

the NTS . 

Fenix & Scisson (F&S) of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was the consultant 

for NTS drilling activities. 

Numerous other contractors, selected on the basis of lumpsum competitive bids, performed various construction and other 

support functions for the AEC and the DOD. 

1.6 THE NEVADA TEST SITE 

An on-continent location was selected for conducting nuclear 

weapons tests, construction began at the Nevada Proving Ground 

(NPG) in December 1950, and testing began in January 1951. This 

testing area was renamed the Nevada Test Site in 1955. 

The original NPG boundaries were expanded as new projects 

and testing areas were added. Figure 1.4 shows the present NTS 

location bounded on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Range. 

The area of NTS is about 1,350 square miles. The testing location was selected for both safety and security reasons. The arid 

climate, lack of industrialization, and exclusion of the public 

34 
BA 

I / 

GOLDFIELD 

\ 

\ * \ NELLIS AIR FORCE RANGE 

\ _ __--. .I_

SLUI IYS 

JUNCTION 

\ 

\ 

NTS 

\ RFATTY I 

‘\ LATtiRO-

\WELLS 

\ 

MAP AREA 

5i 

Figure 1.4 Nellis Air Force Range and NTS in Nevada 

35 

93 
from the Nellis Air Force Range have combined to result in a very 

low population density in the area around the NTS. 

The only paved roads within the NTS and the Air Force Range 

complex were those constructed by the government for access purposes. The NTS testing areas were physically protected by surrounding rugged topography. The few mountain passes and dry 

washes where four-wheel-drive vehicles might enter were posted 

with warning signs and barricades. NTS security force personnel 

patrolled perimeter and barricade areas in aircraft and vehicles. 

Thus, unauthorized entry to NTS was difficult, and the possibility of a member of the public inadvertently entering an NTS testing area was extremely remote. 

Figure 1.5 shows the NTS, its various area designations, and 

the locations of the seven test events covered by this volume. 

Generally, the "U" means an underground location, the number the 

area, and the "a" the first test location in an area. In addition, for underground tunnels, the "a.03" indicates the third 

drift in a tunnel complex as U16a.03 in Figure 1.5. A low mountain range separates the base camp, Mercury, from the location of 

early DOD atmospheric weapons effects tests on Frenchman Flat in 

Area 5. A few shaft-type underground tests also were conducted in 

this area. The elevation of Frenchman Dry Cake in the middle of 

the Flat is about 3,100 feet. 

A mountain pass separates Frenchman Flat from Yucca Flat 

testing areas. The pass overlooks both Frenchman and Yucca Flats 

and contains the control point complex of buildings including 

Control Point Building 1 (CP-1) where timing and firing for most 

atmospheric tests was performed, and Control Point Building 

(CP-2) where radiological safety support was based. 

Yucca Flat testing areas include Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 

and 10. Underground tests were conducted in some of these areas 

36 

2 
--- 

o-PILE DRIVER 

I 

I 

I 

I 

30 --_ 

I 

I 

Figure 1.5 The Nevada Test Site 

37 
and generally were shaft emplacement types. The elevation of 

Yucca Dry Lake at the south end of Yucca Flat is about 4,300 

feet. To the west of Yucca Flat, in another basin, is the Area 

18 testing location. Some DOD atmospheric tests were conducted 

in Area 18, and one DOD cratering event, DANNY BOY, was conducted 

on Buckboard Mesa in this area at an elevation of about 5,500 

feet. Area 16 is in the mountains west of Yucca Flat toward Area 

18. The single Area 16 tunnel complex at an elevation of about 

5,400 feet was a DOD underground testing location. 

Rainier Mesa is in Area 12 northwest of Yucca Flat, and the 

top of the Mesa is at an elevation of about 7,500 feet. All gunnel-emplacement type events on NTS that were not in the Area 16 

tunnel complex or the Area 15 shaft and tunnel complex were in 

Rainier Mesa. The major Rainier Mesa tunnel complexes were B, E, 

G, N, and T tunnecls. 

Area 15 is in the foothills at the north end of Yucca Flat. 

An access shaft drops nearly 1,500 feet below the surface elevation of 5,100 feet. Three DOD events were conducted in Area 15. 

The first two events were discussed in the first volume of this 

series. The third event utilized the access shaft for the first 

event which was deepened to about 1,400 feet for this event, as 

described in this volume. 

38 
CHAPTER 2 

UNDERGROUMD TESTING PROCEDURES 

Underground tests conducted at NTS prior to 15 February 1962 

primarily were for weapons development or safety experiment purposes. The experience gained contributed substantially to the DOD 

weapons effects testing program to be conducted underground. However, these later DOD underground tests generally were of greater 

complexity than previous underground tests. Also, a number of 

technical problems remained to be solved. 

Obtaining satisfactory test data was an important objective, 

but equally important was the objective of assuring safety of 

test participants and the public. This chapter discusses underground testing methods, problems encountered, and safety procedures used during DOD underground weapons effects tests conducted 

from 5 March 1966 to 26 June 1967. 

2.1 EMPLACSMENT TYPES 

The DOD conducted seven underground nuclear test events 

during this period. Table 2.1 lists these events and pertinent 

data including emplacement type. An emplacement type not discussed in this volume is one that results in excavating or ejecting material from the ground surface to form a crater (see Crater 

Experiment in the Glossary of Terms). There were three shaft and 

four tunnel types of DOD events during the period covered by this 

volume. These are discussed in this section. 

2.1.1 Shaft-Type 

A shaft-type nuclear detonation is intended to be contained 

39 
OPERATION FLINTLOCK LATCHKEY 

DATE 

TEST EVENT 

Q 

5 MAR 66 

& 

I& 

a 8 

25 APR 66 

$77 

“8& 

27 MAY 66 

49 

* & 

$ 

4 

2 JUN 66 

$ 

2 

g

8 

15 JIJN 66 

c 

d? 

$ * 

13 DEC 66 

,a 

a 

@ 

26 JUN 67 

LOCAL TIME (hours) 1015 PST 1136 PDT 1300 PDT 0630 PDT 1000 PDT 1300 PST 0900 PDT 

NTS LOCATION AREA I2 AREA II AREA 6 AREA I5 AREA I6 AREA II AREA I2 

TYPE TUNNEL SHAFT SHAFT TUNNEL XJNNEL SHAFT TUNNEL 

DEPTH (feet) 1,330 970 I.105 4516 I.075 625 1,230 

YIELD (kilotons) Low* Low* 22 62 Low* Low* Low* 

* 

INDICATES LESS THAN 22 KILOTONS 
underground. The shaft is usually drilled, but sometimes mined, 

and it may be lined with a steel casing or be uncased. The nuclear device is emplaced at a depth established to contain the 

explosion. This depth also is selected to allow formation of a 

subsidence crater. At detonation time, a cavity is formed by vaporized rock under pressure which holds surrounding broken rock 

in place until the cavity cools sufficiently to decrease pressure. As broken rock falls into the cavity formed by the detonation, the chimney of falling rock reaches the surface and a subsidence crater forms. Figure 2.1 shows a typical subsidence crater and postevent drilling operation. 

2.1.2 Tunnel-Type 

A tunnel-type nuclear detonation is intended to be completely contained. The nuclear device is emplaced in a mined opening 

at a depth which usually does not allow chimneying of broken rock 

to the surface. A tunnel emplacement may be at the end of a single horizontal tunnel into a mountain or mesa, in one tunnel of a 

complex of horizontal tunnels used for experiments and other nuclear detonations, in a horizontal tunnel from the bottom of a 

vertical shaft, or in an opening of variable size and shape mined 

from a tunnel or the bottom of a shaft. Figure 2.2 shows the portal of a typical DOD tunnel complex. 

2.2 DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES 

The major advantage of underground testing was containment 

of radioactive material. One of the major disadvantages was increased difficulty in determining characteristics of a detonation. Photographing a fireball growing in the atmosphere was no 

longer possible. Samples of a radioactive cloud for analysis no 

longer could be obtained by sampling aircraft. Measurements of 

thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast were complicated 

41 


by the confining underground structures. These disadvantages were 

overcome by developing new diagnostic techniques, some of which 

are discussed below. 

2.2.1 Radiation Measurements 

Measurements of radiations from an underground detonation 

were made possible by developing a system of remote detectors and 

cabling to send signals to recording facilities located on the 

surface. Detectors utilizing various physical characteristics of 

the radiations to be measured were installed near the nuclear device. High-specification coaxial cable and connectors carried the 

measurement signals to the surface where electronic equipment recorded the signals. 

The detector signals were on the way to recording equipment 

in billionths of a second after a detonation, before detectors 

were destroyed. These measurement systems required the most advanced electronic technology available. Indeed, considerable research and development was necessary to acquire and refine these 

capabilities. 

2.2.2 Radiochemical Measurements 

Because clouds from atmospheric detonations no longer were 

available to sample, techniques were developed to obtain samples 

of debris from underground detonations for radiochemical analyses 

and subsequent yield determinations. The first systems were radiochemical sampling pipes leading directly from the device emplacements to filtering equipment on the surface. These pipes 

required fast-closure systems to prevent overpressure from venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere after samples were 

collected. 

While these systems functioned as intended for most detona44 
tions, the systems did not function properly during some tests, 

and radioactive effluent was released to the atmosphere. Subsequently, the use of radiochemical sampling pipes to the surface 

was discontinued. 

The major radiochemistry sampling method which continued in 

use Eor shaft detonations was postevent core drilling. The objective of this drilling was to obtain samples of solidified radioactive debris which had collected in a molten pool at the bottom 

of the cavity produced by the detonation. This method required 

and resulted in development of precise directional drilling techniques and several advancements in the science of core drilling. 

2.2.3 Line-of-Sight (LOS) Pipes 

Most of the DOD shaft-type detonations included LOS pipes 

from the device emplacement to the surface. These pipes allowed 

effects experiments to be conducted as well as measurement of radiations from the detonations. 

However, the J,OS pipes to the surface required fast-closure 

systems as did the radiochemical sampling pipes, and use of LOS 

pipes to the surface also resulted in some releases of radioactive effluent to the. atmosphere. Thus, the frequency of DOD 

shaft-type events, including use of these pipes to the surface, 

decreased, but the use of horizontal LOS pipes in underground 

tunnel complexes became frequent and a valuable weapons effects 

testing system. 

2.3 EFFECTS EXPERIMENTS 

Weapons effects experiments were the primary reason for conducting DOD underground nuclear detonations. The effects of 

blast, heat, and radiation from a nuclear detonation in the at45 
mosphere had been studied extensively. Structures, equipment, 

and materials had been exposed to atmospheric detonations, and 

military hardware also had been exposed to underwater detonations. Underground testing provided an opportunity to study 

effects of ground shock and motion, and, of particular importance, the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials at a simulated high altitude. 

The simulation of a high-altitude detonation was made possible by enlargement and improvement of the LOS pipe system discussed in section 2.2.3. Large-diameter pipes hundreds of feet 

long were constructed underground. The device was emplaced at 

the end of the pipe. An access tunnel sometimes was constructed 

parallel or at an angle to the LOS tunnel, and tunnels connected 

the two at intervals. Hatches allowed access to the LOS pipe and 

sealing of the pipe. Equipment and materials were installed at 

locations within the LOS pipe. The atmosphere in the LOS pipe was 

reduced in pressure by vacuum pumps, to simulate a high altitude, 

before the detonation. Thus, testing of weapons effects was 

extended from atmospheric and underwater to underground and at 

simulated high altitudes. 

2.4 CONTAINMENT FEATURES AND PRORLEMS 

Completely containing radioactive material underground while 

accomplishing diagnostic measurements and effects tests proved to 

be a major engineering challenge. Original efforts considered 

only detonation containment in competent rock formations. It was 

necessary to modify the original efforts to consider zones of 

weakness in rock caused by faults and containment failures caused 

by diagnostic and experiment structures. In addition, decreased 

compressibility of rock caused by high water content with subsequent greater ground motion and stress toward the surface caused 

containment failure. Failures also were caused by unanticipated 

46 
additional overpressure of secondary gas expansion or steam pressure. The major containment features and problems that evolved 

are discussed below. 

2.4.1 Shaft Containment 

Some of the first shaft-type safety experiments were in open 

shafts. When nuclear yields were produced, the open shafts did 

little to contain the radioactive debris. The first method used 

to contain nuclear detonations in shafts was stemming, or filling. 

the shaft with aggregate and sand after device emplacement. Later 

stemming was used that had ground-matching characteristics, such 

as transmission of shock waves and other properties that would 

not contribute to containment failure. 

Keyed concrete plugs at different depths in the shaft stemming sometimes were used. The shaft diameter was enlarged at the 

plug construction location so the poured concrete plug would key 

into the ground surrounding the shaft and provide more strength 

against containment failure. Combinations of concrete and epoxy 

were used later, and epoxy has replaced concrete as a plug material for some shaft-type emplacements. 

Radiochemical sampling pipes, LOS pipes, and other openings 

in stemming and plug containment features had to be closed rapidly after the detonation to prevent venting of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere. Fast-gate closure systems driven by high 

explosives or compressed air were developed to seal the openings. 

After some of these systems did not prevent releases of effluent 

to the atmosphere, use of openings to the surface for diagnostic 

or experiment purposes was discontinued for several years until 

technology improved. 

Scientific and other cables from the device emplacement to 

the surface were another source of containment problems. While 

47 
cables could be imbedded in concrete and epoxy, which effectively 

prevented leakage along the outside of the cables, radioactive 

gases under high pressure traveled along the inside of cables as 

a conduit to the surface. This problem was solved by imbedding 

the inner components of cables in epoxy at convenient locations 

or intervals, such as at connectors, in a technique called gas 

blocking. 

The most serious containment problems were caused by unanticipated geologic and hydrologic conditions at particular test 

locations. Even careful and rigorous calculations, engineering, 

construction, and preparations were inadequate when the presence 

of a geologic zone of weakness near the detonation point and toward the surface was unknown. 

Another similar problem was the presence of higher water 

content than anticipated in rock formations surrounding or near 

the detonation point. This problem caused (1) greater shock 

transmission and ground movement by decreasing rock compressibility, (2) additional secondary gas expansion when the water turned 

to steam, (3) a much higher and longer-sustained pressure from 

the detonation point toward the surface, and (4) subsequent failure of the geologic or constructed containment mechanisms. 

Recognizing and understanding geologic and hydrologic conditions at each test location was necessary before these containment problems could be solved. As additional information became 

available through drilling and intensive geologic studies, these 

problems were resolved by investigations of proposed detonation 

locations and application of detailed site selection criteria. 

2.4.2 Tunnel Containment 

As with shaft-type detonations, containment methods used for 

tunnel events were designed using basic characteristics of the 

48 
nuclear detonation. Tunnel configurations were constructed with 

device emplacements strategically located to cause sealing of the 

access tunnel by force of the detonation. Additional containment 

features were used to contain radioactive debris. 

A short distance from the projected self-sealing location 

toward the tunnel entrance (portal), one or more sandbag plugs 

were installed. Two plugs, each about 60 feet in length, were a 

typical installation. Farther toward the portal, and before entering the main tunnel in a complex with more than one test location, a keyed concrete plug with a metal blast door was constructed. The blast door was designed to contain any gases, with 

pressures up to 75 pounds per square inch (psi), that might penetrate the plugs. 

Also as with shaft-type detonations, the unknown presence of 

undesirable geologic and hydrologic conditions sometimes caused 

venting of radioactive effluent either through the overburden 

(ground above the tunnel) to the surface, through fissures opened 

between the detonation point and the main tunnel, or through the 

plugs and blast door to the main tunnel vent holes and portal. 

More substantial containment features evolved as containment 

problems became better understood and tunnel events became more 

complex. 

Generally, the sandbag plugs became solid sand backfill hundreds of feet long, and the blast door evolved into a massive 

overburden (equivalent) plug separating test location tunnels 

from the main tunnel. The plug typically was 20 to 30 feet of 

keyed concrete with a large steel door containing a smaller 

access hatch, and was designed to withstand overpressure up to 

1000 psi. 

Use of the LOS pipe in tunnel events necessitated development of additional containment and closure systems. The LOS pipe 

49 
tunnel and its access tunnels were separated from the main tunnel 

by the overburden plug. Additional containment and closure systems were for protection of the LOS pipe and its experiments as 

well as preventing release of effluent to the surface. 

Generally, the tunnel volume outside of the pipe was filled 

with stemming, grouting, or by other means to facilitate containment, while the inside of the pipe and its exper ments were protected by fast-closure systems. Various systems were in use ineluding compressed air or explosive-driven gates and doors which 

closed off the LOS pipe .from the detonation with n a small fraction of a second after detonation time. 

The same gas blocking techniques as used in shaft events 

were used to prevent leakage of radioactive gases along or 

through cables from the diagnostic and experiment locations to 

the surface. Additionally, a gas seal door usually was installed 

in the main drift nearer the portal than the overburden plug. 

Utility pipes, such as for compressed air, that passed through 

stemming and plugs also were sealed by closure systems. 

Containment systems evolved to the point that release of 

detectable radioactivity to the atmosphere seldom occurred. 

2.5 TUNNEL AND DRILLING AREA ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 

Access to underground workings and drilling sites was controlled for a number of reasons. During construction, safety of 

both workers and visitors in these locations could have been 

jeopardized by carelessness or seemingly harmless activities of 

untrained and uncontrolled visitors. When security-classified 

material was in these locations, only personnel with appropriate 

security clearances were permitted access. The presence, or anticipated presence, of radioactive material in these locations 

50 
required access control for radiological safety purposes. Access 

requirements established for the above purposes are discussed 

below. 

2.5.1 Tunnel Access Control 

During construction and preparations for a DOD event in a 

tunnel or other underground working, the tunnel superintendent 

was responsible to the project manager for safety of personnel 

underground. All persons going underground, or the supervisors 

of working groups, were required to enter appropriate information 

in the tunnel log book. Visitors and other personnel not assigned to work in the tunnel obtained permission for entry from the 

superintendent, or his representative, and were apprised of tunnel conditions and safety regulations. In the event of an accident or other emergency condition underground, the log book provided information on numbers of personnel and their locations 

underground. 

When classified material was in the tunnel, and during initial reentry after an event, the DOD Test Group Director, or his 

representative, was responsible for entry and safety of personnel 

underground. Security personnel checked for proper security and 

entry clearances, and maintained records of all personnel entering the tunnel. 

Control of tunnel access reverted to tunnel management personnel after tunnel reentry and recoveries. Entry procedures and 

use of the tunnel log book were then as disOussed above. 

Additional access controls were instituted for radiological 

safety purposes after an event or during construction and event 

preparations when radioactivity from a previous event could be 

encountered. Part or all of a tunnel complex could be established as a radiation exclusion (radex) area. 

51 
All persons entering radex areas were logged on Area Access 

Registers. Names and organizations represented were listed. Radiation exposures for the year were listed upon entry and added 

to with self-reading pocket dosimeter measurements upon exit. 

This was to assure that personnel approaching radiation exposure 

guide limits would not be allowed to enter radex areas and accumulate exposures above guide amounts. 

Before entry, personnel were dressed in anticontamination 

clothing and respiratory protection as needed for the particular 

radiological conditions in the tunnel. Upon exit, anticontamination clothing was removed, personnel were monitored for radioactive contamination, and decontamination was accomplished, if necessary. 

2.5.2 Drilling Area Access Control 

Access to drilling areas was controlled by the drilling 

superintendent and the DOD Test Group Director for the same reasons as controlling access to underground workings. During drilling of an emplacement shaft, and during postevent drillback operations to recover radioactive core samples, personnel safety and 

compliance with safety regulations were emphasized continuously. 

During preevent drilling activities, all visitors were required to contact the drilling superintendent before entry to the 

drilling site. Names of visitors and purposes of visits were entered in the daily drilling report, and it was assured that visitors had hard hats and understood safety regulations. 

When classified materials, including the nuclear device, 

were brought into the area for emplacement, the DOD Test Group 

Director controlled access to the area with assistance from security force personnel as in similar tunnel operations. After the 

event, when the drill site was a radex area, during classified 

52 
material removal, or during postevent drilling, both security and 

radiological safety access controls were in effect as discussed 

under Tunnel Access Control. 

2.6 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

Implementation of an effective industrial safety program was 

an important part of any heavy construction operation. Mining 

and drilling operations had a particularly high accident potential. These operations at the NTS involved additional safety 

problems resulting from detonation-induced unstable ground conditions and potential for encountering toxic gases, explosive mixtures, and radioactivity. 

Tens of miles of underground workings were constructed. More 

depth of big holes (three-foot diameter or larger) were drilled 

than the total drilled in the rest of the world. Directional and 

core drilling to recover radioactive debris samples after underground nuclear detonations advanced the science of these drilling 

techniques. These operations were accomplished under unusual 

conditions with accompanying difficult safety problems. 

However, the lost-time accident frequency for the NTS support contractor employing most of the NTS personnel (REECO) was 

only one-tenth of the frequency for the heavy construction industry at large (as determined by annual surveys and reports for 

300 heavy construction corporations). This excellent safety 

record was attained by continuing attention to indoctrinating and 

training NTS personnel, investigating and determining causes of 

accidents at NTS, implementing and enforcing safety regulations, 

and, most important, maintaining the safety awareness of NTS 

personnel. 

This was a joint effort by the DOE and DNA, and their prede53 
cessors, and by the many other government agencies and contractors at the NTS. Administered by REECo, the safety program enjoined all NTS personnel to conduct operations safely, and was 

exemplified by the signs on the portal of a typical DOD tunnel 

complex as shown in Figure 2.2, including "Safety With Production 

Is Our Goal." 

The safety procedures for all NTS operations are voluminous 

and cannot be included in this report. Appendix C of this report 

is an example of pertinent safety procedures: General Tunnel Reentry Procedures for Department of Defense and Sandia Laboratory 

Tests. As these procedures indicate, several aspects of industrial safety are interrelated. Information on monitoring levels 

of radioactivity and personnel exposures to radiation is presented in the next section, 2.7 Radiological Safety Procedures. 

Monitoring of toxic gases and explosive mixtures was an important aspect of safety in underground workings, on drill rigs, 

and in drillhole cellars (enlarged first part of drillhole for 

valving and other equipment). Toxic gases and explosive mixtures 

were created by both the nuclear detonations and the mining and 

drilling operations. The Draeger multi-gas detector and MSA explosimeter were used to detect such gases. The Fyrite or J&W 

oxygen indicators were used to determine the oxygen content of 

the working atmosphere. 

Requirements were that tunnel and drill rig breathing atmosphere contain at least 19.5 percent oxygen. During the period 

covered by this volume, standard operating procedures of the Radiological Sciences Department required that breathing air contain less than the levels of toxic gases and explosive mixtures 

listed in the following table. 

54 
Gases Maximum Concentration 

Carbon monoxide, CO 50 ppm 

Carbon dioxide, CO2 5000 ppm 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen 

dioxide, NO + NO2 25 ppm 

Nitrogen dioxide, NO2 5 ppm 

Explosive mixtures 10% of LEL (lower 

explosive limit) 

Procedures for controlling explosive mixtures and toxic 

gases after each test event are discussed in event chapters as 

appropriate. 

2.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 

Procedures were developed in an effort to evaluate radiological, toxic, and other hazards, and protect workers and the 

public from unnecessary exposures. The following were primary 

written procedures and implementation methods used at the NTS 

from 1966 through 1967. 

2.7.1 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Nevada Test Site Organization - Standard Operating Procedure, Chapter 0524, Radiological Safety 

Chapter 0524, which appears as Appendi x D to this volume, 

defined responsibility, and established criteria and general 

procedures for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. 

Some but not all of the major areas discussed are film badge procedures, radiation surveys, entry into controlled areas and radiation exposure guides. Roles of the onsite REECo Radiological 

Sciences Department and the offsite United States Public Health 

Service (PHS) are defined in NTSO Chapter 0524. 

55 
2.7.2 Standard Operating Procedures for the Radiological Safety 

Department, REECo, dated January 1961. These procedures 

were updated annually beginning in 1966. 

These procedures were prepared to address in more detail the 

radsafe aspects discussed in the latest revision of AEC NTSO-SOP 

Chapter 0524. The same maior areas were discussed but in a more 

detailed manner. 

2.7.3 REECo Radiological Sciences Department Information Bulletins 

The Information Bulletins were formalized instructions for 

performing specific radiological safety and industrial hygiene 

tasks. They defined a situation, delineated responsibility, and 

described methods to be used in performing the task. 

2.7.4 Detailed procedures as outlined in REECo Radiological 

Sciences Department Branch Operating Guides 

These were informal internal procedures written to address a 

particular known or anticipated operational activity. 

2.7.5 Implementation of radiological procedures; required equipment, devices, and capabilities for monitoring radiation levels 

in the environment; and monitoring external and internal exposures of personnel. 

Equipment and devices used for these purposes and necessary 

capabilities were as follows: 

A. Portable Radiation Detection Equipment 

- Eberline PAC 3G (alpha) 

- Eberline PAC 1SA (alpha) 

- Technical Associates Juno SRJ-7 (medium range alpha, 

beta, gamma) 

56 
Technical Associates Juno HRG-7 (high range gamma) 

Teletector 6112 (high range beta, gamma) 

Standard SS-2 (tritium) 

Bendix T-290 (tritium) 

Floor Monitor (alpha) 

Floor Monitor (low range beta, gamma) 

Portal Monitors (low range beta, gamma) 

Eberline E-112B (low range beta, gamma) 

Precision 111 (low range gamma) 

Eberline E-500B (high range gamma) 

Victoreen Radector AGB-500B SR (high range gamma) 

Jordan AGB 10 KG SR Rad Gun (high range gamma) 

uw-1, underwater (gamma) 

Gateway Monitor (gamma alarm) 

Eberline PNC-1 (neutron) 

FN-la (fast neutron) 

Technical Associates Hand and Foot Counters (low range 

beta, gamma 1 

B. Air Sampling Equipment 

Portable gasoline driven air sampling units (Model 102, 

REECo-designed) 

High-volume air samplers (Staplex and Gelman) 

Low-volume air samplers (Gelman) 

Continuous and sequential samplers 

C. Laboratory Analysis Capability .~ 

The radiological safety laboratory analyzed air, soil, 

water, surface swipe, fallout tray, nasal swab, urine, 

and wound swab samples for some or all of the following 

activities: gross alpha and beta, gr'oss fission products, tritium, strontium-90, plutonium-239, and spectrographic analysis of specific gamma-emitting radio57 
nuclides. The laboratory also analyzed some of the 

above samples for nonradioactive materials, such as beryllium, through use of an emission spectrograph and by 

wet chemistry procedures. A spectrophotometer was used 

to analyze other materials. 

D. Monitoring of Personnel Exposures 

The DuPont type 301-4 film packet was replaced with the 

NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security credential holder in.1966 to provide increased personnel dosimetry capability necessary to meet the radiation exposure problems associated with nuclear rocket testing and 

underground nuclear detonations. The holder, designed to 

accommodate a DuPont type 556 film packet, a fast neutron packet, an identification plate, criticality accident components, the security credential, and a snaptype clip, had capabilities for determining beta, gamma, 

X-ray, thermal neutron, fast neutron, high range gamma, 

and high range neutron doses. The DuPont 556 film packet 

contained two component films, type 519 (low range) and 

type 334 (high range). Gamma exposure ranges of the two 

components were 30 mR to 1OR and 1OR to 300R, respectively. The NTS combination personnel dosimeter and security credential holder is shown in Figure 2.3. 

Film badges were exchanged routinely each month for all 

individuals, and upon exit from a radex area when it was 

suspected that an individual had received 100 mR or more 

of exposure. 

Personnel entering radex areas also were issued selfreading pocket dosimeters which indicated accumulated 

exposure. Upon exit, pocket dosimeter readings were entered on Area Access Registers and added to the yearly 

53 

and quarterly accumulated exposures from the automated 

daily NTS radiation exposure report. Pocket dosimeter 

readings were only estimates because several factors 

caused those readings to be less accurate than the doses 

of record determined after processing film packets. 

This use of Area Access Registers helped to maintain 

personnel exposures below the whole-body exposure guides 

in Chapter 0524: 3000 mrem per quarter and 5000 mrem 

per year. Personnel with exposures from the report plus 

any dosimeter reading since the report in excess of 2500 

mrem per quarter or 4500 mrem per year were advised not 

to enter radex areas and their supervisory personnel 

were so notified. 

2.7.6 Additional methods used for control of radex areas and to 

prevent spread of contamination to uncontrolled areas were as 

follows: 

A daily log book was maintained by Radsafe monitors for each 

of the radex area locations. These logs were used to record the 

following information: 

A. Work accomplished: Where people worked and what work 

was accomplished were briefly described. Any unusual conditions, 

such as equipment failure and operational difficulties, were listed. 

B. Visitors: First and last names of visitors 

were entered. Their destination 

and reason for their visit were included where possible. Time they 

exited the area and results of personnel monitoring were recorded. 

60 
C. Unusual occurrences: Any unusual events which occurred 

during the shift were recorded. 

This entry included accidents, 

high-volume water seepage, or any 

other occurrence of an unusual 

nature. 

D. Surveys and samples: Information collected was recorded 

as follows: 

Survey type - Routine or Special* 

Sample type - Routine or Special* 

*Indicate requester's name for Special type. 

E. Date and signature: The date and shift were entered at 

the beginning of the work period 

and the log book was signed before 

leaving the shift. 

Personnel leaving radex areas removed anticontamination 

clothing and equipment and placed them in special containers for 

later laundering or disposal at the designated NTS burial site. 

Personnel then were monitored to assure radiation levels were below those listed on page 250 of Appendix D, AEC NTSO-SOP Chapter 

0524, Radiological Safety. Personnel decontamination was accomplished if radiation levels were above specified limits. Decontamination usually was accomplished by vacuuming, removing radioactive particles with masking tape patches, washing hands or localized skin areas with soap and water, or showering with soap 

and water. 

Vehicles and equipment removed from radex areas were monitored to assure radiation levels were below those listed on page 

250 of Appendix D for release on the NTS. Limits for release of 

vehicles and equipment off the NTS were 0.3 mR/h beta plus gamma 

61 
radiation at contact and no detectable alpha activity. Vehicles 

and equipment normally were decontaminated by vacuuming and steam 

cleaning with water or detergent solutions. 

2.8 TELEMETERED MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS 

Beginning in the early 1960's, various applications of radiation measurement telelnetry were developed at the NTS to determine radiation levels at critical underground and surface areas 

following nuclear detonations. Multi-detector systems with range 

capabilities from 0.5 mR/h to 500 R/h and from 10 mR/h to 10,000 

R/h, continuously monitored locations of concern after being 

emplaced and calibrated prior to each test event. Ion chamber 

detectors were hard-wire-linked by telephone trunk lines to exposure rate meters at a central console in Control Point Building 

2. Detector locations were as far as thirty-five miles from the 

console. 

These remote radiation monitoring systems provided data for 

reentry personnel participating in radiation surveys and recovery 

operations after detonation of a nuclear device. The systems 

aided in substantially reducing radiation exposure of personnel 

involved in reentry programs, and were useful in detecting any 

venting or leaking of radioactive effluent to the atmosphere from 

an underground detonation. 

2.8.1 Evaluation and Development of Telemetry Systems 

The- radiation telemetry systems developed and used had specif ic applications depending upon distance, terrain, env ironment, 

and operational needs. 

62 
A. Remote Area Monitorina Station (RAMS) 

The primary method used was a system of Tracerlab TA-6 

(GM) tube gamma detectors with Model 261 direct readout 

meters. The meter had a two-range scale, 0 to 10 R/h 

and 0 to 100 R/h. This system was limited to a 35-mile 

radius transmission range, and had limited shock resistance capability. 

B. Radio-Link Telemetry 

This EG&G-developed system was a line-of-sight radiolinked system, transmitting the desired information on 

VHF frequencies from a field unit to a main control console. The ionizing radiation-induced signal was then 

read out as cycles per second on an event-per-unit-time 

meter. Detectors provided information which was automatically displayed on digital tape showing the time of 

measurements, locations, and radiation intensities. 

2.8.2 Remote Area Radiation Detection Monitoring Support 

Approximately two hundred remote radiation detector channels 

were available to continuously monitor radiological conditions 

and assess exposure rates before the test area was entered after 

detonation. Approximately 16 detector units were positioned in 

the test area before a shaft-type event. Detectors were placed 

in circular arrays at appropriate distances from SGZ which varied 

with device yield and predicted wind direction (see Figures 2.4 

and 2.5). Variable numbers of detectors were used aboveground and 

underground during tunnel-type events. An additional 20 to 35 

permanently established remote radiation detector stations operated continuously at living areas, work areas, and other locations throughout NTS (Figure 2.6). A large number of additional 

channels were available for additional detector locations and 

63 
READOUT /C P / 

Figure 2.4 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring 

System for Shaft-Type Emplacement Site 

64 
PROBE PLACED ON RIM 

I-K-IF STATION OF MESA A,8OVE B TUNNEL PORTAL 

(JUNCTION OF 

MERCURY HWY AND AREA I2 A 

/ 

G -TUNNEL 

OAO 20 ;O,OOOFT 

30’ IN LINE FROM 

A REMOTE RADIATION DETECTOR 

Figure 2.5 Typical Remote Radiation Detection Monitoring System 

for Tunnel-Type Emplacement Site 

65 
. 

1 0 PERMANENT TELEMETRY 

STATIONS 

r 

I I 

OR17 

63

.__ 

!I 

I

L, 

R29 

R90 

-

30 16 

ORlO 

JRY 

200 lO,OOO FT 

Fi.gure 2.6 Typical 

Detector 

Permanently Established Remote 

Stations Operated Continuously 

Radiation 

Throughout 

the NTS 

66 
substitute channels. Event-related telemetry detectors operated 

from zero time until it was determined that no release of radioactivity would probably occur, or until any released radioactivity had decayed to near-background levels at the telemetry stations. As telemetry systems evolved, readout locations were positioned near the FCP or at locations where telephone lines were 

available, in addition to those events where readouts were located at CP-2. 

Radiation telemetry data were supplemented with information 

collected by a mobile air sampling program. Model 102 air sampling units were used to obtain samples of any radioactive effluent released at event time or during the postevent drilling operations. Test Groups used an average of 21 units during each 

test event. Prior to each nuclear experiment, these samplers 

were placed at specified locations around the test area and remained in position until drillback operations were completed or 

the Test Group Director authorized the removal of the units. 

2.9 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 

The AFSWC provided direct support to NTSO for DOD underground tests, and other Air Force organizations provided support 

under AFSWC control as described in section 1.3.3 of this report. 

However, less air support was required as the probability of 

venting radioactive effluent to the atmosphere decreased with development of more effective containment techniques. 

2.9.1 Changes in Air Support Requirements 

After 1962, Air Force cloud sampling and cloud tracking aircraft generally were not required, except for AEC cratering 

events where radioactive effluent clouds were anticipated. The 

value of analyzing particulate and gaseous cloud samples to de67 
termine characteristics of a detonation decreased. Passage of 

the radioactive effluent through variable amounts and temperatures of rock and other media selectively retained some radionuelides underground, and changed known ratios of fission products 

previously used during analysis of atmospheric detonation cloud 

samples. 

The first change in cloud sampling and tracking support was 

to a lighter Air Force aircraft, the U-3A, with an Air Force 

pilot and PHS monitor. The PHS monitor also performed aerial 

monitoring of selected locations near surface ground zero and 

along the path of any effluent cloud. This air support later was 

performed by PHS and contractor personnel in their own aircraft. 

The Air Force L-20 or a U-6A aircraft, with an Air Force 

pilot and a security guard from the NTS security force, continued 

to provide security sweep coverage of the NTS perimeter and test 

areas until use of helicopters began in 1968. Perimeter sweeps 

were conducted daily, during reasonable flying weather, to assure 

that unauthorized vehicles were not entering the NTS over rough 

terrain or around security barricades on secondary roads. Air 

security sweeps of the immediate test area were conducted for a 

few hours before each detonation to assist in clearing the test 

area and to assure that unauthorized vehicles were not approaching it from directions not controlled by manned security stations. 

Air support for photography missions during test events and 

initial radiation surveys after each event did not change. Helicopters with Air Force pilots generally were used with contractor 

photographers and Radsafe monitors. 

2.9.2 Radsafe Support for Indian Springs AFB 

Radsafe support facilities had been established at ISAFB 

68 
during the atmospheric nuclear device testing series. During 

1962 tests, and subsequent DOD underground tests requiring support aircraft staged from ISAFB, REECo provided all radsafe 

support functions available at the NTS. This included Radsafe 

monitors stationed at the ISAFB radsafe quonset facility, and a 

complete stock of film dosimeters (badges), radiation detection 

instruments, and anticontamination clothing and equipment for use 

by aircrews and ground crews. 

Radsafe monitors issued and exchanged film dosimeters (badges), issued self-reading pocket dosimeters, dressed Air Force 

personnel in anticontamination clothing, provided respiratory 

protection equipment, monitored aircraft and personnel after 

events, decontaminated personnel, and assisted ground crew personnel with decontamination of aircraft. 

Figures 2.7 through 2.9 show decontamination and monitoring 

OF typical B-57 cloud sampling aircraft used during the 1960's 

for cratering events, and other events when the possibility of 

radioactive effluent was anticipated. 

Aircrews departing from contaminated aircraft removed anticontamination clothing and equipment at the radsafe facility, 

showered, and were monitored to assure complete decontamination 

beEore they dressed in regulation clothing and were released. 

Ground crews who removed particulate and gaseous cloud sample 

collection media from aircraft or who participated in aircraft 

decontamination were subject to the same personnel decontamination procedures. 

2.9.3 Radsafe Support for Helicopters 

Although ISAFB radsafe support extended to all participating 

aircraEt, special helicopter radsafe procedures were implemented 

because these aircraft landed at NTS and staged from helicopter 

69 



pads located east of Mercury Highway at the Control Point area 

and near a Test Director’s Forward Control Point (FCP) established for a particular underground event. Helicopter pilots usually 

landed at these locations, and were briefed at the Control Point 

or particular Forward Control Point regarding their scheduled 

missions or other operational missions. 

If the mission involved possible contamination of the aircraft, Radsafe monitors lined the floor of the aircraft with 

plastic, or kraft paper, and masking tape to facilitate decontamination. Pilots and crew members were dressed in anticontamination clothing and provided with film badges, pocket dosimetcrs, 

and respiratory protection equipment if airborne radioactive 

material was anticipated. 

Upon completion of missions, helicopters returne'd to the 

landing pads where they were decontaminated by Radsafe monitors. 

Pilots and crew members were decontaminated at an adjacent forward Radsafe base station, or at Control Point Building 2 where 

the pocket dosimeters were collected and read, and film badges 

were exchanged if exposures of 100 mR or more were indicated by 

pocket dosimeters. 

73 
CHAPTER 3 

RFD HOT EVENT 

3.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The RED HOT event was a DOD underground nuclear detonation 

with a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 1015 hours Pacific 

Standard Time (PST) on 5 March 1966 at tunnel site U12g.06 in 

Area 12 of the NTS. The device was emplaced 1,330 feet beneath 

the surface, in a tuff medium, on the flat surface of a hemispherically-shaped cavity (Figure 3.1). The experiment was a 

weapons effects test to study ground shock. Eleven projects were 

involved including safety documentation, structulral support, and 

scientific studies. The detonation was not completely contained; 

some physical damage and contamination of the tunnel complex rcsulted, and minor levels of radioactive efEluent from this event 

were detected offsite. Additional information is in section 3.3 

"Event-Day and Continuing Activities." 

3.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for the safe 

conduct of all RED HOT activities in Area 12. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC-contractor personnel were in accordance with 

established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations 

Office. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and 

postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

74 
ZERO POINT-~ 

0’ X lo DRIFT 

DEEP WELL DRIFT 

(NOT AN EVENT) 

Figure 3.1 RED HOT Event 
3.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

A "RED HOT Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and 

postevent procedures used to assure safe and economical reentry. 

Radiation sensing instruments and tunnel ccndition indicators 

were located throughout the event complex. In addition, REECo 

Radiological Sciences Department (Radsafe) personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. Stemming design in the access tunnels incorporated necessary provisions to maximize safety of reentry. Geophones were installed to monitor cavity activity and collapse. 

Figure 3.1 shows the tunnel complex for the RED HOT event 

including the tunnel used for the MADISON event (a weaponsrelated event detonated 12 December 19621, and the drift for the 

Deep Well experiment (an experiment related to RED HOT). Air 

sampling pipes were installed through both the sand bag plugs and 

the gas seal door. These were used during reentry to sample air 

just forward of the door and plugs for immediate analysis and 

evaluation. Two 10,000 cfm positive displacement blowers with 

balanced flow rates were used to provide necessary tunnel ventilation. Three evacuated flasks for obtaining air samples through 

plug No. 4 from the GZ side were placed on the portal side of the 

Plug= Tunnel vent lines from the portal to plug No. 4, to the 

general area of Station 42+00 in the main drift, to the general 

area of Station 3+50 in the Deep Well drift, to the MADISON 

drift, and to blind drifts were in place at zero time. Vent line 

monitors and air samples were used to determine the quantity and 

quality of any radioactive effluents released to the atmosphere 

during tunnel ventilation. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the event. 

76 
Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

A mobile issue facility for anticontamination clothing, 

respiratory devices, instruments, and dosimetric devices 

was positioned prior to the event at the security barricade near the FCP. A personnel and vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to the mobile 

issue facility. When authorized by the Test Group Director, these facilities were repositioned to a convenient location near the tunnel portal. 

Radsafe monitors were stationed at all Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) security roadblocks and at all work 

areas within the exclusion area to perform surveys and 

provide other support as directed. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with 

appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, 

and RadsaEe monitors were in attendance. Radsafe had 

personnel stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP 

prior to the RED HOT detonation ready to perform surveys 

and provide emergency support as directed; provide and 

issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, 

.and self-reading pocket dosimetcrs; operate area control 

check stations; and perform personnel, equipment, and 

vehicle decontamination as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, sup77 
plied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

A remote area monitoring system (RAMS) was installed 

with the detection units located underground and on the 

surface and readouts located outside the controlled 

area. This system was functioning at zero time so that 

tunnel and surface radiation conditions could be determined. RAMS c?nsole readings were recorded every 15 

minutes until tunnel ventilation was started. All telemetry stations remained active until the DOD Test Group 

Director requested their deactivation. 

There were 45 RAMS units, 13 inside the tunnel complex 

and 32 on the surface, which recorded data (Tables 3.1 

and 3.2). The detection range of the units was 1 mR/h 

to 1,000 R/h. 

Readout information from these detectors was recorded at 

CP-1 and CP-2. 

Thirty-five air sampler trailer units were positioned at 

various locations in the test area for this event. These 

were started a minimum of three hours prior to scheduled 

device detonation and were set on' continuous sampling 

mode. 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at the muster or control stations 

for issuance or return of their muster or stay-in bad78 
TABLE 3.1 

RED HOT EVENT 

RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

5 March 1966 

Station Location 

UNDERGROUND 

1 2+75 feet (275 feet: main drift) 

2 0+25 feet (25 feet; main drift) 

3 43+00 feet (4,300 feet main drift; just outside plug 

No. 3) 

4 5+00 feet (500 feet; deep well drift) 

5 2+89 feet (289 feet; deep well drift) 

6 3+25 feet (325 feet: deep well drift) 

7 39+00 feet (3,900 feet; main drift) 

8 58+28 feet (5,828 feet: main drift) 

9 32+00 feet (3,200 feet: main drift 

10 5+00 feet (500 feet: MADISON drift) 

11 24+50 feet (2,450 feet; main drift) 

12 15+50 feet (1,550 feet; main drift) 

13 39+00 feet (3,900 feet; main drift) 

79 
TABLE 3.2 

RED HOT EVENT 

RAMS lJNIT LOCATIONS 

5 March 1966 

Station Location 

14 447 feet from SGZ at 45" Azimuth 

15 451 feet from SGZ at 71' Azimuth 

16 385 feet from SGZ at 113' Azimuth 

17 439 feet from SGZ at 161" Azimuth 

18 538 feet from SGZ at 176" Azimuth 

19 608 feet from SGZ at 331' Azimuth 

20 605 feet from SGZ at 343" Azimuth 

21 594 feet from SGZ at 305' Azimuth 

22 1,024 feet from SGZ at 193" Azimuth 

23 827 feet from SGZ at 206" Azimuth 

24 884 feet from SGZ at 237" Azimuth 

25 889 feet from SGZ at 274' Azimuth 

26 916 feet from SGZ at 298" Azimuth 

27 1,406 feet from SGZ at 333" Azimuth 

28 1,072 feet from SGZ at 2" Azimuth 

29 1,034 feet from SGZ at 44" Azimuth 

30 1,065 feet from SGZ at 74" Azimuth 

31 1,021 feet from SGZ at 92" Azimuth 

32 2,030 feet from SGZ at 119' Azimuth 

33 2,450 feet from SGZ at 63" Azimuth 

34 3,306 feet from SGZ at 346" Azimuth 

35 1,815 feet from SGZ at 323" Azimuth 

36 2,434 feet from SGZ at 310" Azimuth 

37 2,434 feet from SGZ at 272' Azimuth 

38 3,583 feet from SGZ at 272' Azimuth 

39 4,165 feet from SGZ at 293" Azimuth 

40 4,684 feet from SGZ at 315" Azimuth 

41 5,250 feet from SGZ at 56" Azimuth 

42 3,053 feet from SGZ at 87" Azimuth 

43 5,515 feet from SGZ at 125' Azimuth 

44 4,074 feet from SGZ at 160' Azimuth 

45 3,806 feet from SGZ at 204" Azimuth 

80 
ges. All personnel were required to have proper security clearances for the area. Control of the area was 

maintained by the use of roadblocks, access authorizations and a Schedule of Events. Parties could enter the 

controlled area only with the permission of the Test 

Group Director or Test Manager. Wackenhut Services 

Incorporated security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks and directing the flow of traffic. 

D. Air Support 

Lookout Mountain Air Force Station (LMAFS) photo personnel and DOD aerial photo personnel were in a UEI-43D 

helicopter positioned a safe distance from the tunnel 

portal at zero time. In addition to the two photo helicopters, an Air Force U-3A aircraft, a pilot and a copilot were made available to a PHS aerial monitoring 

team for cloud tracking purposes. The PHS also operated 

two Turbo-Reech and one C-45 aircraft for cloud sampling 

purposes. The EG&G Martin 404 (NATS,) aircraft was on 

standby in Las Vegas. The three PHS aircraft were code 

named Vegas 2, Vegas 7, and Vegas 0, respectively. 

Vegas 2 was the primary cloud locating and sampling 

plane. It was equipped with cryogenic and electrostatic 

precipitator sampling systems, an Andersen sampler, a 

gross activity air sampler, and gamma detection equipment. Vegas 7 was equipped for its first mission with a 

variable time-controlled sequential air sampler, an 

'electrostatic precipitator and low background beta 

counter, differential beta-gamma detection equipment, 

and a gross gamma detection system. For the second mission it was equipped with a cryogenic sampler, a gross 

air sampler, beta-gamma detection equipment, and a gross 

gamma detection system. Vegas 8 was assigned to cloud 

81 
tracking and carried a high volume tracking filter, sequential air sampler, low background beta counter, and 

gamma detection system. 

3.2.3 Late Precvent Activities 

RED HOT detonation was originally scheduled for 1000 hours 

on 1 March 1966. The muster station was activated at 0000 hours 

on 1 March and the first security sweep was completed at 0200 

hours. A second security sweep began at 0300 hours and was completed at 0500 hours. Experimenter personnel from SC, EG&G, DOD, 

Stanford Research Institute (SRI), and Engineering Physics (EPCO) 

were in the area performing button up activities from 0530 hours 

to 0630 hours. At that time, Area 12 was cleared and the muster 

station moved to the junction of Orange Road and Rainier Mesa 

Road (southeast of Area 12). The arming party entered the area 

at 0720 hours, the muster station was moved to the junction of 

Rainier Mesa Road and Area 2 Road (further southeast from the 

event), and at 0733 WSI personnel began a security sweep of Area 

12. At 0833, arming was complete and the party exited the closed 

area. 

The event was "scrubbed" at 0848 hours; however, WSI personnel were advised to maintain the closed area until the arming 

party disarmed the device. This was accomplished between 0900 

hours and 0930 hours; thereafter, the area was reopened. 

A 24-hour delay was called at 1945 hours on 1 March 1966. 

Preliminary steps were taken toward test execution on 2 March and 

3 March; however, both days the event was "scrubbed." 

On 4 March 1966, the first and second security sweeps were 

completed at 0430 and 0600 hours respectively. A Test Manager's 

readiness briefing was held, and the arming party entered the 

area at 0850 hours. Permission to arm was granted at 0930 hours, 

82 
and the arming party left the area at 0942 hours. After several 

delays from 1031 hours to 1432 hours, the decision was made to 

delay for an additional 24-hours. At 1445 hours the arming party 

departed for GZ to disarm the device, completing the task at 1520 

hours. 

3.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Between 0000 and 0600 hours on 5 March 1966, the following 

experimenter activities were being conducted: 

- REECo personnel performed *final checks of CCTV camera 

equipment. 

- SC personnel made final instrumentation adjustments at GZ, 

checked recording equipment at the Hydyme trailer, and made 

final adjustments on three geophones located 2,450 feet east 

of GZ and three geophones located 3,900 feet east of GZ all in 

the tunnel. Final adjustments also were made in van GMT-2 located in the trailer park outside the tunnel portal, and in 

van E-12 located two miles east of the tunnel portal. 

- EG&G personnel loaded cameras and turned on equipment at photo 

stations No. 1 and No. 2. 

- SRI personnel performed final checks and button up of vans 

located at the tunnel portal, and proceeded to SGZ on Rainier 

Mesa to make final instrument checks and button up an instrument van. 

- EPCO personnel conducted final checks and button up of their 

instrument van. 

- BRL personnel checked system battery conditions and took final 

83 
pressure, temperature, and humidity readings at their 

instrument van. 

Most of the above activities occurred on each previous attempt to execute this event. 

The first and second security sweeps were conducted from 

0140 hours to 0400 hours. A Test Manager's readiness briefing 

was conducted at 0715 hours with a scheduled zero time of 1000 

hours. The muster station was relocated to just north of the 

Area 2 access road at 0800 hours. Arming was complete at 0803 

and the area was clear of personnel by 0813 hours. 

Radsafe personnel arrived at the Test Director's FCP at 0840 

hours, opened the mobile check station, and dressed out reentry 

personnel in anticontamination clothing and equipment. 

At 0915 hours, a photo party of two LMAFS personnel plus a 

USAF crew in a UH-43D helicopter were in position 3,000 feet east 

of the portal at an altitude of 3,030 feet. A DOD photo party of 

three plus a USAF crew in a UH-43D helicopter were in position 

1,500 feet east of the portal at an altitude of 1,500 feet. 

The required countdown began at 0930 hours on radio nets 1, 

2, 6, and 8. Ten minutes prior to scheduled device detonation the 

siren on CP-1 ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of 

the building were turned on until after detonation. 

RED HOT zero time was 1015 hours PST on 5 March 1966. 

A dust cloud formed outside the portal after detonation. 

There was no radiation above background associated with this 

cloud (or elsewhere outside the tunnel) until eight minutes after 

device detonation when venting began. All RAMS units inside the 

portal except stations 10, 11, and 12 ceased functioning immedi84 
ately. Within two minutes, RAMS No. 11 had risen to 900 R/h; 

within six minutes RAMS No. 10 in the MADISON drift had risen to 

100 R/h and continued increasing. Ventilation was turned on so 

that the imminent release of activity could be filtered, and RAMS 

No. 12 readings promptly increased to 110 R/h. Thereafter, RAMS 

units outside the portal indicated varying levels of activity 

during the release, which continued for more than six hours. The 

highest RAMS reading outside the tunnel was 200 R/h at H+19 minutes. After 48 hours, however, all onsite radiation levels had 

decreased to background with the exception of those within the 

tunnel and at the tunnel portal. 

3.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Monitoring 

Approximately 20 minutes after zero time (1015 PST), Vegas 

made its first pass over SGZ at 7,000 feet above mean sea level 

(MSLJ where 50 mR/h was measured. Two additional passes over SGZ 

showed activity levels continuing to rise, reaching 450 mR/h by 

1041 hours. Additional circling of SGZ further indicated the release was moving in a general westerly direction. Hased on this 

information, a sampling flight path was established 2.7 miles to 

the west of SGZ at 7,500 Eeet MSL and normal to the expected 

cloud trajectory. First contact with the cloud's leading edge 

occurred at 1051 hours. Position of the contact point indicated 

the cloud was initially moving on a course of 250 degrees true at 

about 6.5 mph. Sample collection continued until 1127 hours on 

the initially established course. The final sampling pass was 

made from a position 1.5 miles farther to the west at the same 

altitude and flown directly back toward SGZ upon reaching the 

cloud center line. A minimum dose rate reading of 5 mR/h on the 

axial pass was observed at the starting position with the maximum 

readings of SO mR/h occurring approximately 0.25 miles west of 

SGZ. Peak dose rate readings for all previous sample runs were 

approximately 25 mR/h to 30 mR/h. 

85 

2 
Gross gamma information obtained on the last sample pass 

along the cloud axis indicated westerly movement of the cloud had 

ceased. Similar information was obtained at this time by Vegas 7 

making cloud height and trajectory measurements. Flying at 8,300 

feet MSL at 1137 hours, Vegas 7 reported the leading edge had 

reached the PHS farm in Area 15, thereby establishing a trajectory of approximately 70 degrees true. 

Between 1035 and 1140 hours, cloud height measurements had 

determined the lower limit to be at an average altitude of 6,500 

feet MSL and the top at •9,000 feet MSL. At time, it had this 

developed a length of 11 miles, an average width of 1.8 miles, 

and a depth of 2,500 feet, with a resultant volume of 3 x 1012 

cubic feet. 

Vegas 7 returned to the area on a sampling mission between 

1320 and 1410 hours. Repeated flights at 7,500 feet MSL were 

made over SGZ and in circular patterns in the immediate vicinity 

of SGZ to determine the existence of any continuing release. No 

continuing release was detected. 

At 1520 hours, Vegas 8 departed McCarran Airport for a cloud 

tracking mission in the area immediately to the north of SGZ. At 

1618 hours, mid-time of the first sample of Vegas 8's tracking 

mission, the northern edge of the cloud was located at 9,500 feet 

MSL and was found to extend from Gold Reed to the northern tip of 

the Belted Range. Activity varied from approximately two times 

background over Gold Reed to ten times background over the Belted 

Range. A second sample run was flown on a reciprocal heading 

over the first sample run course confirming the first results. 

At 1710, sample run number thr,ee began over the southern tip of 

the Kawich Range at 9,500 feet MSL on a true course of 130 dcgrees terminating at the northern boundary of NTS. The cloud was 

first detected over Gold Reed at three times background and increased rapidly to approximately 75 times background at the ter-
minal position. Sample run number four began at 1742 hours over 

Rlack Mountain at 9,500 feet MSL on a true course of 90 degrees, 

continued to the western boundary of Groom Lake then north on a 

true course of 00 degrees terminating five miles southwest of 

Queen City Summit. Cloud activity twice background was first detected four miles east of Black Mountain and continued uninterrupted to a position directly east of the northern tip of the 

Belted Range. Maximum activity of approximately 140 times 

background occurred at 1748 hours five miles north of Gate 700. 

On D-day from H+4 hours to H+8 hours, an Air Force Tactical 

Air Command (AFTAC) C-54 aircraft tracked and sampled from NTS 

north-northwest to approximately. 38 degrees north, 117 degrees 

west at 7,000 to 9,000 feet MSL. 

On 6 March, Vegas 8 departed McCarran Airport for a cloud 

trajectory mission through north central Nevada. Flight sample 

runs were made between each of the following locations in order 

as given: Mercury, Beatty, Lida Junction, Tonopah, a point 60 

miles from Tonopah on a true heading of 28 degrees, Currant, 

Austin, a point 10 miles north of Battle Mountain, Austin, and a 

point 30 miles south of Austin. 

A C-130 aircraft operating from Tonopah found activity in 

Big Smokey and Monitor Valleys at about 7,000 feet MSL. A C-135 

also searched east of NTS in an area bounded by Salt Lake City, 

Ogden, and Rock Springs, Utah; and Grand Junction, Colorado at 

altitudes between 10,000 and 13,000 feet MSL. Results from this 

flight were negative. 

3.3.2 Surface Reentry Activities 

Initial safety and radiological surveys were performed under 

the direction of the Test Group Director in accordance with the 

87 
"Radiological Safety Support Plan for RED HOT." The initial radiation survey began at 1111 hours and was completed at 1153 

hours on 5 March 1966. 

Two vehicle-borne Radsafe teams, consisting of two radiation 

monitors each, performed the initial ground survey. They were 

referenced as team No. 1 and team No. 2. After release by the 

DOD Test Group Director, the two parties proceeded from the FCP 

via the Area 12 Main Access Road toward the U12g portal area, 

surveying enroute. Initial radiation survey readings are shown 

in Table 3.3. The maximum measurement of 7,000 mR/h was at the 

rope fence in the portal area. 

Radsafe Team No. 1 proceeded to the vicinity of the portal 

and as radiation intensities allowed, obtained radiation measurements at the portal and other locations of interest in the 

area. Upon completion of the survey, team No. 1 proceeded to a 

point immediately outside the newly established radex area near 

the entrance to the portal area. A temporary mobile check station facility was then established at this location. 

Team No. 2 proceeded to the film-instrumentation trailer 

park, surveying enroute. During this survey, film was recovered 

from the trailers. Four SRI personnel were escorted to the 

trailer area by a Radsafe monitor to perform experiment recovery. 

After completion of the trailer park survey, team No. 2 controlled access to the portal area. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials were 

marked to indicate radiation levels present. Personnel entering 

radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed concerning potential exposure and safety precautions and provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

88 
TABLE 3.3 

RED HOT EVENT 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

5 March 1966 

Gamma Exposure Rate 

Time Location (mR/h) 

1111 Stake M-143 (7.2 miles SE of portal) Rkg* 

Stake M-147 (6.2 miles SE of portal) Bkg* 

Stake M-151 (5.2 miles SE of portal) Bkg" 

Stake M-155 (4.3 miles E of portal) Bkg" 

Stake M-162 (3.5 miles NE of portal) Bkg* 

Stake M-163 (3.4 miles NE of portal) Bkg* 

1130 Stake M-167 (2.8 miles NE of portal) 0.2 

1138 Stake M-170 (2 miles NE of portal) 0.5 

1139 Stake M-175 (1.4 miles NE of portal) 1.0 

1140 Stake 12-G-6 (1.1 miles NE of portal) 1.5 

1141 Stake 12-G-7 (1.0 mile NE of portal) 15.0 

1141 C, Tunnel pad entrance 50.0 

1145 Cable run west 500.0 

1145 Rope fence (center)** l,ooo.o 

1146 Rope fence (west) 1,500.o 

1151 Rope fence (west) 7,000.0 

L153 Rope fence (east) 5,000.0 

*Background radiation measurement 

**Because the possibility of venting had been considered, the 

area in front of the tunnel portal had been roped off to prevent anyone from getting in a direct line with the tunnel. The 

rope ran east and west across the portal area, parallel to the 

axis of the tunnel, and 100 Eeet north of the portal. 

89 
After use, anticontamination clothing and equipment were 

laundered and returned to stock for subsequent reissue. Those 

items which could not be decontaminated to permissible levels 

were buried at the designated disposal site in Area 5. 

On 5 and 6 March, reentries were made to the portal area to 

recover film and various other experiment data. According to 

plan, tunnel reentry was not to take place prior to 21 March 

1966. 

On March 6 at 0720 *hours, the security and Radsafe control 

station was moved to the junction of Orange Road and Mercury 

Highway in Area 12. From 0940 hours to 1400 hours, four DOD personnel, five SC personnel, and two LASL personnel entered the 

closed area to recover film and tapes. At 1510 hours, a Radsafe 

monitor, one DOD representative, and mining department personnel 

entered the controlled area to seal the portal. They completed 

the task and exited the area at 1522 hours. 

At 1730 hours, an air sampling trailer was placed in front 

of the tunnel portal. On 7 March 1966, sometime between a radiation survey at 0230 hours and the next entry into the area at 

0530, an explosion took place. The air sampling trailer was destroyed by the explosion. Portal gates, portal coverings, and 

vent lines were damaged. The explosion was caused by explosive 

gas trapped underground which ignited for some unknown reason. 

No personnel were in the area at the time. The rope and barricade fence which had been constructed before the event completely 

blocked access into the portal area. Before and after the explosion anyone proceeding beyond the barricade was accompanied by a 

Radsafe monitor and wore appropriate respiratory protection. The 

portal gates and coverings were repaired, and no reentries into 

the tunnel were permitted until 17 March. 

No other experimenter reentries were recorded between 7 

March and 16 March. 

90 
3.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

3.4.1 PHS Ground Monitoring Support 

Winds on D-day were light and variable, moving the radioactive effluent very slowly to the north-northeast. By the time 

the cloud had penetrated into the offsite populated areas, it was 

diffused over a large area and most of the very short lived radionuclides were not detected. 

Eight PHS ground monitoring personnel were located north and 

northeast of SGZ. Four were stationed onsite and four were offsite along Highway 25 from Hancock* Summit to Warm Springs. One 

of these monitors later checked along Highway 6 from Warm Springs 

to Clark Station. No radiation intensities above background were 

measured by any ground monitors in the offsite areas. 

Six milk samples were collected following this event. Each 

milk sample was counted for 40 minutes using a 400-channel analyzer viewing an energy range from 0 to 2 MeV. No radioiodines 

were detected in these samples. Chemical analyses indicated that 

strontium isotopes were all below 20 pCi/l. 

Vegetation samples were collected in the projected effluent 

trajectory to detect any deposition on the ground. They also 

were obtained at most milk sampling locations, with an effort 

made to take samples representative of the cows' feed. Twentyseven vegetation samples were collected from offsite locations 

and analyzed for gamma emitting isotopes. Only one sample, collected at Battle Mountain, Nevada, on 7 March, showed the presence of fresh fission products (iodine-131 and iodine-133). 

One water sample was collected from a stock tank at Nyala, 

Nevada, on 7 March. Another sample was collected at Nyala and a 

91 
sample was obtained at Twin Springs Ranch on 8 March. None of 

these samples contained fresh fission products. 

Small (less than 1 to 81 picocuries per m3) amounts of radioiodine isotopes were found on filter media from thirteen offsite air sampling stations. 

3.4.2 Tunnel Reentry 

The ventilation blowers were restarted on 17 March 1966. At 

0945 hours on 24 March, a work party accompanied by a Radsafe 

monitor entered the area to remove the gate from the tunnel portal. The gate was removed at 1100 hours and miners began hooking 

up the vent line to the main blowers. 

On 6 April 1966 at 1225 hours, the reentry team entered the 

tunnel which was found to be blocked by debris approximately 

2,500 feet in from the portal. Bioassay samples were taken from 

reentry personnel before and after tunnel entry. 

On 7 April at 1000 hours, a party entered to perform explosive mixture checks of tunnel air before the work party entered. 

They entered as far as the MADISON drift turnoff, noting significant amounts of debris, but no toxic gas or explosive mixtures. 

Because of problems with the MADISON fan generator, no reentries 

were made for the remainder of the day. 

Reentry mining and debris removal continued until the 

MADISON drift was reentered on 9 May 1966 from 1330 hours to 1530 

hours. At this time, a decision was made not to mine through the 

main drift but to drive a parallel bypass drift from the MADISON 

drift toward the Deep Well drift. Work on the bypass drift began 

on 27 April at 1330 hours. On 29 June 1966 reentry teams reentered the main drift through a crossover from the bypass drift. 

Contact readings of 7 R/h were recorded in the main drift. DOD 

92 
photo team, SC inspection party, and visitor party personnel entered the main drift from 1530 to 1615 hours. Upon their exit 

the entrance to the crossover drift was barricaded. 

3.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then 

recorded in the monitors' log book. Maximum industrial hygiene 

readings for the RED HOT event were: 

1. 70,000 ppm CO in the cavity above the "Y" in the tunnel 

on 26 April 1966. 

2. 100 percent of the LEL in the main drift on 19 April 

1966. 

3. 10 ppm NO + NO2 at the reentry mining face on 19 May 

1966. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

were emphasized during all operations. 

3.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities 

On 30 April 1966 at 2230 hours, drillback from the top of 

Rainier Mesa into the RED HOT cavity began. The abandonment 

valve was closed after completion of the drillback operation on 3 

May 1966 at 1545 hours. No core samples with sufficient activity 

for radiochemical analyses were obtained. 

Later in the day on 30 April, DOD had a blower hooked onto 

the abandonment valve so that air could be removed from the 

93 
cavity, thus reducing pressure in the cavity. Cavity ventilation 

was conducted through 5 May 1966. 

3.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at 1015 hours on 5 March 1966 and 

continued until 1500 hours on 13 April 1966. Maximum measurements underground and on the surface were: 

Greater than 1,000 R/h at Station 5+00 (500 feet inside 

MADISON drift) at 1205 hours on 5 March 1966. 

200 R/h at surface station 161 degrees azimuth 439 Eeet from 

the portal at 1034 hours on 5 March 1966. 

The initial reentry survey began at 1111 hours and ended at 

1153 hours on 5 March 1966. The maximum measurement of 7 R/h was 

at the rope fence around the portal area at 1151 hours on 5 March 

1966. 

Postevent mining began on 6 April 1966 at 1255 hours. Mining 

and recovery operations were completed on 26 July 1966. 

Surface drillback into the RED HOT cavity began at 2230 

hours on 30 April 1966 and was completed at 1545 hours on 3 May 

1966. The maximum radiation measurement was 10 mR/h on the drill 

platform at 1535 hours on 3 May 1966. 

The highest alpha radiation measurement was 3,500 cpm at 

1430 hours at the Radsafe alcove on 29 June 1966. 

No radiation intensities above background were measured in 

offsite areas by ground monitors, dose rate recorders, or film 

badges. Small amounts of radioiodines were found on filter media 

94 
from 13 offsite air sampling stations. No fresh fission products 

were found in milk or water samples taken. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

RED HOT radex areas from 5 March 1966 through 26 July 1966 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average 

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 3921 740 16 

DOD Participants 140 80 19 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no health hazard in the 

offsite area was produced by the RED HOT event. 

95 
CHAPTER 4 

PIN STRIPE EVENT 

4.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

PIN STRIPE was a DOD underground detonation with a yield of 

less than 20 kt conducted at 1138 hours Pacific Daylight Time 

(PDT) on 25 April 1966 at shaft site Ullb in Area 11 of NTS. The 

device was emplaced in a mined shaft at a depth of approximately 

970 feet. The event was conducted to study the efEects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. An LOS 

pipe with a maximum diameter of 36 inches extended to the surface 

as part of the study. 

Venting began one minute after detonation and continued 

until cavity collapse occurred approximately five minutes after 

detonation. Seepage from the SGZ area began seven hours after 

detonation and continued until 28 hours after detonation. Venting 

was not through the LOS pipe or shaft stemming but through an unanticipated geologic fissure. Radioactive effluent from this 

event was detected both onsite and offsite. These occurrences are 

discussed in greater detail in section 4.3. The event was fielded 

for the DOD by Sandia Laboratory, which was responsible for furnishing, emplacing, and detonating the PIN STRIPE device. Fourteen projects were conducted by the DOD, laboratories, and contractors. 

4.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all PIN STRIPE project activities in Area 11. Responsibili96 
ties of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with 

established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

action between Field Command, DASA, and the Nevada Operations 

Office. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and 

postevent removal of equipment necessary for their project activities. 

4.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "PIN STRIPE Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to conduct safe and economical reentry and recovery within the desired time frame. In addition, Radsafe personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. 

A. Construction and Experiment Readiness 

Construction at the PIN STRIPE site started in October 

1965 with preparation for shaft mining. Actual mining 

commenced in November, and the shaft was completed in 

early March 1966. Installation of cable troughs, scientific cabling, trailer park, and preparation of the 

mobile tower proceeded in parallel and was completed in 

February 1966 (Figure 4.1). The main trailer park was 

established 650 feet east of SGZ, 100 feet closer than 

for WISHBONE and DILUTED WATERS (these events were described in the first volume of this series), to save on 

cable and decrease signal losses. Two trailers were more 

heavily shock-mounted and placed 350 feet from SGZ to 

allow recording of low level signals with little or no 

amplification and low signal loss. 

During this field construction phase, all experimenters 

were completing fielding preparations and fabricating 

their experiments. These activities were accomplished 

at a relatively easy pace due to stretchout in the PIN 

97 
3 
STRIPE test schedule. Experimenters started arriving 

onsite in late January 1966 to set up and check out 

their instrumentation trailers and prepare experiments 

for mounting on a mobile tower in February and March. 

Early in the field installation phase, advantages of 

electric motor-driven generators for furnishing isolated, regulated, power to instrumentation trailers over 

the previously used diesel-engine-driven generators were 

considered. While motor generators offered better overall reliability, there was some question as to possible 

difficult ground isolation and power losses during area 

power outages before and just after zero time. The controversy was settled when it became apparent that only a 

very few motor-driven generators could be made available. Thus, most instrumentation trailers were powered 

by the usual diesel generators while only a few, the 

Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL) trailers, were powered 

by motor generators. 

The line-of-sight (LOS) pipe and closure hardware were 

delivered several pieces at a time during February and 

March 1966 and were installed one section at a time 

starting from the bottom of the shaft. This installation procedure was in contrast to installation of the 

entire pipe string from the surface as had been done in 

previous drilled-hole LOS pipe tests. Installation of 

pipe sections and closure hardware into the shaft piecewise allowed continuing access to them until stemming 

took place. Just prior to starting pipe installation it 

was discovered that bolts to be used to fasten pipe sections together were of substandard quality (lacking in 

tensile strength). Although no major problem was encountered, pipe installation and dry runs were delayed several days while new bolts were procured. 

99 
Signal dry runs began in late February for a planned 

period of four weeks prior to the full power, full 

frequency (FPFF) dry run. Several electrical leakage 

paths between various signal cable shields and earth 

ground were discovered and subsequently eliminated. 

Once the LOS pipe was installed and checked out, walls 

were removed from the tower sides and access was reduced 

for safety reasons. The mobile tower was then moved to 

its final position, straddling the pit from which the 

top of the LOS p'ipe protruded. The cables leading from 

the experiments back to the instrumentation trailers 

were supported on scaffolding-type cable towers adjacent 

to the test tower. Due to the movement of the tower and 

scientific cables and the long intervening time since 

the FPFF dry run, a mandatory participation dry run was 

held to once more check continuity and operation of the 

entire experimental and electrical system. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the test 

event. Test area maps with appropriate reference points 

were prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, and air sampling equipment were positioned in 

the test area. Reentry routes into the test area were 

established during "dry runs." Party monitors were 

briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

Remote area monitoring stations and air sampling units 

were installed according to DOD and laboratory specifications. Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI 

security roadblocks and work areas within the exclusion 

100 
area to perform surveys and provide other support as 

directed. 

Documenting any radioactive effluent release was the 

primary mission of Radsafe personnel assigned to manned 

stations. All additional personnel at manned stations 

were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, *and reentry parties as needed. 

Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP prior to 

detonation ready to perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform 

personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as 

required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

RAMS units were located as follows: 

8 - underground stations 

1 - SGZ 

4 - 100 feet from SGZ at 90" intervals beginning at 45" 

azimuth 

101 
6- approximately 500 feet from SGZ at varying degrees 

azimuth 

5 - approximately 710 feet from SGZ at varying degrees 

azimuth 

12 - 1,000 feet from SGZ at 30" intervals beginning at 

15" azimuth 

12 - 2,000 feet from SGZ at 30' intervals beginning at 

0" azimuth 

D. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stat ions were establ i shed on D-day. 

All personnel enterinq or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at the muster or control stations 

for issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. All personnel were required to have proper security clearances for the area. Control of the area was 

maintained by using roadblocks, access permits, and a 

Schedule of Events. Parties could enter the controlled 

area only with permission from the Test Manager or the 

DOD Test Group Director. WSI security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks and directing traffic flow. 

E. Air Support 

The two PHS sampling aircraft were Vegas 8, a PHS twin 

turboprop Beechcraft; and Vegas 2, a PHS twin-engine 

Beechcraft C-45. Only Veqas 2 was used on this event 

because the other twin-turboprop Beechcraft, Vegas 7, 

was underqoinq manufacturer's engine changes and structural modifications. The main sampling aircraft was 

Vegas 8, which provided initial monitoring and sampling, 

and also flew two trajectory missions--one on the day of 

the event, and the other on the following day. Vegas 2 

102 
was flown to obtain a gas sample four hours after the 

event. The EG&G/NATS aircraft, a Martin 404, was on 

standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. 

4.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Final checks were made on all systems, and the test was 

scheduled for 19 April. Unfavorable winds (both speed and direction) plagued the test for six days. Although an unsuccessful 

attempt to execute on one other day (between 19 and 25 April) was 

made, PIN STRIPE was not executed until 25 April. 

4.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The readiness briefing on 24 April initially scheduled the 

test event for 1000 hours on the morning of 25 April. However, 

undesirable wind direction and low wind speeds caused postponement at that time. NTS and PIN STRIPE surface wind criteria required a southerly wind of at least 5 knots (approximately 5.8 

mph) to provide adequate fallout protection for the trailer park 

as well as the rest of the test site, and to comply with the 

Limited Nuclear Test Ran Treaty. The 30-minute countdown finally 

began at 1108 hours. PIN STRIPE was detonated at 1138 hours PDT 

with detonation time surface winds of 6 mph from 190' azimuth. 

For about the first minute after detonation, all indications 

were as expected; i.e., the ground heaved and some amount of dust 

was thrown into the air. At H+l minute, the winches were started 

to withdraw the mobile tower from the expected subsidence area. 

At approximately the same time, effluent began to emerge from the 

ground at a point some 150 feet southwest of SGZ. The point of 

emergence lengthened into a line extending toward SGZ in a few 

seconds and further away from SGZ a few tens of seconds later. A 

gray cloud formed, qrowing until subsidence occurred. The subsi103 
dence crater was a maximum of only 14 feet deep and elliptical, 

approximately 135 by 245 feet, elongated in the direction of the 

surface crack from which the effluent emerged. Crater volume was 

33,000 cubic yards. 

The cloud rose to an altitude of about 2,000 feet over the 

test area as it was blown by winds in a north-northeast direction. As planned for such an occurrence, winds did not take 

effluent directly over the trailer park. However, significant 

radiation exposure of trailers and recording equipment inside 

them was caused by gamma shine from the radioactive material in 

the cloud. Winds conti'nued to blow the cloud over the northeastern portions of the NTS and offsite. 

RAMS unit measurements of radiation levels in the trailer 

park rose to 400 R/hour for 2 to 3 minutes. Radioactivity 

decayed rapidly, until at about H+20 minutes, the readings had 

decayed to 15 to 20 R/hour. Permission was granted by the Test 

Manager at H+20 minutes to proceed with high priority data 

recovery. The initial hazards survey party and priority film 

recovery parties then departed the reentry assembly area with 

instructions not to enter areas where the exposure rate was 

greater than 17 R/hour. All high priority film recovery was 

completed by H+35 minutes. The remainder of the film and 

oscillograph paper was recovered by H+80 minutes. 

Since very little radioactive material.was deposited in the 

PIN STRIPE area, the radiation readings dropped fairly rapidly. 

Crews had disassembled the mobile tower and prepared it for experiment recovery by H+S hours. Radiation dosimetry devices on 

the tower were recovered and several experiment packages were removed from the tower by H+7-l/2 hours. 

104 
4.3.1 Cloud Tracking and Sampling, and Offsite Monitoring 

The effluent cloud rose to about 5,500 feet MSL within 9 

minutes after detonation, and to 10,500 feet MSL by one hour 

after detonation with a north-northeast trajectory. After 

approximately three hours travel time at about 10 miles per hour, 

it turned easterly and began to spread out. By the time the 

cloud had traveled about 90 miles with increasing speed (to near 

20 miles per hour), the cloud front extended approximately 90 

miles. 

PHS provided aerial sampling and measurements for the PIN 

STRIPE event. Also, AFTAC, Nevada Aerial Tracking System (NATS), 

and Aerial Radiation Monitoring 'System (ARMS) aircraft tracked 

and sampled the cloud during the night. The two PHS sampling 

aircraft were Vegas 8, a PHS twin-turboprop Beechcraft, and Vegas 

2, a PHS twin-engine Beechcraft C-45. Vegas 8 provided initial 

monitoring and sampling, and also flew two trajectory missions--

one on the day of the event and the other on the following day. 

Vegas 2 was flown to obtain a gas sample four hours after the 

event. 

Shortly after the event, Vegas 8 began overflying the cloud 

to determine radiation levels and trajectory. On the basis of 

the levels of activity, it was decided to wait until H+l hour 

before entering the cloud. Vegas 8 then entered the cloud path 

to obtain information on the size and shape of the release and to 

collect samples for subsequent laboratory analysis. After closein cloud characterization, trajectory flights were made to determine the path taken by the release. 

Prior to the start of sampling, the direction of the visible 

cloud was noted and a circuit oE the cloud was flown to obtain an 

estimate of size and shape. A sampling pattern was set up across 

the projected cloud trajectory and was flown repeatedly while 

105 
sampling. A sampling altitude was selected by visually examining 

the cloud rather than during a vertical penetration so as not to 

unduly contaminate the aircraft before beginning sampling. After 

collecting samples and data on cloud size, two spiral descents 

were made through the cloud to determine the vertical distribution of activity. 

The first trajectory flight served mostly to determine the 

rate of dispersion and decay in concentration of activity to aid 

in planning for the next day. This flight consisted of two legs 

across the cloud position as reported by the NATS aircraft. 

The sampling path for cloud quantitation was established 

initially between the south end of Papoose Lake and Camera Station Butte in Area 3. Cloud arrival time at Papoose Lake was 1240 

hours, establishing the average speed at 10 miles per hour. 

Clearance was requested for Vegas 8 to enter the Bombing and 

Gunnery Range and was received at 1309 hours. The cloud at that 

time was traveling at about 29" from SGZ, was 12 miles wide, and 

8 miles long. 

The end view of the visible cloud at 1220 hours was similar 

to the view shown in Figure 4.2. It was because of this saddle 

that sampling was performed at 7500 feet MSL in order to remain 

in the main body of the cloud. 

Four sets of six sequential samples were collected during 

passage through the cloud. Since the cloud was wider than 

anticipated, the first two sets of sequential samples covered 

only about one-half of the cloud width. The last two essentially 

spanned the cloud. 

Two additional sequential sample sets were collected during 

spiral descents through the cloud over the pass seven miles 

106 
9500’ 

7500’ 

Ground level 

6 miles 

PIN STRIPE 

DASHED LINE INDICATES CLOUD TO SAME 

SOLID LINE INDICATES AN EXAGGERATED 

SCALE AS 

VERTICAL 

THE BASE, 

SCALE. 

Figure 4.2 End View of Cloud at 1220 Hours - Looking North 

107 
northeast of Groom Lake. On the basis of information from the 

other aircraft, the first descent began at 15,000 feet MSL at 

1340 hours at a planned rate of descent of 2,000 feet per minute 

with 45-second sampling intervals. Once the descent started, the 

press of radio communications made it impossible for the pilot to 

maintain this rate, and the sixth sample was completed at 9,100 

feet MSL. However, the cloud top was located at 11,800 feet MSL. 

A second descent was made from 13,200 feet MSL at a rate of 1,000 

feet per minute with one-minute sampling intervals. 

Vegas 2 was the gas sampling aircraft. It had an elevatortype platform that was lowered to approximately five feet below 

the aircraft with five sampling probes mounted on the platform. 

Tubing conducted the air sample into the airplane with sweeping 

" s " bends to the cryogenic sampler, which was the only sampling 

equipment used in Vegas 2. 

Vegas 2 was called in to collect a cryogenic sample and met 

Vegas 8 in the vicinity of the spiral descents. Sampling began at 

1504 hours near Highway 25 west of Hancock Summit, and continued 

until 1606 hours. Low levels of activity prevented cloud edge 

measurement_ which, in turn, precluded cloud volume calculation 

for this mission. 

Vegas 8 was washed with water and detergent to reduce low 

level contamination and detection instrument background. It then 

flew a cloud trajectory mission between 1805 and 2030 hours. 

Shortly aEter takeoff the power inverter supplying the sensitive 

detection systems failed. Information from NATS at 1825 hours indicated cloud activity from Caliente to north of Pioche. 

Between 1913 and 1925 hours, a set of sequential samples was 

collected from 37 miles north of Pioche to Pioche at 13,000 feet 

MSL. A second set of samples was collected between 1940 and 2004 

hours from Pioche to 72 miles south. 

108 
Vegas 8 again departed on 26 April, still without the use of 

permanently-installed detection systems. It was hoped that onboard beta counting of the collected samples would enable the 

crew to locate the cloud. However, the low levels of activity 

and high background prevented this. The two-inch diameter interval samples were collected for consecutive ten-minute periods 

along the flight path at 13,000 feet MSL. Laboratory counting of 

samples collected on this flight indicated the possibility of 

some activity over Utah, but with positive contact from between 

Grand Junction and Meeker to just south of the Colorado border. 

The PHS-NV extended milk sampling network was placed in operation throughout Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, and southern Idaho. 

Also, the extended air sampling network was fully alerted. A 

peak radiation reading of 8 mR/h was recorded about 14 miles east 

of Coyote Summit, NV (about 50 miles from SGZ). This reading decreased to 2 mR/h within 30 minutes after the peak reading. The 

cloud transport speed was approximately lo-15 knots. Indications 

were that the cloud was dispersing. 

The NATS plane had a positive contact with the cloud on 26 

April with the cloud approximately 300 miles due east of NTS; 

airborne readings registered from two to ten times background. 

The air mass containing effluent also was located on 26 April 

over an area extending from southern Wyoming south to southwestern Kansas. The cloud mass appeared to be dispersing, and 

there was evidence that its radioactive content was being diffused. The last positive aerial contact made by the ARMS aircraft was on 26 April at the southeastern Colorado border late in 

the afternoon. 

Vegas 8 intercepted the cloud between Denver and Pueblo, 

Colorado at approximately 1230 hours 26 April, at 14,000 feet 

MSL. The air mass had shifted to the north and was located 

between central Minnesota and central Kansas. Rain showers were 

109 
encountered by the cloud in its passage. The rain and snow in 

North Dakota, Minnesota, and Kansas had a leaching effect on any 

effluent still present in the air mass. PHS, NATS, ARMS, and 

USAF aircraft continued to track the air mass until no further 

positive identification could be made that day. 

During daylight hours of 27 April, the NATS aircraft flew a 

pattern from Wichita, Kansas, north to International Falls, Minnesota and returned to Minneapolis, Minnesota. The last positive 

contact with airborne radioactivity was at 13,000 feet MSL over 

Pawnee City, Nebraska, about 1320 hours EDT. The NATS mission was 

terminated in Minneapolis at approximately 1800 hours Eastern 

Daylight Time (EDT), on 27 April. During the flight, extreme . 

turbulence (as well as snow and rain) was encountered. The NATS 

aircraft later returned to Nevada. The ARMS aircraft was grounded 

at Scottsbluff, Nebraska, because of high winds. 

The highest radiation level in a populated area near NTS was 

1.45 mR/h at Hiko, Nevada, at 1600 hours PDT on 25 April. The 8 

mR/h leve'l at Coyote Summit was in an unpopulated area. 

External exposure rates at Hiko were well below levels of 

concern, resulting in a calculated maximum whole-body exposure of 

12 mR compared to the 500 mR per year offsite individual wholebody exposure guide (see Appendix D). Although internal exposures were expected to be low, precautionary measures were taken 

to minimize radioiodine doses to the thyroid through the milk 

chain (possible through fallout on feed for dairy cows). 

Arrangements were made for 134 dairy cows at one Hiko dairy 

to be placed on dry feed (hay). This was implemented following 

the afternoon milking on 27 April. Also, a mobile thyroid counting trailer was moved from PHS-NV to the Alamo-Hiko, Nevada, area 

on 27 April. 

110 
From 27 through 30 April, thyroids of 78 adults and children 

from surrounding towns were measured for radioiodines. Based on 

these measurements, the projected thyroid doses averaged about 50 

mrem, with two persons receiving thyroid doses in the range of 

150 to 300 mrem. For comparison, the offsite individual thyroid 

exposure guide established by AEC Headquarters was 1500 mrem per 

year. 

Milk samples collected and analyzed by the PHS network for 

Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado showed no detectable radioiodine 

except for samples collected near Provo, Utah. These samples 

showed small amounts of iodine-131. Subsequent sample results 

indicated background levels within two days for this area. 

4.3.2 Radiation Surveys and Reentry Activities 

The PIN STRIPE initial radiation survey began at 1213 hours 

and was completed at 1223 hours on 25 April 1966. Readings are 

shown in Table 4.1. Additional surveys of the test area were 

continued until 2400 hours and are shown in Table 4.2. 

All survey data were reported, as collected, to the net 3 

radio control operator. 

Radsafe personnel were stationed at the DOD Test Group 

Director's FCP to perform initial and subsequent ground surveys 

as required; provide emergency rescue and support as directed: 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices: perform personnel, equipment, and 

vehicle decontamination; and operate a sample return station. A 

mobile facility for issue of anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices was positioned at the 

FCP along with a mobile decontamination unit. 

111 
TABLE 4.1 

PIN STRIPE EVENT 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

25 April 1966 

Gamma Exposure Rate 

Time Location (from SGZ) (mR/h) 

1213 Stake UE5F (1 mile SW) 0.6 

1215 IJllb equipment yard 70.0 

1215 Stake UllB4 (l/2 mile SE) 80.0 

1216 Trailer Compound 5,000.0 

1218 10 feet east of tower 17,000.0* 

1221 Stake 5C35 (l/4 mile SW) 1,700.o 

1223 100 yards from SE perimeter 7,000.0 

*This exposure rate was measured at contact with the ground, and 

was not a personnel exposure rate. 

112 
TABLE 4.2 

PIN STRIPE EVENT 

RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

25 April 1966 

Gamma Exposure Rate 

Time Location (from SGZ) (mR/h) 

1614 Stake 5C20 (3-l/4 miles SW) 12.0 

1626 Stake 5C25 (2-l/4 miles SW) 80.0 

1633 Stake 5C29 (l-1/2 miles SW) 120.0 

1633 Stake 5C29 (4-l/2 miles SW) 250.0* 

1643 Stake 5C33 (3/4 mile SW) 55.0 

1646 Stake 5C36 (SGZ) 6.5 

1658 Stake 5C42 (l-1/2 miles SE) 2.0 

1719 Stake SC51 (2-l/2 miles NE) 1.4 

1719 Stake 5C51 2-l/2 miles NE) 1.5* 

1743 Stake 5C42 l-1/2 miles SE) 1.1 

1745 Stake 5C36 SGZ) 4.0 

1759 Stake 5C33 3/4 mile SW) 35.5 

1807 Stake 5C29 l-1/2 miles SW) 85.0 

la17 Stake 5C25 (2-l/4 miles SW) 50.0 

1826 Stake 5C20 (3-l/4 miles SW) 8.0 

2200 Security Station 256-C 5.0 

2320 Security Station 256-C 2.5 

2400 Security Station 256-C 0.2 

*Contact reading 

113 
Decontamination units were positioned at entrances to controlled areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment used 

in postevent activities also were monitored and decontaminated as 

necessary. 

Each area and all contaminated and radioactive materials 

were marked to indicate radiation levels present. Personnel 

entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material 

were briefed concerning potential exposure and safety precautions, and were provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

4.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

4.4.1 Subsidence Crater Reentry 

From approximately 1620 hours to 1635 hours on 11 May 1966, 

reentry party personnel dressed in anticontamination clothing for 

entry into the crater area. Each person was issued one 200 mR and 

one 1 R pocket dosimeter in addition to one Victoreen Radector 

radiation detection instrument. Acme full-face masks and MSA 

masks were readied and placed in a large plastic bag to be issued 

at the crater site if there was an indication of escaping gases 

or airborne dust particles. The party then traveled to the forward security barricade (located on the access road at the east 

side of the trailer compound), and subsequently was cleared into 

the area at 1645 hours. 

The party entered the crater area inside the perimeter fence 

from the west and proceeded to the west side of the crater (1 R/h 

gamma field) (Figure 4.3). Then the party walked the crater edge 

to the fissure area on the south side of the crater (exposure 

rate varied from 1 R/h gamma to a maximum of 5 R/h gamma at three 

114 
CRATER AREA ACCESS RD. 

GRAY DUST DEPOSIT 

HEAVY AT FISSURES FORWARD 

TO TRAILER COMPOUND * 

=: 

ul 

CRATER ENTRY CONDITIONS 

I.LIGHT WINDS ACCESS 

ROAD 

50 mR/h gamma 

Figure 4.3 Ullb Crater Entry - 11 May 1966 
feet above ground, and 15 R/h gamma contact). This survey was 

completed in three to four minutes. The party entered the crater 

area from the south side and walked to the shaft area where they 

spent three to four minutes. They exited the crater at approximately 1705 hours. Upon arrival at the vehicles, shoe covers, 

hoods, and gloves were removed. This was to avoid contamination 

of vehicles. The party exited the area at 1715 hours. 

Upon arrival at the Radsafe facility, the entry party personnel undressed, were monitored, were decontaminated as necessary, and had film badges exchanged. The average exposure reading 

per pocket dosimeter was 155 mR. Vehicles were surveyed and personnel exited the area. 

4.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

The postevent drill rig and crew arrived at the drill site 

and began setting up on 14 July. Between 18 July and 28 July 

1966, continuous drilling problems were experienced. As a result 

of the problems the operation was suspended, the rig dismantled 

and decontaminated, and the cap welded on the hole by 2030 hours 

on 28 July 1966. The maximum radiation reading recorded during 

postevent drilling activities was 100 mR/h in the cellar at 0040 

hours on 17 July 1966. 

4.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Toxic gas levels and explosive mixtures were monitored frequently. Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

were emphasized during all operations. 

116 
4.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The maximum telemetry reading was greater than 1,000 R/h at 

a station 100 feet from SGZ on 25 April 1966 at 1139 hours. The 

initial survey began at 1213 hours and was completed at 1223 

hours on 25 April 1966. The maximum gamma reading was 17 R/h 

(ground contact) 10 feet east oE the tower at 1218 hours on 25 

April 1966. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent drilling began during day shift on 14 July 1966, 

and the rig was dismantled and equipment removed on 28 July 1966. 

The maximum gamma exposure rate detected was 100 mR/h in the 

cellar at 0040 hours on 17 July 1966. No alpha radiation was 

detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

PIN STRIPE radex areas from 25 April 1966 to 1 August 1966 are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average 

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 1873 835 48 

DOD Participants 185 215 102 

Radioactivity from the PIN STRIPE event was detected offsite. Calculated external and internal exposures at the offsite 

populated area with the highest exposure rates were less than AEC 

Chapter 0524 offsite exposure guides. 

117 
-_ 

CHAPTER 5 

DISCUS THROWER EVENT 

5.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DISCUS THROWER event was a DOD underground detonation 

with a yield of 22 kt conducted at 1300 hours PDT on 27 May 1966 

at shaft site U8a in Area 8 of the NTS. The device was emplaced 

in a 36-inch diameter shaft at a depth of 1,105 feet, and a short 

distance above an interface between two rock formations. The 

event was conducted to study ground shock transmission and characteristics in this type of geologic structure. The primary project consisted of 13 instrumented drill holes spaced at intervals 

in a line out to about 4,000 feet from the emplacement hole. 

Fourteen projects were conducted by DOD agencies and contractors. 

A subsidence crater formed 53 minutes after detonation. No radioactive effluent from this event was detected onsite or offsite. 

5.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for the safe 

conduct of all DISCUS THROWER project activities in Area 8. 

Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in 

accordance with established AEC/DOD aqreements or were the 

subject of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the 

AEC Nevada Operations Office. LASL was responsible Eor furnishing, emplacing, and detonating the DISCUS THROWER device. The 

DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for their project activities. 

118 
5.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "DISCUS THROWER Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to conduct a safe and economical reentry within the desired time frame. 

A. Construction and Test Readiness 

The experimental layout was completed by 31 March 1966, 

except for Hole No. 13, which was added in late April. 

The full power full frequency dry run was held on 16 May 

1966, and the device was placed downhole on 23 May 1966. 

Except for several power outage problems beyond experimenter control, all systems functioned satisfactorily 

during the dry runs. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the test event. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were cstablished during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, aerial 

surveys by helicopter, and reentry parties as needed. 

Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP prior to 

detonation to perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed: provide and issue anticontamination 

equipment, portable instruments and dosimeters; operate 

119 
area control check stations; and perform personnel, 

equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Radsafe manned stations had as a primary mission the 

documentation of any radioactive effluent released. All 

personnel at other manned stations were provided with 

appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, 

and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WST security roadblocks and 

work areas within the exclusion area to perform surveys 

and provide support as directed. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by at the FCP 

to implement rescue and emergency support, and to provide radiological area control as exclusion areas were 

established based upon reported survey data. 

A mobile issue facility for anticontamination clothing, 

respiratory devices, instruments, and dosimetric devices 

was positioned prior to the event at the security barricade near the FCP. When authorized by the Test Group 

Director, this facility was repositioned to a convenient 

location. A personnel and vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to the mobile issue facility. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

All remote area monitoring stations and air sampling 

units were installed according to DOD and LASL speci120 
fications. Twenty-n ine remote area mon itoring system 

units were located as follows: 

1 - Near SGZ 

1 - 30 feet from SGZ at 0" Azimuth 

1 - 50 feet from SGZ at 180" Azimuth 

1 - 120 feet from SGZ at 180° Azimuth 

l- 4,800 feet (trailer park) from SGZ at 180" Azimuth 

12 - 30" intervals on the l,OOO-foot arc beginning at 

15" Azimuth 

12 - 30" intervals on the 2,000-foot arc beginning at O" 

Azimuth 

All telemetry stations remained active until the DOD 

Test Group Director requested their deactivation. 

Air sampling units with radiation detector recorders 

were in operation at zero time on the 2,000-foot arc at 

30" intervals beginning at 15O. 

D. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

Stations were established at the intersection of Orange 

and Area 12 roads, Gate 700, and at manned stations. All 

personnel entering or exiting the controlled area were 

required to stop at muster or control stations for issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. All 

personnel were required to have proper security clearbnces for the area. Area control was maintained using 

roadblocks, access authorizations, and a Schedule of 

Events. Parties could enter the controlled area only if 

they were listed on the Test Manager's Schedule of 

Events or with the permission of the Test Group Director. WSI security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks to direct traffic flow. 

121 
E. Air Support 

Two Air Force aircraft were required to support DOD 

documentry photography projects. A UH-43D helicopter 

from Indian Springs AFD, Nevada, was utilized for still 

aerial photography and a U-6A fixed wing aircraft was 

used for motion aerial photography of the area around 

SGZ at zero time in order to document surface effects 

and effluent release, if any. The PHS used a U-3A aircraft for cloud tracking. 

On standby, in the event they were needed were a UH-43D 

helicopter at CP-1 for use as needed by the Test Manager, a Martin 404 (NATS) aircraft for cloud tracking to 

be conducted by EG&G, and a C-45 aircraft for cloud sampling to be performed by PHS. A Cessna 206 was utilized 

by American Aerial Survey (AAS) for the postevent aerial 

survey. 

5.2.3 Late Prcevent Activities 

On 26 May, 14 DOD/DASA personnel were in the trailer park 

near SGZ for final preparations. In addition, one DOD person was 

in the trailer park to check photo equipment. Three Air Force 

Weapons Laboratory (AFWL) personnel installed magnetic recording 

tape. Nine SC personnel made a final check of the recording 

equipment at the recording trailer park an'd five SC personnel 

made checks of the RAMS and air samplers in the trailer park near 

SGZ. Seven Waterways Experiment Station (WES) personnel made final adjustments at the trailer park and two WES people checked 

the equipment in hole No. 13, fifty feet northwest of SGZ. Four 

U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) personnel installed seismic 

equipment in Areas 2, 4 and 8. Four EG&G personnel checked the 

photo equipment at photo stations 1 and 2. 

122 
5.3 EVENT-DAY ACTIVITIES 

On 27 May from 0001 hours to three hours before scheduled 

device detonation, DOD/DASA personnel were at the trailer park 

near SGZ for final preparations and to check the photo equipment. 

USC&GS made final adjustments to the seismic equipment in Areas 

2, 4 and 8. During this same time period Radsafe personnel 

started the air sampling trailers and AFWL personnel made final 

instrument checks. 

EG&G photo personnel loaded the cameras and activated equipment at stations 1 and 2. SC personnel made final adjustments at 

the trailer park, adjusted geophones, and checked RAMS and air 

samplers in the trailer park. 

At 0100 hours WSI made the first security sweep of the area 

in a U-6A aircraft. At approximately 0121 hours the second security sweep was begun, and it was completed at 0307 hours. 

From 0800 hours to 1230 hours USAF and security personnel 

made sweeps of the closed area. 

A Test Manager's readiness briefing was held at approximately 0900 hours. At this time, permission was granted to arm 

the device. 

The UH-43D photo helicopter was in position at 1005 hours. 

Due to a power failure at CP-1 at 1018 hours, the arming 

party was authorized to reenter the area at 1030 hours. At 1200 

hours, after the power failure problem was solved, permission was 

granted for the device to be rearmed, and by 1206 hours the device was again armed and the arming party was on their way out of 

the area. 

The required countdown began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. 

123 
Ten minutes before device detonation the siren on the CP-1 building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the building 

were turned on until after device detonation. 

DISCUS THROWER zero time was 1300 hours PDT on 27 May 1966. 

Reentry into the area was authorized at 1400 hours, and the 

postevent aerial survey was authorized to begin at approximately 

1450 hours. 

5.3.1 Radiation Surveys and Reentry Activities 

The initial radiation survey began at 1403 hours and was 

completed at 1510 hours by Radsafe monitoring personnel. All survey data were reported to the net 3 radio control operator when 

measurements were made. No readings above "background" were detected. 

D-day experiment recoveries were performed by LMAFS, DNA, 

AFWL, SC, WES, USC&GS, and EG&G personnel. Only background 

radiation readings were recorded. 

Air samplers on the 2,000-foot arc remained in continuous 

sampling mode, and filters were collected every four hours after 

the initial pickup until it was determined that there was no release, at which time the sampler filters were collected every 

eight hours. 

5.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

5.4.1 Postevent Drilling 

An Ideco 40 drill rig designated PS-2D was set up and drilling began at 1018 hours on 10 August 1966. After several attempts 

124 
to clear an obstruction and continue drilling, a decision was 

made at 1455 hours to cease work on PS-2D and move to PS-1D. 

The Ideco 40 was moved to PS-1D and drilling began on 11 

August at 0455 hours. Drilling continued until approximately 1100 

hours on 12 August when the decision to abandon PS-1D was made. 

PS-1D surface casing was capped at 1335 hours. 

A Boyles (angle) drill rig had been brought into the area on 

11 August, necessary preparations were made, and it began drilling at 1204 hours on 15 August. This drilling operation was designated PS-1A. Drilling and core sampling continued through 0140 

hours on 18 August. A total of seventeen core samples were pulled 

with a maximum contact radiation intensity of 300 mR/h for a 

single core sample. 

The maximum radiation exposure rate to personnel was 5 mR/h 

when the PS-2D blowout preventer was removed at 1030 hours on 18 

August 1966. 

During postevent drilling, the area and all contaminated or 

radioactive materials were marked to indicate radiation levels 

present. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed concerning potential exposure and 

safety precautions and were provided with anticontamination 

clothing, equipment, and materials. 

Decontamination units were positioned at entrances to controlled areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment used 

in postevent activities also were monitored and decontaminated, 

if necessary. 

5.4.2 Industrial Safety 

Checks were made on each shift for radiation levels, toxic 

125 
gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then recorded in the monitors' log book. Industrial safety codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. 

5.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at 1301 hours on 27 May 1966 and 

ended at 1600 hours on 1 3une. 

The remote air sampling array placed around U8a was operative from 0100 hours 27 May until 1500 hours 29 May. Analysis of 

samples collected indicated no radioactivity which reasonably 

could be attributed to this event. 

The initial reentry survey was conducted from 1403 hours to 

1510 hours on 27 May. Only background radiation readings were 

obtained. 

Postevent drilling began at 1018 hours on 10 August and was 

completed on 18 August at 0140 hours. The maximum reading of 5 

mR/h was detected at PS-2D when the blowout preventer was removed 

at 1030 hours on 18 August. 

Personnel exposures received on individual entries to DISCUS 

THROWER radex areas during postevent drilling from 11 r\ugust 

through 18 August 1966, are summarized below. Average exposures 

are from self-reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter 

records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged _(mR) (mR) 

All Participants 523 0 0 

126 
CHAPTER 6 

PILE DRIVER EVENT 

6.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The PILE DRIVER event was a DOD underground nuclear detonation with a yield of 62 kt conducted at 0830 hours PDT on 2 June 

1966 at tunnel site U15a.01 in Area 15 of the NTS. This area 

previously was used for the HARD HAT and TINY TOT events which 

were described in the first volume of this series. The device 

was emplaced in granite 1,518 feet below the surface and about 

1,400 feet from the access shaft. 

The purpose of this event was to study nuclear detonation 

effects on underground structures. The PILE DRIVER tunnel comlex (Figure 6.1) was located approximately 1,400 feet below 

ground in a granitic rock. The HARD HAT shaft, previously excavated to a depth of 785 feet, was extended to reach the PILE 

DRIVER depth (Figure 6.2). The complex contained an array of 73 

cylindrical test sections, each section designed to test one or 

more variables. Test sections generally were located in six 

arcuate drifts 100 feet above the working point. These six 

drifts were identified as X, Y, A, B, D, and C at nominal slant 

ranges from the working point of 320, 390, 480, 670, 840, and 940 

feet, respectively. Sixty-five of the 73 test sections were 

lined, one was unlined and unsupported, and seven were reinforced 

with rock bolts and chain link fabric. Figure 6.3 shows test 

sections in the underground tunnel layout. Twenty-seven projects 

were conducted by DOD, laboratory, university, and other contractor personnel to obtain desired information. 

No surface collapse was predicted, and none occurred. Approximately 12 hours after device detonation, minor seepage of 

127 
PILE DRIVER 

HARD HAT 

FEET 

Figure 6.1 PILE DRIVER Underground Tunnel Complex 

128 
EL. 50902 

EL. 5036~ \ /SURFACE 

STATION 1501 SHAFT 

HAKD HAT ACCESS DRIFT -

DRIFT B 

DRIFT A SR=670’ 

sR=480’ 

DRIFT D 

DRIFT Y SR=840’ 

SR=390’, DRIFT C 

DRIFT X 1SR=940’ 

I I EL. 36692 ) 

W P EL. 3572 k 

Figure 6.2 Vertical Section of PILE DRIVER Complex 

129 
130 
radioactive effluent through cracks at SGZ occurred and continued 

for 11 hours. No radioactive effluent from this event was detected offsite. 

6.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all PILE DRIVER activities in Area 15. Responsibilities of AEC 

and AEC-contractor personnel were in accordance with established 

AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between 

Field Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. LASL 

was responsible for providing and installing the nuclear device. 

SC was responsible for stemming and for installation of necessary 

measuring devices and equipment. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary 

for its project activities. 

6.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "PILE DRIVER Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to assure safe and economical 

reentry within the designated period of time. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

All personnel at manned stations were given appropriate 

anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe 

monitors were in attendance. Radsafe personnel were 

stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP prior to 

the PILE DRIVER detonation to perform surveys and provide emergency support as directed: provide and issue 

anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and 

131 
self-reading dosimeters; operate area control check stations: and perform personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination as required. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

Detailed radiological safety reentry plans were submitted to participating agencies prior to the event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed 

regarding surface reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and security station requirements. 

R. Telemetry Support 

A remote area monitoring system was installed with the 

detection units located underground and on the surface, 

and readouts located outside the controlled area. This 

system was functioning at zero time so that shaft collar, shaft, and tunnel radiation conditions could be 

determined. RAMS console readings were recorded every 

15 minutes until tunnel ventilation was started. A 

total of 39 RAMS units provided information for surface 

reentry and later tunnel reentry. They were located as 

follows: 

RAMS 

No. Location 

1 Main drift at 440 feet from shaft 

2 Access drift at 240 feet 

132 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

RAMS 

No. Location 

Shop drift 

Explosive drift 

Shaft station 

Supply drift at 60 feet 

Shaft filter plug 

HARD HAT drift 

Shaft collar 

2,110 feet from SGZ at 2" N 

1,920 feet from SGZ at 39" NNE 

1,620 feet from SGZ at 57" NE 

1,680 feet from SGZ at 91" E 

1,870 feet from SGZ at 107" ESE 

1,900 feet from SGZ at 121" ESE 

1,280 feet from SGZ at 127" ESE 

1,830 feet from SGZ at 157" SSE 

1,640 feet from SGZ at 17C" S 

1,940 feet from SGZ at 213" SSW 

1,150 feet from SGZ at 246" SW 

1,370 feet from SGZ at 289" W 

1,670 feet from SGZ at 339" NNW 

2,940 feet from SGZ at 348" NNW 

2,740 feet from SGZ at 13" NNE 

2,790 feet from SGZ at 33" NE 

2,670 feet from SGZ at 43" NE 

3,060 feet from SGZ at 69" NE 

2,540 feet from SGZ at 117" SE 

2,460 feet from SGZ at 135' SE 

2,970 feet from SGZ at 156" SSE 

2,670 feet from SGZ at 180" S 

2,360 feet from SGZ at 294" W 

2,680 feet from SGZ at 309" NW 

4,850 feet from SGZ at 49" NE 

3,670 feet from SGZ at 104O E 

133 
RAMS 

No. Location 

36 3,430 feet from SGZ at 197" S 

37 3,600 feet from SGZ at 215' SW 

38 4,250 feet from SGZ at 238" SW 

39 4,200 feet from SGZ at 266" W 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. 

All personnel were required to have proper security 

clearances for the area. Control of the area was maintained by the use of roadblocks, access authorizations, 

and a Schedule of Events. Parties could enter the controlled area only if they were listed on the Test Manager's Schedule of Events or with permission of the Test 

Group Director. WSI security guards were responsible 

for activating roadblocks and directing traffic flow. 

D. Air Support 

An Air Force U-3A aircraft, pilot, and co-pilot were 

made available to a PHS aerial monitoring team for cloud 

tracking purposes. Photo support was performed by LMAFS 

personnel in a USAF U-6A aircraft and DOD personnel in a 

USAF UH-43D helicopter. A PHS Turbo Reechcraft was 

available for cloud sampling, as were a PHS C-45 and the 

EG&G/NATS Martin 404. 

6.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

On D-l, personnel representing EG&G, SRI, BTL, SC, and LASL 

134 
were in the area performing final button up activities. A Test 

Manager's readiness briefing was conducted at 1500 hours. 

6.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

The final readiness briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory Panel was conducted at approximately 0600 hours. 

Required countdowns began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8 at 

0800. Ten minutes prior to device detonation the siren on the 

CP-1 building ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of 

the building were turned on until after device detonation. 

PILE DRIVER zero time was 0830 hours PDT on 2 June 1966. 

6.3.1 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time on 2 June and was discontinued at 0900 hours on 23 July 1966. Initially, all RAMS 

units in the underground complex were driven negative by the 

electromagnetic pulse except for the unit in the HARD HAT drift, 

which indicated 83 mR/h at zero time. Readings from the detector 

steadily decreased, reaching background levels by H+90 minutes. 

Other underground units indicated only background when they recovered from the electromagnetic pulse, but began showing positive readings by the afternoon of 3 June. The maximum underground reading was 1.4 R/h at 1000 hours on 11 June at the detector located at 440 feet in the main drift. 

The shaft collar unit measured 1 mR/h until 2125 hours when 

a pulse up to 30 mR/h occurred followed by a steady decrease to 

background by 0310 hours on 3 June. Other surface detectors 

continued to read background until nine and one-half hours after 

detonation when minor seepage of radioactive effluent through 

135 
cracks at SGZ began. This seepage involved only gaseous radionuclides, and a peak reading of 75 mR/h occurred at 0310 hours on 

3 June. The release ceased at approximately 0730 hours on 3 

June. Surface RAMS unit readings, which began decreasing again 

after the release ceased, continued to decrease until all surface 

units were indicating background by 2400 hours on 3 June. 

Remote air sampling began at zero time and continued until 

0930 hours on 23 June. No samples from these stations showed detectable activity which reasonably could be attributed to this 

event. 

6.3.2 Radiation Surveys and Surface Reentry Activities 

Initial safety and radiation surveys were performed under 

the direction of the Test Group Director in accordance with the 

"Radiological Safety Support Plan" for PILE DRIVER. The PILE 

DRIVER initial radiation survey began at 0900 hours and was completed at 1000 hours on 2 June 1966. No radiation above background was detected during the initial survey or at the Sandia 

trailer park and check station areas through 2400 hours on 2 

June, although activity was detected by RAMS units at the shaft 

and SGZ areas. 

After completion of the initial survey, a radex area was 

established. Personnel entering radex areas or to be working with 

contaminated material were briefed concerning potential exposure 

and safety precautions, and were provided with anticontamination 

clothing, equipment, and materials. 

During PILE DRIVER, decontamination units were positioned at 

entrances to controlled areas. Personnel and equipment were monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Drill rigs and associated equipment used in postevent activities also were monitored 

and decontaminated, if necessary. 

136 
6.3.3 Surface Experiment Recoveries 

Surface recovery of experiment tapes and film was conducted 

between 1015 hours and 1.600 hours on D-day. Personnel from DASA, 

SC, SRI, EG&G, LASL, and American Car and Foundry, Inc. (ACFI) 

entered the radex area for this purpose. Radiation levels were 

background during these activities. No personnel were allowed beyond the SC and SRI trailer parks. 

On D+2 at 0704 hours, two SRI personnel entered the SRI 

trailer park to perform additional experiment recovery operations. This recovery was completed at 0730 hours. Radiation 

readings in the trailer park were 0.1 mR/h. 

6.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

6.4.1 Radiation Area Requirements 

Respiratory protection had been required as a precautionary 

measure for personnel working directly over the shaft during 

shaft reentry preparations. However, no further radex area requirements were needed after shaft entry. Radsafe and industrial 

hygiene monitoring support continued throughout the shaft and 

tunnel reentries and postevent drilling activities. 

6.4.2 Shaft Reentry Activities 

Reentry operations began on 20 June 1966 at 1400 hours, with 

the lowering of a television camera down the access shaft to observe damage. Since only minor radiation exposures occurred from 

20 June until 29 June, radex area requirements were discontinued 

on 29 June. Shaft reentry was completed after shaft rehabilitation and when access was gained onto the top of the sand-muck 

137 
pile at the bottom of the shaft on 31 January 1967. No radiation, toxic gas, or explosive mixture problems were encountered. 

6.4.3 Tunnel Reentry Mining and Experiment Recovery Activities 

Reentry down the main drift proceeded concurrently with operations in CR drift. Once the enlarged section at the intersection of CR drift had been safely supported, mucking of the sandfilled, 10x10-foot access drift continued. Placement of steel 

sets and lagging to provide personnel protection continued as the 

heading advanced. 

From 31 January to 31 March, the main drift was cleared and 

mining continued toward reentering the CR drift. Ventilation was 

installed and reentry to the CR drift began at 0810 hours on 31 

March. DOD personnel entered the drift to perform an inspection, 

provide photographic documentation, and recover some experiments. 

Radiation levels were 0.04 mR/h (near background) in the drift. 

Additional instrument recovery was performed in the CR drift by 

Corps of Engineers personnel from 3 April through 10 April. 

On 7 April, a party of four DOD personnel entered the CR 

drift to Section 5 and 6 to perform photographic documentation 

and instrument recovery. The photo team provided movie documentation of CR drift on 10 April and again on 11 April. 

A small hole was drilled into the DL drift on 13 April to 

test for radioactive and toxic gases. Since the levels were 

minimal, work to reenter the DL drift began. On 14 April, work 

on the DL and main drifts continued and a film recovery team 

entered the CR drift. 

A USAF photo crew worked in CR1 and CR2, the main drift, and 

the shop drift on 17 April. During the same time, a DOD recovery 

team recovered an experiment in the DL drift. BTL personnel con138 
ducted experiment recovery operations in the DL drift from 19 

April through 28 April. Work continued in the CR and main 

drifts. 

On 3 May 1967, work to reenter BL and BR drifts began. Instrument recovery in the BR drift was begun on 8 May when miners 

uncovered a canister. Section no. 2 in the DL drift was opened on 

8 May. Instrument recovery in the BR drift continued on 10 and 

11 May. On 19 May, work began to dig out camera canisters in the 

BL drift and continued through 23 May. EG&G personnel removed 

cameras and film from both BL and DL drifts at this time. 

Section no. 4 of the BR drift was reached on 25 May, instruments were removed, and photographic documentation provided. 

Work continued in all drifts with XL, AL, AR, and YR drifts 

reached and reentered from 9 June through 31 July 1967. By 28 

August 1967, reentry of the entire test complex was completed. No 

radiation, toxic gas, or explosive mixture problems were encountered. 

6.4.4 Postevent Drilling Activities 

A vertical exploratory hole, U15.01 PS-lV, was drilled into 

the top of the chimney formed by the PILE DRIVER event. This 

exploratory drilling was conducted from 21 July to 2 August 1967. 

Its chief objectives were to determine the chimney void volume, 

chimney height, and maximum vertical extent of increased permeability due to fracturing. 

Radioactivity levels of 5 mrad/h beta plus gamma were 

measured at the blooie line by Radsafe monitors when a depth of 

650.9 feet was reached. The blooie line was then closed, thus 

preventing air from being exhausted to the surface. At 654.9 

feet, the drill string was raised 29.5 feet to add a section of 

139 
pipe. When the string was lowered, it was discovered that the 

hole had caved to a depth of 631.6 feet. Drilling was difficult 

and, because of the danger of the drill string becoming stuck in 

the hole, the drilling operation was concluded. The following 

day, Radsafe monitors measured unusually high concentrations of 

in an underground exploratory drift near the chimney. It was co2 

concluded that the slight overpressure in the chimney had caused 

CO2 from the chimney region to leak into this drift along fractures and joints. A 100 cubic feet per minute exhaust fan installed at the drill hole collar kept the cavity gas from bleeding into underground workings and alleviated this condition. 

6.4.5 Industrial Safety 

Radsafe monitors routinely checked for the presence of CO, 

C02, NO, N02, hydrocarbons, and explosive mixtures during each 

shift. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

6.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry coverage began at 0830 hours on 2 June and ended 

at 0900 hours on 23 July 1966. The maximum measurement was 1.4 

R/h at 1000 hours on 11 June 1966 from a detector located in the 

main tunnel. 

The initial radiation survey began at 0900 hours and was 

completed at 1000 hours on 2 June. Readings were background 

throughout the survey. 

Postevent mining to effect experiment recovery began at 2115 

140 
hours on 12 July and was completed at 2400 hours on 16 June 1967, 

although experiment recovery continued through August 1967. The 

maximum radiation measurement during this period was 3 mR/h in 

the shaft collar area on 16 and 17 June 1966. No alpha radiation 

was detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

the PILE DRIVER radex area, which was established from 2 June to 

29 June 1966, are summarized below. Average exposures are from 

self-reading pocket dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(ml?) 

Average 

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 173 110 2.7 

DOD Participants 25 110 10.8 

No radiation intensities above background were detected in 

offsite areas by ground monitors, dose rate recorders, or film 

badge stations. It was the opinion of the PHS that no health 

hazard was produced in the offsite area by the PILE DRIVER event. 

141 
CHAPTER 7 

DOUBLE PLAY EVENT 

7.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The DOUBLE PLAY event was a DOD underground nuclear detonation with a yield less than 20 kt conducted at 1000 hours PDT on 

15 June 1966 at tunnel site U16a.03 in Area 16 of the NTS. Device emplacement was within a tunnel in a tuff medium, 1,075 feet 

vertically beneath the surface and 920 feet from the nearest 

ground surface. This tunnel was part of the complex where the 

MARSHMALLOW and GUMDROP events discussed in the first volume of 

this series were conducted (Figure 7.1). DOUBLE PLAY was a weapons effects test which investigated the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. There were 13 

projects conducted by DOD, laboratory, and other contractor personnel. No surface collapse was predicted and none occurred. 

Containment was not complete, and low levels of radioactivity 

were detected offsite. Section 7.3.1 further describes this 

effluent release. 

7.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for the safe 

conduct of all DOUBLE PLAY project activities in Area 16. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject 

of separate action between Field Command, DASA, and the AEC 

Nevada Operations Office. LRL provided the device and performed 

the surface drillback, and SC and DOD were involved in recovery 

142 
N823.800 

PORTAL 

GAS SEAL 

DRIFT PLUGS 

8 

9 

g N82?,400 z 

Figure 7.1 U16a Tunnel Complex 
operations. The DOD was responsible for preevent installation 

and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project 

activities. 

7.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "DOUBLE PLAY Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations and postevent procedures used to produce safe and economical reentry and recovery within the desired time frame. Stemming design incorporated necessary provisions to maximize safety 

of reentry. 

A. Radiological Safety Support 

Participating agencies were provided with detailed reentry plans prior to this event. Test area maps with 

appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference 

markers, radiation decay recorders, and air samplers 

were positioned in the test area. "Dry runs" were conducted to establish reentry routes into the test area. 

Radiation monitors were briefed regarding reentry, 

sample recovery, manned stations, and security station 

requirements. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with appropriate anticontamination materials and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for surface radiation surveys, aerial surveys by 

helicopter, and tunnel reentry parties. Radsafe personnel were stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's 

FCP to perform initial and subsequent qround surveys as 

required; provide and issue anticontamination equipment, 

portable instruments and dosimetric devices: perform 

144 
personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination; and 

operate a sample return station. Anticontamination 

materials available included coveralls, head covers, 

shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing 

apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, plastic bags, and 

masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Thirty-five Jordan RAMS were in place, calibrated, and 

operational at zero time: 9 inside the tunnel and 26 at 

aboveground locations (Table 7.1). 

Nineteen air sampling trailers were placed in an array 

on the surface, calibrated, and operational by zero time 

(Table 7.2). 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. 

All personnel were required to have proper security 

clearances. Control was maintained by using roadblocks, 

access authorizations, and a Schedule of Events. Parties 

could enter the controlled area only if they were listed 

on the_ Test Manager's Schedule of Events or with permission oE the Test Group Director. WSI security guards 

were responsible Eor activating roadblocks and directing 

traffic flow. 

D. Air Support 

Two 1JSAF aircraft from ISAFR supported DOD documentary 

145 
TABLE 7.1 

DOUBLE PLAY EVENT RAMS UNIT LOCATIONS 

15 June 1966 

Station Location 

UNDERGROUND 

1 1,965 feet from portal (inside blast door) 

2 1,730 feet from portal 

2a 1,760 feet from portal (inside blast door) 

3 1,725 feet from portal 

3a 2,300 feet from portal 

4 1,570 feet from portal 

5 1,320 feet from portal (MARSHMALLOW pipe tunnel) 

6 1,120 feet from portal 

7 870 feet 

8 670 feet 

9 640 feet 

10 Portal 

11 580 feet 

12 585 feet 

13 275 feet 

14 322 feet 

15 713 feet 

16 402 feet 

17 464 feet 

18 496 feet 

19 155 feet 

20 265 feet 

21 480 feet 

22 584 feet 

from portal 

from portal (inside gas seal door) 

from portal (outside gas seal ddor) 

AROVEGROUND 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

from portal 

at 0" Azimuth 

at 24' Azimuth 

at 4S" Azimuth 

at 76" Azimuth 

at 161' Azimuth 

at 214O Azimuth 

at 229" Azimuth 

at 239" Azimuth 

at 273' Azimuth 

at 309" Azimuth 

at 330" Azimuth 

at 341' Azimuth 

23 1,385 feet from portal at 21° Azimuth 

24 4,013 feet from portal at 64O Azimuth 

2s 943 feet from portal at 108" Azimuth 

26 923 feet from portal at 127" Azimuth 

27 986 feet from portal at 173" Azimuth 

28 1,131 feet from portal at 239" Azimuth 

29 2,230 feet from portal at 247' Azimuth 

30 1,354 feet from portal at 267' Azimuth 

31 SGZ 

32 Vent (Before North filter) 

33 Vent (After North filter) 

34 Vent (Before South filter) 

35 Vent (After South filter) 

146 
TABLE 7.2 

DOUBLE PLAY EVENT 

AIR SAMPLING ARRAY 

15 June 1966 

Station Location 

1 580 feet from portal at 0" Azimuth 

2 461 feet from portal at 35" Azimuth 

3 275 feet from portal at 45' Azimuth 

4 322 feet from portal at 76O Azimuth 

5 148 feet from portal at 119" Azimuth 

6 30 feet from portal *at 180" Azimuth 

7 402 feet from portal at 214' Azimuth 

8 155 feet from portal at 273" Azimuth 

9 

10 

264 feet 

480 feet 

from portal 

from portal 

at 309" Azimuth 

at 330" Azimuth 

11 1,336 feet from portal at 12' Azimuth 

12 1,445 feet from portal at 56" Azimuth 

13 4,013 feet from portal at 64' Azimuth 

14 1,946 feet from portal at 74' Azimuth 

15 2,230 feet from portal at 247' Azimuth 

16 1,354 feet from portal at 267O Azimuth 

17 1,722 feet from portal at 277" Azimuth 

18 2,403 feet from portal at 316" Azimuth 

19 SGZ 

147 
photography projects. A UH-43D helicopter for still 

aerial photography, manned by APC personnel, orbited in 

an BOO-foot radius semicircular flight pattern at 1,500 

feet in altitude upwind from the tunnel. Motion picture 

photography of SGZ at zero time was performed by LMAFS 

personnel in a U-6A aircraft which orbited in a 3,000-

foot radius semicircular pattern, 3,000 feet in altitude, upwind from the tunnel. 

The PHS was provided a USAF U-3A aircraft for cloud 

tracking and a C-45 aircraft for cloud sampling. A 

Turbo Beechcraft was on standby to be used for cloud 

sampling, if needed. 

WSI security personnel performed security sweeps in a 

USAF U-6A aircraft, and an additional USAF UH-43D helicopter was on standby for the Test Manager's use, if 

needed. 

The EG&G/NATS Martin 404 aircraft was on standby at 

McCarran Airport in Las Vegas if needed for cloud tracking purposes. 

7.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Personnel conducting experiments, performing final dry runs, 

and checking instrumentation on D-l represented SRI, LMSC, EG&G, 

APC, SC, DNA, KOA, AVCO, AFWL, GE and BTL. 

A Test Manager's readiness briefing was conducted at 15Ofl 

hours on 14 June. 

7.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

From 0001 to 0640 hours on 15 June 1966, Radsafe monitoring 
personnel started the air sampling trailers: LMSC personnel 

checked the vacuum pumps and TV systems at the test chamber and 

assembly building; EG&G personnel checked all photo stations; SC 

personnel made final instrument checks at the recording trailer 

park, checked the geophones and buttoned up instrumentation at 

the instrumentation alcove, and were at the reentry safety trailer: and GE personnel checked out instrument cassettes. DOD personnel checked cabling at the experiment chamber, made instrument 

checks, and performed a last-minute inspection of the U16a.03 

tunnel and portal area. Simultaneously, SRI personnel buttoned 

up their operations. 

The arming party entered the area at 0305 hours. A security 

sweep at 0640 hours conEirmed that all personnel were clear of 

the area except the arming party. A final readiness briefing was 

conducted approximately two hours before scheduled device detonation. At this time permission was granted to arm the device. 

From two hours to 30 minutes before device detonation, USAF 

and security personnel in the U-6A aircraft made a final sweep of 

the closed portion of Area 16. 

The device was armed and the arming party departed the area 

by 0926 hours. DOD and PHS aircraft were in position by 0941 

hours. 

Required countdowns were broadcast on radio nets 1, 2, 6, 

and 8. Ten minutes before device detonation the siren on CP-1 

ran for 30 seconds, and the red lights on top of the building 

were turned on until after device detonation. 

DOUBLE PLAY zero time was 1000 PDT on 15 June 1966. 

149 
7.3.1 Effluent Releases 

There were four effluent release situations following the 

DOUBLE PLAY event. 

The first release, which began at 1002 hours (H+2 minutes) 

on D-day, was through aboveground cable hole locations used for 

the MARSHMALLOW Event. A RAMS unit located aboveground near the 

point of release indicated a radiation reading of 1 R/h at 1002 

hours which steadily increased to a maximum of 40 R/h at 1023 

hours (H+23 minutes). A decision was made by DOD representatives 

to send a party into the area to seal the leaks. A maximum radiation reading of 3 R/h at contact with the cable and cable 

holes at the north cable run was measured before the work party 

began sealing the leaks and applying water glass at 0745 hours on 

16 June. By the time the water glass had been applied at 1145 

hours, radiation intensity had decreased to 0.9 R/h. Readings 

steadily decreased thereafter, reaching background at 1700 hours 

on 13 June (D+4 days). 

The second release, this time through the portal, began at 

1005 hours (H+5 minutes) on D-day. After reaching a maximum of 8 

R/h at 1129 hours, radiation readings steadily decreased. This 

effluent release continued until 1151 hours on 17 June when tunnel ventilation was turned on. At that time radiation readings 

from the RAMS unit located at the portal increased from 2.5 mR/h 

at 1100 hours to 110 mR/h at 1200 hours. After 1200 hours, readings again steadily declined until 1200 hours on 23 June when an 

increase from 1.3 mR/h to 13 mR/h occurred. This was due to a 

reactor test in another area of the NTS. After this, readings 

continued to decline until background was reached at 2400 hours 

on 1 July 1966. Background readings were reported at this unit 

until the unit went oEf line on 3 July. 

150 
A third release situation began on 17 June at 1151 hours 

when the tunnel ventilation system was turned on. Primarily, 

noble gas radionuclides passed through the vent line filter system until 1336 hours on 17 June when ventilation system operation 

was discontinued. Refore ventilation was implemented, all four 

RAMS units at or near the filter boxes read less than 500 mR/h. 

Readings were: 

Reading Before Reading After 

Start of Ventilation Start of Ventilation 

Before North Filter 32 mR/h 1.5 R/h 

After North Filter 14 mR/h 800.0 mR/h 

Before South Filter 18 mR)h 950.0 mR/h 

At South Filter 430 mR/h 20.0 R/h 

The highest reading during this ventilation was 50 R/h at 

the south filter box at 1330 hours on 17 June. 

The fourth release began when the ventilation system was 

restarted at 1536 hours on 17 June because explosive gases had 

accumulated in the tunnel complex. Ventilation continued until 

0900 on 18 June 1966. Readings on RAMS units at or near the filter boxes steadily declined from the following maximums: 

Before North Filter - 245 mR/h 

After North Filter - 230 mR/h 

Before South Filter - 200 mR/h 

At South Filter - 50 R/h 

Telemetry was discontinued at 2200 hours on 11 July 1966. 

7.3.2 Test Area Monitoring 

Telemetry began at 1001 hours on D-day and continued until 

151 
2200 hours on 11 July 1966. Four separate release situations 

were monitored and were discussed in section 7.3.1. Maximum readings 

The 

box 

detected by underground units 

maximum reading aboveground 

at 1330 hours on 17 June. 

was 

were 

50 

in 

R/h 

excess 

at the 

of 1,000 

south f

R/h. 

ilter 

The initial radiation survey began at 1107 hours and ended 

at 1116 hours on 15 June 1966 (Table 7.3). 

Two Radsafe parties in vehicles, each party consisting of 

two monitors, performed the initial survey. They were referred 

to as Radsafe Survey Party No. 1 and Radsafe Survey Party No. 2. 

When released by the Test Group Director, the two parties proceeded from the FCP along the telephone pole road to the Area 16 

main access road and then to the tunnel portal area, surveying 

enroute. 

Party No. 1 proceeded into the portal area to the vicinity 

of the portal entrance. Upon completion of the initial survey, 

Party No. 1 then obtained radiation measurements at the portal 

entrance and locations of interest in the portal area. Party No. 

1 then returned to a point immediately outside the established 

radex area by the office trailer park. 

Radsafe Survey Party No. 2 proceeded to the film instrumentation trailer park, surveying enroute. Upon completion of 

the trailer park survey and when directed by Radsafe Control, 

Party No. 2 proceeded to survey SGZ and returned to the portal 

area to await further assignments. All survey data were reported 

to the net 3 radio control operator as measurements were made. 

Plotting facilities were maintained at the FCP and CP-1. 

A mobile facility for issue of anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimetric devices was positioned 

at the FCP. A mobile decontamination unit was positioned adjacent to it. 

152 
Time 

1107 

1108 

1109 

1110 

1111 

1114 

1116 

TABLE 7.3 

DOUBLE PLAY EVENT 

INITIAL RADIATION SURVEY DATA 

15 June 1966 

Gamma Exposure Rate 

J,ocation (From Portal) (mR/h) 

Stake 16C28 (1 l/2 miles NE) Bkg* 

Stake 16C29 (1 l/4 miles NE) Bkg 

Stake 16C30 (1 mile NE) Bkg 

Stake 16C31 (3/4 mile NE) Bkg 

Stake 16515 (l/4 mile N) 2 

150 Feet NE of portal 50 

Portal recovery area 20 

*Background radiation measurement 

153 
7.3.3 Data Recovery 

Film recovery from the portal area was authorized on D-day 

and accomplished without incident. Recovery parties accompanied 

the initial survey team at 1045 hours and made recoveries at that 

time. Upon reentry into the area SRI, EG&G, SC, LMSC and DOD personnel made recoveries of film and tape. A survey of the portal 

and reentry safety trailer was conducted by SC personnel. Reentry 

operations were completed at 1135 hours. Due to the presence of 

radioactive effluent, the area was cleared after this reentry and 

surveillance was maintained. Urine samples were taken from all 

reentry team personnel. Results are discussed in section 7.4.1. 

Recovery parties entered the area again on 16 June to remove 

cameras from the EG&G camera bunker. 

7.3.4 Aerial Radiation Surveys 

A. EG&G/NATS Mission 

The EG&G/NATS aircraft was dispatched at 1254 hours on 

D-day to locate and track the radioactive effluent released. Initial contact was made with the effluent cloud 

at 1325 hours near SGZ. Radioactivity slightly above 

background was found at three locations between the test 

site and a point 200 miles northeast of the event location at 9,000 feet MSL. This activity soon dissipated to 

undetectable levels. 

At 1805 hours the aircraft returned to Las Vegas for refueling. Upon landing, weather conditions in the tracking area and downwind sectors were reviewed. Considering adverse weather conditions, further efforts to track 

during the night were dismissed as unsafe. A very early 

morning attempt to relocate the effluent was scheduled 

for 16 June. 

154 
The aircraft was airborne at 0528 hours on 16 June, and 

the mission was completed at 1625 hours with no activity 

above background detected. 

B. PHS Missions 

PHS personnel flew two aerial sampling missions in support of the DOUBLE PLAY event on 15 June 1966. Aircraft 

91264 (Vegas 7) was equipped for cloud sampling and 

determination of cloud volume. It carried an Andersen 

sampler, a gross air sampler, a sequential sampler, and 

gamma detection equipment on the first mission. The 

same aircraft also was flown on a second mission with 

essentially the same equipment as used earlier in the 

sampling and cloud volume determination. 

1. Mission 1 

At 1012 hours PDT (H+12 minutes) Vegas 7 began circling 

S'GZ at an altitude of 7,500 feet MSL and at a distance 

of approximately two miles. First contact with the 

cloud occurred at 1014 hours one-half mile south of 

Tippipah Springs. A sampling path was established from 

a point one mile east of Tippipah Springs and running 

west to Reservoir Peak at 7,500 feet MSL. 

Continued sampling passes over the path from 6,500 to 

9,000 feet MSL until 1040 hours indicated a near constant width of one mile with the base at 6,800 feet MSL 

and top at 8,500 feet MSL. A second sampling path was 

established directly over, and parallel to, the Pahute 

air strip at 1045 hours at an altitude of 7,500 feet 

MSL. The leading edge of the cloud arrived over the air 

strip at 1047 hours. Between 1040 and 1145 hours, repeated sampling runs were made normal to the cloud tra155 
jectory over Pahute air strip, and from this position 

through the longitudinal axis to the portal at altitudes 

between 6,500 and 8,500 feet MSL. Data analysis subsequently indicated a downwind velocity for the cloud of 

13 mph on a trajectory of approximately 315" true. 

At 1050 hours, a maximum exposure rate of 0.2 mR/h was 

measured over Pahute air strip at 7,500 feet MSL. The 

maximum reading during the entire mission was 1.4 mR/h 

at 8,000 feet MSL over the portal. The latter reading 

held within +(I.1 mR/h at this location from about 1015 -

hours until the aircraft departed the area at 1145 

hours. The release was not visible at any time. 

2. Mission 2 

At 1332 hours, Vegas 7 reentered the area passing over 

the portal at 7,500 feet MSL on a true heading of 315O. 

A reading of 1.8 mR/h was measured above the portal. No 

further readings were indicated as the flight continued 

to the Pahute air strip. 

At 1337 hours a second flight path began over the air 

strip at 8,500 feet MSI, on a true heading of 90°, terminating over BJY. Cloud presence was first detected at 

a point approximately 6.2 miles from the portal on a 

true course of 340", continuing for two miles. Repeated 

passes were flown over the course between 6,500 and 

9,500 feet MSL with a maximum concentration at 7,700 

feet KSL. At 1341 hours, a reading of 0.12 mR/h was 

measured 6.5 miles from the portal at 7,500 feet MSL on 

a true course of 015". Between 1340 and 1500 hours, a 

slow eastward drift in the cloud was observed, and by 

1525 hours the new trajectory of 015" true was determined. 

156 
At 1545 hours, a reading of 0.09 mR/h (3 times background) was measured 23 miles from the portal on a 

course of 015" true at 8,000 feet MSL. The second mission was terminated at 1550 hours. 

Because the primary purpose of the second mission was to 

determine the concentration and direction of any continuing release, total cloud volume measurements were not 

made. 

Results indicated .that the release was primarily noble 

gases and radioiodines. 

7.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

7.4.1 Tunnel Reentry and Experiment Recovery 

The AEC authorized tunnel ventilation from 1151 to 1330 

hours, 17 June 1966. Because explosive gas mixtures accumulated 

in the tunnel, ventilation was restarted at 1537 hours on 17 June 

and continued periodically until 21 September 1966. No reentries 

into the tunnel were made until 12 July 1966. During the interim, 

the general area was cleaned up and preparations for reentry were 

made. 

Initial tunnel reentry began at 1045 hours on 12 July and 

was completed at 1210 hours. A second reentry party entered the 

tunnel at 1500 hours and exited at 1533 hours. At 1540 hours, a 

third party entered the tunnel and recovered tape and cameras 

from the 16+25 (1,625 feet in from the portal) alcove. The exposure rate at this location was 600-700 mR/h. 

Washing down of the tunnel began on 12 July and was completed on 13 July. This operation was conducted to settle dust 

157 
and reduce contamination. Sand was then spread on the floor in 

front of the blast plug. All tunnel work was performed wearing 

anticontamination clothing and full-face masks. Workers exiting 

the tunnel required extensive decontamination of clothing and 

equipment. 

A reentry party reached the blast door on 14 July at 1350 

hours where they reported a radiation reading of 3 R/h. Film and 

samples were recovered. 

During the next several days, work continued in the tunnel. 

Since the radiation readings near the plug were greater than 

R/h, MSA all-purpose masks were worn in addition to anticontamination clothing by all personnel working in the area. The tunnel was washed down at the GUMDROP "Y" and the MARSHMALLOW "Y." 

On 18 July the tunnel supervisor was contacted and advised 

that his personnel were approaching 2500 mrem for the quarter. 

The decision was made to suspend operations for that shift and 

bring in miners having lower exposures. 

General Electric personnel and miners entered the 16+25 

alCOVe to recover equipment on 19 July. The maximum exposure 

indicated by pocket dosimeters for persons making this recovery 

was 450 mrem. 

By 21 July, the vent line had been i'nstalled through the 

overburden plug. From 21 July to 28 July, the tunnel was 

thoroughly washed down and clean sand was spread on the floor. 

At 1000 hours on 28 July, the blast door entry party was 

briefed on operations beyond the door and began dressing out. Two 

Radsafe personnel and two miners entered the tunnel, surveyed the 

area near the test chamber, and opened the blast door. They instal led e lectrical cord to supply power for an air sampler lo1 
cated at the test chamber. No toxic or explosive gases were detected; however, the radiation reading inside the test chamber 

was 4-5 R/h. This party exited the tunnel at 1050 hours. Elapsed 

time behind the blast plug was six minutes. Photography party 

personnel began dressing out at 1045 hours. The Test Group Director and his party, accompanied by two Radsafe monitors, reentered 

the test chamber at 1100 hours. Photos of the chamber were taken 

by DOD photography documentation personnel, and at 1125 hours, 

the party exited the tunnel. Elapsed time behind the blast plug 

was six minutes. 

GUMDROP reentry drift damage was assessed on 29 July. No 

masks were required from the portal to the gas seal door, however, complete anticontamination clothing was required. Waterglass was sprayed from the gas seal door to the "Y". 

On 2 August, a DOD inspection party again entered the test 

chamber. Maximum radiation readings were 8 R/h gamma ten feet 

from the test chamber, 15 R/h contact with the tunnel floor, 5 

R/h inside the test chamber, and 6 R/h contact inside the test 

chamber. There were no detectable toxic gases or explosive 

mixtures beyond the blast door. 

An experiment recovery operation began at 1030 hours on 3 

August. Recovery team members used supplied-air equipment due to 

the large amount of dust in the recovery area. Operations were 

completed and personnel exited the tunnel at 1525 hours. No radiation or industrial hygiene problems were encountered. Urine 

samples were taken from party personnel and their film badges 

were changed. Results are discussed in section 7.4.1. 

Inspection of the LOS pipe began at 1022 hours on 10 August 

1966. The radiation reading 260 feet from the end of the pipe 

was 15 R/h gamma, which was the maximum reading for this reentry. 

Pipe inspection was complete at 1050 hours. 

159 
Two LMSC personnel accompanied by a miner, two operators, 

and three Radsafe personnel reentered to 32 feet beyond the blast 

plug to perform a recovery operation at 1210 hours on 15 August. 

The group exited the tunnel at 1320 hours. Between 1445 hours 

and 1545 hours another reentry team entered the test chamber to 

recover some additional LMSC experiments. 

No further experiment recoveries were performed until 16 

September 1966 when LMSC personnel removed two camera units from 

the test chamber. Recoveries from the test chamber by DOD, LMSC, 

and SC personnel continued through 23 September. Recovery 

operations were completed and the test chamber was secured on 

that date. 

Work continued in the tunnel with initial reentry into the 

DOUBLE PLAY drift occurring on 7 October. Reentry personnel were 

dressed in required sets of anticontamination clothing and masks 

including two pairs of coveralls and gloves. The maximum radiation level encountered was 15 R/h gamma. Sample recovery in this 

drift was conducted on 20 and 21 October 1966 by DOD, KOA, and SC 

personnel. Photographic documentation was performed by DOD personnel. 

On 25 October, SC personnel reentered the tunnel for an inspection of the DOUBLE PLAY test chamber; 01, 02 & 03 reentry 

drifts; and alcoves 1 through 5. This reentry was completed at 

1500 hours. Film badges were changed and urine samples taken. 

On 14 November a gate was installed across the MARSHMALLOW 

drift entrance to prohibit access. An additional gate was installed at 11+25 feet in the main drift. After installation of 

these gates, a wire fence was installed to help control access 

and radiation warning signs were put up. 

Urine samples taken from personnel were analyzed for gamma 

160 
activity and tritium concentrations throughout DOUBLE PLAY 

reentry operations. These results indicated minor exposures to 

tritium, radioiodines, and ruthenium radionuclides. Observed 

tritium concentrations in urine indicated average personnel 

exposure rates of less than 15 mrem/wk. 

7.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling began at 1000 hours on 22 July 1966 on 

postevent hole PS-1A to recover solidified melt samples for analysis. Drilling was done to a total depth of 1,195 feet. Directional surveys were run as the hole was drilled and gamma logged, 

and a total of 14 core samples were taken. The abandonment valve 

was closed at 1330 hours 28 July 1966. 

Postevent drilling began on sidetrack PS-1AS at 1210 hours 

on 2 August 1966 at 860 feet. Drilling was done to a total depth 

of 1,149 feet, directional surveys and gamma logging were accomplished, and a total of 15 samples were taken. The abandonment 

valve was closed at 1815 hours on 6 August 1966. 

The maximum core sample intensity for a single core sample 

was 210 mrad/h beta plus gamma and 20 mR/h gamma at contact. 

Operational and maintenance support for the drilling vent 

line radioactive effluent monitoring system was provided on a 24-

hour per day basis from 2 August through 6 August 1966 on the 

DOUBLE PLAY postevent drilling operation. 

On 2 December 1966, full time Radsafe support was discontinued. 

7.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Toxic gases and explosive mixtures were continuously moni161 
tored. Maximum readings in the tunnel complex were 100 percent 

of LEL for explosive mixtures, 7,500 ppm CO, and 10,000 ppm CO2 

at the MARSHMALLOW vent line on 17 June 1966. A maximum concentration of 20 ppm NO + NO2 was measured on 21 October 1966 at 

alcove No. 5. 

Industrial safety codes, including specific codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. 

7.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1001 hours on 15 June 1966, 

and ended at 2200 hours on 11 July 1966. The maximum measurement 

in the tunnel complex was greater than 1,000 R/h occurring from 

1001 hours on 15 June 1966 to 0240 hours on 16 June 1966 in the 

MARSHMALLOW tunnel at 1,320 feet, and at 10 other underground 

stations for lesser durations. 

The initial reentry survey teams began measurements at 1107 

hours and completed the survey at 1116 hours on 15 June 1966. 

The maximum gamma reading detected during the survey was 50 mR/h 

at 1114 hours 150 feet northeast of the portal. No alpha radiation was detected. 

The maximum personnel exposure rate detected at postevent 

hole PS-1AS was 3 mR/h gamma on the platform at 0800 hours on S 

August 1966. No alpha radiation was detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries into 

DOUBLE PLAY radex areas from 15 June to 29 December 1966 are summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

162 
No. of Entries 

Logged 

Maximum 

Exposure 

(mR) 

Average 

Exposure 

(mR) 

All Participants 4,824 1,100 61 

DOD Participants 351 1,100 149 

Minor levels of radioactivity were detected offsite, but it 

was the opinion of the PHS that there were no offsite health hazards associated with the DOUBLE PLAY event. 

163 
CHAPTER 8 

NEW POINT EVENT 

8.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The NEW POINT event was a DOD underground detonation which 

had a yield less than 20 kt and was conducted at 1300 hours PST 

on 13 December 1966 at shaft site Ullc in Area 11 of NTS. The 

device was emplaced at a depth of 825 feet in a 66-inch diameter 

steel-cased drill hole, and an LOS pipe with a maximum inside 

diameter of 36 inches extended to the surface. Figure 8.1 shows 

the NEW POINT test configuration including the winch mechanism to 

remove the experiment tower before crater subsidence. NEW POINT 

was a test to determine the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on equipment and materials. The experiment program 

included 18 projects conducted by the DOD, laboratory, and contractor personnel. 

Crater subsidence occurred approximately 13 minutes after 

detonation. Containment was complete. No radioactive effluent 

was detected onsite or offsite from this event. 

8.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

8.2.1 Responsibilities 

The DOD Test Group Director was responsible for safe conduct 

of all NEW POINT project activities in Area 11. Responsibilities 

of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance with established AEC/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate 

action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations 

Office. LRL was responsible for providing and emplacing the 

164 
, 
device. SC was responsible for arming. The DOD was responsible 

for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment 

necessary for its project activities. 

8.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "NEW POINT Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to conduct safe and economical rcentry and recovery within the desired time frame. In addition, 

Radsafe personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry 

Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. 

A. Construction and Exoeriment Readiness 

The site selected for NEW POINT was prepared for drilling and the area cleared and graded during April 1966. 

Drilling of the 825-foot deep NEW POINT hole (Ullc) began in May. The casing was 66 inches in diameter. 

During the spring of 1966, while cable and other long 

lead-time items were being procured and the site was 

being readied for construction, experimenters were preparing their experiments in their laboratories. Experiment design, fabrication, and checkout continued 

through the summer while construction was underway at 

the NEW POINT site. 

On previous similar events cable troughs from the tower 

to the trailer park were permanently-emplaced structures. They had solid plywood bottoms, on which cable 

bundles were laid, and they were supported three feet 

above the ground by 4 x 4-inch posts driven into the 

ground. On PIN STRIPE, numerous electrical isolation 

problems were experienced between cable bundles in the 

166 
troughs. NEW POINT cable troughs were designed to prevent recurrence of problems due to moisture and cable 

bundle tangles. Troughs were open-slat platforms to 

allow drainage, and the slats themselves were covered 

with sheet plastic to prevent moisture absorption. A 

sufficient number of troughs which were wider than those 

used on previous events were employed so that each project's cable bundles were physically separated. The 

cable troughs were fabricated and emplaced during July 

and August. 

In late September, instrumentation trailers began to 

arrive at the site and be installed in the trailer park 

located 650 feet from SGZ. Trailers were furnished with 

electrical power (mostly by electric motor generators to 

electrically isolate them from ground) and were shock 

mounted with rigid foam beneath the wheels and underbodies to attenuate expected ground shock to safe levels. 

Checkout of trailer sequencing and recording systems was 

accomplished concurrently with cable checkout and connection. A total of 29 instrumentation trailers, which 

contained oscilloscopes, tape recorders, and oscillographs, were emplaced. Figure 8.2 shows trailer locations and the complete NEW POINT layout. 

The mobile tower was constructed during the summer and 

assembled at NTS in early October. 'Several practice recoveries oE the tower were made with different combinations of winches, power sources, and controls to confirm 

the ability of the tower, and its recovery system, to 

function properly; and, to measure the time to move the 

tower 300 feet, the distance necessary to insure that it 

would not fall into the crater. During these tests, each 

floor was weighted as it would be during the event, and 

scrap cables were attached to the cable support arms to 

167 
N 

t 

23 

LRL 

TRAILERS 

SANDIA 

Q 

Kay 

c=s

%r 

4 

g 13 TRAILER 

2000 FEET 

L 

+___ 3oo’ _-_+-- %O---- ’ 

Figure 8.2 NEW POINT Area Layout 
simulate the drag of experiment cable bundles. No problems were encountered, and satisfactory performance was 

demonstrated. 

LOS pipe sections and closure hardware were delivered to 

NTS and checked out during October. A dry run emplacement of the LOS pipe string was performed at the end of 

October to insure that proper alignment could be obtained. 

After completion of tower dry runs, outer experiment 

cassettes were installed on the tower. Inner cassettes 

containing experiments .were then installed, cables to 

recording equipment were connected, and checkout of 

experiment/recording systems was started. 

Coordinated signal dry runs began in early November and 

were held daily in preparation for the full power full 

frequency (FPFF) dry run scheduled for 29 November. Dry 

runs were employed to insure proper operation of the 

central timing system, which furnished discrete timing 

signals, and to verify operation and proper sequencing 

of instrumentation trailers, recording equipment, experiment circuitry, and other functions related to device 

and LOS pipe systems. 

In addition to the timing and firing system indicated 

above, a monitoring system provided personnel in the 

event control room at CP-1 with indications of instrumentation trailer power and temperature and experiment 

status for most NEW POINT experiments. The large number 

of experiments made it necessary to organize display of 

these status monitors to assist in quickly recognizing 

conditions which would warrant a hold in the countdown 

to attempt repairs to malfunctioning equipment. The pos169 
sible impact of such a hold on other experiments could 

have been damaging enough that it was considered inadvisable to invoke a hold unless monitors indicated a 

significant portion of the test was compromised. 

An electrical logic system was used to indicate when 

conditions were catastrophic to a significant number of 

experiments. Experiments were weighted, based on a 

priority system, and the catastrophe criterion was increased as the 30-minute countdown progressed, committing more experiments and device subsystems. To complement this monitor arrangement, a hold relay was provided 

to the majority of experimenters and was to be manually 

actuated in the event of a countdown hold. By using this 

relay, an experimenter could arrange to hold equipment 

in a passive mode until the countdown was resumed and 

the relay deactivated. Thus, it was possible to hold the 

countdown even after experiments using the hold relay 

were committed. Although such holds were practiced during dry runs, the final countdown proceeded without incident. 

The FPFF dry run was held on 29 November with all experiments, device, and closure systems participating in as 

near event time electrical configuration as possible. 

The purpose of the FPFF was to demonstrate electrical 

compatibility of all systems and to identify any electrical interference problems prior to device emplacement. The first FPFF attempted was declared successful. 

On 30 November, the device canister was closed and LOS 

pipe string insertion was begun. Several days were taken 

to emplace the pipe and align it to provide a perfectly 

vertical LOS. Next, the Spoolex pipe section was located over the pipe cap and aligned with the LOS. A steel 

170 
bellows (not evacuated) was connected between the 

Spoolex pipe and the top of the LOS pipe completing the 

LOS to the surface. After completing these alignment 

activities, checkout of Spoolex experiments and placement of required Spoolex experiment shielding, stemming 

was begun. 

The annulus between the LOS pipe and the 66-inch diameter cased hole was filled with sand as prescribed in 

the stemming plan. 

B. Radiological Safety Support 

Participating agencies were provided with detailed radiological safety reentry plans prior to the event. Test 

area maps with appropriate reference points were prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Party monitors were briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, and 

security station requirements. 

All remote area monitoring stations and air sampling 

units were installed according to DOD and Laboratory 

specifications five days before scheduled device detonation. Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI security roadblocks and all work locations within the exclusion area to perform surveys and provide other sup-

'port as directed. 

Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by at FCP to 

provide rescue and emergency support, and radiological 

area control when exclusion areas were established. 

Anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and 

171 
dosimetric devices were issued from a mobile facility, 

which was located at the FCP aong with a mobile decontamination unit. 

Documenting any radioactive effluent release was the 

primary mission of Radsafe personnel assigned to manned 

stations. All additional personnel at manned stations 

were provided with appropriate anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

Radsafe also provided monitoring teams and supervisory 

personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, helicopter surveys, and reentry parties as needed. Radiation monitoring personnel were standing by at the FCP 

prior to detonation to perform surveys; provide emergency support as directed; provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable instruments, and dosimeters; operate area control check stations; and perform 

personnel, equipment, and vehicle decontamination, as 

required. 

Radsafe facilities were stocked with anticontamination 

materials such as coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, 

full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, plastic bags, and masking tape. 

C. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

Twenty-three remote area monitoring system units were 

located as follows: 

l- SGZ 

5- at 277" at 320 feet, 259' at 655 feet, 285' at 675 

feet, 300" at 735 feet and 290" at 5,000 feet from 

SGZ. 

172 
5- at 45" intervals on the 750-foot arc, beginning at 

0" 

12 - at 30° intervals on the 5,000-foot arc, beginning 

at 30" 

All telemetry units had a range of O-1,000 R/h. Equipment for readout of data from these units was located in 

the SC/DOD telemetry trailer located inside the CP-1 

compound. 

Eighteen air sampling units were in operation at zero 

time. These units were located at 20" intervals on the 

2,000-foot arc, starting at 20". . 

D. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at muster or control stations for 

i'ssuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. 

All personnel were required to have proper security 

clearances. Control was maintained using roadblocks, 

access authorizations, and a Schedule of Events. 

Parties could enter the controlled area only if they 

were listed on the Test Manager's Schedule of Events or 

with the permission of the Test Group Director. WI 

security guards were responsible for activating roadblocks and directing traffic flow. 

E. Air Support 

The PHS and USAF provided aerial monitoring and sampling 

services for the NEW POINT event. Monitoring aircraft 

consisted of one USAF U-3A with a USAF pilot and copilot 

173 
and two PHS monitors who checked for radioactive effluent. The NATS Martin 404 and a Turbo Beechcraft were on 

standby in Las Vegas but were not called. Aerial surveys 

were conducted preevent and postevent. Postevent aerial 

photography was conducted by APC and LMAFS personnel in 

a UH-1F helicopter; and a postevent aerial photography 

mission was performed by AAS personnel in a Cessna 206 

aircraft. 

8.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

Experimenter personnel were in the closed area on 6 December 

performing final button up activities. The only area control was 

security control of the SGZ area. 

Final stemming of the annulus and the Spoolex pit was completed. The tower was moved over the pit and aligned with the 

LOS pipe. Wood/honeycomb crush boards were placed under the 

tower tracks to absorb ground shock in excess of the tower design 

specification, and steel frames were bolted to the concrete pad 

to restrict vertical and sidewards tower motion. Experiment cables and other equipment were arranged in their event-time configuration in readiness for the event scheduled for the morning 

of 7 December. 

Rain had fallen during the day on 6 December, turning to 

thunderstorms and torrential rains late in the afternoon and 

evening. The rain caused two major problems which required considerable effort to resolve. Rain water leaking into the tower 

at cable holes and doors caused pallets and several cassettes to 

be electrically grounded to the tower. This was corrected by 

mopping and using heaters to dry wet areas. Rain also saturated 

crushable foam used to shock-mount instrumentation trailers, particularly foam in shallow pits dug under trailer wheels. The 

water-saturated foam easily crushed under the weight of the 

174 
trailers, causing them to settle and tilt. A crash effort 

quickly was instituted to replace the wet foam with dry foam 

wrapped in sheet plastic. Despite these last minute problems, 

all experiments and systems were ready for the scheduled event. 

8.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 

Adverse winds on 7 December prevented detonation on the 

scheduled date. Poor high altitude wind conditions (which could 

have resulted in any radioactive release being blown to occuppied 

areas or beyond U.S. borders) also were experienced the following 

two days. Another attempt to detonate was made on 10 December, 

but surface winds were not suitable. 

Between 0001 and 0700 hours on 13 December final instrument 

checks were made by personnel from HDL, LMSC, GE, NOL, AVCO, 

ECOM, NDL, WANL, AFWL, RADC, Boeing, PA, Nortronics, Hughes, WES, 

LRL, and SC. Three WES personnel made final adjustments on recording equipment and ran calibrations in the Project 9.13 

Trailer located 2,000 feet west of SGZ. Three parties of three 

EG&G personnel each loaded cameras and turned on equipment at 

five photo stations. Instrumentation adjustments to geophones 

were made by four SC personnel. REECo, SC, and DOD parties performed final button up of the trailer park areas. 

A readiness briefing conducted at 0700 hours resulted in 

zero time being scheduled for 1030 hours. The arming party entered the closed area at 0730 and departed at 0925 hours. The 

Radsafe facility was opened at 0800 hours to dress out reentry 

personnel. At 0931 the closed area was again checked by security 

personnel and found to be clear except for approved personnel at 

manned stations. At 1025 hours, zero time was again rescheduled. 

At 1230 hours the U-3A aircraft developed oil pressure trouble 

and landed at Desert Rock air strip; however, the Test Manager's 

175 
helicopter and the PHS Turbo Reechcraft were in place at 1255 

hours. 

The countdown was broadcast on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. 

Ten minutes before device detonation the siren on CP-1 ran for 30 

seconds, and the red lights on top of the building were turned on 

until after device detonation. 

NEW POINT zero time was 1300 hours PST on 13 December 1966. 

All control room monitors indicated normal functioning of 

the device, instrumentation, and other systems. Immediate observable effects were the anticipated ground shock and some airborne dust. The detonation was completely contained. 

Telemetry coverage began at zero time and was discontinued 

at 0800 hours on 15 December 1966. The maximum reading of 50 R/h 

was recorded at SGZ at H+l minute after which this RAMS unit 

ceased functioning. All other units steadily decreased from initial readings (H+l minute) ranging from 1.1 R/h (320 feet at 277O 

from SGZ) to 1 mR/h (at numerous locations). All radiation readings were the result of induced radioactivity from experiments 

and equipment and gamma shine from these locations. 

At about H+30 seconds, tower winches were manually started 

from the control room. The tower was withdrawn to its recovery 

point, about 325 feet west of SGZ, in 2.8 'minutes. The winch 

start signal also fired two HE charges to sever a cable bundle 

between the tower and the Project 2.1 junction box to prevent it 

from snagging. At Y+5 minutes power in the area was remotely cut 

off to prevent electrical hazards upon reentry. 

The surface around SGZ subsided at H+13 minutes, producing a 

surface crater approximately 210 feet in diameter. The crater was 

unusual in two respects. First, while the rim was relatively 

176 
circular, it had two distinct depths; approximately the northern 

half had very steep walls and was 80 to 90 feet deep. The 

remainder was relatively shallow, about 30 feet deep. Secondly, 

the center of the crater was offset about 30 feet to the 

northeast of the concrete pad and pit around the drill hole. The 

pad rested, intact, at the bottom of the 30-foot deep portion of 

the crater. 

8.3.1 Surface Reentry and Recovery Activities 

Two mobile Radsafe monitoring teams performed initial radiation surveys which began at 1326 hours and were completed at 

1355 hours on 13 December 1966 (Table 8.1). All positive mea- . 

surements were from induced radioactivity of experiments and 

equipment and gamma shine from these locations. A maximum reading 

of 500 mR/h was detected at 1352 hours at the Boeing Trailer 

located 15 feet from the tower. All survey data were reported to 

the net 3 radio control operator when measurements were made. 

After the radex area was established, all contaminated or 

radioactive materials were marked to indicate radiation levels 

present. Personnel entering radex areas were briefed concerning 

potential exposure and safety precautions and provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

On 13 December at 1350 hours, recovery parties entered the 

closed area to recover oscilloscope film, magnetic tape, and 

other data. Experimenter organizations participating were DASA, 

HDL, ACFI, ECOM, BAC, NDL, WAL, NC, BTL, HAC, SC, LMSC, EG&G, 

NOL, GE, LRL, APC, GA, and USGS. These efforts were completed by 

1500 hours without difficulty and according to the practiced reentry plan. Instrumentation trailers and their contents survived 

the ground shock undamaged. 

177 
Time 

1326 

1328 

1330 

1331 

1332 

1333 

1334 

1335 

1336 

1338 

1339 

1350 

1352 

1355 

TABLE 8.1 

NEW l?OINT EVENT 

INITIAL RADIATION 

13 December 

SURVEY 

1966 

DATA 

Location 

Gamma Exposure 

(mR/h 1 

Rate 

Stake 5Yll Bkg* 

Stake 5Y12 

Stake 5Yl3 

Stake 5Y14 

Stake 5Y15 

Stake 5Y16 

Stake 5Y17 

Stake 5Y18 

Stake 5Y19 

Stake 5Y20 

Stake 5Y21 

Junction of 5Y and 11B roads 

Stake llB1 

Stake llB2 

1lB road and UllC access road interBkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

Bkg 

0.15 

section 

South perimeter fence 

North end of trailer park 

East perimeter fence 

North perimeter fence 

Skid 3 

10.0 

1.5 

1.2 

2.5 

1.5 

100 feet NW of tower 10.0 

Boeing Trailer - 15 feet 

East side of trailers 

from tower 500.0 

4.0 

*Background radiation reading 

178 
The lower portion of the tower stairway was replaced, and 

passive dosimetry equipment was recovered from the experiment 

cassettes by 1615 hours. At 1700 hours, free access to all areas 

except the crater, tower, and trailers adjacent to the tower was 

permitted. 

8.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

a.42 Experiment Recovery 

At 0800 hours on 14 December, an LRL reentry party was 

dressed in anticontamination clothing and equipment in order to 

perform recovery of the highly radioactive (from activation) AEC 

recording cassette from the first floor of "the tower. This recovery operation was completed at 1100 hours at which time personnel from DASA, HDL, ACFI, ECOM, NDL, WAL, NC, SC, EG&G, and GA 

were allowed to perform their tower recovery operations. These 

activities were completed on 15 December. During tower operations, radiation surveys were performed and Radsafe monitors were 

in attendance. 

A TV camera was lowered into the LOS pipe to examine its 

interior. Pipe walls were clean down to about 280 feet, at which 

point the pipe had broken in tension at a weak weld, probably 

during ground shock. Sand filled the pipe from the break presumably down to the closed upper ball valve making further examination impractical. 

On 16 December a fence was constructed around the crater and 

the tower was moved inside the fence. Roth tower and fence were 

marked with radiation warning signs. 

179 
8.4.2 Postevent Drilling 

Postevent drilling on PS-1A to obtain core samples for analysis began at 2100 hours on 14 December. Core sampling began at 

2145 hours on 16 December and was completed at 0015 hours on 17 

December. A total of 16 core samples was taken with a maximum 

contact radiation reading of 40 R/h for a single core sample. 

On 17 December at 0100 hours, sidetrack drilling began on 

PS-1AS at a depth of 693 feet. Core sampling began at 1145 hours 

and was completed at 1649 hours on 17 December. Twenty-seven 

core samples were taken with a maximum contact radiation reading 

of 25 R/h for a single core sample. At 1800 hours, a burst of 

gas reading greater than 200 mR/h came through the disconnected 

drill pipe. Drillers were given masks to wear and air samples 

were taken. Mud was pumped on top of the Otis plug to try to 

seal the leak. At 1905 hours the rotating head was removed and 

no more gas was detected. The abandonment valve was closed at 

2100 hours. The rig was decontaminated to acceptable levels and 

removed; then the area was fenced. 

8.4.3 Industrial Safety 

Toxic gas and explosive mixture levels were monitored continuously. No readings above permissible levels were detected. 

Industrial safety codes, including 'specific codes for 

mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and 

emphasized during all operations. 

8.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 1301 hours on 13 December 

1966, and ended at 0800 hours on 15 December 1966. The maximum 

180 
gamma exposure rate detected was 50 R/h at SGZ at 1301 hours on 

13 December 1966. This radioactivity was induced activity in 

equipment and material from prompt neutrons before closure systems sealed the LOS pipe. 

Initial survey teams began at 1326 hours and the survey was 

completed at 1355 hours on 13 December 1966. The maximum gamma 

reading detected was 500 mR/h at the Hoeing Trailer located 15 

feet from SGZ at 1352 hours on 13 December. No alpha radiation 

was detected. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries into 

NEW POINT radex areas from 13 to.18 December 1966 are summarized 

below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket dosimeters 

as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from 

film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (n-R) 

All Participants 642 1,955 84 

DOD Participants 144 1,855 206 

Postevent drilling began at 2100 hours on 14 December and 

the abandonment valve was closed at 2100 hours on 17 December 

1966. No alpha radiation was detected. Maximum gamma exposure 

rates detected during drillback operations were: 

Postevent Hole No. 1A - 0.6 mR/h in the cellar from 2130 

to 2400 hours on 16 December 1966. 

PS-1A Core - 40 R/h at contact. 

Postevent Hole No. 1AS - 200 mR/h from the pipe at 1800 

hours on 17 December 1966. 

181 
PS-1AS Core - 25 R/h at contact. 

No radioactivity above normal background levels was detected 

offsite by ground and aerial monitoring teams, by stationary dose 

rate recorders, or in any environmental samples either after the 

detonation or during subsequent sample recovery operations. No 

fresh fission products were detected in any environmental sample 

collected offsite throughout this period, and no prefilter air 

samples contained levels of gross beta activity above normal 

background. 

It was the opinion of the PHS that no radioactive contamination of the offsite area resulted from this event. 

182 
CHAPTER 9 

MIDI MIST EVENT 

9.1 EVENT SUMMARY 

The MIDI MIST event was a DOD underground detonation with a 

yield less than 20 kt conducted at 0900 hours PDT on 26 June 1967 

at tunnel site U12n.02 in Area 12 of the NTS. The device was emplaced in a tuff medium 1,230 feet from the nearest free surface. 

MIDI MIST investigated the effects of a nuclear detonation environment on equipment and materials. The experiment program included 16 projects conducted by DOD, laboratory, and other contractor personnel. U12n.02 drift for MIDI MIST was constructed 

in an extension of the existing U12n tunnel complex (Figure 9.1). 

Low levels of radioactive effluent were detected offsite by aircraft only. 

9.2 PREEVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.2.1 Responsibilities 

Safe conduct of all MIDI MIST project activities in Area 12 

was the responsibility of the DOD Test Group Director. Responsibilities of AEC and AEC contractor personnel were in accordance 

with established AX/DOD agreements or were the subject of separate action between Test Command, DASA, and the AEC Nevada Operations Office. Because LRL fielded the test device, the LRL 

Test Group Director was responsible to the Test Manager for radiological safety within a 5,000-foot radius of SGZ. This responsibility was in effect from the time the device was moved to 

the emplacement site until zero time. At zero time, the Test 

183 
-if184 
Manager relieved the LRL Test Group Director of responsibility 

pursuant to the provisions of the NTS-SOP and assigned responsibility to the DOD Test Group Director. The DOD was responsible 

for preevent installation and postevent removal of equipment necessary for its project activities. 

9.2.2 Planning and Preparations 

The "MIDI MIST Reentry Plan" described preevent preparations 

and postevent procedures used to assure safe and economical reentry. In addition, Radsafe personnel were provided with "Detailed Initial Reentry Procedures" for reentry and recovery operations. Stemming design incorporated necessary provisions to 

maximize reentry safety. 

Mining and test area preparations were conducted in the 02 

drift for MIDI MIST and in the 03 drift for a future event. Various experiment alcoves were mined, test instrumentation was installed, and the LOS pipe and associated hardware were installed. 

Fifty-three instrumentation trailers were used to record data 

from this event. 

Sand stemming and blast doors had been emplaced in the 

tunnel. The plugs provided containment, reduced radioactivity in 

the reentry area, and minimized reentry problems. Blast doors 

contained any debris that passed the stemming. Radiation sensing 

instruments provided remote detection of tunnel radiation levels 

while tunnel condition indicators remotely monitored the condition of the tunnel. 

A. Radiological Safety SUppOrt 

Participating agencies were provided with detailed radiological safety reentry plans prior to the test event. 

Test area maps with appropriate reference points were 

185 
prepared. Reference markers, radiation decay recorders, 

and air sampling equipment were positioned in the test 

area. Reentry routes into the test area were established during "dry runs." Radiation monitors were briefed regarding reentry, sample recovery, manned stations, 

and security station requirements. 

All personnel at manned stations were provided with anticontamination clothing and equipment, and Radsafe monitors were in attendance. 

A mobile issue facility for anticontamination clothing, 

respiratory devices, ins$ruments, and dosimetric devices 

was positioned prior to the event at the security barricade near the FCP. When authorized by the Test Group 

Director, this facility was repositioned to a convenient 

location near the tunnel portal. A personnel and vehicle decontamination facility was established adjacent to 

the mobile issue facility. 

Radsafe monitors were stationed at all WSI security 

roadblocks and at all work areas within the exclusion 

area to perform surveys and provide other support as 

directed. Sufficient Radsafe personnel were standing by 

at the FCP to provide rescue and emergency support, and 

radiological area control as exclusion areas were established. 

Radsafe provided monitoring teams and supervisory personnel for initial surface radiation surveys, helicopter 

surveys, and tunnel reentry parties. Radsafe personnel 

were stationed at the DOD Test Group Director's FCP to 

perform initial and subsequent ground surveys as required; provide emergency rescue and support as directed; 

provide and issue anticontamination equipment, portable 

186 
instruments, and dosimetric devices; perform personnel, 

equipment, and vehicle decontamination; and operate a 

sample return station. 

Anticontamination materials available included coveralls, head covers, shoe covers, full-face masks, supplied-air breathing apparatus, plastic suits, gloves, 

plastic bags, and masking tape. 

B. Telemetry and Air Sampling Support 

A RAMS installation was installed with the detection 

units located underground and on the surface, and 

readouts located outside the controlled area. This 

system was functioning at zero time so that tunnel 

radiation conditions could be determined. RAMS console 

readings were recorded every 15 minutes until tunnel 

ventilation was started. Forty-nine remote telemetry 

radiation monitoring stations provided coverage as 

follows: 

RAMS 

No. Aboveground Location 

*1 31 feet from portal at 328" Azimuth 

2 67 feet from portal at 45" (vent filter system) 

3 67 feet from portal at 45" (vent filter system) 

*4 67 feet from portal at 45" (vent filter system) 

*5 67 feet from portal at 45" (vent filter system) 

6 400 feet from portal at 16" Azimuth 

7 275 feet from portal at 89" Azimuth 

8 363 feet from portal at 164" Azimuth 

9 482 feet from portal at 192" Azimuth 

"10 558 feet from portal at 228" Azimuth 

11 416 feet from portal at 291° Azimuth 

187 
RAMS 

rJ0. Aboveground Location 

12 648 feet from portal at 333" Azimuth 

13 2,570 feet from portal at 328' Azimuth 

14 2,234 feet from portal at 342' Azimuth 

15 1,817 feet from portal at 355' Azimuth 

16 1,316 feet from portal at 20" Azimuth 

17 666 feet from portal at 69" Azimuth 

18 1,369 feet from portal at 137" Azimuth 

*19 1,964 feet from portal at 163" Azimuth 

*20 1,822 feet, from portal at 191" Azimuth 

*21 2,773 feet from portal at 234' Azimuth 

*22 2,013 feet from portal at 256" Azimuth 

23 2,742 feet from portal at 301" Azimuth 

24 2,766 feet from portal at 316" Azimuth 

25 6,056 feet from portal at 115" Azimuth 

*26 3,086 feet from portal at 282" Azimuth 

27 3,550 feet from portal at 282" Azimuth 

28 3,228 feet from portal at 288" Azimuth 

29 3,160 feet from portal at 288" Azimuth 

30 3,240 feet from portal at 289' Azimuth 

31 4,760 feet from portal at 259' Azimuth 

32 4,816 feet from portal at 270" Azimuth 

33 4,805 feet from portal at 273" Azimuth 

*34 5,016 feet from portal at 305" Azimuth 

34a 3,320 feet from portal at 267.5" Azimuth 

Underground Location 

*35 1,300 feet inside 02 drift 

36 963 feet inside 02 drift 

37 300 Eeet inside 02 drift 

"38 300 feet inside 03 driEt 

"39 3,000 Eeet in from portal in main drift 

188 
RAMS 

No. Underground Location 

40 2,940 feet in from portal in main drift 

41 2,740 feet in from portal in main drift 

"42 300 feet inside 01 drift 

*43 59 feet inside 01 drift 

44 1,675 feet in from portal in main drift 

4s 1,475 feet in from portal in main drift 

46 700 feet in from portal in main drift 

47 SO feet in from portal in main drift 

*cc Cloud chamber alcove 60 feet inside 01-05 drift 

*Read out on strip chart recorder near portal. 

Twenty-one air samplers were placed in a surface array, 

calibrated, and operational at zero time. 

C. Security Coverage 

Muster and control stations were established on D-day. 

All personnel entering or exiting the controlled area 

were required to stop at the muster or control stations 

for issuance or return of their muster or stay-in badges. All personnel were required to have proper security clearances for the area. Control of the area was 

maintained by the use of roadblocks, access authorizations, and a Schedule of Events. Parties could enter 

the controlled area only if they were listed on the 

"Test Manager's Schedule of Events," or with permission 

of the Test Group Director. Two reentry control points 

were established: 

1) two and one-half miles south of the Area 12 Camp for 

those persons scheduled to enter the U12n portal 

area to recover experimental data, and 

189 
2) at the intersection of Stockade Wash Road and Pahutc 

Road for those personnel scheduled to enter the 

Rainier Mesa trailer parks to recover experimental 

data. 

WSI security guards were responsible for activating 

roadblocks and directing traffic flow. 

D. Air Support 

Aircraft support for this event was as follows: 

Type Organization Mission 

U-6A Security D-day Security Sweep 

UH-1F DOD Photo 

UH-1F LMAFS Photo 

U-3A USAF/PHS Cloud Tracking 

Turbo Beech PHS Cloud Sampling 

Turbo Beech PHS Cloud Sampling* 

Martin 404 EG&G/NATS Cloud Tracking* 

*On standby at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

MIDI MIST was originally scheduled for detonation on 23 June 

1967. Muster stations were activated at 1400 hours on 22 June by 

WSI guards. All roadblocks were activated at 1402 hours. The 

first security sweep began at 1403 hours and was completed at 

1835 hours. At 2300 hours, the second sweep began with completion 

at 0045 hours on 23 June. At 0116 hours, DOD requested that the 

trailer park on Rainier Mesa be rechecked. Only prearming personnel were to remain in the area. The Rainier Mesa sweep was completed at 0220 hours. The aerial security sweep began at 0548 

hours and was completed at 0655 hours. 

190 
Permission to arm the device was granted at 0650 hours on 23 

June. The device was armed and the area cleared by 0912 hours. 

A delay of zero time was called at 0945 hours and the event was 

cancelled at 1315 hours. The arming party departed for N-tunnel 

at 1430 hours, and the device was disarmed by 1550 hours. The HE 

experiments were disarmed by 1600 hours. The event was postponed 

until 26 June. 

9.2.3 Late Preevent Activities 

A readiness briefing was held at 1530 hours on 25 June. 

Experimenters were in the closed area all day performing button 

up activities. Experimenter organizations represented were SC, 

EG&G, AFWL, BRL, LMSC, RADC, GA, LASL, AVCO, NOL, LRL, SRI, and 

DOD. The first security sweep was performed by WSI and completed 

at 1930 hours. 

9.3 EVENT-DAY AND CONTTNUING ACTIVITIES 

The second security sweep of the closed area was completed 

at 0050 hours on 26 June. At 0245 hours, permission was granted 

to arm the HE experiments; permission to arm the device was 

granted at 0540 hours. Manned photo station personnel were in 

their assigned positions by 0605 hours. WSI personnel conducted 

a final security sweep which was completed at 0635 hours. HE and 

device arming parties were out of the closed area and the area 

cleared by 0737 hours. I 

The final weather briefing for the Test Manager and Advisory 

Panel was conducted approximately two hours before planned device 

detonation. 

Required countdown began on radio nets 1, 2, 6, and 8. At 

ten minutes before device detonation the siren on CP-1 ran for 30 

191 
seconds, and the red lights on top of the building were turned on 

until after device detonation. 

MIDI MIST zero time was 0900 hours PDT on 26 June 1967. 

Telemetry measurements began at 0901 hours. The maximum 

gamma exposure rate detected was 275 R/h at underground station 

36 at 0901 hours. Ncasurements supplied by 25 operating RAMS 

units located aboveground indicated no activity above background 

radiation until 1322 hours when tunnel ventilation systems were 

turned on. These readings were verified by reentry team monitors 

who checked out all trailer parks including those on top of 

Rainier Mesa. The five RAMS units inside the tunnel complex 

along the main drift averaged 6.6 mR/h six hours after detonation. The first indication of effluent activity occurred at 1340 

hours and the controlled release continued until approximately 

0900 hours on 27 June at which time the radiation readings from 

the vent line monitors decreased to background. About 4,500 

curies of radioactivity were released through 22 hours after 

detonation, and the remote monitoring instrument at the tunrlel 

entrance was measuring 6.5 mR/h at that time. 

9.3.1 Surface Reentry Activities 

Initial safety and radiological surveys were performed under 

the direction of the Test Group Director in accordance with the 

"Radiological Safety Support Plan for MIDI MIST." Initial survey 

teams were released at 1002 hours by the Test Group Director. At 

1006 hours two vehicle-borne Radsafe parties, consisting of two 

monitors each, began the initial survey which was completed at 

1015 hours. All initial survey readings were background because 

release of gaseous activity through the vent line filter system 

had not begun. 

All survey data were reported to the net 3 radio control 

192 
operator when measurements were made. Plotting facilities were 

maintained at the FCP and CP-1. Radsafe control was located in 

the operations trailer at FCP. 

Each area and all contaminated or radioactive materials at 

the portal and, later, underground were marked to indicate radiation levels present. Personnel entering radiation areas or working with contaminated material were briefed concerning potential 

exposure and safety precautions, and provided with anticontamination clothing, equipment, and materials. 

After use, anticontamination clothing and equipment were 

laundered and returned to stock for subsequent reissue. Items 

which could not be decontaminated to permissible levels were 

buried at a designated disposal site. 

9.3.2 Experiment Recovery 

Experiment recovery began at 1045 hours. DOD personnel 

traveled to Rainier Mesa instrument trailer park and reaction 

history trailer park to control data recovery teams. Those orgarizations recovering data from the Rainier Mesa instrument 

trailer park were SC, EG&G, AFWL, BRL, RADC, GA, LASL, AVCO, NOL, 

LRL and SRI. LRL and DOD personnel recovered data from the reaction history trailer park. Separate recovery activities were being conducted at the portal area, where DOD personnel were controlling operations by LMSC, LRL, and SC representatives. Film 

and tape recovery was accomplished without encountering detectable radiation. 

Permission was granted at 1200 hours for SC personnel to 

operate the gas sampling system at the portal. At 1415 hours, SC 

personnel disconnected cables at the reaction history cable hole 

near SGZ and four cable holes at the Rainier Mesa instrument 

trailer park. They also disconnected cables at the portal area. 

193 
EG&G personnel recovered film from photo stations No. 1 and 

2 at 1643 hours. No further experiment recoveries were performed 

on 26 June 1967. 

9.3.3 Initial Tunnel Reentry 

Initial tunnel reentry began at 1830 hours on 26 June. The 

reentry team entered the tunnel to the gas seal door where the 

maximum radiation reading encountered was 10 mR/h. They then 

opened the gas seal door. Ry 1845 hours they had inspected the 

900 psi door on the portal side and noted that it was in good 

condition. A 15 mR/h maximum radiation reading was recorded at 

this location. No explosive mixtures or toxic gases were 

detected. 

The initial tunnel reentry team began their exit at 1910 

hours and the second reentry team entered the tunnel to open the 

900 psi door and remove the sand bags from the opening. No 

further tunnel reentry activities were conducted on 26 June 1967. 

9.4 POSTEVENT ACTIVITIES 

9.4.1 Tunnel Reentry 

Each participant in tunnel reentry operations was certified 

by the Bureau of Mines as having satisfactorily completed training in the use of the two-hour McCaa breathing apparatus, along 

with instruction in mine rescue procedures. 

Tunnel reentry activities began again at 1053 hours on 27 

June when a reentry team entered the tunnel complex to "walk out" 

the 02 drift. By 1107 hours all vent lines were in place, the 

radiation intensity was less than 0.5 mR/h, and no explosive mixtures or toxic gases were detected. Upon reaching scientific sta194 
tion No. 5 at 1130 hours, radiation readings again were taken. 

No toxic gases or explosive mixtures were detected and the maximum radiation reading was 100 mR/h at contact. Scientific station No. 6 was reached at 1135 hours. The maximum radiation intensity was 200 mR/h at contact with the scientific station No. 6 

door. A slight indication of toxic gases (approximately 100 ppm 

CO) was detected between scientific station No. 6 and No. 7. 

Minor repair to the vent line, which had been broken approximately 10 feet beyond scientific station No. 7 on the working 

point side, was accomplished on 28 June. 

9.4.2 Postevent Mining and Experiment Recovery 

Postevent mining began at 1030 hours on 29 June 1967. After 

all tunnel repair was complete and the ventilation system was operational, personnel from experimenter organizations, accompanied 

by Radsafe monitors, were allowed to enter the tunnel and perform 

recovery operations. Those personnel performing recovery tasks 

were from LMSC, LRL, GA, SC, AFWL, AMC, EG&G, and DOD. Experiment 

recoveries proceeded as planned. There were no radiation or industrial hygiene problems encountered. Recovery operations went 

smoothly, experiments were recovered from the tunnel and LOS 

pipe, and the effort was terminated on 14 July 1967. The maximum 

gamma reading obtained was 130 mR/h on contact with the inside of 

Station No. 9 at 1130 hours on 5 July 1967. The maximum alpha 

radiation measurement was 20,000 cpm per 55 cm2 on LASL equipment 

located between test chamber Nos. 6 and 7 at 1840 hours on 29 

June 1967. 

Later in July, a decision was made to perform reentry mining 

to study the stemmed areas and learn as much as possible about a 

successfully contained event. About 900 feet of LOS pipe was removed and a reentry drift was mined from July 1967 to 6 December 

195 
1967 on the left side and parallel with the experimental drift. 

No radiation problems were experienced. 

9.4.3 Postevent Drilling 

Drilling began on PS-1A at 0930 hours on 16 July 1967. After encountering several problems with drilling equipment, sufficient depth was reached to begin the core sampling operation at 

1347 hours on 20 July. Twenty-four samples were obtained, with a 

maximum contact radiation intensity of 23 R/h for a single core 

sample, and the operation was concluded at 2010 hours that same 

day. 

A sidetrack hole, PS-1AS was begun at a depth of 1,160 feet 

at 2255 hours on 20 July. The first core sample was obtained at 

1750 hours on 21 July. A total of 21 samples were taken with a 

maximum contact radiation intensity of 7 R/h for a single core 

sample. 

Postevent drilling operations were completed and the ahandonment valve closed at 0416 hours on 22 July 1967. 

9.4.4 Industrial Safety 

Reentry was not made beyond ventilation, 1,000 ppm CO, or 10 

percent LEC 0E gas mixtures. Checks were made on each shift for 

radiation levels, toxic gases, and explosive mixtures. These measurements were then recorded in the monitor's log book. Maximum 

industrial hygiene readings for the MIDI MIST event were: 

1. 100 percent of the CEL in the 02 drift on 22 September 

1967. 

2. 70,000 ppm CO in the 02 drift on 22 September 1967. 

196 
3. 20 ppm NO + NO2 at the reentry work face on 23 September 

1967. 

4. 15,000 ppm CO2 in the 02 drift on 28 September 1967. 

Appropriate safety measures were taken to protect mining 

personnel from those hazardous conditions. Industrial safety 

codes, including specific codes for mining, tunneling, and drilling were established by REECo and emphasized during all operations. 

The Test Plan required that all explosives and all elcctroexplosive components, toxic materials, or radioactive materials 

were handled, stored, and transported in accordance with the 

applicable section of the Army Material Command Regulations 

AMCR-385-224, and AEC NTS-SOPS. 

The portal construction area and the tunnel were hard hat 

and foot protection (safety shoes, safety boots, miners boots or 

toe guards) areas. Each participating agency provided its own 

industrial safety apparel. 

Eye protection, safety glasses, or cover-all goggle types 

were worn whenever explosives of any configuration were being 

handled. Conductive booties were worn over shoes at all times in 

the Explosive Assembly Building. Conductive safety shoes could 

be worn in lieu of the conductive booties provided they 1rad not 

been worn on gravel or dirt surfaces. 

9.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 

Telemetry measurements began at 0901 hours on 26 June 1967, 

and ended at 1600 hours on 30 June 1967. The maximum gamma expo197 
sure rate detected was 275 R/h at underground Station 36 at 0901 

hours on 26 June 1967. 

The initial reentry survey teams entered the area at 1006 

hours and completed the survey at 1015 hours on 26 June 1967. The 

maximum gamma reading obtained was background radiation (0.05 

mR/h). No alpha radiation was detected. 

Postevent mining began at 1030 hours on 29 June 1967 and 

ended at 0730 hours on 3 August 1967. The maximum gamma reading 

obtained was 130 mR/h on contact with the inside of Station No. 7 

at 1130 hours on 5 July 1967. The maximum alpha radiation measurement was 20,000 cpm per 55 cm2 on LASL equipment located hetween test chamber Nos. 6 and 7 at 1840 hours on 29 June 1967. 

There was no change in the radiation intensities underground during the postevent recovery operations from 14 July to 3 August 

1967. 

The maximum personnel gamma exposure rates detected during 

postevent drillback operations were: 

Postevent Hole No. 1A - 0.3 mR/h in the cellar at 1700 

hours on 20 July 1967. 

PS-1A Core - 23 R/h at contact. 

Postevent Hole No. 1AS - 15.0 mR/h in the cellar at 0230 

hours on 22 July 1967. 

PS-1AS Core - 7 R/h at contact. 

No alpha radiation was detected. Postevent operations were 

completed on 4 January 1368. 

Personnel exposures received during individual entries to 

198 
MIDI MIST radex areas from 26 June 1967 to 3 January 1968, including tunnel work in preparation for another test event, are 

summarized below. Average exposures are from self-reading pocket 

dosimeters as recorded on Area Access Registers. Maximum exposures are from film dosimeter records. 

Maximum Average 

No. of Entries Exposure Exposure 

Logged (mR) (mR) 

All Participants 3,487 625 18 

DOD Participants 414 285 a 

199 
REFERENCE LIST 

References are not indicated within the text of this report, 

but are included in this list by chapter or part. Most references are available for review at, or through, the DOE/NV Coordination and Information Center (CIC). Security--classified references are located at the DNA/HQ Technical Library in Alexandria, 

Virginia, but are available only to persons with appropriate security clearances and a need for classified information contained 

in the references. 

The CIC is operated by REECo, the custodian of nuclear testing dosimetry and other radiological safety records for DOE/NV, 

and the custodian for DNA of reference documents for reports on 

DOD participation in atmospheric, oceanic, and underground nuclear weapons testing events and series. Arrangements may be 

made to review available references for this report at the CIC by 

contacting one oE the following: 

Health Physics Division 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

2753 South Highland Avenue 

Post Office Box 14100 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0994 

FTS: 575-0994 

or 

Manager, Coordination and Information Center 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. 

Post Office Box 14400 

Las Vegas, NV 89114 

Commercial: (702) 295-0748 

FTS: 575-0748 

200 
Source documents available through the National Technical 

Information Service (NTIS) may be purchased from NTIS at the 

address and telephone number listed below: 

National Technical Information Service 

5285 Port Royal Road 

Springfield, VA 22161 

Commercial: (703) 487-4650 

(Sales Office) 

References available through public bookstores, through the 

U.S. Government Printing Office, and only at the CIC are listed 

without asterisks. Asterisks after references or groups of references indicate availability as follows: 

* Available through the NTIS and also located at the CIC. 

** Located in the REECo Technical Information Office adjacent to the CIC, available through the CIC, and may be 

subject to Privacy Act restrictions. 

*** Located in the DNA/HQ Technical Library, and subject to 

security clearance requirements. 

PREFACE 

1. Office oE Public Affairs, U.S. Departm.ent of Energy, Nevada 

Operations Office, "Announced United States Nuclear Tests," 

NVO-209 (Rev. 2), January 1982 

2. Devine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 

Ban Debate, Oxford University Press, NY, 1978 

3. Harris, P.S., et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

PLUMBBOB, DNA 6005F, 15 September 1981" 

201 
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Veterans' 

Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing," U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979 

Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION 

DOE/NV, "Announced Nuclear Tests," (n. 1). 

Devine, "Nuclear Test Ban Debate," (n. 2). 

5. Weapons Effects Test Group, Field Command, Defense Atomic 

Support Agency, "Orientation, Nevada Test Site," January 

1962 

6. Weapons Test Division, Defense Atomic Support Agency, 

"Orientation, Nevada Test Site," revised 15 August 1964 

7. Ponton, Jean, et al., Defense Nuclear Agency, OPERATION 

DOMINIC II, DNA 6027F, 31 January 1983* 

8. Radiological Safety Divison, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., "Danny Boy Event, On-site Rad-Safe 

Report," May 1962 

Chapter 2, UNDERGROUND TESTING PROCEDURES 

9. Liverman, James L., Energy Research & Development Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Nevada Test 

Site, Nye County, Nevada, ERDA - 1551, September 1977" 

10. Butkovich, Theodore R., Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Effects of Water Saturation on Underground Nuclear Detonations, UCRL-51110, 9 September 1971* 

202 
Committee on Veterans Affairs, "Claims for Disabilities," 

(n. 4), on venting. 

11. Radiological Safety Department, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc., "Standard Operating Procedures," January 

1961-1968 

EVENT SUMMARIES AND EACH EVENT CHAPTER 

12. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, Report 

of the Test Manager, Operation Flintlock, 1 July 1965 

through 30 Ju-ne 1966, NVO-33, March 1967, Unpublished. 

13. Atomic Energy Commission, Nevada Operations Office, Report 

of the Test Manager, Operation Latchkey, 1 July 1966 through 

30 June 1367, NVO-36, May 1968, Unpublished. 

14. REECo Environmental Sciences Department field record archives are maintained chronologically and by test event and include the following: 

a. Procedures, Reentry Plans, Radsafe Plans, and Schedules of Events. ** 

b. Correspondence. ** 

C. Reports, including onsito Radsafe and offsite PHS 

event reports. ** 

d. Exposure reports, Radsafe log books, Area Access 

Registers, radiation survey forms, telemetry forms, 

and other sampling and dosimetry forms. ** 

203 
204 
APPENDIX A 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Access Shaft Headframe A framed structure above the shaft collar, necessary for lowering and hoisting the elevator cage, personnel, and 

equipment in tunnel shafts. 

Activation Products Nuclides made radioactive by neutrons 

from a nuclear detonation interacting 

with usually nonradioactive nuclides. 

Also called induced activity. 

Advisory Panel A group of experts formed to advise the 

user (see Testing Organizations) Test 

Director concerning operational factors 

affecting a test detonation. 

AFSWC The Air Force Special Weapons Center, 

located at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. AFSWC provided 

air support to the AEC Test Manager for 

NTS testing activities. 

AFSWP The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was activated on 1 ,January 1947, 

when the AEC was activated, to assume 

residual functions of the U.S. Army 

Manhattan Engineer District. 

Air Support AircraEt, facilities, and personnel required for various support functions 

205 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Alpha Particle 

Andersen Sampler 

Anticontamination 

Clothing 

Atmospheric Test 

Series 

Attenuation 

during testing, such as cloud sampling, 

loud tracking, radiation monitoring, 

photography, and personnel and equipment transport. 

A particle emitted spontaneously from 

the nucleus of the radionuclide, primarily heavy radionuclides. The particle is identical with the nucleus of 

a helium atom, having an atomic mass of 

four units and an electric charge of 

two positive units. 

The standard H. H. Andersen six-stage 

inertial impactor, modified by the 

addition of a seventh stage filter, 

designed to collect particles on the 

basis of mass and density at a given 

intake rate. 

Outer clothing worn to prevent contamination of personal clothing and the 

body and spread of contamination to 

uncontrolled areas. 

Each of several series of U.S. tests 

conducted from 1945 to 1962, when nuc1ea.r device detonations and experiments were conducted primarily in the 

atmosphere. 

The process by which photons or particles from radioactive material are 

206 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

reduced in number or energy on passing 

through some medium. 

Background Radiation 1) Natural environmental radiation. 

2) The radiations of man's natural environment, consisting of cosmic 

rays and those radiations which 

come from the naturally radioactive 

atoms of the earth, including those 

within man's body. 

3) The term also may mean radiation 

extraneous to an experiment. 

"Beer Mug" Dosimeters Dosimetric devices installed in a protective shield the size and shape of a 

beer mug (see Dosimeter). 

Beta Particle A negatively charged particle of very 

small mass emitted from the nucleus of 

a radionuclide, particularly from the 

fission product radionuclides from nuclear detonations. Except for origin, 

the beta particle is identical with a 

highspeed electron. 

BJY The intersection of Mercury Highway 

with roads originally constructed for 

the BUSTER-JANGLE 1953 atmospheric test 

series, located at the NW corner of 

Area 3 on the NTS. 

Blast Door May be in blast plug, but originally 

was in its own keyed plug toward the 

207 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Blast Plug 

Blooie Line 

Bluebird Teams 

portal from the blast plug. Evolved 

into an overburden plug with a large 

steel door contining a smaller access 

hatch and designed to withstand up to 

1000 psi overpressure. May be welded or 

bolted closed during detonation. Sometimes a loosely used substitute term 

for a gas seal door. 

Barrier constructed underground as a 

primary containment feature. May be 

constructed with sandbags (see Sandbag 

Plugs), solid sand backfill, concrete 

(see Keyed Concrete Plug), or other 

materials. Some plugs may have openings through them that are sealed with 

blast doors, and sometimes sandbags are 

added to protect the opening temporarily during detonation. 

Pipe line used to remove cuttings from 

the drill string to the settling pond. 

Vehicle-borne teams consisting of 2 radiation monitors, each with equipment 

and materials to distinguish, follow, 

delineate and sample at ground level 

any effluent release from a nuclear detonation at the NTS. They usually were 

positioned within the secured area to 

be free to move about as directed without having to gain access through security stations into the test area. 

Button up Activities Preparations made prior to a detonation 

208 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Cable nrift 

Cal-Seal 

Cassette 

Cellar 

Chamber 

Check Po3nts or 

Check Stations 

C;~iinney 

during which time all facilities and 

areas were secured as required, vehicles and equipment were removed, and 

fixtures were prepared to withstand 

detonation shock. 

A passageway tunnel, usually parallel 

to the LOS drift, also known as the access or reentry drift, in which cables 

from various experiments in the LOS 

pipe were installed toward a cable alcove and then through a sealed shaft to 

the surface. 

A commercial sealant that is high density, quick-drying, high strength, and 

resilient concrete. 

A holder or container for a sample, an 

experiment, or a group of experiments. 

The larger diameter, first part of a 

drilled hole where valving and other 

equipment are located. 

A natural or man-made enclosed space or 

cavity. 

Geographic locations established and 

staffed to control entry into restricted areas. 

The volume of broken rock above an underground detonation cavity that falls 

209 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Cloud Sampling 

Cloud Tracking 

Coaxial Cable 

Collar 

Console 

Containment 

downward when decreasing cavity gas 

pressure can no longer support the column of broken rock. 

The process of collecting particulate 

and gaseous samples of an effluent 

cloud to determine the amount of airborne radioactivity, and/or for subsequent analysis of detonation characteristics. Sampling usually was accomplished by specially equipped aircraft. 

The process of monitoring and determining the drift and movement of an 

effluent cloud, either by radar or by 

radiation monitoring and visual sighting from aircraft. 

A high-frequency telephone, telegraph, 

television, or scientific data transmission cable consisting of a conducting outer metal tube enclosing and insulated from a central conducting core. 

See "Shaft Collar" 

A cabinet or panel containing instrumentation for monitoring or controlling 

electronic or mechanical devices. 

The process of confining radioactive 

products of a nuclear device detonation 

underground. 

210 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Decontamination 

Device 

Dog Hole 

DOD 

Dose 

(continued) 

The reduction of amount or removal of 

contaminating radioactive material from 

a structure, area, object, or person. 

Decontamination may be accomplished by 

(1) treating the surface to remove or 

decrease the contamination; (2) letting 

the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of 

natural decay: or (3) fixing and covering the contamination to attenuate the 

radiation emitted. 

Nuclear fission or fission and fusion 

materials together with the arming, 

fusing, firing, chemical, explosive, 

canister, and diagnostic measurement 

equipment, that have not reached the 

development status oE an operational 

weapon. 

An area smaller than an alcove which 

has been mined into the tunnel rib. 

Normally used to store small equipment 

or tools. 

The U.S. Department of Defense. The 

federal executive agency responsible 

for the defense of the United States. 

Includes the military services and special joint defense agencies. 

A quantity (measured or accumulated) of 

ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy 

absorbed by a medium, including a person. 

212 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Dose Rate As a general rule, the amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation energy that 

an individual or material would absorb 

per unit of time. Dose rate is usually 

expressed as rads (or rems) per hour or 

multiples or divisions of these units. 

Dosimeter An instrument or device used to indicate the total accumulated dose of (or 

exposure to) ionizing radiation. Instruments or devices worn or carried by 

individuals are called personnel dosimeters. 

&em Disintegrations per minute; a measure 

of radioactivity. Literally, atoms disintegrating per minute. 

Draeger Multi-Gas 

Detector An instrument used to detect toxic gases, such that a sample of the ambient 

atmosphere is drawn through a selected 

chemical reagent tube which indicates 

the concentration of a toxic gas. 

Dressed-Out Dressed in anticontamination clothing 

and associated equipment. 

Drift A secondary passageway tunnel, usually 

horizontal, from or between main tunnels or shafts. 

Drillhole Designations PS-1v: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

vertical 

213 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

PS-ID: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

directional 

PS-1A: Post-Shot drill hole number 1 -

angle 

Each 'S' added after any of the above 

notations indicates a "sidetrack" or 

change of direction in the drillhole. 

Dry Runs Rehearsals or practices in preparation 

for an actual test event. 

Effects Experiments Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

Explosimeter A battery-operated detector calibrated 

to indicate the concentration in the 

ambient atmosphere of explosive gases 

and vapors as percent of the lower 

explosive limit (LEL) of methane gas. 

Explosive-Proof 

Flashlight A flashlight constructed in such a manner that its use will not cause or create an explosion in an explosive gas 

atmosphere. 

214 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Exposure A measure expressed in roentgens (R) of 

the ionization produced by gamma rays 

(or x-rays) in air [or divisions of R; 

l/1000 R = milliroentgen (mR)l. The 

exposure rate is the exposure per unit 

of time, usually per hour but sometimes 

smaller or larger units (e.g., R/min, 

R/day, mR/h). 

Film Badge Used for the indirect measurement of 

exposure to ionizing radiation. Generally contains 2 or 3 films of differing sensitivity. Films are wrapped 

in paper (or other thin material) that 

blocks light but is readily penetrated 

by radiations or secondary charged particles resulting from radiations to be 

measured. The films are developed and 

the degree of darkening (or density) 

measured indicates the radiation exposure. Film dosimeters commonly are used 

to indicate gamma and x-ray exposures, 

and also can be designed to determine 

beta and neutron doses. 

Fission The process whereby the nucleus of a 

particular heavy element splits into 

(generally) two nuclei of lighter elements, with an accompanying release of 

energy. The most important fissionable, or fissile, materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission is 

caused by the absorption of a neutron. 

215 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Fission Products A general term used for the complex 

mixture of radioactive nuclides (see 

Radionuclides) produced as a result of 

nuclear fission. 

Fissionable Material A synonym for fissile material, also 

extended to include material that can 

be fissioned by fast neutrons only, 

such as uranium-238. Used in reactor 

operations to mean reactor fuel. 

Forward Control Point A geographic location in the forward 

test area, usually adjacent to the 

closed (or secured) test area. 

Fusion The combination of two very light nuclei (of atoms) to form a relatively 

heavier nucleus, with an accompanying 

release of energy. Also called thermonuclear fusion. 

Gamma Log Instrument used to measure natural 

radiation levels in a preemplacement 

hole, and after an event to measure 

radiation in the cavity. 

Gamma Rays Electromagnetic radiations of high energy emitted from the nuclei of radionuclides, or bundles of energy called 

photons, which usually accompany other 

nuclear reactions, such as fission, 

neutron capture, and beta particle 

emission. Gamma rays, or photons, are 

identical with x-rays of the same energy, except that x-rays result from 

216 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Gamma Shine 

Gas Seal Door 

Gas Seal Plug 

Geiger-Muel!er Counter 

Geophones 

Ground Zero 

electron reactions and are not produced 

in the nucleus. 

Measurable gamma radiation intensity 

from an approaching radioactive cloud 

or passing cloud, as opposed to measurements from or in gamma emitting 

fallout. Also gamma radiation scattered by air molecules, as opposed to 

direct radiation from a gamma source. 

A door constructed in a tunnel gas seal 

Plug* Roth are designed to prevent 

venting of gases. 

A plug employing epoxy, plastic, or 

other material, designed and installed 

to prevent the passage and venting of 

gases. 

An instrument consisting of a Geiger 

tube and associated electronic equipment used to detect and measure (and 

sometimes record) nuclear radiation. 

Electronic instruments which detect and 

record rock falls and earth movements 

by the use of sound. 

The point on the ground or water at 

which a surface, near surface, towertype, or ballon-type nuclear detonation 

occurs; as opposed to an airburst where 

the detonation is high in the air, or 

an underground detonation where the 

217 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

H-Hour 

Hard Copy 

Hot Line 

Ion 

Ionizing Radiation 

surface is relatively unaffected (see 

Surface Ground Zero). 

Time zero or exact time of detonation 

to the minute, second, or fraction of a 

second; as opposed to H + 1 which implies one hour after detonation, unless 

time units of seconds or minutes are 

listed. 

The original paper document used in 

research. 

A location on the edge of a radex area 

where exiting personnel remove anticontamination clothing and equipment and 

are monitored for contamination and decontaminated as necessary before release. 

An atomic particle or part of a molecule bearing an electric charge, usually a positively charged ion and a negatively charged ion are formed as a pair 

(e.g., A negatively charged electron 

displaced from its positively charged 

remaining atom). 

Any particulate or electromagnetic radiation capable of producing ions, directly or indirectly, in its passage 

through air or matter. Alpha and beta 

particles produce all ion pairs directlYf while the electrons of initial ion 

pairs produced by gamma rays and x-rays 

218 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

in turn produce secondary ionization in 

Isotopes 

Keyed Concrete Plug 

Leukemia Cluster 

LOS Tunnel (as opposed 

to LOS Pipe) 

LOS Pipe 

their paths. 

Different types of atoms within the 

same element, all reacting approximately the same chemically, but differing 

in atomic weight and nuclear stability. 

For example, the element hydrogen has 

three isotopes; normal hydrogen is the 

most abundant, heavy hydrogen is called 

deuterium, and radioactive hydrogen is 

the radioisotope called tritium. 

A concrete plug of greater diameter 

than the shaft or tunnel cross section, 

such that the concrete is poured into 

the surrounding rock, providing greater 

strength against overpressure from the 

nuclear detonation. 

An apparent but unexpected or extraordinary group of leukemia cases within 

some number or group of persons. 

A mined opening for installation of the 

LOS pipe. 

A line-of-sight pipe pointed at a device. A large diameter pipe, hundreds 

of feet long, constructed underground 

to simulate high altitude conditions. 

219 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Manhattan Engineer 

District The U.S. Army predecessor organization 

to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 

Manned Stations Locations inside the closed and secured 

area which are occupied by authorized 

personnel during an event. 

Microbarograph An instrument that measures and records 

small changes in atmospheric pressures. 

mR A radiation exposure term (see Exposure). 

Mucking Removal of loose rock from drilling and 

mining operations. 

Noble Gases Those inert gases which do not react 

with other elements at normal temperature and pressure (i.e., helium, neon, 

argon, krypton, xenon and sometimes 

radon). 

Nuclear Device 

(vs. weapon or bomb) A device in which most of the energy 

released in a detonation results from 

reactions of atomic nuclei, either fission, or fission and fusion. A device 

under development (see Device) is not 

considered a weapon or bomb. Both A-

(or atomic) bombs and H- (or hydrogen) 

bombs could be called atomic weapons 

because both involve reactions of atomic nuclei. However, it has become customary to call weapons A-bombs if the 

220 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

energy comes from fission, and H-bombs 

if most of the energy comes from fusion 

(of the isotopes of hydrogen - see definition). A developmental nuclear device is not a weapon or weapon component until it can be mated to a delivery system. 

Nuclear Device Tests Tests carried out to supply information 

required for the design, improvement, 

or safety aspects of nuclear weapons, 

and to study the phenomena and effects 

associated with nuclear explosions. 

Nuclear Weapon Tests Tests to provide development and weapons effects information, which may or 

may not utilize a deliverable nuclear 

weapon. 

Otis Plug Plug used to seal postevent drill 

holes. This is a permanent plug. 

Overburden Plug A keyed concrete plug toward the portal 

from the blast plug, containing a blast 

door, and withstanding pressures as 

high as the rock above GZ to the surface, or overburden, could withstand. 

Party Mon'itors Radiation monitors assigned to reentry 

and recovery parties or groups. 

Pipe String Pieces of drill pipe that are added as 

drilling continues. 

221 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 

Privacy Act 

rad 

Radex Area 

Radiation Exposure 

(continued) 

The Privacy Act of 1974. Public Law 

93-579. An Act to amend Title 5, U.S. 

Code, by adding Section 552a to safcguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal Records, to provide that 

individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. 

Abbreviation for radiation absorbed 

dose. A unit of absorbed dose of 

radiation representing the absorption 

of 100 ergs of ionizing radiation per 

gram of absorbing material, including 

body tissue. 

An acronym for radiation exclusion 

area. A radex area is any area which 

is controlled for the purpose of protecting individuals from exposure to 

radiation and/or radioactive material. 

Exposure to radiation may be described 

and modified by a number of terms. The 

type of radiation is important: external exposure is to beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays and X-rays: internal 

exposure is from radionuclides deposited within the body emitting alpha, 

beta, gamma or x-radiation and irradiating various body organs. (see Dose 

and Exposure). 

222 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Radioactive Effluent The radioactive material, steam, smoke, 

dust, and other particulate debris released to the atmosphere from an underground nuclear detonation. 

Radioactive or Fission 

Products A general term for the complex mixture 

of radionuclides produced as a result 

of nuclear fission (see Activation Products). 

Radionuclides A collective term for all types of radioactive atoms of elements as opposed 

to stable nuclides (see Isotopes). 

Recovery Operations Process of finding and removing experiments, by-products, or data from the 

test area after a test event. 

rem A special unit 'of biological radiation 

dose equivalent; the name is derived 

from the initial letters of the term 

"roentgen equivalent man or mammal." 

The number of rem of radiation dose is 

equal to the number of rads multiplied 

by the quality factor (QF) and the 

distribution factor (DF) of the given 

radiation. 

roentgen A special unit of exposure to gamma (or 

X-1 radiation. It is defined precisely 

as the quantity of gamma (or X-1 rays 

that, when completely stopped, in air, 

will produce positive and negative ions 

223 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Safety Experiments 

Sandbag Plugs 

Seismic Motion 

Shaft 

Shaft Collar 

with a total charge of 2.58~10~~ couAomh in one kilogram of dry air under 

standard conditions. 

Device tests conducted to determine the 

safety of nuclear weapons during transportation and storage. Elements of the 

conventional high explosive portions of 

the devices were detonated to simulate 

accidental damage and to determine the 

potential for such simulated damage to 

result in significant nuclear yield. 

Data gained from the tests were used to 

develop devices that could withstand 

shock, blast, fire, and other accident 

conditions without producing a nuclear 

detonation. 

Barriers used in tunnels, constructed 

of sandbags, to help contain underground detonations and minimize damage 

to underground workings. 

Earth movement caused by an underground 

nuclear detonation, similar to a minor 

earthquake. 

A long narrow passage sunk into the 

earth. Shafts for device emplacement, 

ventilation, or access to underground 

workings may be drilled or mined. 

The area immediately around the shaft 

at ground level, usually cemented, 

224 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Shield Walls 

Slushing Operations 

Spalling 

Stemming 

Suitcase Analyzer 

which supports the headframe and other 

equipment. 

Walls or barriers used to protect 

equipment or instrumentation from heat, 

blast, and radioactivity. 

The process of moving broken rock with 

a scraper or scraper bucket. May be 

used on the surface or underground, 

where ore or waste rock is slushed into 

hoppers or other locations for removal. 

Rock disintegration by flaking, chipping, peeling, or layers loosening on 

the outside edges. May be caused immediately by rock stressing in proximity 

to a detonation point. Also results 

later, after continued stressing from 

temperature change expansion and contraction. Spalling also may result or 

begin when rock containing moisture is 

raised to a high temperature, and expanding vapor creates fractures. 

The materials used to back-fill or plug 

the emplacement shaft, drift, or LOS 

driEt to contain the overpressure and 

radioactive material from a nuclear detonation. 

A portable radiation analysis instrument used to analyze samples in the 

field or in other locations than a laboratory. 

225 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Surface Ground Zero The location on the ground surface directly above an underground zero point 

or directly below an airburst. 

Test Event The immediately preceeding preparations 

for, including arming and firing, and 

the testing of a nuclear device, including the detonation and concurrent 

measurements and effects. 

Testing Organizations Organizations conducting nuclear tests 

at the NTS (see DOD, LASL, LRL and SC). 

Trailer Park The location of modified trailers and 

vans which contain measurement and recording equipment attached to cables 

coming from underground detectors and 

experiments. Usually located at least 

900 feet from SGZ. 

Tunnel An underground horizontal or nearly 

horizontal passageway. 

Tunnel Access Entry to a tunnel or tunnel complex 

upon approval of the Test Director during test operations, or upon approval 

of the Tunnel Superintendent during 

routine operations. 

Tunnel Complex A composite of passageways branching 

from and including the main tunnel or 

access tunnel from a shaft. 

Tunnel Walk-Out A visual, walking inspection of the 

tunnel or tunnel complex, usually as a 

226 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

2-Hour McCaa Breathing 

Apparatus 

Underground Structures 

Program 

User 

Vela-Uniform 

Venting 

Water Glass 

part of the initial reentry after a detonation, to check for hazards of any 

and all kinds prior to allowing general 

access to the underground workings. 

A self-contained respiratory device 

that supplies two hours of breathing 

oxygen. 

The construction and fabrication of 

test structures underground for the 

purpose of detonation effects evaluation. 

An organization conducting tests at the 

NTS (See Testing Organizations). 

Department of Defense (DOD) program designed to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate underground 

nuclear explosions. 

Release of radioactive material, steam, 

smoke, dust and other particulate debris through a zone of weakness from 

the detonation-formed cavity into the 

atmosphere. 

A collodial suspension in water of a 

sodium silicate compound. A hardening 

gel commonly used as a preservative, an 

adhesive, in plaster, and in cement. 

Used at NTS as a grout to seal cracks 

227 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (continued) 

Weapons Effects 

Experiments 

Weapons Development 

Weather Briefings 

Workings 

X-rays 

and fissures, and, in dilute form, has 

been sprayed on surfaces for dust and 

contamination control purposes. 

Experiments with the purpose of studying the effects of a nuclear detonation 

environment on materials, structures, 

equipment, and systems. Includes measurements of the changes in the environment caused by the nuclear detonation, such as ground movement, air 

pressures (blast), thermal radiation, 

nuclear radiation, and cratering. 

See Nuclear Device Tests 

Meetings of test-associated administrators, advisors, and other technical 

personnel prior to each test event to 

evaluate weather conditions and forecasts on event day, and make decisions 

on any necessary operational schedule 

changes. 

An excavation or group of excavations 

made in mining, quarrying, or tunneling, used chiefly in the plural, such 

as "the workings extended for miles 

underground." 

Electromagnetic radiations produced by 

electron reactions, as opposed to emission of gamma rays by nuclei. Other228 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (conki nued ) 

Yield 

wise high energy x-rays are identical 

with gamma rays of the same energy. 

The total effective energy released by 

d nuclear detonation. It is usually 

expressed in terms of the equivalent 

tonnage of TNT requi red to produce the 

Same energy release in an explosion. 

The total energy yield is maniEested as 

nuclear radiation (including residual 

radiation), thermal radiation, and 

blast and shock energy; the actual distribution depending on the medium in 

which the explosion occurs and also 

upon the type of weapon. 

229 
230 
APPENDIX B 

ABUREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The abbreviations and acronyms in the following list ape 

used in Volume II of the DOD underground testing reports. Additional information and definitions may be found in the text and 

in the Glossary of Terms. 

AAS 

ACFI 

AEC 

AFSWC 

AFSWP 

AFTAC 

AFWL 

AMC 

APC 

ARF 

ARMS 

AVCO/RAD 

BAC 

Bkg

BJY 

BRL 

BTL 

CCTV 

CDC 

CETO 

CIC 

co 

co 

CP21 

CP-2 

cps

CT0 

D-Day 

DASA 

DF 

DNA 

DOD 

DOE 

dpm

ECOM 

EDT 

IX&G 

American Aerial Survey 

American Car and Foundry 

Atomic Energy Commission 

Air Force Special Weapons Center 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

Air Force Technical Applications Center 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

Army Material Command 

Army Pictorial Center 

Armour Research Foundation 

Aerial Radiation Monitoring System 

AVCO Corporation 

Boeing AircraEt Corporation 

Background Radiation Measurement 

BUSTER-JANGLE roads intersection 

Ballistics Research Laboratory 

Bell Telephone Laboratories 

Closed Circuit Television 

Center for Disease Control 

Civil Effects Test Organization 

Coordination and Information Center 

Carbon monoxide 

Carbon dioxide 

Control Point Building 1 

Control Point Building 2 

Counts per second 

Continental Test Organization 

The day a nuclear detonation takes place 

Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Distribution Factor 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy

Disintegrations per minute 

U.S. Army Electronics Command 

Eastern Daylight Time 

EG&G, Inc. (formerly Edgerton, Germo:;hausen , h 

Grier) 

231 
ABBREVIATIONS 

EPCO 

ERDA 

FCDASA 

FCDNA 

FCP 

FCWT 

F&S 

FPFF 

FSI 

GA 

GE 

GM 

GZ 

HAC 

HDL 

HE 

H&N 

ICC 

IITRI 

ISAFB 

IS0 

JCS 

KOA 

kt 

LANL 

LASL 

LEL 

LLNL 

LMAFS 

LMSC 

LOS 

LRL 

MPC 

MRC 

mrem/qt 

mrem/yr 

mR/h 

MSA 

MS 1.1 

NATS 

NC 

MDL 

NOB 

NOL 

N02

NO+N02 

NPG 

NRDS 

NTS 

NTSO 

AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

Engineering Physics Company 

Energy Research and Development Administration 

Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency 

Forward Control Point 

Field Command Weapons Effects dnd Tests Group 

Fenix and Scisson, Inc. 

Full Power Full Frequency 

Federal Services, Incorporated 

General Atomic Corporation 

General Electric Corporation 

Geiger-Mueller 

Ground Zero 

Hughes Aircraft Company 

Harry Diamond Laboratories 

High explosives (conventional) 

Holmes & Narver, Inc. 

Interstate CommercF! Commission 

Illinois Institute of Technology, Research 

Institute 

Indian Springs Air Force Base 

Isotopes, Incorporated 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Ken O'Brien and Associates 

Kilotons 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alarnos 

National Laboratory) 

Lower explosive limit 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Lookout Mountain Air Force Station 

Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 

Line-of-sight 

Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory) 

Maximum permissible concentration 

Moleculon Research Corporation 

Millirem per quarter 

Millirem per year 

Milliroentgens per hour 

Mine Safety Appliance 

Mean sea level 

Nevada Aerial Tracking System 

Northrup Corporation 

Army Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense Lahordtory 

Nevada Operations Branch 

Naval Ordnance Laboratory 

Nitrogen dioxide 

Nitric oxide plus nitrogen dioxide 

Nevada Proving Ground 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station 

Nevada Test Site 

Nevada Test Site Organization 

232 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (continued) 

NV00 

PA 

PDT 

I?HS 

1'Pm 

psi 

PST 

SF 

Ratlex Area 

RADC 

r&i/h 

Radsafe 

rat3saEe 

RAGS 

RAMS 

RARS 

RCG 

RDS 

REECo 

rem 

R/h

RMS 

RPG 

SC 

SGZ 

s L 

SNL 

SOP 

SRI 

STWT/DASA 

swc 

TC 

TCDASA 

TCM 

TCWT 

TGD 

TNT 

USAEJ, 

USAF 

IJSC&GS 

USGS 

U SWR 

VA 

WANL 

WES 

WP 

ws I 

Nevada Operations c?ffice 

Picatinny Arsenal 

Pacific Daylight Time 

United States Public Health Service 

Parts per million 

Pounds per square inch 

Pacific Standard Time 

Quality Factor 

Radiation Exclusion Area 

Rome Air Development Center 

Radiation absorbed dose per hour 

Radiological Safety Department (formerly Division), 

REECo 

Radiological Safety, in general 

Remote area gas sampler 

Remote area monitoring station 

Remote area recording station 

Radioactivity concentration guide 

Remote data station 

Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, 

Incorporated 

Roentgen equivalent man or mammal 

Roentqcns per hour 

Radector monitoring station 

Radiation protection guide 

Sandia Corporation (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Surface Ground Zero 

Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National 

Laboratories) 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Standard operating procedures 

Stanford Research Institute 

Weapons Test Division/Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Special Weapons Center 

Test Controller 

Test Commanii, Defense Atomic Support Agency 

Tunnel condition monitor 

Test Command, Weapons Effects & Test Group 

Test Group Director 

High explosive chemical (trinitrotoluene) 

United States Army Electronic Laboratory 

IJnited States Air Force 

United States Coast and Geodetic Survey 

United States Geological Survey 

United States Weather Bureau 

Veterans Administration 

Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory 

Waterways Experiment Station 

Working Point 

Wackenhut Services, Incorporated 

233 
234 
APPENDIX C 

SC-Al-68-227 

GESERIIL TK’JXEL REESTRY PROCEDURES FOR 

DEP:\RT?,IENT OF DEI‘ES’SE ;\ND S.INDL\ LABORATORY NUCLCAR TESTS 

. . George R. \Venz 

Harold L. Rarrick 

Health Physics Division, 3312 

Sandia Laboratory. Albuquerque 

April 1968 

ABSTRACT 

This document dcscribcs f’rcshot preparations and postshot procedures tar salve and economical reentry into n tunwi area alter a nuclear detonation. lZssoclated rcxsponsibil~tlc:s. possible 

hazards. r+:c:ntry ground rules, prcshot I)repnrutions, commumcatlo!ls. reentry partIes and cquipmcnt. lnltial tunnel revntrlcs, and recovery ot’ scicsntll’ic cxpcrlmcnts are explained. 

235 
Issued by Sandia Corporation, 

a prime contractor to the 

United States Atomic Energy Commission 

L EGAL NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. 

Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person acting on 

behalf of the Commission: 

A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, 

with respect to the accurac:?, completeness, or usefulness of the information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in the report may not 

infringe privately owned rights; or 

B. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for 

damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, 

or process disclosed in this report. 

As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" 

includes any employee or contractor of the Commission or employee of 

such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of 

the Commission, or employee of such contractor prepares, disseminates, 

or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employement or 

contract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. 

236 
Significant contributions on tunnel reentry procedures have been made by \V. D. Burnett, 

P. 0. XIatthews, and T. R. Crites of S,mdia Laboratory and by C. R. Pen\vcll and his staff of 

Reynolds Electric and Engineering Co. (REECo). >Iercury, Nevada. Significant contributions in 

esplosl\-e and toslc gas monitoring and ventilation have been made by D. R. Parker. Sandia Laboratory and R. LC’. Viet, REECo. XIr. L. LV. Brewer pioneered the use of a gas chromatogrsph in 

severe environments and D. J Coleman and J. D. Ashworth greatly improved the radiation detector 

instnllatlon and contributed the rcmotc evplosimctc:r. hlr. G. LV. Divyer is lnrpely responsible for 

the present filter system. Air. IV. P. Bennett. LI:L-Livermore. gave us valuable assistance durin: 

our Initial ciforts. The continued support of Cal. J. J. Neuer, US!\I:, and the advice and guidance 

. of \V II. Klnqsley are gratefully ackno\vlcdgnd. 

Specifically rommcnc!cd are C. X. Cla>qon, II. D. lZd~.~.nrds. I:. J. Solacgul and thclr initial 

reentry teams who h~\e performed these duties in very severe cnvlronmcnts. 

237 
239 

240 

241 

242 

243 

244 

245 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction 239 

Responsibilities 

I’osslble H;Iz~T-ds 

Reentry Ground Rules 

Summclry oi Preshot Preparations for Reentry 

Communications 

Reentry Parties and Equipment 

Initial Tunnel Reentries 

Tur;ncl Scicntliic Recoveries from the Experimental Chamber 247 

238 
(1) Tile Test ltnnaqer IS rcslmnslhlc to the :\I<C i‘or the safety of all the 

particlpatin: personnel at sites under the Jurisdiction of SVOO and 

has approt.31 authority over decisions effecting the sctiery of these 

personnel. (Rcf: NTSO Draft 0571-013a.) 

(2) The NV00 Operational Safety Division \vill advise the DOD Test 

Group Director (TGD) and the Reentry Control Group on all problems 

pertainiq to health and s:\fcty. 
with the espcrirnental setup and with possib!e postshot tunnel 

conditions and hazards. 

(4) T!:e Ree!?rry Control Group will arrange the necessary sun!>ort 

for reentry and recovery, e.g., it will provide mine rescue trained 

personnel, Rad-Safe support (see Annex A), Industrial IIyqlcne 

Support. etc. 

c. TC/D.\S:\ or Sandia Laboratory Test Group Director 

(1) Tile TCD is responsible for the safe conduct of all ncti:ities in :he 

tunnel area IIe will authorize and initiate both a tunnel condition 

survey and reentry and recovery operations \vlth the roncl:rrcncc 

of the Test ATanager. 

(3) The TGD will be responsible for initiating all action for ti-,e !)rcchot 

installation and postshot removal of equ’pment and service:; r-oqulred 

for’ Test Group support activities except those iterns co~c>rccl as .1T-C 

responsibilities in t!:e AtlC/DOD o::rc~:mcnt. 

a. Rndlation. 

the rollo-;ing: 

Rndiation in tunnel reentry areas mny result i’rom in? one of 

(1) Le:lk 

from 

of radioacti,;e 

ground zero. 

gases or materlnls through lissurcs or ircictures 

(7) Failure of the tunnel stemming. 

(3) :Yctivation and/or dispersion of sarnplcs in the experimental chamber. 

b. Explosive or toxic 

direct or secondary 

trations dnnqcrous 

gases. Various explosive 

products of the detonation 

to personnel. 

and toxic 

may be 

gases 

prcscnt 

released as 

111 concenc. Explosives. 

the tilnnel. 

C’ndetonntcd IIE may remain either Intact or scattered 111 
d. .I tunnel party :vill return to the portal under any of I!IC follo\vinq 

conditions: 

(1) Upon decision of the Team Chief 

_:: 

(3) \\‘hcn any member of Teams I, 2. 3. and 4 shoiv a hIcCna oxygen 

supply less than 30 ntmosphercs or :I Drncgcr pressure less than 

450 I’si. 

(3) lipon loss oi c.ommunicutions \\lt!i the Reentry Control Group at 

the portal. 

241 
g. Personnei radiation exposure limits are those set by STS SOP 

C!tapter 052-I. The radiation dose limit for the operation 1s 3 Rem 

per calendar quarter. .I person’s exposure, ho\vever, will be terminated when his pocket dosimeter reaches 2.0 Rem, assuming his esposure history would allow 3 Rem during this operation. 

h. Tunnel 

turned 

of the 

tations 

reentry 

on and 

sample 

of this 

will not be made 

samples of the air 

must indicate that 

procedure. 

before the tunnel ventilation has been 

monitored at the portal. Evaluatior 

reentry can be made within the limi. 

i. Reentry will not be made beyond ventilation, lOR/hr, 

percent of the lower explosive 1im;t of explosive gas 

2. 3. and 4.may be exempted from these requirements 

circumstances by mutual decision of the Chief of the 

Group and the Chief of the Party. 

1000 ppm CO, or 

mixtures. Teams 

under extenuating 

Reentry Control 

10 

1, 

j. The 

for 

Rescue 

immediate 

Team will 

dispatch. 

always be stationed near the portal with a train 

5. Summ?rv of Preshot Prenat-ntions For Reentrv 

a. Stemming should provide fireball containment and should reduce radioactlvlty and explosive gas in the reentry area. The overburden plug 

should contain any debris that may pass the stemming. The gas seal 

door should contain any gases that penetrate the overburden plug. 

b. Remote radiation 

radiation levels, 

and temperature 

sensing instruments will provide knowledge 

while tunnel condition indicators (geophones, 

gages, and explosimeters) remotely monitor 

of tunnel 

pressure 

the tunnel. 

c. Air sampling lines for gas chromatography are normally installed through 

both the gas seal door and the overburden plug. Each installation is provided with suitable remotely operated valves. Samples may be drawn 

from the inside of the gas seal door, from both sides of the overbrtrdcn 

plug. and :‘rom near the .stemmtng. Snmplin; from these lines will !lelp 

determine the explosive and toxic gas concentrations tn the tunnel prior 

to reentrv. 

d. \‘.11ves are normally Installed :n the >:ent lines and makeup ports 

gas seal door and overbarden plug. ;\n axial \.anr fan is locntcd 

makeup vnlx,es to reduce r:egative Ilressure. Ti:c valves and ian 

rcrnorely operated from a manned location and 1: ill !lave positlon 

tars to indicate wphethcr r!.e; ; are iulll open or iully closed, The 

monttors ‘;.ill also sho\T. :*vhethrr the t’nn power IS on or oif. 

in the 

on the 

are 

monoposItion 

242 
e. Tile I‘ollo\vinq ltcms ordinarily have po~vcr turned on through and after 

zero time: 

(1) Tunnel rtttlltics and instrumentation. Power to these items \vill be 

turned off near zero time. 

(2) Ceophonc transmlttcr trailer. This supplies power to the geophone 

and ?he pressure and terrlperature amplifiers ivhich must be left on 

to monitor for cavity collapse and pressure changes. 

(3) Ventilation fans. Power will be controlled remotely. 

(4) Radiation detectors. 

(5) Explosimctcrs. 

(6) Ventilation and gas sampling valves. Power will be controlled 

remotely. 

f. The Sutorbilt fans ~111 be installed so they will pull ,jir through the vent 

line filter system beiorc it is released to the atmosphere. One Satorbilt 

fan will be usc:d :or a back-up in case the other fan fails. 

L’entilation. !Z. 

(i) Tt:e vcntllation system 1s installed so that all areas of the tunnel 

that are not closed off are swept with fresh atr irom the portal. 

(2) After zero time and ,.vhen the TCD zives his approval (with the consent oi the Test Llanaeer), the tunnel ventilation system will be 

turned on, exhaust and makeup air will be supplied from the portal 

through valves in the gas se,;1 door and, if possible, the overburden 

plug. There Lvill be valves that can be remotely operated in both 

vent lines at the gas seal door and, If possible, at the overburden 

pluc Vent line samples will be taken to monitor for radioactive. 

explosive. and/or toxic effluents. 

243 
244 
8. Initial Tl:nnel !;<,entrics 

a. ;\iter the event the TCD rvill review radl:ltion :~nd tunnc.1 condition 

monitors. \Vhcn hc determines that it is saie, and ..vith the agreement 

of the Test Mnnagcr, the tunnel ventilation system 1~111 be turned on 

E:<II:\LST. Slakeup air will be supplied from the portal through the 

valves in the plugs. 

b. Prior to entry Into the tunnel, a.11 experimental cables and all electrical and telephone lines going into the tunnel through the portal will 

be elthtr locked open or disconnected. -211 other cables qoin,n into the 

tunnel ‘vi11 be disconnected and taped or cut and grouted as necessary. 

Along with the pressure, temperature. and gcoph0r.e instruments. the 

remote radiation monltorinq system nnd tl:e remote esplosimctcrs \vill 

be left connected. Ko circuit into the tunnel or into the instrumentation 

trailers \vill be closed 

in front of the portal 

the portAl). 

v:hen 

(including 

personnel 

an area 

;Lre either 

estendin:r 

In 

50 

the 

ioet 

tunnel or 

on either 

directly 

side of 

T,le Chief of the Reentry 

conditions by reviewing 

tunnel radiation, tunnel 

This relicw tvill dctcrmine 

Control 

surixe 

c*onditlon 

v;hen 

Group rvill advise the TGD on tunnel 

conditions, eshnu5t gas iniormation. 

ind!cxtors, and :jeisnllc iniormnt~on. 

tunnel reentry may ;ictudlly begin. 

iVhcn cleared by the TGD anti the Test Il:%nn::cxr and x hen all surface 

recoveries and po:ver checks nrc complete. Team 1 \vill be allo\vcd to 

make the initial tunnel reentry. There \\ill be no chance in the tunnel 

ventilation setup or in utilities ivhile Teams 1 through 3 are underground. 

The number of people in the portal area and trailer parks will be held 

a minimum. 

to 
Team 2 will reenter with an enSine and car containlnz the necessary 

equipment to open the over!lurden plug door. This gro~lp ~.~,tll take in 

the reel of communication l::lre and connect it up IO the exlsting r‘ommunlcation line jack at the o:,erburden ply,'rrto reestablis!l communications \vlt!l 

tt:e reentry controi group at the portal. Team 2 will open the mx11v3y door 

and bvill continuously monitor I’or radionctivity and :‘or toslc and explosive 

gases. Thev jvill then rvithdrnw to the portal \vith the engine. 

Team 3 ~::ili reenter to the overburden [‘lug and reestablish communications 

usln~ the reel c:onnectcd to the communication line jack. The team l’:ili ~a.‘alk 

0uI the rcn:nininq drift continxously monitoring for radionctil,ity and 1’or 

toxic and explosive gases. They \n;ill also observe the vr:nt !intts to assure 

thernsr!\,ps :hnt the lines are Intact. Team 3 {vi11 ;lrocccd to ;!ir stemrnln~:. 

if possible, notinS tunnel .xnd pipe conditions. Tlley ~~111 t!wn ~‘~‘:\lt-n to the 

end oi t!!e e:ipcrimental i>ipe and (establish ventilation in the pipe II time 

and conc!itior!s permit. Swipes will bet taken on t!:e .\‘rnt port r)!‘ the test 

chamber nr.d checked ior contnminntion. These ‘I\ ill lx latc:r .,n~ly:xu for 

Cc and isotope identification. 

T!w missIon ot’ Teams 1, 2, and 3 is to verify that the tunnel complex 

is kvithin ;;cceptable levels for toxic and rndioactive gases and to check 

the contiltion of the pipe and tunnel. 

d. If Teams 1. 2, and 3 determine that tunnel rehabilitation may be safely 

conducted, they will leave the tunnel and Team 6 ~111 make temporary 

repairs as needed to the \.ent line or tunnel. A Rnd-Safe monitor will 

remain ,.vith Team 6 while in the tunnel 2nd continue to monitor ior 

radiation 2nd :osic gases. 

246 
9. Tl.:nnel Scientific Recoveries from the Fxnrrimental Chamber 

a. Scientific recoveries in the tunnel xvi11 not be permitted until Tcarr. 1. 

3_, or 3 has searched all drifts and verified that the tunnel is clear of 

dangerous amounts of toxic, explosive, and radioactive gases. 

b. Before scientiiic recoveries may begin, repair of the tunnel along the 

recovery route to the experimental chamber must be complete. This 

activity may include repairin g broken lagging and removing hazardous 

obstacles as well as repairing railroad track and vent lines. The tunnel 

lights will be turned on before all scientific recoveries except film 

recoveries begin. All cabling extending into a crushed zone will be cut. 

c. Team 5 will conduct a technical survey and perform the necessary 

actions to begin scientific recoveries. 

d. Team 7 will then be permitted to proceed to the experimental chamber 

and begin the removal of samples in order of priority. A Rad-Safe/ 

Industrial Safety monitor will be present at all times. This monitor 

will advise the Chief oi the Reentry Control Group, who is responsible 

for terminating scientific recovery, whenever the tunnel environment 

becomes dangerous. A Rad-Safe check sfation will be established at 

each Scientific Station to control contamination. 

247 
248 
APPENDIX D 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 

NEVADA TEST SITE ORGANIZATION 

NTSO-0524-01 

Chapter 0524 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 

0524-01 Radiological Safety 

011 Purpose 

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure is to define 

responsibility and to establish criteria and general procedures 

for radiological safety associated with NTS programs. Additional operational instructions relating to radiological safety 

for particular activities may be published as a part of the Test 

Manager's Operational Plan. 

012 Responsibilities 

a. Test Manager. The Test Manager is responsible to the AEC 

for the protection of participating personnel and off-site 

populations from radiation hazards associated with activities conducted at the NTS. By mutual agreement between the 

Test Manager and a scientific user, control of rad-safety 

within the area assigned for a particular acttvity may be 

delegated to the user's Test Group Director during the period of time when such control could have a direct bearing 

on the success or failure of the scientific program. 

b. Test Group Director. Whenever operational rad-safety control 

is delegated to a Test Group Director under provisions of 

012a above, he is responsible to the Test Manager for establishment and notification of safety criteria within the 

assigned area. Under such conditions, he will be responsible 

for submitting a detailed rad-safety operational plan to the 

Test Manager for concurrence. 

C. Area Manager, LVAO. The Area Manager is delegated the onsite rad-safety responsibility for the NTS, except for those 

periods in which operational control of specified areas may 

be delegated to the Test Group Director under 012a above. 

The Area Manager is also delegated responsibility for the 

off-site radiological safety operations associated with NTS 

activities. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

249 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-02 

0524-02 

0524-03 

0524-04 

041 

d. Radiological Safety Advisor. The NTSO Rad-Safety Advisor is 

responsible to the Test Manager for staff supervision of radsafety policies and procedures at the NTS. 

e. AEC Radiological Safety Officer. The AEC Radiological Safety 

Officer is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, for the 

direction and coordination of the on-site and off-site radsafety programs, except for those periods when operational 

control of specified areas is delegated to a Test Group Director under 012a above. 

f. Off-Site Radiological Safety Officer. The Officer-in-Charge, 

U. S. Public Health Service Off-Site Activities Office, LVAO, 

is designated as the Off-Site Rad-Safety Officer and is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, through the AEC RadSafety Officer, for operation of the off-site program. 

g* Project Manager, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. 

The Project Manager provides on-site rad-safety support services to the Area Manager, LVAO, and to Test Group Directors 

as required. 

h. Participating Agencies. The official in charge of each 

agency or organizational group participating in NTS field 

activities is responsible to the appropriate NTSO official 

designated above for compliance by his personnel with established rad-safety policies, procedures and controls. Each 

official in charge of a participating group is also responsible at all times to his parent organization for the radiological safety of personnel under his supervision. 

Organization 

The chart showing the organizational relationship of the rad-safety 

activities is shown in Figure I on the following page. 

Radiation Incidents Reports 

See NTSO Chapter 0502 and NTSO Appendices*0502-04, A, B, and C 

for detailed reporting procedures. 

On-Site Rad-Safety Operations 

Purpose 

The purpose of this on-site plan is to set forth procedures to be 

followed by all participants in connection with on-site radsafety operations at the Nevada Test Site. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

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RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-042 

042 Definition of On-Site Terms 

a. Certified Monitor: Any person certified to the Test Manager 

or his designated representative as a qualified monitor by a 

Test Group Director or his Radiological Safety Representative. 

b. RPG: Radiation Protection Guide is the radiati'on dose which 

should not be exceeded without careful consideration of the 

reasons for doing so; every effort should be made to encourage 

the maintenance of radiation dose as far below this guide as 

practicable. 

C. RCG: Radioactivity Concentration Guide is the concentration 

ofradioactivity in the environment which is determined to 

result in whole body or organ dose equal to the Radiation 

Protection Guide. 

d. MPD: The Maximum Permissible Dose in rems that can be accumulated at any age 1s equal tb five times the number of years 

beyond age 18, thus MPD = 5 (N-18) where N is the age. 

e. NTS: The Nevada Test Site, excluding Desert Rock and Area 51, 

but including Mercury and the Jackass Flat area. 

f. On-Site: The area within the NTS boundaries including 

Mercury. 

Fl* Radex: Radiological Exclusion Area. 

h. Controlled Area: Refers to any area within the NTS boundaries 

where for safety or any other purpose it is necessary to control entry of personnel. 

i. User: Those organizations having an approved technical 

program. 

j. REECo: Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc., the 

support contractor for the Nevada Test Site. 

043 Responsibilities 

a. The Project Manager, REECo, is responsible to the Area Manager, 

LVAO, for furnishing radiation safety support services as 

follows: 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

251 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-043 

1. Providing rad-safety support, including qualified monitors, 

to user organizations as required. 

2. Making radiological surveys, mapping and properly marking 

all contaminated areas, and distribution of this survey 

information. 

3. Conducting a personnel radiation dosimetry program. 

4. Mafntaining and calibrating radiation detection equipment. 

5. Procuring, issuing, and decontaminating rad-safety clothing, supplies, and equipment as required. 

6. Providing radioactive source material and waste disposal 

control within the Nevada Test Site. 

7. Operating personnel- and equipment-decontamination facilities. 

8. Providing advice and assistance in matters pertaining to 

radiological safety. 

9. Conducting occupational and bio-assay program. 

10. Providing necessary support services for the off-site radsafety program as required. 

11. Conducting rad-safety training courses as required. 

12. Preparing final on-site reports containing radiological 

data following each test operational period, special 

reports as requested, and detailed operational plans for 

each future program. 

13. Providing a stand-by emergency monitoring team to handle 

unforeseen incidents associated with radiation. 

14. Providing a repository for records and source documents 

pertaining to personnel dosimetry for all OTO field activities and all prior weapons test series. 

15. Conducting analysis of samples for radioactivity and for 

certain toxic materials. 

b. The Support Contractor will prepare and keep current a manual 

containing the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for providing rad-safety support services to users and contractors at 

NTS as outlined in 043a above. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

252 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-044 

c. Whenever a Test Group Director has been delegated responsibility for on-site rad-saEety under subsection 012a above, the 

Test Manager's operation order will specifically list those 

functions in subsectton 043a For which the Support Contractor 

will be responsible to the Test Group Director. 

044 Radiation Protection Guides 

a. Badiatlon Exposure Criteria 

1. The radiation exposure criteria for all test personnel at 

the NTS are established for each series of tests by AEC 

Headquarters. 

2. AEC Manual Chapter 0523 and 0524 contain the radiological 

safety criteria for peaceful uses. 

3. External Whole Body Radiation 

(a) Quarterly Dose. Shall not exceed 3 ferns (gamma + 

neutron). 

(b) Yearly Dose. Shall not exceed 5 rems (whole body 

gamma + neutron) except as 1Lsted below. 

(c) Exceptions 

(1) If the individual's MPD minus his previous li.fetime cumulative dose is less than 5 rem no 

exposure which will cause him to exceed his MPD 

will be authorized. 

(2) If the Fndividual's MPD minus his previous lifetime cumulative occupational dose is greater 

than 5 rem an added exposure may be allowed provided the parent organization has maintaIned an 

accurate record of the individual's lifetime 

radiation exposure. The Test Manager is authorized to approve an increase in the exposure, and 

in no case will more than 12 rem per year be 

authorized. All work requests must be fully 

justiEied by the user as to the need and requirement to receive an authorization to exceed the 5 

rem per year radiation dose. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

253 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-044 

(3) The Test Manager may approve requests from the 

Director, DOD Test Group for an increase in the 

operational radiation exposure when submitted 

in accordance with the special limits prescribed 

by the Armed Forces. 

(d) Accidental Dose. Provisions of NBS Handbook 59 shall 

pertain in the case of an accidental or emergency 

exposure. 

4. Radiation Concentration Guides. The maximum permissible 

body burdens and concentrations (MPC) in air and water of 

radio-nuclides are contained in National Bureau of 

Standards Handbook 69 (June 1959). 

b. Radiation Contamination from Weapons Testing 

1. Allowable vehicle and equipment contamination must not 

exceed: 

7 mr/hr (gamma) 

400 d/m/55 cm2 (removable aipha by swipe) 

1000 d/m/55 cm2 (fIxed alpha) 

By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be detected by swiping a one squarefoot area and monitoring the swipe. These measurements are 

made by portable survey instruments. 

2. Personnel contamination should be maintained as low as 

possible and decontamination exercised when levels exceed 

those shown: 

Item Alpha Gamma 

d/m/.55 cm2 mr/hr 

Outer Clothing 1000 7 

Shoes 1000 7 

Skin or Underclothing 200 1 

3. Respirator protective devices will be maintained at a 

contamination21evel less than 1 mr/hr (beta+gamma) or 

200 d/m/55 cm (alpha fixed or removable). 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

254 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-045 

4. Equipment or vehicles, alp a contaminated to levels in 3 excess of 10,000 d/m/55 cm , will be decontaminated by 

mobile equipment in the field prior to transporting to 

the decontamination pad. 

C. Radiation levels from reactor testing. Maximum permissible 

radiation levels will be as specified in the Test Group 

Director's Operational Plan. 

045 Film Badge Procedures 

a. All personnel entering NTS must wear a current gamma-measuring 

film badge. These will be attached and worn with the security 

badge, and will be routinely exchanged each month. 

b. Neutron film badges will be issued to individuals working with 

neutron sources, or working in the reactor areas when required 

by test operations. These badges will be exchanged and processed whenever an individual or group of individuals could 

have received a dose greater than '100 mrem or at the end of 

each calendar quarter, whichever is sooner. 

C. Dosimeters will be worn by all personnel working in a radiation area in which it is possible to receive in a normal working day a radiation dose greater than 100 mrem. 

d. Film badges will be exchanged by all personnel at the nearest 

Pad-Safety facility immediately after leaving a radiation area 

or zone in which a pocket dosimeter reading shows a dosage of 

100 mr or greater, or at any time a greater exposure is suspected. These badges will be processed each work day. 

e. Individuals returning to their home stations, or otherwise 

terminating their participation with an activity at the NTS, 

~111 turn in their film badges as a part of the Mercury checkout procedures. Film badges will be collected and processed 

each work day for these departing individuals and the dosage 

results will be reported to the appropriate agency within 

24 hours from processing if the film badge process-lng indicates 

a dosage greater than 100 mrem. 

046 Radiological Surveys. 

When operational rad-safety control has been delegated to a Test 

Group Director under 012a, the Director will be responsible for 

the initi_al radiation survey of the specified area after an 

operation. Permission for entry into the area prior to completion 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

255 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-047 

of the initial survey lies solely with the Director. After the 

radiological situation has stabilized, he will advise all other 

parties of the situation, and will permit operations in the area 

in accordance with his published safety plan. 

047 Entry into Controlled Area 

a. The Test Group Director or Area Manager, LVAO (as appropriate), 

is responsible for establishing a controlled area when required 

for reasons of radiation safety, These areas will normally be 

established when: (1) the radiation intensities require precautions to limit personnel exposure, (2) it is anticipated 

that radiation or use of radioactive material could cause a 

problem, (3) it is possible through an accident or otherwise 

that an experimental program could produce radiation, or 

(4) the Test Group Director or Area Manager considers it 

desirable for any safety reason to control entry of personnel. 

b. Procedures to control access of personnel will be established 

by the Area Manager, LVAO, or by the Test Group Director if 

the provisions of subsection 012a apply. The specific details 

on access procedures and precautions necessary to protect personnel from the radiation hazards associated with a particular 

program will be contained in the Test Group Director's Operation Plan. 

C. In the event of an emergency, the Test Manager, Test Group 

Director, or their authorized representatives may authorize 

entry into a precise location. This authorization may be 

verbal. 

048 Radiation Exposure Control 

a. Control of Exposure 

1. Recovery parties will not enter areas with radiation 

intensities in excess of 10 r/hr unless specifically 

authorized by cognizant authority. 

2. Surveys to establish isointensity lines greater than 

1000 mr/hr will not be conducted as a routine function 

for each experiment. 

3. Construction activities in radex areas will be accomplished only at the discretion of the Area Manager, LVAO. 

4. Eating and smoking in radex areas or controlled area will 

be prohibited. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

256 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-049 

b. Monitors 

1. ParticLpating organizations will normally provide their own 

monitors. If they are unable to so do, the REECo RadSafety Organization will provide monitors. 

2. The REECo Rad-Safety Organization will provide training 

courses for project monitors as required. 

3. All participating organizations will provide a list of 

certified monitors to the REECo Rad-Safety Division. 

C. Anti-Contamination Clothing and Equipment. Necessary radsafety equipment, including instruments, clothing, respirators, film badges and dosimeters may be obtained at the RadSafety Building (CP-2) or the Reactor Test Area Ran-Safety 

Facility. 

d. Decontamination 

1. Vehicles and equipment found to be contaminated will be 

taken to the decontamination station adjacent to the RadSafety Building (CP-2) or the Reactor Test Area Rad-Safety 

Facility. 

2. Monitoring and decontamination of aIrcraft will be provided by the on-site rad-safety organization when requested. 

049 Radioactive Material Control 

a. Definitions 

1. Controlled Radioactive Sources: Any encapsulated radioactive source that has an assocfated dose rate greater 

than 1.5 rem/hr at one yard. 

2. Registered Radioactive Sources: 

(a) Plutonium, Polonium and Radium: those greater than 

0.1 millicuries 

89 90 91

(b) Barium 140 , Strontium , Strontium , Yttrfum : 

those greater than 0.135 mc 

(c) All other sources greater than 1.35 mc not controlled 

under 049 a-l above. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

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RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-049 

b. Radioactive Source Control Procedures 

1. In advance of receipt of source at NTS, the using agency 

is responsible for submitting to the Area Manager, LVAO, 

for information and comment (with a copy to the Assistant 

Manager for Test Operations, ALO), written operating and 

radiological safety procedures for controlling the use of 

any radioactive source as defined in a-l above. The following information is required: 

(a> Time of arrival at NTS. 

(b) Isotope or isotopes involved. 

cc> Proposed use of the radfoactive material. 

Cd) Statement that shipment will comply with ICC shipping 

regulations or other appropriate AEC regulations. 

(e> Where the source will be stored. 

(f) Final disposition of source. 

(g) Operating procedures which will be followed in storing and working with the source. 

(h) Name of individual responsible for radiological 

safety. 

The Assistant Manager, OTO, will review all operational 

plans and procedures and will furnish the using agency 

with appropriate comments. 

2. The senior on-site representative of user scientific 

laboratory, agency, or organization Is responsible for 

notifying the REECo Rad-Safety Division in advance of the 

movement of any radioactive material, as defined in a-l 

above, to other locations unless covered by operational 

procedures established in b-l above. 

3. Agencies using calibration sources will be familiar with 

radiological safety procedures for use of radioactive 

sources. The REECo Rad-Safety Division will assist user 

agencies Ln developing operational plans and procedures on 

request. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

258 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-049 

4. All radioactive material as defined in 049a, exclusive of 

source and nuclear material (SSN) brought onto the NTS, 

will be registered with the REECo Rad-Safety Division at 

the time of entry onto the test site. 

5. The Area Manager, LVAO, is responsible for making periodic 

inspection of user agency source control procedures and 

reporting such inspections with appropriate recommendations 

to the Assistant Manager for Test Operations, ALO. 

C. Radioactive Waste Material Control Procedures 

1. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for disposing 

of radioactive waste material, on the NTS, except as 

defined in c-2 below. A radiological safety plan and control procedures will be submitted by REECo to the Area 

Manager, LVAO, for review and comment, with a copy to the 

Assistant Manager for Test Operations, ALO. 

2. Disposal of radioactive waste material as a result of 

operations in the 400 and 401 areas is the responsibility 

of the Project Test Group Director. 

d. Removal of Radioactive Material 

1. All shipments of radioactive materials, except as exempted 

in d-2 below, will be labelled according to appropriate 

Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, 

U. S. Coast Guard, and U. S. Pos,tal regulations. Arrangements for packaging shipments will be the responsibility 

of the organization initiating the shipment. Shipping 

records will be initiated on an on-site Rad-Safety shipping 

form and will be completed and certified by the REECo RadSafety organization. 

2. Scientific samples, instruments and equipment designated 

by the Test Group Director are exempt from the above procedural requirements when transported by courier vehicle 

or fly-away aircraft. A suitable record of exempted 

material will be maintained by the REECo Rad-Safety 

Organization. 

e. Reports and Records 

1. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for submittin 

monthly to the Area Manager, LVAO, a map showing the specific areas of radioactive contamination within NTS, showing locations, levels and types of radiation. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 196 

259 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-0410 

2. The REECo Rad-Safety Division is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date master file showing the ownership, 

source strength and specific location of all radioactive 

sources on the Nevada Test Site, 

0410 Dosimetry and Records 

a. The REECo Rad-Safety Organization will provide dosimetry and 

record services for both the on-site and off-site organizations and maintain dosimetry records on all on-site personnel. 

Dosage reports will be submCtted for all personnel to the 

Area Manager, LVAO, and to the Test Group Director on a monthly 

basis. The Test Group Director and the Area Manager, LVAO, 

will also be provided with a report of all integrated exposure 

in excess of 2 rems (gamma + neutron) on a daily and monthly 

basis as outlined. 

h. A quarterly exposure report will be furnished to the Area Manager, LVAO, and to the Assistant Manager, Office of Test 

Operations, ALO. 

C. Record disposition policies and regulations shall be in accordance with the provisions of AEC Appendix 0203-091-11, Sections 

5 and 6. 

0411 Documenting Decontamination 

At the time any area decontamination has been completed, REECo will 

submit a record in quadruplicate to the Test Manager, including 

such data as: a map of the area showing radiation intensities, 

radiation levels at specific locations prior to decontamination, 

radiation levels upon completion, effect of character of terrain 

on radi.ation intensities, type of equipment used on the job, dosages equipment operators received, effectiveness of the decontamination, time required to complete the decontamination, photographs, 

and any other pertinent facts relating to the problem. 

0412 Counting Laboratory 

A counting laboratory for determining gross radioactivity will be 

operated in Mercury by the On-Site Rad-Safety Organization. 

Analysis for specific material such as plutonium, tritium, and 

beryllium will be made for user organizations as a routine support 

service, if requested. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

260 
RADLOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-05 

0524-05 Off-Site Rad-Safety Operations 

051 Purpose 

a. The purpose of this plan is to set forth the general procedures to be followed by the U. S. Public Health Service OffSite Rad-Safety Organization in providing off-site radiological safety support on a continuous basis and for test activities at the Nevada Test Site. 

b. Detailed monitoring and sample collection procedures are 

contained in the Off-Site Radiological Safety Plan. 

052 DefinLtion of Terms 

The Off-Site Area is defined as the area surrounding NTS to a 

radius of about 250 miles. 

053 ResponsIbiLities 

a. During non-test periods the Public Health Service Off-Site 

Rad-Safety Organization is responsible to the Area Manager, 

LVAO, for: 

1. Analyzing data and preparing final off-site reports of 

previous series and special reports as requested. 

2. Preparing detailed operational plans for forthcoming 

series. 

3. Maintaining an active film badge program as required 

to fully document the gamma dosage to off-site populations and communities. 

4. Maintaining an active public education program, including periodic visits to communities. 

5. Maintaining an environmental sampling program, including 

air, water, and foodstuffs. 

6. MaintaLning liaison with State and local health officials 

in the off-site area. 

7. Providing an off-site monitoring service. 

b. During a test period the Publfc Health Service Off-Site RadSafety Organization is responsible to the Area Manager, LVAO, 

for: 

TG(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

261 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-054 

1. Providing the same services as during the non-test period, 

on an expanded scale to meet increased testing activities. 

2. Fully documenting the off- site radiological situation 

following each test activity in which radioactive fallout 

could be detected off-site. 

3. Maintaining an up-to-date map of the off-site area showing the locations and levels of any radiation. 

4. Investigating inquiries and incidents of a medical nature 

from the off-site populace in accordance with the procedure 

contaIned in NTSO-SOP Chapter 0701. 

054 Operational Guide - Radiation Exposure 

The off-site radiological safety criterion is 0.5 roentgens per 

year whole body gamma exposure and one-tenth of the maximum permissible concentration of radioisotopes in air and water as listed 

in NBS handbook 69. These MPC's may be averaged over a period up 

to one year. 

055 Objectives 

The objectives of the off-site radiological safety activities are 

as follows: 

a. To verify the off-site radiological situation associated with 

test site activities to insure public safety. 

b. To have trained personnel available to take emergency measures 

prescribed by the Atomic Energy Commission should an unacceptable situation develop. 

C. To obtain an adequate record of the radioactivity in the offsite area. 

d. To maintain public confidence that all reasonable safeguards 

are being employed to preserve public health and property free 

from radiation hazards. 

e. To investigate reports of incidents attributed to radioactivity 

which could result in claims against the Government or create 

unfavorable and unwarranted public opinion. 

f. To accumulate data to provide a basis for a better evaluation 

of cumulative radiation dose to people. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

262 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-056 

056 Organization 

a. By a Memorandum of Understanding between the PHS and the AECALO, the PHS is responsible to staff and operate the off-site 

radiological safety program at NTS. 

b. PHS-commissioned officers will be permanently assigned to the 

Las Vegas Area Office in support of this activity. The number of officers so assigned will be by mutual agreement 

between the Division of Radiological Health, Public Health 

Service, and the Office of Test Operations. 

C. The Officer-in-Charge, PHS Off-Site Activities, is the OffSite Rad-Safety Officer. 

d. The permanent staff will be augmented during test periods by 

personnel assigned through the Division of Radiological 

Health, PHS. 

057 Operational Plan 

a. Survey Results 

1. Monitoring radiation readings will be radioed to Net 

Control at Mercury Bldg. 155 by the monitoring teams. 

2. A carbon copy of all monitoring data will be forwarded 

immediately after each test activity to the Office of 

the Test Manager. 

3. The results will be posted on a large-scale wall map 

in Bldg. 155 as received. The intensity and time of 

reading will be noted at each reading location. 

4. An interim off-site radiological safety report will be 

prepared following each test activity for submission to 

the Area Manager, LVAO. 

b. Environmental Sampling 

1. Air sampling stations will be established in the larger 

population centers. Results from these stations assist 

in delineating the fallout pattern and documenting 

negative values outside the fallout area. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26. 1961 

263 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-057 

2. Water samples will be collected periodically at representative places such as public water supplies, stock watering ponds, and ground water surface discharge and will 

be counted for gross radioactivity. 

3. Milk samples will be collected periodically from dairy 

farms, processing plants, and retail outlets in the offsite area. 

4. Food samples will be collected to obtain data on internal radiation hazards to the off-site population. 

5. A representative number of water, milk and food samples 

showing above normal gross levels will be analyzed for 

specific significant isotopes. 

C. Public Education 

1. Public relations is recognized as one of the more important functions of the off-site program. Educational 

activities will be directed toward individuals and 

groups through informal discussions, distribution of pertinent literature, showing of movies, and matter-of-fact 

question answering. 

2. The Office of Test Information, NTSO, will furnish 

guidance and direction as necessary in the conduct of 

off-site public relations. 

d. Film Badge Program 

1. Film badges will be strategically placed in populated 

places, along highways and trails in non-populated areas, 

and inside and outside buildings, and will be exchanged 

monthly. 

2. The film badges will be supplied and processed after 

exposure by the REECo Rad-Safety Organization. 

e. Liaison with Public Health Officials 

Continuous liaison will be maintained with State and local 

health officials. For operational periods notification of 

testing activities will be coordinated with appropriate test 

officials. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

264 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-058 

f. Instrumentation 

1. Monitoring instruments for detecting alpha, beta, and 

gamma activity will be furnished and maintained by the 

Support Contractor. 

2. Continuous recorders will be placed in communities to 

present a visual record of gamma radiation levels in 

these localities. 

g* On-Site Data Collection--Reactor Operations: 

The assignment of areas of responsibility for collection of 

data on site for periods of reactor testing will be as mutually agreed upon by the "Committee for Environmental-Radiation 

Studies." 

058 Medical Activities 

When required by test site activities, a medical officer will be 

assigned by the PHS Liaison Officer Network Coordinator to the 

staff oE the Off-Site Rad-Safety Officer. He will be responsible 

for maintaining liaison with local physicians, answering inquiries of a medical nature, investigating complaints and conducting 

public relations. 

059 Veterinary Activities 

a. A veterinarian will be assigned by the Veterinary Corps, 

U. S. Army, to the AEC Las Vegas Areas Office. 

b. Programmatic direction and administration will be supplied 

by the Area Manager, LVAO. 

C. The Veterinary Officer is responsible for maintaining liaison with the local veterinarians managing the off-site animal 

project, answering inquiries from ranchers, and investigating 

complaints. He will also collect biological specimens for 

radiochemical analysis and will perform special studies as 

directed. 

0510 Communications 

a. The primary method of communications will be by a low-band 

VHF radio net. All off-site vehicles will be equipped with 

a 2-way radio on this net. Automatic repeater stations will 

be used to provide complete coverage. 

TN(NTSO)-0000-4 June 26, 1961 

265 
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY NTSO-0524-0511 

b. Telephone service will be used as a secondary method of 

communication. 

C. The Support Contractor will maintain and operate the radio 

net. 

0511 Counting Laboratory 

A low-level radiochemical laboratory will be operated at Mercury 

for determining gross radioactivity and specific radiochemical 

tests that are desirable for environmental samples in order that 

the Nevada Test Site Organization will be able to better evaluate 

cumulative low-level radiation dose to people. 

0512 Emergency Plan 

The Emergency Plan for evacuation of off-site populatfon groups 

is outlined in NTSO SOP Chapter 0601-04. 

266 
TEST MANAQER 

/

(A) 

I 

. 1

1 

Radiological Safety 

Advisor I 

I 1 

(6) I I , 1 

Test Group Director Area Manager LVAO 

s..................................... 

: 

Red-Safety : AEC Rad-Safety : Representative : Officer 

Operational control of 

assigned areas 

I REECo 

tc1 Radiological -’ Safety I Veterinary Activities 

User Red-Safety Division 

Organization 

.-.-=-=- Adminlstrative 

(A) Policy 

(B) Normal Operations 

(C) When requested by user 

I 
268 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Armed Forces Staff College 

ATTN: Library 

Assistant Secy of Def, Public Affairs 

ATTN: PA0 

Assistant to the Secy of Defense 

Atomic Energy 

ATTN: Executive Assistant 

ATTN: J Rubell 

Defense Nuclear Aqency 

ATTN: GC 

ATTN: PA0 

ATTN: STBE 

5 cvs ATTN: NTPR 

25 c;s ATTN: STTI/CA 

Defense Technical Info Center 

12 cys ATTN: DO 

Field Command 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

ATTli: FCLS, Maj J. Stinson 

2 cys ATTN: FCT 

25 cys ATTN: FCLS 

Interservice Nuclear Weapons School 

ATTN: TTV 

National Defense University 

ATTN: ICAF Tech Library 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Army Library 

ATTN: Mil Documents Section 

Army Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

2 cys ATTN: DAAG-AOTF-N 

US Army Center of Military History 

ATTN: DAMH-HSO 

US Army Chemical School 

ATTN: ATZN-CM-CS 

ATTN: ATZN-CM-MLB 

US Army Comd & Gen Staff College 

ATTN: Library 

US Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency 

ATTN: Library 

US Army War College 

ATTN: Library 

US Military Academy 

ATTN: Director of Libraries 

DEPARTMENT OF THE -_-.NAVY 

Aviation History ilnit 

ATTN: Library 

--_~-.~--.___-._~_..____ DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued) 

Bureau of Medicine & Surqery 

ATTN: Assist for Medical Surgery 

James Carson Breckinridge Lib 

ATTN: Library Div 

Marine Corps Base Library 

ATTN: Document Custodian 

Marine Corps Dev & Education Command 

ATTN: J. Breckinridqe Lib 

Marine Corps Historical Center 

ATTN: Code HDH-2 

Marine Corps Nut Test Personnel Review 

ATTN: Code MMRB-60 

Merchant Marine Academy 

ATTN: Director of Libraries 

Naval Hospital Corps School 

ATTN: Library 

Naval Ocean Systems Center 

ATTN: Library 

Naval Oceanographic Office 

ATTN: Code 025, Historian 

Naval Postgraduate School 

ATTN: Code 1424, Library 

Naval Research Laboratory 

ATTN: Library 

Naval School 

ATTN: Commanding Officer 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

ATTN: Nut Tech Div 

ATTN: Tech Lib 

Naval Surface Weapons Center 

ATTN: Library 

Naval War College 

ATTN: Profesor 8 Libraries 

Naval Weapons Center 

ATTN: Code 233 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility 

ATTN: Library 

Navy Dept Library 

ATTN: Librn 

Navy Nuclear Power Schonl 

ATTN: Library 

Navy Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

2 cys ATTN: W. Loeffler 

269 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Eontinued) -_-

Nimitz Library 

ATTN: Documents & Reports Dept 

Office of the Judge Adv Gen 

ATTN: Code 73 

US Merchant Marine Academy 

2 cys ATTN: Librn 

US Naval Air Station Lib 

ATTN: Library 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Aerospace Defense Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Communications Comnland 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Institute of Technology 

ATTN: Library 

Air Force Logistics Connland 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Nuclear Test Personnel Review 

ATTN: OEHL/NTPR 

Air Force Systems Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Technical Applications Ctr 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

ATTN: Tech Library 

Air National Guard 

ATTN: Historian 

Air Training Command 

ATTN: Historian 

Air University Library 

ATTN: AUL-LSL 

Military Airlift Cormnand 

ATTN: Historian 

Pacific Air Forces 

ATTN: Historian 

Tactical Air Command 

ATTN: Historian 

US Air Force Occupational & Env Health Lab 

ATTN: NTPR 

USAF School of Aerospace Medicine 

ATTN: Strughold Library 

DEPARTMENT -___ OF ENERGY 

Department of Energy 

GTN 

2 cys ATTN: OMR, DP-22 

DEPARTMENT _.____.~-_.---~-_--- OF ENERGY (Continued) 

Department of Energy 

Nevada Operations Office 

ATTN: Public Affairs 

ATTN: Dot Con for Tech Library 

2 cys ATTN: Health Physics Div 

Department of Energy 

Human Health & Assessments Div 

ATTN: C. Edington, EV-31 

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES _-__-__ --

Centers for Disease Control 

ATTN: G. Caldwell 

Central Intelligence Agency 

ATTN: Office of Medical Services 

Department of Health & Human Svcs 

ATTN: Office of General Counsel 

Exec Oft Of the President 

Management & Budget Off Lib 

ATTN: Librn 

Library of Cnngress 

ATTN: Serial & Govt Publication 

ATTN: Library Service Div 

ATTN: Science & Tech Div 

National Archives 

ATTN: Lihrn 

National Atomic Museum 

ATTN: Historian 

National Bureau of Standards 

ATTN: Librn 

Occupational Safety & Health Admin 

ATTN: Library 

Oft of Health & Disability. ASPER 

ATTN: R. Copeland 

Oft of Workers Compensation Pgrm 

ATTN: R. Larson 

US Coast Guard Academy Library 

ATTN: Librn 

US House of Reoresentatives 

ATTN: Committee on Veterans Affairs 

2 cys ATTN: Comittee on Armed Services 

US House of Reoresentatives 

Connlittee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce 

ATTN: Subcommittee on Health P, Envir 

US Senate 

Committee nn Armed Services 

ATTN: Committee on Veterans Affdlrs 

US Senate 

Committee on Veterans Affairs 

ATTN: Connjittee nn Veterans Affairs 

270 
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued) 

Veterans Administration Oft Central 

ATTN: Dept Veterans Benefit, Central Oft 

ATTN: Director Board of Veterals Appeal 

The White House 

ATTN: Domestic Policy Staff 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS 

University of California 

Lawrence Livetmore National Lab 

ATTN: Tech Info Dept Library 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

ATTN: M. Walz, ADLC MS Al83 

ATTN: D. Cobb, ESS MSS D466 

2 cys ATTN: ADPA MMS 195 

2 cys ATTN: Library 

Reynolds Electrical & Engr Co, Inc 

ATTN: CIC 

2 cys ATTN: W. Brady 

2 cys ATTN: B. Eubank 

2 cys ATTN: K. Horton 

Sandia National Laboratories 

ATTN: J. Metcalf 

ATTN: Central Library 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 

Advanced Research & Applications Corp 

ATTN: H. Lee 

JAYCOR 

ATTN: A. Nelson 

ATTN: Information Systems Div 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASIAC 

ATTN: E. Martin 

ATTN: C. Jones 

Kaman Tempo 

ATTN: DASJAC 

National Academy of Sciences 

ATTN: C. Robinette 

ATTN: Medical Follow-up Agency 

ATTN: National Materials Advisory Board 

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp 

ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE 

R&D Associates 

ATTN: P. Haas 

Science Applications, Inc 

ATTN: L. Novotney 

271 
272