NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0205n.06

No. 19-1884

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CYNTHIA HUNTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The district court granted summary 

judgment on Appellant Cynthia Hunter’s discrimination claims. She appeals, arguing that 

Defendant-Appellee, General Motors LLC (“GM”), engaged in sex discrimination when it 

discharged her, created a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Hunter, a black woman, was hired on March 1, 2013 as a Mainframe Technical Specialist 

at GM’s Warren Technical Center in Michigan. R. 25-1 (Hunter Dep. at 36, 39–40) (Page ID 

#157, 160–61). Samuel Rurka, her supervisor and a white male, began to harass Hunter in 2014. 

Id. at 30, 61 (Page ID #154, 171). For example, he speculated during a team meeting what a child 

between Hunter and a white male coworker would look like. Id. at 62–64 (Page ID #172–74). 

Rurka also began to report that Hunter had performance issues. See R. 25-2 (2014 Performance 

Review at 2–3) (Page ID #299–300).
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On September 24, 2014, Hunter was found to be partially at fault for a data-loss incident. 

See R. 25-2 (Overview of Mainframe Data Loss at 1) (Page ID #303). Although Hunter explained 

to her team members that she would address a problem regarding the capacity of the mainframe’s 

tape libraries, R. 25-1 (Hunter Dep. at 116–18) (Page ID #208–10), Rurka ordered that the files be 

deleted without consulting her, see R. 25-3 (Rurka Dep. at 24) (Page ID #394). A disciplinary 

memorandum was placed in her personnel file. R. 25-2 (Disciplinary Mem. Jan. 5, 2015) (Page 

ID #305). On September 20, 2015, Hunter and Jorge Diaz were making “change requests,” and 

Diaz failed to follow directions, “caus[ing] some corruption.” R. 27-12 (Gurchiek Dep. at 11–12) 

(Page ID #578). Hunter was disciplined, see R. 25-2 (Disciplinary Mem. Oct. 1, 2015) (Page ID 

#312), but Diaz was not, R. 25-1 (Hunter Dep. at 151) (Page ID #234). Hunter was involved in 

other incidents in 2015 as well. See, e.g., R. 25-2 (Disciplinary Mem. Oct. 1, 2015) (Page ID 

#312); R. 25-7 (Rurka Decl. at 4) (Page ID #486).

GM received an anonymous email complaint on September 30, 2015, alleging that Rurka 

did not treat female employees fairly and made inappropriate comments about women. R. 25-2 

(GM Awareline Case Detail Report at 1) (Page ID #313). Hunter and the other female employee 

on her team were interviewed in response to the complaint. See R. 25-2 (GM Global Security 

Investigation Report at 8) (Page ID #322). They explained that Rurka complimented their male 

coworkers but not them, treated them disrespectfully, refused to let them work from home, 

excluded them from meetings, and made inappropriate comments about women. GM concluded 

that “[t]he allegations of discrimination and harassment are unsubstantiated.” Id. Afterwards,

Hunter complained to HR about Rurka’s treatment. R. 25-1 (Hunter Dep. at 155) (Page ID #237).
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Hunter was discharged on February 18, 2016, after she made a change request on February 

4, 2016, which Rurka asked her to undo. Id. at 100, 167, 171–72 (Page ID #197, 245, 249–50). 

Rurka recommended her discharge. R. 25-7 (Rurka Decl. at 5) (Page ID #487). Hunter filed an 

“open door” complaint about her termination, but the investigation concluded that her claims of 

discrimination were unsubstantiated. R. 25-2 (Open Door Appeal Letter) (Page ID #333).

Hunter raised race and sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act of 1976

(“ELCRA”) as well as race- and sex-based retaliation claims under ELCRA in state court, and GM 

removed the case to federal court. R. 1 (Notice of Removal) (Page ID #10–23). GM filed a motion 

for summary judgment, R. 23 (Mot. for Summary J. at 1–2) (Page ID #108–09), which the district 

court, through the magistrate judge, granted, R. 33 (Op. & Order Granting Mot. for Summary J. at 

1–36) (Page ID #624–59); R. 21 (Notice, Consent, & Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate 

Judge) (Page ID #103). Hunter filed a motion for relief from judgment and/or reconsideration, R. 

36 (Mot. for Recons. at 1–27) (Page ID #665–91), which was denied. R. 37 (Op. & Order Den. 

Mot. for Recons. at 1–12) (Page ID #692–703). This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

When we address a state-law claim, we apply the federal rules of procedure. See Hanna v. 

Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965). We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and denial of a motion to reconsider that decision. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. 

Atrium Health Sys., 922 F.3d 713, 723 n.6 (6th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is warranted “if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R. CIV. P. 56(a). Facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
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to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS1

A. Discrimination

An employer cannot discharge an employee based on her sex under Title VII or ELCRA. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a). A plaintiff may demonstrate sex 

discrimination with direct or indirect evidence. White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 

232, 238 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 2004), overruled 

on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)). Hunter contends 

that she has produced both.

Direct evidence is evidence that “requires no inferences or circumstantial evidence to 

create an inference of discrimination.” Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 

2018) (citing Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th 

Cir. 1999)). Hunter points to Rurka’s differential treatment of male employees, Appellant Br. at 

33–35, but this evidence requires us to draw inferences that the differential treatment reflects a 

bias against women and that this bias motivated Hunter’s discharge. Therefore, Hunter does not 

provide direct evidence of sex discrimination.

When a plaintiff seeks to demonstrate discrimination through indirect evidence, we utilize 

the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), framework. White, 429 F.3d at 238. 

A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., 

1We apply the following analysis to both the ELCRA claims and the Title VII claims unless otherwise noted. 

See Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957 (6th Cir. 2014). To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, “a 

plaintiff normally must show that he or she: 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) was qualified 

for the position; 3) suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) suffered such action under 

circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” See Macy v. Hopkins

Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing cases), abrogated on other 

grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see 

also Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prob. Ct., 392 F.3d 151, 166 (6th Cir. 2004). Only the fourth prong 

is at issue here, and Hunter fails to show a material fact dispute exists.

First, Hunter appears to argue that Rurka’s discriminatory motive manifested itself in his 

scapegoating of her for her male coworker’s mistakes. See, e.g., Appellant Br. at 14–15. She 

points to two incidents for which she was disciplined for a male colleague’s mistakes: the 

September 2014 mainframe data-deletion incident and the September 2015 incident involving 

Diaz. Id. at 25. However, she does not specifically identify the mistakes made by her male 

coworkers during the data-deletion incident for which she alone was blamed. The record shows 

only that her male team members were present during the team meeting. And although Hunter 

shows that she was blamed for the later incident, one instance of scapegoating during a three-year 

tenure does not permit an inference of discrimination.

Second, Hunter relies on a differential-treatment theory. Appellant Br. at 26–31. To 

succeed, she must show that a similarly situated non-protected person was treated more favorably,

Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2016), or that the 

comparator received a different disciplinary outcome when “the plaintiff and his proposed 

comparator . . . engaged in acts of ‘comparable seriousness,’” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 
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455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.

2002)). Hunter does neither.

Hunter argues that her male coworkers were not disciplined as she was for the September 

2014 or September 2015 incidents, that she was fired despite making fewer mistakes than her male 

coworkers, and that Rurka called only women “uneducated,” “sloppy,” or “lazy.” Appellant Br. 

at 29–31. As discussed above, Hunter does not argue that she and her male colleagues engaged in 

the same conduct during the September 2014 and September 2015 incidents. To support her 

assertion that she made fewer mistakes than her male coworkers, she points to a coworker’s

statement that she had the lowest percentage of mistakes. See id. at 29–30. However, this 

datapoint does not indicate whether Hunter’s male counterparts were making the same mistakes 

as she was. Finally, Rurka’s comments by themselves do not demonstrate differential treatment. 

We have held that comments may be so probative “of a decision-maker’s discriminatory animus 

that a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 

is not fatal to her claim,” Birch, 392 F.3d at 166, but we have never held that mere rude statements

are sufficient. Accordingly, Hunter’s sex discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment.

B. Hostile Work Environment

Under Title VII and ELCRA, Hunter must establish a prima facie case of a sex-based

hostile work environment by demonstrating

that (1) she is a member of a protected class (female), (2) she was subjected to 

harassment, either through words or actions, based on sex, (3) the harassment had 

the effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and creating an 

objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (4) there 

exists some basis for liability on the part of the employer.
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Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir. 2008); Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 

461, 468 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Downey v. Charlevoix Cty. Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs, 576 N.W.2d 

712, 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)) (ELCRA). As to the third prong, the only prong at issue here, 

“the conduct must be ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable 

person would find hostile or abusive and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as 

abusive.’” Warf v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 713 F.3d 874, 878 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000)). We consider the totality of 

the circumstances in assessing objective severity or pervasiveness and look to the following factors 

for guidance: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 

interfere[d] with an employee’s performance.” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 

724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). “[O]ffhand 

comments” and “isolated incidents” do not suffice. Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 515 

(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Our precedent

presents “a relatively high bar for what amounts to actionable discriminatory conduct under a 

hostile work environment theory.” Phillips v. UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 328 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting 

that in many cases, overtly discriminatory statements and racial slurs did not create a hostile work 

environment under this standard).

Hunter does not meet this high bar. She argues that Rurka treated female employees 

disrespectfully, did not allow female employees to work from home, blamed Hunter for male 

employees’ mistakes, and excluded female employees from meetings. Appellant Br. at 36. Such

conduct is discriminatory, but it is not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
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[her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327 (quoting 

Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2011)). And while Rurka’s comments 

about what a child between Hunter and a white male coworker might look like are totally 

inappropriate and offensive, they are not so serious under our precedents that they “alter[ed] the 

conditions of [her] employment and create[d] an abusive working environment.” Williams, 

643 F.3d at 511.

C. Retaliation

At the prima-facie stage of an ELCRA retaliation claim, Hunter must establish that (1) she 

engaged in protected activity; (2) the defendant knew that she did so; (3) “the defendant took an 

employment action adverse to [her]; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the 

protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 

553, 568 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987)); Garg v. 

Macomb Cty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Mich. 2005). Hunter’s brief on 

appeal on the retaliation claim consists of two sentences stating that Rurka made the decision to 

terminate Hunter. Appellant Br. at 36. As we have held in other cases, such perfunctory argument 

forfeits the issue on appeal. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial 

of the motion to reconsider.