1 Other than the petiti oner’s petiti

on for writ of habeas corpus and the order denying r

elief on t he petit ion, the
r ecord consists of o ne judg ment fo rm; vario us misce llaneous o rders; a Clin ton Cou nty She riff Depa rtm ent’s inmat e arrest report, pre sumab ly from the Indian a county in which the petit ioner was arrested

after his f

light from Tennessee; and sev eral “offen der senten ce letters,” app arently issue d by the West Te nnessee H igh Secu rity Facility. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs A

ugust 7, 2001
RONALD CRAFTON v. JAY D UKES, Warden Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County

No. 5450 Joseph H. Walker, Judge

No. W2001-00320-CCA-R3-CO - Filed September 6, 2001

The petitioner appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The trial court determinedthat the allegations contained in the petitioner’ s pro se petition were not ones that would entitle him to ha beas cor pus relief, and therefore dismissed his petition. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
A LAN E. G LENN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID G. H AYES and J OE G. R ILEY , JJ., joined. Ronald Crafton, Henning, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Generaland Report er; and Mark E. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
From the extremel y spars e record in this case, 1 it appears that on November 7, 1991, the petitioner, Ronald Crafton, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Henry County of two counts of rape, a Class B felony. After his conviction, while out on bond aw aiting sentencing , he apparently left the state. According to the petitioner, he was subsequently sentenced in absentia to twelve years on each count, with

the sentences to

be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On April 26, 1994, he was transported from Indiana, where he was incarcer a ted, back to Tennessee to begin service of his Tennessee sentences.2 It does no t appear th at the petition er has pre viously a ttacked h is Tenne ssee conv ictions by e it her a direc t

appeal or post-convict

ion pleadi

ng. -2- On December 14, 2000, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus 2 in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County. He alleged that his original computer printout sheets issued at West Tennessee State Penitentiary showed that his time began to run on November 7, 1991, and that he was told by a deputy at the Henry County Jail th at the judge was “

giving” him that time because he had “not been in any trouble.” He alleged that the tr

ial court unlawfu

lly resentenced him on April 24, 1994, when he was outside the county’s jurisdiction, changing his sentence effective date to April 26, 1994. He claimed that there were no factors justifying his receiving the maximum sentences within the range of punishment. He further alleged that the trial cou rt’s o rder of consecutive sentencing was ill egal, because it was unaccompanied by any findings of fact by the trial court reflecting the n

ecessity of conse

cutive sentencin

g. According to his

argument, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because, if sentenced properly, his sentences would have expir ed.
On January 9, 2001, the court dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding that he had failed to allege any grounds that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Thereafter, on February 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a timely appeal to this court, challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his petition.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition. He alleges that the Henry County trial court impos ed an unlawful sentence by inappropriately applying enhancement factors to sentence him at the top of the range, failing to follow the statutory guidelines in imposing consecutive sentences, and changing his sentence effective date when he was out of the jurisdiction. The petitioner further alleges that the court clerk “falsified and back-dated a certificate” to change the effective date

s of his sentence,

thereby violating

his due process ri

g hts under the Fifth Amendment

of the United State

s Constitution. The Sta

te responds that the petitioner ’s allegations, even if true, would render his sentence voidable, rather th an void, and argues that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for its failure to state appropriate grounds for habeas corpus relief.
It i s well-established in Tennessee that the remedy provided by a writ of habeas corpu s i s limited in scope and may only be invoked where the j udgment is void or the petitioner’s term of imprisonment has expired. State v. Ritchie , 20 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport , 980 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1998) ; Passarella v. Stat e , 8 91 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . To obtain habeas corpus relief, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence is void and not merely voidable. See Davenport , 980 S.W.2d at 409; Passarella , 891 S.W.2d at 627. A void, as opposed to a voidable, judgment has been defined by our supreme court as “one in w

hich the judgment is

facially invalid because the court did not have the statuto ry authority to render such judgment.” Dykes v. Compton , 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn

. 1998); see also Taylor v. State , 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). The judgment of a court of general3 Although there are two judgments, pres umably, reflecti

ng the two convictions ass ailed by the petiti oner, the single judgment contained in the record s hows that he was sentenced on November 22, 1991, to a period of

twelve years for rape, and that this senten ce was co nsecutive to that imp osed in ind ictment 1 1798. H e received two day s jail credit. This rape s entence would not have expired, m uch less bo th sentenc es, even if th e petitioner had go ne into custody on the date of

its i mposition,

which did not occ

ur because he ha

d fled the jurisdi

ction.
4 Since the petitioner w as conv icted in 19 91, he w as subject to a three-ye ar statute of limit ations on br

inging a petition fo r post-con viction relief

. See Tenn. C ode An n. § 40-3 0-102 (1986) (repealed 1995). -3- jurisdiction is conclusive and p resumed to

be valid, and such a judgment ca n only be impeache

d if the record affirma

tively shows that the

rendering cour

t was without perso

nal or subject ma

tte r jurisdiction. Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 162 (Tenn. 1993) ; Passarella , 891 S.W. 2d at 626

. The petitioner canno

t collaterally at

tack a facially

valid judgment of th

e trial court in

a petition for habeas corpus relief. Archer , 851 S.W.2d at 162. T hus, habeas corp

us relief is avail

able only when “‘it appears uponthe face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or aut

hority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment . . . has expired.” Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
After a careful review, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed th e petitioner’s petition for its failure to allege grounds that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. As the State points out, the petitioner does not alleg e that the Circuit Court of Henry County lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction in the case. In arguing that the trial court unlawfully altered his sentence, the petitioner appears to principally rely on the fact that at least onecomputer printout letter issued by the prison

system reflecte

d his “sentence effective date” as November 5, 1991,

while in subsequently

issued letters the

date was recor

ded as April

24, 1994. 3 However, an error made by prison officials

or the prison compu

ter system in reco

rding the petitione

r’s sentence and parole dates would not render the judgment of the Henry County Circuit Court void. As the trial court noted, the proper method for

the petitioner to challenge his time credits or parole dates is through the avenues of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 4-5-101 to -325. See B righam v . Lack , 755 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). We further note that the proper method for the p et itioner to challenge a facially valid judgment based on a constitutional violation would have been in a petition for post-conviction relief. Lewis v. Metro. Gen. Sessions Courtfor Nashville , 949 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) ; Fredrick v. State , 906 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). 4 Thus, we do not accept the petitioner’s circular argument that his sentences, tho

ugh facially vali

d, are not actua

lly so because of s

entencing irreg

ularities.
CONCLUSION
Based on a careful review, we conc lude that t he trial court did not err in finding that the petition failed to allege grounds that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we-4-

affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE