FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APRIL 1, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-13202 

Non-Argument Calendar

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00448-JOF-ECS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JESUS VARGAS-CALDERON,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Northern District of Georgia

 ________________________

(April 1, 2011)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Jesus Vargas-Calderon appeals his 70-month sentence imposed after he

pleaded guilty to being a previously deported alien who unlawfully re-entered the

United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, VargasCalderon argues his sentence is excessive and unreasonable in light of both the

record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He asserts his sentence fails to

account for the mitigating aspects of his history and personal characteristics. 

Specifically, Vargas-Calderon contends his sentence is unreasonable because six

of his twelve criminal history points were attributable to crimes he committed

when he was seventeen, thus his sentence was unduly influenced by his youthful

indiscretions. 

We review sentences for reasonableness, using an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 

When evaluating the “substantive reasonableness” of a sentence, we consider the

totality of the circumstances. Id. On appeal, the party challenging the sentence

bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v.

Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We determine whether

the sentence is substantively reasonable based on the factors in section 3553(a),

and we ordinarily expect a within-guidelines sentence to be reasonable. Id. We

will only vacate a sentence if we determine that “after giving a full measure of

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deference to the sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is

unreasonable.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en

banc), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2010) (No. 10-

727). 

The parties dispute the applicable guidelines range—the government argues

the 70 month sentence is a below-guidelines variance, and Vargas-Calderon

argues it is at the low-end of the applicable guidelines range. Either way, VargasCalderon’s sentence is substantively reasonable. First, Vargas-Calderon’s

sentence was well below the statutory maximum of 20 years. See, e.g., United

States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding a sentence as

reasonable in part because it was “appreciably below” the statutory maximum). 

Second, the sentence correctly reflects Vargas-Calderon’s multiple illegal reentries into the United States and his multiple convictions for driving under the

influence. The district court considered Vargas-Calderon’s arguments regarding

his age and work history in fashioning the sentence. Vargas-Calderon has not met

his burden to show that the district court abused its discretion, so we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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