alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50200

Summary Calendar

 

DENNIS LIPTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

F. WHITTEN PETERS, Acting Secretary of the U.S.. Air Force; 

MARGIE L. HUMPHREY, Colonel, Commander, HQARPC,

Respondents-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. SA-99-CV-235-EP

--------------------

November 30, 2000

Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dennis Lipton appeals following the district court’s denial

of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the Air

Force’s denial of his discharge application based upon him being

a conscientious objector. Lipton argues that, although the

Secretary of the Air Force concluded that the primary reason for

the application was Lipton’s disappointment over not obtaining a

residency in pathology as he had requested, the Secretary did not

determine whether Lipton’s application was also substantially
No. 00-50200

-2-

motivated by his opposition-to-participation-in-war beliefs. 

Lipton also argues that, if the Secretary’s decision found that

Lipton’s conscientious-objection beliefs were not sincere, there

was no basis in fact supporting that finding.

Our review of the Air Force’s denial of a conscientiousobjector discharge is extremely narrow. DeWalt v. Commanding

Officer, Fort Benning, GA., 476 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1973). 

Such a denial must be sustained if this court can discern any

basis in fact for it. Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175, 1179

(5th Cir. 1972).

Our review of the Secretary’s decision reveals that the

Secretary determined that Lipton’s professed objection-toparticipation-in-war beliefs were not sincere. Lipton’s argument

that the Secretary failed to determine whether Lipton’s discharge

application was substantially motivated by qualified beliefs and

his attempt to apply the holding in Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d

1272, 1278-80 (1978), to his case are without merit. A review of

the record reveals that there is a basis in fact supporting the

Secretary’s determination that Lipton’s professed beliefs were

not sincere. See Hopkins v. Schlesinger, 515 F.2d 1224, 1228

(5th Cir. 1975); Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175, 1179 (5th

Cir. 1972). The dismissal of Lipton’s § 2241 petition is 

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000815278
<NAME> CHRISKEN PARTNERS CASH INCOME FUND L.P.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         707,678
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   52,690
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               779,837
<PP&E>                                      13,517,202
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,709,068
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,587,971
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          434,133
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  11,153,838
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,587,971
<SALES>                                        702,851
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               750,538
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  513,518
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                237,020
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            237,020
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   237,020
<EPS-BASIC>                                       5.93
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     5.93


</TABLE>
----

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 5 July 2004

in Case T-39/03 DaimlerChrysler AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (1)

(Community trade mark - Opposition - Withdrawal of opposition - No need to adjudicate)

(2004/C 251/29)

Language of the case: German

In Case T-39/03: DaimlerChrysler AG, established in Stuttgart (Germany), represented by N. Siebertz, lawyer, against Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (Agent: G. Schneider), the intervener before the Court of First Instance being Axon Leasing GmbH, established in Munich (Germany), represented by S. Lüft, lawyer — action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 November 2002 (Case R 329/2001-4) — the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), composed of: J. Pirrung, President, N. J. Forwood and I. Pelikánová, Judges; H. Jung, Registrar, made an order on 5 July 2004, the operative part of which is as follows:

----

(1)OJ C 101 of 26.4.2003.

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel DE JESUS VARELA, a.k.a. De Jesus Isaguires-Varela, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50165

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted January 16, 2018 *

Filed January 19, 2018

P. Kevin Mokhtari, Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ajay Krishnamurthy, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Chelsea Ann Estes, Esquire, Kimberly Sue Trimble, Trial Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Manuel De Jesus Varela appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 21-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

De Jesus Varela argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain why it rejected his non-frivolous argument that his reason for reentry justified a lower sentence. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered De Jesus Varela’s sentencing arguments and adequately explained its reasons for selecting a within-Guidelines term. *See Rita v. United States,*551 U.S. 338, 358-59, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Contrary to De Jesus Varela’s contention, the record as a whole reflects that the district court believed that, notwithstanding De Jesus Varela’s mitigating arguments, a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range was warranted in light of his criminal and immigration history. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (adequate explanation can be inferred from the record as a whole).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EX-4.7





 Exhibit 4.7 

C&J Energy Services, Inc. 

Issuance of Common Stock 

November 30, 2017 
 C&J Energy Services,
Inc. 
 3990 Rogerdale Road 
 Houston, Texas 77049 

Ladies and Gentlemen: 
 This letter is being
delivered to you pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of October 25, 2017, by and among C&J Energy Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), Caymus Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation, O-Tex Holdings, Inc., a Texas corporation (“O-Tex”), the undersigned, a stockholder of O-Tex, the other stockholders of O-Tex party thereto and Opus Sellers Representative LLC (the “Merger Agreement”). Unless otherwise indicated, capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set
forth in the Merger Agreement, as applicable. 
 Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, the Company issued
         shares of common stock, par value $0.01 per share, of the Company (“Common Stock”) to the undersigned. The undersigned will not offer, sell, contract to sell, pledge or otherwise dispose of,
(or enter into any transaction which is designed to, or might reasonably be expected to, result in the disposition (whether by actual disposition or effective economic disposition due to cash settlement or otherwise) by the undersigned or any
affiliate of the undersigned or any person in privity with the undersigned or any affiliate of the undersigned), directly or indirectly, including, except for the registration statement provided for in Section 8.16 of the Merger Agreement, the
filing (or participation in the filing) of a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission in respect of, or establish or increase a put equivalent position or liquidate or decrease a call equivalent position within the meaning
of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated thereunder with respect to, any Common Stock or any securities convertible into, or
exercisable or exchangeable for such Common Stock, or publicly announce an intention to effect any such transaction, for a period from the date hereof until February 28, 2018 without the prior written consent of the Company (such period, the “O-Tex Lockup Period”). For the avoidance of doubt, in no event shall the Company’s performance of or compliance with its covenants under Section 8.16 of the Merger Agreement relieve the
undersigned of its obligations hereunder, which obligations shall continue in full force and effect until the expiration of the O-Tex Lockup Period. 












 
	
	Yours very truly,
	
	              

	Authorized Signatory
	Address:


  

	
	 ACKNOWLEDGED:
 C&J ENERGY
SERVICES, INC.

	
	              

	By:

 Signature Page to Lock Up Agreement
exh_1024.htm


Exhibit 10.24







AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO


HARVARD BIOSCIENCE, INC.


EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN







This Amendment No. 2 to the Harvard Bioscience, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the “Plan”) is effective as of May 23, 2013 (the “Effective Date”).







In accordance with Section 18 of the Plan, as approved by the stockholders of Harvard Bioscience, Inc. on the Effective Date, in order to increase the number of shares of common stock reserved for issuance under the Plan to Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand (750,000), the Plan is hereby amended as follows, effective as of the Effective Date:








	
1.

	
The reference to “Five hundred thousand (500,000) shares” in the initial paragraph of the Plan is hereby deleted and replaced with “Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand (750,000) shares”.













	
2.

	
The following is added to the end of the Plan:












“DATE AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO PLAN APPROVED BY BOARD OF DIRECTORS: AUGUST 2, 2011.


DATE AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO PLAN APPROVED BY BOARD OF DIRECTORS: FEBRUARY 26, 2013.


DATE AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO PLAN APPROVED BY STOCKHOLDERS: MAY 23, 2013.”








	
3.

	
Except as expressly amended hereby, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 138 Considered and Passed House (CPH)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. J. RES. 138

 Appointing the day for the convening of the first session of the One 
                        Hundred Sixth Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 20, 1998

 Mr. Solomon introduced the following joint resolution pursuant to H. 
               Res. 594; considered as having been passed

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Appointing the day for the convening of the first session of the One 
                        Hundred Sixth Congress.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the first regular session 
of the One Hundred Sixth Congress shall begin at noon on Wednesday, 
January 6, 1999.
                                 <all>
```
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 2023

- 1949

_____________________________ R.D., A Child
, Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Dixie County

. Jennifer Jones Johnson , Judge

. April 23, 2024

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , B ILBREY , and L ONG , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell Dixon, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION
                                       OF
                             CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                       AND
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         I, Tony Tong, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003, that the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-QSB of PacificNet Inc. for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on
Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of PacificNet Inc.

         I, Shao Jian Wang, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB of PacificNet Inc. for the quarter ended June 30, 2005
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on
Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of PacificNet Inc.

By: /s/ Tony Tong
    ---------------------------------------
    Tony Tong
    Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
    (Principal Executive Officer)

By: /s/ Shao Jian Wang
    ---------------------------------------
    Shao Jian Wang
    Chief Financial Officer
    (Principal Accounting Officer)

August 15, 2005

This certification pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is
not "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the applicable rules of the Securities
Exchange Commission.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from SEC
Form 10-QSB and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         790,451
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,082,878
<ALLOWANCES>                                   131,233
<INVENTORY>                                  1,567,986
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,409,626
<PP&E>                                       2,201,402
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,391,703
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,227,166
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          808,028
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       507,048
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,856,978
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,227,166
<SALES>                                      3,943,159
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,977,708
<CGS>                                        1,909,674
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,909,674
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,442,002
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,447
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                620,585
<INCOME-TAX>                                   262,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            358,485
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   358,485
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .35


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 30, 2015

a1027

Order 

Clerk

October 30, 2015

150119

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 150119

COA: 317054

Ingham CC: 13-000161-FH

FATEEN ROHN MUHAMMAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On October 15, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the July 29, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the 

application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, 

we VACATE the Court of Appeals judgment and REMAND this case to that court for 

reconsideration. The Court of Appeals erred by applying harmless error analysis without 

first determining whether the trial court’s order dismissing the habitual offender notice 

was erroneous. See MCR 2.613(A) (stating that a judgment or order of the court may not 

be vacated, modified, or otherwise disturbed “unless refusal to take this action appears to 

the court inconsistent with substantial justice”). The prosecutor has conceded that it did 

not timely serve the habitual offender notice under MCL 769.13. On remand, we direct 

the Court of Appeals to determine whether the trial court erred by concluding that the 

proper remedy for the prosecutor’s statutory violation was dismissal of the habitual 

offender notice. See In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 496 Mich 320 (2014).

We do not retain jurisdiction.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 32 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 32

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the storage of nuclear 
       waste on any territory or possession of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 4, 1997

Mr. Abercrombie (for himself, Mr. Miller of California, Mr. Leach, Mrs. 
 Mink of Hawaii, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Romero-Barcelo, 
 Ms. Christian-Green, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Stark, Mr. Pallone, Mrs. Maloney 
 of New York, Mr. Evans, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, and 
 Mr. Lewis of Georgia) submitted the following concurrent resolution; 
which was referred to the Committee on Commerce, and in addition to the 
 Committee on Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the storage of nuclear 
       waste on any territory or possession of the United States.

Whereas the Insular Area Appropriation Act of 1980 prohibits the transport of 
        nuclear waste to and the storage of nuclear waste on any territory or 
        possession of the United States, unless such transport or storage is 
        specifically authorized by an Act of Congress, and such an authorization 
        has never been granted;
Whereas the people of the territories of the United States in the Pacific region 
        have paid a high price--socially, economically, and environmentally--as 
        a result of nuclear testing;
Whereas the coral and volcanic islands of the Pacific territories are 
        geographically unstable and prone to extreme weather conditions, making 
        those islands poor candidates for the site of a nuclear waste 
        repository; and
Whereas certain foreign interests are now seeking to develop a private nuclear 
        waste storage facility on one or both of Wake Island and Palmyra Atoll: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of Congress that the transport of nuclear waste to 
and the storage of nuclear waste on any territory or possession of the 
United States, including Wake Island and Palmyra Atoll, should continue 
to be prohibited.
                                 <all>
```
#### Taofeek A. QUADRI Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America; Mark T. *413Esper, Secretary of the Army1 Defendants-Appellees

No. 17-2224

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 3, 2018

Filed: January 11, 2018

Taofeek A. Quadri, Pro Se

Claude Shackelford Hawkins, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before BENTON, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

1

. Mark T. Esper has been appointed to serve as Secretary of the Army, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).

PER CURIAM.

Taofeek A. Quadri brought an employment-discrimination action against the Secretary of the Army. The district court concluded that Quadri’s claims were non-justiciable under *Feres v. United States,*340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), and dismissed the action with prejudice. On appeal, Quadri contends only that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court agrees. *See Hupp v. U.S. Dep’t of Army,*144 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir. 1998); *Wood v. United States,*968 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1992).

The judgment is modified to be a dismissal without prejudice, and is otherwise undisturbed. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B. The pending motion for a stay is denied.