J-A23043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM A. MOULIS

Appellant No. 1674 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 3, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002584-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2015

Appellant, William A. Moulis, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench 

trial convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 

substance (“DUI”), stop signs and yield signs, and careless driving.1 We 

affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On the morning of November 2, 2013, Lisa Jacobs called 911 to report an 

erratic driver. Ms. Jacobs informed the 911 dispatcher she had observed the 

driver of a tan/brown Chevy Cavalier sedan driving erratically, swerving, and 

failing to stop at multiple stop signs. Ms. Jacobs said the driver of the 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2); 3323(b); 3714(a), respectively. 
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vehicle almost hit her car. Ms. Jacobs believed the driver might be 

intoxicated and posed a threat to others on the road. Ms. Jacobs 

subsequently supplied police with a written statement of the events as well. 

Officer Eric Maga responded to the 911 dispatch and pulled over the 

vehicle Ms. Jacobs had described. Appellant was the driver of the vehicle 

and Mary Mattei, Appellant’s girlfriend, was the passenger. When Officer 

Maga approached Appellant’s vehicle, he noticed Appellant spoke very slowly 

and had pinpoint pupils. Appellant took longer than usual to produce his 

insurance card and failed to produce his driver’s license and registration card 

the first time Officer Maga requested those documents, requiring the officer 

to ask a second time. Based on the 911 dispatch and Officer Maga’s 

observations, the officer suspected Appellant might be under the influence of 

pills or narcotics. Officer Maga asked Appellant to exit the vehicle so the 

officer could perform field sobriety tests. Officer Maga initially conducted a 

Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test; Appellant displayed six out of six 

signs of impairment during this test. Officer Maga also administered a 

Portable Breath Test (“PBT”), which did not detect alcohol on Appellant’s 

breath. Officer Maga began giving instructions for the walk-and-turn test 

thereafter, but due to the heavy flow of traffic and Officer Maga’s 

observations that Appellant was unsteady on his feet, the officer decided for 

safety reasons to continue the field sobriety testing at the police station. 

At the police station, Officer Maga conducted the walk-and-turn test 
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and the one-leg stand test. Appellant failed both tests. Based on 

Appellant’s deficient performance on the field sobriety tests, and the officer’s 

observations, Officer Maga concluded Appellant was under the influence of 

narcotics. A subsequent blood draw showed Appellant had Xanax and 

Valium in his system. Appellant said he had a prescription for Xanax, but 

Appellant did not produce the prescription to the officer. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with DUI and other summary 

offenses. On August 8, 2014, Appellant filed a suppression motion claiming, 

inter alia, Officer Maga lacked probable cause to arrest Appellant. 

Specifically, Appellant disputed that he failed the field sobriety tests and 

requested the Commonwealth to produce video footage from Officer Maga’s 

police dashboard camera and video surveillance from the police station 

where Officer Maga had later conducted field sobriety tests. The court held 

a suppression hearing on August 11, 2014. At the suppression hearing, the 

Commonwealth presented testimony/evidence from Lisa Jacobs and Officer 

Maga. Ms. Jacobs testified about her observations of Appellant’s erratic 

driving on the morning in question, which prompted her to call 911. Officer 

Maga testified about his observations of Appellant and his administration of 

the various field sobriety tests. Officer Maga also explained that the 

dashboard camera in his police cruiser had been disconnected and was nonfunctioning on the morning of November 2, 2013. Thus, Officer Maga 

maintained there was no video footage of Appellant’s performance of the 
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HGN test. Officer Maga further testified that there is a surveillance camera 

in the hallway of the police station where the officer conducted the later field 

sobriety tests, but Officer Maga was unsure whether the camera was 

functioning on the date in question. The Commonwealth also moved into 

evidence, without objection, an e-mail dated June 25, 2014, from the 

Assistant District Attorney to defense counsel, confirming there was no video 

footage of any of the field sobriety tests. 

The defense presented testimony from Ms. Mattei. Ms. Mattei’s 

version of events directly contradicted the events as described by Ms. Jacobs 

and Officer Maga. Ms. Mattei testified that Ms. Jacobs was the person 

driving erratically, and Appellant only swerved to move out of Ms. Jacobs’ 

way. Ms. Mattei said Ms. Jacobs was “flying down the road” and almost 

caused a big accident. Additionally, Ms. Mattei thought Appellant 

successfully completed the HGN test. Ms. Mattei admitted she did not see 

Appellant perform the walk-and-turn test or one-leg stand test because she 

was seated in the lobby of the police station at that time, but Ms. Mattei 

maintained she saw video surveillance in the lobby. Ms. Mattei guessed 

that, if Officer Maga had conducted field sobriety tests at the police station, 

then there would be video footage of those tests. Ms. Mattei also indicated 

Appellant has a prescription for Xanax and Valium. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. The court 

expressly stated it found Ms. Mattei’s testimony incredible. 
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Appellant proceeded directly to a bench trial. The parties incorporated 

by reference all testimony/evidence from the suppression hearing with the 

exception of testimony and evidence concerning the HGN test and the PBT.2 

The Commonwealth recalled Officer Maga. Officer Maga testified that 

Appellant admitted at the time of his blood draw he had consumed two 

Xanax, but Appellant did not recall if he had taken those pills the night 

before the traffic stop or two nights prior. Based on the officer’s 

observations of Appellant, Officer Maga opined Appellant was incapable of 

safe driving. The parties stipulated that the levels of Xanax and Valium 

detected in Appellant’s blood were consistent with therapeutic values for 

those drugs. 

The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Jennifer Janssen, 

an expert in forensic toxicology. Ms. Janssen testified that Appellant’s blood 

results showed the presence of Xanax and Valium. Ms. Janssen explained 

Xanax can cause drowsiness, lightheadedness, and impaired coordination. 

Ms. Janssen stated Valium can cause sedation, muscle relaxation, and 

lethargy. Ms. Janssen also indicated that pinpoint pupils are more indicative 

of opiate use, which was not detected in Appellant’s system. Nevertheless, 

Ms. Janssen explained that just because a drug is below the detection limit 

does not necessarily mean the individual did not consume that particular 

____________________________________________

2 Thus, Appellant’s performance during the HGN test and the results of the 

PBT are relevant only to Appellant’s suppression challenge. 
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drug. Ms. Janssen concluded there were therapeutic concentrations of 

Xanax and Valium in Appellant’s system at the time of the blood draw, and 

Appellant was “under the influence” of those substances. The defense did 

not present any additional testimony or evidence. 

At the conclusion of trial, the court found Appellant guilty of DUI, stop 

signs and yield signs, and careless driving. The court specifically said it 

deemed Ms. Jacobs’ testimony credible and Ms. Mattei’s testimony 

incredible. On September 3, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to time 

served plus six (6) months’ probation for DUI; the court imposed no further 

penalty for the summary offenses. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence 

motion on Monday, September 15, 2014, which the court denied the next 

day. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 14, 2014. On 

October 16, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

subsequently filed a motion for extension, which the court granted until 

November 25, 2014. On November 25, 2014, Appellant timely filed his 

concise statement. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 

GRANT APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE

EVIDENCE OF THE ARREST FOR LACK OF PROBABLE 

CAUSE?

WHETHER APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 

VIOLATED BY THE COMMONWEALTH’S FAILURE TO 

PRODUCE VIDEOTAPE TESTIMONY OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
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AND SOBRIETY TESTS?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARGUING THAT 

APPELLANT’S CLAIMS RELATED TO SUFFICIENCY OF THE 

EVIDENCE AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WERE WAIVED 

FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE A 

SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED [RULE] 1925(B) STATEMENT?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 

THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD 

TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR DUICONTROLLED SUBSTANCE?

WHETHER THE VERDICT OF THE TRIAL COURT OF GUILTY 

FOR DUI-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IS AGAINST THE 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?

(Appellant’s Brief at xi). 

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 

A.2d 14, 26 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal 

conclusions based upon the facts.

Williams, supra at 27 (quoting Jones, supra). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Anthony M. 
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Mariani, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court’s 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 2, 2014, at 4-9) 

(finding: (issue 1) Officer Maga pulled over Appellant’s vehicle based on 

911 dispatch that Appellant was driving erratically;3 Officer Maga 

administered HGN test at scene of traffic stop; Officer Maga testified at 

suppression hearing that Appellant exhibited six out of six signs of 

impairment during that test; Officer Maga also conducted walk-and-turn test 

and one-leg stand test, both of which Appellant failed; court found incredible 

Ms. Mattei’s testimony about her observations of Appellant’s performance on 

field sobriety tests; based on Officer Maga’s observations and Appellant’s 

failure of field sobriety tests, Officer Maga had probable cause to arrest 

Appellant;4(issue 2) Commonwealth did not possess materials requested 

____________________________________________

3

In its opinion, the trial court initially analyzed whether police had 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. (See Trial Court Opinion at 

2-4). Appellant does not contest the validity of the traffic stop on appeal, so 

we need not address it. 

4 To the extent Appellant claims on appeal that he was under arrest before

the additional field sobriety testing at the police station, Appellant did not 

preserve that specific complaint at the suppression hearing or in his Rule 

1925(b) statement, so it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 

Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (holding any issue not raised in Rule 1925(b) 

statement is waived on appeal); Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (explaining appellate review of order denying suppression 

is limited to examination of precise basis under which suppression was 

initially sought; court will not consider new theories of relief on appeal). 

Moreover, even if Appellant was under arrest before the additional field 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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by Appellant; Officer Maga testified that dashboard camera inside his police 

cruiser was not operational on date in question; Officer Maga further 

testified he had no knowledge regarding whether any video existed depicting 

Appellant’s performance of field sobriety tests at police station; Appellant 

provided no evidence that videos of his field sobriety tests actually exist; 

even if Appellant could show existence of videos, Appellant demonstrated no 

bad faith by Commonwealth in relation to preservation of alleged videos;5

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

sobriety testing, Officer Maga had probable cause to arrest Appellant at the 

scene of the traffic stop based on: (1) Ms. Jacobs’ report that Appellant was 

driving erratically; (2) Officer Maga’s observations of Appellant’s very slow 

speech and pinpoint pupils; (3) Appellant’s failure to produce his driver’s 

license and registration when initially asked; (4) Appellant’s slow production 

of his insurance card; (5) Appellant’s failure of the HGN test, in which 

Appellant exhibited six out of six signs of impairment; and (6) Appellant’s 

unsteadiness on his feet during the instructional phase of the walk-and-turn 

test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weaver, 76 A.3d 562 (Pa.Super. 

2013) (explaining probable cause exists if facts and circumstances within 

personal knowledge of police officer are sufficient to warrant person of 

reasonable caution in belief that offense has been committed; holding officer 

had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI where concerned citizen 

called police to report defendant’s erratic driving, officer initiated traffic stop, 

defendant appeared sluggish and responded slowly to commands, defendant 

failed HGN test, and police recovered Suboxone and Valium from defendant’s 

vehicle). 

5 Appellant also claims the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the alleged 

videotapes constitutes a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 

S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding suppression by prosecution of 

evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process where 

evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, regardless of good or bad 

faith by prosecution). To succeed on a Brady challenge, the defendant must 

show: (1) the evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the Commonwealth suppressed the 

evidence; and (3) the defendant suffered prejudice. Commonwealth v. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(issues 3-5) Appellant’s bald allegations in Rule 1925(b) statement 

concerning challenges to sufficiency and weight of evidence are too vague to 

permit review; Appellant’s claims provide no guidance as to which elements 

of DUI offense Commonwealth allegedly failed to prove, and how weight of 

evidence did not support verdict; Appellant’s sufficiency and weight of 

evidence claims are waived for vagueness). 

Moreover, when examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Feese, 79 A.3d 1101 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 626 Pa. 674, 94 A.3d 

1007 (2014). Here, Appellant offered only the testimony of Ms. Mattei to 

support his proposition that the videotapes existed and would contain 

“favorable evidence” (i.e., they would show Appellant did not fail the field 

sobriety tests). The trial court found Ms. Mattei’s testimony incredible. 

Thus, Appellant cannot demonstrate a Brady violation. See id. 
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weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (quoting Jones, supra at 120-

21). 

The Vehicle Code defines the offense of DUI, in relevant part, as 

follows:

§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or 

controlled substance

* * *

(d) Controlled substances.—An individual may 

not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the 

movement of a vehicle under any of the following 

circumstances:

* * *

(2) The individual is under the influence of a 

drug or combination of drugs to a degree which 

impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the 

movement of the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Additionally:

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the 

finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence and to determine the credibility of 

the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute 

its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we 

may only reverse the...verdict if it is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight 

claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 
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weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited 

to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in 

ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented the following 

testimony/evidence at trial: (1) Ms. Jacobs testified she was driving her 

children to a doctor’s appointment on the morning of November 2, 2013, 

when she observed the driver of a nearby vehicle driving erratically; the 

driver failed to stop at multiple stop signs, swerved all over the road, drove 

across both lanes of traffic without signaling, and almost caused an accident; 

other drivers were honking their horns; Ms. Jacobs called 911 and described 

the vehicle and the driver’s actions; (2) Officer Maga responded to the 911 

dispatch and pulled over the vehicle Ms. Jacobs had described; Appellant 

was the driver of the vehicle and Ms. Mattei was the passenger; Appellant 

spoke very slowly and took longer than Officer Maga had expected to 

produce his insurance card; Appellant failed to comply with the officer’s 

initial request to supply his driver’s license and registration; Appellant had 

pinpoint pupils, consistent with the consumption of pills or narcotics; Officer 

Maga conducted a walk-and-turn test and one-leg stand test, both of which 

Appellant failed; a subsequent blood draw showed Appellant had Xanax and 

Valium in his system; Appellant admitted taking Xanax either the night 
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before or two nights prior; Officer Maga believed Appellant was incapable of 

safe driving; and (3) Ms. Janssen, an expert in forensic toxicology, testified 

that Appellant had Xanax and Valium in his system at the time of the 

incident; Ms. Janssen explained the adverse side effects of both substances, 

which were consistent with Officer Maga’s observations of Appellant’s 

behavior at the time of the traffic stop. 

The defense offered the suppression testimony from Ms. Mattei. Ms. 

Mattei’s version of events directly contradicted the events as described by 

Ms. Jacobs and Officer Maga. Ms. Mattei testified that Ms. Jacobs was the 

person driving erratically and Appellant only swerved to move out of Ms. 

Jacobs’ way. Ms. Mattei admitted she did not see Appellant perform the 

walk-and-turn test or one-leg stand test because she was in the lobby of the 

police station at that time. Ms. Mattei also testified that Appellant has a 

prescription for Xanax and Valium. The court expressly stated it found Ms. 

Jacobs’ testimony credible and Ms. Mattei’s testimony incredible. Viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for DUI. See 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2); Hansley, supra. Additionally, the trial court as 

fact-finder was free to accept the testimony from the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses and to reject Ms. Mattei’s testimony. See Champney, supra. 

Appellant’s guilty verdict for DUI is not so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice. See id. Thus, even if Appellant had preserved 
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his challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, those claims 

would still merit no relief. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial 

court’s opinion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2015
(fl 

generall·~n,.t!...ore specifically in that this Court rejected his claim that he was arrested c::> . J~H 

•• 0<2.1- 

:fll ~i,ut p~\\ cause. Defendant also claims that he was denied due process when the 

~. Connr,on~~d1 id not turn over certain video evidence. Defendant also raises 

-- (...) u-~~ 

U.. chall~es lSa~~n the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. All claims fail. 

t·· c.) ...J 

-:;:,.. n.. .a: 

~· ~..I 

c-~ ,:, 

On appeal, the defendant claims that this Court erred in denying his suppression motion 

followed by a term of probation of six months. Defendant then filed this timely appeal. 

code offenses. Defendant was sentenced to a term · of imprisonment of time served 

found guilty of driving under the influence of a controlled substance and various vehicle 

sentencing motions on September 16, 2014. After a non-jury trial, the defendant was 

September 3, 2014 which became final when this Court denied defendant's postThis is a direct appeal wherein the defendant appeals the Judgment of Sentence of 

Mariani, J. 

OPINION 

WILLIAM A. MOULIS, 

vs. 

) 

) 

) CC No. 2014-02584 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

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2 

1 In his Omnibus Pretrial Motion and in his 1925(b) statement, the defendant only claimed that his arrest 

was without probable cause. He never specifically challenged the actual stop of his vehicle, which required 

the standard of reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011). However, 

because the defendant claimed in his Omnibus Pretrial Motion that he never violated the vehicle code and 

did not fail any sobriety tests, this Court will address both issues in its opinion. 

places himself at risk of prosecution for filing a false claim if the tip is untrue, whereas an 

to be trustworthy, in the absence of special circumstances, since a known informant 

identified citizens who report their observations of criminal activity to police are assumed 

Commonwealth v. Swartz, 787 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en bane). "Indeed, 

but may rely upon the information of third parties, including tips from citizens." 

suspicion, police officers need not personally observe the illegal or suspicious conduct, 

occurred. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011). "To have reasonable 

suspicion to believe that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is occurring or has 

Police officers are permitted to conduct a vehicle stop if the officer has reasonable 

stop of his vehicle as well as the probable cause to arrest him or whether he challenged 

only the probable cause to arrest him.1 Regardless, both arguments fail. 

field sobriety tests prior to his arrest. It is not clear whether the defendant challenged the 

without probable cause because he did not violate the vehicle code nor did he fail any 

Defendant's motion to suppress was based on defendant's contention he was arrested 

defendant's vehicle and the field sobriety tests administered to the defendant. 

predicated on the Commonwealth's refusal to produce video evidence of the stop of 

motion to suppress, a request for a probable cause hearing and a motion to dismiss 

Prior to trial, Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion. That motion contained a 

Defendant first claims that this Court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

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3 

The defendant's vehicle was stopped as a result of a 911 call from a concerned 

motorist, Lisa Jacobs, whose identity was known to the 911 dispatcher. Ms. Jacobs 

relayed her observations that the defendant had been operating his vehicle in a reckless 

manner. Ms. Jacobs told the 911 dispatcher that she was driving on Ewings Mill Road 

in Robinson Township. While she was driving, the defendant's vehicle had quickly 

driven up to the left side of her vehicle and almost swerved into her vehicle. The 

defendant's vehicle quickly swerved away. She then observed the defendant's vehicle 

pass her and repeatedly swerve again across her lane and into oncoming traffic and 

almost drive off the road. She related that other vehicles were forced off the road due to 

the defendant's driving and they were honking their horns at him. She also explained that 

the defendant drove through a few stop signs. She then continued to her destination and 

called 911. Ms. Jacobs was able to describe the vehicle to the 911 dispatcher and she 

relayed all of her observations about the defendant's driving. Officer Eric Maga was 

dispatched to investigate the matter. He called Ms. Jacobs and she related her 

observations to him. Officer Maga quickly located the defendant's vehicle and initiated a 

traffic stop. Ms. Jacobs's information concerning the defendant's erratic driving clearly 

established reasonable suspicion that the defendant had violated the Motor Vehicle 

unknown informant faces no such risk." Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 593 

(Pa. Super. 2005). Similarly, "Pennsylvania law ... permits a vehicle stop based upon a 

radio bulletin if evidence is offered at the suppression hearing to establish reasonable 

suspicion." Id. at 594; see also Commonwealth v. Anthony, 977 A.2d 1182, 1185-1186 

(Pa.Super. 2009). 

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4 

2 The defendant's girlfriend testified that the defendant did not commit any vehicle code violations. For the 

reasons set forth on the record, this Court did not find her testimony credible. 

3 The defendant's girlfriend testified that she did not see the defendant fail the field sobriety tests. Again, 

for the reasons set forth on the record, this Court did not find her testimony credible. 

defendant. 

believes this evidence was clearly sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the 

the defendant had been driving under the influence of a controlled substance. This Court 

had failed three field sobriety tests.3 He clearly possessed the required knowledge that 

Officer Maga was aware that the defendant had been driving in an erratic manner and he 

The defendant failed both of those tests as well. At the time of the defendant's arrest, 

signs of impairment. The walk-and-tum test and the one-leg test were also administered. 

test, or eye test, and the results of that test disclosed that the defendant exhibited all six 

defendant. Officer Maga testified that he administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus 

(Pa.Super. 2008). In this case, Officer Maga administered field sobriety tests to the 

alcohol or a controlled substance. Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 118 

warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under the influence of 

exists when a police officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to 

Similarly, probable cause existed to arrest the defendant. Probable cause to arrest 

Therefore, the stop of defendant's vehicle was proper. 

Code. Accordingly, the information supplied by Ms. Jacobs was sufficient to provide 

the requisite reasonable suspicion for Officer Maga to conduct the traffic stop.' 

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5 

The evidence adduced during the suppression hearing indicated that the 

Commonwealth did not possess the materials requested by the defendant. Officer Maga 

testified that dashboard camera inside the police cruiser he was driving at the time of the 

arrest was never operational. He testified that the police cruiser had been placed in 

service in 2012 and that the dashboard camera never worked since that time. He also 

testified that he had no knowledge as to whether a video existed of the defendant 

performing field sobriety tests in the hall area of the police station. The Commonwealth 

Under Pennsylvania discovery rules, a defendant may request the Commonwealth 

to produce inculpatory evidence that is relevant and the Commonwealth must produce 

such information provided it is within the possession of the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 585 (Pa.Super. 2003). However, where the 

evidence is equally accessible or inaccessible to both parties, a defendant cannot use the 

discovery rules to compel the Commonwealth to produce such evidence. Id. Moreover, 

unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth, the 

Commonwealth is not accountable for the failure to preserve any potentially useful 

evidence and the failure to preserve such evidence does not constitute a denial of due 

process of law." Commonwealth v. Feese, 79 A.3d 1101, 1108 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Defendant next claims that his due process rights were violated when the 

Commonwealth did not provide copies of a dash cam videotape from Officer Maga's 

police cruiser or a videotape of the defendant's filed sobriety tests conducted at the 

Robinson Township Police Station. 

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6 

The defendant's final four issues relate to very general challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence. Pennsylvania courts have 

explained that "a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the 

issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all." 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683 686 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also 

Commonwealth v. Seibert. 799 A.2d 54 (Pa. Super. 2002). In such circumstances, the 

vague issues raised on appeal are deemed waived. Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 

advised the Court that the video recorded in the Robinson Township Police Department 

hallway "loops over itself' if no timely request is made to preserve the video. The 

defendant was arrested on November 2, 2013. The suppression hearing occurred on 

August 11, 2014. Defense counsel did not file a motion seeking disclosure of the video 

until August 8, 2014. Officer Maga only became aware that the defendant's counsel 

requested a copy of the video on the date of the suppression hearing. Although the 

defendant made a general statement that he believed that the videos in question did 

actually exist, he did not provide any evidence that the videos actually existed or what 

information would have been contained on them. Simply put, the videos requested by 

the defendant were not in possession of the Commonwealth. Dashboard camera videos 

never existed. Additionally, even if the defendant could have somehow proved the 

existence of the videos, there was certainly no showing by the defendant of any bad faith 

on the part of the Commonwealth in relation to the preservation of such videos. 

Accordingly, the failure to produce any of the videos to the defendant was not error. 

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7 

Similarly, Appellant herein failed to articulate the specific 

elements of any crime which he deems the evidence 

presented at trial failed to sufficiently establish. Though the 

Commonwealth did not object to Appellant's defective 

1925(b) statement on this issue, the trial court indicated in 

sufficiency was waived on appeal: 

The Superior Court held that this statement was too vague and, therefore, the issue of 

Was there not insufficient evidence to sustain the charges 

of Murder, Robbery, VUFA no license, and VUFA on the 

streets. [sic] Thus, denying petitioner due process of law? 

the Superior Court was evaluating a 1925(b) statement that posed the following question: 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258; (Pa. Super. 2008). In Williams, 

established at trial are too vague and result in a waiver of the issues raised on appeal. See 

evidence that do not articulate the specific elements that an appellant deems weren't 

Germane to this case, general claims of insufficiency of evidence or weight of 

There is a common sense obligation to give the trial court 

notice as to what the trial court should address in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion. While there is a middle ground that 

counsel must travel to avoid having a Rule 1925(b) 

statement so vague that the trial judge cannot ascertain 

what issues should be discussed in the Rule 1925(a) 

opinion or so verbose and lengthy that it frustrates the 

ability of the trial judge to hone in on the issues actually 

being presented to the appellate court, see Kanter v. 

Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. 2004 ), that is not an 

onerous burden to place on counsel. It only requires using a 

little common sense. 

Super. 2006): 

148 (Pa. Super. 2006). As set forth in Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Pa. 

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8 

reasonable doubt. He claims that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond a 

the evidence. He also makes two allegations that his guilt was not proven beyond a 

evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the verdict was against the weight of 

what is required in such a statement. The defendant makes bald allegations that the 

In this case, the defendant's final four claims in his 1925(b) statement fall short of 

jury was against the weight of the credible evidence as to all of the charges.") 

waived for having filed a vague 1925(b) statement claiming only that "the verdict of the 

therefore, waived.); Seibert, 799 A.2d 54 (Appellant's weight of the evidence issue 

securing execution of documents by deception" was insufficient and the issue was, 

that stated, "[t]he evidence was insufficient to support the verdict on the charge of 

evidence claim for appellate review.); Reeves, 907 A.2d at 3 (a Rule 1925(b) statement 

committed the above-captioned offenses" did not properly preserve a sufficiency of the 

Simpson was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 

captioned offenses" and that "the testimony of Sondra Coble, Julienne Briggs, and Atlas 

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the above523 (Pa. Super. 2007)( a 1925(b) statement stating that "[t]he evidence presented was 

Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257-1258; see also Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522- 

its Opinion that Appellant's failure to list any reasons he 

believes that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

charges created a situation in which this is issue is too 

ambiguous to be effectively reviewed by the trial court and 

should be dismissed. Trial Court Opinion, filed June 26, 

2007, at 7. As such, in light of Flores, supra; we find 

Appellant has waived this issue. 

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9 

Date: .~,,p,_ / I 2,:;11- 

By the Court: 

For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of Sentence should be affirmed. 

reasonable doubt and he claims that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not prove 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His claims do not provide any guidance as to 

which elements were lacking proof and how the weight of the evidence did not support 

the verdict rendered in this case. These allegations are too vague and, pursuant to the 

authority set forth above, this Court believes that these issues are waived for appellate 

review. 

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