NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAMELA TINKY MNYANDU, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-55846 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-06485-DSF-FFM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019**

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. 

Pamela Tinky Mnyandu appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Conlon v. United States, 

474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-55846 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mnyandu’s claims

against defendants Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., Lunsway, and 

Rose because Mnyandu failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether these defendants instigated Mnyandu’s criminal prosecution with malice. 

See id. at 621, 624 (unanswered requests for admission, or untimely and deficient 

responses to the same, are deemed admitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) and may 

be relied on as the basis for granting summary judgment); Pelletier v. Fed. Home 

Loan Bank of S.F., 968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992) (to survive summary 

judgment, nonmoving party “ordinarily must furnish affidavits containing 

admissible evidence tending to show the existence of a genuine dispute of material 

fact”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 

banc) (elements of malicious prosecution claim under § 1983); Roberts v. McAfee, 

Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) (elements of malicious prosecution claim 

under California law). Contrary to Mnyandu’s contention, she was not excused 

from her obligation to respond to defendants’ requests for admission because the 

district court had authorized the parties to conduct discovery. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(d) (prohibiting discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference except “when 

authorized . . . by court order”).
3 18-55846 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Mnyandu’s 

claims against defendants Colannino and Racowaschi under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 37(b)(2) and 41(b) because Mnyandu willfully failed to produce 

documents in compliance with the district court’s discovery orders despite 

receiving an extension of time and being warned that noncompliance could result 

in dismissal. See Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(standard of review and factors for determining whether to dismiss under Rule 

41(b)); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 

1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review and factors for evaluating terminating 

sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mnyandu’s motion 

for default judgment as a sanction because defendants did not violate any 

discovery orders or other court order. See Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel & Country 

Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of review). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mnyandu’s request 

for disqualification of Magistrate Judge Mumm because Mnyandu failed to 

establish any ground for recusal. See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868-69 

(9th Cir. 1980) (standard of review and circumstances requiring recusal under 28 
4 18-55846 

U.S.C. § 455).

We reject as without merit Mnyandu’s contention that the magistrate judge 

acted without jurisdiction because the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to rule on 

all non-dispositive, pretrial matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

AFFIRMED.