NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

NOEL ADAN VILLALOBOS, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0407

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-012638

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix

By David L. Abney

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

The Leader Law Firm, Tucson

By John P. Leader

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Chapa Law Group, P.C., Phoenix

By Miguel J. Chapa 

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

FILED 3-7-2023
2

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Charles E. Trullinger, III, Joseph J. Branco, Sean M. Moore

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Noel Adan Villalobos, Adan Villalobos, Rosalva Rascon, and 

Jose Luis Rodriguez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) challenge the superior court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Maricopa County (“the County”). We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This case arises from an October 2016 automobile accident 

that resulted in the death of Nuvia Villalobos and serious injury to her 

minor child. The accident occurred in the intersection of Broadway Road 

and 71st Avenue/Sienna Vista Avenue. At that intersection, the County

maintains Broadway Road and the City of Phoenix (“the City”) maintains 

the area north of Broadway Road, including Sienna Vista Avenue. Nuvia, 

approaching Broadway Road from the north on Sienna Vista Avenue, tried 

to turn left onto Broadway Road and collided with a school bus.

¶3 Plaintiffs sued the County, the City, and two parties not 

relevant to this appeal alleging the intersection was not reasonably safe for 

travel. Plaintiffs identified three alleged safety concerns at or near the 

intersection: (1) a misplaced stop sign on Sienna Vista Avenue north of the 

intersection; (2) the lack of a stop line or stop bar closer to Broadway Road 

on the north side of the intersection; and (3) sight obstruction caused by a 

Salt River Project utility pole on the northeast corner of the intersection.

¶4 The County moved for summary judgment, contending in 

relevant part that it owed no duty of care because none of the three alleged 

safety concerns were within its jurisdiction. The City moved for summary 

judgment on other grounds.
VILLALOBOS, et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The superior court granted the County’s motion, finding that 

Plaintiffs “ha[d] not come forward with evidence to support a finding that 

Maricopa County owed a legal duty as to the placement of the stop sign or 

stop line or for motorists on southbound 71st Avenue.” It denied the City’s 

motion, finding genuine issues of material fact remained as to its potential 

liability. The City filed a special action petition challenging both rulings. 

We declined to exercise special action jurisdiction, and the Arizona 

Supreme Court declined review.

¶6 Upon returning to the superior court, the City moved to 

bifurcate trial, which the superior court granted. Several months later,

Plaintiffs settled their claims against the City. The court then entered a final 

judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c) for the 

County. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the grant of 

summary judgment to the County and the bifurcation order. We have 

jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). We review a grant of summary judgment 

de novo and view the evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving parties; here, Plaintiffs. Zambrano v. M & RC

II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53, 58, ¶ 9 (2022).

¶8 To establish a negligence claim against the County, Plaintiffs

must prove four elements: (1) a duty requiring the County to conform to a 

certain standard of care; (2) the County’s breach of that standard; (3) a 

causal connection between the County’s conduct and the resulting injury;

and (4) actual damages. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560, 563-64, ¶ 7 

(2018).

¶9 The superior court determined the County owed no duty of 

care in this case. The County concedes on appeal that it owes a duty to keep 

its roads reasonably safe for travel. See Dunham v. Pima County, 161 Ariz. 

304, 306 (1989); see also A.R.S. § 11-251(4) (granting county boards of 

supervisors the power to “[l]ay out, maintain, control and manage public 

roads”). And while Plaintiffs concede on appeal the three safety concerns 

they identified “may not have been on a roadway for which Maricopa 

County was responsible,” they contend the County’s duty extends to 

“motorists . . . turning into Maricopa County’s roadways from other 

jurisdictions.” See Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 52 (1984) (stating 
VILLALOBOS, et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

that the duty to maintain reasonably safe roads extends to “those who use 

the public streets”). The County, on the other hand, contends its duty does 

not include “inspect[ing] and tak[ing] action to correct . . . roadway defects 

on adjoining roads owned and maintained by other entities.”

¶10 We need not decide whether the County had any duty to 

correct defects on adjoining roads because Plaintiffs presented no evidence 

establishing the County failed to meet the standard of care. Whether a

defendant breached the standard of care generally is for the trier of fact to 

resolve, Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 295, ¶ 11 (App. 2009), but summary 

judgment can be granted if “no reasonable juror could conclude that the

standard of care was breached.” Sanders v. Alger, 242 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 24 

(2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rudolph v. 

Ariz. B.A.S.S. Fed’n, 182 Ariz. 622, 626 (App. 1995) (Court of Appeals can 

affirm summary judgment when superior court errs in granting summary 

judgment based on lack of duty “if there is no evidence that defendants 

breached their duty.”).

¶11 As discussed above, Plaintiffs presented evidence that the 

City placed a stop sign too far from Broadway Road and did not place a 

“stop line/bar directing vehicles where to safely stop,” both of which 

Plaintiffs contend “violated a host of applicable roadway engineering 

standards” and caused or contributed to the accident. Plaintiffs also 

presented evidence suggesting that the utility pole on the northeast corner 

“significantly hinder[ed] southbound . . . motorists from seeing westbound 

traffic on Broadway.” They conceded, however, that the stop sign, missing

stop line, and utility pole “are within City . . . jurisdiction.” Moreover, their 

expert acknowledged the County’s only connection to this accident was 

that it happened on Broadway Road.

¶12 Plaintiffs nonetheless contend the County can be held liable 

because it “was on notice—based on prior crashes at this intersection and 

another nearby similar intersection . . . about the unreasonably dangerous 

condition of the intersectional area[.]” But their expert admitted the prior 

accidents he contended had “similar dynamics” merely involved 

“southbound vehicles on 71st Ave. [Sienna Vista Avenue], turning left on 

to W. Broadway, when impact occurred with another vehicle.” Plaintiffs’ 

expert’s deposition testimony was that only two of those accidents occurred 

prior to the Villalobos’ accident and neither involved the motorist’s view 

being obstructed due to a utility pole.

¶13 Plaintiffs also contend the County “was obligated to make 

reasonable efforts to correct the defect[s].” But they did not identify any 
VILLALOBOS, et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

specific efforts the County should have undertaken; their expert instead

speculated that the City “likely would have consented and cooperated” had 

the County approached it and “expressed a desire to correct the hazardous

conditions.” Plaintiffs expanded on that speculation in their opening brief:

[T]here are any number of measures Maricopa County could 

have taken to fulfill its standard of care, including: (1) 

vigorously requesting and, as needed, demanding that the 

City make changes to the stop-sign placement and install a 

stop line/bar in the proper location, (2) providing some type 

of warning to westbound motorists on Broadway Road as 

they approached the intersection, (3) placing a traffic light and 

warning lights in the jurisdictional area of the intersection 

that Maricopa County controlled, and (4) even suing to have 

the conditions on the City property declared a public 

nuisance and judicially forcing the necessary remedial action.

But they cite no record evidence or legal authority showing the applicable 

standard of care required the County to do any of these things. See Rule 

56(e) (stating that a party opposing summary judgment “must . . . set forth 

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial”); Rogers v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 

399, 403 (App. 1991) (“A jury will not be permitted to require a party to take 

a precaution that is clearly unreasonable.”) (citation omitted).

¶14 For these reasons, we conclude the superior court did not err 

in granting summary judgment to the County. As the County is the only 

remaining defendant, we need not address Plaintiffs’ challenges to the 

superior court’s trial bifurcation order.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm. The County may recover its taxable costs incurred 

in this appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.