Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re K.C., 2019 IL App (4th) 180693

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re K.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee, v. K.C., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-18-0693

Filed March 14, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 18-JD-57; 

the Hon. Thomas J. Difanis, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, John M. McCarthy, and Jessica L. Fangman, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. 

Robinson, and Rosario David Escalera Jr., of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Holder White and Justice DeArmond concurred in 

the judgment and opinion. 
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 In March 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, 

alleging that respondent, K.C. (born Jan. 21, 2002), was a delinquent minor because he 

unlawfully possessed a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2016)) and the debit card 

of another person (720 ILCS 5/17-32(b) (West 2016)). Following a detention hearing, the trial 

court found it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity to detain respondent. 

Respondent was subsequently released from detention. In April 2018, the State filed a 

supplemental petition for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, alleging respondent 

committed burglary to a motor vehicle (id. § 19-1(a)) and unlawful use of a weapon (id. 

§ 24-1(a)(1)). The court again found it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity to 

detain respondent. In May 2018, respondent pleaded guilty to burglary of a motor vehicle. The 

court conditionally released him from detention. In June 2018, the State filed a supplemental 

petition for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, alleging respondent committed retail 

theft (id. § 16-25(a)(1)). The court found it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity to 

detain respondent. In July 2018, the court ordered respondent to be committed to the 

Department of Juvenile Justice. 

¶ 2 Respondent appeals, asserting (1) the trial court failed to consider the requisite statutory 

factors prior to ordering his detention and (2) although moot, this court should consider the 

issue under the public interest exception. The State argues this court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider respondent’s appeal. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 On March 21, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, 

alleging that respondent unlawfully possessed a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 

2016)) and the debit card of another person (720 ILCS 5/17-32(b) (West 2016)). 

¶ 5 On March 26, 2018, the trial court arraigned respondent on the petition and conducted a 

detention hearing. The State presented a factual basis supporting the petition and requested that 

respondent be detained. 

¶ 6 The trial court found respondent should be detained pending adjudication, stating, in 

pertinent part, as follows: 

“I do find probable cause to believe the [r]espondent [m]inor is a delinquent minor 

as alleged in each of these matters. 

 I would note that we do have police contacts going back now over seven *** years 

almost, and I would also note that we have *** five failed station adjustments. The fact 

that these are two separate dates[,] and [in light of] the seriousness of the allegations[,] 

it’s the Court’s determination at this time it is a matter of urgent and immediate 

necessity that the [r]espondent [m]inor be detained for the protection of the person and 

property of another.” 

The trial court then entered an order of temporary detention. 

¶ 7 On April 13, 2018, the trial court released respondent from detention. On April 26, 2018, 

the State filed a supplemental petition for adjudication of delinquency and wardship, alleging 

that, following his release from detention, respondent committed burglary to a motor vehicle 

(id. § 19-1(a)) and unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1(a)(1)). That same day, the trial court 
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arraigned respondent on the supplemental petition and conducted a detention hearing. The 

State presented a factual basis supporting the supplemental petition and again requested that 

respondent be detained. The court found probable cause and determined respondent should be 

detained, stating as follows: “Based upon the proffers, there’s probable cause to believe 

[respondent] committed one or more of the offenses set forth in the supplemental petition. It is 

a matter of immediate and urgent necessity that he be detained.” The court then entered a 

second order of temporary detention. 

¶ 8 On May 18, 2018, respondent pleaded guilty to burglary to a motor vehicle. The trial court 

conditionally released him from detention. 

¶ 9 On June 7, 2018, the State filed a supplemental petition for adjudication of delinquency 

and wardship, alleging that, following his most recent release from detention, respondent 

committed the offense of retail theft (id. § 16-25(a)(1)). The trial court arraigned respondent on 

the supplemental petition and conducted a detention hearing on June 7, 2018. The court found 

probable cause and determined respondent should be detained, stating, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

“I do find there is probable cause to believe the [r]espondent minor is a delinquent 

minor as alleged in the supplemental petition. I note this is a young man who is pending 

sentencing for burglary to a motor vehicle and was literally released just a few weeks 

ago on May 18. It is the Court’s determination that it is a matter of urgent and 

immediate necessity that he be detained for the protection of the person or property of 

another. It is the order of the Court he will be held in the custody of Court Services 

pending the next hearing.” 

That same day, the trial court entered a third order of temporary detention. 

¶ 10 On July 20, 2018, the trial court ordered respondent to be committed to the Department of 

Juvenile Justice for five years or until his twenty-first birthday, whichever occurred first. 

Respondent filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied. 

¶ 11 This appeal followed. 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, respondent argues that (1) the trial court failed to consider the requisite 

statutory factors prior to ordering his detention and (2) although moot, this court should 

consider the issue under the public interest exception. The State argues this court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider respondent’s appeal.

¶ 14 A. Jurisdiction 

¶ 15 The State challenges this court’s jurisdiction based on respondent’s purportedly deficient 

notice of appeal. Specifically, the State contends that respondent’s notice of appeal failed to 

identify his assertion that the trial court erred in ordering his detention on three occasions. 

¶ 16 “[I]t is generally accepted that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed.” Burtell v. 

First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433, 394 N.E.2d 380, 382 (1979). “The notice of 

appeal serves the purpose of informing the prevailing party in the trial court that the 

unsuccessful litigant seeks a review by a higher court.” Id. “[T]he failure to specify a particular 

order in a notice of appeal does not preclude our review of that order ‘so long as the order that 

is specified directly relates back to the judgment or order from which review is sought.’ ” In re 
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Desiree O., 381 Ill. App. 3d 854, 863, 887 N.E.2d 59, 68 (2008) (quoting Perry v. Minor, 319 

Ill. App. 3d 703, 709, 745 N.E.2d 113, 118 (2001)). “ ‘Where the deficiency in notice is one of 

form, rather than substance, and the appellee is not prejudiced, the failure to comply strictly 

with the form of notice is not fatal.’ ” People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 105, 885 N.E.2d 1053, 

1059 (2008) (quoting Lang v. Consumers Insurance Service Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 226, 230, 

583 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 (1991)). 

¶ 17 Here, the amended notice of appeal states that the nature of the order appealed from is the 

adjudication, sentence, and denial of motion to reconsider the sentence. Respondent’s motion 

to reconsider challenged the length of his sentence, but failed to identify issues regarding the 

court’s predetention findings. While we find that the amended notice of appeal fails to identify 

the issue respondent now raises on appeal, we view the deficiency to be a matter of form, 

which has not resulted in prejudice to the State. See id. Thus, construing the notice of appeal 

liberally, we find this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 

¶ 18 B. The Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine 

¶ 19 Respondent argues that the trial court was obligated to consider the statutory factors listed 

in section 5-501(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 2016)) 

before detaining him on three separate occasions but failed to do so each time. Respondent 

acknowledges this issue is moot because he has already been sentenced to the Department of 

Juvenile Justice. However, respondent maintains that this court may address the issue under 

the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Specifically, he contends this court’s 

review of the issue is necessary because it “will continue to affect minors” and future guidance 

is necessary because “[t]here does not appear to be any authoritative determination within 

Illinois law as to whether the circuit court must consider the factors listed in the *** statute 

when determining the existence of immediate and urgent necessity to detain a minor.” 

¶ 20 “An issue on appeal is moot where it no longer presents an actual controversy.” People v. 

Harvey, 2018 IL 122325, ¶ 19, 115 N.E.3d 172. However, the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine “permits review of an otherwise moot question where the ‘magnitude or 

immediacy of the interests involved warrant[s] action by the court.’ ” In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 

114994, ¶ 16, 995 N.E.2d 990 (quoting Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392, 876 N.E.2d 650, 

657 (2007)). This narrowly construed exception applies only when each of the following 

elements are shown: “(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) an authoritative 

determination of the question is desirable for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) the 

question is likely to recur.” Id. We decide de novo whether this exception applies. In re Alfred 

H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 350, 910 N.E.2d 74, 77 (2009). 

¶ 21 The State concedes that the first element to the public interest exception—whether the 

question presented is of a public nature—applies here. A minor’s liberty interest is a question 

of a public nature. See In re Austin S., 2015 IL App (4th) 140802, ¶ 30, 45 N.E.3d 1096. 

However, the State asserts that respondent has failed to show the second and third elements 

apply. We focus our analysis on the second element. 

¶ 22 As stated, respondent contends future guidance is necessary because “this issue will 

continue to affect minors” and “[t]here does not appear to be any authoritative determination 

within Illinois law as to whether the circuit court must consider the factors listed in the *** 

statute when determining the existence of immediate and urgent necessity to detain a minor.” 
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The State counters that “there is no need for guidance because the statute clearly states the trial 

court must consider the *** factors listed in [the statute].” We agree with the State. 

¶ 23 The relevant portion of section 5-501(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides as 

follows: 

“If the court finds that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the 

protection of the minor or of the person or property of another that the minor be 

detained or *** that he or she is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, the court may 

prescribe detention ***; otherwise it shall release the minor from custody. *** In 

making the determination of the existence of immediate and urgent necessity, the court 

shall consider among other matters: (a) the nature and seriousness of the alleged 

offense; (b) the minor’s record of delinquency offenses, including whether the minor 

has delinquency cases pending; (c) the minor’s record of willful failure to appear 

following the issuance of a summons or warrant; (d) the availability of non-custodial 

alternatives, including the presence of a parent, guardian or other responsible relative 

able and willing to provide supervision and care for the minor and to assure his or her 

compliance with a summons.” 705 ILCS 405/5-501(2) (West 2016). 

¶ 24 Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the statute clearly states that the trial court “shall 

consider” the identified matters. Id. Respondent notes that the State concedes in its brief that 

the court did not consider the fourth factor (the availability of noncustodial alternatives) and 

argues, quoting In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 355, that “the circuit court’s failure to properly 

follow the statute shows ‘there is a need for authoritative determination for the future guidance 

of public officers.’ ” However, simply because the trial court may not have followed the statute 

does not lead to the conclusion that the statute’s requirements are somehow unclear. We think 

the statute plainly sets forth the criteria the trial court is to consider in making a finding as to 

immediate and urgent necessity. Respondent has thus failed to show an authoritative 

determination is needed for future guidance. See id. at 358 (“Because this case ‘does not 

present a situation where the law is in disarray or there is conflicting precedent,’ respondent 

has failed to show that this case meets the second requirement for the ‘public interest’ 

exception.” (quoting In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365-66, 710 N.E.2d 1226, 

1227 (1999))). Accordingly, we decline to review this moot issue under the public interest 

exception. 

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 27 Affirmed.