[Cite as Rhododendron Holdings, L.L.C. v. Harris , 2021-Ohio-147.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY RHODODENDRON HOLDINGS, LLC, et al. Plaintiffs-Appellants

v. THOMAS BRADLEY HARRIS, et al. Defendants-Appellees : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 28814

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CV-5825 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 22nd day of January, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . JAMES H. GREER, Atty. Reg. No. 0046555 and MATTHEW M. SUELLENTR OP, Atty. Reg. No. 0089655, 6 North Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants DANIEL J. RUDARY, Atty. Reg. No. 0090482, 75 East Market Street , Akron, Ohio 44308 Attorney for Defendants-Appellees

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J.-2-

{¶ 1} Rhododendron Holdings, LLC appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against it on its second amended complaint, which alle ged trade-secret

violations and rais ed numerous claims against the appellees. 1 {¶ 2} Rhododendron advances four assignments of error. First, it cont ends the trial court erred in entering summary judgment without first ruling o n a pending motion to compel discovery. Second, it claims the trial court erred in en tering summary judgment on two counts in the second amended complaint alleging violatio ns of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Third, it argues that the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice under Civ.R. 56 two counts alleging breach of contract. Fourth, it asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing three other counts with prejudice und er Civ.R. 56 where the appellees’ summary-judgment motion simply incorporated by refer ence arguments raised in a prior Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. {¶ 3} The present appeal stems from Rhododendron’s 74-page, 15-count second amended complaint filed on April 15, 2019. That complaint raise d legal claims against appellees Thomas Bradley Harris, Andrew Rynearson, John Diamond , The Progressive Orthopedic Company, LLC, and Modal Manufacturing Company, LLC. Despite the lengthy complaint, the detailed history set forth in the partie s’ briefs, and the existence of thousands of pages of exhibits and depositions, the essential i ssues of fact and law underlying the present appeal are relatively narrow.

1 We note that the June 4, 2020 notice of appeal in this case ac tually was filed by Rhododendron and a third-party defendant, Douglas S. Hawkins, w ho apparently is challenging the trial court’s denial of a competing summary-jud gment motion. For ease of reference, we will refer to the appellants collectively as “Rho dodendron.”-3- {¶ 4} The record reflects that a company called NovoSource developed, manufactured, and sold FDA-approved artificial knee and hip rep lacements. Appellees Harris, Diamond, and others were directors of NovoSource. Diamo nd also served as the company’s general counsel. In addition to his duties at NovoSou rce, Harris played a leading role in other companies, including Skeleton Crew Manufa cturing, LLC (“SCM”). NovoSource and SCM were parties to a distribution agreement und er which SCM purchased and resold NovoSource products. Part of that agreemen t gave SCM a conditional, non-exclusive license to manufacture and sell Novo Source products if NovoSource ceased operations. {¶ 5} In order to market its products, NovoSource required “510(k) cl earance” from the FDA. That streamlined process involved developing a product from an existing device so that the two products were “substantially equivalent” althou gh not necessarily identical. NovoSource ultimately created two knee implants and two hip imp lants through the 510(k) process and spent several million dollars developing the underl ying intellectual property known as “design-history files.” {¶ 6} When NovoSource began marketing its devices, SCM was its bigges t distributor. Harris subsequently formed The Progressive Orthope dic Company, LLC (“TPOC”) in 2013, and TPOC acquired SCM in its entirety. In add ition to his role as NovoSource’s general counsel, Diamond served as TPOC’s outside legal counsel. NovoSource continued its business relationship with the combine d TPOC/SCM. {¶ 7} Later in 2013, TPOC/SCM fell behind on payments to NovoSource, causing or contributing to financial distress for NovoSource. Diamond r esigned from his role as a NovoSource board member and as the company’s general counsel in February 2014.-4- Around that time, NovoSource’s largest secured lender, the Dayt on Regional Signature Fund, threatened to sue NovoSource and to foreclose on a $1.12 million loan to the company. Given the uncertainty surrounding NovoSource’s future, Harris also began seeking to obtain NovoSource’s design-history files for his own use. Harris made multiple requests for the files between January and June 2014. {¶ 8} NovoSource CEO Andrew Cothrel discussed giving Harris the files with NovoSource board chairman Harold Linville, who opposed the idea . While Harris was seeking the design-history files, NovoSource began exploring a sale of the company to salvage some value. In July 2014, healthcare company Cardinal H ealth agreed to buy NovoSource for $12 million. The proposed transaction needed app roval from NovoSource’s board of directors, which included Harris. It was known that Cardinal Health was not going to use TPOC/SCM as a distributor if the sale occu rred. Cothrel feared that Harris might vote to block the sale. Cothrel also knew Harris c laimed a right to the NovoSource design-history files under the terms of SCM’s earlie r distributor agreement with NovoSource. Cothrel additionally knew that Cardinal Health viewed Harris’ claimed right to the design-history file s as a potentially deal-killing issue. {¶ 9} Cothrel eventually decided to send Harris NovoSource’s design-h istory files on a flash drive. The files were sent to “Brad Harris/The Progr essive Orthopedic Company” in North Palm Beach, Florida on August 25, 2014. When he sent the files, Cothrel knew that Harris would not be using them on behalf of N ovoSource. Rather, Cothrel knew that Harris wanted the files to help him pursue a post-NovoSource life. According to Cothrel, he and Harris agreed to limitations on Ha rris’ use of the designhistory files. One such restriction was that any product Harris developed could not be-5- identical to a NovoSource product. But Cothrel did not sent Har ris or TPOC anything in writing on August 25, 2014 or later placing restrictions on the use of the design-history files. Cothrel nevertheless believed that adequate protections were in place to maintain the overall secrecy and confidentiality of the design history f iles when he gave them to

Harris. {¶ 10} After receiving the design-history files, Harris used them to p ursue TPOC’s own 510(k) submissions to the FDA. Beginning in September 2014, TPOC began applying to the FDA for 510(k) clearances based on NovoSource’s knee and hip designs. TPOC’s applications were identical to NovoSource’s earlier appl ications, and the products TPOC later manufactured after obtaining FDA approval were essen tially identical to NovoSource’s products. In January 2015, NovoSource’s board of d irectors learned that TPOC had submitted 510(k) applications based on NovoSource’s de signs. At some point, the NovoSource design-history files were transferred from TPOC to Modal Manufacturing Company, LLC, with which Harris also was associated. {¶ 11} Several months before Cothrel sent Harris the NovoSource design -history files, Rhododendron acquired the notes securing the Dayton Regi onal Signature Fund’s $1.12 million loan to NovoSource. In December 2014, Rhododendro n sued NovoSource to foreclose on the notes and received a $3 million cognovit ju dgment. Rhododendron later sought assurances that NovoSource had not allowed TPOC or any other third party to access NovoSource’s design-history files. Cothrel responded by telling NovoSource’s counsel to make no representation regarding whether TPOC had ac cess since several former employees could have shared something with Harris. At th at time, Cothrel did not

disclose to Rhododendron that he had shared the files with Harr is. In April 2015,-6- Rhododendron again expressed concern that NovoSource had allowe d TPOC to use the design-history files. Cothrel ultimately disclosed his transmis sion of the files to Rhododendron principal Doug Hawkins while out for a drink in Se ptember 2017. {¶ 12} By July 2015, NovoSource had ceased to operate and went into receivership. In the summer of 2017, the receiver sold NovoSour ce’s assets to

Rhododendron in satisfaction of t he $3 million cognovit judgmen t. Rhododendron filed its initial complaint in the above-captioned case in December 2017. Thereafter, Rhododendron filed first and second amended complaints. Portion s of the second amended complaint later were voluntarily dismissed. Rhododendro n also filed a motion to compel discovery, and the defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for partial dismissal. While the motion to compel and the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) m otion remained pending, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Rhodode ndron’s remaining

claims. {¶ 13} On May 15, 2020, the trial court sustained the defendants’ moti on for summary judgment and overruled Rhododendron’s competing motion. In support of its decision, the trial court incorporated by reference and adopted all of the defendants’ summary judgment briefing and arguments. The trial court amende d its summary judgment order nunc pro tunc on May 18, 2020 to make clear that it had entered summary judgment on all remaining counts of Rhododendron’s second amend ed complaint. The trial court’s entry of summary judgment included Civ.R. 54(B) c ertification due to the existence of one or more remaining counterclaims or third-party claims by the defendants. This timely appeal followed. {¶ 14} In its first assignment of error, Rhododendron challenges the t rial court’s-7- entry of summary judgment against it without first ruling on it s pending motion to compel discovery. {¶ 15} The record reflects that Rhododendron moved to compel the produ ction of certain documents on July 30, 2019. Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment in January 2020. The motion to compel remained pending when the trial court sustained the defendants’ summary-judgment motion on May 15, 20 20. On appeal, Rhododendron’s entire substantive argument regarding the motion to compel is as follows: “In failing to rule on Rhododendron’s Motion to Compel , the trial court denied [Rhododendron] its procedural due process rights. Rhododendron was denied the opportunity to explore a critical issue in the case and the opp ortunity to obtain perhaps dispositive discovery materials. Consequently, the trial court’ s omission constitutes reversible error.” (Appellant’s Brief at 14.) {¶ 16} We find Rhododendron’s argument to be unpersuasive. “When a tri al court enters summary judgment without expressly determining a pending motion, the motion impliedly is denied. * * * Where the pending motion is a motion to compel, the party opposing summary judgment must seek a delay of the trial court’ s ruling pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F) or otherwise include in their response to the moti on for summary judgment some allegation of prejudice as a result of the trial court’s f ailure to rule.” Polivka v. Cox , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1364, 2003-Ohio-4371, ¶ 23. {¶ 17} Here Rhododendron has not identified anywhere in the record whe re it sought a delay under Civ.R. 56(F) or otherwise alleged prejudic e as a result of the trial court’s considering the defendant’s summary-judgment motion wit hout first resolving the motion to compel. This failure by Rhododendron “precludes a fin ding of prejudice and-8- results in waiver of the issue.” Boulder Capital Group, Inc. v. Lawson , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-58, 2014-Ohio-5797, ¶ 34. The first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 18} In its second assignment of error, Rhododendron contends the tr ial court erred in entering summary judgment against it on counts three a nd four of the second amended complaint. These counts alleged violations of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61, et seq. With regard to count three, Rhododen dron challenges the entry of summary judgment on its claim against Harris for misappropri ating trade secrets. With regard to count four, Rhododendron challenges the entry of summ ary judgment on its claim against Rynearson and Diamond for misappropriating trade secrets. {¶ 19} Rhododendron advances six arguments under its second assignment of error. First, it contends the trial court engaged in impermissi ble fact-finding and failed to apply Civ.R. 56 properly. Second, it claims the trial court err ed in its application and analysis of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act concerning discl osures and secrecy measures. Third, it asserts that genuine issues of material fac t exist as to whether NovoSource voluntarily disclosed its design-history files to Ha rris and, in so doing, destroyed trade-secret protections or whether the existence of adequate secrecy measures preserved trade-secret protections. Fourth, Rhododendr on argues that the trial court erred in overruling its own competing motion for summary judgment. Fifth, it maintains that the trial court erred in its analysis and applic ation of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act because “use” is a method of misappropriation. Sixt h, it contends genuine

issues of material fact exist as to whether count four is time barred as against Diamond. {¶ 20} We begin our analysis with the language of the Ohio Uniform Tra de Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61, et seq. It defines a “trade secret” as follo ws:-9- (D) “Trade secret” means information, including the whole or a ny portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, de sign, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, meth od, technique, or improvement, or any business information or plans , financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbe rs, that satisfies both of the following: (1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential , from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainab le by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure

or use. (2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. R.C. 1333.61(D) {¶ 21} The trade-secrets act defines “misappropriation” as any of the following: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who k nows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by imp roper

means; (2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without the express or implied consent of the other person by a person who did any of the following: (a) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secr et; (b) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to kn ow that the knowledge of the trade secret that the person acquired was derived from-10- or through a person who had ut ilized improper means to acquire it, was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, or was derived from or through a person who o wed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; (c) Before a material change of their position, knew or had re ason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had be en acquired by accident or mistake. R.C. 1333.61(B). {¶ 22} The trial court disposed of Rhododendron’s complaint by enterin g summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees. We review a tria l court's ruling on a summary-judgment motion de novo. Schroeder v. Henness , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012-CA18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42. Under Civ.R. 56(C), a movant is entit led to summary judgment when the movant demonstrates “that there is no issue as to any material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and th at reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to t he nonmoving party.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. , 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 617, 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998). {¶ 23} In its first argument under the second assignment of error, Rho dodendron contends the trial court engaged in impermissible fact-finding when it adopted and incorporated by reference the entirety of the appellees’ summar y judgment filings. Rhododendron notes that summary judgment motions themselves are not “evidence.” Rhododendron argues that the trial court could not have adopted the appellees’ legal arguments as its own without also adopting the appellees’ versi on of the facts and construing those facts in favor of the appellees. To the extent that the trial court did so,-11- Rhododendron contends it violated Civ.R. 56(C). {¶ 24} Upon review, we find the foregoing argument to be unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the trial court’s act of entering summary judgm ent by adopting the appellees’ entire summary judgment filings is not particularly helpful. Bu t it also does not constitute per se reversible error. We have recognized that a trial court is not required to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law when ruling on a summary judgment motion. Huber

v. Mues , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2011-CA-75, 2012-Ohio-2540, ¶ 8-9. In Huber , we affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment where, as here, it adopted the reasoning in the appellee’s summary judgment memorandum. {¶ 25} We note too that the trial court did make limited findings to e xplain why it granted the appellees summary judgment on counts three and four of the second amended complaint. These findings were sufficient to facilitate appellate review. In particular, the trial court reasoned: Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for

violation of Ohio’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act are HEREBY DISMIS SED WITH PREJUDICE because NovoSource voluntarily disclosed its des ign history files to Harris/TPOC thereby destroying any trade secre t protection that might otherwise have existed; NovoSource’s purported effor ts to maintain secrecy of its design history files are objectively un reasonable in light of voluntarily providing those files to Harris/TPOC for t heir own use; Plaintiff’s OUTSA claim against Rynearson is unsupported by any credible evidence that Rynearson acquired or disclosed the design histor y files with any knowledge that they were acquired by improper means; Plaint iff’s-12- OUTSA claim against Diamond is unsupported by any evidence that Diamond acquired or disclosed any of NovoSource’s purported tra de secrets and, in any event, the claim is time-barred. (May 15, 2020 Order at 2.) {¶ 26} As for whether the trial court erred in adopting the appellees’ arguments, resolution of that issue depends on whether those arguments wer e predicated on undisputed material facts. Under its first argument, Rhododendr on asserts in the abstract that genuine issues of material fact exist. But it does not ide ntify any particular factual dispute that the trial court overlooked. Consequently, we will proceed to Rhododendron’s remaining arguments, which are more specific. {¶ 27} Rhododendron’s second argument challenges the trial court’s fin ding that NovoSource’s voluntary disclosure of its design-history files t o Harris/TPOC destroyed trade-secret protection that otherwise existed. Construing the evidence most strongly in its favor, Rhododendron argues that the limited, one-time discl osure occurring in this case did not destroy the trade-secret status of the design-history f iles or, at a minimum, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. For their part, the appe llees insist that NovoSource’s disclosure to Harris for his own benefit did destroy trade-secr et protection for the designhistory files as a matter of law. {¶ 28} Upon review, we find this aspect of Rhododendron’s argument to be persuasive. As a threshold matter, we agree with Rhododendron t hat a trier of fact could find that NovoSource’s design-history files at least initially qualified as a “trade secret” under R.C. 1333.61(D). The real issue raised by Rhododendron’s second argument is whether Cothrel’s act of disclosing those files to Harris destr oyed existing trade-secret-13- protection as a matter of law. The plain language of R.C. 1333. 61(B) persuades us that it did not. As set forth above, R.C. 1333.61(B) generally defines misappropriation of a trade secret to include improper a cquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade-secret of another. {¶ 29} We see no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cothrel voluntarily disclosed the design-history files to Harris, and Harris likewi se did not improperly acquire them as a matter of law. Indeed, Cothrel’s own deposition estab lished that he elected to give Harris the files to help Harris “advance his post-NovoSour ce life” and “get started charting his own destiny away from NovoSource.” (Cothrel depo. at 232, 236.) We note, however, that R.C. 1333.61(B) also defines misappropriation to include the improper

“use” of a trade secret. If Cothrel’s disclosure to Harris nece ssarily negated the files’ tradesecret status, then it would not be possible for Harris to misa ppropriate the files by improperly using them. By defining the misappropriation of a tr ade secret to include impermissible “use” by a person to whom the secret has been dis closed, the statute recognizes that the disclosure of a trade secret to a single pe rson does not necessarily destroy its trade-secret status. 2 If the rule were otherwise, the information subsequently “used” by the recipient could not be a trade secret. {¶ 30} The foregoing analysis leads directly into Rhododendron’s third argument, which lies at the heart of the parties’ dispute. Rhododendron c ontends the design-history files retained trade-secret protection because Harris was restr icted or limited in his use of

2 We might reach a different conclusion if Cothrel had made a ge neral public disclosure of the design-history files. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co ., 467 U.S. 986, 1002, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (“Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret. * * * If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect t he confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his pr operty right is extinguished.”).-14- them. Construing the evidence most strongly in its favor, Rhodo dendron claims a trier of fact reasonably might find such restrictions and limitations to be imposed by fiduciary duty, contract, and an express agreement between Cothrel and Ha rris. {¶ 31} To resolve Rhododendron’s argument, we turn first to R.C. 1333. 61(B)(2),

which identifies the circumstances under which a trade secret m ight be misappropriated through improper “use.” As relevant here, R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) defines “misappropriation” to include use of a trade secret without exp ress or implied consent by a person who, at the time of his use, knew or had reason to kno w that his knowledge of the trade secret “was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use[.]” {¶ 32} In their motion for summary judgment, which the trial court ado pted in full, the appellees claimed that Cothrel voluntarily sent Harris the design-history files “without any restriction on their use.” On appeal, Rhododendron challeng es this adopted finding by the trial court. Rhododendron argues that a duty to maintain secrecy arose through a fiduciary duty Harris owed to NovoSource based on his status as a member of its board of directors. We note, however, that Cothrel did not sent the f iles to Harris for use in his capacity as a member of NovoSource’s board. Cothrel knew that H arris would not be using the files on behalf of NovoSource. To the contrary, Cothr el admittedly sent the files because he knew Harris’ company, TPOC, was about to lose its st atus as a distributor for NovoSource, and he wanted to help Harris start a “post-NovoSour ce life.” In light of Cothrel’s decision to send the files knowing that Harris would not use them in his capacity as a NovoSource director, we see no genuine issue of material f act as to whether Harris’ fiduciary relationship with NovoSource imposed a duty of secrec y.-15- {¶ 33} Rhododendron next suggests that an obligation of secrecy arose by contract. This argument relies on a September 2013 non-disclosu re agreement (“NDA”) between NovoSource and Harris’ company, TPOC. We agree with the appellees, however, that this agreement did not govern Cothrel’s disclosur e of the design-history files. Harris was not a party to the NDA, and Rhododendron’s po sition in this case is that the files were sent to Harris personally, not to TPOC. 3 It is also questionable whether the boilerplate NDA, which purported to cover “all information,” wa s specific enough to preserve trade-secret protection for the design-history files. But most importantly, even if the NDA could apply here, it only covered information disclosed by NovoSource “in furtherance of evaluating the Business Relationship.” The NDA d efined “Business Relationship” as “a possible business relationship whereby [TPO C] invests in NovoSource’s business or engages in some similar transaction.” Cothrel’s disclosure to Harris had nothing to do with a possible business relationship, investment, or similar transaction between NovoSource and TPOC. Therefore, we see no g enuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of the NDA, which was not implicated by Cothrel’s

disclosure to Harris. {¶ 34} In our view, the only real issue is whether a trier of fact cou ld find that Harris misappropriated the design-history files by exceeding the scope of use to which he and Cothrel purportedly had agreed. As set forth above, misappropri ation under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) includes using trade-secret information withou t express or implied consent where knowledge of the trade secret “was acquired under circumstances giving

3 We note, however, that Cothrel sent the files to “Brad Harris/ The Progressive Orthopedic Company.”-16- rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use [.]” (Emphasis added.) Even if no fiduciary duty or NDA imposed secrecy restrictions, Harris stil l could be liable for tradesecret misappropriation under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) if his use of the trade secret was without Cothrel’s express or implied consent and Harris knew or had reason to know that he had acquired the information under circumstances obligating him to limit his use of the information. On this issue, the trial court erred in making an adopted finding that Cothrel gave Harris the design-history files without imposing “any rest riction on their use.” {¶ 35} In its appellate brief, Rhododendron cites evidence establishin g a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cothrel and Harris had agr eed to limitations on Harris’ use of the design-history files and whether Harris exceeded tho se limitations. In his deposition, Cothrel claimed the purpose of his disclosure was t o enable Harris to use the “template” of the design-history files “to get things in motion .” According to Cothrel, Harris was “incapable of handling design development and progression t hrough the regulatory traps of an orthopedic implant.” (Cothrel depo. at 226, 235.) T hat being so, Cothrel sent Harris the files “to communicate to [Harris] that this is what [a 510(k)] looks like, this is the package you have to put together. This is the testing you have to do. This is what a design-history file looks like.” ( Id . at 224.) {¶ 36} Cothrel explained that he never intended for Harris to use Novo Source’s design-history files to submit a “mirrored 510(k)” to the FDA f or products essentially identical to NovoSource’s. Moreover, Cothrel testified that Har ris understood and agreed that he was only permitted to pursue non-identical products that were not based on a mirrored 510(k). ( Id . at 223-224, 227.) Based on conversations with Harris leading up to Cothrel’s disclosure of the design-history files, it “never ent ered [Cothrel’s] mind” that-17- Harris subsequently would take NovoSource’s files and submit th em to the FDA as part of a mirrored 510(k) application. ( Id . at 231, 235-236.) Nevertheless, Harris did use the NovoSource files to obtain mirrored 510(k) clearances for TPOC through the FDA. ( Id . at 238-239.) Cothrel testified that Harris’ actions with regard to the FDA submission violated a “verbal agreement” the two men had when he gave Harris the fi les. ( Id . at 329.) {¶ 37} Viewed most strongly in Rhododendron’s favor, the evidence conc erning Harris’ use of NovoSource’s design-history files establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he misappropriated a trade secret under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) by knowingly using the files without Cothrel’s consent in a way th at violated a duty to limit his use of the files. A trier of fact reasonably might find the existence of such a duty based on Cothrel’s testimony about an oral agreement between Cothrel and Harris limiting Harris’ use of the files. The credibility of Cothrel’s testimon y on that issue is a matter for the trier of fact to resolve. Therefore, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on counts three and four insofar as genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Harris’s exceeding the permissible scope of his use of the design-histor y files on behalf of TPOC. {¶ 38} In its fourth argument, Rhododendron contends the trial court e rred in overruling its own summary judgment motion. In the course of it s argument, Rhododendron suggests that the trial court improperly resolved genuine issues of material fact. At the same time, however, Rhododendron claims i t was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the record demonstrates con clusively that there was no waiver of trade-secret protection when Cothrel disclosed Nov oSource’s design-history

files to Harris. {¶ 39} We find Rhododendron’s fourth argument to be unpersuasive for at least-18- two reasons. First, as explained more fully in our resolution o f Rhododendron’s third argument, the record persuades us that genuine issues of materi al fact exist as to whether Harris misappropriated a NovoSource trade secret through his us e of the design-history files. Those genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment for Rhododendron or the appellees. Second, we note that a trial cou rt’s denial of summary judgment generally is not appealable. Hubbell v. Xenia , 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9. For these reasons, we reject Rhodode ndron’s fourth argument. {¶ 40} In its fifth argument, Rhododendron contends the trial court er red in entering summary judgment in favor of appellees Andrew Rynearson and Jac k Diamond on count four of the second amended complaint. In particular, Rhododendr on argues the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rynearson and Diamond misappropriated NovoSource’s design-history files through their improper “use” of the

files. {¶ 41} With regard to Rynearson, the second amended complaint named hi m as a defendant only “in his capacity as Director of Engineering for The Progressive Orthopedic Company, LLC and Modal Manufacturing Company, LLC.” (April 15, 2019 Second Amended Complaint at caption.) Count four alleged that Rynearso n was a senior product development engineer at a company identified as “IDMS” when he signed engineering and testing reports submitted to the FDA in connection with Har ris’ mirrored 510(k) submission. Count four also alleged that Rynearson knew or shou ld have known that the NovoSource IP included in TPOC’s 510(k) submissions, which incl uded his prior work for NovoSource, was acquired by improper means. Count four further alleged that Rynearson-19- and others knew or should have known “that NovoSource did not g ive express or implied consent for such use,” and that Rynearson and others “used and disclosed the NovoSource IP through TPOC’s 510(k) submissions to the FDA.” As a result, count four alleged that Rynearson was liable for trade-secret misappropria tion. {¶ 42} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s entry of summ ary judgment in favor of Rynearson. Because he was sued in his corporate cap acity as director of engineering for TPOC and a related company, Modal, the sole bas is for imputing liability to him was by way of his employment with one of those companies . In the proceedings below, however, Rynearson averred that he never had been employ ed by Modal and that he was not employed by TPOC until January 2015. Thus, according to Rynearson’s affidavit, he was not an employee of TPOC when Cothrel gave Har ris NovoSource’s design-history files in August 2014 or when those files were su bmitted to the FDA (i.e., “used” by Harris/TPOC) later that year. {¶ 43} Based on evidence of Rynearson’s use of both personal and work e-mail

accounts around the time of his employment , Rhododendr on su gges ts on appeal that he may have worked for TPOC prior to January 2015. (Appellant’s Br ief at 28-30.) Having reviewed Rynearson’s entire deposition, including his discussio n of his personal and work email use, we fail to see how it supports a reasonable inferenc e that he was employed by TPOC prior to January 2015. ( See , e.g ., Rynearson December 6, 2019 depo. at 14- 15, 178, 190-193.) Rhododendron also asserts that Rynearson fai led to comply with a discovery request to search his personal email for additional r elevant evidence. Assuming that this is true, it does not support a reasonable inference t hat such a search would have-20- established Rynearson’s employment by TPOC prior to January 201 5. 4 Even construing the evidence in Rhododendron’s favor, we see no genuine issue o f material fact regarding when Rynearson began his employment with TPOC. {¶ 44} In any event, regardless of Rynearson’s employment date, we see no basis for a claim against him on the theory that he knew or should ha ve known NovoSource’s design-history files had been acquired by improper means, as al leged in count four. As set forth above, Harris did not acquire the design-history file s by improper means. Cothrel voluntarily gave Harris the files. The only real question is wh ether Harris exceeded the scope of his permissible use of the files in contravention of a purported oral agreement he had with Cothrel. Although we have found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harrris misappropriated the design-history files by usi ng them improperly, we see no evidence that Rynearson knew or should have known of any use restrictions imposed by an oral agreement between Cothrel and Harris. {¶ 45} In his deposition, Rynearson testified Harris already had filed 510(k) applications with the FDA long before Rynearson began his emplo yment with TPOC. After Rynearson started working at TPOC, Harris repeatedly told him t he company was contractually entitled to use NovoSource’s design-history files for the 510(k)s once NovoSource ceased being able to supply TPOC with inventory. (Ry nearson December 6, 2019 depo. at 84-89, 170-172, 221, 246.) Rynearson did not ques tion that explanation, which was outside the scope of his engineering work. ( Id . at 173.) {¶ 46} On appeal, Rhododendron claims a genuine issue of material fact exists

4 And if Rhododendron thought additional discovery responses wer e necessary for it to oppose summary judgment, it could have sought to delay the tria l court’s ruling pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F).-21- regarding Rynearson’s professed lack of knowledge of any improp er use of the designhistory files by Harris. In support, Rhododendron first cites d eposition testimony from Thomas Smith, who did consulting work for TPOC. On the cited pa ges, Smith explained that Rynearson told him NovoSource and TPOC “did not depart ami cably.” (Smith depo. at 108.) Smith also discussed what Rynearson told “multiple” FD A reviewers who later questioned NovoSource’s design-history files being part of the TPOC 510(k) submissions from Harris. According to Smith, Rynearson told the FDA represe ntatives: “NovoSource was or is going out of business. Could not supply the product t o [TPOC]. Part of a contract that TPOC has with NovoSource stipulating * * * that they would be able to—they would supply the product. And if this product could not be supplied, they had legal capability to submit 510(k)s.” ( Id . at 113.) In short, Smith recalled Rynearson representing to t he FDA that TPOC possessed the NovoSource design-history files because of a contract “situation.” ( Id .) {¶ 47} Smith’s recollection is consistent with what Rynearson stated i n his own deposition. ( See , e.g. , Rynearson December 13, 2019 depo. at 13-14.) Rhododendron claims the fact that multiple FDA reviewers asked questions abo ut the presence of NovoSource materials in the applications should have caused Ryn earson to know that the design-history files had been acquired through improper mea ns. In our view, this is not a reasonable inference for at least three reasons. First, t he design-history files were not “acquired” through improper means. Second, Rynearson’s resp onse to the questions apparently satisfied the FDA. Third, we see nothing in the FDA’ s general inquiries that should have made Rynearson aware of Harris exceeding the scope of an oral agreement Harris purportedly had with Cothrel. Even construing the eviden ce in a light most-22- favorable to Rhododendron, it simply is not reasonable to infer from the FDA’s inquiries that Rynearson should have known about the alleged Cothrel-Harr is oral agreement. {¶ 48} Rhododendron also suggests that Rynearson’s responses to the FD A’s inquires “changed” over time. But the record does not support a finding that his responses changed in a meaningful way. Rhododendron cites one reference t o a breach of contract by NovoSource and another reference to NovoSource being insolve nt. Of course, insolvency by NovoSource is a logical reason for its inability to supply TPOC with inventory in breach of a contract between the companies. In fac t, that is precisely what was discussed during Rynearson’s deposition. He was asked about an explanation to the FDA involving “NovoSource filing for insolvency and thus having an inability to fulfil its obligation.” (Rynearson December 6, 2019 depo. at 245.) Based o n our review of the record, we see no error in the trial court’s entry of summary j udgment in favor of Rynearson. {¶ 49} Under its fifth argument, Rhododendron challenges the trial cou rt’s entry of summary judgment for Jack Diamond. As with its argument regardi ng Rynearson, Rhododendron claims a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Diamond “used” NovoSource’s design-history files while having reason to know that Harris had misappropriated them. (Appellant’s Brief at 31.) Rhododendron a rgues at length that

Diamond made substantial investments in TPOC and Modal Manufact uring, a company affiliated with Harris and TPOC, and eventually obtained the 51 0(k) clearances from TPOC. Rhododendron also asserts that Diamond, an attorney, advi sed Harris and TPOC in the dispute with NovoSource and positioned TPOC’s interests against NovoSource both before and after resigning as NovoSource’s general counsel

.-23- {¶ 50} Once again, however, we see no evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Diamond misappropriated NovoSource’s design-hist ory files through improper use. Assuming, purely arguendo, that any of Diamond’s various actions could be found to constitute “use” of the files, we see no evidence e stablishing a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Diamond knew or should have know n that Harris’ own use of the files exceeded the scope of an oral agreement with Cothr el. That being so, we fail to see how Diamond himself can be liable for misappropriation t hrough “use” by assisting Harris. Consequently, the trial court did not err in entering s ummary judgment in favor of

Diamond. {¶ 51} In the sixth argument under its second assignment of error, Rho dodendron contends genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether th e trade-secret misappropriation claim against Diamond was barred by the applic able statute of limitation. This argument is moot in light of our determination that the tr ial court properly entered summary judgment for Diamond on the merits of that claim. {¶ 52} Based on the reasoning set forth above, Rhododendron’s second assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. The assignment of error is sustained insofar as we have found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris misappropriated a trade secret under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) by k nowingly using NovoSource’s design-history files without Cothrel’s consent in a way that violated a duty to limit his use of the files. The genuine issue of material fa ct involves Cothrel’s testimony about the existence of an oral agreement with Harris limiting t he permissible scope of Harris’ use of the files and Harris’ violation of that agreemen t. In all other respects, the second assignment of error is overruled.-24- {¶ 53} In its third assignment of error, Rhododendron contends the tri al court erred in dismissing with prejudice under Civ.R. 56 two breach-of-cont ract claims asserted in counts nine and ten of the second amended complaint. {¶ 54} Rhododendron notes that the trial court dismissed the claims fo r lack of standing based on arguments raised by the appellees in a prior Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Rhododendron argues that, in so doing, the trial court improperly converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Rhododend ron also argues that a motion for summary judgment is not a proper mechanism for ass erting lack of standing. It further argues that a dismissal for lack of standing should have been without prejudice rather than with prejudice. Finally, Rhododendron contends a ge nuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it had standing to sue for breach of contract. {¶ 55} Upon review, we find Rhododendron’s arguments to be unpersuasiv e. In count nine of the second amended complaint, Rhododendron assert ed a breach of contract claim against SCM and TPOC. Rhododendron brought the c laim as assignee and successor in interest to the rights of NovoSource. Count ni ne alleged that SCM/TPOC had breached the terms of a contractual “Forbearance Agreement” with NovoSource by failing to make certain required monthly payments. Count ten of the second amended complaint asserted a breach of contract claim against Harris an d TPOC. Rhododendron again brought the claim as assignee and successor in interest t o the rights of NovoSource. Count ten alleged that Harris and TPOC had breached a contractual nondisclosure agreement with NovoSource by disclosing trade secret s. {¶ 56} On May 10, 2019, the appellees moved to dismiss counts nine and ten pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on the basis that Rhododendron lack ed standing to enforce-25- the contracts or sue for breach. The appellees noted that Rhodo dendron was not a party to any of the contracts. They then argued that the contracts we re not among the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. To the contrary, the appellees argued that the contracts explicitly were excluded from the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. {¶ 57} The May 10, 2019 motion to dismiss remained pending when the ap pellees moved for summary judgment on January 21, 2020. The appellees s pecifically sought summary judgment on counts nine and ten, once again arguing tha t Rhododendron lacked standing to enforce the contracts because (1) Rhododendr on was not a party to the contracts and (2) Rhododendron’s acquisition of NovoSource’ s assets explicitly excluded any and all contracts to which NovoSource was a party. {¶ 58} On May 15, 2020, the trial court filed an order entering summar y judgment in favor of the appellees. In so doing, the trial court specifi cally adopted and incorporated by reference “the authority, analysis, and evidentiary material s” contained in the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, which included the argu ment that Rhododendron lacked standing to enforce the contracts at issue. {¶ 59} In light of the foregoing, we reject Rhododendron’s argument th at the trial court improperly converted the appellees’ motion to dismiss int o a motion for summary judgment. The appellees separately filed a motion to dismiss an d a motion for summary judgment. Both motions raised the issue of Rhododendron’s lack of standing to enforce the contracts. In its May 15, 2020 order, the trial court made clear that it was resolving the standing issue by ruling on the appellees’ summary-judgment motion. Contrary to Rhododendron’s assertion on appeal, we see no reason why a lack of contractual-26- standing cannot be raised and resolved through Civ.R. 56 where no genuine issue of

material fact exists. See , e.g ., Asia-Pacific Futures Research Symposium Planning

Committee v. Kent State Univ ., 2016-Ohio-2691, 63 N.E.3d 780, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.) (affirming the entry of summary judgment on the basis that the appellant lacked standing to sue on a contract). {¶ 60} We also reject Rhododendron’s argument that the trial court’s d ismissal for lack of contractual standing should have been without prejudice . Rhododendron’s argument is premised on the notion that a dismissal for lack of standing under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is not a “merits” determination and, therefore, should be without prejudice to refiling. (Appellant’s brief at 39.) Once again, however, the t rial court did not dismiss counts nine and ten under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). It entered summary j udgment against

Rhododendron on those counts. {¶ 61} Rhododedron cites A-1 Nursing Care of Cleveland, Inc. v. Florence Nightingale Nursing, Inc ., 97 Ohio App. 3d 623, 647 N.E.2d 222 (8th Dist.1994) for the proposition that a Civ.R. 12(B) motion to dismiss is the only p ermissible way to resolve a “standing” issue. In that case, the Eighth District found a Civ .R. 12 motion necessary because the “standing” issue involved a jurisdictional question rather than a “merits”

determination. Id . at 626-627. {¶ 62} In the present case, however, we are unpersuaded that whether Rhododendron could sue for breach of contract involved a jurisd ictional question. Unlike jurisdictional standing, contractual standing “ ‘is assessed in conjunction with the merits of the claim, not as a threshold issue.’ ” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. for Registered Holders of GE Commercial Mtge. Corp., Commercial Mtge. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006--27- C1 v. Courthouse Crossing Acquisitions, LLC , 2017-Ohio-9231, 101 N.E.3d 1243, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.). “Although lawyers and courts occasionally state inf ormally that an entity has no ‘standing’ to enforce a contract if that entity is not a par ty to the contract or a thirdparty beneficiary to it, such a n entity’s inability to sue goes to the merits and does not deprive courts of jurisdiction.” Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ciraco , 225 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex.App.2007); see also Cotton v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London , 831 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir.2016) (recognizing that contractual stan ding involves issues of contract interpretation and goes to the merits of a claim). To the extent that the Eighth

District’s decision in A-1 Nursing Care may be read as reaching a contrary conclusion, we find it unpersuasive. {¶ 63} Finally, Rhododendron contends a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it could sue for breach of contract. We disagree. Rh ododendron purchased

most of NovoSource’s assets in 2017. The transaction resulted i n the creation of a Fiduciary Bill of Sale dated August 23, 2017. (Exhibit 1 to Rho dodendron’s Second Amended Complaint.) That document specifically identified which NovoSource assets Rhododendron was purchasing. “Acquired Assets” included, among other things, “all pending legal claims of the Company (whether pending or otherwi se), claims, refunds, causes of action, choses in action and rights of recovery with respect to the ‘Business, Acquired Assets and Assumed Liabilities.’ ” ( Id .) The Fiduciary Bill of Sale expressly stated, however, that “Acquired Assets” “shall not include any Excluded Assets.” The Bill of Sale then specified that among the Excluded Assets were “ each and every Contract to which the Company is a party or by which it is, or the Business of the Company or any of the Acquired Assets are, bound.” (Emphasis added.) ( Id .)-28- {¶ 64} In short, the assets Rhododendron acquired from NovoSource did not include “Excluded Assets,” and the Excluded Assets encompassed “each and every Contract to which [NovoSource] is a party.” In the present case , Rhododendron is suing for the breach of contracts with SCM, TPOC, and Harris to which NovoSource was a party. Based on the clear, unambiguous language of the Fiduciar y Bill of Sale, those contracts were Excluded Assets and not purchased by Rhododendro n. We note too that Rhododendron did not acquire all of NovoSource’s legal claims. It only acquired claims “with respect to” NovoSource’s “Business, Acquired Assets, and Assumed Liabilities.” Because Acquired Assets did not include Excluded Assets, and Ex cluded Assets encompassed “each and every Contract to which [NovoSource] is a party,” we see no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhododendron could sue for breach of the

contracts at issue. {¶ 65} In opposition to our conclusion, Rhododendron cites an affidavi t from NovoSource receiver Myron Terlecky attached to its own competin g summary judgment motion. Thereon, Terlecky avers: “When executing the Fiduciary Bill of Sale and Intellectual Property Assignment as Receiver for NovoSource, In c., it was understood and intended that Rhododendron Holdings, LLC was assigned all legal claims and rights of recovery that belonged to NovoSource, Inc., including claims fo r breach of contract.” (Terlecky affidavit at paragraph 20, filed on January 21, 2020. ) But regardless of Terlecky’s intent and belief, Rhododendron could not have been assigned NovoSource’s legal claims for breach of contract because all contracts to wh ich NovoSource was a party

were explicitly excluded from the transaction. Terlecky’s averment fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as it is contrary to the languag e of the Fiduciary Bill of Sale-29- itself. Where a document is clear and unambiguous, parol eviden ce may not be used to

contradict its terms. Rhodes v. Rhodes Indus., Inc ., 71 Ohio App.3d 797, 804, 595 N.E.2d 441 (8th Dist.1991). As a matter of law, Rhododendron had no ri ght to enforce the contracts or sue for breach. Therefore, the trial court properl y entered summary judgment against Rhododendron on counts nine and ten. The third assignme nt of error is overruled. {¶ 66} In its fourth assignment of error, Rhododendron contends the tr ial court erred in dismissing with prejudice counts one, two, and fourtee n of the second amended complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 56. {¶ 67} Rhododendron argues that the appellees did not seek summary jud gment on counts one, two, and fourteen. Instead, Rhododendron asserts that the appellees moved for dismissal of those counts under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and t hat the trial court later improperly converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for su mmary judgment. This argument lacks merit. The appellees’ summary-judgment motion sp ecifically referenced counts one, two, and fourteen and sought judgment in those coun ts under Civ.R. 56. (January 21, 2020 Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 13-14, 39.) In its May 15, 2020 order disposing of Rhododendron’s claims, the tria l court noted that the case was before it on the competing summary judgment motions, w hich included the appellees’ arguments about counts one, two, and fourteen. {¶ 68} Rhododendron’s real complaint appears to be that the appellees’ summaryjudgment motion partially incorporated by reference arguments m ade in their earlier motion to dismiss counts one, two, and fourteen. But the act of incorporating by reference arguments made in a prior motion to dismiss did not “convert” t he motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. We note too that Rhododendron engaged in the same-30- practice when its competing summary judgment motion incorporate d by reference arguments raised in Rhododendron’s memorandum in opposition to the appellees’ motion to dismiss. For example, at page 10 of its own January 21, 2020 motion for summary judgment, Rhododendron asserted: “The right of Rhododendron Hol dings, LLC to enforce and sue upon the contracts at issue in this case is identified in Plaintiff’s May 23, 2019 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ May 10, 2019 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint[.] * * * Those arguments are specifica lly incorporated by reference herein by Plaintiff and will not be reproduced in the interests of judicial efficiency.” In any event, nothing prohibited either party from incorporating arguments by reference and doing so did not convert a prior motion to dismis s into a motion for summary judgment. The fourth assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 69} Having sustained a portion of Rhododendron’s second assignment of error, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Montg omery County Common Pleas Court and remand the case for further proceedings consist ent with this opinion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur.

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James H. Greer Matthew M. Suellentrop Daniel J. Rudary Hon. Steven K. Dankof