THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Kevin M. Stoffell, Appellant, 

v. 

Christy M. Stoffell, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2013-001189 

Appeal from Richland County 

The Honorable W. Thomas Sprott, Jr., 

Family Court Judge 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2014-MO-028 

Heard June 10, 2014 – Filed July 9, 2014 

AFFIRMED 

Reynolds H. Blankenship, Jr., and H. Clayton Walker, 

Jr., both of Walker & Reibold, LLC, of Columbia, for 

Appellant. 

Charles D. Lee, III, of McLaren & Lee, of Columbia, for 

Respondent. 

 PER CURIAM: The appellant challenges a family court order finding him 

in contempt for failing to pay respondent a specified portion of his entire military 
retirement benefit and for deducting his disability pay from his retirement benefit. 

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. Interpreting the Agreement: Lee v. Univ. of S.C., 407 S.C. 512, —, 757 

S.E.2d 394, 397 (2014) ("If [a contract's] language is plain, unambiguous, 

and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is 

required . . . ."); Steffenson v. Olsen, 360 S.C. 318, 321–22, 600 S.E.2d 129, 

131 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding when presented with contractual language 

equivalent to that here: "The provision in question clearly requires Husband 

to pay Wife 15 percent of his entire retirement benefits he receives upon 

retirement. . . . Had the parties intended to limit the award to those benefits 

accrued during the marriage, they could have so provided, and it is not for 

the trial court or this court to change the terms the parties agreed upon."). 

2. Jurisdiction: Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 353, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 

(1983) ("In all [divorce] decrees . . . [the parties] may agree to any terms 

they wish as long as the court deems the contract to have been entered fairly, 

voluntarily, and reasonably."). 

3. Disability Pay: Lee, 407 S.C. at —, 757 S.E.2d at 397 ("If [a contract's] 

language is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable 

interpretation, no construction is required . . . ."). 

4. Contempt: Brandt v. Gooding, 368 S.C. 618, 627, 630 S.E.2d 259, 263 

(2006) (holding that a trial court's finding of contempt "should be reversed 

only if it is without evidentiary support or the trial judge has abused his 

discretion"); Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 

82–83, 370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988) (holding an act is willful for purposes of 

contempt if "'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do 

something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something 

the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey 

or disregard the law" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979))); 

Moseley, 279 S.C. at 351, 306 S.E.2d at 626 ("Contempt results from the 

willful disobedience of a court's order."). 

5. Conditions Imposed by the Family Court: Cannon v. Cannon, 275 S.C. 424, 

425, 272 S.E.2d 179, 179–80 (1980) ("That a court has the power to enforce 

its orders through a contempt citation cannot be disputed."). 
6. Attorney's Fees: Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 533, 599 S.E.2d 114, 123 

(2004) ("An award of attorney's fees rests within the sound discretion of the 

trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of 

discretion."); E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476–77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 

(1992) ("In determining whether an attorney's fee should be awarded, the 

following factors should be considered: (1) the party's ability to pay his/her 

own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the 

parties' respective financial conditions; (4) effect of the attorney's fee on 

each party's standard of living."). 

AFFIRMED. 

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 

concur.