Opinion filed March 7, 2024 

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00354-CR 

__________

JOE STARKS, JR., Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2-462-21

O P I N I O N

The legislature recently codified the offense of mail theft into Section 31.20 

of the Penal Code, which addresses the rising rates of “porch piracy,”1 the scourge 

1

See Porch Pirate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?q=p

orchpirate (last visited March 6, 2024) (“A person who steals parcels that have been delivered and left 

unattended outside the intended recipient’s home, business, etc.”); see also Drew McKay, The Porch Pirate 

Problem, 59 HOUSTON L. REV. 455 (2021) (discussing the enactment of Section 31.20). 
2

of e-commerce vendors and patrons everywhere.

2

 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 31.20 (West Supp. 2023). Appellant, Joe Starks, Jr.,3 was charged by information 

for the offense of mail theft by appropriating “mail” from fewer than ten addresses, 

a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 31.20(c)(1). Appellant waived his right to a jury trial 

and pleaded not guilty to the charged offense. After a bench trial, the trial court 

convicted Appellant of the offense and sentenced him to confinement for 365 days

in the Taylor County Detention Center. 

In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to establish that 

he stole another person’s mail or packages as delivered by a common carrier or

delivery service. He contends that the language and intent of Section 31.20 does not 

criminalize the theft of mail or other packages that are delivered by the United States 

Postal Service (USPS), which he alleges is not a common carrier or delivery service

under the statute. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

Ricky Holguin, a USPS mail carrier, delivered a package and two envelopes 

to the home of Latisha Martinez. In doing so, Holguin placed these items on the step

of Martinez’s residence and rang the doorbell. Shortly thereafter, Holguin observed 

Appellant take those same envelopes and the package from the front porch of 

Martinez’s residence and take them into his residence. Holguin could see Appellant 

through the glass screen door of Appellant’s residence, and he saw Appellant begin 

opening the items. Holguin then called 9-1-1.

2

Section 31.20 became effective on September 1, 2019.

3

In a separate appeal, we recently affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the seconddegree felony offense of possession of methamphetamine. See Starks v. State, No. 11-22-00236-CR, 2024 

WL 479370 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 8, 2024, no pet. h.).
3

Officer Jay Shafer Young of the Abilene Police Department was dispatched

to Appellant’s residence to investigate this incident. When she arrived, the front 

door to Appellant’s residence was open and Officer Young was able to see the stolen 

packages inside Appellant’s residence through the glass screen door. Martinez

testified that she did not give Appellant permission to take her delivered envelopes 

and packages, and she authenticated security footage that showed Appellant taking 

them from her front porch. 

Appellant testified and denied that he committed the offense, that he was the 

person shown on the security footage, and that he was the person who was arrested 

for this offense. In that regard, Appellant further testified that he did not remember 

the day that the theft was alleged to have occurred and that neither the security 

footage nor the testimony presented at trial refreshed his recollection.

II. Standards of Review

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard 

of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all 

of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 

756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that 

we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted 

evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the 
4

factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole 

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be 

afforded. Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts 

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garia, 667 S.W.3d at 

762; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility 

of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v.

State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports 

conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor 

of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 

667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial 

evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the evidence directly 

prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct 

evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to 

establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require that 

every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper, 214

S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances 

is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency 

of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v.
5

State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d

446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 

When, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of a 

statute, we review the statutory-construction question de novo. Delarosa v. State, 

677 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When we construe a statute, we must 

“seek to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted 

the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We 

first examine the literal text of the statute. McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 871 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “[W]e read words and phrases in 

context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Harris v. 

State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Lopez v. State, 253 

S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). “We must ‘presume that every word in 

a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence 

should be given effect if reasonably possible.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hardy, 963 

S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Only if the statutory language is 

ambiguous, or leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly 

intended, may we consult extra-textual sources.” Id. (citing Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 

785). Further, “[i]f the language of the statute is plain, we follow that language 

unless it leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.” 

Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A statute is ambiguous 

in those situations where reasonable, well-informed persons might understand the 

statute to have two or more different meanings. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 

598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

III. Analysis

Appellant contends that (1) Section 31.20 only criminalizes the theft of mail 

and other items that are delivered by a common carrier or delivery service, and 
6

(2) the USPS is not a common carrier or delivery service within the meaning of the 

statute. He asserts, therefore, that the theft of “mail” as defined in the statute 

excludes any theft of “mail” that the USPS delivers.

The State responds that the USPS is a delivery service. It also points out that, 

under federal law, a mailbox may only contain United States mail on which postage 

has been paid. As such, because the statute criminalizes theft of mail “from another 

person’s mailbox,” it necessarily criminalizes the theft of United States mail. See

18 U.S.C.A. § 1725.

Under Section 31.20, “[a] person commits an offense if the person 

intentionally appropriates mail from another person’s mailbox or premises without 

the effective consent of the addressee and with the intent to deprive that addressee 

of the mail.” PENAL § 31.20(b) (emphasis added). “Mail” is defined as “a letter, 

postal card, package, bag, or other sealed article that: (A) is delivered by a common 

carrier or delivery service and not yet received by the addressee; or (B) has been left 

to be collected for delivery by a common carrier or delivery service.” Id.

§ 31.20(a)(3) (emphasis added). Here, the information charged Appellant with 

intentionally appropriating packages and envelope bags from Martinez’s premises

without her consent.

A. The Meaning of Section 31.20

We first construe the statute based on the plain meaning of the words used. 

Section 31.20 does not define the term “delivery service.” Therefore, we must “turn 

to the common, ordinary meaning of that [term].” Hines v. State, 535 S.W.3d 102, 

110 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 

140, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (consulting dictionary definitions for the term 

“conceal” in the absence of a statutory definition)).
7

Merriam-Webster defines “delivery” as “the act or manner of delivering

something.” Delivery, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 

2003). It defines “deliver” as “to take and hand over to or leave for another.” 

Deliver, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). The term

“service” is defined in many ways—“the work performed by one that serves,” 

“useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity,” such as professional 

services, or “a facility suppling some public demand.” Service, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). This last example best

describes the United States Postal Service—the “facility supplying some public 

demand.” The term “service” is also included in its title. Moreover, the public 

demand being supplied by the USPS is the delivery of mail and other items. See 39 

U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(1) (Providing that the USPS is empowered to “provide for the 

collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of 

mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.”). 

We also note that restrictions exist for the use of mailboxes. Section 31.20(b) 

makes it an offense for a person to appropriate “mail” from another person’s 

mailbox. Additionally, federal law provides that only mailable matter—United 

States mail—may be placed in a mailbox:

Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits any mailable matter such as 

statements of accounts, circulars, sale bills, or other like matter, on 

which no postage has been paid, in any letter box established, approved, 

or accepted by the Postal Service for the receipt or delivery of mail 

matter on any mail route with intent to avoid payment of lawful postage 

thereon, shall for each such offense be fined under this title.

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1725. The USPS Domestic Mail Manual, which is posted on its

website, provides further guidance that reaffirms the exclusivity of 

mailboxes and United States mail: “[E]very letterbox or other receptacle 

intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail . . . is designated an 
8 

authorized depository for mail within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. . . . 1725,” and 

“the receptacles . . . may be used only for matter bearing postage.” UNITED 

STATES POSTAL SERV., MAILING STANDARDS, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL 508.3.1.1, 

508.3.1.3 (2024), https://pe.usps.com/cpim/ftp/manuals/dmm300/full/mailingStand

ards.pdf (last visited March 6, 2024). 

 Considering the foregoing principles and our construction of the text and 

intent of Section 31.20, we conclude that (1) the USPS is a “delivery service” under 

Section 31.20, (2) the term “mail” as it is defined and used in Section 31.20 

encompasses mail and other items that are delivered to an addressee by the USPS, 

and (3) Section 31.20 criminalizes the intentional appropriation of mail and other 

items delivered by the USPS and which are confiscated by a person from another

person’s premises or mailbox—mailboxes that contain letters, cards, packages, 

bags, or other sealed articles that bear postage, that is, United States mail.

Appellant attempts to focus on the definition of “common carrier” as it is used 

in the statute, and its distinction from the USPS. But Appellant does not explain 

why the USPS is not a delivery service; he simply asserts that it is not. Irrespective 

of this argument, Appellant misinterprets the intent of Section 31.20. As we have 

explained, nothing in the text of Section 31.20 reasonably excludes the USPS from 

its scope—it is undoubtedly a delivery service within the common, ordinary meaning 

of that phrase.

We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. Because Section 31.20 

criminalizes the theft of United States mail as it is defined in Section 31.20 and 

because Appellant does not dispute on appeal that he stole United States mail in this 
9

instance from Martinez’s premises, we conclude that the record contains sufficient 

evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant committed mail theft under Section 31.20 as 

charged in the information. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

March 7, 2024

Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.