alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Douglas HOPPER, MD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INC., a New York State not-for-profit corporation and Does, 1 through 100 inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55573

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed December 26, 2017

Margarita Salazar, Kory Sorrell, Attorneys, Law Offices of Margarita Salazar, APLC, Chula Vista, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Stephen L. Backus, David D. Ernst, Attorney, Backus & Ernst LLP, Los Ange-les, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS,* Chief District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Raner C. Collins, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Douglas Hopper appeals the dismissal of his false advertising claim against the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) on the basis of arbitral immunity.1 We review a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. *New Mexico State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP,*641 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.2

Arbitral immunity extends to claims that arise out of a decisional act and exists to “protect the decision-maker from undue influence and protect the decision-making process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants.”3*Sacks v. Dietrich,*663 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). But Hopper’s false advertising claim is predicated on AAA’s descriptions of its arbitrators disseminated through its website and direct mail. Commercial advertisement, designed to sway individuals to choose AAA over its competitors — as Hopper alleges occurred here — is distinct and distant from the decisional act of an arbitrator. Therefore, adjudication of claims, like false advertising, that arise before a formal arbitration relationship between parties to arbitration, arbitrators, and arbitration companies like AAA will not lead to “undue influence” over the arbitration process, nor will it expose arbitrators’ decisions to “reprisals by dissatisfied litigants.” *Id.*

REVERSED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. At oral argument, Hopper stated that he was appealing only the dismissal of his false advertising cause of action.'

2

. On remand, the district court may limit Hopper’s recovery to restitution to preclude intrusion into the arbitrators’ decisional acts, which are protected by arbitral immunity.

3

. Hopper does not dispute that arbitral immunity applies to entities, such as AAA, that facilitate arbitration.
418 P.2d 416

#### In the Matter of ANONYMOUS, alleged neglected dependent minor children. Martin S. ROGERS, Appellant, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA and Alice N. Truman, a Judge thereof, Appellees.

2 CA-CIV 271.

Court of Appeals of Arizona.

Sept. 27, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 27, 1966.

*171John William Johnson, Tucson, for appellant.

Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Philip' W. Marquardt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Martin S. Rogers is prosecuting this appeal from an order of the superior court, Pima County, Arizona, finding him in contempt of court and ordering that he pay the sum of $100 to the superior court clerk to purge himself of said contempt or a bench warrant would issue for his arrest for failure to so do. Appellant thereupon filed his notice of appeal the same day.

We have often reiterated the principle that an appellate court has a duty, sua sponte, to inquire into its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, notwithstanding the absence of a challenge to such jurisdiction. Ginn v. Superior Court In and For County of Pima, 1 Ariz.App. 455, 457, 404 P.2d 721 (1965) ; Christian v. Cotten, 1 Ariz.App. 421, 423, 403 P.2d 825 (1965); Searles v. Haldiman, 3 Ariz.App. 294, 413 P.2d 860 (1966).

Preliminarily, we must point out that the “order” from which this appeal is taken was a minute entry order bearing no signature of .a judge. Such order does not comport with the requirements of Rule 58 (a), as amended, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., and is therefore lacking in effectiveness for purposes of appeal. Haechler v. Andrews, 2 Ariz.App. 395, 397, 409 P.2d 315 (1965) ; State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 112, 392 P.2d 775 (1964).

Apart from this lack of the prerequisite of “form,” the subject contempt order is not an appealable order. The lower court based its adjudication of contempt, after affording appellant a full opportunity to be heard, on appellant’s failure to appear as counsel at a scheduled court hearing. Such act has recently been classified by the Supreme Court of Arizona as a criminal contempt within the purview of A.R.S. § 12-864, as distinguished from the criminal contempt referred to in A.R.S. §§ 12-861 through 12-863. Ong Hing v. Thurston, 101 Ariz. 92, 416 P.2d 416, 422 (1966). There being no constitutional or statutory authority conferring such right, appellant has no right of appeal. Herzog v. Reinhardt, 2 Ariz.App. 103, 104, 406 P.2d 738 (1965) ; See also Van Dyke v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz. 508, 543, 211 P. 576 (1922) ; In re Wright, 36 Ariz. 8, 13, 281 P. 944 (1929) ; A.R.S. § 12-2101.

Since an appeal does not lie from this contempt order, this court is without jurisdiction to proceed and the appeal is hereby dismissed.
**
**Exhibit 31.2**

**Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to**

**Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Kenneth S. Parks, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-K/A of Mylan N.V.; and

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omitto state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. 

 

/s/ Kenneth S. Parks

Kenneth S. Parks

Chief Financial Officer
*(Principal Financial Officer)*
Date: April 30, 2019
**
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLAR
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         502,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,367,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 2,966,000
<INVENTORY>                                  3,764,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            16,650,000
<PP&E>                                       3,663,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,642,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              23,051,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,468,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    11,805,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,927,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                23,051,000
<SALES>                                     12,511,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,511,000
<CGS>                                        4,531,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,531,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            12,648,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                14,423
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (198,000)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,866,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (1,752,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,668,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,114,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .51
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .51
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                                  1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                       DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                            JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                                       26,834
<SECURITIES>                                                  6,836
<RECEIVABLES>                                                 4,949
<ALLOWANCES>                                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                             39,138
<PP&E>                                                        2,125
<DEPRECIATION>                                                    0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                               41,829
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                         3,774
<BONDS>                                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                             0
<PREFERRED>                                                       0
<COMMON>                                                        142
<OTHER-SE>                                                   37,913
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                 41,829
<SALES>                                                       9,199
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                              9,199
<CGS>                                                         1,161
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                 1,161
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                             (1,954)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                     39
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                         (1,993)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                   0
<CHANGES>                                                         0
<NET-INCOME>                                                (1,993)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                   (.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                 (.14)


</TABLE>
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T J E R E MY T HO MAS C L AR K, P e titio n e r- A p p e lla n t, v. M I KE M ARTE L, R es po nd ent- A pp el l ee . N o. 10- 16986 D. C . No . 2 : 0 8 - c v - 0 2 9 4 9 - L KK ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e E a s te rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia L a w r e nc e K . K a r l t on, D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d S e pt e m be r27, 2011 ** B efo re: H A W K IN S , S IL V E R M A N , an d W . F L E T C H E R , C i rcu i tJu d g es. C a l i f orni as t a t e pr i s one rJ e r e m yT hom a s C l a rk appe a l s pr o s e f r om the di stri ctcourt ’ s j ud gm entdi sm i ss i ng hi s 28 U . S . C . § 2 25 4 h abea s pet i t i on as u n t i me l y . W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r2 8 U . S. C. § 2 2 5 3 , a n d w e a f f i rm. 

# FI LED OC T 5 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS10- 16986 2 C l arkco n t en d s h i s p et i t i o n i s n o tsu b j ectt o A E D P A ’ s st atu t e o f l i m i t at i o n s, be c aus e he i s a c tua l l yi nnoc e nti n the s e ns e tha tthe I nf orm a t i on, j uryc ha r ge , a nd j uryve r di c tf

orm s onl ype rm i tt e d af i ndi ng of gui l tf ors e c ond de gr e e m ur de r , a nd there fore he w as i m prop er l y f ou nd gu i l ty of f

i rs tdegree mu rder . T he di stri ctcourt prop er l y di sm i ss ed the habeas pet i t i on as un t i m el y a s i tw as fi l ed af t erthe on e- ye ar s ta tu to rylim ita tio n s p e r io d h a d e n d e d . See 28 U . S . C . § 2244( d) . C l a rk pr e s e nt s no n e w e v id e n c e o f

a c tu a l in n o c e n c e s u f

f ic ie n t to e x c u s e h is u n tim e lyf ilin g . See L ee v. L a m p ert , N o . 0 9 - 3 5 2 7 6 , 2 0 1 1 W L 3 2 7 5 9 4 7 , a t * 6 ( 9 th C ir . A u g u s t 2 , 2 0 1 1 ) .

“ [A ] ctual i nn ocence means fa ctual i nn ocence, no tm er e l egal i nsuffi ci ency . ” B ou sleyv. U

ni ted Stat es , 523 U . S . 614, 623 ( 1998) ( i nt e rna l quot a t i on m a rks om i tt ed). W e c ons true appe l l a nt ’ s a ddi t i ona l a r gum e nt s a s am ot i on t o e xpa nd the c e rtif ic a te o f ap p e a lab ility . S o c o n s tru e d , th e m o tio n is d e n ie d . See 9 th C ir . R . 22 -1(e ); Hi i v ala v . W

ood , 19 5 F . 3d 10 98 , 11 04 -05 (9th C i r. 19 99 ) ( per c uri am ). AF F I RME D.
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 USC, SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



In connection
with this amendment to annual report of Medicine Man Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 29,  2018 (the
“Report”), we, the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Rule 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                  
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |                                                                                                                                                     
| | 2. | The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.





|Dated: March 29, 2018 | /s/ Brett Roper                           
|--------------------- | ------------------------------------------
|                      | Brett Roper, Chief Executive Officer      
|                      |                                           
|                      |                                           
|Dated: March 29, 2018 | /s/ Jonathan Sandberg                     
|                      | Jonathan Sandberg, Chief Financial Officer
#### Katherine HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NORTH CAROLINA; North Carolina Department of Public Instruction; North Carolina Teachers and State Employees Retirement System; Dr. Barry Shepherd, in His Official and Individual Capacity; Kathryn Auger, in Her Official and Individual Capacity; Gary Austin, In his official and individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-2271

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 19, 2017

Decided: December 21, 2017

Katherine Harris, Appellant Pro Se.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Katherine Harris appeals the district court’s order denying relief on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Harris v. North Carolina,*No. 3:17-cv-00548-RJC-DSC (W.D.N.C. Oct. 2, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
EXHIBIT 23.3

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement of Atlas Energy Group, LLC (the Company) on Form S-8 (File
No. 333-202441, effective March 2, 2015) and of the reference to Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc. and the inclusion of our report dated January 20, 2015 in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2014, of the Company and its subsidiaries, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|CAWLEY, GILLESPIE & ASSOCIATES, INC.
|                                    
|/s/ Robert Ravnaas                  
|Robert D. Ravnaas, P.E.             
|President                           
|                                    
|March 27, 2015                      
|Fort Worth, Texas
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION IX 

75 Hawthorne Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105 

November 1, 2011

Ursula Kramer, Director

Pima County Department of Environmental Quality

150 W. Congress Street

Tucson, Arizona 85701-1317

Dear Ms. Kramer:

Thank you for your timely submission of the Pima County 2010 Ambient Air Monitoring Network Plan. 

We have reviewed the submitted document and have found that it is complete, informative, very detailed 

and meets all of the requirements for annual network plans as required by our regulations set forth under 

40 CFR Part 58.10. We specifically approve the discontinuation of the Broadway and Swan PM10

monitor per 40 CFR Part 58.20 (f). While this letter serves as official approval of the annual network 

plan, it does not constitute approval of system modifications that may take place in the future. We will 

continue to work with your district to review system changes as they proceed.

If you have any questions regarding this letter or enclosed comments, please feel free to contact me at 

(415) 972-3851 or Michael Flagg at (415) 972-3372.

Sincerely,

/s/

Matthew Lakin, Manager

Air Quality Analysis Office

Air Division

Enclosure

cc: Wayne Byrd, PDEQ

Ted Gould, PDEQ
Comments on the Pima County 2010 Ambient Air Monitoring Network Plan 

Please update next year’s annual network plan to reflect the following comments:

Concentrations used to assess minimum monitoring requirements in Table 5: PM10 Design 

Criteria should not exclude pending exceptional event requests.

Prince Road PM10 is identified as source impact, microscale site in the tables on page 14 and 26, 

while the narrative on page 27 describes the monitor as “representative of a neighborhood scale”.
### Gormas. Michael (OST) From: 

### Sent: To: 

### Cc: Subject:

Mr.Todd Homan, Director. Office ofAviation Analysis US Dept. OfTransportation 1200 NewJersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20590 Dear Mr. Homan AI Rubin

# ··--I!!JII··· Monday, November 10, 2014 1:06 PM Gormas, Michael (OST) sally_smith@begich.senate.gov,chad.padgett@mail.house.gov,kevin_sweeney@murkows ki.senate.gov,citytke@gmail.com,info@flyalaskaseaplanes.com; chad.padgett@mail.house.gov; kevin_sweeney@murkowski.senate.gov; citytke@gmail.com; info@flyalaskaseaplanes.com Essential Air Service, USDOT Determination 80-1-167

November7, 2014

..**···~** ··c

' :···;

Please continue to provide Essential Air Service to Tenakee Springs, Alaska through Juneau, Alaska. Juneau, the State Capitol and our life line, is the center ofair service in South East Alaska. Alaska Seaplane Service has provided safe, frequent, timely, and efficient air service to our communityforyears. Weather in South East Alaska is a majorfactor in providing service to Tenakee Springs and service from any othercity would significantly impact ourability to gettimely mail and freight. Juneau is the only City where services such as large grocery and household goods are available to ourcommunity. Please approve Alaska Seaplane Service's Application to continue serving Tenakee Springs. Thank You
The Rubin Family 

# • • Tenakee Springs, Ak. 99841

1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abel Heriberto FABIAN-BALTAZAR, AKA Abel Heriberto Fabia Baltazar, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-16115

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed December 14, 2017

*478Melanie Leigh Alsworth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peggy Sasso, Esquire, FPDCA — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Fresno), Fresno, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: KOZINSKI and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KEELEY,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

The district court didn’t err by enforcing Fabian-Baltazar’s express waiver of his right to bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). “(A] plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). But, even construed liberally, Fabian-Baltazar’s pro se habeas petition didn’t challenge the voluntariness of his collateral appeals waiver. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,