19-30

Gonzalez-Polanco v. Rosen

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A 206 846 591/592

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 13th 4 day of January, two thousand twenty5 one.

6

7 PRESENT:

8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

9 ROBERT D. SACK,

10 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 MARIA FERNANDA GONZALEZ-POLANCO,

15 CHRISTOPHER MAURICIO ORELLANA16 GONZALEZ

17 Petitioners,

18

19 v. 19-30

20 NAC

21 JEFFREY A. ROSEN, ACTING UNITED 

22 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.1 23

24 _____________________________________

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), 

Acting Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen is substituted for 

former Attorney General William P. Barr.
2

1

2 FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, Attorney,

3 Youman, Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New 

4 York, NY.

5

6 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffery Bossert Clark, Acting 

7 Assistant Attorney General;

8 Shelley R. Goad , Assistant 

9 Director; Kristin Moresi, Trial 

10 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

11 Litigation, United States 

12 Department of Justice, Washington, 

13 DC.

14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

15 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

16 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

17 is DENIED.

18 Petitioners Maria Fernanda Gonzalez-Polanco and her son 

19 Christopher Mauricio Orellana-Gonzalez, both natives and 

20 citizens of Guatemala, seek review of a December 3, 2018, 

21 decision of the BIA affirming an October 23, 2017, decision 

22 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of 

23 removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

24 (“CAT”). In re Maria Fernanda Gonzalez-Polanco, Christopher 

25 Mauricio Orellana-Gonzalez, No. A 206 846 591/592 (B.I.A.

26 Dec. 3, 2018), aff’g No. A 206 846 591/592 (Immig. Ct. New 

27 York City Oct. 23, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

28 with the underlying facts and procedural history.
3

1 We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented 

2 by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d 

3 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well 

4 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 

5 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual findings 

6 for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo); Gjolaj 

7 v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 

8 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing nexus determination for 

9 substantial evidence).

10 An asylum applicant must establish past persecution or a 

11 well-founded fear of future persecution and that “race, 

12 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

13 group, or political opinion was or will be at least one 

14 central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 

15 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195 (“the 

16 applicant must establish both that the group itself was 

17 cognizable and that the alleged persecutors targeted the 

18 applicant on account of her membership in that group” 

19 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Although 

20 persecutors may have more than one motive, see Acharya v. 

21 Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014), “the protected 
4

1 ground cannot play a minor role . . . [t]hat is, it cannot be 

2 incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to 

3 another reason for harm,” In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. 

4 Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007). 

5 The agency reasonably determined that Gonzalez-Polanco 

6 failed to show that her membership in her proposed social 

7 group of single mothers without male protection was one 

8 central reason that gang members targeted her for extortion. 

9 Gonzalez-Polanco testified that gang members extorted her 

10 because they believed she had money from her partner in the

11 United States. And she had no evidence that the gang members 

12 would have attempted to extort her if they did not think she 

13 could pay. Accordingly, the record reflects that the gang 

14 members’ motivation was financial gain, not to harm her on 

15 account of a protected ground. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 

16 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm visited upon 

17 members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented 

18 to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales 

19 are tipped away from considering those people a particular 

20 social group within the meaning of the INA.”); Melgar de 

21 Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) 
5

1 (“general crime conditions are not a stated ground” for 

2 asylum). 

3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

5 stays VACATED.

6 FOR THE COURT: 

7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

8 Clerk of Court