*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 28 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

MAURICIO ALFONSO

HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-4056

(D.C. No. 96-CR-275)

(D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Defendant Mauricio Alfonso Hernandez appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
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I.

Hernandez was a passenger in a car driven by his sister when it was stopped

at a checkpoint on I-70 near Richfield, Utah. Highway Patrol Trooper Denis

Avery approached the car and asked the driver for her license and car registration. 

She produced what appeared to be a valid California driver’s license and a

registration certificate. The registration document matched the car and indicated

the car belonged to Maria Robles. When Avery questioned the driver and

Hernandez about the owner of the car, both indicated the car belonged to a friend,

but neither could identify the owner and neither knew how to contact the owner. 

Avery asked the driver to pull the car over to the shoulder of the road

because he believed the car might be stolen. As the car was pulled over, Avery

noticed a set of dirty hand prints on the car’s bumper beneath the license plate. 

The prints were pointing up as if someone had used the bumper to pull out from

underneath the car. The driver and Hernandez told Avery they were traveling to

Denver, but neither could provide an address or telephone number for the people

they were going to visit. Avery asked if they were carrying drugs. Both said

“no” and Hernandez asked if Avery wanted to look. Avery said, “of course,” and

looked under the rear bumper at the point where he had seen hand prints. He

noticed the screws under the bumper had recently been removed. Avery removed

the screws and pulled the bottom of the bumper down, revealing six kilograms of
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packaged cocaine. Avery arrested the driver and Hernandez.

II.

Hernandez claims the cocaine should be suppressed because (1) the

checkpoint was unconstitutional; (2) Avery exceeded the authorized scope of

investigation at the checkpoint; and (3) Hernandez’s consent to search the car was

involuntary. In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

evidence, this court accepts the factual findings of the district court unless they

are clearly erroneous and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the

district court’s findings. See United States v. Elliott , 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th

Cir. 1997). However, we review de novo the ultimate determination of the

reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that Hernandez does not have

standing to challenge the search of the car. United States v. Eylicio-Montoya , 70

F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 1995). However, he does have standing to challenge

his own seizure. Id. (“A passenger does not relinquish her Fourth Amendment

interest in protecting herself from unlawful seizures merely because she chooses

to ride in a vehicle in which she has no possessory or proprietary interest.”); see

also United States v. Martinez , 983 F.2d 968, 974 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if

we determine Hernandez was illegally seized, the evidence will be suppressed “to

the extent that it was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” United States v. Miller , 84
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F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).

A stop of a vehicle at a fixed checkpoint (a “roadblock” stop) is a seizure

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. GalindoGonzales , 142 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 1998). However, a brief roadblock stop

at a fixed checkpoint does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted

reasonably. Reasonableness, in the context of a roadblock seizure, is evaluated by

weighing “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to

which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference

with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 

Hernandez claims the checkpoint where he was stopped was

unconstitutional because the authorization for its use was overly broad and, thus,

the seizure did not advance the public concerns supposedly served by the seizure. 

Noting “[o]ther courts conducting the balancing test under Brown have had some

empirical data upon which to conduct a meaningful analysis of the effectiveness

of the checkpoint in advancing the matters of public concern,” Report at 16, the

magistrate judge agreed with Hernandez and concluded the government had failed

to establish the stop was effective in advancing its designed purposes. The

district court rejected this finding and denied Hernandez’s motion to suppress. 

The court specifically rejected the magistrate’s conclusion that the government

was required to present empirical evidence to demonstrate the checkpoint at issue
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advanced the particular purposes it was designed to address.

The purposes of the checkpoint were:

A. To inspect license plates, registration certificates, and

driver’s licenses.

B. To inspect compliance with seat belt and child restraint

requirements.

C. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by

any controlled substances.

D. To detect anyone having in their possession alcohol or

controlled substances.

E. To conduct exterior examination of vehicles for the required

lights, turn signals, and other exterior safety devices.

Record I, Doc. 1, attach. A. All of these purposes are legitimate law enforcement

rationales for conducting a checkpoint stop. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police

v. Sitz , 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (states have legitimate interest in eradicating

drunken driving); Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (“States have a

vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to

operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence

that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being

observed.”). Moreover, the checkpoint advanced these important government

interests. By stopping vehicles, the troopers were able to quickly confirm (1)

vehicles had proper license plates, lights, turn signals, and other exterior safety

devices; (2) motorists had valid registrations and licenses and were in compliance

with seat belt and child restraint requirements; and (3) motorists were not

impaired by or in possession of alcohol or other controlled substances. The
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effectiveness of the instant stop is apparent. Further , the infringement of the

seizure on Hernandez’s personal liberty was slight as he was only questioned a

few minutes. Therefore, Hernandez’s initial detention at the checkpoint was

reasonable.

Hernandez argues Avery’s investigation exceeded its authorized scope. 

During a roadblock stop, a police officer is entitled to verify a driver’s license,

registration, and proof of insurance to determine if the driver has a valid license

and is entitled to operate the vehicle. Galindo-Gonzales , 142 F.3d at 1221. If the

officer seeks to expand the investigation of a motorist beyond the purposes of the

checkpoint, the officer must have “‘a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Bloom , 975 F.2d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir. 1992)). However,

“[o]fficers properly investigating one kind of offense are not required to ignore

suspicious circumstances suggesting the commission of other kinds of offenses.” 

Id. at 1222; see also United States v. Massie , 65 F.3d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1995).

When neither the driver nor Hernandez could show ownership of the car,

Avery was justified in continuing to detain them to ascertain if the car was stolen. 

See id. (officer justified in asking additional questions at roadblock when driver

could not produce registration papers). Moreover, after noticing the hand prints

on the car’s bumper, and considering the other suspicious circumstances present,
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Avery was entitled to ask the driver and Hernandez if they were carrying drugs. 

Avery did not violate Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Hernandez gave Avery permission to search the car while he was detained. 

Hernandez contends his consent was involuntary. However, we need not consider

this claim because Hernandez does not have standing to challenge the search of

the car. See Martinez , 983 F.2d at 974 (“Absent standing, we need not consider

either [defendant’s] challenge to the initial search of the trunk or the related

issues of consent.”) .

The district court’s order denying the motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge