### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma rc h 19 , 200 7 S es sio n
TENNI E MARTI N, ET AL 

### . V 

### . NORFOLK SOUTH ERN RAILW AY COMPANY, ET A L 

### . Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Anderson Coun ty

No. A2LA0325

No. E2006-01021-COA- R3-CV- F ILED JULY 6, 2007

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R

. , d i s s en t i n g.
Ista rt wi th an e le me nta

ry and be dr oc k pri nc ipl e of Te nn e sse e jur isp ru de nc e : w he n a pa rt y tim e ly fi le s a c omp la int

in ci rc uit c ourt , all e g e s fa c ts ma kin g ou t a ca us e of a c tio n, and

de mand s a jury , that party

has a c onstitut ional rig ht to have a jur y pass upon the mer its of its allegations. Tenn. Const. Art. I , §6. (“Tha

t the rig ht of trial by

jury shall remain inviolate . . .” ). I fully rec og nize that a par ty ’s jury demand a

nd its right to pursue its alleg ed cause of action can be leg itimately thwarte d if the pa rt y su e d c an d e mo ns tr ate , un der the ru br ic of Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 , th a t it is e nti tle d to
su mma ry jud g me nt. He nc e , if the ma te ri a l fa c ts pe rt a ini ng to a de fe ns e are no t in dis pute a nd if tho se fa c ts s ho w c on clu si vel y th at th e de fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to a jud g me nt, the pla int if

f l os e s it s constitutional rig ht to a jury trial, its c ase is ove r, and the defe ndant g oes aw ay wi t h summary jud g me nt.
Ihave pr e vio us ly

e xpre sse d my

vie w o f s umm ary

jud g me nt, a

vie w that I bel ie ve is
c on sis te nt w iththe de c isi on s o f t he Sup re me Court

on thi s su bje c t: Summary judgme nt is not an appropriate vehicle for disposing of a
c los e c as e , or eve n a “ razo r- thi n” c as e , or what one might re fer to as a we ak c as e . These c ases c an be disposed of on direc ted ver dict, or by jur y ve rd ic t, or whe n a tr ia l ju dg e e xer c ise s h is o r h e r r ole a s a thirteenth juror, or

in connec tion with other post-judgme nt pr oc e e din g s - - b ut o nly aft e r o ra l te sti mony ha s b e e n guid e d in to e vid e nc e by

dir e c t e xami natio n an d te ste d b y ri g or ou s c ro ssexamination. S ummary

judgme nt for the d efendant is rese rved f or tho se sit uatio ns wh e re the un dis pu te d ma te ri a l f act s r e fl e c t th a t a pla int if f h a s no c as e
.-2-

Spa rk s v . Ba pti st H os p. Of E. T e nn ., 03 A0 1- 97 10 -C V- 00 47 2, 19 98 WL 18 85 40 a t *4 (Te nn . Ct

. App. E.S., April 3, 1998) (Susano, J., concurring ) (e mphasis in origina l).

I n the instant case , the cr itical i s s u e, re d u ce d to its core, is simply this: Are there , in the
rec ord bef

ore us, (1) fac ts a

nd (2) rea sonable infere nces, favor able to the plaintiff’s position, from fa c ts, wh ic h, if

fo un d b y a jur y , c ou ld l e a d th a t jury

to r e a so na

bly c on c lud e that the de c e a se d wa s le ss t h an5 0 % a t f

a u l t ? If s o , s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t i s n o ta

p p r o p r i a t e
. I f

i n d t h e r e ar e s u c h f

a c t s
. A c tu a l l y, Ifind sever al mater ial fac ts i n d i s p u t e

—disputes that prompt me to rejec t the holding of the
m a j o r i t y t h a tt h i s c a s e s h o u l d n o tp r o c e e d

t o c o n s i d e r a t i o nb y a

d u l y- i m p an e l e d j u r y.
Th e tr ia l c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e e vid e nc e sh ow s, wi tho ut d isp ute , th a t th e pla int if f’ s v e hic le stopped twice at and/or on the tra cks. This finding appea rs to have been criti cal to the c ourt’s judgme nt in this case . There is certa inly evidenc e in the re cord to support such a finding by a trier of fa ct. Ther e is, howeve r, other e vidence — e.g. , the written stateme nt of the train a nd eng ine cr ews — whi ch, whe n v ie we d in a light m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he pla int if

f — a s it mus t be — s up po rt s a conclusion of only

one stop. The jury

should resolve this issue.
On another

fac tual issue, the t rain’s eng ineer testified t hat he blew the tra in’s whistle prior to the collision. On the other hand, the re w as a ne arby witness — Cecil Smit h — who testified that he did no t he ar a

wh ist le . Sh ou ld a

jur y no t r e so lve thi s c on fl ic t?
There is a signific ant di spute in the record as to how fa r the de cea sed could see as she looked do wn the trac ks tow ard

the on c omi ngtr a in. F ur the rm or e , th e re is a

dis pu te a s to wh e the r, a nd to what extent, overg rown ve g etation near t he crash si te i mpacted the dece ased’ s line of si g ht. Why sh ou ld a jur y no t be imp ane le d to e va luate thi s c on fl ic t?
Bot h s i d es pre sented e x perts. Not surpr isingly , these e x perts disag ree sharply as to the dy namics of the c ollisi on. I t seems to me that t hese competing theories are properly for a jury to sort out and per form a c redibility deter mination.
There are other fa ctual disputes, e.g. , the safe ty of this two-tr ack crossing controlled only by a “c rossbuck” sign a

nd the manner

in which the dec ease d approa ched a nd crosse d the double tra cks
o nh er wa y t o o p en t h e d o o rs t o t h e M o ra nC h u rc h t h at S u n d ay m o rn i n g.
I f a ju ry were to r e so lve the se va ri ou s d isp ute s in

the pla int if

f’ s f a vo r, Ibe lie ve it c ou ld
rea sonably

conclude that the plaintiff’s f ault was less than 50%

. I n my judgme nt there a

re g enuine issues of material fa ct pre cluding a finding , as a matter of law, that the dece ased was g uilty of 50% fa ult or more. I

would vacate the trial c ourt’s judg ment and
re mand fo r a jur y tr ia l. I n my jud g me nt, our c on sti tut ion wi ll p e rm it o f n oth ingle ss.
Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.-3- 

### ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE