N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT ALEXANDER

DIAZ M AR TINEZ, Pe t i tione r,
v. JEFFER SON B . SESSIONS III, Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R e sponde nt. No. 12-71822 Age n c y No. A071-581-265
M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for R e vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igra tion Appe a ls Argue d and Subm itte d June 5, 2017 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : GR

AB E R , SAC K, ** and M UR GUIA, C irc uit Judge s. Pe titione r Ale xa

nde r Dia z -M artine z tim e ly se e ks re vie w of the B oa

rd of Im m i gra tion Appe a l s ’ (" B IA" ) dism issa l of his a p pe a l of the im

m igra t ion judge ’ s (" IJ" ) orde r finding him re m ova ble
. W e de n y

the pe tition. 

# FIL ED
JUN 29 2017 M O LLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a

ppropria te for public a tion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* ** The Honora

ble R obe rt D. Sa c k, Unite d Sta t e s C irc uit Judge for the C ourt of Appe a ls for the Se c ond C irc uit, sitting by de signa tion.1. The B IA c orre c tly he ld tha t the a dm ission of Pe titione r’ s e arlie r sta te m e nts a nd othe r e vide nc e viola

te d ne ithe r 8 C .F.R . § 287.3(c ) nor the Fifth Am e ndm e nt. B e c a

use Pe titione r’ s e arlie r state m e nts we re m a de da y s be fore the issua nc e of the notic e to a

ppe ar, § 287.3(c ) doe s not a pply
. Sa m ay oa -M a

rtine z v. Holde r, 558 F.3d 897, 901–02 (9th C ir. 2009); In re E-R -M -F-, 25 I. & N. De c . 580, 582–85 (B .I.A. 2011). " M iranda wa rnings a re not re quire d be fore que stioning in the c onte xt of a

c i vil de porta

tion he aring," Unite d State s v. Sola n o-Godine s, 120 F.3d 957, 960 (9th C ir. 1997), a nd Pe titione r ha s not a

rgue d tha t his sta te m e nts
we re c oe rc e d. 2. The B IA c orre c tly

he ld tha t, unlike in He rnande z -Gua da rra m a v. Ashc roft, 394 F.3d 674 (9th C i r. 2005), the a dm i ssion of e arlie r stat e m e nts by Pe titione r’ s frie nd, in this c a se , wa s irre le va n t to the B IA’ s a

na ly sis. The B IA
re lie d only

on the te stim ony

of Pe titione r a n d othe r witne sse s a t the m e rits he aring. 3. Substa ntia l e v ide nc e supports the a ge nc y ’ s a dve rse c re dibility de te rm i na tion. Se e Pe re z -Arc e o v. Ly nc h, 821 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th C ir. 2016) (stating sta

nda rd of re vie w). Pe titione r a dm i tte d a t the m e rits he aring tha t he ha d lie d to borde r pa trol offic e rs a bout his a tte m pte d e ntry into the Unite d Stat e s. Se e Silva -Pe re ira

v. Ly nc h, 827 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th C ir. 2016) (holding tha t an
a dm ission of prior dishone sty c an support a

n a dve rse c re dibility

finding), c e rt.
2de nie d, 137 S. C t. 1366 (2017). The IJ note d tha

t Pe t itione r c ould not e xpla in
a de quate ly

why he l ie d. In vie w of the im pla u sibility of Pe titione r’ s te stim ony , 1 the re c ord doe s not c o m

pe l the c onc lusion tha

t Pe titione r’ s story

— that he wa s a

n innoc e nt pa

rtic i pa nt in his frie nd’ s de vious pla n— wa s truthful. Ac c o rdingly , the B IA c orre c tly

c onc lude d, in light of the a dve rse c re dibility

finding, tha

t the re wa s substa ntia l e vide nc e tha

t Pe titione r a tte m

pte d to a id a

nd a be t a lie n sm

uggling. 2 4. The B IA did not e rr in a pply ing the " c le ar a nd c o nvinc ing" sta nda rd inste a d of the " c le a

r, une quivoc a l, a

n d c onvinc ing" sta

n da rd. Se e M onda c a -Ve ga v. Ly nc h, 808 F.3d 413, 419–22 (9th C ir. 2015) (e n ba n c ) (holding tha

t the two sta nda rds a re the sa m e ), c e rt. de nie d, 137 S. C t . 35 (2016). Pe tition DE N IE D.

1 Pe titione r kne w tha

t his frie nd wa s not a

Unite d Sta t e s c itiz e n a

nd tha t his frie nd’ s visa

ha d be e n c anc e lle d just two we e ks e a rlie r, a fte r he trie d

to wa l k a c ross the b orde r.

2 B e c a use we de ny t

he pe tition on this ground, we ne e d not re a c h

the B IA’ s a lte rna tive holding tha

t, c re d iting Pe titione r’ s te stim ony , he e nga ge d in a lie n sm uggling. 31 Diaz

- Martinez v. Session s , No. 12

- 71822 Murguia, Circuit Judge , d issenting in part : I disagree with the majority that the BIA correctly concluded , based on the adverse credibility determination , that Diaz

- Martinez aided alien smuggling
. N o party, judge, or court

— not the immigration judge, not the BIA, and not the government on appeal

— has argued that the adverse credibility determination provided the basis for Diaz

- Martinez ’s conviction of aiding alien smuggling. The IJ never reference d the adverse credibility determination in its analysis of why Martinez aided alien smuggling; the BIA explicitly stated that the adverse credibility finding “is n ot essential to removability.” Because the agency never explicitly (or, in my view , implicitly) relied on the adverse credibility determination for its substantive findi ng that Diaz

- Martinez aided alien smuggling, I would grant the petition. At the very least, we should have remanded this case to the BIA to address the significance, if any, of the adverse credibility determination. The majority relies on Silva

- Pereira v. Lynch , 827 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) , for its conclusion that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. 1 Silva

- Pereira at best stands for the simple notion that a pre - removal

- proceeding lie can “support” an adverse credi bility determination that already is supported by multiple inconsistencies in the petitioner’s asylum

1 N either party cited or briefed Silva

- Pereira
. 

# FILED
JUN 29 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 application and testimony before the IJ. Id. at 1185

– 87. In contrast to the petitioner in Silva

- Pereira , here, the only basis for the adverse credibilit y determination is the fabricated story Diaz

- Martinez told immigration officials at secondary inspection. Diaz

- Martinez never made an inconsistent or untrue statement in his filings or testimony before the IJ. The majority elevates Silva

Pereira to a status not envisioned by that case and with potentially dramatic unintended consequences. I have little doubt that a proper adverse credibility determination could support the BIA’s decision in this c ase
— if the BIA actually relied on the determinat ion. But the BIA did not do so, and our job is not to supply the agency’s reasoning for it. In Altamirano v. Gonzales , we refused to consider BIA ’ s argumen t on appeal that the petitioner’ s presence in the car provided an air of normalcy and therefore con stitu ted an affirmative act constituting aiding alien smuggling , because “ [t]his . . . was not the basis for the IJ ’ s decision.” 427 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 2005). We explained that “[w]e ‘ m ay not accept appellate counsel’ s post hoc rationalizations for agency action; Chenery requires that an agency’ s discretionary order be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.’” Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines Inc. v. United States , 371 U.S. 156, 1 68

– 69 (1962)). Here, n ot only does the majority i gnore the3 warning not to permit post hoc rationalizations for agency action, but the majority doubly errs by actually supplying the post hoc rationalization. Based on Altamirano , I would grant the petition. At the very least, however, we should have taken a more cautious approach and remanded the case so that the agency can explain the significance, if any, of the adverse credibility determination. Because the majority decision allows for the removal of Diaz

Martinez based on reasoning that neither the IJ nor the BIA relied on, I must respectfully dissent.