NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 07a0462n.06 Filed: June 29, 2007 No. 05-5714 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. SI RRI CO DA RN EL LSNI PES, a/k/ a Mic ha e l Sn ipe s, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

OPI NI ON

Be for e : C LA Y, G ILM AN , a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge

. S i rr i co Da rn el l S n i p es p l ed gu i l t y t o a c h ar ge of conspiringto distribute more than 50 g rams of c rac k coca ine and 500 g rams or more of powde r

coca ine. His plea a g ree ment stated that the g overnme nt would file a motion for the cour t to depart below the mandatory -minimum sentence if the g overnme nt w as satisfied, in its sole discretion, that Snipes had provided substantial assistanc e. Six months a fter enter ing his guilty plea, Snipes filed a motion to seeking to withdraw it. The dist rict cour t denied Snipes’s motion and, in the absenc e of a de parture motion from the g overnme nt, sentence d him to the mandatory -minimum sentence of life i mprisonment. On appeal, S nipes contends that the g overnme nt brea ched its ag ree ment, that he sh ou ld hav e be e n p e rm itt e d to wi thd ra w h is p le a , a

nd tha t hi s se nte nc e wa s o the rw iseNo. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 2 - constitutionally flawe d. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the j udg ment of the district court.

I. BACKG ROUND A g rand jury indicted Snipes in September of 2003 on one count of conspiring to distribute, and of conspiring to possess with the i ntent to distribute, 50 g rams or more of a substanc e conta ining

coca ine base (cr ack) and 500 gra ms or more of pow der c ocaine . Three months later, in Dec ember of 2003, the g overnme nt filed an information providing notice, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)( 1), that Snipes face d an enhanc ed sentenc e if convicted due to two prior state fe lony -drugconvictions in 1997 and 1999. On J an u ar y

26, 2004, Snipes pled g uilty to the conspirac y

char g e. He signe d both a plea

a g re e me nt a

nd a n A g re e d F a c tua l B a sis (A F B ) fo r the c ha rg e . Sni pe s adm itt e d in the AF B that hi s involvement in the conspirac y included the distribution of at least 50 g rams of crac k coca ine and at least 2 kilog rams of pow der c ocaine . The AF B a lso detailed Snipes’s two p ri o r s t ate f elony -drug convictions. Acc ording to an af fidavit submitt ed by J eff

ery Whit t, Snipes’s attorney

at the time, the AFB ’s re citation of th e drugquantities was re vised twice be fore Snipes would ag ree to it. Dan Smit h, the Assistant U .S. Attorne y (AUSA) who prosec uted Snipes’s case , was out of town dur ing these ne g otiations. W hitt therefor e neg otiated the ter ms of Snipes’s AFB with Ag ent Rainer Drolshag en of the Fe dera l Bure au of I nvestig ation. I n his affidavit, W hitt asserted that Smith had expressed disappointment with the AFB chang es upon his return f rom vac ation, despite his office ’s approva l of them.No. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 3 - Ba sed on the c ombination of the drugamounts to which S n i p es ad m itted and his prior

c on vic tio ns , h e fa c e d a

mand a tor

y -m ini mum sen tenc e of

lif e imp ri so nme nt u

nd e r 2 1 U .S. C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) . Snipes’s plea a g ree ment expli citly spelled out this mandatory -minimum sentence to which he wa s subject. I t also expl ained, howe ver, that the g overnme nt would file a motion purs ua nt t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (e ) s e e kin g a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e fr om the mand a tor

y lif e se nte nc e if Snipes provided the g overnme n t with substantial assistance. The decision of whe ther to file the motion was left to the g overnme nt’s “sole discr etion.” Ne a rl y si x mo nth s a ft e r s ig nin g the a g re e me nt, Sni pe s r e pla c e d Wh itt wi th H e rb e rt

S. Moncier, a private attorney in K nox ville. On J uly 15, 2004, Moncier proce eded to f ile the first of two motions seeking to withdraw S nipes’s guilty plea. The ini tial motion s et forth two g rounds for withdrawa l: (1) the cha

ng es in the law that arose from t he S upreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and ( 2) Snipes’s conc ern that the information he could provide to the g overnme nt would “in all probability ” be insufficient to war rant a § 3553(e) depar

ture. The district court denie d Snipes’s motion on bot h gro u n d s . I t first determined that the chang es in the sentenc ing la

w had no be aringon the mandatory -minimum sentenc e that Snipes f ace d by virtue of his prior convictions. Reg ardingSnipes’s second c ontention, the court o b s erve d that the g overnme nt sti ll ho pe d to c a ll Sni pe s a s a wi tne ss in t he up c omi ngc ri min a l tr ia l of Te rr y and Mars ha ne Woo ds , two of Snipes’s coc onspirators. Snipes filed a second moti on to withdraw in late S eptember of 2004. He a sserted that (1) he had begun to reg ret e ntering his plea almost immediately , but that interveningevents ha d preve nted him fr om c on ta c tin g c ouns e l, ( 2) the dis tr ic t ju dg e wh o a c c e pte d h is p le a ha d a con fl ic t of

int e re st,No. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 4 - (3 ) t he dr uga mou nts in t he AF B we re e rr on e ou s, a nd (4) the se nte nc inglaw h a d c ha ng e d, a g a in ci t i n g Blak

e ly . Snipes’s conflict-of -intere st claim stemmed fr om District J udg e Ronnie Gre er’ s

re pr e se ntatio n, be fo re joi nin g the be nc h, of a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt name d Jam e s H un t. A c c or din g to Sni pe s, Hunt w ou ld h a ve be e n th e g ov e rn me nt’ s “ ma in w itn e ss” ha d S ni pes’ s c a se pr oc e e de d to trial, and the g overnme nt intende d to c all Hunt at the Woods’ trial as we ll. I n response to Snipes’s motion, J udg e Gr eer

rec used himself fr om the case

. The c ase w as then tra

nsfer red to District Judge L eon Jordan, who held a he aringon Snipes’s pe nd ingse c on d mo tio n to wi thd ra w. Judg e Jord a n iss ue d a n op ini on in A pr il o f 2 00 5, de nyingbo th the motion and Snipes’s acc ompanying r equest for an evidentiary hear ing. U ltimately , the g overnme nt d id n o t s u

b p o e n a Sn ip e s to te s ti f

y a t th e Wo o d s ’ tr ia l a n d th e r e f o r e d id n o t file a § 35 53 (e ) mot ion fo r a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e . Th e g ov e rn me nt e xpla ins thi s d e c isi on by no tin g tha

t, afte r filing his moti on to withdraw his plea, Snipes “ ref used to be interviewe d” and instea d asser ted that he had w ithdrawn fr om his ag ree ment. Sn i p es ’s counsel similarly failed to re spond to the g ov e rn me nt’ s r e qu e st t o in te rv ie w Sn ipe s. Th e g ov e rn me nt wa s th e re fo re un a ble to c a ll Sn ipe s to testify at the Woods’ trial. J udg e Jordan subsequently sentenc ed Snipes to a mandatory -minimum term of life imprisonment in April of 2005. Snipes tim ely

filed the prese nt a

ppeal, challeng ing both his convic tion and his sentence . He

asser ts that (1) the g overnme nt br eac hed the plea ag ree ment, (2) he should be permitted to withdraw his ple a , ( 3) his manda to ry -m ini mum se nte nc e vio la te s h is F if th A me ndme nt r ig hts , a

nd (4 ) h is sentenc e fa ils to t ake into ac count the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentenc ing f actor s.No. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 5 - II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We r e vie w d e no vo the qu e sti on of wh e the r t

he g ov e rn me nt b re a c hed th e plea a g re e me nt. Un ite d S tat es v . S wan be rg , 370 F.3d 622, 627 ( 6th Cir. 2004). I n contra st, the denial by the district

c ourt of a de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to wi thd ra w a ple a wi ll b e ov e rt

ur ne d o nly if the co urt abuse d it s discretion. United States v. Dix on , 479 F.3d 431, 436 ( 6th Cir. 20 0 7 ). W e also re view a district court’s de nial of a r equest for an evidentiary hear ing unde r the a buse-of -discre tion standard. United Sta te s v . Tr ipl e tt , 828 F.2d 1195, 1199 ( 6th Cir. 1987). Finally , constitutional challeng es ra ised by

cr im in a l d e f

e n d a n ts f o r th e f ir s t ti me o n a

p p e a l a r e e v a lu a te d a g a in s t th e p la in

- e r r o r s tandar d of revie w. United States v. Barton , 455 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 748 (2006). B. The go ve r nm e nt did no t b r e ac h t he ple a a gr e e m e nt Snipes’s plea a g ree ment provided that the de cision to file a § 3553(e ) downwa rd-de parture mot ion lay in t he g ov e rn me nt’ s “ so le dis c re tio n. ” Th is k e y fa c t—t hat Sn ipe s’ s a g re e me nt e xplic itl y pr ov ide d the g ov e rn me nt w ithdis c re tio n— dis tin g uis he s h is c a se fr om Un ite d Stat es v . B e nja mi n , 138 F.3d 1069, 1074 ( 6th Cir. 1998), upon which Snipes mistakenly relies. The court in Be nja mi n he ld t hat w he re a n a g re e me nt d oe s n ot p ro vid e dis c re tio n, the g ov e rn me nt mus t jus tif y its fa ilure to file a § 3553( e) motion by show i ng that the def

endant br eac hed the a g ree ment. Id . In c on tr a st, “whe n a plea

ag ree ment allocates co m p l ete discr etion to the g overnme nt to consider whe ther a

su bs tanti a l a ssi sta

nc e mot ion

sh ou ld b e fi le d, ” thi s cou rt re vie ws the g ov e rn me nt’ s d e c isi on “ on ly for unconstitut ional motives.” Un ite d S tat es v . M oo re , 225 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2000) . Ex amples of unconstitutional motives include the failure to a file a substantial-assistance motion based on theNo. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 6 - defe ndant’s ra ce o r religion. W ade v. U nited States , 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (c iting ra ce a nd relig ion as examples of unconstitutional moti ves for not f iling a de parture motion, but concluding that the def

endant ha d not alleg ed such motives in that ca se). Recog nizi ng this formidable bar rier, Snipes c ontends that the g overnme nt’s unconstitutional motive f or failing to c omply with the ag ree ment was “ punishing Snipes . . . [for] not s aying w hat the prosec utor wante d said.” He cites no authority , howeve r, for the proposition that this amounts t o an

un c on sti tut ion a l mo tiv e . Ind e e d, ob ta ini ngtr ut hful, r e le va

nt t e sti mony

is a c on sti tut ion a lly

va lid

rea son that the g overnme nt enters suc h ag ree ments in the first place . The g overnme nt ex pecte d Snipes to testify

conce rning his knowledg e of the drug conspirac y at t he trials of Terry and Mar shane Woods. Ult imately , though, the g overnme nt never benef itted from Snipes’s testimony , truthful or otherwise, be cause Snipes filed his first motion to withdraw his guilty plea a nd to challeng e the dr

ug

a mou nts c on ta ine d in

the AF B pr ior

to t he be g inn ing of the Woo ds ’ t ri a l. T his fa ilure to c oo pe rate alone justified the g overnme nt’s decision not to file a de parture motion. Snipes nonetheless asserts that he attempted to withdraw fr om the ag ree ment beca use he a nd his a tto rn e y

se ns e d e a rl y

on that th e g ov e rn me nt mig ht have wa nte d h im t o te sti fy

to c e rt a in f

a c ts, such as dr ug amounts, with which he disag ree d. I n particula r, Whitt ’s af

fi davit explained that he

a dv ise d Sn ipe s th a t A USASmith’ s d isp le a sure wi th t he c ha ng e s to Sni pe s’ s A F B “ may c a us e pr ob le ms w itha ny

do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e . . . in the futur e .” Sni pe s als o the or ize s tha t Smi th w ou ld have pr efe rre d that Snipes’s testimony match up more closely with that of Hunt, who the g overnme nt also hoped would testify

at the Woods’ trial.No. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 7 - This arg ument fails for at l east three reasons. First, if the facts that the g overnme nt wanted Snipes to testify

to were truthful and within his knowledg e, his failure to so testify clea rly justifies the g overnme nt’s withholding of a depar ture motion. Second, to the e x tent Snipes sugg ests that the g ov e rn me nt w a nte d h im t o te sti fy fa lse ly , h e pr ov ide s n oth ingbe y on d h is o wn su bje c tiv e fe a r o f t

his prospec t to support his claim. S nipes ultimately provides no valid basis upon which to conclude that the g overnme nt intended to suborn his perjury at t he W oods’ t rial in order to obtain convictions that it was able to sec ure, a s it turns out, wit hout his assistance. Snipes makes m u ch o f t he fa ct that S mi th , wh o p ros ecut ed S ni pes , all egedl y ex pres sed di sap po in tm ent ov er t he ed it s t o S ni pes ’s A FB that his office had appr oved . The district cour t properly deter mined, howeve r, that this alleg ed sentiment of disapprova l in no way lessened Snipes’s a

bility to compl y wi t h t h e terms of his plea ag ree ment and coope rate with the g overnme nt. Finally , as noted above, Snipes doe s not contend that the g overnme nt expl icitly demande d that he testify

to fac ts bey ond those contained in his AFB or otherwise w ithin his knowledg e. Snipes instead conc edes that he short-c ircuited the pr o ce s s o f p repa ring to testify

at the Woods’ trial by

se e k i n g t o w i t h dr a w h i s p l e a b e f o r e t h e t r i a l e v e n b e g a n . M o r e o v e r , e v e n a f t e r S n i p e s r e fu se d to

c oo pe rate , th e g ov e rn me nt c on tac te d h im t o s e e if he sti ll w a nte d to te sti fy a t th e Woo ds ’ t

ri a l. Sni pe s d e c lin e d, a nd his a tto rn e y did no t re sp on d to t he g ov e rn me nt’ s r e qu e st t o in te rv ie w Sn ipe s. Be cause Snipes c annot show that the g overnme nt ha d unconstitutional motives for f ailing to f ile a motion for a downwa

rd depa rture, w e conc lude that the g overnme nt did no t b re ac h t h e plea

a g re e me nt. Simi larl y , w e c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ou rt di d no t abuse its dis c re tio n in fa ili ngto hold an evidentiar

y hear ing, sinc e Snipes has alleg ed no fa cts sufficie nt to support his claim.No. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 8 - C. Sni pes’s m otion to wi thdraw his p lea Rule 11(d) of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure a llows a d efe ndant to withdraw a g uil ty ple a a ft e r the c ourt a c c e pts it, bu t pri or to se nte nc ing , only if “ the de fe nd a nt c a n s ho w a fa ir and just rea son.” I n deter

mining whether Snipes had made suc h a showing , this court has identified

v ar i o u s fa ct o rs as re l ev an t , i n cl u d i n g: (1) whe ther the movant asser ted a defe nse or whether

he has c onsistently

maintained his inn oc e nc e ; (2) the le ng th of tim e be tw e e n the e ntr y of the ple a

and the mot ion

to withdraw; (3) why the g rounds for withdrawa l w ere not presente d to the court at an ear lier time; (4) the c ircumstance s underlying the entry of th e p l ea o f g uilty , the nature and the ba ckg round of a defe ndant and whe ther he has admitted hi s g uilt; and (5) potential pr ejudice to the g overnme nt if the motion to wit hdrawis gr anted. United States v. Valdez , 362 F .3 d 903 , 912 (6 th Cir . 200 4)

. Th e dis tr ic t cou rt ’s op ini on

date d Apr il 7, 20 05 c a re fu lly a nd tho ro ug hly a na ly zed a ll o f t he se fa c tor s a s w e ll a s Sn ipe s’ s sp e c if ic argume nts for pe rmitting withdraw al in this case befor e ultimately denying his motion. A detailed e x planation by us cover ing the same ground would there fore be unduly duplicative. We conc lude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing Snipes’s motion to withdraw his g uilty plea f or the

rea sons set forth in that court’ s well-re asoned opinion. We n ote in p ass in g that Sn ipe s’ s a sse rt ion s th a t he and his mot he r i nte nd e d f

or on e of his

a tto rn e y s to file a wi thd

ra wa l motio n soo ne r tha

n 171 da y s a ft e r t he ple a wa s in iti a lly

e nte re d mi g ht, if tr ue , h e lp e sta

bli sha n in e ff

e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l cla im. Sni pe s h a s n ot r a ise d s uc h a c la im in t his a pp e a l, h owever, so that is su e is n ot b e fo re us . M or e ov e r, a n in e ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im would be more appropr iately pursued throug h a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See, e .g. , United StatesNo. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 9 - v. W ink le , 4 7 7 F

. 3 d 4 0 7 , 4 2 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( e xp l a i n i n g t h i s c o u rt ’ s r e l u c t a n c e t o a dd re ss ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of

-counse l claims on direct a ppeal)

. D. O th er cl a i ms Sni pe s a lso ra ise s th re e c on sti tut ion a l argume nts fo r t he fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. H e fi rs t contends that the district c ourt’s application of the 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) mandatory life sentenc e vi ol ate d h is Fift h Amen dm ent ri ghts

. Th is argum ent is mi sgui ded becau se S ni pes si gned an AFB admitting the drug quantities at issue and attesting to his prior drugconvictions. No constitutional violation therefor e ar ises from the court’s relianc e on those a dmitted facts at se ntencing

. See U nited States v. Cook , 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that a cour t “may not rely on fac ts other tha n th os e re nd e re d in

the ve rd ic t or which the def en d a n t h a s specifically admitted to impose a mandatory enhanc ement” (emphasis added)). Moreove r, t he fa cts of Snipes’s prior c onvictions are sp e c if ic a lly e xemp te d f

ro m Blak e ly ’s g eneral rul e that fa cts incre asing a def endant’ s max imum penalty must be admitted by a def endant or found by a jury

. Se e Un ite d Stat es v. A lfo rd , 436 F.3d 67 7, 68 0 (6 th Cir .) (r e a ff

ir min g tha t “ a ny fa c t ( other than a prior conviction ) w hic h is ne c e ssa ry to

su pp or t a se nte nc e e xce e din g the ma ximuma uth or ize d b y

the fa c ts e sta

bli sh e d b y a ple a of

g uil ty

or a jur y ve rd ic t mu st b e a dmi tte d b y the de fe nd a nt o r p ro ve d to a jur y be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t” (bra ckets omitted)), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 325 (2006). Snipes’s second argument is that his indictment wa s defe ctive for failing to mention his prior convictions. But the g overnme nt properly filed an infor mation giving notice of its intent to seek a life s en t en ce based on Snipes’s pr ior convictions, a pr ocedur e set for th in 21 U.S.C . § 851. See Un ite d Sta te

s v. W atf or d , 468 F.3d 891, 910 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“Unde r 21 U.S.C. § 851, theNo. 05-5714

United States v. Snipes

- 10 - Gover nment provides notice of its intent to seek enhanc ed penalties, not in the i ndictment, but in an information filed separately by the United States Attorney with the trial court be fore the def endant’ s trial or g uilty

plea.” ), cert. de nied , 75 U.S.L .W. 3636 (2007). We thus conclude that Snipes’s sec ond argument has no merit. Snipes’s final contention, based upon his de fec tive-indictment theory , is that a rema nd for

re se nte nc ingis r e qu ir e d p ur su a nt t o 1 8 U. S.C. § 35 53 (a ). B e c a us e Sni pe s h a s f

a ile d to ra ise a

va lid de fe c tiv e -i nd ic tme nt c la im, ho we ve r, we have no ne e d to a dd re ss t his a rgume nt.

III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.