NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

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IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY , Petitioner
,

v.

THE HONORABLE KATHRYN STOCKING

- TATE, Commissioner and Judge Pro Tem of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of YUMA
, Respondent Commissioner,

P.R., Real Party in Interest

.
No. 1 CA

- SA 21

- 0020

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Yuma County No. S1400JD20170164 The Honorable Kathryn E. Stocking

- Tate , Judge Pro Tempore

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED AND RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office
, Tucson By Dawn Rachelle Williams Counsel for Petitioner

Meerchaum & Orduno PLLC
, Yuma By Candice Orduno

- Crouse C ounsel for Real Party in Interest FILED 3-4-2021DCS v. HON. STOCKING

- TATE/P.R. Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

H O W E , Judge:

¶1 In this special action, t he Department of Child S afety challenges Respondent trial judge ’s orde r denying the Department’s motion to dismiss the dependency action after establishing a permanent guardian for P.R., Real Party in Interest . Special action jurisdiction is appropriate because the Department has “no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remed y by appeal[,]” see Levinson v. Jarrett ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa
, 207 Ariz. 472, 474 ¶ 4 (App. 2004), and the issue raised is purely a legal question, with statewide importance, see State v. Brown , 210 Ariz. 534, 537 ¶ 6 (App. 2005).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Department removed P.R. from her parents shortly after she was born

. Respondent adjudicated her dependent and subsequently terminated her mother’s and father’s parental rights. P.R. was placed with her maternal uncle, Ray F. Responde nt appointed a guardian ad litem to protect P.R.’s interests t hroughout the proceeding s

. ¶3 Because of Ray ’s and his significant other’s history with the Department in previous dependency proceedings, Respondent did not find adoption appropriate. Respondent d id, however, “award the legal and physical custody of the child” to Ray as her permanent guardian “without restriction.” The Department then moved to dismiss the dependency since P.R. was no longer a dependent child

. Respondent denied the motion at the beh est of the guardian ad litem , stating that it wanted continued oversight of the guardianship, relying on A.R.S. § 8

– 873.01(A) , which states that the court shall order reunification services in a pending dependency proceeding for the parent “ when a dependen cy petition is filed on a permanent guardi a n ship

. ” The Department moved to reconsider because A.R.S. § 8

– 872(J) requires that the “ dependency shall be dismissed ” on the entry of an order of permanent guardianship . Respondent denied the motion and this special action followed.DCS v. HON. STOCKING

- TATE/P.R. Decision of the Court

3 DISCUSSION

¶4 The Department argues that Respondent was statutorily required under A.R.S. §§ 8

– 872(J) and 8

– 201(15) to dismiss the child dependency action after establishing Ray as P. R.’s permanent guardian. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Potter , 248 Ariz. 347, 349 ¶ 9 (App. 2020); see also Gutierrez v. Fox , 242 Ariz. 259, 264 ¶ 17 (App. 2017)

. The t ext of a statute is the most reliable indicator of its meaning. Potter

, 248 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 9 . When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature ’ s intent becau se its intent is readily discernible from the face of the statute. Id

¶5 Respondent erred in not dismissing the dependency action after m aking Ray the permanent guardian. Section 8

– 872(J) require s that

“ [o]n the entry of the order establishing a permanent guardianship, the dependency action shall be dismissed.” A.R.S. § 8

– 872(J). The ordinary meaning of “shall” in a statute is to impose a mandatory provision

. S ee HCZ Const., Inc. v. First Franklin Fin. Corp. , 199 Ariz. 361, 363 ¶ 10 (App. 2001). T he L egislature clearly and unambiguously mandated that when the juvenile court appoints a permanent guardian the juvenile court must dismiss the underlying dependency. A.R.S. § 8

- 872(J). T he definition of “dependent child” also supports this conclusion. A “dependent child” is one who is “[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and who has no parent or guardian . . . willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control.” A.R.S. § 8

– 201(15)(a)(i). Once Respondent appointed t he permanent guardianship, P.R. no longer fit within the definition of “dependent child” and Respondent had to dismiss the dependency. See A.R.S. § 8

– 201(15)(a)(i).

¶6 Real Party in Interest argues that Section 8

– 873.01(A) permits Respondent to continue the dependency even when a perm anen t guardianship has been established , but th is misreads the statute

. Section 8

– 873.01(A) applies only when a dependency action is filed after the establishment of a permanent guardianship, which is not the case here. Furthermore, notwithstanding the mandatory dismissal of the dependency, A.R.S. § 8

– 872(J) provides that the court “may order a report and shall set a review to be held within one year following the entry of the final order and may set such other and furthe r proceedings as may be in the best interests of the child.” Before the review hearing, the court could require “an investigation [. . .] surrounding the welfare and best interests of the child.” The Legislature thus accounted for a ny reasonable oversight the court desired.DCS v. HON. STOCKING

- TATE/P.R. Decision of the Court

4 CONCLUSION

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction
, grant relief, and remand for pr oceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court may exercise its discretion in making any further orders it deems necessary under A.R.S. § 8

– 872(J)

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