[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6732.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6732

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BACHMAN.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, Slip Opinion No. 

2020-Ohio-6732.] 

Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—Six-month 

suspension. 

(No. 2020-0739—Submitted July 22, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2019-061. 

______________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Louis Bachman, of North Bend, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0017713, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1984. He 

served as chief magistrate of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, General 

Division, from January 2007 until he resigned on September 10, 2018 (except for a 

brief period in 2013). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 2

{¶ 2} In a December 5, 2019 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel,

alleged that Bachman engaged in judicial misconduct in conjunction with an 

incident involving a woman who had disrupted a trial in his courtroom by 

screaming in the hallway. Bachman left the bench to locate the woman, brought 

her into his courtroom, summarily held her in direct contempt of court, and when 

she protested his actions, increased her three-day jail sentence to ten days. 

{¶ 3} Based on the parties’ stipulations and evidence presented at a hearing 

before a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, the board found that Bachman 

engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended that he be suspended from 

the practice of law for six months, fully stayed on conditions.

{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct but not the 

recommended sanction. 

Facts and Misconduct 

{¶ 5} On September 4, 2018, Bachman was conducting an asset-forfeiture 

trial in his assigned courtroom on the fifth floor of the Hamilton County courthouse. 

On that day, K.J. entered the courthouse at approximately 7:45 a.m. with the intent 

to file a petition for a civil protection order. After she completed the necessary 

paperwork, an employee in the clerk of courts’ office informed her that she had 

missed the 8:10 a.m. filing deadline for her petition to be heard that day and that 

she would have to return the following day. K.J. proceeded to Bachman’s 

courtroom in the apparent hope of having her case heard that day. Video footage 

shows that in the hallway outside the courtroom, Bachman’s courtroom clerk spoke 

with K.J. Their exchange lasted for approximately two minutes. Bachman’s law 

clerk, who was watching the two on a video monitor, exited the courtroom and 

joined the brief exchange. The video shows that as the courtroom clerk turned 

away, K.J. was still talking, then the law clerk raised his hand and ended the 

conversation. 
January Term, 2020 

3

{¶ 6} At that point, K.J. turned away and walked down the hallway toward 

the exit, and Bachman’s law clerk began to walk back toward the courtroom. K.J. 

then screamed so loudly that it was heard in the courtroom and captured on the 

audio system that was recording the proceedings. Bachman immediately said, 

“Okay, time-out” and stopped the trial. He then left the bench and exited the 

courtroom. At his disciplinary hearing, he testified that he stopped the trial because 

he could not hear a question asked of a witness. 

{¶ 7} Seeing that K.J. was walking toward the exit, Bachman ordered her to 

stop and return to the courtroom. After running toward K.J. and catching up with 

her near a stairwell, Bachman once again ordered her to return to the courtroom. 

She complied and began to walk back to the courtroom with Bachman following 

her. When K.J. turned toward the main entrance of the courtroom, Bachman placed 

his hand between her neck and her shoulder and redirected her to a side entrance. 

With his hand still firmly between her neck and her shoulder, Bachman directed 

her into the courtroom and into the jury box. 

{¶ 8} The following exchange then occurred: 

[Bachman to K.J.]: Have a seat right in that jury 

box, and don’t move. 

[Bachman to the clerk]: Get the sheriff up here. 

[K.J.]: What? Why? 

[Bachman]: If you open your mouth one 

more time, you’re adding on to your misery ma’am. 

[K.J.]: What— 

[Bachman]: Stop. Now—now—now, let 

me see who is here for my 8:30 cases. 
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 4

{¶ 9} Bachman then began calling the names of the parties on his 8:30 a.m. 

docket. Shortly thereafter, deputies arrived. After asking K.J. to state her name, 

Bachman stated, “Deputies, she’s in your custody for contempt of court for causing 

a ruckus which interrupted our hearing. Three days in jail.” 

{¶ 10} K.J. became upset, started crying, and yelled, “No! No!” Bachman 

stated, “Don’t make it worse ma’am.” After K.J. resisted the deputies and screamed 

several times, Bachman said, “Ten days.” While the deputies wrestled with K.J., 

she yelled, “Why every time I come here to get help, you always send me to jail? 

You didn’t even hear what it was that I had to say and now I got to go to jail for 

three days.”1

 Bachman, replied, “Now it’s ten, ma’am.” As deputies dragged K.J. 

from the courtroom at Bachman’s direction, Bachman addressed one of the deputies 

to congratulate him on an award that the deputy had received; according to 

Bachman, he was attempting to “inject some humanity” into the situation. Later 

that day, Bachman signed an order finding K.J. in direct contempt of court. 

{¶ 11} Two days after the incident occurred, Judge Kim Burke, the 

administrative and presiding judge of the Hamilton County Court of Common 

Pleas, General Division, watched the video footage of the incident, issued an order 

mitigating the penalty, and ordered that K.J. be released from custody. 

Approximately four days later, Bachman was informed that the judges were aware 

of his conduct and that the general sentiment among them was that he should be let 

go. At his disciplinary hearing, Bachman testified that he submitted his resignation 

after being told that if he resigned, “this would be quiet and that would be it.” 

{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that Bachman’s conduct 

violates Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge at all times to act in a manner that 

promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 

 

1. K.J.’s statement referred to a contempt finding that Bachman issued against her in August 2017 

for knocking a sign off the wall in the hallway outside the courtroom after Bachman denied her ex 

parte application for a civil protection order. At his disciplinary hearing, Bachman testified that he 

did not recall that incident at the time of the events at issue in this case. 
January Term, 2020 

5

judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety), 2.2 

(requiring a judge to uphold and apply the law and perform all duties of judicial 

office fairly and impartially), and 2.8(B) (requiring a judge to be patient, dignified, 

and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and 

others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity). We adopt these findings 

of misconduct. 

Sanction 

{¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for attorney and judicial misconduct, we 

consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, 

the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 

imposed in similar cases. 

{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that five mitigating

factors are present: Bachman did not have a prior disciplinary record, had not acted 

with a selfish or dishonest motive, had made full and free disclosure to the board 

or exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, had presented evidence 

of his good character or reputation, and had had other sanctions imposed for his 

conduct—namely, the loss of his employment. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), 

(4), (5), and (6). The parties stipulated and the board agreed that just one 

aggravating factor is present—the vulnerability of and resulting harm to the victim, 

K.J. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8). We adopt these findings in part. We agree that 

Bachman did not have a prior disciplinary record, that he made a full and free 

disclosure to the board or exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, 

had presented evidence of his good character and reputation, and had other 

sanctions imposed for his conduct. However, we disagree with the finding of the 

mitigating factor of absence of a dishonest or selfish motive in this case. We find 

this to be an aggravating factor in addition to refusal to acknowledge the wrongful 

nature of the misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (7). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 6

{¶ 15} The board found that Bachman had demonstrated a clear lack of 

patience, dignity, and courtesy, created the impression that he was not impartial, 

and effectively undermined the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the 

judiciary. The board also found that he failed to appreciate the inappropriateness 

of his actions. Although he testified that he regretted leaving the bench that day, 

he expressed no remorse for the harm that he had caused to K.J.—choosing instead 

to focus on the effects of his misconduct on his own career and finances. 

{¶ 16} The board considered three cases in which we publicly reprimanded 

judges who, among other things, failed to comply with rules requiring them to act 

at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, 

integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Oldfield, 

140 Ohio St.3d 123, 2014-Ohio-2963, 16 N.E.3d 581 (publicly reprimanding a 

judge who presided over 53 cases in which a public defender appeared as counsel 

while she was living in the judge’s home and riding to the courthouse with the judge 

each day); Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 93 Ohio St.3d 474, 756 N.E.2d 104 

(2001) (publicly reprimanding a judge who talked to a recently arrested person over 

the telephone, picked her up and drove her home, and later accepted that person’s 

guilty plea in the resulting criminal case); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker, 78 

Ohio St.3d 92, 676 N.E.2d 870 (1997) (publicly reprimanding a judge who made 

derogatory remarks regarding a litigant’s national origin in one case, ordered 

marriage as a condition of probation in three other cases, and exhibited a lack of 

judicial temperament in several others). 

{¶ 17} Although the board acknowledged that Bachman had engaged in a 

single, isolated instance of misconduct, it determined that his misconduct is more 

egregious than that in Oldfield, Medley, and Mestemaker. The board found that 

Bachman’s misconduct is more in line with the misconduct at issue in three cases 

in which we imposed fully stayed six-month suspensions on judicial officers who 

had conducted ex parte and other improper proceedings in their courtrooms. 
January Term, 2020 

7

{¶ 18} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague, 88 Ohio St.3d 321, 725 N.E.2d 

1108 (2000), the judge misused the authority of his judicial office to summon to his 

courtroom the owner and the driver of a vehicle that he had personally observed 

being operated in a reckless manner. While the owner and the person who had been 

driving the vehicle sat at the defendant’s table, the judge conducted an arrogant 

inquisition and reprimanded them from the bench. Having previously threatened 

them with criminal charges, he stated that he was going to report their driving habits 

to their employer. Hoague later wrote an open letter of apology that was published 

in a local newspaper and was ultimately convicted of a misdemeanor count of 

coercion. Upon finding that Hoague failed to act in a manner that promoted public 

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, we suspended him from 

the practice of law for six months but stayed the entire suspension on the condition 

that he engage in no further misconduct. 

{¶ 19} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Porzio, 160 Ohio St.3d 77, 2020-Ohio1569, 153 N.E.3d 70, we imposed the same sanction on a magistrate who, after 

conducting a hearing on petitions for civil stalking protection orders, excused one 

of the pro se parties and then engaged in a lengthy ex parte communication with 

the remaining party regarding the merits of the pending petitions. In addition to 

violating rules that required her to act in a manner that promotes public confidence 

in the judiciary and prohibiting ex parte communications, Porzio violated a rule 

requiring her to disqualify herself from any proceeding in which her impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned. Porzio had no prior disciplinary record, lacked a 

dishonest or selfish motive, exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 

proceedings, and lost her job as a result of her misconduct. 

{¶ 20} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-

Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, a judge interceded in a probation matter that was 

within the province of the probation department, used vulgar and intemperate 

language while lecturing the probationer in his courtroom, and did so when neither 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 8

the probationer’s counsel nor the prosecutor were present. He also unnecessarily 

injected himself into an internal police-department investigation related to a 

criminal case that was pending in his court and in an open courtroom, accused the 

police department of engaging in a coverup. We imposed a conditionally stayed 

six-month suspension on Elum for his misconduct, which included all three of the 

rule violations that Bachman has been found to have committed in this case. 

{¶ 21} Based on these cases, the board recommends that we impose a 

sanction of a six-month suspension stayed in its entirety. However, we find that a 

stayed suspension is not commensurate with the judicial misconduct in this case. 

When a judicial officer’s misconduct causes harm in the form of incarceration, that 

abuse of the public trust warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law. 

{¶ 22} The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the public, 

guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and enhance 

public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 

103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33. Sanctions serve as a 

deterrent to similar violations by judicial officers in the future, they notify the 

public of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession, and they build 

confidence in the legitimacy and integrity of the judiciary. Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Horton, 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 561, ¶ 60. 

{¶ 23} Judicial officers have inherent authority to summarily punish for 

direct contempt to secure the effective administration of justice and the dignity of 

the court. See Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 

520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). And R.C. 2705.01 permits a judicial officer to summarily 

punish a person whose misbehavior in or near the courtroom “obstruct[s] the 

administration of justice.” But in this case, the scream outside Bachman’s 

courtroom can be characterized only as a distraction at best or a momentary 

interruption to the proceedings at worst. The only obstruction to the administration 

of justice that day occurred due to Bachman’s misconduct. 
January Term, 2020 

9

{¶ 24} Bachman testified at his disciplinary hearing that the scream 

prevented him from being able to hear a question that was being asked of a witness. 

While the scream may have interrupted the trial occurring in Bachman’s courtroom, 

it was a far cry from obstructing the trial. “Trial courts * * * must be on guard 

against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the 

administration of justice.” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78 S.Ct. 622, 

2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958). “The record must demonstrate that the contemnor had an 

intent to obstruct the administration of justice or disobey an order of the court.” 

DeMoss v. Lappin, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 16428, 16566, 1994 Lexis 2622 (June 

15, 1994). Because of the summary nature of punishment for a direct-contempt 

conviction, the obstruction must pose an imminent threat to the administration of 

justice; it is not even enough that the obstruction poses a likely or probable threat. 

In re LoDico, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003-CA-00446, 2005-Ohio-172, ¶ 48, citing In 

re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972), and Craig v. Harney, 

331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947). There is nothing in the 

record to suggest that K.J. screamed to prevent Bachman from conducting the trial. 

Understandably, the scream likely frustrated or angered Bachman, but under no 

circumstances could the scream be viewed as rising to the level of obstructing the 

trial or presenting an imminent threat to the administration of justice. Bachman 

admitted as much at his disciplinary hearing. And when K.J. protested, asking why 

she was being thrown in jail and causing sheriff’s deputies to physically subdue her 

and remove her from the jury box where Bachman had seated her, Bachman 

compounded his misconduct by more than tripling her jail sentence. 

{¶ 25} This court has made clear that the power to punish for contempt is 

properly used to secure the dignity of the courts, not to demean and intimidate 

people. Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007-Ohio-979, 862 

N.E.2d 514, ¶ 41. Abuse of this power “ ‘not only throws doubts on [the judicial 

officer’s] impartiality, but also weakens the public’s perception of the integrity of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 10 

the judiciary.’ ” Id., quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 

114, 760 N.E.2d 412 (2002). 

{¶ 26} In Cox, we imposed an indefinite suspension on a former judge for 

three counts of misconduct, one of which involved abuse of his power of contempt. 

Relative to that count, the judge ordered the arrest of a person who, upon learning 

that his nephew had to pay an additional $200 fee in his case before the judge, 

remarked to a court cashier that “judges can be crooks, too.” Id. at ¶ 5. After the 

cashier reported the remark to the judge, the judge ordered the person’s arrest and 

the person was held in custody for three hours. Because the judge’s abuse of the 

contempt power seriously undermined the goals of strengthening public confidence 

in a fair and impartial judiciary, we imposed “an equally serious sanction * * * for 

the public’s protection and as a deterrent to such subversive conduct in the future.” 

Id. at ¶ 42. 

{¶ 27} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, we imposed an 18-month 

suspension, with six months stayed, on a judge for multiple instances of 

misconduct, one of which involved jailing a gallery spectator for contempt without 

cause. 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635, 876 N.E.2d 556. The incident arose 

when the judge ordered a woman who was watching her daughter’s probationviolation hearing to leave the courtroom because the woman had raised her hand. 

When she protested slightly, the judge told her to “just leave” and that he had “heard 

enough” out of her. Id. at ¶ 8. He then threatened to put her “in [her] daughter’s 

place” if she did not leave. The woman started to leave the courtroom, muttering, 

“I can’t believe this,” but the judge called her back and found her in contempt of 

court. Id. The judge then sentenced her to 24 hours in jail. In our analysis of this 

abuse of judicial authority, we stated that “[t]he measured and even-handed 

administration of justice is central to our judicial system.” Id. at ¶ 9. And with 

respect to this count of misconduct, we found that the judge had “stained the 
January Term, 2020 

11 

integrity of that system with his intemperate, unreasonable, and vindictive decision 

to eject this spectator from the courtroom and jail her for contempt.” Id. 

{¶ 28} Despite the fact that Cox and Parker both involved multiple acts of 

judicial misconduct, the two cases are instructive regarding the appropriate sanction 

in this case because they both involved an abuse of the judicial power to punish for 

contempt that resulted in a person’s incarceration. 

{¶ 29} When determining a sanction for professional misconduct, injury

caused by the misconduct is a factor that this court considers. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 

500, 2012-Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, at ¶ 20, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53. K.J. did 

not testify at Bachman’s disciplinary hearing, and there is nothing in the record to 

indicate why that was the case. However, the video footage of the incident is 

revealing and disturbing. It shows Bachman exiting the courtroom in his robe and 

running down the hallway in pursuit of K.J. He accosts her at the elevators and 

returns her to his courtroom. Once there, Bachman walks her through the crowded 

courtroom with his hand on her shoulder, places her in a seat in his jury box, and 

orders her not to move just before summoning the sheriff. Multiple sheriff’s 

deputies soon arrive, and Bachman orders them to take K.J. into custody and to jail 

her for three days for contempt, causing her to cry and attempt to leave the jury 

box. 

{¶ 30} The next 20 minutes of the video are difficult to watch. While K.J. 

resists being arrested and pleads with Bachman to explain why she is being jailed 

for three days, she is physically subdued by two deputies, threatened with being 

tased, and ultimately dragged from the jury box by several deputies. Bachman’s 

only response is to increase her jail sentence to ten days. Not only is the chain of 

events set in motion by Bachman’s misconduct physically and emotionally harmful 

to K.J., the incident exposed the sheriff’s deputies and other court personnel to harm 

from a violent and unnecessary arrest on full display in front of a courtroom full of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 12 

people who have no other choice but to sit silently and witness such a disturbing 

sight. Bachman then congratulates a deputy on an award the deputy had recently 

received and resumes the proceeding as if nothing out of the ordinary has just 

transpired. Meanwhile, the video footage shows, while K.J. continues protesting 

her arrest, she is dragged, yanked, pinned to a wall, and handcuffed to a chair. 

Before the video ends, over 20 deputies and members of the court staff are involved 

in jailing K.J.—all because of a scream of frustration in the hallway that lasted one 

second. 

{¶ 31} Although Bachman stipulated that K.J. was the victim of his 

misconduct and that she was vulnerable, the board found that Bachman’s hearing 

testimony demonstrated his lack of understanding of the harm he had caused. The 

board report specifically states: 

[Bachman’s] testimony demonstrated a lack of insight as to 

the inappropriateness of his actions. His biggest regret was leaving 

the bench that day. He did not show any remorse for the effects of 

the incident on [K.J.] but rather focused on the impact it had on his 

career and his resulting financial loss. He defended his action as 

being within the law rather than * * * an appropriate exercise of the 

contempt power. 

Bachman’s sentencing K.J. to ten days in jail for a one-second scream in the 

hallway as she was leaving his courtroom area and for questioning why she was 

being jailed is outrageous. The spectacle his conduct created was even more 

appalling and demonstrates his utter indifference to the harm he caused K.J. and the 

integrity of the judiciary. 

{¶ 32} This court has made clear that judicial misconduct that abuses the 

public trust will result in “significant consequences.” Horton, 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 
January Term, 2020 

13 

2019-Ohio-4139, 140 N.E.3d 561, at ¶ 77. A fully stayed six-month suspension for 

Bachman’s judicial misconduct is not a significant consequence. In a unanimous 

decision in Horton, this court imposed an indefinite suspension from the practice 

of law on a former judge who, while in office, sexually harassed members of his 

staff, created a hostile work environment, misused county resources to benefit his 

judicial campaign, and blamed his staff for causing his unethical behavior. 

Although we rightfully found that Horton’s actions were inappropriate, unethical, 

and egregious based on the imbalance of power he had over his staff, the people 

who were subjected to his misconduct at least had some ability to extricate 

themselves from the abuse, imbalance of power notwithstanding. K.J. and others 

like her who have been improperly jailed did not have that ability. 

{¶ 33} The power to summarily punish for direct contempt is not tempered 

by the rigors of due process. It is a prodigious power that is not to be invoked for 

actions that offend one’s sensibilities or when a judicial officer feels personally 

affronted or disrespected. There are other, less severe, ways of handling disruptive 

courthouse conduct, ranging from a momentary pause (which would have averted 

this case) to ordering someone’s departure from the courtroom or the courthouse. 

And with tremendous powers come tremendous responsibilities. The 

administrative and presiding judge of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

recognized this when she ordered K.J. released from jail.2

 Disciplinary cases 

involving an abuse of judicial power, particularly one depriving a person of his or 

her liberty, is a significant violation of the public trust. Even considering the 

 

2. As a reminder, Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(a) requires an attorney to self-report his or her violations of the 

Rules of Professional Conduct that raise a question about the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or 

fitness to practice law. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy, 140 Ohio St.3d 391, 2014-Ohio3774, 18 N.E.3d 1191, ¶ 14. And Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) requires attorneys to report any ethical 

violation by a judicial officer. See generally Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report 

Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 259 (2003). This incident 

occurred in September 2018, but the disciplinary complaint against Bachman was not filed until 

December 2019. It is unclear from the record how Bachman’s misconduct was reported. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 14 

mitigating factors present in Bachman’s case and that as a result of his misconduct 

he resigned his position, a fully stayed six-month suspension is not a sanction 

commensurate with his misconduct. 

{¶ 34} We recognize the many circumstances under which trial-court 

judges and magistrates can become exasperated with the courthouse conduct of 

parties, lawyers, and the public. Judicial officers are human beings with the full 

range of human emotions. But when lawyers become judicial officers, they are 

held to an additional—and a higher—standard of conduct. See Jud.Cond.R., 

Preamble [3]. This is particularly so because of the many ways in which a judicial 

officer can deprive a person of property and, more importantly, of liberty. 

{¶ 35} Sending someone to jail is not the adult equivalent to sending a child 

to his or her room for a time-out. Yet Bachman and other judicial officers who 

have been sanctioned for similar conduct seem to equate the two. Not only was 

Bachman’s jailing of K.J. unauthorized under the contempt statute, but he exhibited 

a total disregard for the reason she was at the courthouse in the first place⸻to get 

a civil protection order. He also showed a complete indifference to the 

circumstances of her life (e.g., whether she had children or other family members 

to care for, employment she might lose, or any other harm she could suffer), to the 

indignity she endured by being physically restrained in a crowded courtroom, and 

ultimately, to the loss of her liberty. 

{¶ 36} In indefinitely suspending the former judge in Horton, we stated that 

“[w]e will protect the public by sending a strong message to members of the 

judiciary that abusing the trust of public employees and the public at large will 

result in significant consequences.” 158 Ohio St.3d 76, 2019-Ohio-4139, 140 

N.E.3d 561, at ¶ 77. Thus, a sanction more severe than a fully stayed six-month 

suspension not only is compelled by Bachman’s misconduct and the aggravating 

factors present in this case but is also necessary to send a strong message to 
January Term, 2020 

15 

members of the judiciary, to deter similar violations in the future, and to make 

crystal clear to the public that this type of judicial misconduct will not be tolerated. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 37} Accordingly, Michael Louis Bachman is suspended from the 

practice of law for six months. Costs are taxed to Bachman. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 

concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 

FISCHER, J., not participating. 

_________________ 

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Adam P. Bessler, Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Reminger Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Borchelt, and Ian D. Mitchell, for 

respondent. 

_________________