Opinion issued February 10, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-14-00625-CV

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STEVEN MOODY, Appellant

V.

SPRING CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM DEALERSHIP CO.

AND AUTO NATION CORPORATION, Appellees

On Appeal from the 133rd Judicial District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014-26991

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Steven Moody, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at the time of 

filing his notice of appeal from the interlocutory orders granting the appellees’ 

motions for summary judgment, has neither paid the required filing fee nor
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established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 20.1; 

see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.208, 51.941(a), 101.041(1) (West 

2013), § 101.0411 (West Supp. 2014); Order Regarding Fees Charged in the 

Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and Before the Judicial 

Panel on Multi-District Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 13-9127 (Tex. Aug. 16, 

2013). After being notified by the Clerk of this Court on August 14, 2014, that his 

appeal was subject to dismissal for failure to pay the fee, appellant filed a motion 

for an extension of time to pay the fee on August 28, 2014, claiming that he had 

filed an affidavit of indigence in the trial court on July 24, 2014. Although 

appellant claimed that he had established his indigence and the trial clerk’s website 

indicated that the trial clerk had filed a contest to the affidavit, no order regarding 

the contest had been included in the record.

Furthermore, on September 25, 2014, appellees notified the Clerk of this 

Court that the trial court had recently signed an order severing the John Doe 

defendants that appellant had sued. On October 30, 2014, this Court ordered the 

trial clerk to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the orders regarding the 

severance motions and the contest to appellant’s affidavit of indigence. On 

January 5, 2015, the trial clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record containing the 

trial clerk’s contest to the appellant’s affidavit and motion for extension of time for 

a hearing on the contest, but no order regarding the contest or motion. The trial 
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clerk also filed the trial court’s September 23, 2014 order granting the appellees’ 

motions for severance, making the interlocutory orders now final and appealable.

However, the Court’s October 30, 2014 Order was returned on November 

17, 2014, with the following typed notations, “RETURN TO SENDER, 

ATTEMPTED — NOT KNOWN, UNABLE TO FORWARD,” and the following 

handwritten notation, “RTS RLSD,” indicating that it was returned to sender 

because appellant had been released from prison. On December 30, 2014, the 

Clerk of this Court notified appellant, at his last known prison address provided by 

him, that this appeal was subject for dismissal for want of prosecution unless he 

provided the Clerk his current address within 15 days of the date of that notice. On 

January 9, 2015, the Clerk’s notice was returned with the same “RTS RLSD” 

notations listed above. Appellant has neither paid the filing fee nor responded to 

the Court’s notices with any other address. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5; 42.3(c).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. 

APP. P. 5, 42.3(b), (c). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.