[Cite as State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-3329.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

HENRY LAMAR HARRIS

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29903

Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 03806

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on August 30, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Henry Lamar Harris appeals from his convictions for 

murder, felonious assault, discharge of a weapon on or near prohibited premises, and 

having weapons under disability. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
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I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On June 13, 2021, P.B. was driving a white SUV; his brother L.B. was in the 

front passenger seat, and his nephew, L.B.’s son, was in the rear passenger seat. P.B. 

had driven the vehicle to the home of Joel Oldham, who ran a car wash out of his 

residence on Wentworth Avenue in Dayton. As P.B. was backing out of Oldham’s 

driveway, a man approached the vehicle; when P.B. stopped the vehicle to shift from 

reverse to drive, the man fired numerous shots into the vehicle. P.B. was struck in the 

wrist and L.B. was struck multiple times. L.B. later died from his injuries. 

{¶ 3} LaVon Robinson was at Oldham’s home at the time of the shooting. He 

observed a black man walk a bicycle onto Oldham’s porch. The man used some type of 

tool on the bike. Robinson was looking down when he heard about five or six pops which 

he thought sounded like firecrackers. He then saw the white SUV drive away, and he 

saw the man with the bicycle run away on foot without the bike. 

{¶ 4} Larry Crutcher was sitting on his porch on Wentworth Avenue at the time of 

the shooting. Crutcher, who knew Harris by sight but not by name, observed Harris 

walking with a bicycle. Harris stopped in front of Crutcher’s home and looked toward 

Oldham’s residence. According to Crutcher, as a white SUV began backing out of 

Oldham’s driveway, he saw Harris pull out a gun, walk toward the SUV, and fire into the 

driver’s side of the vehicle. Harris then ran away and left the bike in front of Crutcher’s 

home. 

{¶ 5} Crutcher’s son, Je’an Crutcher, had known Harris for years but only knew 

him by his nickname “Blakk.” Je’an saw Harris walk up the street with a bike and stop in 
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front of the Crutchers’ home. Je’an then saw Harris walk toward Oldham’s house. 

Je’an then went inside his home, at which time he heard five gunshots. 

{¶ 6} Je’an met with Dayton Police Department Detective David House and 

showed House Blakk’s Facebook account. House gathered information about Harris 

from the Facebook account and through law enforcement websites. House then showed 

Je’an a picture of Harris from a law enforcement website. Je’an confirmed that Harris 

was the person he knew as Blakk. 

{¶ 7} After receiving information that Harris had been spotted at a Greyhound Bus 

station in Columbus, U.S. Deputy Marshal David Youngless led other law enforcement 

officers to the station. They encountered Harris, who was carrying a backpack. 

Youngless had copies of two warrants for Harris’s arrest. Harris refused to provide his 

name when asked and stated that he was not the person the officers were looking to 

arrest. Youngless took Harris into custody and conducted a search of the backpack. 

The backpack contained a handgun loaded with six bullets, two bags of bullets, and a bus 

ticket under a different name.

{¶ 8} A hammer found on Oldham’s porch was swabbed for comparison with 

Harris’s DNA and was found to be a match. The bullets removed from L.B.’s body were 

determined to have been fired from Harris’s revolver. Harris’s cellular telephone records 

indicated that he had been in the area of Wentworth Avenue at the time of the shooting. 

Je’an testified at trial that the gun located in Harris’s backpack was the same gun he had 

previously observed in Harris’s possession. A photographic array was presented to P.B.,

and he identified Harris as the shooter.
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{¶ 9} In January 2022, Harris was indicted on two counts of murder, five counts of 

felonious assault, one count of discharge of a weapon on or near prohibited premises, 

and two counts of having weapons under disability. Except the counts of having 

weapons under disability, all the counts carried attendant three-year firearm 

specifications. Harris filed motions to suppress the photographic identifications and the 

search of his backpack, both of which were overruled.

{¶ 10} Harris was found guilty by a jury of the charges of murder, felonious assault, 

and discharge of a weapon on or near prohibited premises. The charges of having 

weapons under disability were tried to the judge, and Harris was also found guilty of those

charges. 

{¶ 11} The trial court merged the murder convictions and the two counts of 

felonious assault related to L.B. and imposed a prison sentence of 15 years to life, plus a 

consecutive three-year sentence for a firearm specification. The trial court also merged 

the felonious assaults related to P.B. and sentenced Harris to an 8-years prison term on 

that offense, plus a consecutive three-year term for a firearm specification. The court 

ordered those two sentences to be served consecutively. The sentences imposed for 

the remaining offenses were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for 

murder. Thus, Harris’s aggregate sentence was 29 years to life. 

{¶ 12} Harris appeals.

II. Suppression Motion

{¶ 13} The first assignment of error states as follows:
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED HARRIS’ 

MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS.

{¶ 14} Harris claims the trial court should have granted his motions to suppress 

pretrial identifications and the post-arrest search of his backpack.

{¶ 15} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier 

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the 

credibility of witnesses.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. 

“Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence . . . Accepting these facts as true, the 

appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion 

of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” (Citations 

omitted.) Id.

{¶ 16} We begin with Harris’s claim that the trial court should have suppressed the 

warrantless search of his backpack. 

{¶ 17} In general, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to only 

a few specific well-established exceptions. State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 15. “One 

such exception is for searches incident to a lawful arrest.” (Citation omitted.) State v. 

Frazee, 2015-Ohio-4786, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). This exception “derives from interests in officer 

safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” 

(Citations omitted.) Id. Under this exception, “an officer making a lawful arrest may 

conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's person and of the area ‘within his 
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immediate control.’ ” Id. “The area within a person's immediate control includes ‘the area 

from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.’ ” Id.

at ¶ 11. “The right to search incident to arrest exists even if the item is no longer 

accessible to the arrestee at the time of the search. . . . As long as the arrestee has the 

item within his immediate control near the time of the arrest, the item can be searched.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 183.

{¶ 18} Here, it is undisputed that Deputy Marshal Youngless had arrest warrants 

in his possession when he detained Harris, and Harris had the backpack on his person 

at the time of his arrest. Thus, under the authority of Adams, Youngless had the right to 

conduct a search of the backpack. 

{¶ 19} We next address Harris’s claim that the pretrial identification made by Je’an

was improper and should have been suppressed. Specifically, he complains that the 

identification was unduly suggestive because House only presented one picture of Harris 

to Je’an to confirm that Harris was the person Je’an knew as Blakk. 

{¶ 20} “To justify suppressing a pretrial identification, a defendant must 

demonstrate (1) that the identification procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive 

as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification, and (2) that the 

identification in fact was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances.” (Citations 

omitted.) State v. Green, 2003-Ohio-5744, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.). “In other words, even if an 

identification procedure was overly suggestive, the identification remains admissible if 

sufficient evidence of reliability exists. A determination of reliability is unnecessary, 

however, where an identification procedure was not unduly suggestive.” (Citation 
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omitted.) Id. 

{¶ 21} Je’an’s identification of Harris from a photograph did not involve a witness 

identifying a person who was unknown to them. Although Je’an knew him only as Blakk, 

Je’an was very familiar with Harris, whom he had known for years. Je’an gave House 

information about Blakk and showed House Harris’s Facebook page. Je’an confirmed 

that a photograph which House subsequently located was the person he knew as Blakk. 

As such, we agree with the trial court’s finding that this identification was reliable. 

{¶ 22} Finally, Harris contends that a pretrial identification made by P.B. should 

have been suppressed. In support, he argues that the reliance by the police on the 

identification made by Je’an rendered P.B.’s identification improper. 

{¶ 23} The record demonstrates that House prepared a photographic array. He 

began with a picture of Harris taken from a law enforcement website, then searched the 

website for pictures of men who were similar in appearance. After creating the 

photographic array of six photographs, House assigned another detective, Sara Lipps, to 

present the array to P.B. Lipps was not familiar with the case or the suspects, and she 

did not have the identification key for the array. She properly instructed P.B. on the 

identification process. P.B. identified Harris as the offender. 

{¶ 24} As noted, Harris argues that the identification was improper because of the 

prior identification made by Je’an. He does not claim the photographic array was unduly 

suggestive or that it was improperly administered. We find nothing in the record to 

suggest that the identification made by P.B. was suggestive or unreliable. Therefore, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in denying suppression of this identification. 
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{¶ 25} The trial court did not err in overruling the motions to suppress. The first 

assignment of error is overruled.

III. Manifest Weight and Sufficiency

{¶ 26} The second assignment of error asserted by Harris states:

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 

AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO 

SUSTAIN HARRIS’ CONVICTIONS.

{¶ 27} Harris contends the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to identify 

him as the shooter and that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

{¶ 28} “[S]ufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied 

to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally 

sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial 

to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the 

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Marshall, 2010-Ohio-5160, ¶ 52 

(2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the crime's essential 

elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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{¶ 29} On the other hand, when an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, 

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the 

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must 

be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387

(1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A case should 

not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence except “ ‘in the 

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Id.

{¶ 30} “[A]lthough sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, 

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that 

a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a 

finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 (10th 

Dist.). Accord State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.). As a result, a 

determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be 

dispositive of sufficiency. State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 31} LaVon Robinson testified that a black male who had been on Oldham’s 

porch doing something with his bike was the same person who committed the shooting. 

A hammer found on the porch was collected and was found to have Harris’s DNA on it. 

Larry and Je’an Crutcher each testified that Harris had been in front of their home with a 

bike shortly before the shooting. Larry Crutcher identified Harris as the person who he 

observed fire a gun into the SUV. P.B. identified Harris from a photographic array. The 
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gun recovered from Harris’s backpack was identified as the weapon used in the shooting, 

and phone records demonstrated that Harris was in the vicinity of the shooting at the time 

it occurred. 

{¶ 32} Based upon this evidence, we see no basis for concluding that the jury lost 

its way in finding that Harris was the shooter. Accordingly, the second assignment of 

error is overruled.

IV. Consecutive Sentences

{¶ 33} Harris’s third assignment of error is as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF 

CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT 

CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

{¶ 34} Harris asserts the record fails to support the trial court’s findings in support 

of consecutive sentences. We disagree.

{¶ 35} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits a trial court to impose consecutive sentences if 

it finds that (1) consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or 

punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; 

and (3) one or more of the following findings are made:

(a) The offender committed the offenses while awaiting trial or sentencing, 

was under a sanction imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.16, R.C. 2929.17, 

R.C. 2929.18, or was under post-release control;
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(b) At least two of the offenses were committed as part of one or more 

courses of conduct, and the harm was so great that no single prison term 

adequately reflects the seriousness of the conduct;

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

{¶ 36} “The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to 

defer to a trial court's consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court's findings must 

be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” 

State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5; State v. Norris, 2023-Ohio-4057, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 37} The trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect 

the public from future crime or to punish Harris. The court further found that consecutive 

sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Harris's conduct and the 

danger he posed to society. The court also found that the offenses were committed as 

part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm was so great that no single prison 

term would adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct. Finally, the court found 

that Harris’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive sentences were 

necessary to protect the public from future crime. Thus, the trial court made findings 

which supported the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the sentences must be 

upheld unless we find that those findings were clearly and convincingly not supported by 

the record.
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{¶ 38} According to the record, Harris fired numerous shots at a vehicle with three 

passengers. One of those passengers was killed, and a second suffered a gunshot 

wound. Thus, the record supported a finding that two or more offenses were committed 

as part of one course of conduct, and that by killing one victim and injuring a second 

victim, the harm caused was so great that no single prison term would adequately reflect 

the seriousness of the conduct. Additionally, the presentence investigation report 

showed that Harris had been adjudicated as unruly as a teenager, had been placed on 

probation, and had violated the terms of that probation. He also had a lengthy 

misdemeanor offense history which included convictions for assault and domestic 

violence. Further, Harris was indicted in May 2021 for aggravated possession of drugs, 

possession of cocaine, obstructing official business, and resisting arrest. In June 2021, 

he was indicted for aggravated possession of drugs and receiving stolen property. He 

was awaiting trial on both of those cases when he committed the instant offenses. 

Additionally, Harris had been placed on intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC) in March 

2021 for an aggravated possession of drugs charge. At some point he violated ILC and 

absconded. Thus, the record supported a finding that Harris had committed the offenses 

while awaiting trial or sentencing and that his history of criminal conduct demonstrated

that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him.

{¶ 39} On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s consecutive 

sentence findings were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. 

Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.
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V. Conclusion

{¶ 40} All of Harris’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.