COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

SHARON HATHAWAY FORREST 

v. Record No. 2256-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

GREGORY LAWRENCE RUHLIN JULY 18, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jack B. Stevens, Judge 

 (Sharon Hathaway Forrest, pro se, on briefs). 

 (Andrew G. Lawrence, on brief), for appellee. 

 Amicus Curiae: (Steven Allen Forrest, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Sharon Hathaway Forrest (mother) appeals the decision of the 

Circuit Court of Fairfax County (trial court) denying her motion 

to transfer this matter to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court of the City of Norfolk and resolving other issues. 

 Mother was granted a divorce from Gregory Lawrence Ruhlin 

(father) by the trial court in 1993. At the time this matter was 

heard by the trial court, mother lived in Norfolk with her new 

husband and had custody of the parties' six children. 

 Mother raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether 

the trial court had authority to order mother's new husband to 

refrain from making derogatory comments about father; (2) whether 

the trial court erred by denying mother an additional hearing; 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

(3) whether the trial court's refusal to transfer this matter was 

in the children's best interests; and (4) whether the trial court 

was permitted by statute to prohibit derogatory statements. Upon 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

On review, we consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the party prevailing 

in the trial court. Where the trial court's 

decision is based upon an ore tenus hearing, 

its determination will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence in the record to support it. 

Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 

30 (1989). 

 I. Authority Over Mother's Husband

 "'In Virginia, we have established the rule that the welfare 

of the infant is the primary, paramount, and controlling 

consideration of the court in all controversies between parents 

over the custody of their minor children. All other matters are 

subordinate.'" Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, 16 Va. App. 314, 318, 

429 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993) (citation omitted). Moreover, "[i]n 

matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad 

discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to 

foster a child's best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 

326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). 

 We reject mother's contention that the trial court did not 

have authority to require mother's husband to refrain from making 
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derogatory comments about father in the presence of the children. 

 Mother's husband had testified as a witness, was present in 

court, and was subject to the court's authority. There is no 

question mother's husband had sufficient notice, as the trial 

court spoke directly to mother's husband and ordered him to avoid 

making any comments about father in the presence of the children. 

See Rollins v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 438, 441, 177 S.E.2d 639, 

642 (1970). This is not an instance where due process requires 

the joinder of a party, and Code § 8.01-7, relied upon by mother, 

is not applicable. 

 In exercising its authority to promote the best interests of 

the children, a trial court may impose restrictions which affect 

non-parties. See, e.g., Carrico v. Blevins, 12 Va. App. 47, 

49-51, 402 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1991) (mother who lived with her 

boyfriend was barred from having overnight visitors of opposite 

sex when son visited). Moreover, the trial court had authority 

to review and modify custody of the children if mother and her 

husband failed to comply with the court's order. 

 II. Additional Hearing

 "After a court has concluded an evidentiary hearing, 'during 

which each party had ample opportunity to present evidence, it 

[is] within the court's discretion to refuse to take further 

evidence on this subject.'" Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 

480, 375 S.E.2d 387, 392 (1988) (citation omitted). Contrary to 

mother's characterizations, we find no evidence that there were 
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improper ex parte communications or that mother was prevented 

from presenting evidence to the court. Mother received a copy of 

father's letter to the court concerning the use of "respite 

providers" to supervise father's visitation. Mother then filed a 

memorandum in response to the proposed split fee arrangement. 

The trial court had mother's arguments before it when it denied 

mother's requested arrangement. We cannot say the trial court 

abused its discretion when it entered the order without 

conducting an additional hearing. 

 III. Denial of Transfer

 Code § 20-79(c) allows, but does not require, the transfer 

of a matter concerning the care and custody of minor children 

from the circuit court to "any juvenile and domestic relations 

district court within the Commonwealth that constitutes a more 

appropriate forum." Transfer, therefore, is expressly left to 

the discretion of the trial court. The trial court noted that it 

was refusing to transfer the matter to the Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court of the City of Norfolk because "[t]he 

case was tried here, and this Court has . . . been supervising 

this matter since the beginning." 

 We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by 

retaining jurisdiction over a matter which had begun in the 

Fairfax County courts and over which the trial judge had presided 

for numerous hearings. 

 IV. Derogatory Statements
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 Mother argues that the trial court erred when it ordered 

mother to refrain from making derogatory statements about father, 

because there was no evidence mother had made derogatory 

statements. Mother also argues that the Virginia Code does not 

authorize such a prohibition. 

 There was evidence to support the conclusion that mother had 

made negative comments about father to the children. For 

instance, while the eldest daughter testified that mother had 

never said anything against father, the daughter also testified 

that mother had said father was dangerous. Moreover, in 

furtherance of the children's best interests, the trial court was 

authorized to order mother to refrain from making derogatory 

comments, regardless whether such comments had been made in the 

past. Therefore, the trial court was acting within its statutory 

and discretionary authority in ordering mother to refrain from 

making derogatory comments about father in the presence of the 

children. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.