Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

OPINION

No. 04-14-00352-CR

JOHN GONZALES III,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR7917

Honorable Laura Parker, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 6, 2015

AFFIRMED

This case stems from an aggravated robbery resulting in the murder of James Whitley. 

Appellant John Gonzales III was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Upon motion by the State, 

the juvenile court waived jurisdiction and transferred the matter to criminal court. After 

Gonzales’s motion to suppress was denied, he entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced by the 

trial court to twenty-years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. On appeal, Gonzales contends the juvenile court erred in transferring jurisdiction 
04-14-00352-CR

and the criminal court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2012, David Estrada and Appellant Gonzales went to an apartment complex 

to purchase marijuana from James Whitley. Gonzales was fifteen-years-old at the time. Gonzales 

exchanged several phone calls with Whitley regarding the purchase of the marijuana. Before going 

to the apartment complex, Gonzales and Estrada decided to rob Whitley of the marijuana. 

Gonzales brought his Smith & Wesson .40 caliber semi-automatic firearm for purposes of the 

robbery.

Estrada and Gonzales were driven to the apartment complex by a third individual who did 

not know of their plans and did not know Gonzales brought a firearm to the meeting. When they 

arrived at the apartment complex, Estrada and Gonzales met Whitley and another individual, Pablo 

Pecina, by the washroom. Gonzales asked for the drugs and Whitley asked for the money. Estrada 

stalled and Gonzales lifted his shirt and pulled out his firearm. To Gonzales’s surprise, Whitley 

also pulled a weapon and both men fired.

Whitley was struck in the thigh and died from his injuries; the bullet that struck Gonzales 

grazed his head, requiring a couple of staples. Gonzales and Estrada ran back to the vehicle and 

Gonzales asked the driver to take him to the hospital. Instead, the driver pulled into a gas station 

a short distance away. The driver called 911, told the dispatch, “Hey, my friend’s been shot. Here 

he is,” and he and Estrada left. Before leaving, Gonzales gave Estrada the firearm and told him to 

get rid of it.

While the San Antonio police officers were investigating Whitley’s shooting, they received 

the call of Gonzales’s shooting. It was not until later that the officers realized the two gunshot 

victims were connected. When officers arrived at the gas station, Gonzales reported “We were 

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walking down the street, somebody drives by and shoots me.” While they were investigating, 

Gonzales’s mother arrived. His mother told him to tell the officers the truth. Gonzales finally told 

them “I was at the apartment complex, the guy shoots me and I shot him back.” By all accounts, 

at that point in the evening, the officers were investigating the incident as a case of self-defense.

Gonzales was originally handcuffed and taken to the juvenile facility. However, shortly 

after arriving, the officers transported Gonzales to the Santa Rosa Children’s Hospital to be treated 

for his injuries. While Gonzales was at the emergency room, San Antonio Police Detective 

Raymond Roberts interviewed Estrada. Estrada told the officer that Whitley shot first; however, 

when confronted by the officer, Estrada confessed their plan to rob Whitley and identified 

Gonzales as possessing and firing the weapon. Detective Roberts requested Detective Kim Bower 

proceed to Santa Rosa Children’s Hospital to check on Gonzales’s condition and to tell his mother 

that Detective Roberts would like to speak to him. Detective Bowers testified she gave Gonzales’s 

mother a card with her phone number and asked to her contact them when Gonzales was released.

Gonzales arrived at the police station between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Detective Roberts 

told both Gonzales and his mother “If y’all don’t want to do it tonight, we don’t have to do it 

tonight.” The record shows Detective Roberts insisted Gonzales was not under arrest, and that 

Gonzales and his mother came in on their own, and they were both free to leave. In fact, Detective 

Roberts told both Gonzales and his mother that Gonzales would be leaving at the end of the 

interview. Detective Roberts did not Mirandize Gonzales and did not take him before a magistrate.

Detective Roberts asked Gonzales if he knew what was going on, if he was in pain, and 

how he felt. Gonzales responded, “I feel fine.” Detective Roberts testified that Gonzales was able 

to answer all of his questions and did not appear to be in any distress. Gonzales originally told 

Detective Roberts that Whitley fired first and that he returned fire; Detective Roberts confronted 

him with Estrada’s version of events and Gonzales ultimately told Detective Roberts their plan 

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was to steal the marijuana from Whitley. Gonzales also told Roberts that he always takes a gun 

with him whenever he goes to buy weed. 

When asked to relay what transpired, Detective Roberts described Gonzales’s demeanor to 

the court. He “kind of chuckled, smiled and he said, ‘That was my first mistake. My second was 

letting him stand up.’” When Detective Roberts asked Gonzales to explain what he meant, 

Gonzales explained that he should have pointed his weapon directly at Whitley instead of pointing 

it down.

Before leaving the police station, Detective Roberts gave Gonzales an opportunity to tell 

his mother the version of events he had relayed to the officer. Detective Roberts told Gonzales 

and his mother that the information would be presented to a magistrate and, if the magistrate 

determined the facts satisfied the elements set forth in the murder statute, then a warrant would 

issue. He also explained that if Gonzales ran, it would make matters worse. Later that morning, 

the magistrate issued an arrest warrant and Gonzales was arrested for the murder of James Whitley. 

On September 26, 2012, the State filed its original petition for waiver of jurisdiction and 

discretionary transfer to criminal court.

After a hearing, the juvenile trial court found probable cause to believe that Gonzales

committed the offense. The court concluded that due to the nature of the offense, Gonzales’s use 

of a deadly weapon, the psychiatric evaluation, the probation officer’s certification and transfer 

report, and the recommendations from the probation officers, the State’s petition should be 

granted.

WAIVER OF JUVENILE JURISDICTION

Gonzales first argues the juvenile court erred in transferring jurisdiction to the criminal 

court.

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A. Arguments of Parties

1. Gonzales

Gonzales contends the juvenile court erred when it found that the protection of the public 

and rehabilitation of Gonzales could not be served with the juvenile probation’s resources and 

programs. At the hearing, defense counsel maintained that a Texas Juvenile Justice Department

commitment would have adequately protected the public and rehabilitated Gonzales. Gonzales 

argued he was not a violent person by nature and exhibited excellent behavior throughout both the 

proceedings and all meetings with the probation officers. Defense counsel argued that Gonzales 

was the picture of someone who could be rehabilitated. He acknowledged the wrongfulness of 

Gonzales’s delinquent behaviors and expressed his beliefs that Gonzales had improved because 

“he grew up.”

On appeal, Gonzales further argues the trial court erred by failing to focus on the individual 

child. Instead, Gonzales contends the juvenile court focused solely on the severity of the 

allegations. Gonzales was cooperative with law enforcement and there were no reports of behavior 

issues during his incarceration. Gonzales suffers from cerebral palsy and epilepsy and requires 

services available through the juvenile system. Finally, counsel argues that determinate sentencing 

is a good option and would provide adequate protection to the community at large.

2. State

The State contends the factors weigh heavily in favor of transferring jurisdiction. Although 

the individual factors are subject to review, the ultimate determination is based on a review of the 

entire record. The State acknowledged Gonzales’s cerebral palsy and epilepsy; yet, the State 

pointed out neither diagnosis prevented him from committing either this offense or previous 

offenses which invoked the juvenile justice system. Moreover, this was not just a murder—but 

felony murder. Gonzales went to the scene intending to steal drugs from a drug dealer. He took 

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his own weapon to the drug deal and murdered the dealer. This was the third time in four years 

that Gonzales was involved in the legal system and, although he was not classified as a gang 

member, he did claim membership in YTC (Young Texas Click), a “tagging crew.”

B. Texas Family Code Section 54.02

Texas Family Code section 54.02(a)(3) provides that prior to transferring a juvenile to 

criminal court for prosecution, the juvenile court must find (1) probable cause to believe the 

juvenile committed the offense alleged in the petition; and (2) the seriousness of the offense 

alleged, the background of the child, and the welfare of the community require criminal 

prosecution. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a)(3) (West 2014); see also Faisst v. State, 105 

S.W.3d 8, 11 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.). The Court of Criminal Appeals recently addressed 

the juvenile court’s role in waiver of juvenile jurisdiction cases.

The transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal court for 

prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the exception, not the rule; the 

operative principle is that, whenever feasible, children and adolescents below a 

certain age should be “protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected to the 

harshness of the criminal system[.]” 

Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Hidalgo 

v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). 

The State bears the burden to convince the juvenile court, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that “the welfare of the community requires transfer of jurisdiction for criminal 

proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child (or 

both).” Id. at 40–41 (citing Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11). The juvenile court’s order must provide

that the section 54.02(f) factors were taken into account in making the determination. Id. at 41–

42. An appellate court may only set aside the juvenile court’s determination upon a finding the 

trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 42.

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C. Standard of Review

Until recently, the appellate courts applied different guidelines for the abuse of discretion 

standard. Compare In re M.D.B., 757 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, 

no writ) (“In reviewing the [juvenile] court’s action for an abuse of discretion, this court must 

determine if the [juvenile] court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.”) with 

Bleys v. State, 319 S.W.3d 857, 862–63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.), abrogated by 

Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. (reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s finding under Section 54.02(f)(4)). In Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals explained that

in evaluating a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court 

should first review the juvenile court’s specific findings of fact regarding the 

Section 54.02(f) factors under “traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.” But 

it should then review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision under an abuse 

of discretion standard.

The court further explained, “In other words, was [the juvenile court’s] transfer decision essentially 

arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based, or did it represent a reasonably principled 

application of the legislative criteria?” Id. Our review begins with an analysis of the factors 

outlined in Texas Family Code section 54.02(f). 

D. Analysis under Texas Family Code section 54.02(f)

Gonzales’s case was called before the juvenile court on October 19, 2012.

1. Whether Alleged Offense Was Against a Person or Property

The first factor listed in section 54.02(f) is “whether the alleged offense was against person 

or property.” TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 54.02(f)(1). The alleged offense was the capital murder 

of James Whitley. Detective Roberts testified as to his conversation with Gonzales and his 

admitted involvement in the offense. Gonzales admitted that he and Estrada planned to rob 

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Whitley during a marijuana purchase. Gonzales brought his firearm to the planned robbery. 

Gonzales planned the robbery and fired the shot that killed Whitley. 

2. Sophistication and Maturity of the Child

The second factor is “the sophistication and maturity of the child.” Id. § 54.02(f)(2); 

Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11. Bexar County Juvenile Probation Officer Traci Geppert testified that 

she met with Gonzales and his family on multiple occasions and she considered him to be 

sophisticated and mature. She further relayed that he understood both the proceedings and the 

charges against him. 

Also available to the trial court was the psychiatric evaluation requested by the juvenile 

probation office. Dr. Heather Holder’s report provided that “[Gonzales] knows right from wrong 

in a general sense, and he is specifically aware of the wrongfulness of the charge of which he is 

currently accused.” Additionally, she concluded “it is believed that [Gonzales] is mature and 

sophisticated in that he is responsible for his conduct and able to assist his attorney in his defense.” 

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f)(2).

Gonzales’s mother also testified before the juvenile court. She described her son as very 

much in control during the incident. When he originally lied to the officer, she directed him to tell 

the officers the truth and he did so. 

3. Record and Previous History of the Child

The third factor to consider is “the record and previous history of the child.” Id.

§ 54.02(f)(3); Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11. Gonzales had two prior juvenile probations. In 2008, he 

was placed on deferred probation for possession of a controlled substance, Xanax. In 2009, 

Gonzales was placed on formal probation for the charge of terroristic threats stemming from 

Gonzales threatening another student with a pair of scissors. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

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§ 54.02(f)(3); Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11. He completed his probation in April of 2010. Both 

charges resulted in Gonzales being expelled from the school he was attending. 

At the time of his arrest, Gonzales was a student at Robert E. Lee High School and several 

letters were presented to the trial court describing Gonzales as a nice student without any outward 

displays of violent behavior.

4. Adequate Protection of the Public and Likelihood of Rehabilitation

The fourth factor to consider is “the prospect of adequate protection of the public and the 

likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently 

available to the juvenile court.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f)(4); Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11. 

At the time of the offense, Gonzales was living with his mother and two sisters. When his mother 

was notified of the shooting, her initial reaction was that it could not be Gonzales because he was 

at home. She was unaware that he had left the residence and did not know that he owned a firearm. 

Geppert further addressed Gonzales’s cerebral palsy and epilepsy diagnoses. He had a special 

education distinction based on his orthopedic impairment and a reading disorder. He was 

mainstreamed at the high school and had not exhibited behavioral issues while in detention. 

During cross-examination, Gonzales’s mother conceded that Gonzales had recently run away from 

home because he did not like “living by the rules.” However, after living on the streets for a period 

of time, he had returned to their home.

Geppert testified the juvenile court system’s probation jurisdiction would end when 

Gonzales turned eighteen and the jurisdiction for Texas Youth Commission would end when 

Gonzales turned nineteen. Geppert explained the only other option, besides adult sentencing, was 

determinate sentencing. She did not believe determinate sentencing was proper because of the 

allegations: the charge was murder, Gonzales was carrying his weapon, and Gonzales was 

purchasing marijuana. Additionally, Geppert testified that she did not believe the juvenile 

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probation system had sufficient time to work with Gonzales given the severity of the allegations. 

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f)(3); Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 11. Her supervisor agreed, and so 

did a staffing committee, consisting of two supervisors and a Child Protective Services 

representative.

5. Specific Factual Findings

Not only must the record substantiate the court’s findings, but the juvenile court must make 

“case-specific findings of fact” with respect to the 54.02(f) factors. See Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 51. 

Here, the juvenile court judge made the following findings:

1) Gonzales was alleged to have committed murder under Texas Penal Code 

section 19.02;

2) Gonzales was sixteen at the time of the hearing;

3) Gonzales was fifteen at the time of the offense;

4) Gonzales’s mother resides in Bexar County;

5) no adjudication hearing had yet been conducted;

6) the parties were properly notified of the hearing;

7) prior to the hearing, the trial court obtained a psychological assessment 

including a psychological examination, a complete diagnostic study, a social 

evaluation, full investigation of Gonzales, Gonzales’s circumstances, and the 

circumstances of the alleged offense;

8) the offense was against a person;

9) Gonzales is sophisticated and mature enough to be transferred into the criminal 

justice system and he understands the allegations, the court proceedings, and 

their possible consequences;

10) the procedures, services, and facilities available to the Juvenile Court are 

inadequate for rehabilitation of Gonzales while also protecting the public; and

11) after a full investigation and hearing, Gonzales’s circumstances, and the 

circumstances of the offense, there is probable cause to believe that Gonzales 

committed the offense and, because of the seriousness of the offense and the 

background of Gonzales, the welfare of the community required that criminal 

proceedings proceed in Criminal District Court.

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6. Analysis

Here, the juvenile court’s findings are substantially more case-specific than the findings 

analyzed in Moon. See Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 51 (concluding the trial court’s findings were 

superfluous because it only considered fact that offense was against another person). The juvenile 

court made specific findings as to Gonzales. Cf. id. Based on a review of the record, including 

the trial court’s findings of fact, we conclude the trial court provided “a sure-footed and definite 

basis from which an appellate court can determine that its decision was in fact appropriately guided 

by the statutory criteria, principled, and reasonable.” Id. at 49; cf. Guerrero v. State, No. 14-13-

00101-CR, 2014 WL 7345987, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2014, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the trial court’s order was deficient under 

Moon). Accordingly, we overrule Gonzales’s first issue.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Gonzales next contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement given to 

Detective Roberts.

A. Arguments of the Parties

At trial and on appeal, defense counsel argued Gonzales was a scared fifteen-year old and 

that any reasonable individual in his position would have believed that he was not free to leave. 

The interrogation was, therefore, custodial and the officer was required to take Gonzales before a 

magistrate prior to obtaining a statement.

The State was adamant that Gonzales was not in custody when he gave his statement to 

Detective Roberts. Both he and his mother were told they could leave and did not have to talk to 

the officers. They were both told that no matter what Gonzales relayed to the officer, his mother 

would be taking him home that night. And, in fact, as the officer promised, Gonzales left with his 

mother and the case was presented to a magistrate.

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B. Standard of Review

When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a 

bifurcated standard. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Guzman v. 

State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When a question turns on credibility and 

demeanor, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling and gives “almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that 

the record supports.” Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; accord Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Guzman). We give the same deference to the trial court’s rulings 

on mixed questions of law and fact “if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; accord Montanez, 195 

S.W.3d at 106. 

We review other mixed questions of law and fact and questions of law de novo. Guzman,

955 S.W.2d at 89; accord Montanez, 195 S.W.3d at 106. When custody attaches is a mixed 

question of law and fact. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Garza 

v. State, 34 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d).

B. Texas Family Code section 51.09

When a defendant is a juvenile at the time of his arrest, the provisions of the Texas Family 

Code control issues involving his substantive rights. Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 866 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Gonzales contends his interrogation by Detective Roberts constituted a 

custodial interrogation and that his confession should have been suppressed under Texas Family 

Code section 51.095 because he was not brought before a magistrate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 51.095 (West 2014); Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009), 

aff’d, 325 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

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C. Gonzales’s Interrogation

In determining whether an individual is in custody, an appellate court examines all of the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine if there was a formal arrest or “restraint 

on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 

511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d 704, 712 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). This determination focuses on the objective 

circumstances of the interrogation and not on the subjective views of either the interrogating 

officers or the person being questioned. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d 

at 712. Our review focuses on whether, in light of the particular circumstances, a reasonable 

person would have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson 

v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712. 

In Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), the Court of Criminal 

Appeals set forth four factors relevant to the determination of whether an individual is in custody: 

(1) Was the suspect “physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”?; (2) 

Did “a law enforcement officer tell the suspect that he cannot leave”?; (3) Did the “law 

enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his 

freedom of movement has been significantly restricted”?; or (4) Was there “probable cause to 

arrest and law enforcement officers [did] not tell the suspect that he [was] free to leave”? Id.; see 

also In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713. We remain mindful that because the custody determination 

is based entirely on objective circumstances, whether the law enforcement official had the 

subjective intent to arrest is irrelevant unless that intent is somehow communicated to the suspect. 

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323–24; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254; In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713. 

We, therefore, turn to an analysis of each of the Dowthitt factors.

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1. Was Gonzales Physically Deprived of His Freedom of Action?

“[O]rdinarily, when a person voluntarily accompanies a law enforcement officer to a 

certain location, even though the person knows or should know that the officer suspects that he or

she may have committed or may be implicated in the commission of a crime, the person is not 

restrained or ‘in custody.’” Garcia v. State, 237 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no 

pet.) (citing Miller v. State, 196 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d)). 

“When the circumstances show that the individual acts upon the invitation or request of the police 

and there are no threats, express or implied, that he will be forcibly taken, then that person is not 

in custody at that time.” In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713; Garcia, 237 S.W.3d at 836 (citing Shiflet 

v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).

Here, the only testimony before the juvenile court was that Gonzales and his mother were 

told they did not have to speak to the officers and that they could leave at any time. Gonzales’s 

mother did testify that Detective Bowers told her that the officers “thought it was self-defense and 

that if I would take him back that they could clear it all up.” However, that does not rebut the 

officer’s testimony that Gonzales and his mother knew they could leave the interrogation if they 

chose to do so.

2. Did Detective Roberts Communicate that Gonzales Was Not Free to Leave?

There is no indication, and Gonzales does not allege, that at any point during his 

conversation with Detective Roberts that Detective Roberts, or any other individual, told Gonzales 

that he was not free to leave. All evidence contained within the record supports the contrary 

proposition.

3. Would a Reasonable Person Believe His Freedom of Movement Was Restricted?

At several points prior to the interview, and at several points during the interview,

Detective Roberts told Gonzales that he would be leaving the police station after giving his 

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statement. Detective Roberts testified he did not consider Gonzales in custody and did not plan to 

arrest Gonzales prior to seeking an arrest warrant from a magistrate. Detective Roberts clearly 

articulated his subjective intent to Gonzales and his mother. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323

(communicating subjective intent affects objective circumstances); Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254

(same); In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713 (same). 

Although Gonzales contends that his age and the events earlier that evening would lead a 

reasonable person to believe he was in custody, the record simply does not support such an 

allegation. At no time following the doctor’s examination at the hospital was Gonzales in 

handcuffs. Gonzales left the hospital with his mother and his mother took him to the police station. 

Nothing compelled either Gonzales or his mother to be at the police station. When they arrived, 

Gonzales and his mother were informed they were free to leave at any time and did not have to 

talk to the officers. After Gonzales finished speaking to Detective Roberts, he and his mother 

voluntarily left the police station.

4. Was There Probable Cause to Arrest and Detective Roberts Failed to Tell Gonzales 

He Was Free to Leave?

By the time Detective Roberts interviewed Gonzales, he had already interviewed Estrada 

and knew Gonzales was involved in Whitley’s death. However, Detective Roberts testified that 

although Estrada claimed the firearm belonged to Gonzales and that Gonzales was the individual 

who shot Whitley, he anticipated Gonzales could reasonably point the finger at Estrada as the 

shooter. It was not until Gonzales told the officer that the gun used during the robbery was his 

firearm, that he brought the weapon to the apartment complex, and that he fired at Whitley that 

Detective Roberts was able to confirm Estrada’s statement. 

Although Detective Roberts may well have possessed probable cause to arrest Gonzales at 

some point during the interview, there is no controverting evidence that Detective Roberts 

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instructed Gonzales that he was free to leave and Gonzales left. Detective Roberts also clearly 

articulated his intent to present the evidence to the magistrate and that he anticipated a warrant 

would issue for Gonzales’s arrest. The concern that an officer has established probable cause to 

arrest and does not tell the defendant that he is free to leave, as outlined in Dowthitt and its progeny, 

is not present in this case. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255; Aguilera v. State, 425 S.W.3d 448, 

456 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).

D. Application

Because this case turns on the trial court’s determination of credibility and demeanor, we 

give almost total deference to the trial court’s factual findings. Montanez, 195 S.W.3d at 106; 

Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Although the evidence supports Gonzales was originally handcuffed 

at the gas station, and when he was transported to the juvenile facility and Santa Rosa Children’s 

Hospital, he was never in handcuffs or restrained in any manner when he spoke to Detective 

Roberts. Detective Roberts’s testimony that he specifically told both Gonzales and his mother that 

she would be taking Gonzales home that evening was supported by Detective Bowers’s testimony 

as well as the video recording of Gonzales’s statement. Merely being questioned by an officer, 

even when the officer has reason to believe the juvenile is involved in a criminal activity, does not 

constitute custody. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255; In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713. Gonzales was 

present with his mother, both Gonzales and his mother agreed for Gonzales to speak to Detective 

Roberts, Gonzales was told that he was not under arrest, and he left the police station after his 

statement.

Because the evidence supports that Gonzales was free to leave at any time and that he 

elected to speak to Detective Roberts, we conclude that a reasonable person would have believed 

he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112; 

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254–55. Accordingly, the trial court did not

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abuse its discretion in allowing Detective Roberts to testify regarding Gonzales’s statement and to 

admit a video-recording of the same statement into testimony. We, therefore, overrule Gonzales’s 

second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Gonzales’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

PUBLISH

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