[Cite as State v. Pampley, 2024-Ohio-251.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

Nos. 112672 and 112673

v. :

HIGHPRIEST LEWIS PAMPLEY, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 25, 2024 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case Nos. CR-22-669855-A and CR-22-673970-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Dominic Neville, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

The Goldberg Law Firm L.L.C. and Adam Parker, for 

appellant. 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:

In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant Highpriest Lewis 

Pampley (“Pampley”) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History

This case stems from two separate criminal cases, both of which were 

resolved by guilty plea.

In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-669855-A, on May 12, 2022, a Cuyahoga 

County Grand Jury indicted Pampley1 on one count of aggravated robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.02(A)(1), and one count of failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B)

with a furthermore specification. The robbery and aggravated robbery counts both 

carried one- and three-year firearm specifications. These charges arose from a 

carjacking where Pampley allegedly stole a woman’s car at gunpoint and then fled 

from police.

In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-673970-A, on September 6, 2022, a 

Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Pampley2 on three counts of rape in violation 

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) 

with a sexual motivation specification, and two counts of gross sexual imposition in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1). There is minimal information in the record 

1 The indictment lists the defendant as High Priest Lewis-Pampley rather than 

Highpriest Lewis Pampley. At a pretrial hearing on March 23, 2023, Pampley confirmed 

that his full name is Highpriest Aaron Lewis Pampley.

2 The indictment lists the defendant as Highpriest Aaron Pampley Jr. rather than 

Highpriest Lewis Pampley.
regarding the events from which these charges arose; the charges stem from an 

alleged sexual assault that occurred in 2018.

Pampley initially pleaded not guilty to both indictments. On 

March 13, 2023, the court held a change-of-plea hearing. At this hearing, the 

assistant prosecuting attorney placed the plea offer on the record and the court 

engaged in the following preliminary discussion with Pampley, in relevant part:

PAMPLEY: So look, this is my worry, right? It’s my worry that I’m 

going to cop out, but with the Reagan Tokes, you feel me, I’m going to 

get in trouble and end up having to do that time because that’s just —

like, Friday, I got assaulted by a CO.

THE COURT: So I understand. So you’re worried — like, listen, you 

get four years Reagan Tokes time, you’re worried that you’ll get all that 

time.

PAMPLEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: So a couple things. One, Reagan Tokes is pending before 

the Supreme Court, and they may get rid of it. They may say it’s 

unconstitutional, illegal. And you would only have four years of Reagan 

Tokes if you get a maximum sentence.

Reagan Tokes time is shorter depending on your sentence. Let’s say 

you got a four-year sentence. That Reagan Tokes time is only two years. 

It’s not necessarily four years.

* * *

PAMPLEY: So if I take this plea, right, so like, if you tell me I get some 

on the back end, I’m not talking the high end, so say you sentence me 

to three, right? I’m going to say four. Say you sentence me to four, 

right? So I’m going to get out after this four or —

THE COURT: You’re actually probably going to get out in less than four 

because you’ll get credit for the time you’ve been sitting.

PAMPLEY: So I can get time served for the year?
THE COURT: You will definitely get credit for all the time you’ve been 

sitting, and under Reagan Tokes, if you behave yourself, have great 

conduct, you can earn time off your sentence of five to 15 percent.

PAMPLEY: I know about going to school and getting an OPI, and stuff 

like that. I know how to get good days. I’m just more skeptical of the 

fact that somebody do something and they say that I did it, and you 

know, birds of a feather flock together, and I’m going to be left out.

THE COURT: You know, Mr. Pampley, I can’t forecast what’s going to 

happen once you’re in prison. I don’t have any control over that. I can 

tell you if, in your example, you get four years, you will get credit for the 

time served.

PAMPLEY: So I would have three left?

THE COURT: You would have three left.

The Reagan Tokes time would be there, but that would be subject to it 

still being constitutional, and then they would have to conduct a 

hearing in order to keep you there before they can keep you in there.

PAMPLEY: So it’s three to five or three to nine right now?

THE COURT: It’s three to nine years, and I told you, your counsel, I’ll 

run everything concurrent.

Also, a benefit of this is that in Case Number -970, you’re pleading to a 

non-sex offense, so you don’t have to register as a sex offender.

PAMPLEY: Oh, that’s cool.

THE COURT: Yeah. It’s a big change in the plea.

So, I mean, I’m sure your counsel told you, there’s good things about 

this and bad things. 

I don’t know what happened with your case. I have these cases. I have 

the filings by your counsel. You know whether or not, for the 

[aggravated] robbery case, what you did or didn’t do. You know that.

Your counsel knows what the State can prove in court. If your counsel 

said there’s a likelihood you’re found guilty, then you should probably 

take this plea. If your counsel told you that there’s a good chance, you 

know, you might be found not guilty, then go forward at trial.
You’ve got to think about that, what’s the likelihood of you being 

successful, at trial versus not being successful at trial, and you have to 

weigh those.

PAMPLEY: Right. I mean, I’ll take the plea. I’m, like, way scared on 

the Reagan Tokes end, but on your end, I see what you’re saying, 

though. I’ll take the plea, but whatever happens on the back end, you 

don’t got nothing to do with it, for real.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: He just doesn’t like the uncertainty and not 

having control over —

THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. Pampley, I wish I could tell you more. I’m 

telling you straight up, I have zero control of that aspect. I have zero 

control over that.

PAMPLEY: So that’s why I said I’ll take the plea. I see what you’re 

trying to do on your end. I’m just going to have to battle that on the 

back end.

THE COURT: So do you want to go forward with the plea then?

PAMPLEY: Yeah.

The court then proceeded to engage in a formal Crim.R. 11 plea 

colloquy with Pampley.

Pampley ultimately pleaded guilty in case 669855 to one count of 

robbery, a felony of the second degree, and the attendant one-year firearm 

specification; one count of attempted failure to comply, a felony of the fourth degree; 

and one count of receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor of the first degree. In 

the case 673970, Pampley pleaded guilty to one amended count of kidnapping, a 

felony of the second degree. The remaining counts and specifications against 

Pampley were dismissed.
The court ordered a presentence-investigation report (“PSI”) and 

mitigation-of-penalty report from the court psychiatric clinic.

On April 13, 2023, the court held a sentencing hearing. The court 

stated at the outset of the hearing that it had reviewed the PSI, mitigation-of-penalty 

report, a reintegration plan provided by defense counsel, and a social, mental, 

educational, and psychiatric history synopsis provided by defense counsel. Defense 

counsel then informed the court that Pampley wished to withdraw his plea and 

potentially hire different counsel. Pampley addressed the court as follows:

Reasons, reasons to. During my plea bargain I was going through 

mental, mental trauma and physical trauma and I was not in the right 

state of mind when I took the plea due to getting assaulted by a CO 

within the jail. And I was not stable. And different other conditions 

within the jail. And I was not in the right state of mind when I took the 

plea.

The last thing that I knew about a plea was three to five. I really wasn’t 

conscious. And we was talking at the last hearing when you was saying 

— when I was [pleading] guilty to the charges I thought I was going 

home. That’s what I was hearing in my head. I wasn’t present and 

really know what’s going on.

So I would like to ask you to withdraw my plea today, and have a fair 

chance to do what I got to do and do the right thing. I would like to be 

on the record also.

The court confirmed that Pampley did not want to place anything else on the record 

regarding his oral motion to withdraw his plea. The court then heard from defense 

counsel and the assistant prosecuting attorney.

Following the parties’ arguments on the motion, the court stated:

The court will note several items for the record. One, that the plea 

occurred on the trial date of Mr. Pampley. We were set for trial.
Secondly, the court engaged in a lengthy plea colloquy with Mr. 

Pampley in which the court stated unequivocally what Mr. Pampley 

was facing in terms of prison time.

There were further conversations regarding consecutive versus 

concurrent and Reagan Tokes. It was abundantly clear at the time of 

the plea hearing that Mr. Pampley was going to be sentenced to a term 

of incarceration in prison because of the plea to the one year firearm 

specification, in addition to the counts in case number 669855, the 

felony of the second degree, robbery, the attempted failure to comply, 

felony of the fourth degree, and then the misdemeanor, receiving stolen 

property.

It was clearly placed on the record that Mr. Pampley would be serving 

a prison sentence. And so that was explained to him clearly. 

Furthermore, the court went through a deliberate criminal rule 

colloquy prior to asking the defendant whether or not he wanted to 

plead guilty, advised him of his constitutional rights, went through the 

maximum penalties, went through post release control, and went 

through Reagan Tokes, and the maximum indefinite sentence and the 

qualifying offenses.

Furthermore, the court clearly asked Mr. Pampley if he understood 

what was happening in court on that day. He stated that he did.

Furthermore, prior to today’s sentencing hearing the court reviewed 

the presentence investigation report that was completed on April 13th 

and the mitigation of penalty report that was completed on April 12th.

In the presentence investigation report there was no mention by the 

defendant during his interview that he was suffering from any mental 

calamities on the date of his plea.

Furthermore, when he was speaking with a physician for his mitigation 

of penalty report, psychiatric physician, Dr. Hernandez, M.D., he made 

no complaints at all regarding suffering any mental anguish or any 

physical pain in the immediate days, hours, preceding his guilty plea on 

March 23rd of 2023.

The court finds that there is no reasonable and legitimate basis for the 

defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas in both case numbers 669855 

and 673970, and will go forward with sentencing at this juncture.
The court then proceeded to sentencing. The assistant prosecuting 

attorney addressed the court, summarizing the facts that resulted in Pampley’s 

charges and Pampley’s criminal history before requesting the court impose a 

minimum prison term of nine years. Defense counsel then addressed the court, 

beginning by objecting to the imposition of the Reagan Tokes Law. Defense counsel 

went on to summarize some of Pampley’s personal history in mitigation, ultimately 

requesting a sentence closer to the minimum prison term, in addition to requesting 

that Pampley’s personal history and mitigation report be sent with him to the Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Pampley then addressed the court 

and apologized to the victim who was present at the sentencing hearing.

The court sentenced Pampley to an aggregate prison sentence of 

seven to 10 years.

Pampley filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases and presents two

assignments of error for our review:

I. The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty pleas.

II. Mr. Pampley’s indefinite sentence is unconstitutional.

Law and Analysis

I. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

In his first assignment of error, Pampley argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it denied Pampley’s presentence motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea because Pampley made a prima facie claim that his guilty pleas were not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Pampley also argues that the court did not 

afford him a full and impartial hearing on his motion. 

In general, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be 

freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 

(1992). It is well established, however, that “[a] defendant does not have an absolute 

right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial court must conduct a 

hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable legitimate basis for the 

withdrawal of the plea.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision must be affirmed. Id. at 527. 

The term abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 

N.E.2d 1140 (1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 

N.E.3d 463.

Courts have traditionally considered nine factors when reviewing a 

trial court’s decision denying a defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea. State v. Hopkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112430 and 112704, 2023-Ohio4311, ¶ 13. Those factors include whether a defendant was (1) represented by 

competent counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before he entered the plea, (3) 

given a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, and (4) the record reflects that 

the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request. Id., citing 
State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph 

three of the syllabus.

Additionally, consideration is given to whether (5) the motion was 

made in a reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons for withdrawal, (7) 

the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, and 

(8) the defendant had evidence of a plausible defense. Id., citing State v. Fish, 104 

Ohio App.3d 236, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995), see also State v. Heisa, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 101877, 2015-Ohio-2269. Finally, courts have considered (9) 

“‘whether the state would be prejudiced if the defendant were permitted to withdraw 

his guilty plea.’” Id., quoting State v. Barnes, 172 Ohio St.3d 63, 2022-Ohio-4486,

222 N.E.3d 537, ¶ 32 (Brunner, J., concurring), citing State v. Richter, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 46122 and 46123, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15476, 2 (Sept. 29, 1983).

Pampley argues that several of these factors weigh in support of his 

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Specifically, he argues that he made the motion 

within a reasonable time; he stated specific reasons for the withdrawal — given his 

mental state at the time of the plea, he was not capable of entering a knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent plea; and he was not afforded a full hearing because the 

court did not allow him an opportunity to present evidence but merely heard 

arguments from the parties.

With respect to the timing of the motion, we note that while it was a 

presentence motion, it was made one month after Pampley entered his guilty plea,

immediately prior to the court sentencing Pampley. Further, with respect to 
Pampley’s argument that he was not afforded a full hearing, we note that the court 

held a brief hearing on the oral motion and concluded the hearing after asking if 

Pampley or defense counsel wished to place anything else on the record. The court 

engaged Pampley, defense counsel, and the assistant prosecuting attorney at length 

regarding Pampley’s oral motion to withdraw his plea. Likewise, while Pampley now 

argues that he was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of 

his motion, our review of the record shows that at no time did Pampley or his counsel 

attempt to present any evidence in support of his motion. Nor has Pampley clarified 

at any point, before the trial court or in this appeal, what evidence he was unable to 

present in support of his motion.

Our review of the record also reveals that the court gave full and fair 

consideration to Pampley’s motion. The court outlined on the record the reasons 

that it was denying Pampley’s motion, including that it had engaged Pampley in a 

lengthy Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy before accepting his guilty plea, and that it was 

“abundantly clear” at the time of Pampley’s plea that he would be sentenced to 

prison because of the one-year firearm specification and because of the applicability 

of the Reagan Tokes Law. Whether or not Pampley was suffering from physical or 

mental trauma at the time of his plea, his argument that he thought he would be 

“going home” after pleading guilty is entirely contradicted by his own statements on 

the record.
For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Pampley’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Therefore, Pampley’s first 

assignment of error is overruled.

II. Reagan Tokes Law

In Pampley’s second assignment of error, he argues that his indefinite 

sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional. Specifically, 

Pampley argues that his indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law violates

his constitutional right to a jury trial, the separation-of-powers doctrine, and his due 

process rights. 

In State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535, the Ohio 

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, thereby 

overruling Pampley’s arguments. Therefore, we overrule Pampley’s second 

assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the 

trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR