Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 136 / Friday, July 15, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 45965 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day 

of July 2016. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Theresa Barczy, 

Acting Branch Chief, Rules, Announcements 

and Directives Branch, Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2016–16659 Filed 7–14–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–3462; Notice No. 23– 

275–SC] 

Special Conditions: Cirrus Design 

Corporation, Model SF50; Whole 

Airplane Parachute Recovery System 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Cirrus Design Corporation 

(Cirrus), model SF50 airplane. This 

airplane will have a novel or unusual 

design feature(s) associated with a 

whole airplane parachute recovery 

system. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: These special conditions are 

effective August 15, 2016 and are 

applicable on July 6, 2016. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Bob Stegeman, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Aircraft Certification 

Service, Small Airplane Directorate, 

ACE–111, 901 Locust; Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329– 

4140; facsimile (816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On September 9, 2008, Cirrus Design 

Corporation applied for a type 

certificate for their new SF50 airplane. 

The SF50 is a seven seat (five adults and 

two children), pressurized, retractable 

gear, carbon composite, single engine jet 

airplane. The airplane will have a 

Maximum Take-Off Weight of 6,000 

pounds, a Maximum Operating Speed of 

250 Knots Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS), 

and a Maximum Operating Altitude of 

28,000 feet. 

Cirrus intends to install a whole 

airplane ballistic parachute system 

(BPS) called the Cirrus Airframe 

Parachute System (CAPS). This 

installation couples the BPS with the 

automatic flight controls. The CAPS will 

be installed as standard equipment on 

the SF50 airplane. Unlike the SR20 and 

SR22 airplanes CAPS, the SF50 CAPS is 

a supplemental system and no credit for 

the system will be used to meet part 23 

requirements. The SF50 CAPS design 

will require some performance 

enhancements over existing technology 

used in other BPS. 

The system will consist of the 

recovery parachute, activation and 

deployment systems, and autopilot 

functions. The SF50 CAPS will be 

designed for a higher gross weight, 

maximum activation speed, and 

maximum operating altitude. 

Whole airplane parachute recovery 

systems are intended to save the lives of 

the occupants in life-threatening 

situations for which normal emergency 

procedures have been exhausted. 

Potential emergencies include, but are 

not limited to—loss of power or thrust; 

loss of airplane control; pilot 

disorientation; pilot incapacitation with 

a passenger on board; mechanical or 

structural failure; icing; and accidents 

resulting from pilot negligence or error. 

The recovery system should prioritize 

protection from most probable hazards, 

but it is not reasonable to expect it to 

protect occupants from every possible 

situation. 

This technology, which was originally 

developed for ultralight and 

experimental aircraft, was first approved 

for general aviation airplanes with a 

Supplemental Type Certificate for the 

Cessna model 150/152 airplanes. The 

FAA issued special conditions for these 

airplanes to incorporate ballistic 

recovery systems on October 22, 1987 

(Special Condition No. 23–ACE–33; 

Ballistic Recovery System, Inc., 

Modified Cessna 150/A150 Series 

Airplanes and 152/A152 Model 

Airplanes to Incorporate the GARD–150 

System; Docket No. 037CE) (FR Doc. 87– 

26420, November 11, 1987). These 

special conditions were later modified 

for the other general aviation airplanes 

(Special Condition No. 23–ACE–76; 

Ballistic Recovery Systems, Modified for 

Small General Aviation Airplanes; 

Docket No. 118CE) (FR Doc. 94–16233, 

August 5, 1994), including the Cirrus 

Design Corporation SR20 airplanes 

(Special Condition No. 23–ACE–88, 

Ballistic Recovery Systems Cirrus SR20 

Installation, Docket No. 136CE) (FR Doc. 

97–27504, October 15, 1997). 

The previously FAA-approved BPS 

consists of a parachute packed in a 

compartment within the airframe. A 

solid propellant rocket motor, adjacent 

to the parachute pack, extracts the 

parachute. A mechanical pull handle 

mounted within reach of the pilot and 

copilot or passenger activates the 

system. At least two separate 

independent actions are necessary to 

activate the system. 

In addition to a normal BPS, the SF50 

CAPS system will incorporate an airbag 

to assist deployment and a system for 

sequencing deployment and interfacing 

with the airplane’s avionics. The 

avionics interface is intended to bring 

the airplane within a valid deployment 

envelope speed (67–160 KCAS). 

The SF50 CAPS is a non-required 

system that differs from other BPS in 

that it will interact with the flight 

control system and other airplane 

systems. The baseline special conditions 

must incorporate the required level of 

safety for the normal BPS as well as the 

aspect that interfaces with the airplane. 

Since it is a non required system, 

additional latitude exists to evaluate 

and substantiate the system so it will 

present no additional hazards. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Cirrus Design Corporation must show 

that the SF50 meets the applicable 

provisions of part 23, as amended by 

amendments 23–1 through 23–62 

thereto. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the SF50 because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the SF50 must comply with 

the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of 14 

CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy under 

section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the 

‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 


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45966 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 136 / Friday, July 15, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The SF50 will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

features: A whole-airplane parachute 

recovery system that is a supplemental 

safety system and unlike any previously 

approved BPS, will add enhancements 

that assist deployment and autopilot 

functions that work to bring the airplane 

into an acceptable deployment 

envelope. 

Discussion 

This system is a non-required system 

that will interact with the flight control 

system. These special conditions must 

incorporate the required level of safety 

for the normal ballistic parachute 

system as established by Special 

Condition 23–ACE–76 in addition to the 

aspect that interfaces with the airplane. 

The FAA revised § 23.1309, 

Equipment, systems, and installations, 

in amendment 23–62 (76 FR 75736, 

December 2, 2011) to address two 

different types of equipment and 

systems installed in the airplane. This 

system operates at the limit of the 

normal operating envelope and 

challenges normal expectations of such 

a supplemental system. Amendment 

23–62 preamble states: Section 23.1309 

lists the qualifiers ‘‘under the airplane 

operating and environmental 

conditions’’. 

Section 23.1309, amendment 23–62 

preamble also describes two actions for 

the applicant. First, the applicant must 

consider the full normal operating 

envelope of the airplane, as defined by 

the Airplane Flight Manual, with any 

modification to that envelope associated 

with abnormal or emergency procedures 

and any anticipated flightcrew action. 

Second, the applicant must consider the 

anticipated external and internal 

airplane environmental conditions, as 

well as any additional conditions where 

equipment and systems are assumed to 

‘‘perform as intended’’. 

Section 23.1309(a)(2) requires 

analysis of any installed equipment or 

system with potential failure conditions 

that are catastrophic, hazardous, major, 

or minor, to determine their impact on 

the safe operation of the airplane. The 

applicant must show that they do not 

adversely affect proper functioning of 

the equipment, systems, or installations 

covered by § 23.1309 and do not 

otherwise adversely influence the safety 

of the airplane or its occupants. 

Section 23.1309(a)(2) does not 

mandate that non-required equipment 

and systems function properly during 

all airplane operations once in service, 

provided all potential failure conditions 

have no effect on the safe operation of 

the airplane. The equipment or system 

must function in the manner expected 

by the manufacturer’s operating manual 

for the equipment or system. An 

applicant’s statement of intended 

function must be sufficiently detailed so 

the FAA can evaluate whether the 

system is appropriate for its intended 

function(s). 

To incorporate the intent of 

amendment 23–62, the FAA issues these 

special conditions to include previous 

BPS special conditions, address the 

interaction CAPS with other airplane 

systems, and that it is a non-required 

system. The system must function 

within specified manufacturer’s limits 

while operated within the 

manufacturers recommended envelope. 

Since it is a non-required system, the 

means of substantiation have been 

altered to reflect the bounds of the 

operating envelope, the means of 

analysis that can be substantiated with 

overlapping lower-level testing/analysis, 

and relieve in-flight deployment to 

avoid unnecessary expense and the 

inherent danger in performing this test. 

All special condition requirements 

must meet two fundamental criteria: 

• The installed system must not 

introduce unacceptable hazards prior to 

or after activation. 

• The applicant must show that the 

system does not adversely affect proper 

functioning of the equipment, systems, 

or installations covered by § 23.1309 

and do not otherwise adversely 

influence the safety of the airplane or its 

occupants. 

The applicant does not have to 

demonstrate the system in flight on a 

test airplane. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 23–16–01–SC for the Cirrus Design 

Corporation SF50 airplanes was 

published in the Federal Register on 

March 18, 2016 (81 FR 14801). The FAA 

received 11 comments that disagreed 

with the special condition provisions 

for demonstration via test or test 

supported by analysis. These comments 

primarily focused on the concern that 

the FAA should require testing of the 

BPS in flight to validate intended 

performance. 

The process of an applicant showing 

compliance to these BPS system special 

conditions is a complex and multitiered process. The applicant must 

conservatively demonstrate each 

function of the entire deployment event 

sequentially, from pulling the handle to 

securing the airplane after ground 

impact, to meet the special conditions. 

These separate events and functions can 

be demonstrated to satisfy the 

requirements of these special conditions 

with lower-level testing, normally using 

analysis supported by test. This is 

consistent with certification methods 

used on many other parts of the 

airplane. 

The FAA decision to allow a means 

of compliance without requiring inflight 

deployment on a test airplane is not a 

complete elimination of testing or an 

evaluation of the system. The FAA 

believes that test or analysis supported 

by test will provide an acceptable level 

of safety to demonstrate that the system 

will perform its intended function; 

therefore, no in-flight deployment on a 

test airplane will be required. 

The Cirrus SF50 BPS is a nonrequired safety device intended to 

improve occupant survivability in 

emergencies and under extreme 

conditions. The certification 

requirements contained in these special 

conditions are consistent with the 

requirements of §§ 23.1301(a) and 

23.1309(a) for equipment that is not 

required for type certification or by the 

operating rules. Because the BPS is nonrequired equipment, its design must be 

shown to be appropriate for the 

intended function and it must not 

adversely affect safety. The FAA 

Aircraft Certification Service has 

evaluated the intended function, design, 

and installation of the SF50 BPS, and 

has considered what is required to meet 

an acceptable confidence level. 

The potential operational decision to 

deploy the BPS in service would be the 

result of an emergency, one that will 

invariably result in a controlled crash. 

While the BPS is expected to improve 

occupant survivability in an emergency, 

the residual risk to the occupants is not 

completely eliminated. The primary 

hazard introduced while performing a 

comprehensive BPS flight test is the risk 

to the flight test crew when exposed to 

controlled crash conditions during a 

successful deployment. The FAA has 

determined the requirement to 

demonstrate the BPS via testing or 

testing supported by analysis to be 

‘‘appropriate for the intended function 

and does not adversely affect safety’’. 

Therefore, the FAA will not require a 

comprehensive flight test deployment. 

Another commenter requested 

clarification of paragraph 1(c)(3), 

regarding definition of occupant 

protection after aircraft structure 

damage. To clarify, the FAA’s intent of 

this paragraph was to ensure that the 

cabin can protect the occupants after a 

normal deployment even if the cabin 

experiences damage resulting from the 

deployment process or as a result of 

ground impact. The paragraph does not 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 136 / Friday, July 15, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 45967 

assume any airplane damage prior to 

system deployment. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the SF50. 

Should Cirrus apply at a later date for 

a change to the type certificate to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

the special conditions would apply to 

that model as well. 

Under standard practice, the effective 

date of final special conditions would 

be 30 days after the date of publication 

in the Federal Register; however, as the 

certification date for the Cirrus SF50 is 

imminent, the FAA finds that good 

cause exists to make these special 

conditions effective upon issuance. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplane. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and it affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

14 CFR 11.38, 11.39, 21.16 and 21.17. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Cirrus SF50 

airplanes. 

1. Whole Airplane Parachute 

Recovery System With Flight Control 

and Deployment Augmentation. 

(a) System Validation. 

(1) The applicant must demonstrate 

by test, or analysis supported by test, 

that the system will not cause an 

unacceptable hazard or otherwise 

exceed the system deployment design 

loads for the critical flight conditions. 

(2) The recovery system activation 

envelope must include speeds at or near 

VS up to at least Vo. The applicant must 

satisfactorily demonstrate by test, or by 

analysis supported by test, the logic and 

automatic control interface that allow 

the recovery system activation over this 

speed range. 

(b) Occupant Restraint. 

Each seat in the airplane must be 

equipped with an approved restraint 

system, which will protect the 

occupants from serious head and upper 

torso injuries during a recovery system 

deployment and ground impact at the 

critical load conditions. 

(c) Parachute Performance. 

(1) A 1.5 factor of safety applied to the 

limit load must be used for all 

components of the recovery system as 

well as the attachment structure, the 

cabin structure surrounding the 

occupants, and any interconnecting 

structure of the airplane. Limit loads are 

defined as the parachute deployment 

forces developed within the operational 

envelope of the system. Lower factors of 

safety for airplane weight and velocity 

may be used, so that when combined in 

the energy equation, represent a 1.5 

factor of safety of the energy equation. 

(2) Stitching must be of a type that 

will not ravel when broken. 

(3) The applicant must show via test, 

or analysis supported by test, that with 

the recovery parachute deployed and 

the airplane structure damaged, the 

airplane impact during touchdown will 

result in an occupant environment in 

which serious injury to the occupants is 

improbable. 

(4) The applicant must show via test, 

or analysis supported by test, that with 

the recovery parachute deployed, the 

airplane can impact the ground in 

various adverse weather conditions, 

including winds up to 15 knots, without 

endangering the airplane occupants at 

and after touchdown. 

(d) System Function and Operations. 

(1) The installation design and 

location of the extraction device must 

consider fire hazards associated with 

the activation of the parachute system 

and reduce this potential as much as 

possible without compromising 

function of the extraction device. 

(2) A system safety analysis will be 

conducted on the recovery system that 

will consider the effects of annunciated 

and un-annunciated failures. This 

analysis will address both losses of 

function as well as malfunction 

(including un-commanded system 

activation). The applicant must show 

that they do not adversely affect proper 

functioning of the equipment, systems, 

or installations covered by § 23.1309, 

and do not otherwise adversely 

influence the safety of the airplane or its 

occupants. It must be shown that 

reliable and functional deployment in 

the adverse weather conditions that the 

airplane is approved for have been 

considered. For example, if the airplane 

is certified for flight in icing conditions, 

and flight test in icing reveals that ice 

may cover the deployment area, then 

the possible adverse effects of ice or an 

ice layer covering the parachute 

deployment area should be analyzed. 

(3) The recovery system must be 

designed to safeguard against 

inadvertent activation. Two separate 

and intentional actions will be required 

to activate the system. 

(4) It must be demonstrated that the 

system can be activated without 

difficulty by occupants of various sizes, 

from a 10th percentile female to a 90th 

percentile male, while sitting in the 

pilot or copilot seat. 

(5) The system must be labeled for 

identification, function, and operating 

limitations. 

(6) The airplane must be equipped 

with ASTM F 2316–06 conforming 

placards suitable to draw attention of 

first responders. Section 11 of ASTM F 

2316–06, specifies that the airplane 

should be marked with a ‘‘danger’’ 

placard placed adjacent to the exit point 

of each rocket/parachute, an 

‘‘identifying’’ placard attached to each 

rocket, and ‘‘warning’’ placard(s) 

applied where occupant(s) enter the 

airplane or where rescue personnel can 

readily see the placard(s). 

(e) Design and Construction. 

(1) All components of the system 

must be protected against deterioration 

due to weathering, corrosion, and 

abrasion. 

(2) Adequate provisions must be made 

for ventilation and drainage of the 

system compartments and associated 

structure to ensure the sound condition 

of the system. 

(f) Materials and workmanship. 

(1) The suitability and durability of 

materials used for parts, the failure of 

which could adversely affect safety, 

must— 

i. Be established by experience or 

tests; 

ii. Meet approved specifications that 

ensure their having the strength and 

other properties assumed in the design 

data; and 

iii. Take into account the effects of 

environmental conditions, such as 

temperature and humidity, expected in 

service. 

(2) Workmanship must be of a high 

standard. 

(3) The parachute(s) must be 

identified with a data panel that defines 

the Manufacturer, Date of Manufacture, 

Part Number, and Serial Number. 

(g) Systems Maintenance and 

Inspection. 

(1) Instructions for continued 

airworthiness must be prepared for the 

system that meet the requirements of 

§ 23.1529. 

(2) Adequate means must be provided 

to permit the close examination of the 

system components to ensure proper 

functioning, alignment, lubrication, and 

adjustment during the required 

inspection of the system. 


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45968 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 136 / Friday, July 15, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

(h) Operating Limitations. 

(1) Operating limitations must be 

prescribed to ensure proper operation of 

the system. A detailed discussion of the 

system, including operation, limitations, 

and deployment envelope must be 

included in the Airplane Flight Manual. 

(2) Operating limitations must be 

prescribed for inspecting and 

overhauling the system components at 

approved intervals. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 6, 

2016. 

William Schinstock, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–16813 Filed 7–14–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–4237; Special 

Conditions No. 25–619–SC] 

Special Conditions: Gulfstream 

Aerospace Corporation Model GVII– 

G500 Airplanes; Isolation or Protection 

of Airplane Electrical-System Security 

From Unauthorized Internal Access 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Gulfstream Aerospace 

Corporation (Gulfstream) Model GVII– 

G500 airplane. This airplane will have 

a novel or unusual design feature when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport-category 

airplanes. This design feature is a digital 

systems architecture requiring isolation 

or protection from unauthorized 

internal access. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on 

Gulfstream on July 15, 2016. We must 

receive your comments by August 29, 

2016. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2016–4237 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov/, 

including any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot 

.gov/. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and 

Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–1298; facsimile 

425–227–1320. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice of, and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

on, these special conditions is 

unnecessary because the substance of 

these special conditions has been 

subject to the public comment process 

in several prior instances with no 

substantive comments received. The 

FAA therefore finds that good cause 

exists for making these special 

conditions effective upon publication in 

the Federal Register. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

Background 

On March 29, 2012, Gulfstream 

Aerospace Corporation applied for a 

type certificate for their new Model 

GVII–G500 airplane. The Model GVII– 

G500 airplane will be a business jet 

capable of accommodating up to 19 

passengers. It will incorporate a low, 

swept-wing design with winglets and a 

T-tail. The powerplant will consist of 

two aft-fuselage-mounted Pratt & 

Whitney turbofan engines. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under Title 14, Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Gulfstream 

must show that the Model GVII–G500 

airplane meets the applicable provisions 

of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by 

Amendments 25–1 through 25–129. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., part 25) do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for the 

Model GVII–G500 airplane because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Model GVII–G500 airplanes 

must comply with the fuel-vent and 

exhaust-emission requirements of 14 

CFR part 34, and the noise-certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The 

FAA must issue a finding of regulatory 

adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 

574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Model GVII–G500 airplane will 

incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design feature: A digital 


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