FAA’s Progress and 

Challenges in Advancing 

the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System

Statement of

The Honorable Calvin L. Scovel III

Inspector General

U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Subcommittee on Aviation 

United States House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m. EDT

Wednesday

July 17, 2013

CC-2013-028
1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Federal Aviation Administration’s 

(FAA) progress in developing the Next Generation Air Transportation System 

(NextGen)—a system that is expected to provide safer and more efficient air traffic 

management. As you know, NextGen is an important and necessary transportation 

infrastructure project to modernize our nation’s aging air traffic system. It is also FAA’s 

most complex effort to date and will require multibillion-dollar investments from both the 

Federal Government and airspace users.

Since the effort began in fiscal year 2004, we have reported on cost increases and delays 

as well as challenges that FAA must address to successfully transition from legacy air 

traffic systems to NextGen. In September 2009, a Federal Government-industry task 

force—established at FAA’s request—recommended several strategies for accelerating 

NextGen’s benefits in the near term. While FAA has taken important steps to improve 

NextGen’s management, such as establishing a new program management office, the 

Agency has made little progress in shifting from planning to implementation and 

delivering benefits to airspace users. 

Today, I will focus on three priorities the Agency must address to realize NextGen’s 

benefits: (1) addressing underlying causes for difficulties in advancing NextGen,

(2) maximizing near-term benefits of new performance-based navigation routes and 

procedures, and (3) keeping the implementation of critical automation systems on track.

IN SUMMARY

FAA’s difficulties in advancing NextGen and transforming the National Airspace System 

(NAS) stem from a number of underlying causes, including the lack of an executable plan 

and unresolved critical design decisions. For example, FAA’s initial plans for NextGen

did not address implementation costs or how technologies would be developed or 

integrated. Also key to NextGen’s success is integrating new performance-based 

navigation (PBN) routes and procedures at key airports in order to maximize near-term 

benefits and gain user support. Yet, FAA’s lengthy procedure development process has 

delayed the implementation of new routes, and unresolved obstacles, such as the lack of 

updated controller policies and procedures, make it uncertain when airspace users can 

expect widespread benefits. Advancing NextGen also depends on successfully deploying 

new automation systems that controllers use to manage air traffic. However, FAA 

continues to face technical, cost, and schedule risks with its efforts to modernize or 

replace automation systems at terminal facilities because the Agency has not identified

and finalized all needed software and hardware requirements. Furthermore, despite recent 

progress with the En Route Automation Modernization System (ERAM)—a multibillion 

dollar program for processing flight data—considerable work remains to complete the 

effort in 2014 as currently planned. 
2

BACKGROUND

NextGen involves a significant and much needed overhaul of the NAS to shift from 

outdated ground-based air traffic management systems to more effective satellite-based 

systems. This effort includes several components, such as:

● redesigning airspace and deploying new performance-based flight procedures,

● developing systems to help controllers better manage air traffic, and

● providing critical technologies and infrastructure for NextGen.

To accomplish NextGen’s long-term goals, Congress mandated in 2003 that FAA create 

a plan to implement NextGen by 2025. While FAA’s initial planning focused on this 

timeframe, the Agency more recently emphasized near- and mid-term initiatives. The 

following table highlights FAA’s NextGen initiatives and modernization programs 

underway and their expected benefits.

Table. Examples of Key NextGen-Related Initiatives and Programs

Initiative/Program Expected Benefits

Metroplex Airspace Improve the efficiency of airspace that affects multiple airports near 

large metropolitan areas.

Airport Surface Operations Improve the management of airport taxiways, gates, and parking 

areas.

Data Communications 

(DataComm)

Provide two-way data communication between controllers and flight 

crews for improved cruise and transition operations to enable more 

efficient use of available or forecast NAS capacity.

ERAM Replace and significantly enhance existing software at the 20 FAA 

Centers that manage high-altitude air traffic. ERAM is FAA’s key 

platform for NextGen to process NAS flight data.

Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)

Enhance information about aircraft location for pilots and air traffic 

controllers using satellite-based surveillance technology.

System Wide Information 

Management (SWIM)

Provide a more agile exchange of information through a secure, 

NAS-wide information web that will connect FAA systems with other 

agencies and airspace users.

Source: OIG analysis.

To solidify Government and industry commitments, FAA asked RTCA1 to examine 

NextGen operational improvements planned for the 2012 to 2018 timeframe, help 

develop plans to maximize NextGen benefits, and justify investment in mid-term 

 1 Organized in 1935 as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA, Inc. is a private, not-for-profit corporation that 

develops consensus-based recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management 

system issues. It functions as a Federal advisory committee. 
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capabilities. The task force made 32 recommendations and stated that focusing on 

delivering near-term operational benefits, rather than major infrastructure programs, 

would help gain industry confidence in FAA’s plans and encourage users to invest in 

NextGen. 

LACK OF AN EXECUTABLE PLAN, UNRESOLVED CRITICAL DESIGN 

DECISIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES HAVE HINDERED 

NEXTGEN PROGRESS

To date, FAA’s progress in implementing NextGen has not met the expectations of 

Congress and industry stakeholders largely due to several underlying programmatic and 

organizational weaknesses: (1) the lack of an executable plan given unstable 

requirements, (2) unresolved critical design decisions, (3) organizational culture and 

frequent turnover in NextGen leadership, and (4) undefined benefits. These weaknesses 

have contributed to stakeholder skepticism about NextGen’s feasibility and reluctance to 

invest in NextGen. 

FAA Continues To Lack an Executable NextGen Plan

FAA’s NextGen plans—which initially targeted completion for 2025 at a cost of 

$40 billion—have lacked realistic strategies for achieving a system that could handle 

three times more air traffic while reducing FAA’s operating costs. Weaknesses in FAA’s 

plans were demonstrated early with the Agency’s 2005 progress report to Congress.

2

Specifically, the report did not address implementation costs, establish priorities, specify 

sequencing for specific airports and airspace, or detail how needed technologies would be 

developed or integrated. Instead, the report focused on eight strategies for transforming 

the NAS, such as how to use weather information to improve on-time performance.

Throughout FAA’s initial planning efforts, the Agency did not validate whether planned 

programs would provide needed capabilities, were technically feasible, and would be 

affordable for FAA or airspace users. In 2009, an internal FAA study3 found that the 

Agency’s NextGen plans were not risk-adjusted to realistically reflect what was 

technologically feasible and therefore could not be implemented as promised. The study 

concluded that implementing NextGen would cost significantly more than the initial 

$40 billion estimate and take as much as 10 years longer than originally planned. 

FAA has been unable to set realistic plans, budgets, and expectations for key NextGen 

programs, largely due to a lack of firm requirements for NextGen’s most critical 

capabilities. As we reported in April 2012,4 requirements continue to evolve for major 

 2 FAA, “2005 Progress Report to the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan,” March 2006. 3 Joint Planning and Development Organization (JPDO), “Portfolio Analysis Report,” 2009—also referred to as the “Trade Space 

Analysis.” The JPDO commissioned the report for FAA to meet Federal requirements to develop a business case for its 2011 

NextGen budget request. 4 Status of Transformational Programs and Risks to Achieving NextGen Goals (OIG Report No. AV-2012-094), Apr. 23, 2012. 

OIG reports and testimonies are available on our Web site at http://www.oig.dot.gov.
4

transformational programs5 such as ADS-B and DataComm. Therefore, decisionmakers 

and stakeholders lack sufficient information—including reliable cost and schedule 

estimates for achieving NextGen’s goals of enhancing capacity and reducing delays—to 

assess progress and risk.

FAA Has Not Resolved Key Design Decisions That Will Shape NextGen 

Requirements, Timing, and Costs 

FAA will continue to face difficulties with setting firm requirements for NextGen 

capabilities because several critical design decisions are still unresolved. Without a clear 

vision of needed capabilities, NextGen’s benefits, timing, and costs—as well as its 

integration into the NAS—remain uncertain. 

Key unresolved design decisions that will determine NextGen capabilities, timing, and 

costs include the following:

• Air/Ground Division of Responsibility. FAA has not decided how much 

responsibility for tracking aircraft will be delegated to pilots in the cockpit versus 

what duties will remain with air traffic controllers and ground systems.

• Level of Automation. FAA has not decided on the degree of human involvement in 

air traffic management and separating aircraft, which is key to establishing technical 

requirements for NextGen. Possible options range from today’s largely manual flight 

management to a mostly automated system centered on machine-to-machine 

exchanges with little controller involvement.

• Facility Requirements. FAA has not decided on the number and locations of air 

traffic facilities needed to support NextGen. In July 2012,6 we recommended that 

FAA develop comprehensive and regularly updated cost estimates for its effort to 

realign and consolidate the Nation’s network of air traffic control facilities into 

centralized locations. FAA concurred with our recommendation but has since scaled 

back its plans and will focus only on an integrated facility in the New York 

metropolitan area. 

FAA’s Organizational Culture and Frequent Changes in Leadership 

Contribute to Difficulties in Advancing NextGen

FAA’s difficulties in advancing NextGen technologies also stem from underlying 

organizational and management challenges, including an organizational culture that has 

been slow to embrace NextGen’s transformational vision. For example, a 2010–2011 

 5 FAA has identified six “transformational programs,” which are to provide the foundational technologies and infrastructure 

needed for NextGen. These programs are Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), System Wide Information 

Management (SWIM), Data Communications (DataComm), NextGen Network Enabled Weather (NNEW), NAS Voice System 

(NVS), and Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies (CATM-T). 6 The Success of FAA’s Long-Term Plan for Air Traffic Facility Realignments and Consolidations Depends on Addressing Key 

Technical, Financial, and Workforce Challenges (OIG Report No. AV-2012-151), July 17, 2012. 
5

study conducted at FAA’s request,

7 referred to as the Monitor Study, found that the 

Agency’s culture was resistant to the type of significant change needed to achieve 

NextGen and lacked a sense of urgency. Similarly, officials we spoke with cited a 

resistance to change as a stumbling block to advancing NextGen.

Both the Monitor Study and our interviews suggest that FAA’s highly operational, 

tactical, and safety-oriented culture can lead to a risk-averse outlook that is slow to 

embrace change, resulting in an organization that prioritizes day-to-day operations over 

more strategic and policy-driven change over time. Moreover, as we have previously 

reported in 2010,8 FAA’s culture is reluctant to embrace outside technologies and has 

historically not leveraged the work of other departments—such as the U.S. Department of 

Defense’s research and development related to surveillance and security of aircraft. 

Organizational instability and inconsistent leadership have also undermined FAA’s 

efforts to establish a culture that could effectively advance NextGen. Since 2003, FAA 

has had five Administrators, and was without a confirmed Administrator from December 

2011 until January 2013. In addition, FAA’s current Deputy Administrator was only 

recently appointed after about a 4-month vacancy, and FAA has yet to permanently fill 

the Assistant Administrator for NextGen position, which has been vacant since December 

2012. Stakeholders we interviewed expressed that frequent turnover in senior leadership 

has hindered a consistent message and a shared vision for NextGen, along with limiting 

accountability for NextGen problems and lack of progress. 

Since the NextGen effort began in 2004, FAA has undergone several reorganizations 

intended to assign responsibility, accountability, and authority for NextGen.9 FAA 

announced its most recent major reorganization in 2011, which included establishing a 

new Program Management Office to bridge the gap between NextGen’s strategic 

requirements and program implementation. While such actions could better position 

NextGen for success, it is too early to assess the overall effectiveness of this change, and 

it remains unclear how these changes will ultimately advance NextGen. 

We are currently conducting an audit further examining FAA’s reorganization and the 

underlying causes for FAA’s delays in implementing NextGen, and expect to issue our 

report later in 2013.

 7 Between July 2010 and June 2011, the Monitor Group studied FAA’s governance, processes, capabilities, and culture. 8 Timely Actions Needed To Advance the Next Generation Air Transportation System (OIG Report No. AV-2010-068), June 16, 

2010.

9 For example, in May 2008, FAA announced a reorganization of its NextGen efforts, which included establishing a Senior Vice 

President for NextGen and Operations Planning within the ATO and an office for NextGen Integration and Implementation to 

support the Senior Vice President. Similar to the 2011 reorganization, FAA believed the change would help move NextGen 

closer to implementation.
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Undefined NextGen Benefits Have Led to Industry Skepticism and 

Reluctance To Invest in NextGen Systems 

NextGen’s success depends in part on obtaining buy-in from key stakeholders—

particularly airspace users, who elect to purchase and install costly NextGen avionics in 

their aircraft to achieve NextGen capabilities. Without widespread equipage, such as 

advanced avionics that will be required for ADS-B and DataComm, FAA will be unable 

to markedly increase capacity or save fuel through NextGen systems.

FAA recognizes the importance of industry participation and engages stakeholders 

through various forums, such as RTCA and the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC),10

as it works to establish near- and mid-term objectives for NextGen. Despite these efforts, 

consensus on NextGen priorities beyond the near-term has not been reached, and 

questions remain between FAA and industry regarding what benefits will be achieved 

and when. Moreover, as we have previously reported and testified, FAA has not clearly 

defined the benefits of key NextGen initiatives for enhancing capacity, reducing delays, 

and reducing operating costs. As a result, airspace users are skeptical about FAA’s ability 

to deliver the technologies and related benefits and remain reluctant to equip with costly 

NextGen technologies. 

Breakdowns in past FAA efforts have also fueled airspace users’ reluctance to invest in 

new technologies—especially if the technologies may later be discarded. For example, 

FAA abandoned a much smaller but similar effort to implement a controller-pilot data 

link communications program11 that was expected to play an important role in enhancing 

air capacity and reducing flight delays. FAA and industry jointly invested in the program 

and began using data linking on a limited basis. However, FAA terminated the program 

in 2005 because of cost growth and technical issues. User concerns and a lack of clearly 

defined benefits with NextGen technologies have triggered debate among FAA and 

industry about the need for equipage incentives, such as Government-backed grants or 

loan guarantees. 

In response to these and other concerns, FAA convened a joint FAA-industry RTCA task 

force in 2009 to identify the major obstacles to user NextGen acceptance.12 The task 

force framed several overarching issues for guiding FAA and industry investments and 

made a series of recommendations to the Agency to address them. For example, the task 

force emphasized that assigning responsibility, accountability, authority, and funding 

within FAA is critical to accomplish all associated tasks and achieve NextGen benefits. 

 10 The NAC is a Federal advisory committee that will develop recommendations for NextGen portfolios with an emphasis on the 

midterm (through 2018). The NAC includes representation from affected user groups, including operators, manufacturers, air 

traffic management, aviation safety, airports, and environmental experts. 11 The controller-pilot data link communications program represented a new way for controllers and pilots to communicate that 

was analogous to wireless email. The program was planned for use at en route centers that manage high-altitude air traffic. 

Implementing this program—and obtaining expected benefits—required joint investments by FAA and airspace users. 12 RTCA, “NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Report,” September 9, 2009.
7

In 2012, we reported13 that while FAA quickly endorsed the task force’s 

recommendations by incorporating them into its NextGen strategic plans and budgets and 

establishing a mechanism for continued industry collaboration, the Agency has made 

limited progress in implementing them. Continued uncertainty about FAA’s efforts to 

resolve the safety, policy, training, and organizational issues addressed by the task force 

could further deter industry’s commitment to invest in NextGen technology.

OBSTACLES FACING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW PERFORMANCEBASED NAVIGATION ROUTES UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO MAXIMIZE

NEAR-TERM BENEFITS AND ENSURE USER SUPPORT 

Introducing new performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures, such as Area 

Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP),

14 is critical to 

achieving near-term NextGen benefits, including more direct flight paths, improved ontime aircraft arrival rates, greater fuel savings, and reduced aircraft noise. However, use 

of PBN procedures has been limited due to unresolved obstacles, such as the lack of 

updated controller policies and procedures for using PBN and the lengthy flight 

procedure development process. Although FAA has important PBN efforts underway, 

these obstacles make it uncertain when airspace users can expect widespread benefits. 

Use of PBN Procedures Is Limited 

Although FAA has implemented over 100 RNP procedures to date at large airports, the 

benefits of these procedures remain unrealized because air carriers and airports are not 

widely using them. In 2012, FAA tasked MITRE15 to obtain and analyze data to measure 

the use of PBN procedures and quantify their benefits. According to our analyses of 

MITRE’s preliminary data, RNP use is high at some small- to medium-sized airports, 

such as Oakland, CA, but overall RNP use is low, particularly at busy airports, such as 

those in the New York City area. Notably, at the six large airports16 where FAA has 

implemented advanced PBN procedures with curved approaches to runways,17 only about 

3 percent of eligible airline flights18 actually used them. 

 13 Challenges With Implementing Near-Term NextGen Capabilities at Congested Airports Could Delay Benefits (OIG Report No. 

AV-2012-167), August 1, 2012. 14 RNAV is a method of navigation in which aircraft use avionics, such as Global Positioning Systems, to fly any desired flight 

path without the limitations imposed by ground-based navigation systems. RNP is a form of RNAV that adds on-board 

monitoring and alerting capabilities for pilots, thereby allowing aircraft to fly more precise flight paths.

15 MITRE Corporation manages a research and development center for FAA, the Center for Advanced Aviation System 

Development.

16 The six large airports are: Reagan National, Dulles International, Chicago Midway International, LaGuardia International,

Newark Liberty International, and John F. Kennedy International. 17 Curved approaches to runways improve the use of airspace by allowing aircraft to avoid critical areas of terrain or conflicting 

airspace, thus increasing capacity.

18 An eligible flight is one in which (1) the aircraft was authorized to fly the RNAV/RNP procedure and (2) the flight was in a 

position to join the procedure. 
8

Several obstacles have undermined FAA’s efforts to increase use of PBN procedures. For 

example, according to a March 2012 FAA internal study and a June 2013 NAC report,

19 a 

key obstacle at busy metroplex locations is the lack of controller tools to manage mixed 

operations—that is, merging aircraft using straight-in approaches with those on curved 

paths.20 Other reported obstacles include the lack of clear procedure design objectives, 

outdated controller procedures, and the lack of standard training for pilots and controllers. 

Recognizing the importance of addressing these obstacles, FAA tasked a team with 

developing an action plan, but it remains unclear as to when they will issue a report on 

the team’s plan.

21

FAA is also working to streamline its process for implementing new procedures in 

response to improvements from an internal FAA review—the NAV Lean project.22 In 

September 2010, FAA reported numerous problems with the process, such as the lack of 

an expedited method for approving procedures that have only minor revisions, 

inconsistent interpretation of environmental policies and guidance, and inconsistencies in 

data. To address these problems, FAA made 21 recommendations for streamlining the 

process for deploying new procedures. In June 2011, FAA issued its plan for executing 

the 21 recommendations and to date has implemented 4. However, FAA does not expect 

to complete the entire NAV Lean initiative until September 2015. We plan to issue a 

report on FAA’s NAV Lean progress later this year.

Key PBN Projects Are Underway, but Benefits Remain Uncertain 

In 2010, FAA launched its metroplex initiative—a 7-year effort to improve the flow of 

traffic and efficiency at congested airports in 13 major metropolitan areas.

23 The 

metroplex project is a step in the right direction to achieving the near-term benefits of 

reduced congestion, as it involves introducing new PBN procedures. While FAA has 

completed initial studies or begun design work at 9 of 13 metroplex locations, it has only 

begun the implementation phase for one location—Houston, TX. According to FAA, 

airline procedure design and other issues have caused delays at the first two sites

(Washington, DC and North Texas), and some metroplex activities were recently halted 

or delayed due to sequestration. 

 19 NAC (in response to tasking from FAA), “Recommendation for Increased Utilization of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) 

in the National Airspace System (NAS),” June 2013. 20 According to MITRE, other causal factors, such as weather or operational conditions that do not necessitate the use of PBN 

instrument approaches, can also affect RNP use. 

21 The PBN Action Team was formed to develop mitigations to obstacles impacting the implementation and operational use of 

PBN procedures. Three NATCA representatives and three FAA management representatives identified 31 obstacles with 

corresponding action plans for mitigations; however, the plans have not yet been approved by FAA management. 22 NAV Lean was a cross-agency project to streamline policies and processes used to implement instrument flight procedures in 

response to a 2009 joint FAA-industry task force report recommendation. FAA used the “Lean Management Process” to identify 

areas of waste.

23 The 13 metroplex locations are: Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Houston, Memphis, Northern California, North Texas, Phoenix, 

Southern California, Washington, DC, Cleveland/Detroit, and South/Central Florida.
9

Additionally, in March of this year, after 4 years of planning and development, FAA

began publishing new PBN procedures as part of its Greener Skies24 project in Seattle.

According to FAA, the Agency found errors with some of the new procedures and has 

ongoing efforts to fully implement them. However, controllers will not be able to 

optimize the use of these procedures until FAA completes critical safety studies—due 

this September—and deploys new controller automation decision support tools. As a 

result, it is uncertain when users will see widespread benefits and whether this model can 

be applied NAS-wide.

As we reported in August 2012,25 industry representatives have expressed concerns that 

FAA has not yet integrated efforts from other related initiatives, such as better managing 

airport surface operations.26 In addition, many airspace users that are equipped with 

advanced avionics would like more advanced PBN procedures than FAA’s current efforts 

provide—specifically, those that regularly allow for more precise and curved approaches. 

FAA FACES PROGRAMMATIC AND COST RISKS WITH NEXTGEN’S 

AUTOMATION SYSTEMS

FAA’s goals for NextGen in the near- and mid-term ultimately depend on the success of 

its ongoing efforts to deploy new automation systems that controllers rely on to manage 

air traffic. FAA cannot maximize new PBN routes or implement NextGen technologies 

(such as ADS-B and DataComm) without delivering new automation platforms for 

controllers in terminal airspace (near airports) and en route (high altitude) airspace. 

However, despite recent progress, FAA continues to face technical, cost, and schedule 

risks with both its Terminal Automation Modernization/Replacement (TAMR) 

program—FAA’s effort to modernize terminal air traffic control facilities—and 

ERAM—a $2.1 billion system for processing en route flight data. 

FAA Faces Significant Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risks in Modernizing

or Replacing Automation at Terminal Facilities

FAA’s TAMR program aims to modernize or replace all of the automation systems that 

controllers rely on to manage traffic at terminal facilities with a single automation 

platform—the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). If 

effectively implemented, TAMR is expected to reduce Agency costs and facilitate the 

implementation of NextGen capabilities. TAMR currently involves modernizing 

automation systems at 11 terminal facilities, 7 of which are the largest and busiest in the 

Nation. FAA estimates this effort will cost $438 million and be completed between 2015 

and 2017. 

 24 Greener Skies is an airspace redesign project focused on using PBN procedures to reduce environmental impact of air traffic 

around Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. 25 Challenges With Implementing Near-Term NextGen Capabilities at Congested Airports Could Delay Benefits (OIG Report No. 

AV-2012-167), August 1, 2012. 26 Surface operations include the management of airport taxiways, gates, and parking areas.
10

However, as we reported in May 2013,27 the Agency faces significant cost, schedule, and 

technical risks to modernize these facilities. Specifically, FAA has yet to identify and 

finalize all software and hardware requirements that are needed to successfully replace 

the existing automation system28 with STARS. Finalizing these requirements involves 

extensive software development and testing—a lengthy and potentially costly process 

should issues arise in testing. FAA is currently developing software to address 

94 requirements gaps but anticipates identifying more gaps once it begins transitioning to 

STARS at the busiest facilities. Moreover, because full STARS capability at the 

11 terminal facilities is still years away, FAA continues to add new capabilities to 

existing systems at select facilities to support air traffic operations. The longer FAA must 

maintain and update existing systems at these sites, the greater the implementation and 

cost risk because FAA will have to add the same new capabilities to STARS. 

Our audit also found that FAA’s current cost and schedule estimates for its TAMR effort 

may not be reliable. For example, FAA’s approved program schedule does not include 

detailed milestones for software testing and implementation, and was not assessed for 

risk per Agency requirements. In addition, FAA’s cost estimates exclude major program 

cost elements, such as an estimated $270 million in technical refresh29 and modernization 

costs. As a result, the true timelines and costs to modernize terminal automation remain 

unknown.

We made a number of recommendations to better and more cost efficiently manage 

FAA’s terminal modernization efforts. FAA concurred or partially concurred with our 

recommendations and has begun working to address them.

FAA Is Making Considerable Progress Toward Getting ERAM on Track, but 

Critical Work on Complex Facilities and Key Capabilities Remains 

FAA’s NextGen goals depend on the successful deployment of ERAM—a $2.1 billion 

system for processing flight data at en route locations. Without ERAM, FAA will not 

realize the key benefits of NextGen’s transformational programs, such as new satellitebased surveillance systems and data communications for controllers and pilots. FAA 

originally planned to complete ERAM by the end of 2010, but significant software 

problems impacted the system’s ability to safely manage and separate aircraft and raised 

questions as to what capabilities ERAM would ultimately deliver. As a result, FAA 

rebaselined the program in June 2011, pushing its expected completion to 2014 and 

increasing cost estimates by $330 million. 

 27 FAA’s Acquisition Strategy for Terminal Modernization Is at Risk for Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Performance 

Shortfalls (OIG Report No. AV-2013-097), May 29, 2013. 28 Common Automated Radar Terminal System (CARTS-IIIE) is the existing automation system currently at the 11 large 

terminal facilities.

29 Technical refresh or technology refreshment is associated with keeping fielded products, systems, and services maintained and 

operational.
11

FAA is making considerable progress with fielding ERAM. The Agency is now using 

ERAM at 16 of 20 sites either on a full- or part-time basis—a significant step forward 

given the extensive problems at the two initial sites. FAA plans for all 20 sites to achieve 

full operational capability and to decommission30 the legacy system by August 2014. 

However, as FAA deploys ERAM to the Nation’s busiest facilities, such as those in the

New York and Washington, DC area, it expects to identify new problems that could 

impact cost and schedule. FAA is currently spending about $12 million a month on the 

ERAM contract, excluding NextGen efforts funded through the contract. If the current 

contract burn rate does not decline significantly, the Agency will need additional funds to 

complete this stage of the program.31

Moreover, controllers and experts continue to raise concerns about ERAM’s capabilities.

While these issues are not expected to delay ERAM’s 2014 implementation, they will 

need to be addressed for the system to support most NextGen initiatives.

● Flight Plan Trajectory Modeler—This capability models aircraft flight paths to 

predict aircraft collision conflicts and to ensure accurate handoffs between controllers 

as they communicate with pilots who transit to airspace controlled by another facility.

However, the modeler software has often required adjustments to change the flight 

plan trajectory to ensure accurate handoffs. According to controllers, improvements 

are needed to support current operations and NextGen capabilities that use trajectorybased operations.32

• Aircraft Tracking and Sensor Fusion—This capability allows ERAM to integrate—

or “fuse”—multiple radars and satellite-based information for controllers. However, 

thus far, controllers have not been able to take advantage of this improved capability 

because of problems with the ability to track aircraft accurately and consistently. A 

MITRE analysis found that the ERAM tracker will require adjustments to use ADS-B

and radar together to manage air traffic. 

CONCLUSION

NextGen is a necessary and complex undertaking—one that involves cutting edge 

technologies, new procedures, and a myriad of stakeholders whose priorities may 

conflict. Given these complexities, it is essential that FAA develop an executable plan

with firm requirements, resolve critical design decisions, and address other underlying 

causes for delays in advancing NextGen. Until FAA implements new performance-based 

 30 Decommissioning involves the disconnection, removal, and disposal of the HOST computer system once ERAM has been 

declared operationally ready at a site. 31 The Office of Management and Budget approved shifting $44 million from the ERAM operations and maintenance account to

the facilities and equipment (F&E) account, increasing total ERAM F&E funding to $374 million. As of February 2013, FAA 

had spent a total of $241.86 million—about 64.7 percent of the $374 million in F&E funding allocated since the June 2011 

rebaseline.

32 Trajectory-based operations focus on more precisely managing aircraft from departure to arrival with the benefits of reduced 

fuel consumption, lower operating costs, and reduced emissions. 
12

routes and procedures at congested airports and develops important NextGen automation 

systems, NextGen benefits will remain unrealized. FAA’s recent reorganization is a step 

toward improving the management and direction of these efforts, but sustained 

leadership, with clear lines of accountability and authority, will be key to achieving 

intended outcomes.