STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-2057

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Timothy John Bakken,

Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2015

Affirmed

Rodenberg, Judge

Polk County District Court

File No. 60-CR-13-2028

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Andrew W. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, 

Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge. 

S Y L L A B U S

Each individual image depicting child pornography and stored on a computer drive 

is a separate pornographic work under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 

4(a) (2014). 
2

O P I N I O N

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant challenges his seven sentences for possession of pornographic works 

involving minors. He contends that the double-jeopardy prohibition against multiple 

prosecutions found in Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, and the statutory protection afforded by 

Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2014) prohibit his convictions of seven counts of possession of child 

pornography when the offenses involved continuous possession of a single computer. 

Alternatively, he argues that Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2014), limits his punishment 

because his conduct arose from a single behavioral incident. We affirm.

FACTS

On June 7, 2013, police executed a search warrant and seized appellant Timothy 

John Bakken’s computer from his residence. When law enforcement later imaged 

appellant’s hard drive, they recovered numerous pornographic pictures,

1

many of which 

appeared to depict minors. Law enforcement documented the descriptions and the 

download dates and times for seven of the pornographic pictures depicting minors. 

 

1

In his motion to the district court, appellant referred to the pornographic items as 

“photographs.” On appeal, appellant refers to them as “images.” The state refers to the 

items on appeal as “photographs.” The statute broadly defines “pornographic works” as 

“any visual depiction, including any photograph . . . or computer-generated image . . . that . 

. . uses a minor to depict actual or simulated sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 

1(f)(2)(i) (2014). “Photograph” connotes an image created by exposure of a photosensitive 

surface to light. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1329 (5th ed. 

2011). The images involved here are not, strictly speaking, photographs. We therefore use 

either “images” or “pictures” to describe the items. “Picture” is defined as a visual 

representation rendered on a flat surface, Id. at 1335, which seems to encompass a

computer-generated image on a computer monitor.
3

Appellant was charged with seven counts of possession of a pornographic work 

involving a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2014).

2

 The seven 

counts corresponded to the seven images, each of which was described and identified by 

the date and time that appellant received and viewed each image: Count/Image 1 on 

November 9, 2012 at 3:57 p.m.; Count/Image 2 on December 2, 2012 at 4:27 a.m.; 

Count/Image 3 on December 9, 2012 at 5:49 p.m.; Count/Image 4 on December 14, 2012 

at 5:41 p.m.; Count/Image 5 on March 5, 2013 at 6:32 p.m.; Count/Image 6 on April 28, 

2013 at 5:25 p.m.; Count/Image 7 on June 4, 2013 at 8:19 p.m. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to all seven counts. Testifying under examination by the 

court, appellant admitted (1) receiving and viewing the images at the dates and times listed 

above, (2) that each image was of a different child, and (3) that he downloaded all of the 

involved images to his home computer. The district court formally accepted appellant’s 

pleas of guilty. The district court then ordered appellant to undergo psychosexual and 

psychometric assessments before sentencing, and it scheduled a separate sentencing 

hearing. 

The parties submitted written and oral arguments to the district court concerning 

sentencing. Appellant then raised the issues he argues on appeal, namely double-jeopardy 

and that the charged offenses arose from a single behavioral incident. After a two-day 

 

2 Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2014), is unchanged from the 2012 version, under 

which appellant was convicted and sentenced. The same is true of Minn. Stat. §§ 617.246, 

subd. 1(f)(2)(i) (2014) and 617.247, subd. 2(a) (2014), discussed below.
4

sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced appellant on all seven counts, as well as on

separate and unrelated offenses of which a jury had convicted him.3 

The district court rejected appellant’s double-jeopardy and single-behavioralincident arguments. To reject the double-jeopardy argument, the district court relied on 

the structure of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a). Specifically, it noted that the statute 

prohibits possession of either (1) a computer containing a pornographic work or (2) a 

pornographic work itself. It concluded that each downloaded picture was a separate 

pornographic work. In finding separate behavioral incidents, and therefore imposing 

separate sentences for each conviction, the district court relied on the “significant evidence 

regarding each downloaded pornographic image . . . includ[ing] the date and time of the 

download, the names of the files, [and] . . . where [each] was saved.” This appeal 

followed.

ISSUES

I. Did appellant forfeit his constitutional and statutory double-jeopardy arguments?

II. Do appellant’s convictions for seven counts of possession of child pornography 

violate Minn. Stat. § 609.04?

III. Did the district court err when it concluded that the conduct underlying the 

seven offenses to which appellant pleaded guilty constituted separate behavioral 

incidents and sentenced appellant on seven separate counts of possession of 

child pornography?

 

3 Appellant was convicted following a jury trial on the separate offenses of terroristic 

threats, gross misdemeanor domestic assault, and criminal damage to property in the fourth 

degree. These offenses took place on or about September 14, 2013, while the investigation 

in this case was pending. 
5

ANALYSIS

I. Appellant did not forfeit his constitutional and statutory double-jeopardy 

arguments.

The state argues that we should not reach the merits of either appellant’s

constitutional double-jeopardy argument or his argument concerning section 609.04 and its 

prohibition against convictions for primary and lesser-included offenses because appellant 

waived them.

4

 Specifically, the state argues that appellant waived any constitutional 

double-jeopardy argument by making a counseled guilty plea before raising the argument 

at the sentencing hearing. The state also argues that appellant never raised section 609.04 

and its prohibition against convictions for primary and lesser-included offenses. 

Accordingly, the state maintains that we should only reach the merits of appellant’s section 

609.035 argument. 

A. Appellant preserved his constitutional double-jeopardy argument 

because the claim can be decided on the record as it existed at the time 

he pleaded guilty.

Concerning whether appellant forfeited his constitutional double-jeopardy argument 

by failing to assert his double-jeopardy challenge before pleading guilty while represented 

by counsel, Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.01, subd. 2, provides that a counseled defendant waives 

all non-jurisdictional defects by entering a guilty plea. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 64 

 

4

The state’s brief presents this argument as one of waiver. The Minnesota Supreme Court 

has clarified that “waiver is the intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.” State v. 

Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278, n.3 (Minn. 2015), (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 733, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993)). Here, the absence of any double-jeopardy 

argument at the district court seems not to have been intentional or deliberate. Forfeiture, 

unlike waiver, is a “failure to make a timely assertion of a right.” Id. We analyze this case 

as one of possible forfeiture, and not of waiver.
6

(Minn. 2011). The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to determine whether a defendant 

forfeits his double-jeopardy protections by failing to file a timely and proper pretrial 

motion to dismiss. State v. Sahr, 812 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Minn. 2012). In Jeffries, however, 

the supreme court noted that “a counseled guilty plea does not bar a defendant from raising 

a double-jeopardy claim on appeal if that claim can be decided on the existing record at the 

time the defendant pleads guilty.” 806 N.W.2d at 65.

The state argues that Jeffries does not apply here. We disagree. The record of 

appellant’s guilty plea is clear and sufficient to resolve this issue on appeal. The complaint 

described the seven digital images and detailed the dates and times that appellant 

downloaded each one. At the guilty-plea hearing, appellant admitted to the facts of the 

complaint, including the separate download dates and times. He now argues that, on these 

facts, he cannot constitutionally be sentenced on each count. Appellant did not forfeit his 

constitutional double-jeopardy argument.

B. By raising issues under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 to the district 

court, appellant preserved his section 609.04 argument for appeal.

The state also argues that appellant forfeited5any issue under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 

because he failed to specifically raise the issue to the district court. Generally, “litigants 

are bound [on appeal] by the theory or theories . . . upon which the action was actually 

tried below[,]” Annis v. Annis, 250 Minn. 256, 262-63, 84 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1957), and an 

appellate court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. 

Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We have held, however, that

 

5 Again, the state’s briefing argues waiver, but the question is more properly analyzed one 

of forfeiture. See note 4, supra.
7

arguments concerning section 609.04 are not forfeited when an appellant raises issues 

under section 609.035 to the district court because section 609.035 involves the same 

factual determination as does the application of section 609.04. State v. Hodges, 384 

N.W.2d 175, 181-82 (Minn. App. 1986), aff’d, 386 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1986). 

Here, despite appellant not specifically arguing to the district court that section 

609.04 prohibits multiple convictions, he did raise section 609.035 in his sentencing brief. 

Therefore, under Hodges, we conclude that appellant did not forfeit his section 609.04 

arguments.

II. Section 609.04 is inapplicable to this case because none of the seven counts is 

an “included offense” of any other count.

Appellant argues that Minn. Stat. § 609.04 prohibits his conviction of more than one 

count of possession of a pornographic work involving minors. The issue presents a mixed 

question of fact and law that we review de novo. State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 

(Minn. 1998). Section 609.04, subd. 1, provides that:

Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of 

either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both. 

An included offense may be any of the following: 

(1) A lesser degree of the same crime; or

(2) An attempt to commit the crime charged; or

(3) An attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime; 

or

(4) A crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were 

proved; or

(5) A petty misdemeanor necessarily proved if the 

misdemeanor were proved.

Here, appellant was charged with seven counts of possession of a pornographic 

work involving a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a). None of the 
8

seven counts fits the statutory definition of an “included offense” under any other count. 

Each involved image was separately downloaded at a known date and time. No charged 

offense is a lesser degree of any other charged offense, nor does proof of any charge 

necessarily prove any other charge. Therefore, the facts and legal basis of appellant’s 

convictions do not support his argument. Section 609.04 is inapplicable to this case.

III. The district court did not err in concluding that appellant’s possession of 

individual images of child pornography constituted separate behavioral 

incidents, where each was separately downloaded and stored on appellant’s 

computer drive.

Appellant’s remaining arguments are that his convictions and multiple sentences 

violate his constitutional double-jeopardy rights and/or Minn. Stat. § 609.035. The state 

urges us to avoid the constitutional double-jeopardy question and resolve this case 

exclusively through section 609.035. 

The supreme court has held that courts should “avoid a constitutional ruling if there 

is another basis on which a case can be decided.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 

(Minn. 2006). The legislature adopted section 609.035 “to broaden the protection afforded 

by our constitutional provisions against double jeopardy.” State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 

394, 400, 141 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1966). Specifically, section 609.035 solidifies a person’s 

double-jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the same offense. See

Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 60-61 (Minn. 2011) (noting one aspect of double-jeopardy rights is 

protection against multiple punishments for the same offense); State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 

477, 483 (Minn. App. 1993) (referring to section 609.035 as “Minnesota’s ‘double 

jeopardy’ statute,” the purpose of which is “to eliminate multiple . . . punishments”). 
9

Against this backdrop, we agree with the state that section 609.035 encompasses

appellant’s constitutional double-jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the 

same offense. We therefore analyze the statutory protection, which is broader than the 

constitutional protection. 

A. Each digital image on a computer drive is a separate pornographic work 

under Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a).

Under section 609.035, we first consider the defined criminal conduct. Section 

617.247, subd. 4(a), provides that “[a] person who possesses a pornographic work or a . . .

computer . . . containing a pornographic work, knowing or with reason to know its content 

and character, is guilty of a felony.” (Emphasis added.) Because he possessed the child 

pornography in digital form, appellant urges us to read section 617.247, subd. 4(a), as 

criminalizing only the possession of a computer containing pornographic works. He 

argues that possession of a computer drive containing multiple individual images or

pictures in digital form is a single offense. Appellant argues that, under the statute, the 

state’s argument improperly divides his single continuing offense—possessing a computer 

containing pornographic works involving minors—into seven criminal charges. The state 

counters that a plain reading of this disjunctive statute prohibits possession of any single 

pornographic work involving a minor, and also prohibits the possession of a computer or 

other storage system containing a pornographic work involving a minor. 

Appellant cites cases from Iowa, Kansas, and New Mexico to support his reading of 

the statute. Because those cases are extra-jurisdictional, we afford them little weight. See 

Wajda v. Kingsbury, 652 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Minn. App. 2002) (declining to find extra-
10

jurisdictional cases persuasive when those cases do not express the law in Minnesota and 

Minnesota appellate courts have not previously cited those cases). And, critically, the 

cited cases involve statutes worded differently than Minnesota’s statute. For example, the 

Iowa Supreme Court specifically contrasted Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), with Iowa 

Code § 728.12(3), which criminalizes possession of a computer or “other print or visual 

medi[a],” but does not criminalize possession of an individual “pornographic work.” State 

v. Muhlenbruch, 728 N.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Iowa 2007). Using dictionary definitions, the 

Iowa court determined that “medium” means “the instrumentality of expression rather than 

the expression itself,” or an “object or device . . . on which data is stored.” Id. at 214 

(citations omitted). The Kansas Court of Appeals likewise emphasized that Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 21-3516(a)(2) (2000) criminalized possession of a “printed or visual medium.”

State v. Donham, 24 P.3d 750, 754 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). The court analyzed the term 

“medium” in the same manner as the Iowa Supreme Court. The New Mexico Supreme 

Court applied the rule of lenity in interpreting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6A-3(A) because the 

modifier “any” in the New Mexico statute made the legislature’s intended unit of 

prosecution ambiguous. State v. Olsson, 324 P.3d 1230, 1234-35 (N.M. 2014). 

Read closely, these foreign cases support the state’s reading of Minnesota’s statute, 

expressly prohibiting possession of either a “pornographic work” or “a computer . . . 

containing a pornographic work.” Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a). Although the state 

could have charged appellant’s possession of a computer drive containing child 

pornography as a single count, it also could and did charge multiple counts for distinct 

pornographic works stored on a single computer drive.
11

Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 2(a), provides that “‘pornographic work’ has the 

meaning given to it in section 617.246.” Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(f)(2)(i), provides 

that “‘pornographic work’ means . . . any visual depiction, including any photograph . . . or 

computer-generated image . . . that . . . uses a minor to depict actual or simulated sexual 

conduct.” Despite the images on appellant’s computer drive being stored in digital form, 

each digital file was “a visual depiction” and a “computer-generated image.” Each was, 

therefore, a separate “work.”

Minnesota caselaw applying the statute also supports this interpretation of 

“pornographic work” and “computer-generated image.” See generally State v. Cannady, 

727 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2007) (affirming 23 convictions for possession of child 

pornography on a single computer); State v. McCauley, 820 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. App. 

2012) (affirming 20 convictions for possession of child pornography on a single 

computer), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2012); State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135 (Minn. 

App. 2004) (affirming five convictions for possession of child pornography on a single 

computer). Although none of these cases have expressly held that each digital image on a 

computer is a separate pornographic work, each case affirmed multiple convictions relying

on an interpretation of the statute as authorizing the state to charge multiple counts for 

possession of multiple pornographic works stored on a single computer. 

We hold that each digital image on a computer drive is a separate pornographic 

work under Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a). 
12

B. Appellant’s conduct constituted separate behavioral incidents because 

appellant downloaded the individual files containing images of child 

pornography on distinctly different dates with a broad criminal 

objective.

Having concluded that Minnesota’s possession-of-child-pornography statute

criminalizes possession of individual child-pornography images despite the storage of 

those images on a single computer drive, we next consider whether the seven counts 

charged in this case constitute separate behavioral incidents. Appellant pleaded guilty to 

downloading the images on different dates and times, and as a result, the facts are not in 

dispute. When the facts are not in dispute, the decision whether multiple offenses are part 

of a single behavioral incident presents a question of law, and is reviewed de novo. State 

v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012).

Section 609.035, subd. 1, provides that, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than 

one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the 

offenses.” “Whether two acts are part of a single course of conduct depends on the facts of 

the particular case.” State v. Hawkins, 511 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Minn. 1994). In reviewing 

whether multiple offenses arise from a single behavioral incident under section 609.035, 

we consider “the factors of [a unity of] time and place and whether a defendant is

motivated by a single criminal objective.” State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 

(Minn. 1995). The state has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the conduct underlying the offenses arose from multiple behavioral incidents. State v. 

Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Minn. 2000); see, e.g., State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 

660, 666 (Minn. 2006) (noting that the state failed to show that the possession of child 
13

pornography offenses “took place at significantly different times or with significantly 

different criminal objectives”).

Appellant’s unity-of-time-and-place argument again relies on an incorrect reading

of section 617.247, subd. 4(a), as criminalizing only the possession of his computer, rather 

than the individual files or pictures. Using that reading as the basis of his argument, 

appellant argues that his “possession was continuous and uninterrupted,” and took place 

exclusively in his home. But the conduct underlying appellant’s offenses is his possession 

of the individual pictures, as discussed. Although the offenses share a unity of place—

appellant’s computer—appellant admitted under oath during his plea to downloading the 

pictures on seven different dates over the course of seven months. Therefore, under the

Bookwalter unity-of-time-and-place factor, appellant’s conduct involved separate 

behavioral incidents.

Appellant next argues that personal sexual gratification motivated his collection of 

the images—fulfilling the Bookwalter single-criminal-objective factor. The “personal 

sexual gratification” objective is similar to “motivation by perverse sexual desire,” which 

we have held to be too broad of a criminal objective to meet the single-criminal-objective 

factor when there are multiple instances of sexual contact with a juvenile. State v. Secrest, 

437 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. May 24, 1989). Secrest 

relied in part on State v. Eaton, in which the supreme court determined that the objective of 

swindling money was too broad to be a single objective when the defendant planned and 

executed thefts of two different checks at two separate times. 292 N.W.2d 260, 267 

(Minn. 1980) Appellant’s actions here are comparable. He received multiple images
14

depicting child pornography on different dates and times over the course of seven months. 

Therefore, his criminal goal of collecting child pornography for personal sexual 

gratification is too broad to be a single criminal goal.

Under the Bookwalter single-criminal-objective test, appellant’s actions in 

acquiring multiple works of child pornography on distinct dates are separate behavioral 

incidents. Appellant’s multiple sentences do not violate section 609.035.

D E C I S I O N

In sum, the district court correctly ruled that, under Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 

4(a), each digital image possessed by appellant on his computer drive and depicting child 

pornography is a separate “pornographic work.” And the district court did not err in 

sentencing appellant for possession of seven separate pornographic works involving 

minors, because the state proved on this record that appellant’s offenses arose from

separate behavioral incidents.

Affirmed.