United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-30979

George Hughes, 

Petitioner—Appellee,

versus

Darrel Vannoy, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 

Respondent—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:16-CV-770

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:

George Hughes and Drew Hawkins fought, Hughes’s gun fired, and 

Hawkins died. On trial for second degree murder, Hughes testified that the 

gun fired accidentally when Hawkins pulled on the gun and the two men 

collided. His testimony was contradicted by an eyewitness supposedly 

watching the fight from outside her apartment across the street who said she 

saw Hawkins backing away from Hughes with his handsraised at the moment 

the gun fired. Hughes’s trial counsel never attempted to interview the 

eyewitness or her roommate, who would have testified that the eyewitness 

was actually inside their apartment at the time of the shooting.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 5, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Hughes applied for state postconviction relief for counsel’s 

ineffectiveness in failing to interview the eyewitness. Though a state court 

commissioner recommended relief after holding two evidentiary hearings, 

the Louisiana courts disagreed. Hughes then sought federal habeas relief, 

which the district court granted, finding the state court’s application of 

clearly established law unreasonable. The State now appeals. We affirm.

I

A

On November 19, 2004, Hughes’s adopted daughter, Amy, and 

Hawkins, her boyfriend, got into an argument, during which Hawkins 

physically attacked Amy and locked her out of the apartment they shared. 

Amy called Hughes from her neighbor’s phone to tell him about the fight. 

Hughes told her to call the police and said he would come to her apartment. 

Amy refused to call the police but told Hughes she would call back to let him 

know if things were okay. Sometime after this call, Hawkins let Amy back 

inside, and they continued to argue. Hughes later called the apartment, and 

the phone was answered. According to Hughes, he heard sounds of a struggle 

and heard Amy say that Hawkins was killing her. Hughes called the 

apartment again, and Hawkins answered. The two had a heated exchange,

and Hughes told Hawkins that he was going over there and was “going to 

kick [Hawkins’s] ass.”

Hughes took a .22 caliber handgun when he left for Amy’s apartment.

He testified that he took the gun because Hawkins ran with a rough crowd, 

and Hughes was unsure who would be present at Hawkins and Amy’s 

apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment complex, Hughes saw Hawkins 

and Amy outside by Hawkins’s car. Hughes testified that he heard Amy 

scream at Hawkins to let go of their infant child and saw Hawkins yank the 

child away from Amy. Hughes then exited his vehicle and approached 

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Hawkins. During this time, the gun was in Hughes’s back pocket. As he 

approached, Hughes saw Hawkins throw the child into the back seat of his 

car. The two men exchanged more words, and both threatened to hit the 

other. Then Hughes “flew” at Hawkins, and they began to fight. During the 

fight, Hughes’s gun fired, and Hawkins was shot and killed.

Hughes was arrested and charged with second degree murder. He was 

represented at trial by public defender Scott Collier. At trial, the central issue 

was whether Hughes intended to shoot Hawkins or if the gun accidentally 

fired during the struggle. 

Hughes testified that after some initial fighting, Hawkins staggered 

backwards, put his hands up, and said, “no more, no more.” Hughes then 

turned to talk to Amy, at which point Hawkins saw the gun in Hughes’s back 

pocket. Hawkins yelled for help and moved towards Hughes. Hughes 

testified that it seemed like Hawkins was on drugs.1 As Hawkins advanced, 

Hughes calmly removed the gun from his back pocket, told Hawkins that he 

didn’t need a gun to beat Hawkins up, and said he would place the gun on his

truck. As he turned to do so, Hawkins grabbed the barrel of the gun and tried 

to get the gun away from Hughes. Hughes testified that Hawkins said “[g]o 

ahead and shoot me” and yanked on the barrel of the gun. Hawkins’s hand 

slipped off the gun. The two men fell forward towards each other, and the 

gun hit Hawkins’s chest and discharged. Forensic evidence supported 

Hughes’s version of events. Dr. Gilbert Corrigan testified that Hawkins died 

1 A toxicology report confirmed that Hawkins was under the influence of 

oxycodone and diazepam. State v. Hughes, No. 2006 KA 2422, 2007 WL 1765559, at *4 

(La. Ct. App. June 20, 2007) (unpublished).

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of a “contact wound,” and “the trajectory of the bullet was consistent with 

either a struggle or with the victim being bent over.”2

Two eyewitnesses testified at trial contradicting Hughes’s version of 

events, but both gave conflicting statements as to whether they witnessed the 

actual shooting. Amy testified at trial that she saw Hughes shoot Hawkins 

when Hawkins was backing up, had his hands raised, and was about one or 

two feet away from Hughes. She testified that, as far she could remember, 

she did not turn her back on the two men when they were fighting. Amy’s 

trial testimony contradicted her initial statement to police in which she said 

that her back was turned at the moment the gun fired. Amy’s sister also 

testified at trial that Amy told her she did not witness the shooting because 

her back was turned while tending to her child.

The other, and only disinterested, eyewitness was Sandra Allen, who 

testified at trial that she witnessed the altercation from outside her apartment 

across the street. Allen stated that she heard arguing and then went outside, 

where she saw two men fighting. According to Allen, one man backed away 

from the other with his hands raised and then she heard the gunshot and saw 

the man with raised hands fall to the ground. Allen’s trial testimony was 

somewhat contradicted by her initial written statement to the police. In it, 

Allen said she was inside her apartment when she heard someone calling for 

help and a gunshot, which is what prompted her to go outside where she saw 

two men arguing.3 When asked at trial why her testimony contradicted the

earlier statement, Allen said she incorrectly “transposed” the events in her 

2 Hughes, 2007 WL 1765559, at *4.

3 There is an obvious logical flaw in Allen’s written statement because she could 

not have seen Hughes and Hawkins arguing after the gun was fired. 

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statement due to nerves. On cross examination, one of Hughes’s attorneys4

pressed Allen on the inconsistency, and Allen continued to insist that she 

witnessed the shooting. 

B

Hughes was found guilty by a nonunanimous jury.5 After the verdict, 

Collier became aware of a television interview Allen gave the night of the 

shooting, which Collier believed indicated that Allen was inside at the time 

of the gunshot. He moved for a new trial based on Allen’s interview and some 

additional newly discovered evidence. The trial court judge denied the 

motion, noting that she “c[ould] not imagine” how Allen, a witness who was 

subpoenaed for trial, could be considered newly discovered evidence. 

Hughes was sentenced to life in prison without the benefit of parole, 

probation, or suspension of sentence.

On direct appeal, Hughes argued that the trial court erroneously 

denied his motion for a new trial. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal 

affirmed the denial because “the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . would 

have led to the discovery of the ‘new’ evidence alleged by” Collier. The 

Louisiana Supreme Court denied Hughes’s application for certiorari.

In 2009, Hughes’s new counsel filed a state postconviction 

application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel because Collier 

never interviewed Allen, a key eyewitness. A state trial court commissioner 

held two evidentiary hearings. In them, Allen’s roommate, Lee,6 testified 

that Allen was watching television when both heard the gunshot. Lee said she 

4 Allen was cross-examined by Collier’s co-counsel.

5 The vote was 11-1.

6 Lee’s last name is also Allen. To avoid confusion, the opinion refers to Lee only 

by her first name and Sandra Allen by her last.

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saw Allen go outside only after hearing the gunshot. Allen testified and 

reiterated her trial testimony that she went outside when she heard arguing 

and so was outside when the gun fired.

Collier testified at the evidentiary hearings as well. He said he was 

unaware Allen was going to testify that she had seen the shooting until the 

week before trial when the prosecution informed him of the content of 

Allen’s testimony. Prior to that, he knew Allen had been subpoenaed but

thought she was just going to testify to coming outside after the shooting as 

this was Collier’s understanding of Allen’s written statement to the police. 

Collier did not attempt to interview Allen either before or after he became 

aware of her supposedly changing testimony. When asked whether it was a 

strategic decision not to interview Allen, Collier said it was a strategic 

decision not to ask for a continuance when he discovered the change in 

testimony because it contradicted Allen’s earlier written statement. He said 

there was no strategy behind his decision not to try to interview Allen at any 

time, even prior to learning of her changed testimony. Collier acknowledged 

that if he had interviewed Allen, he would have discovered her roommate, 

who would have contradicted Allen’s trial testimony.

The commissioner issued a 22-page recommendation to grant relief 

for counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to interview Allen. However, the 

state trial court dismissed Hughes’s application without any explanation or 

hearing on the matter. The state appellate court denied Hughes’s request for 

supervisory writs without elaboration. Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court 

denied Hughes relief in a single-page order, concluding he “fail[ed] to show 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard of 

Strickland v. Washington.”

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Hughes then filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in federal 

court.7 He asserted three grounds for relief, including one based on 

ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to investigate Allen’s statements. The 

district court referred the petition to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge 

concluded that counsel’s decision to forgo investigating and interviewing 

Allen was not reasonable and that this deficient performance prejudiced 

Hughes at trial.8

The State objected to the report. The district court conducted a 

de novo review and agreed with the magistrate judge that the state “court’s 

ultimate legal conclusion was objectively unreasonable.” The district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and ordered a new trial.

The State now appeals. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district 

court correctly determined that no deference was due to the Louisiana 

Supreme Court’s denial of relief regarding counsel’s failure to investigate 

Allen’s statement.

II

In an appeal from a district court’s grant of habeas relief, this Court 

reviews issues of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.9

7 Hughes filed an earlier pro se § 2254 petition when his writ application before the 

Louisiana Supreme Court was still pending. The district court dismissed the petition for 

failure to exhaust state court remedies but gave Hughes 30 days from the receipt of the 

Louisiana Supreme Court decision to file another § 2254 petition. The instant petition was 

filed within 30 days of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of Hughes’s writ application. 

8 The magistrate judge recommended denying relief on the other two grounds 

Hughes raised, a recommendation the district court also adopted. The parties additionally 

disputed the timeliness of Hughes’s petition. The magistrate judge recommended finding 

that the petition was timely because equitable tolling was warranted, and the district court 

agreed. The State does not challenge the district court’s timeliness finding on appeal. 

9 Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485, 499 (5th Cir. 2008).

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III

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) 

requires a district court to defer to a state habeas court’s determination of the 

merits of a prisoner’s claims unless the state decision “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding.”10 Where, as here, a state court correctly 

identifies the governing clearly established law, a state court decision may 

nevertheless be “an unreasonable application” of that law if it “applies [the 

law] unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.”11 “A merely 

incorrect state court decision is not sufficient to constitute an unreasonable 

application of federal law . . . .”12 Instead, the state court decision must be 

“so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.”13

We must “carefully consider all the reasons and evidence supporting 

the state court’s decision.”14 That the Louisiana Supreme Court decision 

does not explain its reasoning does not affect our review. We are required to 

“determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state 

10 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

11 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000). 

12 Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 2006). 

13 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

14 Mays v. Hines, 141 S. Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021) (per curiam).

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court’s determination”15 and examine “each ground supporting the state 

court decision.”16

Hughes’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is governed by

Strickland v. Washington’s two-part inquiry. He “must show: (1) ‘that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’

and (2) that the deficiency was ‘prejudicial to the defense.’”17 Because the 

Strickland “inquiry is highly deferential to counsel” and AEDPA defers to 

the state court, our review is “doubly deferential.”18

A

To demonstrate deficient performance, Hughes “must show that 

[counsel] made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”19 We “indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.”20 Under AEDPA’s standard, we must defer to the 

state court unless no fairminded jurist could conclude Hughes’s trial counsel 

was reasonably competent. 

15 Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 524 (2020) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

16 Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 525 (2012) (per curiam).

17 Anaya v. Lumpkin, 976 F.3d 545, 550–51 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)). 

18 Id.; see also Knowles v. Mizrayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (“[B]ecause the 

Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably 

determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.”).

19 Anaya, 976 F.3d at 551 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

20 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”21

Counsel’s “decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments.”22 The American Bar Association 

standards, which the Supreme Court uses as a guide for determining what is 

reasonable,23 provide that “[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 

investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues 

leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case.”24 Of course, “the duty to 

investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance 

something will turn up,” but it does require counsel to “have good reason to 

think further investigation would be a waste.”25 Accordingly, “trial counsel 

must not ignore ‘pertinent avenues of investigation,’ or even a single, 

particularly promising investigation lead.”26

In Bryant v. Scott, we found deficient performance where counsel 

failed to interview two eyewitnesses who could identify Bryant as the bank 

robber.27 We explained that “eyewitness identification of Bryant at the crime 

scene was the cornerstone of the state’s case in chief. Consequently, 

information relevant to Bryant’s defense might have been obtained through 

21 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

22 Id.

23 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). 

24 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting 1 ABA Standards for 

Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)). 

25 Id. at 383.

26 Charles v. Stephens, 736 F.3d 380, 390 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Porter v. 

McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009); citing Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383–84). 

27 28 F.3d 1411, 1418 (5th Cir. 1994).

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better pretrial investigation of the eyewitnesses, and a reasonable lawyer 

would have made some effort to investigate the eyewitnesses’ testimony.”28

Likewise, here, Allen’s testimony as the only disinterested eyewitness 

claiming to see Hughes shoot Hawkins while Hawkins was backing away with 

his hands raised was the cornerstone of the State’s case that Hughes shot 

Hawkins intentionally.

It is possible that the state court found no deficient performance 

because, as the State argues, Collier’s failure to interview Allen was a 

strategic decision. To be sure, “conscious and informed decision[s] on trial 

tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel.”29 But Collier admitted that there was no strategy 

behind his decision not to even attempt to interview Allen personally or send 

an investigator to do so upon finding out that Allen would testify to seeing 

the shooting. 

Another explanation for the state court’s decision could be that 

Collier’s failure to interview Allen wasn’t deficient because he only found 

out about the supposed change in her testimony a few days before trial. 

However, Collier knew prior to the week before trial that the district attorney 

had subpoenaed Allen. And Collier had read Allen’s written statement in 

which she claimed to have seen part of the altercation. So Collier knew that 

28 Id.; see also Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding 

deficient performance and an unreasonable application of clearly established law by state 

court where counsel relied on the investigative work of the state and did not make any effort 

to interview either of the two eyewitnesses to the crime).

29 Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 491 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

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Allen was an eyewitness to Hughes and Hawkins’s fight and likely a 

“particularly promising investigation lead.”30

Collier’s interpretation of Allen’s written statement is also 

unconvincing. In her statement, Allen wrote “I was sitting in . . . my front 

room, and heard someone calling for help. Then I heard a gunshot go off. I 

came out of the house and hear – and seen two people arguing.”31 Collier 

thought this statement “clear[ly]” said that Allen was inside at the time of 

the shooting. Allen’s statement is far from clear. Since Hawkins collapsed 

after the shooting, she could not have seen the two men fighting after the 

shot. Thus, the written statement must be somehow incorrect. Collier’s 

failure to do any sort of investigating work to clarify Allen’s statement given

the importance of her testimony belies reasonable competence.

Even if Collier lacked prior notice that Allen was a promising lead, a 

reasonable attorney learning of new and potentially damning testimony on 

the eve of trial would have moved for a continuance or at least attempted to 

try to investigate the new testimony in whatever limited time was available. 

At the state evidentiary hearing, Collier said he decided against requesting a 

continuance because Allen’s testimony could be impeached on cross 

examination with her previous written statement.32 Even accepting that the 

30 Charles, 736 F.3d at 390.

31 Allen clarified that the two people she referred to were two men, who could only 

be Hughes and Hawkins.

32 The State claims that Collier didn’t move for a continuance “because they had 

taken a prior continuance just a few months before the June of 2006 trial setting, and their 

chances of getting a second continuance were not good, [so] they felt that going to trial with 

an inconsistent star state witness—one who could be easily impeached with her prior 

statements—would be in petitioner’s best interest.” This explanation is not found in 

Collier’s testimony. He does note that he moved for a continuance in early 2006, but his 

reason for not requesting a second continuance upon learning of Allen’s changed testimony 

was just that he did not think Allen could deviate from her written statement and that he 

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written statement was strong impeachment evidence, a fairminded jurist 

could not find that Collier’s performance was rendered competent by 

vigorous cross examination. We rejected a similar argument in Bryant, 

explaining that “[t]he fact that [counsel]’s cross examination was effective 

does not necessarily indicate that a reasonable lawyer, viewing the trial 

ex ante, would have regarded an interview of the eyewitnesses as 

unnecessary. . . . Moreover, assuming that [counsel]’s cross examination was 

effective, that is not to say it could not have been improved by prior 

investigation.”33 And Collier had no explanation or strategic thinking behind 

his decision not to attempt to interview Allen himself or send an investigator 

to do so. We thus cannot say that a fairminded jurist would find Collier’s 

strategic decision not to request a continuance or to even try to interview 

Allen to be a “conscious and informed decision.”34

Because there is no “reasonable argument that [Collier] satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard” of adequate performance, we agree with

the district court’s conclusion that Collier’s performance was deficient and 

the state court’s determination to the contrary was an unreasonable 

application of Strickland.

35

could impeach her if she did. Nowhere does he claim that deciding not to request a second 

continuance was a strategic decision based on the likelihood of the judge granting the 

motion. 

33 Bryant, 28 F.3d at 1418 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

34 Ward, 420 F.3d at 491; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (“[S]trategic choices 

made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”); see also Koon 

v. Cain, 277 F. App’x 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding deficient 

performance, and an objectively unreasonable state court ruling to the contrary, where 

counsel failed “even to attempt to interview the lone eyewitness to a crime, whose 

testimony [was] critical to the defensive theory presented”). 

35 Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. 

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B

Hughes must also establish prejudice by showing “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.”36 A reasonable probability 

“requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different 

result.”37 The jury’s lack of unanimity in convicting Hughes indicates that 

the verdict was “only weakly supported by the record.”38 Such a verdict “is 

more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming 

record support.”39 Here, too, we must defer to the state court unless no 

fairminded jurist could agree with its finding of no prejudice.

“A defendant who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his 

counsel must allege with specificity what the investigation would have 

revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial.”40 Hughes 

argues that two pieces of evidence impeaching Allen’s trial testimony would 

have been uncovered through competent investigation: (1) her television 

interview on the night of the shooting and (2) the testimony of Allen’s 

roommate, Lee.

As a threshold matter, the State attempts to downplay the importance 

of Allen’s testimony altogether, arguing that her testimony was not 

36 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

37 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

38 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Indeed, the only evidence indicating the gun was 

fired intentionally was the inconsistent testimony from Amy and Allen. On the other hand, 

Hughes’s testimony was supported by forensic evidence indicating the gunshot was a 

contact wound.

39 Id.

40 United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 

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inconsistent with Hughes’s and so it could not have been a significant factor 

in leading the jury to convict. If so, this could explain the state court’s finding 

of no prejudice. But Allen’s and Hughes’s testimonies were irreconcilable on 

critical facts related to the intentionality of the shooting. Allen testified that 

when she heard the gun fire, she saw one man backing away from the other 

with his hands raised.41 That is incompatible with Hughes’s testimony that

Hawkins did not have his hands raised when he was shot and that the gun 

accidentally fired when the two men fell forward towards each other. 

To be sure, there is evidence indicating that Hughes intended to harm

Hawkins when he drove over to the apartment complex with a gun, namely

Hughes’s own statements at trial that he drove over to “kick [Hawkins’s] 

ass.” The relevant evidence of whether the shooting was accidental, though,

concerns the moment of the shooting. The only evidence indicating that 

Hughes intended to shoot Hawkins when the gun fired was Amy’s and 

Allen’s testimony that Hawkins had his hands raised as he was backing away 

from Hughes at that moment. And Amy’s testimony was effectively 

impeached by her earlier contradictory statements to police and her sister.42

Allen’s testimony was the lynchpin for the State’s case.

We turn now to the specific evidence Hughes claims counsel should 

have discovered. First, Hughes points to a television interview Allen gave the 

night of the shooting. He urges that this interview has strong impeachment 

41At the evidentiary hearing, Allen claimed that she did not testify that the shooting 

occurred when one man had his hands raised. But at trial she repeatedly said that one man 

“had his hands up trying to back away from the gentleman that was coming at him” when 

she heard the shot. 

42 There were other inconsistencies in Amy’s testimony undermining her 

credibility. For example, she insisted that her fight with Hawkins was only verbal. But later, 

she admitted that Hawkins threw her up against a wall by her neck. There was also 

testimony that Amy feared retaliation from Hawkins’s family. 

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value because Allen said she was inside when she heard the gun fire. 

A fairminded jurist could easily disagree. In the interview, Allen said “I was 

sitting in the house watching TV and all of a sudden I heard someone holler 

for help, then I heard some gun shots go off.” The statement does not 

indicate whether or not Allen went outside during that sequence of events. 

At best it is only weak impeachment evidence, unable to meet the high bar 

for prejudice under our deferential review.

Hughes next contends that Lee’s testimony would have significantly 

undermined Allen’s testimony. Lee testified at the state evidentiary hearing 

that Allen was watching television on the night of the shooting and 

specifically stated that Allen was “sitting in the chair” inside the apartment 

when both of them heard the shot. Lee repeatedly testified that Allen only 

went outside after hearing the shot: “We heard the shot, and [Allen] jumped 

up and grabbed the phone. She heard somebody yell ‘help,’ and she went out 

the door.”

The State attempts to minimize the impeachment value of Lee’s 

testimony, but it mischaracterizes it in doing so. According to the State, Lee 

testified that “she thought that [Allen] was inside of the apartment, with the 

exterior door wide open, when the fatal shot was fired.” Thus, the State 

argues that Lee did “not have personal knowledge of what [Allen] saw” 

through the open front door. Lee’s testimony doesn’t indicate whether their 

apartment door was open or closed on the night of the shooting, nor did 

Allen’s trial testimony. Even if the front door was open, Allen insisted at trial 

that she was on the sidewalk outside her apartment when the gun fired, not 

that she was watching the incident through her open front door from inside 

her apartment. So Lee’s testimony would still have cast doubt on Allen’s 

credibility.

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Alternatively, the State argues that Collier would not have discovered 

Lee even if he had interviewed Allen. It is difficult to see how a fairminded 

jurist could conclude that a reasonably competent attorney would not have 

learned of Allen’s roommate upon interviewing Allen. Indeed, quickly into 

his cross examination of Allen, Collier’s co-counsel asked Allen whether 

anyone was with her the night of the shooting, to which she answered yes. 

When asked during the evidentiary hearing, Collier himself admitted that he 

likely would have found out that Allen had a roommate if he had gone to 

interview her. We thus cannot say that a fairminded jurist would find 

discovering Lee to be beyond the scope of a reasonably competent interview 

of Allen.

Another explanation for the state court’s conclusion could be that 

Collier and his co-counsel already tried to impeach Allen using her written 

statement, and so additional impeachment evidence would not have created 

the requisite probability of a different outcome. This rationale would be 

convincing if the written statement had impeachment value. But as we have 

explained, Allen’s written statement suffered from an obvious logical flaw: It 

did not specify a reasonable course of events and therefore was easily 

explained at trial by Allen’s assertion that she simply “transposed” the series 

of events. Lee’s detailed and consistent testimony suffers from no such 

defect. Accordingly, her testimony would have been a “powerful rebuttal” 

to Allen’s.43

Given the importance of Allen’s testimony to the State’s case and the 

value of Lee’s impeachment testimony, we find that no fairminded jurist 

43 Anderson, 338 F.3d at 394 (finding prejudice and an objectively unreasonable 

state court decision where counsel failed to call a crucial eyewitness to testify because “his 

testimony would have been a powerful rebuttal to that of the victim and her minor 

daughter”). 

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could conclude that the failure to introduce Lee’s testimony would not have 

“undermine[d] confidence in the outcome.”44

IV

AEDPA sets a high bar but not an insurmountable one. The Louisiana 

courts’ denial of relief to Hughes is one of the rare “extreme malfunctions in 

the state criminal justice system” that we are obliged to correct.45 We affirm.

44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

45 Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Richter, 562 

U.S. at 102).

Case: 19-30979 Document: 00515967483 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/05/2021