In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-1711

GUO H. HUANG,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

Respondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A95-577-259

____________

ARGUED APRIL 19, 2006—DECIDED JULY 14, 2006

____________

Before COFFEY,EASTERBROOK, andMANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Guo Huang applied for asylum

alleging that Chinese family planning cadres forced his wife

to have an involuntary abortion. An immigration judge

denied the application, finding that Huang was not credible

and had not demonstrated either past persecution or a

reasonable fear of future persecution. Because the IJ’s

adverse credibility finding was based on substantial

evidence, including Huang’s submission of a certificate

purportedly documenting his wife’s forcible abortion, we

deny the petition for review.
2 No. 05-1711

I.

At his asylum hearing before an Immigration Judge, Guo

Huang testified that he, his wife, and their son are from

Lianjiang County in Fujian Province. After his son’s birth,

his wife had an IUD implanted according to mandatory

birth control practices. But in 1999 the Huangs paid a

private doctor to remove the IUD, and in March 2000 she

learned that she was pregnant. The pregnancy was in its

very early stages at that point, and the Huangs moved to a

nearby town, purportedly to prevent family planning

authorities from discovering her condition. She subsequently missed her mandatory physical examination,

given every three months.

Huang alleged that his wife’s failure to appear for the

physical alerted the family planning authorities that she

might be pregnant, and that on May 15, 2000, the “family

planning cadres found her.” Huang testified that when he

came home and found his wife missing, someone told

him that she had been seized by family planning cadres as

she was taking out the trash. He asserted that he went to the

local clinic to find her, but by the time he arrived she had

already had an abortion. Huang specifically testified that

the abortion was involuntary. He also offered a certificate,

signed by a physician and bearing an official seal from the

Lianjiang County Hospital, which states that Jin Fang

Huang underwent an “artificial abortion” on May 15, 2000.

The certificate does not specify whether the procedure was

voluntary or involuntary. Huang testified that she was

given the certificate after he asked the hospital for “proof in

case later on my wife suffer any complication afterwards

they can help.” Finally, he testified that if he were returned

to China he feared imprisonment because of his wife’s

pregnancy. Also, he was concerned about his “illegal exit,”
No. 05-1711 3

1 Huang’s wife did not come to America with him, and remains

in China. Her absence in these proceedings is, in itself, no bar

to Huang’s claim. “[T]he spouse of a woman who has been forced

to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure can thereby

establish past persecution.” In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918

(B.I.A.1997); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir.

2006) (citing In re C-Y-Z); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 753 (7th

Cir. 2004). At oral argument, Huang asserted that his intention

was to bring his family over from China after he had obtained

asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (allowing the spouse or child

of an asylee “be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien”).

a reference to his once having a valid passport that he

relinquished to the snakeheads who helped smuggle him to

the United States.1

After Huang testified, the IJ read aloud portions of a

background report prepared in March 2000 by the Canadian

Embassy in Beijing describing conditions in Lianjiang

County. The IJ noted that according to the report, forced

abortion and forced sterilization were no longer accepted

methods for enforcing birth control, even though local

government officials acknowledged problems with this in

the past. The IJ also referred to the State Department’s

1998 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions,

which states that the U.S. embassy was “unaware of any socalled ‘abortion certificates,’ which are often presented as

part of asylum applications as evidence of a forced abortion.” That report says that “the only document that might

resemble such a certificate and result in confusion is a

document issued by hospitals upon a patient’s request after

a voluntary abortion.”

The IJ then issued his decision, ruling that Huang failed to

establish his claim for asylum because he was not credible.
4 No. 05-1711

Specifically, the IJ stated that he “did not believe [Huang’s]

story and believes that [Huang’s] wife either never went for

an abortion, or perhaps agreed to have a voluntary abortion

on May 15, 2000.” The IJ based this finding on several

perceived inconsistencies in Huang’s story. First, the IJ

noted that Huang failed to explain how the authorities

located the family after their move to Guantou Town less

than two months earlier, or why they would be searching

for her so early in the pregnancy. The IJ also doubted

Huang’s testimony that his wife’s missed physical examination accounted for her being seized by family planning

cadres and forced to undergo an abortion. Moreover, the IJ

noted that Huang testified that his family was not threatened with fines or pressured in any other way before the

alleged abortion. The IJ also emphasized that forcible

abortions were not being performed at the time in Fujian

Province and that certificates are given not to women who

have involuntary abortions, but rather to women who

undergo voluntary abortions and want proof of the procedure to qualify for medical leave from work. Having found

him incredible, the IJ ruled that Huang had not shown that

he or his wife had suffered past persecution or that he had

a well-founded fear of future persecution if returned to

China. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and

affirmed the IJ’s ruling.

II.

Credibility determinations must be supported by cogent

and specific reasons and bear a legitimate nexus to the

finding. Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2006);

Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2000). This

court affords substantial deference to an IJ’s stated reasons,

and will overturn a credibility finding only in “extraordi-
No. 05-1711 5

nary circumstances.” Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 550

(7th Cir. 2006). No such deference is due, however, to

credibility findings that are “drawn from insufficient or

incomplete evidence.” Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 969

(7th Cir. 2003). The credibility analysis in this case is not

affected by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119

Stat. 231, because Huang filed his asylum petition before the

passage of that statute. See Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764,

766 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006).

Huang correctly argues that some of the IJ’s bases for his

credibility finding were not founded in cogent and

specific reasoning. For instance, the IJ merely speculated,

without support in the record, that family planning cadres

could not or would not take action so quickly after discovering that Huang’s wife was pregnant. Nor does the

record support the IJ’s conclusion that Huang’s testimony

was “simply too weak to establish a credible or plausible

claim” because he failed to testify that he had been threatened with fines or lesser sanctions. The IJ had no basis in the

record to find that the family planning authorities would

resort to lesser sanctions in a case where the family had

already fled. If the IJ had based his credibility determination

on this reasoning alone, the credibility finding would be

unsupportable; we “cannot uphold credibility assessments

unmoored from the record, based on nothing but the IJ’s

personal speculation or conjecture.” Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425

F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d

748, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2004).

But the IJ did base his finding on one ground that is

sufficient to support the determination. The IJ specifically

alluded to the State Department asylum profile to suggest

that the Chinese government does not issue certificates of

involuntary abortions, and found that Huang’s testimony
6 No. 05-1711

and his characterization of the abortion certificate were

inconsistent with the report. The IJ relied on the State

Department’s 1998 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country

Conditions Report, which disclaimed any knowledge of

involuntary abortion certificates:

The U.S. Embassy and Consulate General are unaware

of any so-called ‘abortion certificates,’ which often are

presented as part of asylum applications as evidence of

a forced abortion. According to Embassy officials, the

only document that might resemble such a certificate

and result in confusion is a document issued by hospitals upon a patient’s request after a voluntary abortion.

This certificate is used by patients as evidence to request

2 weeks of sick leave after an abortion has been performed, a right provided by the law.

The IJ held that when viewed in light of the profile, Huang’s

“explanation as to the issuance of an abortion certificate in

May of 2000 suggests that his wife agreed to have the

abortion, it was not forced.”

We have not yet directly addressed whether an official

certificate offered as proof of a forced abortion constitutes

evidence of such persecution despite a contrary State

Department profile, but we have twice relied on the profile

to hold that IJs may not demand such certificates as corroboration of claims of a forcible abortion. See Zhang v. Gonzales,

434 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2006); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385

F.3d at 753-54. In both cases, we cited the same passage

from the State Department profile relied upon in this case

and held that the petitioners’ failure to present documentary

evidence of an involuntary abortion was excusable because

any such documentation “would imply that the procedure

was voluntary as opposed to forced.” Lin v. Ashcroft, 385

F.3d at 753. “According to Embassy officials, the only
No. 05-1711 7

document of that nature is one provided only in cases of

voluntary abortions, in which certificates are provided to

allow the patient to obtain time off work. The absence of a

hospital certificate . . . is entirely consistent with [allegations

of an involuntary abortion].” Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1000

(citation omitted).

Other circuits have similarly relied on the State Department’s characterization of the certificates as documentation of voluntary procedures and required corroboration

from applicants offering them as evidence of an involuntary

abortion. The Eighth Circuit recently upheld an adverse

credibility finding in a case where the petitioner presented

a certificate as proof of an involuntary abortion: “These

inconsistencies are of a substantive nature and go to the key

issues in [the petitioner’s] asylum claim. [Petitioner] has

offered no concrete evidence in support of his testimony

regarding the forced enforcement of China’s family planning policy in the Fujian Province. Without such evidence,

there was reason for the IJ to question the credibility of

[petitioner’s] testimony about the issue.” Cao v. Gonzales, 442

F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir. 2006). Other circuits have also treated

the attempt to use the certificates as proof of an involuntary

abortion as an inconsistency that the petitioner must

affirmatively address. In Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 219

(3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit held that an IJ was justified

in requiring a petitioner to provide further corroborating

evidence of an involuntary abortion where the petitioner

offered an “abortion certificate, a document whose authenticity [the IJ] questioned and a document which on its face

is silent as to whether the abortion referred to was procured

without consent.” Most recently, the Second Circuit held

that the State Department’s profile was compelling, and

“constituted a basis for the IJ to have found implausible

[petitioner’s] testimony that his wife’s abortion—as evi-
8 No. 05-1711

denced by the certificate—was involuntary.” Lin v. Gonzales,

446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006).

As shown in the case law from this and other circuits, the

State Department’s vague and inconclusive determination as to the validity of these abortion certificates is at odds

with the testimony of many asylum applicants from China.

But even though the State Department’s characterization is

not as well-researched or informative as we might wish, it

constitutes evidence that such a certificate shows only a

voluntary abortion, and that conflict supported the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination. Although we held in

Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005), that “an

IJ should not rely on generalized Profiles or Country

Reports to refute an applicant’s personal experience,” the IJ

here did not apply “generalized Profiles or Country

Reports.” See also Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 225-26 (3d

Cir. 2004) (IJ may not reject “the validity of the abortion

certificates based on nothing more than the country report”). Rather, the IJ narrowly applied specific information

provided in the profile and contrasted it with the petitioner’s testimony. Moreover, in Dong the IJ’s application of

the country report was flawed because “[n]either the Profile

nor the Country Report rule out the” petitioner’s version of

events. Dong, 421 F.3d at 578. The information in the State

Department’s profile here regarding the certificates explicitly contradicts Huang’s testimony. We conclude, as the

Eighth Circuit did in Cao v. Gonzalez, that the inconsistency

was substantive and that without additional corroborating

evidence, the IJ was entitled to find Huang’s testimony

implausible. Cao, 442 F.3d at 661.

We acknowledge that our holding may place applicants in

a difficult position, especially since the line between a

voluntary and a coerced abortion may sometimes be
No. 05-1711 9

2 It is undisputed in this and many other cases that China

vigorously enforces its “one child” policy. (If the first child is a

girl, with some bureaucratic approval the parents may be allowed

to have a second child.) However, a mother of a first-born son

who is again pregnant may feel compelled to submit to a

“voluntary” abortion to avoid being captured later by the cadres

and forced to have an abortion. That may be what it takes to

obtain a certificate, but to label such an abortion “voluntary” is

questionable to say the least. The certificate should at least prove

she was pregnant; if she already has a son, one could assume she

had no choice but to abort the second baby. Perhaps the affidavit

that is missing in this case could set forth a scenario to corroborate what seems to be a Hobson’s choice inflicted upon Chinese

families.

blurred.2 But the contradiction between Huang’s characterization of the certificate and the analysis of the State Department casts serious doubts on either the authenticity of the

document or its provenance. While this case predated the

REAL ID Act and Huang was not required to supply

corroborating evidence, see Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d at n.1,

the government at argument indicated that an affidavit from

Huang’s wife would have made his case for asylum much

stronger and more sustainable. We concur, and note that the

Third Circuit has held that even “using the pre-REAL ID

Act standard for reviewing IJ determinations concerning the

availability of corroboration,” it was reasonable for an IJ to

expect some corroborating evidence where an abortion

certificate is offered as proof of an involuntary abortion.

Chen, 434 F.3d at 220. We need not reach the issue of

corroboration here; the IJ did not demand any corroborating

evidence from Huang, but simply made an adequate

credibility determination on the basis of the available

evidence.
10 No. 05-1711

Huang also argues that the IJ failed to give his case a

“particularized review” because it arbitrarily disregarded

sections of the State Department and Canadian reports

suggesting that forced abortions, while uncommon and

prohibited by government policy, do occur. See Toptchev v.

I.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2002) (appropriate to take

notice of State Department country report as long as Board

undertook a particularized review of the case). The BIA

must “consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to

perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely

reacted.” Mansour, 230 F.3d at 908, quoting Becerra-Jimenez v.

I.N.S., 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987). Huang cites

Chitay-Pirir v. I.N.S., 169 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1999), for

the additional proposition that the IJ’s “interpretation of the

evidence should be fully inclusive for an accurate review to

result,” and contends that this means that the IJ was required to specifically consider and discuss the parts of the

reports compatible with his allegations. He asserts that the

IJ ignored congruities between his testimony and the

reports, and that therefore he did not receive the “particularized review” required by Toptchev, 295 F.3d at 723. But in

Chitay-Pirir, the IJ’s serious misunderstanding of the facts

and the lack of current information in the record precluded

a “discerning judgment” by this court. Chitay-Pirir, 169 F.3d

at 1081-82. Here, Huang has failed to show that the IJ made

any factual errors. He merely asserts that the IJ gave

insufficient weight to those parts of the report that are

arguably consistent with his testimony. Nor has he shown

that the IJ failed to make a “particularized review” of his

case. Toptchev, 295 F.3d at 723. Here, the IJ’s analysis, as

adopted by the BIA, shows that it did consider the issues

Huang raised, and found cogent and specific reasons, rooted
No. 05-1711 11

in the available country reports, to find that his testimony

was not credible.

III.

We hold that the IJ’s credibility determination, while

partially founded on mere speculation, was ultimately

based on substantial evidence in the form of Huang’s

submission of the abortion certificate. In denying Huang’s

petition for review, we note that it is not clear what will

become of him. Homeland Security Secretary Michael

Chertoff recently commented that China’s delay in taking

back emigrants has created a backlog of some 39,000

Chinese citizens in the United States. See Lara Jakes Jordan,

Chertoff: China won’t take back deportees, Associated Press,

March 14, 2006; US says China refuses deportees, BBC News,

March 16, 2006. It is unclear how many Chinese citizens

are currently detained in the United States awaiting repatriation. The government was unfortunately unable to clarify

matters at oral argument, either as to the size of the backlog

or the extent to which it is the result of China’s inability or

refusal to process such returns. In any event, despite our

concerns, there are no “extraordinary circumstances”

present in this case that warrant granting Huang’s petition

for review. Giday, 434 F.3d at 550. The petition is therefore

DENIED.
12 No. 05-1711

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-14-06