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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: CAROL SHINER ROSENBLOOM, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON

APPEAL OF: MARGIE HAMMER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 464 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered, March 1, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 02

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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. *
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2020 Margie Hammer , Esq., appeal s part of the orphans’ court o rder , directing
her to pay $65,000 in to the E state of Carol Shiner Rosenbloom, Esq., an incap acitated person 1 and former client of Attorney Hammer

. An orphans’ court has no authority under the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (“PEFC”) 2 to force a person to give money to an estate , if, as here, the money does not belong to the estate. We therefore reverse
.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “ ‘ Incapacitated person ’ ” means an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively a nd communicate decisions in any way is impaired to such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety. ” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501.

2 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101

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This guardianship matter began August 22, 2016 , when Dr. Richard
Rosenbloom petitioned the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County to have M s.
Rosenbloom , his wife, adjudged an incapacitated person. The court granted
Dr. Rosenbloom’s request two months later. It simultaneously appointed Aligned Partners Trust Company (“ the Guardian ”) the plenary guardian of Ms.
Rosenbloom’ s estate

. 3
The Guardian subsequently petitioned to invalidate certain gifts that Ms.
Rosenbloom had given to the Rosenblooms’ daughter, Kate , in the summer of
2016

. Ms. Rosenbloom gave Kate title to a home and certain investment accounts worth $283,000. The court f o und that Kate exerted undue influence over Ms. Rosenbloom and negated the transfer of the $283,000 a ccounts to
Kate . However, it refused the Guardian’s request to negate Ms. Rosenbloom’s gift of the Hart wood Drive home to Kate, because the orphans’ court found that Ms. Rosenbloom had wanted to give that home to Kate despite any undue
influence

. 4
At the hearing regarding Ms. Rosenbloom’s capacity and her gifts to Kate, the Guardian learned from Attorney Hammer ’s testimony that Attorney
Hammer had performed legal work for Kate and Ms. Rosenbloom during 2016

.

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3 Several other individuals and agencies have served as limited guardians of Ms. Rosenbloom’s person. Their identities are irrele vant to the disposition of this appeal

.

4 Dr. Rosenbloom contested the transfer of the house to Kate in a separate appeal. Kate did not appeal the portion of the order directing her to return $283,000 to the estate.J

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T he orphans’ court found that Attorney Hammer p repared document s at Ms.
Rosenbloom ’s request to transfer the home and accounts to Kate. Attorney
Hammer also had represented Kate in her divorce. Attorney Hammer testified that every payment she received for her legal
services to both Kate and Ms. Rosenbloom came from Kate

. Even so, the orphans’ court found that the money Kate used to pay Attorney Hammer originated from the $283,000 that Kate received from Ms. Rosenbloom. T he orphans’ court therefore ordered Attorney Hammer to forfei t that money to
the estate.
T he orphans’ court entered its order regarding Attorney Hammer’s fees
and the Hartwood Drive home on March 1, 2019

. Attorney Hammer appeal ed

on April 1, 2019.
She asserts four grounds of error regarding the orphans’ court dec ree directing her to pay $65,000 in to Ms. Rosenbloom’s estate. Before addressing
those claims, we first consider the Guardian ’s assertion that Attorney
Hammer’s appeal is premature.
1. Attorney Hammer’s Appeal Is of Right
The Guardian contends that Attorney Hammer’s appeal is interlocutory in nature. According to the Guardian , the orphans’ court merely di rected Attorney Hammer to refund $65,000 to the estate , because she “ was paid with funds belonging to [Ms. Rosenbloom] without receiving authorizat ion from [the orphans’ court].’” Guardian ’s Brief at 14 ( quoting Orphans’ CourtJ

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Opinion, 5/20/19, at 7). T he Guardian provides no argument to support its
claim that Attorney Hammer’s appeal is interlocutory, nor does it explain what
f urther proceeding At torney Hammer need ed to pursue in the orphans’ court before the order in question would become appealable

. Although the Guardian does not directly say so, we infer that it believes this Court does not yet have appellate jurisdiction over Attorney Hammer’ s appeal. “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of
review is de novo , and the scope of review plenary.” Barak v. Karolizki , 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa.Super. 2018). An appellate court “has jurisdiction to entertain appeals taken (1 ) as of right from a final order; (2) from interlocutory orders by permission; (3) from certain interlocutory orders as of right; and (4) from certain collateral orders.” Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria City v. Int'l Ins. Co. , 685 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citations omitted). “An order is final if it disposes of all claims and all parties, and an order is interlocutory when it does not effectively put a litigant out of court.” Koken v. Colonial Assurance Co. , 885 A.2d 1078, 1101 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005) (citation omitted), affirmed per curiam, 893 A.2d 98 (Pa. 2006). We need not resolve whether the order in question was interlocutory, because, even if it was, Attorney Hammer could immediately appeal it as of right. “An appe al may be taken as of right from the following orders of the Orphans’ Court Division . . . (5) an order determining the status of . . .J

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creditors in an estate, trust, or guardianship . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 342(a) (emphasis added). The orphans’ court found th at Attorney Hammer had wrongfully acquired funds belonging to Ms. Rosenbloom. The court therefore determined Attorney Hammer’s status to be an unlawful creditor of the estate. Accordingly, Attorney Hammer could immediately appeal as of ri ght under
Pa.R.A .P. 342(a)(5). We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “interlocutory orders as of right . . . .” Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria City , supra . We are thus satisfied that appellate jurisdiction over Attorney Hammer’s appeal h as vested
in this Court

. Acc ordingly , we may reach the merits of her appeal.
2. Application of the PEFC, Section 5536(a) Attorney Hammer raises four claims of error regarding the decree of the orphans’ court . They are :

1. Did the court err in applying 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536 to attorney ’ s fees that were earned prior to a determination of incapacity and paid by [Kate] ?
2. Did the court err in ordering the return of fees based on a presumption that the funds originated from assets transferred by [ Ms. ] Rosenbloom prior to the date that she was adjudicated incapacitated?
3. Did ordering the return of fees, in addition to requiring Kate

. . . to return the value of assets transferred to her, result in a windfall to the

. . . estate?
4. Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the [Orphans’] Court’ s findings that [ Ms. ] Rosenbloom lacked capacity to make financial decisions four months prior to an adjudication of incapacity?J

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Hammer’s Brief at 3. We only address Attorney Hammer’s firs t issue , because our disposition of it moots her remaining three claims

. Attorney Hammer claims the orphans’ court misapplied Section 5536 of
the PEFC

. She argues that the basis for the Guardian ’s claim against her was “factually inaccurate.” Id. at 24. According to the Guardian ’s filing in the orphans’ court , both payments to Attorney Hammer occurred after that court declared Ms. Rosenbloom an incapacitated person . As such, the Guardian argued tha t Attorney Hammer needed to petition the court for disbursement under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(a).
See September 26, 2018 Letter of Mario Santilli, Esq. on behalf of Guardian
at 1

. The Guardian reasserts that ar guments in this Court

. Attorney Hammer counters that Section 5536(a) of the PEFC does not apply , be cause (1) her legal services to Kate and Ms. Rosenbloom predated Ms. Rosenbloom’s incapacity ; and (2) the legal fees were paid by Kate

– i.e. , not the incapacitated person . Therefore, Attorney Hammer believes Kate’s payments to her are valid, and she may retain the funds. Hammer’s Brief at
25

- 16. When reviewing a decree of the orphans’ court, our scope of review is confined to determine if “the record is free from legal error and to determine if the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by competent and adequate
evidence.” In re Klein’s Estate , 378 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa. 1977). In the latter pursuit, we defer to the finder of fact and “take as true all the evidenceJ

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supporting the [orphans’ courts’] findings and all reasonable inferences
therefrom.” In r

e William L. , 383 A.2d 1228, 1237 n.12 (Pa. 1978). “However, we are not limited when we review the legal conclusions that [the] orphans’ court has derived from those facts.” In re Estate of Cherwinski , 856 A.2d 165, 167 (Pa.Super. 2004) (capitalization o mitted). In addition, any “issue of statutory construction presents a question of law for which our
standard of review is de novo .” In re Navarra , 185 A.3d 342, 350 (Pa.Super. 2018).
When t he orphans’ court ordered Attorney Hammer to pay $ 65,000 into
the estate of Ms. Rosenbloom , it reasoned as follows:

Attorney Hammer testified that, pursuant to an invoice issued to [Ms. Rosenbloom], she received the following payments for attorney’s fees on the stated dates:

June 5, 2016 $1,500.00 June 17, 2016 $3,000.00 June 17, 2016 $2,300.00 September 8, 2016 $11,565.26 October 24, 2016 $55,000.00 November 24, 2016 $10,000.00 She further stated that the payments were made by [Kate], not from [Ms. Rosenbloom’s] funds. Reviewing [Attorney] Hammer’ s testimony, in conjunction with the testimony set forth in the other two hearings, the Court finds that [Attorney] Hammer was paid with funds belonging to [Ms. Rosenbloom] without receiving authorization from this Court. Per the above testimony and the C ourt ’ s findings, the $283,000 transferred to [Kate] was undertaken at a time when [Ms. Rosenbloom] was cognitively i mpaired and not capable of m aking an informed decision about her financial affairs. Accordingly, the Court has ordered that those funds are to be returned to [Ms.J

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- Rosenbloom’s] estate

. As [Attorney] Hammer was unable to accurately quantify [Kate’s] financial estate or her assets , and [Kate] failed to trace the $55, 000 payment and the $10,000 payment to funds belonging solely to her, it must be presumed that the funds used to pay [Attorney] Hamm er were the funds that [ Ms. Rosenbloom] transferred to [Kate] approximately four months prior to paying the invoices. For those reasons, [Attorney] Hammer is directed to return the sum of $65,000 to th e estate of [Ms. Rosenbloom]

. Orphans’ Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3/1/19, at 9

- 10 (citations to the record omitted). The analysis of the orphans’ court followed a three

- step process. First, it determined that Ms. Rosenbloom was incapacitated when she gave money
to Kate , who had exerted undue influence over Ms. Rosenbloom to acquire that money

. 5 Second, the court found that Kate used that money to pay Attorney Hammer’s legal bills. Third, the orphans’ court concluded that,
because the gift from M s. Rosenbloom to Kate was invalid, the payment from Kate to Attorney Hammer was equally invalid. In making this determination, the court did not find that Attorney
Hammer exerted undue influence over Ms. Rosenbloom, that she overcharged for her legal ser vice, that she failed to render proper service, or that she in anyway defrauded Ms. Rosenbloom. Instead, the orphans’ court relied on the

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5 Kate has not appealed the court’s decision that she exerted undue influence over Ms. Rosenbloom. Our review therefore extends only to whe ther Kate’s payment to a third party for services rendered is subject to the control of the orphans’ c ourt.J

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argument of the Guardian , namely that Kate’s payment s to Attorney Hammer
violated Section 5536(a) of the PEFC. We di sagree.
That section permits the orphans’ court to direct payments on behalf of an incapacitated person from his or her estate. It provides:

(a) In general. -- All income received by a guardian of the estate of an incapacitated person

. . . in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, may be expended in the care and maintenance of the incapacitated person, without the necessity of court approval. The court , for cause shown and with only such notice as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, may authorize or direct the payment or application of any or all of the income or principal of the estate of an incapacitated person for the care, maintenance , or education of the incapacitated person, his spouse, children or those for whom he was making such provision before his incapacity, or for the reasonable funeral expen ses of the incapacitated person’ s spouse, child , or indigent parent. In proper cases, the court may order payment of amounts directly to the incapacitated person for his maintenance or fo r incidental expenses and may ratify payments made for these purposes. For purposes of this subsection, the term “income” means income as determined in accordance with the rules set forth in Chapter 81 (relating to principal and income), other than the po wer to adjust and the power to convert to a unitrust.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(a). 6

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6 Aside from reproducing this statute in its appellate brief, the Guardian cites no authority to defend its assertion that an orphans’ court may ord er an attorney to forfeit her legal fees to an estate. Nor does the Guardian attempt to analyze the language of the statute to demonstrate how the General Assembly imparted such authority to an orphans’ court. Instead, the Guardian says, “even the earlie st cases recognize the obligation of the orphans’ court to oversee and question any request to use the inca pacitated person’s resources.” Guardian ’s Brief at 15

- 16. Assuming that that proposition is correct, it is of no help to the Guardian in its quest to render Attorney Hammer’s legal fees an asset of the estate.J

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We note the Rules of Statutory Construction mandate that “the court must give plain meaning to the words of the statute. It is not a court’ s place
to imbue the statute with a meaning other than that dictated by the plain and unambiguous language of the statute.” In re R.D.R. , 876 A.2d 1009, 1016 (Pa.Super. 2005); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b).
T he language of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(a) only authorizes the orphans’

court to exert authority over funds within the estate. Nothing in that section give s the court the authority over funds that lie outside “the income or principal of the estate of an incapacitated person .” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(a). 7 Moreover, t his section does not authorize an orphans’ court to seek payment of funds into the estate of an i ncapacitated person from a third

- party
transaction

. For the court to exercise its authority, the principal and income in question must be a part of the estate

. Here, the orphan s’ court order ed Kate to refund the full $283,000 to the estate, as an invalid, inter vivos gift from Ms. Rosenbloom to Kate. However,
under Section 5536(a) , the court could not go beyond Kate to recover estate

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7 Our legislature defined both “principal” and “income” for PEFC purposes. The “principal” of an estate is “Property held in trust for distribution to a remainder beneficiary when the trust terminates or property held in trust in perpetuity.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8102 (definition of “Principal”). In other words, the principal is the current assets of an estate at the tim e of the estate’s establishment. An estate’s “ income ” is “Money or property which a fiduciary receives as current return from a principal asset . The term includes a portion of receipts from a sale, exchange, or liquidation of a principal asset to the extent provided in Subchapter D (relating to allocation of receipts during administration of trust).” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8102 (definition of “Income”) . In other words, income is profit generated from the principal.J

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funds that Kate may have subsequently transf erred to third parties, including Attorney Hammer.
T he $65,000 that Kate paid to Attorney Hammer and her law firm was never “property held in trust for distribution to” Ms. Rosenbloom

. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8102 (definition of “Principal”) . Nor was it money “ which [the guardian] receive[d] as current return from a principal asset [or] a portion of receipts from a sale, exchange , or liquidation of a principal asset . . . .” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8102 (definition of “Income”). Thus, the $65,000 was neither principal n or
income of the estate

. The Guardian ’s attempt to secure that money in an orphans’

- court proceeding under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(a) fail s
. C ontrary to the belief of the orphans’ court and the Guardian , Attorney
Hammer had no obligation to petition that court to be paid for services to Kate
and Ms. Rosenbloom , when t hose services predated the decree of incapacity and were paid for by Kate

. R egardless of how Kate obtained t he money she paid Attorney Hammer, those funds had been passed to a third party an d , thus, may not be acquired under Section 5536(a) of the PEFC

. Order reversed.J

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2020