UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2172

JOHN WILLIAM BISHOP; DONNA J. BISHOP,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF MACON, NORTH CAROLINA; MACON COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT; ROBERT L. HOLLAND, Individually and in his 

Official Capacity as Sheriff of Macon County; C. J. LAU, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff 

of Macon County; GARY GARNER; W. T. POTTS; OHIO CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (2:10-cv-00009-MOC-DLH)

Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul Louis Bidwell, Asheville, North Carolina; Douglas A. Ruley, 

Leicester, North Carolina, for Appellants. Sean F. Perrin, WOMBLE 

CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Ronald 

K. Payne, LONG, PARKER, WARREN, ANDERSON & PAYNE, PA, Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellees.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

John William Bishop (“John”) and his mother, Donna J. Bishop 

(“Donna”), appeal the district court’s order adopting the 

magistrate judge’s revised recommendation and dismissing with 

prejudice Donna’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); 

dismissing with prejudice the Bishops’ state law claims for 

negligence and bailment against Appellees Holland and Lau in their 

individual capacities; dismissing with prejudice Donna’s state law 

claims against Appellee Garner; and dismissing without prejudice 

Donna’s remaining state law claims. The Bishops assert that the 

court erred in dismissing Donna’s federal claims, erred in 

dismissing the negligence and bailment claims, and abused its 

discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some of 

their state law claims but not others. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to 

state a claim, accepting factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. 

Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s 

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level,” with “enough facts to state a claim 
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to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this standard, bare 

legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” 

and are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, when “a complaint pleads facts 

that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The Bishops first challenge the dismissal of Donna’s § 1983 

claims, asserting that personal property was wrongfully seized 

from her home because the items were not listed in the search 

warrants. A valid search warrant must “particularly describ[e] 

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this requirement is to 

preclude officers from a general, “exploratory rummaging in a 

person’s belongings.” United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 647 

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Nevertheless, a warrant is not intended to impose a 

constitutional strait jacket on investigating officers. Courts 

must refrain from interpreting warrant terms in a hypertechnical 

manner, and should instead employ a commonsense and realistic 

approach.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“A search is not invalidated in its entirety merely because some 

seized items were not identified in the warrant.” United States 

v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, to prevail 

on an unlawful seizure claim, a plaintiff must prove that the 

government unreasonably seized property. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 

U.S. 56, 71 (1992).

Although some of the personal property seized was not listed 

in the search warrants, we find no error in the district court’s 

dismissal of these claims. A commonsense but not hypertechnical 

review of the search warrants accounts for the items seized. The 

mere assertion, without more, that police seized some items not 

listed in the warrants does not render the seizures 

unconstitutional.

The Bishops next contend that the district court erred in 

dismissing their state law claims for negligence and bailment 

against Holland and Lau in their individual capacities, arguing 

that public official immunity did not apply. We disagree. In 

North Carolina, public officials are generally immune from 

personal liability for negligence in the performance of their 

duties unless evidence demonstrates that they acted maliciously, 

corruptly, or outside the scope of their official authority. 

Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th Cir. 2003); Wilcox v. 

City of Asheville, 730 S.E.2d 226, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). Here, 
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the Bishops have neither alleged nor presented any evidence 

demonstrating that Holland or Lau acted maliciously, corruptly, or 

outside the scope of their official authority. Moreover, the 

Bishops’ mere allegations of gross negligence cannot defeat 

immunity. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 803 (4th Cir. 1994).

The Bishops also challenge the district court’s exercise of 

supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. We review

the court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of 

discretion. Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203 

(4th Cir. 1997). The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction allows 

district courts “authority to decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction in limited circumstances, including . . . where the 

court dismisses the claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 

394 (4th Cir. 2012); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012). In 

deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court 

should consider “the values of judicial economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 

343, 350 (1988). We conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction and 

dismissing the state law claims that involved issues of settled 

state law. Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 

384, 388 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED