In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2431 

DOUGLAS HOLLOWAY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, 

d/b/a Canadian Pacific, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:16-cv-09191 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 20, 2019 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Douglas Holloway’s year-and-ahalf long employment with Canadian Pacific ended after he 

received multiple suspensions for violating safety standards 

and other work rules. The final chapter came when Holloway 

sustained an injury in a vehicle collision while not wearing a 

seatbelt. When combined with Holloway’s prior record of 

infractions, this new safety-standard violation was enough for 
2 No. 18-2431 

the company to terminate Holloway. In his ensuing lawsuit, 

Holloway alleged he was fired not for violating Canadian 

Pacific’s rules, but instead for reporting a workplace injury. 

We agree with the district court that the record evidence does 

not support his contention and therefore affirm. 

I 

Canadian Pacific hired Douglas Holloway as a conductor 

in July 2014. In short order he found himself the subject of 

several disciplinary actions. In November 2014, for example, 

Canadian Pacific advised Holloway that his attendance record 

was lacking and that he needed to be available to work when 

the company needed him. By way of another example, 

Holloway received a 10-day suspension in May 2015 for not 

providing his engineer with important safety information 

while working on a railcar. In time a pattern emerged, as 

Holloway received suspensions for violating Canadian 

Pacific’s safety and work rules again in August 2015 and 

September 2015. 

The final straw came on October 18, 2015. It was then that 

Holloway and another employee, J.S., were doing a “switch 

job”—railroad lingo for moving railcars as part of building a 

train. The work required J.S. and Holloway to use an all-purpose vehicle to move around Canadian Pacific’s Bensenville 

Yard. J.S. drove while Holloway rode in the passenger seat, 

but neither fastened a seatbelt. Holloway also never inspected 

the vehicle for safety defects, later saying he assumed J.S. had 

done so. A subsequent inspection revealed that the vehicle 

needed repairs—for example, zip ties were being used to hold 

a makeshift windshield covered with dirt and scratches to the 

vehicle’s frame. 
No. 18-2431 3

At one point during the assembly work, J.S. crashed the 

vehicle into a pole. Both J.S. and Holloway sustained injuries 

that required medical care at a hospital. The particular treatment Holloway received triggered an obligation under the 

Federal Railway Act for Canadian Pacific to report his injury 

to the Federal Railroad Administration. J.S.’s injury was minor and did not require such reporting. 

After the accident, Canadian Pacific notified J.S. and 

Holloway that a formal investigation and hearing would 

follow. In the months leading to the hearing, however, J.S. 

was furloughed and therefore did not attend. Holloway 

attended the hearing along with a representative from the 

United Transportation Union. The hearing officer determined 

that Holloway had violated Canadian Pacific’s seatbelt 

requirement and a separate rule requiring him to inspect for 

and report safety defects with the company’s vehicles. The 

hearing officer’s final report canvassed Holloway’s lengthy 

discipline history and led to a recommendation of 

termination. Canadian Pacific accepted the recommendation 

and fired Holloway in December 2015. At no point did the 

company discipline J.S. for her role in the accident. 

Holloway unsuccessfully appealed his dismissal through 

the procedures in the collective bargaining agreement 

between his union and Canadian Pacific. After receiving 

permission to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, he brought several claims against Canadian 

Pacific in district court. 

The district court denied Holloway relief on each of his 

claims. Now on appeal, he challenges only the district court’s 

award of summary judgment to Canadian Pacific on his claim 
4 No. 18-2431 

for unlawful retaliation in violation of the Federal Railway 

Safety Act. 

II 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

in favor of Canadian Pacific de novo. See Rahn v. Board of 

Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 2015). 

The Federal Railway Safety Act prohibits a railroad from 

discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee 

“if such discrimination is due, in whole or in part, to the 

employee’s lawful, good faith act done ... to notify, or attempt 

to notify, the railroad carrier or the Secretary of 

Transportation of a work-related personal injury or workrelated illness of an employee.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(4). To 

prevail on such a claim, Holloway needed to show, among 

other things, that his reporting of his workplace injury from 

the October 2015 incident contributed to Canadian Pacific’s 

decision to fire him. See Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co., 880 F.3d 

377, 381 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A) and 

29 C.F.R. § 1982.104(e)(2)); see also Araujo v. New Jersey Transit 

Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(applying the same statutory standards). 

Holloway argues, as he did in the district court, that “[i]t 

is obvious that the protected activity was a contributing factor 

in the adverse action.” He sees the point as obvious because 

he was fired only after he came forward and reported his 

workplace injury. Holloway also contends that Canadian 

Pacific’s decision not to fire J.S. for her involvement in the 

accident supports his allegation of retaliation. These 

contentions fall short on the law and the facts. 
No. 18-2431 5

Our caselaw is clear that a plaintiff alleging retaliation in 

violation of § 20109(a)(4) cannot point only to the sequence of 

events—an injury report followed by a later dismissal—to 

show that the complaint was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action. See Koziara v. BNSF Ry. Co., 840 

F.3d 873, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the district court’s 

conclusion that the plaintiff’s injury report was a contributing 

factor to the adverse action simply because it “initiated the 

events that led to his discipline”); see also Armstrong, 880 F.3d 

at 382 (explaining that the phrase “contributing factor” is a 

standard of causation that does not eliminate the requirement 

for a plaintiff to present evidence of an improper motive). 

Something more than the mere sequence of events is required, and Holloway has failed to provide that something 

more. At summary judgment he came forward with no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that his termination reflected 

Canadian Pacific’s retaliation for reporting his injury. He 

pointed to nothing showing that anyone within the company 

faulted or was frustrated with him for reporting the October 

2015 accident. Nor did he identify any evidence suggesting 

animus toward him—for example, that his supervisor had 

been looking for a reason to fire him and used his report of 

the accident as the reason to let him go. 

The record evidence is altogether different. What it shows 

is that, in fewer than two years with Canadian Pacific, 

Holloway repeatedly violated the company’s work and safety 

rules and was eventually fired for accumulating so many 

violations. That he happened during the same time period to 

be involved in a workplace accident and to have reported an 

injury does not—without more—create an inference that 
6 No. 18-2431 

reporting his injury contributed to Canadian Pacific’s decision 

to terminate him. 

Holloway is right to observe that J.S. was not disciplined 

for the October 2015 accident. But the observation does not go 

very far, as J.S.’s disciplinary history paled in comparison to 

Holloway’s record. J.S. had received a reprimand and counseling on one prior occasion but otherwise had a clean record 

with Canadian Pacific. Nothing in the Federal Railway Safety 

Act precluded the company from taking stock of Holloway’s 

employment history, beset as it was with disciplinary problems, and proceeding to dismiss him. 

Holloway’s comparison of his circumstances to those of 

J.S. misfires on another front. He altogether overlooks that he 

and J.S. engaged in the same protected activity—reporting an 

injury to Canadian Pacific. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(4). But 

even though J.S. engaged in the same protected activity, she 

was not disciplined. So Holloway’s comparison of the treatment he and J.S. received from Canadian Pacific only reinforces that the company did not retaliate against him for his 

engaging in protected activity, but rather fired him because of 

his long record of disciplinary problems. 

We owe a final word to Holloway’s assertion that the district court impermissibly weighed evidence and made credibility determinations when granting summary judgment to 

Canadian Pacific. We have reviewed the record and find no 

support for this contention. The district court provided a thorough and detailed recounting of the evidence brought forth 

by both parties and in no way strayed from the standards governing summary judgment. 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.