No. 12358 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1972 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, upon relation 

of BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, 

a corporation, 

Relator, 

ROBERT E. MILLER, and the DISTRICT COURT 

OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 

STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 

OF CASE, 

Respondents. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Relator: 

Church, Harris, John 6 Williams, Great Falls, 

Montana. 

Earl J. Hanson and Douglas Allen argued, Great 

Falls, Montana. 

For Respondents: 

Hoyt, Bottomly and Gabriel, Great Falls, Montana. 

John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana. 

Submitted: September 28, 1972 

~ecided : 1 7 1m 

Filed: rniil!p$ 
Mr. Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opirtion of the Court. 

This is an original proceeding wherein relator seeks a writ 

of supervisory control to the end that the respondent district 

court of the eighth judicial district, the Honorable Paul G. 

Hatfield presiding, should vacate its order dated August 24, 

1972, ordering relator insurance company to answer interrogatory No. 26 of plaintiff's first interrogatories. 

We issued an order to show cause directed to the district 

court with copies to counsel for plaintiff Miller. Respondents 

appeared by brief and motion seeking denial of the application 

for a writ and an order sustaining the district court's order. 

Oral argument was had. No problem concerning procedure is 

presented. 

Respondent Miller, hereinafter referred to as the Insured, 

is plaintiff in the district court action. He commenced the 

action against relator Bankers Life & Casualty Company, hereinafter referred to as the Insurance Company, to recover general 

and punitive damages essentially for breach of contract by the 

insurance company. 

Insured alleged in his amended complaint that he purchased 

two insurance policies from Insurance Company. One of the 

policies purchased was titled "~ickness and Accident Policy" 

and the other policy was titled "Accident Policy". Early in 

1971, Insured made certain claims under both policies and thereafter instituted the action against Insurance Company on July 

30, 1971. ~nsured's amended complaint was filed on December 14, 

1971. 

Insured divided his action into two claims. One claim 

concerns the Sickness and Accident Policy and the other the 

Accident Policy. In both claims Insured seeks damages for breach 

of contract and exemplary or punitive damages for alleged violations of the insurance code of the state of Montana. Insured 
has pleaded in both claims, among other allegations, that the 

course of conduct of Insurance Company was deliberately embarked 

upon and was designed to be, was, and is oppressive, malicious, 

and fraudulent as to Insured in addition to being a violation 

of the insurance code. 

In its amended answer Insurance Company alleged that it has 

made all payments due Insured under the Sickness and Accident 

Policy and denied that these payments were late. Furthermore, 

in Insurance Company's amended answer to claim two of lnsuredls 

complaint, Insurance Company alleged that there was no coverage 

afforded by the Accident Policy and therefore no payment was 

due' Insured. Insurance Company also denied all allegations of 

wrongdoing including those allegations of malicious or oppressive 

conduct. 

Insured then began extensive discovery through the use of 

interrogatories. Many were objected to by Insurance Company. 

Several objections were sustained and several were overruled, 

In the course of lnsuredls discovery interrogatory No. 26 of 

plaintiff's first interrogatories to defendant was propounded 

to Insurance Company. Interrogatory No. 26, the only one involved 

in this proceeding, reads: 

"State the names and addresses of all persons within 

the State of Montana who have made a claim against 

Bankers Life & Casualty Company for monies they claim 

owed to them under health and accident or disability 

policies issued by Bankers Life and Casualty Company 

and which claim Bankers Life and Casualty Company has 

either refused or has not paid in full in the amount 

claimed due by the Policy holder during the past three 

(39 years, 11 

Insurance Company made this objection to interrogatory 

No, 26: 

 his interrogatory is objectionable on the grounds that 

the information called for is irrelevant and, further, 

is confidential business information which the defendant 

should not be required to disclose unless and until plaintiff 
shows that it is relevant to the subject matter 

involved in the pending action. Further, this 

interrogatory is objectionable on the grounds that 

it amounts to a cross-examination of defendant upon 

immaterial matter which does not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 

11 And, further, this interrogatory is objectionable 

on the ground and for the reason that it is unreasonably burdensome, oppressive, or vexatious. I1 

As stated heretofore, ~nsured's complaint indicates that 

he seeks damages for alleged breach of contract under two . 

separate policies and then pleaded and alleged violations of 

the insurance code, thereby attempting to bring his case within 

the law of State ex rel. Larson v. District Court, 149 Mont. 131, 

423 P.2d 598. We are not here directly concerned with Larson 

at this stage. However, the allegation as to violation of the 

insurance code is what might be termed a general allegation concerned with the merits of his claims under the two contracts. 

That is to say, the allegations of insurance code violations are 

dependent upon whether there has been a breach of the contract 

sued upon, which has been denied in all particulars, We shall 

not here attempt to distinguish Larson other than to observe 

that Larson discussed the "unique facts alleged in petitioner's 

complaint". 

Interrogatory No. 26 does not amern itself with the ~nsured's 

insurance contracts or claims in suit, Rather, it seeks names 

and addresses of all persons and policyholders of Montana who 

have made claims for benefits which were either refused for any 

reason or not paid in the full amount claimed, which would cover 

presumably all denials of coverage for whatever reason, all cases 

of partial coverage, all erroneously submitted claims, and all 

litigated, adjusted or compromised claims; all without regard to 

the hundreds of different factual contents, or even the private 

business matters of the thousands of policyholders. Such far 
reaching results are uncalled for by the issues raised in 

this litigation. The rules of discovery were never intended 

to interfere with contractual relationships in such a far 

reaching manner. We observe in this connection that the district court allowed wide latitude to the Insured in propounding 

interrogatories which are not presented as issues here, although 

some were objected to. 

The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure require interrogatories 

to be relevant to the subject matter of the action. Rule 33 

provides in part: 

I I Interrogatories may relate to any matters which 

can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the 

answers may be used to the same extent as provided 

in Rule 26(d) for the use of deposition of a party. It 

Rule 26(b), M.R.Civ.P., provides: 

"(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless otherwise 

ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) 

or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding 

any matter, not privileged, which is relevant 

to the subject matter involved in the pending 

action, whether it relates to the claim or defense;£ the examining party or to the claim or 

defense of any other party, including the existence, 

description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 

things and the identity and location of persons 

having knowledge of relevant facts, It is not 

ground for objection that the testimony will be 

inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought 

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Emphasis added.) 

We shall assume for our purpose here that the discovery 

attempted was relevant and material but whether it was reasonable to the issues pleaded at this stage is the crux of the 

matter. Apparently the Insured would search for some "pattern" 

of business practices that might somehow relate to his general 

charge of an oppressive, malicious and fraudulent action towards 

him. However, in all of the cases we have searched the subject 

of reasonableness is considered by weighing the annoyance and 

expense involved against the value of the information sought. 

See: 4A ~oore's Federal Practice 5 33:20; United States v. 

Imperial Chemical Industries, 8 F.R.D. 551; United States v. 
Loewfs, Incorporated, 23 F.R,D. 178. 

Here, it is clear from the affidavits and answers that the 

answer to interrogatory No. 26 involves multiple and minute 

factual details which can only be compiled after many thousands 

of hours of work at a considerable cost. Also, counsel for 

Insured stated that he intends to write a letter to each and 

every policyholder disclosed in the answer to interrogatory No. 

26. The rules of discovery were never intended to be used to 

interrupt or interfere with contractual relationships to this 

extent. We are simply unable to see, even assuming the factual 

matters sought to be relevant, where, considering the annoyance 

and expense involved, the value of the information sought has a 

reasonable relationship under these circumstances. 

Accordingly, we find the district court abused its discretion 

in ordering that interrogatory No. 26 be answered and that part 

of its order of August 24, 1972, is set aside. 

~ssociakd Justice 

Associate Justices. 

Mr, Justice.John Conway Harrison deeming himself disqualified 

took no part in this Opinion.