J -S29015-19 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

v. 

CUONG PHAM, 

Appellee 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant No. 2207 EDA 2018 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 15, 2018 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014307-2011 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019 

Appellant, Cuong Pham, appeals pro se from the post -conviction court's 

June 15, 2018 order dismissing his timely -filed petition under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the facts and procedural history of 

Appellant's underlying convictions, and we need not reiterate that discussion 

for purposes of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 11/21/18, at 1- 

4. Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition at issue herein on December 7, 

2017. Counsel was appointed, but instead of filing an amended petition on 

Appellant's behalf, counsel filed a Turner/Finley' 'no -merit' letter and 

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 
J -S29015-19 

petition to withdraw. On May 18, 2018, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without a hearing, to which 

he filed a pro se response, as well as an amended PCRA petition. However, 

on June 15, 2018, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing Appellant's 

petition and granting counsel's request to withdraw. 

Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court ordered 

him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Appellant, however, did not file any Rule 1925(b) statement but, 

instead, he filed two additional, pro se amended petitions. On November 21, 

2018, the PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Herein, Appellant presents twelve issues for our review in the 

"Statement of the Questions" portion of his brief, yet he delineates only two 

separate claims in his "Argument" section. See Appellant's Brief at 2-3 

("Questions Presented for Review"); id. at 11-15 ("Argument"). 

Consequently, Appellant has failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119 ("The 

argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive type or in type 

distinctively displayed - the particular point treated therein, followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent."). The two 

claims set forth in Appellant's "Argument" section are the following: 

[I.] Base[d] upon the legislative intent, for an individual to be 

convicted under the statue [sic] 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5902(3), the 

individual must do more than make an offer to another person for 

sexual activity: the individual must undertake acts the [sic] 

demonstrate he has hired that person to perform a sexual act. 

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[II.] [Appellant's] action of soliciting for ... sexual activity without 

money exchanging hands or him undertaking further action that 

would demonstrate he has hired an individual does not constitute 

"hire" under the statute 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5902(e), and thus[,] the 

evidence proffered at trial was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction. 

See Appellant's Brief at 12, 13. 

This Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA court's findings will not 

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

In the case sub judice, we have reviewed the certified record, the briefs 

of the parties, and the applicable law. Additionally, we have considered the 

thorough opinion of the Honorable Daniel D. McCaffery of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We conclude that Judge McCaffery's 

well -reasoned opinion accurately disposes of the issues presented by 

Appellant. Accordingly, we adopt his opinion as our own and affirm the order 

dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition for the reasons set forth therein. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/7/19 

-3 
Circulated 07/19/2019 10:51 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION-CRIMINAL SECTION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

: PHILADELPHIA COURT 

: OF COMMON PLEAS 

: CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

CP·Sl-CR-0014307-2011 

CUONG PHAM 

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Opinion • 

11 I I II Il 11111 I I 111111111 

. 8192428381 --· '-·--- --- ·- ---· --- 

MCCAFFERY, J 

OPINION 

FILED 

Nov 21 201a 

Ofn�PeaJs!Post Trial 

of Jud/cf al Records 

Cuong Pham (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals from an order denying him relief pursuant 

to the.Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter PCRA). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. For the reasons 

set forth below, it is suggested that the order be affirmed. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 23, 2015, following a waiver trial, Appellant was found guilty of Patronizing 

Prostitutes, graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5902(e).

1 

Following the verdict Appellant waived the preparation of pre-sentence reports: and this Court 

imposed a sentence of time served to twelve months' incarceration. After the imposition of 

sentence, Appel1ant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which this Court denied on 

May 22, 2015. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal. On November 22, 2016, the Superior 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Pham, 159 A.3d. 595 (Pa. Super. 

2016). A petition for allowance of appeal followed and on September 8, 2017, the Pennsylvania 

I Appellant was originally tried by a jury in June oF2012 and was convicted oFthe above offense. On April 22, 

2014, the Superior Court granted him a new trial. Commonwealth v. Pham, 2583 EDA 2012. 
Supreme Court denied the petition. Commonwealth v. Pham, 170 A.Jd. l 033 (Pa. 2016). 

On December 7, 2017, Appellant filed a prose PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed to 

/ 

represent him and on May 17, 2018, counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Finley v. 

Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. After this Court carefully and assiduously reviewed the entire 

record, it sent Appellant a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss on May 18, 2018, upon 

finding that Appellant could not obtain PCRA relief because he was no longer serving a 

sentence. Appellant responded to the notice by letter dated May 29, 2018. In his letter he raised 

issues involving the scheduling of the PCRA and asserted that he did not request the appointment 

of PCRA counsel. On June 11, 2018, he filed an amended pro se PCRA petition wherein he 

argued that he should be entitled to equitable post-conviction collateral relief because no one 

explained to him that he could not obtain PCRA relief if his sentence had expired. 

On June 15, 2018, after again reviewing the entire record, this Court issued an order 

dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition without a hearing and granting PCRA counsel's motion to 

withdraw. On June l 0, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from the June 15, 2018 

order. Although ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal, Appellant filed two pro se amended PCRA petitions on August 27, 2018, and September 

7, 2018. As best that can be discerned, Appellant again argued that he never requested the 

appointment of PCRA counsel and that he never signed a contract with appointed counsel. He 

also claimed that he should have been granted relief because he is actually innocent, the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain his conviction, counsel forced him to waive his right to a jury trial, 

and there is a restraint on his liberty due to his inability to scrub the memory of his conviction 

from his mind. 

2 
FACTUAL HISTORY 

On December 9, 2010, at about 12:30 a.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Stephanie 

Rosenbaum and other officers were in the 1800 block of East Sergeant Street investigating 

activity related to prostitution because of a string of murders of prostitutes in the area. (N.T. 

3/23/15, 12-13). Officer Rosenbaum's role was to act as a decoy. (N.T. 3/23/15, 12-13). While 

doing so, a brown Nissan Maxima pulled up to her and the driver, the Appellant herein, told the 

officer that he wanted a "blowjob." (N.T. 3/23/15, 13). Officer Rosenbaum asked Appellant 

how much he was willing to pay and he said, "$20.00,, Id. Officer Rosenbaum contacted 

members of her back-up team who placed Appellant under arrest. 

Appellant testified in his own defense. He stated that on the night of the incident he 

intended to visit a Vietnamese handyman who he wanted to hire to remove Appellant's property. 

According to Appellant, while looking for a parking spot, a woman approached and asked him 

what he wanted and if he had any money. (N.T. 3/23/15, 24-27, 39-40). He asked her what she 

wanted and told her to leave. (N.T. 3/23/15, 12-13). Appellant denied that he was looking for 

oral sex that night or that he asked the officer for a blowjob, (N.T. 3/23/J 5, 25, 39-40), adding 

that his wife was in the car when the officer approached but had exited to meet the handyman 

before he was arrested. (N.T. 3/23/15, 42). 

Jane Huynh, Appellant's wife, also testified in his defense. She indicated that on the night 

of her husband's arrest, she drove to the area where the incident occurred to meet her husband 

who was planning to meet with a handyman. (N.T. 3/23/15, 61, 64). When Appellant arrived, 

she entered the passenger side back seat of Appellant's car, which had a large coffee pot and 

tools partially obscuring her. (N.T. 3/23/15, 61-62). While her husband was searching for a 

parking spot, a woman approached the car and said something to Appellant. (N.T. 3/23/15, 63- 

3 
64). Ms. Huynh told her husband that she did not want to be involved in what was occurring and 

told him to drive away. (N.T. 3/23/15, 64). 

DISCUSSION 

Instantly, Appellant failed to comply with this Court's order directing him to file a 

1925(b) Statement of Matters. Consequently, he waived appellate review of any claim he raises 

on appeal. Precedent in this Commonwealth firmly establishes that when an appellant is ordered 

to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, he or she must comply with Rule 1925(b)'s requirement in 

order to preserve issues for appeal, and that any appellate issues not raised in a compliant Rule 

l 925(b) statement will be deemed waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 

(Pa. 1998). It is noted that the Superior Court has held that this principle applies in PCRA 

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 63 l, 633 (Pa. 2002). 

In a criminal case, however, Rule 1925 contemplates that not filing a timely Rule l 925(b) 

Statement may be deemed to be "per se ineffective." Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(J). Nevertheless, 

because Appellant represents himself on appeal that exception does not excuse Appellant's 

failure to comply with this Court's order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that where 

an individual insists on representing himself at any stage of criminal proceedings against him, 

that individual cannot later assert his own ineffectiveness on appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 1994) (adopting the Superior Court's standard with regard to 

pro se criminal defendants who represent themselves). Accordingly, it is respectfully suggested 

that the order appealed from be affirmed because Appellant waived appellate review by not filing 

the ordered l 925(b) statement. 

To the extent that Appellant might be claiming that the issues set forth in the two PCRA 

petitions Appellant filed after this Court issued the 1925(b) order preserved the issues contained 

4 
therein for appellate review, he still would not be entitled to review. The law is clear that a 

defendant may not file a subsequent PCRA petition while a PCRA appeal is pending. 

Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000). Therefore, the issues raised therein are a 

nullity. 

Finally, and most importantly, this Court's order should be affirmed because, at the time 

Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition, he no longer was serving a sentence. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has clearly and unequivocally held that a defendant cannot obtain PCRA relief 

once his or her sentence has expired. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1997). 

That rule applies even in so-called "short sentence" cases. In Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 

7 54 (Pa. 2013), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that "due process does not require the 

legislature to continue to provide collateral review when the offender is no longer serving a 

sentence." Id. at 765. The Court explained its rationale as follows: 

Because individuals who are not serving a state sentence have 

no liberty interest in and therefore no due process right to 

collateral review of that sentence, the statutory limitation of 

collateral review to individuals serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation, or parole is consistent with the due 

process prerequisite of a protected liberty interest. Of course, 

the legislature was free to extend a statutory right of collateral 

review to individuals like Petitioner who had completed their 

sentence and, had they done so, they would be 

constitutionally obligated to ensure that those rights were 

impacted only in accord with due process. However, the 

legislature did not do so. Rather, the General Assembly, 

through the PCRA, excluded from co11ateral review those 

individuals who were no longer subject to a state sentence, 

thereby limiting the statutory right of collateral review to 

those whose liberty was constrained. 

The legislature was aware that the result of the custody or 

control requirement of Section 9543(a)(l)(i) would be that 

defendants with short sentences would not be eligible for 

collateral relief. Indeed, that was the apparent intent: to 

restrict collateral review to those who seek relief from a state 

5 
sentence. The legislature's exclusion from collateral relief of 

individuals whose liberty is no longer restrained is consistent 

with the eligibility requirements of habeas corpus review 

under the general state habeas corpus statute[.) 

The PCRA provides eligibility for relief for cognizable claims, 

including claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and 

is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief in Pennsylvania. 

Petitioners are required to satisfy, inter alia, the criteria for 

eligibility for relief, and the timeliness restrictions. By further 

limiting the eligibility for relief under the PCRA to petitioners 

serving sentences, our legislature chose not to create any 

statutory entitlement to collateral review for defendants who 

have completed their sentences. 

Turner, 80 A.3d at 766-67 (citations omitted). 

Under the above authorities, it is suggested that Appellant be denied appellate relief and 

the order issued by this be affirmed.

2 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully suggested that the Order of this Court denying 

Appellant PCRA relief be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT, 

Date: November 21, 2018 

2 It is noted that Appellant did not raise as an issue a claim that he never complained about never having requested 

that PCRA counsel be appointed to represent him until after this Court sent him the 907 notice. He also never 

directly requested permission to represent himself. Also, it is noted that there is no equitable or "sympathetic" 

exception to the requirement that a defendant must be serving a sentence to obtain PCRA relief. Finally, the 

appointment of counsel has no effect on the finding that Appellant could not obtain PCRA relief because he was no 

longer serving a sentence. 

6 
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE 

I, James Molinari, Esquire, Law clerk to the Honorable Daniel D. Mccaffery hereby 

certifies that on the 21st day of November, 2018, by first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and 

correct copy of the attached opinion was served upon the following: 

Cuong Pham, Pro Se 

3218 N.45th Street 

Pennsauken, N.J. 08109 

Lawrence J. Goode, Esquire 

Chief-Appeals Unit 

Office of the Philadelphia 

District Attorney 

Three South Penn Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

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