J-S28009-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.N.W.

APPEAL OF: N.M., BIOLOGICAL 

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 940 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): A.N. No. 2 of 2016

BEFORE: OLSON, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2017

N.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered on May 

23, 2016, granting the petition filed by the Warren County Children and 

Youth Social Services Agency (“CYS” or the “Agency”), and involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her female, special needs child, S.N.W., 

born in March of 2000 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).1 Mother’s counsel, Attorney Nathaniel J. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother named K.M. as Child’s father. He is believed to be deceased, and 

to have lived in North Carolina prior to his death. See N.T., 5/23/16, at 27, 

42, 60-63, 82. In the same termination decree entered on May 23, 2016, 

the trial court also terminated the parental rights of K.M./unnamed, putative 

father. On January 18, 2017, the counsel appointed to represent 

K.M./unnamed, putative father, Attorney Michelle M. Alaskey, filed with this 

Court a motion to withdraw as counsel. She asserted that K.M. is either 

deceased or was a fictitious name, and that a diligent search by both 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Schmidt, (“Counsel”), filed with this Court a petition for leave to withdraw as 

counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 

(1967). We affirm, and grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

supplemental petition to withdraw, as well as the motion to withdraw as 

counsel filed by the counsel appointed to represent K.M./unnamed, putative 

father.

On March 22, 2016, CYS filed the petition seeking to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of Mother and K.M./unnamed, putative father. 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on May 23, 2016. Neither Mother 

nor K.M./unnamed, putative father appeared. The counsel appointed to 

represent Mother, and the counsel appointed to represent K.M./unnamed 

putative father were present, and represented their clients’ interests. 

Mother’s counsel stated that Mother was living in Kulpmont, North Carolina, 

where she had previously resided. N.T., 5/23/16, at 4.

CYS first presented the testimony of Child’s foster mother, B.S., 

(“Foster Mother”). Id. at 5. Foster Mother testified that Child came to live 

with her and her husband, W.S. (collectively, “Foster Parents”), and their 

two children on April 11, 2015. Id. at 5-6. Foster Mother also testified that, 

when Child came to live with them, Child had a developmental age of 18

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Attorney Alaskey and CYS did not produce any individual for Attorney 

Alaskey to represent in the termination proceedings. We, hereby, grant 

Attorney Alaskey’s motion to withdraw as counsel. 
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months, and, at the hearing, Child had a developmental age of 24 months. 

Id. at 6-7. Moreover, Foster Mother testified that Child had grown in height, 

weight, and size since she had come to live with the Foster Parents. Id. at 

10-12. Child has to wear a diaper and to be bathed, and can only speak ten 

words that do not communicate her medical condition to Foster Mother. Id.

at 14. Child calls Foster Mother “Mom” approximately twice a week. Id. at 

35. Foster Parents are not a pre-adoptive resource for Child. Id. at 37-38. 

There is no time-frame for how long Child will reside with the Foster Parents 

in foster care. Id. at 45-46.

Next, CYS presented the testimony of its caseworker, Amanda Bindics, 

who had been working with Child since September 8, 2015. Id. at 47. In 

her testimony, Ms. Bindics explained that Child has cerebral palsy and 

pyruvate dehydrogenase complex deficiency. Id. at 48. Ms. Bindics also 

testified that Child has no family available with whom Child may reside in 

long-term placement. Id. at 70. Moreover, Ms. Bindics testified that Mother 

is not a placement option for Child. Id. She stated that Child would not be 

affected if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and that Child would be 

unaware of such a termination. Id. Additionally, Ms. Bindics testified that 

Foster Parents are providing for all of Child’s physical, emotional and 

developmental needs. Id. at 71. 

Based on this testimony and CYS exhibits 1-21, which the trial court 

admitted into evidence, the trial court made its findings of fact at the 
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conclusion of the hearing on May 23, 2016, and entered its termination 

decree on that same date.

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) on June 22, 2016. Counsel filed a petition 

for leave to withdraw as counsel for Mother on December 28, 2016, an 

Anders brief on December 27, 2016, and a supplemental petition for leave 

to withdraw on January 19, 2017.

In her Anders brief, Mother raises one issue challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of her parental rights 

to Child. See Anders Brief; Mother’s Concise Statement at 1.2 In its 

opinion entered on June 24, 2016, the trial court adopted the reasons for the 

termination decree thoroughly stated at the conclusion of the hearing on 

May 23, 2016.

Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and 

wishes to withdraw representation, he or she must do the following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record . . ., counsel 

has determined the appeal would be frivolous;

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2

In her concise statement that accompanied her notice of appeal, Mother 

stated her issue somewhat differently from her Anders brief, but we find 

that Mother adequately preserved her issue for our review. Cf. Krebs v. 

United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in 

both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the 

Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal). 
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(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support 

the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no-merit” letter or 

amicus curiae brief; and 

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to [the client] and advise him of 

his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any 

additional points he deems worthy of the court’s attention.

In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1274-1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), this 

Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of 

parental rights. “When considering an Anders brief, this Court may not 

review the merits of the underlying issues until we address counsel’s request 

to withdraw.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237. 

In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our 

Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., the 

contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “After an appellate court receives an Anders

brief and is satisfied that counsel has complied with the aforementioned 
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requirements, the Court then must undertake an independent examination 

of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re 

S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237.

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the client of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has 

held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Here, in his petition for leave to withdraw filed on December 28, 2016, 

with this Court, counsel complied with each of the requirements of Anders. 

Counsel indicates that he conscientiously examined the record and 

determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, counsel’s Anders 

brief comports with the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, attached to his supplemental petition for 

leave to withdraw, filed on January 19, 2017, is a copy of his letter to 

Mother, dated January 17, 2017. In compliance with Millisock, the letter 

advised Mother of her right to proceed pro se or retain alternate counsel and 

file additional claims, and stated counsel’s intention to seek permission to 

withdraw. Accordingly, counsel has complied with the procedural 
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requirements for withdrawing from representation, and we will proceed with 

our own independent review.3

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 

2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also 

Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 

(Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

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3

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court did not address Mother’s issue, 

finding the concise statement too vague for review. This Court has stated, 

however, “[o]nce counsel has satisfied the above requirements [for a motion 

to withdraw and Anders brief], it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own 

review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment 

as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. 

Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super. 2004)). See 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(following Goodwin). Thus, we decline to find that the concise statement is 

too vague for our review. After conducting an independent review, we also 

find that this appeal is wholly frivolous.
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equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

In the Anders brief, Mother contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion or erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence was 

sufficient to support the involuntary termination of her parental rights under 

section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). Mother suggests that CYS failed to 

provide reasonable efforts to reunify her with Child.

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 
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2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under sections 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 
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environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as 

follows.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988).

Further, this Court has stated:

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations 

omitted).

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 
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(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Regarding section 2511(a)(5), we have stated:

we . . . review the record to determine whether [a 

child has] been removed from [the parent] for six 

months and whether [the parent] can remedy the 

conditions leading to the removal of [the child]. 

See, In the Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 334 

(Pa. Super. 1998) (the child has been removed from 

the parents by the court and the conditions which led 

to placement of the child continue to exist and have 

not been remedied within a reasonable time and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child). We also note that in 

considering the importance of stability to a child’s 

welfare, the reasons why the child has been with the 

third party for so long must be taken into account. 

In Re: Adoption of Steven S., 612 A.2d 465, 471 

(Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 625 A.2d 1194 

(Pa. 1993).

In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 395 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights 

under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to 
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section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. 

Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination 

under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court stated the 

following:

THE COURT: All right.

I’ll start with the putative father and/or [K.M.]. Obviously the 

father of [Child] has never been in the picture according to prior 

dependency orders. [Mother] indicated that the father was 

named [K.M.] and that he passed away shortly after [Child’s] 

birth. [Child] is 16 now and whether it was [K.M.] or anybody 

else, no father has played any part in her life. So clearly the 

[A]gency has met the grounds under 2511(a) (1) and (2), that 

there’s either an incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

biological father to provide any care to perform any parental 

duties.

As far as subsection (b) goes there’s no dad, no bond, no 

concerns for the Court other than that [Child’s] best interests 

will be met if the rights of any biological father are terminated.
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With respect to [Mother], the [A]gency set forth in its petition 

three subsections under 2511. First, that the parent by conduct 

continuing for a period of at least six months immediately 

proceeding [sic] the filing of the petition either served a subtle 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties, and in this case it’s both.

The petition was filed on March 22nd so we go back to 

September 22nd of last year thereabouts. [Mother’s] supervised 

visits had already terminated two months earlier in July. At 

best, a chance encounter at Walmart after the six-month clock is 

ticking, a couple of phone calls towards the middle or end of 

March, kind of a last ditch effort by [Mother] to re-assert herself, 

ended up with the usual from her, talking a good game but 

never following through with it.

The [A]gency frankly went over and above even attempting to 

schedule supervised visits so that a gift could be given, because 

by that time I’d ordered that the [A]gency didn’t have to make 

any continued reunification efforts. Once again, she didn’t follow 

through. Her reasons are incredible. As I’ve indicated in past 

orders, she has an excuse for just about everything where it 

came to stepping up to the plate for [Child].

So in the six months immediately filing the petition she 

performed no parental duties and her actions clearly 

demonstrate a [settled] purpose of relinquishing her parental 

claim. She actually was in town for part of that and still couldn’t 

find the energy to schedule contact with [Child].

Under subsection (2), the [A]gency’s burden is to show that the 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of 

the mother has caused [Child] to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental 

well[-]being, and the conditions and causes of that incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

As of placement last April, it’s quite clear that [Mother] was 

neglecting [Child] in just about every facet of her life. Starving 

her on weekends, having her stay at hospitals after her 

discharges because of whatever personal issues she was having, 

not following up on specialized medical appointments, not 

participating at school, not changing [Child’s] diaper before 
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school, the school[‘]s having to shower [Child], change her 

because [Mother] was neglectful in those regards.

[Child’s] growth really is obscene when you see the progress she 

made under the roof of people who give a darn, gained weight 

consistently, thrived in every aspect of her being, verbally, 

physically, developmentally, didn’t miss 30 days of school that’s 

for sure, and when she showed up she was healthy, happy, 

ready to be educated.

And there’s absolutely nothing that’s occurred since placement 

that would indicate [Mother] is in any better place to address 

those [issues]. She’s been absent. Her supervised visits, 11 out 

of 25, when they were in place dropped out in July ten months 

ago, has had really essentially no ability to indicate that she 

would be able to address those issues.

And I’m just not talking about from a financial aspect or housing, 

that help is available. I’ve seen the [A]gency help a parent in 

bad economic straits reunify with a child, it happens all the time 

when the parent wants it to, when they’re willing to put the 

child’s needs above their own, but nothing [Mother] has done 

throughout indicates that's a priority for her.

So under 2511(a) (2) the [A]gency has met its burden of proof 

by clear and convincing evidence again that those grounds exist.

And, finally, subsection (a)(5), [Child] was removed from the 

care of [Mother] at least six months ago, it was in April of 2015, 

so we’re talking about 13 months. The conditions that led to the 

removal or placement of [Child] continue to exist. The parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time and the services or assistance reasonably 

available to [Mother] are not likely to remedy the conditions that 

led to [Child’s] removal and best interests would -- and 

termination of parental rights would serve [Child’s] best 

interests.

Again, [Child’s] been in agency custody 13 months. There has 

been no progress of any kind by [Mother] to alleviate the 

circumstances that led to [Child’s] placement. The [A]gency has 

gone once again over and above providing transportation, 

holding her hand, trying to get her to medical appointments, IEP 

meetings, scheduling supervised visits where transportation was 
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provided, really to start with an open door communication policy 

in the foster home. [Mother] has done nothing. She’s had 

services available and clearly termination of parental rights 

would best serve [Child’s] needs.

And I’ll address that now with respect to 2511(b). Clearly 

there’s not going to be any harm to [Child’s] developmental, 

physical and emotional needs if [Mother’s] rights are terminated. 

She won’t know it occurred and she never will. She recognizes 

[Mother] just as another face at the beauty salon at Walmart. 

Nothing more, nothing less. Recognizes her aunt or her friend 

[K.] more than her biological mother and it’s to be expected. It 

went from at the very beginning supervised visits, [Child] 

demonstrating openly that she is excited to see [Mother] to what 

happened last September at Walmart which was

essentially somebody at the mall coming up to sing.

The relationship between [Foster Mother] and [Child] obviously 

indicates that she’s capable of forming strong attachments with 

caregivers. For whatever reason, whatever occurred in the 15 

years in [Mother’s] care didn’t result in the type of attachment 

that [Child] wouldn’t completely forget about her after a half a 

year, and again, I understand [Child’s] functional limitations, but 

apparently it doesn’t prevent her from forming attachments and 

keeping those attachments.

And, again, I’m really not giving any weight to [Mother’s] 

inability to find a home, to work, to provide medical care, 

clothing to the extent that they’re environmental factors because 

that’s not really any part of the equation. It’s [Mother’s] resolve 

or determination that it’s not worth the fight, not worth the 

effort to cooperate with the [A]gency to take advantage of those 

services.

So those are really side issues to the ultimate consideration and 

that is [Mother] has given up unfortunately, and frankly, I 

understand the nature of having a child with those type of 

special needs, but she wasn’t coming anywhere near her 

obligations, not when she’s starving [Child] on weekends, not 

getting her to medical appointments, having her sit in a hospital 

for inpatient care for days at a time, not showing up or not 

indicating where she’s going to be at, not having the energy to 

change a diaper in the morning. Those are the considerations 

that I’m giving to subsection (b).
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And I do need to put on the record, and it’s not meant to be 

anything other than making the record complete, but I fully 

understand that [Child’s] permanency will not be with the 

[Foster Parents] and I’m certainly considering that. It would be 

even more of a no-brainer if the [Foster Parents] planned on 

adopting [Child]. They’re not, they’ve done their part that’s for 

sure, and apparently they’re willing to continue to do their part, 

and I have absolutely no question that the [A]gency, the [Foster 

Parents] and the foster -- or, the adoptive home that’s located in 

the future will all work together to make that final transition a 

successful one for [Child].

Would it be easier if there wasn’t going to be one more 

transition? Sure, but certainly a transition back to [Mother] isn’t 

in [Child’s] best interest. There would be no reason, nothing of 

record to indicate that I should try to keep that open as a 

possibility, so there’s nothing there, no bond, no attachment, no 

history of appropriate care, no cooperation with the [A]gency 

during the placement period, just a horrible reunification with 

[Child].

So I just want the record to make it clear that I understand that 

[Foster Parents] aren’t the permanent home for [Child], but the 

fact that she can remain there and [Foster Parents] and the 

[A]gency will oversee her placement in an adoptive home 

certainly is in her best interests under subsection (b).

So on that basis I will be entering the proposed decree of 

termination with respect to [Mother], [K.M.] and unknown 

putative father and that the [A]gency can continue with adoption 

without any further notice to the biological parents.

N.T., 5/23/16, at 82-90.

While Mother suggests that the trial court abused its discretion and 

erred as a matter of law in terminating her parental rights when CYS failed 

to provide her with reasonable efforts to promote reunification between her 

and Child prior to filing the termination petitions, our Supreme Court has 

held that an agency’s failure to provide reasonable reunification services 
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does not preclude termination of parental rights. In the Interest of: 

D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014). Thus, we find her argument lacks 

merit.

After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record 

supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s legal conclusions 

are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, it was proper for the 

trial court to find no bond exists such that Child would suffer permanent 

emotional harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). It is well settled that “we will not toll 

the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007, citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the 

hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.”). Also, there is no need to postpone termination until the 

agency identifies an adoptive family. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 

268-269. 

As we find the trial court’s conclusions are supported by competent 

evidence in the record, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

with regard to Child under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), on the basis 

of the trial court’s statement on the record at the conclusion of the hearing 

on May 23, 2016. See N.T., 5/23/16, at 82-90. We also grant counsel’s 
J-S28009-17

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petition and supplemental petition to withdraw as counsel for Mother, as well 

as the motion to withdraw filed by the counsel appointed to represent K.M. 

and any unnamed, putative father. 

Decree affirmed. Petition and supplemental petition to withdraw filed 

by Mother’s counsel granted. Motion to withdraw filed by K.M./unnamed, 

putative father’s counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2017