Filed 5/3/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JA COBO G. GARCIA, a Minor, etc., et al.

,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

AMERICAN GOLF CORP ORATION
et al.

,

Defendants and Respondents. B267613

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GC050056)

APPEAL from a judgme nt of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Howard L. Halm, Judge. Reversed.

Robert D. Feighner; Law Offices of Edward J. Deason

, and Edward J. Deason, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney, Ann Sherwood Rider, Assistant City Attorney; Law Offices of Michael R. Nebenzahl, Michael R. Nebenzahl; Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, and Justin Reade Sarno, for Defen dant and Respondent City of Pasadena

.2 Daley & Heft and Lee H. Roistacher for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent City of Pasadena.

_________________________

I n this opinion, we hold that the trail immunity in
Government Code section 831.4 1 does not immunize a dangerous
condition of a commercially operated, revenue generating public golf course that causes injury to pedestrians on an adjacent trail

. Consequentl y, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of City of Pasadena (City) on the claim s by Jacobo G. Garcia (Jacobo) and his mother, Ana Pavon (Pavon), (collectively appellants) that they were injured by a dangerous condition of City owned property kn own as the Brookside Golf Cours e when Jacobo was hit by an errant golf ball on a walkway City contends
is a trail

. 2

1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.

2 Below, the parties disputed whether the walkway at issue is a trail under section 831.4. We need not decide that issue. Even if the walkway qualifies as a trail, City is not entitled to trail immunity. For purposes of this opinion, we presume without deciding that the walkway is a trail.3 FACTS The Brookside Golf Course is owned by City and managed and operated by American Golf Corporation (American Golf) pursuant to a lease agreement. Within the Brooks ide Golf
Course there are two 18

- hole golf course s , the E.O. Nay Course
and the C.W. Koiner Course. The Rose Bowl Loop (Loop) is comprised of road ways (including West Drive) that encircle the Rose Bowl Stadium and
the Brookside Golf Course . These roads provide access to recreational areas within the Central Arroyo Park and Brookside Park, including the golf course, stadium, a children’s museum,

te nnis courts, a quatics center, baseball and soccer fields, equestrian facilities an d open park space. People use the Loop for walking, jogging, skati ng and bicycling. In 2001, after a person was hit by a golf ball outside the Brookside Golf Course, City erected safety nets at the 12th, 17th
and 18th holes of the C. W. Koiner Course.
Ther e is a 13

- foot wide pedestrian walkway (walkway) along the Loop. To distinguish it from the black asphalt roadway, the walkway is light brown in color . Also, it is

sep a rated from the roadway by a 12

- inch wide white painted line
as well as flexible deline ators that City placed on the white line
at 100 foot intervals. The Brookside Golf Course is separated from the walkway by a concrete wall topped by a chain link fence

. There are various chain link gates in the fence that give motor
vehicles access to th e golf course for use as a parking lot during major events at the Rose Bowl . Both the fence and gates are4

approximately seven feet six inches high. 3 Inside the Brookside
G olf C ourse, posted on the fence surrounding it

, t here are warning signs that read : “NOTICE [¶] YOU ARE WITHIN A
GOLF COURSE AREA. [¶] YOU ASSUME THE RISK OF
GOLF BALLS AND OTHER RECREATIONAL USERS.” On September 30, 2011, Jacobo was hit in the head by an
errant golf ball while Pavon was pushing him in a stroller on the walkway. The y were traveling along West Drive and near the first post of the gate for Lot 6, which is adjacent to the 15th h ole
of the C.W. Koiner Course. Appellants filed a government claim on February 22, 2012, which alleged: “Claimant [Jacobo] was struck in the h ead by a golf ball. He was transported by ambulance to Huntington
Memorial Hos p ital and transferred to Children’s Hospital whe r e he was diagnosed with a brain injury, including a subdural hematoma. He experience d significant pain, cognitive difficulties, urinary dysfunction, eye injuries, and emo t ional distress. Claimant [Pavon] suffered emotional distress and the

consequence s of caring for [Jacobo].” Regarding the acts or omissions of City, appellants averred: “Failure of the public entity to protect against a dangerous condition on public property pursuant to [sections] 830 and 835. The public entity permitted a dangerous activity of a golf c ourse next to a public
sidewalk/ walking and biking area; failed to protect against the known risk of golf ball s leaving the golf course and striking persons on public property, but not on the golf course; failed to

3 Appellants maintain that although “the fence measures 7 feet, 6 inches above the sidewalk,” it is “only 6 feet, 6 inches f rom the golf course el evation.”5

erect fences or other barriers to protect the public or arrange the golf course to minimize this risk or adequately warn golfers and pede strians of thi s risk.” Appellants sued American Golf for negligence and City for dangerous condition of public property. City filed a motion for summary judgment and argued
there was no dangerous condition of the walkway , City did not
have actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition of the walkway, and City was entitled to immunity under sections 831.4, 830.6, 820.8, 820.2 and 835.4. Also, City argued that it could not be liable because warning signs were posted, and Pavon
assumed the risk because she was aw are of, or should have been

a ware of, the danger of errant golf balls

. In opposition

, appellants argued that none of City’s statutory defenses had merit in large part because a dangerous condition of the walkway was not at issue. Rather, the issue was

a dangerous condition of the Brookside Golf Course, i.e., the fairways were too narrow and had too few trees

, and the fences
were too low

. As for the warning signs, appellants argued , inter alia, that there was no evidence City erected them, and they did

no t provide a reasonable warning to pedestrians outside the golf course of the hazard posed by errant golf balls. In support of their argument regarding the signs

, appellants pointed out that Bahman Janka (Janka), City’s project director for the walkway as well as transportation administrator of its Department of Transportation, testified during deposition that he does not know who installed the signs, when they were installed or who maintains them. In addition, Janka testified he
does not know who owns the signs or fence around the Brookside
Golf Course. David Sams (Sams), City’s person most6

knowledgeable concerning the management of the Brookside Golf
Course and administration of the lease with American Golf testified during deposition that he does not kn ow who erected the signs, when they were erected, or who owns the signs. Kyle A. Mitchell (Mitchell), the general manager of the Brookside Golf Course, testified during deposition that he is not aware of any signs warning pedestrians of golf balls. A ppel lants’ civil engineering e xpert
, Brad P. Avrit (Avrit) , provided a declaration stating: “ [T] he warning signs posted on the fence separating the golf course and the public walkway were not fully visible for an approaching pedestrian exercising reasonable c are

. . . . Furthermore, even if a pedestrian does read the warning sign s , it is impossible to anticipate when and where a golf ball will come flying over the fence

. . . . In addition, the warning on these signs [does] not tell a pedestrian what to do to protect themselves from a small, hard golf ball flying over the fence of the golf course. Thus, it is my opinion that the warnings signs posted every few hundred feet are not positioned to pro vide adequate warning, and
thus do not adequately protect or wa rn pedestrians” who a re using the walkway. With respect to the design of the Brookside Golf Course, appellants submitted the expert de claration of Michael J.
Hurdzan . He declared: The area where Jacobo was hit “is inherently unsafe for cars and pedestri ans on or along West Drive because of errant golf balls entering that area.” City knew or should have known that there “would be a reasonably high likelihood of golf balls landing in that vicinity. Protection of pedestrians using the [Loop] could have ea sily been accomplished by good design or remedial measures.” “[G]olf course operators should be vigilant to observe any place on or near their golf7

course where errant golf balls could hit unsuspecting people or property. This is especially true on a hig hly traveled area such as the [Loop] where the golf holes and probable play areas are so close together. At the 15th hole, the only barrier between the golf fairway and West Drive is a [six foot, eight inch] fence and some small and somewhat thin foliage trees that are more of a visual barrier than an effective ball stopping barrier

. . . . The trees are not dense enough to stop golf balls, but being a visual barrier, actually contribute to [a problem] because golfers cannot see pedestrians to warn them, n or can pedestrians see all of the golfers or golf balls that could cause them harm. The trees are not effectual safeguards. The fence is too low to provide adequate protection.” In further support of their dangerous condition argument, appellants submit ted the deposition of Sams in which he testified
that he had personally hit golf balls over the fence near the Brookside Golf Course. He had seen about five people hit golf
balls over the fence of the 15th h ole of the C.W. Koiner Course.
This occurred wi th either a tee shot o r a second shot. The trial court granted City’s motion. In its written ruling, the trial court concluded that City was entitled to trail immunity. As a result, the trial court declined to reach City’s other immunity d efenses. 4

4 The trial court provided an advisory ruling on the following question: “despite the Trail Immunity, can City be liable for the dangerous condition of the Golf Course because City owns the Golf Course?” The trial court found triable issues as to whether there was a dangerous condition, whether City had actual notice of the dangerous condition, and whether City took sufficient action to protect against the risk of injury by posting warning signs

.8 A ju dgment of dismissal was entered. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review. “An order granting summary judgment is subject to de novo review. [Citation.]” ( Moreno v. Quemuel (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 914, 91 7

– 918.) Like the trial court , we employ a three

- step analysis : “ ‘First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, we determine whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, if the moving party has carried its initial burden, we decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact
issue. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Supervalu, Inc. v. Wexford Underwriting Managers, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 64, 71.)
II. D angerous Condition of Public P roperty. A dangerous condition of public property “means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. ” (§ 830, subd. (a).) “Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negl igent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive9

notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a suff icient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. ” (§ 835.) As explained by our Supreme Court, the following are “well
established: first, that the location of public property, by virtue
of which users are subjected to hazards on adjacent property, may constitute a ‘dangerous condition’ under [Government Code] sections 830 and 835; second, that a physical condition of the public property that increases the risk of injury from third party
conduct may be a ‘d angerous condition’ under the statutes.” ( Bonanno v. Centra l Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 154 ( Bonanno ).)
I I I. Trail Immunity.
Neither a public entity nor a grantor of a public easement to a public entity is liable for injury ca used by , inter alia, a condition of: “ (a) A n y unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding , including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water s p orts, recreational or scenic

areas and which is not a (1) city stree t or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways . [¶] (b) A ny trail used for the above

purposes

. ” (§ 831.4.) Whether property qualifies for immunity “depends on a number of considerations, including accepted definitions of [the word trail] [citations], the purpose for which the property is designed and use d, and the purpose of the immunity statute [citation].” (

Amberger

- Warren v. City of Piedmont (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1078

– 1079 ( Amberger

- Warren ).)10 In Amberger

- Warren , the plaintiff, her friend and their two dogs were in a fenced

- in, off

- leash lower loop section of a dog park owned by a public entity. The lower loop was a paved pathway across a hill, which was described as a dirt embankment. When the plaintiff went up the pathway to put a leash on her dog, she was bumped by either her dog or her fri end’s dog and slipped on some debris on the pathway. She fell backward, landing part way off the pathway. To avoid tumbling down the hill, she grabbed an exposed cement edge and injured her hand. ( Amberger

- Warren

, supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1077

– 1078. ) The court concluded as a matter of law that the pa thway was a trail under section 831.4. ( Amberger

- Warren

, supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) After reaching that conc l usion, the court
moved on to the next issue, which was whether the in j ury was caused by a condition of the trail. ( Id . at p. 1083.) The plaintiff argued that her injury was caused by dangerous conditions unrelated to the trail, “including: allowing dogs to run unleashed in the park; permitting debris to accumulate on the trail; failing to install a guardrail where the accident occurred; and locating the trail in a dangerous area, i.e., next to a slope onto which people could fall.” ( Amberger

- Warren

, supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) The court noted that the public entity was not lia ble for harm caused by third party actors “such as plaintiff’s own unleashed dog unless some unimmunized conduct on its part contributed to that harm.” ( Amberger

- Warren

, supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) As a result, the plaintiff’s case had to hing e o n the other conditions she identified. But the trail immunity covered debris on the pathway. Moreover, trail immunity applied to the design of the trail, which included the11

absence of a guardrail. Finally, the court concluded that the hill
was “not unre lated to the trail because the trail is what provides access to the hill and exposure to the alleged danger.” ( Id . at

p. 1085.) The court reasoned that “location, no less than design, is an integral feature of a trail, and both must be immunized for
the same reasons. To accept plaintiff’s argument would be to require installation of handrails or other safety devices on trails, or relocation of trails, whenever the surroundings could otherwise be considered unreasonably dangerous. The likely and unaccept able result, which the immunity was created to avoid, would be the closure of many trails in areas that could be deemed at all hazardous.” ( Ibid .)
I n our view, the court did not hold that there must be immunity for every injury occurring on a trail whe n an adjacent public property was a contributing factor . Rather, the court examined the causation question in light of the policy of section
831.4 . It identified the issue a s whether a trail and an adjacent public property meet a relatedness test. That test has two parts: proximity and liability that will likely cause the trail to close. Thus, the Amberger

- Warren court embraced a nuanced, policy
based relatedness test for determining whether an injury is caused by a condition of a trail when an adjacen t public property may have contributed to the injury. Subsequently, t he court in Prokop v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1332 ( Prokop ) held that a city had
“absolute immunity under [section 831.4] from liability for injuries by a bicyclist w ho collided with a chain link fence immediately after exiting a class I bikeway located” along a river. ( Prokop

, supra , at p. 1335.) The court noted that precedent
establishe d that “a paved class I bikeway is a ‘trail’ within the12

meaning of section 831.4 [.]” ( Id . at p. 1338.) It rejected the argument that immunity did not apply because the accident occurred outside the confines of the bikeway. Citing Amberger

Warren , the Prokop court stated, “A gateway to or from a bike path is patently an integral par t of the bike path. [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 1342.) Because Prokop determined the gate was part of the trail at issue, the bike path, it did not have to decide whether an adjacent pu blic property had caused injury. Most recently, Leyva v. Crocket & Co

. , Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1105 ( Leyva ) was decided

. In that case, the private owner of a golf course granted the City of San Diego two public easements for an unpaved recreational hiking and equestrian trail running par a llel to the golf course . The own er was sued when a person using the trail was hit by a golf ball. ( Id . at

p. 1111.) Even if the trail came within section 831.4, the injured plaintiff in Leyva

, Miguel Leyva, and his wife argued that “the trail’s location next to the golf course ‘has noth ing to do with the fact that [ the victim] was injured by a golf ball from the [adj ac ent] property,’ and the golf course’s lack of safety barriers on the 13th hole is not a faulty design or condition of the trail.” ( Leyva

, supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 11 10.) The court rejected this argument, citing to Amberger

Warren and Prokop . It stated, “Here, the Leyvas are incorrect to argue the location of the trail next to the golf course is unrelated

to [Miguel Leyva’s] injuries: [ H e] would not have been struck by the golf ball if he had not been walking on a trail located next to the golf course. Just as the trail’s location next to a hill in [ Amberger

- Warren ] is an integral featur e of the trail, so is the
trail’ s location next to the golf course. Further, it ma kes no13

difference whether the alleged negligence in failing to erect safety barriers along the boundary between the golf course and the trail occurred on the golf course or on the trail itself because the effect
is the same. [¶] Additionally, the erectio n of a safety barrier on the boundary of the golf course is equivalent to the installation of
a handrail in Amberger

- Warren . In that case, the court observed,

“ ‘ [w]e presume that there are many miles of public trails on slopes in this state that could be made safer with handrails, and that handrails would perhaps enhance the safety of all trails, wherever located, that bear pedestrian traffic. But to require installation of handrails along every public trail where it might be reasonably prudent to do so w ould greatly undermine the immunity’s objective of encouraging access to recreational

areas

. . . . ’ [Citation.] Similarly, public pathways along golf courses certainly could be made safer by cordoning off or erecting high barriers between the golf cours es and trails. However, setting aside how the aesthetics of such barriers could mar the recreational experience for trail users, the burden and expense of erecting barriers to make recreational trails entirely safe from errant golf balls would chill priva te landowners

. . . from granting public easements to public entities along golf courses, resulting in closure of such areas to public use. [Citation.]” ( Leyva

, supra , 7 Cal.App.5th at p p. 1110

– 1111.)
This triad of cases

—

Amberger

- Warren

, Prokop and Ley va

— are at the heart of whether City is entitled to trail immunity.
I V

. City Cannot Claim T rail Immunity

. Presuming for the sake of argument that the walkway is a trail for purposes of section 831.4, the crux of this case is whether the injury to Jacobo was caused by a dangerous condition of the14

walkway for purposes of trail immun i ty. To determine this issue,

we must interpret section 831.4

. When engaging in statutory interpretation, our goal is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. “ If the langu age is clear and unambiguous, the court presumes that the Legislature meant what it said and the inquiry ends. But if the statute is ambiguous, i.e., it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court may use a variety of extrinsic ai ds. For example, it may consider the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. In addition, t he court may consider the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. [Citations.]” ( Jewish Community Centers Development Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 700, 708.) A court “construing an ambiguous statute

must av oid, if it can, an interpre t ation that would lead to absurd consequences. [Citation.]” ( Id

. at p. 712.) The plain language of section 831.4 provides immunity for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of trails, but it does not provide immunity for inju ries caused by dangerous conditions of adjacent public properties. We perceive no ambiguity in section 831.4 on this point. But, as recognized in Bonanno , the location of public property can be a dangerous condition, and so too can the physical condition of a public property that increases the risk of injury from third party conduct. When, if ever, must a dangerous condition of an adjacent public property that increases the risk of injury from third party conduct be considered a dangerous condition of a trail such that the shield of section 831.4 will cover the adjacent public property? The statute does not15

specify, leaving us with an ambiguity. Amberger

- Warren resolves the ambiguity with the relatedness test. In other words, unless properties are deem ed related for policy reasons, courts will not immunize adjacent public properties. The Brookside Golf Course does not pass the relatedness

test. As we explain below, Amberger

- Wilson

, Prokop and Leyva are not analogous.
The trail in Amberger

- Warren was n ext to a hill described as a dirt embankment, which posed a danger of people falling

. The presence or absence of guardrails would not have been an
issue but for the trail. It is true that the plaintiff’s fear of tumbling down the hill was a causal factor in her hand injury, but it is also true that she would not have injured her hand without being bumped by an unleashed dog, slipping on debris,
fall ing backwards and grab bing an exposed cement edge of the
trail , and if the trail had guardrails . In other w ords, the
unleas h ed dog as well as conditions of the trail other than it s location were substantial factors in the injury

. Moreover, the trail was the very thing that provided the public access to the
hill. Beyond that

, neither the trail nor hill were co mmercial enterprises that earned profits that could be used for maintenance, safety features, and insurance

, and for paying lawyers and judgments. Thus, imposing liability would have given public entities the choice of either paying for guardrails on
trai ls next to hills or closing such trails. Due to the expense, it was likely the trails would be closed and the public would be deprive d of the use and enjoyment of trail s and related park s

. F or policy reasons, the trail and its location next to the hill c ould

not be separated with respect to analyzing trail immunity.16 In contrast, policy dictates that the walkway and the
Brookside Golf Course be giv en separate immunity analysis , at least with respect to a danger posed by third party conduct on the golf c ourse

. The Brookside Golf Co urse is a developed and commercially operated golf course that introduced the danger of people using the Loop getting hit by errant golf balls. In other words, there is a risk of harm posed by third parties, i.e.

, golfers. Th is danger is
the result of a human creation in contrast to the naturally occurring danger posed by the hill in Amberger

- Warren due to topography and gravity. It is common knowledge that when golf courses are in areas where errant golf balls could cause in jury
outside of the courses in spaces frequented by people and
vehicles , they are designed to protect against such injury. And
the fact that the Brookside Golf Course has a fence and strategically placed trees leads to the reaso nably deducible
inference t hat

— whether successful or not

— it was designed to protect people outside the course from errant golf balls hit by golfers . This clearly indicates that the designer and City were aware of the potential harm that errant golf balls might cause
absent safety p recautions. T he danger of errant golf balls (and need for safety) exists for people outside the Brookside Golf Course regardless of whether they use the walkway. As a commercial enterprise that generates revenue , the Brookside Golf Course can pay for saf ety features such as the safety nets that it erected in 2001 after a pedestrian was hit by an errant golf ball.
I t can obtain insurance, and it can pay lawyers and judgments. In addition, it is the Loop, of which the walkway is only a small part, that p rovides access to the golf course. If the walkway was eliminated

— if the area it occupies was merged into17

part of the st reet or turned into a sidewalk

— the Loop would still provide access to the golf course

. Though the trail and Brookside Golf Course have close proximity, it is not likely that liability will cause City to close the trail given that the golf course generates revenues that can pay for maintenance and judgments. It is fair to d eny the City trail immunity f

or a dangerous condition of the Broo kside Golf Course
that increas es the risk of harm by third party conduct . Rather
than prompting the closure of trails that abut public streets and

are adjacent to pub licly owned golf courses , liability will prompt
such golf courses to take corrective acti on in a manner consistent with the accepted and expected methods of managing golf

courses

. A bulwark to our conclusion is that recognizing immunity here would give City a disincentive to correct a dangerous
condition of the Brookside Golf Course even if the course is revenue generating

. And if the Brookside Golf Course has a dangerous condition, recognizing immunity would have the absurd consequence of requiring City to protect people using the Loop from getting hit by a n errant golf ball except anyone w ho happens to be using the walkway

. Stripped down to its essence, we determine the following.
T he Amberger

- Warren court was confronted with a case that
involved dual dangerous conditions

— the location of the trail and the slope of the hill

— and decided the dangerous conditions
should be deemed related

. This served pragmatism because the trail and hill were part of the same park and presumably under the same management , and the fate of the trail and access to the hill were tied together because making them s afer would involve changing the design of the trail by installing guardrails. The18

walkway and the Brookside Golf Course also, arguably, have dual dangerous condi tions

— location of the walkway and insufficient fences and/or trees to block errant golf balls. But the walkway
and the golf course are separable by different use s as well by the golf course’s revenue s

. If City is held liable, it will be prompted to correct the design of the golf course rather than the design of
the trail. Thus, these two arguabl e dangerous conditions are not related , and immunity for one should not be immunity for both. Though City urges us to conclude that Prokop dictates a decision in its favor, we disagree. The gate in Prokop did not exist without the bikeway because they w ere both part of the design of the bikeway beyond mere location. And, the gate was not a separate, commercially operated property that could finance safety measures. Accordingly, there is no analogy between the facts and policies in Prokop and those here

. This brings us to Leyva . It provides no assistance to City because it involved materially different facts. The condition of the golf course could not be dangerous but for the trails . A s we have indicated, the danger posed by the Brookside Golf Course would exist even if the walkway did not; there would still be a danger of errant golf balls hitting motorists and recreational users of the Rose Bowl Loop. Also, here, the Brookside Golf Course has fences and trees designed for protection of Rose Bowl
Loo p users, and the issue is the adequacy of those measures as opposed to their absence. Also, the Leyva court was concerned that liability in that case would discourage private landowners from granting easements for public use. That, of course, is not a

co ncern in this case

. Based on all these considerations, a public golf course

cannot assert a trail immunity defens e when: (1) the golf course19

is adjacent to a trail abutting a public street ; (2) the golf course is a commercially operated, revenue

- generatin g enterprise ; (3) the golf course has a dangerous condition that exposes people outside
it to a risk of harm from third parties hitting errant golf balls ; and (4) th e dangerous condition of the golf course caused harm to
a user of the trail

. To be complete , we acknowledge that City would have us
affirm based on the holdings of Burgueno v. Regents of University of California (2015 ) 243 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1061 ( Burgueno ) and Hartt v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1391 ( Hartt ). But neither case is on point. Burgueno involved a fatal
collision on the Great Meadow Bikeway , which is on the campus of the University of California, Santa Cruz. The plaintiffs argued
that the Great Meadow Bikeway was not a trail under section
831.4 because it had a du al use, one being transportation and the other being recreation. The court held: “Since the Great Meadow Bikeway has mixed uses that undisputedly include recreation, the Regents have trail im munity under section 831.4, sub division (b) from claims, such a s plaintiffs’ claims, that arise from the condition of the Great Meadow Bikeway.” ( Burgueno

, supra , at

p. 1061.) The court relied, in part, on Hartt , which held that the
mixed use of a path by service vehicles and recreational cycling
did not defeat trai l immunity. ( Hartt

, supra , at p. 1400.) These cases pertain to whether a particular path qualifies as a tra il for

purposes of trail immunity. Neither case analyzes a causation
issue similar to the one herein.
V. City’s Warning Sign and Assumption of Ri sk Defense s
. City contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because there were warning signs on the Brookside Golf Course20

fence, and because appellants assumed the risk of injury caused by errant golf balls.
A “public entity is not liable for in juries proximately caused by the dangerous condition if it renders an adequate warning.” ( Foremost Dairies , Inc. v. State of California (1986) 190 Cal.App.3d 361, 367.) “Whether [a] warning was adequate is ordinarily a question of fact, but it may ‘be re solved as a question
of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. [Citations.]’” ( Ibid .)
The initial flaw in City ’s warning sign defense is that there
is no evidence that it installed, owns or maintains the signs

. City does not argue that we should infer that it installed, owns and maintains the signs, and it cited no law establishing that it is entitled to a defense based on warning signs erected by a third party. Ultimately, these issues are moot for our purposes
because reasonable mind s can differ regarding the adequacy of the warning signs, which is illustrated by Avrit’s expert opinion that the warning signs were not adequate due to their placement as well as their verbiage. Thus, the adequacy of the signs must be decided by a trier of fact. This brings us to assumption of risk. “The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is applied to certain sports or sports

- related recreational activities where ‘conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integ ral part of the sport itself’ and their removal would alter the nature of the sport. [Citation.]” ( Childs v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 64, 69

– 70 .) Secondary assumption of risk arises where “the defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff w ho is careless in encountering a known risk created by the defendant’s breach of its duty. [Citation.]21

Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery. Secondary assumption of risk ‘is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.’ [Citation.]” ( I d

. at p. 69.) City argues we should affirm based on Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482 ( Shin ) , a case in which our Supreme C ourt held
that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred a golfer from suing a coparticipant after being struck by a golf ball. ( Id . at

p. 486.) Shin is inapposite because Jacobo and Pavo n were not participants in the sport of golf at the time of th e accident

. Next, City asks us to follow the reasoning of McGuire v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Association (2003) 835 So.2d
416 ( McGuire ) . There, the court relied on Louisiana’s duty

- risk analysis to bar suit after a jogger was hit by a golf ball while jogging on the roadway in a park with a golf course. Because
McGuire does not apply California’s primary assumption of risk doctrine, it is not persuasive, and we decline to factor it into our analysis. It bears mention ing , however, that the McGuir e court reached its conclusion because the plaintiff knowingly encountered the risk. Here, if appellants were aware of the risk and were careless in encountering it, that would only establish

se condary assumption of the risk. Accordingly, summary judgmen t would not be appropriate because there would still be an issue of fact, i.e., apportionment of fault under comparative fault principles.
V I

. Other Immunity Issues. City requests that we affirm summary judgment based on the immunities afforded by sectio ns 830.6
, 820.2 and 815.2, subdivision (b)

. We decline.22 “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable

. . . for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of, or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design
has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design is prepared in conformity
with standards previously so approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a
reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor.” (§ 830.6.) “A public entity claiming design immunity must show the existence of three elements, ‘“(1) [a] causal relationship between the plan and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan prior to construction; [and] (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the design.”’ [Citation s .]” ( Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.) City argues that t here is a causal relationship between the plan or design of the Loop and the accident ; the design for the Loop was approved by City or a C ity employee exercising discretionary authority in advance of construction; and there is
substantial evidence that a r easonable public entity or employee could have approved the design

. But as we have indicated in connection with our trail immunity discussion

, a dangerous condition of the walkway’s location cannot be conflated with a dangerous condition of the Brookside Golf Course ’s lack of fences and/or trees, and any contribution of the walkway’s location to appellants’ injuries cannot exonerate City from liability with23

respect to a dangerous condition of the Brookside Golf Course. The same reasoning applies to design immunity. In other words, even if City could establish design immunity for the walkway,
that would not foreclose liability for injury caused by a dangerous
condition of the Brookside Golf Course. Once again, our reasoning is informed by policy. A co mme rcially operated and

revenue

- generating golf course should not be absolved of liab ility
if it would not otherwise qualify for design immunity on its own merit simply because a dangerous condition of that golf course happen s to cause harm on a n adjacent tra il. F or a commercially operated and revenue

- generating g olf course to use the shiel d of design immunity, it must prove discretionary approval of its plan (versus the plan of an adjacent trail) prior to construction, and substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of its design (versus the design of an adjacent trail). For these reasons, City’s arguments about the Loop are moot. Section 820.2 provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, “a public employee is not liable for an injury resul ting
from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result
of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Pursuant to section 815.2, subdivision (b), and except as otherwise provided by statute, a

p ublic entity cannot be held liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability. City argues that it is entitled to immunity under these
statutes for the discretionary desi gn of the Loop and nearby recreational areas. But appellants are suing based on a dangerous condition of the Brookside Golf Course rather than an injury resulting from an act or omission of a C ity employee , and24

City has not explained how or why section 81 5.2, subdivision (b)
and section 820.2 would operate to immunize City from the liability permitted by section 830.6. We note that the recognized method for a public entity to avoid liability for a dangerous condition of public property is through the affi rmative defense of design immunity. ( Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 342

– 343.) As explained above, City failed to establish that design immunity entitled it to summary judgment.
DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed

. Appellants s hall recover their costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

______________________, Acting P. J. ASHMANN

- GERST

We concur:

______________________, J.

CHAVEZ

______________________, J. *

GOODMAN

* Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Co urt, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.