[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-13055

________________________

Agency No. A029-021-783

ANDRE MARTELLO BARTON, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(September 25, 2018)

Before WILSON and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and VINSON,* District Judge.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: 

 *

Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, 

sitting by designation.

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The federal immigration laws give the Attorney General the discretion to 

cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident who

(among other conditions) “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years 

after having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). Importantly for 

present purposes, though, the continuous-residence requirement is subject to the 

so-called “stop-time rule.” The provision that embodies that rule—at issue here—

states that any period of continuous residence terminates when the alien 

“commit[s] an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the 

alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or 

removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this 

title, whichever is earliest.” Id. § 1229b(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

The question before us is whether a lawful-permanent-resident alien who has 

already been admitted to the United States—and who isn’t currently seeking 

admission or readmission—can, for stop-time purposes, be “render[ed] ... 

inadmissible” by virtue of a qualifying criminal conviction. Other circuits have 

divided over the answer. For slightly different reasons, the Second and Fifth 

Circuits have both held that a lawful permanent resident needn’t apply for 

admission to be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” under the stop-time rule (as has the 

Third Circuit, albeit in an unpublished opinion). See Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 

60, 67 (2d Cir. 2017); Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 2015);

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Ardon v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 449 Fed. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2011). More 

recently, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “a lawful permanent resident 

cannot be ‘rendered inadmissible’ unless he is seeking admission.” Nguyen v. 

Sessions, __ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4016761, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2018).

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Second, Third, and Fifth 

Circuits, and disagree with the Ninth.

I

A

Andre Martello Barton is a native and citizen of Jamaica. Barton was 

initially admitted to the United States on May 27, 1989 as a B-2 visitor for 

pleasure; approximately three years later, he successfully adjusted his status to 

lawful permanent resident. Since his admission, Barton has run afoul of the law on 

several occasions. Initially, on January 23, 1996—for reasons that will become 

clear, the dates matter—Barton was arrested and charged with three counts of 

aggravated assault and one count each of first-degree criminal damage to property 

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was convicted 

of all three offenses in July 1996. Then, a little more than a decade later—first in 

2007 and then again in 2008―Barton was charged with and convicted of violating 

the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. (For present purposes, only Barton’s 1996 

crimes are relevant to determining whether he is eligible for cancellation of 

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removal. Barton’s 2007 and 2008 offenses occurred more than seven years after 

his admission to the United States—which, as we will explain, is the pertinent 

timeframe for establishing continuous residence under the cancellation statute.) 

The Department of Homeland Security subsequently served Barton with a 

notice to appear, charging him as removable on several grounds: (1) under

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of an aggravated felony related 

to drug trafficking; (2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for violating controlledsubstance laws; (3) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), for being convicted of illegally 

possessing a firearm; and (4) under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for being 

convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single 

scheme. Barton admitted the factual allegations in the notice and conceded 

removability based on the controlled-substance and gun-possession offenses, but 

denied that he had been convicted of a trafficking-related aggravated felony or of 

two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. Barton

also indicated that he intended to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful 

permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges of 

removability, and the government later withdrew the other two charges. 

B

As promised, Barton subsequently filed an application for cancellation of 

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which, as already explained, allows the 

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Attorney General to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawfulpermanent-resident alien if―in addition to other requirements not relevant

here―the alien “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after 

having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). Importantly,

though—as also explained—the continuous-residence requirement is subject to the 

“stop-time rule,” which terminates the accrual of continuous residence when the 

alien commits a crime that (1) is listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and (2) that renders 

the alien either “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(2) or “removable” under 8 U.S.C. § 

1227(a)(2) or (a)(4). Id. § 1229b(d)(1)(B). 

In his cancellation application, Barton acknowledged his prior criminal 

convictions and included as exhibits records that, as relevant here, showed that he

had committed the crimes that resulted in his convictions for aggravated assault, 

criminal damage to property, and unlawful gun possession on January 23, 1996. 

The government moved to pretermit Barton’s application, arguing that Barton 

hadn’t accrued the required seven years of continuous residence after his May 27,

1989 admission because, under the stop-time rule, his continuous-residence period 

ended on January 23, 1996. 

In response, Barton contended that his 1996 crimes didn’t trigger the stoptime rule. As to § 1229b(d)(1)’s “removable” prong, Barton said that his 1996 

offenses didn’t qualify because they arose from a single scheme of misconduct 

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constituting one crime involving moral turpitude committed outside his first five 

years in the United States, whereas the cross-referenced § 1227(a)(2) establishes

removability, as relevant here, only for (i) a single crime involving moral turpitude 

committed within five years of an alien’s admission or (ii) multiple crimes 

involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. The government 

didn’t press—and has since abandoned—the argument that Barton’s 1996 crimes 

rendered him “removable” for stop-time purposes. Instead, it insisted that Barton’s 

1996 offenses―even if considered as a single crime involving moral turpitude

occurring outside the five-year timeframe―rendered Barton “inadmissible” under 

§ 1182(a)(2), which unlike removability under § 1227(a)(2) isn’t limited by a

single-scheme requirement. Barton replied—thus teeing up the issue before us—

that as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident not seeking admission (or 

readmission) to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “render[ed] ... 

inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(d). 

The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, concluding that 

Barton’s 1996 offenses “render[ed]” him “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(2), 

thereby triggering § 1229b(d)(1)’s stop-time rule, thereby prematurely ending his 

period of continuous residence in the United States, thereby disqualifying him for

cancellation of removal. 

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C

Barton sought review of the IJ’s order in the Board of Immigration Appeals, 

reiterating his argument that a lawful-permanent-resident alien not seeking 

admission to the United States can’t be “render[ed] inadmissible” under

§ 1182(a)(2) for stop-time purposes. In a non-precedential single-member 

decision, the Board agreed with the IJ, concluding that Barton’s 1996 offenses 

triggered the stop-time rule and thus forestalled his accrual of the requisite seven 

years of continuous residence. Citing its earlier decision in Matter of JuradoDelgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (B.I.A. 2006), the Board (per the lone member) held

that Barton’s convictions barred him from seeking cancellation of removal 

because—so far as we can tell from a very summary order—the phrase “renders 

the alien inadmissible” in § 1229b(d)(1)’s stop-time rule requires only that the 

applicant be “potentially” inadmissible, not that he be actively seeking admission. 

Barton now petitions for review of the Board’s decision. He asserts, as he 

has all along, that as a lawful permanent resident he “plainly cannot be 

inadmissible as a result of any offense, as he is not seeking admission to the United 

States.” Br. of Petitioner at 8.

II

Under the principle announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), “[a]s a general rule, an agency’s 

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interpretation of a statute which it administers is entitled to deference if the statute 

is silent or ambiguous and the interpretation is based on a reasonable construction 

of the statute.” Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). 

And to be clear, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference applies with 

full force when the Board of Immigration Appeals interprets ambiguous statutory 

terms in the course of ordinary case-by-case adjudication. See INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). But so do Chevron’s limitations. 

Accordingly, here as elsewhere, if we determine―employing “traditional tools of 

statutory construction”―that “Congress has spoken clearly, we do not defer to 

[the] agency’s interpretation of the statute,” because “we must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1307 (quoting

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44). 

The threshold question before us, therefore—at Chevron step one, so to 

speak—is whether the usual rules of statutory interpretation provide a clear answer 

to the following question: Can a lawful-permanent-resident alien who is not

presently seeking admission to the United States nonetheless be “render[ed] ... 

inadmissible” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)? Although it is 

undoubtedly true that “the concept of inadmissibility is generally married to 

situations in which an alien is actually seeking admission to the United States,” 

Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 2015), for the reasons that follow, 

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we hold that an already-admitted lawful permanent resident—who doesn’t need 

and isn’t seeking admission—can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for stop-time 

purposes. 

A

Any application of the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” of 

course, must begin “with the statutory text, and proceed from the understanding 

that unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in 

accordance with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). At issue here (again) is the stop-time 

rule, which (again) terminates the seven years of continuous residence that a lawful 

permanent resident must accrue in order to qualify for cancellation of removal. In 

relevant part, the stop-time rule provides as follows:

[A]ny period of continuous residence ... in the United States shall be 

deemed to end ... when the alien has committed an offense referred to 

in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to 

the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable 

from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this 

title, whichever is earliest.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).

Because the parties here agree that Barton is not ineligible for cancellation 

of removal on account of having committed an offense that rendered him 

“removable” under § 1227(a)(2) or § 1227(a)(4), the sole question before us is 

whether his 1996 convictions rendered him “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(2). 

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Barton’s position is simply stated: He says that he “plainly cannot be inadmissible

as a result of any offense, as he is not seeking admission to the United States.” Br. 

of Petitioner at 8 (emphasis added). Although Barton’s argument has a certain 

intuitive appeal, we conclude that § 1229b(d)(1)’s plain language forecloses it.

We begin our textual analysis where Barton does—with the word

“inadmissible.” Standard English-language dictionaries all seem to define 

“inadmissible” in pretty much the same way: “Not admissible; not proper to be 

allowed or received.” Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 1254

(1944); see also, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1139 (2002)

(same); Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2011) (“[n]ot admissible; not to be 

admitted, entertained, or allowed”). Unsurprisingly, those same dictionaries 

similarly define the root word “admissible”: “Capable of being or having the right 

to be admitted to a place.” Oxford English; see also, e.g., Webster’s Second at 34 

(“[e]ntitled or worthy to be admitted”); Webster’s Third at 28 (same). So, in short, 

an alien like Barton is “inadmissible” if he isn’t “proper[ly]”—or doesn’t “hav[e] 

the right to be”—present in the United States. 

On, then, to the word “renders,” which precedes “inadmissible.” Barton 

asserts that Congress’s use of that term—such that the alien must commit an 

offense that “renders” him “inadmissible”—“requires certain factual circumstances 

to be in existence to be operative,” and thus that it “makes most sense for Congress 

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to have used ‘renders’ inadmissible to apply to those seeking admission ....” Br. 

of Petitioner at 12–13. We disagree that the term “renders” necessitates (or even

properly suggests) so narrow a reading. Turning again to the dictionaries, we find 

that they almost uniformly define “render” to mean “to cause to be or to become.” 

E.g., Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 2109 (1944); Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 1922 (2002) (same); Oxford English 

Dictionary (3d ed. 2011) (same). Some, interestingly—and we think tellingly—go 

on to explain that the word “render” can indicate the conferral of a particular 

condition, or “state.” Webster’s Second at 2109; Webster’s Third at 1922. 

A “state”-based understanding makes particularly good sense here, where 

the word that follows “renders” is “inadmissible.” Cf. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 

519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (emphasizing that a statutory term’s meaning should be 

determined by reference to “the specific context in which [it] is used”). By their 

very nature, “able” and “ible” words1 connote a person’s or thing’s character,

quality, or status—which, importantly for present purposes, exists independent of 

any particular facts on the ground, so to speak. Consider, for instance, the 

following example, taken from one dictionary’s definition of the word “render”:

“Sewage effluent leaked into a well, grossly contaminating the water and rendering 

 1 For an explanation of the differences—why sometimes “able” and sometimes “ible”?—see

Catherine Soanes, Do you know your -ibles from your -ables?, Oxford Dictionaries: 

OxfordWords (Oct. 23, 2013), https://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2012/10/23/ibles-and-ables/

(last visited Sept. 15, 2018).

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it undrinkable for 24 hours.” Oxford English (emphasis added). The described

water isn’t properly drunk for a full day—whether or not anyone is actually trying 

to drink it. It is, by its very nature, not drinkable. Here’s another, again from a 

dictionary definition of “render”: “[T]he rains rendered his escape impossible.” 

Oxford Dictionary of English 1503 (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added). Because of 

the rains, the unidentified captive’s escape couldn’t be made—whether or not he 

was actually trying to make it. Similar illustrations abound: A terminal illness 

renders its victim untreatable regardless of whether she is actively seeking 

treatment; rot renders a piece of fish inedible regardless of whether someone is 

trying to eat it; sheer weight renders a car immovable regardless of whether 

someone is trying to move it. You get the point. So too here—an alien can be 

rendered inadmissible regardless of whether he is actually seeking admission.

We simply cannot discern in § 1229b(d)(1)’s text any indication that in order 

to be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” within the meaning of the stop-time rule, an

alien must presently be seeking admission. Rather, an alien is “render[ed] ... 

inadmissible” when he is “cause[d] to be or to become” not “proper[ly]” or

“right[ly]” admitted. In other words, “inadmissib[ility]” is a status that an alien 

assumes by virtue of his having been convicted of a qualifying offense under § 

1182(a)(2). True, for an alien like Barton, who has already been admitted—and 

isn’t currently seeking admission—that status might not immediately produce realCase: 17-13055 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 Page: 12 of 18 
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world admission-related consequences. But it isn’t categorically irrelevant to 

admission either; rather, it may just be that the otherwise-latent status manifests 

somewhere down the road. Barton is of course correct that, as a general rule, an 

already-admitted lawful permanent resident needn’t seek readmission to the United 

States. There are exceptions, however. For instance, a once-admitted alien may 

need readmission if he “has abandoned or relinquished [lawful-permanentresident] status,” “has been absent from the United States for a continuous period 

in excess of 180 days,” or “has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the 

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). (Importantly, the term of 

“inadmissib[ility]” imposed by § 1182(a)(2) has no sunset; once an alien is 

“render[ed] ... inadmissible” under the statute, he retains that status indefinitely.)

2

So as a matter of both linguistics and logic, at least for stop-time purposes, a 

lawful permanent resident can—contrary to Barton’s contention—be “render[ed] 

... inadmissible” even if he isn’t currently seeking (and for that matter may never

again seek) admission to the United States.

 2 In Nguyen, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that § 1101(a)(13)(C) specifies circumstances in

which a lawful permanent resident might have to seek readmission, but answered that none of 

them applied in the case before it. __ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4016761, at *3. With respect, we 

think that misses the point—which isn’t whether the particular alien before the court himself 

needs readmission right now, but rather whether a once-admitted alien might someday need 

readmission, such that his “inadmissible” status would matter. Clearly he might, such that it 

would.

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B

In resisting this plain-language interpretation, Barton relies principally on

the rule against surplusage―which cautions against needlessly reading a statute in 

a way that renders (pun fully intended) certain language superfluous. See, e.g., 

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). In particular, Barton asserts—

If an offense referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), to wit, a [crime 

involving moral turpitude], categorically render[s] an alien 

inadmissible and trigger[s] the stop-time rule, without respect to 

whether that individual is actually seeking admission, then there 

would be no need to consider whether, in the alternative, the offense 

render[s] the alien removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) or (a)(4).

Br. of Petitioner at 11. 

Although we find Barton’s surplusage-based argument a little hard to follow, 

he seems to be saying something like the following. At the outset, he correctly 

recognizes that in order to trigger § 1229b(d)(1)’s stop-time rule, two conditions 

must be met: first, the alien must have “committed an offense referred to in section 

1182(a)(2)”; second, and separately, that offense must “render[] the alien” either

“inadmissible ... under section 1182(a)(2)” or “removable ... under section 

1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) ....” See Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60, 66–67 (2d 

Cir. 2017) (explaining the “stop-time rule as having two requirements”); Calix, 784 

F.3d at 1006 (same). From that starting point, and presumably fastening on the 

fact that both § 1229b(d)(1)’s prefatory “referred to” clause and the “inadmissible” 

prong of the statute’s operative clause cross-reference § 1182(a)(2), Barton appears 

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to contend that an alien’s commission of any § 1182(a)(2)-based crime that meets 

the threshold “referred to” condition will also ipso facto “render[] the alien 

inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2).” Thus, he says, there will never be a need

to proceed to determine whether a crime qualifies under the operative clause’s 

separate § 1227(a)-based “removable” prong—hence, the argument goes, the 

surplusage. Barton’s solution: Courts should read the stop-time rule “so that the 

inadmissibility part applies to permanent residents seeking admission, and the 

[removability] part applies to those permanent residents in the United States 

already, not seeking admission ....” Br. of Petitioner at 11. 

We reject Barton’s argument for two reasons. As an initial matter, the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the usual “preference” for “avoiding 

surplusage constructions is not absolute” and that “applying the rule against 

surplusage is, absent other indications, inappropriate” when it would make an 

otherwise unambiguous statute ambiguous. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 

536 (2004) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). 

Rather, faced with a choice between a plain-text reading that renders a word or 

clause superfluous and an interpretation that gives every word independent 

meaning but, in the doing, muddies up the statute—courts “should prefer the plain 

meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress.” Id. Because, as we 

have explained, the statutory language here is clear, it is unnecessary―and in the

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Supreme Court’s words, would be “inappropriate”―to apply the anti-surplusage 

canon here. 

Moreover, and in any event, Barton’s surplusage-based argument 

misunderstands the stop-time rule’s operation. Contrary to Barton’s assumption, 

answering “yes” to the first question—whether the alien has “committed an offense 

referred to in section 1182(a)(2)”—does not necessarily require a “yes” to the 

second question—whether that offense “renders the alien inadmissible ... under 

section 1182(a)(2).” The reason is that while the mere “commi[ssion]” of a 

qualifying offense satisfies the prefatory clause, actually “render[ing] the alien 

inadmissible” demands more. Under § 1182(a)(2), an alien “is inadmissible”—

here, as a result of a “crime involving moral turpitude”—only if he is “convicted 

of, or ... admits having committed, or ... admits committing acts which constitute 

the essential elements of” the listed offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In 

short, while only commission is required at step one, conviction (or admission) is 

required at step two. See Calix, 784 F.3d at 1006 (“If an alien has committed an 

offense listed [in § 1182(a)(2)], does inadmissibility automatically result? It does 

not.”); see also Heredia, 865 F.3d at 66–67 (recognizing commission-conviction 

distinction).3

 

 3 There is one clarification worth making here. Although it is an alien’s conviction of a 

qualifying offense that “renders [him] inadmissible” for stop-time purposes, his period of 

continuous residence is deemed to terminate on the date he initially committed that offense. So, 

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So contrary to Barton’s contention, there is no surplusage. The statutory 

language that he assails as superfluous is in fact the second of two independent 

requirements, both of which are necessary to trigger the stop-time rule.4

 

III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold, per the stop-time provision’s plain

language, that a lawful-permanent-resident alien need not be seeking admission to 

the United States in order to be “render[ed] ... inadmissible.” Accordingly, the 

Board correctly concluded that Barton is ineligible for cancellation of removal 

because the stop-time rule―triggered when he committed a crime involving moral 

turpitude in January 1996―ended his continuous residence a few months shy of 

the required seven-year period.5

 

in effect, his conviction-based inadmissibility “relates back” (our term) to the date of the crime’s 

commission. See, e.g., Heredia, 865 F.3d at 70–71 (“[W]hen a non-citizen is rendered 

inadmissible—by a conviction, admission of the criminal conduct, or through some other 

means—the stop-time rule may make him ineligible for cancellation of removal, if, as of the date 

of his commission of the underlying offense, he had not yet resided in the United States 

continuously for seven years. To state it another way: as long as a qualifying offense later does

render the non-citizen inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), the date of the commission of 

the offense governs the computation of a lawful permanent resident’s continuous residency in the 

United States.”).

4 Although the Ninth Circuit embraced a version of this surplusage-based argument in Nguyen, 

see __ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4016761, at *3, it failed to account for the fact that while commission 

of a crime alone satisfies § 1229b(d)(1)’s prefatory clause, the operative “render[ing]” clause 

requires more—either a conviction of or a formal admission to the underlying offense.

5 Because we conclude that the stop-time provision’s statutory language is unambiguous, we 

needn’t definitively determine whether, as the government contends, the Board’s decision 

here―which the parties agree is a non-precedential single-member order―is entitled to Chevron 

deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 

matter.”). We note, though, that in Quinchia v. U.S. Attorney General, this Court held that 

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PETITION DENIED. 

 

“Chevron deference is not appropriate[ly]” afforded to “a non-precedential decision issued by a 

single member of the [Board] that does not rely on existing [Board] or federal court precedent.” 

552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Quinchia further indicates that a singlemember Board decision should be deemed to have “rel[ied] on” existing precedent for Chevron

purposes only where it is actually dictated—or “compelled”—by an earlier decision. See id. at 

1258 (citing Garcia–Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011–14 (9th Cir. 2006), for the 

proposition that “Chevron deference may apply where the non-precedential [Board] decision 

relied on, and was ‘compelled by’ an earlier precedential decision”); cf. Silva v. United States 

Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that it is permissible under 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A) for the Board to summarily affirm the decision of the immigration judge

without opinion when, among other conditions, the issues “are governed by existing precedent”).

It is true, as the government says, that the single-member opinion here cited 

(parenthetically) the Board’s earlier decision in Matter of Jurado-Delgado for the proposition 

that “the phrase ‘renders the alien admissible ... or removable’ in section [1229b(d)(1)] requires 

only that an alien ‘be or become’ inadmissible or removable, i.e., be potentially removable if so 

charged,” 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 31 (B.I.A. 2006). But as the Fifth Circuit has correctly explained, 

“[t]he [Board] in Jurado-Delgado clearly answered one narrow question,” which is similar, but 

not identical, to the one presented here: “It held that an alien could be charged with removal on 

one ground and be ineligible for cancellation of removal because of another ground. The opinion

does not explicitly answer whether a lawful permanent resident who does not need to be 

admitted nonetheless has his period of continuous residence stopped by an offense rendering him 

inadmissible.” Calix, 784 F.3d at 1009. Because the single-member decision here required an 

extension (or at least a refinement) of Jurado-Delgado, we doubt that it qualifies under Quinchia

as one that “rel[ies] on” existing Board precedent. 

One of the principal justifications for granting deference to administrative agencies is that

they operate pursuant to regular procedures that ensure thorough consideration and vetting of 

interpretive issues. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (basing policy of deference, in part, on the 

conclusion that “the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion”). When, 

as here, those procedures are short-circuited, that justification evaporates. Cf. Rotimi v. 

Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to give Chevron deference to a singlemember Board decision because (1) the Board itself affords such decisions no precedential 

weight and (2) the Board’s governing regulations provide that it has a duty to provide “clear and 

uniform guidance [...] on the proper interpretation and administration” of the immigration laws, 

which it shall do through precedential decisions) (cited in Quinchia, 552 F.3d at 1258).

Case: 17-13055 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 Page: 18 of 18