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SJC-12119

BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs. BOARD OF 

REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE & another.

1

June 27, 2017.

Board of Registration in Medicine. Administrative Law, 

Decision.

The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a 

judgment of a single justice of the county court dismissing his

petition for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to 

G. L. c. 249, § 4. On May 18, 2017, we issued an order 

affirming the single justice's judgment and indicated that this 

opinion would follow. 

In 2010, Padmanabhan, a medical doctor, was terminated from 

his position at Cambridge Health Alliance, a termination that he 

alleges was based on false claims that he harmed patients and in 

retaliation for certain actions that he took, including 

reporting purported insurance fraud. Subsequent to his

termination, the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) 

commenced disciplinary proceedings against him, and referred the 

matter to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA).2 

Following an evidentiary hearing that spanned eight days, the 

DALA magistrate issued his recommended decision in August, 2015. 

The board subsequently remanded the case to the magistrate, in 

 

1 Division of Administrative Law Appeals.

2 The parties do not specifically state, and the record

before us does not appear to indicate, when exactly the Board of 

Registration in Medicine began its investigation of Padmanabhan. 

It issued its statement of allegations against him in July, 

2014. 
2

January, 2016, asking the magistrate to elaborate on certain 

parts of his decision and, among other things, to include 

credibility determinations and clarify certain inconsistencies

in the decision. In March, 2016, the magistrate issued an order 

indicating that he was preparing a revised recommended decision 

for the board in response to the remand order.

Shortly thereafter, Padmanabhan filed a "Renewed Complaint 

in the Nature of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari" in the 

county court. In the petition he argued that his due process 

rights had been violated in various ways during the course of 

the board proceedings. He also argued that the recommended 

decision issued by the magistrate in August, 2015, became final 

in February, 2016, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.01(11)(c)(3) (1998), and that his petition thus did not stem 

from, or seek relief from, an interlocutory ruling but rather 

what was, in effect, a final decision of the board. The board 

moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the proceedings 

before it had not yet concluded and that it had not yet issued a 

final decision. The single justice dismissed the petition 

without a hearing.3 

In his appeal, Padmanabhan continues to argue that the 

magistrate's recommended decision became the board's final 

decision pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3), and 

that his appeal is thus not interlocutory. The regulation 

provides that if an agency such as the board "fails to issue a 

final decision within 180 days of the filing or re-filing of [a] 

tentative decision, the initial decision shall become the final 

decision of the [a]gency, not subject to further [a]gency 

review." In Padmanabhan's view, the magistrate's recommended 

decision, issued in August, 2015, became the board's final 

decision in February, 2016, 180 days after it was issued. After 

the board received the recommended decision, however, it 

remanded the case to the magistrate for additional findings and 

 

3 Padmanabhan previously filed a similar petition for relief 

in the county court in 2014. In that petition, he sought review 

of the DALA magistrate's denial of his motion to dismiss the 

disciplinary proceedings. A single justice allowed DALA's 

motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that the 

magistrate's decision was interlocutory, not subject to judicial 

review at that time, and that Padmanabhan would be entitled to 

seek review pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64, at the conclusion of 

the disciplinary proceedings before the board. Padmanabhan did 

not appeal from the dismissal of this earlier petition.
3

clarification, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.01(11)(c)(2), and it did so within 180 days of having 

received the recommended decision. In other words, the remand 

was timely. In that circumstance, according to the board, when 

it recommits a tentative decision to the presiding officer -- in 

this case the DALA magistrate -- the 180-day period referred to 

in 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3) will begin to run anew 

when a revised decision is refiled. See 801 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.01(11)(c)(2) ("[t]he same procedural provisions applicable 

to the initial filing of the tentative decision shall apply to 

any re-filed tentative decision after recommital"). 

We agree in the circumstances presented here that the 

board's decision was not yet final when Padmanabhan filed his 

petition in the county court, and that his attempt to have

review at that juncture was premature.4 We note as well that 

when the board issues a final decision, the appropriate avenue 

to seek review is by a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64, 

not via a petition for relief in the nature of certiorari, as 

Padmanabhan filed here. See, e.g., Picciotto v. Appeals Court 

(No. 2), 457 Mass. 1002, 1002, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1044 

(2010), and cases cited ("certiorari relief designed to correct 

errors not otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal"

[quotation and citation omitted]). The single justice, in 

short, did not err or otherwise abuse his discretion in 

dismissing the petition.

Although Padmanabhan's argument regarding finality is 

ultimately unavailing, we are not unsympathetic to his 

situation. The board issued its statement of allegations 

against him in July, 2014, almost three years ago, and 

 

4 The circumstances here differ from those presented in 

McGuiness v. Department of Correction, 465 Mass. 660 (2013), 

where we also considered 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(3). 

In that case, a Civil Service Commission (commission) vote on 

whether to adopt a DALA magistrate's findings of fact and 

recommended decision resulted in a two-to-two tie. See id. at 

662. We concluded that the tie vote amounted to a "failure to 

make a final decision" and, pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. 

§ 1.01(11)(c)(3), resulted in the magistrate's decision becoming 

the final decision of the commission by default. See id. at 

666. In doing so we noted that the commission "did not fail to 

act for want of effort; it did not act because it could not, 

given the voting deadlock." Id. Here, however, the board did 

act.
4

Padmanabhan claims that his medical career has essentially been 

in limbo ever since. We do not condone the lengthy disciplinary 

process to which Padmanabhan has been subjected. Indeed, we 

have serious concerns about the potential for repeated 

recommitals and, in turn, repeated re-settings of the 180-day 

clock pursuant to 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(11)(c)(2), and to 

the elongated process that could result. In this case, as it 

turns out, the DALA magistrate issued his amended recommended 

decision in August, 2016, while this appeal has been pending,

and the board has since adopted that decision and suspended 

Padmanabhan's license.

5 For Padmanabhan, therefore, it appears 

that the end of the administrative process is imminent. He now 

has the opportunity to pursue judicial review of the final 

decision of the board, which he may do pursuant to G. L. c. 112, 

§ 64. In that appeal, he will be free to raise issues related 

to the procedural aspects of the disciplinary process and the 

length of time that process took in his case.6

For these reasons, we affirmed the judgment of the single 

justice.

Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se.

Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for Board of 

Registration in Medicine & another.

 

5 In January, 2017, while this appeal was pending, 

Padmanabhan filed an "Emergency Injunction" in this court asking 

for a stay of any further proceedings before the board. The 

board opposed the attempt to prohibit it from issuing a final 

decision. A single justice denied the motion.

Counsel for the board stated at the oral argument of this 

case that the board has since adopted, with some modifications, 

the magistrate's amended recommended decision but that, at that 

point, the board had not yet determined whether to impose 

discipline. According to papers subsequently filed by 

Padmanabhan, the board issued an order of indefinite suspension 

on May 11, 2017, effective thirty days from that date.

6 In addition to the concerns expressed above, we also are

troubled by the fact that counsel for the board was unsure of 

the practical consequences of Padmanabhan's situation (e.g., 

whether he can effectively practice medicine, and get paid to do 

so, pending the board's decision). It behooves the board to 

understand its own disciplinary process and the effect of that 

process on those subject to it.