alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 The undersigned, who is the Chief Executive Officer of International
Microcomputer Software, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that (i) the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the three-month period ended December 31,
2003, as filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Quarterly Report"), to which this Certification is an Exhibit, fully complies
with the applicable requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act;
and (ii) the information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


 DATE: FEBRUARY 11, 2003


BY: /S/ MARTIN WADE, III
Martin Wade, III
Director & Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been
provided to International Microcomputer Software, Inc. and will be retained by
International Microcomputer Software, Inc.and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                       33
#### John C. ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The State of SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION PAROLE AND PARDON SERVICES; Warden, Broad River Correctional Institution, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-7027

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 19, 2017

Decided: December 21, 2017

John C. Robinson, Appellant Pro Se. Tommy Evans, Jr., SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON SERVICE, Columbia, South Carolina; Christina Catoe Bigelow, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

John C. Robinson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Robinson that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. *Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); *see also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Robinson has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving *810proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Tampa Electric Company Polk 2-5 Conversion Project

Proposed GHG BACT Emission Limits (4/2/2013)

Annual

Operating Operating Case Gross Hours of

Case Description Output Operation Averaging Monitoring 

(MW) (lb/hr) (lb/MWh) (hr/yr) Time Frequency 

A. Combined Cycle - Natural Gas (4x1 CC Unit)

CC-10 75% load/59°F ambient 1,190 1,044,149 878 4,760 

CC-14 100% load/EC/DB/90°F ambient 1,127 990,300 879 4,000 878 (a) 12-Month Rolling Continuous 

B. Combined Cycle - ULSD Fuel Oil (4x1 CC Unit)

CC-25 100% load/EC/59°F ambient 1,125 1,388,666 1,235 N/A 1,235 (c) 3-Hour Annual Test 

C. Simple Cycle - Natural Gas (Each SCCT)

SC-5 100% load/EC/59°F ambient 174 230,329 1,320 N/A 1,320 (c) 3-Hour Annual Test 

D. Simple Cycle - ULSD Fuel Oil (Each SCCT)

SC-16 100% load/EC/59°F ambient 186 248,476 1,334 N/A 1,334 (c) 3-Hour Annual Test 

EC = evaporative coolingDB = duct burner firing(a) Excluding CT loads less than 50% of design capacity.(b) 40 CFR Part 98 emission factors for methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O).(c) Corrected to ISO conditions (59 °F, 14.7 psia, and 60% relative humidity).

Sources: B&V, 2013. ECT, 2013. TEC, 2013.

Proposed BACT Lim

CO2e

Emissions

(lb/MWh)

CO2e Emissions
#### Jonathan HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Jeramie Barideaux, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE; Rodney Monroe, Chief; John C. Gorrod, Sergeant; Michael R. Bodenstein, Officer; Michael C. Wallin, Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-2053

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 19, 2017

Decided: December 21, 2017

Jonathan Harris, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel Edward Peterson, CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Charlotte, North Carolina; Ronald L. Gibson, RUFF BOND COBB WADE & BETHUNE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Jason Robert Benton, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Lori R. Keeton, LAW OFFICES OF LORI KEETON, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Harris seeks to appeal the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims and related state law claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127. S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

*813The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 8, 2017. The notice of appeal was filed on September 8, 2017. Because Harris failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid-the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Jairo Ernesto Diaz SORTO, AKA Eairo Diaz, AKA Ernesto Diaz, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-73229

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed December 5, 2017

Jairo Ernesto Diaz Sorto, Pro Se

Andrea Gevas, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jairo Ernesto Diaz Sorto, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution and thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252; *see Martinez v. Sessions,*873 F.3d 655, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2017). We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings. *Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,*828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

We do not consider the facts Diaz Sorto references in his opening brief or the materials. attached to it that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Diaz Sorto failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution, where the evidence demonstrates his feared harm from gang violence lacks a nexus to an enumerated ground. *See Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

We reject Diaz Sorto’s contention that he is eligible for asylum. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(2)(i).

Finally, Diaz Sorto does not make any specific arguments regarding CAT relief. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised *614in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
532 P.2d 201

#### NAVAJO COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Raymond H. Randall, Individually and as County Treasurer of Navajo County; William M. Smith, M. M. "Mike" O'Haco, Max E. Taylor, Individually and as members of the Board of Supervisors of Navajo County, Arizona, Appellants, v. PEABODY COAL COMPANY, a corporation, Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CIV 2368.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department A.

March 4, 1975.

Mary Z. Chandler, James D. Winter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellant.

Philip E. von Ammon, Donald R. Gilbert, Fennemore, Craig, von Ammon & Udall, Phoenix, for appellee.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

OGG, Presiding Judge.

Appellants, in their motion for rehearing, have urged that this Court further clarify the original decision in the case because of the far-reaching tax implications.

*260Appellants assert that our decision could be interpreted to strike down Navajo County’s entire assessment on all property of Peabody Coal Company located within the County upon the Navajo and Hopi Indian Reservations. The issue of Navajo County’s authority to tax the personal property and improvements of Peabody Coal Company was never presented to this Court or the Superior Court of Navájo County. The appellants now admit that it was error when they failed to separate the two concepts of taxing Peabody’s leasehold interest. in the producing mines and the taxing of Peabody’s improvements and personal property.

To avoid future misinterpretation of our decision, the limited holding in this case as applied to this fact situation only prohibits Navajo County from assessing taxes on Peabody’s leasehold interest in the producing mines that are located on the Navajo and Hopi Indian Reservations. There is nothing in this opinion that should be interpreted to prevent Navajo County from imposing taxes upon the personal property and improvements owned by Peabody that are located upon the Navajo and Hopi Indian Reservations. See Navajo County v. Four Corners Pipeline Co., 106 Ariz. 511, 479 P.2d 174 (1970). Supplemental Opinion 107 Ariz. 296, 486 P.2d 778 (1971); Pima County v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 21 Ariz.App. 406, 520 P.2d 319 (1974); Article XX of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S.

We are aware that there may be some problems in determining the exact tax payable to Navajo County by Peabody Coal Company under the present assessment and tax bill. We regret that we cannot in this case dispose of all future problems by determining the exact sum owed in taxes. This specific matter was never presented to this Court or the Superior Court of Navajo County and we therefore lack both the necessary information and the authority to make such a determination in this case.

The motion for rehearing is denied.

DONOFRIO and STEVENS, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIALS STATEMENTS OF CERAMICS PROCESS SYSTEMS CORPORATION AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10Q FOR PERIOD ENDING
SEPTEMBER-28-1996.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-28-1996
<CASH>                                          51,833
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  320,152
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     29,026
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               417,910
<PP&E>                                       1,065,999
<DEPRECIATION>                                 795,615
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 688,622
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,098,420
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        79,404
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,989,202)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   688,622
<SALES>                                      1,379,317
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,379,317
<CGS>                                        1,333,294
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,672,560
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               148,258
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             177,886
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (441,501)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (441,501)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (441,501)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.06)
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos PLACERES-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50092

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted January 16, 2018 *

Filed January 19, 2018

Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James Fife, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*298MEMORANDUM **

Carlos Placeres-Cruz appeals the 37-month sentence and 3-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Placeres-Cruz first contends that the government breached his plea agreement by failing sufficiently to urge the merits of a four-level fast-track departure at his sentencing hearing. “Courts enforce the literal terms of a plea agreement,” *United States v. Ellis,*641 F.3d 411, 417 (9th Cir. 2011), and here the government complied with the literal terms of the agreement by recommending a four-level fast-track departure and a sentence of 24 months’ custody. Because the government did not agree to urge particular arguments in favor of the departure, its failure to discuss the sparing of prosecutorial resources arising from the plea did not constitute a breach. *See United States v. Benchimol,*471 U.S. 453, 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2103, 85 L.Ed.2d 462 (1985) (per curiam); *United States v. Johnson,*187 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999).

Placeres-Cruz next argues that the district court improperly based its imposition of supervised release on punitive factors. Because Placeres-Cruz did not raise this objection in the district court, we review for plain error. *See United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). Even if the district court plainly erred by considering the need to punish when deciding whether to impose supervised release, *see*18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), Placeres-Cruz has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence absent the error. *See United States v. Dallman,*533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008). Given the court’s expressed concern about Placeres-Cruz’s extensive and recidivist criminal and immigration history, , and the need to deter, we conclude the district court would have imposed supervised release absent any consideration of punishment.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ignacio SANCHEZ, also known as Nacho, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10172 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed February 16, 2018

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ignacio Sanchez, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, JONES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Ignacio Sanchez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Sanchez submitted an untimely response, which we construe as a motion for leave to file an out-of-time response and GRANT.

The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Sanchez’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief, Sanchez’s response, and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

June 9, 2020

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1300 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central UNITED STATES OF AMERICA District of Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee , No. 3:18-cr-30011-SEM-TSH-1

v. Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. SHAWN LEE Defendant-Appellant.

O R D E R

Defendant-Appellant filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on April 1, 2020. No judge in regular active servic e has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc, and all of the judges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing. Judge St. Eve called for an answer regarding the no n-delegation issue and no judge in active service voted to hear the issue en banc.

The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule cotains summary financial information extracted from
consolidated financial statements of Ceramics Process Systems Corporation
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such Form 10-Q for
period ending June 28, 1997.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-27-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-28-1997
<CASH>                                         317,123
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  228,697
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    167,657
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               721,404
<PP&E>                                         390,691
<DEPRECIATION>                                 890,161
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,114,332
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,510,277
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     7,780,766
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,114,332
<SALES>                                        984,810
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               984,810
<CGS>                                          466,435
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  603,084
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              63,907
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                322,898
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            322,898
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   322,898
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.03
        

</TABLE>
IV

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 216

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the use of future budget

surpluses.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 11, 1998

Mr. SHAW (for himself, Mr. LAHOOD, and Mr. BACHUS) introduced the

following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the use of future

budget surpluses.

Whereas it is anticipated that the budget of the United

States Government will be in surplus in fiscal year 1999;

Whereas the Office of Management and Budget has forecasted growing surpluses until fiscal year 2008;

Whereas the budget of the United States Government has not

been in balance since 1969;

Whereas the last time a balanced budget was submitted to

Congress was by President Richard M. Nixon in 1971;

Whereas a unique set of interrelated factors, including a fiscally disciplined Congress, low interest rates, a strong

economy, low unemployment, decreasing welfare dependency, the end of the cold war, the abolition or reduction
2

•HCON 216 IH

of wasteful government programs by Congress, and the

present Administration’s willingness to submit a balanced

budget has contributed to eliminating the budget deficit;

Whereas reversal of any of those factors could mean a return

to budget deficits;

Whereas a budget surplus could allow Congress to better address critical needs in the areas of transportation, education, defense, or health, and to cut taxes;

Whereas Congress has authorized the national debt, by law,

to reach $5,500,000,000,000, which represents a significant financial burden on the people of the United States;

Whereas paying down the national debt would help preserve

social security, keep interest rates low, and reduce the

Government’s annual interest payments, which totaled

$245,000,000,000 in fiscal year 1997; and

Whereas leaving the next generation of Americans a

$5,475,000,000,000 debt is immoral: Now, therefore, be

it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That Congress declares that at least half of

3 any future budget surplus should be used to reduce the

4 national debt.

Æ