J-A28018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

LATEEFAH PERRY

Appellee No. 2443 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order entered July 17, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0001940-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J. FILED APRIL 28, 2020

The Commonwealth appeals from the July 17, 2018 order granting 

judgment of acquittal in favor of Appellee Lateefah Perry on the charge of 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. We vacate the 

July 17, 2018 order and remand for reinstatement of the April 11, 2018 

sentence on this charge.

The record reflects that on the evening of January 23, 2017, Malika 

Adamson (complainant/victim), Appellee (whom Adamson considered her 

“step-sister”), and Appellee’s friend Chantey attended a party at Iddin 

Williams’ house at 4513 North 13th Street in Philadelphia. Dion Kornegay, 

who was Appellee’s boyfriend, and his brother Beano were also at the party. 

During the party, Adamson got into an argument with Beano, and a fight 

____________________________________________

* Former Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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ensued. Kornegay and Appellee broke up the fight. N.T., 12/5/17, at 36, 52-

56. 

Adamson left the house and called the police. Appellee and Chantey 

followed Adamson to try to calm her down, and the three sat in a car outside 

the house. A police officer responded to the call but made no arrests because 

Adamson refused to provide the names of any combatant. Appellee drove 

Adamson home. Id. at 36, 52-56.

Adamson initially did not realize the extent of her injuries, but she woke 

up the next morning to find her left eye swollen nearly shut, her face covered 

in bruises, her lip gashed, and her body sore. She called for an ambulance, 

which transported her to a local hospital, and she received treatment for a 

broken nose. Id. at 56-57, 60-62.

The fight and Adamson’s injuries sparked a series of heated cellphone 

conversations and text messages over the next few days between Adamson, 

Kornegay, Iddin and Appellee. Adamson made clear to Kornegay that she 

wanted to contact the police to get his brother Beano prosecuted for assaulting 

her. Kornegay attempted to talk Adamson out of contacting law enforcement

and attempted to convince her that she should settle her dispute with Beano 

as they would on the streets: by fighting someone they chose for her to fight 

or arranging for someone to fight Beano on her behalf. Adamson refused. 

Adamson was upset with Appellee, whom she felt was taking Kornegay’s side 

rather than hers. Id. at 62-64, 160-61. 
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Throughout the day on January 26, 2017, Kornegay and Adamson 

communicated by phone between five and ten times. Kornegay called the 

victim and told her that he had someone for her to fight. The victim advised 

him that she was not going to fight, and that she was going to get his brother 

locked up. Kornegay told her not to go anywhere and that he was on his way 

to her house. Id. at 63-67, 138, 153.

At approximately 7:15 p.m. on January 26, 2017, Adamson had just 

brought her four- and six-year-old children inside her home at 3027 West 

Gordon Street. She was standing outside talking to Chantey on the phone 

when she looked down her block toward 30th Street and saw Kornegay, Iddin, 

Iddin’s brother Si and an unknown woman walking in her direction. Kornegay 

screamed something, and Adamson turned to run back into her house. 

Kornegay and the others began running and chasing her as she attempted to 

get inside. Before she could close and lock her door, Kornegay and the others 

reached her door and tried to push it open. Adamson’s brother, Rakeem, 

joined Adamson in resisting the intruders. Outnumbered, and with Kornegay’s 

hand extended through the doorway, Adamson was unable to close the door, 

so she struck Kornegay’s hand with a brick lying by the door. Kornegay

retracted his hand, and Adamson and Rakeem closed and locked the door. 

Adamson immediately called the police. Id. at 69-73, 148, 153-54.

Adamson opened the door and saw Kornegay and the others walking 

back toward 30th Street. Adamson saw Appellee near 30th Street in the 
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driver’s seat of Appellee’s car, a black Toyota Corolla. Adamson proceeded 

outside as Iddin, Si, and the unknown woman were entering the passenger 

seats of the car, and she yelled at the group not to leave because she had 

called the police. As Kornegay neared the car, he spun around, brandished a 

pistol from his pocket, and fired several shots toward Adamson. She dove 

behind her steps before crawling inside her front door. When the shooting 

stopped, she peeked out of her front window and saw Appellee’s car driving 

in reverse along Gordon Street toward 29th Street. Id. at 104, 131, 150, 154.

Detective James Dunlap obtained the cellphone records for Appellee’s

mobile phone and analyzed the historical cell site data from the time of the 

incident. During the group attack on the victim, and the minutes immediately 

preceding and following the attack, Appellee’s cellphone was within an 

approximately one-square-mile, circular area that included the crime scene.

This geographical area excluded Appellee’s registered address, Kornegay’s 

registered address, and the address at which Appellee and Kornegay had been 

living at the time of the crime. Detective Dunlap further limited the cellphone’s 

location to the southwest portion of the circular area, which included the crime 

scene, by determining that the phone was transmitting data to the southwest 

panel of the cell tower. Appellee’s registered address and place of residence 

at the time of the crime were northeast of the cell tower, approximately one 

and a half miles east of the crime scene. Id. at 158, 199-200; N.T. 12/6/17, 

at 48-49, 57, 59.
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On December 8, 2017, a jury found Appellee guilty of conspiracy to 

commit aggravated assault. On April 11, 2018, Appellee was sentenced to 

eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration, followed by one 

year of probation, with immediate parole. On April 18, 2018, Appellee filed 

timely post-sentence motions seeking “extraordinary relief,” i.e., judgment of 

acquittal. On July 17, 2018, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion and 

entered judgment of acquittal. The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal to 

this Court, and both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The trial court stated in Rule 1925 opinion:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, the circumstances of this case do not establish that 

[Appellee] conspired to commit an assault on the complainant. 

First, the complainant testified that although she recognized the 

car as belonging to [Appellee], she never saw her that evening. 

The complainant further stated there did not appear to be anyone 

inside of the car. However, even if [Appellee] was present inside 

of her car, the evidence was insufficient to show that she was 

aware of Mr. Kornegay’s criminal intent. See Commonwealth v. 

Swerdlow, 636 A.2d 1173, 1177 (Pa. Super. 1994) (finding that 

mere presence is insufficient to establish a conspiracy “unless the 

[Appellee] had prior knowledge of his alleged co-conspirator’s 

criminal intent”). Second, the Commonwealth presented no 

evidence that [Appellee] knew Mr. Kornegay was in possession of 

a weapon, let alone that he would use it to assault the 

complainant. After Mr. Kornegay and the three other individuals 

were walking away from the complainant’s home and in the 

direction of the car, the complainant walked into the middle of the 

street and yelled after them. It was at this moment that Mr. 

Kornegay turned around and spontaneously began shooting at the 

complainant. Third, the surrounding circumstances leading up to 

the incident on January 26th do not lend support to the 

Commonwealth’s argument that [Appellee] shared a criminal 

intent to assault the complainant. On January 24th, following the 
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complainant’s physical altercation with Mr. Kornegay’s brother, it 

was [Appellee] who tried to calm her God-sister down and then 

drove her home. That [Appellee] and Mr. Kornegay were in a 

relationship at the time is similarly insufficient by itself to establish 

that an agreement was formed. See Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 410 (Pa. 2018) (“No level of intimacy 

or history between actors can replace the elements of the 

offense.”). The circumstantial evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth did not suffice to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellee] conspired to commit an assault against the 

complainant.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 5-6. 

The Commonwealth raises a single issue in this appeal:

Was the lower court’s order granting [Appellee]’s post-sentence

motion for a judgment of acquittal for conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault erroneous, where the evidence showed that 

[Appellee] drove four people to and from the home of the alreadyinjured victim where they attempted to assault her as a group, 

even before one of the conspirators pulled out and fired a gun?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

A post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal “challenge[s] the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction” for the offense charged. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(6). When reviewing a sufficiency challenge,

an appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and all 

reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are 

sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It [is] incumbent upon the Superior Court to 

consider all of the evidence introduced at the time of trial, and 

apparently believed by the fact finder, including the expert’s 

testimony. In applying this standard, [the reviewing court must] 

bear in mind that: the Commonwealth may sustain its burden by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence; the entire trial record 

should be evaluated and all evidence received considered,

whether or not the trial court’s ruling thereon were correct; and 

the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 
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and the weight of the proof, is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Pa. 2007). “Because 

evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 

119, 126 (Pa. 2013).

A person commits criminal conspiracy if (1) she intends “to commit or 

aid in the commission” of a crime; (2) she enters “into an agreement with 

another [a ‘co-conspirator’] to engage in the crime;” and (3) she “or one or 

more of the other co-conspirators” commits an overt act in furtherance of their 

agreement. Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 969 (Pa. 2019). Because 

direct evidence of criminal intent and conspiratorial agreement is rarely 

available, these elements are generally proven through circumstantial 

evidence, such as “the relations, conduct[,] or circumstances of the parties,

or overt acts on the part of co-conspirators.” Id. Among the circumstances 

that are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt 

confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) 

knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the 

crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy. 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 97 (Pa. Super. 2019). “While such 

circumstances are insufficient standing alone, they may furnish a web of 

evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable 

doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which 
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they occurred.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 416 A.2d 523, 524 (Pa. Super. 

1979) (internal quotations omitted). 

“Other circumstances which are relevant include post-crime conduct, 

such as flight, because it tends to establish consciousness of guilt. When 

combined with other direct or circumstantial evidence, that conduct may 

provide sufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy.” Jordan, 212 A.3d at 

97. Cases examining conspiracies in situations involving getaway drivers

often emphasize post-crime conduct as illustrative of intent. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, [], 505 A.2d 295, 297 ([Pa. Super.] 

1986) (“A jury could find that appellant’s presence outside the 

Johnson home, where he had no cause to be, sitting behind the 

wheel of a car, which he then used to transport the stolen Johnson 

television set and the thief away from the scene of the crime, was 

not merely fortuitous.”); Commonwealth v. Azim, [] 459 A.2d 

1244 ([Pa. Super.] 1983) (per curiam) (“Conspiracy to commit 

burglary has been found where the defendant drove codefendants 

to the scene of a crime and then later picked them up.”) (citation

omitted); Commonwealth v. Esposito, [] 344 A.2d 655, 656 

([Pa. Super.] 1975) (“She was the driver and custodian of the 

getaway car, on whose person the police found some remnants of 

the day’s booty. While it is true that there was no direct evidence 

of an unlawful agreement, such an agreement can readily be 

inferred from appellant’s conduct.”).

Id. at 98.

Notably, “individuals can conspire to commit a crime—to rob a bank for 

instance—but abandon the cause or be thwarted prior to completion and still 

be guilty of conspiracy. All that is required for a conspiracy is an agreement 

to commit a crime and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement or plan.” 

Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A.2d 310, 316 (Pa. Super. 1999).
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Appellee was charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. A 

person commits aggravated assault if she “attempts to cause serious bodily 

injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 

life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Since commission of the underlying crime 

is not an element of criminal conspiracy, a conspirator may be convicted of 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault even if the conspirators are 

unsuccessful in committing the assault. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 

A.3d 939, 944 (Pa. Super. 2013). Similarly, “the crime ultimately 

accomplished does not retroactively limit the scope of the original conspiracy.”

Id. Whether the victim “actually suffered serious bodily harm is [therefore] 

irrelevant” where the conspirators intended to inflict such an injury. 

Commonwealth v. Caterino, 678 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 1996).

The Commonwealth argues that Appellee conspired with Kornegay, 

Iddin, Si, and an unidentified female to assault Adamson physically for 

threatening to report Beano to the police.1 Appellee participated in this 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth continues, by agreeing to drive the others to 

and from Adamson’s house. The record supports this argument. 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth all but admits that Appellee did not conspire with 

Kornegay to shoot at Adamson. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10, 21 (Kornegay’s 

decision to shoot at Adamson was “conceivably spontaneous”). 
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Multiple pieces of evidence, viewed collectively, establish Appellee’s 

intent to participate in, and agreement to enter, the conspiracy to assault 

Appellee physically: (1) Appellee’s relationship as Kornegay’s girlfriend, (2) 

Appellee’s knowledge that Kornegay’s brother, Beano, had injured Adamson 

in a fight on January 23, 2017, (3) Appellee’s knowledge that Kornegay was 

attempting to convince Adamson not to call the police and to settle her dispute 

with Beano through other means, such as a fight with another person, (4) 

Appellee’s support for Kornegay’s proposal, (5) the fact that Appellee drove

Kornegay, Iddin, Si, and an unidentified female to Adamson’s house on 

January 26, 2017 and waited for them in her car, (6) the four individuals’

attempt to break into Adamson’s house forcibly, (7) the individuals’ retreat to 

Appellee’s car after Adamson and her brother fought them off, (8) Adamson’s 

demand during their retreat that they wait for the police, and (9) Appellee’s 

flight from the scene in her car with the other individuals. While each fact is 

insufficient standing alone, the body of circumstantial facts, “viewed in 

conjunction . . . and in the context in which they occurred,” Carter, 416 A.2d 

at 524, links Appellee to the conspiracy by proving her association with other 

conspirators, her knowledge of their plan to assault Adamson, her presence 

at the scene of the crime, and her flight from the scene. In addition, Appellee 

committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy by driving her cohorts 

to Adamson’s house and fleeing with them from the scene. The other four 

individuals committed overt acts by attempting to break into Adamson’s house 
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forcibly. The fact that the plan to attack Adamson failed does not absolve 

Appellee from conspiring to harm Adamson. Vining, 744 A.2d at 316. For 

these reasons, the Commonwealth proved each element of the crime of 

conspiracy.

The trial court failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, as the law required it to do. According to the trial 

court, Adamson testified that she never saw Appellee on the evening in 

question, and nobody appeared to be inside the car. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The 

Commonwealth, however, introduced Adamson’s signed statement to 

detectives that evening in which she identified Appellee as the getaway driver

in a car that Appellee owned. Moreover, Appellee’s cellphone data showed 

that she was within one square mile of the crime scene and outside the area 

encompassing her registered address, Kornegay’s registered address, and the 

address at which Appellee and Kornegay had been living at the time of the 

crime. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence 

demonstrates that Adamson saw Appellee in her car. 

The trial court also contends there was no evidence that Appellee knew 

Kornegay possessed a weapon or intended to use it against Adamson. The 

court misperceives the nature of the conspiracy. As discussed above, the 

Commonwealth virtually concedes that Appellee did not conspire to shoot 

Adamson. Conversely, the evidence demonstrates that Appellee conspired to 

attack Adamson physically. The lack of a conspiracy to shoot Adamson does 
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not negate Appellee’s culpability for participating in the conspiracy to attack 

Adamson physically.

Next, the trial court maintains that the “surrounding circumstances” do 

not establish Appellee’s intent to enter a conspiracy, because (1) “on January 

24th, following the complainant’s physical altercation with [] Kornegay’s 

brother, it was [Appellee] who tried to calm her God-sister down and then 

drove her home,” and (2) “[the fact] that [Appellee] and [] Kornegay were in 

a relationship at the time is similarly insufficient by itself to establish that an 

agreement was formed.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The court erred by viewing these 

strands of evidence in isolation instead of viewing the entire body of evidence 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Although Appellee helped 

calm Adamson down and drove her home, other evidence demonstrates that 

she later joined the conspiracy, such as her support for Kornegay’s position 

concerning Beano and the fact that she drove the four other individuals to 

Adamson’s house and served as the getaway driver from the scene. Jordan, 

212 A.3d at 98. This conduct, in conjunction with the fact that Appellee was 

Kornegay’s girlfriend, furnished sufficient proof of her participation in the 

conspiracy. 

For these reasons, the trial court erred by granting Appellee’s postsentence motion for judgment of acquittal. We therefore vacate the order 

granting judgment of acquittal and remand for reinstatement of Appellee’s 

judgment of sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.
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Order vacated. Case remanded for reinstatement of guilty judgment 

and sentence. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/28/2020