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[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 341 Introduced in House (IH)]

  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 341

 Expressing the sense of the Congress that the commitment made by the 
 United States, in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to arrange 
 financing and construction of 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, and 
  to provide fuel oil and other assistance to North Korea, should be 
  suspended until North Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat to the 
       peace and security of Northeast Asia or the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 8, 1998

  Mr. DeLay (for himself, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Hefley, Mr. Weldon of 
 Pennsylvania, Mr. Forbes, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Aderholt, Mr. Gibbons, Mr. 
Talent, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Watts of Oklahoma, Mr. Miller of Florida, Mr. 
   Hayworth, and Mr. Knollenberg) submitted the following concurrent 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
 Expressing the sense of the Congress that the commitment made by the 
 United States, in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to arrange 
 financing and construction of 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, and 
  to provide fuel oil and other assistance to North Korea, should be 
  suspended until North Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat to the 
       peace and security of Northeast Asia or the United States.

Whereas North Korea refuses to carry out its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty and other nuclear accords to which it is a 
        signatory, including by refusing to allow the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency to inspect 2 suspected nuclear waste sites at the Yongbyon 
        nuclear complex and interfering with the inspections the agency 
        conducted at North Korea's plutonium reprocessing plant and other sites;
Whereas the United States entered an Agreed Framework with North Korea on 
        October 21, 1994, to build 2 light water nuclear reactors for North 
        Korea at a cost of between $4,000,000,000 and $6,000,000,000, and to 
        provide to North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until 
        construction of the first reactor is complete, and in exchange North 
        Korea agreed to cease operating its graphite moderated reactors, 
        plutonium reprocessing facilities, and other related facilities out of 
        international concern that plutonium produced by them might be diverted 
        to nuclear weapons production;
Whereas the agreement delays inspection of suspected nuclear waste sites until 
        the near completion of the 2 new reactors, and effectively condones 
        North Korea's original refusal to permit the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency to inspect the nuclear waste sites, which precipitated the crisis 
        that led to the agreement;
Whereas this multiyear delay in inspecting the suspected nuclear waste sites 
        precludes any determination of the amount of reprocessed plutonium North 
        Korea may already have available for possible nuclear weapons 
        production;
Whereas former United States Ambassador-at-Large Robert Gallucci has stated that 
        primitive graphite nuclear plants being built by North Korea would be 
        capable of producing enough spent fuel to produce nearly 30 nuclear 
        weapons per year, and along with outside experts has acknowledged the 
        ``technical possibility'' that fuel from the new light water reactors 
        built with help from the United States could produce enough plutonium to 
        make up to 70 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas North Korea has refused, and continues to refuse, the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency permission to inspect and inventory the spent fuel 
        rods from North Korea's existing nuclear reactors prior to their 
        encasement in order to determine whether any plutonium has been 
        extracted from them, even though the United States has provided over 
        $20,000,000 to pay for the cost of encasing the rods;
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency has indicated that the United 
        States gave no support to the Agency's attempts to persuade North Korea 
        to allow inspection of the fuel rods;
Whereas in May 1998, North Korea announced that it was unsealing its nuclear 
        reactors and might restart them, and was ceasing further encasement of 
        nuclear fuel rods;
Whereas in July 1998, North Korea sent ``maintenance teams'' back into the 
        weapons-grade plutonium reprocessing plant;
Whereas the former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
        Hans Blix, North Korean defectors, and the United States Defense 
        Intelligence Agency have all reported that North Korea has 15,000 
        workers constructing a nuclear weapons program underground, including a 
        plutonium production plant for making weapons-grade plutonium;
Whereas the State Department warned North Korea during talks in New York on 
        August 25, 1998, that the building of a secret underground nuclear 
        facility that would permit North Korea to restart its nuclear program 
        was unacceptable;
Whereas the United States expression of displeasure with North Korea's secret 
        underground activities was undermined by the State Department's 
        subsequent request to Congress on September 23, 1998, for permission to 
        reprogram $27,000,000 in additional fiscal year 1998 funds to provide 
        assistance to North Korea pursuant to the Agreed Framework and by the 
        Department's decision in early September 1998 to provide an additional 
        300,000 tons of food aid;
Whereas State Department officials claim that the heavy fuel oil being provided 
        has no direct military benefit to North Korea, while other observers 
        have noted that the deliveries permit North Korea to use its own funds 
        to pay for larger quantities of lighter grade oil that can be used for 
        other purposes, including military transport;
Whereas the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil being delivered each year exceeds the 
        capacity of North Korea's only oil-fired electrical plant, and United 
        States officials have acknowledged that North Korea diverted some of the 
        fuel oil to steel production and other industrial uses;
Whereas North Korea additionally has demanded that the United States immediately 
        lift decades-old economic sanctions, finance the $750,000,000 cost of 
        modernizing its electric power grid, and pay for other auxiliary 
        facilities;
Whereas during June and July 1998, Secretary of Defense Cohen and other United 
        States military officials disclosed that North Korea had succeeded in 
        developing a missile with a 600-mile range capable of reaching South 
        Korea and part of Japan, and was developing 2 longer-range missiles that 
        could reach all of Japan, Okinawa, and possibly Alaska and Hawaii;
Whereas on August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that 
        crossed over Japanese territory, parts of which traveled almost 4,000 
        miles to land off the coast of Alaska, in an apparent attempt to launch 
        a satellite; and
Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency's senior intelligence officer for 
        strategic programs has publicly stated that the 3-stage configuration 
        used in the missile launch on August 31, 1998, could enable North Korea 
        to send warheads across the Pacific: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the commitment made by the United States, in 
        conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to help finance and 
        build 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, to provide fuel oil 
        and other assistance to North Korea, and to begin lifting the 
        decades-old economic embargo on North Korea, should be 
        suspended until the President certifies that North Korea has 
        agreed to--
                    (A) cease further development of its ballistic 
                missile program;
                    (B) cease all aspects of its nuclear weapons 
                development program;
                    (C) cease all construction and activity on all 
                nuclear facilities other than the light water nuclear 
                reactors permitted by the Agreed Framework entered into 
                on October 21, 1994;
                    (D) allow international inspectors complete access 
                to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, all plutonium 
                reprocessing facilities, and other suspected nuclear 
                weapons sites consistent with North Korea's commitments 
                under the Agreed Framework and other international 
                treaties to which North Korea is a signatory;
                    (E) eliminate its existing stockpile of weapons-
                grade plutonium and allow verification of such 
                elimination; and
                    (F) stop diverting food, fuel oil, and other 
                international humanitarian assistance to its military 
                personnel and infrastructure; and
                    (G) sign an agreement formally ending the war with 
                South Korea; and
            (2) the President should at no time, with respect to North 
        Korea, waive section 123(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
        1954, which requires the maintaining of International Atomic 
        Energy Agency safeguards as a precondition for the transfer of 
        nuclear technology.
                                 <all>
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