[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15276

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-24384-CMA

LORI RAPPAPORT LACROIX, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

COURTNEY LACROIX, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 versus

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTHERN INDIANA, 

GREEN MOUNTAIN FINANCIAL FUND, LLC, 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

TOWN OF CLARKSVILLE, IN, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(September 28, 2015)

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Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff Lori Rappaport LaCroix pro se appeals the district court’s sua 

sponte dismissal of her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After review, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. The Complaint

On November 18, 2014, Plaintiff LaCroix filed a pro se complaint against 

two federal district courts, the Green Mountain Financial Fund, LLC, Morgan 

Stanley, the State of Indiana, the State of New York, the town of Clarksville, 

Indiana, several law firms, and many other individuals, including several attorneys 

and judges, alleging 69 causes of action related, in some way, to the 1998 death of

her father, Alfred Rappaport. The complaint identifies a wide array of events and 

legal proceedings that occurred over multiple decades, all of which allegedly 

constitute various violations of state and federal law. The complaint was 189 

pages long and had 179 pages of attached exhibits. Plaintiff LaCroix filed with her 

complaint a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

B. Dismissal of the Complaint

On November 19, 2014, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other reasons, the district court dismissed 

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the complaint for failing to comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the district court stated that the complaint 

was “in no sense the short and plain statement of the claim required by Rule 8.” 

Moreover, the complaint was a “shotgun pleading” that “completely disregard[ed] 

Rule 10(b)’s requirement that discrete claims should be plead in separate counts.” 

Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint, denied Plaintiff LaCroix’s 

in forma pauperis motion as moot, and directed the clerk to close the case. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state 

a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th 

Cir. 2003). We may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record. Long v. 

Comm’r of IRS, 772 F.3d 670, 675 (11th Cir. 2014). 

B. Rule 8 and Rule 10

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint 

“must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2)’s purpose is to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) 

(quotation marks and alterations omitted). Therefore, “a complaint’s factual 

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allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(quotation marks and alterations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. 

Ct. 1955.

Further, the allegations in the complaint “must be simple, concise, and 

direct,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the complaint must “state its claims . . . in 

numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 

circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). A “shotgun pleading”—one in which “it is 

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support 

which claim(s) for relief”—does not comply with the standards of Rules 8(a) and 

10(b). Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Ctr. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366

(11th Cir. 1996); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2001). This Court has repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings. See PVC 

Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 

2010); Davis, 516 F.3d at 979.

Additionally, although “pro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard 

than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally,” Alba v. 

Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008), this liberal construction “does not

give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an 

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otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action,” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty.

of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), overruled on 

other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937. Even a pro se litigant is 

required to comply with the rules of procedure. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 

106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993).

Here, the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failing to 

comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff LaCroix’s complaint is 189 pages long, contains 763 numbered 

paragraphs, and was filed with a 179-page appendix. Nothing about this is “short 

and plain.” Moreover, the complaint’s 763 numbered paragraphs consist of 

factual allegations that are not specifically tied to any of the 69 enumerated causes 

of action. Indeed, the 69 causes of action are alleged against the defendants

collectively, making it impossible to identify which particular defendant engaged 

in what allegedly wrongful conduct. In other words, Plaintiff LaCroix’s complaint

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is a classic shotgun pleading. See Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366. As such, it does not 

comply with Rule 8(a), 8(d), or 10(b), and the district court properly dismissed it. 1

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing 

Plaintiff LaCroix’s complaint.

AFFIRMED. 

 

1 While a pro se plaintiff must generally “be given at least one chance to amend the 

complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice,” the district court need 

not allow amendment where a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim and is, 

therefore, futile. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) overruled in part by Wagner 

v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Given the 

aforementioned nature of Plaintiff LaCroix’s complaint, we conclude that amendment would be 

futile and, therefore, the district court committed no error by dismissing the complaint without 

providing leave to amend. In any event, on appeal Plaintiff LaCroix does not argue that she 

should have been allowed to amend in the district court before dismissal of this particular 

complaint.

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