### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 18-2431
D OUGLAS H OLLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

S OO L INE RAILROAD C OMPANY, d/b/a Canadian Pacific, Defendant-Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:16-cv-09191 — Jorge L. Alonso , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 8, 2019

— D ECIDED F EBRUARY 20, 2019

____________________

Before F LAUM, B ARRETT, and S CUDDER , Circuit Judges

. S CUDDER , Circuit Judge . Douglas Holloway’s year-and-ahalf long employment with Canadian Paci fi c ended after he received multiple suspensions for violating safety standards and other work rules. The fi nal chapter came when Holloway sustained an injury in a vehi cle collision while not wearing a seatbelt. When combined withHolloway’s prior record of infractions, this new safety-stan dard violation was enough for2 No. 18-2431

the company to terminate Holloway. In his ensuing lawsuit, Holloway alleged he was fi red not for violating Canadian Paci fi c’s rules, but instead for re porting a workplace injury. We agree with the district court that the record evidence does not support his contention and therefore a ffi rm. I
Canadian Paci fi c hired Douglas Holloway as a conductor in July 2014. In short order he found himself the subject of several disciplinary actions. In November 2014, for example, Canadian Paci fi c advised Holloway that his a tt endance record was lacking and that he needed to be available to work when the company needed him. By way of another example, Holloway received a 10-day suspension in May 2015 for not providing his engineer with important safety information while working on a railcar. In time a pa tt ern emerged, as Holloway received suspensions for violating Canadian Paci fi c’s safety and work rules again in August 2015 and September 2015.
The fi nal straw came on October 18, 2015. It was then that Holloway and another employee, J.S., were doing a “switch job”—railroad lingo for moving ra ilcars as part of building a train. The work required J.S. and Holloway to use an all-purpose vehicle to move around Canadian Paci fi c’s Bensenville Yard. J.S. drove while Holloway rode in the passenger seat, but neither fastened a seatbelt. Holloway also never inspected the vehicle for safety defects, later saying he assumed J.S. had done so. A subsequent inspection revealed that the vehicle needed repairs—for example, zip ties were being used to hold a makeshift windshield covered wi th dirt and scratches to the vehicle’s frame.No. 18-2431 3

At one point during the assembly work, J.S. crashed the vehicle into a pole. Both J.S. and Holloway sustained injuriesthat required medical care at a hospital. The particular treatment Holloway received triggered an obligation under the Federal Railway Act for Canadian Paci fi c to report his injuryto the Federal Railroad Administration. J.S.’s injury was minor and did not require such reporting. After the accident, Canadian Paci fi c noti fi ed J.S. and Holloway that a formal investigation and hearing would follow. In the months leading to the hearing, however, J.S. was furloughed and therefore did not a tt end. Holloway

a tt ended the hearing along with a representative from the United Transportation Union. The hearing o ffi cer determined that Holloway had violated Canadian Paci fi c’s seatbelt requirement and a separate rule requiring him to inspect for and report safety defects with the company’s vehicles. The hearing o ffi cer’s fi nal report canvassed Holloway’s lengthy discipline history and led to a recommendation of termination. Canadian Paci fi c accepted the recommendation and fi red Holloway in December 2015. At no point did the company discipline J.S. for her role in the accident. Holloway unsuccessfully appealed his dismissal through the procedures in the colle ctive bargaining agreement between his union and Canadian Paci fi c. After receiving permission to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he brought several claims against Canadian Paci fi c in district court. The district court denied Holloway relief on each of his claims. Now on appeal, he challe nges only the district court’s award of summary judgment to Canadian Paci fi c on his claim4 No. 18-2431

for unlawful retaliation in violation of the Federal Railway Safety Act.
II
We review the district court’ s grant of summary judgment in favor of Canadian Paci fi c de novo . See Rahn v. Board of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ. , 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 2015). The Federal Railway Safety Act prohibits a railroad from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee “if such discrimination is due, in whole or in part, to the employee’s lawful, good faith act done ... to notify, or a tt empt to notify, the railroad carrier or the Secretary of Transportation of a work-relat ed personal injury or workrelated illness of an employee.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(4). To prevail on such a claim, Ho lloway needed to show, among other things, that his reporting of his workplace injury from the October 2015 incident contributed to Canadian Paci fi c’s decision to fi re him. See Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 880 F.3d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A) and 29 C.F.R. § 1982.104(e)(2)); see also Araujo v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. , 708 F.3d 152, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the same statutory standards). Holloway argues, as he did in the district court, that “[i]t is obvious that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action.” He sees the point as obvious because he was fi red only after he came forward and reported his workplace injury. Holloway also contends that Canadian Paci fi c’s decision not to fi re J.S. for her involvement in the accident supports his allegation of retaliation. These contentions fall short on the law and the facts.No. 18-2431 5

Our caselaw is clear that a plainti ff alleging retaliation in violation of § 20109(a)(4) cannot point only to the sequence of events—an injury report followed by a later dismissal—to show that the complaint was a co ntributing factor in the adverse employment action. See Koziara v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 840 F.3d 873, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the district court’s conclusion that the plainti ff’s injury report was a contributing factor to the adverse action si mply because it “initiated the events that led to his discipline”); see also Armstrong, 880 F.3d at 382 (explaining that the phras e “contributing factor” is a standard of causation that does not eliminate the requirement for a plainti ff to present evidence of an improper motive). Something more than the mere sequence of events is required, and Holloway has failed to provide that somethingmore. At summary judgment he came forward with no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that his termination re fl ected Canadian Paci fi c’s retaliation for reporting his injury. He pointed to nothing showing thatanyone within the company faulted or was frustrated withhim for reporting the October 2015 accident. Nor did he identify any evidence suggesting animus toward him—for example, that his supervisor had been looking for a reason to fi re him and used his report of the accident as the reason to let him go. The record evidence is altogether di fferent. What it shows is that, in fewer than two years with Canadian Paci fi c, Holloway repeatedly violated the company’s work and safety rules and was eventually fi red for accumulating so many violations. That he happened duri ng the same time period to be involved in a workplace accident and to have reported an injury does not—without more—create an inference that6 No. 18-2431

reporting his injury contributed to Canadian Paci fi c’s decision to terminate him. Holloway is right to observe that J.S. was not disciplined for the October 2015 accident. But the observation does not go very far, as J.S.’s disciplinary history paled in comparison toHolloway’s record. J.S. had received a reprimand and counseling on one prior occasion but otherwise had a clean record with Canadian Paci fi c. Nothing in the Federal Railway Safety Act precluded the company from taking stock of Holloway’s employment history, beset as it was with disciplinary problems, and proceeding to dismiss him. Holloway’s comparison of his circumstances to those of J.S. mis fi res on another front. He altogether overlooks that he and J.S. engaged in the same protected activity—reporting an injury to Canadian Paci fi c. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(4). But even though J.S. engaged in th e same protected activity, shewas not disciplined. So Holloway’s comparison of the treatment he and J.S. received from Canadian Paci fi c only reinforces that the company did not retaliate against him for his engaging in protected activity, but rather fi red him because of his long record of disciplinary problems.
We owe a fi nal word to Holloway’s assertion that the district court impermissibly weighed evidence and made credibility determinations when g ranting summary judgment to Canadian Paci fi c. We have reviewed the record and fi nd no support for this contention. The district court provided a thorough and detailed recounting of the evidence brought forthby both parties and in no way strayed from the standards governing summary judgment. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.