COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-18-00143-CR

KEVIN L. JONES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1531264D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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After pleading guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant Kevin L. Jones 

attempts to appeal his conviction for possessing less than one gram of 

methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Jones in accordance with the

parties’ agreement and certified that Jones has no right to appeal. See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02 (West 2018); Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

After the plea hearing, Jones timely filed on March 27, 2018, a pro se 

notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(c), 26.2(a)(1). On April 12, 2018, we 

notified Jones that the trial court had certified that he had no right to appeal and 

that we would dismiss his appeal unless on or before April 23, 2018, he or any 

party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for 

continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. After the letter we sent 

Jones was returned because he was no longer in the Tarrant County Jail, we 

sent the same notice to his penitentiary address on May 3, 2018, and reset the 

deadline to file a response to May 14, 2018.

On May 14, 2018, Jones filed a pro se response, but two days later, he

filed a pro se motion requesting, among other relief, to extend the time to file a 

response. On May 30, 2018, we granted Jones’s motion to the extent it sought 

additional time to file a response and extended the time to June 14, 2018, but we 

denied all other requested relief. On May 31, 2018, Jones filed another response

that elaborated on his earlier one.

The record does not show that the punishment the trial court assessed 

exceeded the prosecutor’s recommended—and Jones’s agreed-to—punishment; 

additionally, the record and Jones’s responses do not show that Jones wants to 

appeal a matter that he raised by written motion that he filed and the trial court

ruled on before trial or that the trial court granted Jones permission to appeal. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Thus, in accordance with the trial court’s 
3

certification, we dismiss the appeal.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); 

Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680. Along with the appeal, we dismiss all pending 

motions as well.

3

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

ELIZABETH KERR

JUSTICE

PANEL: KERR, PITTMAN, and BIRDWELL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 2, 2018

 2We have no authority to do anything but dismiss. See Chavez v. State, 

183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Jones might, though, have other 

avenues of relief. See Greenberg v. State, No. 02-17-00297-CR, 2018 WL 

2142770, at *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 10, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication); see also Tex. R. App. P. 23.2; In re Gomez, 268 

S.W.3d 262, 264 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (“[T]he high court has 

emphasized that nunc pro tunc is the only means by which a defendant can 

obtain relief from the omission of back-time credit from a judgment, at least until 

the defendant is confined beyond his correct maximum discharge date.”).

3On June 13, 2018, Jones filed a motion to extend time to file a response 

to a nonexistent Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 

S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967).