All defe ndants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) and D OJ , Gonzales and 1 El sto n h ave mov e d to dis mis s p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) . D e fe nd ant G on zal e s a lso ha s mo ve d to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 5) for insufficient ser

vice of proce ss. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA
SEAN M. G ERLICH, et al., P lai nt iffs, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -1 13 4 ( JD B) UNITED STAT ES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., De fend ant s.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiffs are e ight unsuc cessf ul applicants for

employ ment with the United States Depa rtment of Just ice ( "D OJ ") who asser t claims arisingfrom the we ll-publiciz ed misconduct of
se nio r D OJ of

fi c ia ls who a lle g e dly

dis c ri min ate d a g a ins t c e rt a in a pp lic ants ba se d u

po n th e ir po lit ic a l a ff

ili atio ns . Pl a int if

fs a sse rt c la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ant D OJ f or mon e tary and e qu ita ble relief under the Privacy

Act, the Civil Service Ref orm Act (" CSRA" ), the F eder al Recor ds Act (" F RA " ) a

nd the Un ite d St ate s Co ns tit uti on . Pl a int if

fs ha ve a lso su e d f

or me r D OJ of

fi c ia ls Alberto Gonzales, Monica Goodling, Mic hael Elston, and Esther McDona ld, and cur

rent DO J officia l L ouis DeF alaise ( collectively , the " individual defenda nts"), pe rsonally

for money damag es base d on claims broug ht directly under the First and F ifth Amendments to the Constit ution. Now pendingbefor e the Court ar e motions to dism iss filed by DOJ and eac h of the individual defenda

nts pursuant to Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (1) a nd 12(b)( 6). 1 Fr om the inception of this case , plaintiffs have emphasized, repe atedly , the extraordinar y-2-

circ umstances that unde rlie it. To be ce rtain, the Court agree s that misconduct by senior g overnme nt officials -- espec ially when it implicates the F irst Amendment -- is grave ly serious
and mus t no t be c on do ne d. B ut d e fe nd ants have ra ise d s e ve ra l thre sh old iss ue s th at po te nti a lly preve nt this C ourt from c onsideringthe merits of plaintiffs' case . Indeed, f or the re asons explained below, the Court will not reac h the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional claims ag ainst the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants be c a us e it c on c lud e s th at, u

nd e r c ontr oll ingSup re me Court and D. C. Circuit prec edent, the CSRA is a compre hensive, re medial statutory scheme that prec ludes the
re c ognit ion

of an im pli e d d ama g e s r e me dy

a g a ins t th e ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants . T he Court a lso conclude s that plaintiffs' claims for e quitable re lief suffe r fr om fatal plea ding de ficienc ies. L ikewise, most of plaintiffs' Privacy Act cla ims are insuff

iciently pled and must be dismissed. Plaintiffs J ames Saul, Matthew F aiella a nd Daniel He rber

have, how ever , satisfied their plea ding b ur d e nw i thr e s p e c tt o D O J ' s a l l e g e d m a i n t e n an c e o f

F i r s tA m e n dm e n t - r e l at e d r e c o r d s ( C o un tI) and irre levant re cords ( Count I I ) in violation of the Privacy Act, and those plaintiffs will be
a llo we d to pr oc e e d w iththo se c la ims . H ow e ve r, the oth e r p la int if fs la c k s tand ingto p ur su e tho se claims and they

will be dismiss ed fr om the case
.The fa cts set forth in this section ar e take n primarily from plaintiffs' second a

mended 2 complaint (" Sec Am. Compl."). T he sec ond amende d complaint incorpora tes two repor

ts issued jointly by DOJ's Off

ice of the Inspector G ener al (" OI G" ) and O ffice of Profe ssional Responsibili ty

(" OPR"), whic h are entitled "An Investig ation of Alleg ations of Politi cized Hiring in the Depa

rtment of Just ice Honor s Progr am and Summer L aw Intern Prog ram" (June 24, 2008) (" First OI G/OPR Report") a nd "An Investig ation of Politi cized Hiringby Monica Goodlingand Other Staff

in the Offic e of the Attorney Gene ral" (Jul y

28, 2008) (" Second OI G/OPR Report"). B e c a us e the se c on d ame nd e d c omp la int inc or po ra te s th e se tw o r e po rt s, the Court wi ll a lso consider the m in resolving the instant moti ons. See EEOC v. St. Fra ncis Xavie r Paroc hial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 ( D.C. Cir. 1997). -3- BACK GR OUND 2 I. Allegations of

Misconduct in the Hon ors P rogramand S um m er Law Intern P rogram Hir ing P r oc e ss The Attorne y

Gene ral' s Honors Prog ram (" Honors Prog ram" ) is the exclusive means by which DOJ hires rec ent law sc hool gr aduate s and judicial law c lerks who have no prior le g al experience . First OI G/OPR Report at 3. Historically , the Honors Program ha s been ve ry competitive and the numbe r of a pplications rec eived in a ty pical year far surpasses the number of positions t hat ar e ava ilable. I d. Severa l of DOJ's compone nt divisi ons participate in the Honors Prog ram hiringproce ss, which is overse en by DOJ's Off

ice of Attorney Recruitment and Manag ement (" OARM") . I d. Although O ARM proce sses all applications, each c omponent hires its own Honors Prog ram attorney s. I d. A similar hiringproce ss also exi sts for paid summer interns in DOJ's Summer L aw Intern Prog ram (" SL I P"). I d. at 3-4. In 2 00 2, the Ho no rs Pr og ra m and SL I P hi ri ngpr oc e ss w a s r e vampe d in re sp on se to
rec ommendations from a group of se nior offic ials within the Attorney Gene ral' s office (" Working Gr ou p" ). Se e id. at 4. Th e se c ha ng e s, wh ic h r e ma ine d in

e ff e c t until 20 06 , w e re de signe d to stimul ate incr ease d applications, to maintain the pre stige of the Honor s Progr am and to help DO J compete w ith law firms for the best ca ndidates. See id. at 4-5. In order to allow more DO J-4-

attorney s to participate, pa rticularly political appointees in lea dership positions, the hiring proce ss beca

me more c entra liz ed in Washington, D.C. See id. at 4. To that end, a Scr eening Commi ttee, compose d of seve ral membe rs of the WorkingGroup, wa s also cre ated to re view and approve the ca

ndidates who we re se lected f or interview s by

the components. I d. at 5. The composition of the Scree ning Committee cha ng ed fr om y ear

to y ear , and the c omponents were g ener ally unawa re who serve d on the Commit tee or what cr iteria it applied in re viewing
c and idate s. I d. Mo re ov e r, the Sc re e nin gCommitte e g ave no re a so ns or e xplanatio ns fo r i ts decision to desele ct a c andidate f rom the list of those to be interview ed. I d. Throug h 2005, OARM rec eived ve ry fewcomplaints about the newhiringproce ss or the decisions of the Scr eeningCommi ttee. I d. Howeve r, in 2006 OARM rec eived a number of complaints reg ardingthe abnor mal leng th of time taken for Scree ning Committee re view and the unusually larg e number

of see mingly

qualified Honor s Progr am and SL I P candidates that were de se le c te d f

or int e rv ie ws . I d. As a

re su lt o f t

he c omp la int s, DO J cha

ng e d th e hir ingpr oc e ss
on c e a g a in i n 2 00 7, tr ans fe rr ingc ontr ol o f t he Sc re e nin gCommitte e fr om p oli tic a l a pp ointe e s to
car eer employ ees. I d. Then, in April 2007, an a nony mous letter was se nt to the Chairmen of the House a nd Senate Judiciary

Commi ttees fr om "A G roup of Conce rned D epar tment of J ustice Employ ees." I d. at 66. That letter claimed that a

number of highly

qualified c andidates, who had been se lected f

or interview s by

car eer employ ees w ithin the indivi dual DOJ components, had been subse quently

reje cted by

the Scre eningCommi ttee on the ba sis of their Democ ratic Par ty or liberal a ffiliations. I d. at 1 n.1. The O I G and the O PR, which were alre ady investigating issues
re late d to the re mov a l of

c e rt a in Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y s, de c ide d to e xpand the sc op e of

the ir investigation to include the alleg ations reg ardingHonors Prog ram a nd SL I P hiring. I d. at 1.-5-

On J un e 2 4 , 2 0 0 8 , th e O I G a n d th e O P R i s s u eda j o i n tre p o rts um m ar i z i n g th ei r f i n d i n gs entitled "An Investig ation of Alleg ations of Politi cized Hiringin the Depa rtment of Just ice Honors Prog ram a

nd Summer L aw Intern Prog ram." Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 59. That re port serve s
a s th e ba sis fo r m os t of

the a lle g atio ns in p la int if fs ' se c on d ame nd e d c omp la int . Ce ntr a l to tho se alleg ations is the report' s finding that two members of the 2006 Scree ning Committee, Esther Mc Do na ld a

nd Mic ha e l E lst on , to ok

po lit ic a l and

ide olo g ic a l a ff

ili atio ns int o a c c ount i n de se le c tin gc and idate s f

or Ho no rs Pr ogra

m and SL I P in te rv ie ws . Se e id. ¶¶ 18 4- 92 , 1 93 -9 9; F ir st OI G/OPR Report at 99. Plainti ffs a lso alleg e, base d on the re port, that McDona ld conducted Interne t searc hes re g ardingcandidates' political and ideolog ical af filiations, printed out such information when it re veale d liberal a ssociations and then attached the printouts and her own ha nd wr itt e n c omm e nts to t

he c and idate s' a

pp lic atio ns in s up po rt

of he r r e c omm e nd atio ns to desele ct them. See Sec . Am. Compl. ¶ 62, 196; First OI G/OPR Report at 71-73, 76-77, 82. Be cause these doc uments exi sted only in hard c opy , occupie d substantial storag e spac e and contained pe rsonal information about the applicants, they wer e plac ed in a " burn box" and destroyed prior to the initiation of the OI G/OPR investigation. See F irst OI G/OPR Report at 68- 69. As for the other individual defe ndants, plaintiffs foc us much of their attention on Monica Goodling, the n DOJ's White House L iaison, who they alleg e wa s the " principal wie lder of authority amongthe four subc abinet-le vel individual defe ndants" and the de fac to arc hitect of thi s unla wf ul s c he me to w e e d o ut " ide olo g ic a lly un de sir a ble " c and idate s. Se e Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶¶ 88, 95, 175- 76, 178. Plaintiffs further a lleg e that base d upon Goodling' s g ener al over sight role a nd her a dmitted use of Interne t "se arc h strings" to scree n liberal a pplicants for othe r ca

ree rThe re spective pr og rams to which plaintiffs a pplied, and the r eleva

nt y ear s, are as 3 follows: Sean Ger lich (Honors Program, 2006), Christopher Coleman (SL I P, 2006), J ames Gooch ( Honors Prog ram, 2002), B enjamin Meier (Honors Program, 2002), James Saul (Honors -6- positions wit hin DOJ , she also assisted McD onald with her Interne t resea rch r eg ardingHonors Prog ram a

nd SL I P applicants. See id. ¶¶ 179-80. With reg ard to for mer Attorne y

Gene ral Al be rt o G on zal e s, pla int if fs pr ima ri ly a lle g e tha

t he wa s c omp lic it i n th is s c he me " [t]hr ou g h h is unprec edente d, irresponsible a bneg ation of re sponsibili ty ," by which he e ffe ctively

authorized Go od lin gto o rc he str ate the un lawf ul c on du c t at is su e . Se e id. ¶ 2 14 . L ike wi se , p la int if fs a lso alleg e that L ouis DeF alaise, D irec tor of OARM, ena bled the unlawf

ul conduct bec ause he held a "ke y oversig ht role" with reg ard to c are er e mploy ee hir ing matters, he kne w of c omplaints from some components in 2006 that the Honor s Progr am and SL I P hiring proc ess " had bee n politiciz ed," and yet he" cast[ ] a blind eye" to the problem. See id. ¶¶ 202, 205, 207. II. P roce dural Hi story Plaintiff Sean Ger lich orig inated this action on June 30, 2008, less than a wee k afte r the first OI G/OPR report wa s relea sed. The f irst amended c omplaint, filed by five of the curr ent plaintiffs (Ge rlich, Coleman, Gooc h, Meier, Saul) and one who is no longe r par t of this action (Z ajac ), followed on August 15, 2008. Bef ore a ll defenda

nts could respond to the amended complaint, plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their c omplaint for a se cond time. This Court g rante d plaintiffs' motion and the second a mended c omplaint was filed on Nove mber 12, 2008. The sec ond amende d complaint, which adde d three plaintiffs (F aiella, He rber , Spiege l) and defe ndant DeF alaise, g ener ally alleg es that plaintiffs -- all unsucce ssful applicants for employ ment with DOJ -- ha

ve bee n injured by

the " politiciz ed" hiringproce ss that plagued the Honors Prog ram a

nd SL I P during 2002 a

nd 2006. Specifica lly , the sec ond amende d complaint

3Pr ogra

m, 2 00 6) , M atth e w F a ie lla (H on or s Pr ogra

m, 2 00 6) , D anie l H e rb e r ( Ho no rs Pr ogra m, 2006), Ry an Spieg el (Honor s Progr am, 2002). Sec . Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-10. Pla int if fs have sty

le d th e ir c a se a s a putativ e c la ss a c tio n a

nd the ir [71] m oti on

fo r c la ss 4 cer tification is curre ntly

pending . Severa l defe ndants have counter ed by moving to strike the c la ss a lle g atio ns fr om t

he se c on d ame nd e d c omp la int . Se e , e .g ., Mc Do na ld M ot. to S tr ike Cla ss Al le g atio ns (F e b. 16 , 2 00 9) . O n M arc h 9 , 2 00 9, the Court sta y e d a ll b ri e fi ngon

c la ss cer tification issues, pendingresolution of the motions to dism iss. After the motions were f

ully briefe d, plaintiffs also filed a number of notice s of 5 su pp le me nta l a

uth or ity , a

nd so me de fe nd ants fi le d r e sp on se s, wh ic h th e Court ha s a lso c on sid e re d in

re so lvi ngthe ins tant m oti on s. -7- asser ts fifteen se para

te counts ar ising unde r the Privac y Act (Counts I -VI I ), the U.S. Constitut ion (Counts VI I I -XI I I ), the CSRA (Count XI V), a nd the FRA ( Count XV). Def endants have moved 4 to dismi ss the second a

mended c omplaint in it s entirety , pursuant to Rules 12(b)( 1) and 12( b)(6)
. Plaintiffs have opposed the motions. Following its rec eipt of def endants' reply

briefs, the Court

5 held a motions hear ing on August 18, 2009 and the motions are nowripe for resolution. STANDARD "[I ]n passing on a motion to dismis s, whether on the g round of lac k of jurisdiction over the su bje c t matte r o r f

or fa ilure to s tate a

c a us e of a c tio n, the a lle g atio ns of the c omp la int

sh ou ld be construe d favor ably

to the pleade r." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see L eathe rman v. Ta

rra nt Cty . Nar cotics and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Phi llips
v. B ur e a u o f P ri so ns , 5 91 F .2 d 9 66 , 9 68 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) . T he re fo re , th e fa c tua l a lle g atio ns mus t be pre sumed true, a

nd plaintiff must be g iven eve ry favor able infe renc e that may be dra wn from the alleg ations of fa ct. Scheue r, 416 U.S. at 236; Sparrowv. United Air L ines, Inc., 216 F .3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Howe ver, the Court need not ac cept a s true " a leg al conc lusion couche d as a f

actua l alleg ation," nor

infere nces that are unsupported by the fa cts set out in the-8-

complaint. Trudea

u v. Fe dera l Trade Comm'n, 456 F .3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. A llain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Under Rule 12(b)(1) , the par

ty seekingto invoke the jurisdiction of a fe dera l court -- p l a i n t i f f s h e r e - - b e ar s th e b ur d e no f e s t a b l i s h i n gth atth e c o urth a s j ur i s d i c t i o n . S e e U S E c o l o g y, Inc. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interior, 231 F .3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (c iting Steel Co. v. Citiz ens for a Be tter Env' t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998)); se e also Gr and L odg e of F rate rnal Or der of Police v. Ashcrof t, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) ( "[A] Rul e 12(b) (1) motion imposes on the court an af firmative oblig ation to ensure that it is actingwithin the scope of its jurisdictional authority .") ; Pit ney

Bow es, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 27 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D .C. 1998). Although a

court must acc ept as true all the fa ctual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint when revie winga motion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) , L eathe rman, 507 U.S. at 164, "'p l ai n t i ff [ s '] fa ctu al al l ega t i o n s i nth e c o mp l ai n t. . . wi l l b ea r c l o s er s cr u t i n y i nre s o l v i n g a 12(b)( 1) motion' tha

n in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a

claim." Gra

nd L odg e, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14 ( quoting 5A Cha rles Alan Wrig ht & Ar

thur R. Mill er, F eder al Prac tice and Proce dure § 1350 ( 2d ed. 1990)) . At the stag e of litig ation when dismissal is sought, a pla int if f' s c omp la int

mus t be c on str

ue d li be ra lly , a

nd the pla int if

f s ho uld re c e ive the be ne fi t of

a ll favor able infe renc es that ca n be dra wn from the a lleg ed fa cts. See St. Fra ncis Xavie r Paroc hial Sch., 117 F.3d at 624. Additionally , a cour t may consider material other

than the alleg ations of the c omp la int

in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r i t ha s juri sd ic tio n to he ar t he c a se , a s lo nga s it

sti ll a c c e pts the fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. See J erome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. F DA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253- 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); St. Franc is Xavier Par ochial Sch., 117 F .3d at 624-25 n.3; Her bert v. Nat'l Ac ad. of Scis., 974 F .2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.1992).-9-

In r e vie wi nga

mot ion to d ism iss purs ua

nt t o Ru le 12 (b )( 6) , th e Court is m ind fu l th at a ll that the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e re quire of a complaint is that it contain "' a short and plain statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,' in order to ' g ive the de fe nd ant f

a ir no tic e of wh at th e . . . c la im i s a

nd the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it re sts .' " B e ll A tl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) ; acc ord Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h "de tailed fac tual alleg ations" a

re not ne cessa

ry to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the " g rounds" of " entitle[m ent] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish " more than la bels and
c on c lus ion s" or

" a fo rm ula ic re c itatio n o f t

he e le me nts of

a c a us e of a c tio n. " Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S.
at 55 5- 56 ; se e a lso Pa

pa san, 47 8 U .S. at 28 6. " To surv ive a mot ion to d ism iss , a

c omp la int

mus t
c onta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c tua l matte r, a c c e pte d a s tr ue , to ' state a

c la im t o r e lie f t

hat is pla us ibl e on its fac e.' " A shcrof

t v. I qbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting T wombly , 550 U.S. at 570); Atherton v. District of Columbia Off ice of the Mayor, 567 F .3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A complaint is plausible on its face " when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to d ra w the re a so na

ble inf e re nc e that th e de fe nd ant i s li a ble fo r t he mis c on du c t a lle g e d. " I qb a l, 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 49 . T his amou nts to a " tw o- pr on g e d a

pp ro a c h" un de r whic h a

c ourt fi rs t identifies the fa ctual alleg ations entitled to an assumption of truth and then de termines " whether they plausibly g ive rise to an e ntitlement to relief." I d. at 1950-51. AN AL YSI S I. P laintif

fs' Constitutional Clai m s Against the Ind ividu al Defendan ts Plaintiffs assert what are commonly known as B ivens claims ag ainst the individual defe ndants -- the y

seek mone y

damag es direc tly

under the Constit ution for alleg ed violations of-10-

their constitutional rig hts. See Bive ns v. Six Unknown F ed. Na rcotics Ag ents, 403 U.S. 388 (1 97 1) . T he B ive ns c la ims are pr e dic ate d o n a lle g e d v iol atio ns of pla int if fs ' F ir st a nd F if th Amendment rig hts by

the individual defe ndants in connec tion with the Honors Prog ram a nd SL I P hi ri ngpr oc e ss. Se e Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶ ¶ 1 77 , 1 86 , 1 95 , 2 08 , 2 12 . A lth ou g h f e de ra l c ourt s "ha ve discre tion in som e cir cumstance s to create a r emedy ag ainst fede ral off

icials for constitutional viol ations," c ourts "must dec line to exercise that discre tion where ' specia l fac tors counsel[ ] hesitation' in doing so." Wil son v. L ibby , 535 F.3d 697, 704 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Bive ns, 403 U.S. at 396). " One ' specia l fac tor' that prec ludes cre ation of a B ivens reme dy is the exis tence of a c omprehe nsive reme dial scheme ." I d. at 705. The Supreme Court first addre ssed this issue in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U .S. 367 (1983), a
c a se that c on sid e re d whe the r a fe de ra l e mpl oye e c ou ld o bta in m on e y dama g e s und e r t

he F ir st Amendment for

an adve rse pe rsonnel ac tion taken ag ainst him in allege d reta liation for cr itical comments he ha d made a bout his employ er to the ne ws media. See id. at 369. The Court declined to r ecognize such a cla im because a complex mix of leg islation, ex ecutive or ders, a nd detailed Civil Service Commission regulations comprised an " elabor ate, c omprehe nsive scheme " that provided substantive a nd proce dural re medies for improper f

eder al per sonnel ac tions. I d. at 38 5. Th e Luc a s Co ur

t a lso no te d th at th e pr op e r q ue sti on is " no t what r e me dy

the c ourt sh ou ld pr ov ide fo r a

wr on gthat w ou ld o the rw ise g o unr e dr e sse d, " but r athe r " wh e the r a n e la bo ra te
reme dial sy stem that has bee n constructe d step by step, with car eful attention to conflicting policy considera

tions, should be aug mented by the cr eation of a

new judicial r emedy

for the constitutional viol ation at issue." I d. at 388. Henc e, the Court made clea r that " Congr ess is in a far better position than a c ourt to evaluate the impact of a new specie s of litigation betwe en-11-

fe de ra l e mpl oye e s o n th e e ff ic ie nc y of the c ivi l se rv ic e ." I d. at 38 9. In r e vis iti ngthe sp e c ia lfa c tor s ana ly sis se ve ra l y e ars late r i n Sc hw e ike r v . Ch ili c ky , 4 87 U. S. 4 12 (1 98 8) , th e Sup re me Court further

observe d that the conc ept of " specia l fac tors counsellinghesitation in the absenc e of a ffirmative a c tio n b y Con g re ss' ' ha s p ro ve d to inc lud e an a pp ro pr iate jud ic ia l de fe re nc e to i n d i ca t i o n s th atco n gre s s i o n al i n ac t i o nh as n o tb ee ni n ad v ert en t . W h en th e d es i gn of a G overnme nt prog ram sug g ests that Congr ess has provide d what it considers adequate re medial mecha nisms for constitutional viol ations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not cre ated a dditional Bivens re me die s. 487 U.S. at 423. Mo re re c e ntl y , in

Wilk ie v. Rob bin s, 55 1 U .S. 55 0 ( 20 07 ), the Sup re me Court a g a in considere d whether

the exist ence of alter

native mea

ns for prote ctinga constitutionally -base d interest pre cluded a

Bive ns remedy . The Wilkie Court ult imately conclude d that the " patchwor k" of " state and f

eder al, administrative and judicia l benche s applying r egulations, statutes and common law rule s" a

vailable to the plaintiff w as unlike the " ' elabor ate r emedial sy stem[s ]'" that
wer e designed to protec t the interests of plaintiffs in B ush and Chilicky , and could not defi ni ti vel y

supp ortan i nfer ence t hat"Co ngres s ex pect ed t he J ud ici ary to st ay it s Bi ven s h and ." I d. at 554 (quotingBush, 462 U.S. at 388) . The Court there fore proce eded to the se cond step of the spec ial-fa ctors ana ly sis -- a step that was unnec essar y in Bush and Chilicky

-- a nd "w eig hing the re asons for a

nd ag ainst the cre ation of a ne w ca use of a ction, the way

that common law j u d ges h av e a l wa y s d o n e, " i tfo un d th ato th er

s p ec i al fa ct o rs co un s el edaga i n s tre co gn i z i n g a Bive ns remedy

for plaintiff' s alleg ed injury . I d. (citingBush, 462 U.S. at 378 ( "I n the abse nce of
su c h a [statut or y re me dy], th e fe de ra l c ourt s mu st m ake the kin d o f r e me dia l de te rm inatio n th at is appropr iate for

a common-la

w tribunal." )).DO J, too , h a s atta c ke d th e via bil ity of the B ive ns c la ims in a

state me nt o f i nte re st 6 su pp or tin gdis mis sa l. S e e DO J Mem . at 32 -4 5. Th e ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants ' a lte rn ativ e argume nts in support of dismissal of the Bivens c laims need not be r eac hed her e. -12- Consist ent with Bush, Chilicky and Wilkie, the D.C. Circuit has articulate d sever al

" g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e s" g ov e rn ingwh e n th e e xiste nc e of a statut or y re me dia l sc he me c ouns e ls hesitation in crea

ting a Bive ns remedy . Spag nola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 ( D.C. Cir. 1988) (en ba nc) (per c uriam). " I f the c omprehe nsiveness of a statutory scheme cannot be g ainsaid and it appear s that ' cong ressional inac tion [ in providing f or dama g es re medies] has not been inadver tent[,] ' courts should defe r to Congr ess' judgme nt with reg ard to the c reation of supplemental B ivens reme dies." I d. at 227-28 (a lterations in orig inal) (quotingChili cky , 487 U.S. at 423). When these c ircumstance s exi st, "c ourts must withhol d their powe r to fashion damag es re medies" unless Congr ess has " plainly expressed an intention that the c ourts prese rve Bive ns remedie s." I d. at 228. Moreove r, " the Chilicky Court made cle ar that it is the compre hensivene ss of the statutory scheme involved, not the ' adequa cy ' of spec ific re medies
e xten de d th e re un de r, that c ouns e ls j ud ic ia l a bs te nti on ." I d. at 22 7. Ind e e d, Spa g no la fo un d th at a compr ehensive statutory scheme prec ludes a B ivens reme dy even when the sc heme pr ovides the plaintiff with " no reme dy whatsoeve r." I d. at 228; see Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709 (" The spec ial fac tors analy sis does not turn on whether the statute provides a

reme dy to the particula

r plaintiff fo r t he pa rt ic ula r c la im h e or

sh e wi sh e s to purs ue ." ). Ap ply ingthe se pr inc ipl e s, the D. C. C ir c uit has held that, for

purposes of the specia l-fac tors analy sis, the CS RA is a compre hensive statutory scheme prec luding B ivens reme dies. Spag nola, 859 F.2d a t 229. In light of this authority , the individual defe ndants asser t that the CSRA pre cludes plaintiffs' Bive ns claims. See, e.g ., Gonzales Mem. at 11-15; GoodlingMem. at 4-9. The Court 6-13-

ag ree s. Plainti ffs have alleg ed that they wer e denie d fede ral e mploy ment throug h DOJ's Honors Prog ram or SL I P for unconstitutional reasons. In Spag nola, the D.C. Circuit established that "B ivens reme dies [do not] exis t for civil servic e employees a nd applicants who a dvance
c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s to fe de ra l pe rs onne l a c tio ns " be c a us e the CSRA" a ff

ir mativ e ly sp e aks " to such claims " by

condemningthe under lying a ctions as ' prohibited personne l prac tices.' " 859 F .2 d at 22 9- 30 . A s p la int if fs the mse lve s a c kn ow le dg e in t he se c on d ame nd e d c omp la int , positions wit hin the Honors Prog ram a nd SL I P are " car eer " e mploy ment positions t hat ar e subject to the " prohibited personne l prac tice" provisions of the CSRA. S ee Sec . Am. Compl. ¶¶ 220-21 (c iting 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301, 2302). Thus, plaintiffs ca n petition the Office of Specia l Counsel (" OSC") - - althoug h they have e lected not to do so as of y et -- a lleg ing a

"pr ohibited pe rs onne l pr a c tic e ." Se e 5 U .S. C §§ 12 12 , 1 21 4, 23 02 . I f t he OSC de te rm ine s th at th e pla int if fs ' alleg ations are meritorious, it would then be re quired to re port its findings to the ag ency involved, in this case DOJ. See 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(2)( B) . I f DOJ fails to take ac tion, then the OSC c ou ld r e qu e st the Me ri t Sy ste ms Pr ote c tio n B oa rd (" MSPB " ) t o o rd e r a

n a pp ro pr iate
corr ective a ction. See 5 U .S. C. § 12 14 (b )( 2) (C ). Mo re ov e r, the se re me die s p la inl y are ava ila

ble to unsucce ssful applicants for car eer positions, s uch as pla intiffs in this case. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2)( A)(i) (includingan " appointment" w ithin the class of " personne l actions" cover ed by the CSRA); S pag nola, 859 F.2d a t 225 n.3 (CSRA applies to fe dera l employ ment applicants a s well as fe dera l employ ees)
. Although pla intiffs do not seriously contest the a

pplicability

of the CSRA, they

take issue with its preclusive ef

fec t larg ely

beca use they are dissatisfied with the reme dies that it affor ds the m. S e e , e .g ., Pls. ' Me m. a t 27 ¶ 8 (" [T]he utt e rl y

unre a lis tic a dmi nis tr ativ e pr oc e ss a va ila bleOn September 10, 2008, then Attorney

Gene ral Mukase y

sent letters to re

jected 2006 7 Honors Prog ram a

pplicants and invited them to interview f or an H onors Prog ram position. See Pls.' Partial Opp' n to DOJ ' s Mot. for Enlarg ement of Time at 4-7 (Oc t. 9, 2008). Plaintiffs assert that th is c omm

un ic atio n w a s a

vio latio n o f D .C. B ar R

ule of Pr of e ssi on a l Co nd

uc t 4. 2 b e c a

us e Muka se y ' s le tte r w a s ma ile d d ir e c tly to t hr e e of the pla int if

fs in t his c a se , r athe r t

ha n to the ir counsel, while this litigation wa s pending . See Pls.' Me m. at 13 n.16. The Court expresses no op ini on on thi s is su e , whic h is no t g e rm ane to t he ins tant m oti on s. -14- to the plaintiffs here " should not pre clude them f rom pursuinga B ivens reme dy .), 36 n.49 (" [G] iven the timing a

nd circ umstances of

this case, it is utterly

unrea listi c to think that [pl aintiffs] have a CSRA reme dy to be pursued." ). Plaintiffs also argue that by offe ring
unsucce ssful applicants an oppor tunity to rea pply for the H onors Prog ram, for mer Attorne y Gene ral Micha el Mukasey has " rec og nize[ d] t he non-via bility of and supe rsede [d] any

competing CSRA re medy

in this case." See id. at 29-30. These a rguments miss t he mar

k beca use the 7 Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have e stablished that the exist ence of the c omprehe nsive
reme dial scheme itself is the releva nt consideration, not the availability or ade quacy

of par ticular
reme dies. See Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 227 (citingChili cky , 487 U.S. at 423) (" [I ]tis the compre hensivene ss of the statutory scheme involved, not the ' adequa cy ' of spec ific re medies
e xten de d th e re un de r, that c ouns e ls j ud ic ia l a bs te nti on ." ). Ind e e d, Spa g no la e sta bli sh e d th at a Bive ns remedy

is preclude d by

the CSRA even when that scheme pr ovides the plaintiff with " no
re me dy wh atso e ve r. " I d. at 22 8; s e e a lso Wils on , 5 35 F .3 d at 70 9 ( " Th e sp e c ia l f a c tor s a na ly sis does not turn on whethe r the statute pr ovides a re medy to the particula

r plaintiff for

the par ticular claim he or

she wishes to pursue .") . Henc e, neither the per ceive d lack of

reme dies for pla intiffs under the CSRA -- e ven thoug h, in fac t, there a re r emedies a

vailable to plaintiffs, a s descr ibedAt the motions hearing , plaintiffs ca lled the Court' s attention to a passag e fr om 8 Correc tional Services Corp. v. Ma lesko, 524 U.S. 61 (2001), discussingthe extension of Bivens reme dies into new conte x ts: "So long a s the plaintiff had a n avenue for some r edre ss, bedroc k pri nci pl es o f se para ti onof p owe rs f orec lo sedju di cia l i mp os it io n o f a ne w s ub st ant iv e li abi li ty ." I d. at 69. As indicate d in this section, the Court has conclude d that plaintiffs do have "a n avenue for so me r edre ss ." -15- a bo ve -- no r f

or me r A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l Muka se y ' s invit atio n a lte rs the fa c t th at pl a int if fs ' 8

" c on sti tut ion a l c la ims are c og niza ble a s ' pr oh ibi te d p e rs onne l pr a c tic e s' wi thi n th e CSRA sy stem." See Spag nola, 859 F.2d at 225 n.3. Neve rtheless, plaintiffs c ontend that " the Court should fully exercise the f

undamental judgme nt that is invol ved in deter mining whe ther to re cognize Bivens jurisdiction on the
e xtra or din ary

fa c ts o f t his c a se ." Pls. ' Me m. at 8 ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . B ut p la int if fs wo uld have this Court exercise its " judgme nt" in a ma

nner that ignor es bindingprec edent - - the wide discretion that plaintiffs de sire this Court to ex erc ise simply does not existwithin the parameters of the c ase la

w. Even unde r Wilki e, a c ase he avily relied upon by

plaintiffs, see Pls.' Mem. at 38- 40, it is pl ain that a c ourt' s "judg ment" in the B ivens are na is hig hly circ umscribed. It is true that the Wilki e Court " weig h[ed] rea sons for and a g ainst the cre ation of a ne w ca use of a ction, the
wa y c omm on law j ud g e s h ave a lw ay s d on e ," but it did so on ly be c a us e the re wa s n o " ' e la

bo rate
reme dial sy stem' " that gove rned the plaintiff' s claims. See 551 U.S. at 554 (quotingBush, 462 U.S. at 388). I f such a

sy stem had existed, however , that would have e nded the spe cial-f actor s analy sis because it would have answ ere d the question whethe r " Congr ess expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand." See id.; Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 ( "I n the abse nce of

such a c ong ressional direc tive, the fe dera l courts must make the kind of r emedial de termination that is appropriate for a common-la

w tribunal." ) (e mphasis added) . The Wilkie Court only proce eded to step two-16-

beca use the a nswer w as uncle ar. H ere , in contrast, the a nswer is c lear

at step one a

nd the Court is permitted to look no further. Pla int if fs are a lso ins ist e nt t

hat, at th e ve ry

le a st, dis mis sa l of

the ir B ive ns c la ims is ina pp ro pr iate in t

he a bs e nc e of jur isd ic tio na l di sc ov e ry , whic h w ill " e ns ur e that th e Court ha s a
c omp le te pic tur e of

thi s c a se ' s f

a c t patte rn

a s th e ba sis fo r i t r e a c hin ga c are fu l, c a se -s pe c if

ic judgme nt." Pls.' Mem. at 28. The Court is unper suaded by plaintiffs insistence that jurisdictional discovery will alter the a

naly sis here. Eve n acc eptingthe alleg ations of the sec ond amende d complaint as true a

nd draw ing a ll reasona

ble infer ence s in favor of plaintiffs, as must be done, see Sche uer, 416 U .S. at 236, this case is square ly controlled by

Spag nola bec ause it conc erns alleg ed constitutional violations that occurre d in the context of a fede ral e mploy ment application pr oc e ss. Suc h v iol atio ns , e ve n th os e a lle g e dly pe rp e tr ate d b y

se nio r g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls, fa ll wi thi n th e sc op e of

the CSRAand

the y are re dr e ssa

ble un de r t

he a dmi nis tr ativ e pr oc e ss
e sta bli sh e d b y

that st atut e . T o d isr e g ard thi s a nd ins te a d r e c ognize a

B ive ns re me dy

he re wo uld ignor e the r easone d judgme nt of Congr ess and c lear Supreme Court and D .C. Circuit prece dent. No amou nt o f j ur isd ic tio na l di sc ov e ry wi ll a lte r t

hat. T he Court

c on c lud e s, the n, that be c a us e plaintiffs are unsucce ssful fede ral job applica nts whose constitutional claims impli cate a "pr ohibited personnel pr actice ," the "c omprehe nsive reme dial scheme " of the CSRA applies and this Court m ust "must decline to e x erc ise [it s] di scre tion" to re cog nize a Bive ns remedy in light of this "spe cial fa ctor." See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 704-05; Spag nola, 859 F.2d a t 229. Ac c or din g ly , p la int if

fs ' B ive ns c la ims (C ounts IX- XI I I ) a s w e ll a s th e ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants themselves will be dismissed from this case
.-17-

II. P lai nt iffs' C lai m s A ga inst DO J A. P rivacy Ac t Claim s for Money Dam ages The Privac y

Act " regulate[s] the collec tion, maintenance , use, and dissemination of information" about individuals by fede ral a g encie s. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub.L . No. 93–579, § 2( a )( 5) , 8 8 St at. 1 89 6, 18 96 . " Th e Ac t g ive s a g e nc ie s d e ta ile d in str uc tio ns fo r m ana g ingthe ir
rec ords and pr ovides for va rious sorts of civil relief

to individuals aggrieve d by failure s on the Gover nment' s part to comply

with the require ments." D oe v. Chao , 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004). One suc h form of r elief e nables a n individual to seek money damag es whe n an ag ency intentionally

or willfully

fails to comply

with the Act' s require ments "in such a way as to have an adver se ef

fec t on an individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g )(1) (D), ( g )(4) . In Counts Ithroug h VI Iof the Se c on d A me ndme nt C omp la int , p la int if fs a sse rt tha t D OJ ha s v iol ate d s e ve n s e pa ra te pr ov isi on s o f t

he Pr iva c y

Ac t. Under the Privacy

Act, a " rec ord" is "a

ny item, collection, or groupingof information about an individual that is maintained by an ag ency

. . . and that conta ins his name, or the ide nti fy ingnumbe r, sy

mbo l, o r o the r i de nti fy

ingpa rt ic ula r a ssi g ne d to the ind ivi du a l." 5 U .S. C. § 552a(a )(4) . The re cords at issue here are the Interne t printouts and the handwr itten notes alleg edly cre ated by

McDona ld duringthe Scre eningCommi ttee' s 2006 review of Honors Prog ram c andidates. The first OI G/OPR report established, a nd both parties now a cknowledg e, that to the e xtent th e se re c or ds on c e e xiste d th e y we re de str oye d in

e arl y 20 07 . Se e F ir st OI G/OPR Report at 68-69.

1. Sub sect ion (e)(7) -- Count I Sub se c tio n ( e )( 7) pr ov ide s th at any a g e nc y ma int a ini nga

sy ste m of

re c or ds sh a llUnder the Privacy

Act " the term ' maintain' includes maintain, collec t, use, or 9 disseminate." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (3). -18- " ma int a in n o r e c or d d e sc ri bin gho w a ny ind ivi du a l e xer c ise s r ig hts gua ra nte e d b y the F ir st Am e ndme nt u

nle ss e xpre ssl y

a uth or ize d b y

statut e or by the ind ivi du a l a

bo ut who m th e re c or d is maintained or unle ss pertinent to and within the scope of an a uthorized law enfor ceme nt activity ." 5 U .S.C. § 552a(e)( 7). The D .C. Circuit has concluded " that an ag ency that maintains any sy ste m of

re c or ds is p ro hib ite d f

ro m ma int a ini nga

re c or d o f a

n in div idu a l' s F ir st Am en dm en tac t i v i ty

'ev en i f [ th atre co rd ] i s n o ts u b s equ en t l y

i n co rp o ra t edi n t o th e a gen cy 's sy stem of re cords.' " Ma

ydak v. United States, 363 F .3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Albrig ht v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 916-17 ( D.C. Cir. 1980)) (e mphasis in origina l). " [T] he Ac tcl ea rl y

p ro h i b i t s ev en th e m er e c o l l ec t i o no f s u ch a r ec o rd , i n d ep en d en to f t h e a gen cy 's maintenanc e, use, or

dissemination of it thereaf ter." Albrig ht, 631 F.2d at 918. B eyond alleg ing that the ag ency

maintained the re cord itself, a damag es cla im for a violation of subsec tion (e)( 7) 9 must also alleg e " that the makingof this rec ord had a n adver se ef

fec t on [ plaintiff] as require d by subsection (g )(1) (D) of

the Act." I d. at 921. Moreove r, a pla intiff must alleg e " ' that the ag ency acte d in a manner

which wa s intentional or willful.'" I d. (quoting5 U.S.C. § 552a(g )(4) ). Plaintiffs have met their ple adingburden he re. The y alleg e that McD onald conduc ted Interne t searc hes re g ardingapplicants' political and ideolog ical af filiations, including "o rga n i z at i o n s t o wh i ch ca n d i d at es b el o n ged
. " S ec . Am
. C o mp l
. ¶ 6 2 , 1 0 3
. T h ey fu rt h er al l ege that she either

cre ated pr intouts of such information or made written " comments on the applications throug hout the proce ss conce rningthe libera l affiliations of ca ndidates." I d. As for the " adver se ef

fec t" that these rec ords had on plaintiffs, the y have a lleg ed that the makingof the-19-

rec ords adve rsely

aff ecte d their sea

rch f or post-law sc hool employ ment -- in the f

orm of out-ofpo c ke t e xpe ns e s, los s o f t ime and e mot ion a l di str e ss - - a

nd de pr ive d th e m of

a fa ir op po rt un ity to obtain the profe ssional and ec onomic benef it of employ

ment in DOJ ' s Honors Prog ram. See , e .g ., Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶

¶ 4 0, 42 . L a stl y , w ithre sp e c t to the e le me nt o f " int e nti on a l or wi llf ul" conduct, plaintiffs a ssert that DOJ, actingthroug h its employ ees, f lag rantly disreg arde d "the leg al require ments and prohibitions that are imposed upon it by Privacy Act subsec tion (e)( 7)" and that such disreg ard c onstitut es intentional or willful conduc t, not mere gross neg lige nce. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-06. Henc e, plaintiffs' (e) (7) Privac y Act cla im is notdefic ient as pled. Neve rtheless, DO J contends that Count Ishould be dismissed because it is precluded by the CSRA . Se e DO J Mem . at 16 -2 0. " In li g ht o f t he e xclu siv e natur e of

the CSRA ' s r e me die s, many courts have held that the CSRA preempts ac tions under the Privac y Act that see k revie w of
a dv e rs e pe rs onne l de c isi on s. " L e e v. Ge re n, 48 0 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 98 , 2 03 (D .D .C. 20 07 ). Th e D. C. C i r c u i th a s , h o w e v e r , t ak e na r ath e r n ar r o wv i e wo f

C S RAp r e e mp t i o ni nP r i v a c y A c tc a s e s . In Hubbar d v. U.S. Envtl. P rot. Ag ency , Adm' r, 809 F .2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the c ourt noted the te ns ion be tw e e n th e Pr iva c y

Ac t and the CSRA , a

nd ob se rv e d th at " it w ou ld b e ano ma lou s to construe the pre- exis ting Privac y Act to g rant the district c ourt power to do indirectly

that which Congr ess pre cluded dire ctly ," na mely , to reviewprohibited personne l prac tices. I d. at 5. B ut the
c ourt we nt o n to sta

te that, [o] n the other ha

nd, as the g overnme nt conce des, the P rivac y Act per mits a feder al job a pplicant to r ecove r damag es for an adver se personne l a ction actua lly cause d by an inac curate or incomplete rec ord. B ut the obvious need to acc ommodate the two statu to r y s c h e me s r e qu ir e s th e d is tr ic t c o urts to an a ly ze th e a s s e rte d c a

u s ati o nlink to be ce rtain they

are not exceedingtheir jurisdiction. I d. The c ourt opined in Hubbar d that the plaintiff " rea lly alleg e[d] only

a wr ong ful personne l-20-

decision" in the guise of a subse ction (g )(1) (C) ac tion. I d. But it held that the " bad fit betwe en the fa cts asser

ted by Hubbar d and a c olorable Privac y Act cla im is reveale d by

Hubbar d' s failure to d e mon str ate the re qu ir e d c a us a l li nk be tw e e n th e pa sso ve r d oc ume nt a nd his fa ilure to o bta in employ ment." I d. (empha sis added). I n other wor ds, the court in Hubba rd re ache d the merits of the c la im a

nd the n n arr ow ly

c on str ue d a n e le me nt o f t

hat c la im ( c a

us atio n) to a

vo id c on fl ic t w ith the CSRA. This approa ch wa s repe ated in Kleiman v. D ep' t of Ener g y , 956 F.2d 335 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). Ther e, the plaintiff a rgued that his job titl e wa s listed inaccur ately in personnel r ecor ds beca use his actua l work assig nments corr esponded to a differ ent job title at a hig her pa y g rade
. I d. at 337. The c ourt consider ed Kleiman' s Privacy Act ame ndment claim to be a " collater al
att a c k o nth e o r ig in a l [

jo b c la s s if

ic ati o n ] p e r s o n n e l d e c is io n " th at, if s u c c e s s f u l, w o u ld " b y p a s s [] the ' exhaustive remedial sc heme' provided by Congr ess" in the CSRA. I d. at 338 (quoting C ar d u cc i , 7 1 4 F. 2 d

at1 7 4 ). T h e a ctu al h o l d i n g o f t h e c as e, h o we v er , h i n gedo nth e c o urt 's analy sis of the ac cura cy

element of

the claim. See id. at 337 (" The re cords, then, a re a ccur ate: they corr ectly ref lect the position to which Kleiman off icially was a ssigne d.") . And the cour t expli citly noted that nothing we say today should be taken to c ast doubt on Hubbard' s statement that " the Pr iva c y Ac t pe rm its a fede ral job a pp lic ant t o r e c ov e r d ama g e s f or an a dv e rs e personne l a ction actua lly cause d by an inacc urate or incomplete r ec o rd ." Hu bb ard ' s ho ldi ng wa s ba se d on the " a c tua lly c a us e d" langua g e ; ours is gro un de d in the re adingof " acc urate ." I d. at 339 n.5 (e mphases adde d) (c itation omit ted). Ag ain, the D.C. Circuit rea ched the merits of the Privacy

Act cla im, but evaluated the pla intiff' s claim with an eye to avoidingconflict with the CSRA.-21-

At the motions hearing , counsel for DOJ argued that plaintiffs have fa iled to alleg e the
nece ssary causa l link as require d by Hubbar d and Kleiman a

nd, thus, they

are simply

using the Pr iva c y Ac t a s a me ans to c oll ate ra lly

atta c k a " pr oh ibi te d p e rs onne l pr a c tic e ." Ac c or din gto DO J, the n, the me re c oll e c tio n o f i nf or matio n o n th e Inte rn e t c on c e rn ingpla int if fs ' F ir st Amendment ac tiviti es did not cause the alleg ed har m -- it was only

cause d by

the subsequent actions of the Scr eeningCommi ttee in takingthat information into acc ount and dese lecting
cer tain candidates for inter

views. B ut this vi ew of

causation is t oo restric tive and is not supported by

Hubbar d and Kleiman. It is plain from those case s that but-for c ausation -- i.e., the
a dv e rs e pe rs onne l a c tio n w ou ld n ot h ave oc c ur re d b ut f or re lia nc e up on the of fe nd ingre c or d - - i s sufficie nt. The docume nt itself is, of course, not c apable of ca using ha rm unless it is reviewe d and ac ted upon. Such is the ca se her e, whe re pla intiffs have a lleg ed that the c ollection of inf or matio n r e g ard ingthe e xer c ise of the ir F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts wa s a but- fo r c a

us e of the ir de se le c tio n b y

the Sc re e nin gCommitte e . A t th is s ta g e of the c a se , th e n, and

dr awi nga ll
re a so na ble inf e re nc e s in fa vo r o f p la int if

fs , th e Court

c on c lud e s th at pl a int if

fs have satis fi e d th e ir pleadingburden by

alleg ing that their desele ctions were cause d by the re cords at issue here
. Ac c or din g ly , p la int if

fs ' su bs e c tio n ( e )( 7) c la im w ill be a llo we d to pr oc e e d a nd DO J' s mo tio n w ill b e d e n i e d w i thr e s p e c tt o C o un t

I. Th e Court

is, ho we ve r, min df

ul o f t he te ns ion

tha t of te n e xists betwee n the CSRA and the Privacy Act, and it may

be nec essar

y to revisit the pree mption is sue f o l l o w i n gd i s c o v e r

y. 2. Subse c ti on ( e )( 5) -- Co untII Sub se c tio n ( e )( 5) pr ov ide s th at any a g e nc y ma int a ini nga

sy ste m of

re c or ds sh a ll "ma intain all rec ords which a re use d by

the ag ency

in making a

ny deter mination about anySubsection (g )(1) (C) provides that an individual may bringa civil ac tion wheneve r an 10 a g e nc y " fa ils to m a int a in a

ny re c or d c on c e rn ing[him ] wit h s uc h a c c ur a c y , r e le va

nc e , ti me lin e ss, and complete ness as is nec essar y to assure f

airne ss in any

deter mination relatingto the qualifications, chara cter , rig hts, or opportunities of, or bene fits to [ him] that may be made on the ba sis of su c h r e c or d, and

c on se qu e ntl y

a de te rm inatio n is ma de wh ic h is a dv e rs e to [h im]. " As is tr ue fo r s ub se c tio n ( e )( 7) c la ims , th e " sy ste m of re c or ds " re qu ir e me nt d oe s n ot a pp ly to subsection (g )(1) (C) cla ims. S ee Mc Cready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 12 ( D.C. Cir. 2006). -22- individual with such acc urac y , rele vance , timeliness, and completene ss as is rea sonably nece ssary to assure f

airne ss to the individual in t he dete rmination." 5 U .S.C. § 552a(e)( 5). " Subsection (g )(1) (C) provides a

civil remedy

if an a g ency

fails to satisfy

the standar d in subsection (e) (5) a nd
c on se qu e ntl y

a de te rm inatio n is ma de wh ic h is a dv e rs e to t he ind ivi du a l." De te rs v. U. S. Pa ro le Comm'n, 85 F .3d 655, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Most "adve rse de termination" claims hing e on 10 inacc urate or incomplete r ecor ds. See, e.g ., L ee, 480 F . Supp. 2d at 209-10 (alleg ing that an inacc urate rec ord led to an a dverse deter mination); Krieg er v. U .S. Dep' t of J ustice, 529 F . Supp. 2d 29, 49 (D.D.C. 2008) ( alleg ing that an incomplete r ecor d led to an adve rse de termination). Ind e e d, DO J cit e s p la int if fs ' fa ilure to a lle g e tha

t th e ir e mpl oy me nt a pp lic atio ns we re ina c c ur ate as one of the g rounds for dismissal of the subsec tion (e)( 5) cla im. See DOJ Mem. at 24. But that
argume nt i g no re s p la int if fs ' a lle g atio ns tha

t ir re le va nt r e c or ds (i .e ., the re c or ds of the ir F ir st Amendment ac tiviti es) led to a n adver se dete rmination ag ainst them (i.e., dese lection by the Scree ning Committee). B y the plain languag e of ( g )(1) (C), re levanc e stands on equa l footing with acc urac y , timeliness and completene ss as a ba sis for pursuingmoney damag es for

an adver se dete rmination. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g )(1) (C). To state a claim for mone y

damag es under subse ction (g )(1) (C), then, a plaintiff must alleg e that: " (1) he has bee n ag g rieve d by an adver se dete rmination; (2) the [ag ency] failed to maintain his recor ds with the deg ree of [relevanc y ] necessar

y to assure f

airne ss in the determination; (3) the [age ncy ' s] reliance on theBe cause the Court conclude s that plaintiffs have a dequate ly pled proxim ate c ausation 11 here , it also concludes that plaintiffs satisfy Hubbar d' s actua l causation requireme nt. See 809 F.2d at 5. Hence , DOJ's pre emption arguments fail as to the (e )(5) claim for the same re asons stated ea rlier. Howeve r, the Court will deny DOJ's motion to dis miss C ount I Iwithout prejudice 12 beca use the pa rties have not briefe d the issue of re levanc e as it re lates to subsections (e )(5) and (g )(1) (C) and the re a

ppear s to be no ca se law dire ctly addre ssing the issue. -23- [ i r r e l e v an t ] r e c o r d s w a s th e p r o x i m at e c a u s e o f th e a dv e r s e d e t e r

m i n at i o n ; an d

( 4 ) th e [ a g e n c y] acte d intentionally

or willfully

in failingto maintain [ rele vant] recor ds." D eter s, 85 F.3d at 657. Plaintiffs alleg e that they

suffe red a

n adver se dete rmination (dese lection/non-hiring ), that DOJ m aintained irr eleva

nt rec ords (re g ardingplaintiffs' First Amendme nt activities) which undermined the fairne ss of the hiringproce ss, that DOJ ' s relianc e on those re cords ( or the relianc e of its employ ees, suc h as McDona ld) proxim ately cause d the adve rse de termination, and that D OJ ( a g a in, thr ou g h it s e mpl oye e s, su c h a s Mc Do na ld, El sto n a nd oth e rs ) a c te d inte nti on a lly or willfully

in maintaining suc h rec ords. Ba sed on those alleg ations and on the for eg oing 11
ana ly sis , th e Court

c on c lud e s th at at th is s ta g e of the pr oc e e din gpla int if

fs have me t th e ir p l e a d i n gb ur d e nw i thr e s p e c tt o th e i r s u b s e c t i o n( e ) ( 5 ) c l a i mp r e s e n t e d i nC o un tII. 12 3. Subse c ti ons (e )( 1) , ( e )( 2) , ( e )( 6) , ( e )( 9) , ( e )( 10 ) - - C ount s II I- VI I Plaintiffs' othe r Privacy

Act cla ims are br oug ht pursuant to subsections (e) (1), ( e)( 2), (e) (6), ( e)( 9), and ( e)( 10). Howe ver, those subse ctions only apply to rec ords that ar e conta ined wi thi n a " sy ste m of

re c or ds ." Se e Maydak, 36 3 F .3 d a t 51 8 ( " [T]he re qu ir e me nts c onta ine d in interre lated subsec tions (e)(1) , (e) (2), a nd . . . (e) (10), a

re trig g ere d only

if the re cords a

re actua lly incorpora

ted into a sy stem of re cords." ); Krieg er, 529 F . Supp. 2d at 50, 55 (subsections (e) (6) a nd (e) (9) only

apply to rec ords containe d within a "sy stem of re cords" ). A " sy stem ofPlaintiffs consistently alleg e that " Def

endant [DOJ] maintained re cords a bout plaintiffs 13 in c onne c tio n w ithits de te rm inatio n o f t he re su lts of

the ir Ho no rs Pr ogra

m and [SL I P] applications, re cords whic h wer e par t of a sy stem of re cords within the mea ning of the Privacy Act." See, e.g ., Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 119. Such alleg ations, which amount to nothing " more than labels and c onclusions," a re pla inly insufficient to mee t plaintiffs' pleadingburden. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555-56. Wil born wa s abrog ated in par t by Doe v. Chao, 540 U .S. 614 (2004), but that 14 abrog ation is not relevant he re. -24- re c or ds " is " a

g ro up of any re c or ds un de r t

he c ontr ol o f a

ny a g e nc y fr om whic h in fo rm atio n is retrie ved by

the name of

the individual or by

some identifying numbe r, sy mbol, or other ide nti fy ingpa rt ic ula r a ssi g ne d to the ind ivi du a l." 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (a )( 5) . H e nc e , to state a c la im for r elief f

or a violation of a

ny of those subsec tions, plainti ffs must nece ssarily alleg e that the
re c or ds at is su e -- he re the Inte rn e t pr int outs a nd Mc Do na ld' s h and

wr itt e n n ote s - - w e re a c tua lly incorpora ted into a " sy stem of re cords." See Maydak, 363 F .3d at 518; Krieg er, 529 F . Supp. 2d at 50, 55. Plaintiffs have not done so. Indeed, the y admit that they

have not done so, but assert 13 that this failure should be e x cused be cause DOJ shoul d not be allowed to be nefit fr om its own misdeeds -- i.e ., destruction of the rec ords bef ore the y could be incor

porate d into a "sy stem of
rec ords." See Pls.' Me m. at 20. In support of their position, plaintiffs cite Wilborn v. HHS, 49 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1995), 14 for the pr oposition t hat DOJ's destruc tion of documents ca nnot undermine their Priva cy Act claims bec ause to rule otherwise w ould cre ate the unhe althy incentive f

or ag encie s to mispl ace or destroy documents in order

to obfuscate the " sy stem of re cords" require ment. See Pls.' Me m. at 20. Wil born is distinguishable, howe ver, be cause that case conce rned the remova l and destruction of r ecor ds alrea dy incorporated into a " sy stem of re cords." See 49 F .3d at 602. Ther e is no such alleg ation here . L ikewise, plaintiffs g ain nothing by makingthe g ener al observation-25-

that " wh e n a

fe de ra l a g e nc y

e sta bli sh e s a n e mpl oy me nt a pp lic atio n p ro c e ss, it n e c e ssa ri ly establishes (or

incorpora

tes those re cords into) a

rec ord sy stem for them" or that within DOJ s uch a sy stem of re cords is maintained by OARM. See Pls.' Me m. at 18. Those per sonnel rec ords -- the on e s st or e d e le c tr on ic a lly by OA RM, and

de sc ri be d b y

Willi s in he r d e c laratio n, se e Willi s Dec l. ¶¶ 5-8 - - ar e not at issue her e. The documents at issue he re a re not the e lectronic versions of pla int if fs ' e mpl oy

me nt a pp lic atio ns sto re d b y

OA RM, but r athe r t

he ha rd c op ie s o f t

ho se applications used by

the 2006 Scre eningCommi ttee, with McDona ld's ha ndwritten notes, and the Interne t printouts. S ee, e .g ., Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 120. Despite plaintiffs' contention that such
rec ords " unquestionably

should have be en plac ed within the applica ble Privacy

Act sy stem of
rec ords involved her e," see Pls.' Mem. at 19, the re cords we re de stroy ed shortly afte r the 2006 Ho no rs Pr ogra

m and SL I P hi ri ngpr oc e ss w a s c omp le te d, se e Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶ ¶ 1 66 -6 7; F ir st OI G/OPR Report at 68-69. Thus, they wer e neve r " actua lly

incorporated into a sy stem of
rec ords." See Maydak, 363 F .3d at 518. Nor is it appar ent that they ever would have be en. Acc ording ly , then, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for r elief pur suant to subsections (e) (1), (e) (2), ( e)( 6), (e )(9) , and (e )(10) of the Privac y Act, and Counts I I Ithroug h VI Iwill therefor e be dismiss ed. 4. St andi ng Not all of the plaintiffs will be a ble to pursue the r emainingclaims for mone y damag es under subse ctions (e) (7) a nd (e) (5) of

the Privacy

Act, howe ver, be cause sever al of them lac k standingto do so. St anding"r equire s a plaintiff to demonstrate the now- familiar e lements of injury in fac t, causation, and redr essability ." L ance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (citing Lujan v. Def

ender s of Wildl ife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 ( 1992)). He re, D OJ focuse s on causationPreviously , DOJ asserted that plaintiff Saul also lac ked standingto pursue dama g es 15 claims under the Privacy

Act for this same rea son, but Saul presented e vidence that he wa s selec ted for a

n interview by

at least one DOJ component. See Saul Dec l. ¶ 8. In response , DOJ fi le d a su pp le me nta l ve rs ion

of the Willi s d e c lara

tio n, wh ic h ame nd e d th e pr ior ina c c ur ate statements re g ardingSaul. See Supp. Wi llis Decl. ¶ 4-13. DOJ also makes this argument with reg ard to Meie r. See Willis Decl. ¶ 19. 16 -26- and asse rts that five of the eig ht plaintiffs (Ger lich, Coleman, Meier , Gooch, Spieg el) lac k standingto pursue money damag es under

the Privacy

Act bec ause the se plaintiffs neve r re ache d the stag e in the hiringproce ss where the violations alleg edly occur red ( i.e., Scre eningCommi ttee revie w). See DOJ Mem. at 10-13. Thus, ac cordingto DOJ , no causa l link between the injury

15 and the unlaw ful conduc t has bee n alleg ed. I d. Initially , plaintiffs conc ede that two of the 2002 applicants (G ooch, Spieg el) " are not of the cla ss of plaintiffs to whom [DOJ ' s] P rivac y Act misconduct applies." Pls.' Opp' n at 21 n.24. Plaintiff Meier w as also a 2002 H onors Prog ram applicant, he nce he also lacks standing . See Sec. A m. Compl . ¶ 6. As to Ger lich and Coleman, DOJ relies on the dec laration of Dea na Willi s, Assistant Director in DO J ' s Offic e of A ttorney Recruitment and Ma

nag ement, to establish that they did not reac h Scree ning Committee re view. Se e Willi s D e c l. ¶

¶ 2 9, 41
. Al tho ug h p la int if fs a c kn ow le dg e that G e rl ic h a nd Col e man w ou ld 16 la c k s tand ingif

the y fa ile d to re a c h Sc re e nin gCommitte e re vie w, the y ins ist that di sc ov e ry

is
nece ssary to make that dete rmination -- e specia lly in light of DO J ' s err or re g ardingplaintiff Saul's se lection for a

n interview. See Pls.' Mem. at 14- 15 & n.18. A cour t may consider material other

than the alleg ations of the complaint in deter mining whether it has jurisdiction to hear the c ase, so longas it still acc epts the fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. See J erome Stevens Pharm., 402 F.3d at 1253-54; St. Franc is Xavier Parochia l Sch., 117 F.3d at 624- 25 n.3. Her e, the Willis decla ration establishes that ne itherB e c a us e the tw o Pr iva c y

Ac t c la ims -- Counts Iand I I-- are a ll that r e ma in o f p la int if fs ' 17 second a mended c omplaint, the Court will di smiss t hese pla intiffs from the c ase. De fe nd ants a sse rt

a numbe r o f a lte rn ativ e g ro un ds fo r d ism iss a l of pla int if fs ' e qu ita ble 18 claims, but for the r easons state d below, the Court nee d not rea ch them. -27- Ger lich nor Coleman we re se lected f or interview s by

any of the c omponents to which they ap p l i ed
. S ee W i l l i s De cl
. ¶¶2 6 -2 9 (G er l i ch ), 3 9 -4 1 (C o l em an ). As a "r ea s o nt o d o u b t " D OJ 's repr esentations, plainti ffs c ite Ger lich' s prior experienc e wor king at DOJ and the " strong statements in support of plaintiff Ge rlich' s Honors Prog ram a pplication" f

rom a super

vising attorney . See Pls.' Me m. at 15 n.18; Sec. Am. Compl. 18. L ikewise, plaintiffs a ssert that the circ umstances surr ounding pla intiff Coleman' s SL I P application "r aise[] suspicion due to the still -unexplained fac t that he neve r re ceive d any form of ' reje ction.' " See Pls.' Mem. at 15 n.18; Se c . A m. C omp l. 2 4. B ut e ve n a c c e pti ngthe se a lle g atio ns a s tr ue , a s th e Court

mus t, s e e St. Fr ancis Xa

vier Paroc hial Sch., 117 F.3d at 624-25 n.3, they do not rise above the level of speculation and hence are insufficient to re but the jurisdictional information contained in the Wil lis declaration. Offer ing nothingmore, plaintiffs Ge rlich and Coleman - - as we ll as Gooch, Spiege l and Meier

-- ha ve fa iled adequately

to alleg e ca

usation and they

will be dismiss ed fr om the c a se fo r l a c k o f s tand ingto p ur su e the re ma ini ngPr iva c y Ac t c la ims
. 17 B. Claim s for Eq uitabl e Re lief Th e re ma ini ngc la ims fo r e qu ita ble re lie f a lso pr e se nt s tand ingiss ue s. Withre sp e c t to 18 prospec tive injunctive relief , plaintiffs lack a

cog nizable injury . Plaintiffs seek injunctive re lief "in the f orm of orde rs enjoiningdefe ndant [DOJ ] from continuing to violate its leg al obliga tions under the Constit ution, the [ CSRA], the [ FRA], and the Privac y Act." Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 240.

" ' B e c a us e inj un c tio ns re gulate futur e c on du c t, a pa rt y ha s st and ingto s e e k in

jun c tiv e re lie f o nly

ifPla int if fs ' c la ims un de r t

he F RAc ann ot p ro c e e d f or the ind e pe nd e nt r e a so n th at pr ivate 19 litigants ar e pre cluded f

rom cha lleng ing a lleg ed noncomplianc e with the re quirements of the FRA; instead, that r esponsibility is left to the administrative enf orce ment structure . See -28- the par ty alleg es, and ultimately

proves, a rea l and immediate -- as opposed to mer ely conjec tural or hy pothetical -- threat of future injury .' " N atura l Res. Def. Council v. Pena, 147 F .3d 1012, 10 22 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 8) (q

uo tin gChurc h v . Ci ty

of Hunts vil le , 3 0 F .3 d 1 33 2, 13 37 (1 1th Cir.1994)). It is also well-established that a plaintiff " has standingto seek re dress for injuries done to him, but may

not seek re dress for

injuries done to others." Moose L odg e No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972). Be cause elig ibilit y

for DO J ' s Honors Prog ram a nd SL I P is l imited to law students or
re c e nt l aw s c ho ol gra du ate s se rv ingin j ud ic ia l c le rk sh ips , p la int if fs are no lon g e r e lig ibl e to
a pp ly fo r t ho se po sit ion s. Con se qu e ntl y , th e se fo rm e r a pp lic ants c ann ot, and

in f a c t do no t, alleg e that DOJ's violations will harm them in the future . See Wag shal v. Foster , 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (a

plaintiff lacks standingwhen he "ha s alleg ed no likelihood whateve r that he himself will ag ain suffe r the a lleg ed injury ") . Moreove r, to the extent that plaintiffs assert
c la ims on be ha lf of " a ll tho se sim ila

rl y sit uate d, " se e Se c . A m. C omp l. ¶ 1, the y la c k s tand ingto seek suc h injunctive relief on behalf of others. See Wagsha l, 28 F.3d at 1252. That this case wa s filed as a putative class a ction does not alter the analy sis. See Simon v. E. Ky . Welfare Rts. Org ., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (a ctual injury still require d to establish standing, e ven in a c lass action context). There fore , the Court conclude s that plaintiffs lack standingto pursue cla ims for injunctive relief

ag ainst DOJ and those claims will be dismi ssed. Plaintiffs also seek de clar atory relief with respec t to past and ong oing violations of the U.S. Consti tution, the CS RA, the FRA, a nd the Privacy

Act. To the extent that plaintiffs are 19Kissinge r v. Reporte rs Comm. for Fr eedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1980) ; Ar mstro ngv. B us h, 92 4 F .2 d 2 82 , 2 94 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) ; Cit ize ns fo r R e sp on sib ili ty and Ethic s in Washington v. De p' t of Homeland Sec ., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 111-12 (D .D.C. 2007); see a lso 44 U.S.C. §§ 2905, 3106. Although most of the de clar atory relief soug ht by

plaintiffs conc erns DO J alone, the 20 individual defenda

nts are a lso named in conne ction with Count VI I I . See Sec. A m. Compl . ¶¶ 162-72, 237. De clar atory relief is inappropriate in individual capac ity suits. S ee V anover

v. Hantman, 77 F . Supp. 2d 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1999). -29- se e kin gde c larator

y re lie f w ithre sp e c t to on g oin gor futur e vio latio ns , p la int if fs la c k a c ogniza ble injury and those c laims fail for the sa me re asons discussed dire ctly above. See City

of Houston, Te x. v. De p' t of

Ho us ingand

Ur ba n D e v. , 2 4 F .3 d 1 42 1, 14 29 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) (p la int if f m us t establish standingto seek for war d-lookingdecla

ratory relief ). And to the e x tent that plaintiffs
are se e kin gde c larator

y re lie f w ithre sp e c t to de fe nd ants ' pa st c on du c t, the y c ann ot d e mon str ate 20 that a de c larator

y jud g me nt w ill re dr e ss t

he ir inj ur ie s. Se e L anc e , 5 49 U. S. at 43 9 ( re dr e ssa bil ity an ele ment of standing ). Redressa bility require s "a

likelihood that the reque sted relief will redre ss the alleg ed injury ." Stee l Co. v. Ci tiz ens for a B etter Env' t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998); see a lso Si mon, 326 U. S
. at4 5 -4 6
. T h e p l ai n t i ff mu s t"p er s o n al l y

[ ] b en ef i ti na t an gi b l e w ay

fr o mth e c o urt 's int e rv e nti on ." War

th v . Se din , 4 22 U. S. 4 90 , 5 08 (1 97 5) . H e re , p la int if fs c ann ot m ake thi s showing
. P l a i n t i f f s a s s e rtd e f

e n d an t s d i s c r i m i n at e d

a g a i n s tD O J ' s H o n o r s P r o g r aman d S LIP applicants ba sed upon their political af filiations. But a de clar atory judgme nt that the Depa

rtment of Jus tice violated plaintiffs' rig hts under the U.S. Constituti on, the CSRA, the FRA, and the Pr iva c y Ac t w ou ld n ot e lim inate the a lle g e d e ff e c ts o f t his dis c ri min atio n. No r w ou ld i t
c omp e ns ate pla int if

fs fo r t he dis c ri min atio n. Rathe r, be c a us e pla int if

fs la c k s tand ing , if

thi s-30-

Court we re to gra

nt p la int if fs the de c larator

y re lie f t hat th e y se e k - - i .e ., de c lari ngtha t de fe nd ants ' pa st a c tio ns we re un c on sti tut ion a l or oth e rw ise un lawf

ul, se e Se c . A m. C omp l.¶ ¶ 2 37 -3 9 - - i t would amount to an advisory opinion of the ty

pe that Ar

ticle I I Istrictly

prohibits. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; Dy

naquest Corp. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 242 F.3d 1070, 1076 ( D.C. Cir. 2001). Be cause the dec laratory

relief soug ht by

plaintiffs would requir e the Court to exceed its limited jurisdiction by

issuing an a dvisory

opinion, the remainde r of plaintiffs' claims for de clar atory relief will be dismiss ed for

lack of standing
. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt wi ll gra nt t he ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants ' mot ion s to dis mis s th e B ive ns c la ims (C ounts IX thr ou g h X I I I ) a g a ins t th e m. D OJ' s mo tio n to dis mis s w ill be g ra nte d in pa rt and de nie d in pa rt . T he Court

wi ll gra nt D OJ' s mo tio n w ithre sp e c t to Counts I I Ithroug h VI Iunder the Privacy Act. All equitable c laims will also be dismi ssed. Howe ver, DOJ's motion will be denied with respe ct to Counts Iand I I , and plaintiffs Saul, F aiella a nd Her ber ma y proce ed with those cla ims under subsections (e )(7) and (e )(5) of the Privac y Act. The other five plaintiffs will, howeve r, be dismissed from the c ase f or lac k of standingto pursue these re maining Priva cy

Act cla ims. A separate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

/s/ JohnD. B ate s J OHN D. B ATES Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge Dated: Septembe r 16, 2009