PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITEDNET LTD.; LEVI RUSSELL, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

TATA COMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, 

INC.; TATA COMMUNICATIONS 

INDIA; TATA SONS PRIVATE, LTD.; 

STEVEN LUCERO; LATINGROUP, 

LLC, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 23-2057 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01081-KWR-JFR)

_________________________________ 

Scott Fuqua of Fuqua Law & Policy, P.C., Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs - 

Appellants. 

Douglas D. Janicik (Karl Tilleman with him on the brief) of Dentons US LLP, Phoenix, 

Arizona, for Defendants - Appellees Steven Lucero and LatinGroup, LLC. 

Philip D. Robben (Randall L. Morrison Jr. with him on the brief) of Kelley Drye & 

Warren LLP, New York, New York, for Defendants - Appellees Tata Communications 

India, Ltd. and Tata Sons Private, Ltd. 

Katherine A. McNamara of Fraser Stryker PC LLO, Omaha, Nebraska, for Defendant - 

Appellee Tata Communications America, Inc. 

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 19, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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MORITZ, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

This case arises from a foreign business deal gone wrong. In 2016, Unitednet, 

Ltd., a United Kingdom company, entered into an agreement to purchase a fiber-optic 

telecommunications network owned by three foreign companies that are part of a 

multinational conglomerate described in the complaint as the “Tata Communications 

empire.” App. vol. 1, 3. But Steven Lucero, a New Mexico resident and key player in 

the deal, allegedly conspired with three other Tata companies to sink the deal so that 

he could purchase the network through his company based in New Mexico, 

LatinGroup, LLC. After the deal fell apart, Unitednet and its director, United 

Kingdom resident Levi Russell, filed this action in New Mexico federal district court. 

They asserted tortious interference with a contract and related claims against Lucero, 

LatinGroup, and the three Tata companies that allegedly participated in the 

conspiracy. But the district court dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non 

conveniens, determining that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum for 

the litigation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

foreign law applies and that the private and public interests at stake favor dismissal 

for forum non conveniens, we affirm. 

Background

The facts of this case, as alleged in the complaint, describe a failed business 

deal that began in 2013, when Tata Sons Private, Ltd., an Indian investment holding 

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company, decided to sell all noncore assets of the Tata empire to pay down its debt.1

One such asset was a fiber-optic telecommunications network that runs from the 

United Kingdom to the Netherlands. Through family connections to the Tata empire, 

Lucero learned of the sale and agreed to purchase the network “at a price well below 

market value” via his company, LatinGroup. Id. at 4. In early 2014, LatinGroup 

formally entered into a preliminary agreement to purchase the network from three 

foreign Tata companies—Tata Communications (UK) Ltd., Tata Communications 

(Netherlands) B.V., and Tata Communications (Bermuda) Ltd. (together, Tata 

sellers). 

During the ensuing negotiations, however, Lucero changed plans and decided 

to purchase the network through a separate corporate entity. To that end, Lucero 

formed Unitednet in the United Kingdom and had LatinGroup assign its purchase 

rights to Unitednet. Lucero also made Russell, a United Kingdom resident, 

Unitednet’s director and promised him an equity stake in the company as 

compensation. Based on that promise, Russell spent the next several years working 

on the deal. 

But at some point, Lucero allegedly changed course yet again and decided to 

sabotage the deal. Lucero realized that he would stand to gain if he could complete 

1

 In reviewing the district court’s forum non conveniens dismissal, we accept 

as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint unless they are contradicted by 

affidavits or other evidence. See DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd., 65 F.4th 

547, 550 (10th Cir.) (accepting factual allegations in complaint as true in reviewing 

forum non conveniens dismissal), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 197 (2023).

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the purchase through LatinGroup, as originally planned, rather than through 

Unitednet. In an effort to sink the deal, Lucero allegedly “played a dual game in 

which he exerted near total control over the negotiations [between Unitednet and the 

Tata sellers] for the purchase of the [network].” Id. at 5. Lucero purported to 

represent Unitednet’s interests “while at the same time working behind the scenes” 

with three other Tata companies—Tata Communications America, Inc., based in 

Virginia; Tata Communications India, Inc., based in India; and Tata Sons Private, the 

Indian investment holding company (together, Tata defendants)—to control the 

position of the Tata sellers. Id. In so doing, Lucero allegedly conspired with the Tata 

defendants to impose onerous terms on Unitednet, including a condition that 

Unitednet obtain a letter from a bank or investor showing that it had secured nearly 

$11 million in funding for the purchase. 

In March 2016, after several years of negotiations, Unitednet and the Tata 

sellers entered into a sale-and-purchase agreement. The agreement contains the 

funding-letter requirement, which provides that Unitednet must produce the letter 

showing the securance of nearly $11 million in financing “within 30 days of written 

request by the Tata . . . [s]ellers.” Id. at 145. It also contains a forum-selection clause 

stating that “[e]ach of the parties consents to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of 

the [c]ourts of England and Wales in any suit or proceeding arising out of or relating 

to th[e a]greement or the transactions contemplated by th[e a]greement.” Id. at 165. It 

additionally specifies that “[n]othing in th[e a]greement, express or implied, is 

intended to confer upon any [p]erson other than United[n]et or the Tata . . . [s]ellers 

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(or their successors or permitted assigns)[] any rights or remedies under or by reason 

of th[e a]greement.” Id. at 163–64. 

In April 2016, the Tata sellers requested that Unitednet produce the funding 

letter, but Unitednet failed to meet the 30-day deadline provided in the agreement. 

Eventually, after over a year without receipt of the requisite funding letter, the Tata 

sellers terminated the agreement. 

Unitednet and Russell then filed this suit in the District of New Mexico against 

Lucero, LatinGroup, and the Tata defendants (but not the Tata sellers). Plaintiffs 

asserted claims against all defendants for tortious interference with contract, civil 

conspiracy, and quantum meruit. They also alleged breach of fiduciary duty against 

Lucero, as well as aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against LatinGroup 

and the Tata defendants. Specifically, they asserted that Lucero took on responsibility 

for obtaining the required funding, but he repeatedly failed to do so and actively 

prevented Unitednet from securing financing. 

Lucero and LatinGroup moved to dismiss the claims brought against them 

under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the forum-selection clause 

in the agreement required plaintiffs to bring those claims in the United Kingdom. See 

Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60 

(2013) (explaining that procedurally, “the appropriate way to enforce a forumselection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum 

non conveniens” (italics omitted)). The same day, Tata Communications America 

also moved to dismiss the claims brought against it for forum non conveniens. 

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The district court denied Lucero and LatinGroup’s motion. It concluded that 

neither Lucero nor LatinGroup could enforce the forum-selection clause because they 

were not signatories to the agreement, and “the [a]greement expressly disclaims 

conferring any rights or remedies upon non[]signatory third parties.” Supp. App. 71. 

But the district court granted Tata Communications America’s motion. Unitednet, 

Ltd. v. Tata Commc’ns Am., Inc. (Unitednet I), No. 21-cv-01081, 2022 WL 1604802, 

at *17 (D.N.M. May 19, 2022). It determined that even though Tata Communications 

America also could not enforce the forum-selection clause, dismissal was appropriate 

under the typical forum non conveniens analysis because (1) the parties did not 

dispute that the United Kingdom was an appropriate and available alternative forum; 

(2) foreign law governs the claims; and (3) the private and public interests favor 

dismissal. See Archangel Diamond Corp. Liquidating Tr. v. Lukoil, 812 F.3d 799, 

804 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing typical forum non conveniens analysis that applies 

when there is no valid and enforceable forum-selection clause). The district court 

conditioned the dismissal on Tata Communications America submitting to 

jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and waiving any statute-of-limitations defenses. 

And if the United Kingdom courts refused jurisdiction, plaintiffs could reinstate their 

claims. The district court also ordered plaintiffs to show cause why it should not 

dismiss the claims against the remaining defendants under the same analysis it had 

just applied to the claims against Tata Communications America. 

In response to the show-cause order, plaintiffs asked the district court to 

reconsider its forum non conveniens analysis but did not otherwise object to the court 

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extending its analysis to the remaining claims. Plaintiffs also filed a one-paragraph 

motion to reconsider, which incorporated and referenced their response to the showcause order. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion and conditionally dismissed 

the claims against the remaining defendants for forum non conveniens. Unitednet, 

Ltd. v. Tata Commc’ns Am., Inc. (Unitednet II), No. 21-cv-01081, 2023 WL 2665578, 

at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2023). The district court imposed the same conditions it had 

placed on Tata Communications America, except that it did not require the two other 

Tata defendants—Tata Sons Private and Tata Communications India—to consent to 

jurisdiction in the United Kingdom (a condition they objected to).2

Plaintiffs appeal. 

Analysis 

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing the action for forum 

non conveniens. We review a forum non conveniens dismissal for abuse of 

discretion. Lukoil, 812 F.3d at 803. Under this standard, “we examine the district 

court’s legal determinations de novo[] and its underlying factual findings for clear 

error.” Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2009). 

Forum non conveniens is a flexible, common-law doctrine that empowers a 

district court to decline jurisdiction over a case when another forum is better suited to 

adjudicate the dispute. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). The 

doctrine’s “central purpose . . . is to ensure that the trial is convenient.” Piper 

2

 The district court also denied as moot motions filed by Tata Sons Private and 

Tata Communications India seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

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Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981). Dismissal on forum non conveniens 

grounds “will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum 

imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court[] and where the plaintiff is 

unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting [that] choice.” Id. at 

249. 

 When evaluating a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, a district 

court begins its analysis with two threshold questions. Lukoil, 812 F.3d at 804. First, 

the court asks “whether there is an adequate alternative forum in which the defendant 

is amenable to process.” Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th 

Cir. 1998). Second, it considers “whether foreign law applies.” Id. If (and only if) 

“the answer to both questions is yes,” the court then weighs a list of private and 

public interests to determine whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Id. at 

605–06. Usually, the court applies “a strong presumption in favor of [a domestic] 

plaintiff’s choice of forum” because “it is reasonable to assume that this choice is 

convenient” for the plaintiff. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56. But “this 

assumption is much less reasonable” when, as here, the plaintiff is foreign. Id. at 256. 

So a foreign plaintiff’s forum choice “deserves less deference.”3 Id.

3

 We pause to note that a valid and enforceable forum-selection clause alters 

the typical forum non conveniens analysis. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63–64. When 

such a forum-selection clause is in play, the court gives no weight to the plaintiff’s 

conflicting forum choice and considers only the public-interest factors, treating the 

private-interest factors as “weigh[ing] entirely in favor of the preselected forum.” Id.

And because the public-interest factors are “rarely” strong enough to override the 

preselected forum, “the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control 

except in unusual cases.” Id. at 64. But here, recall that the district court concluded 

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On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that the United Kingdom offers an 

adequate alternative forum. But they challenge the district court’s choice-of-law 

determination that foreign law applies and its finding that the private- and publicinterest factors favor dismissal. 

I. Choice of Law 

We first consider the threshold choice-of-law issue, which we review de novo. 

Lukoil, 812 F.3d at 804. To determine whether foreign or domestic law governs a 

case, a federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum 

state—here, New Mexico.4 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 

496–97 (1941). In New Mexico, courts follow a two-step process to resolve choiceof-law questions. See Terrazas v. Garland & Loman, Inc., 142 P.3d 374, 377 (N.M. 

Ct. App. 2006). They first characterize “the area of substantive law—e.g., torts, 

contracts, domestic relations—to which the law of the forum assigns a particular 

claim or issue.” Id. The courts then utilize the New Mexico choice-of-law rule 

applicable to the relevant area of law to determine which substantive law governs. Id.

the forum-selection clause in the agreement was not in play because defendants were 

not signatories to the agreement—the only signatories were the Tata sellers and 

Unitednet. The district court thus applied the typical forum non conveniens analysis. 

4

 Plaintiffs’ opening brief asserts that the district court’s analysis of New 

Mexico’s choice-of-law principles was “unnecessary” in this case because no other 

jurisdiction has “any interest in the application of its law to [their] claims.” Aplt. Br. 

7. But plaintiffs properly recognized, both in their reply brief and at oral argument, 

that whether foreign law governs turns on the application of New Mexico’s choiceof-law principles. Indeed, “to determine whether American or foreign law governs,” a 

district court “must conduct a choice[-]of[-]law analysis” under the choice-of-law 

rules of the forum state. Needham v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th 

Cir. 1983). 

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 The parties in this case agree that all but one of plaintiffs’ claims (the quantum 

meruit claim) sound in tort. In tort actions, “New Mexico courts follow the doctrine 

of lex loci delicti commissi,” which directs courts to apply the substantive “law of the 

place where the wrong occurred.” Id. Under this rule, the place of the wrong is 

“where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes 

place.” Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377 (Am. L. Inst. 1934). And since 

“[a] tort is not complete until the plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury,” that place is 

usually “‘the location of the last act necessary to complete the injury.’” Santa Fe 

Techs., Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc., 42 P.3d 1221, 1229 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) 

(quoting Torres v. New Mexico, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995)). 

 Applying the place-of-the-wrong rule here, the district court held that foreign 

law applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims.5

 The district court first noted that on the claims 

for tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and 

abetting that breach, the alleged injury was “financial loss and the loss of the benefits 

under the [a]greement.” Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet 

II, 2023 WL 2665578, at *6. And on the civil-conspiracy claim, it was “the alleged 

interference with . . . Unitednet’s acquisition of funding.” Unitednet I, 2022 WL 

1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 2665578, at *7. The district court 

5

 The district court also said that it would reach the same conclusion under the 

most-significant-relationship test, which it said New Mexico courts have sometimes 

applied in complex cases. Because the parties agree that the place-of-the-wrong rule 

governs here, we follow their lead and apply that rule. We thus need not address 

plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred by alternatively applying the mostsignificant-relationship test. 

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then determined that the last act necessary to complete these injuries was the 

termination of the agreement between plaintiffs and the Tata sellers. Although the 

complaint does not specify where the termination occurred, the district court 

explained that it “could only have been overseas,” given that the Tata sellers are 

based in the United Kingdom, Bermuda, and the Netherlands. Unitednet I, 2022 WL 

1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 2665578, at *6. The district court 

thus concluded that the place of the wrong was overseas, requiring the application of 

foreign law. 

 Plaintiffs argue that the place of the wrong was actually New Mexico, where 

they assert defendants engaged in the tortious conduct, including “the last act of 

interference (or breach of fiduciary duty).”6

 Aplt. Br. 14. But plaintiffs’ assertion 

runs counter to the rule that there is no tort without injury. See Santa Fe Techs., 42 

P.3d at 1229. Because defendants’ alleged conduct did not become an actionable tort 

until plaintiffs suffered an injury, the place of the wrong was where plaintiffs’ injury 

occurred, even if the conduct resulting in that injury took place elsewhere. See id.; 

First Nat’l Bank v. Benson, 553 P.2d 1288, 1289 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that 

lex loci delicti doctrine requires application of “the law of the [s]tate of injury”).

 Plaintiffs nevertheless insist that, at least on the tortious-interference claim, 

they were injured when defendants took steps to ensure they could not perform their 

6

 It bears noting, however, that only two of the five defendants reside in New 

Mexico—Lucero and LatinGroup. And plaintiffs point to nothing in the complaint 

suggesting the three Tata defendants engaged in any tortious conduct in that state.

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obligations under the agreement. But the complaint does not allege that any injury 

resulted from such conduct until the termination of the agreement. Before that point, 

as defendants point out, “the fact that Unitednet did not secure the necessary funding 

to complete the asset purchase—which performance, in any event, was due in the 

[United Kingdom] (or overseas)—resulted in no actual [consequences] to 

United[net].” Aplee. Br. 23–24 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, the Tata sellers could 

have, for instance, excused plaintiffs’ nonperformance by waiving the funding-letter 

requirement or otherwise negotiated changes to the agreement to accommodate 

Unitednet’s financing issues. And had the Tata sellers done so, defendants’ alleged 

attempt to induce the agreement’s termination would have failed, such that plaintiffs 

would have suffered no injury. That is, plaintiffs would not have “los[t] the benefits 

of the [agreement].”7

 App. vol. 1, 27; see also Gen. Assur. of Am., Inc. v. Overby7

 After oral argument, plaintiffs filed a letter under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 28(j) in which they invoke Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A (Am. L. 

Inst. 1979) to argue they need not show that the alleged interference actually induced 

a breach or termination of the agreement to establish tortious interference with a 

contract. Section 766A allows a plaintiff to bring a tortious-interference claim “on 

the ground that the defendant interfered with his contract by causing his performance 

to be ‘more expensive or burdensome’ even if the contract was not breached” or 

terminated. Green Plains Trade Grp., LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 90 F.4th 

919, 924–25 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting § 766A). And plaintiffs cite an unreported 

district-court case predicting that the New Mexico Supreme Court, if presented with 

the issue, would adopt § 766A’s broader definition of interference. See Horizon AGProds. v. Precision Sys. Eng’g, Inc., No. 09-1109, 2010 WL 4054131, at *10 

(D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2010). But plaintiffs have waived this § 766A argument by waiting 

until their Rule 28(j) letter to make it. See Feinberg v. Comm’r, 916 F.3d 1330, 1337 

n.2 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e generally refuse to consider any . . . new issue introduced 

for the first time in a reply brief, let alone in a Rule 28(j) letter.” (alteration and 

omission in original) (quoting Niemi v. Lasshofer, 728 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 

2013))). In any event, the complaint does not plead a § 766A claim (nor do plaintiffs 

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Seawell Co., 533 F. App’x 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that under place-of-thewrong rule, plaintiff’s “alleged injury occurred in North Carolina, the place where 

[third party] terminated its contract with [plaintiff], which was the last event 

necessary to render [defendant] liable for” tortious interference with contract and 

breach of fiduciary duty).8

 

 Resisting this line of reasoning, plaintiffs rely on a district-court decision, 

Carroll v. Los Alamos National Security, LLC, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D.N.M. 2010), 

aff’d, 407 F. App’x 348 (10th Cir. 2011), to argue that the last act necessary to render 

defendants liable here was “the tortious conduct itself.” Aplt. Br. 16. But this reliance 

is misplaced. In Carroll, the plaintiff sued the administrator of an employee benefit 

plan for negligently misrepresenting that the plan he selected would provide 

reimbursement for certain contributions upon retirement. 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1202–05. 

The Carroll court noted that although the plaintiff, who had not yet retired, need not 

“have suffered calculable damages before the cause of action accrues, . . . ‘there [is] 

no cause of action for negligence until there ha[s] been a resulting injury.’” Id. at 

1221 (alterations in original) (quoting Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, Inc., 454 P.2d 

argue that it does). Instead, plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claim proceeds on a 

theory that defendants induced the termination of the agreement, asserting that 

defendants “played an active and substantial part in causing [p]laintiff[s] . . . to lose 

the benefits of the contract.” App. vol. 1, 27; see also Wolf v. Perry, 339 P.2d 679, 

682 (N.M. 1959) (“A necessary element of the tort of inducing a breach [or in this 

case, termination,] of contract is a showing that the defendant played an active and 

substantial part in causing the plaintiff to lose the benefits of [the] contract.”). 

8

 We cite this unpublished case for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 

32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

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963, 964 (N.M. 1969)). And in the Carroll court’s view, the plaintiff had already 

suffered some injury: he “was forced to select his pension plan without being 

correctly informed about his options.” Id. at 1223–24. But here, as discussed, 

plaintiffs fail to allege that they suffered any injury before the Tata sellers terminated 

the agreement. 

Plaintiffs next invoke the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Torres, 

894 P.2d 386, to argue that the last event necessary to give rise to liability must be 

the conduct of the tortfeasor, and not that of third parties like the Tata sellers. But 

Torres imposes no such requirement. There, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful-death 

action against the Albuquerque Police Department alleging that the department’s 

failure to properly investigate a murder suspect allowed the suspect to escape to 

California, where he then shot and killed two individuals. Id. at 388–89. The New 

Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that the shooting in California constituted the 

“last act necessary to complete the injury.” Id. at 390. But it nevertheless held that 

New Mexico law should apply because “the duties of law[-]enforcement personnel 

are defined by [state law],” and “‘[p]ublic policy dictates that New Mexico law 

determine[s] the existence of duties and immunities on the part of New Mexico 

officials.’” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Wittkowski v. New Mexico, 710 

P.2d 93, 96 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)). In other words, as the New Mexico Court of 

Appeals later put it, “Torres accept[ed] the general rule that New Mexico courts will 

apply the tort law of the state where the wrong occurred.” In re Gilmore, 946 P.2d 

1130, 1135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). But Torres declined to apply that rule under the 

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circumstances because “such application would [have] violate[d] New Mexico public 

policy.” 894 P.2d at 390. 

Here, plaintiffs do not contend that this international business dispute 

implicates New Mexico public-policy considerations requiring us to depart from the 

place-of-the-wrong rule. Rather, they argue that under this rule, New Mexico’s 

substantive law governs. But for the reasons discussed, plaintiffs fail to convince us 

that the place of the wrong in this case was New Mexico. We instead agree with the 

district court that the place of the wrong was overseas, where the Tata sellers 

terminated the agreement, because the agreement’s termination was the last event 

necessary to make defendants liable for the alleged torts. See Santa Fe Techs., 42 

P.3d at 1229.

In short, we see no error in the district court’s conclusion that foreign law 

applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims. And plaintiffs do not dispute that if foreign law 

governs “the vast majority of the underlying dispute,” the threshold choice-of-law 

requirement is satisfied.9 Lukoil, 812 F.3d at 806; see also id. (“[W]e have not . . . 

foreclose[d] consideration of forum non conveniens when some of the claims are 

9

 Recall that the complaint asserts only one claim that does not sound in tort—

quantum meruit. The district court did not definitively decide whether foreign law 

applies to this claim, concluding that even if New Mexico law were to apply, it 

“would still find dismissal for forum non conveniens appropriate, as the vast majority 

of the underlying dispute is subject to English law.” Unitednet II, 2023 WL 2665578, 

at *7 (italics omitted); see also Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *16. On appeal, 

plaintiffs do not address whether foreign law applies to their quantum meruit claim. 

And because plaintiffs do not argue that dismissing the case for forum non 

conveniens is inappropriate if New Mexico law applies to this single claim, we do not 

address it either. 

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based on U.S. law and some are based on foreign law. To do otherwise would allow a 

party to avoid a forum non conveniens dismissal simply by including a [domestic] 

claim . . . .”). 

II. Balance of Private and Public Interests 

 We now turn to the district court’s analysis of the private-interest and publicinterest factors. Our review of that analysis “is quite limited.” Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 

576 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2009). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, “[w]e 

must ‘carefully examine’” the district court’s reasoning, “but where the [district] 

court ‘has considered all relevant public[-] and private[-]interest factors, and where 

its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial 

deference.’” Id. at 1172–73 (quoting Gschwind, 161 F.3d at 606). 

A. Private-Interest Factors 

We begin with the private-interest factors, which concern the interests of those 

participating in the litigation. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. These factors include: 

(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) availability of 

compulsory process for compelling attendance of witnesses; (3) cost of 

obtaining attendance of willing non[]party witnesses; (4) possibility of a 

view of the premises, if appropriate; and (5) all other practical problems 

that make trial of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. 

Gschwind, 161 F.3d at 606. 

The district court found that the private interests favored a foreign forum, 

focusing on the location of the parties and witnesses. The district court noted that it 

appeared from the complaint that the parties and witnesses were “located all over the 

world.” Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 

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2665578, at *8. Indeed, the parties are based in the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and India. And the Tata sellers, “whose officers or employees are likely to 

be called as witnesses,” are based in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 

Bermuda. Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 

2665578, at *8. So if it were to retain the case, the district court determined, the 

presence of the parties and witnesses would likely require extensive travel to New 

Mexico from the United Kingdom, India, the Netherlands, and Bermuda—an 

inconvenient task that would cause the parties to incur significant expenses. To be 

sure, the district court acknowledged, neither party presented evidence that any 

witnesses could not be compelled or would be unwilling to attend a trial in New 

Mexico. But even so, the district court remained unconvinced that plaintiffs’ 

suggestion of using “teleconferencing technology suffice[d] to mitigate the cost of 

travel and significant inconvenience that appear[ed] to favor litigation in the United 

Kingdom.” Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 

2665578, at *8.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s concerns about the costs associated 

with travel are misguided. They contend that the judicial system’s response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic confirms it is possible to conduct an entire jury trial by 

videoconference, with every witness and attorney appearing remotely. And even if 

some did choose to appear in person, plaintiffs maintain, those for whom travel 

would be too disruptive and expensive could still appear remotely. Given this 

availability of videoconferencing technology, plaintiffs assert that the private-interest 

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factors “do[] not compel” dismissal here. Aplt. Br. 23.

But in evaluating the district court’s exercise of discretion, we do not ask 

whether the private-interest factors compel dismissal. Rather, we examine whether 

the district court considered the relevant factors and reasonably balanced them. See

Yavuz, 576 F.3d at 1172–73. And here, the district court explicitly considered the 

availability of videoconferencing technology but determined that the private-interest 

factors, on balance, still favored dismissal because the bulk of witnesses are located 

abroad. While plaintiffs disagree with the district court’s analysis, they identify 

nothing unreasonable about it. We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that the private-interest factors favored dismissal. 

See id. 

B. Public-Interest Factors 

 That leaves us with the public-interest factors, which include: 

(1) administrative difficulties of courts with congested dockets which 

can be caused by cases not being filed at their place of origin; (2) the 

burden of jury duty on members of a community with no connection to 

the litigation; (3) the local interest in having localized controversies 

decided at home; and (4) the appropriateness of having diversity cases 

tried in a forum that is familiar with the governing law. 

Gschwind, 161 F.3d at 606. 

The district court determined that the public-interest factors also favored 

dismissal. It explained that “the District of New Mexico face[s] a heavy criminal and 

civil docket,” and retaining this case would present “significant administrative 

difficulties, such as assisting the parties in their efforts to obtain witnesses from 

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around the globe for depositions and trial.” Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *17; 

see also Unitednet II, 2023 WL 2665578, at *8. The district court acknowledged that 

the case has some connection to New Mexico, given that Lucero resides in the state 

and LatinGroup maintains its principal place of business there. But beyond those two 

defendants, the district court observed, the complaint does not allege any ties to the 

state or otherwise raise a local dispute. And without a dispute local to the New 

Mexico community, the district court saw little public interest in burdening the 

community with jury service. By contrast, the district court explained, the dispute has 

strong ties to the United Kingdom, which possesses a much more substantial interest 

in deciding a case that “concerns injury to [its] citizens,” includes “an English 

contract,” involves the acquisition of a telecommunications network connecting the 

United Kingdom and Netherlands, and “will require the application of laws of the 

United Kingdom or England.” Unitednet II, 2023 WL 2665578, at *8; see also 

Unitednet I, 2022 WL 1604802, at *17. The district court thus concluded that the 

public-interest factors tipped in favor of litigation in the United Kingdom. 

Plaintiffs insist otherwise, arguing that the public-interest factors weigh in 

favor of keeping the case in the District of New Mexico. In support, plaintiffs stress 

that they seek to apply New Mexico law to redress wrongful conduct engaged in by a 

New Mexico resident, his New Mexico company, and his three foreign 

coconspirators. But as explained above, the district court correctly concluded that 

foreign law, not New Mexico law, applies. And the district court recognized that two 

defendants reside in New Mexico but reasonably found that the United Kingdom has 

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much stronger ties to the case and a much greater interest in resolving it. Because the 

district court neither ignored nor unreasonably balanced the public-interest factors, 

we again find no abuse of discretion. See Yavuz, 576 F.3d at 1172–73. 

In sum, there is no dispute that the United Kingdom is an adequate and 

available alternative forum, and the district court properly determined that foreign 

law governs this dispute. The district court then appropriately balanced the relevant 

private- and public-interest factors to conclude that they favored the United Kingdom 

as the more convenient forum. The district court thus acted within its discretion to 

dismiss the case for forum non conveniens.10 See id.

Conclusion 

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action 

for forum non conveniens, we affirm. 

10 Given this conclusion, we need not address defendants’ alternative argument 

that the district court erred in concluding that they could not enforce the agreement’s 

forum-selection clause. Nor do we consider their argument that the district court 

should have dismissed the claims against Tata Sons Private and Tata 

Communications America for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

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