Filed 10/26/23 P. v. Long CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT KEVIN LONG,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B325409

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA078020)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed. 

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, 

Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

A jury found defendant Robert Kevin Long guilty of five 

counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (counts 1, 4, 6, 7, 

& 9; Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)) and three counts of continuous 

sexual abuse (counts 3, 5, & 8; § 288.5, subd. (a)). The jury 

further found true allegations that the crimes involved multiple 

victims. (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e).) The court sentenced 

defendant to prison for 120 years to life.

Defendant contends (1) the court erroneously admitted 

evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome

(CSAAS); and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance 

of counsel. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Prosecution Evidence

1. T.C.2

T.C. testified to the following.

In September 1990, when T.C. was 10 years old, T.C.’s 

mother began a dating relationship with defendant. The three 

of them and T.C.’s brother lived together in a house in Carson.

On numerous occasions over a two-year period, defendant 

would enter T.C.’s bedroom at night, pull down T.C.’s pants and 

rub his penis on T.C.’s “butt” until he ejaculated. The contact 

was “skin to skin.” He told T.C., “Don’t tell your mother.” 

Defendant sometimes engaged in similar conduct during the 

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.

2 The prosecution did not allege any crime committed 

against T.C. Her testimony was introduced pursuant to Evidence 

Code section 1108, subdivision (a).
3

daytime, after T.C. came home from school. On one occasion, 

defendant tried to penetrate T.C. vaginally, but stopped when she 

screamed. He then tried to penetrate her rectum. Other times, 

defendant would rub T.C.’s breasts and her vaginal area with his 

hand. Defendant told T.C. that if she told her mother, “he would 

hurt [her] mother.” T.C. took these threats seriously.

Defendant’s sexual abuse of T.C. occurred between 50 and

100 times. The abuse ended when defendant and T.C.’s mother 

ended their relationship in early 1992. Soon afterward, T.C. told 

her mother about the abuse.

On cross-examination, T.C. said that she had not told her 

mother earlier because she “didn’t want anything bad to happen 

to her.” She had talked with a friend about the abuse throughout 

the time it was occurring because the friend “was experiencing 

the same thing.” She did not report the abuse to “an authority.”

2. K.S.

K.S. was born in December 1993. She was 28 years old 

when she testified at trial.

In 1998, K.S.’s mother and defendant began a dating 

relationship. They married in 2000 or 2001, when K.S. was 

seven years old. K.S., her mother, an older brother, and 

defendant lived together in a house in Lancaster.

K.S. testified that she “had a pretty good relationship” 

with defendant “when [she] was a kid,” and considered him 

her “dad.” Their relationship changed one night when she was 

sleeping on her stomach in bed and awoke to feel defendant 

on top of her “grinding” his penis against her “butt area.” Both 

of them were clothed. When K.S.’s mother called for defendant, 

he stopped and left the room. This occurred when K.S. was in 

kindergarten and about six or seven years old.
4

Similar conduct thereafter “happened repeatedly,” “maybe 

five times a month” over a three or four-year period. The conduct 

usually took place “on top of [K.S.’s] clothing.” Once, however, 

defendant pulled down K.S.’s pants and rubbed his erect penis on 

K.S.’s “vagina area” and her “butt area.” K.S. was eight years old 

when this occurred. Another time, defendant engaged in “the 

same type of gyration,” but it ended with defendant ejaculating

on her “butt” and “arm.” Once, defendant put his hands inside 

K.S.’s pants and touched her “vagina.” Another time, he took 

K.S.’s hand and put it down his pants until K.S.’s hand touched 

his penis.

K.S. testified that she did not tell anyone about defendant’s 

sexual abuse as a child because she was “[s]cared of getting in 

trouble, punished, nobody believing [her]. A lot of things. Losing 

the relationship with [her] family.” She thought that if she said 

something, defendant might harm her or her mother. She also 

feared that if others did not believe her she would be “outcasted 

or something like that.” She was also afraid that she would lose 

her “relationship with the only father [she] knew.”

After defendant and K.S.’s mother ended their relationship, 

defendant married the mother of R.M., another victim of 

defendant’s sexual abuse. K.S. and R.M. became friends. K.S.

did not talk to R.M. about defendant’s sexual abuse of her. K.S.

explained at trial that she thought defendant might have done 

that to her only, and if she spoke to R.M. about it, R.M. might 

“look at [her] weird.”

In 2012 or 2013, K.S. communicated with defendant 

through Facebook, and told him: “I never forgot what you did 

to me.” She had no further contact with him.
5

While attending college in 2017, K.S. spoke to others for the 

first time about defendant’s sexual abuse. Later that year, K.S.’s 

mother told her that “something happen[ed]” to R.M. K.S. knew 

she was referring to sexual abuse and told her mother that she 

believed R.M. “because it happened to me.” In August 2017, K.S.

reported the matter to law enforcement.

On cross-examination, K.S. admitted that she told an 

investigating officer that the abuse occurred 10 to 15 times—

far less often than her testimony during trial. She also stated 

that, prior to talking to fellow students in college when she 

was 23 years old, she had never told anyone in her family, law 

enforcement, doctors, or nurses about the abuse.

3. C.W.

C.W. was born in July 1996. She was 26 years old at the 

time of trial.

K.S.’s maternal grandmother adopted C.W. when C.W. was 

five years old. C.W. was thus the sister of K.S.’s mother, but two 

years younger than K.S. Around the year 2000, C.W. visited with 

K.S. at K.S.’s house about two times each week and sometimes 

stayed overnight.

C.W. testified to five specific incidents of sexual contact

involving defendant. When C.W. was four years old, defendant 

took her to a bedroom where he laid her on the bed and pulled 

her pants down. Defendant rubbed his penis “against [her] 

vagina” for a couple of minutes. When he finished, there was 

fluid on her “private areas.” Defendant told C.W. not to tell 

anyone, and C.W. felt that if she did, she “would get in trouble.”

In the second incident, defendant took C.W. into the 

backseat of a car parked in defendant’s garage, where he rubbed

his penis against C.W.’s genitals. A third, similar incident 
6

occurred in a bathroom, and a fourth in a closet. The last 

incident occurred when C.W. was eight years old. As she 

prepared to go swimming in a pool with other children, defendant 

took C.W. to his room and started rubbing his penis against her. 

He stopped when C.W. told him, “No. No. No.”

C.W. testified that there were “at least ten” incidents 

involving defendant rubbing his penis, “skin to skin,” against 

her genitals.

C.W. did not tell anyone about the sexual abuse when 

she was a child primarily because she “thought [she] would get 

in trouble.” When she was 18 years old, she told her “birth mom,” 

and soon afterward, her adoptive mother. She also spoke with 

K.S. and R.M. about the incidents. Later, C.W. told a detective 

who had contacted her in response to K.S.’s report of defendant’s 

abuse toward her.

On cross-examination, C.W. testified that she never told 

anyone at school or doctors about the incidents.

4. R.M.

R.M. was born in December 1995. At the time of trial, 

she was 26 years old.

R.M.’s mother married defendant when R.M. was about 

seven or eight years old. R.M., her mother, defendant, and 

R.M.’s three siblings lived together in an apartment in Lancaster. 

R.M. called defendant, “Dad.”

R.M. described five specific instances of sexual abuse 

by defendant that took place from approximately 2003 until 

approximately 2008. The first occurred when R.M. was eight 

years old. R.M. was sitting on defendant’s lap as defendant 

drove a “quad”—a vehicle that is “like a motorcycle, but [with] 
7

four wheels.” As they rode the quad, R.M. could feel defendant 

“grinding” his penis against her “butt.”

The second occasion occurred when R.M. was sleeping 

on a couch on her stomach and awoke when defendant was on 

top of her “grinding his penis area on [her] butt.” Both of them 

were clothed. R.M. got up off the couch and went to her room. 

Neither said anything to the other.

In the third and fourth instances, defendant took R.M. into 

his room and rubbed his exposed penis against R.M.’s clothed 

buttocks until he ejaculated onto her pants.

During the fifth incident, defendant locked R.M. inside a 

room. He pulled R.M.’s pants and underwear down and rubbed 

his penis against her genitals.

Defendant committed acts of rubbing his penis against 

R.M.’s “butt” more than 40 times over the course of about 

five years and “about 85 [percent] of the time [she] had [her] 

clothes on.” The other times, his penis was exposed and the 

contact “was skin-to-skin.” On other occasions, defendant 

touched her “vagina” with his fingers. On one occasion, when 

R.M. was 10 or 11 years old, defendant lifted R.M.’s shirt 

and sucked on her breasts.

In early 2009, R.M. told her sister’s friend about 

defendant’s sexual abuse. She also told her physical education

coach. In March 2009, she reported the matter to law

enforcement. An investigation ensued that resulted in her and

her sisters being placed in foster care. Around this time, she 

expressed her thoughts in a diary, in which she wrote of wanting 

“to kill [her]self,” to “cut [her]self,” and “to die.”

About three weeks after reporting the conduct to law 

enforcement, R.M. told a deputy sheriff that she had “lied about
8

everything.” During trial, she testified that she did so because 

she knew that her report “would not only affect [her], it would 

affect [her] sister, [her] brother, [her] mom; and [she] didn’t want 

anything to happen to [them].”

5. Monica Borunda (CSAAS expert)

Monica Borunda is a child forensic interviewer, who 

testified as an expert regarding CSAAS. She described CSAAS 

as “a model that helps clinicians understand the way children 

will respond when they have been sexually abused.” She 

explained that the syndrome has five components. The first is 

secrecy: The child victim of abuse may want to keep the abuse 

secret because of express or implied threats of harm to the victim 

or others, or because of fear of “get[ting] in trouble” or of how 

family members will react.

The second component is helplessness. A child who is 

abused by a family member may be confused about the incidents, 

and not know how to get help or articulate what occurred.

The third component is “entrapment accommodation.” The 

child may learn a variety of strategies for coping with ongoing 

abuse, including showing affection toward the abuser.

The fourth component is delayed disclosure. It is common, 

Borunda stated, for persons abused as children not to tell anyone 

until they are an adult, and to make disclosure incrementally. 

The victim may also recall more incidents over time. It is also 

common to have different interviews of the victim yield variations 

of what occurred.

The fifth component is retraction or recantation. The 

child may see negative consequences to the family as a result 

of reporting the conduct and think, “If I take it back, I can undo 

everything.”
9

Lastly, Borunda explained that every child responds 

differently to abuse and not every child experiences each of 

the five components.

On cross-examination, Borunda stated that children 

sometimes falsely assert sexual abuse claims. A child might 

make a false claim if an adult tells the child to do so, or if the 

children assert a false claim out of anger directed at the alleged 

abuser. When the prosecutor asked her about such claims on 

redirect, Borunda stated that “[t]he statistics put it at around 

two to ten percent.”

B. Defense

Defendant testified in his defense and denied any sexual 

conduct with his accusers. He said that when K.S. was a 

teenager, she asked defendant to buy her a car. When defendant 

declined, K.S. became upset. He said he allowed R.M. to sit on

his lap when they rode quads to teach her how to drive them. 

He did not, however, “do anything like mov[e] [his] pelvis against 

[R.M.’s] buttocks.”

C. CSAAS Instruction

The court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 10.64 as 

follows: “Evidence has been presented to you concerning child 

sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. This evidence is not 

received and must not be considered by you as proof that the 

alleged victim's molestation claim is true. [¶] Child sexual abuse 

accommodation syndrome research is based upon an approach 

that is completely different from that which you must take to 

this case. The syndrome research begins with the assumption 

that a molestation has occurred, and seeks to describe and 

explain common reactions of children to that experience. As 
10

distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume 

the defendant innocent. The People have the burden of proving 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] You should consider the 

evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the 

limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim’s 

reactions, as demonstrated by the evidence, are not inconsistent 

with her having been molested.”

DISCUSSION

A. Admissibility of CSAAS Expert Testimony

Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing 

Borunda to testify as to CSAAS because such evidence is—

or should be—generally inadmissible. He acknowledges that 

California courts have consistently approved the use of CSAAS 

evidence when offered to rehabilitate the credibility of victimwitnesses when the defendant suggests that the witness’s 

conduct after the incident is inconsistent with his or her 

testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 

231, 245; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744; 

People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 (Bowker).) 

He further concedes that our Supreme Court in People v. 

McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 (McAlpin) approved of the 

use of expert testimony regarding CSAAS.

In McAlpin, a nine-year-old child informed her mother that 

the defendant—a man the mother was dating—sexually molested 

her. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1295–1296.) The mother, 

however, did not immediately terminate her relationship with 

the defendant or report the incident to police. Law enforcement 

got involved only after the child reported the incident to 

school authorities a year later. During trial, the prosecution 
11

was permitted to introduce “an expert on child molestation 

investigations,” who testified as to why a parent might not report 

a known child molestation. (Id. at p. 1298.) The Supreme Court 

upheld the admissibility of the testimony in part by relying 

on decisions approving of the use of CSAAS evidence. (Id. at

pp. 1300–1301.) “Courts of Appeal,” the McAlpin court stated, 

have held that “expert testimony on the common reactions of 

child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the 

complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; [but] . . . 

is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the 

defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—

e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her 

testimony claiming molestation.” (Id. at p. 1300.) The court 

further stated: “ ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse 

jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, 

and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s

seemingly self-impeaching behavior. [¶] The great majority of 

courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony.’ [Citation.]” (Id.

at p. 1301.) Although CSAAS evidence addresses the behavior 

of children after being molested, the court applied its rationale 

to permit “expert testimony” that “dealt with the failure . . . of 

the child’s parent . . . to report the molestation.” (Ibid.)

Because McAlpin involved the use of expert testimony to 

explain the victim’s parent’s behavior, the court’s statements 

regarding CSAAS are arguably dicta. When, however, the 

Supreme Court writes approvingly of principles that support 

its holding, it “does not make much difference” whether the 

court’s statement on the issue has been “elevate[d] . . . to a 

holding or whether it is a dictum that we must follow”; in either 

case, “[w]e follow.” (People v. Trice (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 984, 
12

987; accord, Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 

1163, 1169.) Indeed, defendant concedes that we have an 

“obligation to apply McAlpin to this case,” citing Auto Equity 

Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455. He 

argues, however, that we should “exercise [our] authority to 

record disagreement with that decision.”

We see no reason to depart from the Courts of Appeal 

who have addressed and upheld, generally, the admissibility of 

CSAAS evidence or to disagree with the Supreme Court’s implicit 

approval of its use in McAlpin. We therefore reject defendant’s 

broad-based challenge to the admissibility of such evidence.

Defendant appears to assert only one challenge to any 

particular testimony by Borunda. During cross-examination, 

defense counsel questioned Borunda as to whether children 

will make false claims about sexual abuse. On redirect, the 

prosecutor asked Borunda: “[E]arlier you testified . . . about 

false sexual allegations. And you testified that that’s actually 

very uncommon?” Borunda responded: “Yes. The statistics put 

it at around two to ten percent.” Defendant made no objection 

to the prosecutor’s question or Borunda’s response during 

trial. On appeal, defendant contends that Borunda’s “specific 

quantification, combined with Borunda’s assurances to the jury 

that neither adults nor children falsely report their childhood 

sexual abuse violated [defendant’s] right to due process.” The 

contention is forfeited by the failure to object. Even if Borunda’s 

reference to the statistical probability of a false claim was 

improper (see People v. Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 886

(Julian)), it was harmless. The reference was isolated and brief, 

and the prosecutor immediately moved on to another subject 

area. Based on our review of the entire record, there is not a 
13

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 

different in the absence of the statistical reference. (See 

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

Lastly, defendant argues that Borunda’s testimony 

regarding CSAAS components of delayed disclosure and 

recantation “improperly permitted the jury to apply ‘the 

syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was 

sexually abused.’ ” (Quoting Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 393.) Defendant points to the prosecution’s closing 

argument where counsel used Borunda’s testimony about 

CSAAS components to explain the victims’ delay in making 

their disclosures and other behavior. The defendant did not 

object to the summation during trial and therefore forfeited 

the argument on appeal. Even if it was preserved for appeal, 

we do not read the prosecutor’s argument as an impermissible 

attempt to prove that the witnesses were abused because they 

exhibited some of the components of CSAAS; but rather, as a

permissible explanation as to how the children’s CSAAS-like 

behavior was “not inconsistent with being sexually abused.”

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant contends that his trial counsel was 

constitutionally deficient for failing to object or move to strike 

Borunda’s testimony that “statistics put [the instances of children 

making false claims of abuse] at around two to ten percent.” The 

claim is without merit.

“To establish a violation of the constitutional right to 

effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his 

counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against the 

standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel’s 

performance was prejudicial in the sense that it ‘so undermined 
14

the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” (People v. 

Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 783–784 (Mayfield), quoting 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).) 

Even if Borunda’s reference to the false claims statistic 

was improper and might have been stricken if counsel raised the 

issue (see Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 886), counsel may 

have decided as a tactical matter not to do so because raising it 

might have served only to draw the jury’s attention to the brief 

statement. Such tactical decisions do not establish counsel’s 

incompetence. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 165; 

People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1140.) 

Defendant has also failed to show that counsel’s failure 

to object was prejudicial. To establish prejudice, defendant 

is required to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217–218, 

quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693–694.) Defendant 

makes no such showing here. The comment he complains of is 

isolated, brief, and in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 

in the record, insignificant. There is no reasonable probability 

that it had any effect on the outcome in this case. (See Mayfield, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 789; People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 816, 821.) We therefore reject defendant’s ineffective 

assistance argument. 
15

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.