Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-3014 | July 9, 2020 Page 1 of 26

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer A. Joas

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of Parental Rights of:

R.G., III (Minor Child)

and

S.G. (Mother) & R.G. (Father),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

July 9, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-3014

Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit 

Court

The Honorable James D. 

Humphrey, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

15C01-1905-JT-12

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-3014 | July 9, 2020 Page 2 of 26

Case Summary and Issues

[1] S.G. (“Mother”) and R.G. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”) separately appeal 

the juvenile court’s judgment terminating their parental rights to their minor 

child, R.G. (“Child”). This case presents two issues for our review: (1) 

whether Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) deprived Mother of 

due process by failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify through visitation 

before filing its petition to terminate her parental rights; and (2) whether the 

juvenile court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights was clearly 

erroneous. Concluding DCS did not deprive Mother of due process and the 

juvenile court’s judgment was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] Mother and Father were married in 2011 and are the biological parents of 

Child, born April 4, 2014. On June 19, 2017, DCS received a report alleging

that Child was being locked in a room and neglected; the report also alleged 

various safety issues in the home and unsanitary living conditions. The same 

day, DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Tristan Thomas and law enforcement 

officers visited Parents’ home, which was a single wide mobile home. 

[3] At the time DCS arrived, Mother was home with Child; Father and Child’s 

maternal aunt had left about two hours earlier to get groceries. As soon as 

Thomas walked inside the home, he observed Child in the hallway confined 

behind two baby gates stacked on top of each other from the floor almost to the 
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ceiling. Child was naked and had feces “caked on his arms, hands, feet, and 

. . . face.” Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 20. Behind the gate, Thomas 

saw feces on the floor and dirty diapers. And outside the gate, there was a 

potty-training toilet filled with urine. Thomas went through the gate to Child’s 

bedroom where he saw “more feces scattered on the floor, . . . dark spots in the 

carpet, [and] a torn and tattered mattress . . . [which] was [a] very yellow tint in 

color with feces smeared on top[.]” Id. at 22. There were also fifteen to twenty

applesauce packets all over the floor of Child’s room and feces smeared all over 

the window, walls, and a teddy bear. There were exposed electrical outlets. 

The room smelled of urine and some of the feces “had white mold growing on 

top of it,” possibly indicating it had been there for a while. Id. at 26. Thomas 

described Child as non-verbal and that Child used “his own language [of] 

grunts and moans” to communicate. Id. at 35. 

[4] Thomas spoke with Mother and “perceived that she was of a lower-functioning 

capacity.” Id. at 30. Mother indicated she put the gate on top of the other gate 

because Child would climb over one gate and get out. At some point, Father 

and maternal aunt returned. Father told Thomas that Mother had mental 

health issues and he worked a lot, which required that he leave Child with 

Mother. When asked about the condition of the home, Father explained that 

the smell was recent and due to their failure to clean over the last few days. 

Father stated that the home is cleaned often, and Child is bathed daily. 

[5] Child was removed from the home immediately. Before taking Child to his 

foster placement, Thomas used twenty to thirty baby wipes to clean the dirt and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-3014 | July 9, 2020 Page 4 of 26

crusted feces from Child. Despite his efforts, “it still wasn’t coming off.” Id. at 

33. At the time, Child’s hair was extremely long and matted. After Child was 

placed with his foster mother, she washed Child’s hair three times before 

contacting Thomas for permission to get Child’s hair cut because his hair could 

not be cleaned and continued to smell of urine. 

[6] On June 20, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”). The next day, the juvenile court held an initial/detention hearing 

during which the juvenile court entered denials on behalf of Parents. Following 

Child’s removal, Parents had two or three supervised visits with Child. 

However, on July 13, the State charged Parents each with two counts of neglect 

of a dependent, as Level 5 and Level 6 felonies, and one count of criminal 

confinement, a Level 6 felony, and Parents were arrested. See Exhibits, Volume 

I at 90. As a result, no contact orders were issued against Parents and DCS 

ceased all visitation. 

[7] Mother spent seventy-two days in the Indiana Department of Correction

(“DOC”) before she was released. Ultimately, in 2018, Father and Mother 

entered into separate plea agreements pursuant to which they each pleaded 

guilty to one count of Level 5 felony neglect of dependent, and the remaining 

charges were dismissed. Father was sentenced to six years, two years in 

community corrections and four years suspended to probation. See id. at 106. 

Mother was sentenced to six years, with credit for the seventy-two days spent in 

the DOC, 658 days in community corrections, and four years suspended to 

probation. See id. at 122. The no contact orders were to remain in effect for the 
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duration of Parents’ executed sentences and/or probation from the date of their 

sentencing: February 20, 2018 for Mother and August 1, 2018 for Father. 

[8] A fact-finding hearing was held on August 21, 2017, at the conclusion of which 

the juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS. Following a dispositional 

hearing, the juvenile court entered a dispositional decree ordering Parents to 

(among other things): maintain contact with the FCM; notify the FCM of any 

arrest or criminal charges; maintain stable, safe, and sanitary housing; timely 

enroll and participate in any recommended programs; complete a parenting 

assessment and all recommendations; attend scheduled visitation; and comply 

with the no contact order. See id. at 30-34. Mother was also ordered to 

complete a psychological evaluation, successfully complete all recommended 

treatment, and comply with mental health treatment.

[9] DCS FCM Karen Lindsey began working with Parents on July 18, 2017. 

When Lindsey was assigned the case, she put in referrals for home-based

casework, individual counseling, parenting classes, psychological evaluations, 

and visitation for Parents, as well as Fatherhood Engagement for Father. 

Ultimately, Lindsey worked with Parents for over two years. 

[10] Parents participated in home-based casework with Karen Duquette of Ireland 

Home Based Services. Duquette and Parents met weekly for just over two 

years – from June 2017 to July 2019 – during which time they focused on

parenting education, household cleaning, and obtaining benefits. Mother also 

began individual counseling with Melissa Hughes, a therapist at Bridges 
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Counseling. Mother attended counseling sessions weekly for fifteen months to 

work through trauma, develop coping skills and a healthy support network, and 

identify boundaries and feelings. Father enrolled in and completed the 

Nurturing Fathers program, a thirteen-week program that aids fathers in 

developing and understanding their emotions, parenting, co-parenting, and 

doing what is best for their child. Parents also completed the Nurturing 

Parenting program, a twelve to thirteen-week parenting program. 

[11] Following review hearings on December 20, 2017 and March 14, 2018, the 

juvenile court issued orders finding that Parents had been compliant with the 

case plan, participated in services, and enhanced their ability to fulfill their 

parental obligations. See id. at 38-39, 44. However, the juvenile court found 

that the cause of Child’s out-of-home placement had not been alleviated and 

Parents had not completed the goals in the dispositional decree. See id. at 39, 

44. On May 31, 2018, the juvenile court issued an order approving a 

permanency plan of reunification but finding that due to Parents’ on-going 

criminal case and the no contact order, DCS had not been able to offer 

visitation between Child and Parents. See id. at 48-49.

[12] In June 2018, Mother and Father each underwent a full psychological 

evaluation conducted by Linda McIntire, a licensed clinical psychologist. Dr. 

McIntire reported that Mother suffers from “significant cognitive impairment” 

and ultimately diagnosed her with a mild intellectual disability. Id. at 138. In 

her report, Dr. McIntire concluded that “the totality of this evaluation 

substantiates that [Mother] cannot, and should not, be responsible for [Child] 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-3014 | July 9, 2020 Page 7 of 26

alone; she virtually does not have the ability to safely do so, even with 

continued parenting education.” Id. at 139. As such, she recommended 

medication management, case management to develop independent living 

skills, and developmental services. Based on Mother’s evaluation, she 

concluded that Father “needs to be willing and able to function logistically as 

though he is a single parent[; he] will need to . . . embrace and master this role 

of primary responsible parent if reunification is to occur.” Id. at 140. 

[13] With respect to Father, Dr. McIntire reported that he does not have mental 

health disorder but testing “reveal[ed] some arrogant attitudes consistent with a 

mild narcissistic presentation[.]” Id. at 150. Specifically, she found that:

[Father] minimized the severity and duration of the problem . . . . 

He claimed that [C]hild was clean when he left shortly before 

DCS arrived and omitted any acknowledgement of the fecal 

smearing throughout the bedding, walls, and carpet. He 

described the house as less clean than usual . . . with no 

recognition that two adults should be fully able to pick up a 

house and clean up human waste, even with a toddler. . . . 

While he may not have had the experience to grasp the severity 

of [C]hild’s developmental delays, [Father] has the intellectual 

ability to understand that double-gating a child, living in human 

excrement, and failing to maintain a minimally clean house are 

negligent and/or dangerous; and, he has the capacity to 

anticipate that if his wife cannot self-care, she most certainly

cannot care for a fast-moving child who has the capacity to injure 

himself but not understand inherent dangers. While finding 

informal supports would be helpful, success in this case rests on 

[Father] assuming full responsibility for the home and [C]hild, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-3014 | July 9, 2020 Page 8 of 26

rather than abdicating care of a vulnerable child to a woman he 

describes as disabled and married in order to care for and protect.

Id. Accordingly, Dr. McIntire recommended that Father continue ongoing 

parenting education. 

[14] The juvenile court again found Parents to be cooperative and compliant with 

services on August 23, 2018. At the time, the no contact orders remained in 

effect. At some point, DCS requested that Stacey Cornett, a child therapist 

with Community Mental Health Center, complete a parenting assessment to 

determine whether Child would be harmed if visits were to occur. On 

November 21, a periodic case review was held during which Cornett testified 

she could not adequately complete a parenting assessment without first 

completing an Attaching and Bonding Assessment between Parents and Child. 

Therefore, the juvenile court authorized contact between Parents and Child for 

the sole purpose of completing the assessment. The no contact orders in 

Mother and Father’s respective criminal cases were modified to allow

therapeutic visits with Child through Cornett.

[15] Cornett completed separate parenting assessments. Cornett believed Mother 

had a “very shallow understanding” of and was “very dismissive of the idea” 

that Child suffered trauma, which Cornett identified as a “huge red flag” and 

very concerning. Tr., Vol. II at 146. In Father’s parenting assessment, he 

displayed a “strong denial that anything that had happened to [Child] as being 

traumatic . . . a very narcissistic type of presentation, which everything kind of 

circled back to him.” Id. at 147. Following the individual assessments, Cornett 
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supervised individual therapeutic visits between Child and each parent. Mother 

needed to be coached during her visit and acted more like a playmate than a 

caregiver. Cornett described Father’s nurturing capacity as weak and noted that 

Child took the lead in playing with Father. At one point, Cornett asked Father 

how he would handle a particular situation and he responded, “How am I 

supposed to know? I’m not a therapist.” Appealed Order at 5; see Tr., Vol. II at 

201.

[16] Following the individual visits, Cornett then supervised a joint visit with 

Parents and Child. Unfortunately, the visit was not successful. Child, rather 

than Parents, led the session and at one point, Father began poking Child to get 

him to laugh; however, Cornett described Child as being “notably agitated” and 

uncomfortable during the interaction. Tr., Vol. II at 163. Cornett instructed 

Father to stop poking Child, but Father ignored her. When he finally stopped, 

Child “walked across the room, got in a chair, tried to cover up his face, and 

curled into a ball” indicating that Child was “over his capacity [and] 

disassociating.” Id. at 164. Cornett stopped the visit immediately. Ultimately, 

these symptoms, in part, resulted in Child’s disinhibited social engagement 

disorder diagnosis. See id. at 165. After the unsuccessful joint visit, Cornett 

determined that no more visits should occur because “the level of disassociation 

[she witnessed] when a child gets to that point, they’re reliving, typically a 

traumatic event that is very disconcerting to them and they’re not in a state 

where they’re able to manage it, so that’s a protective mechanism to keep them 

from experiencing the stress of that situation.” Id. at 167. Cornett consulted 
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two other child psychiatrists and both concluded visits would cause undue 

harm to Child and no more visits should occur.

[17] As part of her criminal case, Mother was on house arrest until January 2019. 

Following a hearing on February 25, 2019, the juvenile court issued an order 

finding that Parents had been compliant with services; however, the

“application of that information continues to be a struggle” and Parents “have 

not been able to demonstrate that they are capable of caring for [C]hild.” 

Exhibits, Vol. I at 66-67. The juvenile court changed Child’s permanency plan

from reunification to adoption. 

[18] DCS filed its verified petition to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights 

to Child on May 3, 2019. Since DCS intervention, Parents had cleaned the 

home and been able to maintain the cleanliness and organization, and, at some 

point in 2019, Father made significant improvements on the home, including 

new flooring.

[19] A fact-finding hearing was held over the course of five days between June and 

October. Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating 

Parents’ parental rights. In addition to making findings about the facts

previously stated, the juvenile court made the following additional findings 

relating to a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being:

f) . . . The evidence [of the condition of] the home is 

consistent with long term neglect which led to the horrendous 
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living conditions of [C]hild. The home conditions and the state 

of [C]hild occurred over a long period of time.

* * * 

h) . . . [Child’s foster mother] stated that [C]hild had no 

language skills and had his own language of grunts and basic 

words to express himself. [C]hild also had boundary issues, 

which concerned [her]. . . . [Child’s foster mother] took [C]hild 

to speech therapy throughout October and November 2017. 

[C]hild is now attending individual therapy. He is still delayed 

on vocabulary and social skills, but he has greatly improved since 

being placed with her.

i) [C]hild’s preschool teacher, . . . had initial concerns about 

[Child’s] vocabulary and social skills [as well as] his food habits, 

because he would become emotional if his food was accidentally 

thrown away. This caused her to believe that he may not have 

been fed enough when he was with [P]arents. . . . 

* * * 

p) . . . While [P]arents consistently attended and participated 

in [home-based casework], lack of motivation . . . [was a]

persistent issue[ ]. Mother also had problems with independent 

living skills and multi-tasking, which is consistent with [her] 

psychological evaluation. . . . [P]arents were partially successful 

with completion of [home-based casework] services [but] it took 

weekly visits and weekly reminders for relatively simple tasks for 

be completed.

* * *
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u) . . . On two (2) separate occasions following the last visit, 

[C]hild told Ms. Cornet and FCM Lindsey that he didn’t want to 

see [P]arents again and that he didn’t like them.

v) [C]hild experienced the following deficits while living with 

[P]arents: no social interaction, a low vocabulary, and virtually 

no stimulation. [C]hild may never recover from these deficits, 

and [P]arents, with their own deficits, will not be able to help 

[C]hild overcome his deficits. . . . [P]arents are incapable of 

dealing with the significant, present and future needs of [C]hild –

conditions and needs which they created.

* * *

x) Mother . . . argued that the feces that was smeared on 

[Child’s] bedroom window and on himself was not feces; it was a 

snack cake she had given him before [DCS] arrived at the home. 

She also stated that his hair was matted because he ate the snack 

cake and then ran his hands through his hair. Mother admits 

that [C]hild was behind the baby gates when [DCS] arrived, but 

that she was cleaning the rest of the house, and she only puts him 

in that area when she’s cleaning. . . .

* * *

Termination is in the child’s best interests . . . in that:

a) Mother cannot, and should not, be the sole and primary 

caregiver for [C]hild. She cannot safely do so, even with the 

amount of parenting education that she has been offered or [with] 

continued parenting education. Mother’s developmental delay 

makes her unable to participate in abstract thinking – a necessity 

when parenting a child. No amount of help from service 
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providers or therapists can help her achieve a level of 

understanding to care for [C]hild.

b) Father continues to portray himself as a victim and 

continues to minimize the amount of trauma that [C]hild has

experienced. Father had approximately six (6) months of 

parenting education and was still unable to answer a simple

question . . . about how he would handle a particular situation. 

In addition, he dismissed Ms. Cornett during his joint visit 

session with [Mother] and [Child] and failed to follow her 

instructions, which led to [Child] shutting down and 

experiencing more trauma.

c) [P]arents have caused [Child] trauma and developmental 

deficits, from which he may never recover. [Child] was treated 

as a caged animal as a result of [their] cruel confinement and 

neglect. [Child] became almost a feral child.

* * *

[P]arents’ minimization of the state of [C]hild when he was 

removed continues to be a concern. An additional concern is 

that the only plan that [P]arents have for the care of [C]hild is 

that [M]other would care for him with other institutional help. 

Father seems unwilling to accept the responsibility of being a 

single parent, and his “plan” is for [C]hild to go to school, then 

daycare, until [F]ather picked him up. In fact, [P]arents have 

shown that they are incapable of caring for [C]hild and his 

significant needs – special needs which they created. [Father] 

does not have a plan if [C]hild was sick or did not have school, 

which would leave that responsibility with [M]other, who is 

incapable of caring for [C]hild. [DCS] has a satisfactory plan for 

the care and treatment of [C]hild, which is: adoption.
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Appealed Order at 2-9. The juvenile court concluded that there is a reasonable 

probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 

to Child’s well-being and that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in 

Child’s best interests. Mother and Father now appeal separately.1 

Discussion and Decision 

I. Mother’s Appeal: Due Process

[20] Mother’s only claim on appeal is that DCS deprived her of due process by 

failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with Child, namely denying her

visitation with Child. As a threshold issue, we first address the State’s 

argument that Mother has waived appellate review of any due process claim

because she did not specifically raise the issue to the juvenile court during the 

CHINS or termination proceedings. See Consolidated Brief of Appellee at 34. 

[21] A parent’s failure to raise a due process claim to the trial court in a CHINS or 

termination proceeding results in waiver. S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 

N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). And although Mother argued in her 

opening and closing arguments at trial that DCS failed to make reasonable 

efforts to reunify the family, she concedes she did not specifically raise a due 

process issue to the juvenile court. See Appellants’ Brief of Mother at 15. 

1 On February 3, 2020, this court granted DCS’ motion to consolidate the Parents’ appeals and allowed DCS 

to file a consolidated brief.
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Nonetheless, this court has discretion to address such claims, especially when 

they involve constitutional rights, the violation of which would be fundamental 

error. Matter of D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), aff’d on reh’g, 

trans. denied; see also L.B. & S.B. v. Morgan Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 616 N.E.2d 

406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“The constitutionally protected right of parents 

to establish a home and raise their children . . . mandates that the failure of a 

trial court to require compliance with any condition precedent to the 

termination of this right constitutes fundamental error which this court must 

address sua sponte.”), trans. denied. Because Mother’s substantive due process 

right to raise her child is at issue, we exercise our discretion to review her due 

process claim even though it was not raised to the juvenile court. 

[22] The crux of Mother’s argument is that DCS failed to “provide meaningful 

visitation to [her] thereby failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify [her] with 

Child[.]” Br. of Mother at 14. Mother contends the alleged due process 

violation warrants reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights.2 We disagree and conclude DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the 

family and did not deprive Mother of due process.3

2

In her brief, Mother acknowledges she “does not challenge either the [juvenile court’s] findings or specific 

conclusions[.]” Id. at 13.

3

Father does not explicitly raise a due process argument with respect to visitation; however, he does argue 

that he complied with every aspect of the dispositional decree except visitation because the no contact order 

prevented him from doing so. See Appellant’s Brief [of Father] at 16. To the extent Father’s argument can be 

interpreted or construed as a due process argument, the same analysis discussed below is applicable to 

Father.
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[23] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no 

person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of 

law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV. The fundamental right to raise one’s child is 

“more basic, essential, and precious than property rights” and is protected by 

the Due Process Clause. Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 845 

N.E.2d 175, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Accordingly, when the State seeks to 

terminate a parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the 

requirements of the Due Process Clause. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). Due process in the context of parental rights requires balancing 

three factors specified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) the 

private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the 

State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest 

supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. at 335; Matter of D.H., 119 

N.E.3d at 588. The private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial, 

namely a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child. 

S.L., 997 N.E.2d at 1120. But the State’s interest in protecting a child’s welfare 

is also substantial. Id. Therefore, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS’ 

and the juvenile court’s actions. Id.

[24] During CHINS proceedings, “DCS is generally required to make reasonable 

efforts to preserve and reunify families[.]” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 (citing 

Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.5). And “[i]n determining the extent to which 

reasonable efforts to reunify or preserve a family are appropriate[,] the child’s 

health and safety are of paramount concern.” Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.5(a). 
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However, this CHINS provision is not a requisite element of our termination of 

parental rights statute, and even a complete failure to provide services would 

not serve to negate a necessary element of the termination statute and require 

reversal. In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Here, Mother 

and Father could not participate in visitation due to no contact orders 

attributable to their respective neglect of a dependent convictions, which were

entered to protect Child’s health and safety. DCS referred Mother and Father 

to numerous services, including home-based casework, individual counseling, 

parenting education and classes, and psychological evaluations – all aimed at 

enhancing Mother and Father’s ability to care for Child with the goal of 

reunifying the family. In fact, testimony at the fact-finding hearing revealed 

that DCS offered Parents every pertinent service they could think of. See Tr., 

Vol. II at 207 (DCS FCM testifying that, with respect to services, she “literally 

gave [Parents] every single [referral] that [she] could possibly think of”). 

[25] In sum, the no contact order is attributable to Mother’s own criminal charges

and was entered to protect Child and therefore, DCS could not offer visitation. 

Contrary to Mother’s argument, the record reveals that not only did DCS make

reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, it made every reasonable 

effort possible, and did not deprive Mother of due process. Even if DCS failed 

to provide any services, it is not an element of our termination of parental rights 

statute and cannot serve as a basis for reversal of termination of parental rights 

order. There was no due process violation.
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II. Father’s Appeal: Termination of Parental Rights

[26] Father contends the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights is 

clearly erroneous.

A. Standard of Review

[27] We reiterate that the right of parents to establish a home and raise their children 

is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The law 

provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or 

unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 

149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Although we acknowledge that the parent-child 

relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture[,]” we also 

recognize that “parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to 

the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to 

terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 

N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). The involuntary 

termination of one’s parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can 

impose because termination severs all rights of a parent to his or her children. 

See In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. As such, 

termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable 

efforts have failed. Id. The purpose of terminating parental rights is to protect 

children, not to punish parents. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.
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[28] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family 

& Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Instead, we 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. In deference to the trial court’s 

unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment 

terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 1161 (2002). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the decision, we 

must affirm. Id.

[29] The juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon as required 

by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8(c), and we therefore apply a two-tiered 

standard of review, Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, then determine whether the findings support the 

judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains 

no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 

N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings 

do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the 

judgment. Id.

B. Statutory Framework for Termination

[30] To terminate parental rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires DCS 

to prove, in relevant part:
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child. 

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

DCS must prove the foregoing elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. 

Code § 31-37-14-2; In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). However, 

because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive DCS need only prove 

one of those three elements by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re 

I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). If a juvenile court determines 

the allegations of the petition are true, then the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
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C. Threat to Child’s Well-being

[31] First, we note that Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s 

findings; therefore, we accept the findings as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 681 

N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Instead, Father challenges the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. In essence, Father 

contends this conclusion is erroneous because the undisputed record reveals he 

was “one hundred percent [compliant] with every aspect of the reunification 

plan” and “did everything he could to receive the information [the service 

providers] provided and change his behaviors and way of thinking.” [Father’s] 

Br. at 19. He argues that at the time of the fact-finding hearing, he had 

“completed every task he was set to and made every effort available.” Id.4 We 

conclude the juvenile court’s findings support its conclusion that the parentchild relationship with Father poses a threat to Child’s well-being. 

[32] In determining whether the continuation of a parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to a child, the juvenile court should consider a parent’s habitual pattern 

of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future 

neglect or deprivation. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The 

4 As noted above, supra ¶ 22 n.3, Father does not explicitly raise a due process argument or allege DCS failed 

to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family in his appellate brief. However, the heart of Father’s 

argument that termination of his parental rights was erroneous is that he was fully compliant with every 

requirement of the dispositional decree except for visitation due to the no contact order. See [Father’s] Br. at 

16. Because Father argued to the juvenile court that DCS did fail to make reasonable reunification effort, we 

reiterate that – to the extent that the substance of Father’s argument can be construed as the same argument 

he made at trial – our reasonable efforts/due process analysis above applies. See supra ¶¶ 24-25.
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juvenile court should also judge a parent’s fitness to care for a child as of the 

time of termination proceedings, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions. Id. When the evidence shows that the child’s emotional and 

physical development is threatened, termination of the parent-child relationship 

is appropriate. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210-11. Unfortunately, such is the case 

here.

[33] Here, the juvenile court concluded, “[P]arents caused [Child] trauma and 

developmental deficits, from which he may never recover. [Child] was treated 

as a caged animal as a result of [P]arent’s cruel confinement and neglect. 

[Child] became almost a feral child.” Appealed Order at 8. While in Parents’ 

care, Child had no social interaction or stimulation and, as a result, now suffers 

from various social and developmental deficits. When DCS initially 

intervened, Child was found confined behind gates, naked, covered in feces, 

and surrounded by extremely unsanitary living conditions. Child was severely 

developmentally delayed, had attachment and boundary issues, and no 

language skills. Cornett explained that children can have “such a lack of 

human interaction that they have developmental losses in so many areas or [do 

not] achieve developmental milestones.” Tr., Vol. II at 179. Child’s foster 

mother testified that when Child was placed with her, he was three years old 

but “he was more [of a] one-year-old, as far as what he was able to express and . 

. . understand. His abilities, his understanding of the world was really several 

years behind where he should have been[.]” Id. at 122. Similarly, Child’s 

preschool teacher stated that Child was “very far behind size-wise – behind [in] 
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development in every way, language-wise, cognitively” and that he did not 

have social or emotional regulation skills. Id. at 135. At the fact-finding 

hearing, she testified she has been Child’s preschool teacher for two year and 

Child is “still a bit below. He’s going to require continued support, and just 

continued high parenting skills and support[.]” Id. at 139. 

[34] There is no doubt that Father was compliant with services. However, the 

evidence demonstrates that despite all of these services, including six months of 

parenting education, he has consistently struggled to apply what he has learned,

rendering him incapable of caring for Child and the significant needs he created

for Child – thus posing a risk of future neglect and additional developmental

delays. This inability is illustrated in the therapeutic visit during which Cornett 

asked Father how he would handle a particular parenting situation and Father 

responded with “How am I supposed to know? I’m not a therapist.” Appealed 

Order at 5. The juvenile court found, based on Cornett’s testimony, “there 

were more concerning interactions, including a complete lack of nurturing 

behavior and an inability to follow simple directions.” Id. Ultimately, Cornett

did not believe Parents, given their own deficits, would be able to care for 

Child, who now has significant needs. See Tr., Vol. II at 180.

[35] In sum, the evidence in the record and the juvenile court’s findings sufficiently 

support the conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to Child’s well-being.
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D. Best Interests

[36] Father also takes issue with the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of 

parental rights is in Child’s best interests.

[37] To determine the best interests of children, the juvenile court looks to the 

totality of the evidence and must subordinate the interests of the parents to 

those of the children. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. “A child’s need for 

permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a 

child[.]” In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before 

terminating parental rights. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children,

798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[38] “A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the 

parent’s current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of 

parental rights is in the best interests of the child[ ].” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373. 

And a child should not be compelled to suffer emotional injury, psychological 

adjustments, and instability to preserve parental rights. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 

210.

[39] Here, the juvenile court found that termination of Father’s parental rights 

would be in Child’s best interests because Father consistently minimizes Child’s 

trauma, portrays himself as a victim, and fails to take responsibility for his role 

in creating this trauma and resulting deficits. In addition, the juvenile court 

found:
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the only plan that [P]arents have for the care of [C]hild is that 

[M]other would care for him with other institutional help. 

Father seems unwilling to accept the responsibility of being a 

single parent, and his “plan” is for [C]hild to go to school, then 

daycare, until [F]ather picked him up. In fact, [P]arents have 

shown that they are incapable of caring for [C]hild and his 

significant needs – special needs which they created. [Father] 

does not have a plan if [C]hild was sick or did not have school, 

which would leave that responsibility with [M]other, who is 

incapable of caring for [C]hild. 

Appealed Order at 8-9. 

[40] Father subjected Child to long term neglect and cruel confinement such that 

Child was significantly harmed and continues to have social and developmental 

deficits. Despite significant parenting education, Father is still incapable of 

caring for Child – particularly a child with exceptional needs – and it is 

undisputed that Child has made significant improvements since his removal 

from Parents. The testimony of service providers may support a finding that 

termination is in a child’s best interests. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. And here, Cornett and FCM Lindsey both

testified at the fact-finding hearing that termination of the parent-child 

relationship is in Child’s best interests. See Tr., Vol. II at 174, 207. Given this 

evidence, the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in Child’s best 

interest is supported by the evidence and the findings.

Conclusion
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[41] We conclude Mother has not shown she was deprived of due process and the 

juvenile court’s findings support its judgment terminating Parents’ parental 

rights. Therefore, the termination order is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, 

we affirm. 

[42] Affirmed.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.