J-S39013- 14

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.G., A MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPEAL OF: R.W. No. 1786 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Order September 20 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 63

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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., WECHT, J. and PLATT, J.* MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2014 R.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on Sep tember 20, 2013, that granted the petition filed by the Washing ton County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (“CYS”) to involuntarily te rminate her parental rights to her minor , female child, A.G. (“Child”) (born in December of 201 0) pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 1 We affirm. On February 6, 2011, CYS first became involved with t his family after CYS received a referral that Child was admitted to Ch ildren’s Hospital with a left clavicle fracture, multiple acute rib fractures on h er left side, multiple healing rib fractures on her right side, transverse fract ure of her right femur,

____________________________________________ 1 On December 4, 2012, Child’s father, T.G. (“Father”), signed a consent form, voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights t o Child. Father does not challenge the termination of his parental rights to C hild, nor is he a party to this appeal.J-S39013- 14

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multipl e classic metaphyseal lesion (“CML”) fractures of the right tibia, CML fractures of the left metatarsal foot, and failure to thrive. Mother has a history of mental health issues, and has been involved in mental health treatment since she was an adolescent. Mother had been a dependent child and the victim of sexual and physical abuse. Mother’s m ental health history includes self-cutting, suicidal ideation and a history o f hearing voices.
On February 6, 2011, as a result of the referral, CYS entered into a Voluntary Placement Agreement with Mother and Father that Child was removed from the care of Mother and Father on Februa ry 11, 2011. Child was placed into CYS shelter care due to the serious inju ries she had suffered after being assaulted by Father, and by Mother’s failure to protect her. Due to the serious injuries inflicted on the child, both Fat her and Mother were charged with criminal offenses.
On March 7, 2011, an Emergency Shelter Care order was entered extending the placement of Child’s shelter ca re. On March 22, 2011, at the time for the scheduled hearing before the Juvenile H earing Master, Mother and Father entered into an agreement that Child wou ld continue in CYS foster shelter care until further order of court. Since then, Child has been in placement. On April 12, 2011, Child was adjudicated a s a dependent child.J-S39013- 14

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As a result of the injuries inflicted to Child, Father was charged with Aggravated Assault, Endangering the Welfare of a Chil d, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person, to which he pled guilty o n December 9, 2011. 2 For her role in Child’s injuries, Mother was also charge d with Endangering the Welfare of a Child, to which she entered a plea o f guilty on February 13, 2012. Mother was sentenced to twenty-three months in t he Intermediate Punishment program. On March 16, 2012, CYS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. On August 22, 2012, a hearing was held on th at petition. The trial court found that CYS did not establish by clear and conv incing evidence for the t ermination of Mother’s parent rights to Child. On February 4, 2013, the agency re-filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. On May 24, 2013, June 26, 2013, and September 3, 2013, hearings were held on that pe tition. At the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Heather Miller, a pare nt educator for the Blair Foundation; Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., a licensed ps ychiatrist; Lindsey Syster, a family resource specialist for Justice Works Yout h Care; Puja Shroff, a therapist; Foster Mother; David Cincinnati , a CYS caseworker; Mother’s paramour, R.V.; Mother’s friend, K.G.; and M other. On September

____________________________________________ 2 In exchange for his plea, Father received a sentence of twenty- two months’ to forty- eight months’ incarceration, followed by a period of t wenty -four months’ probation. At the time of the termination p rocee dings, Father was incarcerated in a State correctional institution.J-S39013- 14

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20, 2013, the trial court entered the order terminat ing Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8 ), and (b) of the Adoption Act. On November 4, 2013, Mother filed a notice of appea l, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursua nt to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2) and (b). 3 In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two issues, as follows.
1. Did the trial court err in finding that competent evi dence established the statutory grounds for termination of [Mother]’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8)?
2. Did the trial court err in finding that [C]hild’s best interests and welfare were served by a termination of [Mother] ’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)? Mother’s Brief, at 4. We review an appeal from the termination of parent al rights with the following standard. [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in d ependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate cour t to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinat ions of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T. ,

____________________________________________ 3 On October 21, 2013, the trial court granted Mother’s counsel’s request to withdraw as counsel, and granted Mother fourteen days to appeal. On January 31, 2014, this Court granted Mothe r’s motion for extension of time to file her brief, and ordered the record to be rema nded to the trial court to insure that the record is complete.J-S39013- 14

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608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the fa ctual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine i f the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. ; R.I.S. , [613 Pa. 371, 455,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (pl urality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discr etion does not result merely because the reviewing court might hav e reached a different conclusion. Id. ; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc. , 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely , [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision ma y be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstr ation of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T. , there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellat e courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parti es during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numero us other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T. , [608 Pa. at 28 -30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the fa cts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in depen dency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the resul t of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994 ). In re Adoption of S.P. , 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termi nation of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Moreover, we have explained: [t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is define d as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convinci ng as toJ-S39013- 14

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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. , 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regard ing the termination of parental rights with regard to any on e subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ). Here, we will focus on section 2511(a)(2). Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.ふ The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: * * * (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent

. * * * (b) Other considerations.ふ The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfar e of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate ho using, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the cou rt shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the condit ions described therein which are first initiated subsequent t o the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.J-S39013- 14

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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

We have stated: In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three element s must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, negl ect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal ha s caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being ; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as follows. As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory ground s for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrat ed by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent .”[]. This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination under § 2511(a)(2): A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made lig htly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.J-S39013- 14

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In re Adoption of J.J. , 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986) (quoting In re: William L. , 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978)). In re Adoption of S.P. , 616 Pa. at 326-327, 47 A.3d at 827. We find the following portion of the trial court’s op inion relevant to our inquiry with regard to subsection 2511(a)(2).

As set forth above, Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from the Blair Foundation’s parenting program due to her inability to demonstrate the application of parentin g skills. Mother was unable to apply the skills that she presuma bly learned, and she had to be prompted to have interacti on with [C]hild. Although Mother did successfully complete Justi ce Works Youth Care "Nurturing Parenting Program" in May of 2013, the family resource specialist representing that pr ovider testified that a parent’s improvement, however slight, triggers closure of the program. The family resource specialist fu rther testified that there were conc erns over Mother’s ability to parent on her own: that Mother was not able to apply the le ssons that she had completed and that Mother did not demonstrate independent parenting. In the two years since [Child] was removed from Mother’s care, Mother continue s to demonstrate her incapacity as a parent. Mother has certainly had a reasonable time to remedy t he conditions which led to [C]hild’s removal, and clearly, there was no evidence that Mother could remedy those conditions i f given additional time. Furthermore, it was apparent from the testimony that Mother continues to demonstrate poor decision making. At the time of the hearing, Mother was cohabitating with a g entlemen who was thirty years her senior, whom she had met three months before he moved in with her. Mother was also sharing her home with another couple whose children are in fo ster care with [CYS]. The father of those children is a registere d sex offender, for conviction of a sex offense involving a m inor. Although Mother claimed that the registered sex offend er did not stay at her home every day, she admitted that he sleep s there, and that he changed his address to the address of Mother ’s residence.J-S39013- 14

- 9 - Mother further acknowledged during her testimony that she continues to be unable to accept the nature and cause of [Child]’s injuries. Mother harbor[s] the unreasonable belief that [C]hild suffered the fractures to her rib cage at birth , that she "shot out and the nurse caught her." Mother also stated t hat she had "learned how to be stern with [CYS] when asked if she had the ability to keep [C]hild safe and protect her from harm, Mother’s only response was "I protect her with my soul." Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 11-12. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence in the record that the repeated a nd continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the Mother had caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence nece ssary for her physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the Mother. Id. at 12. This Court has stated that a parent is required to ma ke diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full paren tal responsibilities.
In re A.L.D. 79 7 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow t o cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness reg arding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected a s untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340. The evidence showed that “Mo ther does not have the ability to protect [C]hild and maintain a sa fe environment for [C]hild, and it is beyond Mother’s ability to even est ablish a parental relationship with [C]hild.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/ 27/13, at 12. The evidence also demonstrated that Mother’s continued incapacity, abuse,J-S39013- 14

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neglect or refusal to parent could not or would not be remedied, despite CYS’s offering of reasonable efforts to assist in her re unification with Child. Mother’s argument regarding section 2511(a)(2) essential l y seeks for this Court to make credibility and weight determinati ons different from those of the trial court. While Mother may claim to love C hild, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, wil l not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We stated in In re Z.P. , a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the ho pe that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle th e responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have prop er parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M. , 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004). After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P. , 616 Pa. at 325- 326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations regarding section 2511(a)(2) are support ed by sufficient, competent evidence in the record. After we determine that the requirements of section 25 11(a) are satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requiremen ts of subsection (b)J-S39013- 14

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are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) ( en banc ). This Court has stated that the focus in terminatin g parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008. In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfar e of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs an d welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to includ e “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stabili ty.” In re K.M. , 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. , [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” require s consideration of the emotional bonds between the par ent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discernin g the effect on the child of permanently severing the parent al bond. In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791. See also In re: T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Mother argues that she has some bond with Child and th at Mother was willing to do anything necessary for return of Child. See Mother’s Brief, at 20. The trial court found as follows: Finally, with respect to Mother’s claim that it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to find that terminati on would best serve the needs and welfare of the child, the Court sub mits that the record overwhelmingly supported this conclusion. [C hild] suffered horrific injuries at the hands of her Father a nd Mother. Mother failed to recognize the hazardous environment her child was in, failed to protect [C]hild, and continues to ha ve difficulty accepting the cause and nature of [C]hild’s injuries. MotherJ-S39013- 14

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does not have the present ability to parent independe ntly or to provide a safe home for [C]hild. Mother has difficul ty making decisions and makes inappropriate decisions which place herse lf and [C]hild in danger. At the time of the terminat ion proceedings, Mother had allowed a registered sex offend er to reside in her home. Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 12-13. Further, the trial court found that there is no bond between Child and Mother. Id. at 9.

[C]hild displays anxiety in response to her visits with Mother, and as a result suffers from hives after the visi ts. Mother never established a primary attachment with [C ]hild. [C]hild clearly demonstrates a lack of emotional atta chment with Mother. Mother does not display affection with the child. Mother has no bond or meaningful relationship with the [C]hi ld but, rather, only a peripheral relationship with [C]hild. There was no evidence of any significant relationship between Moth er and [C]hild and no evidence presented of any adverse conseq uences should this relationship be terminated. On the contrar y, the testimony unequivocally demonstrated that the termina tion of Mother’s peripheral relationship with [C]hild would n ot be detrimental to [C]hild. Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 13. This Court ha s observed that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child and a natur al parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child’s life , and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S. , 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Additionally, as part of its bonding analysis, the t rial court appropriately examined Child’s relationship with Fost er Parents. See In re: T.S.M. , ___ Pa. at ___, 71 A.3d at 267-268 (stating that e xistence of a bond attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily r esult in the denial of aJ-S39013- 14

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termination petition, and the court must consider wheth er the child has a bond with the foster parents). The trial court foun d, as follows:
[C]hild has a strong primary attachment with her foste r mother, who is [C]hild’s pre

- adoptive resource. Termination of [C]hild’s relationship with her foster mother, with whom she is t hriving, would be traumatic and contrary to [C]hild’s best inter ests. The degree of emotional trauma which [Child] would exper ience if removed from her current placement would be considerabl e and the risk of regression very high. [Child]’s emotional security would be considerably undermined if further reunificat ion efforts were pursued. Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/13, at 13-14. As there is competent evidence in the record that suppor ts the trial court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Chil d’s needs and welfare, and the absence of any bond with Mother, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P. , 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental right s to Child. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/4/2014