alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1677

ROBERT TOLBERT; ELLA M. TOLBERT, Petitioners - Appellants, versus COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 95-3978) Submitted: November 19, 1998 Decided: December 1, 1998 Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Tolbert, Ella M. Tolbert, Appellants Pro Se. Edward T. Perelmuter, Loretta C. Argrett, Donald Bruce Tobin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Stuart L. Brown, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* In light of this disposition, we deny the Tolberts’ motion to appoint counsel. 2 PER CURIAM: Robert and Ella M. Tolbert appeal from the tax court’s orderdenying their second motion to vacate the court’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s determination of deficiencies with respect to their 1989, 1990, and 1991 federal income tax liabilities. Because the tax court had no jurisdiction to vacate its decision based on the grounds asserted in Tolberts’ motion, we affirm. See 26 U.S.C. § 748(c) (1994) (tax court’s decision becomes final 90 days after entry); Okon v. Commissioner , 26 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that taxpayer’s second motion to vacate tax court’s decision did not toll 90-day period in which to appeal). Accordingly, we affirm. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
2017 IL 120448

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 120448) 

DOLJIN CHULTEM et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. TICOR TITLE INSURANCE 

COMPANY et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Opinion filed May 18, 2017.

PER CURIAM

OPINION

¶ 1 In this case, one Justice of this court has recused himself, and the remaining 

members of the court are divided so that it is not possible to secure the 

constitutionally required concurrence of four judges for a decision (see Ill. Const. 

1970, art. VI, § 3). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The effect of this 

dismissal is the same as an affirmance by an equally divided court of the decision 

under review but is of no precedential value. See Perlman v. First National Bank of 

Chicago, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 530 (1975). 

¶ 2 THOMAS, J., took no part.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 55 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 55

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 relative to the commencement of the terms of office of the President, 
                Vice President, and Members of Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 15, 1996

  Mr. Pell introduced the following joint resolution; which was read 
          twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 relative to the commencement of the terms of office of the President, 
                Vice President, and Members of Congress.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. COMMENCEMENT OF TERMS OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE 
              PRESIDENT, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

    The following article is proposed as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents 
and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the 
legislatures of three-fourths of the States within seven years after 
the date of its submission to the States for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``The term of the office of the President and Vice President shall 
end at noon on the tenth day of December, and the term of a Senator and 
Representative at noon on the first day of December, of the year 
preceding the year in which their term would have ended if this article 
had not been ratified.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>


                                                                   Exhibit 99.1



                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Workgroup
Technology Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), Patrick H. Kareiva, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly
          presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
          results of operations of the Company.



Date:  October 25, 2002             /s/ Patrick H. Kareiva
      -----------------             -------------------------------------------
                                    Patrick H. Kareiva
                                    President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief
                                    Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 1333** 

JAMES LYONS; POLLY LYONS , Petitioners ,

v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION , Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Energy Regula tory Commission. ( 2210

- 206 )

Submitted : February 27 , 2012 Decided: March 8, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

. William M. Stanley, Jr., STANLEY AND STANLEY LLC, Moneta, Virgin ia, for Petitioners. Michael A. Bardee, General Counsel, Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor, Holly E. Cafer, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: James and Polly Lyons (hereinafter “Petitioners”) petition this court for review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) order denying their request for rehearing on FERC’s prior notice denying as untimely Petitioners’ request for rehearing on a decision following staff action. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review. We will set aside FERC’s order only if we conclude that its denial of rehearing was “ arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ,”

see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006), or “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity. ” See 5 U.S.C. § 70 6 (2)(B) (2006). Further, we will defer to FERC’s reasonable interpretation of its regulations. See Ohio Valley Envtl

. Coal

. v. Aracoma Coal Co. , 556 F.3d 177, 193

- 94 (4th Cir. 2009). Petitioners sought to file a belated request for rehearing on a letter ruling that FERC properly classified as a decision following staff action. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.1902(a) (2012). A request for rehearing on such a decision must be filed within thirty days, which it was not. Id. ; see also 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(a)(1) , (b) (2012) (mandating that a party seek rehearing from any final FERC decision “or other final order, if rehearing is provided for by statute, rule, or order” )

. In denying Petitioners’ request for rehearing, FERC rejected3 Petitioners’ various reasons to excuse the untimely filing of their request for rehearing. Based on our review of the record, as well as the
govern ing statutes and regulations, we conclude that FERC’s decision to deny Petitioners’ belated request for rehearing was not arbitrary or capricious, violative of any law or constitutional right, or an abuse of FERC’s considerable discretion. In denying rehe aring, FERC interpreted and applied the governing regulations in conformity with their plain meaning

. See Ohio Valley Envtl

. Coal

. , 556 F.3d at 193 (explaining that, when regulation is unambiguous, the “plain language” of the regulation controls). Accord ingly, we defer to FERC’s ruling and deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITI ON DENIED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan MARTINEZ-MUNOZ, also known as Juan Menoz Martinez, also known as Juan Munoz Martinez, also known as Juan Martinez, also known as Je*337sus Hernandez, also known as Jose Ferre, also known as Juan Martinez Munoz, also known as Juan M. Martinez, also known as Jorge Ramirez-Lopez, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-20001 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed July 19, 2017

Paula Camille Offenhauser, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Scott Andrew Martin, H. Michael Sokolow, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Juan Martinez-Munoz appeals his 52-month, above-guidelines sentence of imprisonment following his guilty plea to illegal reentry into the United States following deportation. Martinez-Munoz argues that the 52-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, Martinez-Munoz contends that the district court “gave undue, significant weight to his ‘long history1 of abusing alcohol and cocaine.”

We review the district court’s non-guidelines sentence for abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *United States v. Brantley,*537 F.3d 347, *338349 (5th Cir. 2008). The record reflects that the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. The district court noted Martinez-Munoz’s 10 criminal convictions, which included forgery; three driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions; two convictions for failure to stop and give information; failure to identify oneself to a peace officer; assault on a family member; possession of a controlled substance; and an illegal reentry. The district court further noted that Martinez-Munoz had been arrested and deported on three prior occasions without charges being filed. In connection with noting that the enhancing felony in the instant case was a DWI third offense, the district court commented on Martinez-Munoz’s “long history of abusing alcohol .,. and cocaine.” The district court concluded that Martinez-Munoz has “not acclimated to the norms of law-abiding community members” and “has demonstrated time and time again he will not abide by the laws of the United States.” Under the totality of the circumstances, the 52-month sentence is reasonable. *See Brantley,*537 F.3d at 349. Further, we have upheld much greater upward variances. *See id.*at 349-50; *United States v. Lopez-Velasquez,*526 F.3d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Smith,*417 F.3d 483, 492-93 (5th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IV

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 7

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should not have

granted diplomatic recognition to the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 15 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995

Ms. SNOWE submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred

to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should

not have granted diplomatic recognition to the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Whereas the United States has strong and enduring economic, political, and strategic ties with the Hellenic Republic of Greece;

Whereas Greece has been a strategic ally of the United States

in the Eastern Mediterranean during every major conflict

in this century;

Whereas historical and archaeological evidence demonstrates

that the ancient Macedonians were Greek;

Whereas Macedonia is a Greek name that has designated the

northern area of Greece for over 2,000 years;
2

SCON 7 IS

Whereas in 1944 the United States opposed the changing of

the name of the Skopje region of Yugoslavia by Marshall

Tito from Vardar Banovina to Macedonia as part of a

campaign to gain control of the Greek province of Macedonia, and the major port city of Salonika;

Whereas the regime in Skopje has persisted in inflaming tensions between it and Greece through a sustained propaganda campaign and the continued use of an ancient

Greek symbol, the Star of Vergina, in its flag;

Whereas the Skopje regime has refused to remove paragraph

49 from its constitution, a reference to the 1994 declaration by the then communist regime calling for the ‘‘unification’’ of neighboring territories in Greece and Bulgaria

with the ‘‘Macedonian Republic’’;

Whereas Greece has no claim on the territory of the former

Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and has repeatedly

reaffirmed the inviolability of all borders in the area of

the two countries; and

Whereas it is in the best interest of the United States to oppose any expansionist or irredentist policies in order to

promote peace and stability in the area: Now, therefore,

be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) the President should not have extended dip4 lomatic recognition to the Skopje regime that insists

5 on using the Greek name of Macedonia; and

6 (2) the President should reconsider this deci7 sion and withdraw diplomatic recognition until such
3

SCON 7 IS

1 time as the Skopje regime renounces its use of the

2 name Macedonia, removes objectionable language in

3 paragraph 49 of its constitution, removes symbols

4 which imply territorial expansion such as the Star of

5 Vergina in its flag, ceases propaganda against

6 Greece, and adheres fully to Conference on Security

7 and Cooperation in Europe norms and principles.

Æ
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Alfred James Williams, * From the 350th District

 Court of Taylor County,

 Trial Court No. 10254-D.

Vs. No. 11-12-00335-CR * March 31, 2015

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Willson, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that 

there is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this 

court’s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
INNOVATIVE MEDICAL SERVICES                                    EXHIBIT 11
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED OCTOBER 31, 1997 AND 1998



                                                  For the Three Months Ended
                                                          October 31,
                                                  --------------------------
                                                      1998          1997
                                                  --------------------------

Shares outstanding                                   3,916,351     3,520,851 
                                                   ===========   =========== 

Weighted average shares outstanding                  3,916,351     3,284,158 
Stock Options                                        1,514,375       406,250 
Warrants                                             1,798,125     1,798,125 
                                                   -----------   ----------- 
   Total weighted average shares outstanding         7,228,851     5,488,533 
                                                   ===========   =========== 

Net Income (Loss)                                  $   137,741   $(1,407,314)
                                                   ===========   =========== 

Net Earnings (Loss) per share (primary)            $      0.04   $    (0.11)*
                                                   ===========   =========== 
Net Earnings (Loss) per share (fully diluted)      $      0.02   $    (0.07)*
                                                   ===========   =========== 

* SFAS 128 dictates the use of primary versus diluted shares due to loss
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         657,869
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                              101,078,637
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             197,146,503
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        61,578
<OTHER-SE>                                  39,517,215
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               197,146,503
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,221,533
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,855,374
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               324,819
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,616,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,871,893
<INCOME-TAX>                                   776,835
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,095,058
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,095,058
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .17
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 4.1


 


THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED HEREBY HAVE
NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (THE "ACT") OR APPLICABLE STATE LAW AND MAY NOT BE OFFERED, SOLD,
OR OTHERWISE TRANSFERRED, PLEDGED, OR HYPOTHECATED UNLESS AND UNTIL REGISTERED UNDER THE ACT OR STATE LAW OR, IN THE OPINION OF
COUNSEL IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE SATISFACTORY TO THE ISSUER OF THE SECURITIES, SUCH OFFER, SALE, OR TRANSFER, PLEDGE, OR HYPOTHECATION
IS IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH.


 


 


DEMAND PROMISSORY NOTE


 


 


	Principal Amount: US$265,250.68	Issuance Date: January 1, 2017


 


 


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Edgar Express, Inc., a Utah
corporation (the “Company”), hereby promises to pay to Kenneth I. Denos, P.C. (“Holder”), the principal
sum of Two Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents (US$265,250.68) in lawful money of the United
States of America (the “Principal Amount”), with interest on the unpaid balance thereof compounding at the rate of
eight percent (8%) per annum from the date hereof.


 


The entire Principal Amount together with all
accrued but unpaid interest shall be due and payable on the date of receipt of written demand of the holder. Any payments made
on this Note will be applied first to any costs and expenses, then to accrued interest, and then to reduction of principal, or
as otherwise determined at Holder's discretion.


 


Payments of both principal and interest are
to be made to the address of the Holder or such other place as the Holder shall designate to the Company in writing.


 


Upon surrender of this Note for registration
of transfer, duly endorsed, or accompanied by a written instrument of transfer duly executed, by the registered Holder or its attorney
duly authorized in writing, a new note for a like principal amount will be issued to, and registered in the name of, the transferee.
The Company may treat the person in whose name this Note is registered as the owner hereof for the purpose of receiving payment
and for all other purposes, and the Company shall not be affected by any notice to the contrary.


 


In the case of an Acceleration Event, the principal
amount of this Note, together with all interest accrued thereon, may be declared immediately due and payable. For purposes hereof,
“Acceleration Event” shall mean the entry of a decree or order for relief by a court having jurisdiction in the premises
in respect of the Company in any voluntary or involuntary case or proceedings under the United States bankruptcy laws or the appointment
of a receiver, liquidator, assignee, custodian, trustee, sequestrator (or similar official) for the Company or for any substantial
part of its property, or ordering the winding-up or liquidation of its affairs


 


The terms of this Note shall be governed and
construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.


 


	 	EDGAR EXPRESS, INC.
	 	 
		/s/ Mary Foster
	 	Mary Foster, Chief Executive Officer
#### Josand FARMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gio RAMIREZ, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7660

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: February 15, 2018

Decided: February 20, 2018

Josand Farmer, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Josand Farmer, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Farmer v. Ramirez,*No. 0:17-cv-02614-TMC, 2017 WL 6345401 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017). We deny Farmer’s motion to expedite decision and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
No. 11-10161.

No. 11-10706.

No. 12-5368.

#### In re Davis; In re Stouffer; and In re Hawk.

Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.