United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued September 12, 2006

Decided December 18, 2006

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 06-1469

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RODNEY E. HARRIS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-71-003

J. P. Stadtmueller,

Judge. 

O R D E R

Rodney Harris pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),

(d), and use of a firearm in the course of the robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Applying

the guidelines as advisory, the district court sentenced him to 80 months’

imprisonment on the robbery count, at the low end of the guideline range. The

court also imposed a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment

for the § 924(c) conviction because the gun was fired. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On appeal Harris challenges his sentence as unreasonable

because, he contends, it is longer than is necessary to satisfy the factors in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-1469 Page 2

I. Background

In 2001 Harris and a co-conspirator developed a plan to rob the Educator’s

Credit Union in Milwaukee. Harris and his co-conspirator identified an employee of

the credit union from whom they believed they could steal the keys to the Credit

Union building. They trailed this employee, who was six months pregnant, and

observed her both at work and at home. On November 16, 2001, the two waited in

the parking lot of the employee’s apartment building for her to return. As she

exited her car, Harris and his co-conspirator grabbed her. She fell to the ground

during the struggle and they dragged her an undisclosed distance. While she was

on the ground, Harris’s co-conspirator shot her with a .45 caliber semi-automatic

handgun. She suffered a graze wound to the shoulder. Harris and his coconspirator then took her purse, which contained the keys to the credit union, and

fled. They were not apprehended, however; for reasons the record does not disclose,

Harris and the co-conspirator never attempted to enter the bank.

Harris was subsequently arrested for another crime, and a co-defendant in

that case fingered him as being involved in the November 2001 shooting. Harris

confessed to law enforcement officers that in 2001 he and his co-conspirator held up

the Credit Union employee in 2001 as part of a larger plan to rob Educator’s Credit

Union. He also admitted that at the time of the holdup, he was aware that his coconspirator was armed. Harris subsequently pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery,

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and use of a firearm during the course of the robbery, 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). 

In calculating Harris’s imprisonment range for the robbery count, the district

court began with a base offense level of 20, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), and added two

levels because the property of a financial institution was taken, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). 

The court added another three levels because the gunshot wound left a permanent

scar on the employee’s shoulder, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(D), and then two additional

levels because the employee was physically restrained during the robbery, see id.

§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Finally, the court granted Harris a three-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, arriving at a total offense level of 24

and a criminal history category of IV. This yielded an advisory guidelines range of

77 to 96 months for the robbery charge. The court sentenced him to 80 months and

then imposed a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months on the § 924(c)

conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
No. 06-1469 Page 3

1

 During oral argument we requested that the parties file supplemental briefs addressing

which aspect of Mr. Harris’s crime formed the basis for federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a), (d). After reviewing the parties joint submission, we are confident that the district

court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Harris because he was charged with a crime

against the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 

II. Analysis1

On appeal Harris appears to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence,

contending that it does not abide by the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). He proposes that a ten-year sentence would be sufficient because it

would adequately deter his criminal conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); protect the

public from him, § 3553(a)(2)(C); provide him with any needed educational or

vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment, § 3553(a)(2)(D);

avoid unwarranted sentencing discrepancies with any defendants who have

committed similar crimes and received departures, § 3553(a)(6); and acknowledge

that his criminal history overstates his propensity to commit future crimes because

he has changed his behavior for the better since the holdup, § 3553(a)(2)(A). But

Harris misrepresents his criminal history by stating that he has had no further

convictions since committing this crime. The government correctly notes in its brief

that after the holdup, Harris was arrested and convicted of entry into a locked

vehicle and theft.

We review Harris’s sentence for reasonableness, considering the sentencing

factors outlines in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261

(2005); United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court

need not make findings as to each § 3553(a) factor; rather it is “enough that the

record confirms meaningful consideration of the types of factors that § 3553(a)

identifies.” Laufle, 433 F.3d at 987. A sentence that is within a properly calculated

guideline range is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Williams, 436

F.3d 767, 768 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 607-08 (7th

Cir. 2005).

The district court considered Harris’s argument that a total sentence

between 120 and 144 months would fulfill the goals of § 3553(a), but concluded that

assaulting and stalking a pregnant woman was “among the most serious of criminal

offenses,” and that while “it perhaps may not be necessary to deter you further, the

message needs to get out into the community.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A),

(a)(2)(B). The court then “weigh[ed] all of these factors, including the fact that the

Court is obliged to impose a consecutive sentence with regard to the weapons

charge” and determined that a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range was

warranted. This court will not vacate a sentence just because it might have
No. 06-1469 Page 4

imposed a different sentence, United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir.

2006); United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). 

AFFIRMED.