J-S09025-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALONZO ROBINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1301 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 10, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0215061-1982

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: MAY 14, 2021

Alonzo Robinson appeals, pro se, from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing, as untimely filed, his 

serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 

Appellant seeks relief from the judgment of sentence imposed on December 

4, 1984, following his jury conviction of rape and involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse2involving a 17-year-old victim, and his assault of police officers 

attempting to arrest him. On appeal, Appellant insists he was denied his 

constitutional rights when the trial court relied upon false information when 

imposing his sentence. We affirm.

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121, 3123.
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The relevant factual and procedural history underlying this appeal were 

summarized by this Court in a prior memorandum decision as follows:3

On January 31, 1978, Appellant raped the victim. When the police 

attempted to arrest Appellant, he resisted and assaulted the 

officers. On January 25, 1983, a jury found Appellant guilty of 

rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Following a 

separate trial, on January 28, 1983, a jury found Appellant guilty 

of offenses related to the attack on the officers. On December 4, 

1984, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 

twenty-seven and one-half (271⁄2) to fifty-five (55) years’ 

imprisonment.[

4] This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence 

on March 11, 1987, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s 

petition for allowance of appeal on September 2, 1987. 

Appellant filed his first pro se petition for collateral relief on 

June 18, 1990. The court appointed counsel, who filed a “nomerit” letter on January 23, 1991. On March 6, 1991, the court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition and permitted counsel to withdraw. 

This Court affirmed the order on November 25, 1991, and 

Appellant did not seek further review with our Supreme Court. 

Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition on February 

12, 2002. On March 19, 2002, the court denied PCRA relief. This 

Court affirmed the order denying PCRA relief on December 2, 

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3 The certified record in this case was reconstructed by the trial court because 

the original record was transmitted to federal court and has not yet been 

returned. See Notice to Superior Court’s Prothonotary’s Office, 8/27/20. 

Thus, the record before us is limited.

4

It appears the cases were originally listed separately. However, our 

independent search of Appellant’s criminal history reveals that both cases are 

listed under the same trial court docket number. Since at least 2012, this 

Court has referred to both cases under the same trial court docket. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1421 EDA 2012 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. 

Nov. 7, 2012). Thus, under the particular facts underlying the instant appeal, 

we decline to find a violation of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 

977 (Pa. 2019) (holding “when a single order resolves issues arising on more 

than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed”).
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2002, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal on March 21, 2003.

Appellant filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing on 

November 17, 2003. On April 6, 2005, the court denied relief. 

This Court affirmed the order on June 21, 2006, and Appellant did 

not seek further review with our Supreme Court. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1421 EDA 2012 (unpub. memo. at 1-2) (Pa. 

Super. Nov. 7, 2012). 

Appellant filed another PCRA petition on February 4, 2010, which the 

court denied on May 1, 2012. See Robinson, 1412 EDA 2012 (unpub. memo. 

at 2-3). On appeal, this Court affirmed, concluding the petition was untimely 

filed. See id. at 5-6.

On September 4, 2015, Appellant filed the present petition, seeking both 

PCRA and habeas corpus relief. Appellant contends that the presentence 

investigation report (PSI) the trial court used to impose his sentence in this 

case contained “false and misleading information.” Appellant’s Motion for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief/Writ of Habeas Corpus, 9/4/15, at 2 

(unpaginated). He avers that he was first made aware of the “true extent” of 

the inaccuracies during a parole board hearing on March 13, 2015, and “finally 

received a copy of the sentencing transcripts [in the end of April 2015,] after 

being denied access to them for over thirty (30) years.” Id. at 2-3. Appellant 

further insists trial counsel provided ineffective assistance “when he failed to 

properly prepare for sentencing as well as bring all of the discrepancies to the 
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Court’s attention and ensure the record in this case is correct.” Id. at 3. 

Appellant filed an identical petition on April 21, 2017.5

On September 18, 2018, the PCRA court issued Appellant Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 notice of its intent to dismiss his petition as untimely filed without first 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 907, 9/18/18. However, rather than file a response or 

wait for the PCRA court to enter a dismissal order, Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal. On January 31, 2020, a panel of this Court quashed the appeal as 

interlocutory. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 3184 EDA 2018 (unpub. 

judgment order) (Pa. Super. Jan. 31, 2020). Thereafter, on June 10, 2020, 

the PCRA court entered a final order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. This 

timely appeal follows.6

Appellant presents two issues on appeal:

1) Was . . . Appellant denied his constitutional rights at 

sentencing when the sentencing court interjected and 

considered false evidence during sentencing?

2) Did the sentencing court use[ ] a false inaccurate prior record 

score when determining Appellant[’s] sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at VI.

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is wellestablished. “[W]e examine whether the PCRA court’s determination ‘is 

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5 The second document, however, is missing two pages.

6 The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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supported by the record and free of legal error.’” Commonwealth v. 

Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283–84 (Pa. 2016) (citations omitted). “The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 223 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the PCRA court may “decline 

to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no 

support either in the record or other evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Here, the PCRA court found Appellant’s petition was untimely filed, and 

Appellant failed to plead or prove any of exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar. 

PCRA Ct. Op., 6/10/20, at 1 (unpaginated). The statutory requirement that 

a PCRA petition be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence 

becomes final is a “jurisdictional deadline” and a PCRA court may not ignore 

the untimeliness of a petition to address the merits of the issues raised 

therein. Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 204 A.3d 448, 450 (Pa. Super. 

2019), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1028 (Pa. 2019). See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1). 

In the present case, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was final on 

November 1, 1987, 60 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 

petition for allocatur, and the time for Appellant to seek certiorari before the 

United States Supreme Court expired. See Robinson, 1421 EA 2012 (unpub. 

memo. at 5) (explaining the United States Supreme Court subsequently 

enlarged the time for filing a petition for certiorari to 90 days). Thus, pursuant 
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to Section 9545(b)(1), his petition had to be filed by November 1, 1988, and 

his current petition, filed nearly 27 years later, is facially untimely.

Nevertheless, an untimely petition may be considered if one of the three 

timeliness exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition 

invoking one of the exceptions must be filed “within 60 days of the date the 

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).7

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant failed to explicitly invoke any of the 

timing exceptions in either his PCRA petition or his appellate brief. For that 

reason alone, we could conclude he is entitled to no relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

9545(b)(1) (“Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves” a 

time-for-filing exception) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Russell,

209 A.3d 419, 429 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“An issue will be deemed to be waived 

where an appellant fails to properly explain or develop it in his brief.”), appeal 

denied, 218 A.3d 862 (Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 

488 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“The petitioner bears the burden of pleading and 

proving an applicable statutory exception.”).

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7 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended in 2018 to allow a petitioner one year to

invoke a timeliness exception. However, that amendment applies only “to 

claims arising on Dec[ember] 24, 2017 or thereafter.” See Section 3 of Act 

2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, effective in 60 days. Thus, in the present 

case, Appellant is bound by the 60-day time requirement.

 
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Nevertheless, the PCRA court determined Appellant “[a]rguably” 

attempted to establish the newly discovered facts exception set forth at 

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See PCRA Ct. Op. at 1. In order to obtain relief 

pursuant to this exception, a petitioner must demonstrate “the facts upon 

which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii). Further, as noted above, Appellant must establish he filed his 

petition within 60 days of his discovery of these new facts.

In determining Appellant was entitled to no relief, the PCRA court 

opined:

[Appellant] claimed that on March 13, 2015[,] he discovered that 

his [PSI] report contained factual inaccuracies. At the outset, 

[Appellant] failed to demonstrate that the purported inaccuracy of 

his PSI report was unknown to him for more than three decades. 

To the contrary, [Appellant] has been aware of its alleged 

inaccuracy since he was sentenced in 1984, if not earlier. 

According to a 1982 letter authored by [Appellant’s] attorney, 

[Appellant] advised him of specific errors within the PSI report. 

Additionally, [Appellant] acknowledged that he vigorously 

contested the PSI report at sentencing. See PCRA petition, 

9/14/15 at 1 (unpaginated). Thus, the purported fact that the PSI 

report utilized at sentencing contained inaccuracies was not 

previously unknown. Furthermore, even assuming that 

[Appellant] discovered the alleged errors on March 13, 2015, his 

instant petition, filed on September 4, 2015, was clearly filed 

outside the sixty-day window mandated by the former provision 

of 42 [Pa.C.S.] § 9545(b)(2) . . . .

PCRA Ct. Op. at 1 (some record citations omitted).

We agree. In his PCRA petition, Appellant focused on purported 

“inaccuracies” in his PSI, which he argued were a result of the fact the trial 
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court did not order a new PSI at the time of sentencing, but instead relied on 

a prior PSI from a crime committed “14 years earlier.” See Appellant’s Motion 

for Post Conviction Collateral Relief/Writ of Habeas Corpus, 9/4/15, at 1-2. 

He claimed that he “was made aware for the first time the true extent of the 

false and misleading information contained in the PSI” during a March 13, 

2015, parole hearing. Id. at 2. Moreover, he asserted he did not receive his 

sentencing transcripts until April of 2015, and was “informed on May 21, 

2015[,] that the State Police Criminal History repository ha[d] absolutely no 

record of [some] of the alleged crimes” listed in his PSI. Id. at 3. 

Nonetheless, even using the May 21, 2015, date as the date Appellant first 

learned of the purported new evidence, his September 4, 2015, petition was 

filed outside the 60-day window. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

We note that in his brief before this Court, Appellant focuses on a slightly 

different claim — that the PSI indicated a knife was used during the rape, 

when in fact no weapon was used at all. See Appellant’s Brief at 1. He asserts

that during his sentencing hearing, the trial court “made reference to the use 

of [a] knife, which is materially false.” Id. Appellant also states that defense 

counsel “made a timely objection to the judge’s remarks concerning the use 

of a knife [but] his objection was overruled.” Id. at 2. Thus, even assuming 

the trial court incorrectly stated a knife was used during the rape, Appellant 

cannot demonstrate this fact was unknown to him. Indeed, he admits counsel 

objected to the court’s statement during the sentencing hearing. See id. 

Thus, no relief is warranted.
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Lastly, we note Appellant insists we can review his claims “in the interest 

of justice because of ethical concerns.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. However, there 

is no equitable exception to the PCRA time requirements. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he courts of 

Pennsylvania will only entertain a ‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial

timeliness requirement is met.”). Thus, we agree with the PCRA court’s 

determination that Appellant’s petition was untimely filed, and he has failed 

to plead and prove any of the time-for-filing exceptions.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/14/21