IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-10501

Summary Calendar

REGINA K. MURRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; DANIEL M. TANGHERLINI,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CV-744

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This Title VII action arises out of Defendant General Services 

Administration’s (“GSA”) alleged misconduct between 2000 and 2003; the 

period during which pro se Plaintiff Regina Murry (“Murry”) was employed by 

the GSA. The district court dismissed Murry’s claim as barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata. We affirm.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 2, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Regina Murry was employed by the GSA from 2000 through 2003. 

During her time at the GSA, Murry filed a “myriad” of complaints with the 

Equal Employee Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which were consolidated 

by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On April 26, 2007, Murry requested 

separating her “most significant” claims (Murry I) from her remaining claims 

(Murry II), averring that handling Murry I first “would eliminate confusions 

currently present in [her] claims.” R. 141. She followed-up on that request on 

June 6, 2007, again requesting separation of her claims, as she was 

“experiencing difficulty in managing her claims, ‘especially multi-tasking 

functions.’” The EEOC granted her request, dismissing Murry II without 

prejudice on August 22, 2007.

On August 29, 2008, the ALJ issued its decision in Murry I, determining

that the GSA had neither discriminated against Murry on the basis of race or 

disability nor retaliated against her for participating in prior EEOC actions. 

Murry appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”), 

which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and issued the right-to-sue notice for Murry I

on March 9, 2010. R. 137.

Murry I was filed in the Northern District of Texas on June 7, 2010, 

alleging (1) Disability Discrimination – Failure to Accommodate, (2) Unlawful 

Retaliation through changing her work schedule, and (3) Unlawful 

Harassment: Hostile Work Environment. In her first amended complaint, filed 

on October 13, 2011, Murry averred that the discriminatory activity began in 

March 2000 and continued through her termination on July 28, 2003. The 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the GSA on February 24, 

2012.

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On July 2, 2009—prior to issuance of her right to sue notice in Murry I—

Murry requested that the ALJ adjudicate her separated (Murry II) claims 

without a hearing. The GSA denied the Murry II claims on September 10, 

2009, and informed Murry that she could either (1) appeal to the district court 

within 90 days or (2) appeal to the EEOC within 30 days. If she appealed to 

the EEOC, she retained the right to appeal to the district court within either 

(1) 90 days of the EEOC’s decision on appeal or (2) 180 days after the filing of 

the EEOC appeal if the EEOC had not made a decision at that point. So while 

the EEOC did not issue its final decision until July 20, 2012, Murry regained 

her right to sue in Murry II on April 8, 2010—two months before she filed 

Murry I.

Rather than bring Murry II as part of Murry I—or as part of her October 

13, 2011 amended complaint in Murry I—Murry waited to receive her right-tosue notice and brought Murry II in the Northern District of Texas on October 

19, 2012; nearly eight months after the district court dismissed Murry I. Murry 

II alleges Disability Discrimination for failure to accommodate her disabilities, 

and implies retaliation for filing her previous EEOC complaints. As in Murry 

I, the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred prior to her termination in 2003. 

The GSA moved to dismiss Murry II as barred by res judicata. The district 

court granted the GSA’s motion, and Murry appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In our review of the district court’s res judicata ruling, we must 

determine (1) whether the barred claims were part of the same cause of action 

as the claims in” Murry I, and “(2) whether the barred claims could have been 

advanced in” Murry I. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 313 

(5th Cir. 2004). “The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law 

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that we review de novo.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata

grounds is appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the

face of the pleadings. See Kan. Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional Mortg. Corp.

of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Although Murry challenges whether the elements of res judicata have 

been satisfied, her primary argument appears to be that no one told her that 

her Murry II claims should have been brought alongside Murry I. See Pl.’s Br. 

4. While we construe pro se complaints liberally—and are not unsympathetic 

to the difficulty pro se plaintiffs encounter in navigating the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure—pro se plaintiffs are not exempt from the rules of res judicata. 

See Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (“The right of self-representation does not 

exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and 

substantive law. One who proceeds pro se with full knowledge and 

understanding of the risks involved acquires no greater rights than a litigant 

represented by a lawyer, unless a liberal construction of properly filed 

pleadings be considered an enhanced right.”) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The district court concluded that Murry II was barred by the doctrine of 

res judicata, which bars the litigation of claims that were previously litigated 

or could have been raised in an earlier suit. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 

F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983) (“it is black-letter law that res judicata, by 

contrast to narrower doctrines of issue preclusion, bars all claims that were or 

could have been advanced in support of the cause of action on the occasion of 

its former adjudication . . . not merely those that were adjudicated.”). The four 

elements of res judicata are whether: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; 

(2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent 

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jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the 

merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions. 

Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Murry’s argument on the first requirement—identical parties—is 

without merit. Although she alleges that different managers were responsible 

for the discriminatory behavior, the only parties to Murry I and Murry II were 

the GSA and Daniel Tagherlini (acting Administrator of the GSA), not the 

individual managers in their individual capacity. Because she alleges that the 

GSA discriminated against her, and because the GSA was the defendant in 

Murry I, the first requirement of res judicata is satisfied. Murry does not 

contest the second and third requirements.

Murry also challenges the fourth requirement, arguing that Murry I and 

Murry II do not arise out of the same claim or cause of action. This court 

applies the “transactional test” to determine if later-brought claims are 

precluded by an earlier-brought lawsuit. See Davis, 383 F.3d at 313. “The 

critical issue under the transactional test is whether the two actions are based 

on the ‘same nucleus of operative facts.’” Id. “What grouping of facts 

constitutes a ‘transaction’ or a ‘series of transactions’ must ‘be determined 

pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 

related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient 

trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’

expectations or business understanding or usage.” Id. (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982)).

Murry’s claims of discrimination arise from the “same continuing course 

of allegedly discriminatory conduct” by the GSA, beginning in 2000 and 

culminating in her termination in 2003. See id. at 314. The allegedly unlawful 

conduct was motivated by the same alleged racial and disability animus in both 

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cases, and the alleged retaliation was in response to the same EEOC filings. 

Murry argues that Murry II cannot be considered part of Murry I because the 

specific alleged conduct in Murry I took place before the conduct alleged in 

Murry II. While this court has held that “subsequent wrongs by a defendant 

constitute new causes of action,” the principle of “subsequent wrongs” only 

applies if those wrongs occurred (1) “after the plaintiffs had filed their prior 

lawsuit” or (2) “after the district court had entered judgment in the prior 

lawsuit.” Id. All the alleged wrongs suffered by Murry occurred between 2000 

and 2003; Murry I was not filed until 2008. Because all of the allegedly 

unlawful acts occurred before the filing of Murry I, the principle that 

“subsequent wrongs constitute separate causes of action” does not aid Murry’s 

argument.

Finally, Murry could have brought Murry II alongside Murry I. As this 

court stated in Davis, “a plaintiff who brings a Title VII action and files 

administrative claims with the EEOC must still comply with the general rules 

governing federal litigation respecting other potentially viable claims.” Id. at 

316 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because the barred claims arose from 

the same nucleus of operative fact as the claims in [Murry I] and they predate 

that action,” Murry was on notice to include those claims in Murry I. The lack 

of a right-to-sue letter for Murry II does not affect the rules of res judicata.1 

Id.

1 See also, e.g., Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1992); Owens v. Kaiser 

Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title VII claims were not 

exempt from claim preclusion where plaintiffs failed to seek a stay of proceedings or to amend 

their complaint); Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(“Parties to Title VII actions enjoy no immunity from res judicata.”); cf. Boateng v. 

InterAmerican Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) (Title VII claim subject to res 

judicata where plaintiff received right-to-sue letter during pendency of prior action); Jang v. 

United Techs. Corp., 206 F.3d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 2000) (ADA claim was not exempt from 

res judicata where plaintiff failed to obtain right-to-sue letter during pendency of previous 

litigation); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Rivers v. 

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To avoid losing her right to bring her Murry II claims in federal court,

Murry could have: (1) asked for a stay in Murry I to await the conclusion of 

Murry II; (2) brought Murry II in the district court, rather than pursue an 

EEOC appeal; or (3) brought Murry II in the district court once the 180-day 

period following filing of the EEOC appeal expired. Indeed, these claims were 

originally consolidated into a single case by the ALJ, who only separated them 

to accommodate Murry’s request. While that may be an appropriate process 

in the EEOC, res judicata exists precisely to avoid this kind of serial, successive 

litigation of claims arising out of the same series of transactions. Nilsen, 701 

F.2d at 563 (“The doctrine of res judicata contemplates, at a minimum, that 

courts be not required to adjudicate, nor defendants to address, successive 

actions arising out of the same transaction, asserting breach of the same 

duty.”). As in Davis, Murry II is “barred by res judicata even though she had 

not received a right-to-sue letter at the time she filed her lawsuit.” Davis, 383 

F.3d at 315.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (6th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's claims were barred 

by res judicata where she could have obtained a right-to-sue letter and perfected her claim 

during the two-year pendency of prior action). 

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