Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 52 / Thursday, March 17, 2022 / Notices 15243 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention 

Public Health Reassessment and 

Immediate Termination of Order 

Suspending the Right To Introduce 

Certain Persons From Countries 

Where a Quarantinable Communicable 

Disease Exists With Respect to 

Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children 

AGENCY: Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS). 

ACTION: General notice. 

SUMMARY: The Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), located 

within the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS), is hereby 

terminating the Order Suspending the 

Right to Introduce Certain Persons from 

Countries Where a Quarantinable 

Communicable Disease Exists, issued on 

August 2, 2021 (August Order), and all 

related prior orders issued pursuant to 

the authorities in sections 362 and 365 

of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act 

and the implementing regulation, to the 

extent they apply to Unaccompanied 

Noncitizen Children (UC). 

DATES: This Order was implemented 

March 11, 2022. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jennifer Buigut, Division of Global 

Migration and Quarantine, National 

Center for Emerging and Zoonotic 

Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton 

Road NE, MS H16–4, Atlanta, GA 

30329. Email: dgmqpolicyoffice@

cdc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) 

is a quarantinable communicable 

disease caused by the SARS–CoV–2 

virus. As part of U.S. government efforts 

to mitigate the introduction, 

transmission, and spread of COVID–19, 

CDC issued the August Order, replacing 

a prior order issued on October 13, 2020 

(October Order) which continued a 

series of orders issued pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 265, 268 and the implementing 

regulation at 42 CFR 71.40, suspending 

the right to introduce certain persons 

into the United States from countries or 

places where the quarantinable 

communicable disease exists in order to 

protect the public health from an 

increased risk of the introduction of 

COVID–19 (CDC Orders). 

The CDC Orders issued under 42 

U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 CFR 71.40 were 

intended to reduce the risk of COVID– 

19 introduction, transmission, and 

spread at POE and U.S. Border Patrol 

stations by significantly reducing the 

number and density of covered 

noncitizens held in these congregate 

settings and thereby reducing risks to 

U.S. citizens and residents, Department 

of Homeland Security/Customs and 

Border Patrol personnel and noncitizens 

at the facilities, and local community 

healthcare systems. CDC has deemed 

the measures included in the CDC 

Orders necessary for the protection of 

public health during the ongoing 

COVID–19 pandemic. 

The August Order continued a 

suspension of the right to introduce 

‘‘covered noncitizens,’’ as defined 

below, into the United States along the 

U.S. land and adjacent coastal borders. 

The August Order specifically excepted 

UC and incorporated an exception for 

UC issued by CDC on July 16, 2021 (July 

Exception). Based on the public health 

landscape, the current status of the 

COVID–19 pandemic, the situation in 

congregate settings where UC seeking to 

enter the United States are processed 

and held, and the procedures in place 

for the processing of UC in such 

congregate settings, CDC has determined 

that a suspension of the right to 

introduce UC is not necessary to protect 

U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, lawful 

permanent residents, personnel and 

noncitizens at the (POE) and U.S. 

Border Patrol stations, and destination 

communities in the United States at this 

time. This termination as to UC 

supersedes the July Exception 

incorporated in the August Order. The 

present termination does not address 

the application of the August Order to 

individuals in family units (FMU) or 

single adults (SA). 

The August Order applied specifically 

to covered noncitizens, defined as 

‘‘persons traveling from Canada or 

Mexico (regardless of their country of 

origin) who would otherwise be 

introduced into a congregate setting in 

a POE or U.S. Border Patrol station at or 

near the U.S. land and adjacent coastal 

borders subject to certain exceptions 

detailed below; this includes 

noncitizens who do not have proper 

travel documents, noncitizens whose 

entry is otherwise contrary to law, and 

noncitizens who are apprehended at or 

near the border seeking to unlawfully 

enter the United States between POE.’’ 

Three groups typically make up covered 

noncitizens—single adults (SA), 

individuals in family units (FMU), and 

unaccompanied noncitizen children 

(UC). UC encountered in the United 

States were specifically excepted from 

the August Order based on its explicit 

incorporation by reference of CDC’s July 

Exception of UC. 

UC are generally treated differently 

than other individuals apprehended at 

the border under ordinary immigration 

laws. When section 265 does not apply, 

UC generally are transferred to the care 

and custody of HHS’s Office of Refugee 

Resettlement (ORR) pursuant to the 

Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act of 2008. ORR is 

able to care for UC while implementing 

appropriate COVID–19 mitigation 

measures, given ORR’s robust network 

of care facilities that provide testing and 

medical care, and DHS has already been 

excepting UC in accordance with CDC’s 

August Order. With CDC’s assistance 

and guidance, ORR also has 

implemented COVID–19 testing 

protocols for UC in its care and 

continues to practice other mitigation 

measures to prevent and curtail 

transmission of the SARS–CoV–2 virus 

among UC in its care. 

In the August Order, CDC committed 

to reassessing the public health 

circumstances necessitating the Order at 

least every 60 days by reviewing the 

latest information regarding the status of 

the COVID–19 public health emergency 

and associated public health risks, 

including migration patterns, sanitation 

concerns, and any improvement or 

deterioration of conditions at the U.S. 

borders. Following a Preliminary 

Injunction issued by the U.S. District 

Court for the Northern District of Texas 

ordering that the July Exception for UC 

and its incorporation into the August 

Order be enjoined, CDC determined that 

it was necessary to conduct an 

immediate reassessment with respect to 

UC. This reassessment takes into 

account the current status of the 

pandemic. 

Based on the reassessment, the CDC 

Director finds that there is no longer a 

serious danger of the introduction, 

transmission, and spread of COVID–19 

into the United States as a result of 

entry of UC and that a suspension of the 

introduction of UC is not required in the 

interest of public health. The CDC 

Director has determined that suspension 

of entry of UC is not necessary to protect 

U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, lawful 

permanent residents, personnel and 

noncitizens at POE and U.S. Border 

Patrol stations, or destination 

communities in the United States. In 

light of that determination, CDC is 

hereby terminating the CDC Orders 

issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 

and 42 CFR 71.40 as they apply to UC, 

effective immediately. The current 60- 

day review process is scheduled to end 

on March 30, 2022, and CDC will 

conclude its reassessment of whether 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
15244 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 52 / Thursday, March 17, 2022 / Notices 

1Available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/ 

2019-ncov/downloads/CDC-Order-SuspendingRight-to-Introduce-_Final_8-2-21.pdf (last visited 

Mar. 7, 2022); see also 86 FR 42828 (Aug. 5, 2021). 

2The ‘‘CDC Orders’’ issued pursuant to these 

legal authorities are found at 85 FR 17060 (Mar. 26, 

2020), 85 FR 22424 (Apr. 22, 2020), 85 FR 31503 

(May 26, 2020), 85 FR 65806 (Oct. 16, 2020), and 

86 FR 42828 (Aug. 5, 2021) (fully incorporating by 

reference 86 FR 38717 (July 22, 2021), see 86 FR 

42828, 42829 at note 3). 

3See infra 1. 

4Public Health Determination Regarding an 

Exception for Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children 

from Order Suspending the Right to Introduce 

Certain Persons from Countries Where a 

Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https:// 

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/pdf/ 

NoticeUnaccompaniedChildren.pdf (July 16, 2021); 

86 FR 38717 (July 22, 2021); see 86 FR 42828, 42829 

at note 1 (Aug. 5, 2021) (which fully incorporated 

by reference the July Exception relating to UC). 

5Quarantinable communicable diseases are any 

of the communicable diseases listed in Executive 

Order 13295, as provided under section 361 of the 

Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 264), 42 CFR 

71.1. The list of quarantinable communicable 

diseases currently includes cholera, diphtheria, 

infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow 

fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers (Lassa, Marburg, 

Ebola, Crimean-Congo, South American, and others 

not yet isolated or named), severe acute respiratory 

syndromes (including Middle East Respiratory 

Syndrome and COVID–19), influenza caused by 

novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are 

causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic, 

and measles. See Exec. Order 13295, 68 FR 17255 

(Apr. 4, 2003), as amended by Exec. Order 13375, 

70 FR 17299 (Apr. 1, 2005) and Exec. Order 13674, 

79 FR 45671 (July 31, 2014), 86 FR 52591 (Sep. 22, 

2021). 

6See supra note 1. 

7Order Suspending the Right to Introduce Certain 

Persons from Countries Where a Quarantinable 

Communicable Disease Exists, 85 FR 65806 (Oct. 

16, 2020). The October Order replaced the Order 

Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from 

Countries Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 

issued on March 20, 2020 (March Order), which 

was subsequently extended and amended. Notice of 

Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public 

Health Service Act Suspending Introduction of 

Certain Persons from Countries Where a 

Communicable Disease Exists, 85 FR 17060 (Mar. 

26, 2020); Extension of Order Under Sections 362 

and 365 of the Public Health Service Act; Order 

Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From 

Countries Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 

85 FR 22424 (Apr. 22, 2020); Amendment and 

Extension of Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of 

the Public Health Service Act; Order Suspending 

Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries 

Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 FR 31503 

(May 26, 2020). 

8Suspension of the right to introduce means to 

cause the temporary cessation of the effect of any 

law, rule, decree, or order pursuant to which a 

person might otherwise have the right to be 

introduced or seek introduction into the United 

States. 42 CFR 71.40(b)(5). 

the Order remains necessary in whole or 

part to protect the public health with 

respect to SA and FMU by that date. 

Legal Authority 

CDC is hereby immediately 

terminating the August Order and all 

prior orders issued pursuant to sections 

362 and 365 of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C. 

265, 268) and the implementing 

regulation at 42 CFR 71.40 to the extent 

they apply to UC. 

Referenced Order 

A copy of the Order is provided 

below, and a copy of the signed Order 

can be found at https://www.cdc.gov/ 

coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/pdf/Notice

UnaccompaniedChildren-update.pdf. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) 

Order Under Sections 362 & 365 of the 

Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 

265, 268) and 42 CFR 71.40 

Public Health Reassessment and 

Immediate Termination of Order 

Suspending the Right To Introduce 

Certain Persons From Countries Where 

a Quarantinable Communicable Disease 

Exists With Respect to Unaccompanied 

Noncitizen Children 

Executive Summary 

The Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), a component of the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), is hereby terminating 

the Order Suspending the Right to 

Introduce Certain Persons from 

Countries Where a Quarantinable 

Communicable Disease Exists, issued on 

August 2, 2021 (August Order),1 and all 

related prior orders issued pursuant to 

the authorities in sections 362 and 365 

of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act 

(42 U.S.C. 265, 268) and the 

implementing regulation at 42 CFR 

71.40 (CDC Orders),2 to the extent that 

they apply to Unaccompanied 

Noncitizen Children (UC). The August 

Order continued a suspension of the 

right to introduce ‘‘covered 

noncitizens,’’ as defined in the Order,3

into the United States along the U.S. 

land and adjacent coastal borders. The 

August Order specifically excepted UC 

and incorporated an exception for UC 

issued by CDC on July 16, 2021 (July 

Exception).4 The August Order states 

that CDC will reassess at least every 60 

days whether the Order remains 

necessary to protect the public health. 

CDC was in the process of assessing that 

question in light of the current public 

health situation. However, in response 

to an order of the U.S. District Court for 

the Northern District of Texas 

preliminarily enjoining the July 

Exception and the relevant portion of 

the August Order based on concerns 

about the adequacy of the CDC’s 

explanation for those actions and 

consistent with CDC’s continuing 

review, CDC has reopened this issue 

and reconsidered whether UC should be 

subject to the CDC Orders. CDC hereby 

concludes that UC should not be subject 

to the CDC Orders based on the current 

public health circumstances. Based on 

the public health landscape, the current 

status of the COVID–19 pandemic, the 

situation in congregate settings where 

UC seeking to enter the United States 

are processed and held, and the 

procedures in place for the processing of 

UC in such congregate settings, CDC has 

determined that a suspension of the 

right to introduce UC is not necessary to 

protect U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, 

lawful permanent residents, personnel 

and noncitizens at the ports of entry 

(POE) and U.S. Border Patrol stations, 

and destination communities in the 

United States at this time. This 

termination as to UC supersedes the July 

Exception incorporated in the August 

Order. The present termination does not 

address the application of the August 

Order to individuals in family units 

(FMU) or single adults (SA). 

Outline of Reassessment and Order 

I. Background 

A. Public Health Landscape 

B. Current Status of the COVID–19 

Pandemic 

1. Community COVID–19 Levels 

2. Information Specific to UC 

II. Public Health Reassessment 

A. Changing Public Health Conditions 

B. Public Health Factors Specifically 

Relevant to UC Population 

III. Legal Considerations 

A. Concerns Raised by the District Court 

B. Absence of Reliance Interests 

C. Timing Considerations 

D. Basis for Termination With Respect to 

UC Under Sections 362 and 365 of the 

PHS Act and 42 CFR 71.40 

IV. Issuance and Implementation of the 

Termination 

A. Termination as to UC 

B. APA Review 

I. Background 

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) 

is a quarantinable communicable 

disease 5 caused by the SARS–CoV–2 

virus. As part of U.S. Government 

efforts to mitigate the introduction, 

transmission, and spread of COVID–19, 

CDC issued the August Order,6

replacing a prior order issued on 

October 13, 2020 (October Order) which 

continued a series of orders issued 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and the 

implementing regulation at 42 CFR 

71.40,7 suspending the right to 

introduce 8 certain persons into the 

United States from countries or places 

where the quarantinable communicable 

disease exists in order to protect the 

public health from an increased risk of 

the introduction of COVID–19 (CDC 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 52 / Thursday, March 17, 2022 / Notices 15245 

9See supra note 2. 10POE and U.S. Border Patrol stations are 

operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), an agency within Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). 11 86 FR 42828, 42841. 12A single adult (SA) is any noncitizen adult 18 

years or older who is not an individual in a ‘‘family 

unit.’’ 86 FR 42828, 42830 at note 13. 13An individual in a family unit (FMU) includes 

any individual in a group of two or more 

noncitizens consisting of a minor or minors 

accompanied by their adult parent(s) or legal 

guardian(s). Id. at note 14. 

14CDC understands UC to be a class of 

individuals similar to or the same as those 

individuals who would be considered 

‘‘unaccompanied alien children’’ (see 6 U.S.C. 279) 

for purposes of HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement 

custody, were DHS to make the necessary 

immigration determinations under Title 8 of the 

U.S. Code. 86 FR 38717, 38718 at note 4. 

15 86 FR 42828, 42829 at note 3. 

16See supra note 4. 

17See 86 FR 42828, 42835–37 (describing the 

processing of noncitizen SA and FMU by DHS 

components, CBP and ICE, under both regular Title 

8 immigration and under an order pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 265). 

18 86 FR 42828, 42841. 

19See infra II.B. 

20COVID–19 Community Levels, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, https://

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/ 

community-levels.html (updated Mar. 10, 2022). 

21National COVID–19 Preparedness Plan—March 

2022, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/NAT-COVID-19- 

PREPAREDNESS-PLAN.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 

2022). 

22Coronavirus disease (COVID–19) pandemic, 

World Health Organization, https://

covid19.who.int/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2022). 

23COVID Data Tracker, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/ 

covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home (last visited 

Mar. 11, 2022). 

24United States COVID–19 Cases, Deaths, and 

Laboratory Testing (NAATs) by State, Territory, and 

Jurisdiction, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#cases_community (last visited Mar. 11, 

2022). 

25Omicron was first reported to the World Health 

Organization (WHO) by South Africa on November 

Continued 

Orders).9 The August Order applied 

specifically to covered noncitizens, 

defined as ‘‘persons traveling from 

Canada or Mexico (regardless of their 

country of origin) who would otherwise 

be introduced into a congregate setting 

in a POE or U.S. Border Patrol station 10

at or near the U.S. land and adjacent 

coastal borders subject to certain 

exceptions detailed below; this includes 

noncitizens who do not have proper 

travel documents, noncitizens whose 

entry is otherwise contrary to law, and 

noncitizens who are apprehended at or 

near the border seeking to unlawfully 

enter the United States between 

POE.’’ 11

Three groups typically make up 

covered noncitizens—single adults 

(SA),12 individuals in family units 

(FMU),13 and unaccompanied 

noncitizen children (UC).14 UC 

encountered in the United States were 

specifically excepted from the August 

Order 15 based on its explicit 

incorporation by reference of CDC’s July 

Exception of UC.16 The August Order 

and July Exception distinguished the 

immigration processing available to SA 

and FMU from that available to UC.17

While all three groups are processed by 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), a component of the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), following 

that initial intake, UC are referred to 

HHS’ Office of Refugee Resettlement 

(ORR) for care. At both the CBP and 

ORR stages, UC receive special 

attention. 

The series of CDC Orders issued 

under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 CFR 

71.40 were intended to reduce the risk 

of COVID–19 introduction, 

transmission, and spread at POE and 

U.S. Border Patrol stations by 

significantly reducing the number and 

density of covered noncitizens held in 

these congregate settings and thereby 

reducing risks to U.S. citizens, U.S. 

nationals, lawful permanent residents, 

DHS/CBP personnel and noncitizens at 

the facilities, and local community 

healthcare systems. CDC has deemed 

the measures included in the CDC 

Orders necessary for the protection of 

public health during the ongoing 

COVID–19 pandemic. 

In the August Order, CDC committed 

to reassessing the public health 

circumstances necessitating the Order at 

least every 60 days by reviewing the 

latest information regarding the status of 

the COVID–19 public health emergency 

and associated public health risks, 

including migration patterns, sanitation 

concerns, and any improvement or 

deterioration of conditions at the U.S. 

borders.18 Following a Preliminary 

Injunction issued by the U.S. District 

Court for the Northern District of Texas 

ordering that the July Exception for UC 

and its incorporation into the August 

Order be enjoined,19 CDC determined 

that it was necessary to conduct an 

immediate reassessment with respect to 

UC. This reassessment takes into 

account the current status of the 

pandemic. For example, CDC recently 

released its COVID–19 Community 

Levels framework, which allows 

communities and individuals to make 

decisions and reduce COVID–19 

mitigation measures as allowed by local 

context and unique needs.20 This was 

followed by an updated National 

COVID–19 Preparedness Plan, which 

lays out the roadmap to help the nation 

continue to fight COVID–19 in the 

future, while also allowing resumption 

of more normal routines.21

Based on the reassessment below, the 

CDC Director finds that there is no 

longer a serious danger of the 

introduction, transmission, and spread 

of COVID–19 into the United States as 

a result of entry of UC and that a 

suspension of the introduction of UC is 

not required in the interest of public 

health. The CDC Director has 

determined that suspension of entry of 

UC is not necessary to protect U.S. 

citizens, U.S. nationals, lawful 

permanent residents, personnel and 

noncitizens at POE and U.S. Border 

Patrol stations, or destination 

communities in the United States. In 

light of that determination, and as 

described below, CDC is hereby 

terminating the CDC Orders issued 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 

CFR 71.40 as they apply to UC, effective 

immediately. 

A. Public Health Landscape 

Since late 2019, SARS–CoV–2, the 

virus that causes COVID–19, has spread 

throughout the world, resulting in a 

pandemic. Since the beginning of the 

pandemic, the U.S. Government 

response has focused on taking actions 

and providing guidance based on the 

best available scientific information. As 

the waves of the pandemic have surged 

and ebbed, so too have actions taken in 

response to the pandemic. Earlier 

phases of the pandemic required 

extraordinary actions by the U.S. 

Government and society at large. 

However, epidemiologic data, scientific 

knowledge, and the availability of 

public health mitigation measures, 

vaccines, and therapeutics have 

permitted many of those early actions to 

be pulled back in favor of more 

nuanced, targeted, and narrowlytailored guidance that provides a less 

restrictive means to prevent and control 

the SARS–CoV–2 virus and COVID–19. 

As of March 11, 2022, there have been 

over 450 million confirmed cases of 

COVID–19 globally, resulting in over six 

million deaths.22 The United States has 

reported over 79 million cases resulting 

in over 960,000 deaths due to the 

disease 23 and is currently averaging 

around 49,000 new cases of COVID–19 

a day as of March 11, 2022.24

B. Current Status of the COVID–19 

Pandemic 

The highly infectious SARS–CoV–2 

variant B.1.1.529 (Omicron) is 

responsible for the currently receding 

wave of the pandemic. The Omicron 

variant resulted in an extraordinary and 

unparalleled increase in COVID–19 

cases around the world.25 The United 


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15246 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 52 / Thursday, March 17, 2022 / Notices 

24, 2021, and on November 26, 2021, WHO 

designated it a Variant of Concern (VOC). On 

November 30, 2021, the U.S. also decided to 

classify Omicron as a VOC. This decision was based 

on a number of factors, including detection of cases 

attributed to Omicron in multiple countries, even 

among persons without travel history, transmission 

and replacement of Delta as the predominant 

variant in South Africa, changes in the spike 

protein of the virus, and concerns about potential 

decreased effectiveness of vaccination and 

treatments. 

26See Trends in Number of COVID–19 Cases and 

Deaths in the U.S. Reported to CDC, by State/ 

Territory, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#trends_dailycases, citing a seven-day 

moving average of 809,202 cases on January 15, 

2022 (last updated Mar. 9, 2022). 

27 Id. (noting a peak of 809,204 seven-day moving 

average number of cases to 40,433 seven-day 

moving average number of cases on March 7, 2022). 

28COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review: Stay Up 

to Date—Interpretive Summary for Jan. 28, 2022, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https:// 

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/ 

covidview/past-reports/01282022.html (Jan. 28, 

2022). 

29See New Admissions of Patients with 

Confirmed COVID–19, United States, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, https://

covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospitaladmissions (last updated Mar. 10, 2022); see also 

supra note 25. 

30 In addition to vaccine-induced immunity, 

studies have consistently shown that infection with 

SARS–CoV–2 lowers an individual’s risk of 

subsequent infection and an even lower risk of 

hospitalization and death. National estimates of 

both vaccine- and infection-induced antibody 

seroprevalence have been measured among blood 

donors; as of December 2021 these measures 

demonstrated 94.7% of persons 16 years and older 

showed antibody seroprevalence for COVID–19. 

Science Brief: Indicators for Monitoring COVID–19 

Community Levels and Making Public Health 

Recommendations, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- 

ncov/science/science-briefs/indicators-monitoringcommunity-levels.html (updated Mar. 4, 2022); 

Nationwide COVID–19 Infection- and VaccinationInduced Antibody Seroprevalence (Blood 

donations), Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#nationwide-blood-donor-seroprevalence 

(last updated Feb. 18, 2022). 

31Transcript for CDC Media Telebriefing: Update 

on COVID–19, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/ 

2022/t0225-covid-19-update.html (Feb. 25, 2022). 

COVID–19 vaccines are highly effective against 

severe illness and death. Widespread uptake of 

these vaccines, coupled with higher rates of 

infection-induced immunity at the population level, 

as well as the broad availability of mitigation 

measures and effective therapeutics have moved the 

pandemic to a different phase. See also State of the 

Union Address, https://www.whitehouse.gov/stateof-the-union-2022/_( (Mar. 1, 2022). 

32 In September 2020, CDC released the Indicators 

of Community Transmission framework, which 

incorporated two metrics to define community 

transmission: Total new cases per 100,000 persons 

in the past seven days, and percentage of Nucleic 

Acid Amplification Test results that are positive 

during the past seven days. CDC also encouraged 

local decision-makers to also assess the following 

factors, in addition to levels of SARS–CoV–2, to 

inform the need for layered prevention strategies 

across a range of settings: Health system capacity, 

vaccination coverage, capacity for early detection of 

increases in COVID–19 cases, and populations at 

risk for severe outcomes from COVID–19. See 

Christie A, Brooks JT, Hicks LA, et al. Guidance for 

Implementing COVID–19 Prevention Strategies in 

the Context of Varying Community Transmission 

Levels and Vaccination Coverage. MMWR Morb 

Mortal Wkly Rep. ePub: 27 July 2021. DOI: http:// 

dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7030e2. 

33 Id. 

34Supra note 1. 

35Supra note 31. 

36 Indicators for Monitoring COVID–19 

Community Levels and Implementing Prevention 

Strategies, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- 

ncov/downloads/science/Scientific-Rationalesummary_COVID-19-Community-Levels_

2022.02.23.pptx (Feb. 23, 2022). 

37New COVID–19 admissions and the percent of 

staffed inpatient beds occupied represent the 

current potential for strain on the health system, 

while data on new cases acts as an early warning 

indicator of potential increases in health system 

strain in the event of a COVID–19 surge. 

Community vaccination coverage and other local 

information, like early alerts from surveillance, 

such as through wastewater or the number of 

emergency department visits for COVID–19, when 

available, can also inform decision making for 

health officials and individuals. Supra note 21. 

38Supra note 31. 

39 Id. 

40See supra note 21. 

41COVID–19 by County, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/ 

coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/covid-bycounty.html (last updated Mar. 10, 2022). 

Furthermore, 82.8% of the U.S. population lives in 

counties classified as ‘‘low,’’ 15% live in counties 

classified as ‘‘medium,’’ and 2.2% live in counties 

classified as ‘‘high.’’ 

42Per internal CDC calculations. 

43These mitigation efforts include installing 

plexiglass dividers in facilities, enhancing 

ventilation systems, adhering to CDC cleaning and 

disinfection guidance, and providing masks to 

migrants, as well as providing PPE to CBP 

personnel. These measures generally follow the 

infection prevention control referred to as the 

hierarchy of controls. See Hierarchy of Controls, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

available at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ 

hierarchy/default.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2022). 

The hierarchy of controls is used as a means of 

determining how to implement feasible and 

effective control solutions. The hierarchy is 

outlined as: (1) Elimination (physically remove the 

States recorded its highest seven-day 

moving average number of cases on 

January 15, 2022.26 Following this 

unprecedented peak, the number of 

COVID–19 cases in the United States 

began to rapidly decrease, falling by 

95% as of March 9, 2022.27 After a brief 

period of continued increases,28 deaths 

and hospitalizations also reversed 

course and began a swift descent.29

These welcomed changes were due, in 

part, to widespread population 

immunity 30 and a generally lower 

overall risk of severe disease and are 

responsible for allowing the United 

States to return to more normal routines 

safely.31

1. Community COVID–19 Levels 

During the first four waves of the 

pandemic, CDC relied on a particular 

formula to calculate community 

transmission levels and update COVID– 

19 prevention strategies accordingly.32

These indicators reflected the goal of 

limiting transmission in anticipation of 

vaccines becoming available.33 The CDC 

Director examined these indicators in 

conducting the public health assessment 

for the August Order.34

In February 2022, given increased 

levels of population immunity, available 

therapies, and overall milder disease 

associated with the Omicron variant,35

CDC released a new framework, 

‘‘COVID–19 Community Levels,’’ 

reflecting a shift in focus from 

eliminating SARS–CoV–2 transmission 

toward disease control and 

infrastructure protection.36 This new 

framework examines three currently 

relevant metrics: New COVID–19 

hospital admissions per 100,000 

population in the past seven days, the 

percent of staffed inpatient beds 

occupied by patients with COVID–19, 

and total new COVID–19 cases per 

100,000 population in the past seven 

days.37 CDC determined that data on 

disease severity and healthcare system 

strain complement case rates, and these 

data together are more informative for 

public health recommendations for 

individual, organizational, and 

jurisdictional decisions than data on 

community transmission rates alone.38

This comprehensive approach to 

assessing COVID–19 Community Levels 

can inform decisions about layered 

COVID–19 prevention strategies, 

including vaccination and masking to 

reduce medically significant disease and 

limit strain on the healthcare system 

and other societal functions.39

Using these data, the COVID–19 

Community Levels for each county are 

classified as low, medium, or high. CDC 

recommends using county COVID–19 

Community Levels to help determine 

which mitigation measures, such as 

screening, testing, and mask use, should 

be implemented within a community.40

As of March 10, 2022, 72.7% of U.S. 

counties are classified at the low 

COVID–19 Community Level, 21.2% of 

U.S. counties are classified at the 

medium COVID–19 Community Level, 

and 6% of U.S. counties are classified 

at the high COVID–19 Community 

Level.41 Furthermore, 82.8% of the U.S. 

population lives in counties classified 

as ‘‘low,’’ 15% live in counties 

classified as ‘‘medium,’’ and 2.2% live 

in counties classified as ‘‘high.’’ 42

2. Information Specific to UC 

Since the beginning of the pandemic, 

CBP has maintained myriad COVID–19 

mitigation efforts in order to protect 

noncitizens and its workforce.43 The 


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hazard); (2) Substitution (replace the hazard); (3) 

Engineering Controls (isolate people from the 

hazard); (4) Administrative Controls (change the 

way people work); and (5) PPE (protect people with 

Personal Protective Equipment). CBP also continues 

to update the CBP Job Hazard Analysis and the CBP 

COVID–19 toolkit based on the latest relevant 

public health guidance. 

44See supra note 9. 

45CBP most recently reported vaccination rates 

between 75% and 91% among its U.S. Border Patrol 

and Office of Field Operations personnel. 

46El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 

constitute the top three countries of origin for UC. 

Rates of vaccination for each country are as follows: 

El Salvador 65% fully vaccinated, 4.8% only partly 

vaccinated; Guatemala: 31% fully vaccinated, 8.5% 

only partly vaccinated; Honduras: 45% fully 

vaccinated, 8.5% only partly vaccinated. 

Coronavirus (COVID–19) Vaccinations, Our World 

in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/covidvaccinations (last visited Mar. 11, 2022). 

DHS Office of the Chief Medical Officer 

has worked with local community 

partners whose work is critical to 

moving individuals safely out of CBP 

custody and through the appropriate 

immigration pathway. Through these 

partnerships, DHS has supported state, 

local, tribal, and territorial partners and 

NGOs in developing robust COVID–19 

testing and quarantine programs along 

the Southwest Border. In addition, 

vaccine uptake among the CBP 

workforce has reached approximately 

88% among personnel on the U.S.- 

Mexico border. 

CDC understands that in the months 

between the issuance of the August 

Order and now, CBP has implemented 

a robust set of COVID–19 mitigation 

protocols that have substantially 

reduced the potential for COVID–19 

spread among UC in CBP and ORR 

facilities. For many months, UC had 

been tested as they were leaving CBP 

facilities, prior to transfer to large ORR 

facilities. On August 25, 2021, CBP 

began testing UC during CBP’s intake 

process as well, prior to placing UC in 

congregate settings. Intake testing of UC 

started with those encountered in the 

Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Sector of the 

U.S. Border Patrol—the Sector that has 

encountered more than 54% percent of 

UC over the past 12 months. This model 

has subsequently been expanded to 

other high-encounter Border Patrol 

Sectors, including Tucson (January 26, 

2022), El Paso (February 3, 2022), and 

Del Rio (February 3, 2022). Taken 

together, these Sectors account for over 

87% of UC encounters over the past 12 

months—indicating that the large 

majority of UC are now going through 

this intake processing protocol. 

Pursuant to these protocols, UC 

encountered by Border Patrol agents are 

tested for COVID–19 in a sheltered, 

open air location during intake 

processing prior to entering congregate 

settings, thus ensuring the ability to 

segregate UC by test results, provide 

appropriate care to UC who have tested 

positive, and minimize further spread. 

UC that test positive for COVID–19 are 

cohorted together and kept physically 

separate from UC who test negative. UC 

who test positive for COVID–19 go 

through a streamlined designation and 

referral process for ORR placement that 

is substantially faster than the process 

for other UC, generally resulting in 

transfers to ORR within 8 to 12 hours of 

encounter. UC who test positive are 

transported together (and separately 

from other UC) to designated ORR 

facilities that are designed to provide 

robust care for COVID–19 positive 

children and to minimize the chance of 

transmission. UC who test negative go 

through the normal processing, as 

applied to UC, and are tested again 

when they are discharged from CBP 

facilities prior to transport to large ORR 

facilities. UC who test positive at this 

second stage are routed to designated 

ORR facilities to minimize the potential 

for COVID–19 spread. All UC are subject 

to masking requirements while in CBP 

custody. 

Since the inception of these intake 

processing protocols, CBP has tested 

more than 45,000 UC with an overall 

positivity rate of 10%. Consistent with 

the decline in COVID–19 positivity rates 

more generally, the UC overall positivity 

rate has been declining. During the first 

week of March 2022, the overall 

positivity rate for UC in CBP custody 

was around 6%, down from a high of 

nearly 20% in early February 2022. 

CBP’s intake processing protocols 

have also led to a significant decrease in 

COVID–19 positivity rates for UC in 

ORR care. Following the start of 

COVID–19 testing for UC as part of the 

CBP intake process in August, there was 

a significant decrease in the proportion 

of children referred to ORR from the 

RGV Sector testing positive for COVID– 

19 within the first four days of ORR 

custody, as compared to the pre-testing 

period. As of March 5, 2022, COVID–19 

positivity rates in ORR shelter facilities 

ranged from 4% to 15%—a number that 

includes those in facilities designed 

specifically to house COVID-positive 

UC. Once UC are transferred to ORR 

care, ORR has in place a range of other 

mitigation measures, as detailed below, 

to include universal and proper wearing 

of masks, physical distancing, frequent 

hand washing, cleaning and 

disinfection, improved ventilation, staff 

vaccination, and cohorting UC 

according to their COVID–19 test status. 

Due to operational and facility 

constraints, CBP reports that it is not 

able to replicate this robust COVID–19 

testing and isolation program for SA and 

FMU in its custody. 

II. Public Health Reassessment 

A. Changing Public Health Conditions 

CDC continually reassesses the 

development of the COVID–19 

pandemic and the need for continued 

measures under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 

42 CFR 71.40, the authorities that 

support the CDC Orders.44 The public 

health reassessment for UC described 

herein is based upon the most recent 

science and data available to CDC. 

Based upon these data, CDC has 

determined that while the use of the 

CDC Orders to reduce the numbers of 

noncitizens held in congregate settings 

in POEs and Border Patrol stations has 

been part of the layered COVID–19 

mitigation measures over the last two 

years, less restrictive measures than 

those outlined in prior CDC Orders are 

now available with respect to UC to 

mitigate the introduction, transmission, 

and spread of COVID–19. While the 

CDC Orders provided an important 

COVID–19 mitigation measure during 

certain phases of the pandemic by 

reducing the number of noncitizens 

held in congregate settings, other public 

health measures such as workforce 

testing, widespread vaccination, variant 

action plans, and mitigation measures 

specifically available for the UC 

population, are now available to provide 

necessary public health protection for 

noncitizens, Americans, and the DHS 

workforce. 

CDC believes that the widespread 

availability of tests for the general 

public, in addition to other methods of 

surveillance, will permit the workforce 

to rapidly institute necessary mitigation 

measures in the event that cases of 

COVID–19 are detected. At the same 

time, vaccination rates are increasing 

both at home and abroad. Vaccination 

among the American public and the 

DHS workforce in particular has been 

largely successful and, as stated in the 

August Order, widespread vaccination 

of federal employees and personnel in 

congregate settings at POE and U.S. 

Border Patrol stations is a critical step 

toward the normalization of border 

operations.45 Since August 2021, 

vaccination rates in the countries of 

origin for the current majority of UC 

have also increased dramatically.46

Such increased global vaccination rates, 

as well as higher rates of infectioninduced immunity globally, provide 

additional layers of protection. As a 

public health matter, CDC strongly 

recommends that all individuals, 


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47 86 FR 42828, 42837. 

48 Id. 

49See supra note 22. 

50 Id. 

51See supra note 42. 

52See supra note 31. 

53See supra note 41 (noting 54% (n=13) of 

counties along the U.S.-Mexico border are 

considered ‘‘Low’’ (San Diego County, CA; Imperial 

County, CA; Luna, NM; Dona Ana County, NM; 

Otero County, NM; Eddy County, NM; Lea County, 

NM; Presidio County, TX; Brewster County, TX; 

Terrell County, TX; Webb County, TX; Zapata 

County, TX; Cameron County, TX); 37% of counties 

(n=9) along the U.S.-Mexico border are classified as 

having COVID–19 community levels ’’: Pima 

County, AZ, Santa Cruz County, AZ; Cochise 

County, AZ; El Paso County, TX; Hudspeth County, 

TX; Val Verde County, TX; Kinney County, TX; 

Maverick County, TX; and Starr County, TX); and 

8% of counties (n=2) along the U.S.-Mexico border 

are classified as having COVID–19 community 

levels: Yuma, County, AZ and Hidalgo County, TX). 

54 86 FR 38717 (July 22, 2021). 

55UC not subject to an order under 42 U.S.C. 265 

are generally processed under immigration 

processes under Title 8 of the U.S. Code and 

referred from CBP to ORR for care and custody, 

according to the usual legal framework governing 

such referrals. Upon transfer to ORR custody, UC 

are transported to facilities that operate under 

cooperative agreements or contracts with HHS and 

must meet ORR requirements to ensure a high level 

of quality, child-focused care by appropriately 

trained staff. At these facilities, case managers work 

to identify and ultimately place UC with vetted 

sponsors (usually family members within the 

United States). 86 Fed. Red. 38717, 38719 (July 22, 

2020). 

56See supra at note 1. 

57Per May 2021 monthly data from ORR. 

58Per April 2021 monthly data from ORR. 

59Per data from ORR. 

60 Id. From January 2021 through February 2022, 

15,492 UC have been discharged from ORR care. 

61As reported by ORR. 

62For comparison, on March 29, 2021, nearly 

5,500 UC were in CBP custody, with 3,540 of those 

UC in custody for longer than 72 hours; as of March 

31, 2021, the average time in CBP custody for UC 

was 131 hours. 

including noncitizens, receive a 

COVID–19 vaccine. This aligns with 

CDC’s emphasis on global vaccination. 

Even if full vaccination cannot be 

assured, CDC believes vaccination of as 

many people as possible provides some 

level of protection against severe illness 

and hospitalization, thereby protecting 

citizens, noncitizens and the U.S. 

healthcare system. 

The August Order also highlighted the 

threat posed by emerging variants and 

the potential for a future vaccineresistant variant, either of which could 

negatively impact U.S. communities and 

local healthcare resources.47 Based in 

part on these threats, CDC concluded at 

that time that an Order under 42 U.S.C. 

265 should remain in place, pending 

further improvements in the public 

health situation, and subject to 

continual assessment.48 Since the 

August Order, public health officials 

have learned a great deal about variants 

and how best to respond to them. In 

response to Omicron, the U.S. 

Government developed a 

comprehensive plan for monitoring 

COVID–19, swiftly adapting public 

health tools to combat a new variant, 

and deploying emergency resources to 

help communities.49 This plan includes 

a commitment to ensuring that variant 

surveillance, vaccines, tests, and 

treatments can be updated and deployed 

quickly.50

As noted above, a significant majority 

of the U.S. population currently lives in 

an area classified as having a ‘‘low’’ 

COVID–19 Community Level,51

meaning most of the population can 

operate under more relaxed COVID–19 

mitigation strategies.52 Noteworthy for 

purposes of this reassessment, as of 

March 10, 2022, of the 24 U.S. counties 

along the U.S.-Mexico border, 91% of 

counties on the Southwest Border are 

now classified as having a ‘‘low’’or 

‘‘medium’’ COVID–19 Community 

Level.53

B. Public Health Factors Specifically 

Relevant to UC Population 

For all the reasons set forth above, it 

is CDC’s assessment that there is no 

longer a public health rationale to apply 

to UC the August Order and all related 

prior orders issued pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 CFR 71.40. 

Moreover, as explained in the July 

Exception, UC are less likely than FMU 

and SA to introduce COVID–19.54 In 

addition, UC as a population are subject 

to unique care within CBP and ORR 

facilities.55 These facilities are able to 

provide robust mitigation measures that 

have proven to be effective in managing 

COVID–19 and minimizing the risk of 

spread. These reasons serve as an 

additional basis to those outlined herein 

for immediately terminating the August 

Order and all prior Orders as to UC. 

Following the temporary exception of 

UC from expulsion in January 2021, 

CDC formally excepted UC from the 

then-in-place October 2020 Order in 

July 2021. The July Exception was based 

on a public health assessment of the 

specific treatment of UC and the care 

available to them through ORR and was 

fully incorporated by reference into 

CDC’s subsequent August Order.56

On March 4, 2022, the U.S. District 

Court for the Northern District of Texas 

granted a motion for Preliminary 

Injunction brought by the State of Texas 

and ordered that the July Exception for 

UC and its incorporation into the 

August Order be enjoined, with the 

injunction stayed through Friday, March 

11, 2022. Even prior to that court order, 

CDC has been reviewing whether the 

August Order should remain in place as 

part of its regular public health 

reassessment every 60 days. Although 

CDC continues to complete the next 

regularly scheduled reassessment, CDC 

accelerated its ongoing and review 

determined an immediate completion of 

the assessment of the current public 

health situation with regard to UC was 

necessary due to the impending 

effective date of the injunction. Based 

on that reassessment, and after carefully 

considering the issues raised in the 

court’s order, CDC has determined that 

the current public health situation does 

not support the application of the 

August Order to UC. Per the terms of 42 

U.S.C. 265 itself, this lack of public 

health justification means the 

suspension of the right to introduce UC 

is not an available measure. In addition, 

the COVID–19 public health mitigation 

measures already in place for UC 

described herein reinforce CDC’s 

determination that the August Order 

and all related prior orders issued 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 

CFR 71.40 should be terminated as to 

UC. 

Following the temporary exception of 

UC from the October Order in January 

2021, the United States experienced an 

increase in the number of UC arriving 

daily at the Southwest Border. In 

response, HHS and ORR, in conjunction 

with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and with 

the assistance of the Department of 

Defense, greatly expanded the capacity 

for intake and processing of UC. At its 

height, ORR had capacity of over 30,000 

beds 57 and nearly 23,000 children 58

were in its care. Currently, ORR has a 

capacity of nearly 14,000 beds and 

fewer than 10,000 children are in ORR 

care as of March 9, 2022.59 ORR has 

successfully processed and discharged 

over 159,000 UC since January 2021.60

The successful efforts to expand 

capacity for UC have resulted in 

sufficient capacity at ORR sites—both 

along the border and in the interior— 

and significantly reduced the length of 

time that UC remain in CBP custody. As 

of March 11, 2022, the average time a 

UC remained in CBP custody before 

transferring to ORR custody was 23 

hours, and no UC have been in CBP 

custody for over 72 hours.61 This 

represents a substantial improvement 

from early 2021.62 While the number of 

UC encountered may remain at elevated 

levels, expanded ORR capacity and 

improved processing methods have 

resulted in UC remaining in CBP 

custody for shorter periods of time. 

With CDC’s assistance and guidance, 

ORR also has implemented COVID–19 

testing protocols for UC in its care and 


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63 In ORR facilities where the risk of transmission 

is moderate to high, public health officials working 

collaboratively with ORR facilities can determine 

the appropriateness of offering screening and repeat 

testing of randomly selected asymptomatic staff and 

children at the facility, as feasible, to identify cases 

and prevent secondary transmission. 

64Additional criteria (e.g., continued symptom 

monitoring and correct and consistent wearing of 

masks) should be met by ORR as outlined on CDC’s 

website. See Science Brief: Options to Reduce 

Quarantine for Contacts of Persons with SARS– 

CoV–2 Infection Using Symptom Monitoring and 

Diagnostic Testing, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- 

ncov/more/scientific-brief-options-to-reducequarantine.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2020). 

65 Field Guidance #17—COVID–19 Vaccination of 

Unaccompanied Children (UC) in ORR Care, 

Internal Document (CDC memo to ORR, revised 

Nov. 8, 2021). 

66Per data reported by ORR. 

67As reported by ORR. 

68 2022 WL 658579, at *16–*18. 

69 Id. at *16. 

70 In contrast, SA and FMU spend, on average, 2– 

3 days in congregate settings at the border. 

71 Id. at *16. 

72See COVID–19 Vaccinations in the United 

States, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/ 

#vaccinations_vacc-people-onedose-pop-5yr 

(updated Mar. 11, 2022). 

73See supra note 43. 

continues to practice other mitigation 

measures to prevent and curtail 

transmission of the SARS–CoV–2 virus 

among UC in its care. These strategies 

include universal and proper wearing of 

masks, physical distancing, frequent 

hand washing, cleaning and 

disinfection, improved ventilation, staff 

vaccination, and cohorting UC 

according to their COVID–19 test status. 

Per a CDC recommendation, ORR 

conducts serial testing of staff, as 

feasible, to allow early detection of a 

possible outbreak.63 ORR contract and 

grantee staff working in facilities serving 

UC are encouraged to receive the 

COVID–19 vaccine.64 As advised by 

CDC, ORR also restricts movement of 

unvaccinated personnel between 

facilities to reduce potential outbreaks 

resulting from transfer of unvaccinated 

staff between shelters. These measures 

help reduce the spread of COVID–19 

among UC prior to the UC being 

discharged to vetted sponsors in U.S. 

communities. 

In addition to the mitigation measures 

at ORR facilities described above, CDC 

provided updated recommendations to 

ORR regarding the vaccination of UC 

ages 5 and older.65 ORR subsequently 

approved the administration of COVID– 

19 vaccine for age-eligible children. 

Under ORR care, children ages 5 and 

over are offered a COVID–19 vaccine as 

soon as possible, as long as there are no 

contraindications and vaccination does 

not delay unification of UC with 

sponsors. Of the total population of UC 

in ORR care, approximately 98% are 

age-eligible for vaccination and, as of 

March 8, 2022, ORR has administered at 

least one dose of the COVID–19 vaccine 

to 62,644 UC and a second dose to 

15,994, with a refusal rate under 1%.66

CDC considers these vaccination efforts 

to be a critical risk reduction measure 

that supports excepting UC from the 

August Order. 

Although 20,682 UC total have tested 

positive for COVID–19 while at ORR 

shelters during the period of March 24, 

2020 to March 3, 2022, 20,304 of those 

UC testing positive have successfully 

completed medical isolation, with few 

requiring medical treatment. Similarly, 

13,148 cumulative COVID–19 cases 

have been reported from Emergency 

Intake Sites (EIS) as of March 2, 2022; 

however, only approximately 37 of the 

UC in this EIS group have required 

hospitalization.67

These numbers indicate that the risk 

of overburdening the local healthcare 

systems with UC presenting with severe 

COVID–19 disease remains low. Based 

on the robust network of ORR care 

facilities and the testing and medical 

care available therein, as well as 

COVID–19 mitigation protocols that 

include vaccination for personnel and 

eligible UC, there is very low likelihood 

that processing UC in accordance with 

existing Title 8 immigration procedures 

will result in undue strain on the U.S. 

healthcare system or healthcare 

resources. Moreover, UC released to a 

vetted sponsor do not pose a significant 

level of risk for COVID–19 spread into 

the community because they are 

released after having undergone testing, 

quarantine or isolation, and vaccination 

when possible. UC sponsors also are 

provided with appropriate medical and 

public health direction. 

Based on the public health 

reassessment set forth above, as well as 

the successful COVID–19 mitigation 

measures that were and continue to be 

in place for UC, there is no public 

health basis to resume the suspension of 

introduction of UC. Resuming the 

suspension of introduction of UC would 

not significantly decrease the risk of the 

introduction, transmission, or spread of 

COVID–19 at POE or Border Patrol 

stations. Nor does the introduction of 

UC into the United States pose a serious 

danger of the introduction of COVID–19 

such that applying the August Order to 

UC is required in the interest of the 

public health. 

III. Legal Considerations 

A. Concerns Raised by the District Court 

In enjoining CDC from enforcing the 

exception for UC set forth in the July 

Exception and August Order, the court 

in Texas v. Biden found that the July 

Exception and August Order likely were 

arbitrary or capricious in violation of 

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 

for several reasons.68 CDC takes the 

court’s concerns seriously and has 

considered each of them in issuing this 

Order. First, the court stated that ‘‘[t]he 

record before the Court demonstrates 

that nothing changed between the 

October 2020 Order, the July 2021 

[Order], and the August 2021 Order. The 

COVID–19 virus (still) remains a 

threat.’’ 69 Regardless of the public 

health conditions leading up to the July 

Exception and August Order, CDC’s 

most recent reassessment of the status of 

the COVID–19 pandemic and associated 

public health risks makes clear that 

circumstances have now changed 

significantly. Case counts and 

hospitalization rates are decreasing, 

vaccination rates are increasing, and the 

availability of testing and treatments 

also are increasing. These changes and 

continuing trends in the public health 

conditions since the conclusion of 

CDC’s previous reassessment support 

the decision to terminate the Orders as 

to UC immediately. 

Additionally, the court found that the 

July Exception and August Order did 

not adequately explain why UC were 

unlikely to spread COVID–19 to others 

when they spend, on average, more than 

a day 70 in congregate settings at DHS 

facilities ‘‘where they can expose other 

detainees, DHS personnel, and 

American citizens and residents to 

whatever viruses they are carrying.’’ 71

CDC has considered the court’s concern 

and concluded that because of the 

overall decrease in cases of COVID–19 

throughout the country, including at the 

Southwest Border, coupled with the 

increase in vaccination rates, there is an 

extremely low likelihood that intake 

processing of UC in DHS facilities will 

pose a serious danger to the public 

health. Importantly, vaccines are now 

widely available and vaccination rates 

have increased among the American 

public in general and the DHS 

workforce in particular, as well as in the 

countries of origin for the current 

majority of UC.72 Additionally, CBP 

continues to implement a variety of 

mitigation efforts to prevent the spread 

of COVID–19 in POE and U.S. Border 

Patrol facilities, as detailed above.73

Next, the court found that ‘‘instead of 

trying to prevent [UC] from spreading 

the viruses they are potentially carrying 

to the interior of the United States, the 

Government chose to send [UC] away 


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74Texas, 2022 WL 658579, at *16. 

75See supra II.B. 

76 Id. 

77See 86 FR at 38,720. 

78Texas v. Biden, No. 4:21–cv–0579–P, Doc. 100 

at 31. 

79See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the 

Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020). 

80See 86 FR at 42838 (‘‘As outlined in the July 

Exception and incorporated herein, CDC is fully 

excepting UC from this Order.’’). 

81 42 U.S.C. 265. 

82 Id. 

83 Id. 

84 42 CFR 71.40(a). 

85 85 FR at 17061 (emphasis added). 

86 85 FR at 17068. 

from the facilities where the 

Government could monitor them and 

their health.’’ 74 CDC clarifies that 

generally DHS is required by the 

Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) to 

promptly transfer UC to ORR. Even after 

such transfer, UC remain in U.S. 

Government custody through ORR’s 

network of providers where they are 

subject to robust COVID–19-mitigation 

protocols, including distancing, testing, 

masking, quarantining, cleaning and 

disinfection, improved ventilation, staff 

vaccination, and available vaccination 

for noncitizen children.75 These 

mitigation measures allow ORR to 

identify COVID–19 cases, and the vast 

majority of UC who tested positive for 

COVID–19 while at ORR shelters 

successfully completed medical 

isolation. Unlike other covered 

noncitizens apprehended at the border, 

UC in ORR custody undergo COVID–19 

testing twice before being released to the 

community. Accordingly, there very low 

risk that UC are COVID–19 positive 

when they are released into the 

community. Moreover, under ORR care, 

eligible children are offered a COVID–19 

vaccine as soon as possible, as long as 

there are no contraindications and 

vaccination does not delay unification 

of UC with vetted sponsors. When UC 

are released to sponsors, ORR provides 

their sponsors with appropriate medical 

and public health direction, including 

information on how to obtain additional 

vaccination doses as needed as well as 

quarantine and isolation guidance when 

appropriate. 

The court also found that the July 

Exception and August Order did not 

explain how ‘‘preventing the spread of 

COVID–19 between’’ UC can also 

‘‘prevent the spread of COVID–19 from 

the interior of the United States.’’ 76 CDC 

has considered the court’s concern and 

determined that preventing the spread 

of COVID–19 between UC does prevent 

the spread of COVID–19 into the interior 

because the fewer UC that test positive 

for COVID–19, the lower the 

transmission rates will be from any UC 

who is COVID–19 positive into the 

interior. In any event, as discussed 

above, CDC has determined that, given 

the testing of UC that occurs prior to 

transfer to ORR, as well as the robust 

mitigation measures implemented by 

CBP since the August Order and in 

place at ORR facilities, UC present very 

little risk of spreading of COVID–19 

when they are released to their 

sponsors. 

The court also noted a prior U.S. 

Border Patrol Chief’s statement that CDC 

adopted the exception for UC before it 

issued the February 2021 Order pausing 

application of the October Order to UC. 

From this, the court concluded that 

CDC’s July Exception and August Order 

constituted a ‘‘departure from prior 

policy.’’ Regardless of whether there 

had been any defects in a prior 

unannounced decision or in the 

February 2021 Order that affected the 

July Exception and August Order, CDC 

is now providing a fuller explanation of 

its decision to terminate the Orders with 

respect to UC immediately given the 

outcome of its most recent public-health 

reassessment. 

B. Absence of Reliance Interests 

As noted above, in issuing its July 

Exception, CDC considered the impact 

of excepting UC from the October 2020 

Order on the local healthcare systems in 

light of, among other things, data 

showing that the number of UC 

presenting with severe COVID–19 

disease remained low.77 The U.S. 

District Court for the Northern District 

of Texas has found, however, that 

neither the July Exception nor the 

August Order ‘‘indicate that the agency 

considered all of Texas’s potential 

reliance interests.’’ 78 In issuing this 

Order, CDC has considered whether 

state or local governments, or their 

subdivisions, have any ‘‘legitimate 

reliance’’ 79 interests on the inclusion of 

UC in an Order under 42 U.S.C. 265. No 

state or local government could have 

any reliance interest relating to the 

exclusion of UC arising from the August 

2021 Order since it expressly excepted 

UC.80 Because expulsions of UC under 

42 U.S.C. 265 have not been occurring 

since at least February 2021, no State 

could rely on UC being covered by the 

August Order, and CDC does not see a 

need to provide advance notice that it 

will continue excepting UC. We 

therefore focus on the October 2020 

Order and its predecessors. CDC finds it 

useful to distinguish between potential 

long-term and short-term reliance 

interests. 

On the issue of long-term reliance 

interests, CDC has determined that no 

state or local government could be said 

to have legitimately relied on the 

October 2020 Order to implement a 

long-term or permanent change to its 

operations because the October 2020 

Order was by its very nature a shortterm order subject to change at any time 

in response to an evolving public health 

crisis and is subject to regular review by 

CDC. Section 265 may be invoked only 

if there is a ‘‘serious danger of the 

introduction of [a communicable] 

disease into the United States, and [if] 

this danger is so increased by the 

introduction of persons or property from 

such country that a suspension of the 

right to introduce such persons and 

property is required in the interest of 

the public health.’’ 81 The statute may be 

invoked only ‘‘for such period of time 

as [CDC] may deem necessary’’ to avert 

such a danger.82 Thus, both Section 265 

and HHS’s implementing regulation 

recognize that in prohibiting the 

introduction of covered persons ‘‘in 

whole or in part,’’ 83 a CDC Order is 

effective ‘‘only for such period of time 

that the Director deems necessary to 

avert the serious danger of the 

introduction of a quarantinable 

communicable disease.’’ 84

Accordingly, CDC’s initial order 

issued under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 

CFR 71.40 in March 2020 made clear 

that the order represented a ‘‘temporary 

suspension of the introduction of 

[covered] persons into the United 

States’’ 85 and that the order would 

remain effective only for ‘‘30 days, or 

until [CDC] determine[s] that the danger 

of further introduction of COVID–19 

into the United States has ceased to be 

a serious danger to the public health, 

whichever is shorter.’’ 86 The March 

2020 Order was subsequently extended 

on April 20, 2020 and amended on May 

19, 2020. The fact that the policy was 

frequently reviewed should have 

underscored that the use of the Section 

265 authority was a temporary measure 

subject to change at any time. The 

October 2020 Order again confirmed 

this understanding of CDC’s authority 

under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 CFR 

71.40, noting the ‘‘temporary’’ nature of 

the suspension of the introduction of 

covered persons, and the fact that the 

Order would be reviewed every 30 days 

based on ‘‘the latest information 

regarding the status of the COVID–19 

pandemic and associated public health 

risks to ensure that the Order remains 

necessary,’’ and that CDC ‘‘retain[ed] the 

authority to extend, modify, or 


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87 85 FR at 65807, 65812. 

88See P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492 

(D.D.C. 2020). 

89Order, P.J.E.S. v. Mayorkas, et al., No. 20–5357 

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2021), Doc. No. 1882899. 

90See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (explaining that 

features evidencing the temporary and non-rightsconferring nature of a government program ‘‘surely 

are pertinent in considering the strength of any 

reliance interests,’’ and can be considered by the 

agency). 

91See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (rejecting the 

government’s argument that the fact that the DACA 

program provided benefits only in two-year 

increments and was said not to confer any 

substantive rights ‘‘automatically preclude[d] 

reliance interests,’’ but noting that such disclaimers 

‘‘are surely pertinent in considering the strength of 

any reliance interests’’). 

92Supra note 1. 

93See 86 FR 38,717 (July 22, 2021); 86 FR at 

42,837–38; see also 86 FR 9942 (Feb. 17, 2021). 

terminate the Order, or implementation 

of [the] Order, at any time as needed to 

protect public health.’’ 87

In addition, in November 2020, the 

United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia enjoined the 

expulsion of UC on the ground that 

Section 265 likely did not authorize 

such expulsions.88 Although the 

government appealed the injunction and 

obtained a stay of the injunction in 

January 2021,89 there remained legal 

uncertainty over the government’s 

authority to apply Section 265 to UC, 

thus further rendering it unreasonable 

for any state or local government to act 

in long-term reliance on the continued 

expulsion of UC under Section 265. 

Moreover, as a factual matter, CDC is 

not aware of, nor has any state or local 

government brought to CDC’s attention, 

any reasonable or legitimate reliance on 

the continued expulsion of UC under 42 

U.S.C. 265. For example, no state or 

local government has indicated that it 

altered its operations, spending, or 

regulation in light of the prior 

application of Section 265 to UC. The 

total number of UC processed under 

Title 8 remains relatively small, 

rendering it unlikely that state or local 

governments would adversely rely on 

the application of Section 265 to UC by 

making any material changes. 

Additionally, CDC does not believe 

that the presence of UC poses a public 

health risk sufficient to justify 

continued application of 42 U.S.C. 265 

to UC. Because 42 U.S.C. 265 authorizes 

the CDC to prevent the introduction of 

noncitizens only when necessary to 

address a public health risk, no state or 

local government could rely on Section 

265 continuing to be applied in the 

absence of such a risk. Therefore, CDC’s 

considered judgment is that no state or 

local government currently has a longterm reliance interest in the continued 

expulsion of UC under the October 2020 

Order and that any long-term reliance 

interests that might be said to exist in 

connection with the continued 

expulsion of UC under the October 2020 

Order are outweighed by CDC’s 

determination that there is no public 

health justification to expel UC at this 

time.90 To the extent that any state or 

local government did rely on the 

expulsion of UC for purposes of 

resource allocation despite the reasons 

cautioning against such reliance, CDC 

concludes that resource allocation 

concerns do not outweigh CDC’s 

determination that expulsion of UC is 

not required to avert a serious danger to 

public health. 

CDC has also considered whether 

there may be any short-term reliance on 

the continued expulsion of UC under 

the October 2020 Order.91 Because CDC 

is unaware of any such reliance beyond 

the potential allocation of resources 

CDC already considered for local 

healthcare systems, CDC does not 

believe that any state or local 

government could have reasonably 

relied, even on a short-term basis, on the 

continued expulsion of UC. As noted 

above, any such reliance would not 

have been reasonable given the statutory 

requirement that 42 U.S.C. 265 be 

invoked only if there is a ‘‘serious 

danger of the introduction of [a 

communicable] disease into the United 

States, and that this danger is so 

increased by the introduction of persons 

or property from such country that a 

suspension of the right to introduce 

such persons and property is required in 

the interest of the public health,’’ as 

well as the statutory mandate that 

Section 265 be utilized only ‘‘for such 

period of time as [CDC] may deem 

necessary’’ to avert such a danger. Any 

reliance also would have been 

particularly unwarranted because UC 

were subject to expulsion under 42 

U.S.C. 265 for only a very limited 

time—from March 2020 to November 

2020, and then briefly from January 29, 

2021 to shortly before the February 11, 

2021 notice. As such, the exclusion of 

UC from 42 U.S.C. 265 expulsions has 

been the status quo generally since 

November 2020 and certainly since at 

least February 2021. Thus, since the 

start of this public health emergency, 

the period of time during which UC 

have been excepted from expulsion 

under Section 265 is longer than the 

period of time during which they were 

subject to such expulsion. Even if an 

entity had reasonably relied on the 

inclusion of UC in an order under 42 

U.S.C. 265 prior to February 2021, it 

should have adjusted its position by 

now. Therefore, CDC does not believe 

that any potential short-term reliance 

interests can reasonably outweigh CDC’s 

public health determination that there is 

no public health justification for 

expelling UC under 42 U.S.C. 265 at this 

time. 

Finally, Orders under 42 U.S.C. 265; 

268 and 42 CFR 71.40 are not, and do 

not purport to be, policy decisions about 

controlling immigration; rather, as 

explained, CDC’s exercise of its 

authority under Section 265 depends on 

the existence of a public health 

emergency. Thus, to the extent that 

border communities were relying on an 

order under 42 U.S.C. 265 as a means 

of controlling immigration, such 

reliance would not be reasonable or 

legitimate. Even if such reliance were 

reasonable or legitimate, that reliance 

would not outweigh CDC’s public 

health assessment. 

In conclusion, any such reliance 

interests, whether short- or long-term, 

do not outweigh CDC’s determination 

that expulsion of UC is not necessary to 

avert a serious danger to public health. 

Because disruption of ordinary 

processing of UC is a weighty action, 

CDC does not believe it is appropriate 

to resume expulsion when CDC has 

concluded that such action is not 

warranted under the terms of 42 U.S.C. 

265. 

C. Timing Considerations 

As noted in the August Order, CDC 

reassesses ‘‘[t]he circumstances 

necessitating the Order . . . at least 

every 60 days.’’ 92 Accordingly, CDC has 

been in the process of evaluating the 

status of the pandemic and the evolving 

public health conditions since the 

conclusion of its previous review on 

January 29, 2022, to determine whether 

the Order remains necessary in whole or 

part to protect the public health. The 

current 60-day review process is 

scheduled to end on March 30, 2022, 

and CDC will conclude its reassessment 

of whether the Order remains necessary 

in whole or part to protect the public 

health with respect to SA and FMU by 

that date. 

CDC had previously excepted UC in 

its July Exception, as reiterated and 

incorporated in its August Order.93 On 

March 4, 2022, the District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas issued a 

preliminary injunction ‘‘enjoining and 

restraining’’ CDC from enforcing the 

July Exception and August Order to the 

extent that they ‘‘except unaccompanied 

alien children from the Title 42 

procedures based solely on their status 

as unaccompanied alien children’’ 

because, the court found, CDC had not 


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94Texas v. Biden, No. 4:21–cv–579 (N.D. Tex. 

Mar. 4. 2022). 

95 Id. 

96See D.B. v. Cardall, 826 F.3d 721, 738 (4th Cir. 

2016) (‘‘The intricate web of statutory provisions 

relating to [UC] reflects Congress’s unmistakable 

desire to protect that vulnerable group.’’). 

97See Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas,—F.4th—, 

2022 WL 628061, *12 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) 

(noting that some migrants who are expelled could 

be subject to persecution and victimization). 

98See supra notes 1 and 4. 

99See supra note 7. 

100 42 U.S.C. 265; 42 CFR 71.40. 101 42 CFR 71.40. 102Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign 

Quarantine: Suspension of the Right to Introduce 

and Prohibition of Introduction of Persons into 

United States from Designated Foreign Countries or 

Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 FR 56424 

(Sept. 11, 2020); 42 CFR 71.40. 

103 42 U.S.C. 268; 42 CFR 71.40(d). 

104 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). 

105 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). 

adequately explained its decision to 

treat UC differently than other 

noncitizens subject to the October 

Order.94 The court stayed its 

preliminary injunction for seven days.95

Because CDC has determined, after 

considering current public health 

conditions and recent developments, 

that expulsion of UC is not warranted to 

protect the public health, and in 

recognition of the unique vulnerabilities 

of UC, CDC is immediately terminating 

the CDC Orders to the extent they apply 

to UC. Because of their vulnerabilities, 

UC are generally treated differently than 

other individuals apprehended and 

processed at the border under the 

immigration laws. When Section 265 

does not apply, UC generally are 

transferred to the care and custody of 

HHS’s ORR pursuant to the TVPRA.96

ORR is able to care for UC while 

implementing appropriate COVID–19 

mitigation measures, given ORR’s robust 

network of care facilities that provide 

testing and medical care, and DHS has 

already been excepting UC in 

accordance with CDC’s August Order. 

Because CDC has in its expert judgment 

determined again that, based on current 

circumstances, the expulsion of UC 

under Section 265 is not necessary to 

protect the public health, there is no 

justification for subjecting UC to the 

potentially significant harms they could 

suffer if the CDC Orders were to be 

applied to them.97 For these reasons, 

CDC is terminating the CDC Orders to 

the extent they apply to UC. 

D. Basis for Termination With Respect 

to UC Under Sections 362 and 365 of 

the PHS Act and 42 CFR 71.40 

CDC is hereby immediately 

terminating the August Order 98 and all 

prior orders issued pursuant to sections 

362 and 365 of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C. 

265, 268) and the implementing 

regulation at 42 CFR 71.40 to the extent 

they apply to UC.99

CDC is committed to using the least 

restrictive means necessary and 

avoiding the imposition of unnecessary 

burdens in exercising its communicable 

disease authorities. This aligns with the 

underlying legal authority in 42 U.S.C. 

265, which makes clear that this 

authority extends only for such period 

of time deemed necessary to avert the 

serious danger of the introduction of a 

quarantinable communicable disease 

into the United States.100 Such an order 

must also be predicated, in part, upon 

a determination that the danger of such 

introduction is so increased that a 

suspension of the right to introduce 

such persons into the United States is 

required in the interest of public 

health.101

CDC has considered these and other 

relevant factors in the foregoing 

reassessment with respect to UC, 

including the overall shift in the U.S. 

Government response to the pandemic, 

and in the context of reviewing the 

August Order with respect to UC, has 

determined that less restrictive means 

are available to avert the public health 

risks associated with the introduction, 

transmission, and spread of COVID–19 

into the United States. Although 

COVID–19 continues to spread within 

the United States, the numerous tools 

for disease prevention, mitigation, and 

treatment which have been 

implemented over the past two years 

(including those specific to UC in the 

custody of the federal government) are 

sufficient at this point in time to protect 

public health, such that an order 

suspending the right to introduce UC 

under 42 U.S.C. 265 is no longer 

required in the interest of public health. 

CDC is not addressing application of the 

August Order to FMU and SA through 

this termination. 

IV. Issuance and Implementation of 

Termination 

A. Termination as to UC 

Based on the foregoing public health 

reassessment, I hereby Terminate 

immediately with respect to UC the 

August Order and all previous orders 

issued pursuant to Sections 362 and 365 

of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C. 265, 268) and 

their implementing regulation at 42 CFR 

71.40.102

Immediate termination of the August 

Order with respect to UC is based on the 

current status of the COVID–19 

pandemic and the public health 

mitigation measures available for UC 

and the public. In making this 

determination, I have considered 

myriad facts, including epidemiological 

information regarding COVID–19, the 

emergence of SARS–CoV–2 variants, the 

morbidity and mortality associated with 

the disease for individuals in certain 

risk categories, COVID–19 Community 

Levels, national levels of transmission 

and immunity, the availability and 

efficacy of vaccination and treatments, 

as well as care available to UC and 

public health concerns with congregate 

settings at border facilities. While 

holding UC in congregate settings with 

limited options for COVID–19 

mitigation is accompanied by some 

inherent risk, the overall public health 

landscape in the United States has 

changed such that the justification for 

the August Order is no longer sustained 

with respect to UC particularly in light 

of the mitigation measures as applied to 

UC. 

As noted previously, CDC is not 

addressing application of the August 

Order to FMU and SA through this 

termination. DHS will continue to 

exercise its discretion to issue 

exceptions pursuant to a DHS-approved 

process or on a case-by-case basis, based 

on the totality of the circumstances as 

set forth in the August Order to FMU 

and SA, as appropriate. 

B. APA Review 

This Termination shall be 

immediately effective with respect to 

UC. I consulted with DHS and other 

federal departments as needed before I 

issued this Order and requested that 

DHS aid in the implementation of this 

Termination and continued aspects of 

the Order because CDC does not have 

the capability, resources, or personnel 

needed to do so.103

This Termination, like the preceding 

Orders issued under this authority, is 

not a rule subject to notice and 

comment under the APA. Even if it 

were, notice and comment and a delay 

in effective date are not required 

because there is good cause to dispense 

with prior public notice and the 

opportunity to comment on this 

Termination; it would be impracticable 

and contrary to public health practices, 

the public interest, and immigration 

laws that apply in the absence of an 

order under 42 U.S.C. 265 to delay the 

issuing and effective date of this 

Termination.104 In addition, this Order 

concerns ongoing discussions with 

Canada, Mexico, and other countries 

regarding how best to control COVID–19 

transmission over shared borders and 

therefore directly ‘‘involve[s] . . . a . . . 

foreign affairs function of the United 

States.’’ 105 Thus, for both of the 

foregoing reasons, notice and comment 


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and a delay in effective date are not 

required. 

With this Termination, I hereby 

determine that the danger of further 

introduction, transmission, or spread of 

COVID–19 into the United States from 

UC, as defined in the August Order, has 

ceased to be a serious danger to the 

public health and therefore the 

continuation of the August Order, and 

all previous orders issued under the 

same authority, with respect to UC is no 

longer necessary to protect public 

health. Nothing in this Termination will 

prevent me from issuing a new Order 

under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268 and 42 CFR 

71.40 based on new findings, as dictated 

by public health needs. 

Sherri Berger, 

Chief of Staff, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05687 Filed 3–15–22; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4163–18–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Administration for Children and 

Families 

[OMB No. 0970–0476] 

Proposed Information Collection 

Activity; Generic Clearance for 

Disaster Information Collection Forms 

AGENCY: Office of Human Services 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

Administration for Children and 

Families, HHS. 

ACTION: Request for public comment. 

SUMMARY: The Administration for 

Children and Families (ACF) is 

requesting a 3-year extension of the 

Generic Clearance for Disaster 

Information Collection Forms (OMB 

#0970–0476) and the five forms 

currently approved for ACF programs. 

There are no changes requested to the 

umbrella generic and no substantial 

changes to the currently approved 

forms. 

DATES: Comments due within 60 days of 

publication. In compliance with the 

requirements of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, ACF is soliciting 

public comment on the specific aspects 

of the information collection described 

above. 

ADDRESSES: You can obtain copies of the 

proposed collection of information and 

submit comments by emailing 

infocollection@acf.hhs.gov. Identify all 

requests by the title of the information 

collection. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Description: The information 

collected through the forms approved 

under the Generic Clearance for Disaster 

Information Collection Forms is used to 

provide real-time updates during the 

response and recovery phases of a 

disaster. The same generic form has 

been tailored for each of the five 

following ACF offices or programs: the 

Children’s Bureau, the Family Violence 

Prevention and Services Program, the 

Office of Child Care, the Office of Head 

Start, and the Runaway and Homeless 

Youth (RHY) Program. It is possible that 

more program offices may request 

approval of a tailored version in the 

future. 

The requested information is 

submitted by ACF grantees, which 

includes states and tribes. 

Currently Approved Forms 

Family and Youth Services Bureau, 

Family Violence Prevention and 

Services Program. This form collects 

information on post-disaster impacts 

and disaster recovery, including 

requests for assistance from state 

administrators, tribes/tribal 

organizations, state coalitions, or 

resource centers comprising the 

Domestic Violence Resource Network; 

shelters that have been evacuated due to 

damage; shelter residents being served 

in alternate locations; reports of an 

increase in requests for assistance; 

capacity shortfalls; and reported 

increase in domestic violence postdisaster. 

Office of Child Care. The baseline 

information includes the number of 

licensed, regulated, and license-exempt 

child care providers in the state; the 

number of children who are served by 

the ACF Office of Child Care’s Child 

Care and Development Fund (CCDF); 

emergency contact information for the 

CCDF administrator, the licensing 

contacts, and resource and referral 

agencies; interruptions in systems that 

facilitate contacting the child care 

providers; contact person for state 

record-keeping systems; number of 

children served; and damage assessment 

plans of the licensing agency. The 

disaster impact information includes the 

number and type of child care providers 

closed, the number of closed providers 

that serve children who benefit from 

ACF CCDF, the number of children with 

CCDF subsidies affected by the closures, 

total child care capacity lost, whether 

the providers whose facilities have 

closed will be able to reopen, whether 

damaged facilities have been able to 

remain open, degree of disruption in 

services; state decision to implement 

temporary operating standards for child 

care providers; and requests for 

behavioral and mental health services 

for children, families, and staff. Postdisaster recovery questions include 

ability of child care providers to reopen, 

number of service slots lost due to 

closures, total number of child care 

providers that are open in the disaster 

impact zone; and staff shortages. 

Family and Youth Services Bureau, 

Runaway and Homeless Youth Program. 

This form collects information on postdisaster impacts and disaster recovery, 

including requests from grantees for 

technical assistance; a safety and 

accountability report for children and 

youth in RHY programs; reports of 

damage to RHY facilities; and a report 

of any children or youth that have been 

relocated due to damages to facilities. 

Children’s Bureau. This form requests 

information on any disaster-caused 

disruptions of the child abuse/neglect 

reporting and investigation system; 

reports of unaccompanied children 

needing protection, identification, and 

reunification with legal caregivers; 

actions taken by the Child Welfare 

Agency; impacts to Chafee Foster Care 

Independence Program providers; 

accountability and safety report for 

youth receiving services; reports on any 

increase in the number of child abuse or 

neglect reports in the affected areas; 

impacts to Safe and Stable Families or 

Community Based Child Abuse 

Prevention providers; whether families 

receiving in-home services are being 

supported; displaced or temporarily 

relocated foster families; coordination of 

needed services and supervision by the 

Child Welfare Agency; new or increased 

interstate challenges; and compromised 

program records. 

Office of Head Start. Number of Head 

Start (HS) centers and service slots 

located in the disaster impact zone; 

number of centers and available service 

slots open and number closed postdisaster; number of HS centers with 

undetermined status; general access to 

services for children and families in the 

impacted areas; disruptions in 

transportation; ability of families to 

receive care elsewhere; number of HS 

centers closed post-disaster and number 

of service slots lost; and other program 

service interruptions. 

Respondents: ACF Grantees and State 

Administrators. 


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