alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 75

To designate October, 1996, as ‘‘Roosevelt History Month’’, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 1 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995

Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself, Mr. D’AMATO, and Mr. LEVIN) submitted the

following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

To designate October, 1996, as ‘‘Roosevelt History Month’’,

and for other purposes.

Whereas January 30, 1995, is the 113th anniversary of the

birth of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Hyde

Park, New York;

Whereas almost a half-century after the death of President

Roosevelt, his legacy remains central to the public life of

the Nation;

Whereas before becoming President of the United States,

Franklin Delano Roosevelt served in the New York State

Senate and later was appointed Assistant Secretary of

the Navy, and in 1928 became Governor of New York;

Whereas as President of the United States between 1933 and

1945, Franklin Delano Roosevelt guided the Nation
2

•SRES 75 IS

through two of the greatest crises of the twentieth century, the Great Depression and the Second World War,

and in so doing, changed the course of American politics;

Whereas a memorial in stone in the District of Columbia will

soon be dedicated to his memory, as authorized by Congress in 1955; and

Whereas a month commemorating the history of Franklin

Delano Roosevelt would complement the dedication of the

memorial: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That October, 1996, should be designated

2 ‘‘Roosevelt History Month’’. The President is requested to

3 issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United

4 States to observe the month with appropriate ceremonies

5 and activities.

Æ
Buell v. Pallito, No. 26-1-15 Wncv (Teachout, J., Sept. 1, 2015).

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the 

accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION

Washington Unit Docket No. 26-1-15 Wncv

WILLARD BUELL

Plaintiff

v.

ANDREW PALLITO, Commissioner,

Vermont Department of Corrections

Defendant

ENTRY

The State’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff Willard Buell is an inmate in the custody of the Vermont Department of 

Corrections (DOC). He alleges that the DOC improperly revoked his furlough. He filed this 

action seeking habeas corpus relief. The court clarified that it is a Rule 75 action. The State then 

moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that the revocation is alleged to 

have occurred in September 2013 and he did not file this action until January 2015. Rule 75 

requires a petitioner to seek review within 30 days of an action or within 6 months of a failure to 

act. V.R.C.P. 75(c). In opposition, Mr. Buell has pointed out that these time limits are not 

jurisdictional. The State has requested that its motion be considered under Rule 12(b)(6).

Mr. Buell’s point that the time limits in Rule 75 are not jurisdictional is well taken. As a 

matter of law, they cannot be. The rules of civil procedure “shall not be construed to extend or 

limit the jurisdiction of the superior courts or the venue of actions therein.” V.R.C.P. 82. 

However, realizing that they are not jurisdictional does not mean that they are irrelevant. It 

means generally that those time limits are subject to potential extensions under Rule 6. The 

court may have additional discretion in equity in circumstances in which Rule 6 affords no relief.

In this case, however, Mr. Buell’s complaint was filed long after the expiration of both 

timeframes in Rule 75, long after the time for any relief contemplated by Rule 6, and he has 

offered no compelling reason why the court should consider extending the time for any other 

reason.

The State’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 1st day of September, 2015.

_____________________________

Mary Miles Teachout

Superior Judge
CHRISTOPHER HORNES

,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON
OFFENDER REVIEW

,

Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISP OSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5611

Opinion filed March 3, 2016.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

-- Original Jurisdiction

.

Christopher Hornes, pro se , Petitioner.

Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, and Mark Hiers, Assistant General Counsel , Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits

.

THOMAS, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ.

, CONCUR.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION



I, J. Michael Lawrie, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Siebel Systems, Inc.;

2. 	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. 	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. 	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) 	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) 	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. 	The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) 	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) 	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



Date: August 6, 2004



| |     |                      
| | --- | ---------------------
| | By: | /s/ J. Michael Lawrie

| |                        
| | -----------------------
| | J. Michael Lawrie      
| | Chief Executive Officer

---
# C_2015245EN.01002402.xml

| 27.7.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 245/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 245/24

---

Order of the General Court of 22 May 2015 — Walter Klein v Commission

(Case T-297/14) (1)

1

((State aid - Measures adopted by Germany in favour of electricity generated from renewable energy sources and of energy-intensive undertakings - Decision to open the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU - Adoption of the final decision after the action was brought - No need to adjudicate))

(2015/C 245/29)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Walter Klein GmbH & Co. KG (Wuppertal, Germany) (represented by: T. Volz, M. Ringel, B. Wißmann, M. Püstow, C. Oehme and T. Wielsch, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Maxian Rusche and R. Sauer, acting as Agents, and by A. Luke and C. Maurer, lawyers)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application to annul in part Commission decision C (2013) 4424 final of 18 December 2013 to open the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU regarding measures implemented by the Federal Republic of Germany in favour of renewable electricity and of energy-intensive users (State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN)).

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the present action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the present action.

| 2. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for intervention submitted by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. |
| --- | --- |

2.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for intervention submitted by the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

| 3. | Walter Klein GmbH & Co. KG shall bear its own costs and those incurred by the European Commission, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Walter Klein GmbH & Co. KG shall bear its own costs and those incurred by the European Commission, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures.

| 4. | The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 223, 14.7.2014.

1

---
#### Patsy Ann OXFORD, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of James R. Oxford, deceased; James T. Oxford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; Sheriff Phillip Morgan, in his official capacity as Madison County Sheriff; Andy Mitchell, Individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy in the Madison County Sheriff's Office, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1342

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 23, 2017

Filed: December 11, 2017

Darrell Fayne Brown, Jr., Law Offices of Darrell F. Brown, Jr., Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Jason E. Owens, Rainwater & Holt, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Patsy and James T. Oxford sued Madison County, Arkansas,1 and Madison County Sheriffs Deputy Andy Mitchell for allegedly not doing enough to prevent the death of James R. Oxford—Patsy’s husband and James T.’s father—in an automobile accident. We agree with the district court2 that even if the Oxfords’ allegations are true, they do not describe a constitutional violation that would support liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. *See Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n,*734 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2013) (de novo review). The police do not have an enforceable constitutional duty to protect anyone, including people whose affairs they have become involved with, unless they are in' custody (or some similar “special relationship” with the state) or the state affirmatively put them in danger. *See Gregory v. City of Rogers,*974 F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Neither circumstance was present here. As for the county, there can be no municipal liability on the Oxfords’ theory without an underlying constitutional violation. *See McCoy v. City of Monticello,*411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. The Oxfords did not name the county as a defendant but sued county employees in their official capacities. *See Baker v. Chisom,*501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007).

2

. The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

- - - - - - - -

denied

NO. 15-0103

AUGUSTA BARGE COMPANY

v.

FIVE B'S, INC. §

§

§

§

§

§ Galveston County,

1st District.

March 27, 2015

Petitioner 's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case,

having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

May 15, 2015

Petitioner's motion for rehearing of petition for review, filed herein in the above

numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

         

I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE

, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above and attached is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of

Texas in the case numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of

said Court under the date shown.

It is further ordered that petitioner, AUGUSTA BARGE COMPANY, pay all costs

incurred on this petition.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this

the 15th day of May, 2015

.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 104 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 104

   Expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the elections in 
 Albania scheduled for June 29, 1997, and the admission of a free and 
  democratic Albania to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 23, 1997

Mr. Traficant submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
          referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
   Expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the elections in 
 Albania scheduled for June 29, 1997, and the admission of a free and 
  democratic Albania to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the elections in Albania scheduled for June 29, 1997, 
        should be free and open;
            (2) all political parties of Albania should honor the 
        results of such elections; and
            (3) the Administration should work with other members of 
        the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as soon as 
        possible to admit a free and democratic Albania to NATO.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32

Certification Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Onyx Acceptance Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
John W. Hall, President, CEO and Principal Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ JOHN W. HALL

Name: John W. Hall
Title: President, CEO and Principal Executive Officer
Date: November 14, 2003


This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
and not for any other purpose.

1



---



##### 



EXHIBIT 32

Certification Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Onyx Acceptance Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Don P. Duffy, EVP, CFO and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ DON P. DUFFY

Name: Don P. Duffy
Title: Executive Vice President,
CFO and Principal Financial Officer
Date: November 14, 2003


This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
and not for any other purpose.

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001006282
<NAME> PICK COMMUNICATIONS CORP.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         465,915
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,145,912
<PP&E>                                       4,522,870
<DEPRECIATION>                                 156,603
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,685,842
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       28,783,721
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        6,871,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        42,062
<OTHER-SE>                                (21,225,959)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,685,842
<SALES>                                              0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,118,013)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,118,013)
<DISCONTINUED>                            (51,473,441)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (53,591,454)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (18.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
422 P.2d 400

#### BEKINS VAN & STORAGE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent Insurance Carrier, Grover Bloxson, Respondent.*

No. 1 CA-IC 105.

Court of Appeals of Arizona.

Jan. 13, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1967.

*570Merchant, Lohse, Donahue & Bloom, by Ashby I. Lohse, Tucson, for petitioner.

Rees, Estes & Browning, by William D. Browning, Tucson, for respondent.

*

 The Petition was filed with the Arizona Supreme Court and assigned that Court’s Number S527. The Arizona Supreme Court issued its Writ of Certiorari. The matter was referred to this Court pursuant to Section 12-120.23 A.R.S.

STEVENS, Judge.

This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari issued on application of the employer to review the lawfulness of the Award and Findings of The Industrial Commission of Arizona issued 27 August 1964.

Petitioner questions the lawfulness of the Award in that it was determined and issued prior to the filing of certain medical records from Tucson Medical Center. Counsel had stipulated claimant Bloxson would file these medical records, and the Refereee had stated that the matter would not be submitted to the Commission for its decision unitl the hospital records were received.

The Commission’s response to the petition for writ of certiorari admits that it entered its decision before the stipulated matter was made a part of the Commission’s-record.

A stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession ma'de in a judicial proceeding by the parties thereto or their attorneys, in respect of some matter incident thereto, for the purpose, ordinarily,, of avoiding delay, trouble and expense. 50 Am.Jur. Stipulations § 2. A stipulation concerning a pending cause in court has-been held to be an obligation unlike ordinary contracts between parties not in court. Since no consideration is necessary to its validity and no mutuality is required, and it is to be construed like other contracts or written instruments inter-parties. Crunden-Martin Manufacturing *Company v. Christy, 22*Ariz. 254, 196 P. 454 (1921).

It is urged that the matters set forth in the hospital records would not have-changed the action of the Commission. We have examined the records. We are-unable to say that there is an absence of materials contained therein which might reasonably have enabled the employer’s, attorney to develop further facts beneficial to the employer’s position. We are unable to hold that a timely and proper use of the hospital records could not reasonably lead to a different result. In our opinion-the failure to observe the stipulation cannot, in this instance, be classified as harmless error.

We hold that there is no valid' ground or reason to refuse enforcement of the stipulation entered into by counsel with the approval of the Referee. The stipulation is binding upon us as an appellate court, and upon the Commission.

The Award is set aside.

Other issues were raised and argued in the briefs and in oral argument. Since-the Award is set aside for the reasons, given, it is not appropriate or necessary that we discuss them at this time.

CAMERON, C. J., and DONOFRIO, J.„ concur.