UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

KAREL ADAM; IVONNE UMBOH; 

RONALDO ADAM, 

 Petitioners, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., 

United States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 14-9508 

(Petition for Review)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, PORFILIO, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Petitioners, Indonesian citizens and natives, seek review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal from the Immigration 

Judge’s (IJ) denial of Karel Adam’s application for asylum, restriction on removal, 

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Exercising jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 15, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioners entered the United States in June 2000 as nonimmigrant visitors. 

Their authorization to remain expired in December 2000. In 2003, Mr. Adam applied 

for asylum based on his political opinion and membership in a political opposition 

group – FKM-USA. The other Petitioners, his wife and son, are derivative 

applicants.1

 The Department of Homeland Security denied the asylum request and 

placed the Petitioners in removal proceedings. 

 The IJ explained a delay in the proceedings from 2003 to 2010: “Proceedings 

in this matter changed venue multiple times between Los Angeles and Denver until 

this Court denied further motions to change venue and required the [Petitioners] to 

appear at a master calendar hearing.” Admin. R. at 124. At that hearing, Mr. Adam 

said he would file a new asylum application, which he did in November 2010. The 

new application alleged fear of persecution based on the Petitioners’ Christian 

religion. 

 At the merits hearing in 2012, Mr. Adam disavowed his 2003 asylum 

application as inaccurate. He then testified as follows. Mr. Adam is a lifelong 

Seventh Day Adventist. He met and married his wife, Ivonne Umboh, during 

 1

 Mr. Adam’s daughter, Thalia, was originally a derivative applicant. During 

the proceedings, however, she reached adult age and filed a separate application for 

asylum and restriction on removal. The cases were consolidated for the merits 

hearing. During the appeal to the BIA, Thalia moved to sever to allow her to pursue 

adjustment of status based on her marriage to a United States citizen. The BIA 

granted the motion. Thalia is no longer a party to these proceedings. 
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college. In 1998, when living in Jakarta, Mr. Adam decided to transfer their 

daughter, Thalia, from public school to a Seventh Day Adventist school so she could 

“learn more about [her] own religion,” id. at 191, and avoid conflict over whether she 

could be excused from Saturday morning classes to participate in “religious 

activities,” id. at 192. According to Mr. Adam, the public school headmaster 

suggested Thalia engage in religious activities on Saturday afternoons. Mr. Adam 

rejected the suggestion and decided to transfer Thalia. 

 In April 1998, an after-school clash occurred between students at the public 

and Seventh Day Adventist schools. Mr. Adam testified, “Every day I had to pick up 

my kids from school. When I was parking the car in front of the school I saw [the 

Seventh Day Adventist students] getting out [of] school . . . . [T]here were 50 other 

kids behind them . . . and they were all wearing [public school] uniforms.” Id. at 

194. The public school students “started hitting the [Seventh Day Adventist] high 

school children.” Id. Mr. Adam got his daughter into the car but could not leave 

before someone hit the rear window with a baseball bat. He also witnessed “a few 

kids who [got] beaten up.” Id. at 197. The police were called and “came to disperse 

the crowd.” Id. at 238. That evening he learned that two Seventh Day Adventist 

students were killed in the melee. Mr. Adam did not report the damage to his car to 

the authorities. Thalia stayed home from school the following week. “[B]ecause of 

the incident the Adventist school took a step to change the schedule so they started 
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early and finished . . . early.” Id. at 195. A few months later, Mr. Adam moved his 

family from Jakarta to Mataram. 

 Because there were no Seventh Day Adventist schools in Mataram, Mr. Adam 

enrolled Thalia in a Catholic school. His family worshipped at a Seventh Day 

Adventist church without interference. Things were peaceful until early 2000, when 

three men accosted Thalia on a bus. They spit on her and burned the symbol of a 

cross on her arm with a cigarette. Mr. Adam was away from home that day. His 

wife told him she did not take Thalia to the doctor because she was “afraid.” Id. at 

205. Mr. Adam decided to treat the wound at home and did not call the police or 

seek outside medical care. He did not know the men who committed the assault. He 

testified it would have been futile to file a police report because “[b]ased on the 

history that had happened to other Christians and to my close friends the police 

[would] not do anything.” Id. at 249.2

 A few days later, eight Christian churches in Mataram were burned down, 

including the Seventh Day Adventist church. Mr. Adam had no idea “who was 

behind all this stuff, but the situation was very heated, especially because [several 

churches had also been burned down] in Jakarta.” Id. at 208. A few weeks later, 

Mr. Adam quit his job and the family moved back to Jakarta, where he spent the next 

three months looking for work and Thalia refused to return to school. 

 2

 This testimony conflicts with Mr. Adam’s earlier statement that police came 

and dispersed the crowd at the school incident. 
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Although still able to attend church, Mr. Adam and his family left Indonesia 

for the United States. “I basically came to the United States . . . to live . . . 

temporarily until . . . my family was feeling safe.” Id. at 214. Plans changed, 

however, when relatives in Indonesia warned Mr. Adam not to return because “the 

situation in Indonesia was getting worse,” id. at 215. He admitted, however, that 

none of his relatives, all of whom are Christians, have been harmed or threatened. 

Still, he cited instances in Jakarta and Java, “[m]ost of them [not reported] by the 

media,” of Muslims attacking Christians. Id. at 243. 

Thalia testified to the same events her father described, and confirmed the 

details. Like her father, she feared returning to Indonesia because Christians are “not 

able to freely express . . . freedom [of] religion and the police are just standing by[,] 

just watching.” Id. at 275-76. 

The IJ denied relief. He found Mr. Adam and Thalia credible and the 2003 

asylum application not frivolous. But he found Petitioners ineligible for asylum 

because the application was not filed within one year of their arrival in the United 

States and no changed or extraordinary circumstances excused the untimely filing. 

He also concluded Petitioners were not eligible for restriction on removal or CAT 

protection. 

The BIA dismissed the appeal. It agreed with the IJ that the 2003 asylum 

application was untimely. It also agreed Petitioners are not entitled to restriction on 

removal or CAT protection. 
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II. DISCUSSION 

 The BIA issued a single board member’s brief order, so we review it as the 

final order of removal but “may consult the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA 

relied upon or incorporated it.” Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 

2007). “In this circuit, the determination whether an alien has demonstrated 

persecution is a question of fact.” Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 

2011) (ellipses omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden to obtain a 

reversal is steep because, “in reviewing the BIA’s factual findings, we are bound by 

Congress’s directive that ‘administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” BarreraQuintero v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012), quoting 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(4). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo. Tulengkey v. 

Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005). 

 This appeal concerns only the denial of restriction on removal.3

 “To obtain 

restriction on removal, the alien must demonstrate that [his] ‘life or freedom would 

be threatened in [the proposed country of removal] because of [his] race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” 

Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1280 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). 

 3

 Petitioners do not appeal dismissal of their asylum request. They waived 

review of the denial of CAT protection by failing to raise this issue in their opening 

brief. 
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An alien may create a rebuttable presumption of eligibility for 

restriction on removal by either (1) demonstrating past persecution in 

the proposed country of removal on account of one of the protected 

grounds; or (2) showing that it is more likely than not that the alien 

would be subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds upon 

returning to the proposed country of removal. 

Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in 

race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive, and must entail 

more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 975 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not look at each incident in isolation, but 

instead consider then collectively, because the cumulative effects of multiple 

incidents may constitute persecution.” Id. 

A. Past Persecution 

 As to past persecution, what Mr. Adam described in his testimony is 

regrettable and troubling, but our precedent makes it difficult for Petitioners to 

prevail. Even when an alien “suffered repeated robberies and some minor injuries,” 

we have upheld a finding of no past persecution. Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1124. 

Similarly, we have said “[an alien’s] descriptions of . . . riots and . . . church 

burning[s] do not mandate relief.” Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th 

Cir. 2009). Here, the IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that Mr. Adam did not show 

enough under applicable precedent that he was the victim of harm or suffering and 

therefore did not establish past persecution. Based on the record, our limited and 
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demanding standard of review, and binding precedent, we cannot conclude that any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary determination. 

B. Future Persecution 

As to future persecution, an applicant can qualify for restriction on removal by 

establishing that “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be persecuted on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); see also 

Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 977 (same). An applicant must demonstrate a “clear 

probability of persecution.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 

2004). For a fear of future persecution to be well-founded, it must be both 

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976. 

 An applicant can establish an objectively reasonable fear by showing (1) it is 

likely he or she would suffer persecution due to being part of a group that has 

suffered a pattern or practice of religious persecution, or (2) that he or she likely 

would be singled out for persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). As to either (1) 

or (2), “the persecution must be committed by the government or forces the 

government is unwilling to control.” Neri-Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d 1003, 1009 

(10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Adam’s application fails on 

this latter requirement, and we therefore do not address (1) or (2). 

The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that Mr. Adam did not establish that his fear 

was “objectively reasonable.” Under our strict standard of review, we conclude the 
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IJ reasonably found Mr. Adam did not show acts committed by the Indonesian 

government or a group that the government is unwilling or unable to control. 

Further, the evidence showed Mr. Adam and his family were able to attend church 

until they left Indonesia, Indonesia’s constitution protects religious freedom, and his 

relatives in Indonesia have continued to attend a Seventh Day Adventist church 

without harm. This evidence counters Mr. Adam’s alleged fear of future persecution. 

See, Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 977. We cannot conclude any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to reach a determination on fear of future persecution contrary to 

the IJ’s.4

 

 The petition for review is denied. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

 Circuit Judge 

 4

 Petitioners urge this court to adopt the “disfavored group” analysis employed 

by the Ninth Circuit in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 925-29 (9th Cir. 2004). But 

Petitioners failed to raise this issue with the BIA, and we therefore lack jurisdiction 

to consider it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring administrative exhaustion as a 

jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th 

Cir. 1999) (same).