COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Clements 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WILLIE HAYWOOD JACKSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗ BY 

v. Record No. 0113-02-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 FEBRUARY 4, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL 

James A. Luke, Judge 

 Mary K. Martin (Eliades & Eliades, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

Willie Haywood Jackson, appellant, was convicted in a bench 

trial of four counts of distribution of cocaine. On appeal, he 

contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence 

sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

Background

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, and grant to it 

all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Goodman 

 ∗

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 374, 386, 558 S.E.2d 555, 561 

(2002). So viewed, the evidence establishes that Lynn Metosh 

was a paid, confidential informant working with members of the 

Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force in the City of Hopewell. She 

was not available to testify at trial because she died before 

the matter was heard. Evidence delineating her role in making 

the "buys" was introduced by the trial testimony of Detectives 

Jeff Clark, Michael Walls and Ralph Burton, Special Agent Steve 

Irwin and Officer Michael Whittington. Their testimony 

established the completion of four "buys" of crack cocaine on 

four separate occasions, August 9, August 14, August 15 and 

November 14, 2000. 

 On August 9, 2000, Metosh and her boyfriend, Phillip, met 

with Officer Whittington. Whittington searched Metosh, Phillip 

and Phillip's car, and found no contraband. He gave Metosh $100 

of Virginia State Police funds. Metosh telephoned Jackson and 

arranged to meet him in the parking lot of the S & N market. 

She and Phillip drove to the market in his car, and Whittington 

followed them. Whittington testified that he never lost sight 

of Phillip's car and that Metosh and Phillip made no stops en 

route to the market. Upon arrival at the market, Whittington 

identified Jackson in a green pickup truck. He saw Metosh exit 

Phillip's car and enter the pickup truck, where he kept her 

under surveillance while the "buy" was being made. When Metosh 
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exited the truck, she returned to Phillip's car and they drove 

from the market. Whittington followed Phillip's car to a 

pre-arranged meeting place where Metosh gave Whittington a 

plastic baggie, which contained a substance later determined to 

be crack cocaine. Whittington did not detect any body fluids or 

fecal matter on the outside of the baggie. 

 Metosh conducted two more "buys" of crack cocaine under the 

supervision of Whittington, on August 14 and 15, 2000. On 

August 14, 2000, Metosh and Phillip met with Whittington. 

Metosh called the same telephone number at which she had 

previously reached Jackson to arrange a "buy." Before leaving 

for the market, she and Phillip were searched, she was given 

Virginia State Police funds and Whittington followed her to the 

market. When Whittington arrived at the S & N market, he 

identified Jackson walking in front of the market. A few 

minutes later, Whittington observed Metosh exit her car, walk 

over to and enter a "large car, like a Lincoln or Towncar type 

car." Detective Ralph Burton, who was assigned to the Virginia 

Narcotics Task Force and was conducting surveillance at the 

market on August 14, 2000, also observed a green Lincoln Towncar 

in the parking lot facing the market and observed Metosh enter 

the Lincoln, exit and walk away. Neither Whittington nor Burton 

was able to see or identify the driver of the car as Jackson. 

Metosh and Phillip drove to another location, where Whittington 

met them and retrieved from Metosh a cellophane baggie that 
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contained 14 separate packages of off-white material. 

Whittington did not detect any body fluids or fecal matter on 

the outside of the baggie. 

 On August 15, 2000, Whittington followed essentially the 

same procedures as he did on August 9, 2000. He met with 

Metosh, who then telephoned the same number she used to initiate 

the "buys" on August 9 and August 14. Whittington searched 

Metosh, Phillip and Phillip's car, and found no drugs or other 

contraband. He gave Metosh Virginia State Police funds, and she 

proceeded to the market with Phillip in Phillip's car. 

Whittington followed them to the market, and they made no stops 

en route. When Whittington arrived at the S & N market, Jackson 

had not yet arrived. Metosh placed another telephone call to 

the number she called earlier. Approximately ten minutes later, 

a green pickup truck drove into the parking lot. Whittington 

identified Jackson as the driver of the pickup truck. He 

observed Metosh exit Phillip's car, enter a green pickup truck 

driven by Jackson and emerge with a plastic baggie that 

contained a substance later determined to be crack cocaine. 

Whittington did not detect any body fluids or fecal matter on 

the outside of the baggie. 

 On August 9, August 14 and August 15, 2000, Whittington 

searched Metosh, Phillip and Phillip's car before the "buy." 

Whittington had Metosh unhook her bra and shake it to ensure she 

was not hiding contraband in the bra. He also had her unbutton 
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her pants, and he checked her socks and pockets for contraband. 

Whittington and at least one other officer searched Phillip's 

car before the "buys." In addition, he thoroughly searched 

Metosh and Phillip after each "buy." 

 The final "buy" that Metosh initiated and completed took 

place on November 14, 2000. Metosh telephoned the same number 

she called on the three previous occasions and arranged a "buy" 

at the S & N market. Before going to the market, Metosh met 

with Detectives Walls and Clark. Walls searched her person, 

lifting her clothing and checking her shoes and pockets, and did 

not find any contraband. Clark drove Metosh to the market. On 

that day, Jackson was seen by Special Agent Irwin leaving his 

house and entering a green pickup truck parked in the driveway. 

Irwin followed Jackson to the S & N market. Under police 

surveillance, Metosh walked to and entered a green pickup truck 

at the market, and completed the "buy." When Metosh returned to 

Clark's car, she handed him a baggie containing a substance 

later determined to be crack cocaine. No body fluids or fecal 

matter were detected on the outside of the baggie. Walls 

identified Jackson as the driver of the truck. 

 On November 21, 2000, Walls went to Jackson's home to 

execute a search warrant. Walls observed Jackson pull into his 

driveway driving a green Lincoln Towncar. Walls advised him of 

his Miranda rights and testified that "Mr. Jackson stated I 

would find a package of crack cocaine behind the passenger's 
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side of his Lincoln parked in the driveway." Jackson admitted 

he sold drugs, stating he bought half- or quarter-ounce blocks 

of cocaine, which he sold for $50 per rock. He also informed 

Walls that he had a set of scales for weighing drugs. 

Analysis

 Jackson contends on appeal that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his convictions because Metosh did not 

testify at trial and the police failed to conduct a body cavity 

search of Metosh before each of the "buys" was made. He argues 

that, in the absence of Metosh's direct testimony that Jackson 

sold her cocaine in exchange for money, and the absence of a 

body cavity search, the circumstantial evidence of Jackson's 

guilt upon which the Commonwealth relied rises no higher than 

mere suspicion. We disagree. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. Goodman, 37 Va. App. at 386, 558 S.E.2d at 

561. We accordingly discard all evidence of the defendant that 

conflicts with the Commonwealth's evidence and regard as true 

all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth. Norman v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 518, 520, 346 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1986). 

The court must "look to that evidence which tends to support the 

verdict and to permit the verdict to stand unless plainly 

wrong." George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 278, 411 S.E.2d 
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12, 20 (1991). "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is 

entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is 

sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 

307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). "While a conviction may properly be 

based on circumstantial evidence, suspicion or even probability 

of guilt is not sufficient. There must be an unbroken chain of 

circumstances 'proving the guilt of the accused to the exclusion 

of any rational hypotheses and to a moral certainty.'" Gordon 

v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 298, 300, 183 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1971) 

(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 252, 255, 176 S.E.2d 

813, 815 (1970)) (additional citations and quotations omitted). 

However, "[t]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable 

hypotheses that flow from the evidence, not those that spring 

from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 

Based on the testimony of two officers and three detectives 

who participated in arranging and monitoring the "buys," the 

evidence shows that Metosh had no opportunity to purchase or 

obtain the cocaine from someone other than Jackson. Metosh 

initiated each "buy" by calling the same telephone number to 

arrange the transaction. On each occasion that Metosh conducted 

a "buy," she was searched by the police prior to meeting with 

Jackson and was not carrying drugs on her person. On the 

occasions Metosh went to the market in her boyfriend Phillip's 
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car, August 9, August 14 and August 15, Metosh, Phillip and 

Phillip's car were searched before and after the buy. In 

transacting each of the four "buys," Metosh either was 

accompanied to and from the market by a detective or she was 

followed to the market by the police. After Metosh gave to the 

police the baggies of cocaine she bought from Jackson, their 

exterior evidenced no body fluids or fecal matter that would 

have suggested she was hiding drugs in a body cavity. Finally, 

on three occasions, August 9, August 15, and November 14, 2000, 

the officers observed Metosh in a pickup truck with Jackson and 

watched as she exited the truck and returned to the car in which 

she arrived. On August 14, 2000, Jackson was not identified as 

the driver of the vehicle Metosh entered to make the "buy." 

However, on that date, Metosh called the same telephone number 

she had used on previous occasions to initiate the "buys" from 

Jackson and the police observed Jackson on the premises of the 

market just prior to the time set for the "buy." They also 

observed Metosh enter a "green," "large car, like a Lincoln or 

Towncar type car" to conduct the buy. Moreover, on November 21, 

2000, the police saw Jackson arrive at his residence in a green 

Lincoln Towncar where, as indicated by Jackson, they found 

cocaine in his car and a set of scales for weighing drugs. 

Jackson also admitted that he was engaged in selling drugs. 

Based on this evidence, the trial court could reasonably 

infer that Jackson was the driver of the Lincoln on August 14, 
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2000 and that he sold cocaine to Metosh on that date as well. 

"Inferences . . . are elemental ingredients of the fact finding 

process." Morton v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 6, 9, 408 S.E.2d 

583, 584 (1991). "An inference . . . permits a finder of fact 

to conclude the existence of one fact from the proof of one or 

more other facts." Id. 

Jackson contends that the absence of Metosh's testimony at 

trial and the failure of the police to conduct a body cavity 

search before she made the "buys" is fatal to the Commonwealth's 

case. We disagree. "Circumstantial evidence is as competent 

and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided 

it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman, 226 Va. at 53, 307 

S.E.2d at 876. We find the evidence, although circumstantial, 

supports the trial court's finding that Metosh purchased cocaine 

from Jackson on the four occasions at issue and that the 

evidence excludes all other reasonable hypotheses. 

We find no error and affirm. 

 Affirmed.