PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITEDNET LTD.; LE VI RUSSELL, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. TATA COMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, INC.; TATA COMMUNICATIONS INDIA; TATA SONS PRIVATE, LTD.; STEVEN LUCERO; LATINGROUP, LLC, Defendants - Appellees. No. 23-2057

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01081-KWR-JFR)

________________ _________________ Scott Fuqua of Fuqua Law & Policy, P.C., Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs - Appellants. Douglas D. Janicik (Karl Tilleman with him on the brief) of Denton s US LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants - Appellees St even Lucero and LatinGroup, LLC. Philip D. Robben (Randall L. Morrison Jr. with him on th e brief) of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York, New York, for Defenda nts - Appellees Tata Communications India, Ltd. and Tata Sons Private, Ltd. Katherine A. McNamara of Fraser Stryker PC LLO, Omaha, Nebraska, for Defendant - Appellee Tata Communications America, Inc.

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 19, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 12 MORITZ , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ This case arises from a foreign business deal gone wrong. In 2016, Unitednet, Ltd., a United Kingdom company, entered in to an agreement to purchase a fiber-optic telecommunications network owned by three foreign companies that are part of a multinational conglomerate described in th e complaint as the “Tata Communications empire.” App. vol. 1, 3. But Steven Lucero, a New Mexico resident and key player in the deal, allegedly conspired with three othe r Tata companies to si nk the deal so that he could purchase the network throu gh his company based in New Mexico, LatinGroup, LLC. After the deal fell ap art, Unitednet and its director, United Kingdom resident Levi Russell, filed this action in New Mexi co federal district court. They asserted tortious interfe rence with a contract and re lated claims against Lucero, LatinGroup, and the three Tata companie s that allegedly participated in the conspiracy. But the district court dismisse d the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, determining that the United Ki ngdom was a more appropriate forum for the litigation. Because the dist rict court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that foreign law applies and that the private and public interest s at stake favor dismissal for forum non conveniens, we affirm. Background The facts of this case, as alleged in the complaint, describe a failed business deal that began in 2013, when Tata Sons Private, Ltd., an Indi an investment holding Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 23 company, decided to sell all noncore assets of the Tata empire to pay down its debt. 1
One such asset was a fiber- optic telecommunications ne twork that runs from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands. Through family connections to the Tata empire, Lucero learned of the sale and agreed to purchase the network “at a price well below market value” via his company, LatinGroup. Id. at 4. In early 2014, LatinGroup formally entered into a preliminary agr eement to purchase the network from three foreign Tata companies—Tata Communica tions (UK) Ltd., Tata Communications (Netherlands) B.V., and Tata Communicat ions (Bermuda) Ltd. (together, Tata sellers). During the ensuing negotiations, however , Lucero changed plans and decided to purchase the network through a separate corporate entity. To that end, Lucero formed Unitednet in the United Kingdom and had LatinGroup assign its purchase rights to Unitednet. Lucero also made Russell, a United Kingdom resident, Unitednet’s director and promised him an equity stake in the company as compensation. Based on that promise, Russ ell spent the next se veral years working on the deal. But at some point, Lucero allegedly cha nged course yet again and decided to sabotage the deal. Lucero realiz ed that he would stand to gain if he could complete

1 In reviewing the district court’s fo rum non conveniens dismissal, we accept as true the well-pleaded alle gations in the complaint unle ss they are contradicted by affidavits or other evidence. See DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd. , 65 F.4th 547, 550 (10th Cir.) (accepting factual allegati ons in complaint as true in reviewing forum non conveniens dismissal), cert. denied , 144 S. Ct. 197 (2023). Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 34 the purchase through LatinGroup, as orig inally planned, rather than through Unitednet. In an effort to sink the deal , Lucero allegedly “played a dual game in which he exerted near total control over the negotiations [between Unitednet and the Tata sellers] for the purc hase of the [network].” Id. at 5. Lucero purported to represent Unitednet’s interests “while at the same time working behind the scenes” with three other Tata companies—Tata Communications America, Inc., based in Virginia; Tata Communications I ndia, Inc., based in India; and Tata Sons Private, the Indian investment holding company (toge ther, Tata defendants)—to control the position of the Tata sellers. Id. In so doing, Lucero allegedl y conspired with the Tata defendants to impose onerous terms on Unitednet, including a condition that Unitednet obtain a letter from a bank or investor showing th at it had secured nearly $11 million in funding for the purchase. In March 2016, after several years of negotiations, Unitednet and the Tata sellers entered into a sale-and-purchase agreement. The agr eement contains the funding-letter requirement, which provides that Unitednet must produce the letter showing the securance of nearly $11 million in financing “within 30 days of written request by the Tata . . . [s]ellers.” Id. at 145. It also contains a forum-selection clause stating that “[e]ach of the pa rties consents to the exclus ive jurisdiction and venue of the [c]ourts of England and Wales in any suit or proceedi ng arising out of or relating to th[e a]greement or the transactions contemplated by th[e a]greement.” Id. at 165. It additionally specifies that “[n]othing in th [e a]greement, express or implied, is intended to confer upon any [p]erson other than United[n]et or the Tata . . . [s]ellers Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 45 (or their successors or permitted assigns)[] any rights or remedi es under or by reason of th[e a]greement.” Id. at 163–64. In April 2016, the Tata sellers request ed that Unitednet produce the funding letter, but Unitednet failed to meet the 30-day deadline provided in the agreement. Eventually, after over a year without receipt of the requis ite funding letter, the Tata sellers terminated the agreement. Unitednet and Russell then file d this suit in the District of New Mexico against Lucero, LatinGroup, and the Ta ta defendants (but not the Tata sellers). Plaintiffs asserted claims against all defendants for tortious inte rference with contract, civil conspiracy, and quantum meruit. They also alleged breach of fiduciary duty against Lucero, as well as aiding a nd abetting breach of fiducia ry duty against LatinGroup and the Tata defendants. Speci fically, they assert ed that Lucero took on responsibility for obtaining the required funding, but he repeatedly failed to do so and actively prevented Unitednet from securing financing. Lucero and LatinGroup moved to dismis s the claims brought against them under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that the forum-selection clause in the agreement required plai ntiffs to bring those clai ms in the United Kingdom. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex. , 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013) (explaining that pro cedurally, “the appropriate way to enforce a forumselection clause pointing to a state or fore ign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens” (italics omitted)). The same day, Tata Co mmunications America also moved to dismiss the claims brought against it for forum non conveniens. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 56 The district court denied Lucero and La tinGroup’s motion. It concluded that neither Lucero nor LatinGroup c ould enforce the forum-select ion clause because they were not signatories to the agreement, and “the [a]greement expressly disclaims conferring any rights or reme dies upon non[]signatory thir d parties.” Supp. App. 71. But the district court granted Tata Communications America’s motion. Unitednet, Ltd. v. Tata Commc’ns Am., Inc. ( Unitednet I ), No. 21-cv-01081, 2022 WL 1604802, at *17 (D.N.M. May 19, 2022). It determined that even though Tata Communications America also could not enfor ce the forum-selection clause , dismissal was appropriate under the typical forum non conveniens an alysis because (1) the parties did not dispute that the United Kingdo m was an appropriate and av ailable alternative forum; (2) foreign law governs the claims; and (3 ) the private and public interests favor dismissal. See Archangel Diamond Corp. Liquidating Tr. v. Lukoil , 812 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2016) (describ ing typical forum non conveni ens analysis that applies when there is no valid and en forceable forum-selection cl ause). The district court conditioned the dismissal on Tata Co mmunications America submitting to jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and waiv ing any statute-of-l imitations defenses. And if the United Kingdom courts refused juri sdiction, plaintiffs could reinstate their claims. The district court also ordered pl aintiffs to show cau se why it should not dismiss the claims against the remaining defendants under the same analysis it had just applied to the claims agai nst Tata Communications America. In response to the show-cause order, pl aintiffs asked the district court to reconsider its forum non conveniens analysis but did not otherwis e object to the court Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 67 extending its analysis to the remaining claims. Plaintiffs also filed a one-paragraph motion to reconsider, which in corporated and referenced their response to the showcause order. The district court denied pl aintiffs’ motion and conditionally dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for forum non conveniens. Unitednet, Ltd. v. Tata Commc’ns Am., Inc. ( Unitednet II ), No. 21-cv-01081, 2023 WL 2665578, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2023). The district court imposed the same conditions it had placed on Tata Communications America, excep t that it did not require the two other Tata defendants—Tata Sons Private and Ta ta Communications India—to consent to jurisdiction in the United Kingdom (a condition they objected to). 2 Plaintiffs appeal. Analysis Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in di smissing the action for forum non conveniens. We review a forum no n conveniens dismissal for abuse of discretion. Lukoil , 812 F.3d at 803. Under this sta ndard, “we examin e the district court’s legal determinations de novo[] and its underlying factual findings for clear
error.” Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2009). Forum non conveniens is a flexible, common-law doctrine that empowers a district court to decline juri sdiction over a case when anot her forum is better suited to adjudicate the dispute. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert , 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). The doctrine’s “central purpose . . . is to en sure that the trial is convenient.” Piper

2 The district court also denied as moot motions filed by Tata Sons Private and Tata Communications India seeking dismi ssal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 78 Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981). Dism issal on forum non conveniens grounds “will ordinarily be appropriate wher e trial in the plain tiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court[] and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting [that] choice.” Id. at 249. When evaluating a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, a district court begins its analysis wi th two threshold questions. Lukoil , 812 F.3d at 804. First, the court asks “whether there is an adequa te alternative forum in which the defendant is amenable to process.” Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998). Second, it considers “whether foreign law applies.” Id. If (and only if) “the answer to both questions is yes,” the court then we ighs a list of private and public interests to dete rmine whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Id. at 605–06. Usually, the court a pplies “a strong presumption in favor of [a domestic] plaintiff’s choice of forum” because “it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient” for the plaintiff. Piper Aircraft , 454 U.S. at 255–56. But “this assumption is much less reasonable” when , as here, the plaintiff is foreign. Id. at 256. So a foreign plaintiff’s forum c hoice “deserves less deference.” 3 Id.

3 We pause to note that a valid and enfo rceable forum-select ion clause alters the typical forum non conveniens analysis. See Atl. Marine , 571 U.S. at 63–64. When such a forum-selection clause is in play, the court gives no weight to the plaintiff’s conflicting forum choice and considers only the public-interest factors, treating the private-interest factors as “weigh[ing] en tirely in favor of the preselected forum.” Id. And because the public-interes t factors are “rarely” stro ng enough to override the preselected forum, “the practic al result is that forum-sele ction clauses should control except in unusual cases.” Id. at 64. But here, recall that the district court concluded Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 89 On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that the United Ki ngdom offers an adequate alternative forum. But they challenge the dist rict court’s choice-of-law determination that foreign law applies a nd its finding that the private- and publicinterest factors favor dismissal.
I. Choice of Law We first consider the thre shold choice-of-law issue, which we review de novo. Lukoil , 812 F.3d at 804. To determine whethe r foreign or domestic law governs a case, a federal court sitting in diversity ap plies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state—here, New Mexico. 4 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). In New Mexico , courts follow a two-step process to resolve choiceof-law questions. See Terrazas v. Garland & Loman, Inc. , 142 P.3d 374, 377 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). They first characterize “the area of substan tive law—e.g., torts, contracts, domestic relations —to which the law of the fo rum assigns a particular claim or issue.” Id. The courts then utilize the Ne w Mexico choice-of-law rule applicable to the relevant area of law to determine wh ich substantive law governs. Id.

the forum-selection clause in the agreement was not in pl ay because defendants were not signatories to the agreement—the only signatories were the Tata sellers and Unitednet. The district court thus applied the typical fo rum non conveni ens analysis. 4 Plaintiffs’ opening brief asserts that the district court’s analysis of New Mexico’s choice-of-law principles was “ unnecessary” in this ca se because no other jurisdiction has “any interest in the application of its law to [their] claims.” Aplt. Br. 7. But plaintiffs properly recognized, both in their reply brief and at oral argument, that whether foreign law governs turns on the application of New Mexico’s choiceof-law principles. Indeed, “to determine wh ether American or foreign law governs,” a district court “must conduct a choice[-]o f[-]law analysis” under the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Needham v. Phillips Petrol. Co. , 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983). Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 910 The parties in this case agree that all but one of plaintiffs’ claims (the quantum meruit claim) sound in tort. In tort actions , “New Mexico courts follow the doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi ,” which directs courts to appl y the substantive “law of the place where the wrong occurred.” Id. Under this rule, the place of the wrong is “where the last event necessa ry to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.” Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377 (Am. L. Inst. 1934). And since “[a] tort is not complete un til the plaintiff suffers a cogni zable injury,” that place is usually “‘the location of the last act necessary to comple te the injury.’” Santa Fe Techs., Inc. v. Ar gus Networks, Inc. , 42 P.3d 1221, 1229 (N .M. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Torres v. New Mexico , 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995)). Applying the place-of-the-wr ong rule here, the district court held that foreign law applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims. 5 The district court first noted that on the claims for tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting that breach, the alleged injury was “financial loss and the loss of the benefits under the [a]greement.” Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet
II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *6. And on the civil- conspiracy claim, it was “the alleged interference with . . . Unite dnet’s acquisition of funding.” Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *7. The district court

5 The district court also said that it would reach th e same conclusion under the most-significant-relationship te st, which it said New Mexi co courts have sometimes applied in complex cases. Beca use the parties agree that th e place-of-the-wrong rule governs here, we follow their lead and ap ply that rule. We thus need not address plaintiffs’ argument that the district cour t erred by alternatively applying the mostsignificant-relationship test. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1011 then determined that the la st act necessary to complete these injuries was the termination of the agreement between plaintiffs and the Ta ta sellers. Although the complaint does not specify where the termination occu rred, the district court explained that it “could only have been ove rseas,” given that th e Tata sellers are based in the United Kingdom, Bermuda, and the Netherlands. Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *15; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *6. The district court thus concluded that the place of the wrong was overseas, requiring the application of foreign law. Plaintiffs argue that the place of th e wrong was actually New Mexico, where they assert defendants engaged in the tor tious conduct, including “the last act of interference (or breach of fiduciary duty).” 6 Aplt. Br. 14. But pl aintiffs’ assertion runs counter to the rule that there is no tort without injury. See Santa Fe Techs. , 42 P.3d at 1229. Because defendant s’ alleged conduct did not become an actionable tort until plaintiffs suffered an injury, the place of the wrong was where plaintiffs’ injury occurred, even if the conduct resulting in that injury to ok place elsewhere. See id. ; First Nat’l Bank v. Benson , 553 P.2d 1288, 1289 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that lex loci delicti doctrine requires application of “the law of the [s]t ate of injury”). Plaintiffs nevertheless in sist that, at least on the to rtious-interference claim, they were injured when defendants took step s to ensure they could not perform their

6 It bears noting, however, that only two of the five defendants reside in New Mexico—Lucero and LatinGroup. And plainti ffs point to nothing in the complaint suggesting the three Tata defe ndants engaged in any torti ous conduct in that state. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1112 obligations under the agreement. But the complaint does not allege that any injury resulted from such conduct until the termination of the ag reement. Before that point, as defendants point out, “the fact that Unitednet did not s ecure the necessary funding to complete the asset purchase—which performance, in any event, was due in the [United Kingdom] (or overseas)—resu lted in no actual [consequences] to United[net].” Aplee. Br. 23–2 4 (emphasis omitted). Indeed , the Tata sellers could have, for instance, excuse d plaintiffs’ nonperformance by waiving the funding-letter requirement or otherwise negotiated ch anges to the agreem ent to accommodate Unitednet’s financing issues. And had the Ta ta sellers done so, defendants’ alleged attempt to induce the agreemen t’s termination would have fa iled, such that plaintiffs would have suffered no injury. That is, plai ntiffs would not have “los[t] the benefits of the [agreement].” 7 App. vol. 1, 27; see also Gen. Assur. of Am., Inc. v. Overby7 After oral argument, plain tiffs filed a letter under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) in which they invoke Rest atement (Second) of Torts § 766A (Am. L. Inst. 1979) to argue they need not show that the alleged interfer ence actually induced a breach or termination of th e agreement to establish to rtious interference with a contract. Section 766A allows a plaintiff to bring a tor tious-interference claim “on the ground that the defendant interfered with his contract by causing his performance to be ‘more expensive or burdensome’ ev en if the contract was not breached” or terminated. Green Plains Trade Grp., LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. , 90 F.4th 919, 924–25 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting § 766A). And pl aintiffs cite an unreported district-court case predicting that the New Mexico Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would adopt § 766A’s br oader definition of interference. See Horizon AGProds. v. Precision Sys. Eng’g, Inc. , No. 09-1109, 2010 WL 4054131, at *10 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2010). But plaintiffs ha ve waived this § 766A argument by waiting until their Rule 28(j) letter to make it. See Feinberg v. Comm’r , 916 F.3d 1330, 1337 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e ge nerally refuse to consider any . . . new issue introduced for the first time in a reply brief, let alone in a Rule 28(j) letter.” (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Niemi v. Lasshofer , 728 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2013))). In any event, the complaint does no t plead a § 766A claim (nor do plaintiffs Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1213 Seawell Co. , 533 F. App’x 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that under place-of-thewrong rule, plaintiff’s “alleged injury o ccurred in North Carolin a, the place where [third party] terminated its contract wi th [plaintiff], which was the last event necessary to render [defendant] liable for” tortious interferen ce with contract and breach of fiduciary duty). 8 Resisting this line of r easoning, plaintiffs rely on a district-court decision, Carroll v. Los Alamos National Security, LLC , 704 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D.N.M. 2010), aff’d , 407 F. App’x 348 (10th Cir. 2011), to argue that the last act necessary to render defendants liable here was “the tortious c onduct itself.” Aplt. Br. 16. But this reliance is misplaced. In Carroll , the plaintiff sued the admini strator of an employee benefit plan for negligently misrep resenting that the plan he selected would provide reimbursement for certain contributi ons upon retirement. 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1202–05. The Carroll court noted that although the plaintiff, who had no t yet retired, need not “have suffered calculab le damages before the cause of ac tion accrues, . . . ‘there [is] no cause of action for negligence until th ere ha[s] been a resulting injury.’” Id . at 1221 (alterations in original) (quoting Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, Inc. , 454 P.2d

argue that it does). Instead, plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claim proceeds on a theory that defendants induced the termin ation of the agreemen t, asserting that defendants “played an active and substantial part in causing [p]laintiff[s] . . . to lose the benefits of the cont ract.” App. vol. 1, 27; see also Wolf v. Perry , 339 P.2d 679, 682 (N.M. 1959) (“A necessary element of the tort of in ducing a breach [or in this case, termination,] of contr act is a showing that the de fendant played an active and substantial part in causing th e plaintiff to lose the bene fits of [the] contract.”). 8 We cite this unpublished case for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1314 963, 964 (N.M. 1969)). And in the Carroll court’s view, the plaintiff had already suffered some injury: he “w as forced to select his pension plan without being correctly informed about his options.” Id. at 1223–24. But here , as discussed, plaintiffs fail to allege that they suffered any injury before the Tata sellers terminated the agreement. Plaintiffs next invoke the New Me xico Supreme Court’s decision in Torres , 894 P.2d 386, to argue that the last event n ecessary to give rise to liability must be the conduct of the tortfeasor, and not that of third parties like th e Tata sellers. But
Torres imposes no such requirement. There, th e plaintiffs brought a wrongful-death action against the Albuquerque Police Depa rtment alleging that the department’s failure to properly investigat e a murder suspect allowed the suspect to escape to California, where he then shot and killed two individuals. Id. at 388–89. The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that th e shooting in California constituted the “last act necessary to complete the injury.” Id. at 390. But it nevertheless held that New Mexico law should apply because “the duties of law[-]enforcement personnel are defined by [state law],” and “‘[p]ublic policy dict ates that New Mexico law determine[s] the existence of duties a nd immunities on the part of New Mexico officials.’” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Wittkowski v. New Mexico , 710 P.2d 93, 96 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)). In ot her words, as the New Mexico Court of Appeals later put it, “ Torres accept[ed] the general rule th at New Mexico courts will apply the tort law of the st ate where the wrong occurred.” In re Gilmore , 946 P.2d 1130, 1135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). But Torres declined to apply that rule under the Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1415 circumstances because “such application w ould [have] violate[d] New Mexico public policy.” 894 P.2d at 390. Here, plaintiffs do not contend that this international business dispute implicates New Mexico public-policy consid erations requiring us to depart from the place-of-the-wrong rule. Rather, they argue that under this rule, New Mexico’s substantive law governs. But for the reasons di scussed, plaintiffs fail to convince us that the place of the wrong in this case was New Mexico. We instead ag ree with the district court that the place of the wr ong was overseas, where the Tata sellers terminated the agreement, because the agreement’s term ination was the last event necessary to make defendants liable for the alleged torts. See Santa Fe Techs. , 42 P.3d at 1229. In short, we see no error in the distri ct court’s conclusion that foreign law applies to plaintiffs’ tort claims. And plaintiffs do not dispute that if foreign law governs “the vast majority of the underl ying dispute,” the thre shold choice-of-law requirement is satisfied. 9 Lukoil , 812 F.3d at 806; see also id. (“[W]e have not . . . foreclose[d] consideration of forum non conveniens when some of the claims are

9 Recall that the complaint asserts only one claim that does not sound in tort— quantum meruit. The district court did not definitively decide whether foreign law applies to this claim, concluding that ev en if New Mexico law were to apply, it “would still find dismissal for forum non conveniens appropria te, as the vast majority of the underlying dispute is subject to English law.” Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *7 (italics omitted); see also Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *16. On appeal, plaintiffs do not address wh ether foreign law applies to their quantum meruit claim. And because plaintiffs do not argue th at dismissing the case for forum non conveniens is inappropriate if New Mexico la w applies to this single claim, we do not address it either. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1516 based on U.S. law and some are based on foreign law. To do otherwise would allow a party to avoid a forum non conveniens dismissal simply by including a [domestic] claim . . . .”).
II. Balance of Private and Public Interests We now turn to the district court’s anal ysis of the private- interest and publicinterest factors. Our review of that analysis “is quite limited.” Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd. , 576 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2009). Under the abuse-of-d iscretion standard, “[w]e must ‘carefully examine’” th e district court’s reasoning, “but where the [district] court ‘has considered all re levant public[-] and private[-]i nterest factors, and where its balancing of these fact ors is reasonable, its deci sion deserves substantial deference.’” Id. at 1172–73 (quoting Gschwind , 161 F.3d at 606).
A. Private-Interest Factors We begin with the private-interest factor s, which concern the interests of those participating in the litigation. See Gulf Oil , 330 U.S. at 508. Th ese factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof ; (2) availability of compulsory process for compelling atte ndance of witnesses; (3) cost of obtaining attendance of willing non[]par ty witnesses; (4 ) possibility of a view of the premises, if appropriate ; and (5) all other practical problems that make trial of the case easy , expeditious, and inexpensive. Gschwind , 161 F.3d at 606. The district court found that the privat e interests favored a foreign forum, focusing on the location of the parties and w itnesses. The district court noted that it appeared from the complaint that the partie s and witnesses were “located all over the world.” Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1617 2665578, at *8. Indeed, the parties ar e based in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. And the Ta ta sellers, “whose officers or employees are likely to be called as witnesses,” are based in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Bermuda. Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *8. So if it were to retain the case, the district court determined, the presence of the parties and witnesses woul d likely require extensive travel to New Mexico from the United Kingdom, Indi a, the Netherlands, and Bermuda—an inconvenient task that would cause the parties to incur si gnificant expenses. To be sure, the district court acknowledged, ne ither party presented evidence that any witnesses could not be compelled or w ould be unwilling to attend a trial in New Mexico. But even so, the district court remained unconvinced that plaintiffs’ suggestion of using “teleconf erencing technology suffice[d] to mitigate the cost of travel and significant inconve nience that appear[ed] to fa vor litigation in the United Kingdom.” Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *16; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *8. Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s concerns about the costs associated with travel are misguided. They contend that the judici al system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic confirms it is possibl e to conduct an entire jury trial by videoconference, with every witness and at torney appearing remotely. And even if some did choose to appear in person, pl aintiffs maintain, t hose for whom travel would be too disruptive and expensive c ould still appear remotely. Given this availability of videoconferenci ng technology, plaintiffs assert that the private-interest Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1718 factors “do[] not compel” di smissal here. Aplt. Br. 23. But in evaluating the district court’s exercise of discretion, we do not ask whether the private-interest factors compel dismissal. Rather, we examine whether the district court considered the releva nt factors and reasona bly balanced them. See
Yavuz , 576 F.3d at 1172–73. And here, the district court explicitly considered the availability of videoconferen cing technology but determined that the private-interest factors, on balance, still favored dismissal because the bulk of w itnesses are located abroad. While plaintiffs disa gree with the district cour t’s analysis, they identify nothing unreasonable about it. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the private-interest factor s favored dismissal. See id.
B. Public-Interest Factors That leaves us with the public-i nterest factors, which include: (1) administrative difficulties of c ourts with congested dockets which can be caused by cases not being filed at their place of origin; (2) the burden of jury duty on members of a community with no connection to the litigation; (3) the lo cal interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) the appropr iateness of having diversity cases tried in a forum that is fam iliar with the governing law. Gschwind , 161 F.3d at 606. The district court determined that th e public-interest factors also favored dismissal. It explained that “the District of New Mexico face[s] a heavy criminal and civil docket,” and retaining this case would present “significant administrative difficulties, such as assisting the parties in their efforts to obtain witnesses from Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1819 around the globe for de positions and trial.” Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *17; see also Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665578, at *8. The district court acknowledged that the case has some connection to New Mexico , given that Lucero resides in the state and LatinGroup maintains its principal place of business there. But beyond those two defendants, the district court observed, the complaint does not alle ge any ties to the state or otherwise raise a local dispute. And without a dispute local to the New Mexico community, the district court sa w little public intere st in burdening the community with jury service. By contrast, the district cour t explained, the dispute has strong ties to the United King dom, which possesses a much more substantial interest in deciding a case that “c oncerns injury to [its] ci tizens,” includes “an English contract,” involves the acquisition of a telecommunications network connecting the United Kingdom and Netherlands, and “will re quire the application of laws of the United Kingdom or England.” Unitednet II , 2023 WL 2665 578, at *8; see also Unitednet I , 2022 WL 1604802, at *17. The distri ct court thus concluded that the public-interest factors ti pped in favor of litigati on in the United Kingdom. Plaintiffs insist otherwis e, arguing that the public-i nterest factors weigh in favor of keeping the case in th e District of New Mexico. In support, plaintiffs stress that they seek to apply New Mexico law to redress wrongful conduct engaged in by a New Mexico resident, his New Mexico company, and his three foreign coconspirators. But as explai ned above, the district cour t correctly concluded that foreign law, not New Mexico law, applies. And the district cour t recognized that two defendants reside in New Mexico but reas onably found that the United Kingdom has Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 1920 much stronger ties to the case and a much greater intere st in resolving it. Because the district court neither igno red nor unreasonably balanced the public-interest factors, we again find no abuse of discretion. See Yavuz , 576 F.3d at 1172–73. In sum, there is no dispute that th e United Kingdom is an adequate and available alternative forum, and the district court proper ly determined that foreign law governs this dispute. The district court then appropri ately balanced the relevant private- and public-int erest factors to conclude that they favored the United Kingdom as the more convenient forum. The district court thus acted within its discretion to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens. 10 See id.
Conclusion Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action for forum non conveniens, we affirm.

10 Given this conclusion, we need not address defendants’ alternative argument that the district court erred in concluding that they coul d not enforce the agreement’s forum-selection clause. Nor do we consider their argument that the district court should have dismissed the claims ag ainst Tata Sons Private and Tata Communications America for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellate Case: 23-2057 Document: 010111096500 Date Filed: 08/19/2024 Page: 20