Filed 5/4/22 Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of CHRISTINE 

NAKAMOTO and DANIEL HSU.

CHRISTINE NAKAMOTO,

 Respondent,

v.

DANIEL HSU,

 Appellant;

BRION CORPORATION et al.,

 Claimants and Respondents.

 G059108

 (Super. Ct. No. 11D006853)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

James L. Waltz, Judge. Affirmed.

Masson & Fatini, Richard E. Masson and Susan M. Masson for Appellant.

Minyard Morris, Alexander Payne; Garrett C. Dailey for Claimants and 

Respondents.

* * *
2

In this appeal, Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asks that we reverse the trial court’s 

decision denying him need-based attorney fees under Family Code section 2030.1 The 

actual dispute underlying his request for attorney fees is not currently at issue. However, 

it is integral to the court’s attorney fees ruling and is briefly described below.

This is a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine 

Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue is between Daniel 

and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their 

parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. 

The siblings met on March 1, 2006, to discuss Daniel’s claims. They reached an 

agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten 

memorandum (the Handwritten Agreement). Among other things, the Handwritten 

Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three 

siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement

(Compromise Agreement). The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set 

forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment.

The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would be 

a community asset, and that it is still owed to him under the Handwritten Agreement. 

Chau and Melissa asserted the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and 

that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the 

Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they own 

(together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this 

dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the 

Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. 

The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was 

1

Since several parties share the same surname, we refer to the parties by their first name 

to avoid confusion. All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
3

enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Daniel sought interlocutory 

review of this order, but his request was denied.

Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the 

court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a 

tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel 

requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another 

$30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. As to the fees incurred during trial, the 

court found Daniel had overlitigated this case. It denied Daniel’s request for appellate 

fees due to his failure to show reasonable grounds to appeal. Daniel now appeals this 

denial, arguing the court erred by denying his request for attorney fees.

We affirm the court’s postjudgment order. The court’s finding that Daniel 

overlitigated this case is supported by substantial evidence. As to the denial of appellate 

fees, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding Daniel failed to show reasonable 

grounds to appeal. Daniel’s purported grounds for challenging the court’s ruling in a 

prospective appeal are conclusory and only focus on the evidence favorable to his claims. 

He fails to address any of the evidence supporting the court’s conclusion that Daniel and 

his siblings did not intend for the Handwritten Agreement to be a final contract. Nor 

does he explain how this finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. As such, we 

cannot conclude the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it determined Daniel 

had not shown reasonable grounds to appeal.

I

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Daniel and Christine married in 2002. Christine filed this marriage 

dissolution action in 2011. The underlying dispute in this appeal concerns a 

disagreement between Daniel and his two siblings, Chau and Melissa, over Daniel’s 

family inheritance. In short, Daniel believes Chau, Melissa, and several family-owned 
4

business entities, including Sun Ten Pharmaceutical, California (Sun Ten) and Brion 

Corporation owe him $4 million.

2

 It is undisputed this alleged sum is a community asset 

per a transmutation agreement Daniel signed the day he wed Christine. Daniel litigated 

this claim against claimants in the divorce proceeding and lost. While this appeal only 

concerns the court’s denial of Daniel’s request for attorney fees, the underlying conflict is 

material to the fee issue. Thus, we review the history of this dispute below.3

A. Background

Daniel, Chau, and Melissa are the only children of Dr. Hong-Yen Hsu

(Hong-Yen) and Dr. Ruth Lin-Run Hsu (Ruth), who accumulated substantial wealth 

during their lifetimes. Hong-Yen and Ruth were originally from Taiwan, where they 

started several businesses, and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. Hong-Yen 

passed away in 1991, and Ruth passed away in 1998. Ruth was the executor of HongYen’s estate after his death, and all three children were co-executors of Ruth’s estate 

when she passed. The Final Order of Distribution for Ruth’s estate was filed in 2000, and 

the estate’s final tax return was filed in 2002. Still, the total value of Ruth’s estate was 

opaque and appears to be a source of friction. During trial, Daniel estimated her estate 

was worth $60 million, which Chau disputes. We have not been pointed to any other 

evidence in the record that either substantiates or discredits Daniel’s estimate. 

Regardless, the exact value of her estate is immaterial to this appeal.

Around 2005, Daniel became convinced Chau was hiding a portion of their 

parents’ estate from him. He hired an attorney to assist him in obtaining his portion of 

2

Other claimants involved in this appeal are Brion Herbs Corporation and Sun Ten 

Museum. Daniel’s opening brief sometimes refers to Sun Ten as STPCA.

3

Christine was also involved in the litigation over Daniel’s inheritance. She moved for 

attorney fees at the same time as Daniel, and the court also denied her request. Since she 

does not appeal that ruling, we focus on the facts relevant to Daniel.
5

these allegedly hidden assets. The three siblings met in Irvine on March 1, 2006, to 

address Daniel’s allegations. Though Daniel and Chau had both consulted with attorneys 

about Daniel’s claims, no attorneys attended the meeting. Rather, it was informally 

mediated by a mutual family friend, Herb Shen (Shen). After hours of discussion, the 

siblings reached a general agreement. It was documented in the Handwritten Agreement, 

a terse two-page memorandum handwritten by Daniel partially in Chinese and partially in 

English. All three siblings and Shen (as a witness) signed the Handwritten Agreement on 

March 1, 2006.

The only portion of the Handwritten Agreement written in Chinese is the 

first half of first sentence, but the parties agree on its English translation. The remainder 

is written in English. In its entirety, the Handwritten Agreement states, “‘[$4,000,000 

paid to Daniel over eight years] plus employment agreement until May 2011 annual 

salary of US $100,000.00.

[4]

Brion Corporation’s stock in Aurie, Lin-Ling, Hansdale 

name transfer back to company. No touch all the corporation and company from this 

point on including Foundation. [¶] Brion Corporation’s stock in the name of Aurie, LinLing and Hansdale the buy back amount not to exceed US $100,000.00.’”

Aurie, Lin-Ling, and Hansdale are Daniel’s children from a prior marriage. 

Brion Corporation is a California Corporation that was previously owned by Hong-Yen 

and Ruth. Following their deaths, its shares were owned by the Chau, Melissa, and 

Daniel. Aurie, Lin-Ling, and Hansdale appear to have owned an indirect interest in Brion 

Corporation shares through their father, Daniel. It appears the “Foundation” referred to 

in the Handwritten Agreement is the Hong-Yen and Lin-Run Hsu Charitable Foundation

(the Foundation), a California nonprofit public benefit corporation.

In the underlying litigation, the parties dispute whether the Handwritten 

Agreement was meant to be a standalone contract or a memorandum of general points to 

4

The bracketed portion of this sentence was written in Chinese. The English text within 

the brackets is Daniel’s translation, which the parties generally agree is accurate.
6

be later incorporated into a formal written contract. The primary disagreement appears to 

be whether or not Daniel is still owed the $4 million set forth in the Handwritten 

Agreement. The conflict arises from the parties’ divergent perspectives of the events that 

occurred after March 1, 2006.

It is undisputed that on September 12, 2006, Daniel met with Shen in 

Taiwan and signed several documents. Chau and Melissa were not present at this 

meeting. One of these documents, the primary document at issue here, was the nine-page 

Compromise Agreement entered into by Daniel, Chau, and Melissa. Though it was 

signed by Daniel in September 2006 (it is unclear when Chau and Melissa signed), the 

Compromise Agreement provided that “[u]pon full execution of this Agreement, the 

parties agree that it shall be deemed effective as of March 1, 2006.”

Under the Compromise Agreement, Daniel agreed to give up all claims to 

his parents’ estate and to sell his shares in Brion Corporation to Chau for $100,000, 

eliminating his interest in the company. The Compromise Agreement further required 

Daniel to resign as director of the Foundation and as a cotrustee of a subtrust of the Hsu 

Family Trust, and he concurrently executed separate formal resignations. In exchange, 

Brion Corporation would retain Daniel as a senior manager with a salary of $100,000 per 

year plus health insurance, and he would be employed until the earlier of his death, 

incapacity, or his 66th birthday, which was in May 2011. Significantly, though, the 

Compromise Agreement did not mention the $4 million payment discussed at the March 

1, 2006 meeting.

5

The same day he signed the Compromise Agreement, Daniel also signed 

various documents concerning a parcel of real property on Roosevelt Road in Taipei, 

5

On October 11, 2006, Daniel executed a Modification of Compromise Agreement which 

revised the payment structure for Daniel’s salary from Brion Corporation. That same 

day, he also executed a Share Purchase Agreement and an Assignment of Corporate 

Shares Separate from Certificate, which formally transferred Daniel’s Brion Corporation 

shares back to Brion Corporation.
7

Taiwan (the Roosevelt Property). Daniel owned the land and co-owned a building on the 

property with Chau. Initially, Daniel had planned to donate the Roosevelt Property to a 

local theological college. To facilitate the transfer, Chau and Daniel created a real estate 

trust in March 2006 naming the college as the beneficiary of the Roosevelt Property. At 

some point prior to the September 12 meeting, however, the donation became unviable 

because the college could not afford the transfer tax. After the donation fell through, 

Melissa and Chau agreed to buy the property from Daniel. The purchase was 

documented through a property sale agreement, signed on September 12, 2006, in which 

Chau and Melissa purchased the Roosevelt Property for $4 million (the Chau/Melissa 

Sale Agreement). Under the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement, payments would be made 

over eight years into a Taiwanese bank account owned by Daniel. Daniel also 

concurrently executed a Cancellation of Trust for the real estate trust previously created 

to facilitate the donation to the college.

While the parties largely agree on these general facts, they dispute the 

purpose behind the sale of the Roosevelt Property to Chau and Melissa. According to 

Chau, Daniel wanted the $4 million agreed upon at the March 1, 2006 meeting paid 

outside the United States, which Chau asserts was done to avoid American taxes. When 

the donation of the Roosevelt Property fell through, Chau suggested to Daniel around 

July 2006 that he could purchase the Roosevelt Property from Daniel to pay him the $4 

million discussed on March 1, 2006. Since Daniel had planned on donating the 

Roosevelt Property, its market value was irrelevant to him. In contrast, Daniel insists the 

sale of the Roosevelt Property was unrelated to the $4 million discussed on March 1, 

2006. As Daniel recounts, he learned from Shen on September 12, 2006, that the college 

could not accept his donation and that his siblings were interested in purchasing the 

Roosevelt Property. Since the property could not be donated, he decided to sell it to his 

siblings for $4 million, which generally reflected the property’s market value.
8

Chau and Melissa subsequently made two payments to Daniel under the 

Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement in December 2006 and May 2007 totaling $350,000.

Sometime in 2007, Shen approached Daniel about Sun Ten purchasing Daniel’s interest 

in the Roosevelt Property rather than Chau and Melissa. Sun Ten had been established 

by Hong-Yen and Ruth in 1946, and Chau was chairman of its board of directors at the 

time. Daniel and Sun Ten signed a new Property Sale Agreement on June 7, 2007, in 

which Sun Ten agreed to purchase the Roosevelt Property for $4 million paid over eight 

years (Sun Ten Sale Agreement). Like the Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement, payments 

under the Sun Ten Sale Agreement would be paid to a Taiwanese bank account held by 

Daniel. Daniel, Melissa, and Chau then executed an agreement cancelling the sale of the 

Roosevelt Property from Daniel to his two siblings. Sun Ten then reimbursed Chau and 

Melissa for the $350,000 they had paid Daniel.

Chau testified that the parties intended for Sun Ten to assume the obligation 

of him and Melissa to pay Daniel $4 million. Likewise, the Sun Ten Sale Agreement 

attached the Compromise Agreement as an exhibit and incorporated its provisions. 

Specifically, the Sun Ten Sale Agreement, as translated from Chinese to English, stated 

that “[i]n case that [Daniel] breaches any of the obligations mentioned in [the 

Compromise Agreement] during the term of payment by [Sun Ten], [Sun Ten] must 

cease the payment of the aforesaid price according to notification of the third party 

[Chau]; [Daniel] agrees that [Sun Ten] shall make liquidation of the compensation to 

[Chau] within the scope of claim by [Chau] for [Daniel’s] violation of any of its aforesaid 

obligations with the unpaid price on behalf of [Daniel].”

Sun Ten made payments to Daniel for the Roosevelt Property up until 

2013. He did not receive any payments from his siblings during this time period, nor did 

he claim they owed him money under the Handwritten Agreement.
9

B. Trial in the Divorce Proceeding

Christine filed for divorce on July 21, 2011, and later involuntarily joined 

claimants to the proceeding on grounds they were holding community property. 

Claimants responded by demanding indemnity from the spouses under a provision in the 

Compromise Agreement that required Daniel to indemnify claimants for claims made 

against them relating to the agreement (the indemnity provision). The spouses denied 

claimants’ indemnity request and argued the Compromise Agreement was invalid.

The spouses’ claims against claimants proceeded to trial, in which the 

primary dispute was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement 

was enforceable. The spouses alleged claimants owed them $4 million under the 

Handwritten Agreement. Claimants maintained the Handwritten Agreement was never 

intended to be a binding contract. Rather, according to them, it was only a summary of 

the deal points discussed at the March 1, 2006 meeting, and all parties understood that 

formal contracts would be subsequently drafted and signed by the parties. They also 

asserted that even if the Handwritten Agreement was found to be a valid contract, it was 

too vague to enforce.

The court estimated trial would last three days, and none of the parties 

disputed this estimate. Trial commenced in November 2019. However, it consumed a 

total of seven trial days and concluded in January 2019. The court issued a detailed 18-

page final statement of decision in February 2020 (the statement of decision), in which it 

ruled the Handwritten Agreement was not a valid contract and, even if it were valid, it 

would be unenforceable. Instead, the court found the Compromise Agreement was valid, 

enforceable, and controlling. In the court’s opinion, “this was not a close judicial call.”

In explaining the basis for its ruling, the court found Chau to be “a more 

accurate reporter of historical events and found his testimony truthful. On the other hand, 

the court found Daniel to be less accurate as to historical events, his trial testimony less 
10

credible and at times his testimony [was] not truthful.” Further, after the March 1, 2006 

meeting, “Daniel’s correspondence makes very clear that . . . he was anticipating the 

forthcoming Compromise Agreement . . . , something he (falsely) denied at [the] time of 

the bifurcated trial. [B]ased on the totality of the correspondence and based on the post 

[March 1, 2006] conduct by the parties and third parties, and based on the actual drafting 

of many agreements including the drafting and execution of the Compromise Agreement 

. . . , all of that corroborating Chau’s testimony, the court [found] that at the [March 1, 

2006 meeting], the siblings did not have a complete meeting of the minds . . . , and . . . 

never intended the Handwritten Agreement . . . [to] serve as a binding contract.” Rather 

the court concluded the parties reached a deal in principle to settle their dispute “subject 

to the drafting and execution of a series of contracts . . . . That was followed by party 

performance (over years) to include Daniel receiving bargained-for benefits until the 

benefits due Daniel expired under contract.” The court also noted that even if the 

Handwritten Agreement were a valid and final contract, “the agreement itself [was] 

unintelligible and too vague to enforce.”

Daniel requested interlocutory review of the trial court’s ruling, but this 

court denied that request. As such, Daniel cannot directly appeal this ruling until final 

judgment has been entered in the dissolution proceeding. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756 [Generally, “[u]nder the one final judgment rule, ‘“an appeal 

may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action.”’”].)

C. Requests for Attorney Fees

The spouses each requested need-based attorney fees from claimants under 

section 2030 before, during, and after the trial. Most of their requests were at least 

partially granted. In January 2015, the court ordered Brion Corporation to pay $60,000 in 

fees to Christine and $50,000 in fees to Daniel. In December 2017, about a year before 

trial, the spouses both filed motions seeking incurred and future fees. Christine requested 
11

$985,000, while Daniel sought $500,000. The court denied their request for incurred 

fees, but it awarded prospective fees in the amount of $35,000 to Christine and $70,000 

to Daniel for the upcoming trial. The spouses then both filed motions for reconsideration, 

which the court partially granted, resulting in an extra $20,000 in supplemental fees to

each spouse. In total, by the time trial commenced in November 2018, the court had 

already awarded fees in the amount of $140,000 to Daniel and $115,000 to Christine.

After it became clear trial would go longer than the initial three-day 

estimate, the court ordered claimants in December 2018 to pay another $10,000 in 

attorney fees to each spouse. Then, on the final day of trial in January 2019, the spouses 

again moved for more attorney fees. The court reserved the issue. After trial, it issued 

tentative rulings finding the Compromise Agreement was enforceable and controlling and 

the Handwritten Agreement was not. Christine subsequently submitted a request for 

$293,934.80 in fees incurred plus another $100,000 in prospective fees for appeal, while 

Daniel requested $50,000 for fees incurred and $30,000 for appeal. The trial court denied 

these requests on two separate grounds, and it issued separate rulings explaining each.

The first ruling (the attorney fees ruling) found the spouses had failed to 

show their respective fee requests were reasonable. It explained the fees previously 

awarded by the court were sufficient, as they reasonably allowed each party the ability to 

retain counsel of their choice and to fairly litigate the matter. The court determined the 

request for incurred fees was also unreasonable because the spouses had overlitigated this 

case. As to the requests for appellate fees, the court ruled that the spouses had failed to 

show reasonable grounds for appeal.

In the alternative, the second ruling (the indemnity ruling) held the spouses 

were barred from seeking attorney fees from claimants under the indemnity provision. 

The court found “Daniel ha[d] an obligation to defend and indemnify Claimants for all 

matters embraced by the indemnity provision, which necessarily include[d] all costs 

incurred and/or related to this action.” Due to the indemnity provision, the spouses could 
12

not seek need-based fees against claimants under section 2030. As the court explained, 

“Daniel bargained for indemnity and contracted any rights to seek Family Code fees 

away.” (Italics omitted.)

In this appeal, Daniel contends the trial court wrongly denied his request 

for $50,000 in incurred fees and $30,000 in prospective appellate fees. We are 

unpersuaded.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Section 2030

“The denial of a request for attorney fees pendente lite is appealable 

because it possesses all the elements of a final judgment on the issue of whether a spouse 

may be able to obtain such fees.” (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 964, fn. 

37; In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 [“[A] direct appeal lies from 

a pendente lite attorney fees order where nothing remains for judicial determination 

except the issue of compliance or noncompliance with its terms”].)

Here, Daniel sought fees under section 2030. This statute “permits the trial 

court to order payment of attorney fees and costs as between the parties based upon their 

‘ability to pay’ and their ‘respective incomes and needs’ in order to ‘ensure that each 

party has access to legal representation to preserve all of the party’s rights.’” (In re 

Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 829 (Rosen).) “[T]he purpose of section 

2030 is not the redistribution of money from the greater income party to the lesser 

income party. Its purpose is parity: a fair hearing with two sides equally represented. 

The idea is that both sides should have the opportunity to retain counsel, not just . . . the 

party with greater financial strength.” (Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 

238, 251-252.) When issues involving third parties are raised, the court may award 
13

attorney fees against the third party in “an amount reasonably necessary to maintain or 

defend the action on the issues relating to that party.” (§ 2030, subd. (d).)

A court may award fees under section 2030 “‘where the making of the [fee] 

award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under relative circumstances 

of the respective parties.’” (Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) “In determining 

what is just and reasonable, ‘the court shall take into consideration the need for the award 

to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to 

present the party’s case adequately . . . .’ [Citation.] In addition to the parties’ financial 

resources, the court may consider the parties’ trial tactics.” (In re Marriage of Sharples

(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 164-165.) “The court should limit an award to fees that 

were reasonably necessary, including by taking into account overlitigation.” (In re 

Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 356.) “[S]ervices which 

have no apparent effect other than to prolong and to complicate domestic litigation 

cannot be deemed ‘reasonably necessary’ [citation] ‘to properly litigate the controversy’

[citation] and may properly be disregarded by a trial court determining whether and in 

what amount to order one party to contribute to the cost of the other’s representation.” 

(In re Marriage of Behrens (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 562, 576; see Karton v. Ari Design & 

Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744 [“A reduced award might be fully 

justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case”].)

A court’s denial of attorney fees under section 2030 is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. (Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) “The abuse of discretion 

standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect 

of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for 

substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of 

the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior 

Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns. omitted.)
14

B. Attorney Fees Incurred at Trial

In the attorney fees ruling, the trial court denied Daniel’s request for an 

additional $50,000 in fees incurred at trial because Daniel had overlitigated the case. 

Daniel argues this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Under the substantial evidence standard, “‘[o]ur review is limited to a 

determination whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

that supports the finding. [Citation.] In so reviewing, all conflicts must be resolved in 

favor of [the prevailing party] and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be 

indulged to uphold the finding.’” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 

1461, 1472.) “[W]e examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference.” (In re Marriage of 

Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) We do “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate 

the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial 

court. [Citations.] The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered 

the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the 

function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)

In the attorney fees ruling, the court concluded “the additional four trial 

days [were] wholly un-necessary. [W]hile Daniel presented many challenges to 

documents and events, and a lot of trial was allocated to chase down facts and 

authenticate documents, in the end, Daniel conceded what he at first disputed.” The court 

also provided several examples of Daniel’s conduct supporting this conclusion. First, it 

noted he extended trial by challenging “authentication of foreign language documents, 

business records and authentication of foreign language ‘signature stamps.’” Second, 

“Daniel disputed/contested any consideration as and for the Compromise Agreement . . . 

and many hours were allocated to challenge and refute Daniel’s claims and testimony, 

[with] the court later declaring substantial portions of his testimony mis-leading, not 
15

credible and even false.” Third, “[w]ithin final arguments and proposed findings, both 

Daniel and Christine abandon[ed] positions asserted before and during trial, making unnecessary certain trial hours.” The record supports these findings.

As to the first example, many of the documents at issue contained signature 

stamps, also referred to as “medallions,” that are commonly use in Taipei to sign 

documents. The medallions of Daniel and Chau contained Chinese characters that 

corresponded to their Chinese names. Daniel admits that early in the trial, his counsel 

hesitated to stipulate to the authenticity of documents signed with medallions because 

Daniel “questioned whether [his] medallion had been out of his possession.” Counsel 

later stated this remark was incorrect and confirmed Daniel had signed each of the 

documents at issue. Though Daniel concedes this mistake, he argues that after 

“discovering the error, he promptly stipulated to authentication of these documents” and 

that this error did not extend the trial. However, it is undisputed that Daniel took five 

trial days to discover the purported error. As the court explained, “Daniel objected to 

each ‘Medallion Guaranteed’ exhibit, many of which contained Daniel’s wet signature

and then, after five days of trial, Daniel’s counsel finally represented, ‘I confirm that each 

one of the documents . . . were signed, if they were signed by Daniel, by him, and his 

medallion was used by him or with his permission.’”

The record supports the court’s finding that claimants were forced to 

expend trial time authenticating signature stamps on documents based on Daniel’s refusal 

to stipulate to their authenticity due to the claimed loss of his medallion. For example, 

when exhibit 3241 (a trust document relating to the Roosevelt Property) was introduced,

claimants asked Chau a series of questions to authenticate Daniel’s wet signature and 

signature stamp. They moved to admit the exhibit, but Christine objected on grounds that 

Daniel had challenged the use of his medallion. Claimants then had to wait until Daniel 

was on the witness stand to ask him whether exhibit 3241 contained his signature.
16

Likewise, there are other instances in the record in which claimants were 

forced to have Chau authenticate various signatures and signature stamps, including 

Daniel’s, on different documents introduced at trial. Other than mistakenly believing he 

had lost his signature stamp, Daniel provides no grounds for failing to stipulate to the 

authenticity of these documents. And from the portions of the record cited by the parties, 

it does not appear there were any serious doubts about the authenticity of any of the 

documents with signature stamps.

Daniel also admits to questioning the accuracy of several translated 

documents, which necessitated an appearance by the translator at trial. The record also 

shows several instances in which Daniel objected to the authentication of translated 

documents on grounds the translator needed to be made “available for cross-examination 

as to the accuracy of their translation.” But the record reflects the parties stipulated to the 

translator. Nor does Daniel explain why any disputed translation could not have been 

resolved prior to its presentation at trial, avoiding the need for the translator to testify. 

While Daniel generally contends that objecting to a translation is a proper litigation 

tactic, he does not explain why objection to the authenticity of these translations was 

warranted or why it was necessary to examine the translator, especially where he “later 

stipulated to the introduction of the contested documents.” Further, we must presume the 

record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Daniel’s challenges 

to these translations unnecessarily prolonged trial. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. 

Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125-126.) Consequently, Daniel has failed to 

show there is insufficient evidence to support this finding.

As to the court’s second example, Daniel suggests his consideration 

argument was legally tenable based on “his belief of the underlying facts, as they 

occurred.” But the court was not troubled by the legal portion of his argument. Rather, it 

found the argument factually untenable based on its determination that Daniel’s 

testimony was “mis-leading, not credible and even false.” In response, Daniel spends a 
17

large portion of his brief arguing the court erred by finding his testimony lacked 

credibility while believing the testimony of Chau. But he overlooks a key aspect of 

appellate review. Appellate courts do not determine the facts themselves. (People v. 

Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105-106.) An appellate court “‘ha[s] no power to judge of 

the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of 

the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that 

may be drawn therefrom.’” (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 518.) “‘Resolution of 

conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of 

fact.’” (Brown, at pp. 105-106, italics added.) “‘“The trial judge, having heard the 

evidence, observed the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, candor or lack of candor, is 

best qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by their 

testimony.”’” (Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931.)

As to the court’s third example, Daniel does not offer anything to show this 

finding is unsupported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, we presume it is supported 

by the record. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 125-126; see Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409 (Huong 

Que).)

Daniel’s opening brief spends little time addressing any of the court’s 

factual findings discussed above supporting its conclusion that he overlitigated this case.

Instead, he argues it was not his fault the trial lasted seven days instead of three. He 

asserts it was claimants that engaged in excessive litigation. Specifically, he maintains 

claimants introduced a variety of tangential documents that were irrelevant to 

determining whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was 

enforceable. These documents include, among others, the Cancellation of Trust, the 

Chau/Melissa Sale Agreement, the Sun Ten Sale Agreement, Daniel’s resignation from 

the Foundation, and documents relating to the transfer of Daniel’s shares back to Brion 
18

Corporation. Daniel claims he tried to streamline the trial by objecting to the 

introduction of these documents.

This argument is outside our scope of review. When reviewing for 

substantial evidence, “‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the 

determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the [trial court’s] determination . . . . 

If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing 

other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary 

conclusion.’” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143.) 

It is irrelevant whether the trial court could have found that claimants were responsible 

for unnecessarily prolonging trial. Instead, we review whether substantial evidence 

supports the court’s finding that Daniel engaged in excessive litigation.

Besides, we find no merit to Daniel’s contention that these documents were 

irrelevant to the issues at trial. The documents were all executed after the March 1, 2006 

meeting, and, significantly, they all relate to various points discussed at that meeting: the 

return of Daniel’s Brion Corporation shares, his lack of further involvement with the 

Foundation and Brion Corporation, and the $4 million promised. As such, they provide 

evidence that the Handwritten Agreement was not intended to be a binding, final contract 

between Daniel and his siblings. Rather, it can be inferred from these documents that the 

Handwritten Agreement was only a memorandum of general points that the parties 

understood would be followed by formal contracts, namely, these documents. 

Consequently, Daniel’s suggestion that these documents were irrelevant at trial is 

unpersuasive.

In summary, the court’s findings relating to Daniel’s overlitigation of this 

case are supported by substantial evidence, so it was not arbitrary or capricious for the 

court to deny his request for $50,000 in fees incurred at trial.
19

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

Litigants to a spousal dissolution may request appellate attorney fees under 

section 2030. (In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)6

“To warrant an award of fees on appeal, four conditions must be met: (1) the requesting 

spouse must show a need for the award; (2) the paying spouse must have the ability to 

pay the fees; (3) the appeal must be taken in good faith; and (4) there must be reasonable 

grounds for the appeal in the sense that reasonable persons should believe that the 

contentions merit the appellate court’s attention and resolution.” (Ibid.) As with other 

fees requested under section 2030, a court’s denial of appellate fees is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. (Hunter v. Hunter (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 84, 92.)

In the attorney fees ruling, the court denied Daniel’s request for $30,000 in 

appellate fees because he failed to show reasonable grounds for appeal. It explained that 

“the contents of the Handwritten Agreement . . . fell a mile short of being understandable 

so to be enforceable. Nor was the Handwritten Agreement . . . intended by the parties as 

the final agreement (per the credible testimony from Chau, conflicting with the incredible 

testimony from Daniel) . . ., as evidenced by the parties participating in the subsequent 

drafting and execution of the Compromise Agreement . . ., followed by a plethora of 

subsequent agreements intended to execute and fulfill the negotiated expectations and 

promises of the parties, all the while Daniel [accepted] the negotiated benefits and . . . .

did so over many years until the negotiated benefits timed out. In the end the court did 

not struggle during deliberations . . . .”

Daniel fails to show any error in the court’s analysis. Instead, he contends 

that in his future appeal he will show the Handwritten Agreement contains all the 

6

In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at page 258, applied 

former Civil Code section 4370, which was the predecessor to section 2030 (In re 

Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1048-1049; see Stats. 1993, ch. 219, 

§ 106.1).
20

elements of a valid contract. He then cites evidence showing (1) the Handwritten 

Agreement recorded four general points, (2) the parties all testified to the meaning of 

those four points, (3) the Handwritten Agreement was signed by all three siblings and 

Shen, (4) the parties all understood the Handwritten Agreement recorded Daniel’s 

agreement to be bought out of the Brion Corporation and the Foundation for $4 million 

and an annual salary of $100,000 until May 2011.

Daniel, however, completely ignores the evidence supporting the trial 

court’s findings, particularly, the evidence showing the Handwritten Agreement was not 

intended to be a binding contract. By doing so, he has failed to meet his of burden of 

showing the court’s ruling was unsupported by substantial evidence. (Huong Que, supra,

150 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) While it is not our burden to locate this evidence, we have 

done so to highlight Daniel’s failure to show that he can reasonably prevail in any future 

appeal.

Among other things, Chau testified that he told Daniel on March 1, 2006 

that a formal agreement would be prepared. Likewise, Shen testified it was his 

“understanding that a formal agreement was to be prepared following the March 1st, 

2006, meeting[.]” He recounted that at the March 1, 2006 meeting, “each of us agreed 

that [the Handwritten Agreement] was a memo and the [formal] agreement should be 

drafted.” Melissa also testified the Handwritten Agreement was a “memorandum” rather 

than a final agreement. She stated all three siblings understood the Handwritten 

Agreement would be followed by an official agreement drafted in English by an attorney. 

She further explained the Handwritten Agreement did not contain all the agreed upon 

points from the March 1, 2006 meeting. Finally, though the Compromise Agreement was 

signed in September 2006, it was “effective as of March 1, 2006.” This further indicates 

it was meant to formally record the three siblings’ agreement at the March 1, 2006

meeting, and the Handwritten Agreement was not.
21

Moreover, Daniel sent a fax to Sun Ten’s legal counsel on June 14, 2006, a 

few months before he signed the Compromise Agreement. In this fax, which was 

translated from Chinese to English, Daniel requested changes to the salary he negotiated 

at the March 1, 2006 meeting. Specifically, he states, “[t]he final conclusion is that the

agreement reached at the beginning of March will remain the same. The only change was 

about my salary for the next 5 years.” He then explained how he would like his salary to 

be paid over the next five years. Within the same fax, he further states that “with regard 

to the agreement, you mentioned that you would get it ready by mid-July. Could you 

please tell the attorney to hurry a little? [B]ecause I probably would not be here for the 

entire month of July. I will be going to Canada. Please make sure to ask the attorney to 

help out. Even if it would be just an initial draft. [I]t would be ok.” From this fax, it can 

be inferred that Daniel knew the Handwritten Agreement was not final and was waiting 

to receive the final agreement as of June 2006. This interpretation is bolstered by the 

plethora of documents discussed above that Daniel signed months after the March 1, 

2006 meeting, which all related to the subject matter discussed at that meeting.

Daniel’s failure to mention this evidence is telling. The testimony of Chau, 

Melissa, and Shen shows Daniel knew the Handwritten Agreement was not intended to 

be a final agreement. Their testimony is supported by Daniel’s fax, in which he 

continues to negotiate his salary and requests to be provided with a draft of the final 

agreement. And it is reinforced by the numerous documents Daniel signed after the 

March 1, 2006 meeting. Daniel fails to cite anything in the record showing he ever 

questioned these documents or the benefits he received from them. At Daniel’s 

prospective appeal, this evidence would all be accepted as true, and all reasonable 

inferences from this evidence would be made in support of the trial court’s ruling. (In re 

Michael G., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) Daniel provides no explanation as to how 

he can overcome this extensive evidence and establish the Handwritten Agreement was a 

valid contract.
22

D. The Indemnity Ruling

As to the indemnity ruling, it only provides an alternative ground for 

denying the spouses’ request for additional attorney fees under section 2030. Although 

issued in separate documents, both the indemnity and attorney fees rulings appear to 

comprise a single order denying the requested fees on alternative grounds. Among other 

things, the indemnity ruling, which was entered on February 13, 2020, expressly 

incorporates by reference the attorney fees ruling, which was entered on February 10, 

2020. Further, although the indemnity ruling was entered on February 13, 2020, Daniel’s 

notice of appeal only states he is appealing the order entered on February 10, 2020. This 

provides further support for our conclusion that the two rulings comprise a single order.7 

Finally, even if we found error in the indemnity ruling, it would have no effect on the 

outcome of this appeal. The court’s denial of attorney fees would still stand based on our 

analysis of the attorney fees ruling.

Since we find no error in the attorney fees ruling, we need not address the 

propriety of the indemnity ruling. Should the trial court issue any other orders on the 

indemnity issue outside the context of this attorney fees dispute, our opinion does not 

preclude any party from appealing them.

7

To the extent the indemnity and attorney fees ruling are separate orders, we arguably 

lack jurisdiction to review the indemnity ruling since it was not identified in Daniel’s 

notice of appeal. (See DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43 [“‘[W]here 

several judgments and/or orders occurring close in time are separately appealable . . ., 

each appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified—in either a single 

notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal—in order to be reviewable on appeal’”].)
23

III

DISPOSITION

The court’s postjudgment order denying Daniel attorney fees is affirmed. 

Claimants are entitled to their costs on appeal.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

ZELON, J.*

*Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.