```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 45 (Thursday, March 7, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 14669-14673]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-05146]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 16

[CPCLO Order No. 002-2013]

Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation

AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of 
Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is issuing a final rule for the 
recently modified system of records titled ``Investigative Reporting 
and Filing System'' (IRFS), JUSTICE/DEA-008. This system, which has 
already been exempted from particular subsections of the Privacy Act of 
1974, is now being exempted further. Information in this system relates 
to law enforcement and intelligence matters, and for the reasons set 
forth in the rule these exemptions are necessary to avoid interference 
with the law enforcement, counterterrorism, and national security 
functions and responsibilities of the DEA.

DATES: Effective March 7, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: DEA Headquarters, Attn: Bettie E. 
Goldman, Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel (CV), 8701 Morrissette Drive, 
Springfield, VA 22152, telephone 202-307-8040.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    On April 11, 2012, the Department published an updated Privacy Act

[[Page 14670]]

system of records notice (SORN) for IRFS at 77 FR 21808, a DEA system 
of records notice originally published on August 8, 1975, at 40 FR 
38712. In conjunction with the IRFS SORN update, on April 18, 2012, the 
Department published a proposed rule at 77 FR 23173 to amend 28 CFR 
16.98, which had established exemptions of IRFS from various Privacy 
Act provisions, as expressly authorized by Privacy Act subsections (j) 
and (k). The proposed rule did not significantly change the previously 
established exemptions of IRFS from Privacy Act subsections (c)(3) and 
(4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and 
(g). However, the proposed rule did add new exemptions of IRFS from 
Privacy Act subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I); (f); and (h) and made 
general editorial revisions to the reasons for the existing IRFS 
exemptions. The public was provided with thirty (30) days in which to 
comment on the updated SORN and the proposed rule.

Public Comments

    The only comments the Department received with regard to the 
proposed rule were from the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC).\1\ The Department has carefully considered these comments but 
has declined to adopt them in the final rule. The Department has, 
however, added additional information in paragraphs 16.98(j)(9) and 
(11) of the final rule to provide greater clarity and help enhance 
public understanding of the reasons for these exemptions. A summary of 
EPIC's comments and the Department's responses are set forth below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ DOJ did not receive any comments directed at the updated 
IRFS SORN during the SORN comment period. EPIC's comments on the 
proposed rule did characterize the IRFS SORN as containing ``a 
staggering twenty-seven routine uses'' that EPIC perceived as 
presaging the disclosure of ``troves of personally identifiable 
information to a seemingly endless list of recipients.'' To the 
extent that this might be deemed a general comment on the number and 
substance of the IRFS routine uses, the Department considers that 
these routine uses support disclosures that in appropriate 
circumstances are functionally equivalent to the purpose for which 
the information was collected or necessary and proper to the lawful 
furtherance of DEA's authorized mission functions. The Department 
also notes that many of these routine uses were in place before the 
most recent update to the SORN.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPIC specifically noted five issues that it stated were raised by 
the proposed rule that EPIC considered to be substantial. In EPIC's 
opinion: (1) The proposed exemptions contravene the intent of the 
Privacy Act; (2) the DEA does not clearly articulate its legal 
authority to claim certain exemptions; (3) the DEA is required to 
collect only relevant and necessary information, and therefore, it 
should limit its information collection; (4) individuals within the 
IRFS system of records should have access to their information after 
criminal investigations are complete; and (5) individuals within the 
system should have a right to correct their information. Each of these 
contentions is separately discussed below.

(1) The Proposed Exemptions Do Not Contravene the Intent of the Privacy 
Act

    EPIC noted that IRFS may contain records about not only convicted 
drug offenders but also presumptively innocent individuals, such as 
those simply suspected of or alleged to have committed drug offenses. 
EPIC asserted that the ``broad exemptions'' established for IRFS would 
allow DEA employees to use sensitive information with little 
accountability and would contravene the intent of the Privacy Act.
    The Privacy Act itself, specifically 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k), 
authorizes DOJ to apply exemptions to IRFS. 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) states, 
``the head of any agency may promulgate rules * * * to exempt any 
system of records within the agency from any part of [the Privacy Act] 
except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), 
(7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i).'' Similarly, Privacy Act subsection 
(k) expressly authorizes ``[t]he head of any agency * * * [to] 
promulgate rules * * * to exempt any system of records within the 
agency from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) 
and (f) of [the Privacy Act].'' Thus, DOJ's application of exemptions 
to IRFS is fully within the intent of the Privacy Act as it falls 
squarely within the statutory terms of the Act.
    Further, applying exemptions to IRFS does not equate to DEA 
employees using IRFS ``with little accountability.'' The DEA and its 
employees still must comply with important agency requirements in the 
Privacy Act that are not subject to exemption. For example, 5 U.S.C. 
552a(j) lists the provisions of the Privacy Act from which the statute 
permits no exemption. In addition, as the proposed rule stated, 
exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is 
subject to the exemption.
    The need for these exemptions exists even if a record subject may 
only be suspected of or alleged to have committed an offense, or may 
even be clearly innocent (such as victims or witnesses), because the 
reasons for these exemptions are present even if the individual may not 
be culpable. For example, disclosures to non-suspect individuals may 
present risks that the individual may either intentionally or 
accidently reveal the information to the suspect or to others involved 
in criminal activities or for whom disclosure would otherwise be 
inappropriate; may reveal sensitive investigative or intelligence 
techniques; may reveal classified information; may invade the privacy 
of third parties; or may otherwise prejudice investigative and 
adjudicative processes.
    In addition, although the Department has exempted IRFS from 
subsection (e)(4)(1), the Department continues to describe the record 
source categories in order to provide greater public transparency. 
Withholding additional details is necessary to protect the sources of 
law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy 
and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide 
information to the DEA; and further, greater specificity of properly 
classified records could compromise national security. (The Department 
has added a discussion of this point in Sec.  16.98(j)(9) of the final 
rule.) Finally, the Department again notes that most of these 
exemptions were in place prior to the notice of proposed rulemaking.

(2) DOJ Has Clear Legal Authority To Establish These Exemptions

    EPIC commented on DOJ's statutory authority to apply exemptions to 
IRFS, especially under subsection (k)(2), and questioned whether DOJ's 
application of exemptions is procedurally and substantively sound. As 
discussed above, the Privacy Act provides clear statutory authority for 
the exemptions DOJ is applying to IRFS,\2\ the rule expressly provides 
that the exemptions will apply only to the extent that the IRFS 
information is subject to exemption, and the exemptions are justified 
for the reasons set forth in Sec.  16.98(j) of the rule. Further, DOJ 
has complied with procedural requirements to promulgate this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department fully appreciates that exemption under (k)(2) 
generally does not permit an agency to deny an individual access to a 
record where the agency's maintenance of the record has resulted in the 
individual 'being denied a right, privilege, or benefit to which he or 
she would otherwise be entitled by Federal law, or for which he or she 
would otherwise be eligible. Subsection (k)(2) exemptions apply to 
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes that is 
not otherwise subject to exemption under subsection (j)(2). The DEA is 
establishing (k)(2) exemptions in order to protect investigatory

[[Page 14671]]

information that may not be subject to exemption under subsection 
(j)(2), as well as in circumstances where there is no issue relating to 
a denial of a right, privilege, or benefit.
    EPIC further objected to the provision in paragraph 16.98(i) of the 
rule that DEA may waive an applicable exemption in DEA's sole 
discretion. EPIC asserted that ``it is not within the agency's sole 
discretion to waive an exemption if the exemption does not apply.'' As 
previously noted, the exemptions to IRFS only apply to the extent that 
information in this system is subject to exemption. If a record in IRFS 
is not subject to exemption under Privacy Act subsections (j)(2), 
(k)(1), or (k)(2), then the record will be subject to all pertinent 
Privacy Act provisions. It is only where a record is subject to an 
exemption that DEA would have the administrative discretion to waive an 
exemption in whole or in part.

(3) The Scope of IRFS's Information Collection Is Necessary and 
Specifically Authorized by the Privacy Act

    EPIC's comments stated that the Privacy Act's ``relevant and 
necessary'' requirements were ``designed to assure observance of basic 
principles of privacy and due process'' and preclude arbitrary agency 
action. EPIC expressed the concern that government databases might 
become dossiers and be pressed into unintended uses (``mission 
creep''). EPIC suggested that, ``[a]s investigations proceed to a 
close, information can be added or removed from the system as it 
becomes more or less relevant and necessary.''
    Both subsection (e)(1) and subsection (e)(5) are subject to 
exemption under subsection (j)(2), and subsection (e)(1) is also 
subject to exemption under subsection (k). As discussed in detail 
above, IRFS exemptions such as these are fully consistent with the 
language and intent of the Privacy Act, will apply only to the extent 
that the IRFS information is subject to exemption, and are justified 
for the reasons set forth in paragraph 16.98(j) of the rule. It is not 
always possible to know in advance what information will turn out to be 
relevant or necessary, nor to know in advance whether information is 
accurate, timely, or complete. The process of conducting a law 
enforcement investigation involves the movement, in time, toward 
collection of relevant, necessary, accurate, timely, and complete 
information; however, it would be administratively impracticable for 
DEA to persistently add and remove information. The Privacy Act's 
exemption provisions strike the appropriate balance in anticipating and 
accommodating the law enforcement investigative process and 
administrative practicalities. This rule simply applies the law's 
provisions to help ensure the most effective and efficient 
accomplishment of DEA's statutory mission.

(4) Exempting IRFS From Subsections (c)(3) and (e)(8) (and Similar 
Privacy Act Provisions) Is Necessary and Specifically Authorized by the 
Privacy Act

    EPIC's comments stated that DOJ should limit the extent of the 
(c)(3) and (e)(8) exemptions: ``While EPIC recognizes the need to 
withhold notice during the period of the investigation, entities should 
be able to know, after an investigation is completed or made public, 
the information stored about them in the system.''
    The Privacy Act authorizes DOJ to exempt IRFS from subsections 
(c)(3) and (e)(8) under subsection (j)(2), and subsection (c)(3) is 
also subject to exemption under subsection (k). As discussed in detail 
above, these exemptions will apply only to the extent that the IRFS 
information is subject to exemption, and they are justified for the 
reasons set forth in paragraph 16.98(j) of the rule (e.g., because 
access to accounting of disclosures under subsection (c)(3) could 
impede or compromise an ongoing investigation, interfere with a law 
enforcement activity, lead to the disclosure of properly classified 
information which could compromise the national defense or disrupt 
foreign policy, invade the privacy of a person who provides information 
in connection with a particular investigation, or result in danger to 
an individual's safety, including the safety of a law enforcement 
officer). Notice under subsection (e)(8) could impede criminal law 
enforcement by giving persons sufficient warning to evade investigative 
efforts, revealing investigative techniques, procedures, evidence, or 
interest, and interfering with the ability to issue warrants or 
subpoenas. In regard to subsection (e)(8), the Department would 
additionally note that investigations may still be ongoing even when 
related compulsory process becomes a matter of public record, and thus 
disclosures about related compulsory process may also have the same 
potentially adverse consequences explained in the proposed rule. 
Further, a necessity for DEA to monitor all instances of compulsory 
process involving IRFS records, to individually assess when each 
instance becomes a matter of public record, and to then provide notices 
to affected individuals would pose an impossible administrative burden 
on the maintenance of these records and the conduct of the underlying 
investigations. (The Department has added a discussion of this burden 
in Sec.  16.98(j)(11) of the final rule.)
    In addition, pursuant to subsection (t)(2) of the Privacy Act, the 
Department cannot use Privacy Act exemptions established for IRFS as 
grounds to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise 
accessible to such individual under the FOIA. To the extent that 
appropriately redacted IRFS records of completed investigations would 
not undermine law enforcement interests or invade the privacy of 
others, the individual may be able to obtain access to such records 
under the FOIA.

(5) Exempting IRFS From Subsections (d)(2), (3), and (4) and (g) Is 
Necessary and Specifically Authorized by the Privacy Act

    EPIC objected to the Department's proposed exemption of IRFS from 
Privacy Act subsections (d)(2), (3), and (4) (which provide a process 
for individuals to seek and obtain correction of agency records about 
them), and from subsection (g) (which provides for judicial review of 
agency compliance with the Privacy Act). EPIC commented that 
individuals should be able to correct records about them because, 
``[i]ndividuals erroneously listed in the IRFS system of records can be 
subject to investigations by federal and local law enforcement 
agencies.'' EPIC also asserted that in proposing these exemptions the 
Department gave no consideration to the burdens placed on individuals 
from government agency misinformation. EPIC's comments also objected to 
exempting IRFS from subsection (g) because ``individuals will have no 
judicially enforceable rights of access to their records or correction 
of erroneous information in such records.''
    Just as for the other exemptions that the Department proposed, 
Privacy Act subsections (d)(2), (3), and (4) and (g) are all subject to 
exemption under subsection (j)(2), and subsections (d)(2), (3), and (4) 
are also subject to exemption under subsection (k). IRFS exemptions 
such as these are thus fully consistent with the language and intent of 
the Privacy Act, will apply only to the extent that the IRFS 
information is subject to exemption, and are justified for the reasons 
set forth in Sec.  16.98(j) of the rule. Further, contrary to EPIC's 
contention, in proposing these exemptions the Department did carefully 
consider the interests of the affected individuals. This consideration 
is reflected in the express notation in

[[Page 14672]]

the proposed rule that, notwithstanding that the system may be exempted 
from a particular Privacy Act provision, where compliance with the 
provision would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the 
law enforcement or counterterrorism purposes of this system, or the 
overall law enforcement process, the DEA in its discretion may waive 
the exemption. The Department remains convinced that the proposed rule 
strikes the appropriate balance between the potential burdens the 
exemptions may place on individuals and the potential burdens the 
absence of exemptions may place on authorized law enforcement 
processes.
    In sum, DOJ is adding a few new exemptions and making a few general 
revisions to its longstanding and existing IRFS exemptions, as 
permitted by the Privacy Act. The Department has carefully considered 
EPIC's comments, but declines to adopt them in the final rule.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16

    Administrative practice and procedure, Courts, Freedom of 
information, Privacy, Sunshine Act.

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 
U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order 2940-2008, 28 
CFR part 16 is amended as follows:

PART 16--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 16 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 
4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.

Subpart E--Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act

0
2. Amend Sec.  16.98 by revising the section heading, paragraph (c), 
and paragraph (d) introductory text, and adding paragraphs (i) and (j) 
to read as follows:

Sec.  16.98  Exemption of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
Systems--limited access.

* * * * *
    (c) Systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) 
of this section are exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
552a (j)(2) from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); 
(e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. In addition, 
systems of records identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (5) of this 
section are also exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
552a(k)(1) from subsections (c)(3); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); and 
(e)(1):
    (1) Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA-001).
    (2) Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA-002).
    (3) Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA-010).
    (4) Operation Files (Justice/DEA-011).
    (5) Security Files (Justice/DEA-013).
    (6) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/
Ballistics) (Justice/DEA-014).
    (d) Exemptions apply to the following systems of records only to 
the extent that information in the systems is subject to exemption 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2): Air Intelligence 
Program (Justice/DEA-001); Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) 
(Justice/DEA-002); Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/
DEA-010); and Security Files (Justice/DEA-013). Exemptions apply to the 
Operations Files (Justice/DEA-011) only to the extent that information 
in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) 
and (k)(2). Exemptions apply to the System to Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA-014) only to the extent 
that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Exemption from the particular subsections is 
justified for the following reasons:
* * * * *
    (i) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a 
(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), 
(H), (I), (5), and (8); (f); (g); and (h): Investigative Reporting and 
Filing System (IRFS) (JUSTICE/DEA-008). These exemptions apply only to 
the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), or (k)(2). Where compliance 
would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law 
enforcement or counterterrorism purposes of this system, or the overall 
law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the 
DEA in its sole discretion.
    (j) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for 
the following reasons:
    (1) From subsection (c)(3) because to provide a record subject with 
an accounting of disclosure of records in this system could impede or 
compromise an ongoing investigation, interfere with a law enforcement 
activity, lead to the disclosure of properly classified information 
which could compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy, 
invade the privacy of a person who provides information in connection 
with a particular investigation, or result in danger to an individual's 
safety, including the safety of a law enforcement officer.
    (2) From subsection (c)(4) because this subsection is inapplicable 
to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsections 
(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4).
    (3) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the 
system could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of 
that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and 
evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of confidential 
witnesses and informants, or of the investigative interest of the DEA; 
lead to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, 
fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal the 
details of a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique, or the 
identity of a confidential source; or otherwise impede, compromise, or 
interfere with investigative efforts and other related law enforcement 
and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure could invade 
the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life, health, and 
physical safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, 
witnesses, and potential crime victims. Access to records could also 
result in the release of information properly classified pursuant to 
Executive order, thereby compromising the national defense or foreign 
policy.
    (4) From subsection (d)(2) because amendment of the records thought 
to be incorrect, irrelevant, or untimely would also interfere with 
ongoing investigations, criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings, 
and other law enforcement activities; would impose an impossible 
administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and 
reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised; and may impact 
information properly classified pursuant to Executive order.
    (5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are 
inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
    (6) From subsection (e)(1) because, in the course of its 
acquisition, collation, and analysis of information under the statutory 
authority granted to it, an agency may occasionally obtain information, 
including information properly classified pursuant to Executive order, 
that concerns actual or potential violations of law that are not 
strictly within its statutory or other authority, or may compile 
information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant 
to a specific

[[Page 14673]]

prosecution. It is impossible to determine in advance what information 
collected during an investigation will be important or crucial to the 
investigation and the apprehension of fugitives. In the interests of 
effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information 
in this system of records because it can aid in establishing patterns 
of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and 
other law enforcement agencies. This consideration applies equally to 
information acquired from, or collated or analyzed for, both law 
enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. foreign intelligence 
community and military community.
    (7) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation, 
prosecution, or proceeding, the requirement that information be 
collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject 
individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement 
because the subject of the investigation, prosecution, or proceeding 
would be placed on notice as to the existence and nature of the 
investigation, prosecution, and proceeding and would therefore be able 
to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, 
to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony. Moreover, thorough and 
effective investigation and prosecution may require seeking information 
from a number of different sources.
    (8) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals 
supplying information be provided a form stating the requirements of 
subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to criminal law 
enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential 
investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential 
informants and endanger their lives, health, and physical safety. The 
individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative 
techniques and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation 
or flee a specific area.
    (9) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is 
exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to 
subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act, and from subsection 
(e)(4)(I) to preclude any claims that the Department must provide more 
detail regarding the record sources for this system than the Department 
publishes in the system of records notice for this system. Exemption 
from providing any additional details about sources is necessary to 
preserve the security of sensitive law enforcement and intelligence 
information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and 
informants and others who provide information to the DEA; and further, 
greater specificity of properly classified records could compromise 
national security.
    (10) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and 
analysis of information for criminal law enforcement purposes from 
various agencies does not permit a determination in advance or a 
prediction of what information will be matched with other information 
and thus whether it is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With 
the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may 
acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to 
light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined 
in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would 
restrict the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, 
and government attorneys to exercise their judgment in collating and 
analyzing information and would impede the development of criminal or 
other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.
    (11) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice 
requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to 
criminal law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, 
procedures, evidence, or interest, and by interfering with the ability 
to issue warrants or subpoenas; could give persons sufficient warning 
to evade investigative efforts; and would pose an impossible 
administrative burden on the maintenance of these records and the 
conduct of the underlying investigations.
    (12) From subsections (f) and (g) because these subsections are 
inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other 
specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
    (13) From subsection (h) when application of this provision could 
impede or compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, interfere with 
a law enforcement activity, reveal an investigatory technique or 
confidential source, invade the privacy of a person who provides 
information for an investigation, or endanger law enforcement 
personnel.

    Dated: February 28, 2013.
Joo Y. Chung,
Acting Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, United States 
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2013-05146 Filed 3-6-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
```