Opinion filed March 7 , 2024



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ N o. 11

- 22

- 00354 -CR

__________ JOE STARKS, JR. , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Taylor County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2- 462

- 21

O P I N I O N
T he legislature recently codified the offense of mail theft into Section 31.20
of the Penal Code , which addresses the rising rates of “porch piracy,” 1 the scourge

1 See Porch Pirate , O XFORD E NGLISH D ICTIONARY , https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?q=p orchpirate ( last visited March 6, 2024) (“A person who steals parcels that have been delivered and left unattended outside the intended recipient’s home, business, etc.”); see also Drew McKay, The Porch Pirate Problem , 59 H OUSTON L. R EV . 455 (2021) (discussing the enactment of Section 31.20).2 of e

- commerce vendors and patrons everywhere

. 2 See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 31.20 (West Supp. 2023 ). Appellant, Joe Starks, Jr., 3 was charged by information
for the offense of mail theft by appropriating “ mail ” from fewer than ten addresses , a Class A misdemeanor

. Id. § 31.20(c)(1)

. Appellant waived hi s right to a jury trial
and pleaded not guilty to the charged offense

. A fter a bench trial, the trial co urt convicted Appellant of the offense and sentenced him to confinement for 3 65 days in the Taylor County Detention Center

. In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to establish that
he stole another person’s mail or packages as delivered by a common carrier o r delivery service

. He contends that the language and intent of Section 31.20 does not
criminalize the theft of mail or other packages that are delivered by the United States
Postal Service (USPS) , which he alleges is not a common carrier or delivery service
under the statute . We affirm.
I. Factual Background Ricky Holguin, a USPS mail carrier , delivered a package and two envelopes

to the home of Latisha Martinez. In doing so, Holguin plac ed the se items on the step of Martinez’s residence and rang the door bell

. Shortly thereafter , Holguin observ ed Appellant take those same envelopes and the packag e from the front porch of
Martinez’s residence and take them into his residence

. Holguin could see Appellant through the glass screen door of Appellant’s residence , and he saw Appellant begin

open ing the items

. Holguin then called 9

- 1

- 1

.

2 Section 31.20 became effective on September 1, 2019.

3 In a separate appeal, we recently affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the second

degree felony offense of possession of methamphetamine. See Starks v. State , No. 11

- 22

- 00236

- CR, 2024 WL 479370 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Feb. 8, 2024, no pet. h.).3 Officer Jay Shafer Young of the Abilene Police Department w as dispatched to Appellant’s residenc e to investigate this incident . When s he arrived, the front door to Appellant’s residence was open and Officer Young was able to s ee the stolen packages inside Appellant’s residence through the glass screen door

. Martinez testified that she did not give Appellant permission to take her delivered envelopes
and packages, and she authenticated security footage that showed Appellant taking
the m from her front porch

. Appellant testified and denied that he committed the offens e, that he was the person shown on the security footage, and that he was the person who was arrested
for th is offense. In that regard, Appellant further testified that he did not remember the day that the theft was alleged to have occurred and that neithe r the security footage nor the testimony presented at trial refreshed his recollection.
II. Standard s of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State , 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State , 330 S .W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. As such, we defer to the4 factfinder ’ s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. Winfrey , 393 S.W.3d at 768 ; Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899 ; Clayton , 235
S.W.3d at 778

. This deference accounts for the factfinder ’ s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319 ; Garia , 667 S.W.3d at 762; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778 . We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility
of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

. Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326 ; Garcia , 667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525

– 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778

. Because the standard of review is the same , we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638 ; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778 ; Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; Ruiz v. State , 631 S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d)

. It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant ’ s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State , 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13 ). A guilty verdict does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a def endant ’ s guilt. Hooper , 214
S.W.3d at 13

. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v.5 State , 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2017) ; Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

. When, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of a statute, we review the statutory

- construction question de novo. Delarosa v. State , 677 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When we construe a statute, we must “seek to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We
first examine the literal text of the statute. McMillian v. State , 388 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet. ). “[W]e read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Harris v. State , 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Lopez v. State , 253 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). “ We must ‘ presum e that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible. ’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Only if the statutory language is ambiguous, or leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly intended, may we consult extra

- textual sources.” Id. (citing Boykin , 818 S.W.2d at 785). Further, “ [i] f the language of the statute is plain, we follow that la nguage unless it leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.”
Sims v. State , 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)

. A statute is ambiguous in those situations where reasonable, well

- informed persons might understan d the statute to have two or more different meanings. Cortez v. State , 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
III. Analysis Appellant contends that (1) Section 31.20 only criminalizes the theft of mail
and other items that are delivered by a common carrier or delivery service , and6 (2) the USPS is not a common carrier or delivery service within the meaning of the

statute

. He asserts , therefore , that the theft of “mail” as defined in the statute
excludes any theft of “ mail ” that the USPS deliver s

. The State responds that the USPS is a delivery service

. It also points out that,
under federal law, a mailbox may only contain United States mail on which postage has been paid

. As such, because the statute criminalizes theft of mail “from anot her person’s mailbox,” it necessarily criminalizes the theft of U nited S tates mail. See
18 U.S.C. A. § 1725

. Under Section 31.20, “[ a ] person commits an offense if the person intentionally appropriates mail from another person’s mailbox or premises without the effective consent of the addressee and with the intent to deprive that addressee
of the mail.” P ENAL § 31.20(b) (emphasis added) . “Mail” is defined as “ a letter , postal card, package , bag, or other sealed article that: (A) is delivered by a common carrier or delivery service and not yet received by the addressee; or (B) has been left to be collected for delivery by a common carrie r or delivery service.” Id. § 31.20(a)(3) (emphasis added)

. Here, the information charged Appellant with intentionally appropriating packages and envelope bags from Martinez’s premises
without her consent.
A. The Meaning of Section 31.20
We first construe the statute based on the plain meaning of the words used.
Section 31.20 does not define the term “delivery service.” Therefore, w e must “turn to the common, ordinary meaning of that [term]

. ” Hines v. State , 535 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. Ap p.

— Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Williams v. State , 270 S.W.3d
140 , 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (consulting dictionary definitions for the term “conceal” in the absence of a statutory definition) )

.7 Merriam

- Webster defines “delivery” as “ the act or manner of delivering something

. ” Delivery , M ERRIAM

- W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) . It defines “deliver” as “to take and hand over to or leave for another .”
Deliver , M ERRIAM

- W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONA RY (11th ed. 2003) . The term “service” is defined in many ways

— “ the work performed by one that serves,” “useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity,” such as professional services, or “ a facility suppl ing some public demand .” Service , M ERRIAM

W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) . This last example best
describe s the United States Postal Service

— t he “facility supplying some public
demand

. ” The term “service” is also included in its title . Moreover, the public demand being s upplied by the USPS is the delivery of mail and other items

. See 39 U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(1) ( P roviding that the USPS is empowered to “provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery , forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.”).
We also note that r estrictions exist for the use of mail boxes. Section 31.20(b)
makes it an offense for a person to appropriate “ mail ” from another person’s
mailbox. Additionally, f ederal law provides that only mailable matter

— U nited
S tates mail

— may be placed in a mailbox : Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits any mailable matter such as statements of accounts, circulars, sale bills, or other like matter, on which no postage has been paid, in any letter box established, approved, or accepted by the Postal Service for the receipt or delivery of mail matter on any mail route with intent to avoid payment of lawful postage thereon, shall for each such offense be fined under this title

. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1725. The USPS Domestic Mail Manual, which is posted on its
website , provides further guidance that reaffirms the exclusivity of
mailboxes and U nited S tates mail : “ [E] very letterbox or other receptacle
intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail . . . is designated an8 authorized depository for mail within the meaning of 18 U.S.C

. . . . 1725 ,” and
“t he receptacles . . . may be used only for matter bearing postage.” U NITED S TATES P OSTAL S ERV ., M AILING S TANDARDS , D OMESTIC M AIL M ANUAL 508.3.1. 1 , 508.3.1.3 ( 2024 ), https://pe.usps.com/cpim/ftp/manuals/dmm300/full/mailingStand ards.pdf ( last visited March 6, 2024)

. Considering the foregoing principles and our construction of the text and
intent of Section 31.20 , we conclude that (1) the USPS is a “ delivery service ” under Section 31.20, (2) the term “ mail ” as it is defined and used in Section 31.20

encompass es mail an d other items that are delivered to an addressee by the USPS , and ( 3) Section 31.20 criminalizes the intentional appropriation of mail and other
items delivered by the USPS and which are confiscated by a person from a nother person’s premises or mailbox

— mailboxes that contain letters , cards, packages , bags, or other sealed articles that bear postage, that is, U nited S tates mail. Appellant attempts to focus on the definition of “ common carrier ” as it is used in the statute, and its distinction from the USPS. But Appellant does not explain why the USPS is not a delivery service ; he simply asserts that it is not

. Irrespective of this argument , Appellant mis interprets the intent of Section 31.20. As we have explained, nothin g in the text of Section 31.20 reasonably excludes the USPS from its scope

— it is undoubtedly a delivery service within the common, ordinary meaning of that phrase.
We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia , 667 S.W.3d at 761; Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638. Because Section 31.20
criminalizes the theft of U nited S tates mail as it is defined in Section 31.20 and because Appellant does not dispute on appeal that he stole U nited S tates mail in this9 instance from Martinez’s premises , we conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant committed mail theft under Section 31.20 as charged in the information . A ccordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

March 7 , 20 2 4
P ublish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter , J., and Williams, J.