alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

Penske Motorsports, Inc. 10-Q 


Penske Motorsports, Inc.
Detroit, Michigan

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial
information of Penske Motorsports, Inc. for the periods ended March 31, 1998 and
1997, as indicated in our report dated April 30, 1998; because we did not
perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1998, is
incorporated by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-692 on Form S-8.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.


/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
May 14, 1998
Detroit, Michigan
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      In connection with the Quarterly Report of FFD Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Robert R. Gerber, the Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/Robert R. Gerber
-----------------------------
Robert R. Gerber
Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
November 14, 2006
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Antonio Deshawn THOMAS Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4524

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 6, 2018

Filed: February 14, 2018

*368William Reiser Ripley, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Antonio Deshawn Thomas, Pro Se

Before BENTON, MURPHY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Antonio Thomas directly appeals the within-Guidelines-range sentence the district court1 imposed after he pled guilty to drug and firearm offenses. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that an error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(B) occurred during the ehange-of-plea hearing, and that Thomas’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Upon careful review, we conclude that no plain error occurred, see United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (plain-error standard applies where Rule 11 omission was not preserved by timely objection; defendant must show that, but for such omission, he would not have entered plea); and that Thomas’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable, see United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing sentence under deferential abuse-of-discretion standard; discussing substantive reasonableness); see also United States v. Callaway, 762 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2014) (on appeal, within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumed reasonable). In addition, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm.

1

. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
**Exhibit 32.1****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the Quarterly Report of LoralSpace & Communications Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q forthe period ending March 31, 2006 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Michael B. Targoff, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuantto § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of    section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934; and           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and    results of operations of the Company.     /s/ Michael B. Targoff           Michael B. Targoff *Chief Executive Officer*May 8, 2006
#### IN RE: Henry Paul RICHARDSON, a/k/a Packer, Petitioner.

No. 17-2221

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: January 30, 2018

Decided: February 1, 2018

Henry Paul Richardson, Petitioner Pro Se. '

Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Henry Paul Richardson petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry James RADY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-15297

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued October 5, 2017

Submitted November 29, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed December 15, 2017

Gary M. Restaino, Frederick A. Battista, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Keith J. Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ-Federal Public Defenders Office (Phoenix), Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: MOTZ,* M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

The Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Larry James Rady appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Reviewing the district court’s order *de novo, see United States v. Manzo,*675 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012), we reverse.

After Rady pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and armed career criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district court sentenced Rady to the ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum term of imprisonment because it concluded that Rady previously had been convicted of at least three violent felonies. In light of our opinion in *United States v. Jones,*No. 17-15869, Rady’s convictions for armed robbery under Arizona law no longer qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.

The fact that Rady was convicted of armed robbery under an earlier version of Arizona’s robbery statutes1 does not compel a different result. As we noted in *United States v. Molinar,*Arizona courts have continued to rely on case law interpreting earlier robbery statutes to determine the degree of force necessary to commit robbery under the current statutes. No. 15-10430, 876 F.3d 953, 957, 2017 WL 5760565, at *4 n.4 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2017). And in considering this case law ourselves, we have found it to indicate that the force that Arizona law requires is not sufficiently violent to satisfy the ACCA’s force clause. *Id.*876 F.3d at 957-58, 2017 WL 5760565, at *4. Accordingly, for purposes of deciding whether Arizona armed robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause, there is no material difference between the current version of Arizona’s robbery statutes and the version under which Rady was convicted.

*434. Without the armed robbery convictions, Rady does not have three violent felony convictions to trigger the ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum sentence. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Rady’s § 2255 motion and remand with instructions to proceed consistent with this disposition.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-641 (1956) and 13-643 (1973).
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III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 182

Relating to the appointment of Deputy Senate Legal Counsel.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 12 (legislative day, OCTOBER 10), 1995

Mr. DOLE (for himself and Mr. DASCHLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Relating to the appointment of Deputy Senate Legal

Counsel.

1 Resolved, That the appointment of Morgan J. Frankel

2 to be Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, made by the Presi3 dent pro tempore this day, shall become effective as of

4 October 24, 1995, and the term of service of the appointee

5 shall expire at the end of the One Hundred Fifth Con6 gress.

Æ
Exhibit 34.3

CURCIO

+COHEN

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

Managing Member

Park Bridge Lender Services LLC

New York, NY

We have examined managements assertion,
included in the accompanying Managements Report on Assessment of 2015 Compliance by Park Bridge Lender Services LLC with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria (Managements Report), that Park Bridge Lender Services LLC (the
Company) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions Regulation AB as of and for the year ended December 31, 2015, excluding those criteria noted as not
applicable (N/A) within Exhibit B to Managements Report. The transactions covered by this report are only those transactions processed by the Company in its capacity as trust advisor or operating advisor for the asset backed securities
transactions (the Platform) identified in Managements Report. Reference Exhibit A to Managements Report for the transactions covered by this examination. Management is responsible for the Companys compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on managements assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was
conducted in accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, including examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing
criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of a selected sample of the servicing activities related to the Platform, determining whether the Company performed those
selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria during the specified period. Our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this
report. Our examination was not designed to detect material noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests, that may have affected the Companys servicing activities during the period covered by
this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing criteria.

In our opinion, managements assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria identified in Exhibit B to
Managements Report with respect to the transactions identified in Exhibit A to Managements Report as of and for the year ended December 31, 2015, for the Platform, is fairly stated in all material aspects.



|                               
|-------------------------------
|/s/ Curcio & Cohen, CPAS, P.C.
|                               
|New York, NY                   
|February 15, 2016              

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS PC 7 PENN PLAZA, SUITE 1500 NEW YORK NY 10001

TEL: 212 557-9800 FAX: 212 557 9819    WEBSITE: WWW.CWCCPAFIRM.COM
EXHIBIT
32.2


Certification
Pursuant to




18
U.S.C. Section 1350




(as
Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of




the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002)




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of IDT Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended October 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Bill Pereira, Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:






1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
December 15, 2009





/s/    BILL PEREIRABill
      Pereira
              Chief
      Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to IDT Corporation and will be
retained by IDT Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Jorge Alberto ESPERANZA-MARENCO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 17-1437

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 31, 2017

Decided: November 16, 2017

Alfred L. Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Petitioner. Chad A. Readier, Act*290ing Assistant Attorney General, Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director, Joanna L. Watson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Alberto Esperanza-Marenco (“Marenco”), a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal.* We deny the petition for review.

We have reviewed the record, including the transcript of Marenco’s merits hearing, his application for relief from removal, and all supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any of the administrative findings of fact, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports the denial of relief in this case, *see INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), Nor do we discern any legal error in the agency’s rejection of the proposed social group advanced by Marenco in the agency proceedings. *See In re Acosta,*19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985) (discussing immutability require-. ment for establishing a protected “particular social group”), *overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi,*19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); *see also Lizama v. Holder,*629 F.3d 440, 446-47 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing deference afforded the Board’s immutability requirement for a proposed social group).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Esperanza-Marenco*(B.I.A. Mar. 7, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court- and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

 Marenco does not provide any argument related to the Board’s affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s rejection of his claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus, Marenco has waived appellate review of the disposition of his CAT claim. *See Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder,*714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013) (failing to raise a challenge to the Board’s ruling or finding in an opening brief waives the issue).
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6810 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

518 North Ridgewood Drive in Sebring, Florida, as the ‘‘U.S. Army 

Air Corps Major Thomas B. McGuire Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 14, 2023 

Mr. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida (for himself, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. POSEY, 

Mr. DONALDS, Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. WALTZ, Mr. RUTHERFORD, Mr. STEUBE, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of Florida, Ms. SALAZAR, Mr. 

BEAN of Florida, Mrs. CAMMACK, and Mrs. LUNA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 518 North Ridgewood Drive in Sebring, Florida, as the ‘‘U.S. Army Air Corps Major Thomas B. 

McGuire Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS MAJOR THOMAS B. 

4 MCGUIRE POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 518 North Ridgewood Drive in 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6810 IH

1 Sebring, Florida, shall be known and designated as the 

2 ‘‘U.S. Army Air Corps Major Thomas B. McGuire Post 

3 Office Building’’. 

4 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg5 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

6 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

7 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘U.S. Army Air Corps 

8 Major Thomas B. McGuire Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lenny CAIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7431

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: February 9, 2018

Decided: February 15, 2018

Lenny Lyle Cain; Appellant Pro Se. Clinton Jacob Fuchs, Assistant United States Attorney, Kenneth Sutherland Clark, Mushtaq Zakir Gunja, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lenny Cain appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 782. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. *See United States v. Cain,*No.. 1:12-cr-00019-ELH-6 (D. Md. filed Oct. 17, 2017; entered Oct. 18, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this *170court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-6881

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KATO HAINESWORTH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge. (CR-98-30, CA-00-409-3) Submitted: September 18, 2001 Decided: October 16, 2001 Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kato Hainesworth, Appellant Pro Se. S. David Schiller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Kato Hainesworth seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Hainesworth , Nos. CR-98- 30; CA-00-409-3 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED