COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

 VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

 DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 

 ex rel. ELEANOR KENITZER OPINION BY 

 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

v. Record No. 1252-95-4 SEPTEMBER 17, 1996 

 

NEIL C. RICHTER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jack B. Stevens, Judge 

 Nancy J. Crawford, Regional Special Counsel 

(Betsy S. Elliott, Senior Special Counsel; 

James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General; 

Siran S. Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellant. 

 Wayne Hartke (Hartke & Hartke, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 The Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) appeals the 

decision of the circuit court granting appellee's motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. DCSE contends the Virginia 

trial court lacked statutory authority to register the South 

Carolina court order staying implementation of a wage withholding 

petition; petitioner made a general, not special appearance 

seeking to effect registration; the Virginia trial court erred 

when it declined to exercise jurisdiction to enforce its divorce 

decree; and the Virginia trial court erred when it confirmed the 

registration without first resolving the substantive issues. 

 We conclude that the South Carolina family court order was 
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not an order which could be registered under the provisions of 

the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Code 

§§ 20-88.32 to -88.82. We also find that the trial court erred 

in ruling Virginia did not have jurisdiction. We remand this 

matter to the trial court for it to determine the question of 

support arrearages. 

Background

 In 1973, Eleanor Kenitzer was granted a decree of divorce a 

mensa et thoro by the Fairfax County Circuit Court from Neil 

Richter. The decree ratified and confirmed the parties' property 

settlement agreement, which had been executed in Virginia on July 

5, 1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Richter agreed to pay 

$100 per month to Kenitzer for support of the parties' minor son. 

 On July 20, 1973, Richter signed a notarized waiver of service, 

which provided in part that he waived "notice of any further 

proceedings held in this matter" and "[consented] to the validity 

of all proceedings held in this matter." 

 The circuit court entered a decree of divorce a vinculo 

matrimonii on August 5, 1974. Both parties had substantial 

contact with Virginia. Their son was born in Virginia, and they 

had lived in Virginia for the last three years of their marriage. 

 However, after the divorce, Kenitzer and Richter relocated to, 

respectively, California and South Carolina, and neither party 

currently resides in Virginia. 

 Through the California child support agency, in 1991 
 3 

Kenitzer filed a request to withhold wages in South Carolina to 

recover delinquent child support payments from Richter. By order 

entered January 9, 1992, a South Carolina family court ruled that 

it had jurisdiction over Richter and over the wage withholding 

request. Based upon evidence presented to the court, however, it 

granted Richter's petition to stay implementation of Kenitzer's 

request, noting "[t]here is a genuine question or dispute 

concerning the existence of the arrearage." No further action 

was taken on the South Carolina order. 

 Later in 1992, again through the California child support 

agency, Kenitzer sought to recover the alleged support arrearages 

by an action in Virginia. Mother registered the 1973 Virginia 

order in California on February 19, 1992. A Uniform Reciprocal 

Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition was received by DCSE 

in October 1992. In 1995, DCSE filed a motion to intervene and a 

motion for judgment and interest in Fairfax County Circuit Court. 

 Richter made a special appearance in the circuit court to 

register the 1992 South Carolina family court order staying 

Kenitzer's earlier wage withholding petition. The Virginia 

circuit court ruled that it was bound by the 1992 South Carolina 

order, including that court's finding that it had jurisdiction 

over Richter and the subject matter. The Virginia trial court 

granted Richter's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

DCSE appeals the trial court's order. 
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Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

 In 1994, Virginia repealed Code §§ 20-88.12 to -88.31, the 

Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, and 

enacted Code §§ 20-88.32 to -88.82, the Uniform Interstate Family 

Support Act. Both acts, as well as the original Uniform 

Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, were intended to provide 

"a means to establish and enforce child support obligations and 

spousal support obligations across state lines." John J. Sampson 

and Paul M. Kurtz, UIFSA: An Interstate Support Act for the 21st 

Century, 27 Family Law Quarterly 85, 86 (1993). However, "the 

most significant improvement offered by UIFSA [over provisions of 

URESA and RURESA] is the elimination of the multiple-order 

system." Id. at 88. 

 UIFSA adopts the concept of continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction to establish and 

modify the levels of child support due a 

particular child. Thus, once a court or 

administrative agency enters a support decree 

with jurisdiction, it is the only body 

entitled to modify it so long as it retains 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the 

Act. Another state, while required by UIFSA 

to enforce the existing decree, has no power 

under that Act to modify the original decree 

or enter a support order at a different 

level. 

Id. UIFSA also contains long-arm jurisdictional provisions that 

are "designed to allow the forum state to obtain as much such 

jurisdiction as is constitutionally possible." Id. at 89. 

Registration of the Order

 DCSE argues that the trial court erred in registering the 
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South Carolina stay of Kenitzer's petition to withhold wages. We 

agree. Code § 20-88.66 provides that "[a] support order or an 

income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of another state 

may be registered in this Commonwealth for enforcement." A 

"support order" is defined as 

 a judgment, decree, or order, whether 

temporary, final, or subject to modification, 

for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a 

former spouse, which provides for monetary 

support, health care, arrearages, or 

reimbursement, and may include related costs 

and fees, interest, income withholding, 

attorney's fees, and other relief. 

Code § 20-88.32. The South Carolina order did not provide for 

the payment of monetary support or arrearages. The order did not 

determine the merits of Kenitzer's claim or Richter's defense. 

Cf. Price v. Price, 17 Va. App. 105, 114-15, 435 S.E.2d 652, 

658-59 (1993). The order merely barred automatic withholding in 

light of Richter's possibly meritorious defense, and stayed 

further action without making a factual determination. While we 

agree with Richter that an order finding that no support or 

arrearage is due could be a "support order" registerable under 

UIFSA, the South Carolina order is not such an order. 

 Similarly, the South Carolina order was not an 

"income-withholding order." "Income-withholding order" is 

defined as "an order or other legal process directed to an 

obligor's employer or other debtor, to withhold amounts for child 

or spousal support from the obligor's earnings as defined in 

§ 63.1-250." Code § 20-88.32. The South Carolina order was not 
 6 

directed to Richter's employer, and did not direct the 

withholding of any funds. 

 Consequently, the South Carolina order was not within the 

scope of those orders which can be registered in Virginia under 

UIFSA. The trial court erred in registering the order. 

Effecting Registration by Special Appearance

 Richter contends that this issue was not raised in the trial 

court and that DCSE may not raise it for the first time on 

appeal. Rule 5A:18. The record supports Richter's contention. 

We do not address this issue. 

Jurisdiction of Virginia Court

 DCSE contends that the trial court erred by declining to 

exercise its continued jurisdiction to enforce its order. We 

agree. "[A] tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident individual" when, among other 

bases, the "individual resided with the child in this 

Commonwealth" or when the "exercise of personal jurisdiction is 

authorized under subdivision A8 of § 8.01-328.1." Code 

§ 20-88.35(3) and (6). In pertinent part, Code § 8.01-328.1 

extends personal jurisdiction to an individual who has "been 

ordered to pay spousal support or child support pursuant to an 

order entered by any court of competent jurisdiction in this 

Commonwealth having in personam jurisdiction over such person." 

Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(8)(ii).1 

 

 1 Under the circumstances of this case, we find that neither 

Code § 20-88.38 (addressing when Virginia courts may exercise 
 7 

 Moreover, this holding is consistent with the 

Virginia Supreme Court's decision 

in Sheffield v. Sheffield, 207 Va. 

288, 148 S.E.2d 771 (1966). There, 

the parties were divorced in 

Virginia and the husband was 

ordered to pay support. The 

husband moved to Illinois, where he 

was personally served with the 

wife's petition to enter judgment 

on support arrearages. The husband 

did not appear before the court in 

Virginia, although he wrote a 

letter to the court admitting the 

arrearage. The Supreme Court found 

that the Virginia court had 

jurisdiction over the husband, 

noting that 

 a proceeding to reduce alimony arrears to 

judgment is not a new and independent action 

but merely a step taken in the original 

matrimonial action; that having obtained 

jurisdiction of the defendant husband in the 

original proceeding such jurisdiction remains 

unimpaired. 

 

jurisdiction following the filing of a petition in another state) 

nor Code § 20-88.39 (addressing when Virginia courts may exercise 

continuing exclusive jurisdiction) either require or prohibit the 

Virginia courts from exercising their pre-existing jurisdiction. 
 8 

Id. at 291, 148 S.E.2d at 773. See also Shinn v. Kreul, 427 

S.E.2d 695, 698 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the Virginia circuit 

court had personal jurisdiction over Richter as part of its 

continuing jurisdiction to enforce its original support order. 

While Richter argued that the divorce decree was ex parte, the 

record demonstrates conclusively that the Virginia circuit court 

had personal jurisdiction over Richter at the time the divorce 

decree was entered. 

 Code § 20-88.39(A)(1) provides that the Commonwealth of 

Virginia "has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction . . . [a]s long 

as this Commonwealth remains the residence of the obligor, the 

individual obligee, or the child." The statute does not state, 

either by express terms or by implication, that Virginia loses 

all jurisdiction if none of the parties are residents of the 

Commonwealth. We hold that Virginia continues to have the right 

to enforce its own decrees even if all parties are no longer 

residents. The intent of the statute is simply to facilitate the 

enforcement of support decrees by making other states equally 

available to an obligee. When South Carolina declined to issue 

an income-withholding order and made no determination of 

arrearages, Kenitzer could invoke Virginia's jurisdiction for the 

purpose of enforcing its own decree. 

 In summary, we find that the trial court erred in concluding 

that the South Carolina family court order staying Kenitzer's 

wage-withholding petition was an order registerable under UIFSA. 
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 We also find that the trial court erred in ruling it did not 

have jurisdiction over this matter. We remand to the trial court 

to determine what arrearages, if any, exist. 

Reversed and remanded.