J-S03038-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DARIAN SMITH

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 523 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order January 16, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006271-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 28, 2019

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting 

the Motion to Suppress filed by Darian Smith (“Smith”). We affirm.

The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing reveals that at 

approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 8, 2017, Philadelphia Highway Patrol Officer 

Clifford Gilliam (“Officer Gilliam”) and his partner, Officer Antoine Small 

(“Officer Small”), were on routine patrol, in full uniform, in their marked police 

cruiser. See N.T., 1/16/18, at 5-9. Officer Gilliam had ten years of police 

experience at that time. Id. at 6. The officers were travelling southbound on 

32nd Street in North Philadelphia, and proceeded to turn onto Norris Street. 

Id. at 7, 22. Officer Gilliam stated that this particular area was well-known 

for being a high-crime area, including unlawful firearms possession and violent 

crimes. Id. at 7. The Officers were assigned to patrol this particular area due 

to two or three recent shootings. Id. at 7-8.
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While driving the police cruiser on Norris Street, which was illuminated 

with streetlights, Officer Gilliam observed Smith walking between two parked 

cars, from a distance of approximately one car-length away. Id. at 9-10. 

Officer Gilliam stated that

what brought my attention to [Smith], when he came around the 

car, he had both hands in the front of his pants, ... and appeared 

to be clutching a heavy object. Now, when I saw that ..., it was 

no doubt in my mind what he was clutching. It appeared to be a 

firearm. 

Id. at 10. Officer Gilliam testified that based upon his police experience, “the 

actions of [Smith] that night [were] consistent with someone ... trying to 

conceal a firearm[.]” Id. at 11. Notably, however, on cross-examination, 

Officer Gilliam clarified that he never saw the “heavy object” that he suspected 

Smith was clutching. Id. at 25. Officer Gilliam further agreed that he “didn’t 

see any type of angulation in [Smith’s] pants[,] such as an outline of a gun 

....” Id. Moreover, Smith did not run or flee in response to seeing the police. 

Id. at 26. But see also id. at 12 (wherein Officer Gilliam stated that he saw 

another man standing on the side of the street near Smith, and that “[Smith] 

was quickly approaching the male. Kind of trying to blade his body away from 

my position to get to the other male.”).
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Upon making the above observations, Officer Gilliam exited his vehicle,1

followed by Officer Small, to approach Smith. Id. at 13-14. Officer Gilliam 

immediately came up behind Smith, patted him down,2 and felt in Smith’s 

basketball shorts an item that the Officer immediately knew to be a firearm. 

Id. at 14, 16. Officer Gilliam then pushed Smith up against a parked car, 

placed him in handcuffs, and discovered in his shorts a loaded .45 caliber 

handgun. Id. at 17-18.

The suppression court also heard testimony from Officer Small. Officer 

Small, who had over twenty years of police experience at the time, testified 

that after he exited the police cruiser to follow Officer Gilliam, he saw Smith 

holding the handle of a black gun. Id. at 31-33, 37-38. Officer Small testified

that he then alerted Officer Gilliam to the presence of a gun by yelling out the 

word “Yo.” Id. at 33-34. However, on cross-examination, Officer Small 

admitted there was no mention, in any of the police reports filed in this case, 

that he had seen the handle of a gun on Smith’s person, and that the Officer’s 

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1 Officer Gilliam testified that it was only a few seconds between the time he 

first saw Smith and when the Officer exited his vehicle to encounter Smith. 

Id. at 24. 

2 There is no indication in the transcript that Officer Gilliam said anything to 

Smith prior to patting him down. 
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testimony at the suppression hearing was the first time that this had been

mentioned. Id. at 41-43.3

Following his arrest, the Commonwealth charged Smith with firearms 

not to be carried without a license and carrying a firearm on public streets in 

Philadelphia.4 On August 7, 2017, Smith filed a Motion to Suppress the firearm 

evidence. He asserted that the search of his person was unlawful and

unsupported by probable cause, or reasonable suspicion that he was armed 

and dangerous, and therefore, the firearm must be suppressed as fruit of the 

poisonous tree.

On January 16, 2018, after considering the foregoing testimony, the 

suppression court granted Smith’s Motion to Suppress. In response, the 

Commonwealth timely filed a Notice of appeal,

5

followed by a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal. The 

suppression court then issued a Rule 1925(a) Opinion in support of its ruling.

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3 As we explain below, the suppression court found Officer Small’s testimony 

to be incredible. 

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6108.

5 We note that in filing this interlocutory appeal, the Commonwealth complied 

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d), which provides that 

“[i]n a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the 

Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not 

end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal 

that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issue for our 

review: “Whether the [suppression] court erred by suppressing [Smith’s] 

firearm after police officers saw him clutch a heavy object in his shorts and 

‘blade’ his body away from the officers[,] late at night[,] in a high[-]crime 

neighborhood[?]” Brief for the Commonwealth at 7.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, 

we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only 

the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses[,] together with the 

evidence of the prosecution[,] that, when read in the context of 

the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression

court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record

supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of

law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law

to the facts. Our standard of review is restricted to establishing

whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual

findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the

suppression court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Petty, 157 A.3d 953, 955 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “it is the sole province 

of the suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.” 

Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

“It is well settled that an officer may pat-down an individual whose 

suspicious behavior he is investigating on the basis of a reasonable belief that 

the individual is presently armed and dangerous to the officer or others.” 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 605-06 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police may conduct an
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investigatory detention and frisk if they have reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot)). In order to prove reasonable suspicion, “the police

officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts[,] and reasonable

inferences drawn from those facts[,] in light of the officer’s

experience.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999). “The

determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality

was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an objective one, which

must be considered in light of the totality of the

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 893 (Pa. Super.

2012).

Further, the delicate balance between protecting the right 

of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, on 

the one hand, and protecting the safety of our citizens and police 

officers[,] by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens 

while investigating crime, on the other hand, requires additional 

considerations when the police have a reasonable suspicion that a 

person may be armed. 

 * * *

Thus, under Terry ...[,] a police officer may frisk an individual

during an investigatory detention when the officer believes, based

on specific and articulable facts, that the individual is armed and

dangerous. When assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s

decision to frisk a suspect during an investigatory detention, an

appellate court does not consider the officer’s unparticularized

suspicion or “hunch” but rather[,] the specific reasonable

inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of

his experience.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759, 771-72 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(internal citations, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted).
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The Commonwealth contends that Officer Gilliam had reasonable 

suspicion to perform a Terry stop and frisk due to the fact that he was 

patrolling a known high-crime area at night, and observed Smith with his 

hands in his waistband area, apparently clutching a heavy object in a manner 

that indicated to Officer Gilliam, an officer with a decade of law enforcement

experience, that Smith was armed. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 11-

19.

In its Opinion, the suppression court stated as follows in support of its 

ruling that the police lacked reasonable suspicion:

[T]he only specific, articulable fact that Officer Gilliam possessed 

was that [Smith] had his hands in front of him grabbing an object.

The police officer could not make out the form of the object, [and]

did not see a bulge, but just “knew” it was a gun. [Smith] did not 

attempt to flee, was not looking around furtively, nor was he the 

subject of a radio call or complaint. There was absolutely no 

interaction between the police officers and [Smith]. Officer Gilliam

was clear. He did not ask [Smith] to stop, did not inquire of 

[Smith] what was in his waist, or any other inquiry. The [O]fficer 

got out of his car, immediately went to [Smith] and grabbed him 

from behind, reaching around Smith in a bear hug to retrieve 

whatever was in [Smith’s] waist. The police further agreed with 

defense counsel that they were patrolling a particular area, based 

upon an unknown shooting, at an unknown time, at an unknown 

location, when they saw a group of guys[,] and the police made a 

decision to stop them. There was a complete lack of specific, 

articulable facts which would warrant a man of reasonable caution 

in the belief that criminality was afoot[,] and that the action of 

grabbing [Smith] from behind[,] with no other interaction, was 

the appropriate action to be taken. Accordingly, the court acted 

within its discretion in granting [Smith’s] [M]otion to suppress.

Suppression Court Opinion, 4/11/18, at 6 (paragraph break omitted). 

Moreover, the suppression court stated that it found Officer Small’s testimony 
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to be incredible. See id. at 3 (stating that “Officer Small’s testimony was not 

credible given the inconsistencies and his lack of recollection regarding the 

incident, along with the absence of any of these observations[, i.e., concerning 

his seeing the handle of a firearm in Smith’s waistband,] in any of the police 

reports.”).

Initially, to the extent that the suppression court discredited the 

testimony of Officer Small, we may not disturb this finding. See Caple,

supra. 

Further, we agree with the suppression court’s legal determination that 

Officer Gilliam failed to state sufficient articulable facts to reasonably suspect

that Smith was engaged in criminal activity necessary for an investigative 

detention. Our review discloses that the cases the Commonwealth cites to

support a contrary finding are all distinguishable. Officer Gilliam did not (1)

actually see Smith holding a firearm; (2) describe seeing any particular shape 

or characteristic that was consistent with a firearm; (3) see Smith flee or take 

evasive actions; and (4) the Officer only observed Smith for a matter of 

seconds before coming up behind him without a word, and stopping and 

frisking him. Cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 766, 774-75 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding that police officer had reasonable suspicion

to conduct a Terry frisk, where the defendant was standing on a street corner

in a high-crime area at night, had a weighted and angled bulge in his coat

pocket, was alerted to the officer’s presence and intentionally turned his body
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away several times to conceal the bulge in his coat pocket, and the officer

observed the defendant walking away from the known drug corner when the

officer repeatedly circled the area for ten minutes); Commonwealth v.

Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (finding “evasive

behavior” in walking away from police contributes to reasonable suspicion). 

Aside from seeing Smith with his hands in his waistband area, allegedly 

holding some unidentified heavy object, Officer Gilliam did not see any indicia 

of criminal activity. Cf. Commonwealth v. E.M., 735 A.2d 654, 657 (Pa. 

1999) (finding reasonable suspicion existed where the police, after observing 

plastic bags of what appeared to be marijuana bulging out of the jacket pocket 

of the friend with whom E.M. had been smoking, saw a bulge that “could have 

been characteristic of a small semi-automatic” in E.M.’s front pants pocket). 

Further, our Courts have repeatedly emphasized that mere presence in a highcrime area is alone insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See In re

D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001); see also Commonwealth v. Key, 

789 A.2d 282, 289-90 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating that “[a]n individual’s act of 

merely walking away from police officers in a ‘high crime area’ is manifestly 

insufficient to justify an investigative detention of that individual.”).

Rather, we find that the instant case is more analogous to this Court’s 

decision in Commonwealth v. Martinez, 588 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 1991). 

The Martinez Court held that a situation in which the defendant “walked

quickly away from a group of people on a street corner after observing a police
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vehicle ...[, and] where ... officers observed a bulge in her front pocket[,]” does

not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary for an

investigative detention. Id. at 514; see also id. at 516 (stating that an 

officer’s mere belief that a person might be armed cannot serve as an 

additional articulable fact to justify an initial stop). The facts in Martinez are 

similar to the instant case, except, instead of seeing an unidentified “bulge,”

Officer Gilliam saw Smith holding his hands in his waistband area, apparently 

holding an unidentified heavy object, which the Officer believed was indicative 

of secreting a firearm. Moreover, Officer Gilliam observed less suspicious 

activity than the officers in Martinez, in that Smith was not seen “walking 

quickly away” upon noticing the police.

Additionally, contrary to the Commonwealth’s protestations, see Brief 

for the Commonwealth at 17-18, there is no evidence that the suppression 

court disregarded Officer Gilliam’s experience, or the nature of the 

neighborhood being a high-crime area, in weighing the totality of the 

circumstances. Rather, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the 

suppression court ostensibly disbelieved Officer Gilliam’s contention that he 

reasonably suspected that Smith’s actions and appearance were indicative of 

his secreting a firearm. Again, it is not within our purview to question the 

suppression court’s credibility determinations. See Caple, supra. 
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Based upon the foregoing, because we discern no error in the 

suppression court’s factual findings or its application of the law to these 

findings, we affirm its Order granting Smith’s Motion to Suppress.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/19