SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4091-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TERREL MANN a/k/a TERRELL

MANN and TYRELL MANN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Argued May 8, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Haas.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment Nos. 

08-09-0837, 11-04-0359 and 12-03-0271.

Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant 

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; 

Ms. McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).

Timothy F. Trainor, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. 

Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Mr. Trainor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Terrel Mann, who pled guilty to second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), appeals the 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 26, 2017
2 A-4091-14T3

trial court's denial of his motion to suppress incriminating 

statements he provided to police after witnessing the fatal 

shooting of his brother by third parties. We affirm.

I.

The record from the trial court's suppression hearing 

presents the following salient chronology of events.

A.

On June 16, 2011, defendant's brother was shot in the neck 

by an unidentified group of assailants in the backyard of a 

residence in Trenton. Defendant was present at the scene and saw 

his brother fall to the ground after the gunshots hit him. 

Defendant removed his shirt to apply pressure to his brother's 

gunshot wound, and dragged his brother to the front of the 

residence. The brother ultimately died from the gunshot wounds.

Several Trenton police officers arrived at the scene at about 

1:30 p.m. The first to arrive was Officer Tara Dzurkoc. According 

to Officer Dzurkoc's testimony at the suppression hearing, when 

she arrived, she saw "a black male laying on the ground face up 

and a woman . . . holding a bloody white t-shirt to his neck." 

The victim was in front of a home on that street, "on the sidewalk 

area[.]" Dzurkoc recalled that there were "a ton of people" 

gathered around the scene.
3 A-4091-14T3

Dzurkoc testified that, while waiting for an ambulance, she 

noticed defendant in the crowd. Defendant "stood out" to her 

because "he had no shirt on, he had gray shorts on, and he was 

covered in blood." 

Dzurkoc further testified that defendant, who was "very 

upset," said, "I saw who did it, and they're going to get it."

She observed that defendant was "pacing in the street" and 

"cursing." Dzurkoc testified that she "attempted" to calm him 

down, but defendant was "just kind of blowing [her] off[.]" 

Defendant did not ask for medical treatment, nor did anyone meet 

with him "to determine if he was in shock[.]"

According to Dzurkoc, she asked defendant to "stay to the 

side" so she could "keep an eye on him because a detective would 

want to talk to him." Dzurkoc did not stay with defendant. Nor 

was defendant put in handcuffs or placed under arrest. 

Dzurkoc testified that, at that point, she "felt bad for him 

and he was just a witness." She "didn't tell him to stay 

specifically or to leave." According to Dzurkoc, defendant could 

have left "if he wanted to[,]" and he was "detained by him just 

standing where I knew he was until a detective came."

Once another detective arrived, that detective spoke to 

defendant and transported him to the police station in a police 

vehicle. Defendant sat without handcuffs in the backseat of the 
4 A-4091-14T3

vehicle with his girlfriend, Deanna Mott, whom he wanted to come 

with him to the station. Dzurkoc testified that such a situation 

is "[d]efinitely not" how police customarily transport someone 

"under arrest or in custody[.]" In such instances, the suspect 

normally would be handcuffed and searched.

Another Trenton Police Officer, Yusaf Addar, testified that, 

when he arrived at the scene, a detective called him over and told 

him that there was "a witness that needed to be transported to 

[police] headquarters." Addar recalled that defendant and his 

girlfriend were already in the police vehicle, so Addar drove them 

to the station. According to Addar, both defendant and his 

girlfriend were "a little agitated" because "they wanted to know 

what was going on with the victim at the time." Defendant was 

not, however, "yelling or screaming or acting out like he was 

being violent."

Addar testified that defendant did not ask at any time to get 

out of the car, nor was he handcuffed. Mott also had her cellphone 

with her while in the vehicle. According to Addar, the trip from 

the scene to the station took "[m]aybe two minutes if that."

When they arrived at the station, Addar took defendant and 

Mott "through the back entrance where police officers enter" and 

into what is known as the robbery section of the station, an area 

where police only bring "witnesses or suspects." Addar waited 
5 A-4091-14T3

with them for ten or twenty minutes, because "the area they were 

in they're really not supposed to be back there by themselves 

unless they're in the company of a detective or an officer." Addar 

testified that while they waited, Mott used her cell phone "a 

lot."

Addar later collected and photographed defendant's clothing, 

which he did by bringing defendant into an interview room "for 

privacy[,]" although the door remained open. Addar collected 

defendant's pants and sneakers, and gave him a "paper suit" to 

wear. Defendant was "really calm and really cooperative throughout 

the whole process[,]" and according to Addar, was treated "like a 

witness" during their interactions.

James Francis, a Trenton Detective Sergeant, also testified 

on behalf of the State. Francis had previously worked in the 

homicide unit, and he responded to the shooting scene. Detective 

Edgar Rios was assigned to work on the investigation with Francis.1 

While searching the area, Francis located the "primary crime 

scene[,]" at which he found the victim's clothes and "numerous 

shell casings[.]"

According to Francis, after searching the crime scene, he 

returned to the station to interview witnesses. He first 

 

1 Rios was injured while on duty in 2013, and did not testify at 

the hearing.
6 A-4091-14T3

interviewed Mott at Rios's desk, located "in the rear of the 

homicide office, right at the window." While Francis interviewed 

Mott, defendant was left in the "waiting area" with no "police 

guard."

Francis testified that the conversation with Mott was "very 

low key[,]" as he and Rios "tried to ascertain any information 

that she had regarding the incident." The interview took about 

an hour. Mott did not give a formal statement at the time, because 

she had to leave due to "childcare issues[.]" She returned another 

day and gave a formal statement.

Francis recounted that he and Rios drove Mott home after her 

interview, prior to interviewing defendant. After taking Mott 

home, Francis and Rios "reexamined the crime scene[,]" which was 

"two or three row homes away" from Mott's home. That took "[u]nder 

half an hour." According to Francis, they were gone for no more 

than one hour, because the crime scene was located approximately 

five minutes by car from the police station.

Upon returning to the station, Francis and Rios interviewed 

defendant at the same location they had questioned Mott. Francis 

testified that, generally, if a person is considered a suspect or 

in custody, he or she is interviewed in "one of three video 
7 A-4091-14T3

interview rooms." Francis did not read defendant his Miranda2

rights prior to that interview, because the police "don't Mirandize 

witnesses." At that time, Francis and Rios did not have "any 

idea" that defendant was potentially more than a witness.

Francis explained that it was "normal" for detectives to take 

evidence from witnesses, such as defendant's clothing in this 

case. Francis gave defendant "a light jacket that was hanging up 

in the homicide conference room" to wear over the paper suit, 

because "[t]he air conditioner was on, [and] it was pretty cold."

According to Francis, defendant told them during the 

interview that, prior to the shooting, he ran into a person with 

whom he had gotten into a fight earlier in the week. When they 

ran into one another, they got into another fight, which Mott 

eventually broke up. Francis further testified that defendant 

stated that, as he and his group started walking away, the other 

group "started running towards them" so he and Mott went inside 

her house. Defendant then called his brother, who came to the 

area with his cousin. The three men then "went walking around 

looking for the guys" that defendant had been fighting earlier.

They did not find the group, and as they were walking back towards 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966).
8 A-4091-14T3

Mott's house, defendant heard "multiple gunshots coming from the 

alleyway" where his brother was walking.

Francis testified that defendant stated he then ran down the 

alley and saw his brother "on the ground firing at a group of men" 

in the alley. Defendant then "grabbed the gun and started firing 

at the same boys." Defendant could see that his brother was shot 

in the neck at the time.

As recounted by Francis, defendant then told the detectives 

that, once the other group ran away, defendant "drag[ged]" his 

brother out of the alley to the front of the house. Francis did 

not believe defendant's account, because "it just didn't make 

sense that his brother could still be returning fire with 

conceivably a life-threatening injury to his neck where blood was 

gushing out." Francis also did not believe that defendant "called 

his brother out to basically help him with a fight and then he 

lets him walk down an alleyway . . . by himself without backing 

him up or assisting him in any way."

Francis told defendant that his "story" was "not really adding 

up to the physical evidence[.]" According to Francis, defendant 

then "displayed like a little bit of defeat[,] maybe with his 

shoulder slouching and said okay I was – I was firing the gun." 

At that point, and after consulting with an assistant prosecutor, 

Francis read defendant his Miranda rights before asking any 
9 A-4091-14T3

additional questions. Francis testified that defendant did not 

make "any indication" that he wanted a lawyer or wanted to stop 

the conversation. 

Francis and Rios then took defendant to an interview room, 

and began recording the interview. Defendant was not handcuffed 

at that point.

According to the transcript of that interview, Rios read 

defendant his Miranda rights, and then had defendant read them 

back before signing. At one point, Rios defined the term 

"coercion" for defendant, and then ensured that defendant 

understood its meaning by having defendant explain it back to the 

detectives. 

After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant relayed to the 

detectives how the incident began with a fight between him and a 

member of the other group. Defendant stated in that interview 

that he called his brother for help, who showed up thereafter. 

According to defendant, his brother gave him a gun to "hold" prior 

to confronting the other group. Defendant then explained to the 

detectives how the altercation between the two groups ended with 

gunshots.

B.

Mott, defendant's girlfriend, testified on his behalf at the 

suppression hearing. As she described it, once the police arrived, 
10 A-4091-14T3

they put defendant in the police vehicle. Mott went over to the 

vehicle to "try[] to calm him down and figure out why he was being 

put in the police car." According to Mott, the police asked her 

to get in the car with defendant to "calm him down[.]"

Mott testified that one police officer then told another to 

"take [them] down to the police station." Mott further testified 

that defendant said "he didn't want to go, but the cop said to him 

that they probably just want to talk to him when he get[s] down 

there." Mott asserted on cross-examination that she did not have 

her phone with her when they went to the station.

According to Mott, the police took defendant into a different 

room when they arrived at the station. Mott testified that, from 

where she was sitting, she could hear the police "yelling at 

[defendant] telling him that his story was bull[.]" Mott also 

testified that defendant "tried to talk to [her] through the door 

and the cops removed [her] from right there" because she "couldn't 

talk to him[.]" Defendant allegedly "asked to leave to go" to the 

hospital as well. Mott further asserted on cross-examination that 

the police "told [defendant] that he couldn't leave until the gun 

appeared."

Mott testified that Officer Rios later came to her and told 

her she "was lying to him about who had the gun." According to 

Mott, however, she had not previously spoken to the police, so she 
11 A-4091-14T3

was "confused" by that assertion. Mott further testified that she 

did not leave the station that day until "almost ten o'clock that 

night."

Lastly, defendant testified on his own behalf at the hearing. 

He asserted that he could not remember his initial conversation 

with the police at the scene of the shooting, because he was 

"stressed out and in shock[.]" According to defendant, he was "in 

the stage of blacking out" when an officer told him "to get in the 

car until you calm down." Defendant allegedly told them "no, I 

don't want to get in the car[,]" at which point the officers "put 

[him] in the car and from there [he] was still crying, yelling."

Defendant testified that, once he was taken to the station, 

he did not feel free to leave. However, he acknowledged that he 

did not ask to leave.

Defendant further testified that, while being questioned, the 

officers told him that his story was "bullshit." He claimed that 

he felt "threatened" at that point, because the officers allegedly 

told him that if he did not tell them the "right story" about what 

happened, they would charge him with his brother's murder, should 

he die from his injuries. According to defendant, he told the 

police at that point that he had "told [his brother] to pass [him] 

the gun and [he] gave it to somebody and they took it and ran off 

with it."
12 A-4091-14T3

Defendant claimed that he was promised during his second 

interview with the officers that, if he gave them the gun, "they 

were going to let [him] go." According to defendant, he only gave 

the videotaped statement because he believed that "if [he] just 

gave them that statement, that would get [him] out of the police 

station quicker."

Defendant also testified that he did not understand the 

Miranda form that he signed, and he only signed it because he was 

"tired" and "exhausted." He further asserted that he asked for a 

lawyer "[a]t one point in time[,]" but could not remember when. 

Defendant's grandmother allegedly came down to the station at some 

point, although it is unclear if she arrived before or after 

defendant was given Miranda warnings, but the police allegedly 

"wouldn't let her up" to see him.

Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he had 

previously been arrested "several" times, and had been Mirandized 

on more than two prior occasions. One of those occasions occurred 

in December 2009, and a copy of the Miranda form used in that 

matter was admitted into evidence at this hearing. Defendant 

testified that, although the signature on that form from 2009 was 

his, he did not remember signing it.
13 A-4091-14T3

C.

Apart from these fact witnesses, defendant and the State each 

presented competing expert testimony concerning the voluntariness 

of defendant's statements when he was interviewed at the police 

station. Defendant's expert, Dr. Kenneth Weiss, a forensic 

psychiatrist, noted that defendant's measured IQ scores are 

indicative of "borderline intellectual functioning[,]" although 

perhaps not severe enough to support a diagnosis of "intellectual 

disability." Dr. Weiss observed that, during his interview with 

defendant he "did not express himself clearly at all times[.]" He 

also displayed "difficulty understanding" some of Dr. Weiss's 

questions, although he did ask for clarification when that 

occurred. Having reviewed the videotape of defendant's recorded 

police interview, Dr. Weiss concluded that defendant "lacked 

cognitive ability" at that time, and "would not fully understand" 

what his rights were or how to exercise them. Dr. Weiss thus 

opined that defendant's waiver of his self-incrimination privilege 

was neither knowing nor intelligent.

By contrast, the State's forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Charles 

Martinson, had more favorable impressions of defendant's cognitive 

abilities. Dr. Martinson classified defendant as "probably 

somewhat below average in terms of overall intellectual 

functioning." Having likewise reviewed the interview videotape, 
14 A-4091-14T3

Dr. Martinson noted that defendant presented himself in a "calm 

and composed fashion," and did not appear so "emotionally 

overwrought" as to be unable to knowingly and intelligently waive 

his rights. Dr. Martinson found it significant that defendant had 

prior criminal encounters, including at least one prior experience 

being Mirandized by police. That prior experience, in which 

defendant had likewise been questioned after waiving his rights, 

bolstered the State's expert's conclusion that defendant's waiver 

in the present case was knowing and intelligent.

As additional proof on the voluntariness question, the State 

lastly presented testimony from a Pennsylvania police officer who 

had Mirandized defendant in one of his prior cases. The officer

testified that, when he read defendant his Miranda rights, 

defendant seemed to understand, was paying attention, and was not 

upset. According to that officer, defendant was handcuffed during 

that particular waiver discussion and the subsequent interview.

D.

The trial judge, Hon. Andrew J. Smithson, issued a detailed

oral decision on the motion to suppress on September 29, 2014. In 

the course of his ruling, Judge Smithson made several important 

credibility assessments. He found Mott's testimony "not 

convincing" and "not of any consequence." The judge specifically

found that defendant's testimony was not credible, as his conduct 
15 A-4091-14T3

showed he was "capable of thinking and acting." The judge noted 

that, although defendant claimed he blacked out, he was still able 

to convince the police to allow Mott to accompany him to the 

station. The judge also noted that Mott was allowed to ride with 

defendant in the vehicle, which would be "very unusual if one were 

considered to be a suspect."

Based on the overall circumstances, Judge Smithson found that 

defendant was "a critical witness to what was going on, and he was 

treated that way." The judge noted that it was "not surprising" 

that "defendant would understand that the police wanted to talk 

to him, and there would be inconveniences involved[,]" because 

defendant was at the scene and likely had information about the 

shooting. As Officer Dzurkoc had testified, defendant told the 

police that he knew who shot his brother, so "[o]f course the 

police are going to talk to him[.]"

Judge Smithson concluded that defendant was not coerced by 

the police in any way. He did note that the police "may have 

allowed [defendant] to . . . harbor the belief that production of 

the handgun would be his key out of police headquarters." The 

judge found it significant that defendant had been Mirandized 

previously, "where he made understandable choices." On the whole, 

the judge found defendant's suppression testimony "utterly 

unconvincing[.]"
16 A-4091-14T3

The judge also evaluated the opinions of the parties' 

competing experts, finding the testimony of Dr. Martinson to be 

more persuasive. The judge stated that he "could not disagree 

more" with Dr. Weiss's overall conclusion that defendant did not 

waive his rights knowingly and intelligently. The judge instead 

favored Dr. Martinson's contrary findings.

In sum, the trial judge determined that defendant had the 

status of a witness, not a suspect, when he was first questioned 

by the police and was not at that point subjected to custodial 

interrogation. The judge further concluded that defendant's 

subsequent waiver of his rights, after being given Miranda

warnings, was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Consequently, 

the suppression motion was denied.

E.

Following the court's ruling, defendant entered into a 

negotiated plea of guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of 

a weapon. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the 

other count of the indictment, and agreed to recommend a five-year 

sentence, with a one-year parole ineligibility period, contingent 

on a Graves Act waiver. The Presiding Criminal Judge of the 

vicinage subsequently granted that waiver.
17 A-4091-14T3

On February 20, 2015, Judge Smithson sentenced defendant to 

the five-year term with a one-year parole disqualifier, consistent 

with the plea agreement. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our 

consideration:

POINT I

BECAUSE TERRELL'S STATEMENTS WERE MADE DURING 

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND WITHOUT A VALID 

WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 

THEY MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

A. Pre-Miranda Statements.

B. Post-Miranda Statements.

REPLY POINT I

TERRELL WAS IN CUSTODY BECAUSE THE POLICE TOOK 

HIS CLOTHES AND HIS SHOES. HIS SUBSEQUENT 

STATEMENTS WERE MADE WITHOUT A VALID WAIVER 

OF HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND 

MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

Having fully considered these arguments in light of the 

record, the trial court's credibility findings, and the applicable 

law, we affirm the denial of defendant's suppression motion. We 

do so substantially for the thoughtful reasons expressed in Judge 

Smithson's detailed oral opinion. We amplify his decision with 

several comments.
18 A-4091-14T3

We must review a trial court's factual findings at the 

suppression hearing on defendant's self-incrimination claims under 

"a deferential standard." State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48 (2012). 

Our appellate function, on such matters, is simply to consider 

"whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on

sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. 

Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 

N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). We owe "deference to those findings of the 

trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity 

to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J.

at 161; see also Stas, supra, 212 N.J. at 49. By comparison, 

"with respect to legal determinations or conclusions reached on 

the basis of the facts[,]" our review is plenary. Ibid. (citing 

State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011)).

Applying those standards of review here, we are satisfied 

that the trial court's credibility and other factual findings from 

the suppression hearing are well-founded and should not be 

disturbed. In particular, we uphold the court's forcefullyexpressed determination that defendant, his girlfriend, and his 

psychiatric expert were less convincing than the State's 

witnesses. That determination is buttressed by the videotape of 

the post-Miranda interview of defendant, in which defendant 
19 A-4091-14T3

appears to respond voluntarily and lucidly to the officers' queries 

with no manifest indications of coercion.

We reject the State's argument that the officers' initial 

questioning of defendant at the police station before the Miranda

warnings were given should be treated as a custodial interrogation

requiring Miranda warnings. Viewing the "totality of 

circumstances[,]" see State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), 

we agree with the trial court's assessment that defendant had the 

status of a witness, rather than a criminal suspect, when he was 

initially interviewed by the police.

As a general proposition, police officers do not necessarily 

place someone in custody simply by asking that person to accompany 

them to a police station. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.

89, 225-26, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S. Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed.

2d 88 (1997); State v. Purnell, 310 N.J. Super. 407, 421-22 (App. 

Div. 1998) (determining that the defendant was not in custody 

after police took him to a police station), rev'd on other grounds, 

161 N.J. 44 (1999). Similarly, "[i]f the questioning is simply 

part of an investigation and is not targeted at the individual 

because she or he is a suspect, the rights provided by Miranda are 

not implicated." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614-15 

(1999) (citing State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 

1998)).
20 A-4091-14T3

Defendant likens the circumstances in this case to those in 

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015), and State v. Messino, 378 

N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005). 

We find neither of those cases factually on point here. We 

acknowledge that in both Hubbard, supra, 222 N.J. at 271, and 

Messino, supra, 378 N.J. Super. at 573, as in this case, the 

defendant was brought to a police station after a victim was killed 

or severely harmed. However, in Hubbard, the detective's questions 

"roamed far from merely obtaining information that might assist 

[in] the [victim's] treatment." Hubbard, supra, 222 N.J. at 271. 

Moreover, the substance and nature of the interview in Hubbard

were suggestive of a custodial interrogation. Id. at 272.

By contrast, there is ample support in the record for the 

trial court's finding that the nature and tenor of the officers' 

initial interview of defendant was consistent with treating him 

as a witness to his brother's shooting, rather than a targeted 

suspect. Defendant declared at the shooting scene that he knew 

who was responsible for the shots. He voluntarily came with 

officers to the police station, accompanied in the same squad car 

by his girlfriend, who was also a potential eyewitness. He was 

not handcuffed at any time. He was not placed in an interrogation 

room at the station.
21 A-4091-14T3

The substance of the initial interview, fairly construed, was 

focused upon obtaining relevant information from defendant, who 

was a first-hand eyewitness and therefore a person who could assist 

in gathering the pertinent facts. When defendant revealed for the 

first time that he had held a gun and fired shots from it at the 

scene after his brother was harmed, the police appropriately 

terminated the session, issued Miranda warnings, and moved 

defendant into an interrogation room.

Likewise, there are significant differences here from the 

circumstances in Messino, in which a defendant made incriminating 

statements at a police station after his girlfriend's child had 

died of apparent blunt force trauma. We concluded in Messino that 

the questioning in that case amounted to a custodial interrogation. 

Supra, 378 N.J. Super. at 576-77. As a key part of our analysis,

we focused on the fact that the police station was eighteen to 

twenty miles from the defendant's home, and that there was "no 

practical way for [him] to leave the building[.]" Id. at 576. 

Here, by comparison, the station was located only a few minutes 

by car from defendant's girlfriend's house. There were several 

people at his girlfriend's house earlier that day who might have 

been able to assist him. Moreover, according to defendant's 

version of the events, his grandmother had come down to the station 

to see him.
22 A-4091-14T3

Defendant stresses that he was wearing a paper suit and that 

his bloody clothes and shoes had been taken away from him. Even 

so, the police acted reasonably in taking those items of apparel 

from defendant, for reasons of both hygiene and evidence 

preservation. Conceivably, defendant's girlfriend, mother, or 

some other third party could have brought him clothing and shoes. 

There is no indication that if defendant made such a request, the 

police would have denied it.

Defendant also emphasizes the delay of him waiting 

approximately four hours at the station before his interview was 

started. The testifying police officers provided a reasonable 

explanation for that delay, having decided to interview 

defendant's girlfriend first and take her home before turning to 

defendant. The police were also involved in ongoing investigatory 

activities at the scene of the shooting.

Although the four-hour delay was relatively long, there is 

no indication that defendant ever expressed impatience or a desire 

to leave while he was waiting. As the trial court found, defendant 

presumably had some incentive to remain and show the police that 

he could be of assistance to them, by locating the gun that had 

been used to shoot his brother. The fact that the officers 

expressed disbelief or skepticism in reaction to defendant's 

initial account of the events did not convert the situation to a 
23 A-4091-14T3

custodial interrogation. As the judge found, defendant's version 

of what had occurred at the scene was not credible, and the 

officers reasonably had the same reaction.

In sum, we agree with the trial court that defendant was not 

the subject of a custodial interrogation until the point when that 

interview was halted and Miranda warnings were given.

We likewise concur with the judge's well-established findings 

that the post-Miranda questioning was not coercive, and that 

defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights before 

the questioning was conducted. Although defendant may have some 

cognitive limitations, the trial court had a reasonable basis to 

agree with Dr. Martinson's expert opinion that defendant was 

sufficiently knowledgeable to understand his rights and waive 

them. Moreover, the video recording buttresses the judge's 

determination of a lack of coercion during the session.

3

Affirmed.

 

3 For sake of completeness, we do note our agreement with defendant 

that, if we had found the pre-Miranda questioning to comprise a 

custodial interrogation, the contents of the post-Miranda

questioning would likewise require suppression. See State v. 

O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 180-87 (2007) (enumerating various factors 

for such an assessment, including, notably here, the proximity in 

time between the pre-warning and post-warning statements and the

failure of officers to inform a defendant that his pre-warning 

statements cannot be used against him).