2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-27-2010

Michael Pignataro v. Port Authority of New York

and

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 08-3605

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Michael Pignataro v. Port Authority of New York and" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1959.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1959
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

Nos. 08-3605 / 08-3825

________

MICHAEL G. PIGNATARO; THOMPSON R. CHASE

v.

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 

a bi-State agency; JOHN DOES 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5

(agents, representatives and/or employees of the Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey)

The Port Authority of

 New York and New Jersey,

 Appellant in 08-3605

________

MICHAEL G. PIGNATARO; THOMPSON R. CHASE, 

 Appellants in 08-3825

v.

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 

a bi-State agency; JOHN DOES 1-5 and Jane Does 1-5

(agents, representatives and/or employees of 

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey)
2

_________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01767)

District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh

__________

Argued November 19, 2009

Before: RENDELL, BARRY, and CHAGARES,

 Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 27, 2010)

 

Christine C. Lilore, Esq. [ARGUED]

386 Main Street

Wyckoff, NJ 07481

 Counsel for Appellees in 08-3605 

 and Appellants in 08-3825

 Michael G. Pignataro and Thompson R. Chase
3

Sharon K. McGahee, Esq. [ARGUED]

Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

Law Department, Opinions & Appeals Div.

225 Park Avenue South

13th Floor, Room 1324

New York, NY 10003

 Counsel for Appellee in 08-3825 

 and Appellant in 08-3605

 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,

 a bi-State agency

__________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal the Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey (the “Port Authority”) challenges the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Michael Pignataro and

Thompson Chase. The District Court held that helicopter pilots

are not exempt as “professional” employees under the Fair

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and

therefore are entitled to mandatory time-and-a-half overtime

compensation. It awarded Pignataro and Chase two years of

damages, rather than three, because it concluded that the Port

Authority’s FLSA violation was not willful. Pignataro and
4

Thompson appeal that aspect of the District Court’s order, while

the Port Authority challenges the denial of the exemption and

the Court’s award of prejudgment interest. For the reasons that

follow, we will affirm the District Court’s decisions in all three

respects.

I. Background

Pignataro began working for the Port Authority as a

helicopter pilot in 1982 and retired in 2004. The Port Authority

hired Chase in 1977 and promoted him to helicopter pilot in

1982. Because the Port Authority classified helicopter pilots as

“professional” employees under the FLSA, both Pignataro and

Chase were deemed exempt from the overtime provisions of the

FLSA. In April 2004, Pignataro and Chase filed a complaint in

the District Court alleging that they were denied proper overtime

pay under the FLSA for the previous three years. 

On February 9, 2006, the District Court held that

helicopter pilots are not professional employees under the FLSA

and granted summary judgment in favor of Pignataro and Chase

on the issue of liability only. On March 3, 2006, the Port

Authority appealed this ruling, but we dismissed the appeal on

February 23, 2007 because the District Court’s order was not

final. On August 11, 2008, the District Court entered a

monetary judgment in favor of Pignataro and Chase, awarding

Pignataro $67,907.23 in unpaid overtime wages plus $19,177.10

in prejudgment interest (totaling $87,084.33) and awarding
 The parties do not dispute that the FLSA applies to the Port 1

Authority.

5

Chase $50,626.80 in unpaid overtime wages plus $14,297.14 in

prejudgment interest (totaling $64,923.94). Concluding that the

Port Authority’s violation of the FLSA was not willful, the

District Court’s award was based on two years of damages,

instead of three.

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). After

making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s

favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable

jury could find for the nonmoving party. Reliance Ins. Co. v.

Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997). Our review of the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Id. We

have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Helicopter Pilots’ Classification under the FLSA

 The FLSA mandates that if an employee works more 1

than forty hours per week, he must be compensated for overtime

hours at a rate at least one-and-one-half times the employee’s

regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Employees who work in a

“professional capacity,” however, are exempt from this rule.
 The District Court notes that the Department of Labor 2

revised the FLSA’s regulations governing exemptions effective

August 23, 2004. Because the violations alleged in Pignataro

and Chase’s complaint occurred prior to this revision, the

District Court applied the previous version of the regulations.

We will do the same - all citations are to the 2000 edition of the

C.F.R., unless otherwise noted. We note, however, that under

the current regulations we would likely reach the same result. 

6

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Exemptions from the FLSA are to be 2

narrowly construed against the employer, and the employer has

the burden of establishing an exemption. Guthrie v. Lady Jane

Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1983). Whether

helicopter pilots are exempt professionals is a mixed question of

law and fact; we review the District Court’s findings of fact for

clear error and exercise plenary review over its interpretation

and application of the exemption. Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc.,

13 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 1994). 

The applicable exemption from the FLSA urged here

encompasses employees who are determined to be members of

the “learned” professions, as defined by 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3 and

541.301. An employee’s status as a “learned professional” is

determined by his or her duties and salary. 29 C.F.R. § 541.3.

In order to qualify as a “learned professional” an employee’s

primary duties must consist of:
 Under the current version of the regulations, this threshold 3

is $455 per week. 29 C.F.R. § 541.300 (2009). 

 This has become known as the “short test,” applicable to 4

employees who earn more than $250 per week. Reich, 13 F.3d

at 698 n.15.

7

[w]ork requiring knowledge of an advance [sic]

type in a field of science or learning customarily

acquired by a prolonged course of specialized

intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished

from a general academic education and from an

apprenticeship, and from training in the

performance of routine mental, manual, or

physical processes. 

29 C.F.R. § 541.3(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(a).

While there are additional requirements for “learned

professional” status, namely receipt of compensation exceeding

$250 or more per week and duties requiring the exercise of 3

discretion, we concern ourselves initially with whether Port 4

Authority helicopter pilots satisfy the requirements under

§ 541.3(a)(1). See 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(e). We thus consider what

advanced knowledge “in a field of science or learning

customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized

intellectual instruction” entails, and then examine whether
8

Pignataro and Chase’s primary duties required such advanced

knowledge. 

Advanced knowledge is knowledge “which cannot be

attained at the high school level,” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(b), and

which has been obtained through “prolonged study.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.300. The learned professional exemption is available for

professions where, in the “vast majority of cases,” the employee

is required to have “specific academic training.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.301(d). The exemption does not apply to occupations in

which “the bulk of the employees have acquired their skill by

experience.” Id. An “advanced academic degree is a standard (if

not universal) prequisite [sic]” and is, in fact, “the best prima

f a c i e e v i d e n c e o f [p rof essio n a l tr a i n i n g ].”

29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1). The requirement that the employee’s

knowledge be from a field of science or learning “serves to

distinguish the professions from the mechanical arts where in

some instances the knowledge is of a fairly advanced type, but

not in a field of science or learning.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(c).

Examples of professions included in the “learned professional”

exemption are the fields of “law, medicine, nursing, accounting,

actuarial computation, engineering, architecture, teaching,

various types of physical, chemical, and biological sciences,

including pharmacy.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1). 

Although a college or other specific degree may not be

per se required to qualify as a “learned professional,” it is clear

that employees must possess knowledge and skill “which cannot
 “Academic” means “[o]f, relating to, or characteristic of a 5

school [or] [p]ertaining to liberal or classical rather than

technical or vocational education.” Webster’s II New Riverside

Dictionary 69 (1988).

 The Port Authority contends that the District Court erred by 6

not considering Pignataro and Chase’s day-to-day duties and by

focusing instead solely on their credentials. We find no error.

The District Court properly considered whether Pignataro and

Chase’s primary duties required advanced knowledge acquired

by prolonged specialized instruction and study. (App. 7.) To

conduct this analysis, the District Court needed to look at the

qualifications and certifications required to perform Pignataro

and Chase’s daily duties as helicopter pilots at the Port

Authority. The duties that the Port Authority alleges that the

District Court ignored (pre-flight inspection, decisions on

weather conditions, and maintaining daily flight logs, for

9

be attained at the high school level” and which has been

obtained through “prolonged study.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.301(b);

541.300. Furthermore, some type of academic degree is 5

required, as opposed to skill acquired through experience.

29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1). 

We next examine whether the training and study

Pignataro and Chase were required to complete constitute

“advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning

customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized

intellectual instruction.” In order to qualify for their jobs, Port 6
example) do not require any further intellectual instruction or

academic study than the District Court considered. 

 A helicopter instrument rating is required for pilots to fly 7

without any visual reference to the ground. 

 “Intellectual” means of or relating to “the capacity for 8

understanding and knowledge [or] [t]he ability to think

10

Authority helicopter pilots must fulfill the following

requirements: (1) log 2,000 hours of flying time in helicopters;

(2) earn a commercial helicopter pilot certificate with a

helicopter instrument rating; (3) earn a Federal Aviation 7

Administration (“FAA”) Second Class Medical certificate;

(4) have knowledge of FAA rules and regulations governing

helicopter flights; and (5) earn a high school diploma or GED.

(App. 182, 318.) In order to earn a commercial certificate,

applicants must already hold a private pilot certificate and pass

both a knowledge and practical test. 14 C.F.R. § 61.123. The

Port Authority sends helicopter pilots to Florida for a one-week

training, twice each year. 

None of the certifications that helicopter pilots are

required to have are academic degrees. Helicopter pilots are not

required to spend a significant amount of time in a classroom in

order to earn their certifications - nearly all of the instruction

takes place in the air. Logging in-flight hours, in-flight

instruction, and passing practical and written tests do not qualify

as a “prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction 8
abstractly or profoundly.” Webster’s II New Riverside

Dictionary 634-35 (1988).

 The Port Authority maintains that genuine issues of material 9

fact exist as to the daily duties of helicopter pilots, such that

submission to a jury was required. It contends that Pignataro

and Chase’s primary duties, including flying and preparing to

fly, involved a daily exercise of discretion. Because Pignataro

11

and study.” While the Port Authority is correct that helicopter

pilots have “specialized knowledge” and “unique skills” (Port

Authority Br. 12-13), this is not sufficient to qualify under the

learned professional exemption because pilots’ knowledge and

skills were acquired through experience and supervised training

as opposed to intellectual, academic instruction. The District

Court reasoned that pilots’ flight certificates require specialized

instruction beyond a high school education, but do not constitute

advanced academic degrees. Thus, the District Court

determined that helicopter pilots are “‘merely highly trained

technicians’ . . . and therefore do not qualify as professional

employees under the FLSA.” (App. 7-8 (citing Martin v. Penn

Line Serv. Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (W.D. Pa. 1976))). We

agree and conclude that Port Authority helicopter pilots’ work

does not require advanced knowledge that is customarily

acquired from a prolonged course of specialized instruction. We

therefore do not reach the issues of whether Pignataro and Chase

were salaried employees or consistently exercised discretion in

their work. Our reading of the regulation in light of the 9
and Chase do not dispute the Port Authority’s description of

their duties, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Because

we conclude that the “work requiring advanced knowledge

acquired by prolonged specialized instruction and study” aspect

is not satisfied, we need not reach the question of how much

discretion is involved in a helicopter pilot’s daily duties. 

 The Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of his own 10

regulation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.

452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). 

12

requirements for the job leads us to the same conclusion as the

District Court. Port Authority helicopter pilots are, therefore,

not “learned professionals” and are not exempt from the

provisions of the FLSA. 

The Department of Labor has reached the same

conclusion. As we agree with the agency, we need not discuss

the degree of deference we would owe to the agency’s view on

the issue. The Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division 10

has noted that the Department has taken the position that pilots

are not exempt professionals because “aviation is not a ‘field of

science or learning,’ and . . . the knowledge required to be a

pilot is not ‘customarily acquired by a prolonged course of

specialized intellectual instruction.’” Defining and Delimiting

the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,

Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122,

22156 (Apr. 23, 2004) (citation omitted). 
13

The Department of Labor Review Board (the “Board”)

has also decided that airline pilots are not “learned

professionals” as defined by 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3 and 541.301

because there is “no doubt” that airline pilots do not meet the

“threshold prerequisite” of “formal specialized academic

training in a field of science or learning.” In re U.S. Postal

Serv. ANET & WNET Contracts Regarding Review &

Reconsideration of Wage Rates for Airline Captains and First

Officers, ARB Case No. 98-131, 2000 WL 1100166, at *13-14

(Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Aug. 4, 2000). The Board

found that almost all of the professions delineated in the C.F.R.

as “professional” require college or graduate-level study (one

exception being certain nursing degrees that require completing

a college-like academic program). Id. In contrast:

the training of airline pilots in this country

typically does not revolve around specialized

college-type academic instruction, but moreclosely resembles the classic apprenticeship

model--a “structured, systematic program of onthe-job supervised training” coupled with a

program of related instruction. 

Id. at *16 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 29.4 (1999)). 

The Board further noted that many courts have held that a

specialized college degree is required to meet the “learned

professional” exemption. Id. at *29 n.11. For example, the
 The Wage and Hour Division also notes that the District 11

Court for the Northern District of Texas held that pilots are

exempt professionals (Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, Inc. v. Chao, 304

F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (adopting the Paul

Court’s reasoning)), while the District Court for the District of

14

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “airfield

operation specialists” are not learned professionals because they

are only required to have a bachelor’s degree in aviation

management or a related field, or four years of full-time

experience, or an equivalent combination of education and

experience. Fife v. Harmon, 171 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.

1999). The Fife Court held that “[t]his is advanced knowledge

from a general academic education and from an apprenticeship,

not from a prolonged course of specialized intellectual

instruction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition,

the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that probation

officers are not “learned professionals” because their

educational requirement (a four-year college degree) is general

and not specialized. Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

942 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1991).

The Board and the Wage and Hour Division also noted,

however, that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Paul

v. Petroleum Equipment Tools, Co., 708 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir.

1983), concluded that an airplane pilot was a “learned

professional” and was therefore exempt from the overtime

provisions of the FLSA. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22156; In re U.S. 11
Oregon held that helicopter pilots are not exempt (Ragnone v.

Belo Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193-94 (D. Or. 2001)). 69

Fed. Reg. at 22156.

 We question whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 12

Circuit would reach the same result if the issue were presented

today. Since deciding Paul, that Court has issued two other

opinions on similar issues. It held that emergency medical

services employees do not have the necessary academic training

to be “learned professionals” because they are not required to

have a college degree and instead need only “didactic training,

clinical experience, and field internship.” Vela v. City of

Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 675 (5th Cir. 2001). The Vela Court

cited a District of Maryland case, Quirk v. Balt. County, 895

F. Supp. 773 (D. Md. 1995), in which the Court found that

paramedics are not learned professionals because they were only

15

Postal Serv., 2000 WL 1100166 at *13-14. The Board

“respectfully disagree[d] with the Paul majority’s analytical

approach and conclusion.” In re U.S. Postal Serv., 2000 WL

1100166 at *14. Despite Paul, the Wage and Hour Division

decided not to modify its position that pilots are not exempt

professionals. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22156. Not surprisingly, the Port

Authority urges that we should follow Paul. We note that Paul

was decided approximately two decades prior to the Board’s

decision and the Wage and Hour Division’s interpretation of the

exemption that we cite, and the Paul Court stated that the Wage

and Hour Division’s interpretations are entitled to “great

weight.” 708 F.2d at 173 (citation omitted).12
required to have 600 hours of classroom and field training. In

contrast, the Fifth Circuit has also held that athletic trainers

satisfy the education component of the learned professionals

exemption because they are required to have “(1) a bachelor’s

degree in any field; (2) 1800 hours of apprenticeship over a

three-year period; (3) completion of 5 3-hour credit college

courses [in specific areas of study]; and (4) a C.P.R. test.”

Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 524-25

(5th Cir. 1999). The Owsley Court cited Paul in analogizing this

training to that of airline pilots. Id.

 The Paul majority notes that even though there is no 13

evidence in the record that an “airline transport pilot certificate

with single and multiengine class ratings” was required for Paul

to fly, he nonetheless had this certificate. See 708 F.2d. at 171

(“[H]aving been hired as a pilot with a listed skill level, Paul is

in no position to now suggest that less was ‘required’ by [his

employer] simply because the law required less.”). Here, we do

not look to see whether Chase and Pignataro have more training

or education than is required for their job - we look only at

whether their employment involves duties requiring knowledge

16

The Paul Court reasoned that, in order to obtain a

commercial license and instrument rating, a pilot must “acquire

extensive knowledge of aerodynamics, airplane regulations,

airplane operations, instrument procedures, aeronautical charts,

and weather forecasting.” 708 F.2d at 172. Additionally, pilots

are required to receive instruction from a flight instructor, log a

certain number of hours of flight time, and pass written and

practical tests. Id. The Paul Court determined that this is 13
that is “customarily acquired” by a prolonged course of

specialized intellectual instruction and study. The specific

training and qualifications of an individual plaintiff are not

relevant to this determination. Instead, in assessing whether

knowledge is “customarily acquired” through intellectual

instruction, we consider what is required for “the bulk of the

employees” in an asserted profession. 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d);

see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d) (2009) (“The phrase

‘customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized

intellectual instruction’ restricts the exemption to professions

where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite

for entrance into the profession. . . . The learned professional

exemption . . . does not apply to occupations in which most

employees have acquired their skill by experience rather than by

advanced specialized intellectual instruction.”). 

Thus, in a field where most employees gain their skills

through intellectual instruction, an individual employee who

gained his skills through experience may still be exempt under

the FLSA. The Paul Court seems to have focused more on

Paul’s individual situation than the regulations permit. See 708

F.2d at 174 (“[W]e do not decide that company pilots as a class

perform exempt professional work. We face here only a pilot

like Paul with the highest flight rating, considerable training,

and job experience.”). We cannot endorse this approach. See

also Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1565 (finding that the determinative

factor is the education that the job requires, not the education

that the employee actually has); In re U.S. Postal Serv., 2000

WL 1100166 at *14:

17
[A] close analysis of the specialized academic

training provided to members of a job

classification is a threshold step in determining

whether the occupation generically meets the

professional exemption test. Consequently, we

share the view of the dissenting opinion in Paul

that it is analytically incorrect to “work

backwards” from the level of an employee’s

knowledge and skill in order to infer that the

occupation requires the kind of advanced

academic instruction contemplated by the

regulations.

18

“extensive, formal, and specialized training” that is comparable

to that undergone by nurses, accountants, and actuaries. Id.

at 173. However, in light of our own analysis set forth above,

that is consistent with the Department of Labor’s interpretation

of the regulations, we decline to follow the reasoning of the

Paul Court.

Based on the above analysis, we will affirm the District

Court’s grant of summary judgment.

III. Willfulness

Pignataro and Chase challenge the District Court’s

finding that the Port Authority’s violation of the FLSA was not

willful, and that they were thus entitled to only two years of

back pay, not three. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). To establish that the
19

Port Authority’s violation of the FLSA was willful, Pignataro

and Chase must prove that the Port Authority knew it was

violating the FLSA or acted in reckless disregard of whether it

was violating the FLSA. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486

U.S. 128, 133, 135 (1988). Whether a violation of the FLSA is

willful is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error. See

Bianchi Trison Corp. v. Chao, 409 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).

Pignataro and Chase contend that the Port Authority

willfully violated the FLSA because the Port Authority denied

their repeated requests to be paid time-and-a-half for overtime,

and because others who had similar jobs (e.g., Chief Pilot and

Chief Mechanic) were paid time-and-a-half for overtime. At

best, this conduct would constitute only a negligent violation of

the FLSA, and, standing alone, it does not rise to the level

necessary to show that the Port Authority knew or recklessly

disregarded a risk that it was violating the FLSA. 

 Furthermore, an employer has not willfully violated the

FLSA if it acts reasonably in determining its legal obligation.

McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n.13. Here, Julia Basile, manager

of the compensation and retirement division for the Port

Authority, testified that in classifying helicopter pilots as

“professional employee[s]” she relied on discussions with and

“extensive research” by the law department to determine

industry standards for classifying helicopter pilots. (App.

153-56.) Moreover, there waslegal authority for this conclusion

because the appellate decision most directly on point, Paul, held
20

that airline pilots are exempt as “learned professionals.” The

District Court concluded that the Port Authority did not act with

a “reckless disregard for the consequences, but rather, the facts

indicate that [the Port Authority] made a good faith effort to

comply with the law . . . [and the Port Authority’s] actions were

reasonable.” (Id. at 15.) The Port Authority thus acted

reasonably in determining that helicopter pilots were exempt

from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. We will affirm the

District Court’s ruling that the Port Authority’s violation of the

FLSA was not willful and that, under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), the

Port Authority is therefore liable for only two years of damages,

instead of three. 

IV. Prejudgment Interest

The final issue contested by the Port Authority is the

District Court’s award of prejudgment interest to Pignataro and

Chase. We review a District Court’s decision to award

prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Thabault v. Chait,

541 F.3d 512, 533 (3d Cir. 2008). “[I]n the absence of an

explicit congressional directive, the awarding of prejudgment

interest under federal law is committed to the trial court’s

discretion” and should be awarded based on considerations of

fairness. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 1987)

(citing Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d

972, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1984)). There is a presumption in favor of

awarding prejudgment interest on a back pay award under the

FLSA. Id. at 127. If prejudgment interest is denied, the District
21

Court must explain why the usual equities in favor of such

interest are not applicable. Id. Prejudgment interest attempts to

compensate for the delay in receiving the wages as well as offset

the reduction in the value of the delayed payments caused by

inflation. Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d

Cir. 1984) (finding that “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion

not to include pre-judgment interest in a back-pay award under

the FLSA.”). Here, the District Court found it “equitable to

award interest on damages from the commencement of this

action through judgment.” (App. 16.) 

The Port Authority contends that it is inequitable to

penalize it because there was a two-and-a-half-year delay

between when the District Court granted summary judgment on

February 9, 2006, and when the monetary judgment was entered

on August 11, 2008. The Port Authority contends that interest

should not have accrued during this period. A significant

portion of this delay, however, was due to the Port Authority’s

premature filing of a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 2006. We

dismissed this appeal and remanded the case on February 23,

2007 because the District Court’s order of February 9, 2006 was

not a final order. On July 5, 2007, the District Court denied the

Port Authority’s motion to certify that order for interlocutory

appeal. The Court ultimately issued a second written opinion

awarding damages to Pignataro and Chase on August 11, 2008.

Therefore, the only period that could reasonably be excluded

due to unfairness to the Port Authority is from July 5, 2007 to

August 11, 2008, but during that time three status conferences
22

were held and letters on the damages issue were submitted by

counsel. We do not think it unfair for the District Court to have

included this time period in awarding prejudgment interest.

Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

prejudgment interest to Pignataro and Chase for the time period

from February 9, 2006 to August 11, 2008. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the judgment

of the District Court.