Order filed April 30, 2020

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-20-00101-CV

__________

CLAYTON MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND MICHAEL 

RUFF, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE MAR LIVING 

TRUST, Appellants

V.

SUZANN RUFF, Appellee

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C46164-2

O R D E R

Suzann Ruff sued her son Michael A. Ruff and numerous entities in which her 

son was involved. That lawsuit has already spawned several separate proceedings 

in this court. The appeal before us now stems from a September 29, 2019 judgment 

against Clayton Mountain Development, LLC. In that judgment, the trial court

declared that Suzann Ruff is now the sole member of Clayton Mountain 
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Development, LLC, and it also determined that certain deeds and an assignment of 

developer’s rights were null and void. The judgment reflects that Clayton Mountain 

Development, LLC was a party to one of the deeds and that MAR Living Trust was 

a party to all of the voided instruments. The trial court subsequently entered an order 

of severance in which it granted Suzann Ruff’s motion to sever and ordered that “all 

claims by Suzann Ruff against Clayton Mountain Development LLC are 

severed from this action and made the subject of a separation action styled Suzann 

Ruff v. Clayton Mountain Development LLC, having docket number C46164-2”

(emphasis added). This appeal was perfected after the order of severance was 

entered. 

When the appeal was docketed in this court, we sent a letter to the parties to

express this court’s concern that a final judgment had not been entered yet because 

it appeared to this court that the trial court had not disposed of all of the claims

between Clayton Mountain Development, LLC and Suzann Ruff. We requested that 

Clayton Mountain Development, LLC provide this court with documents that 

establish that all claims between it and Suzann Ruff have been finally disposed. We 

sent a similar letter when Michael Ruff, in his capacity as trustee of the MAR Living 

Trust, filed a notice of appeal. 

Appellants have filed a response to this court’s letter. In their response, 

Appellants indicate that they filed the notices of appeal out of an abundance of 

caution even though they have the same concern as this court does about the finality 

of the judgment. Appellants agree that the judgment fails to dispose of all claims

between the parties, but they note that “the express purpose of the motion to sever, 

which was ultimately granted by the trial court, was to attempt to make the 

[September 29, 2019] judgment final and appealable.” Appellants point to various 

pending claims not only between Suzann Ruff and MAR Living Trust but also 

between Suzann Ruff and Clayton Mountain Development, LLC.
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Appellants also provided this court with a copy of Suzann Ruff’s motion to 

sever. In the motion, Suzann Ruff expressed a desire to have “every aspect of the 

litigation resolved as soon as possible” and complained of Mike Ruff’s tactics to 

delay the lawsuit. In the motion to sever, Suzann Ruff specifically requested that 

“the September 29, 2019 Judgment as to Clayton Mountain Development LLC be 

severed such that it is final and appealable at this time. Mike will no doubt appeal. 

He always does. Severance will move the process along with greater speed and 

minimize the harm to Suzy.” While severance orders often do “move the process 

along” and make a previously interlocutory order final and appealable, the severance 

order in this cause seems to muddy the waters even further. The order severed out 

all claims asserted by Suzann Ruff against Clayton Mountain Development, LLC. 

The order did not sever only those claims at issue in the September 29 judgment, nor 

did it mention MAR Living Trust. 

The September 29, 2019 judgment, in conjunction with the severance order, 

is not a final, appealable order. Neither “clearly and unequivocally states that it 

finally disposes of all claims” between the parties at issue here. See Bella Palma, 

LLC v. Young, No. 19-0204, 2020 WL 1898543, at *2 (Tex. April 17, 2020) (quoting 

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001)). Nor does either 

actually dispose of every pending claim between the parties at issue here. See id. 

However, because we are uncertain about the intent of the trial court to enter a final 

judgment when it granted Suzann Ruff’s motion to sever, we abate this appeal so 

that the trial court may clarify its order. See id.; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206. We 

note that Rule 27.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure permits the abatement 

of an appeal to allow the parties to obtain a final order or judgment. 

We abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court so that the trial 

court may clarify its intent with regard to finality and so that the parties may obtain 

orders disposing of the claims between the parties at issue in this appeal. The trial 
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court is directed to enter a clarifying order and to have it forwarded to the clerk of 

this court on or before June 29, 2020. The parties are ordered to notify this court 

immediately if, in the meantime, a final and appealable order is entered. 

The appeal is abated. This court will consider an appropriate motion to 

reinstate the appeal filed by any of the parties, or this court may reinstate the appeal 

on its own motion upon receipt of the trial court’s clarifying order or a final, 

appealable order. 

PER CURIAM

April 30, 2020

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating. 

1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.