Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

ALAN D. WILSON

Kokomo, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JARO MAYDA II, )

)

Appellant-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 34A05-1403-CC-101

)

MELINDA D. BARNETTE, )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable George A. Hopkins, Judge

Cause No. 34D04-1308-CC-702 

August 27, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Senior Judge 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jaro Mayda II appeals from the trial court’s order granting Melinda D. Barnette’s 

motion to dismiss Mayda’s complaint against her alleging fraud, defamation, and the 

failure to repay a loan purportedly established by oral agreement. Concluding that Mayda 

has not established that the trial court committed prima facie error by dismissing the 

complaint on jurisdictional grounds, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mayda, an Indiana resident and physician maintaining an office in Kokomo, 

Indiana, alleged in his complaint that he and Barnette, an Ohio resident, began a social and 

personal relationship sometime in 2003 continuing until sometime in the spring of 2013. 

According to Mayda’s affidavit, during the relationship, Barnette called him by telephone

between 300 and 500 times, sent emails to him between approximately 750 and 1000 times, 

and visited him in Indiana approximately ten times. On those ten occasions that Barnette 

personally met with Mayda in Indiana, he gave her money he now alleges was an informal 

loan from him to her. He claims that the money he gave her was for college tuition and for 

necessary medical treatment and expenses. Mayda alleges that the total amount of money 

he loaned to Barnette over the years was $27,000, and that she had orally agreed to repay 

him after she graduated from college and became employed. 

According to Mayda, the relationship eventually soured, and near the end of their

relationship he learned that Barnette had never been diagnosed with cancer, which 

allegedly was the basis for the money needed for medical treatment. According to the 

complaint, Barnette called Mayda in 2011 and 2012 leaving voice mail messages 
3

acknowledging that she owed him $27,000, and that she wished to meet with him 

personally to repay him. Mayda contends that Barnette has not repaid him despite his 

requests that she do so.

Subsequently, Mayda sought and obtained a protective order against Barnette in 

another court in Howard County on April 15, 2013. Mayda alleges that Barnette made 

threatening phone calls and sent threatening email messages to him in Kokomo, some of 

which indicated her future intent to possibly communicate disparaging information about 

him to embarrass him through the use of the local media. He contends that in the protective 

order matter, Barnette has had several attorneys appear for her and request continuances of 

the matter, but they have not objected to that court’s exercising personal jurisdiction over 

her. However, there is no evidence in the record that Barnette personally appeared in an 

Indiana court. 

Later, Mayda filed a civil complaint against Barnette on August 29, 2013, and 

Barnette’s counsel entered his appearance on her behalf and filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint on October 1, 2013, claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction. Mayda responded

to the motion to dismiss by affidavit, which was filed on October 18, 2013. The trial court 

held a hearing on the motion, took the matter under advisement, and later granted 

Barnette’s motion to dismiss. Mayda now appeals. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We first note that Barnette has not filed a brief. “In such a case, we do not undertake 

the burden of developing arguments for the appellee, but instead, applying a less stringent 

standard of review, may reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie
4

error.” Everette v. Everette, 841 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Thurman v. 

Thurman, 777 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Prima facie error “means at first sight, 

on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. 

The motion to dismiss was granted on the basis that Barnette’s contacts with Indiana 

were not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over her. “Personal jurisdiction is a 

question of law.” LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 2006). “As with 

other questions of law, a determination of the existence of personal jurisdiction is entitled 

to de novo review by appellate courts.” Id. “We do not defer to the trial court’s legal 

conclusion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists.” Id. “However, personal jurisdiction 

turns on facts, typically the contacts of the defendant with the forum, and findings of fact 

by the trial court are reviewed for clear error.” Id. 

“Because Indiana state trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction, jurisdiction is 

presumed.” Davis v. Simon, 963 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Everdry 

Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc. v. Carter, 885 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). “The party 

contesting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence, unless the lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the 

complaint.” Id. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 

before a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have ‘certain 

minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (citing LinkAmerica, 857 

N.E.2d at 967, quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 

95 (1945) (internal quotation omitted)). 
5

Furthermore, 

“[a] single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific 

jurisdiction over a defendant, if it creates a ‘substantial connection’ with the 

forum state and the suit is related to that connection.” Id. (citing McGee v. 

Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957)). 

“But a defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction ‘solely as a result of 

random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of 

another party or a third person.’” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 

105 S. Ct. 2174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Helicopteros, 466 

U.S. at 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 

774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen 

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 

(1980))).

Davis, 963 N.E.2d at 52.

In assessing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

would violate the Due Process Clause, “a person must have certain minimum 

contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Brockman v. Kravic, 

779 N.E.2d 1250, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing International Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Also, a 

defendant’s contacts must “consist of some action by which the defendant 

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. (citing 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958)). 

“Only the purposeful acts of the defendant, not the acts of the plaintiff or any 

third parties, satisfy this requirement.” Id.

Wolf’s Marine, Inc. v. Brar, 3 N.E.3d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

“Indiana’s long arm statute, which Indiana courts have held intended to extend 

personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, provides that a nonresident may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Indiana 

courts if certain conditions are met.” Mart v. Hess, 703 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1998) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(A); Brokemond v. Marshall Field & Co., 612 N.E.2d 143, 
6

145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). Here on appeal, Mayda argues that Barnette’s conduct falls 

under Trial Rule 4.4(A)(1)&(8), which provide as follows:

Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of 

this state who has left the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, 

submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising 

from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent:

. . .

(1) doing any business in this state;

. . .

(8) abusing, harassing, or disturbing the peace of, or violating a protective or 

restraining order for the protection of, any person within the state by an act 

or omission done in this state, or outside this state if the act or omission is 

part of a continuing course of conduct having an effect in this state.

Therefore, we must assess the nature of Barnette’s contacts. “[A] defendant’s 

contacts must ‘consist of some action by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.’” Wolf’s Marine, 3 N.E.3d at 15 (quoting Brockman v. Kravic, 779 

N.E.2d 1250, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). “When evaluating a defendant’s contacts with a 

forum state, courts should assess: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the 

defendant’s forum contacts; (2) the overall contacts of the defendant or its agent with the 

forum state; (3) the foreseeability of being haled into court in that state; (4) who initiated 

the contacts; and (5) whether the defendant expected or encouraged contacts with the 

state.” Id. (citing Brockman, 779 N.E.2d at 1257). In Brockman, we provided the 

following explanation of general and specific personal jurisdiction:
7

General personal jurisdiction refers to the ability to be sued for any claim in 

a state. In order to establish general personal jurisdiction, the court must find 

continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state such that the 

defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court in that state for 

any matter. General personal jurisdiction may exist if the contacts are 

substantial, continuous, and systematic. The contacts required for general 

personal jurisdiction are greater than those needed to establish specific 

personal jurisdiction.

Specific personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction that stems from the defendant’s 

having certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the court may 

hear a case whose issues arise from those minimum contacts. Under this 

theory, the defendant’s isolated contacts with a state that are not enough to 

establish general personal jurisdiction may be sufficient to allow jurisdiction 

over any incidents related to those contacts. A single contact with a forum 

state may be enough to establish specific personal jurisdiction if it creates a 

substantial connection with the forum state and the suit is based on that 

connection. However, the act must be purposeful, not random or attenuated 

or the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.

Id. at 1256-57 (citations omitted).

We note at the outset that in response to Barnette’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, Mayda argued that personal jurisdiction existed under Trial Rule 

4.4(A)(2),(3), and (8). It was in Mayda’s motion to correct error that he raised for the first 

time the legal argument that personal jurisdiction existed under Trial Rule 4.4(A)(1), 

conferring personal jurisdiction when the non-resident is doing any business in this state. 

A party may not raise a new issue for the first time in a motion to correct error. Troxel v. 

Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 2000). Although Mayda had responded to the motion 

to dismiss arguing grounds to establish personal jurisdiction, the argument presented in the 

motion to correct error raised a different ground, and was supported by the same affidavit 

that supported his response. Operating under the premise that this is not a new issue, but 

a different argument under the same issue, we address it here.
8

Mayda initially claims that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over Barnette 

because by entering into an oral contract for the loan of money from Mayda, she was doing 

business in Indiana. Mayda acknowledges under United States Supreme Court precedent 

that a party’s contract with an out-of-state party alone does not automatically establish 

sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum. See Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). “Instead, 

when determining whether a contract should give rise to personal jurisdiction in a 

plaintiff’s state, courts should consider facts such as ‘prior negotiations and contemplated 

future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of 

dealing. . . .” Wolf’s Marine, 3 N.E.3d at 16-17 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479, 

105 S. Ct. at 2185). 

Mayda argued that there was an oral agreement for the repayment of $27,000, and 

that by entering into the agreement, Barnette was subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana 

by doing business in this state. However, Mayda’s complaint and affidavit revealed that 

while the aggregate amount of the alleged debt was $27,000, the agreement, if any, was 

more fluid in nature than necessary to subject Barnette to personal jurisdiction on this 

ground. Over the course of their ten-year social and personal relationship, Mayda alleges 

that Barnette was in Indiana to visit him approximately ten times. He alleges that she 

received money from him on those ten occasions. Mayda contends that the repayment was 

to be made after Barnette completed college and began to work, yet, by his own account, 

he also gave her money for medical treatments and expenses. However, Barnette, 

according to Mayda, was the one who insisted on making the repayment in person. 
9

We further note that under Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1(b)(5) (2002) a party may 

not bring an action involving an agreement that is not to be performed within one year of 

making the agreement, unless the promise, contract, or agreement on which the action is 

based is in writing and signed by the party against whom the action is brought. Therefore, 

looking at the parties’ actual course of dealing under our de novo standard of review,

Mayda has not met his burden of establishing prima facie error on this ground.

Mayda also alleged in his complaint that Barnette had committed defamation. In 

support of establishing personal jurisdiction for abusive and harassing conduct, he argued 

that she had threatened him in Indiana by sending emails and telephone calls causing him 

to obtain a protective order against her. Mayda also argues that Barnette appeared by 

counsel in the protective order matter, and did not assert lack of personal jurisdiction in 

that case. He contends, therefore, that because she has consented to personal jurisdiction 

in that matter, it establishes minimum contacts with the state sufficient to establish personal 

jurisdiction in this matter. Whether Barnette has submitted to personal jurisdiction in the 

other action is an issue that is not before us. We conclude that Mayda has not met his 

burden of establishing prima facie error on this ground. 

With respect to his defamation claim, Mayda alleged that Barnette threatened to 

communicate disparaging statements about him to the local media in an effort to embarrass 

him. “In a defamation action, the place of the tort is generally considered the place of 

publication, i.e., where the defamatory material is communicated to a third party.” Mart, 

703 N.E.2d at 192 (citing Hoffman v. Roberto, 578 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). 

Here, Mayda alleged an electronic threat by Barnette to possibly communicate disparaging 
10

statements about him, but there was no evidence to establish that she had actually 

communicated those statements to a third party. Because Mayda cannot establish an injury 

from the alleged defamation, he has not met his burden of showing that the trial court 

committed prima facie error by dismissing Mayda’s complaint on this jurisdictional 

ground.

To the extent that Mayda argues he has suffered personal injury under subsections 

(A)(2) and (A)(3) of Trial Rule 4.4 subjecting Barnette to personal jurisdiction in Indiana 

based on the allegation that Barnette committed fraud by obtaining money from him for 

medical treatment she did not need or undergo, this argument is unpersuasive. The trial 

court correctly observed that there was no way to determine where Barnette’s alleged 

misrepresentations about her health were made or the nature of their agreement, if any, to 

repay the loan attributable to those expenses such that personal jurisdiction was established. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.