In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 21

- 00025

- CR

AMARFIO DEJALO WASHINGTON , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 188th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 50106

- A

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens2 ME MORANDUM OPINIO N After a jury found Amarfio Dejalo Washington guilty of two counts of assault on a public servant, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years’ conf inement in prison on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. 1 On appeal, Washington contends that (1) the trial court reversibly erred when it failed to include an instruction on effective con sent in its jury charge, (2) he was not present wh e n th e jury panel was seated in violation of Articles 33.03 and 35.17 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure , (3) the trial court reversibly erred when it granted the
State’s cha llenge for cause during jury selection, (4) the tria l cou rt reversibly erred w hen it
allo wed the State to question the jury panel members on their “level of trust” of law enforcement
officer s , and (5) the trial court rever sibly erred when it denied him the opportunity to present
evidence that the charges fo r whi ch he was incarcerat e d had been dismissed by the State. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background On November 27, 2019, D etention O fficer Matthew Overman was conducting perimeter
walks in the back hall of Gregg C ounty ’s north jail, wh e re Washin gton was being housed

. When Overman passed by Washington ’s cell, Washington t old Overman that he wanted to talk to him

. Overman told Washington that as soon as he finished his rounds, he would return to
Wash ington’s cell so they could talk

. Bef o re he was able to return , Overman heard over the

1 W ashington also appeals his other conviction of assaul t on a public s e r vant in companion ca u se number 06

- 21

- 0002 6

- CR, making the identical arguments as those contained in th is case. Consequently, this opinion addresses the issues in both cases
.3

intercom that an inmate, w ho was later determined to be Washington, was threatening to harm
himself. Within twenty

- five seconds, O fficer Anika Hatt joined Over man, and they both enter ed Washington’s cell. The cell floor was covered in water , and Washington “was making loud noise saying that he wasn’t going to come with us unless we were rank.” 2 Overman said that it was his “duty” to remove Washington from his cell to determine whethe r he was going to hurt
himself. Overman ga ve Washington a “lawful order” to exit his cell and to come with them. Again, Washington said that he was not going to go with anyone who was “not rank.” When
Overman gave Washington a th ird order to exit his cell , h e “began yelling, clenched up hi s fists, took a step at [ Overman ] ,” and continued to refuse Overman’s order. 3 Overman said he felt threatened by Washington , so he “grabbed his arm, guided him to a wall, [and] placed him agains t the wall.” Overman stated , “ [Wash ington] th e n began swingi ng his arms crazy, he pushed Hatt, she hit a bunk, hurt her back. ” Washington also hit Overman in the face, knocking off his glasses , which result ed in a one
- inch scratch on Overman’s right chee k. Overman wrapped his arms around Washing ton and then “assisted hi m to the ground so that way [they] 4 could place him in hand restraints.” Overman stated that, through his training, he was aware that

2 According to Overman, “rank” mean t “ [ a] peace office r ” or “[a] sworn

- i n deputy o r corporal.”

3 Overman explained that he was trained to follow a “progression ” in those types of situations, stating , “Just command presen ce being there, verbal orde rs. Usua lly I try to tell them twice, g ive them two lawful orde r s, and if they c ontinue t o refuse or be combative I normally try placing soft hands on them.” Overman said that “soft hands ” meant “touching them and . . . just b arely mov [ing] them.” If an in mate cont inued disobeying his or ders , then Overman would be co m e more forcefu l

.
4 By tha t time, additional officers had arrived to help restrain Washington

.4

when he entered an inmate’s cell, there was always a possibility that he could be ass ault ed by an
i n mate. 5 Captain Luke Whitehead testified that he had worked for Gregg C ounty for over fifteen
years. Whitehead explained that the S tate of Texas ha d policies and procedures in place on running a jail. In particular, Whitehead described the pr ocedure use d by correction al off icers
when inmates are moved through the jail. He also explained the safety measures that officers use when entering an inmate’s cell

. In th at regard, Overman’s handling of Washing ton complied
with the required safety meas ures. 6
II . Discussion
A. Jury Instruction Error In his first point of error, Washington maintains that the trial court erred when it did not include in its jury charge an instruction on the defensive claim of effective consent. 7
A trial court “ is u ltimately r e sponsible for the ac curacy of the jury charge and accompanying instructions.” Delgado v. State , 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Article 36.14 explains that “the judge shall [,] before th e argument begins, deliver to the jury,
excep t in ple a s of guilty, where a ju ry has been waived, a written charge distinctly setting forth

5 Correction al O fficer Hatt ’s testimony was, in relevant pa rt, consistent with Overman’s testim ony.

6 An tonio Monsivais, a lieutenant with the Greg County J ail an d the south jai l administr a tor, testified about the procedures used by the correctional officers if an inmate threatens to hurt himself. In sum, the correctional officers are requi red to ma ke the situation a priority and to get to the inmate as soon as po s sible

. Monsiv ai s explain e d that when an inmate asks for a ranking officer, it is a discretionary call on the part of the correctional off icer on whether to comply with the inmate ’s reques t.

7 It is a defense to the offense of assault that the victim effe c tively consent ed to the o f fender’s assaultive conduct or that the offender reasonably believed that the victim consented, as long as the c onduct did not threaten or inflict seriou s bodily injur y. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 22.06.5

the law applic able to the case

. ” T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 36.14 . In fact, the trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to th e case eve n if defense counsel f ails to object to exclusions or inclusions in the charge. Taylor v. State , 332 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Yet, Article 36.14 does not impose a duty on a trial cour t to instruct the jury sua sponte on unreques ted defens i ve issues because an unrequested defensive issue is not the law applicable to the case. Id

. A defendant may not complain on appeal about the trial court’s
failure to include a defensive instruction that he did not preserve by a request or an objection.
Acosta v. State , 411 S.W.3d 76, 88 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Taylor , 332 S.W.3d at 486). In other words, he has procedurally defaulted any such complaint. Here, Washing ton did not ask the trial court to include in its jury cha r ge an instruction on the defensive claim of effective consent. As a result, h e has waived th e issue on appeal. We , therefore, overrule Washington’s first point of error.
B. Violation of Articles 33.03 and 35.17 of the Texas Code of Crimina l Procedure In his second poi nt of error, Washington maintains that , because he was not present for the seating of the jury panel, the trial court violated Article s 33.03 and 35.17 of the Texas Code
of Crimin al Procedure

. In support of his position, Was hington dire c ts us to the initia l portion of the proceedings when the panel was present but Washington was not. Speaking to the jury panel, the trial court stated,

Okay. Here’s what’s going to happen. We’re going to kind of re

- seat you. We’ re going to call your n ames out and re

- seat you. The good new s is, let me tell you, the good news is because ya’ll got here timely, and we’re kind of ahead, we’re going to be able to finish this process we ll before lunch, okay? Sometimes I’ve had jur ies where we didn’t start u ntil 10 o ’clock, and it went over6

to

- - past lunch. So we’re going to re

- seat you, and then the attorneys will address you for a little while, and we will pick 13 people to be on ou r jury which would start tomorrow. So take a litt le break, just relax, a n d the n w e’re going to move some chairs around, re

- seat you, and go from there. So just stay here, don’t leave the room, okay? Let’s do an exercise. I know. Okay. I’m going to call your name out, and we’re going to s eat you in order beginning over h e re to my left. Deputy Bozman will help you be seated. And then once we’re seated, I’ll give you some more instructions, Okay

. In his brief, Washington represents that , after the t rial court’s explanation above, “it appears that

n ames were called and po t ential j urors were seated by the bailiff.” Yet , the record indicates that
the “ [d] efendant enter [ed] the courtroom while [the] panel [was] being seated.”
Based on that se ries of events, Washington contends that he was not given the opportunit y to “see t h e way [the panel mem bers] conducted themselves, their body language, their facial expressions.” 8 According to Washington, his absence from that portion of the proceed ings put him at a distinct disadvantage.

1
. Article 33.03
“One of the most basic of t h e right s guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial.” Illinois v. All en , 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Lewis v. United States , 146 U.S. 370 (1 892) )

. Moreover, A rticle
33.03 o f the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the defendant’s personal presence at trial, except “when the defendant voluntarily absents himself aft er pleading to the indictment or information, or after the jury has been s elec ted when trial is before a j ury
. ” T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 33.03

.

8 On May 11, 2021 , Washington filed a n amend ed motion f o r new trial and motion in arrest of judgment in which he complain ed , in part, that he was not present in the c ourtroom while the jury panel was being se ated. D uring the hearing on his motion, Washington testified that he would h a ve liked to ha ve been pre s ent when the panel members entered the courtroom so that he could adequately observe their demeanor.7

Washington contends that approximately fifty

- five of the approximately sixty

- five panel
members were seated prior to his entrance into the courtroom. Washington ’ s argument
presumes, without ci ting to any l e g a l authority, that jury selection begins when the panel
members walk through the courtroom doors and begin taking their seats

. Even assuming, without finding, that he is correct , Washington’s claim remai ns meritless because he has not
shown that he was h a r med by the alleged error

. 9 Washington complains that because he was not allowed to observe the panel members
enter the courtroom and take their seats , he was unable to o bserve thei r behavior and
mannerisms

. Yet , the record shows that Washington was p r esent for at least part of the time the panel w as being seated and for every substantive portion of jury selection

. He was present at the
time the trial court called t he ca se to order, during the trial court’s relevant instructions to the jury, when th e l awyers for both parties addressed the panel, a nd when the specific panel
members were chosen to sit on the jury. Consequently, i t is disingenuous for Washington to
cla im th at he did not have adequate opportunity to observe the panel members’ behavior b e c a use he did not see all of them sit down in the ir seats.

2
. Article 35.17
Article 35.17 (1 ) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states, “When the court in it s dis cretion so directs, except as provided in Section 2, the state and defendant shall c o n d uct the voir dire examination of prospect ive jurors in the presence of t he entire panel. ” T EX
. C ODE

9 Under th e traditional harm analysis, Washing ton is require d to show that the complained

- of error “probably caused the rendition of an improper j udgment” o r “ probably prevented [ him ] from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals

. ” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 4 4.1(a).8

C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN . art. 35.17 (1)

. In other words, Article 35.17 (1) r equires that the entire jury panel be present during jury selection, not that the de f e n dant b e present during the entirety of ju ry selection. Article 35.17(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure speaks to the parties’ ability to address each of t he pa nel members individually in a capital felony case whe re the State is seeking the dea t h penalty. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN . art. 35.17(2). N either su bsection (1) nor subsection (2) of Arti cle 35.17 is applicable to Washington’s complaint that he was not present in the courtroom when the jury panel was being seated

. Accordingly, we find t h a t there

was n o violation of Article 35.17

. We overrule Washington’s second point of error.
C. Jury Selection
1. The State’s Challenge For Cause In his third point of error, Was hingto n contends that the trial court reversibly erred when it granted the S t ate’s for

- c ause challenge of a “qualified juror.” During jury selection, the State asked the panel members whether they would requi re

more than one witness’ testimony in order to fi nd a p erson guilty of an offense. Venireperson
Dixon indicated that s h e would need more evidence than just one witness. The following discussion then took place in the presence of the entire jury panel :

[ THE STATE]: Oh, no, and I get where you’re c oming from. In this particular scenario, you would believe that one w i t ness beyond a reasonable doubt, you would find them truthful, credible, and you would say, “I believe t h at they’re telling is the truth, I believe that this happened beyond a reasona ble dou bt ,” but would you still want something more ?

VENIREPERSON D I X O N: Uh

- huh, yea. I can’t take one person’s word.9 . . . . [ THE STATE ] : No, you said you couldn’t take someone
at their word.
VENIREPERSON DIXON : No, no, no. W hat I’m saying is like

- - for example, you’re saying that if you

- - i f I c o u ld believe the person that’s presenting with just their word, without evidence.

[ T HE STATE ] : Yes, ma’am. No video, nothing like that.
VENIREPERSON DIXON : No.

. . . . [ THE STATE ]: I guess what I’m trying to get at is, if yo u we r e presented with one witness that you believe beyond a reasonable doubt, you believe what they’re saying, you believe that I’ve established every single element that I’ve got to es tablish in the case, in that particular scenario, would you still want some t h i ng more?

VENIREPERSON DIXON : And you’re telling me you’re going to establish this without any

- - with no evidence, no video, no

- -

[THE STATE] : That’s it, just on e witne ss. VENIREPERSON DIXON : No. [THE STATE] : Okay. Yo u - - e v e n though you believe what they’re sa ying, you believe it beyond a reasonable doubt, you still couldn’t come to a decision? VENIREPERSON DIXON: Because people

- - we can be in a situation and you every

- - I may not hear what the other person h eard o r t hey make a different interpretati on for it. I think that if

- - I’m hearing some facts, I ought to have something to back my facts instead of just words. Later, Dixon was qu est ioned at the bench in the presence of counsel

. After Dixon wa s given multip le hypothetical circumstances and participated in several lengthy discussions, she10

eventually said , “If I’m listening and I believe it without a reasonable doubt, I don’t need [other evidence]. But I just

- - when I said that to you, I was ju s t thinking we ’re living in a society nowadays where it’s video, it’s cell phones, and all of this stuff is ava ilable.” She continued, “That’s why I said what I said. Do you un derstand?”
T he State moved to strike Dixon for cause, and the tr ial co u rt granted its r equest. Washington objected to the State striking Dixon for cause, and the trial court allowed him to question Dixon for purposes of the record. After a brief d is cussion, Dixon explained, “I think we’ve got a misunderstanding, and perhap s I have phrased it wrong.” Adding that cameras were so easily accessible in today’ s society, Dixon conceded that she would be able to find a person guilty based on only one witn es s’ testimony if she believed the person testifying was credible.
The trial co u rt then excus ed Dixon from the courtroom. Article 35.16(a)( 9 ) of the Texas Code of Crim inal Procedure states , (a) A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular j uror, alleging some fact which renders him incapable or unfit to se rve on t h e j ury. A chall enge for cause may be made by either the state or the defense for any one of the following reasons:

. . . . ( 9 ) That he has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against th e defendant.
T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN . art. 35.16(a)( 9 ). In anal y zi n g whether the trial court erred in its ruling on a challenge for cause, we examine “the entire record of voir dire to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s ruli ng .” Gonzales v. State , 353 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex. Crim. App . 2011) (c i ting Feldman v. State , 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds , T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN . art. 37.071, as recognized11

in Coleman v. State , No. AP

- 75478, 2009 WL 4696064 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec 9, 2009) (per
curium ) ( n ot designated for publication). In addition, t he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
held , A veniremember is challengeable for cause if (among other reasons) he has a bias in favor of or against the defendant or a bias or prejudice against any of the l aw s applicable t o the case upon which the state or defense is to rely. The test is whether the bias or prejudice would substantially impair the prospective juror’s ability to carry out hi s oath and follow instructions in accordance with the la w. Before a p r ospective jur or can be excused for cause on this basis, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views. The propo ne nt of the challenge for cause has the burden of establ ishi ng that th e challenge is proper, and he does not meet this burden until he has shown that the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough t o follow the law. Tracy v. State , 597 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex . Crim. Ap p . 2020) ( cita tions omitted) ; Feldman v.
State , 71 S.W.3d at 744

– 45

. A trial court’s ruling is afforded “great deference” since that court was able to observe
both the demean or and the tone of voice of the venire person. Gonzale s , 353 S.W.3d at 831 (c i ti n g Feldman , 71 S.W.3d at 744). “When a veniremember’s answers in voir dire are ambiguous, vacillating, unclear, or contradictory, particular deference is given to the trial c ou rt’s
decision.” Tracy , 597 S.W.3d at 512 (citing Gar dne r v. State , 306 S.W. 3 d 2 74, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) )

. “A trial judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause may be reversed only for a clear
abuse of discretion.” Id

. The law in Texas is clear : It is proper for the State to ask during voi r di re if j urors can convict on the t e st i mony of one w itness if the jurors believe that witness beyond a reasonable doubt on all of the necessary elements that establish an offense because a negative12

answer b y a juror to the question makes the prospective juro r chal lengeable for cause. Blac k we l l v. State , 1 93 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing
Castillo v. State , 913 S .W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Washington argu es that the State failed to carry its burden of demo nstrat ing that Dixon
would not fo l lo w the law bec a use she eventually affirmed that she could listen to all the evidence and return a guilty verdict if the State met its burden of proof. Yet, the acknowl edg ement by
Dixon at the end of a very lengthy discu ssion does not necessarily requir e a conclusion t h at Dixon would actually follow the law and conform to the “ one witness rule. ” We believe that the record, as set forth above, shows that Dixon’s response s t o the State’s questions were clear, unequiv ocal, and straight forward; that is, sh e c l early said m u ltiple times that she needed more than just one person’s testimony to find an individual guilty of a criminal offense . She specifically noted se ver al times that perhaps the State could produ ce a r ecording of some sort
since cameras were s o r e adily availa b le in our current society

. Her position on the matter
became very evident by the State’s extended questioning, in which it attempted several times to
el icit something other than Dixon’s unequivoc al ans wer that she could not follow the “ one wi t ne ss rule. ” That said, the record supports a finding that Dixon was at least substantially impaired from following the law. As a result , we find no abuse of dis cre tion in the trial court’s granting of the State’s challenge for cause.
We overrule Wash i ng to n’s thi r d point of error.13 2. The State’s Question Regarding the Panel Members ’ Level of Trust of Law Enforcement Officers In his fourth point of error, Wa shi ngton maintains that the trial court erred when it
allowed the State to ask the panel member s a bo ut thei r level of trust toward law enforcement
officers.
A trial court “has broad discretion in the manner it chooses to conduct voir dire , both as
to the topics that will be addressed, and the form a nd substance of the questions that will be employ e d to addres s them.” Jacobs v. State , 560 S.W.3d 205, 210

– 11 (Te x. Crim. App. 2018) (footnotes omitted). Questions that probe into bias and preju dice against th e applicable law are permissible. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P RO C

. A NN . art. 35.16; Hogue v. State , 711 S .W .2 d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Yet, t he trial court may impose reasonable restrictions on voir dire
examination. Boyd v. State , 811 S.W.2d 105, 1 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Faulder v.
State , 7 45 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Tex. Cr im . App. 1987) )

. An a pp el late co u rt reviews the trial court’s decision to limit jury selection under an abuse
of discretion standard. Dowden v. State , 758 S.W.2d 264 , 274 (Tex . Crim. App. 19 88 ) (citing
Smith v. State , 513 S.W .2d 823, 825 (Tex. Cr im . App. 1974) )

. An abuse of di sc retion o ccurs when the trial court refuses to permit a party to ask a proper question

. Allridge v. State , 762
S.W.2d 146 , 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 198 8 ) . Li kewise, permitt ing an improper question would a lso
be an abuse of discretion. Palacio v. State , 5 80 S .W.3d 4 4 7, 450 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) ( citing Barajas v. State , 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) )

. Here, the State aske d the jury pane l the following question:14

And I’m going to ask each and every single one of you w h et he r
- - bas ed on your prior experience with law enforcement, whether you strongly distrust all law enforcement, distrust, trust or strongly trust? And it’s ultimately to give myself and Mr. Davis a gau ge of where we’re at on this. We’ve got to have 12 p eo pl e that, regardless of prior experiences, are going to be open to hearing the evidence and making a fair and impartial decision. In response to the State ’s question, Wa shington objected, stating,
I’ m going to object to improper jury question. To giv e t he jurors a level of trust to list in a specific scale

- - I’m going to object to any jury question to prior communication with law enforcement have

- - gi ving them a lev el of trust number or a strongl y distrust, that’s an improper question.
The trial c ou rt overrul ed Washington’s objection. For the next several minutes, the State spoke to each panel member assessing their level of trust of law enforceme nt officers

. On appeal, Washington maintain s “that the use of such a formulation during voir dire [w as ] simply the wolf of bias toward law enforcement dressed up under a sheep’s pelt of an
innocuous sounding term ‘ trust. ’ ” In support of h is position, W ashington directs us to Hernandez v. Stat e , 563 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In Hernandez , th e p ro spective juror stated his belief that a law enforcement officer would not tell a lie in any case. Three of the
State’s four witnesses we re police officers. Id

. at 950. Consequently, the pro spective juror was
biased as a matter of law in that she wa s e ff ectively prevented “ from impartially judging the credibility of th ose witnesses.” Id

. W hen a pote ntial juror indicates that he or she w ould always believe a police off

icer, the potential jur or is expressing a bias against the defendant and should
be st ru ck for c a use. Id

. Contrary to his argument , Washington cites legal authority that stands for the proposition
that questions regarding a potential juror’s bias in favo r of, or against, law e nforcement officers15

are permissible inquiries . The same co u ld b e said f o r questions relating to the panel members’
level of trust toward police officers or correc tional officers , especially when, as in th is case, the State is relying on the officers ’ test imony to prove its case

. Such an inquiry, and those simila r t o it, give both parties the opportunity to determine whether any panel member would believe or
disbelie ve one person over another merely because of a particular job title or e mployment experienc e
. Far from assisting only the State , the panel members’ a n sw er s to the complained

- of question also provided Washington with useful information. In sum , the question Washington complains of is an acceptab le one ; it is the panel members ’ answers to the qu estion that might possibly result in a n objection in the fo r m of a chall e nge for cause. 10 We overrule Washington’s fourth point of error.
D. Washington’s Previously Dismissed Criminal Charges
In his fi fth point of error, Washington contends that the t rial court reversibly erred when
it refused to admit eviden c e sh owing th a t the charges for which he was incarcerated had been dismissed by the State. To that end, Washington sought the admission of th e evidence several times during the guilt

/innocence pha se of the trial and once during the punishment phase.
Wash i ng to n argue s that the jury should have had the “complete story,” including the fact that the State dismissed the charges against him

.

“ We review a tri al court ’ s decision to admit or exclude evide nce for an abuse of
discr etion. ” Flowers v. State , 438 S.W. 3 d 96 , 103 (T e x. App.

— Texarkana 2014 , pet. ref’d )

10 A tendency to believe or disbelieve the testimony of a pol ice offi cer more than other witnesses may be suffi c ient to justif y the trial court in excusing the potential juror for cause but does not require the juror to be excused for cause. Leac h v. State , 770 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 19 89 , p et. ref ’d)

.16

(citing Martinez v. State , 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) )

. “ Abuse of discretion

occurs o nly if the decision is ‘ so cle arly wrong as to lie outside the zone wi thin which reasonable people might di sa gree.” ’ Id. (quoting Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

. “ We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial co urt. ” Id. (citing Moses v.
St ate , 105 S.W. 3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) )

. If the trial court’s r u li ng was in t he “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and its ruling will be upheld

. Rachal v. State , 917 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In response to Washington’s argum ent , the State maintains that the evidence wa s inadmiss i ble because it was , among other things, irrelevant

. Rule 402 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that all relevant evidence is admissi ble. T EX
. R. E VID . 402. Rule 401 defines
relevant evidence as that having “ any tendency to make the e x is te nce of a n y fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” T EX
. R. E VID . 4 01. “ In deci ding whether a pa rticular piec e of evidence is relevant, the trial judge shou l d as k ‘would a reasonable person , with some experience in the real
world believe that the particular piece of evidence is helpful in determining the truth or falsity of any fact that is of conseq uence to the law suit. ’ ” Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372 , 3 76 (Tex. C r im. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g) (quoting United States v. Brashier , 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9 th Cir. 1976) )

. In support of his position, Washington directs us to Rule 107 of the Texas Rul es of Evidence, entitled the “Rule of Optional Completeness

. ” Ru le 107 s t ates , If a party introduces part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may inquire into any other part on the same subject.17

An adve rse party may also introduce any other act, declaration, con v er sa tion, wr i ting, or recorded statement that is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by the opponent.
T EX
. R. E VID
. 107

. Was hington contends that t he j ury should have heard the “complete” story.
His argu m en t is less t han compelling. Washington was charged with two counts of assault on a public servant. Consequently, the State was required to prove (1) that Washin gton inte ntionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to anothe r and (2) that he c om mi tted the offense against a person he knew was a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 22.01( b ) (Supp.) . Washington does not argu e th at the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he was guilty of the c h ar ge
. Inste a d , he seemingly claims that he had a reasonable explanation as to why he committed the assaults and that the jury should have been allowed to consi der his expla nati on. Accordin g to Washington, “ the evidence of the reasons for his incarcerat i on w ere part and parcel of the context of this prosecution, trial, conviction, and punishment ” b ecause “ [t] his was not an assault on a peace officer that occurred out i n the woods o r at a shopping ce nter or in relation to a DWI stop or domestic violen c e.” Apparentl y, Washington argues that under those types of circumstances, charging a pers on with assault on a public servant would be more palatable. Washington also jus tifies his ac tions , stating, “A ny citizen lawfully going about his or
her business y et thrown into j a il understandably would be upset and even acting belligerent to
the forces of the State that kept them there.” In other words, if Washington had really co mmitted
the c rime for which he was being held , he would have had no defense or excu s e for committi ng18

the assault s on the correctional officers. But because the State dismissed the original charges, he was somehow less responsible for intentionally , knowin gly, or reckl essly caus ing bodi ly injury
to the correctional officers.
The fact t h at the origina l c harges were dismissed h as no relevance to the elements o f the charged offense. In other words , evidence regarding the disposition of the offenses for whic h he was being held was not “ ne cessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to ful l y understand t he part offered by the [State]

. ” See T EX
. R. E VID
. 107. As a result, we find that the trial court’s ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement a nd that the tr ial court did not abuse its
discretion. We overrule Washington’s fifth point of error

. I II. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the t rial court.

Scott E. Stevens Justice
Date Submitted: December 13, 2021 Date Decided: Janu ary 27 , 2022
D o Not Publish