* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 4, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-20236

Summary Calendar

 

GEORGE CARLISLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN JONES; LIEUTENANT SELMAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CV-4045

--------------------

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant George Carlisle, Texas prisoner #494912,

appeals from the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of his

§ 1983 lawsuit against Defendants-Appellants Assistant Warden Mark

Jones and Officer Troy Selman. Carlisle alleged that the

defendants violated his constitutional rights by reassigning him

from the carpentry work unit to the hog barn work unit. Carlisle

argues on appeal that: (1) the district court abused its discretion

by denying his motions to file a second amended complaint, for an
2

extension of time to file a supplemental complaint, and for an

extension of time to conduct discovery; and (2) the district

court’s grant of summary judgment was incorrect.

Examination of the record shows that the denial of Carlisle’s

motion to amend his complaint a second time was harmless. See

Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1998). Carlisle

sought a second extension of time to file a response to the

defendants’ summary-judgment motion so that he could file a

supplemental complaint. The district court was within its

discretion to deny Carlisle’s request to file a supplemental

complaint because the defendants’ summary-judgment motion had

already been filed and Carlisle was trying to raise claims that

were “similar in nature” to his original claims. See Burns v.

Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998). As Carlisle’s

motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery did not meet

the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f), the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying that motion. See Beattie v.

Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2001). 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the

standard applicable in the district court. See Melton v. Teachers

Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America, 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997).

By failing to challenge the district court’s holding that he did

not have a constitutional right to a particular job assignment,

Carlisle abandoned that issue. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222,

224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Even if he had not, however, he could not
3

have prevailed, as that claim is foreclosed by precedent. See

Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5th Cir.

1995); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989).

Carlisle also failed to set forth a valid equal-protection claim

regarding the delegation of job assignments to African-American

inmates in his prison. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299,

306-07 (5th Cir. 1997).

As Carlisle failed to state a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,

the district court properly granted summary judgment for the

defendants. See Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir.

1989). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.