IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11441

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

KEYON W. CARRAWAY,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-113-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Keyon W. Carraway appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm

after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Raising his 

challenges for the first time, he argues that § 922(g)(1) should be construed to 

reach only firearms that moved in interstate commerce in response to the 

defendant’s commercial conduct or in the recent past. Carraway also contends 

that his factual basis was insufficient for conviction, particularly where it did 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 8, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-11441

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not admit that he knew the firearm travelled in interstate commerce. 

According to Carraway, his arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent, but 

he raises them to preserve the issues for further review. The Government 

moves for summary affirmance or, in the alternative, an extension of time to 

file its brief.

Our jurisprudence has rejected that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce 

Clause and also has rejected that the Supreme Court’s ruling in National 

Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), overruled 

our § 922(g)(1) precedents. United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46

(5th Cir. 2013). We also have reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) requires no proof that 

a defendant knew of the firearm’s interstate nexus. United States v. Rose, 587 

F.3d 695, 705-706 (5th Cir. 2009). Insofar as Carraway renews these 

challenges, his arguments are foreclosed. See United States v. Houston, 625 

F.3d 871, 873 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010).

In United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1993), we 

rejected a similar challenge to the sufficiency of a factual basis, concluding that 

“a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to 

interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1).” The Supreme Court’s decision in 

Bond did not address § 922(g)(1) or abrogate this holding. See Bond v. United 

States, 572 U.S. 844, 848 (2014); see also United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 

486, 489 (5th Cir. 2014) (rule of orderliness). The district court’s determination 

that there was a sufficient factual basis for Carraway’s guilty plea was not a 

clear or obvious error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

We DENY the government’s motion for summary affirmance because the 

parties cite no binding authority addressing whether Bond affects the 

interpretation of § 922(g). See Houston, 625 F.3d at 873 n.2. Nevertheless, we 

dispense with further briefing, DENY the Government’s alternative motion for 

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3

an extension of time to file a brief, and AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court.

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