NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIDIA ISABEL GAMEZ-LOPEZ; JENNY 

MIROSLAVA ESTEVES SILVA, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-71119 

Agency Nos. A088-447-438 

A088-447-439 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 14, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: BADE and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,*** District 

Judge.

Lidia Isabel Gamez-Lopez and Jenny Miroslava Esteves Silva (collectively,

“Petitioners”), who are natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for 

the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 18 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-71119 

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. The IJ’s finding of removability was based on an 

interim decision denying Petitioners’ motion to suppress evidence of alienage 

obtained by federal law enforcement agents during the execution of a criminal search 

warrant at Petitioners’ apartment. We review the BIA’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 

1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we 

deny the petition for review. 

1. “Where, as here, the BIA has reviewed the IJ’s decision and 

incorporated portions of it as its own, we treat the incorporated parts of the IJ’s 

decision as the BIA’s.” Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). 

We agree with the BIA that suppression was not required under the Fourth 

Amendment. Under the circumstances, the agents used reasonable force when they 

broke through Petitioners’ apartment door with guns drawn after knocking and 

announcing themselves as law enforcement agents. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 396–97 (1989). Furthermore, the BIA correctly concluded that reasonable 

suspicion was not required to justify detaining Petitioners while the search warrant 

was being executed. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–102 (2005); Michigan 

v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). This is so even though the search warrant did 

not seek evidence of crimes involving violence. See Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 
3 16-71119 

F.3d 1054, 1065–70 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the detention 

and questioning of Petitioners did not prolong the search of their residence. 

Petitioner Gamez-Lopez confirmed that, after she produced two of the three 

documents named in the search warrant, the agents continued to look for the third 

document – a letter from the Social Security Administration. In total, the detention 

lasted only 40 to 60 minutes. 

2. We also agree with the BIA that the agents’ actions were not so coercive 

as to violate the Fifth Amendment. Petitioners were detained and questioned for less 

than an hour. During this time, Petitioners were seated in their apartment within 

eyesight of each other. There is no indication Petitioners were handcuffed or 

otherwise restrained, and they were not yelled at or berated. There were no weapons 

pointed at them while they were questioned. Petitioners do not allege that the agents 

used or threatened to use physical force, denied Petitioners food or drink, or made 

threats or improper promises. Under these circumstances, Petitioners have not 

established that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated. See Gonzaga-Ortega v. 

Holder, 736 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2013).

3. For the same reasons, suppression was not warranted for regulatory 

violations. The first regulation provides that an agent may question an individual 

regarding her immigration status only if the agent “has a reasonable suspicion, based 
4 16-71119 

on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned is, or is attempting to 

be, engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the 

United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2). The agents had reasonable suspicion to detain 

and question Petitioners because they hid in their bathroom when law enforcement 

agents came to execute a criminal search warrant. The second regulation prohibits 

“[t]he use of threats, coercion, or physical abuse . . . to induce a suspect to waive his 

or her rights or to make a statement.” Id. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii). The agents did not use 

threats, abuse, or coercion to induce Petitioners to waive their rights or make a 

statement. 

PETITION DENIED.