UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. ACM 40274 (f rev)

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UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Ian M. WILSON

Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

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Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary 

Upon Further Review

Decided 5 February 2024

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Military Judge: Bryon T. Gleisner (Article 30a proceedings); Brett A. 

Landry.

Sentence: Sentence adjudged 1 February 2022 by GCM convened at the 

Oakland County Circuit Court in Pontiac, Michigan. Sentence entered 

by military judge on 15 March 2022: Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture

of $1,190.00 pay per month for 2 months, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand. 

For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Lieutenant 

Colonel J. Peter Ferrell, USAF; Major Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen 

Payne, Esquire.

Before JOHNSON, ANNEXSTAD, and MASON, Appellate Military 

Judges.

Judge MASON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Judge 

JOHNSON and Senior Judge ANNEXSTAD joined. 

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United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 40274 (f rev)

2

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.

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MASON, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, in 

accordance with his pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement, of one charge and 

one specification of desertion with an intent to remain away permanently terminated by apprehension, in violation of Article 85, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 885.

1 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a 

bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of $1,190.00 pay per month for two months, 

reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening authority took 

no action on the findings or sentence.

Appellant originally raised three assignments of error: (1) whether this 

court should order correction of the entry of judgment, which incorrectly stated

that the convening authority denied a deferment request when Appellant only 

made a suspension request; (2) whether a missing convening order necessitates

remand; and (3) whether Appellant’s sentence is inappropriately severe.2

Additionally, the court’s review of the record indicated that the compact 

disc (CD) purporting to contain the audio recordings of all open sessions of the 

trial failed to capture the final session wherein the military judge apparently 

reopened Appellant’s court-martial to announce his corrected sentence.

We remanded the case for correction of the entry of judgment (Issue 1),

insertion into the record of trial of the missing convening order (Issue 2), and 

resolution of the issue of the missing audio recording of the last session of Appellant’s court-martial. We deferred addressing Appellant’s allegation that his 

sentence is inappropriately severe until the record was returned to this court 

for completion of our Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d), review. See 

United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 40274, 2023 CCA LEXIS 343, at *6 (A.F. Ct. 

Crim. App. 16 Aug. 2023) (unpub. op.). Issues 1 and 2 have been resolved as 

directed. The issue of the recording was also addressed and resolved. The case 

is returned to us for review. Appellant acknowledges that Issues 1 and 2 are 

now moot but still asserts that his sentence is inappropriately severe.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this opinion to the UCMJ and Rules for 

Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).

2 Appellant raises the third issue regarding the severity of his sentence pursuant to 

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 40274 (f rev)

3

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was stationed at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. On 3 January 2021, Appellant knew that he was under investigation for an allegation 

of sexual assault in Oakland County, Michigan. On 9 February 2021, Appellant’s mother called him and told him that the State of Michigan issued a warrant for his arrest. After he finished talking to her, Appellant packed his bags

and transferred nearly $10,000.00 from his savings account to his checking account. He researched map information, “Canadian words,” and area information. He got in his car and started driving north away from Nellis AFB, 

Nevada, with the intent to cross the border into Canada. At some point during 

the drive, Appellant formed the intent to remain away from his unit permanently. During the military judge’s inquiry into the providency of Appellant’s 

pleas, Appellant stated that he had driven too far to turn around and report to

his next shift on time. He decided that he would continue driving towards the 

border and would not go back to his duty station. He proceeded until he was 

about 100 yards away from the United States–Canada border in Washington 

State, where he pulled into a neighborhood, parked, and contemplated whether 

he should cross the border. United States Border Patrol agents approached 

Appellant while he was parked and checked his identification. They learned of 

his deserter status and of open arrest warrants issued by the United States Air 

Force and the State of Michigan. The agents contacted the local police who

arrested Appellant and arranged for his extradition to Michigan.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Law

We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64 

M.J. 1, 2 n.8 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We may affirm only as much of the sentence as 

we find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved based on the 

entire record. Article 66(d), UCMJ. In determining whether a sentence should 

be approved, our authority is “not legality alone, but legality limited by appropriateness.” United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2010). “We assess sentence appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, the appellant’s record of service, and all 

matters contained in the record . . . .” United States v. Fields, 74 M.J. 619, 625 

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (citations omitted).

In conducting our review, we must also be sensitive to considerations of 

uniformity and even-handedness. United States v. Sothen, 54. M.J. 294, 296 

(C.A.A.F. 2001). 
United States v. Wilson, No. ACM 40274 (f rev)

4

When considering the appropriateness of a sentence, we may consider that 

a plea agreement to which Appellant agreed placed limits on the sentence that 

could be imposed. See Fields, 74 M.J. at 626. 

While we have significant discretion in determining whether a particular 

sentence is appropriate, we are not authorized to engage in exercises of clemency. Nerad, 69 M.J. at 148.

B. Analysis

Knowing that he was facing imminent arrest by civilian authorities as part 

of a sexual assault investigation, Appellant transferred nearly $10,000.00 from 

his savings account to his checking account. He researched map information, 

“Canadian words” and area information, and fled his duty station. He was apprehended by Border Patrol agents only about 100 yards from the United 

States–Canada border.

Before trial, Appellant’s trial defense counsel successfully negotiated a plea 

agreement that ensured Appellant would not be sentenced to any confinement 

or to a dishonorable discharge. Yet, Appellant personally asserts that his sentence is inappropriately severe.

We have conducted a thorough review of Appellant’s entire court-martial 

record, including his record of service, and all matters submitted in extenuation and mitigation, including the fact that following his apprehension, he was 

confined awaiting trial for his civilian charge. We find that the nature and seriousness of the offense clearly support, at a minimum, the adjudged sentence.

Thus, the sentence is not inappropriately severe, and we affirm the sentence 

as adjudged.

III. CONCLUSION

The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no 

error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court