No. 95-131 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

GERALDINE JOY LEWIS, 

Petitioner, Respondent and 

Cross-Appellant, 

and 

WILLIAM ISAAC LEWIS, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Joan E. Cook; Law Office of Joan E. Cook, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Daniel L. Falcon; Matteucci, Falcon, Squires & 

Lester, Great Falls, Montana 

Y 

Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 1995 

Decided: November 21, 1995 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

William Isaac Lewis (William) appeals from the December 30, 

1994, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Cascade County, dissolving his marriage to 

Geraldine Joy Lewis (Geraldine) and dividing the marital estate. 

Geraldine cross-appeals from the court's denial in that decree of 

her request for attorney's fees and from the court's subsequent 

order amending the decree. We modify the amended 1994 decree and, 

thereafter, affirm. 

We address the following issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly verbatim, 

Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 

distributing the marital estate? 

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying 

Geraldine attorney's fees? 

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by deleting a 

finding of fact regarding Geraldine's medical and counseling bills 

and modifying the decree accordingly? 

2 
William and Geraldine married on May 22, 1985. No children 

were born of the marriage. During the marriage, the parties 

operated a business in which they boarded horses (stables 

business). The property on which the stables business was 

operated, and where William and Geraldine lived, was owned by 

William prior to the parties' marriage and substantially improved 

during the marriage. 

Geraldine petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in June 

of 1994 and, on December 30, 1994, the District Court entered its 

Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Decree. Thereafter, 

William timely filed a Rule 59 motion requesting that the District 

Court amend the 1994 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree. The District Court amended the decree by adjusting the 

distribution of the marital estate to correct the duplication of 

certain marital assets, deleting a finding regarding Geraldine's 

medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree accordingly. 

William appeals from the court's distribution of the marital 

estate. Geraldine cross-appeals the court's denial of her request 

for attorney's fees and costs and from the court's order amending 

the findings and decree regarding her medical and counseling bills. 

1. Did the District Court err in adopting, nearly 

verbatim, Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Decree? 

William argues on appeal that the District Court's adoption of 

Geraldine's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree resulted in a Decree which is not supported by the evidence; 

he contends, therefore, that the 1994 decree must be vacated. We 

3 
review the adequacy of findings of fact and conclusions of law to 

determine whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent 

to the issues to provide a basis for a decision, and whether they 

are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of 

Nikolaisen (1993), 257 Mont. 1, 5, 847 P.2d 287, 289 (citing In re 

Marriage of Hurley (1986), 222 Mont. 287, 296, 721 P.2d 1279, 

1285). 

The District Court's findings regarding the marital assets, 

the credibility of each party's testimony and Geraldine's 

contributions to the marital estate were extensive. In 

distributing the marital estate, the court considered each party's 

current income and the sources of that income; Geraldine's 

education level and work history; the income from the stables 

business; Geraldine's contributions as a homemaker and her 

contributions to the maintenance of the stables business; and the 

commingling of the parties' income. The findings are sufficiently 

comprehensive and pertinent in light of the factors enumerated in 

5 40-4-202, MCA. In addition, they are supported by substantial 

evidence and, except as discussed below, William does not argue 

otherwise. 

We will not overturn the court's findings and conclusions 

simply because they were, in large measure, adopted from those 

Geraldine proposed. See In re Marriage of Popp (19831, 206 Mont. 

415, 423, 671 P.2d 24, 28. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides that 

a district court may adopt any of a party's proposed findings or 

conclusions so long as they are supported by the evidence and law 

4 
of the case. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not 

err in adopting, nearly verbatim, Geraldine's proposed findings and 

conclusions. 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 

distributing the marital estate? 

A district court has broad discretion in finally and equitably 

apportioning the property and assets of the marital estate between 

the parties. Section 40-4-202(l), MCA. We review the distribution 

of a marital estate to determine if the court's findings of fact 

are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Smith (Mont. 1995), 891 

P.2d 522, 525, 52 St.Rep. 174, 175-76. If the findings and decree 

are supported by substantial credible evidence, we will not alter 

the trial court's decision unless the court abused its discretion. 

Marriaqe of Smith, 891 P.2d at 525. 

Premarital Assets 

William contends that the District Court abused its discretion 

by awarding Geraldine a portion of his premarital property and 

fifty percent of the entire value of the stables. He also asserts 

error in the court's finding that inadequate evidence existed to 

trace his premarital investment monies. 

A court's distribution of premarital assets is governed, in 

the first instance, by statutory criteria. In distributing such 

assets, the court is required to consider the contributions of the 

other spouse to the marriage--including nonmonetary contributions 

and the extent to which such contributions facilitated the 

maintenance of the property--and whether or not the property 

division serves as an alternative to maintenance. Section 40-4- 

5 
202(l) (a)-(c), MCA. 

A district court must consider the origin of prior-acquired 

property in distributing that property. In re Marriage of White 

(1985), 218 Mont. 343, 345, 708 P.2d 267, 269 (citation omitted). 

Notwithstanding its origin, however, such property is subject to 

equitable apportionment between the parties, and equitable 

apportionment does not require that the parties be returned to 

their premarital status. Marriaae of White, 708 P.2d at 269. 

Geraldine testified that she was responsible for the upkeep of 

the family home and that she helped feed the animals and helped 

with other outside work. She further testified that she assisted 

in the purchase of the stables prior to the parties' marriage. 

When William was unable to work at the stables because of an 

injury, Geraldine took sole responsibility for care of the stables. 

Additionally, Geraldine worked at Sperry's Market, a premarital 

asset of William's, often without pay. The court determined that 

Geraldine made substantial contributions to the value of all of the 

marital assets. We conclude that substantial credible evidence 

supports the court's findings regarding the premarital property. 

William also contends that the District Court erred in finding 

that no valid means existed by which to separate the commingled 

funds of the parties. However, the record before us contains 

substantial credible evidence to support this finding. 

The record reflects that William and Geraldine maintained a 

joint account to which they both contributed. Deposits into this 

joint account included Geraldine's social security benefits, wages 

6 
and inheritance money; William's social security benefits, wages 

and income from investments; and income from the stables business. 

The parties did not make an effort during the marriage to keep 

their money separate. We conclude that substantial credible 

evidence supports the court's finding that the parties commingled 

their money and that no viable means existed to separate each 

party‘s money. 

The court's findings are not clearly erroneous and the court 

properly considered the statutory factors set forth in 5 40-4- 

202(l) (a)-(c), MCA. We hold that William has not established an 

abuse of discretion in the distribution of his premarital property. 

Valuation of Marital Property 

Next, William contends that the District Court erred in 

failing to include certain property in Geraldine's share of the 

estate and in accepting "guessed" values of property in valuing the 

marital estate. He further contends that the court erred in 

listing certain assets more than once in distributing the marital 

estate. 

When valuing marital assets, courts may adopt any valuation 

which is supported by the record. In re Marriage of Maedje (1994), 

263 Mont. 262, 267, 868 P.2d 580, 584 (citing In re Marriage of 

Luisi (1988), 232 Mont. 243, 756 P.2d 456). Here, William and 

Geraldine offered different values regarding various marital 

assets. 

Geraldine offered expert testimony regarding the value of 

various assets. Additionally, Geraldine had attended auctions with 

7 
William when certain assets were purchased. The court found that 

William's testimony was inconsistent regarding what property 

constituted the marital estate and the value of such property. The 

court found that the values offered by Geraldine more accurately 

reflected the market values of the parties' assets. The District 

Court's findings regarding the valuation of the parties' marital 

assets are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not 

clearly erroneous. 

William correctly points out that, in the 1994 decree, the 

District Court listed the value of certain assets more than once. 

Geraldine does not dispute that the distribution of the marital 

estate should be adjusted to correct that mistake. However, since 

the District Court corrected this mistake in the order amending the 

decree, this issue is moot. 

William also correctly points out that the court failed to 

distribute the Lincoln Town Car. However, the court did find that 

Geraldine was using this vehicle as her means of transportation and 

that William had possession of other vehicles. Additionally, the 

court recognized that Geraldine requested that the car be awarded 

to her. Accordingly, we modify the decree to award the Lincoln 

Town Car to Geraldine. 

Equalizing the Marital Estate 

The District Court awarded Geraldine marital property valued 

at $2,271 and awarded William property valued at $159,647.52. In 

addition, Geraldine was awarded premarital and gift property valued 

at $165, while William was awarded such property valued at $14,883. 

8 
As a result of the disparate distribution of property each party 

received, the District Court ordered William to pay Geraldine 

$86,047.26 to equalize the marital estate. William contends that 

the District Court abused its discretion by doing so. 

The court considered the factors contained in § 40-4-202, MCA, 

and found that Geraldine made substantial contributions to the 

maintenance of the marital estate. We conclude that the court did 

not abuse its discretion in requiring William to pay Geraldine 

monetary compensation to equalize the share of the estate each 

party would receive. 

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 

denying Geraldine attorney's fees? 

Geraldine contends that the District Court abused its 

discretion in failing to award her attorney's fees and costs. 

Specifically, she argues that the District Court failed to make 

findings regarding, or provide its reasons for, the denial of her 

request for attorney's fees. She urges this Court to remand this 

issue to the District Court for further consideration. 

We review a district court's denial of a party's request for 

attorney's fees in a dissolution action to determine if the court 

abused its discretion. Section 40-4-110, MCA; In re Marriage of 

Gingerich (1994), 269 Mont. 161, 167-68, 887 P.2d 714, 718. We 

will not disturb the district court's findings in this regard if 

they are supported by substantial evidence. Marriase of Ginaerich, 

881 P.2d at 718. 

The District Court acknowledged Geraldine's request for 

attorney's fees and costs in its findings. The court found, 

9 
however, that Geraldine would be receiving a substantial amount of 

the marital estate via William's monetary payment to Geraldine to 

"equalize the marital estate." The court also found that 

Geraldine had paid a portion of her attorney's fees with a cash 

advance from a credit card which William subsequently paid upon 

receiving the credit card bill. In short, it is clear that the 

court considered the financial resources of each party and 

concluded that each party should pay his and her own attorney's 

fees and costs. Substantial credible evidence supports the court's 

findings in this regard and we hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Geraldine's request for attorney's 

fees and costs. 

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 

deleting a finding of fact regarding Geraldine's medical 

and counseling bills and modifying the decree 

accordingly? 

At trial, Geraldine testified without objection regarding 

medical bills in the amount of $98.19 incurred during the marriage 

resulting from an alleged assault by William. Geraldine attempted 

to offer oral and documentary evidence regarding counseling bills 

resulting from alleged verbal abuse by William, but the District 

Court sustained William's objection to the evidence. As a result, 

there is no evidence in the record regarding the amount of 

Geraldine's counseling bills. 

The District Court found that "[Geraldine] had outstanding 

counseling bills of approximately $720 . . . and medical bills of 

$98.19 . . .'I In the decree, the court ordered William to pay 

Geraldine $818.19 out of his share of the marital estate for her 

10 
medical and counseling bills. 

William filed a Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., motion to amend the 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. Following 

consideration of the parties' briefs and oral arguments, the 

District Court amended the decree, as noted above, by adjusting the 

distribution of the marital estate to correct for its previous 

duplication of the values of certain assets. The court also 

amended with regard to Geraldine's medical and counseling bills by 

deleting the finding set forth above and the portion of the decree 

which ordered William to pay Geraldine $818.19 for these bills. 

Geraldine contends that the court erred by deleting reference to 

her medical and counseling bills and modifying the decree 

accordingly. 

We review a district court's grant or denial of a Rule 59 

motion to determine if the court abused its discretion. See 

Hickingbotham v. Duncan (Mont. 1995), 898 P.2d 1215, 1217, 52 

St.Rep. 574, 576. We will not overturn amended findings unless 

they are clearly erroneous. Hickinsbotham, 898 P.2d at 1217. 

Here, substantial evidence supports the original finding 

insofar as it addressed Geraldine's medical bills in the amount of 

$98.19. The court did not have this part of the transcript before 

it when it amended the decree and assumed that, since Geraldine 

provided other parts of the transcript but not this portion, the 

evidence in support of the original finding did not exist. We 

conclude that the court abused its discretion in amending the 

findings to delete reference to the $98.19 in medical bills and by 

11 
deleting paragraph four of the decree to the extent it ordered 

William to pay that amount. 

As stated above, however, there is no evidence of record to 

support any amount of counseling bills. William objected to 

Geraldine's attempt to testify about those bills and to related 

exhibits, and the court sustained the objection. The District 

Court's finding insofar as it addressed Geraldine's counseling 

bills was not supported by substantial evidence and was clearly 

erroneous. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in deleting reference in its findings to the counseling 

bills and deleting paragraph four of the decree to the extent it 

ordered William to pay Geraldine $720 for those bills. 

We modify the amended 1994 decree regarding the Lincoln Town 

Car and the medical bills and affirm the amended decree in all 

other respects.