UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O

. 02-2016

K EN NE TH J. M C P H A IL , A PP EL L ANT ,

V

. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE

.

Be fore I VERS, Chief Judge , and STEI NB ERG and HAG EL , Judges

. O R D E R Appellant, Kenne th J. Mc Phail, through c ounsel, appe als from a n October 30, 2002, Boa

rd of Ve tera ns' Appea ls (BV A or B oard) decision that denie d his claim of entitlement to an ef fec tive date e arl ie r t

ha n A ugus t 6, 1 99 1, for the g ra nt o f s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or c hr on ic pa

ra no id schizophrenia and bipolar disorder ba sed on cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror ( CUE) in dec isions is sued by a VA r eg ional office (RO) in May 1986 and Mar ch 1993. Record (R.) at 1-11. The a ppellant and the Secr etar

y filed brief

s.
Duri ngthe pe nd anc y of the a pp e a l, the Un ite d State s Court of Ap pe a ls fo r the F e de ra l Cir c uit (F eder al Circuit) ruled in Barrett v. Principi , 363 F.3d 1316 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004), reve rsing this Court’s holding that it lacke d jurisdiction be cause the appellant there had failed to file a Notice of

Appea l (NOA ) within the 120-day judicial appea l period set for th in 38 U.S.C

. § 7 266(a) . I n Ba rre tt , the F e de ra l C i r c u i th e l d

t h a t" e v e ni f

i ti s n o tr e l a t e d

t o t h e v e t e r an ' s u n d e r l y i n g c l a i m f o r b e n e f i t s, me nta l il lne ss may

jus tif y the tol lin g of

se c tio n 7 26 6( a )' s 1 20 -d ay pe ri od fo r a pp e a l if c e rt a in
con di ti on s ar e sat is fi ed. " Ba rre tt , 36 3 F .3 d a t 13 20

. F oll ow ing the F e de ra l Cir c uit ' s Ba rre tt ru l i n g, this Court gra

nted the appe llant's motion for le ave to f ile supplemental brief

ing a ddressing the applicability

of Ba rre tt

to the instant appea l. The appe llant and t h e S ec re t ary eac h filed supplemental brief

s in response. This appea l is ti mely , and the Court has jurisdiction over the ca se pursua

nt to 38 U.S.C

. § 7252(a) . For

the re asons set for

th below, the Court will affir m the October

2002 Boa

rd dec ision in part and othe rwise dismiss the appea l. The only issue raised by the appe llant is whether the B oard
e rr e d in de te rm ini ngtha

t me nta l in c a

pa c ity c ann ot, a s a

ma tte r o f l aw, pr ov ide the ba sis fo r e qu ita ble tolling of the time limit for the filing of a N otice of D isag ree ment (NOD ).

Th e a pp e lla nt se rv e d in the L ou isi ana Ar my Natio na l Gu ard fr om F e br ua ry 3, 19 80 , to July 31, 1984, with active duty for tra ining f

rom J une 2 to 16, 1984. R. at 2, 16. I n November 1985, the appellant ' s wife f

iled on his behalf a

claim for service connec tion for "mental ill ness." R. at 101-04, 10 6- 07 . In a

May 3, 19 86 , de c isi on , a

VA RO de nie d th e a

pp e lla nt' s c la im. R. at 12 8- 29 . T he RO2

found that none of

the evidenc e of rec ord indicated that the diag nosed mental illness was incur red in or ag g ravated du ri n g service

. Id. The re cord c ontains no further corr espondenc e fr om the appellant to VA until Aug ust 1991. See R. at 1-631. Nor does the re cord c ontain any evidenc e that the appe llant sought at any time to avail him self of relief aff orded under 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b), whic h allows for a

n extension "for g ood cause shown," of the time limit w ithin which claimants must act to perfe ct a c laim or challeng e an adver se VA de cision. See R. at 1-631. (The Court notes that the g ood-ca use re quirement for

ex t en s i on in § 3.109(b) wa s promulgated in April 1990. See 55 Fe d. Reg . 13,522 (Apr. 11, 1990) .) Having failed to reque st an ex tension under 38 C.F .R. § 3.109(b), the
a pp e lla nt n ow , in

e ff e c t, s e e ks an exten sio n o f t ime by a pp lic a tio n o f t

he do c tr ine of

e qu ita ble tolling. On Aug ust 6, 1991, the appellant filed a claim to reope n his previously disallowed cla im by fi lin g a ne w b e ne fi ts a

pp lic a tio n. R. at 14 7- 51

. I n a n O c tob e r 1 99 1 d e c isi on , th e RO fo un d th a t hi s service rec ords containe d no evidenc e of a ny nervous condition and that the "[f]irst evidence of any
ne rv ou s d iso rd e r i s sh ow n o n 7 -9 -8 4, wi th ve te ra n a dmi tte d to E a st L ou isi ana State Ho sp ita l, w ith continuing tr eatment shown f or bipolar disorde r throug h 1991." R. at 232. Bec ause the RO found that th e a pp e lla nt' s il lne ss f

ir st a pp e are d a ft e r h is peri od of a c tiv e du ty , it

de nie d e nti tle me nt t o service connec tion. Id. He tim e ly fi le d a n N OD wi th r e sp e c t to the Oc tob e r 19 91 RO de c isi on . R. at 248. I n Fe bruar

y 199 2 , the RO confir

med its denial of his claim and issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) afte r finding that the appellant had not submit ted new a nd materia l evidence . R. at 251, 253-58.

On Marc h 2 4, 19 93 , the RO awa rd e d th e a pp e lla nt s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n f

or c hr on ic pa

ra no id schizophrenia and bipolar disord er , ra ted 50% disabling , eff ective Aug ust 6, 1991. R. at 401-03. Throug h his phy sician, the a ppellant fi l ed an NOD with re spect to both the 50% r ating and the Aug ust 1991 effe ctive date assig ned in the M arc h 1993 RO decision. R. at 475-76. In a May 1994 de c isi on , th e RO inc re a se d th e a pp e lla nt' s disa bil ity ratin g fo r h is i lln e ss t o 1 00 %, e ff e c tiv e Au g us t 6, 1991, but de nied an ear lier eff ective date. R. at 483-86. Ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord that the appe llant ever

filed an N OD with re spect to the May 1994 RO decision. See R. at 1-631.

I n J anuar y and Mar ch 1999, the appellant se nt to the RO letters in which he a g ain soug ht an
ear lier ef fec tive date. R. at 513-15, 517- 19, 521, 5 2 3

. I n April 1999, he wa s aff orded a hear ing be fo re an RO he ari ngof

fi c e r. R. at 53 1- 40

. Th e a pp e lla nt te sti fi e d und e r oa th that he d id n ot r e c a ll
rec eiving notice of the May 1986 RO decision deny ing his c laim and that, eve n if he ha d rec eived
su c h n oti c e , h is m e nta l il lne ss w ou ld h a ve pr e ve nte d him fr om und e rs tand ing that he ne e de d to fi le
an N OD wi th r e sp e c t to that de c isi on

. R. a t 53 6. Th e a pp e lla nt a rgue d th a t th e RO ' s f

a ilure to t oll the statutory

period for

filing a n NOD ba sed on his mental incapa city during the per iod betwee n the May 1986 decision and Aug ust 1991, when he f iled his claim to reopen, c onstitut ed C UE i n the Marc h 1993 RO decisi o n

. R

. at 532, 536-39. A Ma y 1999 decision of the RO he aringoffice r conclude d that the May

1986 and Mar ch 1993 dec isions did not c ontain CUE and that the appe llant
wa s n ot e nti tle d to an ea

rl ie r ef fe c tiv e date

. R. at 54 2- 43

. I n May 20 01 , th e B oa

rd a ff or de d h im a3

he ari nga t w hic h h e re pe a te d th e argume nts he prev io us ly ra ise d b e fo re the RO he ari ngof fi c e r i n April 1999. R. at 585-601.

I n the Octobe r 2002 dec ision now on appea l, the Boa rd found no CUE in the Ma y 1986 or Marc h 1993 RO decisions. The B oard a lso found that the 1986 R O decision was final (R. at 2) and conclude d that, as a matter of law, the statutory deadline for fili ng an NOD cannot be tolled on the basis of a c laimant' s mental illness (R. at 9-11).

I n his brief, the a

ppellant ar g ues only

that the B oard e rre d in d et er mining that mental incapa city

could not, as a matter of law, provide the basis for toll ing the statutory one-y ear period for f iling an N OD, and that, as a re sult of mental incapa city , the one- y ear period for

filing a n NOD following the May 1986 RO decision should ha ve been tolled. Appellant' s (App.) Br ief (B r.) at 3-6. I n his brief, the Sec reta

ry argues as follows: ( 1) Be cause the appellant' s brief a ddresse s only that part of the B oa

rd de c isi on that di sc us se d e qu ita

ble tol lin g , th e a

pp e lla nt h a s a ba nd on e d h is C UE c la ims , and " the finality

of the May

1986 RO decision is no longe r at issue, the assig nment of the ef fec tive d at e i s n o ti ni s s u e, an d t h e e qu i t ab l e- t o l l i n g ar gu m en ti s n o tp ro p er l y b ef o re t h e C o u rt " ( S ec re t ary 's Br . at 5); and ( 2 ) VA re gu l ati ons provide a me ans for extending the time limit for filing a n NOD under 38 C.F .R. § 3.109(b) (2004) and the a ppellant did not pursue an e x tension t h ro u g h that
me c ha nis m ( id. at 9-10). This Court has consistently held that any

cl ai m s n o t raised on appea l are abandone d. J oh ns ton v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t.A pp . 8 0, 86 (1 99 7) ; Ph ill ips v . B ro wn , 10 Ve t.A pp . 2 5, 27 (1 99 7) ; W

atai
v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A

pp . 4 41 (1 99 6) ; Bu c k

lin ge r v . B ro wn , 5 V e t

. A p p

. 4 3 5 ( 1 9 9 3 )

. W e , a c c o r d i n g l y, ag ree with the Secre tary

that, on appea l, the appellant a bandoned his a lleg ations of CUE in the May 1986 and Mar ch 1993 RO decisions. I n fac t, the appellant f alls far short of alleg ing a

ny err or that could be c onsidered CUE. "I f a claimant-a ppellant wishes to r easona blely raise CUE, there must be
so me d egree of s peci fi cit y as t o wh at t he al legederro r i s. " Fu go v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 40, 44 (1993). Her e, howe ver, the appellant ha s failed to addr ess CUE in any way ; i n d ee d , that term appe ars nowher e in either

of his briefs. See App. Br

. 1-6; App. Supplemental (Suppl.) B r. At 1-6. He does not point to a

ny evidenc e that establishes that either the corr ect fac ts, a s they wer e known at the time,
wer e not bef

ore the Boa

rd, nor doe s he ave r that the statutory or re g ulatory

provisions ex tant at the time of t he Board decision now on appe al wer e incor rec tly applied. See Ed

dy v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 52, 57 (1996). Rathe r, the appellant' s sole argument is that the Boa rd err ed in its determination that mental i ncapa city is not a basis for tolling the statutorily presc ribed NO D filing period. App. B r. at 1-6.

I n his supplemental brief, the appe llant argues that the princ iple of equitable tolling, which
m ay b e ap p l i ed t o th e 1 2 0 -d ay p er i o d fo r fi l i n g an NO A wi t h t h i s C o u rt u n d er t h e Fe d er al C i rc u i t 's Ba rre tt opinion, su

pra , applies equa lly

to the one-y ear

period for filing an NOD with an R O in order to initi ate a

n appea l to the Boa

rd. App. Suppl. Br . at 4

. T h e S ecretar y , howeve r, ar g ues that the
a p p e l l an tm i s s ta te s Ba rr ett ' s h old ing , w hic h, the Se c re tary c on te nd s, " is s ile nt a s to the e qu ita ble tolling of t h e j u ri s d i ct i o n al d ea d l i n e f o r f i l i n g a N o t i ce o f D i s agr ee m en ti nca s es i n v o l v i n g ch al l enges4

t o p ri o r, fi n al , re gi o n al o ff i ce d ec i s i o n s t h ro u gh cl ai m s o f c l ea r a n d u n m i s t ak ab l e e rr o r. " S ec re t ary 's Reply to App. Suppl. Br. at 3- 4.

The Court nee d not decide w hether equitable tolling a

pplies to section 7105 nor does it need to addre ss the applicability of Ba rre tt to t

his a pp e a l. B e c a

us e the a pp e lla nt h a s a ba nd on e d h is c la ims of CUE and doe s not specific ally argue that a prior adjudication is not final, t here is no foundation upon which the doc trine of e quitable tolling ca n be laid in this case. Accor dingly , the Court holds that the appe llant's C UE claims are no long er at issue and that the issue of e quitable tolling base d on mental incapa city

is not properly

befor e the Court.

Moreove r, ev en we re that equitable-tolling question befor e the Court (e ither base d on an
argume nt t

hat th e 19 93 RO de c isi on

c on ta ine d CU E o r ba se d on an a rgume nt t hat th e Ma

y 19 86 RO decision is not final, see Ma so n v. Br own , 8 Vet.App. 44, 53-58 (1995) ), the a ppellant would have
no ba sis fo r se e kin g e qu ita ble tol lin g of

the NO D f

ili ngpe ri od . T he a

pp e lla nt d id n ot m e re ly

su bmi t
a lat e NOD with r espec t to the May 1986 RO decision, he neve r submitt ed one at all. Moreover , he
c on c e de d at hi s Apr il 1 99 9 h e ari ngtha t he wa s awa

re , at le a st at th a t po int , o f t he May 19 86 RO d e c i s i o nan d

o f t h e N O D r e qu i r e m e n ti no r d e r t o a p p e a l t h a td e c i s i o n

. R

. a t5 3 1

- 3 2 , 5 3 6

- 3 7

. In addition, he had a

rg ued at that hear ing that the period betwee n May 1986 and August 1991, when he sought to reope n his claim, should be tolled. Ib id

. He , the re fo re , ha d on e y e ar c omm e nc ingin Aug ust 1991 or, at the latest, one y ear commencingin April 1999 to file an NOD

. Thus, even a ssuming that equitable tolling would apply to the one-y ear

period for

filing a n NOD a nd assuming that the one-y ear period beg an to run, at the l atest, i n April 1999, the appe llant did not file an NOD d u ri n g that period. See Rosler v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 241, 245- 49 (1991) (holding that claimant' s filing of rec onsideration mot ion with Boa rd during 120-day

judicial appea l period of 38 U .S.C. § 7266 t olled start of that a ppeals pe riod until B VA mailed to cla imant notice of its de nia l of that motio n, a t whic h time the 12 0- da y a pp e a l pe ri od

sta rt e d a ne w) ; se e als o Ashley v. De rwinski , 2 Ve t

. Ap p

. 3 0 7 , 3 1 1 (1 9 9 2 ) ( h o l d i n g t h at , wh er e ap p el l an t es t ab l i s h ed t h at S ec re t ary 's prac tice in mailing B VA dec isions was irregular, 120-da y judicial appea l period beg an to run whe n defe ct in mailing wa s cure d, that is, when appe llant's r epre sentative a ctually rec eived copy

of B oard decision). Equitable tolling of a time period is g ener ally

available to perfor

m an ac tion within t hat period only if the ac tion had actua lly been pe rfor

med. Cf. Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc. , 100 F.3d 857, 8 6 1 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( r e

j e c t i n g ar g u m e n tt h a ts t a tu t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o u g h tt o b e t o l l e d i n d e f i n i t e l y, stating that acc rual of c laim will be tol l ed i f par ty makes g ood-fa ith attempt to ex haust g rieva nce pr oc e dure s, and

c on c lud ing th at di st ri ct c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

re fu sin g to a

pp ly equitable- tolling doctrine to claim); 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b) (providing that time limi ts within which
c la ima nt s ar e r e qu i r e d

t o a c tt o c h a l l e n g e a d v e r s e V A d e c i s i o nm ay b e e xt e n d e d

f o r " g o o d c a us e shown" and requiring that wher e extension is reque sted afte r expiration of ti m e l imit, " the action required of the claimant . . . must be tak en conc urrent with or pr ior to the fi l i n g o f a r eq u est for
e x te ns ion of t

he tim e lim it , and g ood cause must be shown as to why the re quired a ction could not hav e been tak en duri ng th e ori ginal ti me p eri odandcou ldno t h ave b een tak en s oo ner t han it was ") (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; Mason , 8 Vet.App. at 56 (conc luding that wher e no Substantive Appeal ha d been5

filed and no reque st f

or an extension had been made, the Boa rd' s finding s (1) that RO decision wa s fi na l and (2 ) t hat c la ima

nt ha d no t c omp le te d tim e ly a pp e a l fr om that RO de c isi on we re no t c le a rl y err oneous). That is not t he situation here , and the Court has be en unable t o fi n d an y case wher e equitable tolling was a

pplied to perfor

ming a n action on a timely

basis wher e the a ction had not ultimately

been pe rfor

med. I n addition, the Court notes that the appe llant has not filed a " defe ctive" NOD within the statutory period. Ir

win v . D e p't o f V e te ra ns Af fai rs , 498 U.S. 89, 96 ( 1990) (noting that equitable tolling is a llowed, inter a lia, wher e " the claimant ha s actively pursued his judicial
re me die s b y

fi lin g a de fe c tiv e ple a din g duri ngthe statut or y period" ). Ac c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll aff irm the Boa

rd dec ision to t he limited ext ent that i t concluded that the May 1986 RO decision beca me final (R. at 2, 10) and will dismiss t he appe al in all other re spects. Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , it

is

ORDE RED t hat the Oc tob e r 3 0, 20 02 , B oa rd de c isi on is A F F I RME D i n p art

and that th is appea l is otherwise DI SMI SSED.

DA TE D: F e br

ua ry 25 , 2 00 5 PER CU RI AM

.