### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 90 -C R

______________________________ ANTRON RAMMEL

BLAYL OCK, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 115th J udicial District Court

Upshur County , Texas Trial Court No. 13,170

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N Antron Rammel B laylock was indicte d Dec ember 4, 2002, for the offe nse of delivering more tha n o ne bu t le ss t

ha n f our g ra ms of c oc a ine on or a

bo ut Ap ri l 16 , 20 02
. He wa s a lso c ha rg e d w ith having previously

been c onvicted of two pr ior felony off en ses. Afte r a jury

conviction and assessment of punishment, Bla y lock was sentenc ed to s ix ty -five y ear s' confine ment April 12, 2005. The Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls h as au t horized an out-of- time appea l. Blay lock ra ises four points of err or: (1) improper e vidence admitted over a Cra wfo rd objection; (2) denial of a spe edy trial; (3) suff

iciency of the e vidence ; and (4) improper sentence. W e will aff irm the judg ment of the trial court. I. Background F acts The State produc ed evide nce to show that Blay lock sold coca ine t o a non law enforc ement ag ent, Kar en Drig g ers, April 16, 2002, at a motel in Gilmer, Texas. A video ca m er a h ad b een installed in the room so that law enf orce ment office rs in the adjac ent room co u l d o b s er v e the tr ans a c tio n. Offi cers Da nn y B utl e r a nd B ob by Joe G ibb on s o bs e rv e d th e tr ans a c tio ns ; th e ir testimony was c onsistent with Drigg ers' testimony

. At tr ia l, t he State c a lle d th e su

pe rv isi ngc he mis t f

or the Te xas D e pa

rtme nt o f P ub lic Sa fe ty laborat o ry i n Ty ler, De nnis Keith Pridge n, to testify about testing of the c ontrolled substance

. Pridge n had not persona lly conducte d the tests of the substance; that was done by Ruben Rendon,Evid ence of the amount and weig ht of the substance deter mined by the laboratory

was 1 introduced w ithout objection by Gibbons befor e Pridg en' s t es t i m o n y . Gibbons testified that he weig hed the subs t an ce an d d eter mined the weig ht as 4.1 g rams. He was then a sked what the laboratory

found the we ight to be a

nd responde d, "Just a litt le under 3 g rams, like 2.98 Ibelieve w hat it was." I t is well established that questions reg arding the admission of evidenc e ar e re ndere d moot if the same e vidence is elsewher e introduce d without objec tion; any err or in admitting e vidence over a prope r objec tion i s h armless if the same evide nce is subseque ntly admitted without objection. Cha mb e rla in v . S

tat e , 9 98 S.W. 2d

23 0, 23 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Th e re fo re , w e wi ll n ot a dd re ss wh e the r P ri dg e n' s te sti mony a s to the we ig ht o f t

he su bs tanc e wa s a dmi ssi ble , b ut o ur ana ly sis wi ll be limited to his t estimony that the substance was a

controlled substanc e: coc aine. 3 a che mist who no longer

worke d in the are a. After revie wing the test results, Pridge n conclude d the substance c ontained 2.98 g rams of c ocaine

. II. Did the experttest im ony violate Cra wf ord ? I n testify ing that the substance w as coc aine, Pridg en re view ed and use d test results of the substance c onducted by

another chemist. Bla

y lock objects that such e vidence is a viola tion of 1 Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). I n Cra wfo rd , the United States Supreme Court he ld that the admis sion of a hea rsay statement made by a nontestifying de clar ant vi o l at es t h e Six th Amendment if the stateme nt was testimonial when made and the defe ndant lacke d a prior oppor tunity for c ross-examination. Id. at 68. Thus, a

" te sti mon ia l" state me nt i s ina dmi ssi ble a bs e nt a sh ow ing that the de c lara nt is pr e se ntl y

un a va ila ble and the de fenda

nt had a pr ior opportunity for cr oss-examination, even if the state ment falls under

a firmly rooted he arsa

y exception or bea

rs par ticularized g uara

ntees of tr ustworthiness. Id. at 58–60, 68. Although the Cra wfo rd opinion does not provide a compre hensive definition of "testimonial," it d oe s in dic a te that th e term c ov e rs e x part e in- c ourt te sti mony

or its fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt,4

e xtra jud ic ia l st a te me nts c on ta ine d in fo rm a lize d te sti mon ia l mate ri a ls s uc h a s p ri or te sti mony

a t a preliminary

hear ing, be fore a g rand jury , or at a former trial, and police interrog ations. The proper standard of re view on the issue be fore us is a hy brid one: both defe rential a nd de novo. " Although we defe r to a trial court' s deter mination of historical fac ts and cre dibilit y , we
re vie w a c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l e g a l r

u l i n g , i

. e . , w h e t h e r

a s t a t e m e n ti s t e s t i m o n i a l o r n o n - t e s t i m o n ia l, de n ov o. " W

all v . S tat e , 1 84 S.W. 3d

73 0, 74 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); se e als o Li lly v . V irg ini a , 527 U. S. 1 16 , 136 (1 99 9) (s ta tin g c ourt s shou ld ind e pe nd e ntl y re vie w wh e the r out -o f- c ourt state me nts violate the Confrontation Cl ause) . De novo revie w is a ppropriate beca

use the leg al ruling of whe ther a st atement is t estimonial under Cra wfo rd is de te rm ine d by the sta nd ard of an ob

je c tiv e ly re a so na ble decla rant standingin the sho es o f t h e ac tual decla rant. W all , 184 S.W .3d at 742–43. " On that question trial judge s are no better e quipped than ar e appe llate j udg es, and the ruli ng itself does not dep endup on dem eano r, cr edi bi li ty , o r ot her c ri ter ia p ecul iar to pers on al o bs erva ti on ." I d. at 743; Di x on v . S tat e , 244 S.W .3d 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, pet. re f' d). The rationale for a llowing a n expert witness to ex press a n opinion is t hat the witness has specia liz ed educ ation, training , and experience to sur vey information and f

orm conc lusions based on studies, tests, ex periments, and f acts. F or instance , medical doc tors rely on tests made by

others such as repor

ts r eg arding blood te sts, vital signs, X-ra y s, MRI examinations, C T scans, a nd a my riad of other inf

ormation, including patient-subjec tive complaints. The tec hnicians who dre w the blood,

a pp lie d th e blo od

pr e ssu re c uf f, or c on du c te d th e X- ra

y e xami natio n are no t req

uir e d to te sti fy

in5

pe rs on be c a us e the ir te st r e su lts are sim

ply us e d by the e xpe rt to a rr ive a t a dia g no sis of

an il lne ss or injury

. The data from these tests is normally relied on by the expert and without which the e x pert could not proper ly

derive such conc lusions. The evidenc e that is ultimately admitted is the testimony of the e x pert witness who is ava ilable for c ross-examin at ion as to his or her opinions. The Te x as Rules of Evidence rec ogn i z e t h i s and allow a n expert, in forming an opinion, to consider information, eve n if it is not l eg ally admissible evidence , if it is a ty pe re asonably

relied on by experts in the field. See T EX . R. E V ID . 703. The Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls has approve d the ad mission of ex pert testimony based on te st results that another ha s conducte d. S e e M a r ti nez v. Sta te , 2 2 S. W.3 d 5 04 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Aguil ar v . S tat e , 8 8 7 S
. W
. 2 d 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). These case s primarily dealt with the rule s of evidenc e rather than c onfrontation issues and
wer e dec ided bef

ore Cra wfo rd

. B lay loc k urg e s th a t Cra wfo rd a lte rs tha

t or din ary

un de rs tand ingof

an ex pert witn e ss' testimony and that his rig ht of confr ontation was denie d by being unable to cr oss-examine Rendon,

r a t h e r t h anP r i d g e n . T h e p art i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a tP r i d g e nw a s a n e x p e r t i n t h e f i e l d o f c h e m i s t r y. Pridge n testified about the ty pe of tests that a

re used to de termine the composition of a substance, the instruments used (infr are d spect ro s co p y and g as chr omatog raphy mass spectrosc opy

), the la bo rator y me tho d o f a ssu

ri nga c ha in o f c us tod

y of the e vid e nc e , and the sp e c if ic te sts do ne on

thi s substance ( colorim etric te sts—marquis and ca rbothiocy anate ). In response to cross-e x amination, Pr idg e n g a ve a

de ta ile d s c ie nti fi c e xplanatio n o f t he pr oc e dure fo r ex tr act ingthe ide nti fi a ble6

components of the substanc e examined, a pr ocedur e he stated was " a def i n i tive test for c ocaine ." He e x plained that his testimony was not ba s ed s i mply

on "r eadingnotes" of the e x aminer, but by "looking at the printed results from the instruments." This testimony demonstrates that Pridge n was applying his expertise to the scientific data in ar riving at his opinion. Base d on this ex planation, we believe that this t estimony was the e x pert opinion of Pridge n based on definitive tests done on the
su bs tan ce and was no t me re ly a re c itatio n o f t

he no te s o f t

he c he mis t w ho a c tua lly

did the te st. Pridge n was c ross-examined by the def ense. Bla y lock cites the c ase of De e ne r v . S tat e , 214 S.W. 3d 52 2 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 6, pe t. ref ' d). In Dee ner , the State soug ht to introduc e the c ertificates of ana ly sis of phy sical evide nce a nd chain of custody aff idavits a t t ri al. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.41 (V ernon 2005)

. Dee ner o b

je c te d a t h is s e c o n d tr ia l ( th e f ir s t e n d e d in a h u n g ju

r y mi s tr ia l)

. T h e D a ll a s Co u rt of A p p e a l s h e l d t h a t s u c h a f

f i d a v i t s w e r e t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e an d b ar r e d b y Cra wfo rd , but Deene r had failed to objec t to the affi d av i t s at least ten da y s befor e trial a s require d by statute and ther eby forf eited the objection. The distinction betwee n Dee ner and this c ase is that, in Dee ner , n o w itn e ss, expert or otherwise, was available for cross-e x amination and the State attempted to i n t ro d uce aff idavits from witnesses who we re not present. So the evidenc e wa s (1) made by an abse nt decla rant a nd (2) testimonial in nature
. Her e, the e vidence was the e x pert testimony of Pridg en; the State d i d not attempt to introduce any cer tificate of analy sis, affidavit, or la boratory test repor

t
conce rning the substance analy sis. This evidence was not me rely the out-of- court stateme nts from7

an a bs e nt d e c lara

nt; ins te a d, it w a s th e e xpe rt op ini on of an in -c ourt

wi tne ss w ho , in

arr ivi nga t hi s conclusions, had r eviewe d the scientific test results conducte d by another chemist. Dee ner

does not support the conc lusion Blaylock proposes. Other tha n the Dee ner

case , the par

ties furnished no other

authority that addre sses the issue befor e this Court. But, ot h er co urts have de alt with these Cra wfo rd iss ue s. Th e Se ve nth

Cir c uit Appea ls Court of the United States fac ed a ve ry simil ar matter in United St ates v. Moon , 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008)

. I n Moon , J ames DeFr ance sco, a chemist employ ed by the DrugEnforc ement Ag ency , testified that the substance was c ocaine

. The actua l la boratory work was done by another chemist, Rag nar O lson, who had left f eder al employ

ment. Over

a conf rontation objection, DeFran cesc o t est if

ied abo utth e ma chi nes us ed, th e in st rum ent s' ou tp ut , an d Ol son' s la bo ra tor y no te s. Ev e n th ou g h th e c ourt

wa s r e vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e ba se d o n a " pla in e rr or " st and ard , th e Se ve nth Circuit found " no problem with DeF ranc esco' s testimony ." The court sug g ested the note s of Olson would be in ad m i s s i b l e if the prope r objec tion was made, but the " Six th Amendment does not dem andth at a chem is t o r ot her t est if y in g ex pert hav e do ne t he l ab w orkhi ms elf ." Id. at 362. Ot h er co u rt s , co n s i d er i n g Cra wfo rd confr ontation obje ctions, have c ome to a similar conclusion. See, e .g. , State v. De laney , 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (c hemist testified from

ano the r' s r e po rt ); State v. Barton , 709 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Wi s. C t
. Ap p. 2005) (e x pert satisfied confr ontation rig ht beca

use t he ex pert "for

med hi s opinion based on his own expertise and his own8

analy sis of the s ci en t i fi c testi ng . He then pr esente d his conclusions to the jury , and he w as available . . . for c ross-examination.")

. This case does not involve one e x pert mer ely reading to the jury a re port conduc ted by another . Neither

is it l ike Dee ner , wh er e af fi d avit s of a nona

ppear ing e x pert a

re soug ht to be introduced. The testim ony of t his expert witness conce rning the chemical ana ly sis of the substance , deter mined by applying his e x pertise to re liable scientific te st data, wa s admissible as he was subjec t to cross-e x amination. We believe this fulfills the require ment of the Confrontation Cl ause. III . Spe e dy Tr ial B lay lo ck argues he wa s d e nie d h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l. T he Sixth Am e ndme nt t o th e Un it ed Stat e s Co ns tit uti on g ua ra nte e s th e a c c us e d' s r ig ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l. Zam oran o v . S

tat e , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d 6 4 3 , 6 4 7 & n . 5 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 2 )

. Ina d d i t i o n , A rt i c l e I, Section 10 of the Te x as Constitut ion gua rante es the a ccuse d in all criminal prosec u t i o n s the rig ht to a spee dy

and public trial. Id. a t 64 7 & n. 6; see T EX . C O N ST . art. I , § 10. I nre v i ew i n g a t ri al co u rt 's d ec i s i o no na s p ee dy t r i a l m o t i o n , we re v i ew t h e t ri al co u rt 's deter mination of the historical fa cts under a n abuse of

di s cr et i o n s t an dard a

nd conduct a

de novo revie w of the le g al components by independe ntly

eng ag ing in the ba lancingtest set out in Barker v

. W ingo , 4 07 U. S. 5 14 , 5 30 (1 97 2) ; se e Ke lly v . S tat e , 163 S.W .3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 954 S.W .2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Barker require s that we ba lance the following four f

actor s: (1 ) l eng th of the dela y ; (2) re asons for the delay ; (3) def endant' s assertion9

o f the spee dy

trial rig ht; and (4) pr ejudice to the de fenda nt resulting f

rom the dela

y . Barker , 407 U. S. at 53 0; Ke lly , 16 3 S.W. 3d a t 72 6. I n c on du c tin g the ba lanc ing te st, no sin g le fact or is d e te r mi n a ti v e , an d th e c o n d

u c t o f b o th th e p r o s e c u to r an d th e d e f e n d an t ar e to b e w e ig hed. See Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 0, 53 3; State v. Munoz , 991 S.W .2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A. Length of

the De lay We me asure the delay from the defe ndant' s arr est or for mal acc usation. Sh aw v . S tat e , 117 S.W .3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The evide nce show s that the indictment was issued De c e mbe r 4 , 20 02
. Th e tr ia l wa s c on du c te d Ap ri l 11 , 20 05 , r e su lti ngin a de lay of a pp ro xima te ly tw e nty -n ine mon ths . T e xas c ourt s h a ve g e ne ra lly he ld t hat a delay of eight mon ths or mor e is "pr esumptively prejudicia l" and will trig g er a speedy trial ana ly sis. See Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 649 (c i t i n g Ha rri

s v . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). "Pre sumptive prejudice" does not "ne cessa

rily indicate a

statistical probability

of pre judice; it simpl y

marks the point at which courts dee m the delay

unrea sonable e noug h to trigg er the Barker enq ui ry ." Munoz , 991 S.W .2d at 8 2 2 (c i t i n g Dogge t t

v. United States , 5 05 U. S. 6 47 , 6 52 n. 1 ( 19 92 )) . T his de lay is s uf fi c ie nt t o trig g er a speedy trial ana ly sis under Barker

. B. Reasons for the Delay A s ho rt he ari ngwa s c on du c te d o n B lay loc k' s mo tio n to dis mis s f or la c k o f a sp e e dy tr ia l. At that he ari ng , th e State pr e se nte d one wi tne ss; B lay loc k pre se nte d no ev ide nc e . T he on ly wi tne ss, Patty Kennimer , testified that she is a parole office r for the State of Texas and wa s the supervisingA " blue war rant" is an arr est war

rant issued whe n a par o lee is suspec ted of violating the 2 conditions of hi s or her parole

. Se e Fran k lin v . Ky le , 899 S.W .2d 405, 406 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 19 95 , n o p e t.) ; see also T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 508.252 (Ve rnon 2004). The Te x as Crime I ndex C enter and National Crime I ndex C enter
. 3 10 parole office r for

Bla y lock. She furthe r testified that B laylock had a n appointment with her on J anuar y 3, 2003, but f

ailed to a ppear . Kennimer attempted to locate Bla y lock by calling his uncle, C u rt i s B l ayl o c k , w h o a d v i s e d h e r t h a tB l ayl o c k

h a d m o v e d t w o o r t h r e e w e e k s p r e v i o u s l y. Kennimer sent a letter to Bla

y lock advisi ng him that he mus t repor t on J anuar

y 9, 2003, which he failed to do. She then c alled the local county jail, both hospitals, and checke d his criminal history in an ef fort to deter

mine his where abouts. After these a ctions prove d t o b e unfruitful, Ke nnimer
re po rt e d th a t B lay loc k w a s an a bs c on din g pa

ro le e and re qu e ste d th a t a blu e wa

rr ant be iss ue d f

or his

arr e st. Duri ngthe tr ia l, G ibb on s te sti fi e d th at a tte mpt s to loc a te B lay loc k in clu ded pl a c inghis

2 identifying inf

ormation in the TCI C and

N CI C computer sy stems which would aler t office rs making 3 a tra ffic stop or a

rre st that he was wa

nted. The rec ord shows that a capia s was issued for Bla y lock Dec ember

4, 2002, and he w as ser

ved in the Smit h County , Texas, ja il with the capia s and copy of the indictment November 15, 2004. There is no explanation in the rec ord as to w here Bla y lock was from January

2003 until November 2004. The re cord be fore the trial cour t and this Court shows that Blaylo ck absc onded fr om supervision from pa

role in J anuar

y 2003. His prese nce the rea fter is una ccounte d for until November 20 04 wh e n h e wa s se rv e d wi th the ind ic tme nt wh ile inc arc e rate d in the Smit h County , Te xas, ja il.11

On c e it h a s b e e n d e te rm ine d that a pr e su mpt ive ly pr e jud ic ia l de lay

ha s o c c ur

re d, the State bear s the initial burden of providinga justification for the delay

. Em e ry v . S tat e , 881 S.W .2d 702, 70 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); State v. Range l , 980 S.W .2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998,
no p et .). Diff

ere nt rea sons for the de lay are assig ned diffe rent we ights: an intentional de lay for ta c tic a l r e a so ns is w e ig he d h e a vil y a g a ins t th e State ; a neu tr a l re a so n, su c h a s o ve rc ro wd e d c ourt s, is weig hed less hea

vily ag ainst the State; a valid rea son is not weig hed aga inst the State at all; and delay attributable to the de fenda nt may constitute a wa iver of the speedy trial claim. Munoz , 991 S.W .2d at 822. Her e, the State offe red evidenc e to explain that Blaylock absc onded fr om parole supe rvision immediately

afte r the indictment was issued. Ag ents of the State made eff orts to locate B lay lock, t o n o a v a i l

. N o c o n t r a d i c t i n g e v i d e n c e w a s p r e s e n t e d

. T h i s i s a v a l i d r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l ay , o r

in
some circ umstances a waiver of t he speedy trial claim. The e vidence prese nted on the re asons for the delay weig h heavily

ag ainst a finding of a violation of the spe edy trial rig ht. C. As se r ti on o f the Ri ght The third Barker

fac tor requir es a deter

mination of whether the defe ndant asser ted his or her rig ht to a speedy

trial. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 2; see also Munoz , 991 S.W .2d at 825 (plac ing bur den
on de fe nd ant t o a sse rt

or de mand ri g ht t o s pe e dy

tr ia l) . T he de fe nd ant's a sse rt ion of that r ig ht i s
e nti tle d to str on g e vid e nti ary we ig ht wh e n de te rm ini ng wh e the r the de fe nd ant wa s de pr ive d o f h is or her rig ht to a speedy

trial. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 1– 32 ; Zamorano , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 5 1
. Al t h o u gh12

the d e f e n d a n t' s f a il u r e to ti me ly s e e k a s p e e dy tr ia l d o e s n o t a mo u n t to a w a iv e r o f th e r ig h t, suc h failure makes it difficult for a defe ndant to preva il on a speedy trial claim. Se e Sh aw v . S tat e , 117 S
. W
. 3 d 8 8 3 , 8 9 0 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Barker , 407 U.S. at 532). Counsel was appointed f

or B laylock Novembe r 18, 2004, af t er h e was in custody

and had been se rved w ith pr ocess. On January 11, 2005, a motion for spee dy trial and to set aside the indictment for lac k of a spe edy trial was f

iled by Bla y lock. The tria l court set the ca se duringa twowee k period beg inning Febr uary 14, 2005. A pretrial hear ing on the s peedy trial motions was hear d F e br ua ry 2, 20 05 , a

nd a ft e r e vid e nc e wa s pr e se nte d, the tr ia l c ourt too k the iss ue un de r a dv ise me nt. On Fe bruar

y 25, 2005, the trial court notified the parties that it was deny ing the motion to s et aside the indictment, g ave t he ca se priority , and set the tria l for Apr il 2005. The trial beg an Apr il 11, 2005. We find that, under these fa cts, Bla y lock prope rly

asser ted his rig ht to a speedy

trial and wa s g rante d a trial promptly

there afte r. Ove rall, this fac tor would weig h moderately in his favor. D. P rej udi ce The fina l fac tor is prejudice to th e d ef en d ant, which should be assessed in lig ht of the interests of the de fenda

nt that the rig ht to a speedy trial was de signe d to protec t. Barker , 4 07 U. S.
a t 53 2; Munoz , 991 S.W .2d at 826. These interests ar e: (1) pr even t ing oppr essive pre trial inc arc e ratio n; (2 ) min imi zing the anxie ty and c on c e rn of the a c c us e d; and (3 ) lim iti ng the po ssi bil ity that the def

ense w ill be impaired. Barker , 4 0 7 U
. S. a t 53 2; Munoz , 9 91 S.W. 2d a t 82 6. Of

the se int e re sts , th e mos t im

po rt ant i s p ro te c tin g a de fe nd ant' s a bil ity to a de qu a te ly

pr e pa re his or he r c a se13

becau se co mp rom is e of th is in ter est "ske ws th e fai rnes s o f t he en ti re s y st em. " Munoz , 991 S.W .2d at 8 2 6 (q u o t i n g Barker , 407 U.S. at 532–33). The de fenda nt has the burde n to make some showing of prejudice, although a showing of actua l prejudice is not required. Id. When the defe ndant makes a prima fac ie showing of prejudice , the burden shifts to the State to show that the de fenda nt suffer ed "no s eri ou s p rej ud ice bey on d that whi ch ensu ed from th e ord in ary and in evi tab le del ay ." Id. (quoting Ex pa rteMc Ke nz ie , 491 S.W .2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). The re cord indicates that Bla y lock was inc arc erated from Nove mber 13, 2004 until trial, a s he wa s g ive n c re dit

fo r h is t ime se rv e d in

ja il b e g inn ingfr om t

hat date un til the date of

the jud g me nt. This resulted in an a

pproxi mate five -mo n th pretrial inca rce ration, which c annot be c onsidered a s oppressive, but is no more tha n ordinary and inevitable delay

. No evidenc e was pre sented a s to any
an x i et y o r c o n ce rn o f t h e a cc u s ed

. M o s ti mp o rt an t l y , n o ev i d en ce wa s p re s e n t e d t h a t Bl ay l o ck 's defe nse wa s impaired or ha mpere d by

the delay . The trial c onsisted of evidenc e of a single episode of deliver y of a c ontrolled s u b s t an ce involving one unde rcove r witness and two la w enf orce ment
o f f i c e r s w a t c h i n gt h e t r a n s a c t i o ni nana d j o i n i n g r o o m b y v i d e o , w h i c h w a s p l aye d f o r t h e j u r y. Bla y lock does not desig nate any evidenc e in the re cord de monstrating pr ejudice a nd only urg es that "A ppellant had no duty to ma ke an actua l show ing of prejudice , he alleg ed and a rg ued that such a delay would g reatly

aff ect his memory

and ability to a ssist i n prepa ration of tria l and to reme mber other fa cts and the ide ntity and location of witnesses." Whil e these matters are alleg ed in the motion, B lay loc k d id n ot p re se nt a ny su c h e vid e nc e and

the re is n o e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the se a lle g a tio ns in14

t h e r e c o r d

. W e f

i n d n o e v i d e n c e o f

an y h ar m o r p r e j u d i c e t o B l ay l o c k

r e s u l t i n g f

r o m t h e d e l a y. Ov e ra ll, we fi nd thi s fa c tor do e s no t we ig h tow ard fi nd ing a vio la tio n of B lay loc k' s sp e e dy tr ia l r ig ht. E. Balan cing of

the F our F actor s Th e le ng th of the de lay wa s suf fi c ie nt to re qu ir e an inve sti g a tio n o f t he oth e r f a c tor s and

so weig hs moderate ly

ag ainst the State. The only rea son provided in the evide nce f or the delay is that Bl ay l o ckab s co n d edfr o m s u p er v i s i o nfr o m h i s p ar o l e o ff i ce r. S h e at t em p t ed t o l o ca t e h i m t h ro u gh family , jails, and hospitals. He fa iled to appea r i n J anuar

y 2003 for r eports with the par ole offic er. L aw enforc ement officials place d his name on the state and f eder al cr ime information indices, whic h buttresses the c laim that he was an absconde r. Ba sed on this evidence , we f ind this factor we ighs heavily ag ainst a finding that Bla y lock' s speedy

trial rig ht was violated. B laylock did asser t his right sh or tly a ft e r h e wa s se rv e d w iththe ind ic tme nt i n th e c a se ; th is fa c tor wo uld we ig h mo de ra te ly in his favor. In this matter, Bla y lock has shown no pr ejudice a ssociated with the de l ay . Al though a sh ow ing of " a c tua l pr e

jud ic e " is no t re qu ir e d in Te xas, the burd e n is on the a c c us e d to make so me showing of pre

judice which was c aused by the delay of his or her

trial. Ha rri

s v . S tat e , 489 S.W .2d 3 0 3 , 3 0 8 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 7 3 ) ( ci t i n g Cou rtn e yv . S tat e , 472 S.W .2d 1 5 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)). This fa ctor we ighs he avily ag ainst finding a

violation of Bla

y lock' s speedy

trial rig ht. After considering all fac tors involved, we c onclude B laylock was not de nied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.We r e vie w the le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e c on sid e ri nga ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t 4 favor able to the v er d i ct—could a rational jury have f ound the essential e lements of deliver y of a controlled substanc e (c ocaine ) in an amount of mo re t h an o ne but less than four g rams, beyond a rea sonable doubt. J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 30 7, 31 8– 19 (1 97 9) ; Ho op e r v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 9 , 1 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Jack son , 443 U.S. at 318–19). When r eviewing the evidenc e for fac tual sufficie ncy , we revie w all the evidenc e a d m i t t ed at trial in a ne utral lig ht. The evide nce suppor ting a jury ' s verdict may

be fa ctually

insufficient if the evidenc e supporting t he jury ' s verdic t is so weak that the jury ' s judgme nt appea rs clea rly wrongor manifestly

unjust or if the evidenc e supporting the judgme nt of conviction is outweig hed by the g reat weig ht and prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 07 ); Mc Do we ll v. Sta te , 235 S.W .3d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). This fa ctual s u ff i ci en cy standard r equire s that we re ach " a hig h level of ske pticism" bef ore w e may

reve rse a jury ' s verdict ba sed on fa ctual insuffic iency

. Ro be rts , 220 S.W .3d at 524. 15 IV. Insu ff

iciency of the Evid ence B lay loc k a

rgue s " [s]inc e the te sti mony of the Che mis t Pr idg e n w a s e rr on e ou sly a dmi tte d in to
ev i d en ce a

nd since the e vidence conce rning the identity , amount and ana ly sis of the subject substance should be omitted as evidenc e, the e vidence is otherwise insufficient t o sustain the verdic t of the jury ." This issue is c onditioned on a finding that Pridge n' s testimony was inadmissible and 4 there fore cannot be considere d by this C o u rt
. S ince we have f ound Pridge n' s testimony to be admissible, the condition on which this point of error is premised is not established. Blaylock does not argue that the evidenc e is insufficient if Pridg en' s testimony is considere d. Wit hout repe ating the e vid e nc e pr e vio us ly re c ite d, inc lud ing Pr idg e n' s tes tim on y , we fi nd the e vid e nc e is both f a c tua lly and leg ally

sufficie nt to sustain the jury verdic t. There fore , this point of er ror is over

ruled.16

V. Im proper Sentence I n his final point, Blaylock ar g ues th at t h e j u d gment fails to show the trial cour t had the authority to enter a sentenc e in excess of twe nty y ear s' confine ment. This a rg ument orig inates fr om lang uag e con tained in the judg ment indicating that the offe nse wa s a sec ond-deg ree felony with a punishment rang e fr om two to twenty y ear s' confine ment and a ma x imum fine of $10,000.00. The indictment cha

rg ed B laylock with delivery of more tha

n one g ram but less than four g rams of a c ontrolled substance : coca ine, which is a se cond-de g ree felony . T EX . H EA L TH & S AF E TY C ODE ANN . § 481.112 (Ve rnon 2003). Ad d i t i o n al l y , the indictment alleg ed that B laylock had previously

been c onvicted of two f elony offe nses. B laylock pled " true" to the enhanc ement alleg ations, and the jury found that Bla y lock had finally and sequentially been prev i o u s l y found g uil ty of bo th p ri or

fe lon ie s a s a lle g e d. Th e re fo re , th e ra ng e of punis hme nt w a s e le vate d to imprisonment for life, or f or any term of not more than ninety -nine y ear s or less t h an twenty -five y ear s. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(d) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007)

. The jury assessed punishment at six ty -five y ear s' confine ment. The judg ment expressly states that B laylock enter ed a plea of "tr ue" to t he e nh anc e me nt an d tha t a find ing of " tr ue " wa s mad e to the e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio n. Th e on ly omissio n from the judg ment form is the information provided reg arding"A pplicable punishment

ra ng e (i n c l u d i n g e n h an c e m e n t , i f an y )

. " T h e i n f

o r m a t i o n g i v e n w a s " S e c o n d D e g r e e 2

- 2 0 y r s in pri so n/ max $1 0, 00 0 fi ne. "17

This Court has t he authority to ref orm the judg ment to make the r ecor d speak the truth when t h e m at t er h as bee n called to our attention by

any source . Fr e nc h v . S

tat e , 8 3 0 S
. W
. 2 d

6 0 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992). In As be rry v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pe t ref' d), the court noted that the authority of t he appellate cour t to refor m incorre ct judg ments is not dependent
on re qu e st o f a

ny part y ; th e appel la te c ourt may a c t su a sp on te . T he Te xas R

ule s o f A pp e llate Procedur e provide direc t authority for this Court to modify

the judg ment of t he trial court. T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2. We w ill mod if

y the judgm ent to re fl e c t th e c or re c t r ang e of

punis hme nt a s f

oll ow s: "Imprisonment in the I

nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice for life, or for any ter m o f no t m ore t han 99 y ears or l ess th an 2 5 y ears ." See T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(b). The trial court properly sentenc ed Blaylock t o six ty -five y ear s' confine ment as asse ssed by the jury

. As modified, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: Fe bruar y 28, 2008 Date D ecide d: May 14, 2008 Pub lis h