Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1608-CR-1903 | February 24, 2017 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Stephen Miller

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keyshawn D. Sanders,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 24, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A04-1608-CR-1903

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D05-1602-F3-19

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Keyshawn D. Sanders appeals his sentence after he pleaded guilty to dealing in 

a narcotic drug, as a Level 3 felony, and possession of marijuana, as a Class B 
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misdemeanor. He purports to raise one issue for our review but actually raises 

the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

find his youth to be a mitigating factor.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of his offenses and his character. 

[2] We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in Sanders’ sentencing. 

And, because Sanders has failed to present authority or analysis with respect to 

whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses, we 

hold that he has waived appellate review of the inappropriateness of his 

sentence. However, his waiver notwithstanding, Sanders has failed to persuade 

us that his sentence is inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 25, 2016, the State charged Sanders with Level 3 felony dealing in 

cocaine and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Sanders 

subsequently pleaded guilty to both of those charges. Pursuant to his plea 

agreement, the trial court ordered Sanders to enter into a drug court 

participation agreement. That agreement included various requirements that 

Sanders would have to meet during the term of the drug court program and 

provided that, if Sanders completed those requirements successfully, the State 

would dismiss the underlying charges against him. However, Sanders’

noncompliance with the conditions of the drug court program would result in a 
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petition to terminate his participation and subject him to sentencing for the 

underlying offenses.

[4] Within one month of entering the drug court program, Sanders was dismissed 

from a transitional living house for failing to comply with its rules and 

regulations. He also failed to attend another program that he had been 

instructed to attend. As a result of those violations, the State filed a petition to 

terminate his drug court participation, and Sanders admitted to the State’s 

ensuing allegations that he had violated his participation agreement. As such, 

the trial court revoked Sanders’ participation in the drug court program and set 

the matter for sentencing on the underlying offenses. 

[5] At the time of sentencing, Sanders was twenty years old. The presentence 

investigation report informed the trial court that Sanders’ first encounter with 

the criminal justice system occurred with a juvenile adjudication for possession 

of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, in February 

2012. The juvenile court placed Sanders on informal adjustment for six 

months, and, after that time had elapsed, he was discharged from probation 

unsuccessfully. During the pendency of that informal adjustment, the juvenile 

court again adjudicated Sanders a delinquent for possession of marijuana, as a 

Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, in July 2012. In April 2013, 

the court found Sanders to be a delinquent for committing possession of 

marijuana, which would have been a felony for an adult, and criminal 

conversion, which would have been a Class A misdemeanor, and the court

placed him on probation. In July 2013, the court modified his placement from 
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probation to electronic monitoring. In January 2014, the court again modified

his placement and sent Sanders to the Allen County Juvenile Center. In 

September 2014, Sanders received his first adult convictions, which were two

counts of possession of marijuana, one as a Class B misdemeanor and one as a 

Class A misdemeanor. The trial court placed Sanders on probation for a year 

as a result of one of those convictions, and the court revoked his probation in 

June 2015. 

[6] In the instant case, the presentence investigation report also stated that, when 

Sanders was asked, he “admitted to his case manager that he does not have a 

substance abuse problem and that he [stated that] . . . he did [have a drug 

problem] during his assessment so that he could get Drug Court. He report[ed]

that he was only giving partial effort on the program and report[ed] doing the 

minimum in an effort to get by.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 52. In his 

testimony at sentencing, Sanders denied trying to manipulate the trial court and 

stated: “I do have a drug problem. I wouldn’t say I’m addicted to drugs. I 

know I can go without using drugs and I took drug court to help me with the 

little drug problem I do have.” Sent. Tr. at 10. The trial court sentenced 

Sanders to the advisory sentence of nine years for his Level 3 felony conviction,

and it suspended three of those years to probation. The court ordered Sanders 

to serve a concurrent six-month sentence for his misdemeanor conviction. This 

appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[7] Sanders asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find his 

youth to be a mitigating factor. 

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and we review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 

N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and 

actual deductions drawn therefrom. Id. We review for an abuse 

of discretion the court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators to 

justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight 

assigned to those factors. Id. at 490-491. When reviewing the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial

court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if “the 

record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement 

omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and 

advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as 

a matter of law.” Id.

Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), not yet certified.

[8] As this court has noted previously, “youth is not automatically a significant 

mitigating circumstance.” Smith v. State, 872 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied. Rather, whether a defendant’s youth is a significant 

mitigating factor is within the trial court’s discretion. Id. Moreover, if the trial 

court does not find youth to be a mitigator, it is under no obligation to explain 

its reasoning. Id. Here, as in Smith, the trial court did not overlook the 
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defendant’s youth but specifically acknowledged it and chose not to find it as a 

mitigating circumstance. “‘This was the trial court’s call,’” id. (quoting 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493), and Sanders points to no evidence that would 

lead us to believe the trial court’s failure to find youth as a mitigating factor was 

an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.1

Issue Two: Inappropriateness of Sentence

Waiver

[9] On appeal, Sanders asserts that his nine-year aggregate sentence is 

inappropriate. Sanders states his issue on appeal as “[w]hether the advisory 

sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offenses and his 

character.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. However, he presents no authority or 

argument on the nature of his offense. Instead, he focuses solely on the nature 

of his character.

[10] Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[] independent 

appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. 

State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration original). This 

appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. 

Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate 

 

1

 To the extent Sanders asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in the weight it gave to the 

aggravating circumstance of his criminal history and the mitigating circumstances of his guilty plea and his 

remorse for his crime, his assertion is not well taken. A sentencing court cannot abuse its discretion by failing 

to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490.
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that his sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the

character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) (emphasis added). That 

language is clear: Rule 7(B) plainly requires, as this court has long 

acknowledged, “the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate 

in light of both the nature of the offenses and his character.” Williams v. State, 

891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis original to Williams ); see 

also Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; cf.

Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 418 (“We find nothing in Baumholser’s character, 

beyond the current convictions, to be deplorable. However, to obtain relief, 

Baumholser must demonstrate the sentence is inappropriate in light of both the 

nature of the offense and his character.”) (emphasis in original). Because 

Sanders has failed to present any authority or analysis on the issue of the nature 

of his offenses, he has waived our review of the inappropriateness of his 

sentence.

Waiver Notwithstanding

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, Sanders has failed to persuade us that his nine-year 

sentence is inappropriate. As stated above, the trial court sentenced Sanders to 

the advisory term of nine years for his Level 3 felony offense. The advisory 

sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate 

sentence for the crime committed. See Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 32 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015), trans. denied. We also assess the trial court’s recognition or 

nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining 

whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 
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142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a defendant must persuade the 

appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard 

of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

[12] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 

(Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the 

outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the 

end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the 

severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that 

come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another 

sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is 

inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence 

portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by 

restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as 

substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson 

v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[13] Here, aside from providing no evidence or argument concerning the nature of 

his offense, Sanders has not shown that the sentence was inappropriate in light 

of his character. “When considering the character of the offender, one relevant 

fact is the defendant’s criminal history,” and “[t]he significance of criminal 

history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in 
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relation to the current offense.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015), trans. denied. Moreover, the trial court may consider not only the 

defendant’s adult criminal history but also his juvenile delinquency record in 

determining whether his criminal history is significant. E.g., Rutherford v. State, 

866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[14] At sentencing, Sanders was twenty years old with true delinquency 

adjudications for what would have been three Class A misdemeanors and one 

felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court placed him under its 

supervision in two of those cases and discharged him unsuccessfully in one. 

The court modified his placement to increasingly confining placements twice in 

the other. As an adult, he had accrued two misdemeanor convictions, one 

Class A and one Class B. He was placed on probation as a result of one of 

those convictions, and the court later revoked that probation. Sanders’ 

significant juvenile and criminal history reflects poorly on his character. 

[15] Moreover, Sanders’ attempted manipulation of the trial court and disregard for 

the opportunity that the drug court afforded him also reflect poorly on his 

character. See, e.g., Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1009, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 

(stating that the defendant’s refusal to take advantage of rehabilitative efforts 

offered to him reflected poorly on his character), trans. denied. When asked 

about his lack of progress in drug court, Sanders admitted to a case manager 

that he never took the requirements of the drug court agreement seriously and 

that he had claimed to have a drug problem so that he could be offered the 

opportunity of the drug court. And his lack of effort in that program is evident 
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from the fact that he violated the drug court agreement within one month of 

entering into it. While at sentencing he attempted to disclaim any attempt at 

manipulation, the trial court was not required to give credit to his self-serving 

justifications at the very moment when sentencing was imminent. Given 

Sanders’ juvenile and adult criminal history and his refusal to take advantage of 

the rehabilitative services offered by drug court, we cannot say his sentence is 

inappropriate.2 As such, we affirm Sanders’ sentence.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.

 

2

 Sanders also contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate because serving four 

and a half to six years in the Department of Correction may foreclose his future opportunities and harm his 

life situation, while a lesser sentence could allow him to “provide for his dependents” and “accept full 

responsibility for his life and his actions.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. However, as noted above, the question 

under Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate but, rather, whether the sentence 

imposed is inappropriate. King, 894 N.E.2d at 268.