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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MATTHEW LANTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED January 29, 2015

v No. 318358 Genesee Circuit Court KEVIN JAY STEPHENS and GRAND RAPIDS TRANSPORT, INC., LC No. 12-099153-NI

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M URRAY , P.J., and S AAD and K. F. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order that granted defenda nts’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116( C)(10). For the reasons stat ed below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2012, plaintiff’s mother owned and held the title to a Chevrolet Impala. Because she had not used the car in months, she agreed to transfer the car’s title to plaintiff, provided that plaintiff paid for necessary repairs to the car and purchased i nsurance for it. 1 After plaintiff and his mother made this agreement, plaintiff had use of the car, w hich he drove on the afternoon of

1 Specifically, plaintiff state d the following in his deposition :
A . The deal with my mom was she would give me the car—

Q . Uh-hmm.

A . –If I paid the repair bill a nd got insurance. Then she would sign the title over to

me.

Q . Okay.

A . And then it would be mine. But I had to have the repair bill and insurance paid for first.-2- May 11, 2012. Plaintiff had not purchased insurance for the ve hicle by this date, and it remained uninsured. Unfortunately, one o f the Impala’s tires exploded, and the car stalled in the center lane of a highway in Flint. 2 Defendant Stephens, who is a truck driver for defendant Grand Rapids Transport, was driving in the center lane. Because the truck was winding a wide curve in the road, Stephens did not see plaintiff’s car until it was les s than 100 feet in fr ont of his truck, and the truck smashed into plain tiff’s car. Plaintiff suffered extensive damage to his teeth, and injuries to his back and hip as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in October 2012, and alleged that : (1) Stephens acted negligently; and (2) Grand Rapi ds Transport was vicariously res ponsible for Stephens’ actions under MCL 257.401. 3 After discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary dispos ition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). They argued that because the agr eement between plaintiff and his mother contemplated that plaintiff would eventually have ex clusive use and ownership of the uninsured Impala, plaintiff was the constructive owner of the c ar at the time of the accident. Accordingly, defendants said, he was prohibited from recovering damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c). 4 The trial court agreed with defendant’s legal argument and gr anted defendant’s motion, and we affirm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition i s reviewed de novo. Allen v Bloomfield Hills Sch Dist , 281 Mich App 49, 52; 760 NW2d 811 (2008). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual su pport for a party’s claims. Skinner v Square D Co , 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). When reviewing a mot ion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the pleadings , affidavits, and other documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pioneer State Mutual Ins Co v Dells , 301 Mich App 368, 377; 836 NW2d 257 (2013). Summary disposit ion should be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and th e moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . A genuine issue of material f act exists if, when viewing the record in the nonmovant’s favor , reasonable minds could differ on the issue. Skinner , 445 Mich at 162.

2 In his deposition, plaintiff claimed that his May 11, 2012 tri p was the first time he had driven the Impala, and that he was on his way to purchase insurance fo r the car when the accident occurred.

3 The Michigan owner’s liability statute imposes on a vehicle ow ner the legal re sponsibility for negligent operation of a vehicle when “the motor vehicle is bei ng driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.” MCL 257.401(1).

4 As explained infra , MCL 500.3135(2)(c) is a provision of the no-fault act that pr ohibits the recovery of damages by owners who fail to maintain the insuranc e required under the act. Though plaintiff did not file a claim for no-fault benefits in this case, he did not challenge the applicability of MCL 500.3135(2)(c) as an affirmative defense t o his negligence and ownership liability claims.-3- III. ANALYSIS

MCL 500.3101 of the no-fault act mandates that the owner or re gistrant of a vehicle registered in Michigan “shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liabilit y insurance.” MCL 500.3101(1). MCL 500.3135(2)(c) precludes recovery of damages by a person wh o violates the mandatory insurance requirement:

Damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who was opera ting his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred and did not have in effect for that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101 at the time the injury occurred. [MCL 500.3135(2)(c).]

A driver operates his “own vehicle” under MCL 500.3135(2)(c) i f he meets the definition of an “owner” under MCL 500.3101(2)(h). Kessel v Rahn , 244 Mich App 353, 355–356; 624 NW2d 220 (2001). The statute define s an “owner” to include:

( i ) A person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days. [MCL 500 .3101(2)(h)( i ). 5 ]

In its interpretati on of MCL 500.3101(2)(h)( i ), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a person does not need to actually use the vehicle to qualify as the vehicle’s “owner,” nor does a person need to “ commence [] using the vehicle at least thirty days before the accident o ccurred” to qualify as the vehicle’s “owner.” 6 Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp , 469 Mich 524, 530–531; 676 NW2d 616 (2004) (emphasis original) . Rather, “[i]t is the natu re of the right to use the vehicle— whether it is contemplated that the right to use the vehicle will remain in effect for more than thirty days —that is controlling, not the actual length of time that has el apsed.” Id . at 532 (emphasis added). Accordingly, if two parties have an agreemen t to transfer ownership of a vehicle, the prospective owner acquires ownership if the agreem ent “contemplate[s] that the [prospective owner will] have exclusive use of the [car] perman ently.” Id . at 531. After such an agreement has been made, it in consequential if condition preced ents, such as transfer of title or full payment, have not been fulfilled at the time of accident—t he prospective owner of the car is the “owner” of the car under MCL 500.3101(2)(h)( i ) if the ultimate purpose of the agreement was to allow the prospective owne r to have “exclusive use of th e [car] permanently.” Id

.

5 While plaintiff’s mother held title to the Impala at the time of the accident, the same vehicle can have more than one owner. Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group , 278 Mich App 31, 38; 748 NW2d 574 (2008).

6 At the time the Court decided Twichel , the “owner” provision app eared in subsection (2)(g). Twichel , 469 Mich at 527–528. The Leg islature amended MCL 500.3101 ef fective July 17, 2008, redesignating the definition of owner to subsection (2)(h ), but without changing the substance of the provision. 2008 PA 241.-4- Here, plaintiff says that he cannot be the “owner” of the Impa la under MCL 500.3101(2)(h)( i ) because he never purchased insurance for the car, and thus fa iled to satisfy one of the conditions precedent to his mother’s agreement to transf er the title to him. However, this argument misstates the law—as noted, it is inconsequential for purposes of MCL 500.3101(2)(h)( i ) whether conditions precedent to the agreement to transfer own ership of a car are satisfied. 7 Instead, the relevant inquiry i s whether the agreement itself contemplated that plaintiff would eventually have permanent, exclusive use of the vehicle. Twichel , 469 Mich at 531. As noted, and as plaintiff stated in his deposition, the agreement between plaintiff and his mother contemplated that plaintiff would eventually have perman ent, exclusive use of the vehicle.

Accordingly, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was the “o wner” of the Impala as that term is used in MCL 500.3101(2)(h)( i ). He is thus prohibited by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) from bringing this action against defendants, and the trial court co rrectly granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 8

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

7 Because this is a matter of law, not fact, plaintiff is wrong to claim that a jury should determine whether he fulfilled the precondition of obtaining insurance fo r the vehicle.

8 Because we resolve this appeal under Twichel
, supra , we decline to address plaintiff’s argument that his use of the Imp ala was insufficient to render him an owner.