SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0155-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ISMAEL LORENZO, a/k/a 

ISMAEL LORENZO, JR., 

JOEL LORENZO, and 

ISAMEL LORENZO, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted March 20, 2024 – Decided July 2, 2024 

Before Judges Currier and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 20-02-0155.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public

Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Robert J. Carroll, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0155-22

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

PER CURIAM 

 After representing himself at trial with stand-by counsel, defendant was 

convicted of third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(11); third-degree 

financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a); second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon while committing a CDS offense, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-4.1(a); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-7(b)(1). After reviewing the contentions raised by counsel and defendant 

in a supplemental brief, in light of the facts and applicable principles of law, we 

affirm the convictions. However, because there is a discrepancy between the 

oral sentence imposed by the court and the sentence reflected in the Judgment 

of Conviction (JOC), we remand for the court to clarify its sentence and amend 

the JOC if necessary. 

I.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with one count of fourth-degree 

possession of a (CDS) (count one); one count of third-degree possession with 

intent to distribute a CDS (count two); one count of third-degree financial 

facilitation of criminal activity (count three); one count of second-degree 
3 A-0155-22

unlawful possession of a weapon while committing a CDS offense (count four); 

and one count of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (count 

five). 

We derive the facts from the evidence presented during hearings on 

numerous pre-trial motions and at the July 2022 trial. 

A.

 After several anonymous tips, law enforcement used a confidential 

informant (CI) to complete several controlled purchases of CDS from defendant. 

The CI bought marijuana from defendant on two occasions in November 2019. 

There were law enforcement officers present at the time. After each purchase, 

the CI turned over the suspected marijuana to the police, who logged it and 

stored it in a temporary evidence locker. 

Thereafter, the court issued a knock and announce search warrant for 

defendant's premises. Investigators determined defendant's family resided in the 

main living area of a house and defendant lived in the basement, which was 

separately accessible. 

 Representatives of the Sheriff's Emergency Response Team (SERT) 

testified regarding their execution of the search warrant. The court and the jury 

also reviewed two security videos of the search. A SERT member explained he 
4 A-0155-22

was the breacher, responsible for "facilitat[ing] the opening" of the entry point—

the door. Another individual was responsible for knocking on the door. The 

SERT member stated the "knocker" knocked on the door, and "[r]oughly [thirty] 

seconds" later, when there was no response, he was instructed to breach the door. 

A separate individual timed the interval after the knock. The SERT member 

viewed the security camera footage and stated it accurately depicted the 

approximately thirty seconds between the knock and announce and breach. 

 The SERT member testified the officers knocked and announced at "[t]he 

main breach point to the residence, the outside entry door." The security camera 

footage showed SERT arriving at the door at 5:59:01 a.m. and breaching the 

door at 5:59:31 a.m. 

 The officers accessed defendant's apartment through the rear basement 

door of the main residence. Detective Michael McMahon of the K-9 section of 

the Morris County Sheriff's Office testified he entered defendant's residence 

with his dog, Kai, and walked through each room. Kai's narcotics sniff resulted 

in five indications that led to the discovery of marijuana and paraphernalia: two 

indications on a chair and sofa in the living room, two indications on shelves in 

the closet, and one indication in a ceiling vent. During the search of the chair 
5 A-0155-22

in the living room, officers discovered a loaded handgun. In subsequent testing, 

defendant's fingerprints were not found on the gun, magazine, or bullets. 

 Detective Supervisor Jimmy Atoche, in the Special Enforcement Unit of 

the Special Operations Division of the Morris County Prosecutor's office, 

testified that the door to the basement had a deadbolt, aftermarket brackets, and 

looked like it was fortified by a two-by-four piece of wood. Atoche stated the 

search of defendant's bedroom revealed green vegetative matter,1 approximately 

twenty-one small Ziplock baggies inside a leather digital scale pouch, a scale 

described as often used in gram-sized weights, a cell phone, and a New Jersey 

vehicle registration renewal form bearing defendant's name. 

 A search of defendant's closet uncovered three stacks of money in rubber 

bands totaling $2,910 and a box with seven plastic baggies containing green 

vegetation. Atoche stated he noticed "a patchy paint job/sheetrock job" with a 

hole in the wall and peeled it back to find two cell phone boxes and a portable 

speaker box. One cell phone box had "10K" written on it and contained $10,000 

in rubber-banded stacks of bills. A second cell phone box had "10K" written on 

1

 This term was used by the court when law enforcement suspected the substance 

was marijuana. 
6 A-0155-22

it and contained $9,900 in rubber-banded stacks of bills. The portable speaker 

box was larger and contained $20,000 in rubber-banded stacks of bills. 

 Near the second bedroom, there was an access panel that had been taken 

off the wall before the breach. In the panel, Atoche found green vegetation in a 

"standard sandwich Ziploc baggie" that was "full all the way." 

 A narcotics task force officer testified he searched behind a television in 

defendant's apartment and found two boxes of sandwich bags, a silver container 

containing eight individual sandwich bags of green vegetation, and "some blunt 

wraps." He also searched a desk in defendant's bedroom and saw defendant's 

driver's license. In a couch in the living room, the officer found six gallon-size 

Ziploc bags filled with individual Ziploc bags containing green vegetation in the 

area between the springs and the fabric bottom of the couch. He found a package 

of green vegetation in the arm of the couch inside a gray winter hat. 

 A forensic scientist in the Drug Unit of the New Jersey State Police, Office 

of Forensic Sciences tested the submitted samples of green vegetation and 

concluded it was marijuana. 

 The State also presented an expert in forensic examination of mobile 

devices who extracted text messages and photographs from defendant's cell 

phone. The court admitted two photographs into evidence that showed 
7 A-0155-22

defendant holding a bag of marijuana and two boxes of rubber-banded stacks of 

bills. 

 The expert read the jury text messages from an individual named KP

beginning on December 4, 2019, and spanning multiple days, as well as text 

messages from an individual named Bam starting on November 11, 2019. 

 Sergeant James Bruno was admitted as an expert witness in narcotics, 

including coded language, drug dealer hierarchies, and packaging. He explained 

coded language is "a word, a term, or a phrase that's used to discuss or explain 

. . . an actual word." Bruno explained what street-, mid-, and high-level drug 

dealers were, described the organization and record keeping that drug dealers 

use for their money, and the types of packaging used by the different levels of 

dealers. He also testified about the range of prices and profits of different 

quantities of marijuana. Bruno described the terms associated with certain 

narcotics, and then interpreted some of the terms used in the text messages 

previously read to the jury. 

 Bruno stated the text messages revealed that Bam and KP were selling 

marijuana to defendant. He explained that higher-level dealers would sell to 

lower-level dealers and defendant was asking KP in the messages what the price 

per pound of marijuana was. 
8 A-0155-22

 In one of defendant's three pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, heard 

in September 2021, he stated the search was illegal because he possessed a 

California document that permitted him to possess and cultivate medical 

marijuana for medical purposes under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. 

Health & Safety Code § 11362.5. He contended that because the affidavit for 

the search warrant was supported by the CI's observations and information 

regarding selling and possessing marijuana, the affidavit was invalid because he 

was not performing any illegal act. Therefore, the search was illegal, requiring 

the suppression of the items seized during it. 

 In response, the assistant prosecutor advised that defendant was not 

registered as a medical marijuana patient on the California cannabis website. 

Furthermore, defendant was a resident of New Jersey, not California. In 

addition, the State asserted any recent changes to New Jersey's marijuana laws 

did not apply to this December 2019 search during which officers recovered 

"nearly five pounds of marijuana," "distribution paraphernalia, multiple scales, 

$43,000 in cash, and a loaded handgun." 

 The court denied the motion, stating defendant's arguments concerned an 

affirmative defense—that he had a legitimate license applicable in New Jersey 

at the time of these events to possess and use medical marijuana. Defendant had 
9 A-0155-22

the burden of proof as to the affirmative defense. Therefore, the issue was left 

to the jury for its determination. 

 After the State rested its case, defendant raised the issue of the California 

medical marijuana card. The court advised defendant that if he discussed the 

card with the jury, the court would charge the jury with the applicable New 

Jersey law under the Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (CUMMA), 

N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16. 

Thereafter, defendant re-called Bruno who testified that during a search 

of defendant's car, he found a California marijuana card bearing defendant's 

name and a May 21, 2020 expiration date. Bruno further stated that defendant 

was a New Jersey resident in 2019, although he was not sure how long defendant 

had lived in this state. 

 On July 25, 2022, during the testimony of the prosecutor's office's records 

custodian, defendant requested a side bar, during which the following colloquy 

took place: 

[DEFENDANT]: Uh, one of the jurors are sleeping—

THE COURT: I'm sorry? 

 

[DEFENDANT]: —one of the jurors are sleeping. I 

know that—I've indicated to [stand-by counsel]. Uh, so 

—
10 A-0155-22

[STAND-BY COUNSEL]: The person in the middle of 

the front row of the jury box. 

THE COURT: Well (indiscernible)—

[STAND-BY COUNSEL]: Doing my best. 

THE COURT: —all right. Thank you. 

 Pertinent to this appeal, the court included the following jury instruction 

in its charge: 

In this case the defendant has put forth evidence to 

assert that his marijuana possession was for medical 

necessity, specifically, by introducing a California 

marijuana card. A medical marijuana card, if valid, is 

not an absolute defense to the charge in Count 2. 

However, a card was allowed into evidence by this 

[c]ourt as it may reflect on the defendant's intent in 

possessing marijuana[,] if you find that he did, in fact, 

possess marijuana. 

 For the defendant to establish a medical necessity

for the legal possession of marijuana, he must present 

evidence that he is a qualified patient in New Jersey for 

the issuance of a valid [CUMMA] [c]ard . . . . 

 A qualified patient is defined as a resident of the 

State who has been authorized for the medical use of 

cannabis by a healthcare practitioner. To be considered 

a qualifying patient in New Jersey[,] the defendant 

must: 

1. Register with the New Jersey Cannabis 

Regulatory Commission; 

2. Supply the commission with: 
11 A-0155-22

A. Documentation of the healthcare 

practitioner's authorization for the patient or the

medical use of cannabis; 

B. Proof of the application or renewal fee; 

C. The name, home address[,] and date of 

the patient, and date, uh, birth of the patient and

any applicable designated caregiver; 

[D.] The name, address[,] and telephone 

number of the patient's healthcare practitioner; 

and 

E. Up to one alternate address of the patient 

for the delivery of medical cannabis. 

 . . . [I]f approved as a qualifying patient, the 

commission will register a registration card which 

includes the name, address[,] and date of birth of the 

patient, the name of any designated caregiver, the 

expiration date of the registration[,] and a photo 

identification of the patient. 

 If the defendant is classified as a qualifying 

patient and possesses a valid CUMMA card in another

[s]tate other than New Jersey, and then subsequently 

moves to New Jersey, the other State CUMMA card is 

considered valid in New Jersey for a period of up to six 

months. 

 Upon relocating to New Jersey, the defendant 

must provide proof of registration in and a valid photo 

identification card issued by the other State or 

jurisdiction. To legally obtain and possess medical 

cannabis during the six-month period after relocation to 

New Jersey, the defendant is required to provide written 
12 A-0155-22

instructions for medical cannabis dispensation issued 

by a New Jersey healthcare practitioner to a dispensary. 

 To retain a valid CUMMA card after six months 

of relocation to New Jersey, . . . the defendant must 

register as a qualifying patient in New Jersey as 

detailed above. No individual shall be authorized to 

acquire, possess, use or engage in other conduct in

connection with medical cannabis in New Jersey 

pursuant to a medical cannabis registration from 

another [s]tate or jurisdiction for more than six months 

unless the individual registers with the New Jersey

CUMMA Commission as a qualifying patient. 

. . . . 

A qualifying patient may be dispensed a 

maximum of [thirty-six] ounces in one year. An 

exception to this maximum amount exists if a patient is 

terminally ill or is currently receiving hospice care 

through a licensed hospice. A qualifying patient that 

meets this exception may be dispensed an . . . unlimited 

amount of medical cannabis. Qualifying patients that 

do not meet this exception may petition the commission 

for an exemption of the monthly limits and such 

petition can be approved if the commission finds an

exemption is necessary to meet the patient's treatment 

needs. 

 Prior to dispensation to a qualifying patient, 

every batch of medical cannabis is tested by a 

laboratory. A written report summarizing the results of 

the testing shall be included in any packaging materials 

for medical cannabis. A stamp will be affixed to each 

package of medical cannabis prior to delivery to the 

qualifying patient. 
13 A-0155-22

 To find that the defendant possessed the 

marijuana for medical necessity, as . . . defendant has 

proffered, you must find that he is, first, a qualified 

patient. . . . . 

 [1.] [T]he defendant must register with the New 

Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission; and 

 

2. Supply the [C]ommission with:

 A. Documentation of the healthcare 

practitioner's authorization for the patient for the 

medical use of cannabis; 

 B. Proof of the application or renewal fee; 

 C. The name, . . . home address, and date 

of birth of the patient and any applicable 

designated caregiver; 

 [D.] The name, address, telephone number 

of the patient's healthcare practitioner; [and]

 [E.] Up to one alternate . . . address for the 

patient for delivery of the medical cannabis. 

 If approved as a qualifying patient, the 

[C]ommission will register a registration card which 

includes the name, address[,] and date of birth of the 

patient, the name of a designated caregiver, the 

expiration date of the registration[,] and a photo 

identification of the patient. 

 If the defendant has demonstrated that he is a 

qualified patient, the following requirements must also 

be met to validly possess a CUMMA card: 
14 A-0155-22

 Possess a valid [CUMMA] registration card 

issued by the New Jersey Cannabis . . . Regulatory 

Commission; 

 Possess no more than [a] maximum year's . . . 

medicinal marijuana supply, i.e., [thirty-six] ounces per 

year, . . . possessing a valid CUMMA card unless the 

defendant meets the exception for . . . possessing over 

the maximum year's medical marijuana supply for 

being terminally ill or . . . presently receiving hospice 

care; 

 Provide[] proof of written reports that validate 

the medical marijuana the defendant possesses [w]as

tested by a laboratory prior to dispensation; and 

 Provide[] proof that the marijuana possessed by 

the defendant was dispensed to him, was packaged with 

a stamp signifying that the marijuana [w]as medicinal 

marijuana. 

 It is for you, the jury, as triers of the fact to 

determine whether the defendant has met the 

requirements under New Jersey law for the possession 

of a valid New Jersey CUMMA card or a valid out-ofstate card. 

 If you find the defendant possessed a valid 

medical marijuana card, you may use that evidence 

along with the other evidence presented to determine 

the defendant's intent in possessing the marijuana 

purportedly found in his residence. 

 If you believe that the defendant has not 

presented sufficient evidence of medical necessity for 

the possession of medical marijuana, then you may 

disregard the evidence. 
15 A-0155-22

 After the court concluded the jury instructions, it inquired at sidebar 

whether there were any objections to the charge. The State and defendant's 

stand-by counsel both replied "[n]o." Although defendant was present during 

the sidebar conference, the transcript does not reflect any response to the 

question. 

 As stated, defendant was found guilty of possession of marijuana with 

intent to distribute, financial facilitation of a criminal act, and possession of a 

firearm while committing a CDS offense. After a separate trial, defendant was 

found guilty of a certain persons not to have weapons offense. 

B.

 Defendant was sentenced on August 25, 2022. Although the court found 

defendant met the criteria of a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), it

denied the State's motion, because there was a gap between defendant's 2008, 

2013, and current convictions, and defendant's present convictions required 

consecutive sentences, meaning, he "fac[ed] a significant sentence." 

 The court found aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the risk of reoffending; (a)(6), the defendant's prior criminal record; and (a)(9), the need for 

deterrence. The court did not find any mitigating factors. As a result, it found 

the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. 
16 A-0155-22

On count two, third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute, the court sentenced defendant to five years in prison with no period 

of parole ineligibility. On count three, third-degree financial facilitation, the 

court sentenced defendant to a five-year sentence to run consecutively to the 

sentence imposed under count two. On count four, second-degree possession of 

a firearm during a CDS offense, the court imposed a sentence of ten years in 

prison, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility, to run consecutively to the 

sentence under count two. 

On count five, second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, the 

court sentenced defendant to ten years to run concurrently to the sentence 

imposed for count four, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. The court 

stated the overall sentence was twenty years with a five-year parole ineligibility 

period. 

 The JOC reflected defendant was guilty of counts two, three, four, and 

five. The JOC sentenced defendant to five years on count two; five years on 

count three, to run consecutive to count two; ten years with a five-year parole 

ineligibility period to run consecutive to counts two and three on count four; and 

ten years with a five-year parole ineligibility period to run concurrently to the 

sentences imposed on counts two, three, and four on count five. 
17 A-0155-22

II. 

 On appeal, in a counselled brief, defendant raises the following arguments 

for our consideration: 

POINT I 

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE 

PROCESS AND TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY A 

JURY INSTRUCTION THAT UNFAIRLY 

EVISCERATED HIS DEFENSE THAT HE 

POSSESSED THE MARIJUANA FOR PERSONAL 

USE, NOT WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 

POINT II 

THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO VOIR 

DIRE A SLEEPING JUROR DEPRIVED 

DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND 

IMPARTIAL JURY, AND REQUIRES THE 

REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTIONS. 

POINT III 

THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

CORRECTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 

CONVICTION TO REFLECT THE ORAL 

PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE OF A 

FIFTEEN-YEAR TERM WITH FIVE YEARS OF 

PAROLE INELIGIBILITY, NOT A TWENTY-YEAR 

TERM WITH FIVE YEARS OF PAROLE 

INELIGIBILITY 

 In a pro se supplemental brief, defendant presented the following nineteen 

points for our consideration: 

POINT 1 Conflict of Interest 

POINT 2 Affiant[']s Affidavit 
18 A-0155-22

POINT 3 Knock-and-Announce Search Warrant 

Violation 

POINT 4 Defendant[']s Medical Marijuana Card 

POINT 5 Probable Cause[] Was Solely Based on the 

Two Alleged CI Buys 

POINT 6 Officer Confirms the CI Made a Phone Call 

POINT 7 CDW 

POINT 8 Lead Det[ective] D[anny] Corrales Fabricates 

a Phone [Number] That Does Not Belong to [t]he 

Defendant 

 

POINT 9 Det. Corrales [T]estifies [T]hat [B]oth CI 

Purchases [W]ere [S]ent to the Lab 

POINT 10 Det. Corrales Commits Perjury 

POINT 11 Probable Cause [W]as [N]ot Established 

POINT 12 Omnibus Opinion Filed on 11/04/2021 

POINT 13 Rules & Laws That Were Made [u]p [d]uring 

Trial 

POINT 14 Judge's Tactics [T]owards Defense 

POINT 15 Prosecutor Erin Callahan [U]ses May 2019 

Surveillance Testimony 

POINT 16 Jurors & Jury Selection 

POINT 17 Judge Stephen J. Taylor on Sentencing Day 

POINT 18 Cross Examination of the Witnesses 
19 A-0155-22

POINT [19] CI [W]as [N]ot Present at Trial 

A.

We begin with the counselled arguments. Defendant contends he 

introduced his California medical marijuana card to establish he could 

permissibly possess large quantities of marijuana for personal use. His intent 

was to disprove the State's charge of distribution. 

Neither stand-by counsel nor defendant objected to the jury charge, even 

when questioned directly by the court. Therefore, we review for plain error. We 

will only reverse if the error "is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable 

of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. 

Prior to defendant eliciting and presenting information about the 

California card during his direct case, the court cautioned him it would instruct 

the jury as to the particular requirements under New Jersey law to use an outof-state medical marijuana card. The court also stated it would advise the jury 

the card was "not necessarily a defense to possession with intent to distribute, 

that it was introduced as it may reflect on the defendant's intent only." 

Therefore, the court charged the jury exactly what defendant sought to use 

the card for during trial: to demonstrate he did not have an intent to distribute 

marijuana because he had a valid marijuana card. The judge's instructions were 
20 A-0155-22

appropriate given that many of the jurors may have been unfamiliar with 

CUMMA or what was required to have a valid medical marijuana card in New 

Jersey. See State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 594-95 (1958). The instructions 

detailed what the law required for a valid marijuana card and how a resident 

with an out-of-state marijuana card could transfer their license to New Jersey. 

As required, the court's instruction on this issue "explain[ed] to the jury 

in an understandable fashion its function in relation to the legal issues involved." 

State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981). Defendant has not shown any "legal 

impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the 

defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and 

to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring 

about an unjust result." State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969). 

We turn to defendant's allegations regarding the sleeping juror. He 

contends the court should have placed its observations of the juror on the record 

or questioned the juror when it was alerted to the situation. As stated, during 

the testimony of a chain-of-custody witness, defendant informed the court he 

thought a juror was sleeping. 

In State v. Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 87-90 (2016), the Court detailed the 

appropriate procedure a judge should follow when there is an allegation of an 
21 A-0155-22

inattentive juror. The Court explained that when a party alerts the judge of an 

inattentive juror, the judge should provide their own personal observations about 

the juror's attentiveness on the record. Id. at 89. If the judge did not observe 

the behavior, they should voir dire the juror to determine if they were inattentive. 

Ibid. If the judge determines the juror was inattentive, but it was "an 

inconsequential part of the trial," the judge has "broad discretion to determine 

the corrective action that must be taken." Ibid. If the judge finds the juror was 

inattentive, but it was "a consequential part of the trial," the judge must provide 

the information the juror missed or if necessary, excuse the juror. Id. at 89-90. 

In reviewing the judge's actions, we apply a harmful error standard and 

consider whether the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." 

Id. at 89 (quoting R. 2:10-2). From our reading of the record, it appears the 

court did not observe the inattentive juror. Therefore, under Mohammed, the 

court should have examined the juror to determine what they missed, although 

no one asked the court to do so. Ibid. 

Our review of the record also reveals this was not a critical portion of the 

evidence. Defendant only asked the witness one question on cross-examination, 

whether she checked evidence in and out. Furthermore, other witnesses also 

testified regarding the chain of custody of the evidence and were subject to 
22 A-0155-22

defendant's cross-examination. Therefore, it was harmless error not to further 

inquire of the juror their level of attentiveness. 

 Defendant's final contention, through counsel, concerns his sentence. He 

contends the JOC does not align with the court's oral sentence, regarding the 

running of consecutive terms. 

 The court orally imposed a five-year sentence on count two, a consecutive 

five-year sentence on count three, a term of ten-years on count four that was to 

run consecutive to count two, and a ten-year term on count five to run 

concurrently to the sentence on count four. The oral sentence totaled fifteen 

years. However, the court stated "the overall sentence " is twenty years with a 

mandatory five-year period of parole ineligibility. The JOC states the sentence 

on count four runs consecutively to counts two and three, which results in a total 

sentence of twenty years. 

There is no discrepancy between the total sentence announced by the court 

and the JOC. But there is a question of the court's intent regarding the 

consecutive running of the sentences. Therefore, we find it appropriate to 

remand solely for the court to clarify its intent. See State v. Murray, 338 N.J. 

Super. 80, 91 (App. Div. 2001). 
23 A-0155-22

B.

We turn then to defendant's contentions in his pro se supplemental brief. In 

Points one, two, three, and eleven, defendant raises issues regarding the affidavit 

submitted to support the application for a search warrant and the lack of probable 

cause for the issuance of the warrant. Defendant also asserts the search warrant 

was not executed during "standard business hours" and SERT did not wait the 

required time before breaching the door. 

Defendant raised these issues in his pre-trial motions and the court heard 

extensive argument. On February 12, 2021, the court considered and denied 

defendant's motion to suppress evidence in which he alleged there was a lack of 

probable cause in the affidavit used to secure the search warrant and a failure to 

adhere to the knock and announce rule. 

 In a comprehensive written opinion, the court found there was probable 

cause for the search warrant because of the tips received from the CI, the 

surveillance verified the CI's information, and the CI's controlled purchases of 

marijuana from defendant. After detailing the investigation and corroboration 

of the CI's information, the court concluded "there was ample evidence set forth 

in the four corners of the affidavit" to support a finding of probable cause. 
24 A-0155-22

 The court also found the officers' actions in executing the search warrant 

"were objectively reasonable under all the circumstances." It explained that the 

officers were trained and briefed regarding the execution of search warrants, and 

the officer's testimony about the events "was forthright, direct and credible in 

all regards." 

 Our review of a motion to suppress is limited. State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 

592, 609 (2021). The "trial court's factual findings in support of granting or 

denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when '"those findings are 

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."'" State v. A.M., 237 

N.J. 384, 395 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). 

Similarly, our review of a search warrant is limited. State v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 

14, 32-33 (2009). We "'pay substantial deference' to judicial findings of 

probable cause in search warrant applications." State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447, 

464 (2020) (quoting State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 117 (1968)). 

 In addition to evidence regarding the controlled buys, the judge issued the 

search warrant as supported by the officer's affidavit, which was based on his 

surveillance of defendant and defendant's residence, anonymous tips, and 

information from the CI. We are satisfied, in considering the totality of the 
25 A-0155-22

circumstances, that the court did not err in finding there was probable cause for 

the issuance of the search warrant. 

 In addressing defendant's arguments regarding the knock and announce 

procedure, the court noted the security camera footage showed the officers 

complied with the "reasonable wait time" standard and that the officers knocked 

twice, "announced 'police search warrant' multiple times," waited about thirty 

seconds, and then breached the door. While acknowledging that the officers 

may not have waited exactly thirty seconds, the court explained the "reasonable 

wait time" standard is measured by the time it takes an individual to dispose of 

drugs, not how long it takes them to reach the door. 

 The court found no merit in defendant's argument that the officers violated 

the knock and announce rule when they knocked on the main door to the 

residence, but not the door to his apartment. The court stated the officers did 

not have to knock and announce on every door they encounter, but only the 

external door to the residence. There was no evidence that the basement area 

defendant occupied had multiple residences. 

 Before this court, defendant reiterates the arguments previously raised 

before the trial court. We discern no reason to disturb the court's ruling denying 
26 A-0155-22

the suppression motion as defendant has presented no evidence that law 

enforcement did not comply with the knock and announce rule. 

 Points one, four, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and seventeen set forth 

defendant's allegations regarding the judge's misconduct and impartiality. We 

need only briefly address these contentions as we find them lacking in merit. 

In Point one, defendant contends the judge had a conflict of interest and 

should not have considered the pretrial motions or presided over the trial 

because he issued the search warrant. In addressing this argument, the court 

cited to Rule 1:12-1, finding there were no grounds to recuse himself because 

he had issued the search warrant. The judge noted this court's holding in State 

v. Smith, 113 N.J. Super. 120, 137-38 (App. Div. 1971), that issuing a warrant 

is ex parte and Rule 1:12-1(d) does not prevent a judge from hearing a case 

because they have made a ruling on an issue in the pending action. 

Point four concerns an evidential issue addressed by the court during trial. 

We see no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's request to present a 

discrete piece of evidence. Points twelve, thirteen, fourteen and seventeen 

allege the court showed bias and prejudice against him. Our careful review of 

the record shows no support for defendant's contentions. To the contrary, the 

court was patient with defendant, providing guidance on the law and manner of 
27 A-0155-22

presentation and extending great leeway to him in his self-representation. The 

court permitted defendant to fully and fairly participate in the trial. 

 In Point fifteen, defendant asserts the State used surveillance testimony 

that was barred by a prior court order, amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. 

The order defendant relies on to support this argument is not contained within 

the record. And we have discerned no evidence in the record that "was so 

egregious that it deprived . . . defendant of a fair trial." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 

76, 83 (1999). 

In Points six, eight, nine, ten and eighteen, defendant alleges certain 

officers perjured themselves in their testimony. While there may have been 

inconsistencies in some witnesses' testimony, there is no evidence to support the 

allegations of perjury. See N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1. 

In Point nineteen, defendant argues he attempted but was not allowed to 

call the CI to testify, which resulted in a violation of his right to confront his 

accuser. Defendant provides no citation to the record to support his argument 

nor to any court ruling on the issue. Therefore, we cannot properly review the 

contention. 

Nevertheless, we note the following. N.J.R.E. 516 provides that 

[a] witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the 

identity of a person who has furnished information 
28 A-0155-22

purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of the 

laws of this State . . . to a representative of the State 

. . . , unless the judge finds that (a) the identity of the 

person furnishing the information has already been 

otherwise disclosed or (b) disclosure of [the person's] 

identity is essential to assure a fair determination of the 

issues. 

 In State v. Milligan, the Court instructed that when considering whether 

to disclose the identity of a witness, the trial court should weigh "the public 

interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to 

prepare his defense." 71 N.J. 373, 384 (1976) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 

353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957)). 

 Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution permits an accused 

individual "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." As a result, a court 

is not allowed to "admit[] testimony of a witness who directly or indirectly 

provides information derived from a non-testifying witness that incriminates a 

defendant at trial." State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014). 

 In his appellate brief, defendant has not presented any evidence that the 

CI's testimony was necessary to the presentation of his case or that the CI's 

identity should have been disclosed under N.J.R.E. 516. In addition, defendant 

has not presented any evidence that the trial court admitted incriminating 

testimony of a non-testifying witness. See Weaver, 219 N.J. at 151. The 
29 A-0155-22

testimony regarding the CI's controlled buys was only used in the affidavit 

supporting the application for a search warrant, not as evidence before the jury. 

 To the extent we have not commented on them specifically, all other 

points defendant raises on appeal lack "sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion." R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

 Affirmed. We remand solely for the trial court to conduct proceedings 

regarding defendant's sentence as discussed above. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.