alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


(18
      U.S.C. 1350)





The
      undersigned, Sterling H. McDonald, Chief Financial Officer of Evolution
      Petroleum Corporation (the
      "Company"), certifies in connection with the filing with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission of the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the
      quarter ended September 30, 2006 (the "Report")") pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
      1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      to
      his knowledge, that:





1.
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
      13th
      day of November, 2006.


/s
                  /
                  STERLING H. MCDONALDSterling
                    H. McDonald
                  Chief Financial
                    Officer


A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to Evolution
      Petroleum Corporation and will
      be retained by Evolution
      Petroleum Corporation and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
      The foregoing certificate is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission as an exhibit to this Form 10-QSB and shall not be considered filed
      as part of the Form 10-QSB.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Andrew MILLS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-30016

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 21, 2017

*350Christian S. Nafzger, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Samuel Richard Rubin, Federal Public Defender, FDWAID — Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington *&*Idaho, Boise, ID, Theodore Braden Blank, Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, ID, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Andrew Mills challenges the 100-month sentence imposed by the district court following his jury-trial conviction for unlawful possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand for resentencing.

Mills contends that the district court erred in imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 without an explicit finding of willful intent. Because Mills did not object to the enhancement on this basis in the district court, we review for plain error. *See United States v. Herrera-Rivera,*832 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016).

To impose an obstruction of justice enhancement based on perjury, the district court must make explicit findings that: “(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on a material matter, (3) with willful intent.” *United States v. Castro-Ponce,*770 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). The district court plainly erred in applying the enhancement because it failed to make a finding of willful intent. *See Herrera-Rivera,*832 F.3d at 1175. Contrary to Mills’s suggestion, it is the district court’s role to determine the facts relevant to the enhancement. *See Castro-Ponce,*770 F.3d at 822. Thus, we vacate Mills’s sentence and remand for the district court to make the requisite factual findings and determine whether the enhancement should be reimposed.

In light of this disposition, we do not reach Mills’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

VACATED and REMANDED for re-sentencing. _

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
# Official Journal L 353/31 D

| | ISSN 1725-2555 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 353 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 5131 December 2008 |

ISSN 1725-2555

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 353

English edition

Legislation

Volume 5131 December 2008

---

| Contents | | I   Acts adopted under the EC Treaty/Euratom Treaty whose publication is obligatory | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006
   (1) | 1 |

Contents

I   Acts adopted under the EC Treaty/Euratom Treaty whose publication is obligatory

page

REGULATIONS

*

Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006
   (1)

1

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | * | Note to the reader (see page 3 of the cover) | s3 |

*

Note to the reader (see page 3 of the cover)

s3

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-1166

RALPH LOUIS VITALE, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 97-346)

Submitted: June 15, 2000 Decided: June 21, 2000

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ralph Louis Vitale, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. David I. Pincus, Alice

Lizbeth Ronk, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,

D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ralph Louis Vitale, Jr., appeals from the tax court’s order

determining a deficiency in his 1993 and 1994 income taxes. We

have reviewed the record and the tax court’s opinion and orders and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning

of the tax court. See Vitale v. Commissioner, Tax Ct. No. 97-346

(U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 21, July 19, & Oct. 27, 1999). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 81

Commending Robert D. Reischauer for his service to the Congress and the

Nation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 27 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1995

Mr. DOMENICI (for himself, Mr. EXON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. BOND, Mr. LOTT, Mr. BROWN, Mr.

GORTON, Mr. GREGG, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. FRIST, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. SIMON, Mr. CONRAD, Mr.

DODD, Mr. SARBANES, Mrs. BOXER, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. HATFIELD, and

Mr. PACKWOOD), submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Commending Robert D. Reischauer for his service to the

Congress and the Nation.

Whereas Dr. Robert D. Reischauer served as Director of the

Congressional Budget Office from March 6, 1989 to February 28, 1995;

Whereas he previously served in that office in its formative

years from February 28, 1975 to April 1, 1981 as a Special Assistant, Assistant Director, and Deputy Director;

Whereas he has ably and faithfully performed the difficult

duties of the Director’s office serving all Members of the

Congress with great professional integrity and dedication;
2

•SRES 81 ATS

Whereas he has maintained the high tradition of that office

by providing critical analysis and review of complex fiscal

policy issues pending before the Congress;

Whereas he has provided the Congress and the American

public with analysis of these complex fiscal policy issues

with candor, objectivity, and clarity;

Whereas he has performed the duties of his office with remarkable diligence, perseverance, and intelligence often

at great sacrifice to his personal life; and

Whereas he has earned the respect, affection, and esteem of

the United States Senate: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate of the United States com2 mends Robert D. Reischauer for his long, faithful, and

3 exemplary service to his country and to the Senate.

Æ
#### Richard L. NELSON, Petitioner, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent, *344Energy Northwest, Respondent-Intervenor.

No. 15-73548

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 8, 2017 * Seattle, Washington

Filed December 12, 2017

John P. Sheridan, The Sheridan Law Firm, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Petitioner

Quinn Philbin, Edward Dean Sieger, Esquire, Senior Attorney, LABR—U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC, for Respondent

William G. Miossi, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, DC, Angel D. Rains, Assistant General Counsel, Energy Northwest, Richland, WA, for Respohdent-Inter-venor

Before: TALLMAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

1. The Administrative Review Board (ARB) properly affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) dismissal of Richard Nelson’s claim under the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851. Section 5851 “protects energy workers who report or otherwise act upon safety concerns.” *Sanders v. Energy Northwest,*812 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). Nelson’s retaliation claim rests on a catch-all provision, which protects employees who participate “in any other action to carry out the purposes of’ the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(F).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Nelson must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) Energy Northwest knew or suspected that he engaged in the protected activity; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and (4) the circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. *Sanders,*812 F.3d at 1197. Nelson argues that his participation in a “security investigation,” in which he refused to confirm Energy Northwest’s accusations of wrongdoing, constitutes protected activity under the Act. We find that argument unpersuasive.

Conduct within the scope of the Act’s protection must have “a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern.” *Id.*at 1198. Here, Energy Northwest’s investigation was primarily concerned with internal reports of improper per diem practices and unauthorized travel expenses, not safety or security issues. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion, as affirmed by the ARB, that Nelson never raised a safety or security issue during the investigation. Nelson’s conduct was therefore not protected activity under the Act.

Because Nelson did not engage in protected activity, we need not address the other elements of his retaliation claim. The *345ARB properly affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of his claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0637

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

WALTER JASON PURKHISER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including June 26, 2024, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 20 2024

05/20/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0637
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Efrain MACEDO-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40247 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed December 20, 2017

*275Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Efrain Macedo-Perez, Pro Se

Before JONES, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Efrain Macedo-Perez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2011). Mace-do-Perez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
### In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06

- 1 0

- 00 094

- CV

______________________________

BILLY ELDRIDGE , Appellant

V.

STEPHANIE ELDRIDGE , Appellee

On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court

Fannin County, Texas

Trial Court No. PO

- 10

- 39692

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Mo rriss2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Billy Eldridge has filed an appeal. He is not indigent, but has not requested or paid (or

made arrangements to pay) for a clerk ’ s record. Thus, a clerk ’ s record has not been prepared or

filed. Eldridge has also not filed a reporter ’ s record in this appeal and has not paid the filing fee

with this Court. On October 18, 2010, we sent a letter to counsel pointing out that the record was

thirty days overdue and that the fees had not been paid and warning that

, if action was not taken

within ten days to prosecute this appeal with effect, it would be subject to dismissal pursuant to

T EX

. R

. A PP

. P. 42.3(c).

Twenty days has now elapsed, and we have received no response.

We dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: November 15 , 2010

Date Decided: November 16 , 2010
EXHIBIT 31.01A

 

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Peter E. Kalan, certify that:

 

| 1. | I have reviewed this amended quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of CSG Systems International, Inc.; |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| Date:  | September 18, 2015 |   | /s/ Peter E. Kalan      |
|--------|--------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|   |               |   | Peter E. Kalan          |
|   |               |   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

 

1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jorge Luis GALLEGOS-AVILA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-40388 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed December 20, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell,. Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jorge Luis Gallegos-Avila, Pro Se

Before JONES, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jorge Luis Gallegos-Avila has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Gallegos-Avila has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 11, 2009 

p0831 

Order 

 

September 11, 2009 

138993 

THOMAS HOLLIDAY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 138993 

 COA: 281319 

Oakland CC: 2006-078526-ND 

PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 5, 2009 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
##### 



EXHIBIT 12.1
 Certification by the Chief Executive Officer
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of the Company;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the Company and we have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that
has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the
audit committee of Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial
reporting.
  By:
    /s/ Lawrence HoName:
    Lawrence HoTitle:
    Chief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2390

THOMAS L. SWITZER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF STANLEY; OFFICER BROWN; SERGEANT DEAN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Samuel G. Wilson, 

District Judge. (5:10-cv-00128-sgw)

Submitted: February 10, 2011 Decided: February 16, 2011

Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas L. Switzer, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Thomas L. Switzer seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 

complaint against the Town of Stanley. This court may exercise 

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), 

and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). Generally, a district 

court’s dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is not 

appealable. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 

292, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that “a 

plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of his complaint without 

prejudice unless the grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that 

no amendment [to the complaint] could cure the defects in the 

plaintiff’s case”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In this case, Switzer would be able to save his 

action by amending his complaint to comply with the district 

court’s order. Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of 

Switzer’s complaint without prejudice is not an appelable final 

order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED