*

On March 13, 2008, Parish filed a motion requesting oral argument.  After examining

the briefs and the record, however, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.

Thus, Parish’s motion for oral argument is denied, and the appeal is submitted on the briefs

and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 19, 2008*

Decided March 19, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge        

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐2015

Appeal from the United States District

GREGORY PARISH, Court for the Northern District of

Plaintiff‐Appellant, Illinois, Eastern Division.

v. No. 06 C 1690

MOTOROLA, INC., Rebecca R. Pallmeyer,

Defendant‐Appellee. Judge.

O R D E R

Gregory Parish worked as a design engineer for Motorola, Inc.  In late 2002 and early

2003, his supervisors gave him an unfavorable employment evaluation.  They determined,

among other things, that he “need[ed] improvement” and was “confrontational,” and they

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐2015              Page 2

therefore identified him as part of the “least effective” 10% of employees.  Similar

assessments followed during an ongoing Performance Improvement Plan instituted by the

supervisors.  All these criticisms, however, came before the end of April 2003.  Parish

resigned from his position on August 27, 2003, and just over two years later, on August 29,

2005, he sued Motorola alleging that the supervisors’ statements amounted to defamation,

libel, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  He also alleged that he suffered from further

defamation because, while he was seeking unemployment benefits, Motorola informed the

Illinois Department of Employment Security (“IDES”) that he had resigned for health

reasons.  The district court granted summary judgment to Motorola, concluding that

Parish’s claims regarding statements about his work performance were untimely, that

Motorola’s statement to the IDES was privileged, and that Parish failed to identify evidence

of fraudulent misrepresentation.  We affirm.

We must first determine the appropriate law to apply to this  case.  Parish initially

sued in Minnesota state court.  Motorola removed the suit to federal court based on

diversity jurisdiction and then successfully transferred it to the Northern District of Illinois.

In such a case, the district court applies the law of the transferor court, which would have

applied the law of the state where it sits.  See Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB Volvo, 349

F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 2003).  Thus the district court properly looked to Minnesota law.

For procedural matters, including statutes of limitations, Minnesota applies its own

law.  See Danielson v. Nat’l Supply Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 5‐6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).  The

applicable Minnesota statute of limitations for defamation and libel actions is two years and

begins from the time of publication.  See Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 447‐450 (Minn.

1975); Semler v. Klang, 743 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); Wenigar v. Johnson, 712

N.W.2d 190, 209 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); McGovern v. Cargill, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1990).  Parish testified at his deposition that he knew of all the alleged defamatory

statements about his work performance by the end of April 2003, more than two years

before he filed suit in August 2005.  Thus, his defamation and libel claims regarding the

critiques of his supervisors are untimely.  Moreover, even if the Illinois statute of limitations

applied, it allows only one year to file suit, and Parish’s claims would still be untimely.  See

735 ILCS 5/13‐201; Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1222 (Ill. 1996).

The remainder of Parish’s claims are timely, and so we examine them on their merits.

To determine the appropriate substantive law, Minnesota applies a five‐factor choice‐of‐law

balancing test.  Danielson, 670 N.W.2d at 5‐6.  In this case, the factors immediately point to

the application of Illinois law: the entire employment relationship between Parish and

Motorola occurred in Illinois, all the statements in question were made in Illinois, and

Parish moved to Minnesota only after his resignation and then sued there.  Therefore,

Illinois has a higher governmental interest both in the employer/employee relationship and
No. 07‐2015              Page 3

in the allegedly defamatory statements made within its territory about a plaintiff also within

its territory.  This choice also aligns with the most probable expectation of the parties during

employment and at the time the statements were made.

Parish’s claim regarding Motorola’s statement to IDES that he resigned for medical

reasons is barred by statute in Illinois.  Under 820 ILCS 405/1900.1 this statement was

privileged and not subject to a suit for defamation unless it was false and malicious in

intent.  See Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 699 (7th Cir. 2006); Cianci v. Pettibone

Corp., 698 N.E.2d 674, 679‐80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).  To prove maliciousness, Parish must

demonstrate “a direct intent to injure another or a reckless disregard of the defamed partyʹs

rights and of the consequences that may result.”  Cianci, 698 N.E.2d at 679‐80.  He does not

direct us to any proof of maliciousness, and as a result there is no dispute of material fact as

to this issue.

Lastly, Parish’s claim of fraudulent misrepresentation also fails because of a lack of

evidence.  One of the elements that Parish must prove to establish fraudulent

misrepresentation is that he relied on the truth of Motorola’s statements about his work

performance.  See Kopley Group V., L.P. v. Sheridan Edgewater Props., Ltd., 876 N.E.2d 218, 228

(Ill. App. Ct. 2007).  But Parish does not direct us to any evidence that he ever relied upon

Motorola’s statements.  As the district court pointed out, Parish admitted that he felt his

supervisors’ statements about him were false all along.

AFFIRMED.