Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1406-MH-260 | February 10, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Carlos I. Carrillo

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Kyle Hunter

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Matter of the 

Commitment of T.S.

T.S.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Logansport State Hospital,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

79A05-1406-MH-260

Appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Donald L. Daniel, 

Judge.

Cause No. 79C01-0402-MH-8

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, T.S., appeals the trial court’s Order of Regular 

Commitment after a Review Hearing, ordering his continued involuntary 

commitment at Logansport State Hospital. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] T.S. raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence 

established that T.S. is mentally ill and presents a danger to others; and 

(2) Whether his current commitment at the Logansport State Hospital is the 

least restrictive environment appropriate for T.S. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On January 4, 2004, T.S. was released from incarceration after serving his

sentence for two Counts of Class B felony child molesting. Approximately a 

month later, on February 5, 2004, T.S. was involuntarily committed at 

Logansport State Hospital (LSH) upon a finding that T.S. suffered from schizoaffective disorder and was gravely disabled. His original psychiatric evaluation 
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indicated a history of self-mutilation, substance abuse and psychosis, depressive 

and manic episodes. He was noted as being unable “to resist his sexual urges 

outside of [a] hospital setting.” (Transcript p. 6). T.S. has remained 

involuntarily committed at LSH since February of 2004.

[5] During the course of his treatment, T.S. was diagnosed with “post traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD), sexual disorder analyses, borderline [a] buoyant 

personality traits and poly substance dependence.” (Tr. pp. 4-5). T.S. has 

progressed in his treatment program to the point where his treating physician, 

Dr. Danny Meadows (Dr. Meadows), now opines that T.S. “does not have a 

diagnosis of psychotic illness” and has not “had a significant self-harm action in 

recent memory.” (Tr. p. 7). T.S.’s most recent clinical plan indicated that his 

PTSD is “controlled with treatment.” (Respondent’s Exh. 2).

[6] Throughout his treatment, it was noted that T.S. “had intermittent periods of 

gender identity issues as well as insecurity regarding some of his sexual issues.” 

(Tr. p. 5). LSH deemed that T.S. “had predominant sexual issues which he had 

criminal activity for in the past which he was convicted of and [it] was felt from 

a clinical point of view that these issues were going to be detrimental to him.” 

(Tr. p. 7). As a result, T.S. was referred to the Sexual Responsibility Unit 

(SRU) within LSH. 

[7] The SRU is a program developed to treat male patients who have committed 

criminal or deviant sexual acts and who may have previously been incarcerated. 

See Commitment of T.S. v. Logansport State Hosp., 959 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2011). The SRU has various levels, starting with education, and to move 

up to a higher level, the patient must demonstrate that he is changing his 

pattern of behavior regarding his sexual issues. See id. There is no set time for 

completion: while one patient may complete the different levels in six months, 

another may take years to complete the program. See id. Despite years in the 

program, T.S. has yet to complete the SRU’s program. On October 25, 2010, 

T.S. sent a handwritten letter to the trial court, asking the court to support his 

refusal to participate in the SRU. See id. After a hearing, the trial court denied 

T.S.’s petition, concluding that it was in T.S.’s best interests to remain in the 

program. Id. at 857. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that T.S. 

was still in need of the treatment offered by the program and that the risks 

associated with the program were outweighed by the potential benefit that T.S. 

might receive. Id. at 860. 

[8] Over the past two years, T.S. has endeavored to participate fully in the SRU’s 

counseling programs and is making progress under the guidance of Dr. 

Meadows. T.S. was promoted to the highest privilege level and has been 

allowed to attend supervised outings into the community to assess his ability to 

handle situations around children and other high risk populations. During 

those outings, T.S.’s treatment team noticed an increase in T.S.’s anxiety which 

warranted an increase in his medications. The team also noted that T.S. “was 

minimizing what they would call [T.S.’s] arousal.” (Tr. p. 35). 

[9] On February 3, 2014, the trial court received a letter from T.S. requesting a 

hearing for review of regular commitment. On April 23, 2014, the trial court 
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conducted a hearing on T.S.’s petition. Thereafter, on May 23, 2014, the trial 

court issued its Order of Regular Commitment after a Review Hearing, finding 

that T.S. “is suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Polysubstance 

Dependence, Borderline Personality Traits and Avoidant Personality Traits, 

which are mental illnesses as defined in Ind. Code § 12-7-2-130.” (Appellant’s 

App. p. 13). After concluding that T.S. is dangerous to others, as defined in 

I.C. § 12-7-2-53, the trial court ordered continued custody, care and treatment 

at LSH for a period expected to exceed ninety days. 

[10] T.S. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] T.S. contends that the State failed to present by clear and convincing evidence 

that he is mentally ill and gravely disabled or dangerous to others. When 

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to 

commitment proceedings, we look to the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences from that decision. 

Commitment of M.M. v. Clarian Health Partners, 826 N.E.2d 90, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. Id. If the trial court’s commitment order represents a conclusion 

that a reasonable person could have drawn, we will affirm the order even if 

other reasonable conclusions are possible. Id. 
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[12] Upon review, we consider three factors to determine whether the totality of the 

circumstances support an involuntary commitment: “the gravity of the 

behavior leading to hospital admission, behavior in the hospital, and the 

relationship between problematic behaviors and the person’s mental illness.” In 

re Commitment of T.K., 993 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In these 

proceedings, the burden falls on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that: “(1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely 

disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.”

I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e).

[13] In its Order of Regular Commitment after a Review Hearing, the trial court 

concluded that T.S. suffered from a mental illness which made him dangerous 

to others. Although in addition to the dangerousness requirement, T.S. also 

disputes the alternative prong of I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e)—the gravely disabled 

element—the trial court did not establish that finding and, as such, we will not 

address T.S.’s argument in that regard. 

A. Mental Illness

[14] In this context, mental illness is defined as “a psychiatric disorder that (A) 

substantially disturbs an individual’s thinking, feeling, or behavior; and (B) 

impairs the individual’s ability to function.” I.C. § 12-7-2-130(1). Focusing on 

the absence of any self-mutilation episodes and the lack of any diagnosed 

psychotic illnesses, T.S. contends that he no longer suffers from any mental 

illness. Although he acknowledges to have suffered from PTSD and sexual 
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disorders, he considers his PTSD problem “resolved” and his inappropriate 

sexual activity under control. (Appellant’s Br. p. 9).

[15] Originally, at his initial psychiatric evaluation during the intake at LSH in 

February of 2004, T.S. was described as “having a history of psychosis, 

depressive [a] manic episode.” (Tr. p. 6). T.S. had self-mutilation issues and a 

substance abuse problem, in addition to “not [being] able to resist his sexual 

urges outside of [the] hospital setting.” (Tr. p. 6). While we agree with T.S. 

that currently, he no longer has “a diagnosis of psychotic illness” and there 

have been no “significant self[-]harm action in recent memory,” T.S. is still 

medically and statutorily considered mentally ill. (Tr. p. 7).

[16] During the hearing, Dr. Meadows testified that while T.S.’s difficulties with 

PTSD, stemming from past sexual abuse, remain, at the present time, it is 

managed and controlled with treatment. However, T.S.’s treatment plan report 

clearly indicates that T.S. is susceptible to “distress at exposure to cues related 

to traumatic events.” (Respondent’s Exh. 2). 

[17] The record further supports that over the past two years, T.S. has been 

participating fully in the SRU program to address his sexual disorder and, 

unquestionably, is making progress under the guidance of Dr. Meadows. T.S. 

was recently promoted to the highest privilege level and has been allowed to 

attend supervised outings into the community to assess his ability to handle 

situations around children and other high risk populations. During those 

outings, T.S.’s treatment team noticed an increase in T.S.’s anxiety which 
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resulted in an increase in his medications. The team also noted that T.S. “was 

minimizing what they would call [T.S.’s] arousal.” (Tr. p. 35). Unlike for his 

PTSD, T.S.’s treatment plan indicates that his deviant sexual behavior 

diagnosis remains in “active status.” (Respondent’s Exh. 1). So far, even 

though T.S. has made progress in the treatment of his mental illness and its 

underlying roots, no clinician has affirmed that T.S. is ready to be discharged. 

Thus, while T.S.’s diagnoses might be managed and under control, he is by no 

means ‘cured.’ Based on the evidence, the trial court reached a conclusion that 

a reasonable person could have drawn, and therefore we will affirm its finding 

that T.S. is mentally ill. 

B. Dangerous

[18] Turning to the dangerousness prong, T.S. claims that the State failed to 

establish that he presents a substantial risk to harm others. Within the province 

of commitment proceedings, “dangerous” means “a condition in which an 

individual[,] as a result of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the 

individual will harm the individual or others.” I.C. § 12-7-2-53. 

“Dangerousness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence indicating 

that the behavior used as an index of a person’s dangerousness would not occur 

but for that person’s mental illness.” In re Commitment of C.A., 776 N.E.2d 

1216, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In other words, abnormal risk-taking will not 

support a finding a person is dangerous as defined by statute, unless that risktaking is caused by mental illness. Commitment of J.B. v. Midtown Mental Health 

Ctr., 581 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. However, a trial 
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court is not required to wait until harm has nearly or actually occurred before 

determining that an individual poses a substantial risk of harm to others. Matter 

of Commitment of Gerke, 696 N.E.2d 416, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 

a commitment premised upon a trial court’s prediction of dangerous future 

behavior, without prior evidence of the predicted conduct, was valid, and 

observing “[t]he old adage of ‘the dog gets one bite’ does not, and should not, 

apply in the context of commitment proceedings, despite the severe restrictions 

on liberty imposed by commitment to a mental facility”).

[19] Characterizing Dr. Meadows’ testimony that there is a threat he might commit 

a sexual act in the future as purely speculative, T.S. likens his situation to In re 

Commitment of Steinberg, 821 N.E.2d 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), in which we 

reversed a finding of dangerousness. In Steinberg, Steinberg was admitted to the 

emergency room after believing that he heard his roommates speak though his 

computer speakers. Id. at 386. Steinberg also had periods of incontrollable 

anger and had, in a single incident, pointed an unloaded gun at people who had 

threatened him and his roommate. Id. at 387. Upon evaluation, Steinberg was 

determined to be schizophrenic and found to be dangerous to others. Id. at 388. 

Affirming the trial court’s conclusion of mental illness, we nevertheless reversed 

its finding of dangerousness because Steinberg’s mother’s testimony pointing to 

“any potential for danger . . . was purely speculative[.]” Id. While the incident 

of the unloaded gun “may have been risky behavior,” we considered it “too 

slender a thread to support an involuntary commitment.” Id. at 389. 
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[20] As part of his mental illness diagnosis, Dr. Meadows testified that T.S. has a 

sexual disorder, with intermittent periods of gender identity issues as well as 

insecurity regarding some of his sexual issues. Because T.S. has difficulty

resisting his sexual urges outside of the hospital setting, he was convicted of two 

Counts of Class B felony child molestation. Since T.S.’s admittance into the 

SRU, T.S. has made advancements into managing his disorder to the point 

where T.S. was promoted to participate in outings into the community after 

having been separated from children and other high risk populations for more 

than ten years. Because T.S.’s behavior during these community outings raised 

serious concerns with T.S.’s treatment team, Dr. Meadows opined that, until 

T.S. had fully completed the SRU program, T.S. remains a danger to others 

when he is in the community. 

[21] While the speculative facts in Steinberg dictated a reversal of the trial court’s 

finding of dangerousness, the facts here do not warrant the same result. T.S. 

has an established history of harming others. Based on the evidence, it is clear 

that, despite appropriate treatment and progress, T.S.’s sexual disorder is still 

affecting his behavior, emotions and thoughts, and impedes his ability to 

function in an appropriate fashion while in the community. Considering the 

totality of the circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that T.S. 

presents a substantial danger to others. See I.C. § 12-7-2-53.

II. Least Restrictive Environment
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[22] Repeating the argument developed in his previous appeal, T.S. again disputes 

the appropriateness of continued placement in the SRU and contends that the 

State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the probable 

benefits of the SRU outweigh any risk of harm to T.S. 

[23] In the Commitment of T.S., T.S. contested his forcible participation in the SRU. 

Comparing the legal precedents of forcible medication with the issue of forcible 

participation in a therapeutic program, we noted that “counseling and therapy 

are most often focused on behavior, and it is behavior that society is concerned 

with in individuals like T.S., with a history of criminal, sexual misconduct. 

Commitment of T.S., 959 N.E.2d at 859. We applied the relevant portions of the 

existing legal framework with respect to mandatory medication to the situation 

before us, and concluded that in order to forcibly enroll T.S. in counseling, the 

State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: “(1) a 

current and individual assessment of T.S. had been made; (2) that this 

assessment resulted in the honest belief of the medical professions that T.S.’s 

continuation in the [SRU] would be of substantial benefit to treating T.S.’s 

condition and controlling his behavior; and (3) that the probable benefits of the 

[SRU] outweighed any risks of harm to T.S. and his personal concerns.” Id. at 

859-60. 

[24] Admittedly, much has changed since T.S.’s last appeal. T.S. has started to 

participate in the SRU program and has made great strides in the management 

of his sexual disorder. However, not a single clinician treating T.S. endorses his 

request for discharge from the program. Dr. Meadows testified that his 
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recommended treatment plan is for T.S. to complete the SRU program and then 

to be transitioned into the community so as to minimize the risk for relapse. 

Opining that the SRU is currently the least restrictive environment suitable for 

T.S.’s care and needs, Dr. Meadows clarified that when T.S.’s transition into 

the community occurs, the SRU will also ensure that T.S. will continue to have 

access to therapeutic services and treatments to deal with the ensuing difficulties 

of his new environment. While we empathize with T.S.’s lengthy residency in 

the SRU, we are impressed by his progress and it is clear from Dr. Meadows’ 

testimony that the SRU program offers significant benefits to T.S. in 

progressing him to his eventual reintegration into society. Nevertheless, until 

the impact of community outings on T.S. can be more thoroughly assessed and 

“until he has fully completed [the SRU],” his current commitment outweighs 

any risks of harm to T.S. (Tr. p. 11). Therefore, we refuse to disturb T.S.’s 

current placement, and affirm the trial court’s order of continued commitment 

to the SRU at LSH. 

CONCLUSION

[25] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence 

established that T.S. is mentally ill and presents a danger to others, thereby 

justifying a continued involuntary mental health commitment; and his current 

placement in LSH’s SRU is appropriate. 

[26] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C. J. and Baker, J. concur