# Official Journal C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.158.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 158 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5211 July 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.158.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 158

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5211 July 2009

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 158/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Annotated presentation of regulated markets and national provisions implementing relevant requirements of MIFID (Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Commission communication pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community — Public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 158/02

Euro exchange rates

2

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2009/C 158/03

Annotated presentation of regulated markets and national provisions implementing relevant requirements of MIFID (Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council)

3

2009/C 158/04

Commission communication pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community — Public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Call for proposals — EACEA/11/2009 — Structural support for European public policy research organisations and think tanks and for civil society organisations at European level — Europe for citizens programme, Action 2, Measures 1 and 2 — 2010 | 10 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/06 | State aid — The Netherlands — State aid C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2006 on agricultural products and foodstuffs as traditional specialities guaranteed | 24 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Commission

2009/C 158/05

Call for proposals — EACEA/11/2009 — Structural support for European public policy research organisations and think tanks and for civil society organisations at European level — Europe for citizens programme, Action 2, Measures 1 and 2 — 2010

10

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

2009/C 158/06

State aid — The Netherlands — State aid C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (
  1
  )

1

13

OTHER ACTS

Commission

2009/C 158/07

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2006 on agricultural products and foodstuffs as traditional specialities guaranteed

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

---

II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 158/01

On 14 May 2009, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5403. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5403. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/2

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

10 July 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 128,21 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,5140 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 26,030 |
| EEK | Estonian kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 277,50 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,3740 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,7736 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 2,0331 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 67,026 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 45,4005 |
| THB | Thai baht | 47,382 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 19,0303 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 67,8230 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3901

JPY

Japanese yen

128,21

DKK

Danish krone

7,4466

GBP

Pound sterling

0,85800

SEK

Swedish krona

11,0022

CHF

Swiss franc

1,5140

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,0840

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

26,030

EEK

Estonian kroon

15,6466

HUF

Hungarian forint

277,50

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,6993

PLN

Polish zloty

4,3740

RON

Romanian leu

4,2160

TRY

Turkish lira

2,1636

AUD

Australian dollar

1,7940

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,6212

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,7736

NZD

New Zealand dollar

2,2250

SGD

Singapore dollar

2,0331

KRW

South Korean won

1 786,89

ZAR

South African rand

11,4023

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

9,4983

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,3315

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

14 174,11

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,9731

PHP

Philippine peso

67,026

RUB

Russian rouble

45,4005

THB

Thai baht

47,382

BRL

Brazilian real

2,8084

MXN

Mexican peso

19,0303

INR

Indian rupee

67,8230

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/3

---

Annotated presentation of regulated markets and national provisions implementing relevant requirements of MIFID (Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council)

2009/C 158/03

Article 47 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC, OJ L 145, 30.4.2004) authorises each Member State to confer the status of ‘regulated market’ on those markets constituted on its territory and which comply with its regulations.

Article 4, paragraph 1, point 14 of Directive 2004/39/EC defines a ‘regulated market’ as a multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments — in the system and in accordance with its non-discretionary — rules in a way that results in a contract, in respect of the financial instruments admitted to trading under its rules and/or systems, and which is authorized and functions regularly and in accordance with the provisions of Title III of Directive 2004/39/EC.

Article 47 of Directive 2004/39/EC requires that each Member State maintains an updated list of regulated markets authorised by it. This information should be communicated to other Member States and the European Commission. Under the same Article (Article 47 of Directive 2004/39/EC), the Commission is required to publish a list of regulated markets, notified to it, on a yearly basis in the Official Journal of the European Union. The present list has been compiled pursuant to this requirement.

The attached list indicates the title of the individual markets which are recognised by national competent authorities as complying with the definition of ‘regulated market’. In addition, it indicates the entity responsible for managing these markets and the competent authority responsible for issuing or approving the rules of the market.

As a result of reduced entry barriers and specialisation in trading segments, the list of ‘regulated markets’ is subject to greater turnover than under the Investment Services Directive 93/22/EEC. Article 47 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive also requires the European Commission to publish the list of regulated markets on its website and to update it regularly. Consequently, the European Commission will, in addition to yearly publication of a list in the OJ, maintain an updated version of this list on its official website (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm). This list will be updated regularly on the basis of information communicated by national authorities. The latter are called upon to continue to advise the Commission of any additions to or deletions from the list of regulated markets for which it is the home Member State.

| Country | Title of Reg. Market | Operating entity | Competent authority for designation and oversight of market |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (official market) |

Country

Title of Reg. Market

Operating entity

Competent authority for designation and oversight of market

Austria

1.

Amtlicher Handel (official market)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (semi-official market) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (semi-official market)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA — Financial Markets Authority) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA — Financial Markets Authority)

Belgium

| 1. | (a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt,

| (b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | (a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| (b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | (a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

(a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| (b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgaria

| 1. | Официален пазар (official market) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (official market)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (unofficial market) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (unofficial market)

Българска Фондова Борса — София АД (Bulgarian Stock Exchange — Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Financial Supervision Commission)

Cyprus

Cyprus Stock Exchange

| 1. | Main market |
| --- | --- |

1.

Main market

| 2. | Parallel market |
| --- | --- |

2.

Parallel market

| 3. | Alternative market |
| --- | --- |

3.

Alternative market

| 4. | Bond market |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bond market

| 5. | Investment Companies markets |
| --- | --- |

5.

Investment Companies markets

| 6. | Large Project Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

Large Project Market

| 7. | Ocean-going shipping market |
| --- | --- |

7.

Ocean-going shipping market

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Stock Exchange |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Stock Exchange

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission

Czech Republic

| 1. | Main Market (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Main Market (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Free Market (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Free Market (Volný trh)

| 3. | Official Market |
| --- | --- |

3.

Official Market

| 4. | Futures Market |
| --- | --- |

4.

Futures Market

| 5. | Spot Market |
| --- | --- |

5.

Spot Market

| 1.-2. | Prague Stock Exchange
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Prague Stock Exchange

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM-SYSTEM, Czech stock exchange
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM-SYSTEM, Czech stock exchange

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5. | Prague Energy Exchange
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5.

Prague Energy Exchange

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5. | Czech National Bank |
| --- | --- |

1.-5.

Czech National Bank

Denmark

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | Equity market; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

Equity market;

| — | Bond market; |
| --- | --- |

—

Bond market;

| — | Derivatives market |
| --- | --- |

—

Derivatives market

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS

Finanstilsynet (Danish financial supervisory authority)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [authorised market place = regular trade in securities admitted for trading but not listed on stock exchange] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [authorised market place = regular trade in securities admitted for trading but not listed on stock exchange]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

Estonia

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Stock Exchange)






  — | Põhinimekiri (Main list) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Stock Exchange)

—

Põhinimekiri (Main list)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (Bond list ) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (Bond list )

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (Fund list) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (Fund list)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Estonian Financial Supervision Authority)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Regulated Market)






  — | Lisanimekiri (Secondary List) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Regulated Market)

—

Lisanimekiri (Secondary List)

Finland

Arvopaperipörssi (Stock Exchange);

| — | Pörssilista (Official list); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (Official list);

| — | Pre-lista (Pre List); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (Pre List);

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (Other Securities List) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (Other Securities List)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Designation:

Ministry of Finance.

Oversight:

| — | Approval of rules: Ministry of Finance; |
| --- | --- |

—

Approval of rules: Ministry of Finance;

| — | Supervision of compliance:
  Finanssivalvonta, Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority |
| --- | --- |

—

Supervision of compliance:

Finanssivalvonta, Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority

France

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L. 421-1 du code monétaire et financier).

Germany

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (stock exchange supervisory authorities of the federal states) and the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

State authorities:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Greece

| 1. | Athens Exchange






  — | Securities Market |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Athens Exchange

—

Securities Market

| — | Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

—

Derivatives Market

| 1. | Athens Exchange |
| --- | --- |

1.

Athens Exchange

| 1. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

| 2. | Electronic Secondary Securities Market (HDAT-Debt Instruments’ Market) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Electronic Secondary Securities Market (HDAT-Debt Instruments’ Market)

| 2. | Bank of Greece |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bank of Greece

| 2. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

Hungary

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapest Stock Exchange)

| — | Részvényszekció (Equities Section) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Equities Section)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (Debt Securities Section) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (Debt Securities Section)

| — | Származékos szekció (Derivatives Section) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (Derivatives Section)

| — | Áru szekció (Commodities Section) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Commodities Section)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapest Stock Exchange)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority)

Ireland

Main Market of the Irish Stock Exchange

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (‘Financial Regulator’) authorises ‘regulated markets’ and (excluding listing conditions) supervises compliance with MiFID requirements by the Market Operator.

Italy

| 1. | Electronic Share Market (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Electronic Share Market (MTA)

| 2. | Electronic Bond Market (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Electronic Bond Market (MOT)

| 3. | Electronic Open-end Funds and ETCs Market (ETF-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Electronic Open-end Funds and ETCs Market (ETF-Plus)

| 4. | Electronic Securitised Derivatives Market (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Electronic Securitised Derivatives Market (SeDeX)

| 5. | The Market After Hour (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Market After Hour (TAH)

| 6. | Italian Derivatives Market for the trading of the Financial Instruments referred to in Articles 1(2)(f) and 1(2)(i) of the Consolidated Law on Finance (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Italian Derivatives Market for the trading of the Financial Instruments referred to in Articles 1(2)(f) and 1(2)(i) of the Consolidated Law on Finance (IDEM)

| 7. | Wholesale Italian and Foreign Government Bond Market (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Wholesale Italian and Foreign Government Bond Market (MTS)

| 8. | Wholesale Trading in Non-Government Bonds and Securities Issued by International Organisations with Government Participation (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wholesale Trading in Non-Government Bonds and Securities Issued by International Organisations with Government Participation (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Wholesale Online Trading in Government Bonds (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Wholesale Online Trading in Government Bonds (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX Market |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX Market

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

Consob authorises companies which manage markets and approve their by-laws and regulations.

For wholesale markets for Government securities, the operating company is authorised by the Ministry of Economy and Finance having regard to the opinion of Consob and Banca d’Italia.

Latvia

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Main list; |
| --- | --- |

—

Main list;

| — | Debt list; |
| --- | --- |

—

Debt list;

| — | Secondary list; |
| --- | --- |

—

Secondary list;

| — | Funds list. |
| --- | --- |

—

Funds list.

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Financial and Capital Market Commission)

Lithuania

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | The Main List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

The Main List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | The Secondary list of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

The Secondary list of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | The Debt Securities List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

The Debt Securities List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | The Funds List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

The Funds List of the Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Lithuanian Securities Commission

Luxembourg

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange

Malta Stock Exchange

Malta Financial Services Authority

Netherlands

| 1. | (a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| (b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | License by the Minister of Finance after advice from the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets
  Supervision by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets and The Dutch Ministry of Finance. |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

License by the Minister of Finance after advice from the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets

Supervision by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets and The Dutch Ministry of Finance.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Poland

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Main Market) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Main Market)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Parallel Market) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Parallel Market)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO Securities Market Regulated Off-exchange market) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO Securities Market Regulated Off-exchange market)

| 1. and 2. | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warsaw Stock Exchange) |
| --- | --- |

1. and 2.

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warsaw Stock Exchange)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Financial Supervisory Commission)

Portugal

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Official Listing Market) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Official Listing Market)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Futures and Options Market) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Futures and Options Market)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Special Market for Public Debt) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Special Market for Public Debt)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(Energy Market)

| 1.-2. | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Finance Ministry authorises markets by proposal from the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM, responsible for market regulation and supervision).

Romania

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Spot Regulated Market –BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Spot Regulated Market –BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Derivatives Regulated Market – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Derivatives Regulated Market – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată – (Derivatives Regulated Market – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată – (Derivatives Regulated Market – BMFMS)

| 1. and 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.) |
| --- | --- |

1. and 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary — Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary — Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Romanian National Securities Commission)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Romanian National Securities Commission)

Slovak Republic

| 1. | Market of Listed Securities






  — | Main Listed market |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Market of Listed Securities

—

Main Listed market

| — | Parallel Listed Market |
| --- | --- |

—

Parallel Listed Market

| 2. | Regulated Free Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

Regulated Free Market

Bratislava Stock Exchange

National Bank of Slovakia

Slovenia

Ljubljana Stock Exchange official market (Borzni trg)

Ljubljana Stock Exchange (Ljubljanska borza)

Securities Markets Agency

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spain

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (all comprise first, and second market segments) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (all comprise first, and second market segments)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España responsible for market for public debt.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1. | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1.

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1. | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1.

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2. | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2.

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C. | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C.

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E. | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E.

Banco de España

Sweden

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | regulated market for shares and financial instruments equivalent to shares |
| --- | --- |

—

regulated market for shares and financial instruments equivalent to shares

| — | regulated market for derivatives |
| --- | --- |

—

regulated market for derivatives

| — | regulated market for bonds and financial instruments equivalent to bonds |
| --- | --- |

—

regulated market for bonds and financial instruments equivalent to bonds

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Financial Supervisory Authority)

United kingdom

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group — PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group — PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange — Regulated Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange — Regulated Market

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Iceland

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (regulated market)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Financial Supervisory Authority)

Liechtenstein

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Norway

| 1. | Oslo Stock Exchange (official listing)






  — | Equity Market |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Stock Exchange (official listing)

—

Equity Market

| — | Derivatives Market (financial) |
| --- | --- |

—

Derivatives Market (financial)

| — | Bonds Market |
| --- | --- |

—

Bonds Market

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Equity Market |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Equity Market

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (official listing)






  — | Derivatives Market (commodity) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (official listing)

—

Derivatives Market (commodity)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Derivatives Market (commodity) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Derivatives Market (commodity)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Derivatives Market (commodity) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Derivatives Market (commodity)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/9

---

Commission communication pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community

Public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 158/04

| Member State | Italy |
| --- | --- |
| Concerned route | Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino and viceversa |
| Date of entry into force of the public service obligations | 1 December 2009 |
| Address where the text and any relevant information and/or documentation related to the public service obligation can be obtained | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Member State

Italy

Concerned route

Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino and viceversa

Date of entry into force of the public service obligations

1 December 2009

Address where the text and any relevant information and/or documentation related to the public service obligation can be obtained

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/10

---

CALL FOR PROPOSALS — EACEA/11/2009

Structural support for European public policy research organisations and think tanks and for civil society organisations at European level

‘Europe for citizens’ programme, Action 2, Measures 1 and 2 — 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

This call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 is based on the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme to promote active European citizenship for the period between 2007 and 2013 (1) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Programme’).

The Programme constitutes the legal basis for this call for proposals, referring to action 2 ‘Active Civil Society for Europe’ measures 1 and 2, the Structural support for European public policy research organisations and think tanks and for civil society organisations at European level.

1.1.   General Programme objectives

The Programme is intended to contribute to the following general objectives:

| (a) | giving citizens the opportunity to interact and participate in constructing an ever-closer Europe, which is democratic and world-oriented, united in and enriched through its cultural diversity, thus developing citizenship of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

giving citizens the opportunity to interact and participate in constructing an ever-closer Europe, which is democratic and world-oriented, united in and enriched through its cultural diversity, thus developing citizenship of the European Union;

| (b) | developing a sense of European identity, based on common values, history and culture; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

developing a sense of European identity, based on common values, history and culture;

| (c) | fostering a sense of ownership of the European Union among its citizens; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

fostering a sense of ownership of the European Union among its citizens;

| (d) | enhancing mutual understanding between European citizens, respecting and promoting cultural and linguistic diversity, while contributing to intercultural dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

enhancing mutual understanding between European citizens, respecting and promoting cultural and linguistic diversity, while contributing to intercultural dialogue.

1.2.   Specific call objectives

The specific objectives of this call for proposals are:

| (a) | to foster action, debate and reflection related to European citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history and culture through the activities and cooperation of think tanks and within civil society organisations at European level; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

to foster action, debate and reflection related to European citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history and culture through the activities and cooperation of think tanks and within civil society organisations at European level;

| (b) | to encourage interaction between citizens and civil society organisations from all participating countries, contributing to intercultural dialogue and bringing to the fore both Europe’s diversity and unity. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to encourage interaction between citizens and civil society organisations from all participating countries, contributing to intercultural dialogue and bringing to the fore both Europe’s diversity and unity.

1.3.   Thematic priorities

| — | The future of the European Union and its fundamental values |
| --- | --- |

—

The future of the European Union and its fundamental values

| — | Active European Citizenship — participation and democracy in Europe |
| --- | --- |

—

Active European Citizenship — participation and democracy in Europe

| — | Intercultural dialogue |
| --- | --- |

—

Intercultural dialogue

| — | Impact of EU policies on society |
| --- | --- |

—

Impact of EU policies on society

| — | People’s well-being in Europe, employment, social cohesion and sustainable development |
| --- | --- |

—

People’s well-being in Europe, employment, social cohesion and sustainable development

1.4.   Call description

This call for proposals concerns structural support, referred to as operating grants, to organisations pursuing an aim of general European interest. Operating grants provide financial support to cover part of the running costs of the normal and permanent activities of an organisation selected.

Different criteria are used to award either Annual Operating Grants or Multi-Annual Strategic Partnerships. A multi-annual partnership is a cooperation mechanism established between a particular organisation and the Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Executive Agency’) to award specific grants. Such a partnership may be set up for three years under this call.

2.   ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS

2.1.   Organisations

To be eligible for a grant, organisations pursuing an aim of general European interest must:

| (a) | be a non-profit making organisation with a legal personality; applications by networks that do not have a separate operational structure and their own status may be presented by the member organisation responsible for coordinating the network; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

be a non-profit making organisation with a legal personality; applications by networks that do not have a separate operational structure and their own status may be presented by the member organisation responsible for coordinating the network;

| (b) | operate in the field of European citizenship as defined in their articles of association or mission statement and correspond to one of the following categories: | Measure 1:







  A. | European public policy research organisations and think tanks. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(b)

operate in the field of European citizenship as defined in their articles of association or mission statement and correspond to one of the following categories:

Measure 1:

A.

European public policy research organisations and think tanks.

| | Measure 2:







  B. | Civil society organisations working on a European level






  — | European umbrella organisations (platforms) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Measure 2:

B.

Civil society organisations working on a European level

—

European umbrella organisations (platforms)

| — | European networks |
| --- | --- |

—

European networks

| — | Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe

| C. | Civil society organisations involved in fostering active European remembrance |
| --- | --- |

C.

Civil society organisations involved in fostering active European remembrance

| D. | Pan-European umbrella organisations. |
| --- | --- |

D.

Pan-European umbrella organisations.

| (c) | undertake the majority of their activities in eligible countries (See 2.2).

  For multi-annual partnerships, the organisations involved must have been established legally and have had a legal personality for at least four (4) years (on 15 October 2009) in an eligible country and, for the categories given below, cover the following geographical area:






  — | European umbrella organisations and European networks must have members in at least twelve (12) eligible countries; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

undertake the majority of their activities in eligible countries (See 2.2).

For multi-annual partnerships, the organisations involved must have been established legally and have had a legal personality for at least four (4) years (on 15 October 2009) in an eligible country and, for the categories given below, cover the following geographical area:

—

European umbrella organisations and European networks must have members in at least twelve (12) eligible countries;

| — | Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe must be active in at least twelve (12) eligible countries. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe must be active in at least twelve (12) eligible countries.

| — | Pan-European umbrella organisations must have at least six (6) central organisations among their members, who must be present in the 27 Member States. |
| --- | --- |

—

Pan-European umbrella organisations must have at least six (6) central organisations among their members, who must be present in the 27 Member States.

To be eligible for an annual grant, the organisations involved must have been established legally and have had a legal personality for at least one (1) year (on 15 October 2009) in an eligible country and, for the categories given below, cover the following geographical area:

| — | European umbrella organisations and European networks must have members in at least eight (8) eligible countries; |
| --- | --- |

—

European umbrella organisations and European networks must have members in at least eight (8) eligible countries;

| — | Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe must be active in at least eight (8) eligible countries. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisations performing activities with a wide impact on Europe must be active in at least eight (8) eligible countries.

Pan-European umbrella organisations may only submit an application within a multi-annual partnership.

Individuals and public bodies are not eligible to apply for this call.

2.2.   Eligible countries

| (a) | EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom;

| (b) | Croatia; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Croatia;

| (c) | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

| (d) | Albania. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Albania.

3.   ELIGIBLE ACTIONS

The activities of the applicant organisation must make a tangible contribution to developing and implementing the specific objectives and thematic priorities of this call for proposals. They must cover at least one specific aim and one thematic priority among those listed under point 1.

The applicant organisation’s work programme for 2010 and the three-year strategic programme (for multi-annual partnerships) must cover its statutory activities, including conferences, seminars, round tables, representation, communication and enhancement, and their other recurrent European activities.

Eligibility period

The period of eligibility must correspond to the applicant's budget year, as evidenced by the organisation's certified accounts. If the applicant's budget year corresponds to the calendar year, the period of eligibility will be from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010.

For applicants with a budget year that differs from the calendar year, the period of eligibility will be the 12-month period from the starting date of their budget year in 2010.

4.   AWARD CRITERIA

Applications meeting the eligibility and exclusion criteria will be evaluated on the basis of award criteria by an evaluation committee set up with a view to determining which proposals may be co-financed.

The award criteria will comprise qualitative criteria, accounting for 80 %, and quantitative criteria, representing 20 % of the score awarded. For multi-annual partnerships, the same weight will be attributed to the twelve-month work programme and the three-year strategic programme.

4.1.   Qualitative criteria (80 %)

The following factors will be assessed:

| (a) | relevance to the objectives and priorities of the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

relevance to the objectives and priorities of the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme (30 %);

| (b) | adequacy, coherence and completeness of the work programme (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

adequacy, coherence and completeness of the work programme (20 %);

| (c) | impact of the work programme (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

impact of the work programme (10 %);

| (d) | European added value (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(d)

European added value (10 %);

| (e) | visibility of activities and dissemination and exploitation of results towards European citizens and other stakeholders (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

(e)

visibility of activities and dissemination and exploitation of results towards European citizens and other stakeholders (10 %).

4.2.   Quantitative criteria (20 %)

The following factors will be assessed:

| (a) | number of eligible countries involved in the activities of the work programme (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

number of eligible countries involved in the activities of the work programme (10 %);

| (b) | number of potential direct beneficiaries (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

(b)

number of potential direct beneficiaries (10 %).

5.   BUDGET

The Community budget earmarked for co-financing of operating grants is around EUR 8,2 million in 2010. The Executive Agency intends to finance around 55 organisations under this call, although it reserves the right not to attribute all the funds available if the quality of the applications is insufficient.

As an indicative figure, grants for multi-annual partnerships will represent around 85 % and annual grants around 15 % of the available budget.

Grants will be awarded under item 15.06.66 of the General Budget of the European Union.

6.   DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION

The deadline for submission of applications is 15 October 2009.

The Executive Agency is currently setting up a system to allow all applications to be submitted in computer format.

For this call for proposals, applicants must send in their applications using an electronic form which will be available from 15 September 2009. This version (including its annexes) is regarded as the main version. Before this date, the Executive Agency will make available a version of the form in pdf format to allow applicants to begin preparing their dossiers.

A paper version of the Application Dossier must also be sent to the address below before the deadline:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Only applications presented on the appropriate form, duly completed, dated and signed by the person authorised to enter into legally binding commitments on behalf of the applying body will be accepted.

7.   COMPLETE INFORMATION

Detailed guidelines for applicants and application forms are available at the following address: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 32), amended by Decision No 1358/2008/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 (OJ L 350, 30.12.2008).

---

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/13

---

STATE AID — THE NETHERLANDS

State aid C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 158/06

By means of the letter dated 31 March 2009 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified the Netherlands of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the abovementioned measure.

Interested parties may submit their comments on the measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

These comments will be communicated to the Netherlands. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

SUMMARY

PROCEDURE

On 4 March 2009, the Dutch authorities notified to the Commission an illiquid assets back-up Facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group).

FACTS

ING, with headquarters in the Netherlands, is one of the largest financial institutions worldwide, with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion. In January 2009, the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risks and return of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio. The latter is mostly composed of Alt-A securities. The outstanding balance of ING's portfolio amounts to USD 39 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion).

The contemplated measure consists of a cash flow swap between the Dutch State and ING, whereby ING transfers the proceeds of 80 % of the par value of the portfolio (interest and principal repayments) against guaranteed payments from the State on 72 % (i.e. 80 % of 90 %) of the par value of the portfolio (principal only), complemented with a funding fee paid by the State to ING amounting to 3,50 % for the proportion of fixed-rate securities in the portfolio and the USD 1-month Libor rate + 50 bp for the proportion of floating-rate securities in the portfolio.

The Dutch State pays an additional management fee to ING of 25 bp per annum on the outstanding principal amount. In exchange of this measure, ING pays to the Dutch State a yearly guarantee fee of 55 bp on 80 % of the outstanding portfolio amount.

ASSESSMENT

The Commission assessed the transaction under the Commission's Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). The Commission has at this stage doubts regarding the valuation and in particular the valuation methodology to assess the real economic value. The Commission needs to further investigate the underlying assumptions provided by the Dutch State, in particular as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

Consequently the Commission has also doubts about a proper burden sharing between the State and ING. The Commission questions whether the bank really bears the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the portfolio, taking into account the above-mentioned doubts about the assessment of the valuation. The Commission is also not sure if the above mentioned cash flow swap is really as beneficial for the State as is indicated. In particular, regarding the portfolio management fee, the Commission has some doubts about its appropriateness as there seems not too much activity required.

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. At the same time, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

TEXT OF LETTER

‘The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
| --- | --- |

—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.’

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

OTHER ACTS

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 158/24

---

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2006 on agricultural products and foodstuffs as traditional specialities guaranteed

2009/C 158/07

This publication confers the right to object to the application pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2006. Statements of objection must reach the Commission within six months from the date of this publication.

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A TSG

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 509/2006

‘KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA’

EC No: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Name and address of the applicant group:

Name: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Address:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Faks +48 228301648

E-mail: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Member State or third country:

Poland

3.   Specificity of the product:

3.1.   Name(s) to be registered (Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’

3.2.   Whether the name:

 is specific in itself

Image

The name ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ expresses the specific character of the product, which is linked above all to its exceptional taste and aroma. These features reflect the use in the production process of juniper berries, which are finely chopped just before they are added to the meat, and the use of juniper branches during the smoking process.

3.3.   Whether reservation of the name is sought under Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 509/2006:

 Registration with reservation of the name

Image

3.4.   Type of product:

| Class 1.2 — | Meat products (cooked, salted, smoked, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.2 —

Meat products (cooked, salted, smoked, etc.)

3.5.   Description of the agricultural product or foodstuff to which the name under point 3.1 applies (Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’ has the appearance of an evenly wrinkled stick in the form of a garland. It has a characteristic whorl shape, without external longitudinal creases. The garland of sausage exists in two sizes:

| — | small, in natural casings over 32 mm in diameter and weighing 0,5 kg approx, |
| --- | --- |

—

small, in natural casings over 32 mm in diameter and weighing 0,5 kg approx,

| — | large, in protein casings 36 mm in diameter and weighing 0,8 kg approx. |
| --- | --- |

—

large, in protein casings 36 mm in diameter and weighing 0,8 kg approx.

The colour of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ is dark brown, evenly spread over the entire surface, as is typical for heavily smoked sausages.

The consistency and ‘feel to the touch’ of the garland is that of a dry, smooth, evenly wrinkled surface, with a casing which fits tightly to the filling.

The product’s characteristic taste and tenderness result from the selection of raw materials, seasoning (in particular juniper) and the natural smoking which forms part of the production process.

Chemical composition:

| — | protein content — not less than 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

protein content — not less than 15,0 %,

| — | water content — not more than 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

water content — not more than 60,0 %,

| — | fat content — not more than 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

fat content — not more than 35,0 %,

| — | salt content — not more than 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

salt content — not more than 3,5 %,

| — | nitrate (III) and nitrate (V) content expressed as NaNO2 — not more than 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

nitrate (III) and nitrate (V) content expressed as NaNO2 — not more than 0,0125 %.

The above chemical composition values ensure the traditional quality of the product. The finished product yield in relation to the meat used as a raw material is 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.6.   Description of the production method of the agricultural product or foodstuff to which the name under point (3.1) applies (Article 3(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

Ingredients

| | Meat (100 kg of raw material):






  — | Class I pork with a fat content of up to 15 % — 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Meat (100 kg of raw material):

—

Class I pork with a fat content of up to 15 % — 20 kg,

| — | Class IIA pork with a fat content of up to 20 % — 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

Class IIA pork with a fat content of up to 20 % — 50 kg,

| — | Class III pork with a fat content of up to 25 % — 20 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

Class III pork with a fat content of up to 25 % — 20 kg,

| — | cutting fat — 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

cutting fat — 10 kg.

Up to 50 % of the Class IIA or Class III pork may be replaced by beef.

| | Seasonings (per 100 kg of meat):






  — | natural pepper — 0,17 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Seasonings (per 100 kg of meat):

—

natural pepper — 0,17 kg,

| — | juniper — 0,12 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

juniper — 0,12 kg,

| — | sugar — 0,20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

sugar — 0,20 kg.

| | Other additives:






  — | curing mix (based on a mixture of table salt (NaCL) and sodium nitrite (NaNO2)) — about 2 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Other additives:

—

curing mix (based on a mixture of table salt (NaCL) and sodium nitrite (NaNO2)) — about 2 kg.

Feeding in the context of the production of pork intended for use in the making of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’

Feeding refers to fatty-meat fattening. The aim is to produce pigs with a bodyweight of up to 120 kg, characterised by a higher intramuscular fat content (more than 3 %).

| — | Fattening is based on late-maturing breeds, and an appropriate fattening regime makes it possible to achieve the desired intramuscular fat content. The breeds used for fattening do not carry the RN gene, and the RYR 1T gene is present in 20 % of the population. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fattening is based on late-maturing breeds, and an appropriate fattening regime makes it possible to achieve the desired intramuscular fat content. The breeds used for fattening do not carry the RN gene, and the RYR 1T gene is present in 20 % of the population.

| — | Fattening should be carried out in three phases — phase I up to about 60 kg, phase II up to about 90 kg, and phase III up to 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fattening should be carried out in three phases — phase I up to about 60 kg, phase II up to about 90 kg, and phase III up to 120 kg.

| — | Fattening of animals up to 90 kg bodyweight approx. is carried out using two types of feed mixes. The feed mixes (doses) contain: |
| --- | --- |

—

Fattening of animals up to 90 kg bodyweight approx. is carried out using two types of feed mixes. The feed mixes (doses) contain:

| — | as energy components: cereal middlings — wheat, barley, rye, oat, triticale or maize; maize middlings and middlings of naked oat varieties account for up to 30 % of mixes. |
| --- | --- |

—

as energy components: cereal middlings — wheat, barley, rye, oat, triticale or maize; maize middlings and middlings of naked oat varieties account for up to 30 % of mixes.

| — | as protein components: lupin, field bean and pea middlings, post-extraction soya meal, post-extraction rapeseed meal, rapeseed oilcake, fodder yeast or dried green fodder. |
| --- | --- |

—

as protein components: lupin, field bean and pea middlings, post-extraction soya meal, post-extraction rapeseed meal, rapeseed oilcake, fodder yeast or dried green fodder.

| — | Feed mixes (doses) for animals from 90 to 120 kg contain: |
| --- | --- |

—

Feed mixes (doses) for animals from 90 to 120 kg contain:

| — | as energy components: wheat, barley, rye and triticale middlings. Maize middlings and middlings of naked oat varieties may not be used in mixes (doses). |
| --- | --- |

—

as energy components: wheat, barley, rye and triticale middlings. Maize middlings and middlings of naked oat varieties may not be used in mixes (doses).

| — | as protein components: middlings of leguminous crops (lupin, field bean and pea), post-extraction soya meal, rapeseed oilcake or post-extraction rapeseed meal and dried green fodder. |
| --- | --- |

—

as protein components: middlings of leguminous crops (lupin, field bean and pea), post-extraction soya meal, rapeseed oilcake or post-extraction rapeseed meal and dried green fodder.

| — | At no point in the feeding cycle may the following be used: vegetable oils, feed of animal origin, e.g. powdered milk, dried whey, fish meal. |
| --- | --- |

—

At no point in the feeding cycle may the following be used: vegetable oils, feed of animal origin, e.g. powdered milk, dried whey, fish meal.

| — | The metabolic energy content in mixes in all phases of fattening is 12-13 MJ of ME/kg of mix. The protein content in mixes should be around 16-18 % in the first phase of fattening, 15-16 % in the second phase, and about 14 % in the final phase. |
| --- | --- |

—

The metabolic energy content in mixes in all phases of fattening is 12-13 MJ of ME/kg of mix. The protein content in mixes should be around 16-18 % in the first phase of fattening, 15-16 % in the second phase, and about 14 % in the final phase.

| — | Doses for fatteners may be based on nutritive mixes alone, or nutritive mixes and bulk feed, i.e. potatoes and green fodder. |
| --- | --- |

—

Doses for fatteners may be based on nutritive mixes alone, or nutritive mixes and bulk feed, i.e. potatoes and green fodder.

Stages in the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’

| Stage 1 | Preliminary cutting up of all meat ingredients. Ensuring that the pieces of meat are of a uniform size (about 5 cm in diameter). |
| --- | --- |

Stage 1

Preliminary cutting up of all meat ingredients. Ensuring that the pieces of meat are of a uniform size (about 5 cm in diameter).

| Stage 2 | Traditional curing (dry method) for about 48 hours, using a curing mix. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 2

Traditional curing (dry method) for about 48 hours, using a curing mix.

| Stage 3 | Mechanical processing: Class I meat is ground to around 20 mm in size, Class IIA meat to around 8 mm in size, and Class III meat to around 3 mm, and is then minced together with 5 kg of ice. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 3

Mechanical processing: Class I meat is ground to around 20 mm in size, Class IIA meat to around 8 mm in size, and Class III meat to around 3 mm, and is then minced together with 5 kg of ice.

| Stage 4 | Mixing of all meat ingredients and seasonings: natural pepper, sugar and juniper, which is ground just before it is added to the mixer. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 4

Mixing of all meat ingredients and seasonings: natural pepper, sugar and juniper, which is ground just before it is added to the mixer.

| Stage 5 | Stuffing into natural pig intestines of over 32 mm in diameter or protein casings 36 mm in diameter, twisting-off of sticks and shaping in garlands. Two types of casing can be used to make the sausages:






  — | smaller garlands in small pig intestines weighing 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Stage 5

Stuffing into natural pig intestines of over 32 mm in diameter or protein casings 36 mm in diameter, twisting-off of sticks and shaping in garlands. Two types of casing can be used to make the sausages:

—

smaller garlands in small pig intestines weighing 0,5 kg,

| — | larger garlands in protein casings weighing 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

larger garlands in protein casings weighing 0,8 kg.

| Stage 6 | Settling at a temperature not exceeding 30 °C for two hours. Preliminary drying of the surface, ‘settling’ of the ingredients within the sticks. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 6

Settling at a temperature not exceeding 30 °C for two hours. Preliminary drying of the surface, ‘settling’ of the ingredients within the sticks.

| Stage 7 | Drying of the surface, followed by traditional hot smoking (for about 120 minutes) and baking until a temperature of at least 70 °C is reached inside the sticks. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 7

Drying of the surface, followed by traditional hot smoking (for about 120 minutes) and baking until a temperature of at least 70 °C is reached inside the sticks.

| Stage 8 | Cooling for 24 hours. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 8

Cooling for 24 hours.

| Stage 9 | Cold smoking using beech chips and juniper branches (for 120 minutes approx.), followed by drying at a temperature of 14-18 °C for 3-5 days until a yield of 75 % (+/-3 %) is obtained. |
| --- | --- |

Stage 9

Cold smoking using beech chips and juniper branches (for 120 minutes approx.), followed by drying at a temperature of 14-18 °C for 3-5 days until a yield of 75 % (+/-3 %) is obtained.

3.7.   Specific character of the agricultural product or foodstuff (Article 3(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’ derives its specific character from several attributes that are typical of the product:

| — | tenderness and specific properties of the meat, |
| --- | --- |

—

tenderness and specific properties of the meat,

| — | exceptional taste and aroma, |
| --- | --- |

—

exceptional taste and aroma,

| — | uniform shape. |
| --- | --- |

—

uniform shape.

Tenderness, succulence and specific properties of the meat

Pork from pigs of late-maturing breeds fattened to a bodyweight of about 120 kg and having the genetic traits described in point 3.6 is an essential ingredient of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ which influences the specific nature of the sausage. Compliance with these requirements yields an intramuscular fat content in excess of 3 %, ensuring that the meat possesses the appropriate gustatory and technological properties that are essential for the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’. The use of such raw materials and conformity to the traditional method of production, with special regard to the stages of mincing, curing and smoking, ensures that ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ is exceptionally tender and succulent.

Exceptional taste and aroma

The specific character of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ is linked mainly to its unique taste and aroma, which are the result of the use of juniper berries in the production process. Grinding the juniper berries just before starting the production process enhances the sausage’s characteristic taste and contributes to its specific character, while the use of juniper in the smoking process adds to its taste and enhances its exceptional aroma.

Uniform shape

Its shape is the feature which sets ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ apart from other sausages. The sausage is sold only in two, very similar shapes, which makes it easily recognisable for consumers. Kiełbasa jałowcowa has the appearance of an evenly wrinkled stick in the shape of a garland. It has a characteristic whorl shape, without external longitudinal creases.

3.8.   Traditional character of the agricultural product or foodstuff (Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

Traditional raw materials

| 1. | Juniper:
  The 1903 Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Great Illustrated Universal Encyclopaedia) refers to one of the useful properties of this shrub, which has been fairly common in Poland for centuries, namely that juniper releases a pleasant aroma when burnt. The encyclopaedia also indicates that juniper branches, shavings and berries can be used in the smoking process to confer an exquisite taste and aroma on meat. Documents from the second half of the 19th century show that juniper was already used as a seasoning or ingredient of meat dishes and products. The ‘Encyklopedyja Powszechna’, published in Warsaw in 1863, states that juniper berries have a spicy, bittersweet taste and a pleasant aroma and are widely used as seasoning. A standard production method for the sausage using juniper grains and involving juniper-flavoured smoke was established in Poland as early as the end of the 1940s (see article in ‘Gospodarka Mięsna’, the meat industry’s publication (1954, issue 3) entitled ‘Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku’). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Juniper:

The 1903 Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Great Illustrated Universal Encyclopaedia) refers to one of the useful properties of this shrub, which has been fairly common in Poland for centuries, namely that juniper releases a pleasant aroma when burnt. The encyclopaedia also indicates that juniper branches, shavings and berries can be used in the smoking process to confer an exquisite taste and aroma on meat. Documents from the second half of the 19th century show that juniper was already used as a seasoning or ingredient of meat dishes and products. The ‘Encyklopedyja Powszechna’, published in Warsaw in 1863, states that juniper berries have a spicy, bittersweet taste and a pleasant aroma and are widely used as seasoning. A standard production method for the sausage using juniper grains and involving juniper-flavoured smoke was established in Poland as early as the end of the 1940s (see article in ‘Gospodarka Mięsna’, the meat industry’s publication (1954, issue 3) entitled ‘Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku’).

| 2. | Pork:
  The meat of pigs kept for the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ must have an intramuscular fat content of more than 3 %; this is the marbling that confers on the product the desired tenderness, succulence and excellent taste. The use of such meat has a decisive influence on the quality of the final product and its specific character, and is in keeping with the traditional method of production. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Pork:

The meat of pigs kept for the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ must have an intramuscular fat content of more than 3 %; this is the marbling that confers on the product the desired tenderness, succulence and excellent taste. The use of such meat has a decisive influence on the quality of the final product and its specific character, and is in keeping with the traditional method of production.

Traditional method of production and composition

Smoking is a way of preserving meat and the most widespread method of smoking was burning juniper. This is recorded in old Polish manuscripts, such as the notes of the anonymous steward of a country estate in the 1780s, which record recipes for processing meat (AGAD Warsaw, ‘Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego’, ref. 1249). Poland's national bard, Adam Mickiewicz, refers to the popularity of smoking meat with juniper in a description of breakfast at a country house in his 1834 epic poem ‘Pan Tadeusz’. ‘sliced tongue and ham — all quite tasty and home-made, smoked over juniper, fired in the chimney. ’

The tradition of seasoning and smoking meat using juniper was cultivated in local and regional variants in which not just different technologies but also, sometimes, different types of meat were used. As W. Łęg states in the essay ‘Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin’, Gospodarka Mięsna (1953, issue 6), experiments were carried out involving ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ made from game (hare or wild boar with the addition of pork). These sausages tasted different, but essentially the same recipe (interlarding and smoking with juniper) was used everywhere. A meat industry specialist travelling through the Kurpie region made the following notes, in a piece on regional processed-meat specialities published in Gospodarka Mięsna (1950, issue 7-8), on the local variant of kiełbasa jałowcowa: ‘Sausage from Myszyniec, Kurpie region, smoked on juniper and containing juniper grains. Dry, excellent characteristic aroma and taste.’

After 1945, in accordance with the doctrine of central planning, it was decided to build a meat industry based on large processing plants. Standardisation of products and technology based on traditional recipes was introduced with the aim of improving quality and taste. ‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’ as a product name appears in food trading standards in 1947 and 1948. A harmonised standard for ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ was established in 1954; it later developed into the Meat Industry Central Office’s 1964 standard (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Warszawa 1964) on which the present application is based.

These standards were devised with the aim of ensuring the highest possible quality of kiełbasa jałowcowa. Although the standard on which this application is based is no longer binding, it still represents the highest production standards for ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’.

3.9.   Minimum requirements and procedures to check the specific character (Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1216/2007):

With regard to the specific character of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’, the following in particular should be subjected to checks:

| 1. | Quality of raw materials used in production (pork, seasonings), including






  — | technological suitability of the meat, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Quality of raw materials used in production (pork, seasonings), including

—

technological suitability of the meat,

| — | type of fattening, |
| --- | --- |

—

type of fattening,

| — | curing time, |
| --- | --- |

—

curing time,

| — | seasonings used in the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ and the proportions in which they are used. |
| --- | --- |

—

seasonings used in the production of ‘kiełbasa jałowcowa’ and the proportions in which they are used.

| 2. | ‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’ smoking process
  In the course of an inspection, the following must be checked:






  — | maintenance of the temperature required for traditional smoking in hot smoke and the heating temperature, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

‘Kiełbasa jałowcowa’ smoking process

In the course of an inspection, the following must be checked:

—

maintenance of the temperature required for traditional smoking in hot smoke and the heating temperature,

| — | maintenance of the duration and temperature of repeat smoking in cold smoke, |
| --- | --- |

—

maintenance of the duration and temperature of repeat smoking in cold smoke,

| — | use of beech chips and juniper branches for cold smoking. |
| --- | --- |

—

use of beech chips and juniper branches for cold smoking.

| 3. | Quality of the finished product:






  — | protein content, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Quality of the finished product:

—

protein content,

| — | water content, |
| --- | --- |

—

water content,

| — | fat content, |
| --- | --- |

—

fat content,

| — | sodium chloride content, |
| --- | --- |

—

sodium chloride content,

| — | nitrate (III) and nitrate (V) content, |
| --- | --- |

—

nitrate (III) and nitrate (V) content,

| — | taste and aroma. |
| --- | --- |

—

taste and aroma.

| 4. | Shape of the product |
| --- | --- |

4.

Shape of the product

Frequency of controls

Checks on the above-mentioned stages must be carried out once every two months. If all these stages are proceeding correctly, the frequency of the checks may be reduced to two per year.

If irregularities occur at any stage, the frequency of checks on that stage must be increased (to once every two months). Checks on other stages may be carried out once every six months.

4.   Authorities or bodies verifying compliance with the product specification:

4.1.   Name and address:

Name: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Address:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 226232901

Faks +48 226232099

E-mail: —

Image Public  Private

4.2.   Specific tasks of the authority or body:

The above inspection authority is responsible for checks on the entire specification.

---