NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 15-3321

____________ JENNIFER B. GILARMO, Appellant

v. US BANK NA AS TRUSTEE FOR CSAB MORTGAGE BACKED TRUST 2006-1; WELLS FARGO BANK NA AS SERVICER; MO RTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM; DOES 1-10, Inclusive

__________________ ________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-08121) District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

________________ __________________ Submitted Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 1, 2016 Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE a nd SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: February 5, 2016)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM Jennifer B. Gilarmo appeals from an orde r of the District Court dismissing her complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.2 Gilarmo obtained a mortgage loan in January of 2006 from First Laridian Mortgage D/B/A First Lenders Mortgage Company in the sum of $193,600 to refinance a residential property located at 28 Wedgep ort Drive in Toms River, New Jersey. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, In c., as nominee for Laridian Mortgage, its successors and assigns, assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSAB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Th rough Certificates, Series 2006-1. A Corrective Assignment of Mortgage correcting First Laridian’s name was subsequently executed. Then, in Novemb er of 2013, a Corporate A ssignment of Mortgage was executed; U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSAB Mortgage-Backed PassThrough Certificates, Series 2006-1, assi gned the mortgage to U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Credit Suisse Fi rst Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSAB Mortgage Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1. All assignments were duly recorded in the office of th e Clerk of Ocean County. Meanwhile, Gilarmo defaulted on her repa yment obligations and a foreclosure suit was filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey , Ocean County by U.S. Bank, alleging that the loan was in defau lt for the November 1, 2007 payment and all subsequent payments. Final Judgment and a Writ of Execution were entered in state court on January 7, 2015 after Gilarmo failed to appear and defend. She did not seek to appeal the foreclosure judgment in state court. On March 4, 2015, Gilarmo filed a civil action pro se in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, agains t U.S. Bank, Wells Far go Bank, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, to quiet title. She also alleged violations of the Real3 Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESP A”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Home Ownership Equity Pa rtnership Act (“HOEPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1602, and she asserted tort and contract clai ms. She argued in the main that U.S. Bank lacked standing when it sought foreclosure in state court be cause of improprieties in connection with the securitization of the loan. She attached to he r complaint a “Property Securitization Analysis Report” prepared for her by “Cer tified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC” of California, which traced the ow nership history of her Mortga ge and concl uded that her Note was converted into stock, that it th en lost its security component (i.e., the Mortgage), and thus that the right to forecl ose on her property through the Mortgage was forever lost. The defendants moved to dismiss the compla int, Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that it failed to state a claim upon which relief ma y be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review and reverse state court foreclosure judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrin e; and that Gilarmo’s RESPA and HOEPA claims were barred by statutes of limitation, among other arguments. After full briefing, the District Court held argument on the de fendants’ motion and granted it. The Court gave its reasons in open co urt, and its Order was ente red on August 20, 2015. Gilarmo appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Gilarmo argues in her pro se brief that the District Court erred in dismi ssing her complaint. She cites Glaski v. Bank of America, N. A., 160 Cal. Rptr 3d 449 (Cal . Ct. App. 2013), in support of her argument that her Note was assigned not to U.S. Bank but to a securitized trust which could not legally foreclose on her proper ty, and she further argues that the decision4 in Suser v. Wachovia Mortgage FSB, 78 A. 3d 1014 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 2013), requires reversal of the dismissal of her quiet title claim. 1 We will affirm. We exercise plenary re view over subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. See In re: Kaiser Group International In c., 399 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 2005) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); We ston v. Pennsylvania, 25 1 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We may affirm on any ba sis supported by the record. See Fairview Park Excavating Co . v. Al Monzo Constr uction Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1123 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977). We agree with the District Court that, to the extent that G ilarmo complained of injuries caused by the state court foreclosure judgment and invited the Court to review it and reject it, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the RookerFeldman doctrine is narrow, id. at 167-69. A ccordingly, we also hold that, to the extent that Gilarmo’s civil action pres ented an independent non-barred claim, she failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper wher e the complaint fails to stat e a claim upon which relief may be granted, such as where the plaintiff is una ble to plead “enough fact s to state a claim to

1 We reject as meritless one additional argumen t that the District Court erred in failing to strike the defendants’ “untimely” motion to dism iss. The district co urt record shows that counsel for the defendan ts sought and received an exte nsion of time until May 1, 2015 in which to respond to the compla int and then filed the motion to dismiss on May 1, 2015. Accordingly, it was not untimely. All ot her arguments are waived. See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Ci r. 1993) (“When an issue is either not set forth in the statement of issues presented or not pursue d in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has abandoned and waiv ed that issue on appeal.”).5 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell A tlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard “asks for mo re than a sheer possib ility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a mo tion to dismiss. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 2 03, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of pa rticular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court ju risdiction and prudentia l limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing requires an injury that is concrete and particularized and that is not conjectural or hypothetical, and there must be a causal connection between the injury and the cond uct complained of. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 560-61 (1992). Moreover, the “prudential standing rule ... normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relie f from injury to themselves.” Warth, 4 22 U.S. at 509. Gilarmo argues in her brief that U.S. bank as Trustee lacked standing to foreclose on her property because the Mortgage was not properly assigned to the Trust in accordance with the Pooling Se rvice Agreement (“PSA”). He r support for this argument is Glaski, which held that “ borrowers have standing to ch allenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement,” 160 Cal. Rptr at 4 52. However, as the Appellees have amply shown, the overwhelming majority of courts have taken a contrary view, holding that a borrower in default has no standing to challe nge an assignment said to violate a pooling6 service agreement like the one at issue here . See Appellees’ Brief, at 18-20 (citing Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Natio nal Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2014); Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 735 F.3d 220, 228 & n.29 (5th Cir. 2013); Correia v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (In re Correia), 452 B.R. 319, 324-25 (1st Cir. BAP 2011)). When measured against this overwhelmi ng legal precedent, we are not persuaded that Gilarmo may challenge U.S. Bank’s st anding based on allege d non-compliance with the documents governing the trust. Gilarmo is not a party to the PSA nor a third-party beneficiary of the PSA, and her injuries are hypothetical. She admits that she took out the loan, that she is in defau lt, and she does not argue that she ever paid more than the amount due on her loan, or that she received a bill or demand from any entity other than the defendants. She does not allege that the allegedly improper transfer interfered with her ability to pay the Note, or that the original lender would have refrained from foreclosure under the circumstances. It se ems plain enough here that the allegedly improper assignment merely s ubstituted one creditor for a nother, without changing her obligations under the Note. Gilarmo also argues that the decision in Suser v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, 78 A.3d 1014 (N.J. Super. Ct., A pp. Div. 2013), requires revers al of the dismissal of her quiet title claim, but that case can be distin guished on its facts. “Any person in the peaceable possession of lands ... claiming owners hip thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied or disputed ... maintain an action in the superior court to settle the title to such lands and to clear up al l doubts and disputes concerning the same.”7 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62-1. Suser held that quiet title claims also in clude situations where a property owner seeks to re solve whether a putative assignee of an otherwise valid mortgage properly holds the mortgage. 78 A.3d at 1018-19. However, here, final judgment was entered against Gilarmo in a fo reclosure action. There is no basis in the statute or her securitization argument for her quiet title claim to proc eed, and Suser does not undermine that determination. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the complaint.