The H on o ra ble W il li am J
. H ibbler, ofthe N orther n D is tr ic t  ofI l l i noi s , s i t t i ng by des i gna t i on.



## In the 

# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 09

- 2947 S TAN LEY E. M ARTIN , J R ., P et it ioner-App el lant, v. B Y RAN B A RT OW, R espo nd ent-A pp ellee.

A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the Western Di stricto f Wisc onsin
. No . 08- C-518-C

—Barb ara B. C rab b , Judg e.
A RGUED A PRI L 23, 2010

— D ECI DE D D ECE MBE R 9, 2010

B efore M ANI ON an d R OV NER, Cir cu i tJudges , an d H IB BLE R, D istrict Judge.  H IB BLE R, D i s t r i ctJudg e . T hi s i s ana ppea lfr o m the di st r i ctc o ur t’ s o r derdi smi ss i ngPe ti ti o ne r - Appel l an t M ar tin’ s appl i ca ti o n fo ra wri t o fhabe as c o r pus . The cour t di sm i sse d M ar ti n’s ap pli cati on a s unti m el y upon2 N o. 09

- 2947 Re spo nde ntBa r to w’s motio n. M ar tin c o nt en ds th atthe c ou rtm isc alc u lat ed th e d at e u p on w h ich th e a p p lica b le s t a t ut e o fl i mi t a t i o ns b e g a n t o r unb e c a us e o fan i m pr o peri nt er pr et at i o n o fthe rel ev an t se ct i o ns o fthe A nti ter rori sm and Effecti ve Death Penal ty A ct o f19 96 ( AE DPA), 2 8 U. S
. C. § 2 244( d) ( 1)
. W e ag r ee tha t th e d is t r ict court erred i n its calcu lation and therefore re ver se and rem and fo r furtherpro ceedi ngs.

I
. Ba ck g r o und I n 199 6, the St ate o fW i sco nsi n succes sfu lly peti ti oned a st at e co ur t to ha ve M ar tin c i vi l l y c o m m i tt ed as a “ se xual l y v i ol ent per son” pu rs uant to a W i sco nsi n sta tute al l owing com m i tm ent, W i s. S tat
. § 980. 06, o fany perso n w ho: ( 1) “has been convi cted ofa sexual l y v i ol ent o ffense” ; and (2 ) “i s danger ous b ecause h e o r she s uffer s fro m a m entaldi sor der that m ak es i t l i kel y that the per son w i l lenga ge i n one orm or e ac ts ofse xual vi ol ence, ” i d. § 9 80. 01( 7)
. The pre dica te offense f orM ar ti n’s co m m i tm ent was a 1988 co nvi cti on fo r seco nd degr ee sexual ass aul t. The W i sco nsi n ci vi lco m m i tm ent s tatute o nl y a l l ows f or a pe r s o n t o b e he l d i n s t a t e c us t o dy “ un t i l s uc h t i m e a s the per son is n o l onge r a s exual l y v i ol ent per son. ” Id. § 9 80. 06. Thus, the St ate m ust r eexam i ne ea ch p er son com m itted p urs ua nt to th e statu te at least onc e a year, i d. § 980. 07, and a c om m i tte d pe rs on m ay peti ti on f or d isc h ar ge atan y t im e, i d. § 980. 09. The S tat e deci ded anew thatM ar ti n w as a sexu al l y v i ol ent per son each yea r si nce hi s o ri gi nalco m m i tm ent. Then, i n 200 5, afterN o. 09

- 2947 3

a n u m b er of ill-fat ed ch alle n ge s t o h is c om m itm en t in b ot h fed er al a n d s ta te co u rt, M ar tin filed h is fou rt h p et iti on f ordi sc h ar ge, chal l engi ng the S tat e’ s r el i ance o n two e ar l i erc o nv i ct i o ns i n j us tify i nghi s co m m i tment
. The expert s that t est i fi ed at hi s o ri gi nalco m m i tm ent t ri al b a s e d t h eir te st im on y c on c er n in g t h e like lih oo d of re c id ivism i n parto n the f act that M ar ti n previ ousl y f aced c h ar ge s fo r se x u al a ss au lt in 19 76 an d 19 7 9
. H o w ev er , in ea cho ftho se c as es , M ar tin pl ea ded g ui l ty to l es se r, no nsexualcr i m es and the S tat e dro pp ed the c h arges o f se xua la ss au l t. The S tate c o nt i nue d t o r ely o n tho se c o nvic tio n s in its an n u al re ev alu at ion s. T h e s ta te circ u it c ou rtsu m m ar ily d en ied M ar tin ’s p et itio n be c a u se it f o un d “ no c ha ng e i n the r e s po nd e nt ’ s c o nd i t i o n to w a r r a nta h e a r i ng . ” T he s t a t e a pp e l l a t e c o ur ta ff i rm ed th atde ni al, b uta ddr essed M ar tin’ s pet i ti o n o n the m er i ts, r atherthan re l yi ng o n M ar ti n’s f ai l ure to al l ege a c ha ng e i n the f a c t s o fh i s c a s e , a s the lo we rc o ur th a d. Fi nal l y, the W i sco nsi n Suprem e Court denie d his peti ti on f o rl ea ve t o a ppea l

. Thu s, the S ta te ’ s dec i si o n t o c o nt i nue M ar ti n’s co nfinem ent b ecam e fi nalo n A ugust 1 8, 20 08. M ar ti n then fi l ed a pr o se federa lhabea s peti ti on o n S ept embe r2, 2 008 , pur su an t to 2 8 U. S
. C. § 2 25 4, a r g ui ng that the S tat e’ s r el i ance on hi s e ar l i er c onvi cti ons vi ol ate d hi s ple a agr eem ents and hi s const i tuti on al ri ghts. The dis tr i ct c ourti ssued a sua s ponte s how cause or der s ugges ti ng tha t his peti ti on was unti m el y b ecause he was or i gina lly com m i tte d i n 199 6 a nd A ED PA pro vid es fo r a o n e-y ea r st at u te of lim ita tio n s. See2 8 U. S
. C. § 22 44 ( d) ( 1)
. M ar tin the n mov ed to a m end hi s pet i ti o n, and i n hi s pro posed am ended p eti ti on he pu rpor ted to4 N o. 09

- 2947 chal l enge the S tat e’ s r epeate d use o fhi s ear lier co nvi cti ons i n i ts annual re evaluati ons. U pon Respondent’s m oti on, the dist ri ct c ourtdi sm i ss ed M ar tin’ s pet i ti o n a s unt i m ely . The c o ur t co ncl ud ed that the A ED PA sta tute of l i m i tat i ons b egan run n in g on the date o fM ar ti n’s i ni ti alco m m i tm ent o rder be ca us e M ar tin w as e ss en ti al l y c ha l l en g i ngtha t dec i si o n. On app eal, M ar ti n ar gues that the a pp l i c ab le statute ofl i m i tat ions peri od actual l y b ega n to r un on the date ofthe m ostr ecento rderco nti nuing hi s co m m i tm ent.

I I
. S tandard o fRevi ew W e re vie w a d ist ric t c ou rt ’s d ism iss al of a h ab e as p et itio n d e n ov o. M oore v. Ba tt aglia , 476 F. 3d 504, 50 6 ( 7th C ir. 2007).

III
. A n aly sis AE DPA pro vi des a o ne - y ea rs ta tu te o fl i m i ta ti o ns f o ra n a ppl i ca ti o n b r o ug htb y “a per so n i n c us to dy pur su an t to the j ud gm en t of a State cou rt. ” 28 U
. S. C
. § 2244(d )( 1). The s t a t ut e s t a t e s tha tthe l i mi t a t i o ns p e r i o d b e g i ns to ru n from t h e l at es t o f fou r en u m er at ed ev en ts , bu t in thi s ca se the par ti es agr ee that the t ri gg eri ng ev ent was the i ssuance of a j u d gm ent a nd thatthe peri od beg an to run o n “the da te on which the j ud gm ent b ecam e fi nal by the c oncl usi on o fdi re ct r evi ew o r the e xpir ati on o f th e ti m e forse eking such r evi ew . ” Id. § 2 24 4( d) ( 1) (A ). W h at th e p ar tie s d isp u te is w h ich j u d gm en t M ar tin is chal l engi ng.N o. 09

- 2947 5 M ar tin ’s c on st itu tio n al rig h t t o d u e p ro c es s lim its h is c i v i l c o mm i t men t t o the pe r i o d du r i ng whi c h he i s “ bot h m ental l y i l land danger ous, but no l onge r.” Fou ch a v. Lo ui s i ana , 50 4 U.S
. 71 , 77, 11 2 S . C t. 17 80, 17 84, 11 8 L. E d

. 2 d 4 3 7 ( 1 9 9 2 )
. As s o o n a s th e S t a t e l a c k s “ c l e ar a nd convinci ng ev i denc e” thatM ar ti n m eet s bo th co nd i ti ons, it m u st rele as e M ar tin from cu st od y. Id. at 80, 11 2 S
. Ct. at 1786
. I t i s l i kel y forthi s re as on that the W i sco nsi n sta tute p ro vid es f orannualr eev al uati on a nd al l ows M ar ti n to c h alle n ge h is c om m itm en t a t a n y t im e. SeeW i s. Stat. §§ 9 80
. 07, 9 80
. 09
. Re co g ni zingtha t M ar tin’ s co m m i tment i s dependent on a fi nd i ng t h at h e i s cu r r e nt l y both m ental l y i l l and dange ro us, the dist ri ct cour t accepted th e par ti es ’ c o nc l us i o n tha t ea chs ta te c ou rt o r derc o nti nuing M ar ti n’s co m m i tm ent o r denyi ng hi s chal l enge to such com m i tm ent con st i tutes a new j ud gm ent for pu rpos es ofA ED PA , and ther ef or e st ar ts a new statute o fl i mi t a t i o n s p e r i o d

. We a g r e e , a s th i s s e e ms t o b e t he onl y l ogi calco ncl usi on. To hol d other w i se w oul d l ead to one oftwo ab su rd resul ts; ei therM ar ti n coul d never chal l enge an o rd er co nti nuing hi s co m m i tm ent that was en te r ed m o r e th ana y ea ra fte rhi s i ni ti alc o m m i tment or d er or t h e st at u te of lim ita tio n s a p p lica b le t o h is i ni ti alco m m i tm ent o rderwould neve r expir e. Thu s, the parti es in t h is c ase di spute o nl y whether the di str i ct c ou rtco rr ectly inter prete d M ar ti n’s habea s pet i ti o n t o b e a ch al l en g e to the o r i g i na lc om m itm ent or der, r atherthan to the 2 005 or der c ontinuing com m i tm ent. M ar ti n ar gues that because hi s co m m i tm ent in 200 5 w as onl y c onst i tuti onalif i t was bas ed on a fi nd i ng tha t he met th e co ndi ti o ns f o rc o m m itm en t a t th att i m e, he6 N o. 09

- 2947

w as i n custo dy pursuant onl y t o the m ostr ecento rder ext en di nghi s co m m i tmentf o ra no th ery ea r . Thu s, he conte nd s that the l i m itat i ons peri od beg an to r un on the date o fthato rderi n 200 5. R esp ond en t argu es t h a t if w e w ere to accep t M artin’s i nt e r pr e t a t i o n, we wo ul d e ffe c t i v e l y a l l o w pe r s o ns a dj ud g e d t o b e s e xu a l l y v i o l e ntt o r e pe a t e dl y c ha l l e ng e thei r ci vi lco m m i tm ent on t h e s am e g ro und s. Thus, Respondent su gg es ts thati n or der t o deter m i ne wh at j ud gm ent M ar ti n i s chal l engi ng, we m ust l ook t o the s ubst an ce o fthe c l ai m s he made i n hi s appl i ca ti o n. Re spo ndent bel i eve s th at an anal ysi s o ftho se cl ai m s l eads t o th e in ev ita b le c on c lu sio n th at M ar tin is ch alle n gin g h is ini ti al com m i tm ent. I n supp or t of i ts ar gum ents on th is po i nt, Res po nde ntl o o k s t o the l an g ua g e o fA EDPA, to the sta tute’ s pu rp ose s, and to cas e l aw theybel i eve to be re l evant
. A fteraddress i ng ea ch of these l ega lso urces i n succes si on be l ow, w e a ccept the princ ip le espoused b y t h e R es p o n d e n t, bu t fin d th at it d oe s n otap p ly in M ar ti n’s uni que case .
A
. Pl ai n Language ofthe St atute Respondent ar gues that M ar ti n’s i nt er preta ti on o f § 2 2 4 4 ( d) ( 1) do e s n o ts qu a r e wi th a r e a di ngo f§ 2 2 4 4 ( d) as a co here nt wh ol e. Fi rs t, R espondent poi nts o ut that § 2 2 4 4 ( d) ( 2 ) t o l l s the l i mi t a t i o ns p e r i o d wh i l e ana ppli cant s eek s S tat e p os t- convi cti on r el i ef“with re spect to the per ti nent j ud gm ent o r cl ai m . ” Res pond ent a rgues tha t, g i v e n thi s l a ngua g e , i ti s n o tl ogi cal to c o nc l ud e that a peti ti oneri n M ar ti n’s posi ti on a l w ays chal l engesN o. 09

- 2947 7 the m ostr ecentj ud gm en t. R espondent ar gues that such a c on c lu sio n w ou l d r e n d er th e t er m “p er tin en t” in § 2 244( d)( 2) a null i ty. Se c on d , Respondent ar gues that M ar ti n’s i nter preta
ti o n wo u l d n u l l i fy § § 2 2 4 4 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( B )

- ( D) , wh i c h l a y o ut the o ther c i rcum sta nces that m i ght del ay the s tar t date f o rth e l i mi t a t i o n s p e r i o d

. As a n e x a mpl e , R e s p o n d e nt posi ts a si tuati on w here M ar ti n disc ove re d ne w ev id en ce r el at ed to c lai m s he made i n h i s o r i g i na lc o m m i tment tr i alafterthe i ssuance ofa new j ud gm ent forco nti nued c o mm i t men t
. In tha ti ns t a nc e , s e c t i o n 2244 ( d) ( 1 ) ( D) w ou ld se em to se t t h e s ta tu te of lim ita tio n s fo r c h all en gin g the o ri gi nalj ud gm ent running a fterM ar ti n w as al re ady i n custo dy pursuant t o a new j ud gm ent. There ar e tw o m aj orfl aw s in Respondent’s ar gum ents. The fi rs t i s Res pond ent’ s a ssum pti on that we cannot acc ep t an inte r p r e t a t ion of § 2244 (d) tha t, given a p art i c ul a rs e to ff a c t s , n ul l i fi e s a p r o v i s i o n o fthe statute
. Of co ur s e , we a l wa y s e nd e a v o r t o c o ns t r ue s t a t ut e s so as to giv e e ffec t t o e ac h p ro vis ion
. D u n c a n v . Wa lk er, 533 U
. S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120 , 2125 , 150 L. Ed

. 2d 25 1 (2 001) (i nt erna l qu otation om itte d ). Bu t, w e d o not ren d er a pr o vi si o n a nul l i tys i m pl y b y de ci di ngtha t i t ha s no effect i n a s peci fi c f actualco ntext. In other w or ds, ev en a s s umi ngf o rthe s a k e o fa r g ume nttha t § 2 2 4 4 ( d) ( 1 ) ( D) w ou ld n ot ha ve m uc h m e a n in g i n th e rare cont ex t of a c as e in vo lvin g c ivi l c o m m itm en t, like M ar tin ’s, it c ou ld st i l l ha ve m ea ni ng i n th e va stmaj o r i tyo fhabe as l i ti g at i o n. A se co nd pr o bl em wi ththe a r g um en t i s o ne tha t r uns thro ughout Res pond ent’ s br i ef

— he i gnor es the f act that8 N o. 09

- 2947 M ar ti n base s hi s chal l en ge on i ssues thatco uld have been ra i sed i n hi s o ri gi nalco m m i tm ent t ri al, b u t that ar e al so r el ev an t to the 2 00 5 j udg m ent bec au se the State con tinu es to rely on th e sam e conv ictions to j us tify M ar tin ’s c om m itm en t. T h e W isc on sin C ou rtof A p p ea ls did not, as the l ower co urt had, re st its deci si on o n M ar tin’ s f ai l ur e to a l l ege a ny c ha ng es i n h i s co ndi ti o n. Ra the r, i t de c i de d t o t r e a t the l o we r c o ur t ’ s de ni a l o f M ar ti n’s peti ti on f ordi schar ge as a fullr edeterm i nati on o n the mer i ts o fa l lthe i ss ue s th athe r ai se d i n the pe ti ti o n. I n thi s r espect, M ar ti n’s cas e i s e xcepti onalbec ause, d es p ite w h at t h e W isc on sin C ou rtof A p p ea ls d id in t h is c as e , W isc on sin ’s c ivil c om m itm en t s c h em e fo r se x u ally v i o l e ntp e r s o ns do e s n o tr e qu i r e a n a nn ua lr e e v a l ua ti on by the s tat e co urt ofthe o ri gi nalgr ounds ofco m m i tm en t. Ins te ad, i t pr es um es tha t th e o r i g i na lj ud g m en t continues to j usti fy c onfi nem ent a nd as ks w hetheranythi ng has changed thatsho uld c ause the c ourtto r ee va l ua te the c o nfi ne m en t. W i s. S ta t. § 9 80
. 09 ( 1)
. And w hi l e Fou ch a , 50 4 U.S
. at77, 11 2 S. Ct. at17 84, pro hibi ts W i sco nsi n fro m co nfini ng a perso n ci vi l l y c om m i tte d unle ss i t has “cl earand convinc in g” evi dence, nei ther F o u c h a norsubse quent prece dent cal lW i sco nsi n’s pro cedu re s into const i tuti onal d ou b t or re quir e the S tat e t o re exam i ne i ts i ni ti alj usti fi cati ons f orco n fin em ent o n som e per i odi c ba si s. An ex ami na ti o n o fW i sc o ns i n l aw r eg ar di ngpe ti ti o ns f ordi schar ge, wh i ch M ar ti n i s chal l en gin g i n hi s habe as p etition, verifi es th at in m a ny cases th e state cou rt wi l lno t co ns ide rthe e vi den ce o r i g i na l l y j us ti fy i ngc o n-N o. 09

- 2947 9

A t the tim e of M artin ’ s 200 5 p e tition , he ha d to d em on strate 1 pro babl e cau se

— ra the r thanm er el y a l l eg e

— thathi s c ondi t i on h a d ch a n g ed

. S eeAct ofM ay 2 6 , 1 994, W is c. Legis. Ser v. A ct 47 9 (rela ting to civ il com m itm en t of sexua lly v iolen t pe rson s) ( p o r t i o n t o b e c o di fi e d a t W i s . S t a t
. § 9 8 0
. 0 9 ( 2 ) ( a ) )
. Bu tt he es s en t i al f ac tr em ai ns thatabs en tthe ne c es s ar y s howi ng o n the peti ti oner’ s pa rt, the court do es not r econs ider whether he w as a s exuall y violentpers on in the fir stplace

. fi ne men t
. Th e i ni t i a l b ur de n l i e s wi th the pe t i t i o ne r, not the S tat e. The pet itio ner m ust a l l ege f acts i n hi s peti ti on th at w ou ld allow a c o u r t o r j u ry to co n c lu d e t h at h is condi ti on has change d si nce the d ate o fi ni ti alco m m i tm en t. W is. St at . § 98 0.0 9(1 ); s e e a l s o In r e Co mm i t m e ntof K ruse, 296 W is . 2 d 130, 150, 722 N
. W
. 2d 742, 752 (2006 ). I f th e pe titi one r m eets th is plead ing bu rd en, the cou rt w ill ho ld a h ea rin g t o d et er m in e w h et h er a j u ry co u ld c on c lu d e t h at th e p e t itio n er is n o lon ge r a s ex u ally vio len t p er so n . W i s . St at . § 98 0.0 9(2 ). It is on ly 1 afterthe peti ti on er m eets hi s bur den that the S tat e m ust dem onst ra te by cl ear and c onvi nc in g evi dence th at th e p et itio n er ’s c on fin em en t re m ain s jus tifie d

. Id. § 980.09(3). Thu s, gi ven W i sco nsi n ’s d eci si on t o re vi si t i ts i ni ti al j u st ifica tio n s fo r c o n fin in g M ar tin in re sp on se to h is 20 05 p et itio n, w e n ee d n otw or ry w h et h er M ar tin co u ld sti l lc h al l enge hi s o ri gi nalco m m i tm ent o rder, o r w hat the e ffect ofsuch a chal l en ge w ou l d be. In thi s r espect, M a r t i n att e mpt s t o p r o v e t o o muc h. In o r de rt o s uc c e e d, M ar ti n do es not need to sho w thata peti ti oneral w ays chal l enges the m ostr ecentj ud gm en t conti nuing hi s o r10 N o. 09

- 2947 her ci vi lco m m i tm ent. Ins te ad, he o nl y nee ds to sho w th at he i s chal l engi ng the m ost re cent j ud gm ent i n th is case . In f act, th er e i s no di spute thatwh en he fi l ed hi s pe ti ti o n, M ar tin was i n c us to dy pur su an t to the 20 05 j udg m en t, a nd tha t he c ha ll en g ed o ne o fthe gr ounds u pon w hi ch the W i sco nsi n cour ts up hel d that j udg m en t. Thu s, the r e i s no th i ngin th e l an g ua g e o fthe st atut e that lea ds us t o b el i ev e he i s ch al l en g i nga ny j u d gm en t o th er t h a n t h e on e w h ich h e c laim s t o b e c h all engi ng.

B. A ED PA ’ s Purpos es Thi s same po i ntr es o na te s i n o ura na l y si s o fRe spo ndent’s cl ai m that a rul i ng i n f avo r of M ar tin co nfl i cts w ith th e pu rp os es be h in d A E D P A . Re sp on d en t e ss en tia lly ar gue s th ata l l o wi ngM ar tin to ch al l en g e hi s co m m i tment no w o n g r o un ds tha t he c o ul d ha v e r a i s e d y ear s a go confl i cts w i th Congr ess ’ s g oa ls o fpro m oting co m i ty, fi nal i ty , a nd federa l i sm wh i l e a voi ding pie cem eall i ti gatio n . Se eWi llia m s v . Tayl or, 52 9 U.S
. 42 0, 43 6, 12 0 S
. Ct. 14 79 , 14 90 , 14 6 L
. E d

. 2d 4 3 5 (2 00 0); D un ca n v . Wa lk er, 53 3 U
. S. 16 7, 18 0, 12 1 S. C t. 2120 , 21 28- 29, 15 0 L. Ed. 2d 251 ( 20 01 )
. H o wev er, as no te d ab o ve , M ar tin i s i n a un i que si tuati on be cau se t h e S tat e put the questi on o fwh ether h i s p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s a r e l e g a l g r o u n d s f o rh i s c o mm itm en t a t i ssue aga i n f ol l owing hi s 2 005 peti ti on. Thus, des pi te the f ac t th atM artin co ul d ha ve c ha l l en g ed th e St ate ’ s r el i ance o n hi s co nvi cti ons a t h i s ini ti alco m m i tm en t he ar i ng, hi s f ai l ur e to do s o ha s no t ca us ed th e questi on t o gr ow stal e. Instea d, the S tat e has pre ser vedN o. 09

- 2947 11 i t byr est i ng i ts deci si on t o continue M ar ti n’s co m m i tm ent o n thos e s am e g ro und s no w . G i ven that f act, th e a ppl i ca ti o n o fAEDPA ’ s g o al s i s so m ewha t m o re com pli cate d i n thi s ca se. I n additi on t o the f act that the s tat es m ay i ntro du ce p ro c ed u re s t h at red u c e d u p lica tiv e litig at ion, a s W isc on sin ha s d one here, a coup le ofother factor s m ake M artin’s si tuati on uni que w hen i t co m es to ap pli cati on o f AE DPA’s pr i nc i pl es . F i r st, h e i s a ci vi lde ta i ne e, a nd thus part ofa popu l ati on that m ake s up a sm al lpor ti on o f h ab ea s p et itio n er s. Se c on d , his c i rc u m st an c e a ris es on ly afte re xha us ti o n o fs ta te r emedi es , fur th erna r r o wi ngthe field . In sh or t, allo w in g M a r t i n ’ s ca se to go fo rw ar d w ill n otex ac tly op en th e floo d ga te s t o e x c es siv e a n d rep et iti ve fede r alhabe as l i ti g at i o n. Lastl y, wh i l e a chi eving fi nali ty i s o ne o fthe goa l s o f AE DP A, we mu s t i n t e r p r e t th a t g o a l i n a d i ffe r e nt l i g ht w i thin the c o nt e xt o f c i v i l c o mm i t men t
. F i na l i t y i s o f cour se a g re at concern w hen i t co m es to the r eso l uti on ofa parti cul arcl ai m o r ar gum ent, but ove ra l lfi n ali ty w i l lde p en d in l ar ge part on the st ructur e o fa parti cul ar s t a t e ’ s c i v i lc o m m i t m e n ts c h e me

— a s d e s i g n e d a n d i mple m ented. A fteral l, unl i ke a co nvi cti on a nd se n te n ce f o ra di sc r et e cr i m i na lo ffen se , a pe r so n’ s curr en t st atus as a se x u ally vio len t p er so n is a d et er m in at ion th at is co ns ta nt ly an d f o r ev erdi spu tabl e as a matt ero fc o nst itu tio n al la w , s e eFo uc ha , 5 04 U .S. at77, 11 2 S
. Ct. at 1784, and W i sco nsi n sta tutory l aw , W i s. S tat
. § 980. 07.12 N o. 09

- 2947 C. Case Law Responde n t does not gain any add i ti onalsupport by re fer rin g t o c as e la w . In fac t, w h ile c as e la w ap p lica b le to thi s di st i nc ti ve cas e i s s ca r ce , the c as es tha t ar e r el ev an t un d ercu t his pos iti on furth er. The onl y c ase either partyci tes thatco nsi ders the l i m i tati o ns pr o vi si o ns ’ a ppl ic at i o n t o a pe ti ti o n c ha l l en g i ng ci vi lco m m i tm ent i s R evels v . Sa nd ers , 51 9 F
. 3d 734 ( 8th Ci r . 2 00 8)
. In tha t ca se , the M i ss o ur ic o ur ts de nied the peti ti oner ’ s a pp l i cati on f oruncondit i onalr el eas e fro m ci vi lco m m i tm ent under a s tatute a nal ogo us to the W i sc on sin st at u te atiss u e h er e. Id. at74 0; see also M o. R ev. S ta t. § 5 52. 040
. 13
. The Ei g hth Ci r cui t he l d tha t th e A E DP A st atute o fl i m i tat i ons bega n to r un on the date th atthe S ta te de ni ed hi s appl i ca ti o n, r athe rtha n o n the d at e o f h is or igin al c on vic tio n an d co m m itm en t. R eve ls , 519 F. 3d at 7 40 . The c ourtnot ed that the pet i ti oner w as n otch alle n gin g h is in iti a l c om m itm en t, bu t h is c on tin u ed co m m itm en t. Id. R espondent at tem pts to di st i ng ui sh R eve ls by foc u sin g on th e f a c t t h at th e p et iti o ne ri n tha t ca se a ckno wl edg ed th athe di d m ee t th e c r i t e r i a f o rc o n fi n e me n tw h e n h e wa s o r i g i n a l l y c o mm i tte d and w as cl ai m i ng that h is m entalheal th had im p ro ve d to th e p oin t w h er e h e w as n o lon ge r elig ible for civ il com m itm en t. Se ei d. H owever, the Re ve ls c ou rt onl y m ake s no te oftha t acknowle dgem ent t o i l l ustr ate that the peti ti oner w as i n f act chal l engi ng the l at er j ud gm en t. Id. The cou rt neve r i nd i cate s that a peti ti oner c an n o t ch alle n ge a lat er j u d gm en t s ole ly b ec au se h is re aso ns f orchal l engi ng tha t j ud gm ent c oul d have be en the b asi s forchal l engi ng an ear l i erj ud gm ent.N o. 09

- 2947 13 Respondent i s unabl e t o p oin t to any pr ecedent that s t an d s fo r th at p ro p os itio n . In st ea d , he on c e a ga infalls b ac k on h is a rg u m en t t h a t w e s h ou ld find th at M ar tin i s chal l engi ng hi s o ri gi nalco m m i tm ent b y l oo kin g to the c l ai m s he m ake s in hi s a pp l i cati on. H e ci te s to cas es th atdi st i ng uis h b etwee n c l ai m s ch al l en g i ngc o nv i ct i o ns an d tho se c ha l l en g i ngpo st
- co nv i ct i o n o r der s, i nc l udi ng re s e nt e nc i ngo r de r s . T ho s e c a s e s do di s t i ngui s h b e t w een j udg m en ts b as ed o n the c o nt en t o fthe c l ai m s i n the peti ti ons, but they s ay nothi ng ab out the quest i on o f w hethera peti ti oner can chal l enge a l ate r j ud gm ent o n gr ou n d s t h at ap p lied t o an ea rlier j u d gm en t. See, e.g., Walkerv. Ro th , 133 F.3d 45 4, 45 5 (7 th C i r. 19 97 ); Bachman v. Bagley , 4 87 F
. 3d 97 9, 9 82

- 84 ( 6th Ci r . 2 00 7) ( ci ting Lin sco tt v. R o se, 4 36 F
. 3d 587, 59 1 ( 6th Ci r . 2 00 6) a nd D iC enz i v. R o se, 452 F.3d 465 , 469 (6th C ir. 2006)). The S upr em e Co ur t’ s r ec en t o pi ni o n in M agwood v
. Patt e rs on , 13 0 S
. Ct. 27 88, 17 7 L. Ed. 2d 592 ( 2010 ) , i nd i cate s th a ta p e t i t i o n e r ca n i nd e e d d o j u s tth a tu n d e rs o me cir cum sta nces. Li ke som e o fthe case s m enti oned abo ve, M agwood in vo lve s a ch alle n g e t o a res en te n c in g. Id. at 2795
. H ow eve r, wh at m ake s M agwood un iqu e, an d m ore re lev an t t o th e c a se atba r, is th at th e p et itio n er in M a gw o od chal l enged hi s r ese ntenci ng o n gr ounds that he co uld h av e rai sed i n hi s chal l enge to hi s o ri gi nal s e n te n c in g, bu t d id n ot
. Id. A l though the M agwood Cour t w as concerned w i th the ban on s eco nd o r succes si ve pe tit ion s in 28 U
. S. C § 22 44(b) , the rul i ng i ncl ud es lan gu ag e t h at p ro vid es gu id an c e on h ow w e s h ou ld apply t h e sta tute ofl i m i tat i ons i n § 2 244( d)( 1)
. S peci fi cal l y, the Court em phasi zed the effect of a new st ate14 N o. 09

- 2947 j u d g me n t, h o l d i n gth a t“[ a ] n e r r o rma d e a s e c o n d t i me i s s ti l la new er ro r. ” Id. a t 28 01
. M ar tin i s no t ch al l en g i ng a r e s e nt e nc i ng, b ut h e i s c ha l l e ng i nga de c i s i o n mad e re p ea te d ly b y t h e St at e. If th at d ec isio n w as m ad e in er ro r, and i t r esul ted i n M ar ti n’s co nti nued co m m i tm ent, M agwoodsugg est s that M ar ti n m ay chal l enge that new error sepa rately from any p revious error. H owever, we note that M agwoodwil lprob ablynotbe parti cul ar l y r el evanti n the run- of

- the- m i l lchalle nge t o a d en ied pet i ti o n fo rdi sc ha r g e. In M agwood, th e p et iti o ne rr ai se d a c ha l l enge to hi s dea ths en te nc e afte rthe se nt en cingc o ur t c ond uct ed ane nt i r ely ne w se nt en cing hear i ng and c onsi dered al l the evi dence an d ar gum ents an ew. The ca se l eft undi sturbe d pre ce den t co nc erni ngthe sc o pe o fhabe as r ev i ew f o rc ha l l en g es t o pa r o l e dec i si o ns or t h e los s o f goo d tim e c re d its , i d. at 2800 n.12, w hich are m o r e an al o g o us t o a pe ti ti o n fo rdi sc ha r g e th anthe re sente nci ng tha t was be f or e the M agwood Court. U nl i ke i n thi s ca se, it w i l lge nera l l y no t be suffi ci ent t o fi nd th at ther e a re m ult i ple j ud gm ents i n a c i vi lco nfinem en t ca se and b egin the AEDPA s ta tu te o fl i m i ta ti o ns cl ockwith the l ate st j ud gm ent b ecause we w i ll n ot know w hich j ud gm ent a petit i oneri s chal l engi ng. W e m ust i nqui r e fur th era nd the n de ci d e whethe rtha t j udg m en t a mo u n t s t o a r e d e t e r mi n a t i o n th a ta p e r s o n c i v i l l y c o mm itted i s m en t a lly i lland da ng erou s or m erely a determ ination that there are no chan ged circum stan c e s w arr a n t i n ga r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o fth e i n i t i a ld e t e r mi n a ti o n. I n li gh t of M agwood, thi s d isti nc ti o n i s cr i ti ca lt o pr ev en t a fl oo d ofr epeti ti ve habeas l i ti gat i on in thi s a re a.N o. 09

- 2947 15 I n o th e rwo r d s , we a c c e p t th e S t a t e ’ s a r g u me n tth a twe m ust underta ke a co m pari son ofM ar ti n’s cl ai m s with th e r e l e v a n t j udg m en t s . B u t, i n th i s c a s e th e r e a r e t wo j ud gm ents that ar e ba sed o n M ar ti n’s pre vio us co nvi cti ons. Giv en o ur duty to i nter pret ple ading s l iberall y, es p ec ially th os e filed b y p ro s e litig an ts , see, e.g., P erruqu et v. B a iley, 390 F.3 d 5 05, 512 ( 7th Cir. 2004), w e acce p t M artin’ s co nt en ti o n tha t he i s i n f ac t ch al l en g i ngthe St ate ’ s m ostr ecentd ec isi on. Thus, hi s peti ti on i s no t barred b y the one-year stat ut e of li m itations in § 2244(d )( 1), and i t was er ro r f orthe dist ri ct c ourtto d ism iss i t o n that basi s.

I V. Concl usi on Forthe f or ego i ng r eas ons, we R EV ERSE a nd R EMA ND f orfurtherpro ceedi ngs.

12- 9- 10