alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32

             NEVSTAR GAMING AND ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION


Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10Q for
the quarter ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") by Nevstar Gaming and
Entertainment Corporation, the undersigned hereby certifies that:

       1.    The Report complies in all material respects with the requirements
             of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
             as amended, and

       2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
             material respects the financial condition and results of
             operations of the Registrant.


                                            /s/ William O. Fleischman
                                            ___________________
                                            Chief Executive Officer and
                                            Chief Financial Officer
No. D-2649.

#### In re Disbarment of Nunnery.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 566 U. S. 933.]
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 18

- 815 V

Filed: May 2, 2019

UNPUBLISHED

MICHELLE MARIE COBENAIS

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;

Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) V accine;

Guillain

- Barre Syndrome (GBS)

Troy Allen Poetz, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., St. Cloud, MN , for petitioner.

Traci R. Patton , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On June 8, 2018

, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the “Vaccine

Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered Guillain

- Barre Syndrome ( “ GBS ” ) due to an

influenza ( “ flu ” ) vaccine administered to her on October 7, 2015 . Petit ion at 1 . The

case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On April 30, 2019

, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that petitioner is entitled to compensa tion in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, “ it is respondent ’ s position that petitioner has satisfied the criteria set

forth in th e recently revised Vaccine Injury Table (Table) and the Qualification s and Aids

1 The undersigned intends to post this ruling on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website. This

means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine

Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the

disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasio n of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned

agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from

public access. Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this

case, undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in

accordance with the E

- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management

and Promotion of Electronic Government Services).

2 N ational Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755

.to Interpretation (QAI), which afford petitioner a presumption of causation if the onset of

GBS occurs between three and forty

- two days after a seasonal flu vacci nation and there

is no apparent alternative cause Id. at 8 . Respondent further agrees that petitioner

experienced sequelae of her GBS for more than six months and that petitioner has

satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Vaccine Act

. Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the

undersigned find s that petitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

Chief Special Master
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-5 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, (the Report), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Santander Consumer USA Inc. (the Servicer), does hereby certify and
represent that:



| | 1. | A review of the activities and performance of the Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of November 25, 2014, among Santander Drive Auto Receivables LLC, Santander Consumer USA Inc., Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-5 and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (the Agreement) during the period that is the subject of the Report has been made under my supervision.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the period that is the subject of the Report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.By:

/s/ Sandra M. BroderickName:

Sandra M. BroderickTitle:

EVP Head of OperationsDate:

March 30, 2018By:

/s/ Andrew KangName:

Andrew KangTitle:

Executive Vice President Capital Markets and TreasurerDate:

March 30, 2018
<PAGE>



                                                                      Form 10-Q

                                  Exhibit 31.2

                      CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION

I, Frank A. D'Amelio, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Lucent Technologies Inc., certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Lucent Technologies
Inc. (the "registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: February 10, 2004


/s/ Frank A. D'Amelio
----------------------------------------
Executive Vice President and
   Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
#### Lori COOK, individually, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRISON MEDICAL CENTER, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-35613

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2017 Seattle, Washington

Filed December 13, 2017

Theresa M. DeMonte, Daniel Weiskopf, Attorney, McNaul Ebel Nawrot *&*Hel-gren, PLLC, Seattle, WA, Robert Henry Fulton, II, Esquire, Attorney, Fulton *&*Philip PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bennett L. Cohen, Esquire, Attorney, Shughart Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Denver, CO, Sean Robert Gallagher, Polsinelli Shughart PC, Denver, CO, Jeffrey A. *369James, Attorney, Sebris Busto James, Bellevue, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Harrison Medical Center (Harrison) appeals the district court’s denial of its Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and the subsequent entry of judgment in favor of Lori Cook (Cook). We have jurisdiction’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Harrison argues that Cook never had a viable cause of action under the False Claims Act (FCA) because a false claim was never submitted to Medicare. As we have explained, in contrast to a FCA violation claim, the plaintiff in a FCA retaliation claim need only “show that he or she suspected that the defendant submitted a false claim—not that the defendant actually submitted one.” *Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr.,*521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

2. Harrison also contends that Cook’s suspicions lacked an objectively reasonable basis. Cook has pointed to evidence that the jury could have relied on in finding objective reasonableness, and Harrison’s attempts to controvert the evidence fail because we “are not permitted to weigh the evidence again, or to substitute our own judgment for the jury’s.” *Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,*93 F.3d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1996).

3. Finally, Harrison challenges whether Cook had a good faith belief that Harrison was “possibly” committing fraud. *U.S. ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc.,*862 F.3d 890, 908 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab.,*275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)). Reviewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that Cook’s testimony was adequate to sustain the jury’s conclusion that she did. *First Nat’l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr.,*631 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

For these reasons, we are not convinced that the evidence permits “only one reasonable conclusion” that is “contrary to the jury’s verdict.” *Pavao v. Pagay,*307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF AGATE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,733,829
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  144,122
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (27,999)
<INVENTORY>                                    345,668
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,342,006
<PP&E>                                         290,883
<DEPRECIATION>                                (189,239)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,623,428
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          661,463
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        183
<COMMON>                                         1,293
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,876,345
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,623,428
<SALES>                                        359,730
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               359,730
<CGS>                                           51,975
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   51,975
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               736,897
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,519
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (416,901)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    19,891
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (436,792)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (436,792)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.04


</TABLE>
#### Nicholas PATRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETROFF; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16428

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 26, 2017

Nicholas Patrick, Pro Se

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nicholas Patrick, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). *Barren v. Harrington,*152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Patrick’s action because Patrick failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); *Farmer v. Brennan,*511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (setting forth elements of a failure-to-proteet claim); *Wilhelm v. Rotman,*680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth elements of a medical deliberate indifference claim); *Rhodes v. Robinson,*408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); *Serrano v. Francis,*345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of an equal protection claim); *Witherow v. Paff,*52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing prisoners’ First Amendment right to send and receive mail).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### Michael G. WARWICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7444

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: February 15, 2018

Decided: February 20, 2018

Michael G. Warwick, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael G. Warwick seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Warwick has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Miguel ESPINOZA-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-71699

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 20, 2017

Katarina Rost, Law Office of Katarina Rost, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Ann Carroll Varnon, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office *of*the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Miguel Espinoza-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstating a 1999 expedited removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Our review of *481DHS’ reinstatement order is “limited to confirming the agency’s compliance with the reinstatement regulations.” *Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,*539 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). We review de novo due process claims and questions of law. *Id.*at 1136, We deny the petition for review.

DHS did not err in issuing Espinoza-Hernandez’s reinstatement order, where the record shows he is an alien, he was subject to a prior order of removal, and he illegally reentered the United States subsequent to that order. *See id.*at 1137 (court’s jurisdiction over a reinstatement order is limited to reviewing “three discrete inquiries an immigration officer must make in order to reinstate a removal order: (1) whether the petitioner is an alien; (2) whether the petitioner was subject to a prior removal order, and (3) whether the petitioner re-entered illegally” (citation omitted)).

Espinoza-Hernandez’s contentions that DHS did not comply with the procedural requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 241.8 are not supported by the record.

Due to our limited review of reinstatement orders, Espinoza-Hemandez’s contentions regarding eligibility for adjustment of status are not properly before the court. *See id.*at 1137.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

I, David M Long, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, of Biofield Corp.
(the "Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-SSB of the Company for the quarter
ended September 30, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
78o(d)); and

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date: November 19, 2004                By: /s/ DAVID M. LONG
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           David M. Long, Jr., M.D., Ph.D.
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
                                           (Principal Executive Officer)


                                       23
EXHIBIT
      32





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**





**PURSUANT
      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of City Language Exchange, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2007 as filed with
      the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned
      President, Principal Financial Officer, and Principal Accounting Officer of
      the
      Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that based on his knowledge and
      belief: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or
      15 (d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
      Jonny
      White


Jonny
      White


President,
      Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer