Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re L.W., 2018 IL App (3d) 170405

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re L.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jeremie G., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-17-0405

Filed

Supplemental special 

concurrence filed

March 21, 2018

April 25, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, No. 09-JA-128; 

the Hon. Kirk D. Schoenbein, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Angela P. Madison, of Pekin, for appellant.

Stewart J. Umholtz, State’s Attorney, of Pekin (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Richard T. Leonard, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Aimee E. Dluski, of Pekin, guardian ad litem.
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Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justice O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Schmidt specially concurred, with opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In the context of a juvenile neglect proceeding, respondent, Jeremie G., filed a 

supplemental petition to reinstate wardship (petition) over his minor child, L.W., so that 

respondent could establish that he was no longer dispositionally unfit as a parent. The State and 

the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) opposed respondent’s petition, and 

the guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor child supported the petition. After a hearing, the 

trial court denied the petition. Respondent appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 Respondent and Sonja W. are the biological parents of the minor child, L.W., who was 

born in September 2007. In September 2009, the State filed a juvenile petition alleging that 

L.W. was a neglected minor due to an injurious environment. After hearings were held on the 

petition, the trial court found that L.W. was a neglected minor, made L.W. a ward of the court, 

found that respondent was dispositionally unfit as a parent, found that Sonja W. was 

dispositionally fit as a parent, and awarded guardianship of L.W. to DCFS. L.W.’s placement 

was kept with Sonja W. 

¶ 4 At the first and second permanency review hearings in September 2010 and May 2011, at 

which respondent did not appear, the trial court found that respondent had not made reasonable 

efforts or progress due to a lack of interest and cooperation and that respondent was still unfit 

as a parent. At the conclusion of the May 2011 hearing, the trial court returned guardianship of 

the child to Sonja W., terminated wardship, and closed the case. 

¶ 5 More than five years later, in December 2016, respondent filed a pro se petition to restore 

his fitness as a parent. The trial court appointed an attorney for respondent. In February 2017, 

respondent’s attorney filed a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship (the petition at issue 

in the present case) pursuant to section 2-33(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 

ILCS 405/2-33(1) (West 2016)), which provided, in pertinent part, that: 

“(1) Any time prior to a minor’s 18th birthday, pursuant to a supplemental petition 

filed under this Section, the court may reinstate wardship and open a previously closed 

case when: 

 (a) wardship and guardianship under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 was 

vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the 

Probate Act of 1975; 

 (b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under Article II of this Act nor 

is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf of the minor; and 

 (c) it is in the minor’s best interest that wardship be reinstated.” 705 ILCS 

405/2-33(1) (West 2016). 
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Respondent alleged in the petition that, after wardship was terminated in the present case, he 

had completed several services and had put himself in a position to be found dispositionally fit 

as a parent. Respondent alleged further that he had maintained his relationship with L.W., he 

had continued to have regular supervised visits with L.W., and it was in L.W.’s best interest to 

reinstate wardship. Respondent also sought leave to file a motion for a finding of fitness, which 

respondent had attached to the petition, if the trial court granted respondent’s petition to 

reinstate wardship. 

¶ 6 The State filed a response, alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule upon 

the petition because the facts in this particular case did not comply with the requirements of 

section 2-33(1)(a) of the Act. DCFS filed a motion to dismiss respondent’s petition on that 

same basis. Respondent filed a memorandum of law in support of his petition. 

¶ 7 In June 2017, a hearing was held on respondent’s petition and the various responses. At the 

hearing, respondent argued in support of the petition and asked that the petition be granted. The 

State and DCFS opposed the petition, and the GAL joined respondent in support of the 

petition. Sonja W.’s attorney had not been able to make contact with Sonja W. and did not, 

therefore, take a position on the matter. 

¶ 8 After listening to the arguments of the attorneys and taking the matter under advisement for 

a short period, the trial court denied respondent’s petition. As a matter of statutory 

interpretation, the trial court found that all three conditions listed in section 2-33(1) of the Act 

had to be satisfied before a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship could be granted. The 

trial court concluded that the factual situation in the present case did not satisfy the 

requirements of section 2-33(1) because wardship and guardianship in the present case had not 

been vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the Probate Act, 

which was listed as the first condition in the statute (see 705 ILCS 405/2-33(1)(a) (West 

2016)). In making that determination, the trial court relied upon the Second District Appellate 

Court’s decision in In re Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d 860, 866 (2005), which had reached the same 

conclusion in a similar factual situation. The trial court, therefore, denied respondent’s petition 

and also denied respondent’s request for leave to file his motion for fitness. As part of its 

ruling, the trial court stated that its decision was final and appealable and made an Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding that there was no just reason to delay 

enforcement or appeal of its decision. Respondent brought this appeal to challenge the trial 

court’s ruling.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in interpreting section 2-33(1) of the 

Act and in denying his supplemental petition to reinstate wardship. Respondent asserts that the 

trial court’s overly restrictive interpretation of the statute (1) is inconsistent with the Act as a 

whole, (2) is contrary to the Act’s purpose to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties 

whenever possible, (3) would render the statute useless, as an unfit parent would never be able 

to establish fitness or to obtain unsupervised visitation after wardship had been terminated, and 

(4) would lead to negative unintended consequences where courts would be reluctant to 

terminate wardship or to make findings of parental unfitness because such rulings would leave 

an unfit parent with no ability to establish fitness. Respondent contends instead that section 

2-33(1) of the Act should be read so that the first condition listed in the statute serves as one 

basis upon which reinstatement of wardship may be granted and the second and third 
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conditions listed in the statute, taken together, serve as a second basis upon which 

reinstatement may be granted (that the word “and,” between subsections (b) and (c), should be 

read as only applying to those two subsections and that the word “or” should be read into the 

statute between subsections (a) and (b)). In the alternative, respondent asserts that section 

2-33(1) should be read so that each of the three conditions listed in the section is considered a 

separate basis upon which reinstatement of wardship may be granted (that the word “and,” 

between subsections (b) and (c), should actually be read as “or”). Thus, respondent asserts that 

he was not required to satisfy the condition listed in subparagraph (a) of section 2-33(1) to 

obtain reinstatement of wardship as to L.W. In support of his assertion, respondent points to 

section 2-34 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-34 (West 2016)), wherein the legislature specifically 

stated that all of the conditions listed in that particular statute had to be satisfied. Respondent 

contends that had the legislature wanted section 2-33 to be read in that manner, it would have 

used the same type of language that it had used in section 2-34. In making his assertions on this 

issue, respondent contends that the Tr. O. case, upon which the trial court relied, was 

incorrectly decided and should not be followed here. Respondent maintains that, unlike the 

appellate court’s interpretation of the statute in Tr. O., both of his two proposed interpretations 

of section 2-33(1) in the present case would be consistent with the Act and would provide a 

remedy for an unfit parent to seek a finding of fitness in the event that his juvenile case was 

closed, that he corrected the condition that led to the removal of the minor, and that he was 

capable of being found fit. For all of the reasons stated, respondent asks that we reverse the 

trial court’s ruling and, presumably, that we remand this case for further proceedings. 

¶ 11 The State argues first that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal and that this 

appeal should be dismissed. The State asserts that appellate jurisdiction is lacking because 

respondent did not file his pro se petition for fitness or a notice of appeal within 30 days after 

the trial court entered its final order in May 2011, terminating wardship and closing the case 

(see In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786-87 (1998)). Second, and in the alternative, the State 

argues that if this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the trial court’s ruling was proper 

and should be upheld. In support of that argument, the State asserts that section 2-33(1) of the 

Act clearly and unambiguously requires that all three conditions listed in the statute must be 

satisfied before a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship may be granted. The State asserts 

further that, as the trial court correctly found, respondent was unable to satisfy the first 

condition because this case did not involve the appointment of a guardian under the Probate 

Act. According to the State, the Second District Appellate Court’s decision in the Tr. O. case is 

directly on point and should be followed here. Furthermore, the State contends that 

respondent’s assertion regarding possible negative unintended consequences is purely 

speculative and does not justify ignoring the plain language of the statute and that respondent’s 

remaining assertions on this issue are better directed to the legislature, rather than to the court. 

For all of the reasons set forth, the State asks first that we dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction and, second, and in the alternative, that we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 12 I. Appellate Jurisdiction 

¶ 13 Before we address the merits of the parties’ arguments on appeal, we must first address the 

State’s contention that appellate jurisdiction is lacking in this case and that this appeal must be 

dismissed. Although it is well settled that an appeal must be dismissed if appellate jurisdiction 

is lacking (see Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984)), we do not 
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believe that appellate jurisdiction is lacking in the present case. Contrary to the State’s 

contention, the time limits that apply to the filing of a postjudgment motion do not apply to a 

section 2-33(1) petition because, pursuant to the statute, such a petition may be filed any time 

prior to the minor’s 18th birthday. See 705 ILCS 405/2-33(1) (West 2016). Under our reading 

of the plain language of the statute, once a section 2-33(1) petition is filed, the trial court has 

authority and jurisdiction to consider reinstating wardship. See In re T.W., 352 Ill. App. 3d 

1208, 1213 (2004). To the extent that the Second District Appellate Court took a different 

position on jurisdiction in the Tr. O. case (see Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 865-66), we disagree 

with that conclusion. Furthermore, although permanency-type orders are typically not final 

and appealable, the trial court order that was appealed from in the present case was permanent 

in nature and had the characteristics of a final and appealable order. See In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 

2d 1, 16-18 (2005) (finding that under the facts of that particular case, the permanency order 

entered by the trial court was a final and appealable order). We conclude, therefore, that 

appellate jurisdiction is not lacking in this case since respondent’s notice of appeal was timely 

filed within 30 days after the trial court entered its order denying respondent’s section 2-33(1) 

petition. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017); Archer 

Daniels Midland Co., 103 Ill. 2d at 538 (the filing of a timely notice of appeal vests the 

appellate court with jurisdiction); T.W., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1213; Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d at 16-18. 

Having found that appellate jurisdiction exists in this case, we now turn to the merits of the 

parties’ statutory interpretation arguments.

¶ 14 II. Interpretation of Section 2-33(1) of the Act 

¶ 15 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is subject to de novo review on 

appeal. In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 15. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. ¶ 16. The most reliable indicator of 

that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute itself. Id. In 

determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, a court should consider the statute in its 

entirety and keep in mind the subject the statute addresses and the apparent intent of the 

legislature in enacting the statute. Id.; 5 ILCS 70/1.01 (West 2016) (in construing a statute, 

“[a]ll general provisions, terms, phrases and expressions shall be liberally construed in order 

that the true intent and meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out”). If the 

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to 

further aids of statutory construction. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire 

Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. A court may not depart from the plain language of 

the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent with the 

express legislative intent. Id. However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous in that it is 

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, a court may consider extrinsic aids to 

determine the meaning of the statutory language. See Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship 

Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 51 (1990). 

¶ 16 The statute at issue in the present case is section 2-33 of the Act, which, in pertinent part, 

provides as follows: 

“§ 2-33. Supplemental petition to reinstate wardship. 

(1) Any time prior to a minor’s 18th birthday, pursuant to a supplemental petition 

filed under this Section, the court may reinstate wardship and open a previously closed 

case when: 
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 (a) wardship and guardianship under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 was 

vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the 

Probate Act of 1975; 

 (b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under Article II of this Act nor 

is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf of the minor; and 

(c) it is in the minor’s best interest that wardship be reinstated.

(2) Any time prior to a minor’s 21st birthday, pursuant to a supplemental petition 

filed under this Section, the court may reinstate wardship and open a previously closed 

case when: 

 (a) wardship and guardianship under this Act was vacated pursuant to: 

 (i) an order entered under subsection (2) of Section 2-31 in the case of a 

minor over the age of 18; 

 (ii) closure of a case under subsection (2) of Section 2-31 in the case of a 

minor under the age of 18 who has been partially or completely emancipated in 

accordance with the Emancipation of Minors Act; or 

 (iii) an order entered under subsection (3) of Section 2-31 based on the 

minor’s attaining the age of 19 years;

 (b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under Article II of this Act nor 

is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf of the minor; and 

(c) it is in the minor’s best interest that wardship be reinstated. 

 (3) The supplemental petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the 

original adjudication order was entered.” 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2016). 

¶ 17 In the Tr. O. case, the Second District Appellate Court found that the statutory language of 

section 2-33(1) of the Act was clear and that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, all three of 

the conditions listed in section 2-33(1) had to be satisfied before a supplemental petition to 

reinstate wardship could be granted. Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 866. In reaching that 

conclusion, the Second District Appellate Court noted that the legislature had plainly limited 

the application of section 2-33(1) to situations where wardship and guardianship under the Act 

were vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the Probate Act 

of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)). See Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 866. 

¶ 18 Although, as noted above, we do not agree with the Second District Appellate Court’s 

statement in Tr. O. regarding jurisdiction as it relates to section 2-33(1), we do agree with the 

Second District’s interpretation of the conditions portion of the statute. We find, therefore, as 

did the Second District Appellate Court in Tr. O., that all three conditions listed in section 

2-33(1) of the Act must be satisfied before a supplemental petition for reinstatement of 

wardship may be granted. See 705 ILCS 405/2-33(1) (West 2016); Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 

866. In addition to the plain language of section 2-33(1) and the appellate court’s decision in 

Tr. O., our interpretation of the statute is further supported by the fact that the legislature used 

both the words “and” and “or” in section 2-33(2) of the Act (see 705 ILCS 405/2-33(2) (West 

2016)), thus, clearly showing that the legislature intended to use the word “and” when it did so 

in section 2-33(1). Applying that interpretation to the facts at hand, we find that respondent’s 

supplemental petition to reinstate wardship was properly denied because the factual situation 

failed to satisfy the first condition listed in the statute—that wardship and guardianship under 
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the Act were vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the 

Probate Act of 1975. See 705 ILCS 405/2-33(1) (West 2016); Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d at 866. 

¶ 19 We are not persuaded to reach a different conclusion in this case based upon the proposed 

interpretations of section 2-33(1) that respondent suggests. Indeed, as our supreme court has 

pointed out, the use of the conjunctive “and” generally indicates that the legislature intended 

that all of the listed conditions or requirements in a statute be satisfied. M.M., 2016 IL 119932, 

¶ 21. Nor do we believe that any additional insight is gained by considering the language the 

legislature used in section 2-34 of the Act, when the legislature clearly demonstrated in section 

2-33 that it had stated “and” when it meant “and” and that had it stated “or” when it meant “or.” 

Furthermore, we believe that respondent’s remaining concerns regarding possible unintended 

negative consequences and whether a person in respondent’s position lacks a remedy to 

establish fitness are more appropriately directed to the legislature, rather than to this court. 

¶ 20 CONCLUSION 

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County. 

¶ 22 Affirmed. 

¶ 23 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring: 

¶ 24 While I concur, I write separately to address respondent’s contention that the procedure 

utilized in this case terminated his parental rights for all fundamental purposes. It did not. 

Pursuant to section 1-3(13) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(13) (West 2016)), respondent 

continues to have residual parental rights and responsibilities over L.W. As his parental rights 

were not terminated, nothing prevents him from seeking unsupervised visitation or custody by 

filing a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities under the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act. See 750 ILCS 5/601.2 (b) (West 2016).