alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Rita Bety GARCIA-PEREZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-73276

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*623Submitted November 15, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed November 17, 2017

Ramin Ghashghaei, Attorney, Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, CA, Dennis James Eoffe, Attorney, Law Office of Dennis Eoffe, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner

Virginia Gordon, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, Tim Ramnitz, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office, of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and LOGAN,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R, App. P, 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Steven P, Logan, United States District Judge for' the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Rita Bety Garcia-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1.Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the untimely filing of Garcia’s asylum application was not excused by “extraordinary circumstances.” *See*8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Contrary to her assertions, Garcia received sufficient notice of the one-year asylum bar and evidentiary burden to show extraordinary circumstances both through the asylum application instructions and Notice to Appear.

2. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia failed to establish a nexus between her claimed persecution and a statutorily protected ground. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3).1 Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia had not proved that threats against her were motivated by her political opinion instead of gang members’ desire to increase their own power and influence.

3. Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Garcia had not demonstrated that her feared persecution would rise to the level of torture, an “extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment.” *Zhou v. Gonzales,*437 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s determination that Garcia had not shown the Salvadoran government’s acquiescence in any threatened torture. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

PETITION DENIED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. Garcia's opening brief raises for the first time an argument that threats to her child were gender discrimination. Because this argument was not raised before the agency, we lack jurisdiction to consider it, *See Sola v. Holder,*720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
#### Martin PIMENTAL-LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-72363

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 2, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed December 07, 2017

Maria Zlateva, Maria Zlateva, P.C., Salem, OR, Patrick Sherwood, Counsel, Patrick H. Sherwood, P.C., Portland, OR, for Petitioner

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Claire Workman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Matt A. Crapo, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ and BEA, Circuit Judges, and LAMBERTH,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Royce C, Lamberth, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation,

MEMORANDUM **

Martin Pimental-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the *629Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) February 12, 2013 order reinstating his February 4,1999 order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Review of a reinstated order of removal is typically “limited to confirming the agency’s' compliance with the reinstatement regulations.” *Garda de Rincon v. DHS,*539 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales,*486 F.3d 484, 498 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Pimental-Lopez does not challenge any of the three requirements for reinstatement of the February 4,1999 removal order. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); *Garcia de Rincon,*539 F.3d at 1137. Instead, he challenges the underlying removal order on several legal and constitutional grounds.

The governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) states that the “petition to review [orders of removal] must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” Pimental-Lopez’s order of removal was entered against him on February 4, 1999. He did not challenge that removal order until the instant appeal, which he filed on May 20, 2014. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to review his challenges to the underlying order- of removal. In light of this disposition, we need not address Pimental-Lopez’s remaining arguments.

PETITION DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
----

**EXHIBIT        32.1**

**CERTIFICATION        PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION        906 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY        ACT OF 2002**

| (1)    | the                  Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly                  period                  ended June 30, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the                  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange                  Act of                  1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| (2)    | the                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                  respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                  Company.                                                                                                                                                       |

| Date:                  August 10, 2005 | /s/                  Joseph L. Sullivan    |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                   | Joseph                  L. Sullivan        |   |
|                                   | President                                  |   |
|                                   | (chief                  executive officer) |   |
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aleksandr MALIMON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30251

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 8, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed November 16, 2017

Kathleen Louise Bickers, I, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Katie C. De Villiers, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, Jeffrey S. Sweet, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Laura Graser, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and MELLOY,* Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Michael J, Melloy, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Aleksandr Malimon appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

At oral argument, the government conceded that the district court’s “anticipatory *613reduction,” granted at Ordonez’s original sentencing in anticipation of a Guidelines-lowering amendment that had yet to take effect, was not encompassed in the Guidelines calculation under U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(a) but was instead either a variance or departure. It further conceded that under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the “applicable guidelines range” calculation includes only the U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(a) factors and expressly excludes variances and departures. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(A). For this reason, Malimon has not been granted a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and continues to be eligible for a reduction. Malimon preserved the above argument by raising it in his written motion to modify sentence. The error was not harmless. *See*U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. l(B)(iii). We therefore reverse and remand to the district court to determine whether and to what extent a reduction in sentence is warranted. On remand, the district court may take into account, in determining the sentence to be imposed, Malimon’s post-sentencing conduct. *See id.*

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

══════════

No. 17-1048

══════════

OSCAR ORTIZ, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE FARM LLOYDS, RESPONDENT

══════════════════════════════════════════

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

══════════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BOYD, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In this insurance-coverage case, the Court holds that the insurer’s payment of the appraisal 

amount, which established the covered loss, precludes a claim that the insurer breached the policy 

by failing to pay the covered loss. The Court also holds that the insurer’s payment bars 

extracontractual bad-faith claims that seek damages totaling no more than the covered loss. I agree 

with these conclusions and join those parts of the Court’s opinion. I write separately to distinguish 

my view on the insured’s claim under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act. See TEX. INS.

CODE §§ 542.051–.061. The Court holds that the insured may proceed on this claim in light of our 

concurrently issued decision in Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 17–0640, —

S.W.3d — (Tex. June 28, 2019). There, in a similar factual context, the Court remands to the trial 

court for further proceedings to determine whether the insured’s claim is “invalid” and “should 

not be paid” or whether the insurer “is liable” under the policy. See id. at ___ (discussing TEX. INS.

CODE §§ 542.058, .060). As explained in my separate opinion in that case, I would hold that section 
2

.058 applies and section .060 does not, and that—regardless of which section applies—the insurer 

conceded the claim’s validity and its own liability by voluntarily and unconditionally paying the 

benefits claimed. Thus, I would remand solely to determine the amount of statutory interest and 

attorney’s fees the insurer owes the insured. See id. at ___ (BOYD, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). Because I would do the same here, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in 

part in this case as well.

_____________________

Jeffrey S. Boyd

Justice

Opinion delivered: June 28, 2019
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11



                                 BACOU USA, INC.
                 STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                 -----------------------------------------------
                                   (in thousands)
                                    (unaudited)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                        Three Months Ended                   Six Months Ended
                                                              June 30,                           June 30,
                                                   -----------------------------             -----------------

                                                       1998              1997                1998           1997
                                                   -----------       -----------             -----          ----

<S>                                                  <C>              <C>                   <C>           <C>   
Basic:
  Weighted average shares outstanding                17,599           17,312                17,596        17,312
                                                    =======          =======                ======       =======

  Net income                                        $ 6,099          $ 4,245               $ 7,231       $ 8,377
                                                    =======          =======               -------       -------
  Per share amount                                  $  0.35          $  0.24               $  0.41       $  0.48
                                                    =======          =======               =======       =======

Diluted:

  Weighted average shares outstanding                17,599           17,312                17,596        17,312

  Net effect of dilutive stock options
   based on the treasury stock method
   using the average market price                       132                2                    92             6
                                                    -------          -------               -------       -------
 Total diluted shares                                17,731           17,314                17,688        17,318
                                                    =======          =======               =======       =======
  Net income                                        $ 6,099          $ 4,245               $ 7,231       $ 8,377
                                                    =======          =======               =======       =======
  Per share amount                                  $  0.35          $  0.24               $  0.41       $  0.48
                                                    =======          =======               =======       =======

</TABLE>
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

Kurt J. Hein v Terri Jo Hein

Docket No. 353272; 353285

LC No. 2019-034834-DO

Kathleen Jansen 

Presiding Judge

Amy Ronayne Krause 

Michael F. Gadola 

Judges

The April 29, 2021 opinion is hereby AMENDED to correct a clerical error: The first 

sentence of the last paragraph on page 6 will now read: “Consequently, plaintiff is also correct in asserting 

that by default, defendant’s half of his pension would revert to him upon defendant’s death, in the event 

she predeceases him.” 

In all other respects, the April 29, 2021 opinion remains unchanged.

_______________________________

Presiding Judge
#### Carol THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15766

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 18, 2017 *

Filed December 26, 2017

Carol Thomas, Pro Se

Louis Leone, Esquire, Stubbs & Leone, Walnut Creek, CA, Seth Gordon, Esquire, Attorney, Nima Nayebi, Leone *&*Alberts, Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carol Thomas appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging race discrimination under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We have, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Ebner v. Fresh, Inc.,*838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Thomas’s Title VI discrimination claim because Thomas failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant discriminated against Thomas on the basis of her race. *See Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp.,*29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for stating a Title VI discrimination claim), *overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,*241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Thomas’s § 1981 claim because the defendant is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. *See Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist.,*861 F.2d 198, 201-02 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “under the eleventh amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court”).'

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 24) is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices 

# Order

August 15, 2014

14 9921 (2 6 )

WESLEY BASKIN

,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 149 921

COA: 320493

MUSKEGON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

WARDEN,

Defendant

- Appellee.

___________________________________ On order of the Chief Justice, plaintiff’s motion to waive fees is DENIED because

MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees.

Ordinarily, MCL 60 0.2963(8) would preclude plaintiff from seeking leave to appeal in

this Court because of an inability to provide the initial partial fee. However, applying

that statutory section to bar plaintiff from initiating an application for leave to appeal

from the original complaint for habeas corpus filed in the court of appeals would violate

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v Bennett, 365 US

708; 81 S Ct 895; 6 L Ed 2d 39 (1961).

The Clerk shall furnish two copies of this order t o plaintiff. Plaintiff has 21 days

from the certification of this order to submit one of those copies to this Court. By doing

that, plaintiff becomes responsible for paying the $375 filing fee. MCL 600.2963.

Failure to timely submit the order will resu lt in the appeal not being docketed in this

Court. The Clerk shall retain plaintiff’s pleadings until he timely submits the order or the

21

- day period for doing so has expired.

Plaintiff is not req uired to pay an initial partial fee at the time he submits the order

to this Court. The Department of Corrections is directed to collect amounts equal to 50

percent of the deposits made to plaintiff’s account each month and remit $375 to this

Court when t hat full amount is collected. Plaintiff may not file further appeals in thisI, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

August 15, 2014

jam 2

Clerk Court from civil cases initiated by him until the entry fee in this appeal is paid in full.

MCL 600.2963(8).
VILLAGEWORLD.COM
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  VillageWorld.Com,  (the "Small
Business  Issuer")  on  Form  10-QSB  for  the three-month and six-month periods
ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I,  Peter  J. Keenan, Chief Executive Officer of
VillageWorld.Com, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:
     1)          The  Report  fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Small Business Issuer.

/s/  Peter  J.  Keenan

Peter  J.  Keenan
Chief  Executive  Officer
August  15,  2002



<PAGE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                              This schedule contains summary financial
                              information extracted from the unaudited balance
                              sheet of Lucent at December 31, and the unaudited
                              consolidated statement of income for the
                              three-month period ended December 31, 1997 and is
                              qualified in its entirety by reference to such
                              financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                      OCT-1-1997
<PERIOD-END>                        DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                    1,225
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                             6,639
<ALLOWANCES>                                344
<INVENTORY>                               2,604
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         13,256
<PP&E>                                   10,850
<DEPRECIATION>                            6,121
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           24,752
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     9,962
<BONDS>                                   1,945
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                      6
<OTHER-SE>                                4,665
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             24,752
<SALES>                                   8,724
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          8,724
<CGS>                                     4,519
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             4,519
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          2,811
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             54
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           79
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           1,478
<INCOME-TAX>                                686
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         792
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                                792
<EPS-PRIMARY>                              1.23
<EPS-DILUTED>                              1.21
        


</TABLE>
III

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 323

To commend the exemplary leadership of the majority leader.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 3, 1996

Mr. THURMOND submitted the following resolution; which was considered and

agreed to

RESOLUTION

To commend the exemplary leadership of the majority leader.

1 Resolved, That the thanks of the Senate are hereby

2 tendered to the distinguished majority leader, the Senator

3 from Mississippi, the Honorable Trent Lott, for his exem4 plary leadership and the cooperative and dedicated man5 ner in which he has performed his leadership responsibil6 ities in the conduct of Senate business during the second

7 session of the 104th Congress.

Æ