J-A07033-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LINDA M. GOETZ 

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL A. & ANN WILLIAMS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1175 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 26, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Civil Division at No(s): 

2013-SU-0000610

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 25, 2018

Appellant Linda M. Goetz (hereinafter “Linda”) appeals from the 

judgment entered on July 26, 2017, following a non-jury verdict in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Adams County confirming the default judgment entered 

on May 5, 2015, on her quiet title action in favor of Michael A. Williams 

(hereinafter “Michael”).

1

 As Appellant has failed to submit an appropriate 

____________________________________________

1

In accordance with a per curiam Order of this Court entered on April 29, 

2015, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Michael and against Linda 

as directed in its prior order of March 24, 2015. However, the Order was not 

entered on the docket until March 25, 2015. Therein, the trial court denied 

Linda’s motion for post-trial relief filed following its Order entered on 

December 15, 2014. In its December 15, 2014, Order, the trial court found 

Linda had failed to carry her burden of proof and entered judgment in favor 

of Michael and against Linda on Linda’s action to quiet title and all other claims 

set forth in her Amended Complaint wherein she had sought to nullify the 

mortgage in question to clear title to the subject real estate. In addition, 

Linda had entered a default judgment against Michael’s Mother, Ann Williams, 

thereby extinguishing Ms. Williams’ mortgage against the subject property. 
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b), we find all her arguments are waived on appeal. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment.

This Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history in our prior 

memorandum decision as follows: 

This dispute has its roots in the protracted divorce between 

Linda and her ex-husband, Robert Goetz, who is Michael’s uncle. 

The following summary of those divorce proceedings are taken 

from a master in equitable distribution’s report.

The parties met in 1985; they began living together in 

1987. They were married on April 26, 1991 in Frederick 

County, Maryland. The marriage was the second for 

Husband and the third for Wife. The parties separated 

during the marriage several times, the longest of which 

was December 1996 through December 2000. ... The 

parties separated for the final time in September 2004. 

The instant Complaint in Divorce was filed by Wife on 

March 21, 2005 ....

The central dispute in this matter has been the 

determination of what constitutes marital assets. 

Husband claims that all real property and assets are his 

sole property; Wife claims that all real property and 

assets are marital property. The issue arises from 

documents entitled “Prenuptial Agreement” and 

“Postnuptial Agreement” signed by the parties, and 

equitable considerations raised by the parties’ [sic], and 

particularly Husband’s actions and statements in prior

matters before various courts, including the first divorce 

...; a property claim advanced by the parties ... to avoid 

a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 

lien; and a bankruptcy petition filed by Husband in 2005 

after the parties’ final separation. ... The Opinion and 

Order of the [trial court] dated August 15, 2008, ...

affirmed the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement and the 

invalidity and unenforceability of the Postnuptial 

Agreement. ... Despite the above, Husband continues to 

claim that by virtue of the Postnuptial Agreement, Wife 
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has no interest in any real property or the proceeds of 

the public auction of business related joint property and 

at subsequent Master’s hearings spent considerable time 

introducing evidence intended to show ownership of 

assets pre-dated the marriage.

On October 15, 2008, Husband having failed to pay 

alimony pendente lite arrearages and counsel fees under 

Orders of Court ... in the amount of $57,496.96, Wife 

obtained a judgment and filed a Writ of Execution. A 

Sheriff’s sale of construction equipment and salvage 

materials to satisfy the judgment was scheduled for 

February 26, 2009. Husband requested Wife’s 

cooperation to obtain funds against marital property at 

3380 Chambersburg Road to forestall the sale. Wife 

cooperated in signing four mortgages. Husband obtained 

$35,000.00 against three of those mortgages, but did 

not obtain the remaining $25,000 against the fourth 

mortgage. Husband did not pay any amount to Wife. [As 

a result] Wife filed her Fourth Petition for Special Relief 

asking for [a public auction instead of a sheriff’s sale,] 

which was scheduled for Saturday, April 18, 2009. 

Report and Recommendation of Master, 1/26/11, at 1-3.2 Of the 

$35,000 borrowed by Robert against 3380 Chambersburg Road, 

Michael provided $25,000.

Then-counsel for Robert, John A. Wolfe, Esq., deposited the 

checks in an escrow account. At some point after that, Attorney 

Wolfe withdrew from the case, and Husband retained a new 

lawyer, Richard K. Konkel, Esq. On April 17, 2009, Attorney 

Konkel disbursed the proceeds of the escrow account created by 

Attorney Wolfe to Robert.

At the auction on April 18, 2009, Michael signed a bid 

agreement with the auctioneer, Wolfe Industrial Auctions, Inc.3 

Paragraph 1 of the agreement provided that “[a]ll prospective 

buyers must register and receive a bidder’s card.” Paragraph 8 of 

the document provided that in the event that the purchase price 

was not paid, the auctioneer was entitled to recover any losses 

from the buyer, including attorney’s fees and court costs. At the

bottom of the page, Michael’s signature is identified as the 

signature of buyer. The number 60 is handwritten at the top of 

the page.

Michael’s testimony regarding what happened at the auction 

is dependent upon the circumstances under which his testimony 
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was taken and contradictory in certain aspects. The consistent 

aspects of his testimony are that he was bidder #60 at the 

auction. Furthermore, Michael admitted that Robert performed the 

bidding under bid card #60, and that Robert, and not he, had 

provided the funds to pay for the purchase price of all items

purchased under bid card #60. Finally, it is undisputed that Robert 

brought $35,000 to the auction and used it towards the purchase 

price of the assets purchased under bid card #60.

The inconsistencies in Michael’s statements under oath 

concern the reasons why Robert was the person making the bids 

at auction. When he testified on July 8, 2010, during the divorce

case between Linda and Robert, Michael stated that Robert 

performed the bidding because “[h]e knew the history of all his 

equipment much more extensive[ly] than I did.” N.T., 7/8/10, at 

1815.4 As far as the reason why the items were purchased,

Michael testified, “I was going to resell the equipment.” Id., at 

1815; 1829-1830. After the conclusion of the auction, Michael 

testified that Robert told him that he would pay for the purchases 

because Robert “was going to get my $25,000 back.” Id., at 1835.

In contrast, during the non-jury trial in the present case on 

October 28, 2014, Michael testified that he did not purchase 

anything at the auction. See N.T., 10/24/14, at 59. Furthermore, 

he testified that Robert purchased all of the items under bid card 

#60 and did not give Williams any of the items purchased. See id.

Approximately eight months later, Michael recorded the 

mortgage on 3380 Chambersburg Road. The property was later 

sold pursuant to a sheriff’s sale to satisfy Linda’s claims against 

Robert.

The central dispute in this current litigation is the ongoing 

validity of the mortgage, executed by Robert and Linda, against 

3380 Chambersburg Road and held by Michael. Of relevance to 

the current appeal, Linda argues that Robert had in fact paid off 

the $25,000 loan to Williams on the date of the auction by paying 

for the purchases.5 The trial court found that there was no 

evidence to support a finding that Robert had satisfied the loan. 

We disagree, and conclude that pursuant to the stipulations 

agreed to by Williams, there is an outstanding question regarding 

the arrangements between Michael and Robert at and after the 

auction.

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2 As Michael was not a party to the divorce proceeding, none of 

the factual findings from that proceeding can be held against him. 

Linda submitted the Masters’ Reports as exhibits in the non-jury 
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trial. However, the trial court sustained Michael’s objections to 

their admission. We utilize the reports merely to summarize the 

factual and procedural history to provide context to Linda’s claims 

in this matter in a manner consistent with the factual record 

developed in the trial court.

3 The record does not indicate any relationship between Attorney 

Wolfe and the auctioneer.

4 Michael argues, on appeal, that this transcript was not admitted 

at trial. However, when Linda was questioned regarding Michael’s 

prior testimony, the trial court stated “The [c]ourt will read the 

transcript.” N.T., 10/28/14, at 18. Michael did not object, and the 

transcript was not one of the exhibits the trial court explicitly 

excluded from admission at the close of Linda’s evidence.

5 Linda propounded several theories for relief in her complaint. As 

we conclude that a remand is necessary on this issue, we need 

not catalogue the other theories.

Goetz v. Williams, No. 692 MDA 2015, unpublished memorandum at 1-6 

(Pa.Super. filed March 7, 2016). 

This Court went on to list numerous stipulated facts and indicated that 

we were “concerned solely with the application of law” thereto. Id. at 6. 

Specifically, we explained: 

As noted previously, the Terms of Sale document provides that 

Michael, as purchaser, was liable for the purchase price due for 

any asset purchased under his bid number. Furthermore, the 

attached transaction list referenced in stipulation 30 indicates that 

Michael, as purchaser, was liable for a total purchase price at 

auction of $61,240.

Under these stipulated facts, Michael was the purchaser at 

auction, and liable for the purchase price to Wolfe Industrial 

Auctions. See Graver v. O’Reilly, 55 Pa. Super. 505, at *3 

(1913). Robert’s act in settling Michael’s account after the auction 

was in fact income to Michael in the form of retirement of the debt 

Michael owed Wolfe Industrial Auctions. See, e.g., United States 

v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB, 111 S.Ct. 1512, 1518 (U.S. 

1991) (“if the taxpayer is thereafter released from his obligation 
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to repay [a debt,] the taxpayer enjoys a net increase in assets 

equal to the forgiven portion of the debt”); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 

(providing that in support issues, discharge of indebtedness is 

included as income for the debtor). Furthermore, as the party 

signing the Terms of Sale and identified as the buyer under bid 

card #60, the assets purchased at the auction were transferred to 

Michael’s ownership as a matter of law as soon as the bid was 

paid. What happened next is to be the issue on remand.

There is conflicting evidence, from Michael himself, 

regarding what happened to the assets. If Michael’s prior 

testimony is credited, he retained the assets for later resale for 

his own benefit. Furthermore, in his earlier testimony, Michael 

suggested that this discharge of his debt was related to his 

$25,000 loan to Robert. If this testimony is credited, the 

mortgage has been discharged.

On the other hand, if Michael’s recent testimony is credited, 

Robert used Michael’s name, and not his own, at the auction to 

purchase items for himself. However, this clandestine 

arrangement did not change the legal reality that Michael gained 

title to the assets purchased under his name. If somehow this 

testimony is credited, it is necessary for the trial court to 

determine the purpose of Michael’s transfer of the assets to 

Robert. Was it a gift to Robert? Was it pursuant to an oral 

contract? If pursuant to an oral contract, what was the 

consideration to Michael for assuming the liability in the first 

instance? And ultimately, what effect would any of these findings

have on Robert’s liability to Michael pursuant to the note and 

mortgage?

We cannot address these issues in the absence of credibility

determinations. We therefore vacate the judgment, and remand 

for the trial court to hold such further proceedings, if any, it deems 

necessary to address these issues.

Id. at 7-9 (emphasis added). Michael filed his Petition for Rehearing En Banc

with this Court on March 18, 2016, and we denied the same by per curiam

order on May 12, 2016. 

In accordance with our Memorandum decision, upon remand the trial 

court conducted a hearing the purpose of which was to enable it to make 

findings pertaining to the details of the arrangements between Michael and 
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Robert Goetz (hereinafter “Robert”) in connection with the public auction held 

on April 18, 2009. At the outset of the hearing, Linda chose not to supplement 

the record with additional evidence and rested. N.T., 1/11/17, at 3-4. 

Thereafter, Michael called Robert on direct examination. Id. at 6. Robert

explained that while Michael received the ticket to bid, Robert did the actual 

bidding. Robert stated he did not want his identity to be revealed as a bidder, 

because his name appeared on a number of the items to be auctioned. Id. at 

7. Robert estimated that he had bid $61,000 by the end of the auction. Id. 

Robert further testified that while Michael paid nothing for the auctioned 

items, Robert paid thirty-five thousand dollars with funds he had borrowed, 

and the trial court awarded Linda twenty-eight thousand dollars to cover the 

difference in the divorce proceeding. Id. Robert stated he did not give any 

of the items purchased or cash proceeds from the liquidation thereof to 

Michael, nor did he pay Michael any portion of the twenty-five thousand dollars

Michael had lent to him. Id. at 8. 

On cross-examination, counsel for Linda questioned Robert about 

numerous statements Michael had made while testifying at the divorce 

proceeding on July 8, 2012. Id. at 10-15. Robert clarified that the trial court 

had determined Robert was buyer number sixty at the auction. Id. at 16-17. 

Robert consistently testified he did not remember or know the answers to 

numerous additional questions counsel posed which harkened back to the 

divorce proceeding. Id. at 18-23. Argument ensued at which time Robert’s 
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counsel indicated that the matters about which Linda’s counsel was asking 

questions had been resolved pursuant to the divorce proceeding. Id. at 27. 

Specifically counsel explained:

[Robert] paid for the items. Judge Bigham entered an order 

solidifying that situation. Master Phillips laid out in detail where 

the $61,000 came from, 35 from [Robert] and an allocation 

against [Robert’s] property division in favor of [Linda]. [Linda’s 

counsel] is acting like this is an issue that is still unresolved. He 

was the winner in this case and he has all of these documents. 

Id. at 27. Following this statement, the trial court admitted Linda’s exhibits 

9 and 10 solely for the purpose of impeaching Robert.

2

 After additional 

questioning regarding the manner in which the property obtained at the 

auction had been disposed, Robert’s counsel objected. The trial court 

indicated that the line of questioning exceeded the scope of cross-examination 

and was essentially an attempt to re-litigate the divorce proceeding and 

explore a collateral bankruptcy proceeding that was initiated on April 26, 

2013, which it deemed to be impermissible. Id. at 30-34, 41-43. 

Robert could not explain why a mortgage to Michael had not been 

recorded until nearly a year after Robert received the twenty-five thousand 

dollars from Michael, nor could he recall why the mortgage had not been 

recorded “until more than eight months after [Robert] used the $25,000 to 

pay on account of items purchased on bid number 60 at the public auction[.]” 

____________________________________________

2 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 is Linda’s sixth petition for special relief in the divorce 

matter and Exhibit 10 is Robert’s reply thereto. 
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Id. at 46. Robert also did not recall recording a $25,000 mortgage from Linda 

and him to Robert’s sister, Ann Williams. Id. at 46-48. 

Following Robert’s testimony, Linda briefly testified.

3

 She indicated she 

never received payment on the judgment in her favor in the divorce case 

which exceeded fifty-seven thousand dollars for counsel fees, expenses and 

alimony pendente lite. Id. at 51. She also identified Plaintiff’s Exhibit 24 as 

a receipt from the Register and Recorders Office as the recording of the “Ann 

Williams mortgage.” Id. She further explained that Plaintiff’s Exhibit 25 was 

a copy of a mortgage to Michael in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. 

Id. She acknowledged the mortgage “says Ann Williams about five lines 

down” and that her signature appeared on the fourth page. Id. 

Following the January 11, 2017, hearing, the trial court issued an Order 

on June 30, 2017, which reads as follows: 

AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2017, after hearing held 

in this matter and after consideration of the proposed findings of 

fact submitted by each party, pursuant to the direction of the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court, the [c]ourt makes the following 

factual findings:

1. The Findings of Fact entered on December 15, 2014[,] are 

 Reaffirmed and incorporated herein by reference.

2. The Court finds the testimony of Michael Williams credible 

when he indicates that he has never received any payment 

on the $25,000 mortgage executed to him by Robert K. 

Goetz, Jr. and Linda M. Goetz. Transcript of non-jury trial, 

October 28, 2014, pg. 59-60.

____________________________________________

3 Her testimony on direct examination spans just one page, and counsel for 

Michael asked no questions on cross-examination. 
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3. The mortgage referred to in paragraph 2 above secured a 

loan to the parties from Michael Williams in the amount of 

$25,000 as evidenced by Check No. 510. Plaintiffs Exhibit 

No. 4.

4. Michael Williams registered as Bidder No. 60 at a public 

auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce which was held 

on April 18, 2009. Stipulation of Fact No. 23.

5. Michael Williams registered as Bidder No. 60 to facilitate 

bidding on the auctioned items by Robert Goetz, Jr. Tr., pg. 

59.

6. Michael Williams did not pay for any item bid under Bid No. 

60 nor received proceeds or income from any item 

purchased under Bid No. 60. Tr., pg. 59.

7. The total purchase price for items purchased under Bid No. 

60 was $61,240. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 7.

8. Robert Goetz, Jr. paid $35,000 on account of the items 

purchased against Bid No. 60. Stipulation of Fact No. 8.

9. $26,240 of the $61,240 due under Bid No. 60 was never 

paid to the auctioneer. Plaintiffs No. 17; Finding of Fact No. 

64; Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, paragraph 76.

10. Vehicles purchased at auction under Bid No. 60 could 

not be transferred due to clouds on the title to the vehicles. 

Plaintiffs No. 9, paragraphs 23-52.

11. The $26,240 not paid to the auctioneer under Bid No. 

60 was assessed to Robert Goetz, Jr. as part of the property 

distribution in the divorce proceeding between Robert 

Goetz, Jr. and Linda Goetz. Plaintiffs No. 17, 

Recommendation 4H, pg. 25.

12. Possession of the $61,240 worth of equipment 

purchased under Bid No. 60 was awarded to Robert Goetz, 

Jr. as part of the master's recommendations in the divorce 

between Robert Goetz, Jr. and Linda Goetz. Plaintiffs No. 17, 

Recommendation 4H, pg. 25.
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13. The property purchased under Bid No. 60 was retained 

fully by Robert Goetz, Jr. with Michael Williams receiving no 

consideration or profit in permitting the property to pass 

through his bid number from the auctioneer to Robert 

Goetz, Jr.

14. Michael Williams' action in permitting Robert Goetz, 

Jr. to purchase items under Bid No. 60 was a courtesy 

granted between family members.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In an action to quiet title, plaintiff has the burden of proof to 

establish [his or her] right by a fair preponderance of the 

evidence. Poffenberger v. Goldstein, 776 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001).

2. Any transfer of assets, or title to those assets, to Michael 

Williams as a result of Bid No. 60 being in his name was 

immediately transferred from Michael Williams to Robert Goetz 

at equal value and did not involve any profit to Michael Williams 

in any form including the forgiveness of debt.

ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2017, the judgment 

entered May 5, 2015 is confirmed and the Adams County 

Prothonotary's Office is directed to enter judgment as set forth 

therein.

Trial Court Order, entered June 30, 2017, at 1-3 (unnumbered). 

Linda filed a timely notice of appeal on July 26, 2017. On July 28, 2017, 

the trial court ordered Linda to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal within twenty-one (21) days. On August 14, 2017, Linda

submitted a multi-page, multi-paragraph statement wherein she raised 

twenty-one claims of error. The issues set forth therein read, verbatim, as 

follows:
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1. In calling Robert Goetz to testify on his behalf, Michael 

Williams called a witness who is in flagrant, obstinate, defiant, 

and contumacious violation, of various Orders of this court in 

the Goetz divorce case that are directly related to the 

controversy in this case and that deprives Robert Goetz of all 

credibility and requires that all contested issues of fact be 

resolved against Michael Williams.

2. The Finding of Fact that the testimony of Michael Williams 

is credible is contrary to the clear and convincing evidence of 

record which establishes a pattern of years of fraudulent 

collusion between Robert Goetz and Michael Williams, including 

the knowing and fraudulent diversion of the proceeds of the 

mortgage in question from the expressly represented purpose 

of payment on account of the judgment of Linda Goetz against 

Robert Goetz to the payment on account of items that Michael 

Williams admitted under oath that he purchased for resale.

3. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Michael Williams personally received any equipment from the 

property purchased at the April 19, 2009, public auction is 

contrary to the testimony of Michael Williams under oath under 

direct examination and, again, on cross-examination in the 

Goetz divorce in which Michael Williams admitted that he was 

purchasing the items at the public auction to resell them.

4. The evidence offered by Michael Williams on remand does 

not answer the inquiries of the Superior Court as to the purpose 

for Michael's transfer to Robert Goetz of the assets that he 

purchased at the public auction other than to achieve the 

fraudulent diversion of the mortgage proceeds from their 

expressly represented application on account of the judgment 

of Linda Goetz against Robert Goetz.

5. The evidence offered by Michael Williams on remand does 

not answer the inquiries of the Superior Court as to the 

consideration that Michael Williams received for his assumption 

of the legal liability to pay for the items that were purchased at 

the public auction.

6. Characterization, of the undisputable evidence of active 

fraudulent collusion between Robert Goetz and Michael 

Williams to divert the proceeds of the mortgage in question as 
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a "courtesy granted between family members" is contrary to 

the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of record and 

an abuse of discretion.

7. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Michael Williams personally received any equipment from the 

property purchased at the April 19, 2009, public auction is 

contrary to stipulations 23 through 27 and 30 that Michael 

Williams successfully bid on $61,240 worth of items at the 

public auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce case on 

April 18, 2009.

8. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as 

reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to

stipulations 23 through 30 that Michael Williams purchased 

$61,240 worth of items at the public auction of marital assets 

in the Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009, and that Robert 

Goetz paid for $35,000 worth of those items.

9. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as 

reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to the 

undenied testimony of Linda M. Goetz that $25,000 of the 

$35,000 that Robert Goetz paid on account of the bids of 

Michael Williams at the public auction of marital assets in the 

Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009, were the same $25,000 

that Michael Williams had transferred to Robert Goetz in check 

number 510 on January 27, 2009.

10. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as 

reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to stipulation 

28 that Michael Williams knew that Robert Goetz paid $35,000 

on account of the items that were purchased against bid # 60 

at the public auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce case 

on April 18, 2009.

11. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that 

Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as 

reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to stipulation 

29 that Michael Williams paid nothing on account of the items 

that were bid on bid # 60 at the public auction of marital assets 

in the Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009.
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12. It was error to fail to conclude that, when Michael Williams 

consented to the payment of $35,000 by Robert Goetz on 

account of the bids of Michael Williams at the public auction on 

April 18, 2009, that the mortgage to Michael Williams was paid 

in full.

13. The failure to conclude that the fraud and collusion between 

Robert Goetz and Michael Williams to divert the $25,000 from 

the expressly represented application of the funds for the direct 

benefit of Linda M. Goetz to the direct benefit of Michael 

Williams constituted a fraud upon Linda M. Goetz is contrary to 

the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of record.

14. The failure to conclude that the mortgage and note to 

Michael Williams are void and unenforceable due to the 

fraudulent misconduct of Robert Goetz and Michael Williams is 

contrary to the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of 

record.

15. The failure to conclude that the mortgage to Michael 

Williams was divested by the equitable distribution Order of 

May 5, 2011, in the Goetz divorce confirming the express 

language of the mortgage and the recommendation of Master 

Phillips that Robert Goetz was responsible for repayment of the 

loan to Michael Williams is an error of law and an abuse of 

discretion.

16. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph 

20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the 

pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the 

execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law 

and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Michael 

Williams was on notice that, at the time that Linda M. Goetz 

signed the mortgage in question, the collateral for the 

mortgage was in custodia legis in the Goetz divorce case so 

that the lien of the mortgage could only attach to the collateral 

in rem after the entry of the order of equitable distribution in 

the Goetz divorce case.

17. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph 

20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the 

pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the 

execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law 
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and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Michael 

Williams was on notice that the collateral for the mortgage was 

subject to orders of court in the divorce case under the doctrine 

of custodia legis.

18. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph 

20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the 

pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the 

execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law 

and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that, because the 

collateral for the mortgage was in custodia legis in the Goetz 

divorce case, the cash award to Linda M. Goetz in the Goetz 

divorce case had priority over the lien of the mortgage to 

Michael Williams.

19. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph 

20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the 

pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the 

execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law 

and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that the mortgage 

to Michael Williams was divested by the Order of May 5, 2011, 

in the Goetz divorce case that confirmed the express language 

of the mortgage and the recommendation of Master Phillips 

that only Robert Goetz was responsible for repayment of the 

loan to Michael Williams.

20. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph 

20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the 

pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the 

execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law 

and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that the mortgage 

to Michael Williams was divested by the Sheriff's sale on March 

16, 2012, which sale was upon the unsatisfied lien against 

Robert Goetz in the Goetz divorce case, which lien had priority 

over the lien of the mortgage to Michael Williams under the 

doctrine of in custodia legis.

21. Where Robert Goetz was ordered to pay the mortgage in 

question in the Goetz divorce case, it was an error of law and 

an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Linda M. Goetz is 

not required to pay the mortgage under the doctrine of custodia 

legis.
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22. Linda M. Goetz requests leave to supplement this statement 

upon the filing of the transcript of the testimony of January 11, 

2017, herein. [4]

Plaintiff’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed August 

14, 2017, at 1-6. On September 7, 2017, the trial court filed its Opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

In her brief, Linda presents the following Statement of Questions 

Involved:

I. Are the findings in the decisions of December 15, 2014, and 

June 30, 2017, of the court below manifestly unreasonable in light 

of the sustainable evidence of record?

II. Did Robert offer any credible evidence on remand that would 

answer the questions of your honorable court[] that were raised 

in the opinion that reversed the original decision of the court 

below? 

III. Where Michael knew when he tendered the $25,000 to 

Robert, that Robert was in the middle of divorce proceedings and 

that Robert had committed to apply the mortgage proceeds to 

Linda’s lien in the divorce case, did Linda’s lien in the divorce case 

have lien priority over Michael’s mortgage under the doctrine of in 

custodia legis. 

Brief for Appellant at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Before we consider the merits of these claims, we first must determine 

whether Linda has preserved them for appellate review. Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

4 We remind appellate counsel that requesting leave to supplement a Rule 

1925(b) statement upon receiving notes of testimony is not in accordance with 

the prescribed procedure to supplement the statement set forth in Rule 

1925(b)(2). Merely requesting leave to supplement the statement is not the 

equivalent of applying to the trial court and having a request granted by the 

court “for good cause shown.” See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2).
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Wholaver, 588 Pa. 218, 903 A.2d 1178 (2006) (holding appellate courts may 

determine sua sponte whether an appellant has properly preserved issues for 

appeal). The fact that an appellant timely filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

“does not automatically equate with issue preservation.” Jiricko v. Geico 

Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 775, 

958 A.2d 1048 (2008). To the contrary, our law makes it clear that Rule

1925(b) is not satisfied when one simply files any statement. Tucker v. R.M. 

Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), reargument denied, Jan. 30, 

2008, affirmed, 602 Pa. 147, 977 A.2d 1170 (2009). Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4) 

requires that the statement “concisely identify each ruling or error that the 

appellant intends to challenge” and shall “not be redundant or provide lengthy 

explanations as to any error.”

Rule 1925 is a “crucial component of the appellate process, because it 

allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to 

raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 678, 880 A.2d 1239 (2005), cert. 

denied, Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Kanter, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 

1048, 163 L.Ed.2d 858 (2006). For this reason, Pennsylvania courts 

repeatedly have held that an appellant waives all matters for review where he

or she identifies an excessive number of issues in the concise statement. See

Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super. 2006); see also Jones v. 

Jones, 878 A.2d 86 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding issues waived for appellate 
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review where the purpose of filing seven page, twenty-nine issue statement

was to place undue burden on trial court and delay a resolution of the 

proceeding); Kanter supra (finding fifteen page, fifty-five issue statement 

resulted in waiver).

This Court has explained Rule 1925 waiver by stating that “when an 

appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to 

be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal 

analysis which is pertinent to those issues.” Lineberger, supra at 148

(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we have concluded that the 

submission of a Rule 1925(b) statement which is so redundant, vague, 

incoherent, or confusing as to prevent the lower court from engaging in a 

meaningful analysis results in waiver of all claims presented. Commonwealth 

v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109 (Pa.Super 2016) (finding waiver of all claims where 

the appellant failed to identify his claims in an adequate and concise manner);

See also Jones, supra.

In Tucker, supra, this Court further stated:

[T]his Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous 

number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, the appellants have 

deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 

1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review 

of the issues [they] now seek to raise. We have further noted that 

such voluminous statements do not identify the issues that 

appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing 

limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[ ] the raising of 

so many issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant 

1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court 

to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
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Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in 

original). More recently, we also held:

Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing 

upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule 

1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process. When 

a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is 

not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails 

adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be 

pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of 

a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. In other words, 

a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to 

identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of 

no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.

Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

However, “the number of issues raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement does 

not, without more, provide a basis upon which to deny appellate review where 

an appeal otherwise complies with the mandates of appellate practice.”

Mahonski v. Engel, 145 A.3d 175, 181 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, ___ 

Pa. ____, 1168 A.3d 1277 (2017) (quotation marks and quotation omitted), 

appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, 168 A.3d 1277 (2017). This Court has 

recognized that the complexity of the matter under review is a consideration 

for courts to make prior to finding waiver based on the sheer volume of the 

concise statement. Id. (citing Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 

595 Pa. 366, 938 A.2d 417 (2007) (plurality) wherein the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court stressed the appellants had a reasonable basis to include a 

large number of issues in their Rule 1925(b) statement because they had filed 
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a complicated lawsuit with numerous defendants that contained multiple 

counts and had resulted in a large number of trial court rulings). 

The case sub judice does not involve a complicated matter but, instead, 

pertains to a conventional quiet title action which initially required a singleday non-jury trial and was supplemented with an additional hearing, as per 

this Court’s directive, at which Linda chose not to present additional evidence. 

More importantly, the extravagance of Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement

has impeded the appellate process in that it precluded the trial court from 

providing a comprehensive analysis of the issues. This is evident in the fact 

that the trial court did not engage in a legal analysis of each specific issue

asserted in the 1925(b) statement, and, instead, attempted to rephrase the

allegations generally as follows:

5

 

1. Appellant takes exception to this [c]ourt’s credibility 

determinations alleging factual findings that are not 

supported by the record; and 

2. Appellant claims the [c]ourt erred in failing to find that the 

mortgage at issue is defeated under the legal theory of 

custodia legis. 

Opinion Pursuant To Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 9/7/11, at 1. However, even if 

the court correctly guesses the issues raised on appeal and writes a 1925(a) 

____________________________________________

5 While the trial court did not specifically do so in its latest Opinion filed on 

September 7, 2017, in its prior Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) which pertained to 

Appellant’s appeal from its Order dated December 15, 2014, the trial court 

cited to Kanter, supra upon noting Appellant had raised nineteen separate 

issues and attempted to address those issues in the context of three general 

claims. See Opinion Pursuant To Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 7/1/15, at 1. 
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Opinion, the issues may still be waived. See Kanter, supra 866 A.2d at 400. 

Based upon our review of the Statement, we likewise have difficulty 

discerning what exact issues Linda is raising. For instance, her first issue is 

simply a sweeping statement challenging Robert’s credibility in all respects, 

while numerous others refer to findings of fact without citation to the record. 

See Plaintiff’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed 

August 14, 2017, Issues 2-3, 7-11. In addition, Issues 4-5 refer generally to 

how Michaels’s evidence presented on remand failed to satisfy “inquiries of 

this Court.” Finally, numerous other claims harken back to determinations 

made in the divorce proceeding. See Issues 15-21. 

Moreover, as described above, this Court remanded the instant matter 

to enable the trial court to determine the ongoing validity of the mortgage, 

executed by Robert and Linda and held by Michael, against 3380 

Chambersburg Road. Thus, the purpose of remand was limited in scope. “[I]n 

remanding a case for rehearing, [the appellate court] may limit the scope 

thereof to certain defined issues. This limitation restricts the power of the 

court below to a determination of those issues.” Quaker State Oil Ref. Co. 

v. Talbot, 322 Pa. 155, 159-60, 185 A. 586, 588 (1936). Where a case is 

remanded for a specific and limited purpose, the trial court must strictly 

comply with the appellate court’s mandate. Agostinelli v. Edwards, 98 A.3d 

695, 706 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 734, 113 A.3d 278 (2015)

(requiring strict compliance with the mandate of the appellate court on 
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remand). Many of the issues Linda attempts to assert in her Rule 1925 

statement pertain to the parties’ divorce proceeding in 2009.

6

 Linda cannot 

now attempt to re-litigate those claims, and a holding to the contrary would 

give her an impermissible second bite at the apple. 

As Appellant does not clearly state her challenges, we affirm on the basis 

that she has waived all issues on appeal due to her improper concise 

statement. See Tucker, 939 A.2d at 346.7

Order affirmed.

Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/25/18

____________________________________________

6 A Decree in Divorce was entered on July 14, 2011. Therein, it was indicated 

that all claims had been resolved pursuant to a Master’s Report and 

Recommendation filed on January 26, 2011, which was adopted in full as the 

Opinion of the trial court. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2. 

7 This Court may affirm the trial court on any valid basis. Plasticert, Inc. v. 

Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa.Super. 2007).
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