J-S81033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C.M.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.F.C., MOTHER

No. 563 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree February 27, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Orphans' Court at No.: 85284

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2018

 

In these related appeals,1 C.F.C. (Mother) appeals the decrees of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (trial court), entered on February 27, 

2017, that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, C.M.C., born in 

September of 2013, and her other daughter, also C.M.C., born in February of 

2015 (Children). We affirm.2 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This case is a companion case to No. 562 MDA 2017.

2 The Children’s father, J.M.E. (Father), voluntarily relinquished his parental 

rights on December 20, 2016. He did not appeal that termination and he is 

not a party to this appeal. 
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Berks County Children and Youth Services (BCCYS) filed their petitions 

to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights on February 7, 2017. The 

trial court held a hearing on that petition on February 27, 2017. When Mother 

failed to appear, counsel for BCCYS, Jennifer Grimes, and the guardian ad 

litem, Cathy Badal, moved for the admission of 38 exhibits that supported the 

petition and rested. The trial court admitted the exhibits. 

This family has been known to BCCYS since 2016 for inappropriate 

parenting skills, physical abuse by Father, domestic violence between Mother 

and Father, Mother’s unstable mental health, and Mother’s ongoing alcohol 

and drug use. Notes of Testimony, February 27, 2017 (N.T.) at 481; Exhibit 

38. On January 21, 2016, BCCYS received a report that the Children had welts 

on their buttocks and severe diaper rash. The same day, Father admitted to 

the Pottstown Police Department that he hit the Children daily. Pottstown 

Code Enforcement closed Father’s home because it lacked heat. On January 

22, 2016, Father voluntarily signed a safety plan that allowed the Children to 

reside with maternal cousins and permitted Father only supervised contact.

On February 1, 2016, BCCYS obtained an emergency court order placing 

the Children in foster care when the maternal cousins said they were no longer 

willing to care for the Children. When the Children came into care, both of 

them were delayed developmentally. The eleven-month-old was immobile 

and not able to sit or crawl, while the three-year-old was unsteady on her feet 
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and at times would twitch when she got into trouble or got excited. N.T. at 

494; Exhibit 38. 

The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent on February 10, 

2016, and transferred custody to BCCYS. The trial court ordered Mother to 

take parenting education classes; to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation 

and follow any recommendations; to undergo random urinalyses; to secure a 

mental health evaluation and follow any recommendations; and to undergo a 

non-offending parent evaluation and follow any recommendations. The trial 

court also ordered Mother to establish and maintain stable housing and income 

and to keep BCCYS informed of any changes in her residence or income. 

Finally, she was to visit with the Children as scheduled and act in an 

appropriate manner.

Mother was minimally cooperative with services throughout the 

Children’s placement, and made little to no progress in any of the services 

ordered by the trial court. Mother was discharged from casework services on 

November 29, 2016, for non-compliance. Natalie Farst, Mother’s Signature 

Family Services Caseworker, opined that Mother’s barriers to progress 

continued to be deflections of responsibility, failure to begin therapy, failure 

to obtain insurance, as well as an inadequate monthly income. N.T. at 488; 

Exhibit 38. Mother failed to engage in any drug and alcohol evaluation and/or 

treatment. N.T. at 491; Exhibit 38. Mother participated in parenting 

education with Kathy Haag from Partners in Parenting and Morgan 
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Daubenspeck from KidsPeace. BCCYS acknowledged that Mother was 

consistent with visitation from February 1, 2016 until July 16, 2016, however, 

Mother's attendance declined after this review period. During the review 

period dating from June 6, 2016 to September 19, 2016, Ms. Haag voiced 

concern that Mother needed, “continual direction and guidance to carry out 

the teachings; especially when it comes to discipline.” N.T. at 476; Exhibit 

35. For the review period from September 20, 2016 until December 4, 2016, 

Ms. Haag opined, “[Mother] commonly struggles managing the [Children] 

even in a controlled, predictable environment.” Mother missed five out of 

eleven visits during this review period and Ms. Haag suggested that Mother’s 

visitation be decreased. N.T. at 479; exhibit 36. During this review period, 

Mother failed to attend any of the Children’s medical appointments and failed 

to attend the Children's surgery for bilateral myringotomy with insertion of 

tympanostomy tubes. N.T. at 493; Exhibit 38.

On May 20, 2016, Mother submitted to a domestic violence and nonoffending parent evaluation with Andrea Karlunas, MSW, LCSW, CDVC, 

CSOTS. Ms. Karlunas opined:

Due to [Mother's] inability to maintain sobriety and use 

healthy coping skills, [Mother] is unable to protect herself and her 

children from violence. [Mother’s] lack of insight that her own 

behaviors escalate the circumstances and place her at further risk 

and [does] not resolve the matter . . . based on [Mother’s] own 

verbal report, she lacks the skills necessary to protect her 

children. Specifically, [Mother] lacks the skill necessary to identify 

abuse, characteristics of abusers and skills to protect children . . 

. It is a concern that Mother lacks long-term sustainability to 
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remain sober, refrain from abusive relationships, and demonstrate 

healthy coping and parenting skills. 

N.T. at 235, 236; Exhibit 29.

Ms. Karlunas expressed further concern with Mother’s inability to 

recognize the abuse the Children suffered and does not have any confidence 

that Mother will be able to successfully parent the Children without first 

addressing the abuse, taking responsibility for not protecting them, and 

establishing trust with the Children. Ms. Karlunas also opined that Mother 

needed to understand the risks of reuniting with Father and demonstrate her 

role as a parent and protector. Ms. Karlunas recommended that Mother 

participate in non-offending parent psychoeducational sessions followed by 

non-offending parent treatment, a mental health evaluation, supervised 

visitation, parenting, and random urinalyses. N.T. at 236; Exhibit 29. 

After Mother’s evaluation, Mother engaged in non-offending parent 

treatment with Julie Karaisz, LSW, of Commonwealth Clinical Group. Mother 

attended four out of eleven sessions, fewer than fifty percent. Ms. Karaisz 

opined that Mother was never committed to the treatment process and needed 

to be in order to be able to develop the skills necessary to identify abuse and 

acquire an understanding of the risks of reunification with her Children’s 

perpetrator. Mother was discharged from treatment in December of 2016 for 

non-compliance. N.T. at 491; Exhibit 38. 

Mother submitted to a forensic evaluation by Richard F. Small, Ph.D., 

on May 24, 2016. Dr. Small diagnosed Mother with personality disorder with 
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histrionic and dependent features, bipolar disorder, unspecified anxiety 

disorder, alcohol-related disorder, unspecified stimulant-related disorder, 

posttraumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, 

primarily hyperactive and impulsive presentation. N.T. at 225; Exhibit 28. 

Dr. Small opined, “[Mother's] poor choices are likely to negatively affect her 

ability to parent her children. If [Mother] were in a relationship in which her 

children were at risk, one could not be assured that she would protect them.” 

Dr. Small further opined that Mother has a long-standing substance abuse 

disorder and that Mother’s current sobriety is tenuous. N.T. at 225; Exhibit 

28. Dr. Small concluded, 

Unfortunately, although [Mother] is aware that she has 

mental health problems, she has little insight into the seriousness 

of these problems, nor the consequences for her children. Long 

term intensive therapy would be necessary to make any 

significant change . . . [Mother] is unlikely to be able to be a safe 

caretaker for her children. Her psychological and relationship 

issues are so serious that they are likely to negate her ability to 

safely care for her children. 

N.T. at 226; Exhibit 28 (brackets added here).

The trial court entered its decrees changing the Children’s goals to 

adoption and involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights on February 

27, 2017. Mother filed her notices of appeal on March 29, 2017, and her 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal on July 7, 2017.3 

____________________________________________

3

 When Mother failed to file her concise statements with her notices of appeal, 

this Court, on June 12, 2017, ordered Mother to file those statements. Mother 
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Mother raises the following questions on appeal:

A. Whether the trial court provided [Mother] with proper notice 

pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S.A.] §2513(b) and 15.6 of the Berks County 

Orphans [Court] Division procedural rules[?]

B. Whether the evidence presented at trial courts’ [sic] hearing 

supports a finding of the [trial] court granting termination of 

[Mother’s] parental rights[?]

C. Whether the trial court erred by not addressing the emotional 

bonds developed between [Mother and Child] prior to terminating 

[Mother’s] parental rights[?]

Mother’s Brief, at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review in the termination of parental rights is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope 

of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Regarding out review of termination decrees, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

____________________________________________

filed those statements with this Court on June 19, 2017, and with the trial 

court on July 7, 2017. Failure to file a concise statement with a notice of 

appeal can result in the waiver of the issues raised on appeal. However, as 

there was no objection or claim of prejudice from Appellee, we have accepted 

the late filings in these cases in reliance on our decision in In re K.T.E.L., 983 

A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have 

adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not 

evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible 

evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we 

are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and deductions, we 

may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s sustainable 

findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Our standard of review of a change of a child’s goal is as follows:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is 

abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not 

apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound 

by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the record. 

The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the 

responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and 

resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support an opposite result.

Int. of S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946-47 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 
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Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), ((b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal 

citations omitted).

The fundamental test in termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 

A.2d 172 (1975). There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced under 

what is now Section 2511(a)(2), that the petitioner for involuntary termination 

must prove “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being 

and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” Id. at 173.

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific 

reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case 

law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 533 Pa. 115, 
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620 A.2d 481 (1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not 

required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

In its opinion, the trial court notes, and we agree, that Mother has 

waived the issues she raises on appeal by failing to appear at the termination 

hearing on February 27, 2017. Mother claims, however, that she was not 

properly served with notice of that hearing. We disagree and quote the trial 

court’s analysis of this issue, with approval:

Mother has waived any issues she could have raised by 

failing to appear for her termination hearing. [See Fillmore v. 

Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“Failure to timely 

object to a basic and fundamental error . . . will result in waiver 

of that issue. On appeal, the Superior Court will not consider a 

claim which was not called to the trial court’s attention at a time 

when any error committed could have been corrected.] Mother

now asserts that it was trial court error by failing to adequately 

notify Mother of the time, date, and location of the termination 

hearing. Despite appearing before this [c]ourt, in person, on July 

10, 2017, Mother did not raise this issue at the first available 

opportunity or attempt to offer this [c]ourt any good cause for her 

failure to appear on February 27, 2017. [See Fillmore, supra]. 

The preliminary order, entered February 10, 2017, set for 

termination [sic] for February 27, 2017 at 9:30 am [sic] in the 

courtroom assigned to the undersigned. Proof of notice was by 

sworn affidavit and filed in the official court file, the United States 

Postal Service delivery information was attached thereto and 

shows that Mother signed for the Petition, Preliminary Order and 

Notice on February 16, 2017 at 12:53 P.M. in Boyertown, PA, 

which was eleven days before the hearing. The record shows that 

notice of the termination hearing was also published in the 

Reading Eagle, a newspaper of general circulation for the area in 

which Mother resides, and that said notice was also mailed to 

Mother via regular mail. (Notes of Testimony 2/27/17, p. 3). . . .
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/17, at 6-7.

Our examination of the record discloses that it contains a Proof of Notice 

filed with the trial court on February 23, 2017, that states that BCCYS served 

notice of the hearing on Mother on February 13, 2017 by regular and certified 

mail. Attached to the Proof of Notice is the United States Postal Service receipt 

that demonstrates that Mother personally signed for that notice on February 

16, 2017 at 12:53 p.m. at her address of record. Mother had proper notice 

of the petition and the date, time and place of the hearing. Mother’s first issue 

lacks merit.

In regard to Mother’s other two issues, we have carefully examined the 

opinion entered by the trial court on July 27, 2017, in light of the record in 

this matter and are satisfied that that opinion is a thorough and correct 

analysis of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Berks County that terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2) and (b), and changed the Children’s 

goal to adoption, on the basis of the concise, thoughtful, and well-written 

opinion of the Honorable Jill Gehman Koestel. 

Decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/08/2018