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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JONATHAN MILLER (AC 37130)
Lavine, Sheldon and Mullins, Js. Argued January 11—officially released March 15, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen, Suarez, J.)
Robert E. Byron, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Matthew R. Kalthoff

, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’sattorney, andDavidM. Carlucci, assistantstate’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion SHELDON, J. The defendant, Jonathan Miller, appealsfromthejudgmentofconviction, renderedafter
a jury trial, of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1), and two counts of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation ofGeneralStatutes § 53a-181 (a) (1) and (2).1 Onappeal, the defendant claims that the court violated his right to a fair trial by denying his challenge for cause as to
an allegedlybiased venireperson, thereby necessitating his use ofaperemptorychallenge to excuse thatvenireperson. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following factual and procedural history is relevant to the defendant’s claim on appeal. On August 31, 2012, the defendantappearedinfamilycourtinHartford to defend himself against allegations that he had failed to pay child support to Angela Cox, the mother of his
son. Upon leaving the courthouse afterthe hearing, the defendantwasinvolvedinanaltercationwiththe father ofCox’ daughter. As aresult ofthat incident, the defendant was charged with one count ofassault in the third degree, three counts ofbreach ofthe peace in the second degree and one count of criminal mischief in the third degree. Jury selection in this case began on May 7, 2014. The parties selected the six regular jurors on that day. On the next day, the parties commenced voir dire to select the requisite two alternate jurors. Upon questioning venireperson R.D.,2 it was disclosed that his mother recently had been the victim of a burglary. R.D. indicatedthathe didnothaveaproblemwithhisinteraction with police officers regarding that crime, and, when asked whether he would tend to find the testimony of police officers more or less credible than that of other witnesses, he responded, ‘‘I would say possibly more credible. I don’t know. I don’t knowifI wouldbe biased
or not.’’ He acknowledged that he would have to wait to hear what the officers had to say and that his judgment of their testimony would depend on the circumstances. When defense counsel later asked R.D. whether he would ‘‘give more consideration to the police officer’s [testimony] because he’s an officer,’’ R.D. replied, ‘‘It’s possible that I would.’’ Defense counsel then asked R.D. ifhe would have a problem finding the defendant not guilty if the state failed to prove its
case but the defendant did not testify or present any evidence of his own. R.D. responded, ‘‘Well, that he would not say anything would not be a factor. Possibly ifthere was no other positive evidence, that—that may be a factor.’’3 Following counsel’svoir dire ofR.D., the court asked R.D.: ‘‘[I]fone oftheinstructionsthatthejudgeprovided to you was that you’re to treat all witnesses the same whether they be a police officer or a doctor or a layperson or an attorney, you would test their credibility in the same manner. Would you not?’’ R.D. responded that he would and that he wouldjudge all witnesses in the same manner. The state accepted R.D. as ajuror, but the defendant asked that he be excused for cause on the grounds that he had indicated that he might give more credit to a police officer’s testimony than to that of a lay witness and that he might be concerned if the defendant did not testify or present any evidence. The court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause, explaining, ‘‘In the totalityofall of [the] answersto the questionsthatwere presented, [it] does appearthat [R.D.] would follow the instructions of the court as to the law and specifically did answer regarding credibility of witnesses

. . . . [A]ll in all, I think by the totality of all ofthe questions and the answers he would be fair and impartial

. . . .’’ The defendant thus exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse R.D. from serving on the jury. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying his challenge for cause as to R.D., for it thereby required him to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse R.D., and thus deprived him ofhis right to an impartial jury and a fair trial. In response, the state argues that, because the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse R.D. from thejury, and his peremptory challenges were not exhausted, ‘‘the compositionofthejuryandthefairness ofthetrialwere unaffectedbythetrialcourt’s [denialofhischallengefor cause].’’ We agree with the state. ‘‘Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.

. . . The modernjury is regarded as an institution in ourjustice system that determines the case solely on the basis ofthe evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court.

. . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an

. . . unprejudiced jury

. . . . Put another way, [t]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation mark omitted.) State

v. Benedict, 158 Conn. App. 599, 605, 119 A.3d 1245, cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn. 924, 125 A.3d 200 (2015). ‘‘The determinationasto apotentialjuror’s impartiality, inwhichdemeanorplaysanimportantpart, isparticularly within the province of the trial judge and the trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to excuse a juror for cause.

. . . In challenging the competency ofthisjurorto sit on the panel, the [defendants] had the burden of raising [their] claim of actual bias from the realm of speculation to the realm offact.. . . In proving actual juror bias, the party challenging forcausemustalso showthatthejuror’sstate ofmindis fixed and settled and not a mere impression.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thorsen v. Durkin Development, LLC, 129 Conn. App. 68, 72, 20 A.3d 707 (2011).
Inthis case, weneednotdeterminewhetherthe court properly exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause because the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse R.D. from serving on thejury and he did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.4 ‘‘Where a [party] has failed to exhaust his right of peremptory challenge, it is no ground for granting him a new trial that a challenge for cause was overruled.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219, 224–25, 460 A.2d 961 (1983);
see also State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 231–32, 849 A.2d 648 (2004); Statev. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 32 n.8, 770 A.2d 908 (2001); State v

. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299, 313, 613 A.2d242 (1992);Statev.Smith, 49Conn. 376, 379 (1881); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 529 (1880); State v. Omar, 136 Conn. App. 87, 91–92, 43 A.3d 766, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 923, 47 A.3d 883 (2012). Because the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, his claim that he was deprived ofhis right to a fairtrial must fail.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant was found not guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117 (a) (1) (A), and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (5).

2 We refer to the venireperson by his initials to protect his privacy. See State v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 229 n.25, 726 A.2d 531, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 969, 120 S. Ct. 409, 145 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1999).

3 Our recitation of the previously quoted excerpts of R.D.’s voir dire is limited to those inquiries that gave rise to the defendant’s request that he be excused for cause.
4 The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he presence on the jury of a biasedjuror constitutes a structural defect which obviates considerations of exhaustion of peremptory challenges.’’ This argument ignores the premise that when the defendant is able to exercise aperemptory challenge to excuse abiased venireperson from serving on the jury, the allegedly structural defect that may arise from allowing a biased juror to serve on a jury does not come to fruition.