FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 MARCH 31, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-10185

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-14041-CR-KMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

PATRICK FREDERICK WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(March 31, 2009)

Before DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge. *

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Honorable Jane Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,

*

sitting by designation.
Appellant Patrick Frederick Williams appeals his life sentence, imposed on

remand, for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We previously remanded this case to the district court for

compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), requiring the district court to state the

reasons for giving Williams a life sentence and to explain why the sentence was

appropriate. See United States v. Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (11th Cir.

2006) (“Williams I”). In Williams I, we: (1) held that “it was not error to enhance

Williams’[s] sentence on the basis of prior convictions properly noted in the

presentence report (PSI);” (2) found “no constitutional Booker error in assigning 1

to Williams a base offense level of 30, the figure used for crack offenses involving

between 35 and 50 grams;” (3) rejected Williams’s “claim that the trial court

committed reversible Booker error by construing the sentencing guidelines as

mandatory;” and (4) rejected Williams’s “claim that his sentence must be vacated

because the district court failed to inquire ‘whether he affirms or denies that he has

been previously convicted as alleged in the information.’” Id. at 1273–74 (footnote

added) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 851(b)). In Williams I, we also denied Williams’s

claim that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by considering

 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). 1

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prior convictions that were not included in the indictment nor found by a jury. Id.

I.

In this appeal, Williams argues that his life sentence was procedurally

unreasonable because at resentencing the district court treated the Sentencing

Guidelines as mandatory, improperly calculated the guideline range, failed to

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and failed to adequately explain the

chosen sentence by relying on unproven facts from arrest warrants and statements

that he made while asserting his right to contest his guilt at trial. Specifically, he

asserts that by deciding to construe the previous mandate given by this court

narrowly, and failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors in order to impose a lesser

sentence, the district court treated the guidelines as mandatory, in violation of

Booker. Williams also argues that he was not a career offender because his battery

of a law enforcement officer (“BOLEO”) conviction was not a crime of violence

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a). Williams relies on an

intervening Florida Supreme Court decision that held that BOLEO is not a crime

of violence. See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2007) (holding that

battery of a law enforcement officer is not a “forcible felony” under Florida’s

violent career criminal statute). 

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II.

We review de novo whether the district court complied with our mandate. 

United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.

___, 128 S. Ct. 671, 169 L. Ed. 2d 526 (2007). Where we issue a limited mandate,

“the trial court is restricted in the range of issues it may consider on remand.”

United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003). Particularly where

this court holds that there is no merit to a party’s objections to his sentence other

than that for which the court issues a remand, the district court is foreclosed from

addressing any of the other sentencing issues previously raised. See United States

v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996). A district court’s assertion of

jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of such a mandate constitutes an abuse

of discretion. Id. Moreover, a specific mandate is not subject to interpretation. 

United States v. Mesa, 247 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001). 

“Under the law of the case doctrine, both the district court and the court of

appeals are bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court of

appeals in a prior appeal of the same case.” United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466,

469 (11th Cir. 1996). The exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are (1) the

presentation of new evidence, or (2) an intervening change in controlling law, or

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(3) that the appellate decision is clearly erroneous and would result in manifest

injustice if implemented. Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1510

(11th Cir. 1987).

III.

In Williams I, we remanded the case because the district court failed to

comply with § 3553(c)(1) by offering “no reason for the life sentence it elected to

impose upon 26 year-old Williams.” 438 F.3d at 1274. Pursuant to § 3553(c)(1),

a “court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its

imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentenc[ing] . . . range exceeds 24

months, the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). Under Booker, the district court need not state on the

record that it has explicitly considered each § 3553(a) factor and need not discuss

each factor. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather,

“an acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s

arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient.” Id. The weight

accorded to the § 3553(a) factors is within the district court’s discretion. See

Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832. 

Our remand was for the limited purpose of compelling the district court to

comply with § 3553(c)(1) and did not require a recalculation of either Williams’s

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sentencing range or the sentence imposed. Our mandate merely required that the

district court provide reasons for the life sentence it imposed, but we otherwise

found that the sentence was reasonable. Upon remand, the district court provided

reasons in accord with our mandate and Booker. Thus, we conclude that

Williams’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. 

IV.

As previously discussed, our limited mandate restricted the district court

from revisiting issues on which we affirmed during the first appeal, including

whether Williams’s sentence should be enhanced because of certain prior

convictions. However, because one exception to the mandate rule is for an

intervening change in controlling law, we will consider whether two intervening

cases that Williams cites constitute a change in controlling law since the time of

our first decision that should be applied now notwithstanding our mandate. 

Williams claims that the district court erred in classifying him as a career offender

based on an earlier BOLEO conviction because the Florida Supreme Court

recently held that a BOLEO conviction is not a “forcible felony” for the purposes

of sentence enhancement under Florida’s violent career criminal statute. See

Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 212. We addressed and rejected this very argument in

United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2008), cert granted, ___S. Ct.

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___, 2009 WL 425080 (Feb. 23, 2009). Although Johnson is pending review in

the Supreme Court, it is still controlling precedent. See Ritter v. Thigpen, 828

F.2d 662, 665–66 (11th Cir. 1987)(“A grant of certiorari does not constitute new

law.”). In Johnson, we held that the issue of whether a federal statute (in that case

the Armed Career Criminal Act) applies to the state law defined crime of battery is

a federal question, not a state one. Thus, Hearns does not overrule this court’s

opinion in United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2005), which held

that a BOLEO conviction is a crime of violence for purposes of the federal

sentencing guidelines. Williams argues that our holding in Glover must be

reconsidered in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision, Begay v. United

States, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). In Begay, the Supreme Court held

that the felony of driving under the influence is not a “violent felony” under the

language of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2006),

in part because “[i]t is simply too unlike the [18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)] listed

examples . . . to believe that Congress intended the provision to cover it.” 553

U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. Although Begay provides guidance for defining a

violent felony under the ACCA or an analogous sentencing statute, we do not

interpret its holding to require a different outcome in this case or a reexamination

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of our holding in Glover. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in

classifying Williams as a career offender. 

On remand, the district court complied with our limited mandate by giving

reasons for sentencing Williams to life imprisonment, including his failure to take

responsibility for his actions, his lengthy criminal history, the need to promote

respect for law, deterrence, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(c). Because the district court properly complied with our limited remand and

Williams’s arguments are meritless, we affirm Williams’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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