13930 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

(1) Paragraph 2. of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 85F–21, dated May 12, 2021, 

for a flow path UT inspection. 

(2) Paragraph 1.a) of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 130F–21, dated July 1, 2021, 

for a flow path UT inspection. 

(3) Paragraph 2.a) of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 130F–21, Revision A, dated 

July 28, 2021, for a flow path UT inspection. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or responsible Flight 

Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of 

this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9- 

ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the responsible Flight Standards Office. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Luis Cortez-Muniz, Aerospace 

Engineer, Airframe Section, FAA, Seattle 

ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: (206) 

231–3958; email: Luis.A.Cortez-Muniz@

faa.gov. 

(2) Service information identified in this 

AD that is not incorporated by reference is 

available at the addresses specified in 

paragraphs (l)(3) and (4) of this AD. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin 

PW4G–112–A72–361, dated October 15, 

2021. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: 

Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 

Westminster Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal 

Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 562–797– 

1717; internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. For Pratt & Whitney 

service information identified in this AD 

contact Pratt & Whitney Division, 400 Main 

Street, East Hartford, CT 06118; phone: 860– 

565–0140; email: help24@prattwhitney.com; 

website: https://connect.prattwhitney.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th 

St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

fr.inspection@nara.gov, or go to: https://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued on March 4, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05295 Filed 3–9–22; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0962; Project 

Identifier AD–2021–00997–T; Amendment 

39–21976; AD 2022–06–10] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 777–200 

and –300 series airplanes. This AD was 

prompted by reports of three incidents 

involving in-flight fan blade failures on 

certain Pratt & Whitney engines (‘‘fan 

blades’’ are also known as ‘‘1st-stage 

low-pressure compressor (LPC) 

blades’’—these terms are used 

interchangeably in this AD). This AD 

requires installation of debris shields on 

the thrust reverser (T/R) inner wall at 

the left and right sides of the lower 

bifurcation, inspection of the fan cowl 

doors for moisture ingression, repetitive 

functional checks of the hydraulic 

pump shutoff valves to ensure they 

close in response to the fire handle 

input, and corrective actions if 

necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 15, 

2022. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of April 15, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: For Boeing service 

information identified in this AD, 

contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

Attention: Contractual & Data Services 

(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 

110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; 

telephone 562–797–1717; internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. For 

Pratt & Whitney service information 

identified in this AD contact Pratt & 

Whitney Division, 400 Main Street, East 

Hartford, CT 06118; phone: 860–565– 

0140; email: help24@prattwhitney.com; 

website: https://

connect.prattwhitney.com. You may 

view this service information at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2021– 

0962. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0962; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for 

Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James Laubaugh, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO 

Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206– 

231–3622; email: james.laubaugh@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain The Boeing Company 

Model 777–200 and –300 series 

airplanes. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on December 28, 2021 

(86 FR 73712). The NPRM was 

prompted by reports of three incidents 

involving in-flight fan blade failures on 

certain Pratt & Whitney engines. In the 

NPRM, the FAA proposed to require 

installation of debris shields on the T/ 

R inner wall at the left and right sides 

of the lower bifurcation, inspection of 

the fan cowl doors for moisture 

ingression, repetitive functional checks 

of the hydraulic pump shutoff valves to 

ensure they close in response to the fire 

handle input, and corrective actions if 

necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the airplane-level 

implications of the unsafe condition of 

engine fan blade failure. Fan blade 


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failures can cause fan rotor imbalance 

and result in fan blade fragments 

penetrating the inner and outer barrel of 

the inlet. This condition, if not 

addressed, could result in engine inflight shutdown, and could result in 

separation of the inlet, the fan cowl 

doors, or the T/R cowl, or result in 

uncontrolled engine fire. Separation of 

the inlet, the fan cowl doors, or the T/ 

R cowl could result in impact damage 

to the empennage and loss of control of 

the airplane, or to the fuselage or 

windows with potential injury to 

passengers; or it could result in 

significantly increased aerodynamic 

drag causing fuel exhaustion or the 

inability to maintain altitude above 

terrain during extended operations 

(ETOPS) flights, either of which could 

result in a forced off-airport landing and 

injury to passengers. Uncontrolled 

engine fire could result in loss of control 

of the airplane. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive 

Comments 

The FAA received comments from 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA) who supported the 

NPRM without change. 

The FAA received additional 

comments from five commenters, 

including All Nippon Airways (ANA), 

Boeing, Japan Airlines (JAL), United 

Airlines (UAL), and an individual. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Clarify Certain Sentences in 

the ‘‘Background’’ Paragraph 

Boeing requested that the 

‘‘Background’’ paragraph in the NPRM 

be revised to clarify that the failed 

hydraulic pump shutoff valve was not 

the direct cause of the uncontained 

engine fire. Boeing stated that flight data 

indicates that while the hydraulic pump 

shutoff valve failed to close, no 

hydraulic fluid was leaked from the 

system until well after the engine fire 

initiated. 

Boeing proposed that two sentences 

in the ‘‘Background’’ paragraph of the 

NPRM be revised to, ‘‘Several 

flammable fluid lines, the engine 

accessory gearbox, and T/R structure 

were fractured and an uncontained 

engine fire occurred. The hydraulic 

pump shutoff valve failed to close when 

the fire handle was pulled, contributing 

additional flammable fluid to the T/R 

area.’’ Boeing commented that the 

proposed wording recognizes that the 

failure may have contributed additional 

flammable fluid to the T/R area, but that 

it did not directly cause the 

uncontained fire. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter’s 

clarification and did not intend to imply 

that the failed hydraulic pump shutoff 

valve was the direct cause of the 

uncontained engine fire. However, the 

detailed background information, which 

includes the sentences that the 

commenter proposed for the 

‘‘Background’’ paragraph, are not 

carried over into the final rule. The FAA 

has not changed this final rule in this 

regard. 

Request To Use Certain Service 

Information as a Method of Compliance 

ANA requested clarification on 

whether Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

777–71A0092, dated January 13, 2022, 

and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777– 

78A0103 will be allowed as an 

alternative method of compliance for 

the requirements in the proposed AD. 

In addition, for the actions in 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, 

Boeing and UAL requested the use of 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777– 

78A0103 for installing debris shields on 

the T/R inner wall at the left and right 

sides of the lower bifurcation. Boeing 

and UAL also proposed the use of 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777– 

71A0092, dated January 13, 2022, for 

inspecting the fan cowl doors for 

moisture ingression. Boeing stated that 

the description of the modification in 

the proposed AD is vague. 

The FAA agrees to allow the use of 

Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 

777–71A0092 RB, dated January 13, 

2022, for the inspection of the fan cowl 

doors for moisture ingression. The FAA 

has revised the ‘‘Related Service 

Information under 1 CFR part 51’’ 

paragraph and paragraph (g)(2) of this 

AD accordingly. The FAA disagrees 

with allowing the use of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 777–78A0103 for the 

actions specified in paragraph (g)(1) of 

this AD because the service bulletin is 

not yet an FAA-approved service 

bulletin. 

Request To Add Certain Exceptions for 

Ferry Flights 

JAL requested that the FAA revise the 

AD to include certain exceptions for 

ferry flights. JAL stated it is planning to 

ferry affected airplanes to a storage 

point in the United States. JAL 

commented that although the local 

authority in Japan provides regulatory 

requirements for special flight 

permissions which are similar to 14 CFR 

21.197, Special flight permits, the 

Japanese regulatory requirements do not 

include ‘‘to a point of storage’’ language 

for the purpose of the flights. JAL 

proposes to add the following wording 

to paragraphs (c) and (g) of the proposed 

AD, ‘‘except for ferry flights, without 

passenger and cargo, of the airplanes on 

which the actions specified in 

paragraphs (h)(1) and (2) of this AD 

have been done.’’ 

The FAA disagrees with revising 

paragraph (c) Applicability or paragraph 

(g) Required Actions of this AD in 

response to JAL’s comment. Paragraph 

(i), Special Flight Permit, provides that 

special flight permits, as described in 14 

CFR 21.197 and 21.199, are permitted 

provided that the actions in paragraphs 

(h)(1) and (2) of this AD have first been 

accomplished. 14 CFR 21.197(a)(1) 

provides, in relevant part, that a special 

flight permit may be issued for flying 

the aircraft to a base where repairs, 

alterations, or maintenance are to be 

performed, or to a point of storage. The 

requested change is already permitted 

by this AD. The FAA did not change 

this AD as a result of this comment. 

Request To Change the Initial 

Compliance Time to Before Revenue 

Flight 

ANA requested that in paragraph (g) 

of the proposed AD, the FAA update the 

initial compliance time of ‘‘before 

further flight after the effective of this 

AD’’ to ‘‘before the next revenue flight’’ 

to clarify the ferry flight requirement. 

Similarly, JAL requested that in 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, the 

FAA update the initial compliance time 

of ‘‘before further flight after the 

effective of this AD’’ to ‘‘before the next 

revenue flight’’ or ‘‘before further flight 

except the ferry flight without passenger 

and cargos.’’ 

The FAA disagrees with revising the 

initial compliance in paragraph (g) of 

this AD as requested by ANA and JAL. 

The FAA has determined it is necessary 

to require certain actions prior to any 

flight, except as permitted in paragraph 

(h), Special Flight Permit, of this AD. 

Request To Add a Note for Airplanes 

Under Storage or Heavy Check 

JAL requested that the FAA add a 

note to paragraph (g)(3) of the proposed 

AD to clarify that the repetitive 

functional checks are not applicable to 

airplanes under storage or heavy check. 

The FAA partially agrees with the 

commenter. The FAA did not intend for 

the repetitive functional checks of the 

left and right hydraulic pump shutoff 

valves to be performed every 10 days 

when the airplane is not flown. The 

FAA has revised the compliance time in 

paragraph (g)(3) of this AD to specify 

that the repetitive functional check is 

only required within 10 days prior to 

each flight. The FAA disagrees that a 


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note is necessary to specify that the 

functional check is not applicable to 

airplanes under storage or heavy check 

because of the previously discussed 

revisions to paragraph (g)(3) of this AD. 

Request To Clarify the Use of Revised 

Non-Destructive Inspection Procedure 

(NDIP) Documents 

JAL requested clarification for the use 

of revised NDIP documents for the flow 

path ultrasonic (UT) inspection of the 

1st-stage LPC blades specified in 

paragraph (h)(1) of the proposed AD. 

JAL commented that Pratt & Whitney 

Alert Service Bulletin PW4G–112–A72– 

361, dated October 15, 2021, references 

the UT inspection procedures in NDIP– 

1238, NDIP–1240, and NDIP–1241, 

which are currently at the original 

version. JAL asked if the submission of 

an alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) request is necessary if the 

NDIPs are later revised to meet the 

requirements in paragraph (h)(1) of the 

proposed AD. 

The FAA acknowledges that Pratt & 

Whitney Alert Service Bulletin PW4G– 

112–A72–361, dated October 15, 2021, 

requires the latest FAA-approved 

revision of NDIP–1238, NDIP–1240, and 

NDIP–1241 at the time the inspection is 

accomplished. Furthermore, the FAA 

has provided credit for accomplishment 

of the flow path UT inspection 

identified in paragraph (h)(1) of this AD 

using the service information specified 

in paragraph (i) of this AD. 

Request To Provide a Threshold for the 

Special Flight Permit 

JAL and UAL requested that the FAA 

provide a threshold in paragraph (h)(1) 

of the proposed AD for the last flow 

path UT inspection. JAL suggested a 

threshold of 275 flight cycles since the 

last flow path UT inspection for 1ststage LPC blades that have zero cycles 

since new and also for 1st-stage LPC 

that have accumulated any number of 

cycles since new greater than zero. 

UAL stated that omitting a 

compliance time in paragraph (h) of the 

proposed AD for the special flight 

permits creates ambiguity regarding 

when and how often the flow path UT 

inspection is required for special flight 

permits. UAL suggested a threshold of 

275 flight cycles since the last flow path 

UT inspection. 

The FAA agrees to add a threshold of 

275 cycles to paragraph (h)(1) of this 

AD, which is specified in Pratt & 

Whitney Alert Service Bulletin PW4G– 

112–A72–361, dated October 15, 2021. 

This allows airplanes with 1st-stage LPC 

blades that have accumulated 275 cycles 

since new or fewer to be eligible for a 

special flight permit. 

Request To Add Aircraft Maintenance 

Manual Task to Special Flight Permit 

ANA, JAL, and UAL requested that 

paragraph (h)(2) of the proposed AD 

include Task 29–11–00–710–806 of the 

Boeing 777–200/300 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual as an acceptable 

method for accomplishing the 

functional check of the left and right 

hydraulic pump shutoff valves. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter’s 

request and has added Task 29–11–00– 

710–806 of Boeing 777–200/300 Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual to the ‘‘Other 

Related Service Information’’ paragraph 

and to Note (1) to paragraph (g)(3) of 

this AD as guidance for accomplishing 

the actions required by paragraphs (g)(3) 

and (h)(2) of this AD. 

Request To Clarify Requirements in the 

NPRM 

ANA requested that the FAA provide 

clarification of why affected operators 

will have to conduct required periodic 

testing [repetitive functional checks of 

the left and right hydraulic pump 

shutoff valves] even though Boeing 

recommends similar testing to be 

performed as a one-time check before 

return-to-service per Boeing MOM– 

MOM–21–0398–01B. ANA also 

requested clarification whether the 

repetitive 10 day interval continues 

until a terminating action has been 

found. 

The FAA infers that ANA considers 

the low average failure rate per flight 

hour of the hydraulic pump shutoff 

valve in service to justify the 

performance of the one-time check of 

the hydraulic pump shutoff valve 

described in the Boeing MOM–MOM– 

21–0398–01B, combined with the 

existing maintenance program 

recommendation to check the function 

of the hydraulic pump shutoff valve at 

18,000 flight hour intervals, as 

providing an acceptable level of safety. 

The FAA does not agree. Investigation 

of the February 2021 incident, as 

specified in the proposed AD, revealed 

that the hydraulic pump shutoff valve, 

which is remotely controlled by 

electrical switches, does not have an 

indication to the flightcrew to indicate 

when the hydraulic pump shutoff valve 

has failed to move to the commanded 

position. The hydraulic pump shutoff 

valve failed to close when commanded 

via the engine fire handle in that 

incident. Failure of this hydraulic pump 

shutoff valve to close in response to 

commands in the event of an engine fire 

could lead to flammable fluid 

continuing to be supplied to an engine 

fire for a prolonged period, potentially 

resulting in an uncontained fire that 

jeopardizes flight safety. The FAA has 

determined that this issue is an unsafe 

condition requiring corrective action. 

For transport airplanes, the 

determination that an unsafe condition 

exists is based on several criteria, and 

the failure to meet one or more of the 

criteria could lead the FAA to determine 

that corrective action is warranted. 

For each identified potential safety 

issue on a transport airplane, the FAA 

examines the risk on the worst 

reasonably anticipated flights (flights 

actually predicted to occur) to ensure 

that each flight provides an acceptable 

level of safety (identified as ‘‘individual 

flight risk’’ in FAA risk analysis policy). 

That acceptable level of safety consists 

of three basic expectations: 

• That each flight begins in a fail-safe 

state (including consideration of latent 

failure conditions and allowed dispatch 

states under the minimum equipment 

list (MEL)), meaning that a foreseeable 

single failure on any anticipated flight 

should not have a significant likelihood 

of causing a catastrophic event. 

• That each flight does not have a 

numerical risk of a catastrophic event 

due to the issue being examined that is 

excessively (an order of magnitude or 

more) greater than the risk of a 

catastrophic event on an average 

transport airplane. 

• That safety features that were 

prescriptively required due to lessons 

learned from past incidents and 

accidents are not excessively reduced in 

their effectiveness or availability. 

Failure to meet any of these three 

criteria can lead to a determination that 

an unsafe condition exists and AD 

action is necessary, because the level of 

safety on the affected flights does not 

meet the FAA’s thresholds for an 

acceptable level of safety on individual 

flights. 

For each identified potential safety 

issue, the FAA also assesses the total 

cumulative risk of an event occurring at 

any time in the remaining life of the 

fleet of affected airplanes (identified as 

‘‘total fleet risk’’ in FAA risk analysis 

policy). The FAA may determine that 

corrective action is needed to limit total 

fleet risk even when the assessed 

individual flight risk does not violate 

any of the three individual flight risk 

criteria discussed above. Total fleet risk 

is typically assessed by multiplying the 

average probabilities of each of the 

failures or other factors that contribute 

to the occurrence of an event, the total 

number of airplanes affected, the 

average utilization of those airplanes, 

and the average remaining life for those 

airplanes. The FAA also considers the 

number of occupants of an aircraft in 

assessing fleet risk, and applies total 


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fleet risk guideline thresholds expressed 

in terms of both aircraft accidents and 

number of fatalities. 

Either excessive individual flight risk 

or excessive total fleet risk, or both, can 

lead the FAA to determine that an 

unsafe condition exists that requires 

corrective action. The FAA does not use 

or accept calculations of acceptable total 

fleet risk, or acceptable average perflight-hour risk, as a justification for 

taking no action on issues where an 

excessive individual flight risk is 

determined to exist on flights that are 

anticipated to occur. 

In this case, the FAA determined that 

corrective action is necessary under the 

individual flight risk guideline above to 

minimize the occurrence of flights that 

are not fail safe for an engine fire due 

to latent failure of the hydraulic pump 

shutoff valve. The repetitive functional 

check will minimize the number of 

flights that occur with a latent failure of 

the hydraulic pump shutoff valve. The 

FAA determined that the 10-day 

interval for the inspections required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD is practical and 

provides an acceptable level of safety. 

Additionally, regarding the 

commenter’s request as to whether the 

repetitive 10-day interval continues 

until a terminating action has been 

found, the FAA has determined that the 

repetitive functional check of the left 

and right hydraulic pump shutoff valves 

is required until an alternative 

corrective action is approved. 

Request for Credit for Previous Actions 

UAL requested that Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 777–71A0092, dated 

January 13, 2022, and Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 777–78A0103 be added 

to paragraph (i) of the proposed AD as 

credit for actions that were previously 

accomplished in paragraph (g)(1) and (2) 

of the proposed AD. UAL also requested 

that credit be given in paragraphs (i)(2) 

and (3) of the proposed AD for doing a 

mid span UT inspection, in addition to 

providing credit for doing a flow path 

UT inspection. 

The FAA partially agrees with the 

commenter’s requests. The FAA has not 

yet approved a method of compliance 

for paragraph (g)(1) of this AD using a 

specific service bulletin, and therefore, 

credit cannot be provided. As 

previously mentioned the FAA has 

revised paragraph (g)(2) of this AD 

allowing for accomplishment of the 

inspection using Boeing Alert 

Requirements Bulletin 777–71A0092 

RB, dated January 13, 2022 (original 

revision), and therefore, credit is not 

necessary. Although Pratt & Whitney 

Special Instruction No. 130F–21, dated 

July 1, 2021, and Pratt & Whitney 

Special Instruction No. 130F–21, 

Revision A, dated July 28, 2021, include 

instructions for a mid span UT 

inspection, the special flight permit 

paragraph in this AD does not include 

a requirement for the mid span UT 

inspection, and therefore, credit is not 

necessary. However, the FAA has 

retained the credit specified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD for doing the 

flow path UT inspection. 

Request To Delegate AMOCs 

UAL requested that if Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 777–71A0092, dated 

January 13, 2022, and Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 777–78A0103 become a 

FAA-approved method of compliance, 

the FAA should delegate The Boeing 

Company Organization Designation 

Authorization (ODA) authority to 

approve structural related AMOCs when 

deviations to the service documents are 

required. 

The FAA partially agrees with the 

commenter. For Boeing service bulletins 

that are not yet FAA-approved, the ODA 

authority is not granted at this time. 

However, for Boeing service bulletins 

that are FAA-approved, the FAA has 

added a provision in paragraph (j)(3) of 

this AD for delegation to The Boeing 

Company ODA for approval of certain 

AMOCs. This provision allows Boeing 

to propose to the FAA the types of 

AMOCs that may be approved by The 

Boeing Company ODA. 

Request for an Additional Person To 

Conduct the Inspection 

An individual commenter stated that 

there are only 54 airplanes flying in the 

United States that need inspections and 

believes that someone who is involved 

in the professional side of the NPRM 

should be required to be present while 

the airplane is being inspected to ensure 

it is being done correctly. The 

commenter believes this will allow the 

airplane to be inspected the same across 

the board rather than each operator 

inspecting it differently. The commenter 

also believes that the NPRM has been 

needed since the first account of the fan 

blade failure. 

The FAA infers that the commenter is 

suggesting additional FAA oversight is 

necessary for the fan cowl door moisture 

ingression inspections required by this 

AD. The FAA has reviewed the service 

information for the fan cowl door 

moisture ingression inspections and has 

determined that the FAA’s existing 

oversight activity for operators 

performing such inspections provide an 

acceptable level of safety. The FAA has 

not changed this final rule in this 

regard. 

Additional Change Made to This AD 

In the process of preparing this final 

rule, the FAA noticed that the unsafe 

condition statement could be improved 

regarding the initial effects of the fan 

blade failure and the airplane level 

unsafe outcomes that could result from 

each of those initial effects. Therefore, 

the FAA has updated the unsafe 

condition statement in this AD to clarify 

the specific causes and hazardous 

effects. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, 

considered any comments received, and 

determined that air safety requires 

adopting this AD as proposed. Except 

for minor editorial changes, and any 

other changes described previously, this 

AD is adopted as proposed in the 

NPRM. None of the changes will 

increase the economic burden on any 

operator. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

The FAA has reviewed Boeing Alert 

Requirements Bulletin 777–71A0092 

RB, dated January 13, 2022. This service 

information specifies procedures for 

inspecting the fan cowl doors for 

moisture ingression. The FAA also 

reviewed Pratt & Whitney Alert Service 

Bulletin PW4G–112–A72–361, dated 

October 15, 2021. This service 

information specifies procedures for 

performing thermal acoustic image and 

ultrasonic testing inspections of 1ststage LPC blades. This service 

information is reasonably available 

because the interested parties have 

access to it through their normal course 

of business or by the means identified 

in ADDRESSES. 

Other Related Service Information 

The FAA also reviewed Subtasks 26– 

21–00–200–018, 26–21–00–200–019, 

and 26–21–00–840–022, and Task 29– 

11–00–710–806, of Boeing 777–200/300 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual, dated 

September 5, 2021. The service 

information specifies procedures for 

performing a functional check of the 

engine-driven pump shutoff valve. 

Interim Action 

The FAA considers this AD to be an 

interim action. The manufacturer is 

currently developing other actions that 

will address the unsafe condition 

identified in this AD. Once these actions 

are developed, approved, and available, 

the FAA might consider additional 

rulemaking. 


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13934 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 54 airplanes of U.S. registry. The 

FAA estimates the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Installation of T/R debris shields ........ 115 work-hour × $85 per hour = 

$9,775.

$4,300 $14,075 ...................... $760,050. 

Inspection of fan cowl doors .............. 64 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$5,440.

0 $5,440 ........................ $293,760. 

Functional checks of the hydraulic 

pump shutoff valves.

1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 

per inspection cycle.

0 $85 per inspection 

cycle.

$4,590 per inspection 

cycle. 

The FAA has received no definitive 

data on which to base the cost estimates 

for the on-condition corrective actions 

(i.e. repair) specified in this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2022–06–10 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–21976; Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0962; Project Identifier AD– 

2021–00997–T. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective April 15, 2022. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

airplanes, certificated in any category, as 

specified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this 

AD. 

(1) Model 777–200 series airplanes 

equipped with Pratt & Whitney PW4074, 

PW4074D, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084D, 

PW4090, and PW4090–3 model turbofan 

engines. 

(2) Model 777–300 series airplanes 

equipped with Pratt & Whitney PW4090 and 

PW4098 model turbofan engines. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 71, Powerplant. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of three 

incidents involving in-flight fan blade 

failures on certain Pratt & Whitney engines. 

The FAA is issuing this AD to address engine 

fan blade failure, which could result in 

engine in-flight shutdown, and could result 

in separation of the inlet, the fan cowl doors, 

or the thrust reverser (T/R) cowl, or result in 

uncontrolled engine fire. Separation of the 

inlet, the fan cowl doors, or the T/R cowl 

could result in impact damage to the 

empennage and loss of control of the 

airplane, or to the fuselage or windows with 

potential injury to passengers; or it could 

result in significantly increased aerodynamic 

drag causing fuel exhaustion or the inability 

to maintain altitude above terrain during 

extended operations (ETOPS) flights, either 

of which could result in a forced off-airport 

landing and injury to passengers. 

Uncontrolled engine fire could result in loss 

of control of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Installation and Inspections 

Before further flight after the effective date 

of this AD, do the actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(1) through (3) of this AD. 

Repeat the functional check specified in 

paragraph (g)(3) of this AD within 10 days 

prior to each flight. 

(1) Install debris shields on the T/R inner 

wall at the left and right sides of the lower 

bifurcation, in accordance with a method 

approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO 

Branch, FAA. 

(2) Inspect the fan cowl doors for moisture 

ingression in accordance with paragraphs 

(g)(2)(i) or (ii) of this AD, as applicable. 

(i) Do the inspection in accordance with a 

method approved by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO Branch, FAA. If any moisture ingression 

is found, repair before further flight, in 

accordance with a method approved by the 

Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA. 

(ii) Do all applicable actions identified in, 

and in accordance with, the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements 

Bulletin 777–71A0092 RB, dated January 13, 

2022, except where Boeing Alert 

Requirements Bulletin 777–71A0092 RB, 

dated January 13, 2022, specifies to report 

inspection findings, this AD does not require 

any report, and where Boeing Alert 

Requirements Bulletin 777–71A0092 RB, 

dated January 13, 2022, specifies to contact 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 13935 

Boeing for a repair, this AD requires the 

repair to be accomplished in accordance with 

a method approved by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO Branch, FAA. 

(3) Do a functional check of the left and 

right hydraulic pump shutoff valves to 

ensure they close in response to the 

corresponding engine fire handle input. If 

any hydraulic pump shutoff valve does not 

close, before further flight perform corrective 

actions until it closes in response to the 

corresponding engine fire handle input. 

Note (1) to paragraph (g)(3): Guidance for 

accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(2) of this AD can be 

found in the ‘‘Engine-Driven Pump (EDP) 

Shutoff Valve Check’’ (Subtasks 26–21–00– 

200–018, 26–21–00–200–019, and 26–21–00– 

840–022; or Task 29–11–00–710–806) of 

Boeing 777–200/300 Aircraft Maintenance 

Manual. 

(h) Special Flight Permit 

Special flight permits, as described in 14 

CFR 21.197 and 21.199, are permitted 

provided that the actions in paragraphs (h)(1) 

and (2) of this AD have first been 

accomplished. 

(1) A flow path ultrasonic testing (UT) 

inspection of the 1st-stage low-pressure 

compressor (LPC) blades for cracking has 

been done within the last 275 cycles, as 

specified in the Accomplishment 

Instructions, Part A—Initial Inspection of All 

LPC Fan Blades Prior to their Return to 

Service, paragraph 1.A., of Pratt & Whitney 

Alert Service Bulletin PW4G–112–A72–361, 

dated October 15, 2021, and the 1st-stage LPC 

blades have been found serviceable. This 

inspection is not required for 1st-stage LPC 

blades with 275 cycles since new or fewer. 

(2) A functional check of the left and right 

hydraulic pump shutoff valves to ensure they 

close in response to the corresponding engine 

fire handle input and all applicable 

corrective actions (i.e., repair) within 10 days 

prior to flight. 

(i) Credit for Previous Actions 

This paragraph provides credit for the 

actions specified in paragraph (h)(1) of this 

AD, if those actions were performed before 

the effective date of this AD using the service 

information specified in paragraph (i)(1), (2), 

or (3) of this AD. 

(1) Paragraph 2. of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 85F–21, dated May 12, 2021, 

for a flow path UT inspection. 

(2) Paragraph 1.a) of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 130F–21, dated July 1, 2021, 

for a flow path UT inspection. 

(3) Paragraph 2.a) of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Pratt & Whitney Special 

Instruction No. 130F–21, Revision A, dated 

July 28, 2021, for a flow path UT inspection. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or responsible Flight 

Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of 

this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9- 

ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the responsible Flight Standards Office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair, 

modification, or alteration required by this 

AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company 

Organization Designation Authorization 

(ODA) that has been authorized by the 

Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, to make 

those findings. To be approved, the repair 

method, modification deviation, or alteration 

deviation must meet the certification basis of 

the airplane, and the approval must 

specifically refer to this AD. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact James Laubaugh, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Section, FAA, Seattle ACO 

Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, 

WA 98198; phone and fax: 206–231–3622; 

email: james.laubaugh@faa.gov. 

(2) Service information identified in this 

AD that is not incorporated by reference is 

available at the addresses specified in 

paragraphs (l)(3) and (4) of this AD. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 

777–71A0092 RB, dated January 13, 2022. 

(ii) Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin 

PW4G–112–A72–361, dated October 15, 

2021. 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: 

Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 

Westminster Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal 

Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 562–797– 

1717; internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. For Pratt & Whitney 

service information identified in this AD 

contact Pratt & Whitney Division, 400 Main 

Street, East Hartford, CT 06118; phone: 860– 

565–0140; email: help24@prattwhitney.com; 

website: https://connect.prattwhitney.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th 

St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

fr.inspection@nara.gov, or go to: https://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued on March 4, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05309 Filed 3–9–22; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Internal Revenue Service 

26 CFR Part 1 

[TD 9960] 

RIN 1545–BP79 

Guidance Under Section 958 on 

Determining Stock Ownership; 

Correction 

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

Treasury. 

ACTION: Correction to a correction of a 

Treasury Decision. 

SUMMARY: This document corrects a 

correction to a final regulations 

(Treasury Decision 9960) published in 

the Federal Register on Tuesday, 

February 22, 2022. The final regulations 

concern the treatment of domestic 

partnerships for purposes of 

determining amounts included in the 

gross income of their partners with 

respect to foreign corporations. 

DATES: These corrections are effective 

on March 11, 2022, and applicable on or 

after February 22, 2022. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Edward J. Tracy at (202) 317–6934 (not 

a toll-free number). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The final regulations (TD 9960) 

subject to this correction are issued 

under section 958 of the Internal 

Revenue Code. 

Need for Correction 

As published on February 22, 2022 

(87 FR 9445), the final regulations (TD 

9960) contain errors that need to be 

corrected. 

Correction of Publication 

Accordingly, the publication of the 

correction to a final regulation (TD 

9960), which was the subject of FR Doc. 

2022–03611, published on February 22, 

2022 (87 FR 9445), is corrected to read 

as follows: 

1. On page 9445, first column, under 

the caption RIN, the language ‘‘1545– 

BO59’’ is corrected to read ‘‘1545– 

BP79’’. 

2. On page 9445, first column, the 

subject heading, the language 


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