2022 UT App 104

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

SHON BRIAN BLAKE,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20200675-CA

Filed August 18, 2022

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Kraig Powell

No. 191400656

Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Kris C. Leonard, and William M. 

Hains, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY

concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Shon Brian Blake appeals the district court’s Order of 

Restitution. Blake argues that the court abused its discretion in 

ordering restitution for medical bills because there was 

insufficient evidence to support a determination that his criminal 

conduct proximately caused the medical services generically 

identified in those bills. We agree and reverse. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 On February 12, 2019, Blake was involved in a 

confrontation with his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend. 
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 2 2022 UT App 104

During the confrontation, Blake shot at the ex-girlfriend’s car and 

then at the boyfriend. The shots hit the boyfriend twice in the arm, 

and he was taken to the hospital, where he had surgery to remove 

one of the bullets and repair the damage to his arm.

¶3 Blake was charged with attempted murder, felony criminal 

mischief (domestic violence), five counts of felony discharge of a 

firearm, and misdemeanor criminal mischief. As a result of plea 

negotiations, the charges were reduced to aggravated assault, 

felony criminal mischief (domestic violence), and one count of 

felony discharge of a firearm. Blake pleaded guilty to the reduced 

charges, acknowledging that he had shot the boyfriend in the arm. 

The district court sentenced Blake to concurrent prison terms, 

ordered $500 in restitution for damage to the car, and held 

restitution open for one year to allow additional claims to be 

submitted.

¶4 Within that year, the State filed a motion to amend the 

restitution amount to include restitution to cover $36,701.56 that 

the Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC) had allegedly paid 

for the boyfriend’s medical bills. The State supported the motion 

with an attached list of payments, setting forth seven separate 

payments allegedly made to cover twenty-two medical claims 

with service dates from February 12 to 14, 2019. The list did not 

identify what services were provided or by whom; instead, the 

amounts were simply labeled “Medical” or “Medical Facility.”

¶5 Blake objected to the motion, contesting the restitution 

amount and requesting a hearing on the matter. At the hearing,

Blake argued that because the payment amounts were described 

only as “Medical” or “Medical Facility,” he was “unable to 

determine what the specific claim was, where it came from, or 

how it was related to the case.” Therefore, Blake argued, the 

payment list was insufficient to support the requested order of 

restitution.
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 3 2022 UT App 104

¶6 The State was joined by two representatives from UOVC to 

explain the standard processes the office usually employed before 

authorizing any payment.

1 Neither representative had personal 

knowledge regarding the payments in question, but they 

explained that before UOVC would authorize a payment, a claims 

analyst would review the invoices and check the dates as well as 

the procedural and diagnostic codes to verify that the treatment 

received was “crime-related.” One of the representatives also 

stated that the payment list did not include the names of the 

treating physicians or facilities or the related codes that would 

describe the relevant medical procedures because the document 

had been redacted due to its status as a protected record under 

the Government Records Access and Management Act, see Utah 

Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-101 to -901 (LexisNexis 2019 & Supp. 2021).

The representative conceded, however, that there were ways to 

allow disclosure of this information in the event it was needed. 

Nonetheless, the State continued to assert that the payment list 

was “proof enough” that the payment amounts were related to 

services proximately caused by Blake’s criminal conduct.

1. The State argues that Blake does not account for the information 

provided by the UOVC representatives because the State 

“proffered” the information by having the representatives 

address the court without placing them under oath. Because Blake 

did not object to the district court’s reliance on the proffered 

testimony, any objection to that reliance would not be preserved 

for appeal. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60, ¶ 7, 975 P.2d 505 

(“As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue 

raised for the first time on appeal.”). But Blake’s argument on 

appeal does not specifically challenge the court’s reliance on the 

proffered testimony. Instead, we understand Blake’s argument to 

be that even considering the proffered testimony, there was 

insufficient evidence to support the district court’s restitution 

order.
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 4 2022 UT App 104

¶7 The district court agreed with the State, relying on the facts 

that the crime victim was identified on the statement as the 

recipient of the medical care, that “the dates of service correspond 

to roughly the time of the alleged injuries in the crime,” and that 

“statutory procedures for making payment to claimants [have]

been followed in this case.” On this basis, the court determined 

that “the medical bills arise from the crime in this case.” The court 

then set complete restitution at $36,701.56 and imposed courtordered restitution of $18,350.78.2 Blake now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Blake contends that the district court abused its discretion 

by ordering restitution where the State did not present sufficient 

evidence to link his admitted criminal conduct to the requested 

restitution amounts. “We will not disturb a district court’s 

restitution determination unless the court exceeds the authority 

prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.” State v. Ogden, 2018 

UT 8, ¶ 25, 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶9 Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, the district court 

is required to determine restitution for any pecuniary damages 

proximately caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct. See Utah 

2. For a discussion of the differences between complete restitution 

and court-ordered restitution, see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, 

¶¶ 27–28, 416 P.3d 1132. This distinction, however, no longer 

exists in current law. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(ii) 

(LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (“In determining the amount of 

pecuniary damages . . . , the court shall consider all relevant facts 

to establish an amount that fully compensates a victim for all 

pecuniary damages proximately caused by the criminal conduct 

of the defendant.”).
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 5 2022 UT App 104

Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (“When a defendant

enters into a plea disposition or is convicted of criminal activity 

that has resulted in pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall order 

that the defendant make restitution . . . .”) (current version at id.

§ 77-38b-205 (Supp. 2021)); State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 38, 416 

P.3d 1132 (determining the appropriate causal standard to be

proximate cause—“the same causation standard . . . that would 

apply in a parallel civil action”).

3 The proximate cause standard 

“requires a showing that the crime, in a natural and continuous 

sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury and 

that the injury would not have occurred absent the crime.” State 

v. Watson, 2021 UT App 37, ¶ 17, 485 P.3d 946 (cleaned up). And 

“even in cases where UOVC compensates a victim, the State still 

bears the burden of proving that the victim has suffered economic 

injury and that the injury arose out of the defendant’s criminal 

activities.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶10 We agree with Blake that our decision in State v. Watson, 

2021 UT App 37, 485 P.3d 946, is controlling here. In Watson, the 

defendant, in a fit of road rage, tried to run the victim off the road, 

hit the victim’s car from behind, and then, after exiting his vehicle, 

chased and assaulted the victim. Id. ¶¶ 2–5. The district court 

ultimately ordered restitution that covered amounts UOVC had 

paid for the victim’s mental health therapy sessions. Id. ¶ 7. 

Although the State had supported its restitution request with a list 

of twenty-five therapy sessions that had commenced about six 

weeks after the road rage incident, the list stated only that the 

charges were for “Mental Health Therapy” and did not list any 

provider information or any further description of the topics 

addressed during any of the sessions. Id. ¶ 8. The State did, 

however, present testimony from a UOVC restitution specialist, 

who explained that under “UOVC’s standard procedure” an 

3. The proximate cause standard has been specifically 

incorporated by the recent modifications to the Crime Victims 

Restitution Act. See id. § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(i)(B).
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 6 2022 UT App 104

analyst would have reviewed each claim and authorized payment 

only if the claim was “related to the specific crime.” Id. ¶ 9.

¶11 The Watson court determined that while it did not doubt 

that Watson’s violent behavior could have led to the victim 

needing mental health services, the State still had not sufficiently 

proved its case for restitution. Id. ¶ 16. As the court explained, “a 

trial court must determine whether restitution is available from 

the record before it rather than from assumptions about the 

analysis an administrative agency may have employed in 

reaching its conclusions under a distinct statute that has different 

goals and limitations. In other words, the court may not delegate 

the determination of proximate cause to UOVC.” Id. ¶ 18 (cleaned 

up). “Instead, so that the court could make its own determination 

based on the evidence, it was incumbent on the State to include in 

the record the materials the claims analyst relied on or other 

evidence . . . to permit the court’s direct review of the evidence

establishing causation.” Id. ¶ 19. Thus, where the State’s evidence 

“did not allow the court to make its own, independent 

determination on the subject” of causation, the evidence “was an 

insufficient basis for the court’s restitution award.” Id.

¶12 As in Watson, the evidence presented here was insufficient 

for the district court to make an independent determination of 

causation without relying on the causal determinations made by 

UOVC. While there is no real argument that the shooting here did 

not cause a need for some medical care to address the gunshot 

wounds, there was insufficient evidence presented from which 

the court could have independently determined that these generic 

amounts, labeled simply “Medical” and “Medical Facility,”

represented medical services for injuries proximately caused by 

Blake. Certainly, there was information before the court about the 

general procedures UOVC representatives employ to assure that 

the medical charges are “crime-related,” and the court trusted that 

UOVC had followed those procedures in this case. But a 

restitution order based almost exclusively on such trust in 
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 7 2022 UT App 104

UOVC’s methods and its assessment of “crime-relatedness”

inappropriately “delegate[s] the determination of proximate 

cause to UOVC.” See id. ¶ 18 (cleaned up); see also id. ¶ 17

(recognizing that “mere ‘crime-relatedness’ falls short of the 

proximate cause standard”).

¶13 In other words, even if a UOVC representative had

determined that there was a sufficient causal link between the 

crime and the medical bills to satisfy UOVC procedures, the 

district court may not simply rely on that determination when 

making a restitution order.

4 And without reliance on UOVC’s 

conclusory determinations, the only evidence supporting the 

causal connection was that unidentified charges purportedly paid 

for medical treatment for the crime victim occurred very close in 

time to the crime. This is not sufficient to establish proximate 

cause. Therefore, where the evidence presented by the State was 

not sufficient to “allow the court to make its own, independent 

determination” as to causation, the evidence was not a sufficient 

basis for the restitution order.

5 See id. ¶ 19. 

4. In this case, neither representative was personally involved in 

the review of the bills relating to the victim’s medical services and 

neither one testified (or proffered testimony) that the amounts 

provided on the payment list were analyzed using standard 

procedures.

5. The parties agree that neither prior case law nor the Crime 

Victims Restitution Act specifies the burden of proof applicable to

claims for restitution, but both advocate for application of the 

preponderance of the evidence standard. See generally State v. 

Oliver, 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 22 n.4, 427 P.3d 495 (recognizing the 

silence of appellate opinions and the act on the appropriate 

burden of proof, but also recognizing that “in federal courts, and 

in other state jurisdictions of which we are aware, the government 

(continued...)
State v. Blake

20200675-CA 8 2022 UT App 104

¶14 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that a more 

forthcoming statement of medical costs was not necessary 

because the court may make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,”

see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53, 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). But 

while “the amount of damages may be based upon 

approximations,” an award of restitution “must rely on a 

sufficient evidentiary basis.” Id. ¶ 52 (cleaned up). And we cannot 

agree that simply knowing that medical services were needed by 

the victim on dates near the crime date was a sufficient 

evidentiary basis to conclude that each of the generic payment 

amounts was for services proximately caused by the shooting. 

The court’s assumptions required reliance on the causal 

determinations made by UOVC, which, for the reasons discussed

above, is not appropriate. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

restitution order.

CONCLUSION

¶15 The evidence provided by the State was insufficient to 

support the district court’s determination that the amounts 

included on the payment list provided by UOVC for unidentified 

medical services were proximately caused by Blake’s criminal

conduct. We therefore reverse the district court’s restitution order.

bears the burden of proving the restitution amount, including the 

requisite causal link, by the preponderance of the evidence” 

(cleaned up)). Accordingly, we apply that standard here and leave 

resolution of that issue for another day.