In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 02-2869

JOSE GARCIA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF MOUNT PROSPECT, MOUNT PROSPECT

POLICE PENSION BOARD, and GEORGE STEINER, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 C 2557—Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2003—DECIDED February 23, 2004

____________

Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. 

I. History

Jose Garcia, an Hispanic, was a police officer for the

Village of Mount Prospect, Illinois from January 1984 until

April 1998. During his tenure as a police officer, Garcia

contributed to the Village’s pension fund. This fund had

been established, along with the Mount Prospect Police
2 No. 02-2869

1 The Board is comprised of five (5) people: two Village Board of

Trustees presidential appointees; two elected from active Fund

participants; and one elected by and from the Fund beneficiaries.

40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-128 (1998). 

2 On January 19, 2000, the district court entered judgment in

that case after the jury returned a verdict in favor of Martinez in

the amount of $1,179,000. Although Garcia was disclosed as a

witness in the Final Pretrial Order, nothing in the record indicates that Garcia himself or his deposition were actually used by

Martinez at trial. The presiding judge, Ruben Castillo, was so

disturbed by evidence of the Village Police Department’s racial

profiling policies presented during the trial, that, after the verdict

was entered, he sent a letter to the Department of Justice urging

(continued...)

Pension Board,1 by the Village under article 3 of the Illinois

Pension Code, 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 (1998). On April

13, 1998, Garcia suffered a heart attack, leaving him totally

and permanently disabled, unable to perform his duties as

a police officer. Consequently, on or about June 20, 1998,

Garcia applied to the Board for duty-related disability

benefits equal to sixty-five percent of his total salary. At the

time of his application and during its pendency, Sergeant

George Steiner was a member of the Board.

Prior to his heart attack and disability application, Garcia

had been a deposition witness in the case of Martinez v.

Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill.

2000). In Martinez, an Hispanic former police trainee

accused the Village Police Department of national origin

employment discrimination. (R. 20-1 Ex. E.) On September

30, 1997, counsel for Martinez deposed Garcia at length

about various discriminatory practices engaged in by the

Village Police Department’s command ranks, including

Steiner. In January 1998, Garcia’s deposition was used by

Martinez in responding to the Village’s ultimately unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.2
No. 02-2869 3

2 (...continued)

an independent investigation of the Village. (R. 20.) Following the

verdict and with the prospect of an appeal looming, the parties

settled, with the approval of the district court. 92 F. Supp. 2d at

785.

Following Garcia’s June 20, 1998 duty-related disability

pension application, the Board selected three physicians to

examine Garcia to determine if he was disabled. 40 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/3-115 (1998). At an April 19, 1999 hearing,

the Board reviewed the physicians’ initial reports and other

evidence submitted by both parties (i.e., Garcia’s pension

benefit application, the initial physical examination of

Garcia). While clear that Garcia was disabled, whether the

disability occurred in the line of duty remained uncertain.

Thus, the Board awarded Garcia non-duty-related disability

benefits equal to fifty percent of his total salary. The

hearing was continued in order to later consider whether

the duty-related benefits were warranted. 

Hearings were held on May 12, 1999, and December 22,

1999, where additional evidence was submitted, including:

Garcia’s own testimony, supplemental medical reports from

the Board-selected physicians, medical records from three

Garcia-selected physicians, depositions of the Boardselected physicians, and miscellaneous employment records.

At no time during any of the three hearings were any

claims of employment discrimination made to the Board.

After the December 22 hearing concluded, the Board met in

a closed session and voted to deny Garcia’s duty-related

benefits, but to continue the non-duty-related benefits. A

written Decision and Order to that effect was issued by the

Board on February 14, 2000.
4 No. 02-2869

3 A complaint requesting review of a final administrative decision

must be filed within thirty-five days of the service of such a

decision upon the affected party. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103

(1998).

4 Although no transcript of the October 24 hearing is included in

the appellate record, it is safe to assume that because neither

Garcia nor the Board briefed whether discriminatory animus

based upon race or national origin infected the Board’s decision,

Judge Bush did not consider the issue. Furthermore, the circuit

court, sitting in an administrative review capacity, cannot consider any evidence outside the administrative record. 735 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/3-110 (1998). Hence, any employment discrimination arguments requiring evidence outside the record (i.e.,

Garcia’s deposition testimony in the Martinez case) and offered

exclusively to challenge the Board’s decision during an administrative review would necessarily fail. Regardless, whether Garcia

made any such arguments to the circuit court has no impact on

the outcome of this case. See infra Part II.B.

On March 15, 2000, Garcia filed a timely 3 complaint for

administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County,

seeking reversal of his denial of duty-related pension

benefits. In his state-court complaint, Garcia alleged only

that the decision “[was] against the manifest weight of the

evidence and . . . [was] arbitrary and capricious.” (R. 20-2

Ex. G-1.) Both Garcia and the Village filed briefs addressing

that issue. Nowhere in Garcia’s initial July 21, 2000 brief or

September 15, 2000 reply brief was there any mention of

illegal employment discrimination generally or as a factor

in the Board’s decision. Nor did the Village make any

reference to such claims in its response brief of August 22,

2000. On October 24, 2000, the state-court judge heard oral

argument, set forth her reasoning on the record, and

affirmed the Board’s decision by written order.4

During the pendency of Garcia’s ultimately unsuccessful

administrative appeal, on September 15, 2000, he filed Title

VII charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”). (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) He alleged that
No. 02-2869 5

5 Generally, we have held that for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

to apply, the complained-of injury must have been caused by the

state-court judgment itself. See Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705,

714 (7th Cir. 2001), Durgins v. City of E. St. Louis, 272 F.3d 841,

844 (7th Cir. 2001); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.

1996); but see Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 397 (7th

Cir. 2001). Garcia’s injury was not caused by the state-court

judgment and hence, it might be said that the doctrine does not

apply. But given the complexities of the doctrine, we refrain from

determining definitively whether Rooker-Feldman does or does

not apply. Rather, we affirm the district court’s dismissal solely

on res judicata grounds.

when the Board denied him duty-related disability pension

benefits, the Village and the Board engaged in unlawful

retaliation for his Martinez-related testimony and unlawful

employment discrimination based upon race and national

origin. (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) The EEOC dismissed Garcia’s charge

and issued a right-to-sue letter on January 11, 2001. Thus,

on April 11, 2001, Garcia filed a complaint in the Northern

District of Illinois against the Village, the Board, and

George Steiner in his individual and official capacities. In

the complaint, Garcia alleged violations of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2001),

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and sought declaratory and

injunctive relief and damages. Motions for summary

judgment based upon res judicata were filed by the Village

and the Board under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b).

But on May 21, 2002, District Court Judge Elaine Bucklo

sua sponte raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction

and dismissed the action under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983). She also dismissed the summary-judgment motions

as moot. This appeal followed. For the following reasons we

affirm the district court’s dismissal, but on res judicata,

rather than Rooker-Feldman, grounds.5
6 No. 02-2869

6 In this opinion, we equate “res judicata” with “claim preclusion,”

which refers to “ ‘the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing

litigation of matters that were or could have been raised in an

earlier suit.’ ” Welch v. Johnson, 907 F.2d 714, 718 n.2 (7th Cir.

1990) (quoting LaSalle Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. County of

DuPage, 856 F.2d 925, 930 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988)). This understanding of res judicata is distinguishable from “collateral estoppel” or

“issue preclusion,” which refers to the preclusive “effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation in a subsequent action of an issue

of law or fact that has actually been litigated and decided in the

initial action.” Id. We consider only the application of res judicata,

and not collateral estoppel, in the instant case.

II. Analysis

In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461,

481 (1982), the Supreme Court held that full faith and

credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, applies to state-court judgments

entered in proceedings to review a state administrative

agency. But cf. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796

(1986) (holding that full faith and credit is inapplicable

to endow unreviewed administrative proceedings preclusive

effect in Title VII cases). A judgment of a state court sitting

in an administrative review capacity will have preclusive

effect on claims and issues brought in subsequent lawsuits

according to the law of the state where the judgment was

rendered.6 456 U.S. at 481-82. But a federal court can deny

preclusion if the state-court proceedings denied the parties

a full and fair opportunity to litigate by falling below the

minimum requirements of due process. Id. at 481-82; see

Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Jurisdiction 2d § 4471.3 (2002). 

In the instant case, the Village, Board, and Steiner urge

that the Illinois circuit court’s administrative review of the

Board’s denial of duty-related benefits has a res judicata

effect on Garcia’s federal civil-rights claims. Our analysis,

based upon Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82, has two prongs.
No. 02-2869 7

First, we will assess the applicability of res judicata under

Illinois law. Second, we will review Garcia’s opportunity to

fully and fairly litigate his civil-rights claims.

A. Illinois res judicata law

Under Illinois law, in order for res judicata to apply to

Garcia’s current civil-rights claims, the circuit court’s

previous affirmance of the Board’s decision must: (1) have

reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involve the same

parties or their privies as the current claims; and (3)

constitute the same cause of action as the current claims.

Pirela v. Vill. of N. Aurora, 935 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir.

1991) (citations omitted); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (Ill. 1998). Here, only the

second two elements are at issue.

1. Same parties

Garcia was the plaintiff in both the circuit court administrative appeal and in this case. Therefore, the second

element of res judicata is easily met with respect to Garcia.

There are three defendants in this case: the Board, the

Village, and Steiner, in his individual and official capacities. Only the Board was a named party in Garcia’s administrative appeal to the circuit court. Hence, the second

element of res judicata is clearly met with respect to the

Board. We must then consider whether the Village and

Steiner are in privity with the Board. 

Garcia offered no authority in his initial brief to this court

for his assertion that neither the Village nor Steiner would

be in privity with the Board. In his reply brief, Garcia cited

but one case, Rhoads v. Board of Trustees, 689 N.E.2d 266

(Ill. App. Ct. 1997), in support of this argument. However,

Rhoads is distinguishable from the instant case and is

against the greater weight of authority.
8 No. 02-2869

The Rhoads court held that a municipality’s police pension board was not in privity with the municipality itself.

Id. at 269-270. In Rhoads, a police officer injured his knee

in two separate incidents while performing his duties as

a police officer. In 1988, his knee was injured when his arm

was trapped in the window of a car whose driver attempted

to drive away to avoid being snared in a prostitution “sting,”

dragging Rhoads. In 1991, the same knee was again injured

when a suspect kicked him. Id. at 268. Rhoads made

worker’s compensation and, when it became apparent that

he would no longer be able to work as a police officer, dutyrelated disability pension claims. The municipality settled

the worker’s compensation claim. However, the pension

board denied his duty-related disability pension application.

Id. 

Rhoads appealed this denial to a circuit court. He

argued that the board should have awarded him full “dutyrelated” benefits because the worker’s compensation settlement foreclosed any argument regarding whether his

injuries were suffered in the line of duty. Id. The Illinois

court held that because the defendant board was not in

privity with the municipality, Rhoads could not avail himself of the benefits of issue preclusion stemming from the

worker’s compensation settlement in the pension board

litigation. Id. at 270. The court reasoned that the board had

not been consulted by the city during settlement negotiations, and that the two entities serve distinct constituencies

with respect to incentives to settle or litigate. Id. Put

simply, it would have been unfair to preclude the defendant

board from litigating causation because the board’s interests were not adequately protected in the settlement

negotiations.

Unlike Rhoads, where a plaintiff attempted to use

collateral estoppel offensively, based upon a settlement

agreement, to the detriment of a defendant not party to

the original action, here it is the defendants who seek to

invoke res judicata defensively, based upon a final adjudi-
No. 02-2869 9

cation, against a plaintiff who was party to the original

action. Our finding of privity between the Village and the

Board benefits the Village, the party who was not literally

present in the original litigation. And there is nothing to

suggest that the Village would have made any arguments

significantly different than those offered by the Board

during the circuit court’s consideration of Garcia’s appeal.

Furthermore, Garcia was himself a party in the original

action, and we presume that his interests were vigorously

advanced before the circuit court. Consequently, the fairness concerns underlying the Rhoads court’s reasoning are

not present here.

Furthermore, case law and common sense support a

finding of privity between the Village and the Board. In

effect, the Board is an agent of the Village, and the Village,

therefore, is in privity with the Board. See McKinney v. City

of E. St. Louis, 188 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). The

Village has delegated the functions of overseeing and

administering the Fund to the Board, in that the Village

created the Board, 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101, appoints two

members of the Board, 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-128, and is

legally required to provide reserve capital for the Fund

through taxation, 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-127, 5/3-142. 

Garcia argues that despite the agency relationship described above, because the Village was not a named party

in his appeal to the circuit court, the Village is not in privity with the Board. “The law cannot tolerate such an

absurdity.” McKinney, 188 N.E.2d at 343, quoted in Dempsey v. City of Harrisburg, 279 N.E.2d 55, 57 (Ill. App. Ct.

1971).

The correct rule is: when a judgment is rendered

against an officer of a municipal corporation who sues

or is sued in his official capacity, the judgment is

binding upon the corporation, upon other officers of the
10 No. 02-2869

7 Arguably, this issue was not addressed because following the

district court’s ruling pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

Garcia voluntarily dismissed all the counts (V, VI, VIII) leveled

against Steiner. (R. 35.) Regardless, we easily find privity between

Steiner, at least in his official capacity, and the Board.

same municipal corporation who represent the same

interest, and upon all residents and taxpayers thereof.

Id. (citing 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 729).

See also Davis v. City of Chicago, 53 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir.

1995) (holding that a purported distinction between the

city’s personnel board and the city itself is a “distinction

without a difference. The Personnel Board is part of

Chicago and acted on the City’s behalf; it is not a separate

legal entity.”)). Because the Board is an agent of the

Village, overseeing and administering the Fund on the

Village’s behalf, and because the Village would ultimately

be responsible for judgments rendered against the Board,

the Village is in privity with the Board.

Since Garcia raised no arguments regarding the privity of

Steiner in his individual capacity with the Board,7

 we need

not address that issue here. However, Garcia did dispute

the privity of Steiner in his official capacity, albeit in a

summary fashion. As a sergeant in the Village police and as

a Board member, Steiner is an employee (or agent) of the

Village and/or the Board. Hence, as a Village employee and

agent, under the above analysis, his privity with the Board

is established. Alternately, as a Board employee and agent,

he is in privity with the Board. See Davis, 53 F.3d at 803-04

(citations omitted).

2. Same cause of action

Having determined that the first two elements of res

judicata are met, all that remains is to assess whether
No. 02-2869 11

Garcia’s administrative appeal of the Board’s denial of

his duty-related disability benefits comprises the same

cause of action as his claims in this case. Until River Park,

Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 891 (Ill.

1998), Illinois courts were free to utilize either the “same

evidence” or “transactional” test for determining whether

causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes.

Under the “same evidence” test, a “second suit is barred

‘if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would

have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential

to maintain both actions.’ ” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. St.

Mary’s Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ill. 1992)). The outcome

under this approach depends upon the relief requested by

a plaintiff: two claims may be part of the same transaction,

but nonetheless still be considered separate causes of action

because the evidence needed to support each claim differs.

Id. at 892. But under the less restrictive and more pragmatic transactional approach, “ ‘the assertion of different

kinds of theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of

action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the

assertion of relief.’ ” Id. at 891 (quoting Rodgers, 597 N.E.2d

at 621). Unlike the same evidence approach, this approach

views claims in factual terms, focusing only on the bounds

of the transaction at issue, disregarding the number of

substantive theories, the variant forms of relief flowing

from those theories, and the variations in evidence needed

to support the theories. Id. at 892 (citing Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 24, cmt. a at 197 (1982)). In River

Park the Illinois Supreme Court unequivocally and explicitly adopted the transactional approach, id. at 893 (stating

“our approval of the transaction test necessitates a rejection

of the same evidence test”), and copiously listed other courts

similarly adopting the transactional test, id. at 893-94

(listing at least twenty-three cases) (citations omitted).

Therefore, Garcia’s federal causes of action, including

Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims, will constitute the
12 No. 02-2869

8 Garcia attempts to argue that the “core of operative facts” for

the circuit court’s review of the Board’s decision is primarily

(continued...)

same cause of action as his administrative appeal, if the

claims “arise from the same group of operative facts . . .

even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence . . . .”

Id. at 893 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24,

cmt. b at 199). An analysis of Garcia’s EEOC filing and his

district court complaint reveals that all the civil-rights

claims arise from the same core of operative facts—the

Board’s decision to deny Garcia duty-related disability

benefits. This is the exact same core of operative facts that

gave rise to Garcia’s appeal of the Board’s denial to the

Illinois circuit court.

As Garcia argues, it is true that his administrative appeal

of the Board’s decision looked only at whether the denial

was against the manifest weight of the evidence, see

Koulegeorge v. State of Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 738

N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 744 N.E.2d

285, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 886 (adopting the manifest

weight of the evidence standard of review), and arbitrary

and capricious—a very narrow review of the decision’s

propriety. And Garcia’s complaint in federal district court

alleges that the Board’s decision was improper because it

was the product of illegal discrimination and retaliation, for

which he should be compensated through an award of full

duty-related disability benefits and damages. But regardless of what a court reviews the Board’s decision for, both

the administrative appeal and the instant lawsuit question

the basis—either proper or improper—of the Board’s denial

of Garcia’s disability benefits. The “core of operative facts”

is identical for both causes of action: the acts of the Board

and the Village Police Department leading up to and

including the Board’s decision to deny the benefits. Attempts to construe the causes of action in any other manner

are futile.8
No. 02-2869 13

8 (...continued)

the circumstances surrounding the heart attack, whereas the

“core of operative facts” underlying the instant claims is the

Board’s decision-making process. (App. Br. at 26-27.) This is

simply untrue. The “core of operative facts” underlying the

Board’s decision was indeed limited to the circumstances surrounding the heart attack. But, the adjudication which this court

views as now having a preclusive effect is the circuit court’s

affirmance of the Board’s decision, and not the Board’s decision

itself. And Garcia acknowledges, as our discussion of his EEOC

and district court complaints demonstrates, see infra, that his

instant claims relate directly (and solely) to the propriety of the

Board’s decision. Thus, as we previously stated, the circuit court’s

decision and the instant claims are based upon the same core of

operative facts: the propriety of the Board’s decision-making

process.

Furthermore, the Appellant’s own EEOC filing and

district court complaint reveal this to be the case. In his

EEOC filing, two basic allegations were made: (1) “the

denial of full pension benefits was based on my national

origin, Hispanic;” and (2) “I was denied full pension benefits

. . . in retaliation for having testified favorably for the

plaintiff in a national origin discrimination suit brought by

another Hispanic officer against the Village of Mount

Prospect.” (R. 20-1 Ex. A.) The Appellant’s allegations to the

EEOC explicitly referenced national origin discrimination

and retaliation only in the context of the Board’s denial of

his full benefits. This court’s thorough review of the EEOC

charge could not uncover any distinguishable allegation of

workplace discrimination made without reference to the

Board’s decision. 

Similarly, the allegations leveled in Garcia’s district court

complaint are framed solely in terms of the Board’s denial

of his disability benefit application. His recitation of facts,

(R. 20-1 Ex. A at 3-7), and every claim, (R. 20-1 Ex. A at 7-

21), focus entirely on the Board’s denial. The complaint does
14 No. 02-2869

9 Perhaps recognizing that such an allegation would be the only

persuasive basis for his argument that the instant cause of action

did not arise from the same operative facts as the administrative

appeal, Garcia asserted in his brief to this court that, “[my] claims

of retaliation and discrimination . . . [arose] . . . from the treatment [I] received while employed by the Village,” (App. Br. at 27).

Demonstrating the fallacy of this statement, Garcia conceded a

mere three paragraphs later that “[i]t was only after all the

hearings were over and after the Pension Board made its decision

that [I] even became aware of [the discrimination and/or retaliation] claims.” (App. Br. at 28.) His claims arose not from the

general treatment he received as a Village police officer, but

rather directly from the Board’s decision.

not contain any factually supported allegations of workplace

discrimination made outside of the context of the Board’s

actions.9

 The administrative appeal challenged the Board’s

decision, the motives behind which are the basis for instant

lawsuit. In sum, as the EEOC charge and district court

complaint make plain, the administrative appeal and the

cause of action in federal court arise from the same core of

operative facts. See, e.g., Pirela, 935 F.2d at 912-13.

B. Full and fair opportunity to litigate

Having concluded that all three res judicata requirements

under Illinois law are met, our remaining inquiry is

whether Garcia had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his claims. As a corollary to the transactional rule, Illinois

adopted the doctrine of merger and bar which precludes the

sequential pursuit not only of claims actually litigated, but

of those that could have been litigated. Durgins, 272 F.3d at

843 (citing People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Ill. 1992); Henry v. Farmer

City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1986 (summarizing Illinois law)); see also River Park, 703 N.E.2d at

895. Thus, so long as Garcia could have joined his federal
No. 02-2869 15

claims with the administrative appeal of the Board’s

decision, then he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

those claims under Illinois law. 

At first blush, this inquiry appears to be the most troublesome. This is due to conflicting Illinois case law regarding

whether federal civil-rights claims may be joined as independent causes of action with administrative appeals heard

by Illinois circuit courts prior to the exhaustion of Illinois’

administrative process for the civil-rights claims, established under the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 1979 (“ICRA,”

“Illinois Human Rights Act,” “IHRA,” or “Act”), Pub. Act No.

81-1216, 1979; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101—5/10-101

(2003). Ultimately, how the Illinois courts resolve this issue

is immaterial to our inquiry here. The administrative

process through which a federal civil-rights claim must

traverse before a court can exercise jurisdiction does not

negate a court’s ability to eventually exercise that jurisdiction. Because Illinois circuit courts could have exercised

jurisdiction over Garcia’s federal civil-rights claims (either

directly or after Garcia exhausted available administrative

remedies), Garcia could have joined those civil-rights claims

with his administrative appeal of the Board’s decision.

Consequently, he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his civil-rights claims in the Illinois legal system.

We begin with the oft-acknowledged proposition that the

states and the federal government share concurrent

jurisdiction over Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Martinez

v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); Pirela, 935 F.2d

at 913. Moreover, a state may limit, but not eliminate, the

exercise of such jurisdiction in its own courts. See FaulknerKing v. Wicks, 590 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992),

quoted in Cooper v. Ill. State Univ., 772 N.E.2d 396, 399-400

(Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
16 No. 02-2869

10 Neither Appellant nor the Appellees make any noticeable efforts

to distinguish between these types of claims. Clearly, a case

brought under Illinois law and involving civil rights will be subject

to the Act and must be brought before the IHRC. See Manley v.

(continued...)

In 1979 the Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Civil

Rights Act, supra. The Act seeks to “secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination because

of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age,

marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable

discharge from military service . . . .” 775 Ill. Comp. Stat.

5/1-102(A) (1979). Furthermore, the Act established the

Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”), an administrative body to adjudicate claims involving civil rights. 775

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-101, et seq. (1979). Judicial review of the

IHRC’s final orders is also provided for in the Act, whereby

either party to a dispute can exercise their right to review,

so long as such requests are filed within thirty-five days of

a final order. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-111(A)(1) (1979).

Critically, the Act also limits the jurisdiction of Illinois

courts, mandating that any party seeking to pursue a civilrights claim in Illinois must first exhaust administrative

remedies available under the Act (by filing a claim with the

IHRC and proceeding with an IHRC investigation and

adjudication), before appealing to an Illinois circuit court to

hear the claim. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-111(C) (1979)

(“Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state

shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil

rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.”). 

A review of Illinois case law by this court reveals that

since 1979, the application of 5/8-111(C), particularly the

phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” has been

consistent for certain types of claims, but rather confusing

for others.10 Illinois courts, and hence, federal courts, con
No. 02-2869 17

10 (...continued)

City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2001). The copious

citations in the Appellant’s reply brief to cases which do not

involve claims brought in Illinois courts under federal civil rights

laws are both irrelevant and misleading. (App. Rep. Br. 3-5.)

Appellant also attempts to discredit cases, (App. Rep. Br. at 16-

18), decided by this court and cited by the Appellees by stating,

without supporting authority, that § 8-111(C) was not in effect at

the time the cases were decided. However, a simple review of the

legislative history of the ICRA reveals that § 8-111(C) has been in

effect since the inception of the ICRA in 1979 and every case

referred to by the Appellant as “not applicable” or “not controlling”

was decided well after 1979.

sistently find that cases based upon state common-law

claims “inextricably linked” to civil-rights violations are

subject to the Act and thus, Illinois circuit courts do not

have original jurisdiction over such claims. The administrative process under the Act must be completed before a

circuit court can exercise jurisdiction over these types of

claims. See, e.g., Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312

F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002); Talley v. Wash. Inventory

Serv., 37 F.3d 310 (7th Cir. 1994); Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees,

219 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Johnson v. Baxter

Healthcare Corp., 907 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Geise v.

Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. 1994);

Welch v. Ill. Sup. Ct., 751 N.E.2d 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).

Similarly, cases based upon the Illinois Constitution or

other Illinois statutes which are “inextricably linked” to

civil-rights violations are subject to the Act and its jurisdictional limits. See, e.g., Damato v. Phelan Chevrolet Geo,

Inc., 927 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Baker v. Miller, 636

N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) Faulkner-King v. Wicks, 590

N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (alleged constitutional vio-
18 No. 02-2869

11 Although the case does not specify, the trial court may have

allowed the federal civil-rights claims to proceed because the party had exhausted all administrative remedies under applicable

federal and state law.

12 Appellant attempts to distinguish Stratton due to the basis

for its administrative appeal, the writ of common law certiorari,

(App. Rep. Br. 14-16), as opposed to the Illinois Administrative

Review Law (“IARL”), 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110 (1998), applicable in the instant case. It is a distinction without difference. As

Stratton explicitly stated,“[w]here a final administrative decision

has been rendered . . . the circuit court may grant the relief which

a party seeks [only] within the context of reviewing that decision

. . . .” 551 N.E.2d at 645-46 (citing Dubin v. Personnel Bd., 539

N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (Ill. 1989)). Likewise, under the IARL, a circuit

(continued...)

lation does not confer concurrent jurisdiction between both

the IHRC and an Illinois trial court). 

Also, cases explicitly alleging civil-rights violations under

Illinois law are subject to the Act. See, e.g., Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 738 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Mein v.

Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. 1985); Veazey v.

LaSalle Telecomm., Inc., 779 N.E.2d 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002);

Lewis v. Collinsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 511 N.E.2d 899

(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Williams v. Naylor, 497 N.E.2d 1274

(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).

However, where allegations of civil rights violations are

framed only in terms of federal laws, such as the claims

involved in this case, the Illinois courts have been much

less clear. Compare Stykel v. City of Freeport, 742 N.E.2d

906, 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (determining that a trial court

may consider federal civil-rights claims joined with an

administrative review of a distinct claim before the circuit

court);11 Stratton v. Wenona Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 1, 551

N.E.2d 640 (Ill. 1990) (holding that § 1983 claims may be

joined with an administrative review);12 with Faulkner-
No. 02-2869 19

12 (...continued)

court sitting in an administrative review capacity may not

consider any new or additional evidence—the court is limited to

the record on appeal, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110 (1998). See

Dubin, 539 N.E.2d at 1246 (“The differences which once existed

between the [IARL] and common-law methods of reviewing

decisions of administrative agencies have been all but lost, and

now the nature and extent of judicial review is virtually the same

under both methods. The circuit courts, therefore, do not possess

greater authority to review actions by agencies whose final

decisions are reviewable through common-law methods than the

courts have when statutory procedures apply.”) (citation omitted).

King, 590 N.E.2d at 517-18 (affirming Illinois trial court’s

dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over

claims brought under U.S. Const. amend. XIV and 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988) because the claims are

covered by the IHRA), cited in Cooper, 772 N.E.2d at 399-

400; Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees, 791 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. App. Ct.

2003) (expressly holding that Illinois circuit courts do not

have original jurisdiction due to the IHRA exclusivity

provision to hear claims of discrimination arising under

federal statutes) (cert. petition pending); Cahoon v. Alton

Packaging Corp., 499 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)

(holding that a federal civil rights claim must be prosecuted

under the same procedure applicable to a state civil-rights

claim).

Garcia argues that since the greater weight of Illinois

authority, see supra, holds that a circuit court cannot exercise original jurisdiction over federal civil-rights claims,

he could not have joined his Title VII, § 1983, and § 1981

claims with his complaint for administrative review of the

Board’s denial of full duty-related benefits. But these cases

stand for the proposition that Illinois circuit courts lack

original jurisdiction over any claim involving civil rights.
20 No. 02-2869

Once a claimant exhausts administrative remedies under

the ICRA, Illinois circuit courts may indeed exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from an IHRC’s final order. Therefore, regarding whether or not Garcia had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Title VII, § 1983, and § 1981

claims, it makes no difference whether Garcia could have

directly joined these civil-rights claims with his administrative appeal of the Board’s decision, or whether he

would have had to initially file with the IHRC to exhaust all

available state administrative remedies prior to the joinder.

In either case, the Illinois circuit court would have had

jurisdiction, sooner or later, to hear his civil-rights claims.

Simply because federal civil-rights claims must be considered first by the IHRC (and the EEOC in the case of Title

VII claims), does not mean that the circuit court cannot

eventually exercise jurisdiction over those claims, once the

administrative process is completed.

Our jurisprudence makes this clear. A potential civilrights claimant has “a reasonable opportunity to bring . . .

equal protection claim[s] before the circuit court because

Illinois allows a plaintiff to join constitutional claims under

§ 1983 with a request for administrative review [of a

separate claim].” Manley, 236 F.3d at 397 (explicitly holding

that a police officer appealing a review board’s termination

decision to the circuit court could have joined §§ 1983 and

1985 claims, although ultimately affirming the district

court’s dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Many of our

cases, some of which are listed here, considered whether

civil-rights claims can be joined with administrative

appeals of different claims to Illinois circuit courts and bear

striking similarities to the instant case. In Durgins, 272

F.3d at 843-44, we held that a police officer appealing her

discharge by the City’s Board of Police and Fire Commissioners to an Illinois circuit court could have joined her

constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Likewise, in

Davis, 53 F.3d at 802-03, we affirmed a district court’s
No. 02-2869 21

13 Under the dual filing system, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); (R.

20-1 Ex. A); see, e.g., Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs, Inc., 999

F.2d 223, 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (where plaintiff “filed a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC and its Illinois counterpart . . . .”),

filing a Title VII-based civil-rights claim with the EEOC is also

considered to be a filing with the corresponding state agency, and

vice versa. Hence, after filing a charge with the IHRA (and also,

(continued...)

dismissal of a § 1983 claim based upon res judicata when a

refuse-collection coordinator appealing his discharge by the

City Personnel Board to a circuit court failed to join his

constitutional claims under § 1983. And finally, in Pirela,

935 F.3d at 913-14, we explicitly held that despite the

IHRA’s vesting of sole jurisdiction over civil-rights claims in

the IHRC, according to Board of Trustees v. Illinois Human

Rights Commission, 490 N.E.2d 232, 236 (Ill. App. 1986)

(interpreting Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312 (Ill.

1985)), the Act only precludes direct access to the circuit

courts, and hence, a police officer appealing his discharge by

the Police and Fire Commissioners to an Illinois circuit

court could not escape the res judicata effects of his failure

to raise his discrimination claims either before the administrative body or the circuit court. 

The practical difficulties of exhaustion will not prevent

res judicata from applying. These issues are largely inconsequential to the our analysis because no matter how such

complexities are sorted out, Garcia nevertheless would still

have been able to join his civil-rights claims with his complaint for administrative review. For example, there may

indeed be an exhaustion requirement under the IHRA

in order to bring any federal civil-rights claims in Illinois

circuit courts. And if so, in the case of Title VII claims, in

order to preserve access to both the federal and state legal

systems, a claimant must file his complaint with the

IHRA.13 But again, a circuit court would nonetheless
22 No. 02-2869

13 (...continued)

effectively, with the EEOC), assuming the IHRC resolved the

dispute in the employer’s favor, a claimant would then have the

option of either appealing the IHRC’s denial of relief to an Illinois

circuit court, or, after obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the

EEOC, suing his employer in a federal district court.

eventually be able to exercise jurisdiction once the state

administrative process—and ipso facto, the federal administrative process—was completed.

We also note that Garcia was required to appeal the

decision of the Board within thirty-five days of its decision.

See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103 (1998). Clearly, if Garcia

had sought to exhaust his state and federal administrative

remedies for his civil-rights claims prior to the filing of his

complaint for administrative review of the Board’s decision,

he would have been pressed for time. In Herrmann, we

addressed this timeliness problem.

Ordinarily . . . the statutes of limitations governing

the plaintiff’s other claims will not be so short that he

risks being barred from pursuing those claims by waiting to complete the Title VII administrative process. If

[a plaintiff] does face a looming deadline for suing on

his other claims, he can ask the EEOC or its state

counterpart to accelerate the administrative process; he

will have good cause for doing so. . . . [The plaintiff] can

sue on his other claims, ask the court—and again he

would have a very strong case for doing so—to stay the

proceedings, until the Title VII administrative process is

complete . . . . These possibilities make the danger that

applying res judicata in Title VII suits will interfere

with legislative design remote. Although it will mean

additional delay in some cases, the plaintiff is protected, in part at least, against being harmed by delay

by the fact that he will be accruing additional
No. 02-2869 23

14 Although this is not technically the same as the circuit court

staying its own proceedings, it has the same effect. See, e.g.,

Dubin v. Personnel Bd., 539 N.E.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Ill. 1989).

entitlements to back pay [or lost benefits] during this

period, and will receive prejudgment interest on his

award when and if he does prevail.

Id. at 225 (emphasis added). The IARL explicitly provides

for a circuit court to stay the decision of the administrative

agency for good cause.14 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-111(a)(1)

(1998). Consequently, Garcia could have petitioned the

circuit court to stay the decision of the Board pending the

conclusion of the civil-rights administrative proceedings.

Had the circuit court denied his request, then res judicata

would not now apply.

Garcia also incorrectly argues that because his federal

civil-rights claims would have necessitated evidence outside

of the administrative record (i.e., Garcia’s testimony in the

Martinez case, Garcia’s conversations with Steiner), the

limited scope of a circuit court’s administrative review

which prevents the consideration of such “new” evidence,

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110 (1998), would have prevented

him from fully and fairly litigating his civil-rights claims.

This contention is premised on the idea that somehow his

administrative appeal of the Board’s decision would subsume his civil-rights claims. But Title VII and §§ 1981 and

1983 claims are original actions independent of the administrative review proceeding and are therefore plenary in

scope. See Stykel, 742 N.E.2d at 914; Stratton, 551 N.E.2d

at 646 (holding that a § 1983 claim is an “independent,

original action,” rather than a review proceeding, even

when it challenges an administrative action). Because a

civil-rights claim under federal law is a distinct cause of

action, the scope of administrative review with respect to

the appeal of the Board’s decision is irrelevant with respect
24 No. 02-2869

to the circuit court’s review of any newly joined civil-rights

claims. See Durgins, 272 F.3d at 843 (acknowledging the

limitations of administrative review, but noting that

constitutional claims joined in such proceedings can be

explored in discovery).

Moreover, Garcia chose to pursue an administrative

appeal of the Board’s decision to the circuit court. He could

have foregone that appeal (thereby avoiding the aforementioned procedural complexities) and simply pursued his

federal civil-rights claims solely in federal court (of course,

after exhausting his Title VII administrative remedies with

the EEOC). As Judge Easterbrook pointed out in Davis, a

plaintiff is free to pursue his claims strategically, but he

must abide by the consequences of those choices.

[The plaintiff] split his claim for his own reasons: he

wanted simple, streamlined litigation in the Circuit

Court of Cook County so that he could get back pay as

quickly as possible. His § 1983 claims against the

[defendants] are more complicated and have lower

stakes, so he wanted to postpone them. . . . That is an

understandable strategy but not a good reason for

foisting two suits on the judicial system and his adversary. Having made a tactical choice to expedite decision,

[the plaintiff] must accept the consequences.

Davis, 53 F.3d at 803.

Because Illinois circuit courts could have exercised

jurisdiction over Garcia’s independent federal civil-rights

claims either directly or after Garcia exhausted available

administrative remedies, it was thus possible for Garcia to

join those claims with his administrative appeal of the

Board’s decision. He had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his civil-rights claims and consequently, res judicata

applies.
No. 02-2869 25

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal is

AFFIRMED on res judicata grounds.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—2-23-04