Filed 7/16/24 In re T.A. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re T.A., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B325535

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP01880A, B)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TRAVIS A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Dismissed as moot.

Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
2

Travis A., father of T.A. and C.A. (Father), challenges the 

juvenile court’s findings and order on a Welfare and Institutions 

Code1 section 387 petition for a more restrictive placement. We 

dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2021, the Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) filed a petition alleging T.A. and C.A. were subject to the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, 

subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), due to parental emotional abuse and 

Father’s substance abuse. In a negotiated disposition, Father 

pleaded no contest to the section 300, subdivision (b)(1)

allegations that he emotionally abused the children and 

endangered them by his marijuana abuse. The court declared the 

children dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b).

Initially, the juvenile court ordered the children home of 

parents. However, in May 2022, the children were removed from 

Father and a section 387 supplemental petition for a more 

restrictive placement was filed due to Father’s continued verbal 

aggression against the children. After a hearing, the juvenile 

court found true the allegation in the supplemental petition, 

found the previous disposition had been ineffective in protecting

the children, and modified the children’s placement to home of

mother, Nicole P. (Mother), with monitored visitation for Father. 

Father appeals.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

DISCUSSION

Father appeals the juvenile court’s order at the hearing on 

the section 387 petition placing the children with their mother 

and awarding him monitored visits. Father argues insufficient 

evidence supported the court’s finding that the previous 

dispositional orders were ineffective in protecting the children 

and its findings justifying removal. However, more recently, the 

juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction with an exit 

order awarding sole physical custody to Mother, joint legal 

custody to both parents, and monitored visits for Father.

2 There 

is no indication that Father, or any other party, appealed from 

the exit order, and the time to do so has expired. (See Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) DCFS contends this renders the

appeal moot, and we agree.

Father argues the appeal is not moot based on his belief 

that if we were to reverse the findings and orders on the petition 

for a more restrictive placement, the matter “would be remanded 

to the family court with instructions to change the Custody Order 

so that it grants both [parents] joint physical and legal custody” 

of the children. This is not the case. Reversing the findings and 

orders on the section 387 petition “could not deliver the desired 

relief—namely, a change in custody and/or visitation. Even after 

2 We grant County Counsel’s request that we take judicial 

notice of the juvenile court’s March 20 and 27, 2023, minute 

orders and the juvenile custody order entered March 27, 2023. 

(Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459, subd. (a); In re M.B. (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 617, 627 [“postjudgment evidence may, in 

appropriate cases, be considered to determine whether an issue 

on appeal is moot”].) We decline to take judicial notice of the 

remaining document in the request for judicial notice, Exhibit 1,

as it is unnecessary for the resolution of the appeal.
4

such reversal, the more recent custody and visitation terms 

contained in the exit order would govern. To effect an actual 

change in custody and visitation rights, the appellate court would 

need to reverse the juvenile court’s last word on custody and/or 

visitation—the exit order terminating jurisdiction on those 

terms—which . . . the appellate court does not have the power to 

do if that order has not been appealed.” (In re S.G. (2021) 

71 Cal.App.5th 654, 666–667.) Therefore, even if the juvenile 

court erred in finding that the original dispositional order was 

ineffective in protecting the children or in finding that the 

children would be at substantial risk if they were not removed 

from Father’s custody, there would be no effective relief for us to 

grant. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical 

factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is 

whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it 

finds reversible error”]); In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 

[case is moot when events render it impossible for a court, if 

deciding the case in the appellant’s favor, to grant effective 

relief].) “[T]he failure of the appellant . . . to appeal an exit order 

that both terminated jurisdiction and set forth the final custody 

and visitation arrangement mooted the appeal from the earlier 

dispositional order regarding custody and visitation.” (In re S.G.,

at p. 667.)

Father argues that even if the appeal is moot, we should 

exercise our discretionary authority to consider its merits because

“whether courts will continue to not find evidence at the 

heightened standard before they remov[e] physical custody from 

their parents” is an issue of broad public interest that is likely to 

recur. However, the legal standard for removal is clear and wellestablished, this highly particularized and fact-based ruling does 
5

not appear to present any issues of broad public interest likely to 

recur, and we see no indication of a miscarriage of justice in this 

case. Father also contends there is “a material question of 

custody” awaiting court determination, but custody of the 

children was determined by the juvenile court in the custody and 

visitation exit order that Father did not appeal. Accordingly, 

while we acknowledge that “[e]ven when a case is moot, courts 

may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the 

dispute” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282), there is no 

reason to exercise that discretion here and we decline to do so.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.