NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROSARIO RANCES RUBIA,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki, 

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2012-7155

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 09-2865, Judge Mary J. Schoelen.

______________________ 

Decided: May 13, 2013

______________________ 

 ROSARIO RANCES RUBIA, San Francisco, Tigaon, Philippines, pro se. 

 DANIEL RABINOWITZ, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondentappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, 

Director, and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director. 
2 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI

Of counsel on the brief were MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI, Deputy 

Assistant General Counsel, and CHRISTINA L. GREGG, 

Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

of Washington, DC. Of counsel was CHRISTA A. SHRIBER. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, PLAGER, and O'MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Rosario Rances Rubia (“Ms. Rubia”) appeals from the 

decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) affirming a Board of Veterans Appeals 

(“the Board”) decision which found that she did not submit new and material evidence sufficient to reopen her 

claim for entitlement to non-service-connected death 

pension benefits. Rubia v. Shinseki, No. 09-2865, 2012 

U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71 (Vet. App. Jan. 18, 2012) 

(“Vet. Ct. Op.”). Because Ms. Rubia’s appeal does not 

raise a legal or constitutional issue falling within this 

court’s jurisdiction, we dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

Ms. Rubia is the widow of Antonio Zape Rubia (“Mr. 

Rubia”). According to a May 2007 letter from the National Personnel Records Center (“NPRC”), Mr. Rubia “served 

as a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, 

including recognized guerrillas, in the service of the 

Armed Forces of the United States . . . from September 1, 

1941 to June 30, 1946, the date of discharge.” Vet. Ct. 

Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71, at *1-2. The 

NPRC letter stated that Mr. Rubia’s service “is not considered as active service in the United States Army.” Id.

at *2. Mr. Rubia died in December 1982. Rubia v. Peake, 

No. 06-1179, 2008 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 354, *2 

(Vet. App. Mar. 28, 2008). 

Ms. Rubia filed a claim for compensation benefits with 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in December 
 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI 3

2001. Id. In December 2003, the Board found that Ms. 

Rubia was not entitled to receive non-service-connected 

death pension benefits because she did not meet the 

statutory eligibility requirements based on her husband’s 

military service. See Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet.

Claims LEXIS 71, at *13 (noting that the Board cited 38 

U.S.C. § 107 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.40 in reaching its decision). 

Ms. Rubia did not appeal that decision and it became 

final.

Ms. Rubia sought to reopen her claim in May 2005. 

The Board denied her request in November 2005, on 

grounds that she failed to submit new and material 

evidence. Id. at *2. In March 2008, the Veterans Court 

vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further 

proceedings in light of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ 

(“the Secretary”) concession that the VA failed to give Ms. 

Rubia adequate notice of the types of evidence needed to 

substantiate her claim. See Rubia, 2008 U.S. App. Vet. 

Claims LEXIS 354, at *3-6. 

The Board remanded the case to the VA to comply 

with the Veterans Court’s decision, and, in March 2009, 

the VA regional office denied Ms. Rubia’s request to 

reopen her claim. Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet. 

Claims LEXIS 71, at *3. In a decision dated June 12,

2009, the Board again found that Ms. Rubia failed to 

submit new and material evidence sufficient to reopen her 

claim for benefits. In that decision, the Board noted that: 

(1) in December 2008, the VA gave Ms. Rubia notice of the 

evidence necessary to reopen her claim and establish 

entitlement to the benefits sought; (2) the VA explained to 

Ms. Rubia that “the RO previously denied [her] claim as 

the Veteran’s Philippine Army service was not considered 

‘active military service’ for purposes of VA death pension 

benefits”; and (3) in January 2009, Ms. Rubia “indicated 

that she had no other information or evidence to give to 

substantiate her claim.” Appendix 15. The Board explained that service prior to July 1, 1946 in the organized 
4 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI

military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth 

of the Philippines, including guerrilla service, is qualifying service “for compensation, dependency, indemnity 

compensation, and burial allowance . . . [but] it is not 

qualifying service for VA pension benefits.” Id. at 17 

(citing 38 U.S.C. § 107 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.40). Because Ms. 

Rubia provided no new and material evidence showing 

that her husband had the type of service that would 

confer eligibility for non-service-connected death pension 

benefits, the Board concluded that her claim could not be 

reopened. Ms. Rubia appealed this decision to the Veterans Court. 

Before the Veterans Court, Ms. Rubia argued, among 

other things, that the Board failed to consider three 

letters that she received from the VA. The Veterans 

Court indicated that two of the letters were not in the 

record and that it had previously found, in a separate 

order, that “the Secretary did not err in not including 

these documents in the record based on his assertion that 

they do not exist.” Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet. 

Claims LEXIS 71, at *8. The Veterans Court found no 

prejudicial error in the Board’s failure to discuss the third 

letter, which was in the record, because the letter simply 

stated “that the RO received her application for benefits, 

that the application was being processed, and that a 

decision would be issued as quickly as possible.” Id. at *8-

9. 

Ms. Rubia attached a number of documents to her 

briefing before the Veterans Court. In response to these 

submissions, the Veterans Court: (1) noted that several of 

the letters attached – including certification of Mr. Rubia’s service – were already in the record; and (2) declined 

to consider other documents on grounds that they were 

not before the Board when it rendered its decision. Id. at 

*5 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (precluding the Court from 

considering any material that was not contained in the 
 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI 5

“record of proceedings before the Secretary and the 

Board”)).1

Turning to the merits, the Veterans Court found that 

Ms. Rubia failed to demonstrate that the Board’s decision 

was clearly erroneous or that its decision was unsupported. At the outset, the court noted that Ms. Rubia did “not 

cite specific laws or regulations that she feels the Board 

inappropriately applied.” Id. at *9. Instead, she “appears 

to read the December 2003 Board decision as denying her 

claim based on her failure to prove Mr. Rubia’s service, 

and endeavors to have her claim reopened based on her 

submission of new and material evidence establishing his 

service.” Id. at *10. Because Ms. Rubia presented no 

evidence contradicting the Board’s determination that her 

husband’s service did not qualify for pension benefits, and 

because she did not argue that the relevant statute – 38 

1 Although Ms. Rubia attempted to assert new arguments after the Secretary submitted the record in this

case, the Veterans Court declined to consider them on 

grounds that they were untimely. See Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 

U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71, at *4-5 (citing Rule 

31(a)(3) of the Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure 

and noting that the Secretary’s brief was submitted on 

June 10, 2010, and Ms. Rubia submitted new arguments 

in September 2010, long after the fourteen day window for 

filing a reply brief had passed). The Veterans Court’s 

enforcement of its procedural rules is entitled to deference, and we see no error in the court’s application of its 

rules. See Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 35 (Fed. Cir. 

1999) (“Congress has provided the Court of Veterans 

Appeals the express authority to promulgate its rules, 

practice and procedure, see 38 U.S.C. § 7264(a), and it is 

appropriate for the Court of Veterans Appeals to have 

discretionary authority to apply its rules as other courts 

of appeals.”) (citation omitted)). 

 
6 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI

U.S.C. § 107 – was somehow inapplicable to her case, the 

Veterans Court found no error in the Board’s decision. Id.

at *16. Ms. Rubia timely appealed to this court. 

DISCUSSION

Our review of Veterans Court decisions is strictly limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may 

review “the validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court 

on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any 

interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a 

factual matter) that was relied on by the Court in making 

the decision.” Unless the appeal presents a constitutional 

issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 

7292(d)(2). 

Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1541(a), the surviving spouse 

of a veteran who meets the service requirements set forth 

in 38 U.S.C. § 1521(j) is eligible to receive non-serviceconnected pension benefits.2 A “veteran” is defined as a 

person who “served in the active military, naval, or air 

service, and who was discharged or released therefrom 

2 Section 1521(j) provides that a veteran meets the 

service requirements if the veteran:

served in the active military, naval, or air service 

– (1) for ninety days or more during a period of 

war; (2) during a period of war and was discharged or released from such service for a service-connected disability; (3) for a period of ninety 

consecutive days or more and such period began 

or ended during a period of war; or (4) for an aggregate of ninety days or more in two separate periods of service during more than one period of 

war.

38 U.S.C. § 1521(j).

 
 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI 7

under conditions other than dishonorable.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 101(2). Under 38 U.S.C. § 107(a), service before July 1, 

1946 in the “organized military forces of the Government 

of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,” including 

organized guerrilla forces, “shall not be deemed to have 

been active military, naval, or air service” for the purpose 

of conferring pension benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.40(c)

(providing that persons who served in the Commonwealth 

Army of the Philippines are entitled to receive “compensation, dependency and indemnity compensation, and burial 

allowance”); see also Rivera v. Principi, 62 F. App’x 942, 

945 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that pension benefits are not 

included in 38 C.F.R. § 3.40(c)). 

Here, the Board found that Ms. Rubia failed to submit 

new and material evidence sufficient to reopen her claim

for non-service-connected pension benefits, and the Veterans Court agreed. On appeal, Ms. Rubia states that she 

“absolutely disagree[s] to the issuance of the affirmation 

of the BVA or Board’s Decision, dated June 12, 2009” 

because it is “purely incorrect.” Informal Br. ¶ 4. She 

then asks this court to “extend to [her] the favorable 

verdict in consonance with the submitted Military Service 

Records derived from the rendered service during WWII 

in the Philippines, as shown in the records and also about 

the Honorable Discharge of the deceased veteran, etc.” 

Id. at ¶ 6. 

In response, the Secretary argues that we should dismiss Ms. Rubia’s appeal on grounds that it fails to “raise 

any issue concerning the validity or interpretation of any 

statute, regulation, or rule of law relied upon by the 

Veterans Court that could provide a basis for this Court’s 

jurisdiction.” Appellee’s Br. 8-9. In the alternative, the 

Secretary submits that we should affirm the Veterans 

Court’s decision. For the reasons explained below, because Ms. Rubia raises no legal or constitutional issues on 

appeal, we dismiss. 
8 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI

In her informal brief, Ms. Rubia answered “no” to the 

question of whether the Veterans Court’s decision involved the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation.3 As was the case before the Veterans Court, it seems 

that Ms. Rubia continues to believe that the denial of 

pension benefits was based on a failure to prove Mr. 

Rubia’s military service. To the contrary, the Board 

specifically found that Mr. Rubia served as a member of 

the Philippine Commonwealth Army, including with 

recognized guerrillas, in the service of the Armed Forces 

of the United States from September 1, 1941 until June 

30, 1946. The Board found, however, that Mr. Rubia’s 

service was not active military service for the purpose of 

conferring pension benefits and that she failed to submit 

new and material evidence sufficient to reopen her claim 

for entitlement to those benefits. Because Ms. Rubia 

3 In response to this question, Ms. Rubia “respectfully request[s] extension of assistance, that [she] should 

be allowed to offer written manifestation regarding this 

matter for enlightenment.” Informal Br. ¶ 2. Before the 

Veterans Court, Ms. Rubia argued that she “proceeded 

throughout the pendency of her claim without the benefit 

of legal representation” and that “this is ‘a neglect’ by the 

RO.” Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71, 

at *6. The Veterans Court found that the VA repeatedly 

informed Ms. Rubia of her options for obtaining counsel 

and specifically concluded that there was “no evidence of 

neglect on the part of VA.” Id. at *7-8. We find no evidence in the record that the Veterans Court or the Board 

denied Ms. Rubia the opportunity to obtain legal counsel. 

And, to the extent Ms. Rubia’s request for “extension of 

assistance” can be interpreted as a request that this court 

appoint legal representation, it is denied, as we generally 

do not appoint counsel on appeal and we see no grounds

for doing so here. Likewise, Ms. Rubia’s request to file an 

additional “written manifestation” is denied.

 
 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI 9

“offer[ed] no evidence casting doubt on the Board’s description of Mr. Rubia’s service,” the Veterans Court 

found no error in the Board’s decision. Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 

U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71, at *16. 

On appeal, Ms. Rubia does not allege that the Veterans Court’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of either 38 U.S.C. § 107 or 38 C.F.R. § 3.40. Indeed, 

the Veterans Court did not interpret or rule on the validity of any statute or regulation. Instead, the sole issue

before the Veterans Court was whether the Board’s determination that Ms. Rubia had not submitted new and 

material evidence was “either clearly erroneous or not 

supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases.” 

See Vet. Ct. Op., 2012 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 71, at 

*16-17. Because the Veterans Court simply applied the 

controlling law to the facts, and because we are unable to 

review the application of that law to these particular 

facts, we lack jurisdiction. And, as the Secretary points 

out, to the extent Ms. Rubia continues to allege that her 

husband qualified as a veteran with active military service, that is a factual determination we lack jurisdiction 

to review. See Struck v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 145, 152-53 

(1996) (indicating that the Board’s determination of 

veteran status is a question of fact subject to the “clearly 

erroneous” standard of review). 

Next, Ms. Rubia argues that the Veterans Court failed 

to consider certain documents in reaching its decision. 

Specifically, Ms. Rubia attaches two documents to her 

informal brief. The first is a proclamation from the former President of the Philippines publishing President 

Roosevelt’s July 26, 1941 military order which provided 

that members of the Philippine military forces were 

eligible for certain benefits from the United States. 

Although this military order is referenced in 38 U.S.C. 

§ 107,4 as previously indicated, Ms. Rubia has not argued

4 Section 107(a) provides that: 

 
10 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI

that the Veterans Court misinterpreted any statute or 

regulation in affirming the Board’s decision, and does not 

explain how she thinks this document supports her claim. 

Ms. Rubia also attached a January 2001 Social Security 

Administration publication discussing special benefits for 

certain World War II veterans. Because Ms. Rubia fails 

to explain how these documents are relevant to the Veterans Court’s decision, we need not address them further.

Finally, although Ms. Rubia answered “yes” to the 

question of whether the Veterans Court decided constitutional issues, she neither cited any constitutional provision nor identified the issue alleged. Instead, in her 

written explanation Ms. Rubia: (1) indicates that there 

were “omissions of the proofs of marked exhibits in evidence”; and (2) includes a vague mention of “VA Laws” 

along with a string of citations to pages within the record 

before the agency. Informal Br. ¶ 3. While we are certainly mindful that “pro se filings must be read liberally,” 

Harris v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(citations omitted), Ms. Rubia’s failure to make any 

specific allegations regarding a constitutional violation 

precludes our review of that claim. 

CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that this appeal does not raise 

any issues within our jurisdiction, we dismiss. 

Service before July 1, 1946, in the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, while such forces were 

in the service of the Armed Forces of the United 

States pursuant to the military order of the President dated July 26, 1941 . . . shall not be deemed 

to have been active military, naval, or air service . 

. . .

38 U.S.C. § 107(a).

 
 ROSARIO RUBIA v. SHINSEKI 11

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.