1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, D.C. 20460 

Attention Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 

Re: Risk Management Program, Accidental Release Prevention Requirements 

Request for Information, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 

To Whom It May Concern: 

Beaver Water District (BWD) appreciates this opportunity to respond to the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency's (EPA's) Request for Information (RFI) on potential revisions to the Risk 

Management Program (RMP) regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 68. BWD is a public drinking water 

treatment utility located in Lowell, Arkansas. We treat water from Beaver Lake, a Corps of 

Engineers reservoir, and supply drinking water to the Northwest Arkansas cities of Fayetteville, 

Springdale, Rogers, and Bentonville. These cities then resell the water to more than 300,000 

people and industries. 

Before responding below to some of EPA's questions in the RFI, we first note that while it is 

important for the federal government to explore what can be done to prevent chemical accidents 

such as that at the West Fertilizer facility, perhaps such efforts should initially be directed 

towards technical assistance and other steps to ensure compliance with the existing RMP 

regulations. In other words, any expansion of the RMP regulations should only come after 

noncompliance issues are addressed or, at least, after a determination that the existing regulations 

are inadequate even if properly implemented. 

BWD won't attempt to respond to all of the EPA's questions in the RFI. Instead we'll focus on 

some of the RFI questions that directly relate to drinking water treatment facilities, particularly 

questions regarding whether EPA should require covered facilities to further evaluate or 

implement inherently safer technologies (1ST) and whether water systems currently subject to 

RMP program level 2 should instead be subject to program level 3. In general, BWD does not 

believe that it is appropriate at this time to require drinking water treatment facilities to conduct 

1ST reviews. We also do not believe that current program level 2 drinking water treatment 

facilities should be subject to program level 3 at this time. 

BWD's responses to specific questions utilize the section numbers of EPA's requests as 

published at 79 Fed. Reg. 44,604-44,633 (July 31, 2014). 
PlWHazard Review element, or as a separate new requirement under CAA section 112(r)? 

• While it may be appropriate and not unduly burdensome to subject certain types of chemicalholding facilities to a "safer alternatives options analysis" (often referred to as IST review), it 

is not appropriate to require drinking water treatment facilities to conduct IST reviews or be 

subject to IST implementation. There can be no across-the-board consensus as to what 

methods or processes would constitute an inherently safer technology for a particular water 

facility. When evaluating potential changes to drinking water treatment chemicals and 

processes, utility experts must consider a number of factors including: security risk tradeoffs; 

local ambient water quality; interactions with co-occurring constituents; generation of 

unintended treatment byproducts and the resulting public health implications; supply chain 

reliability; fiscal and economic impacts; and implications for regulatory compliance with 

other statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and the Clean Water Act 

(CWA). Water utilities have demonstrated a willingness to voluntarily make appropriate 

chemical substitutions where doing so is beneficial, feasible, and does not interfere with their 

primary responsibility of delivering clean and safe drinking water to the public. 

• Clean Air Act (CAA) section 112(r) focuses on preventing accidental chemical releases and 

onsite and offsite consequences, and any consideration of a "safer" chemical alternative or 

IST under section 112(r) would likely be geared to this objective. A water treatment facility, 

however, must take into account not only the safety of the population within the potential 

release impact area, but also the safety and public health of water consumers who often are 

located significant distances away from the water treatment facility. This complex analysis 

can't be standardized and depends upon a large number of variables unique to each water 

facility. It is essential that local experts make this choice without federal mandates that favor 

substances thought to be "inherently safer" than others. Each community and drinking water 

system is different, so broad chemical use restrictions could lead to a reduction of drinking 

water quality, higher costs for ratepayers, and a shifting of risk that fails to improve overall 

safety. 

• Section 112(r) grants EPA regulatory authority over a facility's storage of covered chemicals, 

but only when the facility possesses the chemical in a quantity that exceeds a defined 

threshold quantity. A regulation based on section 112(r) aimed at replacing a covered 

chemical with a "safer" alternative, however, might drive some water utilities to just reduce inventories below the threshold amount. This could have the result of increasing risks. For 

example, maintaining smaller chemical inventories that would not be subject to 112(r) 

oversight would require much more frequent deliveries, especially at larger facilities. The 

more frequent deliveries and associated loading and unloading processes could result in a 

cumulative increase in public safety risks. Dependence upon more frequent deliveries also 
. 

esponse to Section J

.

.l.d, 79 

ed. 

eg. 

,6

: Can the 

national database, 

Lessons Learned Iriformation System or other federal databases be structured to promote the 

exchange of information both within industry and with other stakeholders on potentially safer 

technologies? 

• For reasons set forth in Response 1 above, BWD does not believe it is appropriate to mandate 

that water treatment facilities undertake 1ST review. For those facilities voluntarily 

conducting a potentially safer technology analysis, however, it may be worth considering 

how new or existing federal information sharing databases could serve as avenues for utility 

professionals and other experts to share information regarding the evaluation and 

implementation of alternative processes. The difficulty will be ensuring that any information 

sharing vehicle is adequately shielded from public disclosure, but also readily accessible to 

authorized water utility professionals. Ultimately, water utility managers may be reluctant to 

post facility-specific information for fear of unauthorized disclosure, though they may be 

willing to be listed as points of personal contact. 

3. Response to Section JJ.D.l.g, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,622: How should EPA and facilities address 

the risk tradeofft that could result when changing a process to incorporate safer alternatives? 

• Again, for reasons set forth in Response I above, we do not believe it is appropriate to 

require water treatment facilities to undertake 1ST review or implementation. Such decisions 

must be made by local officials who are familiar with the needs and infrastructure of their 

own communities, rather than by distant federal officials who do not have the benefit of this 

local knowledge. To illustrate the complexity of this analysis, however, some of the risks to 

the public to be taken into consideration when a water utility considers a change from 

gaseous chlorine disinfection include: the potential for increased levels of contaminants such 

as perchlorate in the treated water, creation of new byproducts that require proper disposal, 

the effects of the replacement chemicals on the facility's wastewater, possible accidents and 

spills related to more frequent shipments and deliveries of replacement chemicals, supply 

chain breakdowns that could leave a utility unable to adequately treat water, and higher 

capital and operational costs. 

4. Response to Section ILD.l.i, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,622: If EPA were to develop regulatory 

requirements for safer alternatives, which facilities should be subject to those requirements? 

Should all RMP facilities be subject to such requirements, or only "high risk" facilities, such as 

refineries and large chemical plants? 

• While it may be appropriate and not unduly burdensome to subject refineries and large 

chemical plants to 1ST review and implementation requirements, it is not appropriate to apply 
the requirements of the SDWA. A federal regulatory program that overrides these local 

decisions - with a focus on minimizing chemical releases and onsite and offsite 

consequences, rather than on ensuring the appropriate treatment and safety of drinking water 

- could lead to inadequately treated water and jeopardize public health. 

5. Response to Section ILD.l.j, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,622: What barriers exist for industry to adopt 

safer alternatives? What incentives can be used by government to have facilities implement safer 

alternatives? Should the Agency provide special recognition to companies that implement safer 

alternatives? 

• Federal financial assistance to offset costs incurred by water utilities that have independently 

and voluntarily decided to explore or adopt an alternate treatment chemical could be helpful. 

We wonder, however, if that is realistic to expect. In general, though, it's probably 

inadvisable for the federal government to otherwise incentivize or recognize the adoption of 

1ST by water systems. Incentivizing or publicly recognizing 1ST adoption could imply that 

conversion to an 1ST is by default the appropriate conclusion to reach, even though it may 

not be in the best decision in terms of overall public health. 

6. Response to Section ILD.l.k, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,622: What are other options (other than 

regulatory requirements) exist [sic] to encourage facilities to investigate, develop or implement 

safer alternatives and how can EPAforther these efforts? 

• As noted in response 2 above, EPA could facilitate information sharing among water utility 

professionals, but must do so under conditions that are secure while also being accessible to 

appropriate individuals. 

7. Response to Section II.D.l.l, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,622: If RMP facilities are required to perform 

safer alternative options analyses and implementation plans, should EPA require that the 

analyses and/or implementation plans be submitted to the Agency? Should EPA have any role in 

approving such analyses or plans? 

• Again, BWD does not believe that requiring 1ST reviews or implementation is appropriate 

for water treatment utilities. It follows that such analyses and implementation plans should 

not be submitted to EPA for review or approval because of the uniquely local decisionmaking and public health considerations involved. We also have practical concerns about the 

collection and storage by EPA of such documents, which, if disclosed, would present 

significant security concerns. In the event that 1ST related documents ever are to be shared 

by water utilities with EPA, rules must first be put in place to guarantee the documents are 

protected from disclosure either inadvertently or under the federal Freedom of Information 
Should facilities be required to disclose these analyses or recommendations resulting from such 

analyses to local authorities or the public prior to the selection of options? 

• Just as IST review and implementation should not be required for water treatment utilities, 

disclosure to and participation by local communities should not be federally mandated. 

Water utility decisions often involve local participation, but it is done in ways that are unique 

and appropriate to the water utility, its customers, and the local communities. What is not 

needed is a federal program that dictates the terms under which water utilities and local 

communities engage on water treatment options. 

9. Response to Section II. C. 7.c, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,620: Should RMP-covered municipal water 

and wastewater plants that are not eligible for Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3, 

regardless of whether or not they are located in a state with a Federally-delegated OSHA 

program? Why or why not? 

• EPA should not change the existing regulations and practice regarding the placement of 

drinking water facilities in an appropriate program level. Currently, water utilities that are 

subject to the RMP regulation must meet the requirements of either Program 2 or Program 3 

depending on whether their state has a delegated OSHA program. Public utilities, including 

drinking water utilities, in states that do not have federally-delegated, state-run OSHA 

programs (such as Arkansas) generally fall into Program 2. Utilities in states with federallydelegated, state-run OSHA programs are classified in Program 3. 

• Program 2 represents an appropriate level of accident prevention requirements for drinking 

water systems. According to EPA's RMP Guidance, Program 2 embodies the basics of 

sound prevention practices (safety information, hazard review, operating procedures, 

training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident investigation). Also according to 

EPA, Program 2 requires substantially less documentation and record keeping 

responsibilities than Program 3. 

• Public utilities in states with federally-delegated, state-run OSHA programs originally were 

put in Program 3 to avoid duplicative reporting and recordkeeping requirements - not 

because of any expected safety enhancement due to a Program 3 classification. It would be 

inappropriate and would deliver no measurable safety benefit to impose new administrative 

burdens on the nation's Level 2 drinking water facilities primarily for the sake of having all 

such facilities in the same program level. 
• The absolute number of accidental releases is not necessarily a metric that accurately 

reflects the risks posed by an industry sector. The absolute number of accidental releases 

is biased by the overall number of facilities in a sector and does not take into account the 

relative severity and corresponding risk posed by any releases. EPA notes that, based on 

nearly two decades of accident history reports in the RMP national database, North 

American Industry Classification Code (NAICS) 22131 for 11Water supply and irrigation 

systems 11 is one of the ten NAICS codes most frequently associated with accidents in 

RMP-regulated processes. The RMP database of the accident history reports is no longer 

publicly available, so it's not possible for BWD to critically evaluate this claim. Based on 

our knowledge of the drinking water sector, however, we believe that any elevated 

absolute number of accidents at "Water Supply and Irrigation Systems" is simply a 

function of the large number of such facilities nationwide. We do not believe that these 

facilities experience accidents at elevated frequencies or severities necessitating special 

scrutiny. It, therefore, would be inappropriate to automatically assign NAICS code 

22131 drinking water facilities to Program 3. 

11. Response to Section II.D.B.a, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,628: Should EPA amend the RMP regulation 

to require RMP-regulated facilities to post chemical hazard-related iriformation on their 

websites ... ? 

• Drinking water facilities should not be required to post this information on the internet. 

Public release of chemical inventory and storage location information could seriously 

compromise the security of a drinking water facility and increase the terrorism-related 

risks to the local community. It would have the net effect of undermining EPA's goal of 

reducing chemical release risks at the same time as it jeopardizes the community's 

drinking water supply. 

12. Response to Section ILD.B.e, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,628: Is there other information (web-based 

or otherwise) that would assist local communities, emergency planners, and responders in 

understanding facility risks that should be made publicly available? 

• Under CAA section 112(r) and Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 

(EPCRA) sections 301-303, covered water treatment facilities already provide RMP 

information with local first responders and emergency planners. Again, this information 

should not be made publicly available across-the-board. If there's a need to improve 

information sharing between local first responders and emergency planners, EPA could 

conduct educational outreach and provide technical assistance, including customizable 

materials, to the relevant local entities. 
Cc via email: 

Senator John Boozman Senator Mark Pryor 

Representative Steve Womack 

BWD Board President Bill Watkins 

BWD CEO Alan Fortenberry BWD Plant Manager Bill HagenBurger 

oyd, P.E. 

perating Officer