IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-IA-00398-SCT MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SY STEMS, INC., BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER - LEAKE, INC., DAV ID MOODY

, M.D. AND MADDEN MEDICAL CLINIC, PLLC

v. SY LV I A DIANNE HARKINS AND REGGIE HARKINS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/26/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W INSTON L. KIDD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: MICHAEL T. JAQUES BOBBY L. DALLAS C. MAISON HEIDELBERG GINNY Y. KENNEDY D. COLLIER GRAHAM, JR. ALICIA S. HALL COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: D. COLLIER GRAHAM, JR. CHARLES E. COW AN GINNY Y. KENNEDY C. MAISON HEIDELBERG ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL T. JAQUES BOBBY L. DALLAS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 02/15/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:C ONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2016-IA-00399-SCT

BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER - LEAKE, INC., MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SY STEMS, INC., DAV ID MOODY

, M.D. AND MADDEN MEDICAL CLINIC, PLLC

v. SY LV I A DIANNE HARKINS AND REGGIE HARKINS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/26/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W INSTON L. KIDD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: D. COLLIER GRAHAM, JR. CHARLES E. COW AN GINNY Y. KENNEDY C. MAISON HEIDELBERG ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL T. JAQUES BOBBY L. DALLAS JENNIFER P. BURKES NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 02/15/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC. CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In August 2014, Dianne and Reggie H arkins f i led suit in the C ircuit Court o f the First Judicial Di s t r i ct of H inds C ounty , alleging t hat the direct and proxim ate negligence of

m ultiple h ealthcare providers located in Leake County and Hinds County r esulted in, am ong other p roblem s, t he a m

p utation of D ianne Harkins’s hands a nd f e et. In January 2015,

2Madden Medical Clinic, PLLC (Madden Medical) and D avid M o o d y , M

. D. (Dr. Moody )

f iled a m otion to dism iss or, alternatively , f or s everance a nd transf

er o f venue to the Circuit
Court of Leake C o u

n t y . S h o r t l y t h e r e a ft e r , B a

p tist M edical Center-Leake, Inc. ( BMC-Leake) and Mississippi Baptist Health Sy stem s, Inc. (Baptist Health) f iled a m otion also to dism iss

or transf er venue to the Circuit Court o f L e ake County

. 1 A hearing was held o n April 16,
2016. On February 26, 2016, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of H inds County

ente r e d a n order d e ny ing the m otions of Dr. Moody , Madden M edical, BMC-Leake, and
B a p t i s t H e a l th t o dism iss or, in the alternative, to transf er venue. The parties a

ppealed, collectively f

iling two interlocutory appeals, and both appea l s w e r e g r a n t e d a n d consolidated. ¶2. The Court holds Section 11-11-3(3) to be c l ear and u n a m b i g u o u s . U n der the plain language of Section 11-11-3(3), venue i s proper f o r t he p roperly j oined def endants in Hinds County or Leake County , and the judgm ent of the trial court is af

f irm e d.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. On March 11, 2013, Dianne Harkins arrived at the B MC-Leake em ergency room at approxim a tely 3:50 p.m . and com plained of r ight f

lank pain. From 3:51 p.m . u ntil 7:00 p.m ., Harkins’s blood pressure declined and h e r h e art rate increased. That evening, a CT scan showed m oderate to severe hy d r o nephrosis, a dilated ureter, and the probable presence of calcif ications i n the right ureter. The em ergency - room phy sician then adm itted Harkins to the hospital to the care and service of Dr. Moody

.

1 B ap t ist M ed ical C en ter in H in d s C o u n t y d id n o t j o in th e m o tio n s o r f i l e i t s o w n m o tio n ; th eref

o re, it is n o t a p arty

to th e in stan t ap p eal.

3¶4. Dr. Moody evaluated Harkins a t approxim ately 7:15 a.m . on March 12, 2013. Af ter Harkins’s vital signs were taken and n oted a t 7:48 a.m ., D r. Moody was n otif ied of H arkins’s declining condition, and he ordered m edications to be adm inistered. By 1 0 :30 a.m ., Harkins’s blood pressure had dropped to 67/31. Af t er being notif

ied of Harkins’s condition,
Dr. M oody saw Harkins at approxim ately 10:50 a.m . At 11:15 a.m ., Dr. Moody ordered Harkins to be transf

erred via air am

bulance to Mississippi Baptist Medical Center in Jackson. Harkins was transf

erred at approxim ately 1 2:25 p .m . D r . Moody ’ s discharge sum m ary ref lected that Harkins was transf erred with hy d

ronephrosis and shock. ¶5. Harkins arrived at M i ssissippi B a ptist Medical C enter in Jackson at approxim ately
1:10 p.m ., and she was a dm itted to the em ergency room . Harkins was prescribed antibiotics

at 2:13 p .m . The com

plaint alleges that Harkins w as not given antibiotics until 3:00 and/or
3:45 p.m . Harkins was t hen adm itted to Baptist Medical C enter’s critical care unit with acute respiratory f

ailure, hy potension, sepsis, septic shock, a c idem ia, pneum o nia, renal f ailure
sy ndrom e, and urethral stone with urosepsis. Harkins d eveloped m ore com p lications during her stay in the critical care unit which c u l mi n a t e d i n the developm ent of gangrene in Harkins’s h a nds and f

e et. Due to the developm ent of gangrene, both H arkins’s hands and
f eet were am

putated. ¶6. On August 29, 2014, based on the events described above, Harkins f iled a m edicalm alpractice suit. Harkins’s husband, Reggie Harkins, also b rou g h t a claim f or loss of consortium

. In J anuary 2015, Madden Medical a nd Dr. Moody f iled a m otion to dism iss or, alternatively , to sever a nd transf er venue to Leake County

. T h e r eaf ter, BMC-Leake and

4Baptist Health also f iled a m o t ion to dism iss or transf er to L eake County

. In their respective

m otions, each party cited Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3), arguing that Leake County is the only

proper venue f

or each of them based on the f

acts. ¶7. On February 26, 2016, the Hinds County Circuit Court entered an order deny ing the

m otions of Dr. Moody , Madden Me d i c a l , B MC-Leake, and Baptist Health (collectively , “Leake C ounty Appellants”) t o dism iss or, in the alternative, to transf er venue. Aggrieved by the denied m otions to dism i ss or transf er, the Leake County Appellants f iled interlocutory appeals. 2 This Court granted each appeal and consolidated the appeals. 3
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ¶8. T h e b r i e f

s that the parties and f

riends of the Court have f iled e ach set f

ort h t h e i r rendition of the issue or issues. For clarity and conciseness, the Court has consolidated the issues into one issue w ith two s ubsections. Because the Court holds t he single issue and two subsections to be case-dispositive of all additional issues brought bef o re the Court and aptly argued during oral argum ent, the additional issues are not addressed.

2 Madden Medical and Dr. M oody collectively f iled one appeal, a nd BMC-Leake and Baptist Health collectively f iled the other appeal.

3 M i s s i s s i p p i S t a t e M e d i cal Association, Mississippi Hospital Association, M i s s i s s i p p i Dental A ssociation, Mississi p p i H e a l t h C a r e A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d M i s s i s s i p p i N u

r s e s A s sociation collectively f

iled a n amici curiae b rief in s upport o f the Leake County Appellants. Further, The Mississip p i A s sociation f or Justice f

iled an amicus curiae brief in support of the Harkinses.

5Whether, under Mississippi Code S e c tion 11-11-3(3), t he m alpractice

allegations against a ll the m edical defendants m a y b e brought i n Hinds County , w hen the allege d m alpractice occurred in Hinds County and in Leake County . (a) Whether M ississippi Code Section 1 1- 1 1
- 3 ( 3 ) i s p l a in and unam biguous. (b) Whether Mississippi Code Section 1 1-11-3(3) prevents joinder. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. The C ourt r eviews “a trial court’s grant or denial of a m otion f or change o f v enue f

or

an abuse of discretion, but q u estions of law, such as interpretation of the gen eral venue statute, are reviewed d

e n ovo .” Laurel F

ord Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney , 81 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Miss. 2012) (em phasis in original) (citing Hedgepeth v. Johnson , 975 So. 2d 235, 237 (Miss. 2008)).
ANALYSIS
W h e t her, under Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3), t he m alpractice allegations again s t all t he m edical defendants m ay be brought i n Hinds County , w hen t he alleged m alpractice occurred in Hinds County and in Leake County . ¶10. The H arkinses do not dispute t hat all the alleged m a lpractice on the p art of the Leake County Appellants occurre d i n Leake C ounty , n ot in Hinds County

. The issue of venue, however, arises under Section 11-11-3(3) because additional alleged m alpractice occurred in Hinds Cou n t y by Mississippi Baptist Medical C enter. The Harkinses argue that the

m alpractice in both counties c r e a t e d o ne injury that prevents the separate alleged acts of

m alpractice f

rom being severable. The Leake County Appellants argue the alleged m edical

6negligence in Hinds County should be severed, and venue as to them i s appropriate in Leake

County alone. Our a naly sis r ests on S ection 11-11-3(3), a nd f or the below-detailed reasons, we af f irm the trial court judgm ent. (a) W h e t h e r M i s s i s s i p p i C o d e S e c t i o n 1 1
- 1 1
- 3 ( 3 ) i s p l a i n a n d unam biguous. ¶11. The L e a k e C o u n t y A p p ellants argue that the language of the statute is plain and

unam biguous, providing that the only proper venue f

or a suit against a m edical provider is the county in which the alleged act or o m ission occurred. W ithout stating w hether the statue is clear or a m

biguous, the Harkinses argue that S ection 11-11-3(3) lim its the plaintiff s’ venue choices to a county in which the alleged acts or om issions of m edical m alpractice occurred. ¶12. The Court’s r ole “is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to d eterm ine what it does provide.” Lawson v . Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 7 5 So. 3d 1 024, 1027 (Miss. 2 011). The
Court exam ines the statute and linguistic choices as a whole, n o t l o o k i ng to the words in isolation. Mi l

l e r v . F r e n c h , 530 U.S. 327, 340, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 2255, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2000); In re Settoon Towing, L .L.C. , 859 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2017). “If the words of

a statute are clear and unam biguous, the Court applies the plain m eaning of the statute and ref rains f rom using principles o f statutory construction.” Lawson , 75 So. 3d at 1027. On the other hand, i f a statute i s “am b iguous or silent,” statutory interpretation is w arranted. Miss.
Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. C tr., Inc. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid , 2 1 So. 3 d 600, 607 (Miss. 2009). ¶13. Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3, in pertinent part, provides:

7(1)(a)(i) Civil actions of which the c i rcuit c o urt has original j urisdiction shall

be com m enced in the county where the d ef endant resides, o r, if a corporation, in the co u n t y o f its principal p lace of business, o r i n t he c ounty where a substantial alleged a ct o r om ission occurred or where a substantial event t hat caused the injury

occurred. (ii) C i v i l actions alleging a def ective product m ay also be com m enced in the co u n t y w here the plaintif f obtained the product. (b) If venue i n a civil action against a nonresident def endant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a civil action against a nonresident m ay be c om m enced in the county wh ere the plaintif f resides or is dom i ciled.

. . . (3) Notwithstanding sub section (1) of this section, any action against a licensed phy sician, osteopath, d e ntist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, p hy sician assistant, p sy chologist, pharm acist, podiatrist, optom etrist , c hiropractor, institution f

or the aged or i nf

irm , hospital or licensed pharm acy , including any l egal entity w hich m ay be liable f or their acts or om issions, f or m alpractice, negligence, error , om ission, m istake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of prof e ssional services shall be brought only i n the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred

. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Rev. 2004) (em phasis added). The instant version of Section
11-11-3 i s a product of the 2 004 am endm ent. Pr i o r t o 2 0 04, no special v enue distinction existed f or m edical-m alpractice suits. H.B. 13, 2004 Leg., 1st Exec. Sess. (Miss. 2004). ¶14. The dispute here revolves around the understanding of the word “only ” i n subsection three. “All words and p hrases contained in t he statutes are used according to their com m on and ordinary a c c e p tation a nd m eaning; but technical w ords and p hrases according to their technical m eaning.” M iss. Code Ann. § 1-3-65 (Rev. 2014); see also Lawson , 75 So. 3d at
1028. To determ i ne whether the m eaning of “only ” is plain and unam biguous, the Court

8evaluates the statute and linguistic choices as a whole, beginning o u r a naly sis with subsection

one. Miller , 530 U.S. at 340; In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C. , 859 F.3d at 345. ¶15. Subsection one addresses venue f or general c ivil litigation and states that the action shall be com m enced: (1) “in the c ounty where the d ef endant resides,” (2) “in the county of its principal place o f business” “if a corporation,” (3) “in the c ounty where a s u bstantial alleged act or om ission occurre d , ” ( 4 ) “ w here a substantial event that caused the injury occurred,” (5) “in the county w here the plaintif f obtained the product” if alleging a “ def ective product.” Miss. Code A nn. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i)-(ii). Further , f o r products liability actions, Section 11-11-3(1)(b) allows the plaintif f to com m ence an action “in the county where the plaintif f resides or is d om iciled” if the def endant is a nonresident. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11- 3(1)(b). ¶16. W h en deciding where to f ile an a ction, the plaintif

f m a y have m ore than one county f rom which to pick. A m . Hom e Prods. Corp. v. Sum lin , 9 42 So. 2d 766, 769 (Miss. 2006) (“Of right, the plaintif

f selects am ong the perm issible venues, and his c h o i c e m ust be sustained unless in t he end there is no f actual b asis f

or the claim of venue.”). However, “in the county where the def

endant resides” could provide the plaintif f two different p ossible and
proper venues when there is m ore than one def endant

. Thus, b ecaus e e a c h venue option listed in the paragraph above m ay def ine m ore th a n o n e c o u n t y , they a re b est described as

venue categories

. Subsection one contains six possible venue categories, and depending on the f acts of each case, even m ore possible proper venue counties.

9¶17. Subsect i o n t wo addresses venue f or c a ses with m o re than one plaintif f

. Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-11-3(2). Subsection f our addresses the d octrine of forum non conveniens

. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(4). For our analy sis, subsections two and f our are not pertinent. ¶18. Moving to s ubsection three, f irst we encoun t e r t h e f

o l l o w i n g : “Notwithstanding subsection (1) of

this section

. . . . ” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3). The d issent argues that “notwithstanding” m eans we should not look to subsection o ne. I n e s s e n c e , we should consider subsection three in isolation. W e r e s pectf ully disagree. “Notwithstanding” ensures that subsection one does not def ine or allow additional v enues f or m edical-m alpractice cases. Adam s v. Baptist Mem ’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc. , 965 So. 2d 652 (Miss. 2 007) (“The presence of m edical providers in [ an] action renders subsecti o n ( 1) inapplicable, as the ‘notwithstanding’ language of subsection ( 3) negates the language of subsection ( 1 )

. ” )

. 4 However, despite the “notwithstanding” l anguage, Sec t i o n 11-11-3 was written as one
statute. T o read “notwithstanding” to m ean we are restrained t o look only to subsection three in isolation prevents u s f

rom c onsidering the linguistic choices as whole, which are crucial

to r eading the plain language in subsection three. See Miller , 530 U.S. at 340; In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C. , 859 F.3d at 345. ¶19. Subsection three then goes on to list specif ic ty pes of m e dical providers and the ty pes of claim s that m ay be brought. S ee Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3). It t hen states the venue language at issue. It states that the action “ shall be brought only in the county in which the

4 A lth o u g h th e m ean i n g o f “n o tw ith stan d in g ” w as ad d ressed in A d a m s , A d a m s is d istin g u ish ab le f

ro m th e in s t a n t c a s e b ecau se, u n lik e h ere, A d a m s a d d ressed v e n u e f

o r a
m ed ical an d a n o n m e d ical d ef en d an t. A d

a m s , 9 6 5 S o . 2 d at 6 5 2

. 1 0alleged a ct o r om ission occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3). Unlike subsection one,

subsection t hree contains one single or sole venue category f or m edical m alpractice—“the county in which t h e a l l e g e d a ct or om ission occurred.” Id. Thus, “only ” def ines the sole

c a t e g o r y to d eterm ine the venue f or a m e dical-m alpractice a c tion. The question n o w becom es wheth e r the singularity of the category conf ines the venue choice to one county

. ¶20. The Legis l a t u r e h a s s t a t e d : “ W ords used in the singular num ber only , either as descriptive of persons or things, shall extend to and e m brace the p lural num

ber; and words used i n the plural num

ber shall extend to and e m brace the singular num

ber, except where a contrary intention is m anif est.” Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-33 (Rev. 2014). T heref ore, as long

as there is no m anif

est contrary intention, the statutory l anguage a l so can b e read as stating that the action “shall be brought o nly in the c o unt[ ies] in which the alleged act[ s ] or

om ission[ s] occurred.” See M iss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3). ¶21. To determ i ne if

there is a m anif

est c ontrary intention, the Court looks to subsection one. Subsection one provides in pertinent part: (1)(a)(i) Civil actions of which the circuit court has o riginal j urisdiction shall be com m enced in the county where the def endant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of b u s i n e s s , o r in the county where a substantial alleged a ct or o mission occurred or where a substantial event t hat caused the injury

occurred. (ii) Civil actions alleging a d ef ective product m a y a l s o be com m enced in the co u nty where the plaintif f o btained the product. (b) If venue i n a civil action against a nonresident def endant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a c i vil action against a nonresident m ay be c om m enced in the county wh e r e the plaintif f resides or is dom i ciled.

1 1Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-1 ( em phasis added). The l anguage illustrates that subsection one sim ilarly contains words in t h e s i n g u l ar f orm when ref

erring to “the county ” in w hich suit

m ay be f iled and the “act or o m ission” or “event” t hat occurred. Id. Further, as s tated above,
f or each category , plaintif f s f alling under sub section one m ay choose f rom m ore than one county f or proper venue. Sum lin , 942 So. 2d 769 (“Of right, t he plaintif f selects a m ong the
perm issible venues, and his choice m ust be sustained unless in the end there i s n o f actual basis f or the claim of venue.”). Theref ore, the C o u r t h o l d s there is no m anif est contrary intention to keep the language singular in Section 11-11-3(3), and under case-specif ic f acts, subsection three m a y take the plural f orm . ¶22. It is f

oreseeable t hat the Court could be f a c e d w i t h a s c e n a r i o in which the sam e doctor com m itted m a lpractice on the sam e def e ndant i n m ore than one county

. Under the instant reading of the s tat u t e , all the counties would satisf y the single category def

ined in Section 11-11-3(3). However, if t he Court were to adopt the Leake County Appellants’ and the dissent’s reading of t h e s tatute, the plaintif f would have to f

ile a suit against the sam e doctor i n each and every county where the d octor com m itted m alpractice

. This s im ply does

not com port with any

plain or logical reading of the language of Section 11-11-3(3). ¶23. Thus, c onsidering that o u r r o l e is to determ ine what a statute does provide, Section 11-11-3(3) plainly and unamb i g u o usly provides that where both def endants are private

m edical d ef

endants and where an a c t or om i ssion occurred in both counties f orm ing an indivisible injury , bot

h c o u n t i e s s a t i s fy t

h e s i n g l e category def

ined within Section 1 1-11-3(3).

1 2The issue now becom e s whether Section 11-11

- 3 ( 3 ) prevents joinder of the t wo m edical

def endants. (b) Whether Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3) prevents joinder. ¶24. T he Leake County Appellants argue that joinder under Rule 20 does not cure im p r o p e r

venue because if joinder was allowed, a Leake County A ppel lant—who com m itted all its alleged acts or om issions in Leake County —would be brought into court in Hinds County

. Dr. Moody and Madden M edical specif ically p oint to Adam s , 965 S o. 2d 6 57, to argue that

cases involving “ a me d ical m alpractice def endant and another def

endant” are “only appropriate in the county where the alleged m alpractice o ccurred.” Further, they argue that dif f iculty in splitting up f

ault and dam a ges is not a rea s o n t o a l l o w joinder and disregard

venue. ¶25. On the other hand, the Harkinses argue t h a t , because both def endants are m edical provid ers, there is no m andated legislative priority of venue; both def endants f all equally under Section 11-11-3(3), and the joinde r p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 20 and Rule 82 should be sim ilarly read to f

i x venue in e ither county that satisf ies the p riority -venue requirem ents of Section 11-11-3(3). Further, t he Harkinses state that if the case is severed, com

plete relief cannot be accorded. ¶26. Section 11-11-3(1) h a s not been construed to prevent p erm issive joinder under Rule
20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure or application of R ule 82(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. It i s an issue of f irst im pression 5 f

or t he C ourt whether Section 11-

5 T h e L eak e C o u n t y A p p ellan ts p lace g r eat w eig h t o n A d a m s . A d a m s , 9 6 5 S o . 2 d at 1 311-3(3) allows perm issive joinder under Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure

and application of Rule 8 2(c) of the Mississipp i R u l e s of Civil Procedure where both def endants are m edical providers. ¶27. Rule 20(a) of the M ississippi Rules o f Civil Procedure allows perm issive joinder. I t states in pertinent part: All persons m ay be j oined in one action a s def endants i f there is asserted against them jointly , severally , or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the sam e transaction, o ccurrence, o r s eries of transactions or occurrences, and if a n y question of law or f a ct com m on to all def endants will arise in t he action. A p l a i n t i f f or def e ndant need not be interested in obtaining or def ending against all the relief dem anded. Judgm ent m ay b e given f

or one or m ore of the plaintif f s according to their respective rights t o relief

, and against one or m ore def endants according to their respective liabilities. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Rule 82(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states: “W here several claim s or parties have been properly joined, the suit m ay be b r o u g h t i n a ny county in which any o n e o f t he claim s c ould properly have b een brought.” M iss. R. Civ. P. 82(c). ¶28. As explained a b o v e , t he existence of one category f or venue is dif

f erent f rom the existence of o ne county f or venue, and two c o u n ties m ay satisf y the only category f

or determ ining venue. Theref ore, where two m edical def endants f all w ithin the s a m e category , the Court holds that Section 11-11-3(3) does not contain any language p reventing perm issive joinder under Rule 2 0

. Further, the plain language does not prevent the application of Rule 82(c). Turning to the instant case, the Leake County Appellants and Baptist Medical Center

6 5 2

. H o w ev er, d esp ite th e w eig h t p laced o n A d a m s , th e issu e h ere still is an issu e o f f irst im p ressio n b ecau se A d

a m s d e alt w ith a m ed ical an d a n o n m ed ica l d ef en d an t. Id

. 1 4in H inds County satisf y the o nly category f

or v enue, albeit in dif

f erent counties. Theref

ore, they have been joined properly , and due to the proper joinder of the Leake County Appellants and Baptist Medical Center, the cla i m c a n b e b rought in either of the two counties, under Rule 82(c). ¶29. It is worth n oting that, unlike here, in the Mississippi Tort Claim s Act, the Legislature specif ically noted that joinder of nongovernm ental entities should not change the venue of

a party f alling under the Act. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2012). Section 11-
46-13 states in p e rtinent part, “The venue s pecif ied in thi s s u b section shall control in all actions f iled against governm ental entities, notwithstanding that other defendants which are
not g overnmental entities may be joined i n the suit , and notwithstanding the provisions of any other v enue statute that otherwise would apply .” Id. (em phasis added). T hus, d e s pite joinder, if

the Legislature wanted to lim it t he def endants in the instant suit to the county in which e ach respective alleged act or om ission t ook place, the Legislature could have done so as it did in Section 11-46-13. ¶30. In sum m ation, the Court reads S ectio n 1 1

- 1 1

- 3 ( 3 ) i n h arm ony with Rules 20 and 82(c)of t he Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to the p erm issive joinder of the Leake County Appellants and Baptist Medical Center, the claim can be brought in either of the two counties. Further, because the Court holds that the plain language allows perm issive joinder, the Court will not address the additional argum ents put f orth b y t h e parties regarding

com pulsory joinder, including claim

and issue preclusion.

1 5CONCLUSION

¶31. The Court af

f irm s the j udgm ent of the trial court and holds Section 11-11-3(3) to be plain and unam

biguous. Under the instant f acts, t h e Harkinses are allowed to choose between the two c ounties, as both counties satisf y t he categorical requirem ent contained in Section 11-11-3(3) and both def endants are properly j oined. ¶32. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND KITCHEN S , P . J J., KING, B E AM AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. COLEM A N , J ., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MAX WELL, J. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶33. The L egislature sets venue f or civil act i o n s i n M i ssissippi. W hether the Suprem e Court sees wisdom or f

olly in the statute passed by t he Legislature, we are constrained by the Constitution t o f

ollow i t unless it is unconstitutional bey ond a reasonabl e doubt. In Mississippi Code S ection 11-11-3(3), t h e l a w of Mississippi requires venue in m edical

m alpractice actions against a g iven caregiver to be set i n the county in w hich t he negligence alleged a gainst the caregiver occurred. Because the m ajority ’s holding today departs f rom the law as set by

the Legislature, I, with respect, dissent. ¶34. Statutes establish venue. Salts v. Gulf Nat’l L ife Ins. Co. , 743 S o. 2d 3 71, 373 (¶ 7) (Miss. 1999); Bd. of T

rustees of State Inst. of Higher Learning v. V an S lyke , 510 So. 2d 490, 492 ( Miss. 1 9 87). The s tatute governing the venue issue in the case sub judice reads as f ollows: Notwithstanding s u b section (1) of this section, any action against a licensed phy sician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, phy sician assistant,

1 6psy chologist, p harm acist, podiatrist, optom etrist, chiropractor, institution f or the aged or inf

irm , hospital or licen s e d p h a r m acy , including any l egal entity which m a y be liable f

or their acts or om issions, f or m alpractice, n egligence, error, om ission, m istake, breach of standar d of care or t he unauthorized rendering o f prof

essional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or om ission occurred. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3) ( Rev. 2004). “W hen interpreting a statute that is not

am biguous, this Court will apply the plain m eaning of t he statute.” Pitalo v. GPCH-GP,
Inc. , 9 33 So. 2d 927, 929 (¶ 5 ) (Miss. 2006). To determ ine the plain m e aning, “ we m ust look

at the words of the statute.” Adam s v. Baptist Mem ’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc. , 965 So. 2d 652, 656 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2007). ¶35. The e f

f e c t o f t h e a b o v e - q u o t e d s t atute is straightf orward and clear. An action sounding in m edical negligence against a given caregiver m a y be brought only in t he county in which the alleged negligent act or om ission occurred. W hen the Hinds C ounty Circuit
Court denied the Leake County def endants’ m otion to transf er venue o f the claim s against them , it allowed t he c laim f or negligent a c ts a lleged t o h a v e o c c u rred i n Leake County to proceed in a county other than the one w here the alleged acts or om issions took place, i.e. , Hinds County

. The c ourt’s denial of the m o tion contradi c t e d Section 11-11-3(3)’s clear directive. ¶36. It is a “f

undam ental rule o f our sovereignty ” that “the l egislature h a s t h e power to
enact any law it sees f

it, be it sincere or hy

p ocritical, m oral or im m o ral, wis e o r f o o lish, benef icial or h arm f

ul, p rovided i t does not violate the pro h i b i t i o n s o f the State o r Federal
Const i t u t i o n . ” State v

. Wood , 187 So. 2d 820, 827 (Miss. 1 966). I share m any of the

concerns r aised by the plaintif f s that arise f

rom a statute that requires plaintif f s to s plit their

1 7c a u s es of action, which if t hey sounded in another area of law would be tried togethe r ,

between two dif

f erent v enues. However, those policy concerns and the ill ef f ects, if any , of
poor policy decisions that f all within the legislative prerogative c annot be o ur concern when the ef f ect of the s tatute in question is clear and no questions regarding i t s c onstitutionality

are raised. In ef

f ect, i f the Legislature h as spoken, the nine lawy ers sitting on the Mississippi Suprem e Court, pursuant to our c o n s t i tutional s eparation of powers, m u st listen absent a

concern over the c onstitutional validity of a statute. “The f unction of the Co u r t is not to decide what a s t a t u te should provide, but to determ ine what i t does provide.” Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 75 So. 3 d 1024, 1027 ( ¶ 7 ) ( M iss. 2011). Again, no party to the instant case has challenged the constitutionality of Section 11-11-3(3). ¶37. The m ajority r eaches its holding, i.e. , that the venue statute a llows plaintif f s to bring suit i n Hinds County against the def endants whose alleged negligence occurred in Leake County , i n p a r t b y i nterpreting it in light of S ection 11-11-3(1). (Maj. Op. at ¶¶ 15-19). However, the Legislature explicitly included in Subsection 3 that i t ap p lies “[ n]otwithstanding” s ubsection 1. The m ajority also relies on Mississippi Code S ection 1-3-
33 f or the proposition that t h e L egislature itself has a uthorized courts to construe singular nouns as plural and plural as singular “as long as there is no contrary intention.” (Maj. Op.

at ¶20). As applied to Section 11-11-3(3), the L egislature m ade its contrary i ntent cry stal clear when it added the word “only .” An a ction against a phy s i cian “shall be brought only in the county in which the a lleged act or om ission occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3)

1 8(Rev. 2004) (em phasis added). In m y opinion, the word “only ” m anif ests the i ntention that the word “county ” hold its singular f orm . ¶38. For the f

o regoing reasons, I would reverse and r em and with instructions f o r the trial

court t o sever the claim s against the Leake C ou n t y d e f e n d ants and transf

e r them to Leake County

. MAX WELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

1 9