16630 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 57 / Thursday, March 24, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

improbable, that degrade the structural 

capability below the level required by 

part 25, or that significantly reduce the 

reliability of the remaining system. As 

far as reasonably practicable, the 

flightcrew must be made aware of these 

failures before flight. Certain elements 

of the control system, such as 

mechanical and hydraulic components, 

may use special periodic inspections, 

and electronic components may use 

daily checks, in lieu of detection and 

indication systems, to achieve the 

objective of this requirement. These 

certification-maintenance requirements 

must be limited to components that are 

not readily detectable by normal 

detection-and-indication systems, and 

where service history shows that 

inspections will provide an adequate 

level of safety. 

b. The existence of any failure 

condition, not extremely improbable, 

during flight, that could significantly 

affect the structural capability of the 

airplane, and for which the associated 

reduction in airworthiness can be 

minimized by suitable flight limitations, 

must be signaled to the flightcrew. For 

example, failure conditions that result 

in a factor of safety between the airplane 

strength and the loads of part 25, 

subpart C, below 1.25, or flutter margins 

below V’’, must be signaled to the crew 

during flight. 

4. Dispatch with known failure 

conditions. If the airplane is to be 

dispatched in a known system-failure 

condition that affects structural 

performance, or that affects the 

reliability of the remaining system to 

maintain structural performance, then 

the provisions of these special 

conditions must be met, including the 

provisions of special condition 1, 

‘‘System Fully Operative’’ for the 

dispatched condition, and special 

condition 2, ‘‘System in the Failure 

Condition’’ for subsequent failures. 

Expected operational limitations may be 

taken into account in establishing Pj as 

the probability of failure occurrence for 

determining the safety margin in Figure 

1. Flight limitations and expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Qj as the 

combined probability of being in the 

dispatched failure condition and the 

subsequent failure condition for the 

safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These 

limitations must be such that the 

probability of being in this combined 

failure state, and then subsequently 

encountering limit load conditions, is 

extremely improbable. No reduction in 

these safety margins is allowed if the 

subsequent system-failure rate is greater 

than 10¥3 per flight hour. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on March 

18, 2022. 

Patrick R. Mullen, 

Manager, Technical Innovation Policy 

Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–06178 Filed 3–23–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0896; Special 

Conditions No. 25–812–SC] 

Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 6X Airplane; ElectronicSystem Security Protection From 

Unauthorized Internal Access 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Dassault Aviation 

(Dassault) Model Falcon 6X airplane. 

This airplane will have a novel or 

unusual design feature when compared 

to the state of technology envisioned in 

the airworthiness standards for 

transport category airplanes. This design 

feature is a digital systems architecture 

for the installation of a system with 

wireless and hardwired network and 

hosted application functionality that 

allows access, from sources internal to 

the airplane, to the airplane’s internal 

electronic components. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on 

Dassault on March 24, 2022. Send 

comments on or before May 9, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by Docket No. FAA–2021–0896 using 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov/ and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: Except for Confidential 

Business Information (CBI) as described 

in the following paragraph, and other 

information as described in title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received without change to https://

www.regulations.gov/, including any 

personal information you provide. The 

FAA will also post a report 

summarizing each substantive verbal 

contact received about these special 

conditions. 

Confidential Business Information: 

Confidential Business Information (CBI) 

is commercial or financial information 

that is both customarily and actually 

treated as private by its owner. Under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

(5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from 

public disclosure. If your comments 

responsive to these special conditions, 

contain commercial or financial 

information that is customarily treated 

as private, that you actually treat as 

private, and that is relevant or 

responsive to these special conditions. 

Notice, it is important that you clearly 

designate the submitted comments as 

CBI. Please mark each page of your 

submission containing CBI as 

‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such 

marked submissions as confidential 

under the FOIA, and the indicated 

comments will not be placed in the 

public docket of these special 

conditions. Send submissions 

containing CBI to the Information 

Contact below. Comments the FAA 

receives, which are not specifically 

designated as CBI, will be placed in the 

public docket for this rulemaking. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

https://www.regulations.gov/ at any 

time. Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Thuan T. Nguyen, Aircraft Information 

Systems, AIR–622, Technical 

Innovation Policy Branch, Policy and 

Innovation Division, Aircraft 

Certification Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 2200 South 216th 

Street, Des Moines, Washington 98198; 

telephone and fax 206–231–3365; email 

thuan.t.nguyen@faa.gov. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 57 / Thursday, March 24, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 16631 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

substance of these special conditions 

has been published in the Federal 

Register for public comment in several 

prior instances with no substantive 

comments received. Therefore, the FAA 

finds that, pursuant to § 11.38(b), new 

comments are unlikely, and public 

notice and comment prior to this 

publication are unnecessary. 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested people to 

take part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

The FAA will consider all comments 

received by the closing date for 

comments. The FAA may change these 

special conditions based on the 

comments received. 

Background 

On July 1, 2012, Dassault Aviation 

applied for a type certificate for its new 

Model Falcon 5X airplane. However, 

Dassault has decided not to release an 

airplane under the model designation 

Falcon 5X, instead choosing to change 

that model designation to Falcon 6X. 

In February of 2018, due to engine 

supplier issues, Dassault extended the 

type certificate application date for its 

Model Falcon 5X airplane under new 

Model Falcon 6X. This airplane is a 

twin-engine business jet with seating for 

19 passengers, and has a maximum 

takeoff weight of 77,460 pounds. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Dassault must show that the Model 

Falcon 6X airplane meets the applicable 

provisions of part 25, as amended by 

amendments 25–1 through 25–146. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(e.g., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Dassault Model Falcon 6X 

airplane because of a novel or unusual 

design feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, these special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Dassault Model Falcon 

6X airplane must comply with the fuelvent and exhaust-emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34, and the noisecertification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Dassault Model Falcon 6X 

airplane will incorporate the following 

novel or unusual design feature: 

A digital systems architecture for the 

installation of a system with wireless 

and hardwired network and hosted 

application functionality that allows 

access, from sources internal to the 

airplane, to the airplane’s internal 

electronic components. 

Discussion 

The digital systems architecture for 

the Aircraft Control Domain and the 

Airline Information Services Domain by 

unauthorized persons in the Passenger 

Services Domain system with wireless 

network and hosted application 

functionality on these Dassault Falcon 

6X airplanes is a novel or unusual 

design feature for transport category 

airplanes because it is composed of 

several connected wireless and 

hardwired networks. This proposed 

network architecture is used for a 

diverse set of airplane functions, 

including: 

• Flight-safety related control and 

navigation systems, 

• airline business and administrative 

support, and 

• passenger entertainment. 

The airplane control domain and 

airline information-services domain of 

these networks perform functions 

required for the safe operation and 

maintenance of the airplane. Previously, 

these domains had very limited 

connectivity with other network 

sources. This network architecture 

creates a potential for unauthorized 

persons to access the aircraft control 

domain and airline information-services 

domain from sources internal to the 

airplane, and presents security 

vulnerabilities related to the 

introduction of computer viruses and 

worms, user errors, and intentional 

sabotage of airplane electronic assets 

(networks, systems, and databases) 

critical to the safety and maintenance of 

the airplane. 

The existing FAA regulations did not 

anticipate these networked airplanesystem architectures. Furthermore, these 

regulations and the current guidance 

material do not address potential 

security vulnerabilities, which could be 

exploited by unauthorized access to 

airplane networks, data buses, and 

servers. Therefore, these special 

conditions ensure that the security (i.e., 

confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability) of airplane systems will not 

be compromised by unauthorized 

hardwired or wireless electronic 

connections from within the airplane. 

These special conditions also require 

the applicant to provide appropriate 

instructions to the operator to maintain 

all electronic-system safeguards that 

have been implemented as part of the 

original network design so that this 

feature does not allow or reintroduce 

security threats. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Dassault 

Model Falcon 6X airplane. Should 

Dassault apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, these 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only a certain 

novel or unusual design feature on one 

model of airplane. It is not a rule of 

general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

Authority Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701, 44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Dassault 

Aviation Model Falcon 6X airplane for 

airplane electronic-system security 

protection from unauthorized internal 

access. 

1. The applicant must ensure that the 

design provides isolation from, or 

airplane electronic-system security 

protection against, access by 

unauthorized sources internal to the 

airplane. The design must prevent 


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16632 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 57 / Thursday, March 24, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

inadvertent and malicious changes to, 

and all adverse impacts upon, airplane 

equipment, systems, networks, and 

other assets required for safe flight and 

operations. 

2. The applicant must establish 

appropriate procedures to allow the 

operator to ensure that continued 

airworthiness of the airplane is 

maintained, including all post-typecertification modifications that may 

have an impact on the approved 

electronic-system security safeguards. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on March 

18, 2022. 

Patrick R. Mullen, 

Manager, Technical Innovation Policy 

Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–06205 Filed 3–23–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0021; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–01088–R; Amendment 

39–21994; AD 2021–03–16R1] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; removal; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is removing 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021–03– 

16, which applied to all Airbus 

Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, 

AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, 

AS350D, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, 

AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP 

helicopters. AD 2021–03–16 required 

inspecting each sliding door and 

replacing the upper rail or front roller or 

removing the front roller from service if 

necessary. Since the FAA issued AD 

2021–03–16, inspection results and 

further investigation have confirmed 

that the in-flight loss of a sliding door, 

which prompted AD 2021–03–16, was 

an isolated case resulting from incorrect 

operation and maintenance error. 

Therefore, the FAA has determined that 

no unsafe condition is likely to exist or 

develop on the sliding doors on other 

helicopters in the fleet. Accordingly, AD 

2021–03–16 is removed. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

March 24, 2022. 

The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD by May 9, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–0021; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, the European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The address for Docket 

Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt 

Fuller, AD Program Manager, General 

Aviation & Rotorcraft Unit, 

Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, FAA, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; 

telephone 817–222–5110; email 

matthew.fuller@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written data, views, or arguments about 

this final rule. Send your comments to 

an address listed under ADDRESSES. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2021–0021 

and Project Identifier MCAI–2020– 

01088–R’’ at the beginning of your 

comments. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the final 

rule, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. The FAA will consider 

all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this final rule 

because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. The 

agency will also post a report 

summarizing each substantive verbal 

contact received about this final rule. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this AD contain 

commercial or financial information 

that is customarily treated as private, 

that you actually treat as private, and 

that is relevant or responsive to this AD, 

it is important that you clearly designate 

the submitted comments as CBI. Please 

mark each page of your submission 

containing CBI as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA 

will treat such marked submissions as 

confidential under the FOIA, and they 

will not be placed in the public docket 

of this AD. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Matt Fuller, AD 

Program Manager, General Aviation & 

Rotorcraft Unit, Airworthiness Products 

Section, Operational Safety Branch, 

FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort 

Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817–222– 

5110; email matthew.fuller@faa.gov. 

Any commentary that the FAA receives 

which is not specifically designated as 

CBI will be placed in the public docket 

for this rulemaking. 

Background 

EASA, which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued EASA AD 2020– 

0175–CN, dated September 13, 2021 

(EASA AD 2020–0175–CN) to cancel 

EASA AD 2020–0175, dated August 5, 

2020 (EASA AD 2020–0175) which was 

issued to correct an unsafe condition for 

all serial-numbered Airbus Helicopters 

Model AS 350 and AS 355 helicopters 

if equipped with a left-hand (LH) 

and/or right-hand (RH) sliding door. 

EASA AD 2020–0175 prompted FAA 

AD 2021–03–16, Amendment 39– 

21419 (86 FR 9433, February 16, 2021) 

(AD 2021–03–16). AD 2021–03–16 

applied to Airbus Helicopters Model 

AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, 

AS350BA, AS350D, AS355E, AS355F, 

AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and 

AS355NP helicopters with any sliding 

door installed. AD 2021–03–16 

required, within 30 hours time-inservice, inspecting the upper rail of each 

RH and LH door for parallelism, 

deformation, corrosion, and cracking 

and repairing or replacing the upper rail 

before further flight if necessary; and 


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