Interim Decision #2479 

MATTER OF PICHARDO AND BRUGMAN 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-20581862 

A-20581864 

Decided by Board March 5, 1976 

Since the law a' the Dominican Republic on mutual consent divorce obtained by foreigners 

does not state that both parties to such a divorce must be foreigners in order to render 

applicable the exception of the waiting period for pronouncement, in the absence of any 

evidence to the contrary, it is concluded that a mutual consent divorce obtained in the 

Dominican Republic in which one of the parties is a foreigner may be pronounced at any 

time. Hence, the mutual consent divorce obtained in the Dominican Republic on February 26, 1974, by the United States citizen peititioner from his previous spouse, a 

citizen of the Dominican Republic residing in New York, which was pronounced on the 

same day the judgment was rendered, is valid in the Dominican Republic and is entitled 

to recognition under the law of New York where petitioner subsequently married the 

beneficiary. 

ON BEHALF CF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Robert Greenstone, Esquire Olga Springer 

225 Broadway Appellate Trial Attorney 

New York, New York 10007 

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative 

status for the beneficiaries as his spouse and stepson under section 

201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a decision dated 

October 23, 1974, the district director denied the petitions and subsequently-his decision was certified to us for review. The decision will be 

reversed and the record remanded to the district director. 

The petitions were denied on the ground that the petitioner's marriage to the female beneficiary was invalid because of the existence of a 

prior undissolved marriage entered into by the petitioner. The petitioner, however, claims that he had obtained a divorce by mutual consent from his previous spouse, a citizen of the Dominican Republic 

residing in New York, before marrying the beneficiary. In support of 

this claim, he has submitted a copy of a divorce decree dated February 

26, 1974 from the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of 

San Cristobal, the Dominican Republic, and a copy of the Pronouncement of the Divorce, also dated February 26, 1974. 

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Interim Decision #2479 

The district director, however, found that the petitioner had not fully 

complied with the pronouncement requirement as set out in the Dominican law on divorce I in that the pronouncement was made the same day 

the divorce was decreed. As a consequence, he concluded that the 

divorce was invalid in the Dominican Republic. He relied on our opinion 

in Matter of Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307 (BIA 1973) in denying the 

petition. 

In Matter of Tagle, a recent decision, 15 I. & N. Dec. 595 (BIA 

1976), we held that under the law of the Dominican Republic on divorce 

as amended in 1971, a mutual consent divorce obtained by foreigners 

may be pronounced at any time. The eight-business-day waiting period 

required in mutual consent divorces obtained by Dominicans is inapplicable in such a case. 

The Dominican statute does not state that both parties to such a 

divorce must be foreigners for the exception to the waiting period to 

apply. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we conclude that 

a mutual consent divorce in which one of the parties is a foreigner may 

be pronounced at any time. Inasmuch as.the petitioner, a United States 

citizen, was a party to the divorce proceedings, the divorce was 

properly pronounced on the day the judgment was issued, and thus. is 

valid in the Dominican Republic. 

The petitioner's divorce is entitled to recognition under New York 

law. See Rosenstiet v. Rosenstiel, 262 N.Y.S.2d 186, 209 N.E.2d 709 

(1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 971 (1966). See also Matter of Assan, 15 I. 

& N. Dee. 211 (BIA 1975). 

The district director's decision with respect to the Dominican law is 

incorrect. His decision will be reversed. The record will be remanded, 

however, in order that the district director may determine if the marriage between the petitioner and the beneficiary is bona Me. See Matter 

of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385 (BIA 1975). 

ORDER: The decision of the district director is reversed; the record 

is remanded to the district director for further proceedings consistent 

with the above opinion. 

1Civil Code of the Dominican Republic LaW 1306-bis (1937) as amended by Law 142 

(1971). 

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