[Cite as State v. Kendrick , 2012-Ohio-5795.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 25100

v. : T.C. NO. 03CR4234 SHAUN D. KENDRICK, SR. : (Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant :

:

. . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 7th day of December , 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0020084, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JOSHUA S. CARTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0084925, 10044 Meadow Woods Lane, Dayton, Ohio 45458 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant SHAUN D. KENDRICK, SR., #A489-082, Pickaway Correctional Institution, P. O. Box 209, Orient, Ohio 43146 Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . .DONOVAN, J. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Shaun D. Kendrick, Sr., appeal s a decision of the trial court overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. 2003-CR-4234. Kendrick filed a timely no tice of appeal with this Court on March 16, 2012. {¶ 2} Appointed counsel for defendant-appe llant Kendrick sub mitted an appellate brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alleging that no arguably meritorious issues ex ist for appeal. After a thorough review of the record, this Court agrees that the trial court’s proceedings were proper, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. {¶ 3} We set forth the history of the case in State v. Kendrick , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24626, 2012-Ohio-504, and rep eat it herein in pertinent part: {¶ 4} “On January 26, 2005, Kendrick accepted a plea deal and pled guilty to seven counts of rape. ‘S ix of those convictions were for ra pes that had occurred prior to the July 1, 1996 effective date of th e Senate Bill 2 sentencing la ws, and the other one took place after that date. The trial court sentenced Kendrick to five consecutive, indeterminate sentences of 10 to 25 years and one concurrent sentence of 10 to 25 years for the pre-S.B. 2 rapes. The court also ordered a consecutive 10-year term for the post-S.B. 2 rape. We affirmed Kendrick’s convi ctions and sentence. State v. Kendrick, Montgomery App. 20965, 2006-Ohio-311 [hereinafter ‘ Kendrick I ’].’ State v. Kendrick , Montgomery App. No. 21790, 2007-Ohio-6136, at ¶2 (hereinafter ‘ Kendrick II ’).” {¶ 5} “The Supreme Court of Ohio reve rsed Kendrick's post-S.B. 2 sentence following our decision in Kendrick I . See In re Ohio Sentencing Cases , 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 2006-Ohio-2394, at ¶19. The case was rema nded for re-sentencing in line with State v.3 Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856. See Kendrick II at ¶3.” {¶ 6} “The trial court re-sentenced Ke ndrick on remand to ten years on the post-S.B. 2 count, and, in August 2006, the tr ial court issued a ne w termination entry (hereinafter the ‘Resentencing Entry’). The court ordered Kendrick to serve that sentence consecutive to his other six sentences. Kendr ick appealed following the resentencing hearing, and we affirmed th e trial court’s decision. See Kendrick II at ¶19. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to review our decision in Kendrick II . See State v. Kendrick , 117 Ohio St.3d 1441 (Table), 2008-Ohio-1279.” {¶ 7} “On January 20, 2011, Kendrick filed a ‘Motion to Dismiss and Vacate Conviction Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 & Crim.R. 32(A)(C).’ In his motion, Kendrick argued that the trial court’s Resentencing Entry was not a final appealable orde r. Kendrick asserted that, because there was no final appealable order properly sentencing him, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing and disc harge Kendrick. The trial court denied Kendrick’s motion.” {¶ 8} Kendrick appealed the tr ial court’s decision, and we affirmed, holding that the proper remedy for a trial court’s failure to set forth the manner of a defendant’s conviction in a judgment entry is to issue a nunc pro tunc entry that corrects the error. State v. Kendrick , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24626, 2012-Ohio- 504. We note that the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry reflecting Kendrick’s plea of gu ilty on September 20, 2011. {¶ 9} On September 12, 2011, Kendrick filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim. R. 32.1 and Cr im. R. 32(C). In a judgment entry issued on February 22, 2012, the trial court overruled Ke ndrick’s motion to withdraw his plea without conducting4 a hearing. {¶ 10} It is from this judgment that Kendrick now appeals. {¶ 11} Counsel was appointed to represen t Kendrick on appeal on April 25, 2012. On June 20, 2012, appointed counsel submitted an Anders brief, alleging that no arguably meritorious issues existed for appeal. By ma gistrate’s order of June 22, 2012, we informed Kendrick that his counsel filed an Anders brief and informed him of the significance of an Anders brief. We invited Kendrick to file a pro se brief assigning any error for our review within sixty days. After requesting one extension of time, Kendrick filed his merit brief on September 20, 2012. {¶ 12} Kendrick’s sole a ssignment of error is as follows: {¶ 13} “THE APPELLANT [sic] RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW AFFORDED TO HIM BY THE 5 TH , 6 TH , AND 14 TH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN VIOLATED.” {¶ 14} In his sole assignment, Kendrick contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to withdraw his plea. Specifically, Kendrick argues that coercive tactics and undue influence exer ted by his trial counsel rende red his guilty plea involuntary. {¶ 15} In his direct appeal, Kendrick prev iously argued that his counsel was ineffective, that he had ente red his guilty plea out of frustra tion with his trial counsel’s failure to file pre-tria l motions, that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea to preserve his right to appeal the trial court’s rulings on his pre-trial motions, and that he received erroneous advice regarding pre-trial moti ons. Kendrick also asserted that the trial5 court erred when it overruled hi s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. We rejected Kendrick’s claims regarding the ineffectiveness of hi s trial counsel in our decision affirming his conviction in Kendrick I . 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20965, 2006-Ohio-311. We also held that the trial court did not err when it overruled Kendrick’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id

. {¶ 16} In the instant appeal, Kendrick argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his most recent motion to withdraw hi s guilty plea for the following reasons: 1) he was induced and coerced into entering a guilty pl ea; 2) his trial counsel was ineffective; 3) the trial court abused it discretion by accepting hi s “corrupt” plea; and 4) that he was denied equal protection of the law and due process. {¶ 17} Upon review, we find that the entiret y of Kendrick’s cla ims in his second motion to withdraw his guilty plea either were or could have been addressed in his direct appeal or in a motion for post-conviction relief. Claims that could have been addressed on direct appeal or in a post-conviction relie f motion in support of post-sentence motion to withdraw are insufficient to de monstrate the manifest injustice required by Crim. R. 32.1 in order to vacate a plea. State v. Hartzell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17499, 1999 WL 957746 (Aug. 20, 1999). Additionally, any claims that were raised and rejected in a prior proceeding are barred by res judicata. The claims made by Kendrick regarding the ineffectiveness of his tria l counsel were considered and rejected by us in Kendrick I . Those claims are, therefore, barred by res judicat a. Any additional out-o f-court representations that Hartzell claims his trial counsel made could have been the subject of a post-conviction motion for relief. Kendrick did not seek that relief. Accordingly he cannot demonstrate6 that a manifest injustice resulted from what his attorney is alleged to have said in order to “induce” him into pleading guilty. Thus, we fi nd that the trial court did not err when it overruled Kendrick’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. {¶ 18} Kendrick’s sole assignme nt of error is overruled. {¶ 19} In the performance of our duty, under Anders v. California, to conduct an independent review of the reco rd, we have found no additional potential a ssignments of error having arguable merit. We c onclude that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, the judgment of the tria l court is Affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . FAIN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur. Copies mailed to: Carley J. Ingram Joshua S. Carter Shaun D. Kendrick, Sr. Hon. Michael L. Tucker