## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate Distri ct of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00185

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 355th Distri ct Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CR12234

Before Sudder th, C.J. ; Kerr and Birdwell , JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Ju stice Birdwell 

### G ORDON 

### R AY 

### L EWIS 

### , Appellant

V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ABATEMENT ORDER Ap p ellant Gordon Ray Le wis appeals th e denial of his mo tion for forensic
DNA testi ng. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.0 5

. Before we ca n addr ess the merits of his appeal, we must first determin e whether we have jurisdiction to hear it.
To show the ti meliness of hi s not i ce of appeal, Lewis relies on Rule 4.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate P ro c edure. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6. The re cord, howev er, does
not show whether Lewi s complied with Rule 4 .6. We abate the appeal and remand
the case to the trial court for it to cond uct a hearing to determine (1) the earliest date
when Lewis or his attorney received not ice or a cquired actual know ledge that the trial judge had signed the order de nying L ewis ’ s DNA motion and (2) whether that date

w as more than twenty days after the judge signed the order. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(2). The trial court is fur ther instructed to sign an order with it s fin dings as

r equired by Rule 4.6 (c)

. See Tex. R. A p p. P. 4.6 (c)

. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND DISCUSSION Lewis is serving a li fe sentence fo r a capit al murder committed in 2013

. See
Lewis v. State , No. 02

- 13

- 00367

- CR, 2014 WL 7204708, at *1 (Tex. App.

— F ort W or th
Dec . 18, 2014, pet. ref’d) ( mem. op. , not designated for publication )

. Years later, i n March 2022 , Lewis file d a m otion for f orensic DNA t esting under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

. See Tex. Code Crim.
P roc. Ann. art. 64 .01. On August 30, 2022, the trial court had a hearing o n Lewi s ’ s motion, and o n Febr uary 16, 2023 , t he trial court sign ed an order de n ying it

.3 Lewis then attempted to appe al the order denying his mo tion fo r DNA testing. But in doing so, he missed the sta n dard appella te dea dlines for perfecting the appeal ,

see Tex. R. App. P . 4.1(a), 26.2(a)(1), and the deadlin e for extending the time to perfe ct the appeal , see Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. He relied, instead, on Rule 4.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure

. See Tex. R

. App. P. 4.6. As discussed below, after reviewing the record, we are unable to tell if Lewis met Rule 4.6 ’ s requirements.
A . Rule 4.6
I n the context o f an order denying a DNA motion , Rule s 2 6. 2(a ) ( 2 ) and 26.3

are not the only means to de ter mine when a n otic e of appeal must be filed . If neither
the defendant nor his attorney receive d notic e of the order within twenty days of its signing, the timetable begins to run “ on the earliest date when the d efendant or the
defendant ’ s attorney received notice o r acquired act ua l kn owle dge of the signing

. ” Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(a). 1
1 . What a Rule 4.6 motion must contain
Rule 4.6 of t he Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure addresses the procedure to
g ain additional time to perfect an appeal: (1) A defenda nt ’ s motion for additiona l time must: (A) Be in writing an d sworn; (B) S tate t he defendant ’ s desire to appeal from the appealable order ;

1 The rule has one caveat: “ [I] n no eve nt shall such per iods begin mor e than 120 days after the day the trial judge signed the appealable order.” Id. We are not concerned wit h this caveat.4 (C) State the earliest date when the defendant or the defendant ’ s attorney received no tice or acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge sig ned the appealable order; and (D ) Be filed wit hin 12 0 days of the signing of the appealable order.
Tex. R. A pp . P. 4.6 (b)(1) (A)

– (D).
2
. Fac tual issues a Rule 4.6 m o tion must resolve
Once a motion to gain additional time is filed , Rule 4.6 addresses what happens next procedur ally: (2) To establish the app lication of pa ragrap h (a) of this rule, the defendant adversely affected must prove in the trial court: (A) T he earliest da te on which the defend ant or the defendant ’ s attorney r eceived notice or acquire d actual knowledge that the trial judge signed the a ppealable orde r; and (B) That this date was more than twenty days after the signing of the appealable order. Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 (b)(2)(A)

– (B)

. 3 . Rule 4.6 antici pates a n eviden tiary hearing and require s a written order with factual findings
A s might be expe cted, a hearing is r e quired to resolve th e factual issu es . A nd

a fter the hearing , the trial court m ust sign a writte n order with its factual fi ndings : ( c) The Court ’ s Order. After hearing the motio n for addit ional time, the trial judge must sign a written order that determines the earliest date when the defendant or the defendant ’ s attorney received notice or acquired ac tual knowledge that th e tria l judg e signed the appealab le order and whether this date was m ore than twenty days after the ju dge signed the appealable order.5 Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 ( c )

. B
. Lewis ’ s Rule 4.6 motion
Lewis filed in t he trial court on June 9 , 2023 , a mo tion fo r a dditional t im e to f i le a n o tice of a ppe al under Rule 4.6 of the Texas R ules of Appella te P rocedure and , along with it, a notice of appeal

. But what Rule 4.6 r equi res and what Lewis put in his
motion varied. Le wis’s motion co mplie d with some of Rule 4.6 ’ s provisions but d id not comply with oth ers . 1 . Complianc e T he motion complied with Rule 4.6 in two respects. First, it state d that Lewis

want ed t o appe al the denial of his DNA motion

. See Tex. R. A pp. P. 4.6 (b) (1) (B).
Seco nd, Lewis filed his motion wi thin 120 day s of the trial court ’ s Feb ru ary 16 order.
See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b) (1) ( D ).
2 . Noncompliance
But t he motion fai led to comply with Rule 4.6 in two othe r respect s. Fir st, the
written mo tio n wa s not s worn to. See T ex. R. App. P. 4 .6(b )( 1)(A)

. Second, it d id not specify when he or his c ou nsel had n otice or ac tual knowledge of the Feb ruary 16
order

. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(C). I ns tea d, the motion presume d that Lewis ’ s trial cou nsel (who had later been allow ed to wit h draw ) rec eived noti ce of the February
1 6 order “ soon after that dat e. ”6 3 . Unopposed
The m otion fur ther assert ed that it was unopposed : “ The District Attorney does not op pose the reque st for addition al time. ” 2 As we s hall see, t he State ’ s willingness not to oppose the motion impacted how the motion proceeded

. C
. Trial court ’ s order
O n June 30, the trial court granted Lewis ’ s motion for additional time and
ordered the notic e o f appeal filed

. The order, in it s entirety, provides, On this day the Motion for Add itiona l Time to File Notice of Appeal came on to be con sidered. After consideration, th e Motion is

. . . GRANTED , an d the Clerk is ordered to file the Notice of Appeal. [ 3 ] 1. No hearing
B ase d on the order itself, the trial court did not appea r to h ave held an

e vident iary hearing on Lewis ’ s Rule 4.6 m otio n . I f there was an evidentiary he aring,

our re cord does not contain a reporter ’ s record of it.

2 The State ’ s willingness not to oppose L ewis ’ s motion effectively recognize d his right to appe a l the den ial of his DNA mo t i on . See Tex

. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.05. A pro secutor ’ s “ primary duty ” is “ to see that jus tice is done. ” I d. art. 2.01.

3 In the ori ginal order, th e document prov ides the word s “ DENIED ” and

“ GRANTED , ” and “ G RANTED ” i s circled.7 2. No fac t u al fi nding s Either way

— and m ore importan tly

— the trial cour t did not make the required
Rule 4.6 (c) findings, i.e., it did not determine “ the ea rlie st date when the defendant or
the defen dan t ’ s attorn ey received n otice or acqui red ac tu al kno wledge that the t rial judge signed the appealable order and whether this da te was more than twenty da y s after the judge signed the ap pealable order. ” See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 (c)

. D. Jurisdiction
T o invoke our appel late jurisdiction , an a ppellant must file a timely notice of appeal

. Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim . App. 1996) ; Rodriguez v . State , No. 04

- 23

- 00717

- CR, 2023 WL 5603205, at *1 (Tex. A pp.

— San Antonio Aug. 30, 2023, no pet. ) (per curiam) (me m. op., not designated for publication ). Based on this

re cord, w e cannot tell if Lewis ’ s notice of appeal is timely

. W hen we identify a concern about our jurisdiction, we m ust address that question sua sponte
. Searls v. State , No. 02

- 19

- 00136

- CR, 2019 W L 4019678, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2019, no p et.) (mem. op., not d esignated for publication). Thus, be fore assuming jurisdiction, we must determine whether Lewi s’s reliance on Rule 4.6 i s ju stified.
II. RESOLUTION D ISCUSSION On appeal, the State d oes not object to th e form of Lewis ’ s motion for

a d ditional time or to the form o f the tr ial court ’ s order g ranting it

. A s noted in
Lewis ’ s Rule 4.6 motion , the St at e did not oppose the exten sion , so th e Sta te ’ s position on appeal is con sistent wi th its position before the trial court

.8 But p art ies may not confer subject

- matter ju risdiction on a court. See Ex parte
Derosier , No. 02

- 15

- 00100

- CR, 2015 WL 6550557, at *3 (T ex . App

. — Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2015, pet. ref ’ d) (mem. op., not de signated for publica tion) (citing Ex parte Sledge , 391 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ) , pet. ref ’ d

, 49 0 S.W.3d 501 ( Tex. C rim.
A pp. 2016)

. They cannot confer jurisdiction on a court b y agreement. State v. R iewe , 13 S.W.3d 408, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

. 4
Before we have jurisdiction , the record must establish that neithe r Lewis nor
his counsel ha d received no tice or acquired actu al knowledge of the signed or der denying Le wis ’ s DNA mot io n within t wenty days a fter the trial court sign ed it

. Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 (a). T h e trial court ’ s order granting Lewis ’ s mo tion does not r e solve
th e s e factual issue s , as Rule 4.6 (c ) requires. See T ex. R. App. P. 4.6(c). B ut b y granting Lewis ’ s motion, th e trial court implicit ly f ound that Lewis met the factual requirements.
Th e tria l court ’ s f ailure to comply with Rule 4. 6 (c) can be expl ained procedurally. B ecause the S t ate d id not complain abou t the procedural defects in
Lewis’s motion , the trial co ur t ’ s failure to con duct a n evidentiary hearing, or the trial

4 T he Tex as Court of Criminal Appe als later stated that the portion of Riewe that asserted a defendant could not use R ule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure t o correct a jur isdictional defect in a notice of appeal was dicta and dec lined to rely on it. See Bayl es

s v. State , 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 n. 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; State v. Palmer , 469 S.W.3d 264, 26 6 n.2 (Te x. App.

— Fort Worth 2015, pet

. ref’d)

.9 court ’ s order granting Lewis ’ s motion , all the procedural defects

— and potentia ll y all the jurisdictional defects

— went unchallenged.
Yet t h is is not a si tuation where Le wis alleged facts that fell within Rule 4.6 ’ s sche me a nd where the State sti pu late d to those facts. This is a situation in which (1 ) Lew is alleged that he did not know when his counsel received notice or had actual knowledge of the trial court ’ s order, (2) Lewis never stated when he had notice or
actual know ledge of the order, an d (3) no thing in the re cord sheds any additional lig ht on the subject. In short, t he re cord does not support Lewis ’ s comp liance with Rule 4.6(a).
N evertheless, at this junct ure, w e de cline to dismiss Lewis ’ s appeal based on

• his fai lure to file a s worn Rule 4.6 motion ,

• the absence of an evidentiary hearing at which Lewis showed when he a nd his counsel had notice or actual knowledge of the February 16 order , or

• the trial court ’ s failure to make the nece s s ary factual findings in i ts Rule 4.6 order as required by Rule 4.6 (c)

. We expla in why.
W hen interpreting a text , we must presume that every word has been used for a purpose and that each word, ph rase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if

reaso nably possible. State v. H ardin , 664 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)

. We
do not focus strictly on a discrete provi sion but, ins tead, look at other statutory provisions as well to harmonize text and avoid conflicts. Id.10 Other a ppellate rules favor givin g an appellant t he op portunity to correct errors in a notice of appeal. H ere are two example s: f irst, Rule 25.2(f) of the Texas R ules of Appellate Proce dure authorizes amending a defective no tice of appeal , Tex. R . App. P. 25.2(f) , a nd second, Rule 37.1 of the T exas Rule s of Appellate Procedure requires giving an appellant an opportunity to correct any defect in a notice of a ppeal “ so that
it can be reme died , if possible. ” Tex. R. Ap p. P. 37. 1. The appellate rules also recognize th at counsel have no t always been diligent
abou t notifying their clients that the trial court has ruled and about what their clients ’ appellate options ar e. For example, Ru le 48.4

— adopted in 2007

— requires defense

coun sel to certify to an appellate court that counsel ha s sent a copy of the opinion to

t he client and notified the client of the client ’ s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review

. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4

. A failure to n otify the client might re sult
in a writ of hab eas corpus seeking an out

- of

- time app eal based on ineffecti ve

as sistance of counsel

. S ee , e .g. , Ex parte Smith , 444 S. W.3d 661, 663

– 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Bald ez

, 510 S.W.3d 492, 496

– 97 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2014,
no pet .)

. 5
Tu rnin g to Rule 4.6 it self and its wording, we note that p rocedural requi remen ts , even if mandatory, may be waived unless they are ju risdictional.

5 Rule 77.3 prohibit s us fr om citing unpub lished opinions of the Texas Court of Crimi nal Appeals. Tex . R. App. P. 77.3 . Accord ingly, although numerous unpublished opinions in which the court gr anted out

- of

- ti me appeal s based on ineffective assistance of counsel are available on We stlaw , we will not cite them

. We furth er note that many of them preda te Rule 48.4 ’ s ad option.11 Comptroller v. Landsfeld , 352 S.W.3d 17 1, 174 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2 011, pet. denied) (c i ting In re United Servs. Auto. Ass ’ n (USAA) , 307 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex

. 2010) (orig. proceed ing) )

. When determin ing whether a proce dural requirement is jurisdi ctional, we apply statutory interpretation pri nciples. See id. (citing City of D eSoto
v. White , 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009) )

. Our goa l is to ascertain the drafters ’ intent by examini ng th e statute ’ s plain language. Id

. (citing City of DeSoto , 288 S.W.3d at 394 ) ; see Hardin , 664 S.W. 3d at 87 2 ( “ When we interpre t statutes, we seek to effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators who e nacted the legislation. In doing s o,

we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and
attempt to discern the fair, objective m ean ing of the text

. . . . ” (fo otn ote omitted) ). Based on our review of Rule 4.6, s ome por tions of it are jurisdictional whil e oth er portions are procedural. Specifically, Subsection (a) set s out the j urisdictional requi rements
. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 ( a )

. Both t he defendant and his attorn ey must not h ave received notice or
had actual knowl edge that the trial judge signed th e ord er within twenty days after its signing. Id. The parties cannot waive these requirements b y agreement. See Riewe , 13
S.W.3d at 413

. Turning to Subs ection ( b) , it set s out the procedur e for establishing the jurisdi ctional requirements. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 (b)

. Because the r equire ment that
the written motion be sworn to appears in Sub sectio n (b) (the procedur al provision)
bu t is not required under Subse ct ion (a) (the jurisdictional provision ) or thereaf ter in12 Su bsection (c) (the fact ual recitatio n s re quire d in the trial court ’ s order), we conclude
th at the fact that the moti on is not sworn t o is a pr oced ural requirement that can be
waived absent an objecti on . See Comptroller , 352 S.W.3d at 174

. Here, the S t ate waived
any defe ct in Lewis ’ s motion by n ot objecting

. 6
As for Subsection (c) , it anticipates an evidentiary hearing and requires the tr ial
court to state in its order it s fi ndings rega rding the disp os i tiv e j urisdictional facts
under Subsection (a). See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4

. 6 (c). Because ther e app arently was no evidentiary hearing and because the order did not comply with Rule 4.6(c), t h e S tate could have objected , but it did not. One of the purposes of an objection is to give opposing counsel an opportunity to respon d. See Williams v. State , 662 S.W.3d 452,
4 60 (Tex. C rim. App. 202 1 ). Here, Lewis was not given that opportunity. We

c onclude that t he failure to have a heari ng and the error in the ord er are procedural and, thus, waiva ble

. See Comptroller , 3 52 S.W.3d at 174. B y not objecting , the State
waived both defe ct s . See id. This construction is consiste nt with R ules 25.2(f) a n d
37.1 , both of which an ticipate errors in notices o f appeal and fa vor giving a n appellant
an oppor tunity to correct those er rors, if possible. See Tex. R. App . P. 25.2(f), 37.1

.

6 Rule 4.6(b)(3) s tates that if a n appellant ’ s motion complies with R u les 4. 6(b)(1) and (2), “ the motion may serve as the defendant ’ s n otice of appeal. ” Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(3). Rule 4.6(b)(3) thus provides both a rew ard for co m plying with Rules 4.6 (b )(1) and (2) and a penalty for no t comply ing with them

— noncompliance means th e motion cannot dou ble as the notice of appeal. L ewis , however , filed both a Rule 4.6 motion and , alon g with it, a notice of appeal. L ewis was not relying on hi s Rule 4.6 m otion do ublin g as hi s notice of appeal.13 Our construction of Rule 4.6 as having j urisdic tional and procedur al p ortion s is

n ot without some pote ntially contra ry author ity

. On the civil side, Rule 30 6a of the
Texas Rul es of Civil Procedure is comparable to Rule 4.6. See Tex. R . Civ . P

. 3 06a ; see also Tex . R. App. P. 4. 2. An d civil case law suggests that procedu ral defec ts are fatal

to a Rule 306 a motion. See , e.g. , In re Pe ñ a , No. 13

- 1 8

- 00627

- CV, 2019 WL 943371, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christ i

– Edinburg Feb. 26, 2019, no pet.) (m em . op.) ( “ The purpose of a sworn motion is to

. . . reinvoke a trial court ’ s jurisdiction fo r the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing to determ ine the date on which the party or its counsel first recei ved notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment. ”);
Trevino v. Hale , No. 07

- 02

- 0235

- CV, 2002 WL 1291246, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Amarill o June 11, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for p ublication) ( “ Without adhering to the
proper proc edures and procurement of an o rder from the trial court finding t he d ate on which notice or actual knowledge was received, this [c] ourt cannot depart from the
ori ginal appellate timetable. ”) ; Carrera v. Marsh , 847 S.W.2d 337, 34 1 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 1993, orig. p roceeding ) (op. on reh ’ g) ( “An unv erified motion to reinstate

. . . cannot operate to exten d the appellate timetable .

. . . ”). We are not persuaded t hat simply because a rule addresses jurisdiction, every aspect of the rule is necessarily jurisdictional. See Reid v. SSB Hold ings, Inc. , 506 S.W.3d 140, 148 (Tex. A pp . — Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) ( “ There is no language in the statute that indicates that the verification requirement is jurisdictional or providing that fai lure to verify the complaint should result in dismissal. ”) ; Comptroller , 352 S.W.3d at 17 7 ( “ The mo tion14 requirement means that a case may proceed against those governmental entities that
do not seek dismissal

— in other words, that a county can waive a party ’ s noncompliance. This confirms that compliance with the notice requirements is not jurisdiction al

. ” (quoting Roccaforte v. Je fferson Cnty. , 341 S.W.3d 919, 92 6 (Tex. 2011))

. W e de clin e to apply this harsh construction to Rule 4.6 when the State do e s no t
oppose Lewis ’ s motion and when ot her provisions of the T e xas Rules of Ap pellate
Procedure conte mp late giving Lewis an opportunity to cure

— if possible

— any d efects in his notice of appeal

. We see no benefit in forcing Lewis to file a writ of habeas

c orpus seek ing an out

- of

- time appeal if the def iciencies can be co rrect ed on direct appeal. Although we c onclude that the noted defects in Lewis ’ s Rule 4.6 mot ion and proceedings are not necess arily fatal to h is appeal , we are nevertheless no t persuaded
that we have jurisdiction. Nor are we persuaded that we do not ha ve jurisdiction.
Even if the S t ate is w illing to waive an evid entiary hearing and the defect in the
trial court ’ s order, we are not

— especial ly where, as here, the record does not support
the o rde r and where Rule 4.6 (c) specifically re quires the tr ial co urt to mak e the factual findings establ ish ing our appellate juri sdic tion

. Lewis ’ s failure to insist on

• a hearing and

• an order complying with Rule 4.6 (c) , and t he Sta t e ’ s failure to object to15 • the absence of a hearing and

• the order ’ s not comply ing with Rule 4.6 (c)
may have the effect o f imp rop erly conferring jurisdiction on us where no j urisdiction
other wise exi sts. See Riewe , 13 S.W.3d at 413.

Before assuming jurisdiction, we ins ist on a h ear ing and an order complying
with Rule 4 .6 (c)

. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c); Black v. Curtis , No. 07

- 23

- 00261

- CV, 2023 WL 6932554, a t *1 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Oct. 19, 2023, order) (per curiam ) (applying
Te x. R. Civ. P. 306a). Before we can assume jurisdiction under Rule 4.6, the record
must sh ow the earliest date wh en Lewis and his attorney received noti ce or other wise acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge had signed the February 16 order and whether that date was more than twenty days after February 16. See Tex. R. A pp. P. 4.6(a ) , (c).
III. CONCLUSION
Ac c ordingly, we abate the a ppeal for the t ria l court to con duct within thirty days of the dat e of this order a hearing to dete rmine :

• the earliest d ate whe n L ewis and his trial attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge tha t the trial judge had sign ed the February 16, 2023 o rder , a nd

• wh eth er this date was more than twenty days after the judge signed the February 16, 2023 ord er . After con ducting the hearing, the trial court “ must sign a writt en order that
determines the earliest date when the defend ant or the defendant’s attorney receive d16 n otice or acquired actual knowledge that the tri al judge signed the appealable order
and whether this date was more than twenty days after the judge signed t he appealable
order. ” See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6 (c)

. Within forty days of the date of this or der, a su pplement al reporter ’ s record of
the abatement hearing a nd a supplemental clerk ’ s re cord containing th e trial court ’ s fac tual fi ndings should be filed in our court. A fter we recei ve both the supplemental reporter ’ s record of the hearing and the supplem ent al clerk ’ s re cord con taining the trial court ’ s order , the appeal will be automatically reinstated . A fter the appeal is reinstated, we will determine wh ethe r we have j urisdiction over it

. See Bell v. State , 6 49 S. W.3d 867, 884 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st D ist .] 2022, pet. ref’d) (stating that courts have jurisdiction to determine whether they h ave jurisdicti on). /s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. A p p . P. 4 7. 2(b)
Delivered : December 21, 2023