alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Elijah Solomon BAYLOCK, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph MCFADDEN, Warden of Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7141

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: January 18, 2018

Decided: January 22, 2018

Joshua Snow Kendrick, KENDRICK *&*LEONARD, P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Susannah Rawl Cole, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Elijah Solomon Baylock, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Baylock has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the *199materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 32.2

          CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C.
                 SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                       OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Euro Group of Companies, Inc.
(formerly ICT Technologies, Inc.), a Delaware corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Chief
Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

     (1)  The Report of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
          section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



                                            /s/  Andrew Eracleous
                                            -----------------------------------
                                                 Andrew Eracleous
                                                 Chief Financial Officer

August 19, 2008
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Exela Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ended
December 31, 2017 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald Cogburn, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



Date:
April 10, 2018



/s/ Ronald CogburnName:

Ronald CogburnTitle:

Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)


A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CEDRIC CUNNINGHAM

, Appellant,

v.

BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 8

[ December 12, 2019 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County ; Carlos A. Rodriguez , Judge; L.T. Case No.

CACE17021766

.

Cedric Cunningham, Fort Lauderdale, pro se.

Robert D. Yates of Robert D. Yates P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

D AMOORGIAN

, G ERBER and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 32    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Disability Access Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter Chin, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:  (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of the operation of the Company.  Date: October 22, 2010By: /s/ Peter Chin
Peter Chin, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting, Executive and Financial Officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. Kartarie Sahndal Prince LEAKE, a/k/a Kartari Miller, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6777

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: January 30, 2018

Decided: February 1, 2018

*153Kartarie Sahndal Prince Leake, Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker Be-thea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kartarie Sahndal Prince Leake appeals the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and dismissing it on that basis. A certificate of appealability is not required in order for us to address the district court’s jurisdictional categorization of a “Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive habeas petition.” *United States v. McRae,*793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court correctly determined that Leake’s motion was not a “true 60(b) motion” but was, in substance, a successive § 2255 motion. *See id.*at 397-400. We therefore hold that the district court correctly determined that, in the absence of prefiling authorization, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the successive § 2265 motion. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h) (2012). Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

Additionally, we construe Leake’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a successive § 2255 motion. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either:

> (1) newly discovered evidence that ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

> (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Leake’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Corey Jawan ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph MCFADDEN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7050

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: January 30, 2018

Decided: February 1, 2018

Corey Jawan Robinson, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*155PER CURIAM:

Corey Jawan Robinson seeks to appeal the district court’s orders accepting in part the first recommendation of the magistrate judge and accepting the second recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Robinson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny as moot Robinson’s motion to stay the appeal pending resolution of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, deny his motion for a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
# EUR-Lex - 32003R0047 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32003R0047

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 47/2003 of 10 January 2003 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 **

*
Official Journal L 007 , 11/01/2003 P. 0064 - 0064 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 47/2003

of 10 January 2003

amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 545/2002(2), and in particular Article 2(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 lists the products which are to be supplied fresh to the consumer and are subject to standards.

(2) Consumer packaging containing different species of fruit and vegetables are becoming more common on the market and enable demand from certain consumers to be met.

(3) Fair trading requires fresh fruit and vegetables sold in the same package to be of uniform quality. This makes it necessary to extend the list of products subject to marketing standards to include other products when combined in sales packages with products already on that list.

(4) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 should therefore be amended.

(5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The following is added to Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2200/96:

"Other products referred to in Article 1, when combined in a sales package of a net weight of less than three kilograms with at least one of the products in this Annex."

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 January 2003.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 84, 28.3.2002, p. 1.
Order entered November 6, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00878-CR

MARIO LOPEZ JUCUP, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F10-55339-R

ORDER

The Court ORDERS the trial court to make findings of fact regarding whether appellant 

has been deprived of the clerk’s and reporter’s records because of ineffective counsel, indigence, 

or for any other reason.

 The trial court shall first determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal. If 

the trial court determines that appellant does not desire to prosecute the appeal, it shall 

make a finding to that effect.

 If the trial court determines that appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, it shall next 

determine whether appellant is indigent and entitled to proceed without payment of costs 

for the clerk’s and reporter’s records. If appellant is entitled to proceed without payment 

of costs, the trial court shall make a finding to that effect. Moreover, if appellant is 

indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to 

assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel. If the 

trial court finds appellant is not indigent, it shall determine whether retained counsel has 

abandoned the appeal.
 The trial court shall next determine: (1) the name and address of each court reporter who 

recorded the proceedings in this cause; (2) the court reporter’s explanation for the delay 

in filing the reporter’s record; and (3) the earliest date by which the reporter’s record can 

be filed. 

 The trial court shall next determine the date by which the clerk’s record will be filed.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a supplemental record, containing the written 

findings of fact, any supporting documentation, and any orders, to this Court within THIRTY 

DAYS of the date of this order.

The appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with this order. It shall be 

reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the supplemental record is received, 

whichever is earlier.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
---

Exhibit 23.1

GEORGE STEWART, CPA
2301 SOUTH JACKSON STREET, SUITE 101-G
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98144
(206) 328-8554 FAX(206) 328-0383

To Whom It May Concern:
The firm of George Stewart, Certified Public Accountant consents to the
inclusion of the Financial Statements of Preferential Equities, Corp. as of
December 31, 2007 and 2006, in any filings that are necessary now or in the near
future with the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Very Truly Yours,
/s/ George Stewart
George Stewart, CPA
March 27, 2008





---
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 53 (Friday, March 18, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15442-15443]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05771]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Mental Health; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Mental Health Special 
Emphasis Panel; Deciphering Immune-CNS Interactions in HIV (R01, 
R21).
    Date: April 14, 2022.
    Time: 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 
Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Rebecca Steiner Garcia, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Officer, Division of Extramural Activities, National Institute of 
Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 
6001 Executive Blvd., Room 6149, MSC 9608, Bethesda, MD 20892-9608, 
301-443-4525, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#661512030f08031414260b070f0a48080f0e48010910"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="344740515d5a5146467459555d581a5a5d5c1a535b42">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program No. 93.242, Mental 
Health Research Grants, National Institutes of Health, HHS)


[[Page 15443]]


     Dated: March 15, 2022.
Melanie J. Pantoja,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-05771 Filed 3-17-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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</html>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo GRANT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10329

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed July 3, 2017

Kirstin Ault, Assistant U.S. Attorney, J. Douglas Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*931Ned Smock, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Oakland), Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lorenzo Grant appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 37-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Grant contends that the district court erred by concluding that his conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant under California Penal Code § 273.5 was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015) and, therefore, constituted a Grade A violation of supervised release. *See*U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i) *&*cmt. n.2. This claim is foreclosed by *United States v. Laurico-Yeno,*590 F.3d 818, 821-23 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 is a categorical crime of violence under the force clause of the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which is identical to the force clause in the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Contrary to Grant’s claim, *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), does not undermine *Laurico-Yeno. See Johnson,*135 S.Ct. at 2563 (striking down the residual clause in the definition of “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, but declining to call into question the remainder of the definition, including the force clause).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eduardo RAMOS-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 16-10394, 16-10438

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

*561Matthew Cassell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU-Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eric Scott Manch, Manch Law Firm PLLC, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Eduardo Ramos-Rodriguez appeals the 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the partially consecutive 21-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. In Appeal No. 16-10438, we dismiss. In Appeal No. 16-10394, we affirm.

Reviewing de novo, *see United States v. Harris,*628 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011), we conclude that Appeal No, 16-10438 is barred by a valid appeal waiver. The terms of the appeal waiver in Ramos-Rodriguez’s disposition agreement unambiguously encompass the claims raised in this appeal. *See id.*Moreover, contrary to Ramos-Rodriguez’s contention, the record reflects that he waived his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2009).

In Appeal No. 16-10394, Ramos-Rodriguez argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider his sentencing arguments and explain the sentence. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered Ramos-Rodriguez’s arguments and sufficiently explained the within-Guidelines sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, contrary to Ramos-Rodriguez’s contention, the sentence is not an abuse of discretion in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including his significant immigration history. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Appeal No. 16-10394: AFFIRMED.

Appeal No. 16-10438: DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,