NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FLEXTRONICS INTERNATIONAL USA, 

INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

PANASONIC HOLDINGS 

CORPORATION; PANASONIC 

CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

MURATA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.; 

MURATA ELECTRONICS NORTH 

AMERICA, INC.; MURATA POWER 

SOLUTIONS, INC.; TAIYO YUDEN CO., 

LTD.; TAIYO YUDEN (U.S.A.) INC.; TDK 

CORPORATION; TDK-EPC 

CORPORATION; TDK CORPORATION 

OF AMERICA; TDK U.S.A. 

CORPORATION; TOKIN 

CORPORATION; TOKIN AMERICA, 

INC.; SAITAMA MURATA 

MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.; SAGAMI 

ELEC CO., LTD.; SAGAMI AMERICA 

LTD.; SUMIDA CORP.; SUMIDA 

ELECTRIC CO., LTD; SUMIDA 

No. 22-15231 

D.C. Nos. 5:19-cv-00078-EJD 

5:18-cv-00198-EJD 

MEMORANDUM*

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUL 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

AMERICA COMPONENTS, INC.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 16, 2023

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS,

** NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Flextronics International USA, Inc., and its affiliates (collectively, “Flex”) 

appeal the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of its Fourth Amended 

Complaint against Panasonic Holdings Corp. and Panasonic Corp. of North 

America (collectively, “Panasonic”).1 Flex alleges that, from January 1, 2003 to 

December 31, 2017 (“Conspiracy Period”), Panasonic and six other inductor 

producers (collectively, “Defendants”)2conspired to fix supra-competitive prices 

** Pursuant to General Order 3.2(h), Judge S.R. Thomas has been drawn 

to replace Judge Wardlaw in this matter. Judge S.R. Thomas has reviewed the 

briefs and the record and viewed the recording of the oral argument hearing in this 

case.

1 After we heard oral argument and took the case under submission, the parties 

stipulated to the dismissal of Sumida Corp.; Sumida Electric Co., Ltd.; and Sumida 

America Components, Inc. (collectively, “Sumida”) Sagami Elec Co., Ltd. and 

Sagami America Ltd. (collectively, “Sagami”). Panasonic is the only appellee that 

remains.

2 The four other Defendants include Murata Electronics North America, Inc.; 

Murata Power Solutions, Inc.; and Saitama Murata Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

(collectively “Murata”); Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd. and Taiyo Yuden (U.S.A.) Inc. 
3 

for inductors in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

1. The district court erred in concluding that Flex failed to adequately 

allege parallel pricing. See In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Parallel pricing is a relevant factor to be considered along with the 

evidence as a whole; if there are sufficient other ‘plus’ factors, an inference of 

conspiracy can be reasonable.”). Parallel pricing need not be identical so long as it 

is similar and reasonably contemporaneous. See In re Musical Instruments & 

Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2015).

Flex’s allegation of parallel pricing is based on an analysis of its own 

purchases of $750 million in inductors from Defendants during the Conspiracy 

Period. Dr. Russell Lamb conducted a statistical price analysis of Flex’s purchases 

from Murata, Taiyo Yuden, and TDK, and found that the three companies’ prices 

for certain inductors always moved in parallel, and prices remained stubbornly 

stable throughout the Conspiracy Period. Although Flex acknowledges that it did 

not purchase enough obviously comparable products over a long enough time 

frame from Panasonic, Sagami, Sumida, or Tokin to permit a statistical analysis, 

Flex provides factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that 

(collectively, “Taiyo Yuden”); TDK Corp.; TDK-EPC Corp.; TDK Corp. of 

America; and TDK U.S.A. Corp. (collectively, “TDK”); and Tokin Corp. and 

Tokin America, Inc. (collectively, “Tokin”).
4 

Panasonic’s, Sagami’s, Sumida’s, and Tokin’s prices moved in parallel with 

Murata’s, Taiyo Yuden’s, and TDK’s prices. For example, Flex alleges that 

Panasonic and Sagami’s monthly median prices for certain popular inductors 

exhibited similar trend lines over time and were nearly identical by 2012. Flex 

also identifies fourteen specific examples of price comparisons in which 

Panasonic, Sagami, Sumida, and Tokin had substantially similar prices to Murata, 

Taiyo Yuden, and TDK for the same type of inductor during a particular month. 

Finally, Flex alleges that when TDK submitted proposed prices to an original 

equipment manufacturer customer in December 2012, January 2013, and July 

2013, TDK knew Panasonic’s price and pricing strategy for similar inductors such 

that in all three cases, TDK never submitted a price lower than Panasonic.

Construing the pleadings in Flex’s favor, this alleged conduct is sufficient to 

plausibly allege parallel pricing. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are 

true (even if doubtful in fact).” (internal citation omitted)).

2. When considering Flex’s plus factors, the district court erred two 

ways. First, it erred by focusing only on Defendants’ participation in the Japan 

Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association (“JEITA”)

meetings and failing to consider the Fourth Amended Complaint holistically. The 
5 

correct analysis requires us to “consider each purported plus factor in turn and 

cumulatively to determine whether [Flex] ha[s] alleged nonconclusory facts 

sufficient to state a claim under § 1.” Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1194; see 

also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) 

(explaining that “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety”). Second, the 

district court erred by requiring Flex to plead facts “tending to exclude the 

possibility that defendants acted independently.” However, the requirement that a 

plaintiff offer “‘evidence that tends to exclude the possibility’ of lawful 

independent conduct” is more appropriate at summary judgment, rather than on a 

motion to dismiss. SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2022) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 

(1984)). The proper standard is that which “applies to all § 1 complaints: a 

plaintiff must plausibly allege an agreement that is unreasonable ‘per se’ or under 

the ‘rule of reason.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 

S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018)).

Flex adequately alleges five plus factors that weigh in favor of finding 

conspiracy.

A. Flex alleges instances which are plausibly understood as invitations to 

collude in a price-fixing conspiracy. For example, at a November 2008 meeting, 

the then-chairman of JEITA stated to the Passive Components Committee 
6 

(“PCC”)—a committee covering capacitors, inductors, and resistors—that “it is not 

the time to reduce prices.” Similarly, a Panasonic employee noted ongoing 

“[p]rice correction (price increase / price reduction suppression efforts)” at a June 

2010 PCC meeting and that “[a]t consumer PCC, price reductions were suppressed 

while assessing competitor prices.” Finally, in April 2014, an employee of Taiyo 

Yuden contacted representatives of the other Defendants asking them to “decide 

the [Consumption Factor (“CF”)] value of the inductor” and proposing CF values 

for two types of inductors and requesting “verification” of the proposed values. 

The CF is a value formulated by the World Trade Statistics group using data 

collected by JEITA from its members, which is used to calculate “average sales 

price by region using estimated consumption and reported total sales.” JEITA’s 

policy prohibited member companies from discussing proposed CFs with one 

another. A representative from Tokin responded to Taiyo Yuden’s request that he 

was not sure what the CF would be, but he would follow TDK’s recommendation.

B. Flex also alleges facts reflecting consciousness of guilt or 

acknowledgements by co-conspirators that their conduct is anticompetitive. For 

example, in 2012, a Panasonic employee stated that “there was a lot of material, 

such as which customers are increasing, which we called information exchange 

that would now be acknowledged as a compliance violation.” The term 

“compliance violation” refers to Panasonic’s fair-trade compliance policy, which 
7 

prohibits “[a]greements and exchanges of information with competitors regarding 

prices, quantity, and other competition-related matters.” Moreover, in February 

2005, a United Chemi-Con employee sent notes from a JEITA meeting to his 

superiors warning that “In North America, these sorts of meetings are completely 

prohibited, so please take utmost care in the handling of the attached memo.” 

Similarly, the President of KOA, who served as a chair of the PCC during the 

Conspiracy Period, acknowledged that certain aspects of JEITA meetings “can put 

the company at risk of being deemed as taking part in antitrust activities.”

C. Flex alleges that Panasonic participated in similar and overlapping 

conspiracies to fix the prices of capacitors and resistors. See In re Dynamic 

Random Access Memory (DRAM) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 28 F.4th 42, 

53 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that participation in other conspiracies is a plus factor 

“particularly when the prior conspiracy and the alleged subsequent conspiracy 

have factual overlap or involve the same actors”). Panasonic applied for amnesty 

from the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in connection with 

agreements with its competitors to inflate the price of both capacitors and resistors. 

The conspiracy period for the capacitors conspiracy—September 1997 to January 

2014—overlaps with the inductors Conspiracy Period. Indeed, Flex alleges that 

the meetings for resistors and capacitors were scheduled and held in tandem with 

the meetings for inductors, and information for all three passive components was 
8 

often distributed in a single communication. Moreover, capacitors, inductors, and 

resistors were treated similarly by Defendants and their employees. For example, a 

Tokin employee who was indicted for the capacitors conspiracy participated in and 

performed acts—such as information exchanges—for inductors as well as 

capacitors.

D. Flex alleges that the exchange of firm-specific, forward-looking, and 

confidential information at JEITA meetings facilitated the price-fixing conspiracy. 

Although “mere participation in trade-organization meetings where information is 

exchanged and strategies are advocated does not suggest an illegal agreement,” 

Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1196, the exchange of information may be 

considered a plus factor that supports a finding of conspiracy. See United States v. 

Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969) (holding that the exchange of 

customer-specific and confidential price information is sufficient to establish 

conspiracy to survive a motion to dismiss). The Federal Trade Commission and 

the DOJ have acknowledged that, other things being equal, the exchange of certain 

types of information are more likely to raise competitive concern: (1) “information 

relating to price, output, costs, or strategic planning”; (2) “information on current 

operating and future business plans”; and (3) “individual company data” rather 

than “aggregated data that does not permit recipients to identify individual firm 

data.” Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust 
9 

Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors 15–16 (April 2000). The 

information exchanges in this case have all three qualities.

Moreover, Flex identifies discussions at JEITA and PCC meetings that “are 

largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly 

coordinated action.” Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1194. For example, at a 

May 2007 PCC meeting, attendees discussed customer “cost-down” requests, or 

requests by customers for price decreases. Similarly, at the meeting, Murata and 

Sagami explained to their competitors their increases in revenue from 2005 to 2006 

and forecasted revenue increases in 2007. Finally, Sagami told its competitors that 

it was “struggling in handling the steep rises in the price of materials and the 

environment.”

Panasonic argues that this case should be controlled by Citric Acid and 

Musical Instruments, but those cases are distinguishable. Citric Acid was decided 

at summary judgment, which applies a higher standard than the plausibility 

standard on a motion to dismiss. See 191 F.3d at 1094. Unlike this case, the

information exchanges at issue in Citric Acid involved aggregated, rather than 

firm-specific, data. See id. at 1098–99. Musical Instruments is distinguishable 

because the information exchanges occurred during “open panel discussions 

attended by many people” at biannual trade shows, which were open to thousands 

of members and the media. 798 F.3d at 1191. Moreover, in Musical Instruments, 
10 

we found that participation in trade shows and the adoption of minimum advertised 

price policies over several years was consistent with the defendants’ self-interest. 

Id. at 1196–97. By contrast, Flex alleges that the exchange of firm-specific and 

forward-looking information in this case occurred at private meetings between nine 

corporate groups and facilitated parallel pricing. Unlike Musical Instruments, Flex 

also alleges sufficient facts suggesting that the information exchanges and 

discussions at JEITA meetings went against Defendants’ self-interest.

E. Flex alleges that the characteristics of the inductors market make it 

conducive to conspiracy. The inductors market is highly concentrated. See

DRAM, 28 F.4th at 52 (noting that “[e]xtreme market concentration may suggest 

conspiracy, particularly when accompanied by other plausible plus factor 

allegations”). For example, Murata, Panasonic, Sumida, Taiyo Yuden, and TDK 

controlled over 80% of the market for inductors in 2004 and over 66% in 2016. 

Flex estimates that when Sagami and Tokin are included, Defendants controlled at 

least 73% of the market in 2016. Inductors are an interchangeable commodity, 

such that product differentiation between two companies for the same type of 

inductor is “minimal.” There are high barriers to entry for new inductors 

producers. Inductors are demand inelastic. Finally, the prices of inductors have 

remained stable from 2008 to 2013 despite a decline in demand.

* * *
11 

Considering Flex’s Fourth Amended Complaint as a whole and applying the 

plausibility standard, we hold that Flex’s factual allegations of parallel pricing and

plus factors are sufficient to nudge its claim of a price-fixing conspiracy “across 

the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

REVERSED.