IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to

C.W.

A.W.

D.C.

R.C.

M.C.

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No. 39004-7-III

(Consol. with No. 39005-5-III

No. 39006-3-III

No. 39007-1-III

No. 39027-6-III

No. 39028-4-III)

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

STAAB, J. — In this consolidated appeal, TW, the mother, appeals the trial court’s 

termination of her parental rights to four of her children, and JW, the father, appeals the 

trial court’s termination of his parental rights to two of his children. Both parents argue 

that the Department of Children, Youth and Families failed to establish that all necessary 

services were expressly and understandably offered and provided. Specifically, the 

mother argues that the Department failed to take steps to reunify contact with her children 

so she could complete services. The Father argues that the Department failed to provide 

adequate treatment for his chemical dependency and adequate treatment from a Christian 

mental health counselor. Additionally, both parents challenge findings that there is little 

likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the children can be returned to the 

FILED

SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

2

parents in the near future. We affirm the court’s order terminating the parental rights of 

the mother and father.

 

BACKGROUND

1. DEPENDENCY

TW, the mother, and JW, the father, were married and had two children together: 

CW (born on September 29, 2011) and AW (born on June 12, 2010). The mother has 

three older children with another man: DC (born on October 29, 2007), RC (born on 

April 1, 2006), and MC1(born June 15, 2004). The father of these three children has 

relinquished his parental rights and is therefore not a party to this appeal.

In October 2018, the Department filed separate dependency petitions against the 

mother and father for all of the children. The parents entered agreed orders of 

dependency.

The dependency case was assigned to social workers from the Department: 

Tiffany Labish, who worked on the case from March 2019 to December 2021, and 

Margaretia Taylor, who worked on the case beginning in February 2022.

During the dependency, the three youngest children, CW, AW, and DC, disclosed 

that they had been the victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by both of the parents, and that 

 

1 As MC turned 18 during the dependency, the mother’s parental rights with 

regard to him are not the subject of the termination.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

3

they had also perpetrated abuse on each other. CW, in particular, made very graphic and 

explicit disclosures of sexual abuse. Both CW and AW alleged that their mother and 

father were involved in the abuse. Labish described the children’s disclosures as “varied” 

and “numerous” but also consistent. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 160-61.

Following the disclosures in April 2019, the trial court entered a temporary no

contact order between the parents and the children and then extended the order 

suspending visitation for an additional 30 days “pending the recommendation by the 

children’s individual counselors that visitation should resume.” Ex. P-16. Throughout 

the dependency, the trial court entered orders extending the suspension of visitation 

during the dependency based on a determination that visitation would jeopardize the 

health, safety, or welfare of the children. The Department did not pursue visitation 

during the dependency as it was not in the children’s best interest, and during at least part 

of the dependency there was an ongoing law enforcement investigation into the 

allegations.

In March 2020, the Department filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of 

the mother and both fathers.

Approximately three years after the dependency was filed, the trial court granted 

the mother’s motion for therapeutic visitation with DC, but denied it with respect to the 

other children. The order permitted the mother to have a single supervised community 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

4

visit with DC, who was then 14 years old, and had expressed interest in a visit. The court 

determined that the nature of a supervised visit would protect his safety. The court found 

that because DC was a teenager, it should consider his preference in determining 

visitation. However, the trial court declined the mother’s request for visitation with the 

other children as AW and CW’s counselor did not recommend contact with their mother 

and RC did not want contact with his mother.

Following the initial visit, DC requested further visitation, and visitation continued 

for about two months. After a couple months, DC requested that the visits be terminated 

because he believed the mother was not making any progress toward change and that she 

had showed up to the latest visit under the influence. The social worker, Taylor, admitted 

that she did not attempt to refer the mother for a parenting assessment or family therapy 

during the two months she was visiting with DC. She noted that she had spoken with DC 

about resuming family therapy, and he communicated that he did not want to engage in it. 

Taylor also said that the mother’s ability to complete the evidence-based parenting or 

“parenting” was dependent on DC’s discretion.

2. TERMINATION TRIAL

The case proceeded to a termination trial in May 2022. “Neither parent appeared 

for trial despite the [trial court] offering them to appear by Zoom or by phone and giving 

the attorneys opportunities to contact them before [the start of] each day.” RP at 636. 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

5

A. Evidence Related to the Mother

The Department identified the mother’s parental deficiencies as “physical abuse, 

sexual abuse, chronic neglect, chemical dependency, and failure to protect.” RP at 44. 

The agreed services for the mother were to “successfully complete a chemical 

dependency assessment and any recommended treatment,” participate in any “random 

UA/BA[2]testing . . . as recommended,” “successfully complete a parenting assessment,”

“successfully complete an evidence-based parenting program,” “successfully complete 

mental health treatment and individual counseling,” and “follow all recommendations.” 

RP at 45-46.

1) Chemical dependency

The mother did complete a chemical dependency assessment, and the assessment 

did not find any current chemical dependency issues but also found that the mother could 

be subjected to a UA upon reasonable suspicion. The mother was subjected to a number 

of UAs, all came back positive for THC.3 However, Labish noted that as the mother was 

removed from the children at the time of the positive test results, “there was no way to 

assess [the] mother’s ability to safely parent while using THC.” RP at 59. 

 

2 Urinalysis/breath analysis.

3 Tetrahydrocannabinol.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

6

For the purposes of chemical dependency, no further treatment was recommended 

for the mother. No additional assessment was requested or ordered during the 

dependency.

2) Parenting assessment

In regard to the court-ordered parenting assessment, the mother failed to 

participate although a referral was sent in December 2018. After the court ordered the 

mother to have no contact with the children, the Department did not refer the mother for a 

parenting assessment a second time because the assessment requested the provider to be 

able to observe the parent and child interact, and the trial court continued to suspend 

visitation between the mother and the children.

3) Evidence-based parenting program

The mother was referred to an evidence-based parenting program but because 

there was a no contact order between the mother and children, she was able to participate 

in the part of the program that did not require the children’s participation. The mother 

completed the “Positive Parenting Program” as far as she could with visitation 

suspended.

After she completed the parent part of the program, the program provider, Lacey 

Hurley, recommended that the mother receive ongoing mental health therapy. Hurley 

said she did not think she could make recommendations for follow up for the mother 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

7

other than continuing in individual counseling because the mother had only completed 

part of the program. Hurley also noted that it was difficult to make a recommendation or 

provide feedback because “[the mother] wasn’t able to provide a lot of examples of 

struggles with parenting. She really identified parenting as fairly easy for her . . . she 

really identified very minimal parenting challenges.” RP at 141-42. 

Hurley did file a report with the Department raising a concern about the mother’s 

“lack of insight” into how her behavior and parenting practices impacted her children’s 

behavior. RP at 143. Hurley said she believed the mother lacked insight because 

collateral information outlined a number of behavioral issues with the children but the 

mother indicated she had minimal behavioral issues with her children.

Although a parenting program can help a parent gain insight, the mother did not 

gain any additional insight during the course of the parenting program. The mother never 

fully completed the program, and the Department did not refer her for a second evidencebased program because all of the other programs required parent-child interaction.

4) Mental health treatment

The Department also produced evidence that the mother failed to address her 

deficiencies through mental health treatment. The mother initially saw a counselor at 

New Horizons, Rhonda Del Carlo, for three months from the end of 2018 to 2019. The 

mother was referred to Del Carlo with “unspecified anxiety disorder” and attended eight 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

8

total appointments. RP at 211. During the counseling sessions, the mother only 

minimally addressed the CPS4allegations and would discuss her concerns of distress “but 

it was very surface.” RP at 215. The mother eventually terminated the relationship due 

to scheduling concerns. As part of her discharge, Del Carlo provided referrals to other 

agencies and also wrote out a summary of treatment and progress made. Although the 

mother made “partial improvement,” she “made minimal progress on her goals of 

learning coping skills to address anxiety.” RP at 212, 217.

After she stopped seeing Del Carlo, the mother asked the Department not to refer 

her for mental health treatment because she preferred a Christian counselor and wanted to 

engage in counseling on her own. She attended two sessions with Mary Kay Hall, a 

Christian counselor she had found. But Hall terminated treatment when she learned that 

the mother was involved in a dependency case. Hall provided minimal information about 

her engagement with the mother but informed Labish that the mother had been unwilling 

to participate in any counseling services without the father.

The Department submitted a mental health treatment referral for the mother in 

June 2020 and then a follow up referral in April 2021. However, the mother never 

engaged with either of these providers.

 

4 Child protective services.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

9

In February 2022, after Taylor was assigned to the case, the mother communicated 

to Taylor that she had been requesting a Christian counselor who was not contracted with 

the Department. Taylor connected her with a counselor that fit this description, Suzie 

Toews. Taylor informed Toews that the mother needed to address the concerns that led 

to the dependency, the mother’s history of her own sexual abuse, and the mother’s ability 

to safely parent and protect her children. The mother started seeing Toews in March 

2022. The Department did not have any information on the type of therapy and any 

progress the mother made with Toews because the mother would only allow the fact that 

she was in treatment and her attendance to be reported.

Toews testified that she had been teaching the mother skills to deal with her 

anxiety and depression. Although Toews said that the mother was “moving ahead,” she 

also stated that “[i]t starts with denial, and we pretty much still are working on denial.” 

RP at 556, 559-60. Toews also said that she could not really say how long it would take 

for the mother to process her anxiety and depression because there were so many 

unknowns. Toews did not identify any safety concerns with the children being placed in 

the mother’s care but also said she did not have enough information to make that 

determination.

There was no evidence presented that the mother addressed the underlying issues 

that led to the dependency with any of her counselors.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

10

5) Psychosexual evaluation

The Department also referred the mother for a psychosexual evaluation in 

September 2019. Because the Department could not find a provider in Spokane with 

availability, it referred the mother to a provider, Jodie Field, in Omak, Washington. The 

mother completed the evaluation in January 2020.

During the evaluation, Field asked the mother about the alleged sexual abuse, and 

the mother denied participation. However, Field explained that the evaluation did not 

look at whether the mother had committed a sex offense or sexual deviancy but instead 

focused on her amenability to treatment. Field testified that the mother was defensive 

during the testing and as a result, the information obtained from the evaluation was 

probably limited and there was “likely more to know about her.” RP at 190. However, 

Field also stated that she performed a polygraph examination on the mother and “[n]o 

deception was indicated.” RP at 192.

Field’s report from the psychosexual evaluation stated that the mother needed 

mental health counseling and specified that she needed trauma counseling to heal from 

her own childhood trauma. The report also recommended parenting programs or classes 

to help the mother identify safe individuals to bring around her children, how to parent 

safely, and how to set safe boundaries with her children.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

11

6) Family therapy

The Department referred the parents to family therapy and both engaged in the 

service for two sessions in 2018. The therapy was halted at the request of the therapist 

after, along with other disclosures, CW provided graphic and explicit accounts of sexual 

abuse that had occurred in their family home. The therapist believed that the children 

needed to process the trauma before moving forward for family therapy to be productive. 

Because visitation was never resumed between the parents and children, the Department 

did not provide another referral for family therapy.

B. Evidence Related to the Father

The father’s parental deficiencies were “physical abuse, sexual abuse, chemical 

dependency, and chronic neglect.” RP at 44-45. The court-ordered services for the 

father included participation in UA/BA testing as recommended by treatment providers 

or upon reasonable suspicion, “successfully complete a parenting assessment,”

“successfully complete mental health treatment or individual counseling,” and 

“[d]emonstrate the ability to meet the child’s physical and psychological needs, as well as 

maintain a clean, safe, nurturing, stable and drug and alcohol free home.” RP at 86. The 

Department also referred the father for psychosexual evaluation following the children’s 

sexual abuse allegations.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

12

1) UA/BA testing

There was never any order for the father to engage in UA/BA testing as neither of 

the social workers ever had a reasonable suspicion of use, and he never participated in 

such testing.

2) Parenting assessment

There was a referral for a parenting assessment in 2018, but the father did not 

participate in the assessment, and a second referral was never entered because visitation 

between the father and the children was suspended.

3) Mental health treatment

Regarding mental health treatment, the father “was very clear throughout the 

dependency that he didn’t want to work with any provider that was connected with the 

department whatsoever.” RP at 89. Like the mother, the father sought treatment from 

Hall, but Hall had also terminated his treatment after two sessions. The father then 

informed the Department he was going to seek a different provider, but the Department 

never received any additional information on further treatment. The Department referred 

the father to Renewed Stories for mental health treatment in June 2020, but the father did 

not engage with the provider.

Labish said that, based on her understanding, the Department was not permitted to 

ask counselors their religion prior to contracting with them. However, she noted that she 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

13

did put in her counseling referral that the parents preferred a Christian counselor “so that 

way hopefully if people responded that they had availability, they would, also, be able at 

that time to indicate whether or not they were Christian.” RP at 164. Labish encouraged 

the father to seek out counselors in the community and also “tried to seek some 

community providers out online that did identify as Christian based.” RP at 165. 

4) Psychosexual evaluation

The Department referred the father for a psychosexual evaluation in November 

2019, but he failed to complete the evaluation, although he attended the mother’s 

evaluation. After the initial referral expired, the Department submitted a second referral, 

but the father still did not participate in the evaluation.

After being assigned to the case, Taylor referred the father to John Colson for 

mental health treatment as well as a psychosexual evaluation. Colson was trained to 

evaluate and treat juvenile and adult sex offenders. He had previously treated the father 

in 2010 for about a year following allegations of sexual abuse in the home.

In regard to this case, the father attended a single appointment with Colson, but 

refused to complete the evaluation or engage in any services. The father did not have any 

further contact with Colson after the appointment. 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

14

C. Additional Testimony

Labish testified that her communication with the parents throughout the case had 

been poor because both the father and the mother had requested that all communications 

go through their attorneys.

Labish testified that during the case, there were ongoing conversations with the 

children’s providers about contact with their parents and the providers consistently stated 

that suspension of parent-child contact should continue until the parents were willing to 

admit how they had traumatized their children and work through it in a therapeutic 

setting. As it was never the recommendation to pursue the parent-child relationship, 

contact was never resumed.

Dr. Jon Christensen, an expert in pediatric psychology, evaluated CW in the fall of 

2020 and testified that CW had some sort of cognitive impairment along with potential 

memory issues.

Although they had multiple placements during the dependency, at the time of trial, 

AW and CW were placed in an adoptive home. AW and CW both expressed a desire to 

stay in their current placement.

DC also, despite having multiple placements, had a potential adoptive home 

though he was not placed there at the time. DC would not refer to JW as his father and 

would only refer to his mother using her first name.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

15

RC additionally had several placement disruptions and went “on the run” on 

multiple occasions, but at the time of trial, he was in a stable home. RC did not wish to 

have further contact with his mother, and he wanted her parental rights to be terminated 

“so he can move on with his life.” RP at 256. A mental health therapist who worked 

with him testified that RC refused to use the mother and father’s first names when 

discussing them and would instead refer to them as “bio mom” and “stepdad.” RP at 296.

3. TRIAL COURT’S DECISION

At the conclusion of trial, the court took the matter under advisement and eight 

days later reconvened the parties for an oral decision. Like the trial, neither of the parents 

attended the trial court’s oral ruling. The trial court followed up with detailed findings of 

facts and conclusions of law. 

As part of its decision, the trial court found that all necessary services reasonably 

available and capable of correcting deficiencies within the foreseeable future had been 

expressly and understandably offered or provided to both parents and that there was little 

likelihood the conditions would be remedied so that the children could be returned to the 

parents in the near future.

The trial court found that the mother had been offered numerous counseling 

options but failed to follow through with any of them. Moreover, the testimony from her 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

16

counselors indicated that they all believed the mother needed to deal with her own trauma 

and deficiencies before she could begin working on her parenting.

Specifically, the court found that the mother was referred for a parenting 

assessment in December 2018, prior to the no contact order being put in place in April 

2019, but did not contact the counselor she was referred to. She had completed the 

portions of the parenting assessment that she could while visitation with the children was 

suspended, and the counselor who oversaw the program recommended she continue with 

counseling and testified that the mother lacked insight as a parent as she could not 

provide examples of where she struggled as a parent and said that it was very easy to 

parent five children.

The trial court noted that the no contact order preventing the mother from 

completing the parenting assessment was “based on the trauma caused by mom’s failure 

to protect and lack of supervision.” RP at 633. The trial court had indicated that there 

would be no contact with the children until it was recommended by the children’s 

counselors. At the time, neither AW nor CW’s counselors were recommending 

visitation. RC and DC did not indicate that they wanted contact with the mother. 

Although DC tried to resume contact with the mother in February 2022, he asked for the 

visits to be stopped after he believed that the mother was under the influence at one of the 

visits.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

17

In regard to whether the mother could remedy her deficiencies in the near future, 

the trial court found that it was clear that the mother made no progress in the twelve 

months following the entry of the disposition order, and thus the rebuttable presumption 

of unfitness applied. The mother had expressed in the parenting program that parenting 

her five children was easy and that there was little she needed to change. After three 

years, the mother had still failed to engage in the recommended areas of treatment, which 

were processing her own abuse and neglect as a child and how to keep her own children 

safe from any abuse and neglect. Aside from DC, the mother had not seen her children in 

three years, and repairing the bond would be unlikely to occur in the near future.

The trial court found that the father’s participation in two family therapy visits was 

minimal and occurred only at the beginning of the dependency. The trial court also found 

that the father had completed two UA/BA tests at the request of the Department and both 

had come back clean, so no further follow up was needed based on the results. Despite 

being given multiple opportunities, the father did not complete a psychosexual 

evaluation. Additionally, the trial court found that the father “never engaged in mental 

health treatment or individual counseling during the life of the case” despite multiple 

referrals from the Department. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2522. The father also did not 

complete the parenting assessment initially and then was unable to do so after the court 

ordered him not to have contact with the children.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

18

The trial court concluded that “the father demonstrated through his own inactions 

and omissions” an unwillingness or inability to make use of the services provided. CP at 

2523. It was clear that even engaging in services at that point would be insufficient to 

allow the father to remedy his parental deficiencies in what would be the foreseeable 

future for AW and CW. The court further supported this conclusion with findings that

the father had not seen the children in about three years and failed to even appear for the 

termination trial, making it clear that he had no interest in making changes.

Thus, the trial court found that the State had met its burden to prove by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence that the mother was unfit to parent and all services 

capable of correcting deficiencies had been offered. The trial court also found that it was 

in the best interests of the children to terminate the parent-child relationships.

Accordingly, the trial court granted the State’s motion to terminate the parental 

rights of both the mother and the father with regard to each of the children.

Both the mother and father appeal.

ANALYSIS

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children, and a 

trial court asked to interfere with that right should employ great care.” In re Welfare of 

M.R.H., 145 Wn. App. 10, 23, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). To terminate a parent-child 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

19

relationship, the State must follow a two-part process. In re Parentage of I.M.-M., 196 

Wn. App. 914, 921, 385 P.3d 268 (2016). First, the State must show the parent is unfit. 

Doing so requires the State to prove the six elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1):

(a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child;

(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 

13.34.130;

(c) That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, 

have been removed from the custody of the parent for a period of at least 

six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;

(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been 

expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary 

services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental 

deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and 

understandably offered or provided;

(e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that 

the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. . . .

(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly 

diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and 

permanent home.

The State must prove the statutory elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 

RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i); I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. at 921.

Second, the State must also show that it is in the best interests of the child to 

terminate the parent-child relationship. RCW 13.34.190(1)(b).
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

20

“A trial court’s findings of fact in a termination proceeding will not be disturbed 

so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.” In re the Parental Rights of B.P. 

v. H.O., 186 Wn.2d 292, 313, 376 P.3d 350 (2016). “Substantial evidence is evidence in 

sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared 

premise.” In re Welfare of T.B., 150 Wn. App. 599, 607, 209 P.3d 497 (2009). Whether 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence is determined in light of the degree 

of proof required by the legal conclusion at issue. In re Dependency of P.D., 58 Wn. 

App. 18, 25, 792 P.2d 159 (1990). Reviewing courts defer to the trial court’s 

determinations on the weight of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting 

testimony. In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015). 

Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Id.

Whether findings of fact support conclusions of law is reviewed de novo. In re 

Parental Rights of K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466, 477, 379 P.3d 75 (2016). 

2. WHETHER NECESSARY SERVICES WERE OFFERED OR PROVIDED TO THE PARENTS

Both the father and the mother contend that the Department failed to 

understandably offer and provide all necessary services. We disagree.

Washington law requires the Department to provide or offer both the father and 

the mother “all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the 

parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). A 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

21

“necessary service” is one that is required to address a condition preventing reunification 

of the parent and child. I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. at 921. “The inquiry is not limited to 

services ordered by the court during the dependency, but rather the Department must 

show it offered all necessary available services.” Id. 

“A service is ‘necessary’ if it is needed to address a condition that precludes 

reunification of the parent and child.” Id. Fulfillment of its statutory obligation requires 

the Department to, at the least, “provide a parent with a list of referral agencies that 

provide those services.” In re Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644, 651, 102 P.3d 

847 (2004). If a claim is based on the Department’s alleged failure to provide a service, 

“termination is appropriate if the service would not have remedied the parental deficiency 

in the foreseeable future.” In re Parental Rights of D.H., 195 Wn.2d 710, 719, 464 P.3d 

215 (2020).

The statute also requires the Department to demonstrate that it tailored those 

services to the father and the mother’s individual needs. I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. at 921. 

Where a parent presents with both mental health and chemical dependency conditions, 

the Department must provide “integrated services.” Id. at 922.

A. Mother5

 

5 The mother fails to assign error to any of the trial court’s findings of fact or 

conclusions of law in her briefing under either of the issues. See RAP 10.3(g). 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

22

The mother argues that the Department failed to provide or offer all necessary 

services because it failed to facilitate reunification with her children. As a result, the 

mother was unable to complete the court-ordered family therapy, parenting assessment, 

and evidence-based parenting program. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion 

that the Department provided or offered all necessary services and the services that 

required contact with her children were not reasonably available.

Washington courts have held that “visitation” on its own is not a service that must 

be provided under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). In re Dependency of T.H., 139 Wn. App. 784, 

792, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007). An appeal of a termination order is not a proper time to 

argue that trial court orders precluded visitation. Id. However, visitation may be part of 

a service like an interactive parenting class. 

The dependency statute states that “[v]isitation is the right of the family” where 

visitation is in the best interests of the child and emphasized that visitation is essential for 

maintaining the parent-child relationship and making reunification possible. RCW 

13.34.136(2)(b)(ii)(A). Where it is in the best interest of the child, the Department must 

encourage the maximum parent contact possible. Id. However, visitation may be limited 

or denied where the court “determines that such limitation or denial is necessary to 

protect the child’s health, safety, or welfare.” RCW 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii)(C). Moreover, 

[w]hen a parent or sibling has been identified as a suspect in an active 

criminal investigation for a violent crime that, if the allegations are true, 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

23

would impact the safety of the child, the department shall make a concerted 

effort to consult with the assigned law enforcement officer in the criminal 

case before recommending any changes in parent/child or child/sibling 

contact. In the event that the law enforcement officer has information 

pertaining to the criminal case that may have serious implications for child 

safety or well-being, the law enforcement officer shall provide this 

information to the department during the consultation. 

Id. However, the Department may only use the information from law enforcement to 

inform its decision-making on visitation, and it may not share the information. Id.

Here, in addition to an ongoing law enforcement investigation during at least part 

of the dependency, Labish testified that the children’s providers advised that until the 

parents were willing to admit how they had traumatized the children, resumption of 

contact would not be in the children’s best interest. Because this was the 

recommendation of the providers throughout the case, the Department did not request 

that visitation be resumed. And throughout the dependency case, given the numerous 

allegations, the trial court found that visitation should not be resumed. Although it is 

unclear whether RC and DC were seeing providers during the entirety of the dependency, 

they did both express that they did not wish to have contact with their parents. 

The Department was required to encourage parent visitation to the maximum 

extent possible where it is in the best interests of a child. However, the court may limit or 

deny visitation where such action is necessary to protect a child’s health, safety, or 

welfare and such was the case here. The mother does not argue that it was in the 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

24

children’s best interest to resume visitation, nor does she claim that the trial court abused 

its discretion in continuing to suspend visitation. Rather, she suggests that, despite the 

recommendations of the children’s providers and the trial court’s decision, the 

Department should have advocated for visitation because visitation was required for her 

to complete certain court-ordered services. In order for the mother to engage in the 

services recommended by the Department, she needed to first take steps that would make 

it safe for her children to reengage in visitation, including addressing her own trauma 

through individual mental health treatment. She failed to engage in these services in a 

meaningful way. Because the evidence shows that visitation was not in the children’s 

best interest, the services dependent upon reunification were not “reasonably available.”

The mother contends that the Department’s position is undermined by the fact 

that, upon DC’s request, the Department sought an order permitting therapeutic contact 

between the mother and DC. The mother does not explain her argument or support her 

contention that it was the Department that sought the order permitting visitation with 

DC.6 The trial court’s order states that it was granting the mother’s request for visitation, 

not the Department’s. Accordingly, this argument fails.

 

6 This court will not “scour the record and construct arguments for counsel.” In re 

Disciplinary Proceeding Against Whitney, 155 Wn.2d 451, 467, 120 P.3d 550 (2005).
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

25

On appeal, the mother also maintains that the Department failed to facilitate the 

necessary services during the time period when she did have contact with her children. 

Although she does not explicitly argue it, it appears she is claiming that, during the two 

months where she had visitation with DC, the Department should have re-referred her for 

family therapy, a parenting assessment, and an evidence-based parenting program. 

Assuming this is the mother’s position, this argument only applies to the termination of 

the mother’s parental rights with regard to DC. The mother did not raise this challenge at 

trial so the facts are undeveloped. See RAP 2.5(a). Even so, providing services in such a 

short time span would be futile. 

“‘Where the record establishes that the offer of services would be futile, the trial 

court can make a finding that the Department has offered all reasonable services.’” 

K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d at 483 (quoting In re Welfare of C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51, 56 n.2, 225 

P.3d 953 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The provision of services is futile 

where a parent is unwilling or unable to participate in a reasonably available service that 

has been offered or provided.” Id.

In K.M.M., the court determined that the provision of attachment and bonding 

services to K.M.M.’s father would have been futile because K.M.M. “could not tolerate 

interactions with her father and refused to attend visitation.” Id. Further, the additional 

services would have also been futile because the father failed to show empathy for 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

26

K.M.M.’s needs: he failed to recognize his own parenting deficiencies and blamed the 

Department, foster parents, K.M.M.’s therapist, and his own therapist for his failure to 

reunify with K.M.M. Id. at 484. Additionally, as the father had failed to address his own 

mental health issues, he was not ready to support K.M.M.’s attachment. Id. at 485. The 

court also noted that there was no evidence that attachment and bonding services would 

have repaired the parent-child relationship but rather the evidence tended to show that the 

relationship was irreparable and any reunification attempt would be detrimental to 

K.M.M. Id. at 484.

Here, like K.M.M., even had the Department re-referred the mother for family 

therapy, a parenting assessment, and an evidence-based parenting program during the 

short period where she resumed contact with DC, the provision of these services would 

have been futile because the mother still would not have addressed her underlying trauma 

that prevented her from safely parenting her children and realizing her own parenting 

deficiencies. The mother showed a lack of awareness of her own deficiencies when she 

expressed that parenting five children was easy and she did not have any issues with her 

children. Absent significant progress in her own mental health treatment, including 

becoming more aware of her own deficiencies, any services involving interacting with 

DC likely would have been ineffective. 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

27

In fact, with regard to family therapy specifically, the Department asked DC if he 

wished to engage in it after he resumed visitation with his mother, and he stated that he 

did not. Taylor’s testimony also appeared to indicate that whether the mother proceeded 

with the evidence-based parenting program and the parenting assessment during 

visitation was at DC’s discretion. Additionally, the mother points to no evidence 

showing that the additional parenting-related services would have repaired the mother’s 

relationship with DC; rather, DC’s request to stop visitation and stated belief that his 

mother had not made progress tended to show that the mother’s relationship with DC was 

irreparable. Thus, the mother’s argument that the Department should have re-referred the 

mother for parenting-related services when she resumed visitation with DC fails.

In sum, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the Department 

offered or provided to the mother all necessary, reasonably available services capable of 

correcting her parental deficiencies.

B. Father

The father maintains that the Department failed to offer or provide all necessary 

services because it did not offer or provide chemical dependency treatment and did not 

tailor services to provide him with a Christian mental health therapist. We disagree. 

The trial court ordered, and the father agreed to participate in numerous services. 

To address concerns that the father may have a chemical dependency, the court ordered 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

28

UA/BA testing as recommended by treatment providers or upon reasonable suspicion by 

the social workers. Throughout the course of the dependency, the father’s participation 

in services and contact with the social worker were minimal. The father did not appear 

for the termination trial and did not present any evidence. 

On appeal, the father maintains that the Department did not provide chemical 

dependency services and did not investigate his need for chemical dependency treatment. 

Initially, the father argues that the Department failed to provide him with chemical 

dependency services. He points out that while testing was ordered on an as-needed basis, 

no testing was ever offered. To this extent, he contends that the trial court finding that he 

had participated in two UA/BA tests that had come back clean is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The father is correct that the testimony and evidence at trial showed that no 

UA/BA testing had been ordered throughout the course of the dependency, and therefore 

the trial court’s finding was an error as it was not supported by substantial evidence. 

However, as this finding by the trial court was in the father’s favor and the trial court 

ultimately did not find that the father was unfit due to chemical dependency, the 

erroneous finding did not materially affect the trial court’s decision. Thus, this error did 

not impact the outcome of the proceedings and was harmless. See State v. Caldera, 66 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

29

Wn. App. 548, 551, 832 P.2d 139 (1992) (“[A]n erroneous finding of fact not materially 

affecting the conclusions of law is not prejudicial and does not warrant a reversal.”).

The father contends that chemical testing was never offered. While this is true, the 

testing ordered by the court and agreed to by the father was conditioned upon the 

recommendation of treatment providers or requested by the social workers. The trial 

court found that the father’s contact with treatment providers and the social worker was 

minimal. There is no evidence that the treatment providers or social workers ever had 

reason to recommend or request testing. 

The father also argues that the Department was required to “investigate” his 

chemical dependency, relying on In re I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. 914, 385 P.3d 268 (2016). 

In I.M.-M., the mother promptly completed a psychological evaluation that identified her 

cognitive impairments and found that she may struggle with traditional therapy. 

Although the Department was provided with the evaluation, the Department failed to 

investigate the identified needs, failed to address those needs in further evaluations and 

treatment, and failed to provid tailored services. Id. at 923. In contrast to I.M.-M., there 

is no evidence that the father’s chemical dependency was likely to impact his ability to 

address other parental deficiencies nor is there any evidence that services other than 

testing were needed. 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

30

Moreover, as the Department points out, the father’s focus on chemical 

dependency services is a red herring. The trial court did not terminate the father’s 

parental rights based on chemical dependency deficiencies. Instead, the court found that 

the father failed to address his parental deficiencies of “physical abuse, sexual abuse, and 

chronic neglect.” CP at 2475. 

The father also maintains that the Department failed to offer and provide all 

necessary services when it did not refer him to a Christian mental health counselor. He 

argues that he had a constitutional right for a referral to a Christian counselor and 

maintains that the fact that he attended two sessions with Hall, a Christian counselor, in 

2018 demonstrates that he would have been more amenable to mental health services had 

the Department referred him to a Christian counselor. The Department responds that it 

did not prohibit the father from using a Christian counselor, made attempts to find 

Christian counselors, but in the end the father was unwilling to work with any treatment 

provider connected to the Department.

The father claims that the Department violated his right to freedom of religion 

under the First Amendment and the Washington Constitution by failing to refer him to a 

Christian counselor. The father claims that because the Department could have asked 

counselors their religion prior to contracting with them, it was required to do so under the 

First Amendment and the Washington Constitution. He points out that the Department 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

31

inquiring of a counselor’s religious affiliation would not have violated freedom of 

religion, and from there concludes that they were accordingly required to provide him 

with a Christian counselor. 

This issue was not raised before the trial court and therefore the factual basis for 

this claim has not been developed. Generally, issues raised for the first time on appeal 

will not be considered unless the appellant demonstrates it is a “manifest error affecting a 

constitutional right,” under RAP 2.5(a)(3). The father does not make such a claim and 

the lack of a record makes it difficult to consider this issue. For example, there is no 

evidence in the record showing that there was even a Christian provider to which the 

Department could have referred the father. Accordingly, we decline to address this issue. 

See RAP 2.5; State v. Mashek, 177 Wn. App. 749, 764, 312 P.3d 774 (2013) (argument 

on appeal is waived where defendant failed to raise it before the trial court and provides 

no argument on appeal that any exception to the general waiver rule applies). 

The record demonstrates that the Department made efforts to accommodate the 

father’s request for a Christian mental health counselor. While the Department was not 

permitted to ask counselors their religion prior to contracting with them, when sending 

out referrals for mental health providers in this case, the Department explicitly noted the 

parents’ preference for a Christian counselor. Social worker Labish also searched online 

for counselors who self-identified as Christian. At one point, the Department provided a 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

32

referral to Colson, with whom the father had worked with previously, and while the 

father appeared for the initial intake, he refused to participate in the evaluation or any 

subsequent services.

The evidence suggests that the father’s refusal to participate in mental health 

treatment was not based on his preference for a Christian counselor, but rather on his 

insistence “that he didn’t want to work with any provider that was connected with the 

department whatsoever.” RP at 89. There is substantial evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings that the Department offered or provided all necessary services reasonably 

available with regard to both the mother and the father.

3. LIKELIHOOD OF DEFICIENCIES BEING REMEDIED IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Both parents argue that the trial court erred in finding that there was little 

likelihood that conditions would be remedied so that the children could be returned to the 

parents in the near future. 

Prior to terminating parental rights, the Department is required to show that “A 

parent’s failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within 12 months following 

entry of the dispositional order shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that there is 

little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the 

parent in the near future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). “A parent’s unwillingness to avail 

[themselves] of remedial services within a reasonable period is highly relevant to a trial 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

33

court’s determination as to whether the State has satisfied RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).” In re 

Welfare of T.B., 150 Wn. App. at 608.

Although the Department retains the burden of proof, the rebuttal presumption 

shifts the burden of production to the parent to show evidence of improvement. In re 

Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942, 955-56, 143 P.3d 846 (2006). “When it is eventually 

possible, but not imminent, for a parent to be reunited with a child, the child’s present 

need for stability and permanence is more important and can justify termination.” Id. at 

958-59.

The interpretation of “near future” is dependent on “the age of the child and the 

circumstances of the child’s placement.” Id. at 954. The “near future” is typically a 

shorter period for children that are younger. Id.

A. Mother

The mother maintains that the trial court erred in finding that there was little 

likelihood that her deficiencies will be remedied in the foreseeable future because the 

mother was compliant with available treatment and had shown improvement over the 

term of the dependency. 

The rebuttal presumption applies to this case. Therefore, the burden of production 

shifted to the mother to show evidence of improvement. Although the mother engaged in 

most of the services provided by the Department, she fails to overcome the presumption. 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

34

The evidence demonstrates that the mother submitted to both UAs requested by 

the Department, completed the psychosexual evaluation, participated in family therapy as 

long as it was provided, and submitted to a chemical dependency evaluation. However, 

the mother failed to regularly engage and make progress with counseling and did not 

address her own childhood trauma or how to keep her children safe from abuse. From 

the end of 2018 to 2019, prior to the dependency order, the mother saw Del Carlo for 

counseling for three months and had “partial improvement” during her time there but 

made “minimal progress” toward her goals of learning coping skills and addressing her 

anxiety. RP at 212, 217. At some point, potentially within the twelve-month period, the 

mother also engaged with Hall for counseling but just completed two sessions before Hall 

terminated the relationship. There was no evidence of any progress made by the mother 

during these sessions.

After the twelve-month period, although she was unable to finish the evidencebased parenting program due to visitation being suspended with her children, the mother 

did complete the portions that she could finish on her own. Similarly, the mother was 

unable to complete the parenting assessment due to her lack of contact with her children. 

And the provider who administered the portions of the parenting program expressed 

concern with the mother’s lack of insight into her parenting and that the mother believed 

that parenting five children was easy.
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

35

After she saw Hall, the mother did not engage with another mental health provider 

until two months prior to the termination trial when she started seeing Toews for 

counseling to deal with anxiety and depression. Though Toews noted that the mother 

was moving ahead, she indicated that she was still in the beginning stages of addressing 

her anxiety and depression—specifically, the mother was still addressing her denial—and 

Toews could not provide an estimate on how long it would take for the mother to 

progress. Although Toews did not identify any safety concerns with regard to the 

children being placed in her care, Toews also said she did not have enough information to 

make that determination. Further, there was no evidence that the mother addressed the 

recommended areas of treatment with Toews, which were her history of abuse and 

neglect and how to protect her children from abuse or neglect.

Although the evidence showed that the mother engaged with many of her services 

throughout the dependency, there was substantial evidence that she failed to make 

progress toward remedying the parental deficiencies that had initially resulted in the 

dependency. She failed to even begin to address issues that led to the underlying 

dependency: lack of appropriate supervision and failure to protect. Even though the trial 

court found, and the evidence supports, that the mother did make some progress, it was 

not enough to allow the children to be returned to her in the foreseeable future. Further, 

all of the children stated that they do not wish to be reunited with their mother, and AW 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

36

and CW were placed into a permanent adoptive home in which they expressed a desire to 

stay.

Relying on C.B., the mother maintains that she has overcome the rebuttal 

presumption by completing a chemical dependency program and having recent positive 

visitation with DC. In C.B., the mother made significant progress in the four months 

prior to the termination hearing: she completed chemical dependency programs, 

presented evidence of change from her counselors and friends, was scheduled to begin an 

anger management course, and had positive visitation with her children. 134 Wn. App. at 

949, 954-55, 957. There was no evidence demonstrating how long it would take the 

mother to reunify with her child. Id. at 959.

In contrast, here, apart from her completion of the chemical dependency program 

in 2018, the mother has made little to no progress in addressing her parenting 

deficiencies. Moreover, although the visits with DC initially went well, they actually 

tend to support the Department’s position because after a couple months DC asked to 

stop visits as he believed that the mother had taken substances prior to a visit and was not 

making progress.

The mother contends that the mere fact that she participated in court-ordered 

services demonstrated improvement. However, improvement requires that parent to 

improve the parental deficiencies that resulted in the dependency. Participating in 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

37

services alone does not necessitate a finding of improvement. The parent must also 

benefit from those services, and there was little evidence that the mother benefited from 

her participation in services.

The mother also appears to argue that the results of the psychosexual evaluation 

showed that she was unlikely to predate the children sexually and that she was likely 

being honest about her lack of involvement in any sexual abuse of the children that may 

have occurred. She claims that the evaluation results, taken along with the varied 

accounts of abuse from the children and the fact that criminal charges were never 

brought, demonstrate that there was no basis for the trial court’s finding of a parental 

deficiency with regard to sexual abuse. However, the psychosexual evaluation did not 

look at whether the mother committed a sex offense or sexual deviancy but instead 

looked at amenability to treatment.

The mother further claims that the abuse allegations, specifically with regard to 

her involvement, were not credible. She notes that some of the reported touching 

involved non sexual activities, CW and AW who reported the mother was involved were 

younger and CW has memory and cognition issues, and the psychosexual evaluation 

indicated no deception. However, this court defers to the trial court with regard to 

credibility determinations. See A.W., 182 Wn.2d at 711. The children’s accounts were 

not necessarily false because some of the alleged incidents of abuse could have been non-
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

38

sexual touching such as checking to see if a child had wet his bed. And their cognitive 

issues did not completely discredit their accounts. These were rather both credibility 

factors for the trial court to consider. The same applies to the polygraph results. 

Moreover, the evaluator did not explain what portions of the evaluation the “[n]o 

deception was indicated” result applied to, and as explained above, the focus of the 

evaluation was not whether the mother had perpetrated sexual abuse but whether she was 

amendable to treatment.

B. Father

The father argues that because the services were inadequate, the trial court erred in 

finding that there was little likelihood of conditions remedying in the near future as such 

a finding was premature and contrary to evidence presented at trial. He claims that he did 

participate in some services and likely would have been more successful had he been 

provided the integrated service of chemical dependency treatment as well as therapy 

tailored to his needs. However, as explained above, the provision of further services to 

the father would have been futile, and the Department was not required to provide 

integrated services to the father. Accordingly, this argument fails. 

The father also maintains that substantial evidence does not support the trial 

court’s finding that he “never engaged in mental health treatment or individual 

counseling during the life of the case.” CP at 2473. He points out that he did engage in 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

39

mental health treatment with Hall until she terminated the two sessions. The testimony at 

trial did establish that the father attended counseling with the mother for two sessions 

before Hall terminated the relationship. Therefore, the trial court did err in this finding. 

However, the testimony established that he only attended two sessions with Hall and 

there was no evidence of any progress toward addressing the father’s parental 

deficiencies during these two sessions. Thus, even if the trial court’s findings had

correctly noted the two sessions with Hall, this would not have impacted its decision. 

Accordingly, the error was harmless. See In re Dependency of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 186, 193-

94, 525 P.3d 177 (2023).

The father further contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial 

court’s finding that he “demonstrated through his own inactions and omissions that he is 

unwilling or unable to make use of the services provided by the Department” and 

“demonstrated through a lack of engagement in court ordered services over the course of 

three years that he is unwilling to engage in any services designed to remediate the 

identified parental deficiencies.” CP at 2474. The father claims that he participated in 

some services and would have participated in more had the trial court tailored his needs 

with a Christian counselor. But the trial court did not find that the father did not engage 

in any services, rather it found a lack of engagement. And this finding of a lack of 

engagement was supported by substantial evidence, as explained above, as the father 
No. 39004-7-III (Consol. with Nos. 39005-5-III, 39006-3-III, 

39007-1-III, 39027-6-III, 39028-4-III)

In re C.W.

40

consistently declined to complete the psychosexual evaluation and participate in 

counseling despite repeated efforts by the Department to encourage him to engage with 

the services provided.7

Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was little 

likelihood that conditions would be remedied so that the children could be returned to 

either parent in the near future.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040.

_________________________________

Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________

Pennell, J.

 

7 The father also argues that the trial court erred in finding that his failure to 

appear at the termination trial made it clear that he had no interest in changing so that 

either child could return home in the near future, but he fails to provide argument in 

support of this contention. Accordingly, we decline to address this argument.