Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 8, 2022

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-00548-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.V., A MINOR CHILD

On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-04-11968-V

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Osborne

Venky Venkatraman (Father), pro se, appeals the trial court’s May 6, 2019 

order modifying the parent–child relationship and confirming child-support 

arrearages (May 6, 2019 order). We construe Father’s sole issue on appeal to argue 

the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to reduce the amount of child 

support and ordered that it remain the same because there was no evidence to support 
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the trial court’s findings and conclusions.1 We conclude the trial court did not err

and affirm the trial court’s May 6, 2019 order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother divorced on June 1, 2005, and have two children.2 Father 

has repeatedly been before this Court appealing various orders and seeking 

mandamus relief regarding this high-conflict custody case.3 The underlying facts 

1 We note that Father does not challenge the portion of the trial court’s order relating to child support 

arrearages. Also, Father concedes in his brief on appeal that the portions of the May 6, 2019 order related 

to custody, possession, and access of the child are moot because the child has already turned 18 years old. 

Accordingly, we do not address these portions of the trial court’s May 6, 2019 order.

2 The children are now over eighteen years of age. This appeal relates solely to the younger child who 

was under eighteen at the time of the trial court’s May 6, 2019 order.

3

 See In re Venkatraman, No. 05-19-00941-CV, 2019 WL 4233381 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 6, 2019, 

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying petition for writ of mandamus complaining of May 6, 2019 final 

modification order in suit affecting parent–child relationship); In re S.V., No. 05-17-01486-CV, 2019 WL 

3026768 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming order in suit affecting the parent–

child relationship nunc pro tunc); In re S.V., No. 05-17-01294-CV, 2019 WL 1529379 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Apr. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming order denying Father’s motion to reduce child support); In re 

Venkatraman, No. 05-19-00088-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 20, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) 

(denying mandamus relief); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-19-00171-CV, 2019 WL 642726 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 15, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus relief); In re S.V., No. 05-18-00037-

CV, 2019 WL 516730 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming order modifying 

a permanent injunction in suit affecting the parent–child relationship); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-18-

01510-CV, 2018 WL 6804298 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 27, 2018, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus 

relief); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-18-00751-CV, 2018 WL 3322896 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 6, 2018, 

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-18-00655-CV, 2018 WL 2979858 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas June 14, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus relief as moot); In re 

Venkatraman, No. 05-18-00088-CV, 2018 WL 635995 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 31, 2018, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.) (denying mandamus relief); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-17- 01474-CV, 2018 WL 329363 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Jan. 9, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-17-01349-CV, 

2017 WL 5897460 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 29, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re 

Venkatraman, No. 05-17-01328-CV, 2017 WL 5663620 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 27, 2017, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-17-01330-CV, 2017 WL 5622930 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Nov. 22, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-17-01310-CV, 2017 

WL 5559614 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 16, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re S.V., No. 05-

16-00519-CV, 2017 WL 3725981 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh'g) 

(affirming in part and reversing in part trial court's 2016 SAPCR nunc pro tunc order); In re Venkatraman, 

No. 05-17-00559-CV, 2017 WL 3474016 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 14, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) 

(denying mandamus relief); Venkatraman v. Masurekar, No. 05-15-00792-CV, 2016 WL 7163833 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming judgment against Venkatraman on breach-of-contract 
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and procedural background are well known to the parties. Therefore, we do not 

include a recitation of the facts and include only the procedural background 

necessary for the disposition of the issue raised by Father in this particular appeal.

On December 15, 2017, the trial court signed an order in the suit affecting the 

parent–child relationship nunc pro tunc, ordering Father to pay child support in the 

amount of $895 per month for the younger child after the older child turned 18 years 

of age and graduated from high school. On April 5, 2018, Mother filed her original 

petition to modify the parent–child relationship. On June 17, 2018, Father filed a 

counter petition seeking only a modification of conservatorship, possession, and 

access to the child. On July 2, 2018, Mother filed her first amended petition to 

modify the parent–child relationship and petition to confirm child support in arrears, 

seeking an increase in child support among other things. On January 15, 2019, after 

a trial before the court, the trial court sent the parties a written memorandum ruling 

that stated, in part, “[t]he [F]ather’s child support is set at $895.00 per the last order 

in effect and this Court will not modify that amount.” On May 6, 2019, the trial 

court signed an order modifying the parent–child relationship and confirming childsupport arrearages that required Father to continue to pay child support in the amount 

claim because it was legally impossible for Mother to perform due to intervening judicial act); In re 

Venkatraman, No. 05-17-00489-CV, 2017 WL 2200339 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 19, 2017, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re S.V., No. 05-16-00519-CV, 2016 WL 2993515 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

May 20, 2016 no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing trial court orders that sustained district clerk’s, court reporter’s, 

and deputy reporter’s contest of his affidavit of indigence); In re Venkatraman, No. 05-16-00477-CV, 2016 

WL 1701797 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus relief).
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of $895.00 per month and to continue to provide health insurance for the younger 

child. On July 19, 2019, the trial court signed written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law relating to the May 6, 2019 order.

II. NO MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

In his sole issue on appeal, Father appears to argue the trial court correctly 

denied Mother’s request to increase child support but abused its discretion when it 

ordered the amount of child support to remain the same instead of decreasing it. 

Father contends the trial court abused its discretion “by fixing a child support amount 

for Father that did not comply with Child Support Guidelines” and there is “no 

evidence of substantive and probative character evidence [] to support the [childsupport] award.” Mother responds that Father failed to preserve this issue for appeal 

because he did not file a written counter pleading requesting a reduction in the 

amount of child support. And, Father invited any error in the judgment when he 

asked the trial court to find there was no change in circumstances to justify a change 

in the amount of child support. In the alternative, Mother argues the trial court 

concluded the evidence of a significant and substantial change since the last order 

was insufficient to support a change in the amount of child support. 

The record shows that Father’s counter petition did not request a reduction in 

the amount of child support. Further, the record of the trial on Mother’s motion to 
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modify does not show that the issue was raised.4 Nevertheless, in its written findings 

and conclusions, the trial court found that “[t]he [trial] [c]ourt denied Father’s 

request to decrease child support based upon his reported income” and concluded 

“[Father] should be obligated to pay child support to [Mother] in the amount of 

$895.00 per month for the benefit of S.V. and the evidence did not support an 

increase or decrease in the amount of support.” Accordingly, for the purposes of 

this appeal, we will assume without deciding that the issue was tried by consent and 

construe Father’s argument on appeal to be that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it declined to reduce the amount of child support and ordered that it remain the 

same because there was no evidence to support the trial court’s findings and 

conclusions.5

A. Standard of Review

The trial court has broad discretion to set or modify child support. In re 

K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.). An appellate court 

will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a child support order absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. See Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); In re K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d 

at 894. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, 

4 We note that, during the trial, Father did request that, if the trial court were going to change the amount 

of child support, the amount be based on his net resources as shown in his tax returns.

5

 Father does not specify whether he contends the evidence is legally insufficient, factually insufficient 

or both. However, we construe his argument to be a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence only 

because he contends there is “no evidence” and seeks rendition. See Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, No. 05-

15-01560-CV, 2017 WL 3699823, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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without reference to guiding rules or principles, or fails to analyze or apply the law 

correctly. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 78.

In modification suits, traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap the 

abuse-of-discretion standard. See In re H.K.D., No. 05-18-00968-CV, 2020 WL 

428152, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Challenges to 

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error 

but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In 

re J.P.M., No. 05-18-00548-CV, 2019 WL 6768763, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 

12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Consequently, to determine whether a trial court 

abused its discretion, appellate courts engage in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the 

trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) 

if so, whether the trial court erred in its exercise of that discretion. Id.

Where a trial court has signed written findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

they have the same dignity as a jury’s verdict. In re S.D.S.H., No. 05-15-00564-CV, 

2016 WL 3398074, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to review under the same legal and 

factual sufficiency standards as jury findings. Id. When conducting a legalsufficiency review, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the finding and indulges every reasonable inference that would support 

it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2015). An appellate court 

will not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder and will uphold the finding 
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if the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. Appellate 

courts recognize the trial court is in the best position to observe and assess the 

witnesses’ demeanor and credibility and to sense the “forces, powers, and 

influences” that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal. In 

re C.M.C., No. 05-15-01359-CV, 2016 WL 7166415, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 

9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Consequently, appellate courts defer to a trial court’s 

resolution of underlying facts and to credibility determinations that may have 

affected its determination and will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court. Id. If some evidence of a substantial and probative character supports the 

trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. In re K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d at 

894.

B. Applicable Law

The Texas Family Code permits a trial court to modify a child-support order 

if the movant shows the circumstances of a child or a person affected by the order 

has materially and substantially changed since the date of the order’s rendition. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.401(a). In deciding whether a material and substantial 

change of circumstances has occurred, a trial court is not confined to rigid or definite 

guidelines. In re C.M.C., 2016 WL 7166415, at *4. Instead, the trial court’s 

determination is fact-specific and must be made according to the circumstances as 

they arise. Id. The law does not prescribe any particular method for showing 

changed circumstances, which may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id.
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Section 156.402 of the Texas Family Code provides that in making the 

determination whether there has been a material or substantial change of 

circumstances, it may consider the child-support guidelines under Chapter 154. 

FAM. § 156.402(a). However, a trial court is not required to modify an order to 

conform with the statutory guidelines and, in fact, may do so only if it determines 

that the modification would be in the child’s best interest. See id. § 156.402(b).

The duty to pay child support is not limited to an obligor’s ability to pay from 

earnings but also includes the obligor’s ability to pay from any and all available 

sources. In re K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d at 897. If a parent’s actual income is significantly 

less than he or she could earn because the parent is intentionally underemployed or 

unemployed, the court may order child support based on earning potential instead of 

actual earnings. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.066(a). A finding of intentional 

unemployment to underemployment does not require evidence that the parent’s 

unemployment or underemployment was for the purpose of avoiding child support.

Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 83 & n.8.

C. Application of the Law to the Facts

We construe Father’s argument to challenge the following findings of fact:

20. The application of the child support guidelines in this suit would 

be unjust or inappropriate.

21. The amount of child support per month [ordered] by the [trial] 

[c]ourt may vary from the amount computed by applying the 

percentage guidelines under [§] 154.125 of the Texas Family Code 

for the following reasons:
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A) Father is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and has 

completed law school at the time that child support was set by 

the court.

. . . .

C) The tax return(s) submitted by Father was/were not credible, 

with Father stating that the tax return program made all of the 

substantive decisions.

. . . .

E) The Court denied Father’s request to dec[r]ease child support 

based upon his reported income.

22. It is in the best interest of the child that [F]ather continue to provide 

health insurance for the benefit of the child until the child is no 

longer a minor.

The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law explain why the trial 

court did not modify or change its prior orders with respect to the amount of child 

support or the provision of health insurance for S.V. To the extent Father is 

attempting to collaterally attack the trial court’s December 15, 2017 order in suit 

affecting the parent–child relationship nunc pro tunc, we have already affirmed that 

order. See In re S.V., No. 05-17-01486-CV, 2019 WL 3026768 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 

no pet.) (mem. op.). In addition, during the trial, Father testified that “[he] [didn’t] 

believe there’s a change of circumstances to warrant a change in child support.” It 

is a well-established principle of law that a party cannot request a ruling from a court 

and then complain on appeal that the court committed error by giving him the 

requested ruling. See In re Marriage of Hammett, No. 05-14-00613-CV, 2016 WL 

3086126, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 1, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tittizer 
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v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2005) (discussing “invited error 

doctrine”)).

In his counter petition, Father did not request a reduction in the amount of 

child support or plead any facts identifying specific circumstances requiring such a 

decrease. Nevertheless, Father contends there is no evidence to support the trial 

court’s finding of fact that “[t]he tax return(s) submitted by Father was/were not 

credible, with Father stating that the tax return program made all of the substantive 

decisions.” On appeal, Father contends that the only relevant evidence relating to 

his net financial resources was his 2016 and 2017 tax returns, which showed his 

income as zero; so, based on that evidence, his child-support obligation should have 

been reduced to zero. On both tax returns Father reported his “wages, salaries, tips, 

etc.” as zero. However, this is contrary to Father’s testimony that he had income 

from some consulting work and renting a room in his house through Airbnb. The 

trial court found that these tax returns were not credible and we defer to the trial 

court’s credibility determinations. In re C.M.C., 2016 WL 7166415, at *4.

Father also contends there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding 

that he was intentionally underemployed. Rather he maintains the record shows he 

had just graduated from law school and planned to take the Bar exam in the February 

of the next year and, as a result, he could not earn any significant income until he 

had passed the Bar Exam. However, he also testified that he “wrote on [his] law 

school application . . . the only reason [he was] going to law school [was] because 
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of the custody matter” and “[he’s] spent three and a half years in law school to get a 

daughter back home.” The record also shows that Father has an undergraduate 

degree in engineering and a graduate degree in management. Further, a LinkedIn 

summary of Father’s employment background and qualifications was admitted over 

his objection showing he had a background in information technology, servicing 

various industries including retail, banking, finance, utilities, telecommunications, 

and transportation. It also showed Father had completed general mediation training 

as well as advanced family and divorce dispute-resolution training. The LinkedIn 

summary also stated Father was currently engaged in providing consulting services

to a large patent law firm. In addition, Father testified he had some income from 

consulting work and he rents a room in his house through Airbnb. We conclude the 

record contains some evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Father was 

intentionally underemployed.

Finally, Father argues there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding 

of fact that it is in the child’s best interest that he continues to provide the child’s

health insurance. At trial, the testimony related to Father’s failure to make the 

insurance cards available to the child’s doctor. Father does not point to, nor do we 

find, any evidence showing that health and dental insurance was not available at a 

reasonable cost.

Next, we also construe Father’s argument to challenge the following 

conclusions of law:
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10. It is in the best interest of the child for [F]ather to continue to pay 

child support at the amount previously set and to provide medical 

support.

9. There was insufficient evidence to support either an increase or a 

decrease in the amount of child support Father is ordered to pay.

10.[stet] [Father] should be obligated to pay child support to 

[Mother] in the amount of $895.00 per month for the benefit of 

S.V. and the evidence did not support an increase or a decrease in 

the amount of support.

11. It is presumed that the obligor shall provide health insurance for 

the benefit of the minor child.

12. [Father] did not allege that health and dental insurance was not 

available at a reasonable cost, [and] the [trial] court ordered that 

he continue to provide coverage since such coverage is in the best 

interest of the child.

The trial court’s findings of fact support these challenged conclusions of law. 

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court had sufficient 

information upon which to exercise its discretion and did not err in the exercise of 

that discretion. Father’s sole issue on appeal is decided against him.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err when it declined to reduce the amount of Father’s 

monthly child support obligations.

We affirm the trial court’s May 6, 2019 order.

190548f.p05

/Leslie Osborne//

LESLIE OSBORNE

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF S.V., A 

MINOR CHILD 

No. 05-19-00548-CV

On Appeal from the 256th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-04-11968-

V.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Osborne. Justices Myers and Carlyle 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee JYOTI MASUREKAR f/k/a JYOTI 

VENKATRAMAN recover her costs of this appeal and the full amount of the trial 

court’s judgment from appellant VENKY VENKATRAMAN and from the cash 

deposit in lieu of supersedeas bond.

After the judgment and all costs have been paid, we DIRECT the clerk of the 

district court to release the balance, if any, of the cash deposit in lieu of supersedeas 

bond to appellant VENKY VENKATRAMAN.

Judgment entered this 8

th day of March, 2022.