J-S21012-16

 2016 PA Super 100

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DERRICK TT WALKER,

Appellant No. 485 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-51-CR-0007470-2011

CP-51-CR-0007471-2011

CP-51-CR-0007472-2011

CP-51-CR-0007473-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 13, 2016

Appellant, Derrick TT Walker, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of 4 to 10 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury 

convicted him, in four separate cases, of four counts of unlawful contact with 

a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), four counts of corruption of minors, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), and one count each of unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2902(a)(1), luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure, 18 Pa.C.S. 

2910(a), and simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). On appeal, Appellant 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The facts of Appellant’s cases, which were consolidated for trial, can be 

summarized as follows:1

On May 4, 2011, four days shy of her [tenth] birthday, 

Z.A. was walking to school at around 7:15 a.m. when she 

stopped at a store at 29th and Moore Streets to buy juice and 

chips. While inside shopping, she looked up at a mirror hanging 

on the wall and noticed [A]ppellant,[2] whom she did not know, 

staring at her. She went to the counter to pay for her items, 

and [A]ppellant followed her, stood next to her, and continued to 

stare at her. Appellant left the store, and when Z.A. walked 

outside shortly thereafter, she saw [A]ppellant in a parked red 

car. As she walked down 29th Street, [A]ppellant drove up next 

to her, stopped the car and said “Come here[.]” Z.A. ran to 

school and [A]ppellant drove off. After school, Z.A. told her aunt 

... what happened. Her aunt called the police, who came to the 

house and took a statement from Z.A.

L.C. testified that she was nine years old on May 6, 2011. 

On that date at around 6:45 a.m., she was standing alone at the 

school bus stop at 12th Street and Lehigh Avenue when 

[A]ppellant, whom she did not know, pulled up in a car. He 

asked L.C. if she had “hair on her pussy[.]” L.C. ran to school. 

Later that day, L.C. told a teacher, her mother, and her 

grandmother what had happened. She also spoke with police 

and identified [A]ppellant from a group of photos shown to her.

K.B. testified that on May [11], 2011, she was eleven 

years old. On that date at about 7:45 a.m., she and her six 

year-old brother were walking to Frederick Douglas Charter 

School near Ditman Street. As they walked, a red car drove up 

____________________________________________

1 We do not have the benefit of a trial court opinion in this case, as the 

judge who presided over Appellant’s trial retired. The factual summary 

provided herein was set forth by Appellant in his brief. 

2 Appellant was 41 years old in May of 2011.
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beside her and the driver, [A]ppellant, whom she did not know, 

asked her if she had “hair on her pussy[.]” She and her brother 

quickly walked to school and [A]ppellant drove off. K.B. told a 

teacher, who notified K.B.’s mother and the police. K.B. later 

identified [A]ppellant from a group of photos shown to her by 

police.

T.H. testified that on May 11, 2011, she was eleven years 

old.3 On that date at around 7:15 a.m., she was on a bus 

heading to school near Cleveland and Susquehanna Streets 

when she realized she forgot something at home. She got off 

the bus and began to walk home. A red car pulled up beside her 

and the driver, [A]ppellant, whom she did not know, asked her if 

she had “hair on her pussy[.]” Appellant then reached out the 

car window with his left hand and grabbed T.H.’s wrist. She put 

her foot against the car and pulled her wrist free. T.H. testified 

that [A]ppellant had “a good grip” and that it hurt, but that she 

was not cut or bruised. She ran home and [A]ppellant drove 

away. At home she told her grandmother, ... who called the 

police. Officers came to their house and, as T.H. was outside 

speaking to them, she saw [A]ppellant’s car drive by. She 

pointed out the car to the officers, who then pursued [A]ppellant 

and arrested him.

3 Other Commonwealth evidence, including T.H.’s own 

testimony [about] her birthdate ... indicate[d] that T.H. 

was actually twelve years old on the day in question.

Corporal Eric Reiser testified that he was the officer who 

arrested [A]ppellant as he was stopped at a red light. He 

ordered [A]ppellant out of the car, and when [A]ppellant got out, 

his loose sweatpants fell down. [Appellant] was not wearing 

underwear and the officer leaned down to pull [A]ppellant’s 

pants up. T.H. then identified [Appellant] as the man who had 

approached her.

Police Officer Michael O’Brien testified that he took 

photographs of items found inside [A]ppellant’s car on the day of 

his arrest. The items included binoculars and a camera in its 

case on the rear floor, newspapers and a trash bag on the 

driver’s seat. These items, in addition to a mirror, were later 

seized pursuant to a search warrant.

Detective Linda Pace testified that she showed photo 

arrays on separate occasions to each of the four complainants. 

Each girl identified [A]ppellant. She also stated that the four 
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incidents occurred within a ten- to twenty-block radius in the 

22nd Police District.

Appellant’s Brief at 6-8 (citations to the record and some footnotes omitted).

Appellant was charged in four separate cases pertaining to each of his 

four victims. The cases were consolidated and he proceeded to a jury trial in 

June of 2013. At the close thereof, the jury convicted Appellant of the 

above-stated offenses. On January 23, 2014, he was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 4 to 10 years’ imprisonment. He filed a timely notice of 

appeal. As the presiding trial judge had retired, Appellant was not ordered 

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, and no trial court opinion was filed. Appellant raises the following 

four issues for our review:

1. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of four counts of 

unlawful contact where the trial court instructed the jury that, to 

be convicted of that offense, [A]ppellant must have contacted 

each of the four complainants with the specific intent to commit 

indecent assault or sexual assault, and there was insufficient 

evidence he contacted the complainants for that particular 

purpose?

2. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict [A]ppellant of 

luring as to the complainant T.H. as his act of grabbing her wrist 

was not calculated to entice or induce her to get in his car?

3. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of simple assault 

as to the complainant T.H. where there was insufficient evidence 

that [A]ppellant specifically intended to put T.H. in fear of 

serious bodily injury by physical menace?

4. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of corruption of 

minors as to the complainant Z.A. where there was insufficient 

evidence that his conduct tended to produce or encourage 

delinquent behavior on Z.A.’s part?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.
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Appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

his convictions. 

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to sustain any of his four counts of unlawful contact with a minor. That 

offense is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is 

intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement 

officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed 

the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity 

prohibited under any of the following, and either the person 

initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this 

Commonwealth:

(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating 

to sexual offenses).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant, generally, with committing 

unlawful contact as defined by section 6318(a)(1); it did not define what 

specific Chapter 31 offense(s) Appellant intended to commit when he 
J-S21012-16

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contacted the victims in this case.3 However, the trial court instructed the 

jury that, to find Appellant guilty of unlawful contact, it must conclude, inter 

alia, that Appellant “was intentionally in contact with a minor, and that the 

contact was for the purpose of engaging in an unlawful act; that unlawful act 

being sexual assault and/or indecent assault with a child under 13 years of 

age....” N.T. Trial, 6/5/13, at 127-28 (emphasis added). The 

Commonwealth did not object to the trial court’s instruction. 

According to Appellant, the court’s instruction narrowed the scope of 

his unlawful contact charges and required the Commonwealth to prove, 

“beyond a reasonable doubt[,] that [he] contacted the complainants with 

that specific intent, that is, to commit indecent assault or sexual assault.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant then discusses why the evidence was 

inadequate to prove that he contacted the victims with this intent. Id. at 

14-16. 

Appellant offers no binding, legal authority to support his argument 

that the trial court’s jury instruction required the Commonwealth to prove 

that he intended to commit indecent assault or sexual assault, rather than 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant does not argue that the Commonwealth was required to specify, 

in the criminal information, the underlying crime that Appellant intended to 

commit when unlawfully contacting the minor victims. Case law supports a 

conclusion that no such specificity in the charging document was necessary. 

See Commonwealth v. Reed, 9 A.3d 1138, 1146 (Pa. 2010) (clarifying 

that for purposes of section 6318(a)(1), a defendant need not be separately 

convicted of, or even charged with, the Chapter 31 offense for which he 

contacted the minor). 
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any Chapter 31 offense. For instance, Appellant relies on the Third Circuit 

Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. McElroy, 644 F.2d 274, 280 

(3d Cir. 1981) (concluding that where the trial court’s jury charge, to which 

the prosecutor did not object, narrowed the definition of the charged crime, 

the conviction must rest on proof of the crime as defined by the court). 

Appellant’s reliance on McElroy is unavailing. “Absent a United States 

Supreme Court pronouncement, decisions of federal courts are not binding 

on state courts....” Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306, 315 n.4 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390 (Pa. 

1999); Cambria-Stoltz Enterprises v. TNT Investments, 747 A.2d 947 

(Pa. Super. 2000)).

Moreover, the decisions by this Court that Appellant cites in support of 

his argument are distinguishable. For instance, Appellant relies on 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 313 A.2d 300 (Pa. Super. 1973), where the 

Commonwealth specifically charged Lambert with corrupting the morals of a 

minor “by furnishing dangerous drugs.” Id. at 301. This Court held that 

“[b]y specifically charging the manner by which [Lambert] was alleged to 

have corrupted the morals of these minors, the Commonwealth was required 

to prove that [he] did furnish them with dangerous drugs.” Id. In reaching 

this decision, we stressed that, “[i]n criminal trials[,] the proof offered by 

the Commonwealth must measure up to the charge made in the indictment.” 

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Aurick, 19 A.2d 920, 924 

(Pa. 1941)). 
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Similarly, in the second case cited by Appellant, Commonwealth v. 

March, 551 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. 1988), the Commonwealth added to the 

criminal information four general charges of corruption of a minor, without 

any statement of specific facts underlying those charges. On appeal, March 

argued that his defense counsel was ineffective for not asking for a bill of 

particulars, and this Court agreed. Our reason for this determination rested, 

in part, on the fact that “[w]here the bill of particulars specifically limits 

proof to be adduced at trial to specific acts, the Commonwealth is not 

permitted to obtain a conviction on the offense charged by proof of acts 

other than those specified in the bill.” March, 551 A.2d at 236. We also 

stressed that “where an accused is charged with corruption by one act, and 

the Commonwealth does not prove that act, but proves some other act, a 

conviction for corruption based upon the other act cannot stand.” Id. 

(emphasis added)

The holdings of Lambert and March both involve the 

Commonwealth’s burden of proof when offenses are charged with specificity 

regarding the facts underlying those charges. Neither decision involves the 

circumstances of the present case, where the trial court’s jury instruction

narrowed the scope of offenses that had been charged, more generally, in 
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the criminal information. Appellant does not explain why the holdings of 

Lambert and March should extend to the specific scenario before us.4 

From our review of those cases, it is apparent that both decisions rest 

on the principle that the defendant must be put on notice of the offenses 

charged against him “in order to permit him to prepare a defense, avoid 

surprise, and be placed on notice as to any restrictions upon the 

Commonwealth’s proof.” March, 551 A.2d at 235-36; see also Lambert, 

313 A.2d at 301 (“An ‘indictment is the star and compass of a criminal trial 

... [and it] must be a notification to the defendant of the charge he has to 

meet.’”) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant was on notice that he was 

charged with four counts of unlawful contact with the intent to commit a 

Chapter 31 offense. Again, Appellant does not contend that the 

Commonwealth was required to specify, in the criminal information, the 

Chapter 31 offense(s) he intended to commit when contacting the minor 

victims. Further, Appellant’s argument that this Court is constrained to 

assessing only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he committed the 

specific crimes stated by the court in its jury instruction is not supported by 

____________________________________________

4

Instead, Appellant simply cites those cases, with parentheticals explaining 

their holdings, after stating, “a conviction for unlawful contact required proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [A]ppellant contacted the complainants with 

that specific intent, that is, to commit indecent assault or sexual assault. 

Proof of contact with a different unlawful intent would not support a 

conviction for this offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing Lambert, supra

and March, supra).
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any binding legal authority. Accordingly, his first challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence is unconvincing.5 

Next, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict 

him of luring a child (specifically, T.H.) into a motor vehicle. That offense is 

defined as:

(a) Offense.--Unless the circumstances reasonably indicate that 

the child is in need of assistance, a person who lures or attempts 

to lure a child into a motor vehicle or structure without the 

consent, express or implied, of the child's parent or guardian 

commits an offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2910(a). 

As Appellant recognizes, section 2910 does not define what it means 

to “lure” a child. However, in Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898 (Pa. 

2011), our Supreme Court assessed the meaning of that word in 

determining “whether the mere offer of an automobile ride to a child 

constitutes an attempt to ‘lure’ the child under [s]ection 2910....” Id. at 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant offers no discussion of how the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his convictions of unlawful contact with the intent to commit any 

Chapter 31 offense. Indeed, Appellant suggests that the evidence was 

sufficient to prove that he contacted the victims with the intent to commit 

indecent exposure, which is a Chapter 31 crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3127; 

see also Appellant’s Brief at 14 (“[I]t was purely speculative whether he 

intended to commit the two specified crimes or whether his intent was to 

commit a different offense, such as indecent exposure....”); id. at 16 (“While 

[A]ppellant contacted the complainants for an illicit purpose, the evidence 

did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did so for the purpose of 

committing the crimes of sexual assault or indecent assault rather than, for 

example, indecent exposure, open lewdness or harassment.”). 
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900. Initially, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the word 

“lure” necessarily “involves the making of a promise of pleasure or gain, the 

furnishing of a temptation or enticement, or the performance of some other 

affirmative act calculated to strongly induce another individual to take a 

particular action, usually and most often likely to result in his or her harm.” 

Id. at 909. The Hart Court then elaborated how that definition of “lure” 

applied to the issue before it, i.e., whether Hart had “lured” two young boys 

by simply offering them a ride on two separate occasions, without saying 

anything more to the boys. In holding that the facts of Hart were not 

sufficient to constitute a “lure” under section 2910, the Court explained:

Consistent with the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term 

“lure,” we therefore hold that an attempt to lure under Section 

2910 does not occur upon the mere offer of a ride in a motor 

vehicle to a child, but, rather, involves only situations where a 

child is provided a further enticement or inducement to enter the 

vehicle, in addition to the offer of the ride, particularly under 

such circumstances which suggest the child is being led into a 

potentially harmful situation. ... [T]his enticement or inducement 

may be the promise of a pleasurable reward for entry into the 

vehicle such as receiving money or a treat such as candy or ice 

cream. Likewise, a similar attractive temptation could be created 

with the promise of the opportunity for the child to view an 

object of interest like a toy, a game, or a puppy. The enticement 

or inducement need not necessarily be express, but could also 

arise where the enticement and inducement is evident from the 

circumstances accompanying the making of the offer.

Id. at 910.

Appellant seemingly construes the Hart decision as holding that the 

only way in which to “lure” a child under section 2910 is to order, command, 

or threaten the child to enter the vehicle, while also offering the child 
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inducement or enticement to do so. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19 (arguing 

that he did not lure T.H. because he “employed no form of inducement or 

influence to convince T.H. to enter his car. He did not order or threaten her 

to get in his car, nor did he make any implied or explicit promises to 

persuade her to do so. He never pressured her to avoid unpleasant 

consequences by complying with a command because he never issued such 

a command.”). However, Appellant’s interpretation ignores the Hart Court’s 

holding that the broader definition of the term “lure” includes “the 

performance of some other affirmative act calculated to strongly induce 

another individual to take a particular action....” Hart, 28 A.3d at 909. The 

Court did not expound on this portion of the definition of “lure” because the 

facts in Hart did not call for such an analysis. The facts here, however, 

clearly satisfy that particular component of the definition of “lure” under 

section 2910. Namely, T.H. testified that Appellant pulled his car alongside 

her while she was walking, asked her if she had “hair on her pussy,” and 

then grabbed her wrist and tried to pull her toward his car. N.T. Trial, 

6/4/13, at 140, 142-43. Appellant pulled T.H. with such force that she had 

to “put [her] foot on the car and push[] back” to escape from his “good 

grip.” Id. at 143. By this conduct, Appellant committed an “affirmative act 

calculated to strongly induce” T.H. to enter his vehicle, which satisfies the 

Hart Court’s definition of “lure.” Hart, 28 A.3d at 909. Therefore, the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction under section 2910. 
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In Appellant’s third issue, he avers that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove that he committed a simple assault of T.H. Appellant was convicted 

of simple assault as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3):

(a) Offense defined.-- Except as provided under section 2702 

(relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of assault if 

he:

...

(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury[.]

Serious bodily injury is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial 

risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or 

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 

organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

Appellant contends that the evidence failed to demonstrate that he 

specifically intended “to put, by physical menace, T.H. in fear of imminent 

serious bodily injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 20 (citation omitted). Appellant 

explains:

Although T.H. testified that she was “scared” when 

[A]ppellant grabbed her arm, that fact does not establish that 

[A]ppellant had the specific intent required under [section] 

2701(a)(3). It is reasonable to infer from his actions that 

[A]ppellant specifically intended to prevent her from walking or 

running away. That he frightened her in his attempt to do so 

does not establish that his specific intention in grabbing her wrist 

was to put her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

Appellant’s Brief at 20. 
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Appellant further argues that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth 

v. Fry, 491 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 1985), “is directly on point.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 20. In Fry,

a ten year old female child was walking to school with a younger 

brother and two friends. When she reached the school grounds, 

Eric Fry, age eighteen, approached her from behind, grabbed her 

by putting his arms around her and lifted her off the ground. 

When she started to kick and scream, Fry said, “shut up, you're 

coming with me.” The child had not been acquainted previously 

with Fry. Two children who were serving as safety patrol 

members saw what was happening and ran toward Fry; 

whereupon, he put the child down and walked away. At trial, the 

child surmised that Fry intended to pull her toward a flight of 

stairs leading to a locker room, but she conceded that she wasn't 

certain about that.

Fry, 491 A.2d at 844. 

This Court held in Fry that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

Fry’s conviction of simple assault under section 2701(a)(3), reasoning:

In the instant case, ... the only evidence of physical menace was 

that Fry put his arms around the child and picked her up. He did 

not strike or attempt to subdue her by physical means. He did 

not threaten to inflict bodily injury upon her. There was no 

evidence that serious bodily injury was imminent or that 

appellant intended to put the child in fear thereof. 

The evidence did show that [Fry] told the child to “shut up” and 

that he was taking her with him. The child speculated that 

perhaps [Fry] intended to take her toward the steps leading to 

the locker room. Certainly one can infer from this that a young 

child would be alarmed and frightened by [Fry’s] conduct. 

However, that is not the conduct which was made criminal by 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). The statute required a specific intent on 

the part of [Fry] to put the child in fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury. This the Commonwealth failed to prove. 

Id. at 845 (internal citations omitted).
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We find the present case distinguishable from Fry. Namely, Appellant, 

a 41 year-old man, clearly attempted to subdue T.H., an 11 year-old child, 

by grabbing her wrist and pulling her to his car. Appellant made a very 

explicit, sexual comment to T.H. just prior to gripping her wrist, and held 

T.H. with such force that she had to put her foot against his car to gain 

leverage to escape his grasp. T.H. could have fallen backward and struck 

her head, or injured herself in some other serious manner, due to 

Appellant’s physically restraining her in this way. Moreover, Appellant was 

sitting in the driver’s seat of an idling vehicle when he grabbed T.H., who 

was standing on the sidewalk. At any moment, Appellant could have 

accelerated his vehicle and dragged or struck T.H., which certainly would 

have caused serious bodily injury to the 11-year-old child. These facts were 

sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Appellant had a specific intent to 

place T.H. in fear of immediate, serious bodily injury. Thus, the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain his conviction of simple assault.

In his fourth and final issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction of corrupting the morals of a minor, 

specifically relating to victim Z.A. That offense is defined, in pertinent part:

(a) Offense defined.--

(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, 

being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act 

corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less 

than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or 

encourages any such minor in the commission of any 

crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor 
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in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits 

a misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).

Appellant maintains that his conduct of “staring at and following [Z.A.] 

in a store, and beckoning her to approach him in his car” does not amount to 

acts which would “tend to produce delinquent behavior in Z.A.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 23. As the Commonwealth points out, however, 

it was not required to prove that Z.A. may engage in delinquent 

behavior as a result of [Appellant’s] conduct. See 

Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 279 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (rejecting argument that evidence was insufficient to 

convict appellant of corrupting a minor because he supposedly 

never “encouraged the victim to commit a delinquent act”). 

Indeed, this Court has specifically cautioned against the “use of 

the term ‘delinquent’ in this context” as “a child under ten years 

of age,” like Z.A., “cannot commit a delinquent act.” Slocum, 

86 A.3d at 280 n.11. A person is guilty under 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6301(a) if he corrupts the morals of a minor or encourages a 

minor to commit a crime. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 19. 

We agree with the Commonwealth that our decision in Slocum 

negates Appellant’s argument herein. We also note that in Commonwealth 

v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99 (Pa. Super. 1997), this Court explained:

In deciding what conduct can be said to corrupt the morals of a 

minor, the common sense of the community, as well as the 

sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people 

entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular 

case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered 

criminal by it. Furthermore, corruption of a minor can involve 

conduct towards a child in an unlimited number of ways. The 

purpose of such statutes is basically protective in nature. These 

statutes are designed to cover a broad range of conduct in order 

to safeguard the welfare and security of our children. Because of 

the diverse types of conduct that must be proscribed, such 
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statutes must be drawn broadly. It would be impossible to 

enumerate every particular act against which our children need 

be protected.

Id. at 101 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, at the time of Z.A.’s encounter with Appellant, she was a 9 year 

old girl. She was unaccompanied in a convenience store when she saw 

Appellant “peeking around the corner” and staring at her. N.T. Trial, 6/4/13, 

at 43. Z.A. did not know Appellant. Id. at 44. When Z.A. took the items 

she was purchasing to the counter to pay, Appellant “walked up” and “was 

staring right at [her].” Id. at 45. Appellant did not have any items in his 

hands to purchase, yet he stood “extra close” to Z.A., and was nearly 

touching her, as she paid for her things. Id. at 46, 47. Z.A. stated that 

Appellant was facing her so that the “front part” of his body was almost 

against her right side. Id. at 46. Z.A. felt scared and “just wanted to get 

out of the store.” Id. at 47. Appellant exited the store before Z.A., and 

when she, too, went outside, she saw Appellant sitting in his car “just 

staring” at her. Id. at 47-48. Appellant then pulled up “right next to [her]” 

and said, “Come here.” Id. at 51. Z.A. ran and Appellant drove away. Id. 

at 52. We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s “conduct was 

plainly offensive to any common sense of decency, propriety, and morality.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Accordingly, his conviction for corruption of a 

minor was supported by sufficient evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/13/2016