J.A22045/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COU RT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee :

: v. : : : LEWIS TODD WATKINS, : : Appellant : No. 2270 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 16, 20 13 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division No(s).: CP- 36

- CR -0003573-2013 BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD, * JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 Appellant, Lewis Todd Watkins, appeals from the judg ment of sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Plea s, following a bench trial and his conviction for criminal mischief. 1 Appellant contends that because the property he damaged was part of his leaseho ld, 2 he could not be convicted of damaging another person’s property. W e affirm.

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court

. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5).

2 “A leasehold interest is ‘[t]he interest held by the lesse e (the tenant or renter) through a lease transferring the rights of use and occupancy for a stated term under certain conditions.’” Tech One Assocs. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cnty. , 53 A.3d 685, 689 n.13 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).J. A22045/14

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Appellant rented a room in a house owned by Jeffrey Wool, which Mr. Wool did not occupy himself. 3 N.T., 11/19/13, at 7, 15-16. According to Mr. Wool, Appellant stopped paying rent, so Mr. Wool tr aveled to the house to remove Appellant’s property and change the back door lock. Id. at 12, 17. Mr. Wool was under the impression that Appellant had v acated the premises. Id. at 12. After Mr. Wool changed the lock but before h e left the property, Appellant returned, tried to use his key, and when t hat failed, kicked the door, damaging it. Id. at 8, 13, 23. Mr. Wool unlocked the door, let Appellant into the home, and contacted the police. Id. at 8. After the police arrived, Mr. Wool reentered the home and discovered d amage to two windows and a kitchen cabinet. Id. at 9. Appellant admitted causing the damage. Id. at 21. Appellant was arrested and tried for the aforemention ed crimes. The court found Appellant guilty on November 19, 2013, a nd sentenced him that day to one year of probation and restitution of $1,5 00. Id. at 36. According to the docket, 4 Appellant filed a timely appeal on December 19, 20 13. Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 19 25(b) statement. Appellant raises the following issue:

3 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as it was the verdict-winner. Commonwealth v. Ratsamy , 934 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Pa. 2007).

4 The record does not contain the notice of appeal.J. A22045/14

- 3 - Could [Appellant] be convicted of criminal mischief wher e the property he damaged was part of his leasehold and should not have been construed as “property of another ”? Appellant’s Brief at 4. In support of his issue, Appel lant argues that the Commonwealth conceded he had a legal right to be prese nt and that Mr. Wool improperly locked him out. Thus, Appellant main tains, the property he damaged belonged to him as it was part of his leasehold . We hold Appellant is due no relief. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficie ncy of evidence is de novo , as it is a question of law. Ratsamy , 934 A.2d at 1235.

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reason able doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to support the verdict. Id. at 1235

- 36 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “When reviewi ng the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible fr om that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdi ct winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the off ense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1237. Criminal mischief is defined by Section 3304 of the Cr imes Code: (a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he: * * *J. A22045/14

- 4 - (5) intentionally damages real or personal property of another[.] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5). “Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, o ur standard of
review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Hacker , 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. , which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate t he intention of the General Assembly. A statute’s plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. Only where the words of a statute are not explicit will we resort to other considerations to discern legislative intent. Commonwealth v. McCoy , 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 105. No Pennsylvania case construes “property of another” in S ection 3304(a)(5). Arson, a different Chapter 33 5 crime, however, defines “property of another”:

“Property of another.” A building or other property, whether real or personal, in which a person other tha n the actor has an interest which the actor has no authority t o defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have an interest in the building or property.

5 The Crimes Code defines Chapter 33 as “Arson, Criminal M ischief and Other Property Destruction.” See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-3313.J. A22045/14

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18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(j). Chapter 39 6 of the Crimes Code, which addresses theft and related offenses, also defines “property of an other,” as well as “property”:

“Property.” Anything of value, including real estate, ta ngible and intangible personal property . . . . “Property of another.” Includes property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the ac tor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact t hat the actor also has an interest in the property . . . . 18 Pa.C.S. § 3901. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “real property” and “persona l property” as follows:

real property. Land and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land. personal property. 1. Any movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property. . . . Black’s Law Dictionary 1254 (8th ed. 2004). “Another” is defined as, inter alia , “one other than oneself.” Webster’s Third Internation al Dictionary 89 (1971).
In Fuller v. State , 230 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2010), 7 the Wyoming Supreme Court construed the phrase “property of another ,” which was in

6 Both Chapter 33 and Chapter 39 are categorized unde r Article C: “Offenses Against Prope rty.” See generally 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301-4120.J. A22045/14

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Wyoming’s property destruction statute: “A person is guil ty of property destruction and defacement if he knowingly defaces, inju res or destroys property of another without the owner’s consent.” Id. at 310 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (2014) (emphasis added))

. In Fuller , Mr. Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in Ca sper, Wyoming. After an argument with his wife, Mr. Fuller drove his pickup through the closed garage door, striking his wife’s car inside. He backed up his pickup an d then rammed the car again, this time pushing it throu gh the rear wall of the garage. Both the garage and t he car were damaged. . . . Mr. Fuller was charged with the crime of property destruction and defacement for damaging the car and the garage. At the close of the prosecution’s case, Mr. Full er moved for acquittal, asserting that he could not be convicted for damaging the car he owned or the garage he leased. The district court granted the motion as it rel ated to his wife’s car because the State failed to prove who owned it. The district court denied the motion as it r elated to the ga rage on the basis that, despite Mr. Fuller’s lease of the property, the State had offered sufficient ev idence that the landlords owned the garage. The jury convict ed Mr. Fuller, and after sentencing, he filed this appe al. * * * Mr. Fuller focus es on the phrase “property of another,” contending that it is ambiguous when applied to proper ty in which a defendant has an ownership interest. Because the lease entitled him to sole possession of the garage a t

7 This Court, although not bound by the decisions of our sister states, may adopt their reasoning if we find it persuasive. See Commonwealth v. Grife , 664 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Super. 1995) (adopting ana lyses of courts of sister states).J. A22045/14

- 7 - the time it was damaged, Mr. Fuller asserts that the garage could be considered his property as well as “property of another.” On this basis, he claims that th e statutory language is subject to varying interpretatio ns, and is therefore ambiguous. Id. at 310- 11. The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, and held that t he phrase “property of another” is unambiguous:

the word “property” means “anything of value whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, public or p rivate.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

– 1 –104(a)(viii). The word “another” is commonly understoo d to mean “being one more in addition . . . one that is different from the first or present one.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 88 (1991). The garage was “property,” the landlords were “another,” and they had a property interest in the gar age. When Mr. Fuller damaged the leased garage, he destroy ed or defaced “property of another.” Because the words have a clear and unambiguous meaning, we will give effect t o the plain language of the statute. Id. at 311. Thus, the Court affirmed Mr. Fuller ’s conviction. Id. at 312. Instantly, Section 3304 does not define “real property, ” “personal property” or “of another.” Thus, we resort to construing the plain language of the phrase. See McCoy , 962 A.2d at 1166. We hold that in Section 3304, the term “real property” is “land and anything growing on, attach ed to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land” and the term “personal property” is “any mov able or intangible thing subject to ownership and is not real p roperty.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1254. These definitions are also in accord w ith the definition of “property” in Section 3301(j), which addresses the propert y destructionJ. A22045/14

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offense of arson, and Section 3901, which defines theft

. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 330 1(j) (defining property as including real or personal property), 3901 (describing property as real estate and tangible persona l property); accord Fuller , 230 P.3d at 311. It follows that our definition o f “real property” encompasses the instant damaged items of two windows, ki tchen cabinet, and back door. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1254; cf. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(j), 3901. We next ascertain whether the damaged property is “pr operty of another.” We hold that “another,” as used in Section 33 04, is commonly de fined as “one other than oneself.” See Webster’s Third International Dictionary 89 (1971); accord Fuller , 230 P.3d at 312. Similar to the landlord in Fuller , Mr. Wool owns the instant home and the fixtures with in. See N.T. at 7, 15-16; cf. Fuller , 230 P.3d at 311. Mr. Wool, therefore, has a property interest. See Fuller , 230 P.3d at 311. Thus, it follows that because Mr. Wool has a property interest, the damaged p roperty is “property of another.” Cf. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301 (defining “property of another” as including real or personal property that actor and person other than actor has an interest), 3901 (defining “property of another” as encompassing personal or real property in which non-actor and actor has an interest); Fuller , 230 P.3d at 311 (holding landlords had interest in property tenant leased and thus, property was “property of another” un der Wyoming statute criminalizing property destruction). Because the Common wealth establishedJ. A22045/14

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that Mr. Wool had an interest in the damaged propert y, we perceive no error of law in Appellant’s conviction for criminal mischief and thus affirm the judgment of sentence. See Ratsamy , 934 A.2d at 1235. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/10/2014