Filed 5/13/14 P. v. Ruelas CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RALPH ANTHONY RUELAS,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G048260

 (Super. Ct. No. 12WF2206)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, John 

Conley, Judge. Affirmed.

Harry Zimmerman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and 

Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
2

A jury found defendant Ralph Anthony Ruelas guilty of first degree 

burglary. The court sentenced him to 13 years in state prison. Substantial evidence 

supports his conviction for burglary. The court had good cause to trail the trial. The 

restitution fine was authorized by statute. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

FACTS

Pretrial proceedings

Defendant was arraigned on August 17, 2012. At the conclusion of the 

preliminary hearing, it appeared to the court that a felony had been committed and that 

there was sufficient and probable cause to believe defendant committed the felony. The 

information was filed on September 27, 2012. The matter was set for a pretrial 

conference on October 18. On that date, the minute order states: “Defendant waives 

statutory time for Jury Trial.” January 3, 2013 was the date set for jury trial. 

On January 3, defendant’s jury trial was trailed to January 10 “as day 7 of 

10.” On January 10, a Thursday, when the case was called, the People answered not 

ready for trial and Deputy Public Defender Jon Feldon answered ready. Defendant’s jury 

trial was trailed to January 14 “as day 10 of 10.” 

On January 14, 2013, Feldon informed the Hon. Gregg L. Prickett as 

follows: “I would be ready except for that I was sent out on another trial and currently 

engaged. [¶] Mr. Ruelas informed me that he doesn’t want to have to continue his matter 

and he’s requesting a Marsden [People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118] hearing.” The 

court transferred defendant’s trial to the courtroom of the Hon. Daniel J. Didier where the 

deputy public defender was engaged. That same morning, Judge Didier ordered the 

courtroom cleared and conducted a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden, supra, 2 

Cal.3d 118. The motion was denied. 

Immediately after the conclusion of the Marsden hearing, defendant 

spewed a string of profanities, directing several particularly offensive remarks to Feldon 
3

specifically. The court stated the case was there for trial, and defendant said: “F. . .

you.” Judge Didier told him: “Mr. Ruelas, you know, I’m trying to do the best I can to 

make sure I don’t . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I’m trying to give you a fair trial and to deal with you 

fairly.” Defendant continued with his profanities. 

Feldon told the court: “As I said in C-5, I would be ready on this case, 

except I’m engaged in another trial in this courtroom.1 [¶] Unfortunately, I can’t answer 

ready on this case.” The court inquired whether anyone else from counsel’s office could 

step in to try the case, and the deputy public defender responded: “Unfortunately, your 

Honor, the lawyers in my office are not fungible. We can’t just replace each other. [¶] 

I’m familiar with this case. I’m prepared to go to trial on this case. And it would take 

another lawyer a significant amount of time to come to speed on it. [¶] I can’t just hand it 

off at the last minute.” 

The court explored the notion of appointing conflict counsel to represent 

defendant, but dismissed that idea after concluding it would take any new lawyer some 

time to get prepared for trial. Seemingly while reviewing defendant’s file, the court 

stated: “Mr. Ruelas does have, apparently, a strike prior, five-year prior and a number of 

prison priors; so this is a serious case. [¶] Tentatively, the court would find good cause to 

continue the case till it can be tried. And we would trail it behind the case, the three-day 

case that the court is ready to begin with Mr. Feldon. [¶] I suppose there’s one other 

option. Mr. Ruelas could represent himself. [¶] Do you want to represent yourself?”

Defendant responded: “F. . . you. If we’re going to sit here I’m going to sit 

here regardless. F. . . you. I’m going to do the time, but I’m not going to keep giving 

them the f. . . time to do this [continued profanities] that they’re doing.” The court said: 

 

1 We note Feldon answered ready in this matter on January 10, and, also 

answered ready in Judge Didier’s court on another matter the same day. 
4

“Well, we’re looking at three days until we can start your trial.” The court then ruled: 

“We’ll find good cause to continue the case and trail behind the . . . case that the court is 

presently engaged in.” 

On January 17, Judge Prickett called defendant’s case. Feldon answered 

ready. When the court indicated it was ready to send the case out for trial, the deputy 

public defender said: “At this point, I’d like to move for a dismissal in this case. Mr. 

Ruelas had — his day 10 was Monday [of this week] [¶] . . . [¶] On that day, I had — on 

Thursday of the previous week, I had answered ready for a different jury trial. . . .

[¶] . . . [¶] On Monday, Mr. Ruelas’ case was sent from C5 to C50. And Judge Didier 

conducted a Marsden motion, which was not granted. Mr. Ruelas expressed to the court 

that he did not want to continue his case any further. He wanted to go to trial. I indicated 

to the court that I was ready on either case. The court elected to proceed with the trial we 

had already done the limine motions on, . . . and trailed Mr. Ruelas past day 10 to 

Thursday . . . which is today. Past his — past the drop dead date.”

2

The deputy public defender continued: “I’m saying, your Honor, that the 

court could have gone — could have put . . . case to the side and proceeded on Mr. 

Ruelas’ case, and thereby not violated Mr. Ruelas’ rights.”

3 

 

2 Despite having specifically told Judge Didier on January 14 that he could 

not answer ready on defendant’s case, Feldon told Judge Prickett on January 17 that he 

did answer ready on the instant case in Judge Didier’s court. 

3 In reviewing the January 14 transcript from proceedings in Judge Didier’s 

court, we do not see any indication Feldon requested, suggested or even hinted that Judge 

Didier set the . . . case to the side and try defendant’s case instead. Yet, on January 17, 

Feldon told Judge Prickett: “Your Honor, in that particular situation I would have 

wanted the court . . . to have proceeded on the day 10 case. The other case had more time 

before the statutory period had passed.” When Judge Prickett attempted to tie Feldon 

down with regard to just what happened, Feldon told Judge Prickett: “I told Judge Didier 

that I was prepared to proceed on either case,” a statement which does not appear in the 

transcript of the proceedings in Judge Didier’s court.
5

After hearing more from the deputy public defender, the court stated: “The 

People have the remedy, and so now this becomes a decision for the People to make. We 

can — the People have the option of dismissing and refiling. That means the defendant 

remains in custody during this time period, and hence, this ends up not becoming an 

appellate issue, or the people can continue to assert their right, and then I will rule on 

this.” The deputy district attorney responded that the People remained ready. 

The court, after hearing significant argument from deputy public defenders, 

stated: “Defense motion to dismiss is denied. Matter is assigned to Judge Conley 

forthwith. Counsel are ordered to go to Judge Conley’s court forthwith.” 

The deputy public defender requested the court to order a transcript of the 

proceedings, which the court did. Counsel informed the court the public defender’s 

office would be filing a writ and requested a stay of the trial for “at least long enough to 

file a writ.” Counsel said the writ would be filed by the end of the day, and the court 

stated: “Well, but then there’s tomorrow, and we don’t do trials on Friday, right? So, see 

what I’m saying? And then Monday is a holiday.” The court indicated it would grant the 

stay but needed to have a time waiver. The deputy public defender stated he did not want 

to have his client waive time, so he was ready to proceed, but then asked for a stay until 

1:30 p.m. that same day, which the court granted. 

That afternoon, the Hon. John D. Conley called the matter. The deputy 

public defender informed the court a writ petition was being prepared, and that he wanted 

to “start with 402’s, and then we agree that we’d be engaged in trial. But we’d like to 

hold off on swearing a jury in until Tuesday.” The court asked defendant: “And you 

agree with that, Mr. Ruelas?” Defendant responded: “Yes, I do.” The deputy district 

attorney stated he agreed and also that “a venire is sworn in, that that established 

substantial activities as relates to the trial.” At that point, the court heard pretrial 

motions. 
6

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013, the deputy public defender informed the 

court this court had not issued a stay. Voir dire commenced. 

Trial

Defendant performed odd jobs at the home of a woman who lived across 

from defendant’s mother. Defendant was in and out of the neighbor’s home every other 

day for about six months, but he was not allowed in the bedroom. (Hereafter, the 

neighbor will be called the victim.)

On Friday, August 12, 2012 at about 4:00 in the afternoon, the victim left 

her home, and she returned on Sunday, August 14 at about 6:30 or 7:00 in the evening. 

While she was gone, defendant was hired to do some front landscaping work at the 

victim’s house. She locked “everything,” and did not give defendant a key to her home 

before she left. But she told him she would leave a key to the shed in the drawer of a 

table on her patio. 

When she returned on Sunday evening, the victim noticed a cigarette in the 

carport and noticed the family room blinds weren’t straight. When she walked inside her 

home, the first thing she noticed was the television was gone. In her bedroom, all the 

drawers were open and everything was gone. A window and its frame were damaged. 

Two of the three televisions, the VCR, a portable DVD player and a stereo were gone. 

Tools were missing from the shed, but the shed was locked and the key to the shed was in 

the table. The victim described many other items that were taken as well. 

About three weeks after the burglary, the victim was in defendant’s 

mother’s home and saw what she believed were some of her belongings. She specifically 

recognized one of her possessions “on her coffee table” there. It was the ornate seashell 

her mother brought back after visiting Hawaii for the first time. She took the shell to her 

own house and told the investigator about it. 
7

An investigator with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department identified 

defendant as a suspect after being given the seashell. The investigator questioned 

defendant about the seashell and he said he got it from Calvary Chapel Church on Golden 

West. He said it was in a bag of clothing they give to needy people. He said he gave the 

seashell as well as other items he found in the bag to his mother. 

During the interview of defendant, the investigator told defendant his 

fingerprints were found all over the victim’s bedroom. The investigator testified that, in 

fact, none of defendant’s fingerprints had been found in the interior of the victim’s home, 

and described the questioning technique as a ruse. When told of the fingerprints found, 

according to the investigator, defendant told her that out of curiosity “he had gone 

through her drawers, her jewelry box, her closets, and that’s why his fingerprints would 

be found there.” 

A Calvary Chapel employee testified. She was asked whether Calvary 

Chapel gives out items such as trinkets or house wares, and responded: “Strictly clothes, 

boots, blankets, towels, that kind of thing.” 

II

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

for first degree burglary “because there was not even slight corroborating evidence to 

Ruelas’ possession of stolen property that the jury could use to infer his guilt of 

burglary.” He also contends the court abused its discretion when it found good cause to 

continue the trial and “deprived Ruelas of his right to a speedy trial under [Penal Code] 

section 1382.” (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Additionally, 

defendant argues the court erred in its restitution order. Lastly, defendant argues the trial 

court erred in imposing a restitution fine. 
8

Continuance of Trial

A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to 

continue a trial. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.) “Continuances shall be 

granted only upon a showing of good cause. Neither the convenience of the parties nor a 

stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) A decision 

to grant a continuance under section 1382 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People 

v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 852.)

Defendant contends he was prejudiced when the court delayed his trial for 

three days because, had the prosecution’s case been dismissed under section 1382, “that 

would have created a statutory bar to a new prosecution had the motion to dismiss been 

granted.” 

“(a) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the 

action to be dismissed in the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) In a felony case, when a 

defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant’s arraignment on an 

indictment or information. . . . However, an action shall not be dismissed under this 

paragraph if either of the following circumstances exists: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The defendant 

requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60-day period. In the absence 

of an express general time waiver from the defendant, or upon the withdrawal of a 

general time waiver, the court shall set a trial date. Whenever a case is set for trial 

beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant 

without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or 

within 10 days thereafter.” (§ 1382)

“Section 1382, which interprets the state constitutional right to a speedy 

trial (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 15), provides that absent a showing of good cause, a 

defendant accused of a felony is entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him if he is 

not brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the information.” (People v. Johnson 

(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 561.) “We summarize briefly our conclusions respecting the 
9

speedy trial issue. We conclude, first, that when a client expressly objects to waiver of 

his right to a speedy trial under section 1382, counsel may not waive that right to resolve 

a calendar conflict when counsel acts not for the benefit of the client before the court but 

to accommodate counsel’s other clients. Secondly, we conclude that, at least in the case 

of an incarcerated defendant, the asserted inability of the public defender to try such a 

defendant’s case within the statutory period because of conflicting obligations to other 

clients does not constitute good cause to avoid dismissal of the charges. Finally, we 

reaffirm the holding of People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, that a defendant seeking 

post-conviction review of denial of a speedy trial must prove prejudice flowing from the 

delay of trial; we affirm here because defendant proved no prejudice.” (Id., pp. 561-562.)

“‘The welfare of the people of the State of California requires that all 

proceedings in criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest 

possible time. . . . It is therefore recognized that both the people and the defendant have 

the right to an expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and 

judicial officers and of all counsel, both the prosecution and the defense, to expedite such 

proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice. . . .

[¶] . . . [¶] Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause. The 

convenience of the parties is not in and of itself good cause. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 562-563.)

A number of factors are relevant to a determination of good cause under 

section 1382: “‘(1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the 

duration of the delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that 

is likely to result from the delay.’” (Smith v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 592, 598.

In the instant matter, the court tried mightily to calm defendant down and 

find out what he wanted to do. In reading the transcript, while we cannot say for sure, it 

does appear defendant was frustrated and upset with the result of his unsuccessful

Marsden motion and was not willing to discuss the continuance issue. Here, where it 
10

does not appear the deputy public defender was completely candid with the court, 

defendant had previously waived time, the court had already started another trial with the 

same public defender, the court would be able to get defendant’s case to trial in less time 

than it would have taken another appointed lawyer to prepare to defend defendant, and 

defendant’s prejudice argument is unpersuasive, we conclude there was good cause for 

the court to continue the trial. The present situation does not appear to be a result of the 

state not providing a sufficient number of public defenders. Under the unique 

circumstances we find in this record, we cannot conclude either that defendant was 

entitled to a dismissal under section 1382 or that the court abused its discretion. 

Sufficiency of Evidence

In addressing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, “the reviewing 

court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, 

credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of 

the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the 

evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on 

circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if 

it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of 

which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that 

must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ‘“If 

the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the 

reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.) 
11

The elements of first degree burglary are: “(1) entry into a structure 

currently being used for dwelling purposes and (2) with the intent to commit a theft or a 

felony.” (People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1261.)

Here there is significant circumstantial evidence that defendant entered the 

victim’s home with intent to commit a theft. He knew the victim would be away and he 

had access to the exterior to do outdoor projects. In addition to the evidence defendant 

gave his mother at least one of the items stolen from the victim’s home, he had the key to 

the victim’s shed and some of the stolen items that were taken from the shed. The shed 

was locked and the key returned to the table. Additionally, defendant’s explanation to the 

investigator’s ruse about fingerprints in the bedroom demonstrated a consciousness of 

guilt. Under these circumstances, we conclude sufficient evidence supports defendant’s 

conviction for first degree burglary.

Restitution Fine

The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $280 pursuant to section 

1202.4, subdivision (b)(1). In 2012 the subdivision was amended to provide a minimum 

restitution fine of $240. (Stats. 2012, ch. 868 § 3.) Defendant argues: “Because it 

appears the trial court’s intent was to impose the minimum fine, and the crime was 

committed in 2011, the restitution fine should have been $200.” 

In 2011, section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) provided that a restitution fine 

was to be set at the discretion of the court, “but shall not be less than two hundred dollars

($200), and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), if the person is convicted of a 

felony.” (Former § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2007, ch. 302, § 14.) We see nothing in 

the record to indicate the court intended to impose only the minimum statutory amount, 

and will not speculate that the court so intended.
12

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

THOMPSON, J.