#### Nana ANKOMAH-DAMOAH, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.

16-396-ag

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 22, 2017

FOR PETITIONER: Justin Conlon, Hartford, CT.

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin J. Zeitlin (Benjamin C. Mizer, Justin Mark-el, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Richard C. Wesley, Circuit Judges. William K. Sessions III,* District Judge.

*

 William K. Sessions III, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Nana Ankomah-Damoah, a citizen of Ghana, seeks review of a January 12, 2016 decision of the BIA affirming the December 16, 2014 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his motion to continue his removal proceedings. *In re Nana Ankomah-Damoah,*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Jan. 12, 2016), *aff'g*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Dec. 16, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. “[W]e have jurisdiction to . review an IJ’s denial of a continuance, and ... we conduct that review under a highly deferential standard of abuse of discretion.” *Morgan v. Gonzales,*445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2006). An IJ abuses his discretion “in denying a continuance if (1) his decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) his decision—though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” *Id.*at 551-52 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Upon review of the IJ’s decision and the administrative record, we find no abuse of discretion in the IJ’s denial of a continuance. The agency considered the factors set forth in *In re Hashmi,*24 I. *&*N. Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009), and correctly concluded that: (1) the government opposed the request for a continuance; (2) the underlying visa petition was not prima facie ap-provable because the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services had twice denied it; *2(3) Ankomah-Damoah would only be statutorily eligible to adjust status if the visa petition had been approved; and (4) his proceedings had been continued for ten years while the visa petition was pending. *See Hashmi,*24 I. *&*N. Dec. at 794 (“[A] history of continuances being granted by the [IJ] for the adjudication of a pending [petition], coupled with other relevant factors, may support a decision to move forward with the case.”); *see also Pedreros v. Keisler,*503 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e find no basis for obligating the agency to grant continuances pending adjudication of an immigrant visa petition when there is a reliable basis to conclude that the visa petition or the adjustment of status will ultimately be denied.”). Given that the agency appropriately considered the relevant factors for deciding a continuance, it did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. *See Morgan,*445 F.3d at 551-52; *see also Pedreros,*503 F.3d at 166.

Even assuming that the IJ erred, the petition fails to identify any *prejudicial*error. Ankomah-Damoah essentially argues that the IJ should have granted a continuance until his visa petition appeal was ruled on by the BIA. *See*Petitioner’s Br. 16 (arguing that the IJ’s decision “will likely be rejected by the Board in the visa petition appeal”). After the IJ’s denial of a continuance, however, the BIA affirmed the denial of Ankomah-Damoah’s visa application—as petitioner’s brief elsewhere recognizes. *See id.*at 10. Thus, even assuming that the IJ acted too hastily, Anko-mah-Damoah’s petition fails due to “the general principle of futility—an error does not require a remand if the remand would be pointless because it is clear that the agency would adhere to its prior decision in the absence of error.” *Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*434 F.3d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 2006).

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Ankomah-Damoah and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.