SECONDDIVISION                                                  March 31, 1997           No. 1-95-0965BARBARA B. KADEN, individually and on behalfof all others similarly situated,          Plaintiff-Appellant,     v.AURELIA PUCINSKI, Clerk of the Circuit Courtof Cook County,          Defendant-Appellee,      andTHE COUNTY OF COOK,          Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.�)))))))))))))))))�Appeal from theCircuit Court ofCook County.HonorableDorothy Kirie Kinnaird,Judge Presiding.�     PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiff, Barbara B. Kaden, filed an action on her own behalf and on behalfof all other taxpayers against defendant, Aurelia Pucinski, Clerk of the Cook Countycircuit court (hereinafter Pucinski), in order to recover for the State Treasury thecircuit court fees that are imposed by the state upon persons using the state courtsystem and that are deposited in county treasuries.  Plaintiff challenges theconstitutionality of section 2 of the Fee Deposit Act (50 ILCS 315/2 (West 1992)), andsection 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.5 West 1992)).  Defendantand the Intervenor-Defendant, the County of Cook, filed a motion to dismiss pursuantto section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)).  Thetrial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.  In addition, the trial court deniedplaintiff's motion to strike the appearance of the State's Attorney on behalf ofPucinski.  Plaintiff now appeals from the judgments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).     On appeal, plaintiff challenges the following two statutes:           "All elected or appointed officials of units of local          government, and clerks of the circuit courts, authorized by          law to collect fees which collection is not prohibited by          section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution, shall deposit all          such collected fees upon receipt with the county treasurer          or treasurer of such other unit of local government, as the          case may be, except as otherwise provided by law; and          except that such officials may maintain overpayments, tax          redemptions, trust funds and special funds as provided for          by law or local ordinance." (Emphasis added.)  50 ILCS          315/2 (West 1992).          "All fees, fines, costs, additional penalties, bail balances          assessed or forfeited, and any other amount paid by a          person to the Circuit Clerk, except for certain designated          exceptions shall be disbursed within 60 days after receipt          by the circuit clerk as follows: 47% shall be disbursed to          the entity authorized by law to receive the fine imposed in          the case; 12% shall be disbursed to the State Treasurer;          and 41% shall be disbursed to the county's general          corporate fund." 705 ILCS 105/27.5 (West 1992)).Plaintiff contends that: (1) the circuit court fees are state funds; (2) she had standing;and (3) the Cook County State's Attorney cannot represent the Clerk of the CookCounty circuit court in the absence of a designation of the State's Attorney as aspecial assistant Attorney General.  Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiringPucinski to pay the circuit court fees into the State Treasury.  Moreover, plaintiffmaintains that she is entitled to relief because the two challenged statutes violate:(1) the appropriation provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII,� 2); (2) section 9(a) of the Illinois Constitution (Ill Const. 1970, art VII, � 9(a)) whichstates that fees shall not be based upon funds disbursed or collected; (3) the dueprocess and the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal constitutions  (U.S.Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, �2); and (4) the single-subject requirementof the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,  � 8(d)).           We begin our analysis by noting that a motion to dismiss under section 2-615challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint.  Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison,Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 458 (1981).  The relevant inquiry is whether sufficient facts arecontained in the pleadings which, if proved, would entitle a plaintiff to relief. Urbaitis, 143 Ill. 2d at 475.  Upon review of an order granting a section 2-615 motion,all well-pleaded facts are taken as true.  Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d188 (1995).  In reviewing orders on a motion to dismiss, we apply a de novo standardof review.  Dace International, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237(1995).     We first address plaintiff's contention whether the Cook County State'sAttorney can make an appearance on behalf of the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Plaintiff had moved to strike the appearance of the State's Attorney, but the trialcourt denied it.  Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the State's Attorney Act,whether the State's Attorney's representation of Pucinski is lawful, which raises aquestion of first impression in Illinois.  Plaintiff argues that a special assistantAttorney General needed to be appointed.       Under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the Attorney General shall be the legalofficer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed bylaw  (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, � 15),  in representing the State of Illinois and itsofficers.  The General Assembly later passed the State's Attorney Act (Act) whichprovides, in pertinent part, "that the duty of each State's attorney shall be *** todefend all actions and proceedings brought against his county, or against any countyor State officer, in his official capacity, within his county."  (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(4)(West 1992)).  We note that the statutory language itself is the best indication of theintent of the drafters, and if the terms are unambiguous, they must be given theirplain and ordinary meaning."  People ex rel. Village of McCook v. Indiana HarborBelt R.R., 256 Ill. App. 3d 27, 29 (1993); see also Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & MedicalCenter, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990).       We remain unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that the State's Attorney Actdirectly conflicts with the State constitution under these circumstances.  We believethat the legislature has clearly construed the Act to give the State's Attorney theauthority to represent state officers within his county, which is evident by the plainmeaning of the Act's statutory language.  We note that the duties of the AttorneyGeneral and the State's Attorney can sometimes overlap, since the Attorney Generalexercises his authority state-wide, and the State's Attorney exercises his authoritywithin his county in that same state.  In the present case, it is undisputed that theAttorney General gave his written consent to allow the State's Attorney'srepresentation of Pucinski, a state officer in Cook County.  In addition, Pucinski alsoconsented to the State's Attorney's representation.  We deem these acts of consentsufficient to establish proper representation of Pucinski.  We have not come acrossany statute, nor has plaintiff cited to one, that directs the Attorney General toappoint a special assistant Attorney General.  Accordingly, after carefulconsideration, we determine that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion tostrike the appearance of the State's Attorney.     The next issue we address is one of standing.  Defendants claim that plaintiffdid not have standing.  Plaintiff responds that she was a taxpayer of the governmenton whose behalf the suit was brought and thus has standing.  We find this issue wasnot properly brought before the trial court.       Lack of standing is an affirmative defense which is properly brought forth ina motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure  (735ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994)).  Since defendant here has raised this affirmative defensein a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wefind that it was improperly advanced.  Thus, we cannot now consider this issue.  SeeKaden v. Kagann, 260 Ill. App. 3d 256, 265 (1994).        We now turn to the main question in this case, whether the trial court erredin dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint on the basis that the circuit court feesare not state funds.  Plaintiff strongly urges this court to reverse the lower court'sruling and submits that the court fees are state funds since they are imposed by statelaw for use of the state court system and collected by state officers, specifically theclerks of the circuit courts.  Plaintiff further argues that these alleged state funds arebeing turned over to the County Treasury, as opposed to the State Treasury, whichis in violation of article VIII, section 2 and article VII, section 9(a) of the Illinoisconstitution.  Defendants respond by arguing that the circuit court fees are trustfunds, and thus, cannot be considered state or public funds.     In Kagann, the appellate court discussed in its opinion that the drafters of theIllinois Constitution intended for the General Assembly to decide whether feescollected by the circuit court clerks belong to the State or the counties.  Kagann, 260Ill. App. 3d at 260-1.  The Kagann court articulated, after much research into thedebates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1969-70, that:          "[T]he drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution did not          intend that either the State or the counties have a          constitutional right to fees collected by circuit court clerks.           Rather, the drafters intended that the General Assembly          determine where such fees should be deposited.  The          General Assembly has stated in the Fee Deposit Act that          the fees collected by a circuit court clerk be deposited with          the treasury of the county in which the court sits.  Thus,          *** the State has no constitutional right to the fees          collected by Joel Kagann as the circuit court clerk of the          18th Judicial Circuit."  Kagann, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 261.While we agree with the ultimate analysis, we must remind ourselves to proceed withcaution when analyzing the constitutional convention debates, as it may not beconclusive of all the delegates' intentions.  The appellate court went further andexamined the Illinois Constitution carefully.  It found eight references to "publicfunds belonging to the state" but was "unable to determine whether the fundscollected by the circuit court clerks are meant to be included as public funds of theState."  Kagann, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 260.   We take cognizance of the fact that theGeneral Assembly has never considered circuit court fees to be "public funds" of theState for purposes of section 2 of article VIII of the Illinois Constitution. Furthermore, the fees have not been included in the state budget, nor ever requiredto be regularly audited (as all public funds must be under the Illinois State AuditingAct 30 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)).  Simply stated, no constitutional provisionexists which specifically designates the fees as state funds.       The Illinois Constitution enunciates that the court fees must be used solely topay either the expenses of the circuit court clerks office or alternatively, the cost ofoperation and maintenance of the circuit court (Ill. Const. 1970, art I, � 12). However, the Illinois Constitution does not have express constitutional provisionsregarding the deposit or disposition of the circuit court fees.  See Kotche v. CountyBoard of Winnebago County, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1127 (1980).  It is within the legislature'sconstitutional powers to require that counties pay the salary and expenses of thecircuit court clerk's office.  Drury v. County of McLean, 89 Ill. 2d 417 (1982) Consequently, the General Assembly seems to have     "delegated much of the responsibility for funding the State court system     to the counties *** including fund the offices of the circuit clerks (705     ILCS 105/27.3 (West 1992)), supplement the salary of the local State's     Attorney (55 ILCS 5/4-2001 (West 1992)), and erect, maintain, and     furnish court facilities and provide for the reasonable and necessary     expenses of the judiciary (55 ILCS 5/5-1106 (West 1992))."  Kagann, 260     Ill. App. 3d at 258-9.       Under these particular facts and the existing authority, we conclude that thecircuit court fees are fees leveled for county usage.  We do not believe these funds canbe characterized as purely trust funds or state funds.  These fees are deposited in ageneral fund account, such as the Public Safety Fund, with a certain percentagereverting to the State.  The fees have been able to raise over $80 million in annualrevenue for the county.  See Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 614 (1994). Taking the fees away from the county would create a huge deficit in maintaining theclerk's office.         In sum, we do not believe that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts which, ifproved, would entitle her to relief or even establish that the circuit court feescollected constitutionally belong to the State.  We conclude that the trial courtproperly held that all four counts of her complaint failed to state a cause of action,since they were premised on the contention that the circuit court fees are state funds. For the same reasons as given in Kagann, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 261-4 (where plaintiffbrought an identical suit before the circuit court in DuPage County), plaintiff'scomplaint was properly dismissed.       In light of the foregoing, we uphold the judgment of the circuit court of CookCounty in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint, aswell as denying plaintiff's motion to strike the appearance of the State's Attorney'sappearance.       Affirmed.     CERDA and GALLAGHER*, JJ., concur.                                                                                                                     *Justice Gallagher participated fully in the decision of this case, replacing JusticeRizzi, who originally heard the oral argument of this case prior to his retirement. Justice Gallagher has listened to the recordings of the oral argument and reviewedthe briefs and the record herein.