RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 21a0145p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

INGRAM BARGE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ZEN-NOH GRAIN CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 20-5514

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:19-cv-01025—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: June 28, 2021

Before: SILER, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: David Reisman, Raymond T. Waid, Kathryn Z. Gonski, Trinity Morale, LISKOW 

& LEWIS, New Orleans, Louisiana, W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jason P. Waguespack, Fredric B. Eisenstat, GALLOWAY, 

JOHNSON, TOMPKINS, BURR & SMITH, New Orleans, Louisiana, Kenneth M. Bryant, 

BURR & FORMAN LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., joined. WHITE, J. 

(pp. 7–11), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

SILER, Circuit Judge. Typically, only parties to a contract are bound to its terms. This 

case is no exception. Zen-Noh Grain Corporation was neither a party to nor consented to Ingram 

>
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 2

Barge Company’s contract for the transportation of goods (a bill of lading) and thus is not bound 

to the contract’s forum selection clause. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction 

over Zen-Noh, and we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

I

Zen-Noh purchased shipments of grains from several companies. The sellers were 

required to prepay the barge freight and deliver the product to Zen-Noh’s grain trading terminal 

in Convent, Louisiana. But the sellers were not required to use any specific company to deliver 

the goods. Plaintiff Ingram was chosen. 

Ingram then issued a contract to the sellers for the transportation of goods—a negotiable 

bill of lading in industry parlance. A bill of lading defines the relationships of the parties: the 

consignor (company arranging shipment); the consignee (company which is owed delivery); and 

the carrier (company that carries the goods).1 After the goods have arrived, a consignee presents 

the bill of lading to receive the goods. See Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of 

Frozen Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 92 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993). A negotiable bill of lading is a document of 

title, which is “vested in the holder of the bill.” Id. at 96. 

All the bills issued by Ingram are essentially identical, except two. In most of these bills: 

“the grain seller (or affiliate) is the consignor; the consignment is to the order of the consignee; 

Zen-Noh is included as a ‘notify’ party ‘A/C’[2]the consignor/consignee; the freight is described 

as prepaid; and the signature blocks are for Ingram and the consignor/consignee.” In the two 

exceptions, Zen-Noh is not mentioned at all or is mentioned in the field for consignee. 

Printed on each bill was an agreement to the “Carrier’s Grain Transportation Terms” and 

a link to the Terms on Ingram’s website. Importantly, the Terms: (1) purport to bind any entity 

that has an ownership interest in the goods; and (2) include a forum selection provision selecting 

the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

1Parties can have multiple roles. 

2

“A/C” means “on account of.” 
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 3

Ingram updated its Terms in April 2019. Ingram alleges that it notified Zen-Noh of the 

Terms through an email to CGB Enterprises, Inc. In a declaration, a representative of Ingram 

says, “to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,” that “CGB is a company closely 

connected with Zen-Noh and Zen-Noh is a part-owner of CGB.” The representative also says, 

again on information and belief, “CGB receives many of Zen-Noh’s consigned grain cargos on 

the Lower Mississippi River and often acts on Zen-Noh's behalf in commercial dealings related 

to grain transportation.” Ingram’s email to CGB was sent prior to the use of the invoices at issue 

in this case. 

About three weeks later, Zen-Noh “sent an email to Ingram complaining that Zen-Noh 

had received invoices for which it did not believe it was liable.” Ingram responded that the 

invoices were “per [the] grain contract.” When Zen-Noh requested the grain contract for its 

review, Ingram replied with a link to the Grain Transportation terms. Zen-Noh finally answered 

that it was “not party to the barge affreightment contract as received in your previous email, and 

as such, is not liable for nor will be paying these invoices.” 

No one complains that the grains were not shipped and received by Zen-Noh. Instead, 

Ingram alleges it incurred costs that it claims Zen-Noh must pay. Zen-Noh has already paid 

Ingram demurrage charges— “penalties related to delayed loading or unloading of goods”—but 

has not paid for “unrelated expenses that Ingram incurred en route involving ‘fleeting,’ 

‘wharfage,’ and ‘shifting.’” Those costs it says it does not owe. As a result, Ingram filed this 

lawsuit against Zen-Noh in the Middle District of Tennessee, but the district court dismissed the 

case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

II

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the 

district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Air 

Products and Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Intern., Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007). The 

plaintiff carries the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction, but that burden 

is relatively slight where, as here, the district court “relies solely on written submissions and 

affidavits” to resolve the issue. Id. Nonetheless, the plaintiff must meet its prima facia showing. 
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 4

Id. The court must view the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and 

not weigh “the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal.” Id. (quoting Theunissen 

v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)).

III

Ingram does not allege that Zen-Noh is subject to the court’s jurisdiction through general 

or specific jurisdiction. Rather, it relies on a forum selection clause linked to its bills of lading. 

And a forum selection clause allows a party to agree “to the jurisdiction of a particular court.” 

Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Assocs. in Urology, 453 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing M/S 

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)). 

But a bill of lading is a contract.3 See Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals 

Inc., 5 F.3d 734, 738 (4th Cir. 1993). “When a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not 

inherently local, federal law controls the contract interpretation.” Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, 

Inc. v. Exclusive Expressions, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (S.D.N.Y 2015) (quoting Norfolk S. 

Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22–23 (2004)). Under federal common law, these contracts 

should be construed “by their terms and consistent with the intent of the parties.” Id. (quoting 

Kirby, 543 U.S. at 31). As such, these contracts bind the parties that negotiated them. 

Wemhoener Pressen, 5 F.3d at 738. Here, Ingram and the grain sellers. 

Ingram instead attempts to bind Zen-Noh as a consignee, despite Zen-Noh’s classification 

on most bills as a notify party. See North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank of 

Chicago, 123 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1887) (recognizing that notify parties are distinct from 

consignees). Consignees are considered third-party beneficiaries to bills of lading. Dynamic 

Worldwide Logistics, 77 F. Supp 3d at 374. A bill can bind them, but only with their consent. 

See Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co., 696 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2012); In re 

M/V Rickners Genoa Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) opinion adhered to on 

reconsideration, 643 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) and aff’d sub nom. Chem One, Ltd. V. 

M/V Rickmers Genoa, 502 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2012). And a third-party beneficiary can show 

3

Ingram cannot simply depend on its own broad contract terms to bind Zen-Noh. To do so simply begs the 

question. A party cannot “unilaterally employ definitions to bind another by provision to which the other has not 

consented to be bound.” United States v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 471 F.2d 186, 189 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973).
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 5

consent by: (1) filing suit; (2) its course of conduct; or (3) accepting through its agent.4 Zen-Noh 

did not consent in any of these ways. So, even if we treat Zen-Noh as a consignee, the terms of 

the bills do not reach it. 

Lawsuit. Ingram sued Zen-Noh. So, Zen-Noh neither “file[d] a lawsuit under the bill” 

nor “attempt[ed] to benefit from its terms.” Kawasaki, 696 F.3d at 655. 

Course of conduct. Zen-Noh did not acquiesce to Ingram’s grain terms over a long 

period. Just the opposite. Shortly after Zen-Noh learned of the revised Terms, it informed 

Ingram that it did not consider itself bound by those terms negotiated by the sellers and Ingram. 

Compare APL Co. Pte. Ltd. v. Kemira Water Solutions, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 

2012) (holding that “little past dealings” precludes a finding of acceptance through a course of 

conduct) with Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Landis, No. Civ. A. 94-6153, 1996 WL 4120, at *3 (E.D. 

Pa. Jan. 3, 1996) (finding acceptance when there was no evidence a defendant rejected the bill’s 

unchanged terms over a decade-long relationship). 

Ingram highlights its longstanding relationship with CGB, claiming CGB is affiliated 

with and partially owned by Zen-Noh. Yet, even if that is true, that relationship is too attenuated 

to presume Zen-Noh’s acceptance. Ingram also points to Zen-Noh’s payment of demurrage 

charges on some of the shipments. As the district court found, however, those payments may be 

explained by a separate obligation between Zen-Noh and the sellers. Indeed, Zen-Noh may have 

“an implied obligation to pay freight charges separate and apart from the operative bill of 

lading.” APL Co. Pte. Ltd., 890 F.Supp. 2d at 367; see also FT & T Consulting, Inc. v. B.O. 

Astra Management Corp., No. 12-cv-134, 2016 WL 8711085, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016).

Acceptance by an agent. Zen-Noh and the grain sellers did not have an agency 

relationship. “A basic principle of agency law is that an agency relationship exists only if the 

agent is acting on behalf of and subject to the control of the principal.” APL Co. Pte. Ltd, 890 F. 

4

Ingram makes much of Zen-Noh’s status as the “ultimate consignee” or owner of the grain, but neither is 

synonymous with consent. See Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 374 (“The mere fact that a party is 

a consignee or third-party beneficiary is insufficient to warrant a finding that [the consignee] was bound by the 

terms contained in the bills of lading”); APL Co. PTE v. UK Aerosols LTD., No. C 05-0646, 2006 WL 3848784, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006) (finding mere ownership of property does not bind the purchaser to the terms of a bill 

of lading). 
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 6

Supp. 2d at 369 (quoting Maersk, Inc. v Neewra, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 300, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 

2009)). Ingram presents no evidence that the grain sellers were “acting on behalf” of Zen-Noh 

or under Zen-Noh’s control when the sellers entered the bills of lading. Id. at 369 (collecting 

cases); Kawasaki, 696 F.3d at 655 (“the agency test must fail because [the consignee] did not 

have the power to control. . .”); see also Baker v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & Macrae, 105 F.3d 

1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that counterparties cannot be bound to a third-party contract 

unless the entities are so closely related that being bound to the contract becomes foreseeable). 

To the contrary, binding Zen-Noh in this way would be “[in]consistent with the intent of the 

parties.” Kirby, 543 U.S. at 31. Zen-Noh paid for freight with the expectation that the seller 

would bear the full responsibility for transport. In other words, Zen-Noh sought to avoid a 

contractual relationship with Ingram.

IV

While Zen-Noh is a beneficiary of these bills of lading, that “mere fact . . . does not 

create contractual obligations for that beneficiary.” Dynamic Worldwide, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 374; 

see also Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Kuehne + Nagel, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 

2018) (declining to enforce a forum selection clause against a third-party beneficiary). Instead, 

Ingram must show Zen-Noh consented to its bills. It has not. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s dismissal.
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 7

_________________

DISSENT

_________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent.

The difference between negotiable and nonnegotiable bills of lading is important in this 

case. “A negotiable bill of lading is a document of title, while a non-negotiable bill functions 

more like a receipt.” 22 Williston on Contracts § 59:10 (4th ed. 2020). Buyers of highly fungible 

commodities like grain often choose to resell their grain while it is still in transit from the seller. 

Wallingford Bros. v. Bush, 255 F. 949, 950 (8th Cir. 1918). To transfer title of the still-in-transit 

grain to a new buyer, the original buyer need only endorse the negotiable bill of lading and 

deliver it to the new buyer. Allied Chem. Int’l Corp. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd 

Brasileiro, 775 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985); Susan Beecher, Can the Electronic Bill of Lading 

Go Paperless?, 40 Int’l Law. 627, 631 (2006) (“the negotiable bill of lading [is] the only 

document which the shipper may not transmit by fax or email”). The new buyer then presents 

the bill to the carrier, who “is responsible for releasing the cargo only to the party who presents 

the original bill of lading. . . . If the carrier delivers the goods to one other than the authorized 

holder of the bill of lading, the carrier is liable for misdelivery.” Allied Chem. Int’l Corp., 

775 F.2d at 481. 

A nonnegotiable bill works differently. Goods sent by way of a nonnegotiable bill are 

“nontransferable; that is, John Doe cannot, by indorsing that bill to anyone else, give that

transferee the right to receive the goods from the carrier.” Alan S. Gutterman, Business 

Transactions Solutions § 123:86 (2021). Because title to the goods cannot be transferred midshipment when using a nonnegotiable bill, there is no requirement that the buyer present the 

original bill of lading at the time it accepts the goods from the carrier. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. 

Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co., 255 F. 40, 41–42 (7th Cir. 1918); David A. Bury, Electronic Bills of 

Lading: A Never-Ending Story?, 41 Tul. Mar. L.J. 197, 209 (2016) (“negotiable bills of lading 

require consignees to present the physical bill of lading to enable the carrier to release the cargo; 

conversely, non-negotiable alternatives . . . are not burdened by this requirement”). 
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 8

For that reason, the name listed as consignee on a nonnegotiable bill of lading matters a 

great deal; the carrier must deliver to the named consignee or face liability for misdelivery. Pere 

Marquette Ry. Co., 255 F. at 41–42. Not so with a negotiable bill. Since a negotiable bill of 

lading may change hands multiple times mid-shipment, “the consignee or ‘notify party’ 

designated on the [negotiable] bill of lading [may] not necessarily [be] the holder of the bill at 

the time and place of delivery,” Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen 

Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 92 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993), and these labels accordingly carry little significance. 

The holder of the negotiable bill is entitled to “the rights and [subject to the] liabilities of the 

original consignee.” United States v. Wells Fargo & Co., 271 F. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1921). Thus, 

what matters when dealing with a negotiable bill of lading is who physically presents the bill and 

accepts delivery of the cargo under it. Allied Chem. Int’l Corp., 775 F.2d at 481. And, because 

the bill of lading is negotiable, if it purports to bind the consignee to its terms upon acceptance of 

the goods under it, those who opt to become a party to the transaction by accepting the goods and 

presenting the bill are bound by its terms. 

Ingram Barge’s complaint alleges that Zen-Noh became the consignee after the bills of 

lading were issued, and Zen-Noh does not deny that it physically presented the negotiable bills of 

lading and accepted delivery of the cargo.1 The district court and the majority cite the bills’ 

identifying Zen-Noh as merely the “notify” party, and not the consignee, as evidence that ZenNoh was not a party to the bills and did not consent to be bound by the bills’ terms. I disagree 

with this analysis at a few points. First, Zen-Noh is the named consignee on Bill No. ING 19-

00901. Second, even if Zen-Noh were listed as the notify party on that bill, as it is on all but 

one2 of the other bills in this case, the bills of lading were negotiable, which means that any 

distinction between the “notify” party and the “consignee” evaporated when, as Ingram Barge 

alleges, Zen-Noh presented the negotiable bills and accepted delivery of the cargo under the 

bills. See Pac. Coast Fruit Dist. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 217 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1954) 

1Had Zen-Noh not presented the bills, Ingram Barge would be liable for misdelivery, and Zen-Noh makes 

no such claim.

2Bill No. ING19-00590 does not name Zen-Noh as either consignee or the notify party, but Zen-Noh does 

not dispute that it presented ING 19-00590 and accepted the cargo.
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 9

(party not named in original bill of lading became consignee through its actions). It could not 

have demanded and accepted the cargo otherwise. See Allied Chem. Int’l Corp., 775 F.2d at 481. 

True, neither Zen-Noh nor the named consignees bargained for the terms in Ingram 

Barge’s bills of lading, but, as the majority acknowledges, a bill of lading “can nonetheless bind 

a non-party buyer where there is consent to be bound.” Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano 

Molding Co., 696 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2012). The bills of lading in this case clearly stated 

that “any Consignee hereto is (and will be deemed) bound by [Ingram Barge’s] Grain 

Transportation Terms. The surrender of this original Order Bill of Lading . . . properly endorsed 

is required before the delivery of the shipment.” See, e.g., R. 1-38, PID. 201. Although ZenNoh told Ingram Barge on June 3, 2019—before accepting any of the cargo at issue here—that it 

did not believe it was liable for the fleeting, wharfage, and shifting charges Ingram Barge seeks 

to recoup, that shows only that Zen-Noh was on notice of the terms at issue and nevertheless 

decided to physically present the bills and accept the cargo under the bills anyway. Absent an 

express agreement with Ingram Barge to the contrary, Zen-Noh’s conduct in stepping into the 

shoes of the named consignee and accepting the grain pursuant to the negotiable bills of lading 

demonstrated consent to the terms of Ingram Barge’s bills of lading. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fruit 

Dist., 217 F.2d at 275 (explaining that “receipt and acceptance of the shipment” would be 

sufficient to bind consignee to terms of a bill of lading that made the consignee liable for 

shipping charges, and holding that the consignee was bound to the terms of the bill of lading 

because the consignee’s “unqualified and unequivocal dominion and control of the shipments” 

was “equivalent to acceptance” of the shipments); Neilsen v. Jesup, 30 F. 138, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 

1887) (“The general rule undoubtedly is that the consignee and indorsee of the bill of lading who 

is owner of the goods and of the bill of lading, and who accepts the goods under the bill of 

lading, is bound by its terms.”); Gage v. Morse, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 410, 411 (Mass. 1866) 

(“The receipt by [consignee] of the cargo, which was to be delivered upon payment of the 

freight, would have been evidence of an agreement to receive it upon the terms named in the bill 

of lading[.]”). The majority cites no case holding that a party can unilaterally change the terms 

of a bill of lading under which it demands and accepts delivery of the cargo. 
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 10

The majority contends that neither Zen-Noh’s status as the “ultimate consignee” nor as 

owner of the grain constitutes consent to the bills’ terms, and that being a mere beneficiary of the 

bills of lading does not create contractual obligations for Zen-Noh. Each of those propositions 

standing alone may be correct, but none is squarely applicable here where Zen-Noh was a 

consignee, owner and beneficiary who also presented the bills and accepted the goods. Indeed, 

in none of the cases cited by the majority did a consignee physically present a negotiable bill of 

lading and accept the goods.3 That factual distinction is critical.

Moreover, presentation of the bills and acceptance of the goods is not the only evidence 

of consent to be bound that can be found in the record. Zen-Noh paid demurrage charges owed 

under the terms of Ingram Barge’s bills of lading for some of the shipments at issue. Ingram 

Barge argues that partial payment of demurrage charges pursuant to the bills of lading is 

evidence of Zen-Noh’s consent to be bound. The majority echoes the district court’s 

speculation—based on no fact apparent in the record—that those payments “may be explained 

by a separate obligation between Zen-Noh and the sellers” or were paid pursuant to an implied 

obligation to pay freight charges. One of those theories may prove to be correct, but dismissing 

Ingram Barge’s partial-performance argument based on speculation contravenes our admonition 

that “the pleadings and affidavits submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, and the district court should not weigh ‘the controverting assertions of the party seeking 

dismissal’” when it elects to rule on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without a hearing or the opportunity 

for discovery. Air Prod. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)). At this stage, the 

3

In Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, Inc., the consignee failed to present the negotiable bill of lading at the 

time it accepted the goods, thus never evincing knowledge of the bill of lading’s terms. 77 F. Supp. 3d at 368. 

Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Kuehne + Nagel, Inc. is inapposite, since the third-party beneficiaries were not consignees 

or owners of the cargo, but subcontractors of the carrier who sought the liability protections of the bill’s Himalaya 

Clause. 328 F. Supp. 3d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). And in the remainder of the cases cited by the majority, the 

goods were never accepted by the consignee. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., 696 F.3d at 652 (goods damaged in 

train derailment); APL Co. PTE. v. UK Aerosols LTD., No. C 05-0646-MHP, 2006 WL 3848784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 28, 2006) (goods were “leaking, dangerous and hazardous” and were destroyed by carrier); APL Co. Pte. v. 

Kemira Water Sols., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (hazardous goods—shipped by 

nonnegotiable bill of lading with terms the consignee never received—leaked during shipment and were rejected by 

consignee); In re M/V Rickmers Genoa Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62 (S.D.N.Y.), opinion adhered to on 

reconsideration, 643 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and aff’d sub nom. Chem One, Ltd. v. M/V Rickmers Genoa, 

502 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (goods were destroyed by an explosion en route).
No. 20-5514 Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp. Page 11

district court should have considered Zen-Noh’s partial payment of demurrage charges as 

evidence of Zen-Noh’s consent to be bound. 

Lastly, I do not disagree with my colleagues’ observation that Zen-Noh likely sought to 

avoid any contractual relationship with the carrier by prepaying the shipping fees to the seller. 

But Zen-Noh was free to resell the grain or reject the shipment if it did not agree to Ingram 

Barge’s terms. Further, the seller opted to choose Ingram Barge to transport the goods and could 

have bargained for different terms with Ingram Barge that would not have required the consignee 

to pay the extra shipping fees. If Zen-Noh believes the terms of Ingram Barge’s bills of lading 

were inconsistent with its separate agreement with the seller, Zen-Noh’s recourse is against the 

seller for violating the terms of that separate agreement. Zen-Noh’s understanding of its 

agreement with the seller has no bearing on the issue before us. Our task here is to determine 

whether Ingram Barge carried its “relatively slight” burden in making out a prima facie case for 

personal jurisdiction over Zen-Noh. Id. (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 

1169 (6th Cir. 1988)). I would hold that it has cleared that low hurdle.