[Cite as Cleveland Muni. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Rev., 2024-Ohio-1887.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL SCHOOL 

DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

No. 113334

v. :

CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF 

REVISION, ET AL., :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 16, 2024

Administrative Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-23-983161

Appearances:

Brindza McIntyre & Seed LLP, David H. Seed, Robert A. 

Brindza, Daniel McIntyre, and David A. Rose, for 

appellant. 

Bauernschmidt Law Firm, Karen H. Bauernschmidt, and 

Kelly W. Bauernschmidt, for appellee Murray Hill 

Partners, LLC. 

Sleggs, Danzinger & Gill Co., LPA, Steven R. Gill, and 

Elizabeth Grooms Taylor, for appellee 2187 Murray Hill 

Road, LLC.
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Appellant Cleveland Municipal School District Board of Education, 

a.k.a. Cleveland Metropolitan School District Board of Education (“Board”),

challenges the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. After a thorough review of the applicable law 

and facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

This matter arises from an administrative appeal filed by the Board of 

a determination of the Board of Revision (“BOR”) regarding the value of property 

owned by appellee Murray Hill Partners LLC (“Murray Hill”).

1

 The notice of appeal 

specifically stated that it was filed under R.C. 2506.01.

Murray Hill moved to dismiss the administrative appeal, arguing that 

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a BOR appeal except under R.C. 

5717.05, which does not permit a school board to appeal a BOR decision. 

The Board did not file a brief in opposition, but did file a motion to stay 

the proceedings, arguing that it filed concurrent appeals with both the common 

pleas court and the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). The Board asserted that the 

proceedings should be stayed until the BTA determined its jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal under R.C. 5717.01.

1 The underlying substantive facts of the administrative appeal are not relevant to 

the issues at hand.
The trial court denied the motion to stay and granted the motion to 

dismiss, finding that R.C. 5717.05 (as amended on July 21, 2022) revoked the 

Board’s right to appeal a decision of the BOR. The trial court apparently noted that 

the appeal was purportedly filed under R.C. 2506.01 but found that “[t]he specific 

language prohibiting an appeal governs over the general language of R.C. 2506, et 

seq., which governs administrative appeals generally.”

The Board then filed the instant appeal, raising two assignments of 

error for our review:

The trial court erred when it dismissed the appeal filed under R.C. 

2506.01 despite the clear authority in Ohio law for the appeal.

The trial court erred in finding that an appeal was unavailable under 

R.C. 2506.01 as an appeal is available absent a specific prohibition in 

R.C. 2506.01 or another statute which prohibits the use of this section 

(and which is a subject of pending legislation in the General Assembly).

II. Law and Analysis

Both of the Board’s assignments of error are interrelated and will be 

addressed together. In this matter, we are tasked with determining whether R.C. 

2506.01 provides the Board with standing to appeal a decision of the BOR or if a 

BOR appeal may only be brought pursuant to R.C. 5717.01, et seq. Whether standing 

is conferred is a matter of law, which we review de novo. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23.

“The right to appeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor 

inalienable; to the contrary, it must be conferred by statute.” Midwest Fireworks 

Mfg. Co. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 743 N.E.2d 
894 (2001), citing Roper v. Richfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 168, 

173, 180 N.E.2d 591 (1962).

The Board filed its administrative appeal under R.C. 2506.01. This 

statute provides that “every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, 

tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any 

political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of 

the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located * * * .”

R.C. 2506.01(A).

Subsection (C) of this statute defines “final order, adjudication, or 

decision” to mean “an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, 

privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person.” The subsection then 

specifically precludes “any order, adjudication, or decision from which an appeal is 

granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative authority if a right 

to a hearing on such appeal is provided * * * .”

R.C. 5717.01 provides for an appeal directly from decisions made by 

county boards of revision to the BTA:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken 

to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of the decision 

of the county board of revision is mailed as provided in division (A) of 

section 5715.20 of the Revised Code. Such an appeal may be taken by 

the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative 

authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of 

the Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments 

with the auditor, except that a subdivision that files an original 

complaint or counter-complaint under that section with respect to 

property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the 
decision of the board of revision with respect to that original complaint 

or counter-complaint.

This statute was amended to reflect the above language on July 21, 

2022. Prior to this amendment, the statute did not contain the restriction that a 

subdivision must own or lease the property in question before it can appeal a 

decision of the BOR. Under the prior version of the statute, a school board could 

appeal the decision of a BOR directly to the BTA. The amendment has removed this 

option.

BOR decisions may also be appealed to the court of common pleas 

under R.C. 5717.05:

As an alternative to the appeal provided for in section 5717.01 of the 

Revised Code, an appeal from the decision of a county board of revision 

may be taken directly to the court of common pleas of the county by the 

person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed for 

taxation.

Because this appeal arises from a matter before the common pleas

court, we are only concerned with the language of R.C. 5717.05. As outlined above, 

this statute only permits the owner of the property to file an appeal of a BOR decision 

to the court of common pleas. This statute was not amended — nothing in R.C.

5717.05 ever permitted a school board to appeal a BOR decision to a court of 

common pleas; a school board’s only avenue of redress was via the BTA.

Because the Board seemingly no longer is permitted to appeal the 

decision of the BOR under R.C. 5717.01, the Board attempted to utilize R.C. 2506.01 

in order to file an appeal to the court of common pleas. However, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio has read the requirements of R.C. 5717.05 as jurisdictional. In Huber Hts.

Circuit Courts, Ltd. v. Carne, 74 Ohio St.3d 306, 307, 658 N.E.2d 744 (1996), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissal of appeals to the common pleas court, 

noting that “R.C. 5717.05 sets forth who may appeal, how one appeals, whom the 

appellant names as appellees, and how the appellant serves appellees with notice of 

the appeal. We read this statute as mandatory and jurisdictional.” (Emphasis 

added.) Id. at 308.

While Huber Hts. did not address the issue at hand in the instant case, 

its language is instructive. In its July 2022 amendment, the legislature removed a 

school board’s ability to appeal the decision of a BOR to the BTA. The legislature 

did not amend R.C. 5717.05 to then allow the school board to appeal to the court of 

common pleas. R.C. 5717.05 still only permits a property owner to appeal a decision 

of a BOR to the court of common pleas. 

The absence of a statutory right of appeal by the school board does not 

mean that the Board can turn to R.C. 2506.01 to confer standing. “R.C. 5717.05 

governs appeals from a county board of revision at least to the extent that the 

provisions of the statute diverge from the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2506.” Spencer 

Trust v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27373, 27374, and 

27375, 2015-Ohio-4010, citing Lockhart Dev. Co. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 25728, 2011-Ohio-5000, ¶ 5-8. As noted by the Ninth District 

in Spencer Trust, the provisions of R.C. 5717.05 and R.C. Chapter 2506 differ:
R.C. 5717.05 sets forth requirements for perfecting the notice of appeal 

and for service, provides timelines for when the record from the board 

of revision must be transmitted, and describes when a court of common 

pleas may consider additional evidence. Although the court of common 

pleas acts in an appellate capacity for purposes of R.C. 5717.05, the 

statute also requires the court to “determine the taxable value of the 

property whose valuation or assessment for taxation by the county 

board of revision is complained of[.]”

In each of these respects, R.C. 5717.05 is distinct from the provisions of 

R.C. Chapter 2506 as they relate to administrative appeals generally. 

See, e.g., R.C. 2506.02 (perfection of appeal and transmission of the 

record); R.C. 2506.03 (restrictions on when a trial court may consider 

additional evidence); R.C. 2506.04 (describing the dispositions 

available to a trial court acting in an appellate capacity).

Id. at ¶ 6-7. 

We cannot find that the legislature set forth specific procedures 

regarding appeals of BOR decisions to the court of common pleas but intended for 

appeals by the school board to operate under different parameters under R.C. 

Chapter 2506. The Board’s quarrel is with the legislature and its amendment to R.C. 

5717.01, eliminating the Board’s statutory right to appeal a BOR decision to the BTA. 

The school board has never had standing to appeal a BOR decision to the court of 

common pleas, and we cannot find that R.C. 2506.01 confers such standing on the 

Board.

Finally, the Board also contends that various Ohio courts have found 

that the amendments to R.C. 5717.01 do not apply to tax year 2021, which is the tax 

year implicated in this matter. However, this argument lacks merit with regard to 

the instant appeal because we are not concerned with appeals brought pursuant to 

R.C. 5717.01. That is an issue for the BTA to determine.
Both of the Board’s assignments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion

The trial court did not err in dismissing the Board’s administrative 

appeal. The Board did not have standing under R.C. 2506.01 to appeal a decision of 

the BOR to the common pleas court.2

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR

2 We note that our conclusion is also consistent with the opinion rendered by 

another panel of this court in Bedford City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 8th District Cuyahoga No. 112878, which is being released contemporaneously 

with this opinion.