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PICK-UPDATE: 3/15/2007 

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Internal SFUND Box Number _36_ OF _283_ 

Initials/Date: LDS / 3-15-2007 
P.2 

/OMa-M-?-/ 

RESPONSES TO COMMENTS 

ON THE 

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 

ON THE 

ADJUSTMENT OF REPORTABLE QUANTITIES FOR RADIONUCLIDES 

A Report to the 

Emergency Response Division 

Office of Emergency and Remedial Response 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

March 1989 

Prepared by: 

ICF Incorporated and 

C-E Environmental 

EPA Contract 68-03-3452 
P.3 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

COMMENTS ON POLICY ISSUES 

Comments on CERCLA Authority P-1 

Comments on Exemptions/Exclusions P-ll 

Comments on Federally Permitted Releases P-25 

Comments on Duplicative Reporting P-46 

Comments on Regulatory Burden P-62 

COMMENTS ON TECHNICAL ISSUES 

Comments on RQ Adjustment Options T-l 

Comments on Model Assumptions T-17 

Comments on Radioactive Decay T-47 

Comments on Specific RQs T-52 

Comments on the Inhalation Pathway Model T-67 

Comments on the Ingestion Pathway Models T-79 

Comments on the Direct Exposure Pathway Models T-82 

Comments on Remaining Radionuclides T-87 

Comments on Alternative Methodologies T-88 

Comments on the Mixture Rule T-96 

Comments on Concentration Cutoffs T-101 
P.4 

Commenter Number: 

Page : 

Commenter Name: John A. Eure, Chief 

Bureau of Environmental Health 

Department of Public Health 

State of Iowa 

Response Number: 1 

Issue: 

Comment: 

CERCLA Authority 

It would appear that this proposed rule, if passed, will significantly 

increase the workload of States responding to spills of radioactive material. 

It seems that EPA has not considered this because no funding provisions were 

stated. We would suggest that States be considered in the process. If EPA 

wants or expects us to respond, it should make funding assistance available to 

the States. 

Response: 

The rule concerns only the requirements for reporting radionuclide 

releases at levels equalling or exceeding the reportable quantity (RQ). The 

rule does not require response actions. As noted in the rule's preamble, a 

hazardous substance release notification is merely a trigger for informing the 

government of a release so that the appropriate government personnel can 

evaluate the need for removal or remedial action and undertake any necessary 

action in a timely fashion. Government personnel will evaluate all reported 

releases, but will not necessarily initiate a removal or remedial action in 

response to all reported releases, because the release of an RQ will not 

necessarily pose a hazard to public health or welfare or the environment in 

all circumstances. Government personnel will assess each reported release on 

a case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate action. 

Thus, concerns about the effort needed to respond to radionuclide 

release reports are not relevant directly to this rulemaking. While releases 

of an RQ or more of radionuclides would trigger a report not only to the 

National Response Center under CERCLA, but also to local, and possibly state, 

emergency planning committees under SARA section 304, no response actions are 

mandated under that program either. 

Additionally, under the authority of CERCLA section 104(c)(3)(C), if the 

federal government determines that remedial action for a release should be 

pursued, the state in which the remedial action is to take place must enter 

into a contract or cooperative agreement with EPA. This contract or agreement 

commits the state to pay or assure payment of 10 percent of the costs of the 

remedial action, or 50 percent (or more if EPA deems it appropriate) of the 

costs if the state, or a political subdivision of it, operated the facility at 

which the release occurred at the time that hazardous substances were disposed 

there. Thus, under these circumstances, EPA would make funding assistance 

available to states for the remainder of the costs of remedial actions for 

radionuclide releases if the releases are responded to under this authority. 

P-l 
P.5 

Commenter Number: 3 Response Number: 2 

Page: 1-3 

Commenter Name: D.L. Farrar 

Nuclear Licensing Director 

Commonwealth Edison 

Issue: CERCLA Authority 

Comment: 

Edison, for the following reasons, believes that the proposed amendments 

to the current reporting requirements, and the current reporting requirements 

themselves, are unnecessary as a matter of law and policy. Current reporting 

requirements by the NRC adequately protect the public health and safety and 

the environment from any threat resulting from the release of radionuclides. 

These NRC reporting requirements are unnecessarily duplicated by EPA's 

overbroad interpretation of its authority under CERCLA. In some instances, 

NRC reporting requirements are exceeded by EPA's requirement for immediate 

reporting, even though the NRC has already determined that such immediate 

reports are unnecessary. Therefore, there is no basis for exposing NRC 

licensees to significant penalties and criminal sanctions for failing to 

report releases "immediately." Rather-, EPA should impose no separate 

reporting requirements but should rely on NRC-licensees' reports to the NRC as 

satisfying any reporting requirement under CERCLA. 

EPA believes that CERCLA applies to the release of any radionuclides 

because, in EPA's view, all radionuclides are hazardous substances for the 

purposes of CERCLA. EPA arrives at its view as follows: (1) section 101(14) 

of CERCLA defines hazardous substances to include hazardous air pollutants 

listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act; (2) EPA has generically 

designated radionuclides to be hazardous air pollutants for the purposes of 

section 112 of the Clean Air Act; (3) CERCLA applies to releases of hazardous 

substances to all media, not just air; therefore, (4) CERCLA applies to 

releases of radionuclides to all media. 

This logic is incomplete. Radionuclides are hazardous substances for 

CERCLA only to the extent that radionuclides are hazardous air pollutants 

under the Clean Air Act. The fact that CERCLA applies to releases of 

hazardous substances to all media does not expand the definition of what 

constitutes a hazardous substance, e.g., CERCLA does not convert a hazardous 

air pollutant into a hazardous waste pollutant. Thus, while CERCLA applies to 

releases of hazardous substances in all media, the release of any substance 

into any medium must first be shown to constitute a release of a hazardous 

substance into that medium before that release is subject to CERCLA. Not 

having made that showing for each listed radionuclide but, instead, having 

listed them all based on faulty logic, EPA has exceeded its authority under 

CERCLA. Therefore, EPA must first establish its jurisdiction by determining 

the identities and quantities of radionuclides which are hazardous when 

released into the various environmental media. 

P-2 
P.6 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority - Response 5", with the following additional text] 

EPA also disagrees that a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air 

Act is only a CERCLA hazardous substance if it is released into the air. 

There is no support in the language of CERCLA for the commenter's notion that 

anything designated as a CERCLA hazardous substance due to its listing by one 

or more of the environmental statutes referenced in CERCLA section 101(14) is 

so desijgnated only for releases occurring in the same medium addressed in the 

referenced statute. In addition to the absence of any statutory language 

explicitly supporting the commenter's position, several CERCLA provisions 

indicate that the statute's hazardous substance provisions apply to all media. 

The CERCLA release reporting requirement in section 102(a), as well as the 

definition of "release" in section 101(22), both concern hazardous substances 

released into the "environment", which is defined in section 101(8) to 

constitute all media. Furthermore, section 102(a) also states that EPA may 

set one RQ for any hazardous substance, "regardless of the medium into which 

the hazardous substance is released." This indicates that Congress did not 

intend for hazardous substances to be designated on a media-specific basis. 

P-3 
P.7 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

7 

1 

Response Number: 

R.L. Arscott, Director 

Health, Environment and Loss Protection 

Chevron Corporation 

CERCLA Authority 

The first [concern] deals with the premise that the simple presence of a 

radionuclide in an emergency situation implies hazard. The creation of a 

hazard, as illustrated in the figure that follows this page, implies a chain 

of circumstances involving failure of controls; promotion of release and 

entrainment mechanisms; transport phenomena; dispersion, removal, modification 

and settlement; exposure; uptake; retention; and excretion. The release of an 

RQ does not insure that all these steps have taken place. This is not 

intended to imply that releases of significant radionuclides to the 

environment should be permitted nor that if .such release occurs, prompt 

remediation should not be initiated. We suggest that the Agency specify in 

the final rule that the exceedance of an RQ does not necessarily mean that a 

hazard exists. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that the release of a radionuclide does not necessarily imply 

that a hazard exists. This position was noted in the preamble to the proposed 

rule when it stated that a hazardous substance release notification is merely 

a trigger for informing the government of a release so that the appropriate 

government personnel can evaluate the need for removal or remedial action and 

undertake any necessary action in a timely fashion. Government personnel will 

evaluate all reported releases, but will not necessarily initiate a removal or 

remedial action in response to all reported releases, because the release of 

an RQ will not necessarily pose a hazard to public health or welfare or the 

environment in all circumstances. Government personnel will assess each 

reported release on a case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate action. 

This position also is restated in the preamble to the final rule. 

1 

1 

fl P-4 
P.8 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

13 

4 

Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

CERCLA Authority 

Response Number: 

The requirement for dual notification is also contrary to the provisions 

of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) (49 Federal 

Register 35896 (September 12, 1984)) for licensed nuclear power stations which 

identifies the NRC as the Cognizant Federal Agency responsible for 

notification of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal 

agencies. 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority - Response 5" and "Duplicative Reporting - Response 

11"] 

P-5 
P.9 

Commenter Number: 16 Response Number: 5 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: D.W. Edwards 

Director of Industry Affairs 

Yankee Atomic Electric Company 

Issue: CERCLA Authority 

Comment: 

We agree with EPA that the units of measurement used to determine the 

reportability threshold for releases of radionuclides should be changed to 

better reflect the potential threat to the public and the environment from any 

such releases. However, we do not agree that the additional reporting 

requirements that will apparently be imposed on NRC-licensed power plants by 

this proposed rule are necessary. 

Response: 

The statutory language of CERCLA (section 103(a)) requires that a 

facility's owner or operator immediately report to the National Response 

Center releases from the facility that equal or exceed an RQ. The statute 

provides no exceptions for situations in which other government agencies also 

must be informed of releases pursuant to the directives of other statutes or 

regulations. Notification requirements under CERCLA, however, are not 

intended to supercede or supplant notification to State and local authorities 

in the event of a release. 

CERCLA imposes upon the facility owner or operator the responsibility to 

directly notify the National Response Center and imposes upon the National 

Response Center the responsibility to convey this notification to other 

appropriate government agencies. Indirect reporting by the facility owner or 

operator through another government agency to the National Response Center 

does not satisfy the statutory requirement. Because of this statutory 

requirement, EPA does not have the flexibility to prevent duplicative 

reporting. While EPA understands that some additional burden would be imposed 

upon facility owners and operators who would need to file reports with more 

than one government agency, one purpose of alerting the National Response 

Center is to ensure a coordinated federal, state, and local response to the 

release. Additionally, as noted in the Economic Impact Analysis accompanying 

this rule, EPA expects that only 59 additional episodic release notifications 

will result annually from the RQ adjustments. Under the federally-permitted 

release provisions of section 101(10)(K), licensees of nuclear power plants 

would be excluded from CERCLA release reporting requirements except in the 

case of releases that exceed Nuclear Regulatory Commission permitted limits by 

at least an RQ. Thus, the incidence of duplicative reporting due to this rule 

is relatively small. 

P-6 
P.10 

Commenter Number: 24 (CARC) Response Number: 6 

Page: 2-5 

Commenter Name: Duane A. Siler 

Patton, Boggs and Blow 

Issue: CERCLA Authority 

Comment: 

Radionuclides are unique among CERCLA hazardous substances in that they 

emit energy through a process of decay. It is therefore important to 

distinguish between the emission of radiation from these materials and the 

"release" of the materials themselves. Presumably, the Agency does not intend 

to characterize the mere emission of radiation as a release under section 103. 

Otherwise, ordinary industrial situations involving contained or confined 

accumulations of raw materials or products which happen to contain 

radionuclides would be considered "releases." This would lead to absurd and, 

we believe, unauthorized results. 

For example, there are many types of raw materials which contain 

radionuclides (termed "naturally occurring radioactive material"). These may 

include, among others, lignite coal, phosphate rock, other ores, and crude 

petroleum. Such materials are typically stored in tanks or piles at mines, 

electric generating plants, refineries, smelters and similar processing 

facilities before they are used as raw materials or energy sources. 

Similarly, many products which are derived from these materials contain 

radionuclides, e.g.. phosphate fertilizers, metals, or refined petroleum. 

These products are typically accumulated in containers or piles prior to or 

during distribution. If radioactivity per se were considered a "release," 

then countless such facilities would be required to report a "release" every 

time a quantity of material with an activity level which exceeds the RQ is 

placed in a pile or tank, notwithstanding that the radionuclide materials 

themselves are not released.1 Indeed, any freight train hauling large 

quantities of such raw materials or products would, under this interpretation, 

constitute a facility from which there was a reportable release. 

Such an interpretation would be contrary to the Act. Section 101(22) 

defines release as: 

Any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 

emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, 

dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the 

abandonment or discharging of barrels, containers, and other 

closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or 

pollutant or contaminant ... 

1 Presumably, under this approach, the petroleum exclusion in section 

101(14) of the Act would not apply to stored crude or refined petroleum, since 

the reportable release would be a release of radiation, not of the petroleum 

itself. 

P-7 
P.11 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

Section 103(a) requires reporting of "any release ... of a hazardous 

substance ... in quantities equal to or greater than" the applicable RQ. 

Reading these two sections together, it is clear that a reportable release 

occurs only when a hazardous substance is physically handled in any of the 

ways listed in section 101(22). The hazardous substance at issue here is 

radionuclides -- not the radiation they emit.2 Thus, section 103(a) requires 

notification when a reportable quantity of a radionuclide material is spilled, 

dumped, disposed of, etc. It does not require the reporting of the emission 

of a given quantity of radioactive energy in the absence of a release of the 

radionuclide source itself. 

This raises the question of whether the temporary placement of raw 

materials or products containing radionuclides in tanks or piles at a 

manufacturing facility, by itself, constitutes a "release." Temporarily 

holding materials or products is not spilling, leaking, dumping, or disposing 

them into the environment because this is an intentional method of managing 

the substances and because the substances will be used. A release occurs only 

to the extent that material from a tank or pile migrates into the air or water 

or otherwise remains in the surrounding environment. 

To avoid confusion on this score, EPA should state in the final 

rulemaking that temporary accumulation of raw materials, intermediates or 

products which are or contain radionuclides is not a release. Only to the 

extent that such materials migrate from a pile or container and are therefore 

not retrieved for use, are they properly deemed "released." Such releases 

would be evaluated under the applicable RQ to determine whether reporting was 

required. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that the emission of radiation from radionuclides, apart from 

any release of the radionuclides themselves, does not constitute a release 

under CERCLA. This interpretation has been stated in the preamble to the 

final rule. 

However, the Agency considers any activity that involves the pouring, 

discharging, etc. of a hazardous substance into any containment structure that 

is not completely enclosed to the environment to constitute a release. Thus, 

because the stockpiling of radionuclide-containing materials outside a 

building involves, at a minimum, the "pouring" of a hazardous substance into a 

pile exposed to the air, this would constitute a reportable release under 

section 103. This same rule applies to the placement of material containing 

radionuclides in tanks or other containment structures outside a building. If 

2 Significantly, under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA regulates 

emissions of radionuclide particulates -- not radiation therefrom. See, e.g. 

40 CFR section 61.122 (standard for emissions of polonium-210 from elemental 

phosphorous plants). 

P-8 
P.12 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

the tank or containment structure is not totally enclosed to the environment, 

the placement constitutes a reportable release. 

Furthermore, whether the material stockpiled or placed in a tank or other 

containment structure is intended for use in an industrial process is 

irrelevant to whether that placement constitutes a reportable release. Under 

CERCLA, whether the hazardous substances are used after a release is not 

relevant for reporting purposes, though it might be highly relevant in the 

evaluation of whether a government response will be taken to the release. The 

purpose of the CERCLA reporting requirements under section 103 is to inform 

government agencies of the release so that they may evaluate whether a 

governmental response is appropriate and so that they can assess the response 

measures taken by others (50 FR 13459, April 4, 1985). 

P-9 
P.13_ 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

L2 

3-4 

Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mallinckrodt, Inc. 

Response Number: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

CERCLA Authority 

In summary, the adjustment from one RQ in pounds for all radionuclides, 

to specific curie quantities for each nuclide is a major improvement. 

However, some of the ultra conservative techniques employed by EPA in the 

calculation of these RQs is clearly not justified. The timetable on the 

comments for this proposed rule was such that a thorough review of the 

background information was not possible. We would implore EPA to consider 

additional comments that may be submitted after the close of the comment 

period. 

Response: 

EPA believes that the two months provided for the public to submit their 

comments not only conforms to legal requirements, but also was adequate to 

permit a thorough review of the proposed rule and its background information. 

EPA notes that no other commenters indicated that they were hampered in their 

consideration of the rule by the time allotted for comments. However, where 

appropriate, EPA has considered in this rulemaking those comments received 

after the official end of the comment period. 

Furthermore, EPA does not believe that it employed "ultra conservative" 

techniques in the calculation of the RQs. On the contrary, EPA believes that 

its techniques were reasonable and resulted in final RQ adjustments that are 

protective of public health and welfare and the environment, but which are not 

overly burdensome. The Regulatory Impact Analysis supporting this rule 

projects that only 59 additional episodic radionuclide releases will be 

reported annually to the National Response Center as a result of this rule. 

P-10 
P.14 

Commenter Number: 5 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: Dennis B. Naff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company 

Issue: Exemptions/Exclusions: NARMs 

Comment: 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company, a Division of Mobil Diversified 

Business, owns and operates three phosphate rock mines in central Florida and 

fertilizer production facilities in Pasadena, Texas and DePue, Illinois. The 

phosphate rock mined in Florida as well as the ammonium phosphate fertilizer 

and by-product phosphogypsum produced from the phosphate rock contain very 

small levels of uranium-238 and its natural decay products. Due to the 

presence of these naturally occurring radioactive materials, radon is emitted 

from the phosphate rock and by-product phosphogypsum, and to a lesser extent, 

from the product fertilizer. Based on the available data, calculations show 

that the radon emissions from the three phosphogypsum storage areas in 

Pasadena and one storage pile in DePue will all exceed the reportable quantity 

for radon and so must be reported daily as a release. 

Mobil feels that the proposed rule was not intended to cover this type 

of continuous release. These phosphogypsum piles are constructed by a daily 

addition of new materials as part of the production process and are all 

located in areas removed from the general public. 

Based on the intent of the rule, Mobil requests that an exemption be 

granted for all phosphate rock mines and fertilizer facilities, including 

phosphogypsum storage areas. This will eliminate many unnecessary reports to 

the National Response Center. It will also recognize that these continuous 

releases "present little or no immediate danger to the public health." 

Response: 

Pursuant to the comments received, the Agency completed a review of 

available information on radon emissions from phosphate rock mines, 

beneficiation plants, and drying and grinding facilities, as well as wet 

process phosphate fertilizer plants, (including gypsum piles and phosphate rock 

calciners at those facilities). EPA also reviewed available data on the 

radionuclide concentration of certain large volume waste streams generated at 

these different types of facilities. 

Most of what information is currently available on radionuclide 

emissions and concentrations in wastes from these sources is found in 

background documents supporting EPA1s determination not to regulate these 

emissions under the existing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 

Pollutants (NESHAPs). However, the information offered to support a 

determination not to regulate under NESHAPs does not necessarily support a 

determination not to require reporting under. CERCLA section 103, since the two 

programs involve very different considerations. The NESHAPs information, 

P-ll 
P.15 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

which is aimed toward determining whether radionuclide emissions warrant the 

imposition of regulatory controls, does not represent a determination that 

emissions from these sources should never be reported to any government agency 

for consideration of whether a response action might be taken. Thus, no 

administrative exemptions have been authorized for these particular sources, 

although the Agency will consider in the future additional exemptions from 

CERCLA notification requirements if EPA or other government agencies provide a 

basis for finding that responses to such releases would never be warranted. 

Specifically with respect to phosphogypsum piles, EPA's Office of 

Radiation Programs is still in the process of evaluating this source category 

for possible regulation under NESHAPs (e.g., see 49 FR 43914, October 31, 

1984). Based on data in the NESHAPs background documents and other sources, 

it appears that phosphogypsum may contain elevated levels of certain naturally 

occurring radionuclides (radium in particular). Also, all of the radionuclide 

NESHAPs are being re-evaluated as a result of a voluntary remand. In light of 

these observations, EPA does not believe that a sufficient justification 

currently exists to exempt administratively all releases of phosphogypsum from 

the CERCLA notification requirements. EPA has also reached the same basic 

conclusion for phosphate ore, phosphate rock tailings and overburden, and 

other large volume waste streams generated at phosphate rock processing 

plants. 

To the extent that accumulations of these materials do result in 

releases of at least an RQ of radionuclides, repeated reporting of such 

releases most probably can be avoided through use of the continuous release 

provision in CERCLA section 103(f)(2). This provision provides for reduced 

reporting of releases that are "continuous" and "stable in quantity and rate." 

EPA has published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, April 19, 

1988) detailing the reduced reporting requirements for continuous releases. 

Continuous accumulations of materials that result in releases of an RQ or more 

of radionuclides outside a facility may be able to use this reduced reporting 

requirement. Furthermore, the Agency wishes to clarify that if phosphogypsum 

piles and other sources of airborne emissions from phosphate rock mines/ 

processing plants are eventually regulated under NESHAPs, releases in 

compliance with the NESHAPs would be considered federally permitted under 

CERCLA section 101(10(H). Therefore, such releases would not be subject to 

CERCLA's reporting requirements. 

P-12 
Commenter Number: 7 Response Number: 2 

Page: 3-8 

'Commenter Name: R.L. Arscott, Director 

Health, Environment and Loss Protection 

Chevron Corporation 

Issue: Exemptions/Exclusions: NARM 

Comment: 

Chevron's third concern with the establishment of activity-based 

reportable quantities of radionuclides is the potential for unnecessary and 

distracting reporting. This could arise from the tendency of certain 

extractive, manufacturing, and mining operations to release large volumes of 

material containing low levels of naturally occurring radioactive materials to 

the environment, particularly Radon 222. Chevron is also concerned about 

overloading the reporting system when large quantities of low specific 

activity radionuclides are released during the combustion of fossil fuels. We 

suggest that you strongly consider the consequences of overloading the 

reporting system as shown highly probable in the examples that follow. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 1" and "Exemptions/Exclusions -

Response 6, with the following additional text] 

In response to this and other similar comments, EPA conducted a review 

of available information on the hazards associated with releases of radon and 

other naturally occurring radionuclides from a variety of industrial sources. 

Specific sources examined included phosphate rock mines, beneficiation plants, 

and drying and grinding facilities; wet process phosphate fertilizer plants; 

coal and coal ash piles at coal-fired boiler stations; operations to produce 

crude oil, natural gas, and geothermal energy; and metal and nonmetal 

extraction industries (including lead, copper, zinc, and aluminum 

extraction/processing facilities). The purpose of this review was to 

determine whether a sufficient technical basis exists to administratively 

exempt radionuclide releases from these sources from CERCLA's notification 

requirements. 

Most of the information currently available on radiological hazards 

associated with each source examined is found in background documents 

supporting EPA's determination not to regulate these sources under the 

existing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs). 

EPA has decided that the NESHAPs information does not support an 

administrative exemption from CERCLA's notification requirements for two main 

reasons. First, all of the existing radionuclide NESHAPs are being reevaluated as a result of a voluntary remand. EPA believes, therefore, that it 

would be premature to base an administrative exemption on the NESHAPs 

background information before all related issues have been resolved fully. 

Second, EPA believes that a determination not to regulate under NESHAPs does 

not necessarily support a determination not to require reporting under CERCLA 

section 103, because the two programs involve very different considerations. 

P-13 

I 

I 
P.17 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

The NESHAPs information, which is aimed toward determining whether 

radionuclide emissions from the above sources warrant the imposition of 

regulatory controls, does not represent a determination that emissions from 

these sources should never be reported to any government agency for 

consideration of whether a response action might be taken. 

Additional background information was available, however, to support 

further evaluation of the radiological hazards associated with one of the 

source categories noted above -- coal and coal ash piles at coal-fired boiler 

sites. This additional background information was derived from two primary 

sources: (1) background information developed in support of a forthcoming EPA 

rulemaking on NARM wastes; and (2) information submitted by commenters on the 

radionuclide RQ adjustment NPRM. The information submitted by commenters 

concerning the radiological hazards of coal and coal ash was much more 

extensive and more detailed than similar information submitted for other 

potential release sources. 

Using this additional background information, EPA's Office of Radiation 

Programs (ORP) conducted a separate analysis of the radiological hazards 

associated with coal and coal ash at utility and industrial boilers. ORP used 

reasonably conservative models to estimate the radiation doses and resulting 

health risks to nearby residents and to workers. In particular for nearby 

residents, ORP estimated doses and risks via the following potential exposure 

pathways: (1) direct radiation; (2) various pathways of exposure to 

particulates released to the air, including inhalation, immersion in an 

airborne plume, direct radiation from particulates deposited on the ground, 

and ingestion of crops contaminated by airborne deposition; (3) inhalation of 

radon; (4) ingestion of contaminated ground water, as well as ingestion of 

crops and livestock assumed to be contaminated by the ground water; and (5) 

ingestion of contaminated surface water, as well as ingestion of crops and 

livestock assumed to be contaminated by the surface water. The critical 

exposure pathway (i.e., the one yielding the highest dose and risk estimates) 

was found to be the inhalation of radon, with the lifetime risk of fatal 

cancer caused by this exposure estimated to be roughly 2 x IO"5. 

For workers, EPA estimated radiation doses and resulting health risks 

via four potential exposure pathways: (1) direct radiation when standing next 

to (i.e., 10 meters from) a coal or ash pile; (2) direct radiation when 

standing on a coal or ash pile; (3) various pathways of exposure to airborne 

particulates, including inhalation, immersion in an airborne plume, and direct 

radiation from particulates deposited on the ground; and (4) inhalation of 

radon. The critical exposure pathway for workers was found to be direct 

radiation, especially when standing on a coal or coal ash pile. The maximum 

lifetime risk of fatal cancer caused by direct radiation was estimated to be 

roughly 1 x 10"A; the lifetime cancer risks to workers due to exposures via 

the other pathways were estimated to be 5 x IO"6 or less. See EPA's final 

P-14 
P.18 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

report3 documenting this analysis for more details on the analysis, methods, 

and results. 

Given these results, and recognizing the reasonably conservative nature 

of the models used to derive the results, EPA has decided to administratively 

exempt from CERCLA notification requirements the dumping of coal and coal ash, 

and radionuclide releases to all media from coal and coal ash piles, at 

utility and industrial facilities with coal-fired boilers. According to the 

analysis completed by ORP, the estimated health risks posed by the radiation 

releases from coal and coal ash piles are within the range generally 

acceptable under the Superfund program. The estimated health risk posed to 

nearby residents and to workers are all within the general range of 10"* to 

IO"7 individual lifetime excess cancer risk. 

In addition, the Agency believes that the submission of individual 

reports from each industrial and utility facility with coal and coal ash piles 

may not be consistent with the purposes of the section 103 reporting 

requirement. In the case of radiation releases from coal and coal ash piles, 

the amount and rate of radiation released is extremely similar across all 

industrial and utility facilities with coal-fired boilers. For example, all 

coal and coal ash piles will contain the same radionuclides in roughly the 

same low concentrations. The radiation emitted from these piles, therefore, 

will always be emitted continuously at low levels spread over large areas --

it never will be emitted at a high rate or in an unusually large amount as the 

result of a sudden, episodic release. EPA is already aware of the amount and 

concentration of these radiation releases. Because of these two factors, 

submission of individual notifications of these releases is not necessary for 

the government to assess whether a response action is needed under CERCLA. 

Perhaps more importantly, however, a response action (i.e., removal or 

remedial action) under CERCLA does not appear to be the most appropriate 

federal regulatory resopnse to radiation releases that are (1) similar in 

amount and concentration across an entire sector of industry; (2) pose 

acceptable exposure risks; and (3) disperse quickly in the environment such 

that a response is not necessary to cleanup the accumulation of what has 

already been released. Whereas CERCLA is designed to enable the government to 

respond on a case-by-case basis where each site or release poses different 

hazards and requires a different type of response, other federal regulatory 

programs and mechanisms are more appropriately designed to address the hazards 

of releases that uniformly occur across an entire industry. A more 

appropriate response to the radiation releases from coal and coal ash piles 

may be the imposition of radiation emission limitations applicable to all 

industrial and utility facilities housing coal and coal ash piles. 

3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Technical Background Supplement 

in Support of Rulemaking Adjustment Activities for Reportable Quantities of 

Radionuclides," Office of Radiation Programs, 1989. 

P-15 
P.19 

I 

I 

Commenter Number: 8 Response Number: 3 

Page: 2,3 

Commenter Name: Mark Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Issue: Exemption/Exclusions: Type B Containment 

Comment: 

Since the major purpose of the proposed rule is to provide guidelines 

for notification when material is released to the environment, there must be 

exemptions noted when material is not considered a potential hazard. 

Similar to special form materials described above, radioactive materials 

packaged in Type B shipping containers are also designed to prevent loss or 

dispersal of their contents. Containers must pass the tests specified 

throughout 10 CFR Part 71, and must be approved and registered by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission -- Transportation Branch. Materials in these containers 

can be either special or normal form, and will not be released from their 

containers under accident conditions. For these reasons, materials stored or 

transported in approved Type B shipping containers should be exempt from the 

proposed RQs. 

Response: 

RQs, and the reporting requirements that they trigger, are relevant only 

if hazardous substances are released into the environment. If only the 

container carrying a hazardous substance is exposed to the environment, but 

not its contents, no report under CERCLA is necessary unless the container is 

lost, disposed, or abandoned. Thus, if during a transportation accident, a 

container with radionuclides inside falls out of its transport vehicle and is 

recovered, but does not release an RQ or more of radionuclides, no report is 

required under CERCLA. Therefore, if certain containers never release their 

contents and the containers are not lost or abandoned, CERCLA reports will 

never be an issue. 

P-16 
P.20 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Response Number: 

Mark Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Exemptions/Exclusions: Special Form 

Radioactive material is commonly divided into two categories "normal 

form" and "special form." While normal form material is easily dispersed, 

special form, by definition, is not. Material that is classified as special 

form must pass all of the tests specified in 49 CFR Part 173.469, and is 

usually registered with a Competent Authority. Special form materials are 

easily identified, and already meet the intent to prevent loss or dispersal to 

the environment. At the very least, higher RQs should be established for 

these materials, or they should be exempted from all reporting. 

Response: 

The form from which a release of an RQ or more of a radionuclide occurs 

is irrelevant for purposes of the CERCLA notification requirements. The 

radionuclide RQs are applicable to all chemical and physical forms in which 

radionuclides may exist and thus the same RQ for a given radionuclide will 

apply regardless of whether the radionuclide exists in a special form or a 

normal form. The objective in setting RQs is not to differentiate between the 

likelihood or severity of releases occurring from varying forms of 

containment, but rather to trigger reports to the government of actual 

releases so that the need for government intervention can be assessed. 

P-17 
P.21 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

11 

3 

Gary D. Myers, President 

The Fertilizer Institute 

Exemptions/Exclusions: NARM 

Response Number: 

Several examples from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of 

phosphate rock to produce phosphate fertilizers illustrate the necessity of 

establishing a concentration cut-off to eliminate unnecessary and excessive 

reporting. Because naturally occurring radionuclides are found in association 

with phosphate rock, the extraction, beneficiation and processing of phosphate 

rock inevitably involves the "release" of radionuclides. These releases 

include naturally occurring radionuclides in sand and clay tailings produced 

during the beneficiation of phosphate rock and phosphogypsum produced in the 

processing of phosphate rock to produce phosphate fertilizer materials. In 

these and other situations involving the extraction, beneficiation and 

processing of phosphate rock, the "releases" of radionuclides involve 

materials which are quite dilute and present no immediate danger to public 

health. In addition, these situations have been studied extensively by EPA 

under RCRA and/or other environmental statutes. For example, phosphate rock 

beneficiation tailings were studied extensively by EPA pursuant to sections 

8002(f) and (p) of RCRA. A similar study of phosphogypsum is almost complete 

and has included a census and inventory of all of the operating and closed 

phosphogypsum handling facilities in the United States.1 

Given the dilute nature of the materials involved and the extensive 

knowledge of their location and circumstances already possessed by EPA, 

routine reporting of these materials would not serve the "major purpose" of 

the CERCLA reporting requirements, i.e.. "to alert the appropriate government 

officials to releases of hazardous substances that may require a federal 

response ...". 52 Federal Register 8172. Thus, routine reporting of these 

situations would constitute the "unnecessary and excessive reporting" which 

both the statute and previous EPA CERCLA reporting regulations have sought to 

avoid. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 1", with the following additional text] 

Additionally, EPA believes that the adoption of a concentration cutoff 

through this rulemaking would be inappropriate at this time. Currently, there 

is no one correct cutoff level that would establish what radionuclide 

concentration is below regulatory concern (i.e., a level below which there 

1 As a result of the completed studies of, inter alia, phosphate 

beneficiation tailings, EPA has determined that regulation of these tailings 

as a hazardous waste is unnecessary. 51 Federal Register 36233 (October 9, 

1986). 

P-18 
P.22 

Response Number: 5 (continued) 

would be no benefit in requiring reports of releases of radioactive materials 

in such low concentrations). For example, the Department of Transportation 

(DOT) cutoff suggested for discussion purposes in the proposed rule was 

selected not necessarily on the basis of risk, but rather on what level would 

avoid regulation of natural objects for which the application of 

transportation regulations governing radioactive materials was not intended. 

Additionally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established release limits 

that could be interpreted as denoting what is below regulatory concern, and 

these limits are even lower than the DOT cutoff. 

Although the Agency realizes that there is some concentration of 

radionuclides below which the hazards are so low that a government response is 

unnecessary,, determination of that precise level is a complex task. EPA does 

not have a sufficient basis at this time for determining the appropriate 

concentration cutoff level and, furthermore, does not believe that an RQ 

adjustment regulation is an appropriate forum in which to make such a 

determination. The Agency believes that a rulemaking designed to limit public 

health risks caused by radiation exposure, rather than a rule that simply 

establishes release reporting requirements, is a more appropriate forum. The 

Agency is currently developing two rules related to de minimis/exemption/below 

regulatory concern levels and residual radioactivity criteria that may have a 

bearing on this issue. Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is 

considering a generic rulemaking for designating a radioactive waste below 

regulatory concern. If these rulemakings provide sufficient information in 

the future to enable the Agency to make a finding that a certain radionuclide 

concentration would pose a hazard only rarely and under circumstances that 

would not likely result in any action being taken to respond to the hazard, 

then the Agency will consider a concentration cutoff at that time. 

P-19 
I 

Commenter Number: 17 Response Number: 6 

Page: 2/3 

Commenter Name: Walter R. Quanstrom 

General Manager and Vice President 

Amoco Corporation 

Issue: Exemptions/Exclusions: NARM 

Comment: 

We are concerned that, even with a concentration cutoff, many releases 

of naturally occurring radioactive materials that pose no significant risk 

will be reported. Such releases might occur when natural materials containing 

small amounts of naturally occurring radiation are moved or disturbed in 

place, or even from structures constructed from such materials. Most often, 

the type and amounts of radiation present are unknown and many new measurement 

techniques would have to be employed before it was known whether or not a 

reportable release had occurred. This naturally occurring radioactive 

material does not pose the same type of hazard as radioactive material that 

has been purposely concentrated and processed for some use. Therefore, we 

believe that an exclusion should be granted for releases of naturally 

occurring radioactive materials. The use of an exclusion appears to be 

consistent with other provisions of CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund 

Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. SARA contains an exclusion 

from remedial or removal actions for a release of "a naturally occurring 

substance in its unaltered form, or altered solely through naturally occurring 

processes or phenomena, from a location where it is naturally found" (section 

104(c)).. The situation is somewhat different for releases, which would not 

necessarily occur from the precise location where the material is naturally 

found. However, an exclusion for naturally occurring radioactive material 

released in the vicinity of its natural occurrence would exclude most 

non-threatening releases and would still allow for reporting of releases from 

transportation of the material away from its location, where risks might be 

increased. We believe that the conditions under which releases of naturally 

occurring radioactive materials are released near where they are found differ 

markedly from those assumed by the Agency in developing the RQs. A 

re-evaluation of radionuclide release experience is needed and should lead to 

the development of a more practical reporting regimen. 

As an alternative to an exclusion, a separate reporting class with a 

higher RQ and concentration cutoff that would differentiate these releases 

from releases of concentrated radioactive materials could be developed. 

Appendix B now includes the individual radionuclides plus an RQ for the class 

"Radionuclides." This table could be expanded to include a second class, 

"Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials." 

We strongly urge the Agency to re-evaluate the need for regulation of 

naturally occurring radioactive materials under situations where the release 

of these materials is unlikely to pose a threat to human health or the 

environment. 

P-20 
P.24 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

Response: 

The Agency has decided to exempt from CERCLA notification requirements 

releases of naturally occurring radionuclides from large, generally 

undisturbed land holdings, such as golf courses and parks, along with those 

activities that involve the disturbance (e.g., tilling or excavation) of land 

for purposes other than mining, such as farming or building construction. As 

noted by the commenter, it is possible that large undisturbed land holdings, 

as well as the disturbance of large areas of land, could cause the release of 

an RQ or more of some naturally occurring radionuclides (radon in particular), 

though the concentration of the released radionuclides would be low. The 

Agency concluded that releases from such land holdings and activities rarely 

would pose a hazard to public health or welfare or the environment because 

releases would be dispersed widely in the atmosphere at levels not much (if at 

all) above natural background. Furthermore, the Agency does not believe that 

any action realistically could be taken to respond to such releases. In this 

sense, reports of radionuclide releases from generally undisturbed land 

holdings and land disturbance activities could divert National Response Center 

resources unnecessarily, preventing timely responses to those releases that 

truly warrant a response. 

In addition, the Agency has decided to exempt from CERCLA notification 

requirements the dumping of coal and coal ash, and radionuclide releases to 

all media from coal and coal ash piles, at utility and industrial facilities 

with coal-fired boilers. See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2" for more 

detail. 

P-21 
P.25 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

20 

1 

Response Number: 

Steven M. Swanson, Director 

Health and Environmental Affairs Department 

American Petroleum Institute 

Exemptions/Exclusions: NARM 

API believes EPA should consider excluding from reporting or at a 

minimum modify the reporting mechanism for naturally occurring radioactive 

materials. Such an exclusion may be particularly appropriate for naturally 

occurring material released in the vicinity of its natural occurrence. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 6"] 

P-22 
P.26 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

24 

1-2 

Response Number: 

Paul J. Merger, Chief 

Bureau of Energy and Radiation 

New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation 

Exemptions/Exclusions: NARMs 

The release of one Curie of radium-226 is given the same significance as 

the release of 0.1 Ci of radon-222. This does not seem logical since the 

radium will produce the equivalent of one Ci of radon over hundreds of years 

as compared to radon which will decay within 38 days to less than one-one 

thousandth of its original value. Also, the radon is an inert gas and by 

itself is not a long term problem (less than one day) if discharged to water 

or air. Radium on the other hand will deposit out of surface water and will 

settle out of air causing long term problems. 

The low value for radon may also mean that facilities might have to be 

surveyed for continuous releases of radon. Iron ore tailings and vent shafts 

on mines are examples of items that might be covered. 

It is recommended that all naturally occurring radioactivity RQs be 

re-evaluated on the basis of the ability to produce radon gas. Also it is 

recommended that only those facilities which specifically handle or store 

uranium, thorium, and radium for some useful purpose, past or present, be 

included. The intent should be to eliminate natural radioactivity as a 

"facility" except where man has concentrated uranium, thorium or radium in 

sufficient amounts and in a chemical form that represents a hazard. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Responses 1, 2, and 6" and "Specific RQs 

Response 5"] 

P-23 
P.27 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

25 

2 

Response Number: 

Greta J. Dicus, Director 

Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 

Arkansas Department of Health 

Exemptions/Exclusions: Sealed Sources 

We feel very strongly that the issue of sealed sources should be 

clarified. From the definition of "release" (part II.B., page 8174), it would 

appear that a lost source would not be considered a release -- yet a 200-curie 

Cobalt-60 source can be acutely life threatening, while some of the quantities 

listed in Appendix B would not be acutely life threatening. There would seem 

to be inconsistency between parts of the proposed rule again versus actual or 

perceived risk. 

Response: 

EPA wishes to clarify that a lost sealed source containing radionuclides 

in an amount equal to or above an RQ constitutes a release that must be 

reported to the National Response Center. The reporting requirements 

triggered by the release of an RQ are relevant if a hazardous substance is 

released into the environment. Under the CERCLA definition, radionuclides are 

released when they are exposed to the environment or when they are enclosed in 

barrels, containers, or other closed receptacles that are discarded, lost, or 

abandoned. Thus, if only the containers are exposed to the environment, but 

not the radionuclides that they contain, no report under CERCLA is necessary, 

unless those containers have been discarded or abandoned. If releases do not 

occur from shipping containers or other closed receptacles, and those 

containers or receptacles have not been discarded or abandoned, then the 

section 103 reporting requirements are inapplicable. 

P-24 
P.28 

Commenter Number: 3 Response Number: 1 

Page: 3-4 

Commenter Name: D.L. Farrar 

Nuclear Licensing Director 

Commonwealth Edison 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

EPA has determined that releases in compliance with licenses and permits 

issued by Agreement States are federally permitted releases. Edison agrees 

with EPA's conclusion, but not with its reasoning. EPA believes that an 

Agreement State regulates radiation-related activities by virtue of the NRC's 

relinquishment of authority to the Agreement State. This theory would make an 

Agreement State a delegee of the NRC's. This is incorrect. Agreement States 

regulate radiation-related activities by the exercise of their own police 

powers; police powers which are allowed to come into play only after the NRC, 

through its agreement with an Agreement State, recedes from its plenary 

authority under the pre-emption provided by the Atomic Energy Act. Thus, an 

Agreement State is not a delegee of the NRC, but, instead exercises its own 

independent authority. However, because an Agreement State can exercise its 

authority only by virtue of an Agreement which the Atomic Energy Act lets the 

NRC enter into, the state's exercise of authority can be considered to be 

"pursuant" to the Atomic Energy Act for the purposes of CERCLA. 

EPA would not consider releases to be "federally permitted" if the 

releases come from facilities not subject to specific NRC licensing 

requirements. EPA describes such facilities as "exempt" from NRC regulation. 

This is incorrect. Those facilities have been granted general licenses by the 

NRC. They are not exempt from NRC regulation. Accordingly, any releases from 

these facilities must be federally permitted and, thus, not subject to 

CERCLA's reporting requirements. 

Response: 

EPA's use of the word "relinquished", when referring to how states may 

obtain the authority to regulate radiation-related activities through an 

agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, does not mean to imply that 

an Agreement State was therefore a delegee of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. EPA agrees that Agreement States are exercising their police 

power after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has receded from its plenary 

authority under the pre-emption provided by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). 

Also, EPA wishes to clarify that only certain radionuclide releases from 

Agreement State licensees are considered federally permitted. Specifically, 

any release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material in compliance 

with Agreement State licenses is federally permitted under section 101(10)(K) 

of CERCLA. Releases of naturally occurring and accelerator-produced 

radioactive material (NARM) to the air in compliance with applicable NESHAPs 

are considered federally permitted under section 101(10)(H). However, any 

NARM release from an Agreement State licensee to a medium other than air is 

P-25 
P.29 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

not federally permitted under CERCLA. Although Agreement States may regulate 

these NARM releases, their authority to regulate NARM is not federally derived 

because the only authority that can be relinquished to states by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission is the authority under the AEA to license source, 

byproduct, and special nuclear material. 

The facilities that EPA referred to as being specifically exempted from 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing, permitting, and regulatory 

requirements were facilities operated under Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

contracts; transport carriers of source, byproduct, or special nuclear 

material; those using "unimportant quantities" of source material; and certain 

production and utilization facilities operated by or for the Department of 

Defense and Department of Energy (DOE). A review of Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission regulations confirms that this statement is accurate. There are 

other facilities that are granted general licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, and thus any of their releases that are in compliance with the 

regulations issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not be 

reportable under CERCLA. However, the facilities exempted from Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission regulations are separate from facilities granted general 

licenses, and releases from the former that equal or exceed an RQ would be 

subject to CERCLA reporting requirements, with the few exceptions noted below. 

To the extent releases of source, byproduct, and special nuclear 

material are in accordance with licenses, permits, orders, or regulations 

issued under the AEA through provisions not administered by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission or its Agreement States, they also would be considered 

federally permitted releases. For example, DOE governs its radiation 

protection activities under the AEA by a series of internal orders. When such 

orders are issued under DOE's AEA authority and releases of source, byproduct, 

or special nuclear material are in compliance with the applicable order(s), 

these releases are federally permitted under section 101(10)(K). The 

Department of Defense issues regulations under the AEA governing weapons and 

reactors within its jurisdiction and EPA has issued regulations under the AEA 

for certain operations involving radioactive material (e.g., 40 CFR Parts 190, 

191, and 192); releases of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material in 

compliance with these regulations are also federally permitted under section 

101(10)(K). Any release that is an RQ or more above any of these federally 

permitted levels, however, would be subject to the CERCLA notification 

requirements. 

More detailed discussion on this issue is presented in a NPRM on 

Federally Permitted Releases (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988). 

P-26 
P.30 

Commenter Number: 4 Response Number: 2 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: B.H. Webster, Manager 

Radiological and Chemical Support 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

It is our understanding that commercial nuclear reactors are exempt from 

the reporting, requirements because they are "federally permitted releases" 

covered under plant-specific technical specifications. 

Response: 

Releases from a commercial nuclear reactor exceeding the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission's release limits by an RQ or more must be reported to 

the National Response Center under CERCLA; otherwise, releases from these 

facilities do not need to be reported. Releases that exceed the Commission's 

limits, but that are less than an RQ above those limits, are not federally 

permitted releases but do not need to be reported to the National Response 

Center. In addition to this federally permitted release exemption, releases 

of nuclear material from a nuclear incident subject to the requirements (under 

section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 

financial protection are excluded from the CERCLA definition of releases by 

CERCLA section 101(22)(C). Section ll(q) of the Atomic Energy Act states: 

The term "nuclear incident" means any occurrence, 

including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the 

United States, causing within or outside the United States, 

bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or 

damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out 

of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or 

other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or 

byproduct material .... 

Therefore, EPA does not have the legal authority to require reports of these 

particular releases. Thus, releases from nuclear incidents subject to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's financial protection requirements under 

section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act would not have to be reported to the 

National Response Center, regardless of the quantity released. 

P-27 
P.31 

Commenter Number: 13 Response Number: 3 

Page: 2-3 

Commenter Name: Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

The rule should be clarified to note the existence of particular 

situations which are not covered by the specific exclusions from the 

definition of release in CERCLA and the three types of statutory exemptions 

from the notification requirements set forth, supra. It is our position that, 

as discussed below, these exemptions cover substantially all possible 

reporting situations for operators of nuclear power plants. This should be 

explicitly recognized in the rule. 

The release of effluents from nuclear power plants aire controlled by 

comprehensive Technical Specifications issued by the NRC, in conjunction with 

the issuance of an operating license, which, in turn are developed in 

conformance with, inter alia. 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against 

Radiation. Any releases within Technical Specification limits are, by 

definition, federally permitted and would fall within the statutory exemption 

from notification requirements for releases of hazardous substances. 

Moreover, any release in excess of the permitted values should be 

recognized as a nuclear incident raising the potential for liability under 

section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act. Such a release would thereby fall 

within specific exclusion from the definition of release in CERCLA section 

101(22). Such interpretation would be consistent with the generally 

recognized interpretation as to the scope and coverage of the NRC financial 

protection requirements under section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA").* 

Response: 

[See "Federally Permitted Releases - Response 2", with the following 

additional text] 

Also, EPA wishes to clarify that any releases from a nuclear power plant 

in excess of permitted levels does not automatically meet the definition of a 

"nuclear incident." As defined in section 11(q) of the Atomic Energy Act, a 

Arguably, one can hypothesize a release at a nuclear power plant 

exceeding technical specification limits which affects locations beyond the 

protected area but not offsite areas. Theoretically, such a release might not 

fall within the coverage of section 170 of the AEA. Nevertheless, this 

situation is improbable and would, as discussed infra. be reported to the NRC 

Operations Center. 

P-28 
P.32 

Response Number: 3 (continued) 

nuclear incident causes "bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss 

of or damage to property, or loss of use of property." Clearly, some releases 

above the Nuclear Regulatory Commission limits will cause adverse effects 

short of those defined for a nuclear incident. Accordingly, any release at 

least an RQ above permitted levels but short of a nuclear incident will be 

reportable under CERCLA. 

P-29 
P.33 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 4 

Page: 4/5 

Commenter Name: John J. Kearney, Jr. 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases/Continuous Releases 

Comment: 

Finally, we note that the proposed rules are not intended to define the 

nature and scope of the CERCLA exemptions for federally permitted releases and 

continuous releases. These issues will be resolved in future rulemaking 

proceedings. Pending the outcome of those rulemakings, we interpret the 

federally permitted release exemption as applying to the release of 

radionuclides that are subject to particulate matter regulation under the 

Clean Air Act. 

The reportable quantity regulations for radionuclides will not typically 

be applicable to releases from electric utility power plants. For example, 

for the reasons discussed below, airborne radionuclide releases from fossil 

fuel combustion sources that are subject to particulate matter regulation 

under the Clean Air Act are "federally permitted releases" and are exempt from 

the CERCLA notification requirements. Moreover, where such releases are not 

subject to a Clean Air Act control regulation, they would be governed by the 

reduced reporting requirements of the "continuous release" provisions of 

section 103(f) of CERCLA. 

Response: 

The definition of "federally permitted releases" under CERCLA section 

101(10) is addressed in a separate Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 27268, 

July 19, 1988). EPA agrees that where such releases are not subject to a 

Clean Air Act (CAA) control regulation, or exceed permitted levels by an RQ or 

more, the facility owner or operator could seek to comply with the reduced 

reporting requirements of the continuous release provisions of CERCLA section 

103(f)(2). EPA has published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, 

April 19, 1988) detailing the reduced reporting requirements for continuous 

releases. 

CERCLA section 101(10)(H) defines federally permitted releases to 

include "any emission into the air subject to a permit or control regulation 

under ... section 112 ... of the Clean Air Act." Pursuant to section 112 of 

the CAA, EPA has issued final standards for radionuclide emissions to the air 

as part of the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 

(NESHAPs). These standards currently apply to the following source 

categories: (1) Department of Energy (DOE) facilities; (2) Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission-licensed facilities and non-DOE federal facilities (including 

facilities licensed by Agreement States); (3) elemental phosphorus plants; (4) 

underground uranium mines; and (5) licensed uranium mill tailings. Any 

release of a radionuclide to the air from these sources, if the release is in 

compliance with NESHAPs, is "federally permitted" under section 101(10)(H) and 

P-30 
P.34 

• ^ 

Response Number: 4 (continued) 

thus exempt from CERCLA reporting. It is important to clarify that existing 

NESHAPs apply to the emission of only certain (not all) radionuclides. 

Specifically, the NESHAPs presently do not apply to emissions of radon-220, 

radon-222, and the respective decay products from the first two source 

categories noted above; and apply to only emissions of polonium-210 from 

elemental phosphorus plants.1 An airborne release of radionuclides not 

covered under NESHAPs is not considered federally permitted under section 

101(10)(H). Furthermore, several source categories presently are exempted 

from regulation under NESHAPs (e.g., low energy accelerators not operated by 

DOE,- coal-fired boilers, and mineral extraction industries). Radionuclide 

emissions from these facilities exempted under NESHAPs also are not considered 

federally permitted under section 101(10)(H). This issue may be relevant to 

the Agency's NPRM on federally-permitted releases. 

The Agency currently is revising the radionuclide NESHAPs pursuant to a 

voluntary remand. Until these new standards are finalized, the existing 

radionuclide NESHAPs as described above should be used in determining whether 

airborne emissions are federally permitted under CERCLA section 101(10)(H). 

1 The NESHAPs for underground uranium mines and licensed uranium mill 

tailings do not specify emission limits, but rather establish work practices 

to limit the emission of radon-222 from those types of facilities. 

P-31 
P.35 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 5 

Page: 12/39-40 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Federally Permitted/Continuous Releases 

Comment: 

EPA should expressly confirm that uniform emissions of radon and other 

naturally occurring radionuclides from coal ash sites and similar 

large-acreage facilities are exempt from CERCLA section 103 reporting under 

the "continuous" release exemption of CERCLA section 103(f). As discussed 

below, such releases are precisely the type of release that the continuous 

release exemption is intended to cover. 

CERCLA provides that continuous releases "only need to be reported 

annually or when there is a statistically significant increase in the quantity 

of the hazardous substance released. The Agency has decided to defer 

rulemaking on the continuous release exemption. However, we urge EPA, when it 

addresses this matter in that rulemaking, to recognize that radionuclide 

emissions from a fossil fuel fired power plant and from any ash storage or 

disposal site are within the scope of the continuous release provisions since 

those emissions occur on an uninterrupted basis and are "stable in quantity 

and rate." Thus, even if radionuclide releases to the ambient air from 

utility power plants were not federally permitted releases and therefore 

exempt from CERCLA's reporting requirements, they would be subject only to the 

limited reporting requirements applicable to "continuous" releases under 

section 103(f) of CERCLA. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions -- Response 2" and "Federally Permitted Releases -

Response 4," with the following additional text] 

It is important to note that the provisions of section 103(f)(2) of 

CERCLA do not exempt releases, but do provide for reduced reporting of 

hazardous substance releases equal to or exceeding an RQ that are "continuous" 

and "stable in quantity and rate." 

P-32 
P.36 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 6 

Page: 16-17 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

. Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

Nuclear power plants may release small quantities of radionuclides to 

the ambient air. These releases are composed of "source, byproduct, or 

special nuclear material" as defined by section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act. 

As the proposed rule recognizes, releases of these substances that result from 

a nuclear incident are specifically excluded from CERCLA's definition of 

"release," and therefore are exempt from the reporting requirements. Other 

releases of these substances are exempt from CERCLA reporting requirements as 

"federally permitted" releases under CERCLA section 101(10)(K). 

As it did in the proposed rule, EPA should confirm in the final rule the 

exempt status of these releases. As EPA recognizes, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) "controls the handling of source, byproduct, and special 

nuclear materials through an extensive licensing and regulatory program," 

including "several different requirements for responsible parties to report 

releases of radionuclides immediately." Indeed, imposition of CERCLA 

reporting on nuclear plants would be inconsistent with the NRC/EPA Memorandum 

of Understanding on Regulation of Radionuclide Emissions, which places primary 

responsibility for enforcing radionuclide emission standards from nuclear 

plants with the NRC. Furthermore, since NRC regulations require the reporting 

of radionuclide releases based on off-site dose effects (measured in 

millirem), application of the proposed reportable quantities to licensed 

nuclear power plants could result in imposition of two different reporting 

requirements, using two different and potentially conflicting quantity 

criteria. For the foregoing reasons, EPA should give full effect to the 

exemptions for radionuclide releases from nuclear power plants set forth in 

sections 101(22)(C) and 101(10)(K) of CERCLA. 

Response: 

EPA restates in the final rule the applicability of the reporting 

exemptions for the types of releases described in CERCLA sections 101(22)(C) 

and 101(10)(K). However, releases from nuclear power plants not covered by 

these exemptions or exceeding a Nuclear Regulatory Commission license level by 

an RQ or more (but short of a "nuclear incident") must be reported immediately 

under CERCLA to the National Response Center. The statutory language of 

CERCLA (section 103(a)) requires that a facility's owner or operator 

immediately report releases from the facility that equal or exceed an RQ to 

the National Response Center. The statute provides no exceptions for 

situations in which other government agencies also must be informed of 

releases pursuant to other statutes' or regulations' directives. Notification 

requirements under CERCLA, however, are not intended to supercede or supplant 

notification to State and local authorities in the event of a release. CERCLA 

imposes upon the facility owner or operator the responsibility to notify 

P-33 
P.37 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

directly the National Response Center and imposes upon the National Response 

Center the responsibility to convey this notification to other appropriate 

government agencies. Indirect reporting by the facility owner or operator 

through another government agency to the National Response Center does not 

satisfy the statutory requirement. 

Because of this statutory requirement, EPA does not have the flexibility 

to prevent duplicative reporting. While EPA understands that some additional 

burden would be imposed upon facility owners and operators who would need to 

file reports with more than one government agency, one purpose of alerting the 

National Response Center is to ensure a coordinated federal, state, and local 

response to the release. Additionally, as noted in the Economic Impact 

Analysis accompanying this rule, EPA expects that only 59 additional episodic 

release notifications will result annually from the RQ adjustments. Thus, the 

incidence of duplicative reporting due to this rule is relatively small. 

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to which the 

commenter refers is inapplicable to regulatory efforts undertaken pursuant to 

CERCLA. The MOU was developed to coordinate EPA regulation of airborne 

radionuclide emissions under the Clean Air Act with Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission regulation of its nuclear-licensees. Nothing in the MOU pertains 

to coordinating EPA actions under CERCLA, which had not even been enacted at 

the time of the MOU's signing, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

efforts. 

P-34 
P.38 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 7 

Page: 30/39 

Comment Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

In short, particulate matter emissions -- including emissions of 

radionuclides that occur as components of particulate matter -- from power 

plants are, as EPA has recognized, subject to extensive regulatory controls 

under the Clean Air Act. In its radionuclide proceeding under section 112 of 

the Act, EPA has recognized that particulate matter emission control programs 

under sections 108-110 and section 111 of the Act result in control of trace 

emissions that occur as particulate matter. The CERCLA section 101(10)(H) 

exemption for emissions subject to "control regulation" under the Clean Air 

Act must be read against this background. [See original comment pp. 19-38 for 

supporting arguments.] 

CERCLA's language and its legislative history make clear that 

atmospheric emissions of particulate matter from burning fossil fuels at 

stationary sources, including emissions of radionuclide particles and 

particles containing other hazardous substances, are exempt from CERCLA's 

notification requirements where the particulate matter emissions are subject 

to Clean Air Act control regulation. Public policy considerations --

including the absence of any factual basis for applying CERCLA notification 

requirements to particulate matter constituents -- support the conclusion that 

radionuclide emissions from fossil fuel combustion are exempt from the 

requirements of CERCLA. 

Response: 

The issue of whether airborne radionuclide releases from fossil fuel 

combustion sources that are subject to particulate matter regulation under the 

Clean Air Act are federally permitted releases, and thus are exempt from the 

CERCLA reporting requirements as long as the releases do not exceed the 

permitted level by an RQ or more, is addressed in a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking on federally permitted releases (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988). 

P-35 
P.39 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

1 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Federally Permitted Releases 

Response Number: 8 

Section II. The handling of federally permitted releases needs to be 

clarified in this rulemaking. A definition of what constitutes "continuous 

and gradual" is needed. 

Response: 

While the term "gradual" appears nowhere in the rule or in CERCLA 

concerning continuous releases, all of the relevant language and issues 

regarding continuous and federally permitted releases will be dealt with in 

future rulemakings on these subjects. EPA has published a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, April 19, 1988) detailing the reduced reporting 

requirements for continuous releases, and has published another Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988) defining federally permitted 

releases. 

P-36 
P.40 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

16 

1 

D.W. Edwards 

Director of Industry Affairs 

Yankee Atomic Electric Company 

Federally Permitted Releases 

Response Number: 

Based on our evaluation of the federal exemptions cited in the EPA 

notice, we conclude that licensees of nuclear power plants would be excluded 

from the proposed reporting requirements except in the case of releases that 

exceed existing, federally imposed limits by one reportable quantity. Such 

reporting is unnecessarily duplicative to existing dual reporting 

requirements. 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority 

Response 2"] 

Response 5" and "Federally Permitted Releases 

P-37 
P.41 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

19 

2 

Response Number: 10 

Joel D. Patterson, Manager 

Environmental Affairs 

Middle South Utilities Systems Services, Inc. 

Federally Permitted Releases 

The MSU System requests a clarification in the definition of federally 

permitted releases. Where notification requirements currently exist in other 

regulations governing exceedances of allowable emissions, we request that the 

definition state that those emissions are exempted from CERCLA notification 

requirements. 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority - Response 5", with the following additional 

text] 

In addition, the definition of "federally permitted releases" under 

CERCLA section 101(10) is addressed in a recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988). The commenter is encouraged to use that 

rulemaking to express its preferences on this subject. 

P-38 
P.42 

Commenter Number: 21 Response Number: 11 

Page: 2/6 

Commenter Name: J.F. McKenzie, Director 

Environmental Services Department 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

PG&E also wishes to emphasize its support for the EEI argument for the 

adoption of clarifying language that radionuclide releases from federally 

permitted nuclear power plants are exempt from these reporting requirements. 

In developing definitions of federally permitted releases, continuous 

releases, and statistically significant increases, EPA should ensure that 

fossil fueled powerplants -- operating in full accordance with all applicable 

Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan provisions -- would be exempt from 

SARA reportable quantity reports, even if the amount of fuel use, or the 

proportion of fuels used, varied. 

PG&E operates a number of powerplants which are permitted by the local 

air pollution control districts, in full accord with all applicable, federally 

approved, Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan provisions, to operate on 

either natural gas or low sulfur fuel. During 1970-1985, fuel use by these 

plants averaged 76.2 percent natural gas and 23.8 percent low sulfur fuel oil. 

During the same period, the average annual capacity factor for all of these 

plants was 44.2 percent. However, during this period, the amount of oil fuel 

being utilized by each plant frequently varied. Since heavy metals are 

present in fuel oils but not in natural gas, emission rates will vary with the 

amount of such fuels consumed. 

Such variations could easily be noted through annual reports of total 

fuel consumption. But there would be no real benefit in requiring reports 

every time enough fuel oil is consumed to cause the emission of a reportable 

quantity, if the emissions had always been within permitted levels. 

PG&E recognizes that EPA has stated that the definitions of federally 

permitted releases, continuous releases, and statistically significant 

variations will be the subject of a future rulemaking. This comment is merely 

intended to bring this concern to your attention, and to expand upon similar 

comments submitted by EEI, et al., on behalf of us and others. More detailed 

comments will be submitted after specific definitions are proposed. 

P-39 
P.43 

Response Number: 11 (continued) 

Response: 

EPA has stated in its rule, and restates here, that a release of a 

quantity of radionuclides that does not exceed federally permitted levels by 

an RQ or more does not have to be reported under CERCLA. Also, all of the 

relevant language and issues regarding continuous and federally permitted 

releases will be dealt with in future rulemakings on these subjects. EPA has 

published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, April 19, 1988) 

detailing the reduced reporting requirements for continuous releases and has 

published another Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988) 

defining federally permitted releases. 

P-40 
P.44 

Commenter Number: 22 Response Number: 12 

Page: 2/3 

Commenter Name: G.C. Sorenson, Manager 

Regulatory Programs 

Washington Public Power Supply System 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

The Supply System believes it is the intent of Congress in section 

101(22) of CERCLA, and the intent of EPA in the proposed rule, to exclude 

NRC-licensed nuclear power plants such as WNP-2 from the reporting 

requirement. NRC independently requires that releases from these facilities 

be immediately reported to the NRC and other offsite authorities, and requires 

detailed licensee, State and local government emergency response plans.1 

However, the language of the proposed rule may not achieve this 

objective. While WNP-2 is subject to the financial protection requirements of 

section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act, all releases of radionuclides in excess 

of the RQ may not be from a "nuclear incident" as that term is defined in the 

Act. Section ll(q) of the Atomic Energy Act states: 

The term "nuclear incident" means any occurrence, 

including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the 

United States, causing within or outside the United States, 

bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or 

damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out 

of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or 

other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or 

byproduct material ... 

Not all abnormal releases of radionuclides from a power plant will cause 

bodily injury, loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property. An 

off-normal release from a power plant far from a populated area, or one in 

which the release is carried by the wind away from persons or property, may 

not cause injury or damage and therefore may not constitute a "nuclear 

incident" as that term is defined. Reading the proposed regulation literally, 

an NRC licensee would be required to report such a release to the National 

Response Center even though the release would almost certainly be reportable 

to the NRC under the conditions of the license and the requirements of 10 CFR 

50.72. On the other hand, a more serious release that would rise to the level 

of a "nuclear incident" would, as Congress clearly intended, be excluded from 

1 See, for example, the emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 

section 50.72 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV.D.3. NRC regulations 

also require other periodic non-emergency effluents reports. See, for 

example, 10 CFR section 50.36a and Part 50, Appendix I, section IV.A. 

Finally, a licensee's technical specifications (part of the NRC license) may 

require that offsite radiation doses from normal plant operation be reported 

annually, in order to demonstrate compliance with both Appendix I and 40 CFR 

Part 190. 

P-41 
P.45 

Response Number: 12 (continued) 

the EPA reporting requirement. Given the allocation of responsibilities for 

radiological health and safety among federal agencies, we do not believe 

Congress intended to require reporting to EPA of lesser releases (while 

excluding more significant releases). Therefore, EPA should redefine the 

scope of the CERCLA exclusion in terms of any release from the nuclear power 

plant subject to NRC reporting requirements. 

In summary, because significant releases from nuclear power plants, 

whether or not they constitute "nuclear incidents," must be reported to the 

NRC, we believe that EPA should draft its final rule implementing this aspect 

of CERCLA to expressly exclude from the reporting requirement all releases 

from nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC under either section 103 or 

section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act. 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority - Response 5", with the following additional text] 

As noted by the commenter, under CERCLA section 101(22)(C), a release as 

defined by CERCIA excludes releases of source, byproduct, or special nuclear 

material from a nuclear incident, if the releases are subject to the financial 

protection requirements of section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, 

EPA does not have the legal authority to require reports of these particular 

releases. Thus, such releases would not have to be reported to the National 

Response Center, regardless of the quantity released. On the other hand, 

releases of radionuclides from nuclear power plants that do not constitute 

nuclear incidents would be subject to CERCLA notification requirements, if the 

release is an RQ or more above federally permitted levels. Because the 

magnitude of the risk from such releases is not known, EPA does not believe 

that they should be exempted under a broad exemption of all releases from 

nuclear power plants licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

P-42 
P.46 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

23 

3 

Response Number: 13 

C O . Woody 

Group Vice President 

Nuclear Energy 

Florida Power and Light Company 

Federally Permitted Releases 

Due to the dual jurisdiction of EPA and NRC over radioactive materials, 

a Memorandum of Understanding on the Regulation of Radionuclide Emissions was 

signed by EPA and the NRC (45 Federal Register 72980, November 3, 1980). This 

document states that the NRC has the primary responsibility for enforcing 

radionuclide emission standards at nuclear reactors. Requiring nuclear plant 

release notifications could be considered to be contrary to the intent of this 

agreement. 

In conclusion, FPL believes that EPA should clarify under the specific 

exclusions or statutory exemptions that licensed commercial nuclear reactors 

are exempt from the provisions of Part 302 notification for radionuclides. 

Response: 

[See "CERCLA Authority - Response 5", with the following additional text] 

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to which the 

commenter refers is inapplicable to regulatory efforts undertaken pursuant to 

CERCLA. The MOU was developed to coordinate EPA regulation of airborne 

radionuclide emissions under the Clean Air Act with Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission regulation of its nuclear licensees. Nothing in the MOU pertains 

to coordinating EPA actions under CERCLA, which had not even been enacted at 

the time of the MOU's signing, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

efforts. 

P-43 
P.47 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 14 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Federally Permitted Releases 

Comment: 

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) includes a determination that 

releases of radioactivity from DOE facilities in compliance with DOE Orders 

issued under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act would be considered 

federally permitted releases. Also, "any radionuclide release subject to a 

specific emission limitation or control regulation established under section 

112 of the Clean Air Act [e.g., 40 CFR 61, Subpart H] would be exempt as 

federally permitted, if the release were [sic] in compliance with the 

applicable Clean Air Act Limit." The Office of Environmental Guidance and 

Compliance, DOE, supports these determinations of federally permitted 

releases. DOE is also very interested in "EPA plans to clarify the provisions 

of CERCLA section 101(10) in a future rulemaking" (page 8174) regarding 

federally permitted releases of radioactive material, as well as "Agency plans 

to clarify the language and the notification requirements for continuous 

releases in a future rulemaking" (page 8175). These important related 

rulemaking activities should be considered concurrently with the NPRM on 

reportable quantities (RQs) for radionuclides. Clarification is also needed 

regarding whether DOE facilities which handle source, byproduct, or special 

nuclear material are exempt from these reporting requirements. 

Response: 

EPA acknowledges the commenter's support for EPA's determinations of 

federally permitted releases and the commenter's interest in future 

rulemakings on federally permitted and continuous releases. However, EPA 

wishes to clarify that releases of naturally occurring and acceleratorproduced radioactive material (NARM) from Department of Energy (DOE) 

facilities are not considered federally permitted under CERCLA unless the NARM 

releases are to the air and in compliance with the applicable National 

Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs). The Atomic Energy 

Act gives DOE broad authority to control its radiation-related activities and 

to protect public health and safety and the environment. This authority 

applies to activities involving NARM, as well as activities involving source, 

byproduct, and special nuclear material. However, because section 101(10)(K) 

refers only to releases of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material, 

the only basis for exempting DOE's NARM releases from CERCLA's reporting and 

liability provisions is section 101(10)(H), which is limited to only airborne 

emissions in compliance with the regulations pursuant to the Clean Air Act. 

While the preparation for these other rulemakings is proceeding as 

expeditiously as possible, given their complexity and the number of issues 

P-44 
P.48 

Response Number: 14 (continued) 

that they involve, the importance of adjusting the RQs for radionuclides did 

not enable EPA to proceed with this rulemaking concurrently with the federally 

permitted and continuous release rulemakings. EPA has published a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, April 19, 1988) detailing the reduced 

reporting requirements for continuous releases and has published another 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988) on federally 

permitted releases. 

P-45 
P.49 

Commenter Number: 4 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: B.H. Webster, Manager 

Radiological and Chemical Support 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

We are uncertain about reporting requirements to EPA in the unlikely 

event a release should exceed the "federally permitted releases" covered by 

technical specifications. In any event, exceeding a technical specification 

limit requires a report be made to the NRC as set forth in 10 CFR 50.72, 

"Immediate Notifications Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Plants." We 

do not believe that adding another reporting requirement is appropriate. 

Response: 

The statutory language of CERCLA (section 103(a)) requires that a 

facility's owner or operator immediately report to the National Response 

Center releases from the facility that equal or exceed an RQ. The statute 

provides no exceptions for situations in which other government agencies also 

must be informed of releases pursuant to the directives of other statutes 

or regulations. CERCLA imposes upon the facility owner or operator the 

responsibility to directly notify the National Response Center and imposes 

upon the National Response Center the responsibility to convey this 

notification to other appropriate government agencies. Indirect reporting by 

the facility owner or operator through another government agency to the 

National Response Center does not satisfy this statutory requirement. Because 

of this statutory requirement, EPA does not have the flexibility to prevent 

duplicative reporting. 

It is important to clarify that CERCLA notification requirements are not 

intended to supercede or supplant notification to State and local authorities 

in the event of a release. These notifications may occur as they have in the 

past; the requirement to report immediately to the National Response Center 

may be interpreted on a case-by-case basis, depending on the exigencies of the 

situation. 

Additionally, as noted in the Economic Impact Analysis accompanying this 

rule, EPA expects that only 59 additional episodic release notifications will 

result annually from the RQ adjustments. Thus, the incidence of duplicative 

reporting due to this rule is relatively small. Furthermore, facilities that 

are operating under licenses granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

would not have to report releases to the National Response Center that are in 

compliance with their licenses. Such releases are subject to the federally 

permitted release exemption described in CERCLA sections 103(a) and (b) and 

101(10)(K). Only releases of an RQ or more above these federally permitted 

levels must be reported to the National Response Center. 

EPA understands that some additional burden would be imposed upon 

facility owners and operators who would need to report to more than one 

P-46 
P.50 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

government agency. However, one purpose of alerting the National Response 

Center is to ensure a coordinated federal, state, and local response to the 

release. Generally, radiological response activities are outlined in the 

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). EPA acknowledges that a 

coordinated federal, state, and local response to a radiological emergency is 

extremely important. However, any changes or modifications in response 

responsibilities are addressed more appropriately through the FRERP and each 

agency's individual response plan, rather than through this RQ adjustment 

rulemaking. This rulemaking only concerns what radionuclide releases need to 

be reported to the National Response Center, not what, if any, response may 

result from the notification. 

P-47 
P.51 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Response Number: 

W.B. Smalley, Sr. 

Program Manager, Environmental Protection 

General Electric 

Duplicative Reporting 

We have a concern with the potential for confusion as to "who is in 

charge" that could inadvertently occur among Federal agencies as a result of 

the dual reporting requirements imposed by the proposed rule. 

The processing of special nuclear materials, specifically uranium, at 

this fuel cycle facility is conducted under a license granted by the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Release information is already reported to 

them in accordance with applicable regulations with timing requirements 

ranging from semi-annually on through various steps to include that of 

immediate notification. 

We would suggest that the potential for inadvertent confusion could be 

avoided by doing one of the following: 

(1) Add a fifth definition to the types of releases 

specifically excluded from the definition of release 

in CERCLA section 101(22) as follows: 

(5) Releases of source, byproduct, or special 

nuclear material have been reported to a Federal 

Agency or Commission in accordance with applicable 

regulations or licenses." 

(2) Develop a memorandum of understanding between 

potentially involved agencies that clearly specifies 

"who will be in charge" for each of the conceivable 

categories of incidents. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1", with the following additional text; 

Additionally, because the commenter's suggested exemption for releases 

that have already been reported to a federal agency involves a change in the 

CERCLA statute, rather than in regulations, only Congress, and not EPA, has 

the authority to make such a change. 

P-4£ 
P.52 

Commenter Number: 13 Response Number: 3 

Page: 1/3-4 

Commenter Name: Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor and Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

The proposed rule, as applied to nuclear power plants, requires 

clarification in order to provide guidance to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

("NRC") nuclear power plant licensees in fulfilling their reporting 

requirements. In addition, requiring immediate notification to EPA which is 

duplicative to that provided by direct dedicated telephone communication to 

the NRC and cognizant State and local authorities may lead to delays in 

responding and thus be contrary to the intent of EPA's legislative authority, 

applicable statutes, regulations and existing planning efforts, and possibly 

detrimental to the public health and safety. Comments regarding specific 

provisions of the proposed rule are provided. 

Any release in excess of permitted values would be required to be 

immediately reported to the NRC pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR section 

50.72 as a matter which would involve the declaration of an emergency class 

specified in the licensee's approved emergency plan. Inasmuch as the NRC 

would be notified of any such release, the NRC Operations Center could notify 

EPA and thus fulfill the NRC reporting requirements of CERCLA. The NRC 

Operations Center is required to be kept currently informed of the progress 

and response to any release and is the logical interface with the nuclear 

power plant licensee and the logical conduit for reports made to the EPA. It 

is manned on a 24-hour basis and it has on hand or on call within a short time 

specific expertise relating to releases from a nuclear power station. 

The NRC emergency notification requirements require that a licensee have 

the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies 

within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. (See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 

E, IV, section D.3). This requirement has been recognized as extremely 

difficult to achieve because of the number of agencies to be notified and the 

extent of the information which is required to be conveyed. An additional 

requirement that the EPA be notified immediately would lengthen the time 

necessary for state and local officials to respond to the emergency and thus 

be contrary to the regulations implementing the AEA and CERCLA. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1" and "Federally Permitted Releases -

Response 3" with the following additional text.] 

Additionally, while CERCLA section 103(a) requires "immediate" 

notification to the National Response Center, EPA has stated in the preamble 

to the final radionuclide RQ rule that the requirement to report immediately 

may be interpreted on a case-by-case basis, depending on the exigencies of the 

situation. 

P-49 
P.53 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

13 

5 

Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Duplicative Reporting 

Response Number: 

EPA should clarify its proposed regulations so as not to require direct 

EPA notification by reactor licensees of any releases. Because of the 

comprehensive notification and response requirements which are in place for 

nuclear reactors, the intent of the statute would still be fulfilled while 

streamlining the emergency response and meeting the requirements of other 

applicable statutes, regulations, and plans. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1", with the following additional text] 

Additionally, nuclear reactor licensees should understand that, under 

CERCLA section 101(22)(C), a release as defined by CERCLA excludes releases of 

source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, if the 

releases are subject to the financial protection requirements of section 170 

of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, EPA does not have the legal authority to 

require reports of these particular releases. Thus, such releases would not 

have to be reported to the National Response Center, regardless of the 

quantity released. 

P-50 
P.54 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

16 

1-2 

D.W. Edwards 

Director of Industry Affairs 

Yankee Atomic Electric Company 

Duplicative Reporting 

Response Number: 

NRC already requires reporting of radionuclide releases at lower, more 

conservative levels (specific in 10 CFR Part 20) so that appropriate actions 

can be taken to preclude additional releases or releases of higher activity. 

Furthermore, based on NRC's concept of defense in depth, each licensee is also 

required to maintain an NRC/FEMA-approved emergency preparedness and planning 

program. As part of such a program, licensees immediately notify certain 

Federal, State, and local agencies of all radionuclide releases significant 

enough that release limits specified in emergency action levels have been 

reached. These additional reporting requirements are based on EPA 

520/1-75-001, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for 

Nuclear Incidents." The EPA limits recommended in this manual are 

sufficiently conservative to ensure that the agencies which need to take 

action as a result of such releases are provided enough time to complete those 

actions necessary to ensure the health and safety of the public and 

environment. 

In conclusion, we urge EPA to exempt commercial nuclear power plant 

licensees from the proposed reporting requirements. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 4"] 

P-51 
P.55 

Commenter Number: 18 Response Number: 6 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: J.R. Thorpe, Director 

Licensing and Regulatory Affairs 

GPU Nuclear 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

GPU Nuclear Corporation understands the underlying purpose of the 

proposed rule, i.e., reporting of radionuclide emissions in excess of 

established standards. However, we feel this purpose is served for Nuclear 

Production and Utilization Facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 by the 

NRC's Emergency Planning regulations. Therefore, the proposed rule should 

explicitly state that compliance with NRC Emergency Planning regulations 

constitutes compliance with the proposed notification requirements. Such a 

statement would be consistent with the NRC/EPA Memorandum of Understanding on 

Regulation of Radionuclides Emissions dated November 3, 1980, which states, in 

part, that: 

NRC, using its own regulatory program and statutory and 

regulatory authorities, shall have the primary role in 

implementing and enforcing EPA's Clean Air Act radionuclide 

standards for sources and facilities licensed by NRC. 

It should be noted that NRC guidance requires notification based on 

off-site dose effects rather than the quantity of a radionuclide release as 

proposed by the U.S. EPA. Thus, promulgation of the proposed rule would 

impose dual reporting requirements, using two (2) separate criteria. The 

resultant requirements would be cumbersome to administer and seemingly 

contradicts the intent of the NRC/EPA Memorandum of Understanding. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1", with the following additional text] 

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to which the 

commenter refers is inapplicable to regulatory efforts undertaken pursuant to 

CERCLA. The MOU was developed to coordinate EPA regulation of airborne 

radionuclide emissions under the Clean Air Act with Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission regulation of its nuclear licensees. Nothing in the MOU pertains 

to coordinating EPA actions under CERCLA, which had not even been enacted at 

the time of the MOU's signing, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

efforts. 

The Agency agrees that the reporting requirements under" CERCLA use 

different criteria than Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance to determine 

whether a release must be reported. EPA believes, however, that, aside from 

nuclear power plants, few other individuals and organizations that handle 

radionuclides have the capability to use site-specific data to calculate offP-52 
P.56 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

site dose effects. Additionally, because of the complexity of estimating 

doses, RQs in terms of a dose-equivalent would require a significant amount of 

judgment on the part of the releaser to determine when a release must be 

reported. The Agency believes that it is the government's proper role, and 

not that of a private party, to evaluate the release to determine whether 

government intervention is required. The Agency also believes that 

development of a special rule to cover releases from nuclear power plants 

would serve no useful purpose and would be more confusing and difficult to 

implement. Furthermore, unlike a dose-equivalent RQ, an RQ in curies could be 

estimated irrespective of the exposure circumstances surrounding the release 

and in a more timely manner. By establishing the adjusted RQs in units of 

curies, the Agency has minimized the number of assumptions that would be 

required to be made by releasers to determine if the release equals or exceeds 

an RQ. EPA believes that it will be assured of more timely reporting if the 

reporting trigger is unambiguous and not open to judgment. 

P-53 
P.57 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

19 

2 

Response Number: 

Joel D. Patterson, Manager 

Environmental Affairs 

Middle South Utilities System Services, Inc. 

Duplicative Reporting 

The MSU System believes that: 

The notification requirements already established in 

10 CFR 20 are adequately protective of human health and 

the environment to exempt these releases from the CERCLA 

reporting requirements. 

If a reporting limit has already been established 

under another regulation, that reporting limit should be 

the only reporting requirement for that release (i.e., 

it should be exempt from CERCIA reporting requirements). 

In summary, the MSU System believes that radioactive emissions from 

nuclear power plants are currently regulated in a manner protective of human 

health and the environment. Notification requirements have been established 

in the event that allowable emission limits are exceeded. We believe that the 

current notification requirements are adequate, and that additional 

notification requirements under CERCLA would not provide significantly greater 

protection for human health or the environment. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 4"] 

P-54 
P.58 

Commenter Number: 23 Response Number: 8 

Page: 2-3 

Commenter Name: CO . Woody 

Group Vice President 

Nuclear Energy 

Florida Power and Light Company 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

As stated in the introduction to the proposed rule, the main purpose of 

CERCLA notification requirements is to inform the appropriate government 

officials to hazardous substance releases that may require a federal response. 

This is clearly identified in the Federal Register notice, which states: 

EPA emphasizes that a hazardous substance release 

notification is merely a trigger for informing the 

government of a release so that the appropriate federal 

personnel can evaluate the need for a federal removal or 

remedial action and undertake any necessary action in a 

timely fashion. (52 Federal Register 8172.) 

While there may exist a need for this type of notification requirement 

for some licensees of nuclear materials, this is an unnecessary and redundant 

requirement for power reactor licensees. 

All U.S. nuclear power reactors must have an approved Emergency Response 

Plan in order to obtain an operating license (10 CFR 50.47) from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC). As described in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50, a 

reactor license's emergency plans must demonstrate the organization for coping 

with radiological emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency 

organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, 

training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. Each plant site 

must annually exercise its emergency plan for training purposes. 

Under its regulation, the NRC has designated four emergency classes to 

cover the entire spectrum of emergency conditions. Upon declaration of any of 

these four classes, there exists a requirement to rapidly notify local, state, 

and federal agencies of the emergency. Emergency plan initiating events 

involve both actual and potential releases of radioactive materials. 

If an accident does not meet the criteria for one of the four emergency 

classes, a reactor licensee may still be required to report a release to the 

NRC. The regulations (10 CFR 50.72(b)) require a reactor licensee to notify 

the NRC within one hour of any airborne or liquid effluent radioactive release 

that exceeds prescribed limits. 

Therefore, there currently exists a regulatory mechanism for the 

reporting of radioactive releases to the appropriate State, local and federal 

agencies. Nuclear reactor licensees are reporting unplanned radioactive 

releases to the NRC as required under their licenses. 

P-55 
P.59 

Response Number: 8 (continued) 

FPL believes that the objective of CERCLA notification for radionuclides 

by reactor licensees is being fully achieved through the Emergency Response 

Plan program required under NRC regulations. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 4"] 

P-56 
P.60 

Commenter Number: 23 Response Number: 9 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: CO . Woody 

Group Vice President 

Nuclear Energy 

Florida Power and Light Company 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

CERCLA specifically excludes the- reporting notification of releases 

subject to financial protection under the Atomic Energy Act. These types of 

releases are considered to have the potential for causing sufficient harm that 

liability claims may be generated. 

The rule is contrary to public safety since it ignores informing a 

federal agency of an incident that has a high likelihood of harming the 

public. Rather, the goal should be to report all unplanned releases. 

However, the proposed rule should be modified to exclude notification of 

all releases from nuclear power plants to the EPA. As explained above, there 

currently exists a regulatory mechanism for ensuring federal notification of 

all releases to one federal agency. Having all releases reported to the NRC 

ensures complete and timely notification. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1", with the following additional text] 

As noted by the commenter, under CERCLA section 101(22)(C), a release as 

defined by CERCLA excludes releases of source, byproduct, or special nuclear 

material from a nuclear incident, if the releases are subject to the financial 

protection requirements of section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, 

EPA does not have the legal authority to require reports of these particular 

releases. Thus, such releases would not have to be reported to the National 

Response Center, regardless of the quantity released. On the other hand, 

releases of radionuclides from nuclear power plants that do not constitute 

nuclear incidents would be subject to CERCLA notification requirements, if the 

release is an RQ or more above Federally permitted levels. Because the 

magnitude of the risk from such releases is not known, EPA does not believe 

that they should be exempted under a broad exemption of all releases from 

nuclear power plants licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

P-57 
P.61 

Commenter Number: 25 Response Number: 10 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: Greta J. Dicus, Director 

Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 

Arkansas Department of Health 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

My staff and I appreciate your letter of June 5, 1987 in which an 

explanation of the applicability of radionuclide RQ notification requirements 

to our licensees is provided. We understand that routine regulatory releases 

would not be reportable. However, the proposed rule strongly implies that 

accidental releases above regulatory limits would be reportable. If this 

interpretation is correct, it has definite impact upon our licensees who, 

since they are required to report to us as the cognizant radiation control 

authority, would have dual reporting requirements. Please clarify whether or 

not, under any circumstances, an incident involving accidental release of 

licensed material would result in the licensee having to notify both the 

Arkansas Department of Health and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

We also need to know whether or not it can be assumed that where our State 

regulations allow for certain releases which differ from the proposed rule, 

the EPA rule does not apply. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1", with the following additional text] 

CERCLA section 101(10) defines those releases that are federally 

permitted. For example, section 101(10)(H) stipulates that releases regulated 

or controlled under sections 111 and 112 of the Clean Air Act and under State 

Implementation Plans (and that are in compliance with those regulations and 

control limitations) are federally permitted. Any release of a radionuclide 

to the air in compliance with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous 

Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) is "federally permitted" under section 101(10)(H) and 

thus exempt from CERCLA reporting. Also, any release of source, byproduct, or 

special nuclear material from an Agreement State licensee in compliance with 

applicable limits is federally permitted under section 101(10)(K) and exempt 

from CERCLA reporting. However, any release from an Agreement State licensee 

that is an RQ or more above the release limits noted above is subject to 

CERCLA's reporting requirements and must be reported to the National Response 

Center. EPA recognizes that, in these situations, releasers will be required 

to report twice--once to the "cognizant radiation control authority" and once 

to the National Response Center (not to EPA as suggested in the comment). 

?-5i 
Commenter Number: 25 Response Number: 11 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: Greta J. Dicus, Director 

Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 

Arkansas Department of Health 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

The proposed rule states that a major purpose of the section 103(a) and 

(b) notification requirement is to alert the appropriate government officials 

to releases of hazardous substances that may require a federal response.... 

And further states that response activities are to be taken in accordance with 

the National Contingency Plan (NCP).... How does this relate to the Federal 

Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) insofar as releases of 

radionuclides are concerned? 

Response: 

The requirement that releases of an RQ or more of radionuclides must be 

reported to the National Response Center is consistent with the FRERP. The 

FRERP is concerned primarily with federal support to state and local 

governments for activities beyond the immediate site of peacetime radiological 

emergencies. However, as the FRERP itself notes, " [notwithstanding the 

primacy of the State for protecting public health and safety off site, some 

Federal agencies have statutory or other authorities for responding to certain 

situations affecting public health and safety without a State request. ... 

[the FRERP] provides a framework for coordinating Federal actions within these 

authorities; it does not create any new authorities." (49 FR 35898, September 

12,, 1984) One such controlling statutory authority is CERCLA, with its 

requirement for the reporting of releases to the National Response Center. 

Aside from the statutory requirement for such notification, the FRERP 

itself also expressly allows facility owners or operators to contact directly 

an appropriate federal agency, in this case the National Response Center, for 

assistance (49 FR 35899, September 12, 1984). The FRERP indicates that the 

federal agency contacted, however, should inform these other relevant agencies 

of the request for assistance and all of these agencies would then coordinate 

their activities to respond to the notification. Thus, CERCLA's requirement 

of the immediate reporting of releases to the National Response Center and the 

subsequent coordination of any necessary federal, state, and local response is 

consistent with the FRERP. 

Therefore, this rule has no direct bearing on the FRERP. The framework 

for coordinating federal actions established by the FRERP remains completely 

in place; the reports required by this rule simply will provide added 

information. This rulemaking only concerns what radionuclide releases need to 

be reported to the National Response Center, not what, if any, response may 

result from the notification. It is important to note that EPA has added 

language to the preamble of the final radionuclide RQ rule to help avoid 

conflicts with existing reporting requirements of the FRERP. The release of 

P-59 
P.63 

Response Number: 11 (continued) 

an RQ must be reported "immediately" according to CERCLA section 103(a), but 

the Agency recognizes that the time necessary to make such a report may 

prohibit timely notification in accordance with reporting requirements of the 

FRERP. Therefore, the final radionuclide RQ adjustment rule states that the 

requirement to report "immediately" may be interpreted on a case-by-case 

basis, depending on the exigencies of the situation. 

P-60 
P.64 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

25 

2 

Response Number: 12 

Greta J. Dicus, Director 

Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 

Arkansas Department of Health 

Issue: Duplicative Reporting 

Comment: 

Because releases of radioactive materials are already regulated and 

concentration limits have been established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and the Agreement States, it is difficult to understand why the EPA 

is now getting involved. To avoid two sets of regulations which may be 

incompatible, it would seem to be more operationally efficient and more cost 

effective if EPA were to rewrite the proposed rule to allow the NRC and 

Agreement States to require reporting to them AS THE REGULATORY (LICENSING) 

AUTHORITIES with the licensing authorities perhaps in turn reporting to the 

EPA as necessitated by the level of seriousness of the event. 

Response: 

[See "Duplicative Reporting - Response 1"] 

P-61 
P.65 

Commenter Number: 24 (CARC) Response Number: 1 

Page: 7 

Commenter Name: Duane A. Siler 

Patton, Boggs & Blow 

Issue: Regulatory Burden 

Comment: 

Finally, we would note that, unless EPA clarifies the definition of 

release as applied to radionuclides, as discussed above, and adopts a 

concentration-based limit like DOT's, then the Agency should prepare further 

analyses of the economic and paperwork burden of this regulation on the 

public. According to the preamble, EPA has assumed that only approximately 43 

additional notifications would be required annually under the proposed rule. 

If, for the reasons discussed above, the mere storage of raw materials or 

products which contain radionuclides is considered a release, then tens of 

thousands of additional notifications would be required every year. The 

burden associated with a reporting program of this magnitude, including the 

cost to small entities, would have to be carefully assessed. 

_ i 

Response: 

The Economic Impact Analysis supporting the final RQ adjustments has 

been rewritten to further analyze this rule's economic and paperwork burden in 

light of the requirement on the part of facility owners or operators to report 

releases of an RQ or more of radionuclides from stored (but not fully 

contained) materials. To the extent that accumulations of these materials do 

result in releases of at least an RQ of radionuclides, repeated reporting of 

such releases most probably can be avoided through use of the continuous 

release provision in CERCLA section 103(f)(2). This provision provides for 

reduced reporting of releases that are "continuous" and "stable in quantity 

and rate." EPA has published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 12868, 

April 19, 1988) detailing the reduced reporting requirements for continuous 

releases. Continuous accumulations of materials that result in releases of an 

RQ or more of radionuclides outside a facility may be able to use this reduced 

reporting requirement. EPA estimates that approximately 1,000 facilities will 

submit annual release notifications in accordance with CERCLA's reduced 

reporting provisions. [While there are over 50,000 coal-fired boiler 

facilities that could have been required to annually report radionuclide 

releases from large coal and coal ash piles, these releases have been exempted 

from the reporting requirement -- see "Exemptions/Exclusions -- Response 2."] 

These annual reports are not burdensome, and will provide EPA with useful 

information about radionuclide releases. Additionally, the Agency's current 

estimate is that only 59 additional episodic release notifications will result 

annually from these RQ adjustments. Thus, the additional reporting by any 

particular owner or operator should not be burdensome. 

P-62 
Commenter Number: 2 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: John A. Eure, Chief 

Bureau of Environmental Health 

Department of Public Health 

State of Iowa 

Issue: Options 

Comment: 

It appears that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not 

given full consideration to the reportable quantity limits set forth in 

Appendix B -- Radionuclides. The RQ in some cases seems extremely high, and 

in some extremely low. A case in point is the RQ for Radium 226 which is one 

curie. Because of the nature and property of Radium, the one curie is too 

large when consideration is given to impact on public health and safety. 

Based on our review of the numbers, it appears that there is really no 

scientific reason behind any of the RQ (Ci) numbers. We would suggest that 

serious consideration be given to allotting appropriate time and using Options 

2, 3, or 4 or a combination thereof to develop RQ factors if they are really 

necessary. 

Response: 

The RQs calculated for the 757 radionuclides are based upon careful 

consideration of possible exposure pathways and reasonable models. Generally, 

four exposure scenarios are evaluated for each radionuclide: inhalation, 

direct exposure, ingestion of ground water, and ingestion of vegetables. Each 

exposure model derives the amount (in curies) of a radionuclide that can be 

released under a conservative set of assumptions and that could result in an 

individual located 30 meters away receiving a dose-equivalent of 500 millirem. 

Each of the 757 radionuclides listed in ICRP Publication 30 (for which there 

is health and human intake data available) is analyzed individually; the most 

critical pathway is used to establish the RQ for each radionuclide. For a 

more detailed explanation of each of the release scenarios and the overall 

methodology, refer to the "Technical Background Document in Support of the 

Final Rule Adjusting the Reportable Quantities for Radionuclides." 

The RQ for radium-226 has been set using the same methodology as that 

used to calculate the RQs for the remaining 756 radionuclides. The final RQ 

for radium-226 (alone, not in equilibrium with its daughters) is 0.1 curie, 

which is an order of magnitude lower than the proposed RQ of 1 curie. 

Lowering of the RQ was based on a re-evaluation of the vegetable ingestion 

pathway, which is now the most critical exposure pathway for radium-226. The 

0.1 curie RQ for radium-226 does not mean that EPA considers that a release 

below that level will not be harmful, nor does it indicate that the Agency 

believes that a release at or above that level will be harmful to the public 

health or welfare or the environment. An RQ is simply a mechanism for 

insuring that the government is informed of a release so that an evaluation by 

the government can be made to determine its potential for harm. 

T-l 
P.67 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

Additionally, the RQ for radium-226 in equilibrium with its daughters, a 

common radionuclide mixture, has been calculated to be 0.053 curie, 

approximately half the value for radium-226 itself. Whenever radium is found 

in secular equilibrium with its daughters or approaching this state, the RQ 

will be less than 0.1 curie. 

T-2 
P.68 

Commenter Number: 8 Response Number: 2 

Page: 1/3 

Commenter Name: Mark Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Issue: Option 1: One-Pound RQ 

Comment: 

Overall, Amersham agrees that the one pound RQ for radionuclides is 

inappropriate, yet the proposed RQs still need to be reassessed. 

Until the proposed changes to RQs for radionuclides are accepted, the one 

pound RQ will be in effect beginning July 1987. Some guidance is needed on 

how to calculate one pound for radionuclides; either use specific activity, 

weight of material, or weight of entire storage/shipping container plus 

contents. 

Response: 

CERCLA requires that the release of a hazardous substance be reported to 

the National Response Center when one RQ or more of a hazardous substance is 

released. The one-pound RQ for radionuclides has been in effect since CERCLA 

was enacted in 1980. The RQ of one pound applies to one pound of the 

radionuclide released. Pounds released are units of weight of the hazardous 

substance; it does not include the weight of any storage or shipping 

container. 

The adjusted RQs for radionuclides are in units of curies (or 

becquerels), which are units of radioactivity. Each RQ in these units, 

however, can be converted to a unit of weight (e.g., grams or pounds) for each 

radionuclide using the radionuclide's specific activity (i.e., the number of 

curies per unit of weight for each radionuclide, which depends on the 

nuclide's half-life, atomic mass, and other factors). Whether releasers use 

the RQs in units of curies or some unit of weight, the adjusted RQs apply to 

only the amount of radionuclides released; they do not apply to nonradioactive 

contents of shipping containers or to shipping containers themselves. 

T-3 
P.69 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name:'' 

Issue: 

Comment: 

10 

1 

M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Option 1: One-Pound RQ 

Response Number: 

Your decision to reject Option 1 is applauded. 

Response: 

The Agency believes that the one-pound RQ for radionuclides is 

inappropriate because pounds is not a commonly used measure in radiation 

protection, and a one-pound RQ does not assure timely reporting for many 

radionuclides. The Agency appreciates the support of the regulated community 

on its rejection of this option. 

T-4 
P.70 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

17 

1 

Response Number: 

Walter R. Quanstrom 

General Manager and Vice President 

Amoco Corporation 

Option 1: One-Pound RQ 

As indicated in the preamble to the proposed rule, the statutory RQ of 

one pound for radionuclides is not the most appropriate trigger for 

notification. In fact, an RQ expressed in pounds, which is used for all other 

hazardous substances, is not appropriate for radionuclides. A single value 

for all radionuclides would encompass a wide range of potential hazards under 

this approach. Moreover, radionuclides are not commonly measured in terms of 

mass. In addition to aiding the Agency in its release evaluation process, the 

RQ adjustments are designed to better protect the public health and the 

environment and to reduce the burdens of reporting on the regulated community. 

Neither of these purposes would be served by the one pound, or any other 

mass-based, RQ for radionuclides. In earlier rulemakings on RQs, the Agency 

stated that the reporting requirements were not designed to impose additional 

testing or monitoring costs on the regulated community. Such costs would be 

inevitable if the RQs for radionuclides were expressed in terms of pounds, 

since normal measurements are not taken in that manner. Therefore, we support 

the Agency's proposal to base the RQ on activity and to designate different 

RQs for different substances. 

Response: 

See "Options - Response 3." 

T-5 
P.71 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

20 

1 

Response Number: 

Steven Swanson, Director 

Health and Environmental Affairs Dept. 

American Petroleum Institute 

Option 1: One-Pound RQ 

API supports EPA's proposal to adjust the statutory reportable quantity 

(RQ) of one-pound for radionuclides to more accurately reflect the potential 

hazard and the need to evaluate such releases. Accordingly, API agrees with 

EPA's decision to establish an RQ for radionuclides in terms of activity for 

individual radionuclides rather than on a mass basis. 

Response: 

See "Options - Response 3." 

T-6 
P.72 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

10 

1 

M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs 

Response Number: 

While rejecting Option 2 is understandable due to the difficulty in 

demonstrating compliance especially in quickly estimating dose during an 

actual release, such as a transportation accident, your objections relative to 

the potential variability are equally applicable to the Selected Approach. 

Response: 

EPA disagrees that its objections to Option 2 "relative to the potential 

variability are equally applicable to the Selected Approach." The curie is a 

clearly defined number for any given radionuclide. Unlike a dose-equivalent 

RQ, where determination of whether an RQ has been released would be based on 

the exposure circumstances surrounding the release, an RQ in curies could be 

measured or estimated irrespective of the exposure conditions. An activitylevel RQ minimizes the discretion and judgment required by the facility owner 

or operator in determining whether an RQ or more of a radionuclide has been 

released. For this reason, EPA believes that an activity-level RQ is subject 

to less potential variability than an RQ in terms of dose equivalent. 

Furthermore, EPA believes that in most circumstances, the determination of the 

actual quantity released (in units of curies) will be an easier procedure and 

thus result in more timely reporting. 

Also, see Response Number 7 concerning "Options" (specifically concerning 

Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs) for additional discussion relating to this 

comment. 

T-7 
P.73 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 7 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs 

Comment: 

The Selected Approach is fundamentally identical with Option 2; the 

calculation is just reversed. In the Selected Approach, you set a dose limit, 

make assumptions about the receptor and the environmental conditions, and then 

back calculate to the release level. However, the objection to Option 2, you 

state in 52 FR 8172, "Because of all the judgments and assumptions required to 

estimate dose equivalents, the estimated dose equivalents for two different 

releases with the same level of activity of the same radionuclide may vary 

drastically under different assumptions," are just as critical to the Selected 

Approach. 

Response: 

See Response Number 6 concerning "Options" (specifically concerning 

Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs). The following response also applies to this 

comment. 

Option 2 is not identical to the selected approach for two main reasons. 

The most important difference is that Option 2 only sets a dose-equivalent 

level, allowing the individual in charge of a facility or vessel to determine 

the appropriate models and parameters that should be used to ascertain whether 

an individual has been actually or will be potentially exposed. In the 

selected approach, although a dose-equivalent level is chosen, models 

incorporating conservative parameters are developed and used by EPA to derive 

RQs in activity levels that are more quickly and easily measured. Therefore, 

the selected approach enables the Agency to define clearly for the releaser 

the quantity of material that, if released, must be reported immediately to 

the National Response Center. The government then has the opportunity to 

evaluate the release and to determine, based upon the circumstances 

surrounding the release, if a response action is necessary. Using a doseequivalent level as an RQ would require the releaser to evaluate the 

circumstances surrounding a release and to determine whether or not a report 

should be made. This is contrary to the intent of CERCLA. 

Another important difference, which is related to the one noted above, is 

the likelihood for consistent and timely reports for the two options. EPA 

believes that the determination of the quantity released (in units of curies) 

will be more straightforward than the estimation of a dose caused by the 

released. Accordingly, the selected option is much more likely to result in 

more consistent and timely reporting than Option 2. 

T-8 
P.74 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

14 

18 

Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 8 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs 

To the extent that any CERCLA reporting requirements were applied to 

radionuclide releases from nuclear power plants, however, such a requirement 

should permit the facility to apply a dose-equivalent level that is consistent 

with NRC reporting requirements. Dose-equivalent levels would permit utility 

facilities to apply site-specific methodologies for determining public doses 

that comply with NRC reporting requirements. Facilities using these 

methodolqgies can rapidly determine the public dose resulting from a release. 

Moreover,: any dose-equivalent RQ values that are applied to nuclear power 

plants should be consistent with EPA's 500-millirem RQ adjustment criterion. 

The approach described above would permit EPA, to the extent the Agency 

applied reporting requirements to nuclear power plant releases, to allow 

appropriate adjustments for site-specific application. This approach would be 

in order since nuclear power plants have extensive site-specific data that 

could be used to comply with the reporting requirements. Similarly, if 

applied to nuclear power plants, RQs should be listed for each of the exposure 

pathways (inhalation, ingestion, and direct exposure); the RQ for the 

appropriate pathway (as indicated by the facility's release and exposure data) 

would be applied. 

Response: 

Release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear 

incident subject to the financial protection provisions under section 170 of 

the Atomic Energy Act (generally known as the "Price Anderson Act") are exempt 

from reporting under CERCLA. Furthermore, any release of source, byproduct, 

or special nuclear material in compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

regulations, licenses, or other controls are considered "Federally permitted" 

under CERCLA section 101(10)(K) and are exempt from the RQ reporting 

requirements. However, some releases from nuclear power plants may not fall 

under the exemptions provided by CERCLA. Specifically, any release of an RQ 

that is not federally permitted but does not meet the definition of a "nuclear 

incident" (an occurre'nce causing bodily injury, sickness, disease, death, loss 

or damage to property, or loss of use of property) must be reported 

immediately to the National Response Center. The government may want to know 

of such releases short of a nuclear incident in order to determine whether a 

response is necessary. 

The Agency agrees that personnel at nuclear power plants are likely to be 

able to use site-specific data to calculate potential exposures for a release 

in dose-equivalents. The Agency does not believe, however, that this 

capability necessarily exists among all individuals or organizations that 

handle radionuclides. The Agency also believes that development of a special 

rule to cover releases from nuclear power plants would serve no useful purpose 

T-9 
P.75 

Response Number: 8 (continued) 

and would'be difficult to implement. For this reason, the final radionuclide 

RQ adjustment regulation applies equally to the entire regulated community. 

CERCLA allows the EPA Administrator to establish a single RQ for a 

hazardous substance. While the Agency has evaluated various exposure pathways 

in the adjustment of radionuclide RQs, the Agency has issued only one final RQ 

for each radionuclide based on the most critical exposure pathway. These 

single RQs, which should assure timely reporting in most circumstances, will 

be easier to implement than multiple RQs for each radionuclide for the 

different exposure pathways. 

T-10 
P.76 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 9 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Option 2: Dose-Equivalent RQs 

Comment: 

BID section on ingestion. With the assumptions made, the argument that 

there is insufficient time for on site evaluation of dosimetry is no longer 

valid. Under the proposed scenario, there is more than ample time to evaluate 

a release in terms of potential, if not actual, dose received. 

Response: 

It is true that radionuclide transport in ground water is slow relative 

to the direct exposure and inhalation pathways, and that extensive evaluations 

of individual releases generally could be made before a member of the public 

could be exposed via this pathway. Under CERCLA, however, the government must 

be informed immediately of releases that may pose a hazard to human health or 

welfare or the environment. The purpose of the RQs is to allow the government 

sufficient opportunity to evaluate releases that may require government 

intervention, while not burdening the government with reports of releases that 

are not likely to require a federal, state, or local response. 

The scenarios used were developed for purposes of establishing RQs, not 

for purposes of evaluating a release to determine an appropriate response. 

The "response determination" is made by the On-Scene Coordinator after he 

receives notification from the National Response Center that there has been a 

release. 

The Agency does not believe that establishing a dose-equivalent level as 

the radionuclide RQ is an acceptable option. Estimating dose-equivalent 

levels is a complex procedure that relies substantially on individual 

judgment. Dose-equivalent may vary considerably for different releases even 

if the same quantity of radionuclides is involved. Estimating dose-equivalent 

levels requires making numerous assumptions, and the level of dose may vary 

drastically under different assumptions. An RQ defined in terms of doseequivalent, therefore, would leave a significant amount of judgment to the 

person in charge of the facility or vessel. This would mean that it would be 

difficult to: (1) assure that the government would be notified of all 

radionuclide releases that it deems necessary; and (2) enforce an RQ in doseequivalent units. 

Further, establishing RQs on the basis of dose-equivalents means that 

someone other than the federal government will be determining whether there is 

actual or potential public exposure. The Agency believes that CERCLA's RQ 

requirements were intended to ensure that the federal government is notified 

of all releases that "may pose a threat to human health, welfare, and the 

environment." 

T-ll 
P.77 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

10 

2 

M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Option 3: Single Activity-Level RQ 

Response Number: 10 

Curies and becquerels are units of radioactivity not radiation 

measurement. Also, activity released may or may not be easy to measure 

depending on the radionuclide released. However, selecting a single activity 

level for all radionuclides would be, as you state, inappropriate. 

Response: 

Curies and becquerels are indeed units of activity and not radiation 

measurement. The preamble has been corrected accordingly. 

Activity released is relatively easy to measure, when compared to 

measuring the potential for delivering a specific dose-equivalent to a member 

of the public. A significant amount of judgment on the part of the facility 

owner or operator is required in the case of the latter. Additionally, people 

that handle radionuclides generally are aware of the quantities they are 

handling, in terms of curies or becquerels, and, in the event of a release, 

would be able to estimate the size of the release in a more timely manner. 

T-12 
P.78 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Response Number: 11 

Dennis B. Naff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company 

Selected Option: Activity Level RQs 

In summary, Mobil supports the rationale for specifying radionuclide 

quantities in activity units rather than by weight. 

Response: 

EPA appreciates the support by Mobil in the Agency's decision to specify 

RQs for radionuclides in activity units rather than by weight. 

T-13 
P.79 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

6 

2 

Response Number: 12 

Marc Bowman 

Environmental Engineering Supervisor 

FMC Corporation 

Issue: Selected Option: Activity Level RQs 

Comment: 

The obvious intent of CERCLA reporting requirements under Sections 103(a) 

and 103(b) is to make EPA and the States aware of releases to the environment 

which truly pose a threat to human health and the environment. FMC agrees 

that adjustments to some reportable quantities (RQ) are needed to allow EPA to 

focus its resources on the most serious releases and to protect public health 

and welfare and the environment more effectively. The subject proposed 

rulemaking does this. FMC supports this effort to adjust the RQ for 

radionuclides to an activity limit instead of a weight limit. This is a far 

more sensible approach for radionuclides. 

Response: 

EPA disagrees with the commenter in the sense that the intent of CERCLA 

reporting requirements under sections 103(a) and 103(b) is to make the 

government aware of releases to the environment that may pose a threat to 

human health or the environment, not releases that truly pose a threat. RQs 

do not have to be quantities that will necessarily cause harm. This was a 

point raised during the Senate debate on CERCLA (see 126 Cong. Rec. S14965, 

Daily Edition November 24, 1980 (Statement by Senator Randolph)). EPA has 

decided to relate radionuclide RQs to the inherent radiotoxicity of a 

chemical. It should be stressed, however, that an RQ level does not equal the 

risk posed by the release of the hazardous substance. The RQ represents a 

determination only of possible or potential harm. The actual risks from a 

release will vary with the circumstances of the release and cannot be 

determined ahead of time. 

T-14 
P.80 

Commenter Number: 17 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: 

Response Number: 13 

Walter R. Quanstrom 

General Manager and Vice President . 

Amoco Corporation 

Issue: Selected Option: Activity Level RQs 

Comment: 

In conclusion, Amoco supports the Agency's proposal for activity-based 

RQs for individual radionuclides. 

Response: 

EPA appreciates the support of Amoco Corporation in the Agency's decision 

to specify RQs for radionuclides in activity units rather than by weight. 

T-15 
P.81 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

L2 

1 

Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mallinckrodt Inc. 

Response Number: 14 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Selected Option: Activity Level RQs 

Mallinckrodt fully supports EPA's proposal to list the RQs for 

radionuclides in terms of curies. As the CERCLA list appears now, there is 

some confusion on how you determine the weight of radioactivity in solution. 

As you stated in the proposed rule, the concentration of radionuclides can 

vary a great deal. The use of RQs in curies will result in a more logical and 

definitive standard for protecting the public in the unlikely event of an 

accident. 

Response: 

EPA appreciates the support of Mallinckrodt Inc. in the Agency's decision 

to specify RQs for radionuclides in activity units rather than by weight. 

T-16 
P.82 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: W.B. Smalley, Sr. 

Program Manager 

Environmental Protection 

General Electric 

Response Number: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Model Assumptions: All 

We judge the models used by EPA to derive an RQ for each radionuclide to 

be appropriate for the purpose - - to set a trigger level for reporting so that 

the government may evaluate the need for cleanup and countermeasures. It is 

noted that the models and assumptions are conservative (i.e., 30 m dispersion 

distance, 24 hrs/day exposure, 50 yr dose commitment). Further, the models 

are conservative enough that it is not likely that a member of the public 

would be exposed to more than 500 mrems before countermeasures could be taken. 

In most actual exposure situations, actual doses received are likely to be 

much less. 

Response: 

EPA appreciates the support of General'Electric in the Agency's use of 

the specific model assumptions used to derive the RQs for radionuclides. EPA 

agrees that the models and assumptions used in the adjustment of final RQs are 

conservative and that, in most actual exposure situations, exposed individuals 

likely will receive less than 500 mrems. 

T-17 
P.83 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 2 

Page: 9 

Commenter Name: John J. Kearney, Jr. 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Model Assumptions: All 

Comment: 

EPA's exposure assumptions, while arguably justifiable for releases from 

some sources, are wholly unrealistic in the case of (1) ambient air releases 

from fossil fuel fired electric generating plants and (2) the extremely small 

amounts of radionuclide releases from coal ash stored or disposed of following 

combustion at such plants. 

Response: 

Based on an analysis of airborne emissions from coal-fired boilers (EPA 

520/1-84-022-2), most smokestack releases over a 24-hour period from fossil 

fuel fired electric generating plants would be less than an RQ and thus would 

not be subject to CERCIA reporting requirements. Radionuclide releases (in 

particular releases of radon) from large coal and ash piles, however, will 

likely exceed the RQ in a 24-hour period. Releases that equal or exceed an RQ 

in a 24-hour period must be reported immediately to the National Response 

Center. However, if those releases occur in a manner that is "continuous" and 

"stable in quantity and rate," and if the facility owner or operator reports 

such releases under CERCLA section 103(a) for a period sufficient to establish 

the continuity, quantity, and regularity of the release, then CERCLA section 

103(f)(2) may be applicable and afford some reporting relief. The Agency has 

defined the terms in section 103(f)(2) of CERCLA related to continuous 

releases in a separate proposed rulemaking (see 53 FR 12868, April 19, 1988). 

With respect to the applicability of the model assumptions to releases 

from smokestacks and area sources (which are the type of releases expected 

from electric generating plants and coal ash piles), see "Inhalation Pathway -

Response 1" and "Inhalation Pathway - Response 3." Also, it is important to 

note that, in response to requests from the public, EPA has exempted from 

CERCLA notification requirements radionuclide releases resulting from the 

dumping of coal and coal ash, and radionuclide releases to all media from coal 

and coal ash piles, at utility and industrial facilities with coal-fired 

boilers (see "Exemptions/Exclusions--Response 2"). 

T-18 
P.84 

Commenter Number: LI Response Number 3 

Page: 7-8 

Commenter Name: John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Model Assumptions: All 

Comment: 

Conservative assumptions are reasonable techniques to use when 

considering an obviously broad range of potential exposure scenarios. In 

other cases, the range of potential exposures is so broad that a single 

assumed condition is adopted to cover all circumstances. However, for some 

scenarios, this can result in overly conservative values. In addition, 

although building a conservative factor of 2 or 3 into the calculation by 

itself may not significantly affect the final answer, the product of several 

such independent conservative factors can result in maximum release values 

arbitrarily lowered by an order of magnitude or more. 

Response: 

The Agency does not agree that the model assumptions are overly 

conservative; the assumptions are conservative to allow for timely reporting, 

but are not unreasonable. For example, a 500 millirem dose-equivalent is used 

in the models; the Agency could have used a much lower dose-equivalent. The 

500 millirem level is accepted by the International Commission on Radiological 

Protection and the National Commission on Radiation Protection as the maximum 

dose-equivalent level for exposure to the general public. Similarly, the 

models use a 30-meter distance between the point of release and point of 

exposure; use of a 1-meter distance was rejected by the Agency as being overly 

conservative. 

The Agency received few comments stating that the RQs were too low (as 

would be reflected in overly-conservative assumptions). In addition, 

radioactive decay has been added to the models in the final regulation, 

resulting in even higher RQs and a decrease in conservatism. Finally, in 

certain cases where more than an RQ would be released on a daily basis (such 

as releases of naturally occurring radionuclides from large undisturbed land 

holdings, land disturbance activities, and large coal and coal ash piles) the 

Agency has granted administrative exemptions to the reporting requirement (see 

"Exemptions/Exclusions -- Response 2 and 6"). For all these reasons, EPA 

believes that the final RQs are not "too low" or "overly conservative." 

T-19 
P.85 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 4 

Page: 2/4 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Model Assumptions: All 

Comment: 

The level of conservatism of the proposed RQs is excessive.... Examples 

of unnecessarily conservative assumptions include: a release fraction of one; 

a receptor located 30 meters from the source; invariant atmospheric dispersion 

conditions for the inhalation and direct exposure pathways; no consideration 

of initial concentration of the radionuclide at the release point in liquid 

releases for ingestion calculations; and, no consideration of radioactive 

decay. Consideration of a shorter distance to a receptor (e.g., 1 meter) is 

clearly unwarranted given all of the other conservatisms involved in the 

selection of the RQs. 

The pathway-based methodology is acceptable; however, the assumptions 

used in the current rulemaking are extremely conservative. More conservative 

assumptions are not warranted, and conservatism can and should be reduced. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 3," "Model Assumptions - Response 15," 

and "Direct Exposure Pathway - Response 1." Also, in specific response to 

this comment, the final RQs: 

o Are based on airborne release fractions that range from 

0.001 to 1; and 

o Have been calculated using equations that incorporate 

the effects of radioactive decay, where appropriate. 

In addition, release values for the inhalation pathway were calculated 

independently of the periods of release and exposure because bounds on these 

periods in any given release situation cannot be established. Therefore, the 

inhalation RVs are applicable to all release and exposure durations, including 

very short ones, and it is not unreasonable to assume that atmospheric 

dispersion conditions over short periods will remain constant. 

Finally, calculations for the ground-water ingestion pathway consider the 

total quantity of radionuclide released, but not the initial concentration at 

the release point. While the Agency recognizes that changes in initial 

concentrations in the calculations would give different release values for 

this pathway, the concentration of radionuclide released could vary widely in 

actual release situations and the Agency has no basis for assuming a single 

concentration or range of concentrations for calculational purposes. 

Therefore, the Agency believes that it was justified in using a conservative 

calculational approach that considers point source releases into ground water 

irrespective of the concentration released. 

T-20 
P.86 

Commenter Number: 1 Response Number: 5 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: Garris D. Parker, Jr. 

Department Head 

Radiation Protection Department 

The Wellcome Research Laboratories 

Burroughs Wellcome Co. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

Comment: 

Since this action regards "substantial danger to the public or threats to 

the environment," the choice of a dose equivalent should be made very 

carefully. The chosen 500 millirem may not be the most appropriate. 

According to BEIR-III (NAS BEIR-III, 1980), a dose equivalent of this 

magnitude would result in an increase in fatal cancer risk of approximately 

IO-5 to IO-4. 

In the general safety field, an industry with an average annual mortality 

due to occupational hazards of IO-4 is considered to be "safe." Therefore, in 

order to remain within the definition of "substantial danger," we propose a 

dose equivalent of greater than 5 rem. A dose equivalent of approximately 25 

rem may be most appropriate since one would begin to see clinical indications 

of the exposure. 

Response: 

The phrase "substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the 

environment ..." appears in section 102(a) of CERCLA and refers to the 

designation of additional hazardous substances by the Administrator. This 

statement cannot be construed to mean that RQs for individual hazardous 

substances must be set at such a level that reports should be received only 

when there is a substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the 

environment. Indeed, section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA authorizes federal action 

when there is "imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare 

...." RQs are simply a trigger that allows federal authorities to evaluate a 

release in order to determine if, depending upon the circumstances surrounding 

the release, there is a need for federal, state, and local action. 

RQs are reporting triggers and are not designed to limit the health risks 

associated with radionuclide releases. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 25 

rem would not be an appropriate basis for a reporting trigger because, as the 

commenter acknowledges, clinical indications of exposure are apparent already 

at that level. An RQ based on a 25 rem dose-equivalent, therefore, may not 

allow for timely government responses. 

T-21 
Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Response Number: 6 

W.B. Smalley, Sr. 

Program Manager 

Environmental Protection 

General Electric 

Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

We encourage EPA to use 500 mrems effective dose equivalent as the basis 

for calculating RQs. The value is consistent with the lowest dose level 

recommended by the ICRP for countermeasures in the event of a major radiation 

accident (ICRP 40, p.20-21). We understand and concur with the need to 

express RQs in a more directly measurable quantity such as activity in curies. 

Activity released is unambiguous and can be determined more quickly than 

estimates of dose equivalent. 

We encourage EPA not to lower the 500 mrem basis for RQs. Such action 

would increase costs without a corresponding improvement in public health and 

safety. Adequate conservatism is built into the models. The lowering to the 

value in other standards such as 25 mrems in 40 CFR 190 is not appropriate. 

The purpose of an RQ is to be a reporting level triggering countermeasures. 

Lowering the RQ basis would impose unnecessary dual conservatism and would 

trigger federal response when it is not needed, thus wasting money and 

resources. It is not reasonable to unnecessarily place requirements on U.S. 

industry that are l/5th to l/20th of the lowest international standard. 

Response: 

EPA believes that, for the time being, basing RQs for radionuclides upon 

a 500 millirem dose-equivalent is sufficiently conservative to provide the 

government with reports of releases in a timely manner. At the same time, a 

500 millirem dose-equivalent is not overly conservative and is not expected to 

lead to a large number of reports to which the government will not respond. 

However, if the Federal Radiation Protection Guidance recommendation for 

exposure limits for the general public changes from 500 millirem to 100 

millirem, or any other level, the Agency will consider adjusting the 

radionuclide RQs accordingly in a future technical update. 

In response to the comment that the "... purpose of an RQ is to be a 

reporting level triggering countermeasures," the Agency wishes to clarify the 

purposes of RQs. RQs are triggers for federal notification of a release, not 

triggers for federal response. The goal of developing RQs is to derive a 

level at which the federal government would want to be notified of a release 

so a determination can be made whether or not to respond to the release. 

Responses may range from making telephone calls to the releaser, contacting 

state or local response personnel to ensure appropriate action is being taken 

to mitigate any threats posed by the release, evacuation of nearby residences, 

and actual cleanup of contaminated areas. 

T-22 
P.88 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

RQs must be sensitive enough to cover releases from a wide variety of 

sources under varying circumstances. RQ levels are not established for the 

purposes of setting permit limits or other regulatory standards. Other Agency 

programs are charged with developing standards or source permits. For 

example, the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 

(NESHAPs), implemented under the Clean Air Act, establish emission limits for 

radionuclides released to the air. 

States authorizing the development and promulgation of standards or 

permit limits may require consideration of actual or potential risks and 

costs. In contrast, RQs are not required to be based on health or scientific 

information but may be developed based on administrative ease. Indeed, the 

legislative history of CERCLA states that "Administrative feasibility and 

practicality should be primary factors" in determining reportable quantities 

(Senate Report No. 90-848, to accompany S.1680, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1980). 

The Agency, in developing the RQ adjustment methodology for both the chemical 

hazardous substances and radionuclides, has structured a ranking system that 

reflects the relative hazard posed by hazardous substances. The Agency 

believes that this relative ranking methodology serves the purpose of the RQ 

reporting trigger. 

T-23 
P.89 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

14 

3/7-9 

John J. Kearney, Jr. 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

On the whole, the proposed rule appears to achieve EPA's goals of 

identifying releases that pose the most serious potential danger to the public 

health or welfare or the environment, while minimizing the reporting burdens 

imposed on the public. Specifically, we endorse EPA's proposals to use 500 

millirem as the dose equivalent value for calculating RQs. 

To establish reportable quantities for radionuclides, EPA has used an 

annual dose equivalent level of 500 millirem, which is one-tenth of the 

occupational dose equivalent limit of 5 rem per year. As a consequence, EPA 

has used one-tenth of the curie level set by the International Commission on 

Radiation Protection for the Annual Limits of Intake for occupational 

exposure. As EPA recognizes, the Federal Radiation Protection Guidance 

establishes 500 millirem as the level that provides adequate protection to 

individual members of the public. 

Although EPA may recommend lowering the 500 millirem limit in the 

Radiation Protection Guidance, the Agency should retain that level for 

purposes of calculating reportable quantities for radionuclides. That level 

is an appropriate measurement for emergency, episodic releases that threaten 

public health or welfare -- the kind of release at which CERCLA's notification 

requirements are aimed. Particularly given the very conservative assumptions 

used in EPA's reportable quantity adjustment methodology -- e.g., the failure 

to consider radioactive decay of short-lived radionuclides and the 30-meter 

distance assumption for exposure to releases --a decision to readjust 

reportable quantities based on a lower dose equivalent level would result in 

an unnecessary and burdensome increase in CERCLA reporting obligations. Such 

a decision also would frustrate the Agency's goal of "concentrat[ing] its 

attention and resources on the releases that potentially are most threatening 

to public health or welfare or the environment." 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 6." 

T-24 
P.90 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 8 

Page: 1 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

Comment: 

Section IV.B:, page 8178, 1st column. An emergency response at a level 

of 25 to 100 mrem would appear to be inappropriate in view of TSCA' s reporting 

requirements for incidents presenting "substantial risk of injury to health or 

the environment" or the CERCIA requirement to report releases of "those 

substances which, when released into the environment, may present substantial 

danger to the public health or welfare or the environment." Current federal 

radiation protection guidance for occupational exposure, in its discussion of 

ALARA programs, refers to reference levels as indications of need for such 

actions, as recording, investigation, and intervention. Reference levels in 

the proposed revised 10 CFR Part 20 are derived from exposures which would 

produce an effective dose equivalent of 100 mrem. It would be illogical for 

these same reference levels to also trigger notification of the Emergency 

Response Center. Emergency response should be reserved for real threats. We 

suggest a notification level of 15 rem. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 5" and "Model Assumptions -

Response 6." 

Also, EPA wishes to clarify the relationship between RQs and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission's "reference levels" in the proposed revision to 10 CFR 

Part 20. In that proposed rule, the Commission proposed a dose limit for 

members of the general public of 500 millirem per year, which is consistent 

with the Federal Radiation Protection Guidance and the same dose level on 

which the final RQs are based. However, the Commission states-that (see 51 FR 

1112, January 9,.1986) : 

Dose limits are intended to apply to real doses to persons 

actually exposed. However, it is impossible to accurately 

determine such doses because of incomplete information about 

personal food intake and habits, individual metabolism, 

spatial and temporal considerations, and other confounding 

factors. To compensate for this lack of information, it is 

necessary for licensees to assume values for these factors 

that are conservative (i.e., tending to overestimate the 

dose). Compliance with the dose limits can then generally 

be established in a practical manner by evaluating exposures 

against a reference level that is a small fraction of the 

annual dose limit. This assumes that the annual dose to the 

maximally exposed real person is not likely to exceed a 

faction of the limits, and almost certainly will not 

T-25 
P.91 

Response Number: 8 (continued) 

exceed the limits even if there are other licensed and 

unlicensed radiation sources in the vicinity. 

For these reasons, the Commission proposed a dose-equivalent reference level 

of 100 millirem per year for individual members of the public. Licensees 

operating within this reference level would be confident that no member of the 

public would receive an unacceptably high dose. If a licensee has reason to 

believe that a member of the general public is likely to receive more than 100 

millirem in a year, the licensee would be required to: (1) report this to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (2) provide evidence that the 500 millirem 

limit will not be exceeded; (3) describe steps taken to keep the dose as low 

as reasonably achievable; and (4) explain why the estimated dose exceeds 100 

millirem per year. 

From the above discussion, it is clear that the reference dose is not a 

dose limit, but rather is a mechanism to keep annual doses as low as 

reasonably achievable and below the 500 millirem limit if at all possible. 

Accordingly, EPA sees no reason at this time to base the RQs on 100 millirem, 

the reference level. Furthermore, EPA believes that the RQs are completely 

consistent with the reference level approach; they are based on a dose limit 

of 500 millirem and are calculated in a conservative manner that assures that 

the release of an RQ will likely result in actual doses that are only a 

fraction of 500 millirem. However, EPA notes that if the Federal Radiation 

Protection Guidance recommendation for exposure limits for the general public 

changes from 500 millirem to 100 millirem, or any other level, the Agency will 

consider adjusting the radionuclide RQs accordingly in a future technical 

update. 

T-26 
P.92 

Commenter Number: 25 Response Number: 9 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: Greta J. Dicus, Director 

Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management 

Arkansas Department of Health 

Issue: Model Assumptions: Dose Equivalent 

Comment: 

The (draft) EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for power generating 

facility accidents use dose limits of 1-5 rem. This proposed rule discusses 

levels of 500, 100, or 25 millirem. Why such high limits for one type of 

accident and such low limits for other types of accidents or situations 

involving releases of radiation? The referenced PAGs for power plants have a 

rationale which contains an extensive statement regarding risk versus cost 

versus justification which is used as a rationale for the PAG limits. The 

proposed rule seems to ignore these factors and utilize a magnified perceived 

risk rather than a more realistic actual risk. 500 millirem is an established 

limit to which it is nearly impossible to assign a biological risk. However, 

if dose limits must be lowered, it would certainly be preferable for all 

regulatory agencies to agree on one limit rather than having several different 

limits to deal with. 

Response: 

EPA's Protective Action Guides (PAGs) were prepared in conformance with a 

Federal Register notice of interagency responsibilities for nuclear incident 

response planning dated January 17, 1973. According to this notice, EPA is 

responsible for (1) establishment of protective action guidelines, (2) 

recommendations as to appropriate protective actions, (3) assistance to State 

agencies in the development of emergency response plans, and (4) establishment 

of radiation detection and measurement systems. 

The PAGs are not intended to be "dose limits," as suggested by the 

commenter and, in fact, a manual^ on the PAGs states that "[a] Protective 

Action Guide under no circumstances implies an acceptable dose." Rather, the 

PAGs are expressed in terms of projected doses to individuals that might 

warrant protective action by responsible officials. EPA recommends that 

protective actions should be considered when it is possible for members of the 

general public to receive a whole body dose in the range of 1 to 5 rem. 

Protective actions may be considered optional, to be taken if readily 

feasible, if people may receive a dose of 1 rem. If at all feasible, however, 

protective actions are highly recommended if people may receive 5 rems. 

1/ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation Programs, 

"Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear 

Incidents," September 1975 (Revised June 1980). 

T-27 
P.93 

Response Number: 9 (continued) 

In contrast, the radionuclide RQs are quantities that trigger 

notification of the National Response Center when they are released into the 

environment. This notification is intended to give the government the 

opportunity to evaluate whether a response is needed. The Agency believes 

there are three good reasons for basing the RQs on 0.5 rem rather than the 

PAGs (i.e., 1-5 rem). First, the PAGs and RQs differ in their basic purpose. 

The PAGs are projected dose levels that might warrant protective action, while 

the RQs are simply reporting triggers designed to give the government the 

opportunity to evaluate the release and mount a response if necessary. Given 

these different purposes, EPA sees no reason why the PAGs and RQs should be 

based on the same dose level. Second, while the RQs were calculated based on 

a dose of 0.5 rem, the release of an RQ in the real world will not necessarily 

result in doses of 0.5 rem. Although considered unlikely, the release of an 

RQ could cause doses much higher than 0.5 rem, perhaps even 5 rem. To account 

for this uncertainty, EPA based the RQs on a reasonably low dose that would 

assure timely reporting for most circumstances. Finally, the "protective 

actions" that appear to be contemplated by the PAGs are generally large-scale 

actions, such as emergency response planning and evacuation on a communitywide level. The government, however, may wish to take smaller-scale actions 

in response to a radionuclide release, such as making telephone calls to 

appropriate personnel or cleaning up a release. The 0.5 rem level used to 

calculate the RQs is considered low enough to give the government the 

opportunity to carry out these small-scale responses, as well as any largescale responses that might be necessary. 

T-28 
P.94 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

L2 

2-3 

Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mai1inckrodt, Ine. 

Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

Response Number: 10 

The proposed adjustments to the RQ values for radionuclides are based on 

a dose of 500 mrem. There is a discussion of reducing the RQs for 

radionuclides even lower based on a dose lower than 500 mrem. This reduction 

below 500 mrem is unsupported and is contrary to international and national 

recommendations. The International Commission on Radiological Protection 

(ICRP) in Publication No. 26 recommends an annual dose limit of 500 mrem to 

individual members of the public. The ICRP states this dose limit "has been 

found to provide [an acceptable] degree of safety and the commission 

recommends its continued use...". The National Council on Radiation 

Protection and Measurement (NCRP) also recommended a dose limit to the public 

of 500 mrem per year in Report No. 43. Both the ICRP and NCRP recommendations 

are based on normal exposure. The subject of the EPA's proposed rule deals 

with accidental or unplanned exposures. Proposing that the standard be based 

on the same limit of 500 mrem exposure for an accident is clearly too 

conservative. This results in a standard that is unduly restrictive without 

adequate justification. Any discussion of lowering the standard to achieve an 

exposure less than 500 mrem, is even more absurd. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 6." 

T-29 
P.95 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 11 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Model Assumptions: Dose-Equivalent 

Comment: 

The proposed RQs for radionuclides should remain based on a dose limit of 

500 mrem. The NPRM contains discussions which indicate that the dose limit 

may be lowered to 100 mrem or below. Such reductions would be based either on 

possible revisions of current radiation protection standards for the public, 

which are presently contained in guidance developed by the Federal Radiation 

Council, or on current dose limits in environmental radiation standards 

developed by the EPA for many specific practices. Reductions in the dose 

limit on which the RQs are based are not warranted because both the 

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the National 

Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) recommend that 500 

mrem is an appropriate radiation protection standard for members of the public 

for short-term exposures, which are the only exposures of interest in 

developing the RQs for radionuclides. A dose limit of 100 mrem is believed by 

the major scientific organizations to be necessary for protection of public 

health and safety only for prolonged or continuous exposures. A limit of 25 

mrem, obtained from environmental radiation standards for specific practices, 

is inappropriate for establishing the RQs for radionuclides because this dose 

limit is based on application of the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) 

principle to standard setting, and is not necessary for protection of public 

health and safety from short-term exposures. Also, an additional degree of 

conservatism in establishing the dose limit on which the RQs are based is 

unwarranted given the conservative nature of the models used to estimate dose 

for the different pathways. 

Response: 

The response to "Model Assumptions - 6" is also applicable to this 

comment. Also, with one exception, EPA agrees with the points made in this 

comment. Specifically, EPA agrees that, at this time, a dose of 500 mrem is 

an appropriate level on which to base the final RQs. This dose level poses a 

risk of cancer of approximately IxlO"5, which is in the range of risk posed by 

releases of an RQ of potential chemical carcinogens (when the chemical 

carcinogen RQs are evaluated using the same pathway models used in the 

adjustment of radionuclide RQs). However, it should be noted that if the 

Federal Radiation Protection Guidance recommendation for exposure limits for 

members of the general public changes from 500 mrem to 100 mrem, or any other 

level, the Agency will consider adjusting the radionuclide RQs in a technical 

update. 

EPA also agrees that it would be inappropriate to base the RQs on a dose 

limit of 25 mrem, which is used in several environmental radiation standards 

for specific practices (e.g., 40 CFR Part 190, which establishes environmental 

radiation standards for the nuclear fuel cycle). This dose limit has been 

T-30 
P.96 

Response Number: 11 (continued) 

established in several standards because it is as low as reasonably 

achieveable (ALARA), not because it is clearly necessary for the protection of 

public health and safety. Because of the numerous conservative assumptions 

used to calculate the final RQs, EPA believes that the release of an RQ will 

likely cause a dose of less than 500 mrem and that it would be unnecessary to 

increase the degree of conservatism by using a dose of 25 mrem in the final RQ 

calculations. 

EPA disagrees that "the only exposures of interest in developing the RQs 

for radionuclides" are short-term exposures. It is important to clarify that 

CERCLA section 103 also requires reporting of continuous releases, which could 

result in exposures that are not necessarily short-term. 

T-31 
P.97 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 12 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: ALIs 

Comment: 

While you have relied upon some of the work of the ICRP, i.e., 

determination of ALIs, these ALIs have been misapplied to an environmental 

release and the ICRP guidance on environmental releases has been ignored as is 

detailed in the comments below. 

It is stated that for the Selected Approach, ALIs developed by the ICRP 

were adjusted to reflect the difference between the intake levels (ALIs) and 

release levels, and a lower dose equivalent (500 millirem). First, the ALIs 

published by the ICRP are in becquerels not curies (a minor point but it is 

stated incorrectly in 52 FR 8172). Second, the ICRP published ALIs are 

intended as a system of dose limitation for workers, not environmental 

releases. The ICRP, in Publication 29, "Radionuclide Release in the 

Environmental Assessment of Doses to Man," made recommendations for 

environmental assessments of radioactivity. The recommendations are not 

incorporated into the proposed rule. 

Response: 

ALIs published by the ICRP in Publication 30 are, indeed, in becquerels 

and the referenced statement has been changed accordingly in the final rule. 

Becquerels, however, are easily converted to curies through multiplication of 

the number of becquerels by 2.703 x 10"11. In the final rule establishing the 

adjusted RQs, the final radionuclide RQs are presented in units of curies and 

becquerels. 

The ICRP in Publication 29, "Radionuclide Release into the Environment: 

Assessment of Doses to Man," describes a general methodology for setting 

limits on deliberate releases of radioactive materials into the environment 

and for planning interventions after accidental releases. It is important to 

clarify that the methodology spelled out in Publication 29 is a conceptual one 

rather than a detailed methodology specifying procedures and values to use in 

dose calculations. Among other things, the ICRP suggests: 

o Use of dose-equivalent as a measure of the likely 

consequences of the distribution of radioactive material 

(the publication does not, however, suggest a particular 

dose-equivalent level); 

o Use of mathematical models using realistically 

conservative assumptions in order to characterize the 

radioactive materials released, the transport media, 

T-32 
P.98 

Response Number: 12 (continued) 

the exposure pathways, and man's intake and metabolism (the 

ICRP suggests that "the model must account for the 

biogeochemical cycling and geophysical dissemination of 

radionuclides in both terrestrial and aquatic environments"); 

and 

o Use of the gaussian plume formula for calculation of 

downwind concentrations of radionuclide subsequent to a 

release. 

The authors of ICRP Publication 29 assume that releases are from a fixed 

"nuclear facility" and, as a result, use a point of release to point of 

exposure distance that might exist at a fixed facility with a relatively large 

buffer area (1000 meters). The ICRP also suggests modifications to the basic 

methodology outlined above to take into account site-specific conditions, 

emphasizes the value of monitoring in dose assessment, and suggests other dose 

assessment procedures that may be appropriate for individual facilities. 

Contrary to the statement of the commenter indicating that the ICRP 

recommendations were not incorporated into the proposed rule, it is clear from 

the foregoing that, where applicable, ICRP's methodology was incorporated: 

o A dose-equivalent level was chosen as a measure of the 

effect of ionizing radiation on the public; 

o Mathematical models were chosen using conservative 

assumptions for release, transport, and exposure; 

o Biological parameters implicit in the use of ALIs were 

applied to individual radionuclides and geochemical 

(e.g., retardation) factors and geophysical (e.g., 

meteorological) factors were applied where appropriate; 

and 

o A gaussian plume model was used for atmospheric releases 

incorporating stable meteorological conditions and a 

ground level release. 

The release and exposure scenarios evaluated in the adjustment of RQs 

were intended to be applicable broadly, yielding RQs that would (to the extent 

possible) ensure timely reporting for releases from large fixed facilities, as 

well as from small facilities without large buffer zones. The Agency 

believes, therefore, that a distance shorter than 1000 meters is more 

appropriate for the adjustment of RQs. Additionally, considering the generic 

nature of the scenarios analyzed, it was not possible to incorporate sitespecific factors or monitoring data. Site-specific factors and monitoring 

data, along with other factors related to the release, would be evaluated by 

the appropriate government authority in determining what response (if any) 

should be taken. 

T-33 
P.99 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 13 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: ALIs 

Comment: 

In addition, ICRP Publication 42, "Major Concepts and Quantities in Use 

by ICRP," states "The proper procedure is to carry out such evaluations to 

derive values of committed dose equivalent per unit intake for population 

groups markedly different from adults, particularly infants and children, 

using the same principles as Committee 2 used to calculate the values for 

workers, but applying the appropriate biological parameters and taking account 

of the physio-chemical forms of radionuclides likely to be encountered in the 

public environment." 

These cautionary statements need to be incorporated into the designation 

of the critically exposed individual. 

Response: 

EPA does not believe that it is appropriate to base a reportable quantity 

rule for radionuclides on the critically exposed individual. This approach, 

in general, would lead to lower RQs and an increase in reports of releases to 

which the government would not be likely to respond. For example, the Agency 

at one time considered dividing the ALIs by 2 in. order "to adjust the 

occupational values, which were derived for adults, so that they are 

applicable to other age groups." the Agency considered but rejected this 

approach because it adds another layer of conservatism to already conservative 

models. 

RQs are reporting triggers only; an evaluation of the actual risk of 

exposure is performed on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate government 

authority in order to determine the need for response actions. 

In addition, the Agency rejected the approach of using specific physiochemical forms of radionuclides to derive the RQs. That approach would have 

led to multiple RQs for each radionuclide and., therefore, would be more 

complicated to administer. In developing the RQs, the Agency selected the 

most conservative ALI for each radionuclide and left it to the appropriate 

government personnel to evaluate the need for a response (based, in part, on 

the physio-chemical form actually released). 

T-34 
P.100 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

L3 

4 

Response Number: 14 

James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Model Assumptions: ALIs 

The definition of ALIs (at the beginning at the bottom of the third 

column on page 8177) is incorrect, particularly the use of the term "whole 

body" with the term "committed effective dose equivalent." The first 

definition of ALI should read "... a committed effective dose equivalent of 5 

rem (stochastic ALI)." The purpose of the effective dose equivalent is to 

replace the dose to whole body, which is not a meaningful concept for 

nonuniform irradiations of the body from internal emitters. The term "whole 

body" should not be used in conjunction with "effective dose equivalent." 

Response: 

The definition of ALI referred to by the commenter is the definition used 

by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 51 FR 1092 (January 9, 1986). EPA 

believes this definition is correct. 

T-35 
p.1 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 15 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Comment: 

The current selection of modifiers to the ALI values seems arbitrary, 

e.g., the selection of an exposure point as 30 m downwind. While cordons 

around a release of a chemically hazardous substance may be generally 30 m 

from the release, radionuclides are seldom involved in releases of hazardous 

chemicals. Before a release quantity that will result in an established dose 

can be determined, the potential receptor and the environmental conditions 

must be very carefully defined. 

Response: 

The Agency does not agree that the 30 meter distance downwind is an 

arbitrary parameter for incorporation into the exposure models. Furthermore, 

the Agency did not mean to imply that radionuclides are likely to be involved 

in chemical hazardous substance releases. 

The Agency has developed release scenarios that are believed to be 

conservative but reasonable representations of potential release events. 

Thirty meters was selected as the assumed distance from the point of release 

to the point of exposure. A longer or shorter distance, in reality, could be 

relevant. Most nuclear power plants have restricted areas around a facility 

much greater than 30 meters; many facilities such as hospitals, have no 

restricted area and 30 meters arguably could be too far. In developing RQs, 

the Agency is establishing reporting triggers that will be sufficiently 

protective but not overly burdensome to industry or the government. After a 

release of an RQ or more is reported to the National Response Center, 

appropriate government personnel will evaluate the release conditions 

(including the actual distance from the point of release to the receptor) to 

determine the need for a federal, state, or local response. 

T-36 
P.2 

Commenter Number: 13 Response Number: 16 

Page: 4/5 

Commenter Name: Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Comment: 

The choice of 30 meters for the contaminated drinking water pathway is 

unrealistic for any facility. The likelihood of such a well location is 

extremely remote for a nuclear power facility. The reason given for this 

selection, "for consistency with the atmospheric model," is without a rational 

basis. There is no scientific basis for such "consistency." 

Direct exposure calculated at 30 meters is inappropriate for a nuclear 

power facility. EPA should look at site data for licensed nuclear power plant 

facilities to determine appropriate values. 

The Atmospheric Relative Concentration Value (X/Q) used for calculation 

of the Inhalation RQ is based on an assumed distance between the release point 

and the unrestricted area of 30 meters. This distance is inappropriately low 

for nuclear power facilities. 

The 30 meter distance is too conservative. Certainly one meter would 

correspond to a work-place environment, not an exposure to the public. 

Response: 

The Agency does not agree that the incorporation of a 30 meter distance 

in the drinking water exposure pathway is without a rational basis. It is 

possible that a release of a radionuclide into the ground could migrate and 

contaminate a drinking water well 30 meters away. Furthermore, it is 

important to emphasize that the RQs were not specifically developed for 

nuclear power facility releases, but rather were developed to be broadly 

applicable for all radionuclide releases. The radionuclide release scenarios, 

therefore, represent potential release conditions for all types of facilities 

and vessels that potentially could release radionuclides at levels equal to or 

exceeding an RQ. The scenarios are conservative so that the National Response 

Center will receive notification of most releases for which a government 

response may be warranted. Because the models derive RQs applicable to 

releases from a wide variety of facilities, EPA acknowledges that the models 

do not represent all potential release events accurately. However, due to the 

administrative complexity involved in developing different RQs for different 

types of facilities, the Agency relied on conservative models for the 

inhalation, ingestion (vegetable and drinking water), and direct exposure 

pathways to determine the reporting trigger (i.e., the RQs), and then relies 

on the appropriate government official to evaluate the need for a response 

(based on the actual release conditions) once notification occurs. 

Also see "Model Assumptions - Response 15." 

T-37 
P.3 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 17 

Page: 4 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Comment: 

However, we believe that EPA's proposed reportable quantity rules for 

radionuclides can be improved in several respects. First, EPA should 

recognize that some of its exposure assumptions -- including (1) the 

assumption of a 30-meter distance between the point of release and exposure, 

and (2) the uniform assumption of a point source of release -- are highly 

unrealistic for many kinds of releases. The 30-meter distance assumption is 

simply inapplicable in the case of releases from elevated sources, as is the 

point source release assumption in the case of emissions from large, uniform 

areas such as coal ash sites. The Agency should therefore revise its 

assumptions for such releases. 

Response: 

As explained in "Model Assumptions - 16," the Agency does not believe 

that an assumption of 30 meters between the point of release and the point of 

exposure is unreasonable. There are facilities that potentially could release 

radionuclides that do not have restricted areas and so could expose an 

individual located 30 meters away to a radiation dose (e.g., medical 

facilities, clinics). The Agency acknowledges that its exposure scenarios are 

not appropriate for all release situations at all facilities that potentially 

could release radionuclides. The Agency made conservative assumptions so that 

the government would be notified in a timely manner of most releases that may 

warrant a response. 

The Agency also acknowledges that there are certain releases over an RQ 

to which the government would never respond and, therefore, that should not 

need to be reported to the National Response Center. In particular, releases 

of naturally occurring radionuclides (radon, in particular) from large, 

generally undisturbed land holdings (e.g., golf courses and parks), activities 

that involve the disturbance of land for purposes other than mining (e.g., 

tilling or excavation associated with farming and construction), and coal and 

coal ash piles fall into this category. These releases have been granted an 

administrative exemption from CERCLA's notification requirements (see 

"Exemptions/Exclusions -- Responses 2 and 6"). 

See also "Inhalation Pathway - Response 1" and "Inhalation Pathway -

Response 3". 

T-38 
P.4 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

2 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Response Number: 18 

Page 8180, 3rd column, top. We are not convinced that a distance of 

thirty meters is necessary to protect the public. On the other hand, an 

exposure distance of one meter is unrealistic. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 16." 

T-39 
P.5 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

23 

3 

C O . Woody 

Group Vice President 

Nuclear Energy 

Florida Power and Light Company 

Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Response Number: 19 

FPL is in disagreement with the proposed assumption and use of thirty 

meters in determining the release values. At a nuclear power plant, the 

actual distance between a release source and the nearest receptor may be many 

times that distance. Consequently, FPL would propose that any reportable 

quantity be adjustable to account for realistic conditions rather than 

excessively conservative assumptions. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 16." 

T-40 
P.6 

Commenter Number: L2 Response Number: 20 

Page: 1/2 

Commenter Name: Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mallinckrodt Inc. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: 30 Meters 

Comment: 

You indicate in the proposed rule that a distance of 30 meters was used 

as a conservative distance which would be cordoned off in an accident 

situation. This distance is not consistent with most guidelines that are used 

in the field. The Department of Transportation has developed an Emergency 

Response Guidebook (DOT-P5800.2) that was distributed to over 500,000 law 

enforcement and emergency response personnel across the country. This 

guidebook, or ERG, is also used by CHEMTREC, the Chemical Manufacturers 

Association emergency response assistance program. The ERG suggests moving 

people to 150 ft. from any spill in an upwind direction. Considering the 

widespread distribution and use of the ERG, EPA's use of 30 meters from the 

accident in a downwind direction, rather than the suggested 150 ft. upwind, is 

inappropriate. The RQ values should be recalculated to reflect this more 

realistic value. Even assuming that the guidelines were not followed 

immediately, it is safe to assume that as soon as the first emergency 

responder arrived on the scene, the guidelines in the ERG would be followed. 

Response: 

EPA acknowledges that the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook recommends 

that unnecessary people be kept at least 150 feet (45 meters) upwind from 

releases of 3 categories of nuclear material. However, for 11 other 

categories of nuclear material, the Guidebook does not specify a single 

evacuation or isolation distance; it simply recommends that unnecessary people 

be kept "away," that the hazard area be isolated, and that entry to the area 

be denied. Furthermore, a distance of 30 meters is well within the range of 

isolation distances recommended in the Guidebook for releases of hazardous 

chemicals (not radionuclides). For small leaks of hazardous chemicals, for 

example, the recommended initial isolation distances range from 9 meters to 

180 meters, and for large spills, the recommended initial isolation distances 

range from 20 meters to 380 meters. Approximately 44 percent of the initial 

isolation distances recommended for releases of hazardous chemicals is in the 

0-30 meter range. Therefore, the 30-meter distance is not as conflicting with 

the DOT Guidebook and not as unrealistic as the commenter suggests. Also, the 

RQs were developed assuming no response has occurred. Without notification, 

there is no guarantee evacuation would take place. 

See also "Model Assumptions - Response 16." 

T-41 
P.7 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 21 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Model Assumptions: 24 Hour Exposure 

Comment: 

The inhalation release value seems to assume both continuous release and 

continuous exposure. Fixed facilities using radioactive materials will have 

an allowable effluent release limit (10 CFR 20 or equivalent) that, as a 

federally permitted release, is exempt from CERCLA. Any continuous release 

would be required to be less than the 10 CFR 20 allowable limit. The RQ 

values should be calculated for accidental releases (i.e., short duration). 

Exposure times should also take into account evacuation especially at 30 m 

from the source. Inhalation doses are dependent not only on the air 

concentration, but also on the duration of the exposure. 

Response: 

While the Agency agrees that inhalation doses are dependent on the 

duration of the exposure, inhalation release values are totally independent of 

the duration of exposure. The amount of material necessary to produce a doseequivalent of 500 millirem could be inhaled in a matter of seconds or over 24 

hours. Accordingly, the inhalation exposure pathway model does not include a 

term for the exposure period and, as a result, takes into account sudden 

episodic releases as well as slower releases over a period up to 24 hours. 

There is a 24 hour limit because, for a release of an RQ or more to be 

reportable, the release must occur within a 24 hour period. It is useful to 

clarify, however, that this 24-hour limit applies to the implementation of 

RQs, not to the development of inhalation release values. This point is 

clarified in the final rule. 

RQs pertain to both continuous releases and episodic releases. Not all 

radionuclide releases are limited by 10 CFR Part 20. For example, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission does not regulate Naturally Occurring and AcceleratorProduced Radioactive Material (NARM) and, therefore, releases of NARM from 

Commission licensees could be either continuous or episodic, but are not 

federally permitted. RQs are developed to cover a variety of facilities and a 

variety of release events. 

Evacuation in the vicinity of a release may occur only if a notification 

of the release is made. RQs are designed to ensure that the government is 

notified that a release has occurred and to give the government the 

opportunity to decide whether or not a response is necessary. One possible 

response to such a release might be evacuation, but notification must be made 

before this or any other response can be put into effect by the government. 

T-42 
P.8 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

13 

5 

Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor and Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Model Assumptions: 24 Hour Exposure 

Response Number: 22 

The assumption of exposure period should be tied to an assumption of 

release period. The time interval associated with the RQ does not appear to 

be specified in the proposed rule. For instance, allowable nuclear plant 

releases' over a six month operation period would be expected to exceed the RQ 

for certain radionuclides. 

* 

Response: 

In order to be reportable, an RQ or more of a hazardous substance must be 

released in a 24-hour period. This time interval, which was stated in the 

proposed radionuclide RQ rule, also is stated clearly in the final rulemaking. 

A release over a longer period that equals or exceeds an RQ need not be 

reported unless an RQ or more was released during any 24 hours within that 

longer period. For further discussion of "Determination of When a Reportable 

Quantity Has Been Released," see 50 FR 13463 (April 4, 1985). 

T-43 
P.9 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

14 

4/13-14 

Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 23 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Model Assumptions: 24 Hour Exposure 

EPA should make clear that the established 24-hour release period remains 

applicable for RQs established under this rule. 

In discussing the exposure period used in EPA's direct exposure 

assumptions for setting reportable quantities, EPA comments that "an 

assumption of six months or one year of exposure may be more appropriate than 

a 24-hour exposure period." This statement presumably does not indicate that 

the Agency is contemplating a release period of longer than 24 hours for 

radionuclides since such a period would be incompatible with the 24-hour 

period established in the regulations (40 CFR Section 302.6(a)), which EPA 

does not propose to amend. In any event, if EPA were to extend the release 

period used for the RQs, it would have to raise the numerical level of the RQs 

to avoid excessive and unnecessarily burdensome reporting requirements and to 

ensure that the CERCLA requirements are not applied to releases that present 

no health or safety concerns. 

Furthermore, the 24-hour period is consistent with the exposure 

assumptions that EPA uses in this rulemaking. The Agency has found that "it 

is unlikely that exposure [to a radionuclide release] will occur over more 

than a 24-hour period without a person moving outside of the radiation range." 

EPA concluded in light of this finding that its 24-hour exposure assumption 

"is conservative" and "allows for a maximum exposure time for a release." 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 22." The following response also 

applies to this comment. 

EPA agrees that the 24-hour period of exposure is appropriate for 

calculation of release values in those models that do not mandate some other 

period of time (e.g., ingestion of well water). It is important to note that 

there is a difference between the period of exposure and the period of 

release. All releases must be measured over a 24-hour period to determine if 

the RQ has been exceeded. Exposure, however, can occur over a longer period, 

reflecting the fact that some releases can pose a potential hazard well beyond 

the release period. For example, some"radionuclides released to ground water 

could take over a year to reach and pass a well 30 meters away from the point 

of release. Similarly, radionuclides deposited (released) on vegetables could 

be consumed over a period longer than 24 hours. The period of exposure and 

the period of release, therefore, are not identical necessarily. 

T-44 
P.10 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

3 

Response Number: 24 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Model Assumptions: 24 Hour Exposure 

Page 8180, 3rd column, middle. Since reduced reporting requirements are 

available for releases that are "continuous" or "stable in quantity and rate," 

it would be inappropriate to use 6 months or a year. In few cases could 24 

hours be justified. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions 

Response 23." 

Response 22," and "Model Assumptions -

T-45 
P.11 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

L2 

2 

Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mallinckrodt Ine. 

Response Number: 25 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Model Assumptions: 24 Hour Exposure 

The EPA exposure models use a duration of 24 hours. It is unreasonable 

to assume that the exposure to a radioactive materials accident [would] 

continue unabated for a period of 24 hours. At a fixed facility, steps would 

be taken, in all but the most severe accidents, to terminate the release of 

materials well before 24 hours. Most major facilities have well rehearsed 

radiological contingency plans to deal with this situation. Most accidental 

releases would be terminated shortly after their occurrence. In the case of a 

transportation accident, it is not realistic to assume that members of public 

will stand in close proximity to the accident, in the downwind direction for 

24 hours. A more realistic time of perhaps one hour or less would be more 

appropriate. 

Response: 

See "Model Assumptions - Response 23." 

Also, the release scenarios are conservative to ensure that timely 

reporting occurs. Without such reports, the accident might continue unabated. 

Because a wide variety of facilities could release radionuclides under very 

different circumstances, the Agency has developed models for the inhalation, 

ingestion (vegetable and drinking water), and direct exposure pathways. These 

models are conservative and are used to derive reporting triggers so that 

timely reports will be received by the National Response Center about 

radionuclide releases from facilities or vessels that could require a 

government response. 

T-46 
P.12 

Commenter Number: 1 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: Garris D. Parker, Jr. 

Department Head, Radiation Protection Department 

The Wellcome Research Laboratories 

Burroughs Wellcome Co. 

Issue: Radioactive Decay 

Comment: 

The modelling for inhalation, ingestion and direct exposure is a good 

approach. In order to make it more realistic, however, we suggest that . 

effective half-lives (physical and biological) be incorporated into the models 

for inhalation and ingestion. We realize this will significantly increase the 

complexity of the models, but will lead to more realistic results. 

We agree with your choice of the annual limits of intakes (ALIs) as 

presented by ICRP. These are safe values. 

Response: 

The Agency agrees with the commenter that ignoring radioactive decay in 

the calculation of RQs may lead to results that are overly conservative for 

some radionuclides. For this reason, radioactive decay has been incorporated, 

where appropriate, into the calculations used to determine final RQs for the 

757 radionuclides. 

For the inhalation pathway model and the pathway model for direct 

exposure due to submersion in an airborne cloud, the Agency has decided to 

continue to ignore the effects of radioactive decay. Both of these pathway 

models consider exposures to an airborne plume of radionuclide; however, the 

period of release and exposure - - and hence the extent of radioactive decay 

over these periods -- cannot be defined. For example, a short-lived 

radionuclide could undergo significant decay if the release and exposure 

periods were one day, but decay would be much less if a time period of one 

hour or one minute was considered. Because it is not possible to establish 

bounds oh the range of release and exposure periods, the Agency assumes 

conservatively that no decay occurs over these periods. EPA also ignores 

decay over the period of radionuclide transport to the point of inhalation or 

submersion in a cloud. This approach is adopted because transport to a 

location 30 meters from the point of release occurs in a matter of seconds, 

and decay would be negligible for all but a handful of radionuclides. 

Biological half-life, the time required for normal biological processes, 

such as excretion, to reduce the quantity of radionuclide present in the 

exposed individual by half, is conservatively accounted for in the inhalation 

pathway by basing the calculation upon the most conservative ALI given in 

terms of elimination rates, i.e., D (days), W (weeks), or Y (years). For the 

direct exposure pathway, biological half-life is not applicable because the 

radionuclide is neither ingested nor inhaled. In the case of ingestion, 

T-47 
P.13 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

biological half-life is highly dependent upon the physical and chemical nature 

of the radionuclide. The assumption implicit in the calculations is that the 

chemical and physical form with the longest biological half-life is ingested. 

This conservative approach assures that the RQ is set low enough to require a 

report for an event that might have serious health or environmental 

consequences because of a relative long biological half-life. 

T-48 
P.14 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

7 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 2 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Radioactive Decay 

The EPA methodology was discussed in the proposed rule and has been 

described in detail elsewhere (6). Critical to the applicat ion of the method 

are the conditions and assumptions used to derive the maximum release values 

from established intake values. In all three pathway scenarios, the 

radioactive decay of a specific radionuclide was not explicitly considered in 

the equation. If the transit time along the pathway is equal to or greater 

than the half-life, activity levels were overestimated (conservative). 

Response: 

The Agency agrees with the commenter that ignoring radioactive decay in 

the calculation of RQs may lead to results that are overly conservative for 

some radionuclides. The Agency now has incorporated radioactive decay into 

the exposure models whenever appropriate. 

For further details, see the Technical Background Document supporting the 

final rule and "Radioactive Decay - Response 1." 

T-49 
P.15 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

L2 

3 

Roy W. Brown, Manager 

Regulatory Compliance 

Mallinckrodt Inc. 

Radioactive Decay 

Response Number: 3 

Radiopharmaceuticals typically have half-lives ranging from several hours 

to a few days. None of the calculations performed in the adjustments of the 

RQs contained a correction for radioactive decay over the exposure period. 

When looking at some of the radioisotopes such as 1-123 and Tc-99m, a 

significant error can be introduced when the half-life correction is 

neglected. If the half-life correction were used, the RQ for 1-123 would be 2 

times higher. The Tc-99m RQ would be 4 times higher. This significant error 

in the calculation is not justified since the calculation itself is easy to 

perform. EPA should go back and adjust the isotopes where the half-life 

correction significantly impacts the RQ value. 

Response: 

The Agency agrees with the commenter that ignoring radioactive decay in 

the calculation of RQs may lead to results that are overly conservative for 

some radionuclides. The final RQs, therefore, have been recalculated 

incorporating the effects of radioactive decay, where appropriate. 

For further detail, see "Radioactive Decay - Response 1." 

T-50 
P.16 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 4 

Page: 3-4 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Radioactive Decay 

Comment: 

Radioactive decay is not considered in the dose-assessment models used to 

obtain the RQs from the given dose limit. This is not an unreasonable 

approach jLf the RQ is determined by the dose from the inhalation pathway 

because of the short time delay between release and exposure and because of 

the relatively minor importance for inhalation dose of short-lived daughter 

products which might build up over that time. (This conclusion does not apply 

to radon daughter products.) However, radioactive decay could be important 

for external exposure and ingestion pathways. For external exposure, the dose 

from a given radionuclide often is determined primarily by the decay of shortlived daughter products, so the ingrowth and decay of such daughters should be 

considered in the dose calculations. Calculation of dose for the ingestion 

pathway should consider the time delay between release and ingestion due to 

migration through groundwater, storage of foodstuffs, etc., following an 

assumed release to groundwater. For drinking water pathway, the transit time 

of water from the release point to the well can be significant, and 

appreciable decreases in radionuclide concentrations can occur during this 

time if the half-life is comparable to or less than the radionuclide travel 

time to the well. Thus, the effects of radioactive decay on the RQs should be 

examined for those radionuclides where the RQ is determined by the external 

exposure or ingestion pathways. Including radioactive decay in the pathway 

models is not a major effort, and probably should be included for all pathway 

analyses. The proposed rule also comments that ignoring radioactive decay 

provides a conservative approach in estimating RQs, i.e., including decay 

would increase the RQs for some short-live radionuclides. However, 

consideration of radioactive decay may decrease RQs for some radionuclides, 

particularly long-lived members of the complex decay chains of the actinides 

and their daughter products. 

Response: 

The Agency agrees with the commenter that ignoring radioactive decay in 

the calculation of RQs may lead to results that are overly conservative for 

some radionuclides. The final RQs, therefore, have been recalculated to 

incorporate the effects of radioactive decay into the relevant exposure 

pathway models. 

For further detail, see "Radioactive Decay - Response 1." Additionally, 

radioactive daughters of short-lived radionuclides (including radon daughters) 

are accounted for in the ALIs used in the calculations for the determination 

of RQs based on inhalation and ingestion. 

T-51 
P.17 

Commenter Number: 7 Response Number: 1 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: R.L. Arscott, Director 

Health, Environment and Loss Protection 

Chevron Corporation 

Issue: Specific RQs: Thorium 

Comment: 

Our second concern is with the inability of the National Emergency 

Response Center to gauge the magnitude of the incident and the level of 

response needed from the reporting of the release of one or more reportable 

quantities. We recognize that an uncontrolled release of large quantities of 

high specific activity naturally occurring radioactive materials could 

represent an event of major importance requiring an immediate maximum effort. 

Chevron also feels that the Agency should recognize that the release of a 

similar quantity of low specific activity material presents a much lower level 

of immediate hazard, but that both situations may require immediate, lengthy, 

and expensive remediation. 

For example, consider the release of one RQ of thorium in a solid matrix. 

The RQ for thorium, 0.001 curie, is among the most restrictive contained in 

the proposed rule due to retention in the lung. At concentrations 

occasionally encountered in the energy industry, 1000 pCi/gm, one RQ 

represents 1.1 tons of material. Dust from this material would have to 

approach 2 mg/m3, a visibly dusty condition, such as is seen in the mid and 

southwest to equal the limit set by the USNRC for release into "unrestricted 

areas."1/ 

It is obvious that the response to our example should be significantly 

less drastic from that following the release of a matrix containing 10,000 

pCi/gm or 100,000 pCi/gm into the air environment. 

Response: 

An RQ for any individual substance, whether it be a chemical hazard or a 

radiological hazard, is set such that the government will be informed of a 

release in a timely fashion and have the opportunity to evaluate the 

circumstances surrounding the release in order to determine if a response is 

necessary. EPA recognizes that some releases may be more serious than others 

and that judgment is required to assess the seriousness of any release. The 

Agency wishes to clarify that it is the On-Scene Coordinator for the 

geographical area in which the release occurs, not the National Response 

Center, who determines the seriousness of the release and whether a federal 

response action should be taken. The commenter describes several release 

scenarios for thorium, some more serious than others. In each case, when an 

1 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2 

Column 1. 

T-52 
P.18 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

RQ for thorium is reached and a report made, the government will have the 

opportunity to evaluate the seriousness of the release and determine the level 

of response that may be required. 

Also, because it appears unlikely that 1.1 tons of material containing 

thorium or the RQ for thorium would be released in a 24 hour period, the RQ 

will not present a reporting burden. 

T-53 
P.19 

Commenter Number: 9 Response Number: 2 

Page: 2-3 

Commenter Name: W.B. Smalley, Sr. 

Program Manager 

Environmental Protection 

General Electric 

Issue: Specific RQs: Uranium Compounds 

Comment: 

In response to your request for comment on the methodology, we do not 

agree with the concept of setting a single RQ for each radionuclide. 

Differing chemical compounds containing the same radionuclide have vastly 

different radiotoxicities and fates in the environment. For example, uranium 

dioxide is an insoluble compound and would have almost no effect on 

groundwater compared with uranyl nitrate. Yet both compounds contain uranium. 

Further, the radiotoxicity of uranium taken into the body depends drastically 

on the chemical form and route of intake. For example, consider U-234, the 

limiting isotope found in commercial nuclear fuel fabrication plants. The 

Annual Limit of Intake (ALI) defined and computed by the International 

Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in reports 26 and 30 is a good 

index of relative hazard for material taken into the body. The ALI for 

ingestion of U308, a relatively insoluble form, is 7xl06 becquerels. ALI for 

inhalation of the same compound is IxlO3 Bq. Thus, the relative radiotoxicity 

for uranium compounds taken into the body has a range of a factor of 7000. 

The ALIs for ingestion or inhalation of soluble forms of uranium are 

intermediate to the extremes for insoluble uranium compounds characterized by 

u3o8. 

We suggest the EPA establish several RQs for uranium compounds --.one RQ 

for uranium compounds released into the air, another RQ for surface water 

releases and a third RQ for spills of uranium compounds. This special request 

is made for uranium compounds on the following basis: 

1. The general radiotoxicity for uranium compounds (in broad categories) 

is thoroughly developed by the ICRP. 

2. Uranium compounds are on the largest scale (by weight) of 

radioisotopes used in the U.S. industries. 

3. Uranium fuel cycle facilities have experienced ongoing environmental 

monitoring programs and would be able to differentiate airborne 

releases, surface water releases, and groundwater-releases to a high 

degree of reliability. 

4. Uranium fuel fabrication is an important part of the domestic U.S. 

nuclear electricity generation program. The fabrication of such fuel 

is taking place under a highly competitive international market. 

Unnecessary or over-regulation, including unduly low RQs, will reduce 

the competitiveness of U.S. industries in the world fuel markets and 

could lead to their extinction. 

T-54 
P.20 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

5. The range of radiotoxicity of uranium compounds and the range of 

their inherent mobility in environmental media (i.e., air, surface 

water, and groundwater) are not congruent with a single RQ 

methodology for triggering CERCLA reporting. Our concern is that 

with a single RQ, EPA and other government agencies would spend a 

large fraction of their time investigating reported releases which 

have minimum possibilities of affecting human health while diluting 

their resources for promptly investigating the few releases which 

might warrant intervention to protect public health. 

Response: 

Section 102(a) of CERCLA states, in part, that "The Administrator may 

determine that one single quantity shall be the reportable quantity for any 

hazardous substance, regardless of the medium into which the hazardous 

substance is released." The use of a single RQ for individual substances 

regardless of the media into which the release occurs was adopted to provide a 

relatively simple reporting system that does not unduly burden either EPA or 

the regulated community. For a further discussion of this concept, see 50 FR 

13466 (April 4, 1985). 

In the case of all uranium isotopes (and the remainder of the 757 

radionuclides) release values were calculated for several media such as air 

and ground water, and the lowest release value was chosen as the basis for the 

RQ. This approach assures that the most critical exposure pathway examined by 

the Agency becomes the basis for the RQ. 

Finally, EPA recognizes that uranium fuel fabrication facilities are 

subject to the limitations in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 70, as well as other 

regulations implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A facility that 

is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or an Agreement State, and 

releases source, byproduct, and special nuclear material in compliance with 

its license or at levels that are less than an RQ above the licensed level, 

are exempt from reporting under CERCLA section 101(10)(K). Also, airborne 

releases of radionuclides in compliance with the relevant National Emission 

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) are exempt from reporting 

under CERCLA section 101(10)(H). These facilities are not expected to be 

burdened by the reporting requirements and RQ adjustments established in this 

rulemaking. More detailed discussion on this issue is presented in a Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking on Federally Permitted Releases (53 FR 27268, July 19, 

1988. 

T-55 
P.21 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

10 

4 

M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Specific RQs 

Response Number: 

It is not clear how placing each radionuclide in one of seven groups 

instead of assigning an RQ equal to the smallest release value simplifies 

anything. In meeting the objective of the triggering of appropriate 

notification if a release occurs, whether a group of radionuclides has the 

same RQ or if each radionuclide has a different RQ will not matter. After 

expending the effort to calculate release values for 757 radionuclides, 

listing the results of the calculation rather than an arbitrarily rounded off 

value seems appropriate. 

Response: 

The Agency does not agree that rounding down the release values for each 

radionuclide is arbitrary. The Agency believes that seven different RQs for 

757 radionuclides are administratively simpler than 757 RQs for 757 

radionuclides. Additionally, calculations based on models are only 

approximate, and setting individual RQs for each radionuclide implies a level 

of precision not justified by the calculations. Rounding down to the nearest 

decade is believed by the Agency to be conservative and to produce reasonable 

RQs. 

T-56 
P.22 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 4 

Page: 11-12 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Specific RQs: Radon 

Comment: 

Some utility facilities in which ash from the combustion of coal in power 

plants is stored or disposed of emit very small amounts of naturally occurring 

radionuclides such as radon-222. These landfill or impoundment sites 

typically range in size from 5 to upward of 100 acres. In particular, large 

coal ash disposal sites could be considered to emit radon-222 (in gaseous 

form) in amounts greater than the applicable proposed RQ (0.1 curies). These 

amounts are comparable to naturally occurring emissions from any large-acreage 

facility such as a golf course or cattle ranch. EPA's methodology for 

establishing the proposed RQ for radon-222 appears to be based on exposure 

assumptions that fail to take into consideration the extremely low level of 

emissions of radionuclides over large, uniform areas. Thus, use of EPA's 

methodology results in RQ values that are excessively conservative. 

Clearly, it would be inappropriate and excessively burdensome to require 

facilities with large acreages that emit small amounts of radon or other 

radionuclides into the ambient air, including utilities with coal ash disposal 

sites, to repeatedly notify EPA under CERCLA Section 103 of releases of 

radionuclides from their sites. 

Response: 

EPA recognizes that the model assumptions for airborne releases used in 

the calculation of final RQs (i.e., a ground level point source release) do 

not adequately represent releases over large, uniform areas. See "Inhalation 

Pathway - Response 1" and "Inhalation Pathway - Response 3" for a detailed 

response with respect to this issue. 

Furthermore, EPA recognizes that there may be some radionuclide releases 

for which reports to the National Response Center would serve no useful 

purpose. Accordingly, in response to requests from the public, EPA has 

exempted from CERCLA notification requirements the release of radionuclides 

resulting from the dumping of coal and coal ash, and radionuclide releases to 

all media from coal and coal ash piles, at utility and industrial facilities 

with coal-fired boilers (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2"). EPA also 

has exempted from CERCLA notification requirements the release of 

radionuclides from large undisturbed land holdings and from land disturbance 

activities (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 6"). 

T-57 
P.23 

Commenter Number: 24 Response Number: 5 

Page 1 

Commenter Name: Paul J. Merges, Ph.D. 

Chief, Bureau of Energy and Radiation 

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 

Issue: Specific RQs: Radium-226 and Radon-222 

Comment: 

The release of one curie of radium-226 is given the same significance as 

the release of 0.1 Ci of radon-222. This does not seem logical since the 

radium will produce the equivalent of one Ci of radon over hundreds of years 

as compared to radon which will decay within 38 days to less than one-one 

thousandth of its original value. Also, the radon is an inert gas and by 

itself is not a long term problem (less than one day) if discharged to water 

or air. Radium, on the other hand, will deposit out for surface water and 

will settle out of air causing long term problems. 

The low value for radon may also mean that facilities might have to be 

surveyed for continuous releases of radon. Iron ore tailings and vent shafts 

on mines are examples of items that might be covered. 

Response: 

While it is true that one curie of radium-226 will produce one curie of 

radon-222 given sufficient time (thousands of years), this radon will be 

produced slowly and, assuming that the radium-226 is uncontained, the radon 

will be present in only very low concentrations at any given time. A risk 

comparison of radium-226 and its decay to radon-222 over thousands of years on 

the basis of the RQs, therefore, is not valid. Furthermore, the final RQ for 

radium-226 is 0.1 Ci as mentioned in the response to "Specific RQs-7." 

EPA recognizes that the final RQ for radon is low enough that some 

sources, such as iron ore tailings piles and vent shafts on mines, will 

probably emit more than an RQ of radon within 24 hours. In response to this 

concern, EPA examined background information collected under the National 

Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) program to see if it 

provided a sufficient justification for administratively exempting radon 

releases from mineral extraction industries from the RQ reporting 

requirements. EPA has concluded that the NESHAPs background information does 

not support such an exemption at this time because (1) the radionuclide 

NESHAPs are being reevaluated as part of a voluntary remand; and (2) the 

NESHAPs program and CERCLA notification requirements have different purposes 

and objectives (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2" for more discussion 

on administrative exemptions). However, EPA believes that radon emissions 

from iron ore tailings piles and mine vent shafts would probably qualify as 

"continuous" and "stable in quantity and rate." Accordingly, these releases 

would probably qualify for the reduced reporting requirements under section 

103(f)(2) of CERCIA. 

T-5* 
P.24 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

13-15 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 6 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Specific RQs: Uranium-238 and its Decay Products 

The EPA determined release value for radioisotopes from the uranium-238 

series. For all but Pb-214, the critical release pathway is inhalation. 

Three isotopes have particularly low RQ values: Th-230, Ra-226, and Rn-222. 

In coal fly ash, concentrations of radionuclides of the U-238 series 

range from approximately 1.4 to 9 pCi/g fly ash. Bottom ash values range from 

1.8 to 10.6 pCi/g. For leachate solutions, such as ash ponds and slime waters 

contacting coal ash deposits, measured concentrations of U-238 series 

radionuclides are usually less than 10 pCi/L, typically less than 5 pCi/L. If 

one conservatively assumes that secular equilibrium was maintained through 

Ra-226, then the activities of the decay members should be of the same 

numerical value. 

If the activity of Th-230 is set at 5 pCi/g of fly ash, then the proposed 

RQ value (0.01 Ci) would apply to releases of fly ash of more than 2000 metric 

tonnes per day [(0.01 Ci)/(6 pCi/g) = 2 billion g/day = 2000 metric 

tonnes/day]. This amount exceeds any expected fly ash loss that could 

reasonably occur from an ash site and therefore the proposed RQ for Th-230 

should not affect these ash sites. Likewise, 1 billion liters per day of 

leachate solutions containing 10 pCi/L of Th-230 would have to be released in 

order to exceed the RQ value for Th-230. 

For Ra-226, the proposed RQ level (1 Ci) would apply to releases of more 

than 2 million metric tonnes of ash per day. If secular equilibrium of Ra-226 

and its decay products is assumed, the EPA has set the RQ value of the mixture 

at 0.43 curie. Assuming secular equilibrium, 86 million g/day (86,000 metric 

tonnes/day) of fly ash would have to be released to exceed the RQ value of 

0.43 curie. Release of leachate solutions containing 10 pCi/L of Ra-226 (in 

equilibrium with its decay products) would have to consist of 43 billion 

liters per day to exceed the RQ value (0.43 curie). Again, releases from a 

fly ash site would not be expected to approach the proposed RQ values and 

therefore the RQ value for Ra-226 should not affect ash sites. 

Little field information is available on radon emission from fly ash. 

Estimates from lab measurements range from 0.1 to 6 pCi/m2/sec. These can be 

compared to a calculated average radon emission rate from various U.S. soils 

of 0.7 pCi/m2/sec. Indeed, in its rulemaking on radionuclides pursuant to 

Paragraph 112 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA indicated that the radon-222 

"exhalation rate" for coal storage and waste piles at utility boiler sites is 

less than the exhalation rate for soil. 

T-59 
P.25 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

To best illustrate the effect the proposed RQ value would have, consider 

the average soil radon-222 emission rate (0.7 pCi/m2/sec). Based on the RQ 

value, and assuming that the CERCLA release reporting requirements applied to 

the soil, any facility containing more than 410 acres of land emitting radon 

at the average soil rate would exceed the release limit each day. It would 

appear that federal and state parks, private cattle ranches, golf courses, 

recreational areas, and other large land operations could exceed the proposed . 

RQ value for radon-222. 

Regarding an ash site, the total release of Rn-222 from an ash 

impoundment into the atmosphere depends on the area of the site (in addition 

to compensation density, water content, etc.). Using the proposed RQ value 

for radon-222 (0.1 curie) and a conservative assumption of 5 pCi/m2/sec 

radon-222 emission rate, any ash impoundment larger than 231,000 m2 (57 acres) 

would emit radon-222 on a daily basis in excess of the proposed RQ value for 

radon-222 (0.1 curie). This result occurs because the EPA calculated the RQ 

value using an unrealistically conservative model for uniform radioactive 

emission from a large surface area. Yet the actual expected exposure from 

these sites to a reference man would be orders of magnitude less than the 

levels used in the model. 

The problem arises from applying an inappropriate inhalation model to 

large land-based sites, such as ash sites, to calculate the RQ value for 

radon-222. One solution would be to re-evaluate the radon release value for 

the inhalation pathway given a large horizontal plane source (as discussed in 

an earlier section). Models incorporating horizontal plane sources are 

available in the literature. 

Another approach might be to consider that coal ash deposits cover 

radon-emitting soil. Therefore, the soil radon emission rate should be 

subtracted from the ash emission rate for an equivalent ash area. Where the 

radon emission rate from the ash is less than the soil emission rate, a net 

reduction in the radon emission would occur. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that the dispersion calculations performed for the inhalation 

pathway model are not valid for large land-based sites, such as ash sites. 

See "Inhalation Pathway -- Response 1" and "Inhalation Pathway -- Response 3" 

for a detailed response concerning the appropriateness of the inhalation 

pathway model. As discussed in these responses, EPA chose not to use a 

different modeling approach for large acreage releases because: (1) using 

multiple modeling approaches for different release configurations would result 

in multiple RQs for each radionuclide, which would add significant 

complications to the implementation of this rule; and (2) even if an areasource model were used, one could always argue that the model used was not 

directly applicable to their particular release situation. Therefore, the 

agency chose to use one, broadly applicable inhalation model (a model that 

T-60 
P.26 

Response Number: 6 (continued) 

assumes a point-source release) that yields RQs that will assure timely 

reporting for most conceivable release situations. 

Also, in response to this and similar comments, EPA notes that releases 

of naturally occurring radionuclides (e.g., radon) from large, generally 

undisturbed land holdings (e.g., parks, ranches, and golf courses) have been 

exempted I administratively from the CERCLA notification requirements (see 

"Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 6"). Also, EPA has exempted from CERCIA 

notification requirements the release of radionuclides resulting from the 

dumping of coal and coal ash, and radionuclide releases to all media from coal 

and coal ash piles, at utility and industrial facilities with coal-fired 

boilers (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2"). 

Although the commenter states that the proposed RQ for radium-226 (either 

by itself or in secular equilibrium with its daughters) should not affect fly 

ash sites, EPA wishes to point out the final RQ for radium is lower than the 

proposed RQ. Specifically, the final RQ for radium-226 alone is 0.1 Ci 

(rather than 1 Ci, the proposed RQ) and the final RQ for radium-226 in secular 

equilibrium with its dauthers is 0.053 Ci (rather than 0.43 Ci, the proposed 

RQ). This lowering was the result of a re-evaluation of the vegetable 

ingestion pathway calculations. 

T-61 
P.27 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 7 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Specific RQs 

Comment: 

Some of the RQs appear inconsistent. Examples of inconsistencies are: 

the RQs for Cs-131 (1000 Ci) and Cs-132 (10 Ci), a difference of a factor of 

100, when the annual limits of intake (ALIs) for these isotopes differ by only 

a factor of 10; the RQ for Kr-85 (100 Ci) may not be consistent with the EPA 

standard of 50,000 Ci/GWatt-yr for this isotope; and DOE sites with large 

controlled areas may routinely release radionuclides well in excess of the 

RQs. The validity of the differences between RQs for Ra-226 (1 Ci) and Rn-222 

and Rn-220 (0.1 Ci) are also questionable because the RQs for the radons would 

seem to be more logically set at one or two orders of magnitude larger. Also 

of concern are possible inconsistencies in the RQs for the following 

radionuclides: Kr-85, Kr-85m, and Xe-133, 100 Ci instead of 1000 Ci; and 

Rn-220 and Rn-222, 0.1 Ci instead of 1 Ci. 

Response: 

The Agency believes that the RQs for all 757 radionuclides are consistent 

with the models used to calculate them. The values recovered from the models 

depend upon the assumptions used within the models and, further, the RQs 

depend upon which model, under the given circumstances, produces the lowest 

release value. 

In the case of the final RQs for Cesium-131 (1000 Ci) and Cs-132 (10 Ci), 

the RQs are based upon inhalation and direct exposure, respectively. Cesium131 does not produce a gamma ray upon decay and, therefore, it is not possible 

to calculate a direct exposure release value. The inhalation release value 

for Cs-131, and therefore the RQ, is related directly to the ALI for 

inhalation for this radionuclide. Cesium-132 does produce a gamma ray upon 

decay and the relatively low RQ is based upon this fact; the RQ is unrelated 

to the inhalation ALI. 

With respect to emissions of Kr-85 relative to the EPA standard and 

emissions from large controlled areas at DOE facilities, the Agency emphasizes 

that only releases of an RQ or more above federally permitted levels are 

reportable. The Agency has determined that releases of source, byproduct, and 

special nuclear material from DOE facilities in compliance with DOE orders are 

federally permitted under CERCLA's section 101(10)(K). Furthermore, releases 

of any radionuclide from DOE in compliance with the National Emission 

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants are federally permitted under section 

101(10)(H). Therefore, the RQs will not conflict with federally permitted 

release limits and will not create a reporting burden for releases in 

compliance with those limits. 

T-62 
P.28 

Response Number: 7 (continued) 

The final RQ for Ra-226 is 0.1 Ci and is based on the vegetable ingestion 

pathway; it was lowered an order of magnitude from the proposed RQ based on a 

re-evaluation of the vegetable ingestion pathway calculations. The final RQs 

for both Rn-220 and Rn-222 are also 0.1 Ci, but are based on the inhalation 

pathway. The Agency believes that RQs accurately reflect the relative hazards 

of these nuclides given the modeling assumptions for the different exposure 

pathways. 

T-63 
P.29 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 8 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Specific RQs 

Comment: 

The table in Appendix B should include a column indicating the pathway of 

concern for each radionuclide. Such information would-facilitate more refined 

analysis of potential doses to exposed individuals and help focus further 

revisions to the RQs. 

Response: 

Tables of hazardous substances published in the Federal Register 

ordinarily do not contain information concerning the basis upon which the RQ 

was set (e.g., see Table 302.4, 50 FR 13475, April 4, 1985). This information 

for radionuclides could be found, however, in the "Technical Background 

Document to Support Proposed Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: 

Radionuclides." This document was available for inspection in Room LG-100, 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, SW, Washington, DC 20460. 

The Agency believes that the availability of this document provided ample 

opportunity for analysis of potential doses associated with the proposed RQs. 

A Technical Background Document supporting the final RQ adjustments also is 

available in the Superfund docket room (Room LG-100) and contains the 

background data on the pathways used to develop each final RQ. 

It is important to stress that the RQ assigned to a substance is not 

media-specific. Section 102(a) of CERCLA states that "The Administrator may 

determine that one single quantity shall be the reportable quantity for any 

hazardous substance, regardless of the medium into which the hazardous 

substance is released." Accordingly, EPA evaluated five exposure scenarios 

(each involving different exposure pathways and environmental media) for each 

radionuclide and selected the most critical scenario as the basis for the RQ 

for that radionuclide. Again, for more detail on these various exposure 

pathways, refer to the supporting Technical Background Document. 

T-64 
P.30 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 9 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Specific RQs 

Comment: 

Section II.A of the proposed rule discusses considerations of chemical 

toxicity, rather than radiation dose, in establishing final adjusted RQs for 

long-lived isotopes of uranium, particularly U-238. For a number of very 

long-lived radionuclides listed in Appendix B of the proposed rule, exposures 

probably should be limited by prevention of chemical toxicity rather than by 

radiation dose, i.e., the proposed RQ based on radiation dose probably is 

inadequate to prevent deleterious chemical effects. For example, the proposed 

RQ for Cd-113 based on radiation dose is one curie, but the half-life of this 

isotope is so long that the chemical effects of this highly toxic element 

probably are much more important than radiation dose at the levels of exposure 

used to define the RQ. Other examples of radioisotopes for which chemical 

effects might be more important than radiation dose include Be-10, Cl-36, In115, and Pb-205. EPA should carefully consider chemical toxicity vis-a-vis 

radiation dose for long-lived isotopes of elements that are known to be toxic 

at high doses. For compounds of uranium, calculations suggest that RQs of one 

and 1000 pounds for uranyl nitrate and uranyl acetate, respectively, would be 

consistent with RQs that the EPA has set for other hazardous chemicals. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that for some relatively long-lived and naturally occurring 

radioactive materials, the chemical toxicity may exceed the radiotoxicity. 

Two RQs may apply to the release of a substance containing radionuclides --

one RQ being based on chemical toxicity and the other being based on 

radiotoxicity. In such situations, the lowest applicable RQ for a substance 

governs when the owner or operator must report the release to the National 

Response Center. In this way, the RQs reflect the relative chemical toxicity 

and radiation hazard of a substance. 

For example, naturally occurring cadmium consists of roughly 12 percent 

cadmium-113, a radioactive isotope, and several other isotopes of cadmium that 

are not radioactive. The RQ for cadmium has been finalized at 10 pounds and 

the RQ for cadmium-113, just one component of naturally occurring cadmium, is 

0.1 Ci. A releaser of cadmium metal is required to report if either 10 pounds 

of the metal (if the diameters of the particles of the released metal are less 

than or equal to 100 micrometers) or 0.1 Ci of cadmium-113 (regardless of the 

particle size of the cadmium-113) is released. In this case, the RQ based on 

chemical toxicity is much more limiting than the RQ based on radiotoxicity (a 

release of 10 pounds of cadmium metal or 10 pounds of cadmium-113 constitutes 

far less than 0.1 Ci). For other materials, however, the RQ based on 

radiotoxicity is more limiting than the one based on chemical toxicity. In 

both situations, the lowest RQ applicable to the substance released would be 

the reporting trigger. 

T-65 
P.31 

Response Number: 9 (continued) 

Uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate are additional examples of substances 

with two applicable RQs, one based on chemical toxicity and the other based on 

radiation hazard. Both substances are specifically listed as CERCLA hazardous 

substances because they are included under section 311 of the CWA; however, 

they both consist of about 60 percent uranium-238, a radionuclide. Based on 

their chemical toxicity, uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate have a final 

adjusted RQ of 100 pounds (51 FR 34534, September 29, 1986). The final RQ for 

uranium-238, based upon radiological hazard, is 0.1 Ci, which is equivalent to 

roughly 660 pounds of uranium-238. Both the 0.1 Ci RQ for uranium-238 and the 

100 pound RQ are applicable to releases of uranyl acetate and uranly nitrate, 

but the 100-pound RQ will always trigger reporting first because it is the 

lower, more protective level. The RQ of 100 pounds will assure timely 

reporting of releases of uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate from both a 

radiological hazard and chemical toxicity standpoint. 

T-66 
P.32 

Commenter Number: 5 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1/2 

Commenter Name: Dennis Naff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company 

Issue: Inhalation Pathway 

Comment: 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company, a Division of Mobil Diversified 

Business owns and operates three phosphate rock mines in central Florida and 

fertilizer production facilities in Pasadena, Texas and DePue, Illinois. The 

phosphate rock mined in Florida as well as the ammonium phosphate fertilizer 

and by-product phosphogypsum produced from the phosphate rock contain very 

small levels of uranium-238 and its natural decay products. Due to the 

presence of these naturally occurring radioactive materials, radon is emitted 

from the phosphate rock and by-product phosphogypsum, and to a lesser extent, 

from the product fertilizer. Based on the available data, calculations show 

that the radon emissions from the three phosphogypsum storage areas in 

Pasadena and one storage pile in DePue will all exceed the reportable quantity 

for radon and so must be reported daily as a release. 

Also of concern is the method used to determine exposure. It appears 

that EPA used an average Gaussian plume model based on a ground level release 

for an area source. Since Mobil's gypsum piles, like most in the industry, 

average 100 feet in height, the vast majority of radon emissions would occur 

at elevations that allow significant dilution, and therefore, minimize 

downwind exposure to the general public. 

On the basis of this information, the 0.1 Cl reportable quantity for 

radon is not an appropriate method of determining if a release has occurred 

from any of the facilities discussed above. 

Response: 

[See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 1," with the following additional 

text.] 

If a radionuclide release exceeds the RQ on a daily basis, as might be 

the case for radon releases from phosphogypsum piles, the release would not 

necessarily have to be reported each day. In accordance with CERCLA section 

103(f)(2), daily reports of releases that exceed the RQ are not required as 

long as the releases are continuous and stable in quantity and rate. Radon 

releases from the facilities described by the commenter conceivably could 

qualify for the reduced reporting provisions under CERCLA section 103(f)(2). 

Owners or operators of such facilities, therefore, might have to report the 

radon releases only annually or whenever there is a statistically significant 

increase in the release. 

With respect to the comment on the applicability of the Gaussian plume 

model, EPA agrees that the dispersion calculations performed for this 

inhalation pathway model are not valid for a large storage pile. The Agency 

T-67 
P.33 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

emphasizes, however, that any single dispersion model will not be applicable 

to all possible release scenarios. For this reason, the Agency selected 

relatively conservative models to simulate release events and to calculate RQs 

that are applicable broadly. Models involving above-ground releases (such as 

from gypsum piles) were considered early in the radionuclide RQ adjustment 

process, but were rejected as not being sufficiently conservative for many 

releases. EPA believes that the complications added by having multiple RQs 

for different release configurations would outweigh the benefits to be gained 

by such an approach. 

EPA recognizes that there may be some radionuclide releases for which 

reports to the National Response Center would serve no useful purpose. 

Accordingly, in response to requests from the public, EPA has decided to 

exempt from the CERCLA notification requirements radionuclide releases from 

three sources (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2 and 6"). 

It should be noted, however, that some of the administrative exemptions 

suggested by commenters but not granted are unnecessary. For example, 

smokestack releases from coal-fired boilers have been evaluated by EPA. The 

quantity of radionuclides released from model facilities in a 24-hour period 

is far less than an RQ, thus negating any need generally for the boiler 

operators to report releases, and negating the need for any administrative 

exemption for such releases. Additionally, radionuclide releases that equal 

or exceed an RQ but are "continuous" and "stable in quantity and rate" may 

qualify for the reduced reporting requirements under section 103(f)(2) of 

CERCLA. 

T-68 
P.34 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

8 

1 

Mark A. Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Inhalation Pathway 

Response Number: 2 

Should the calculation of inhalation release values be included in the 

method of determining RQ values for radionuclides, then the ALI selected for 

this calculation should not be a constant based on the lowest value available 

for multiple-ALI nuclides listed in the ICRP 30. Either multiple RQ values 

should be listed for these nuclides, or there should be a provision in the 

regulations to allow an adjustment to be made to the RQ value based upon the 

specific chemical form, and then inhalation class using a different ALI, for 

the specific nuclide handled or transported. 

Although it may be difficult to adjust meterological conditions or other 

factors included in the calculations which have been made conservatively 

constant, selection of the most appropriate ALI for the appropriate inhalation 

class for a specific nuclide would introduce a means for determining more 

reasonable RQs for these nuclides. 

Response: 

For many radionuclides, several ALIs are given corresponding to different 

pulmonary clearance classes (D, W, and Y), or occasionally, for stochastic and 

non-stochastic effects. The Agency has used the lowest ALI value to calculate 

a release value and to determine an RQ. The RQ, then, is based on the most 

hazardous chemical form for every radionuclide. EPA believes that this 

approach, while conservative, is consistent with the purpose of RQs. Namely, 

it provides a single reporting trigger that should assure timely reporting in 

most circumstances. The specific circumstances surrounding a release will be 

taken into consideration by the government in its determination of the need 

for response, and the chemical form of the radionuclide will then be 

considered in more detail. The Agency has made an administrative decision to 

have a single RQ for each radionuclide; multiple RQs could be confusing and 

could lead to reporting delays. 

T-69 
P.35 

Commenter Number: 14 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

9-11 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Inhalation Pathway 

Response Number: 3 

For inhalation exposure, the Agency uses an "atmospheric relative 

concentration" that "corresponds to a ground-level relative concentration 30 

meters downwind from a ground-level release under stable meteorological 

conditions. Fossil fuel fired electric generating plants release, as a result 

of the combustion process, very small amounts of radionuclides to the ambient 

air at elevations well above ground level. Indeed, the smokestack for a 

500-megawatt boiler will typically be more than 100 meters in height, and the 

effective point of release for exposure modeling purposes could be 100 meters 

or more above stack top given the buoyant plume rise associated with such 

emissions. 

Given the elevated point at which the release occurs and the size of the 

typical power plant, it is also unrealistic to assume that the closest point 

of human inhalation is only 30 meters from the point of release. Indeed, in 

its radionuclide rulemaking under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA 

conservatively assumed that the most exposed individual would be located no 

closer than 750 meters from the plant. 

The Agency could address this problem either by calculating separate 

reportable quantities for ambient air emissions from fossil fuel fired power 

plants (and perhaps for ambient air releases from other elevated sources) or 

by making clear in its subsequent rulemaking on federally permitted releases 

that releases of radionuclides from power plant stacks are exempt from 

CERCLA's notification requirements as federally permitted releases. 

Response: 

As stated previously (see response "Inhalation Pathway - 1"), EPA 

realizes that any single atmospheric dispersion model, including the model 

used in the calculation of-the RQs, will not be applicable to all possible 

release scenarios. The Agency believes, however, that multiple RQs for 

different release configurations would cause significant complications and 

would be unnecessary given the purpose of RQs. Moreover, even if the Agency 

used many different models to develop RQs for different release scenarios, 

there would still be countless other scenarios for which the models would not 

be fully applicable. For these reasons, the Agency selected relatively 

conservative models to simulate release events and to calculate RQs that are 

broadly applicable (i.e., that would assure timely reporting in most 

circumstances). Models involving above-ground releases, such as from 

smokestacks, were considered early in the RQ adjustment process but were 

rejected as not being sufficiently conservative to lead to timely reporting 

for many releases. 

T-70 
P.36 

Response Number: 3 (continued) 

Much of the above rationale also applies to the issue of whether 30 

meters is an appropriate distance to assume in the calculation of RQs. EPA 

recognizes that potential receptors often will be located farther away from 

release points. In some circumstances, however, potentially exposed 

individuals may be located 30 meters from, and even closer to, the point of 

release (e.g., transportation-related releases and releases from medical 

facilities and research institutions). Furthermore, RQs also are intended to 

assure timely reporting in the event of significant environmental impacts, and 

environmental entities (i.e., plants, wildlife, and other natural resources) 

within 30 meters can be exposed regardless of the presence or absence of 

people. For these reasons, the Agency believes that the assumed distance of 

30. meters is appropriate for the development of RQs. 

Finally, the Agency has clarified in the preamble to the final rule 

adjusting radionuclide RQs that radionuclide emissions that are in compliance 

with limitations established under the Clean Air Act are federally permitted 

releases under section 101(10)(H) of CERCLA and, therefore, exempt from 

reporting under CERCLA. This point also is made in a recent Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 27268, July 19, 1988) on federally permitted 

releases. NESHAPs Background Documents1 also indicate that model utility 

boiler smokestack emissions are at levels below the radionuclide RQ and so 

reporting of these releases generally will not be required under CERCLA. In • 

addition, in response to this comment and other comments like it, EPA has 

decided to exempt from the CERCLA notification requirements radionuclide 

releases from three sources (see "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2 and 6"). 

1 EPA, 1980. Radiological Impact Caused by Emissions of Radionuclides 

into Air in the United States -- Preliminary Report. EPA 520/7-79-006. 

EPA, 1984. Radionuclides -- Background Information Document for Final 

Rules, Volume II. EPA 520/1-84-022-2. 

T-71 
P.37 

Commenter Number: 14 

Page: 13 

Response Number: 4 

Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Inhalation Pathway 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

EPA should revise its exposure model specifically to take into account 

emissions from large areas. For example, EPA should change the point source 

release assumption in the case of large area sources. In addition, EPA should 

adopt a correction factor to be applied to the proposed RQ for uniform 

emissions over large areas. Implementation of these recommendations would 

help ensure that the CERCLA Section 103 reporting requirements are not 

inappropriately applied to coal ash sites and large-acreage facilities 

emitting small amounts of naturally occurring radionuclides. 

Response: 

As discussed in "Inhalation Pathway - Response 1" and "Inhalation Pathway 

- Response 3," EPA believes that the complications added by having multiple 

RQs (or correction factors) for different release configurations would 

outweigh the benefits to be gained by such an approach. CERCIA allows for the 

adoption of a single RQ for each designated hazardous substance and, 

accordingly, the Agency selected relatively conservative models to calculate a 

single RQ for each radionuclide that would assure timely reporting in most 

release situations. 

T-72 
P.38 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 5 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Inhalation Pathway 

Comment: 

BID section on inhalation. EPA had considered setting RQs by dividing 

annual limitations of intake for inhalation (ALIs) by a constant, but rejected 

the approach. When their adopted approach is examined, the RQs are set by 

dividing the ALI by a constant times the release factor, which was developed 

for uranium fuel cycle facilities and is thus of questionable applicability. 

The constant comes from oversimplified assumptions made in the Chi over Q 

evaluation. The dispersion coefficients have been extrapolated beyond the 

range appearing in any of the standard references on the subject, which makes 

them highly suspect. Since they have assumed the worst case condition of 

ground release, they should have at least allowed for vertical dispersion to a 

breathing zone height of about 1.5 meters, which would increase the RQ by 

about 2.5 times. No decay, plume washout or ground deposition was allowed 

either, nor have ground effects on dispersion been included, which normally 

have pronounced effects on ground level releases. The approach is overly 

conservative, since it multiplies so many conservative assumptions together. 

Response: 

This comment raises several different issues. First, with respect to the 

applicability of the release fractions, the release fractions used in the 

adjustment of RQs (taken from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's NUREG-1140) 

were not developed strictly for uranium fuel cycle facilities. They were 

developed for fuel cycle facilities plus byproduct material licenses, 

including radiopharmaceutical manufacturers, radiopharmacies, sealed source 

manufacturers, and research laboratories. While the Agency recognizes that 

these release fractions do have some shortcomings for the purpose of RQs, they 

represent the only known attempt to quantify airborne release fractions for 

numerous radionuclides in a consistent manner. Short of adopting a uniform 

release fraction of one, therefore, EPA is unaware of any other scientifically 

defensible guidance on which to base release fractions for use in calculating 

RQs. Furthermore, the Agency wishes to stress that the models used in this 

analysis are not worst case models, rather they reflect conservative 

assumptions that the Agency considers reasonable and protective of human 

health and welfare and the environment. 

The Agency agrees that the dispersion coefficients used in the RQ 

calculations have been extrapolated beyond the range appearing in any of the 

standard references on the subject, which introduces a possible error in the 

results. The resulting dispersion coefficients, however, appear reasonable 

when compared to documented values for distances of 100 meters or more. In 

general, the Agency believes that there are overriding reasons to base the RQs 

T-73 
P.39 

Response Number: 5 (continued) 

on a 30-meter distance and that the possible error introduced by the 

dispersion coefficients estimated for this distance does not significantly 

undermine the RQs. 

Finally, with respect to the physical processes considered in the 

inhalation pathway model, the model does take into account plume dispersion in 

two directions (vertical and horizontal), but does not account for dispersion 

in the direction of flow. Dispersion in this direction is very much less than 

that provided by a one meter per second wind velocity and, under these 

circumstances, can be ignored safely in the model. Plume washout and ground 

deposition also were ignored in the calculation of inhalation release values 

and thus many RQs are lower than they would be if these factors had been 

included. The model assumes that the radionuclide in the plume is of 

respirable diameter (10 microns or less) and incorporates a release fraction 

to account for the percentage of a release that would be of this size. 

Particles or aerosols of this size generally are near neutral buoyancy and 

would not be expected to plate out on the ground significantly in the short 

distance of 30 meters to the receptor. Plume washout was not considered 

because, in the United States as a whole, days without rain outnumber days 

with rain and plume washout is an unpredictable factor. Radioactive decay 

also was not considered in the inhalation pathway model for two reasons. 

First, because it is not possible to establish bounds on the range of release 

and exposure periods, the Agency assumed that no decay occurs. Although this 

is a conservative assumption, it reflects the inability of models to 

accurately determine the extent of decay over an unknown period of time. 

Second, the Agency ignored decay that may occur over the period between 

release and inhalation or submersion in a cloud because decay during airborne 

transport to a receptor 30 meters away would be negligible for most 

radionuclides. 

Whenever a model is used to represent a wide variety of potential release 

situations, judgments must be made to establish the model parameters. The 

Agency developed models that were conservative so that it could be assured of 

timely reporting. Specific details that surround a release event will be 

evaluated by On-Scene Coordinators after the National Response Center is 

notified of the release. Regional On-Scene Coordinators will conduct hazard 

assessments to determine adverse impacts to human health, welfare, and the 

environment based on specific information on the release. 

T-74 
P.40 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

2 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Inhalation Pathway 

The reference conditions, assumptions, and methodologies were chosen such 

that the/ final RQ value for each radionuclide was a conservative value. 

However, for the inhalation pathway, the model assumed a point source of 

release, which is inappropriate for releases from coal ash sites. This 

assumption unreasonably overestimated (by approximately three orders of 

magnitude) the fraction of a radionuclide release over a large area that 

contributed to the exposure to a reference individual. 

For coal ash sites, radionuclide releases through the different pathways 

are substantially less than the proposed RQ values, except for radon-222 

emission, into ambient air. If estimates of radon-222 releases exceed the RQ 

value it| is because of the assumption of a point source release. For example, 

assuming that radon emission occurs continuously from ground surfaces to the 

atmosphere at an average rate of 0.7 pCi/m2/sec, national parks, golf courses, 

cattle ranches, and any facility containing more than 410 acres of land, could 

exceed the proposed RQ value for radon-222. 

Response: 

See "Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2 and 6" and "Inhalation Pathway -

Responses 1, 3, and 5" for a detailed response to the issues rased by this 

comment. In summary: 

o The existing inhalation pathway model, although 

not necessarily representative of releases from 

large area sources, is considered the best single 

model for purposes of developing RQs; 

o Releases from large area sources probably are 

continuous and stable in quantity and rate and 

thus probably could qualify for the reduced 

reporting provisions of CERCLA section 103(f)(2); 

and 

o EPA has exempted administratively releases of 

naturally occurring radionuclides from large, 

generally undisturbed land holdings, land 

disturbance activities, and coal and coal ash 

piles from the reporting requirements under 

CERCLA. 

T-75 
P.41 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

8-10 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 7 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Inhalation Pathway 

Using the model with a continuous point source release, atmospheric 

dilution of the released material occurs by lateral and-vertical diffusion 

along the pathway (30 m). The use of a point release into the air in the 

model, however, is an overly conservative way to describe a radionuclide 

release over a large horizontal area to a reference man 30 meters away. 

Realistically, a reference individual 30 meters from the edge of a large 

area uniformly releasing a radionuclide into the air would be exposed to the 

radionuclide equivalently released along a narrow strip directly upwind. 

Radionuclide diffusion out of this strip along the 30 m pathway would be 

counterbalanced by corresponding radionuclide diffusion into the strip from 

adjacent strips. Radionuclide release from areas further away than these few 

strips would contribute an insignificant fraction to the total radionuclide 

exposure to the reference individual. 

Furthermore, only the first 100 meters or so along the central strip 

significantly contribute to the radionuclide exposure to the individual. 

Radionuclide releases beyond 100 meters are increasingly diluted by diffusion 

along the extra path length. 

For the release of small amounts of radioactivity from large surface 

areas, more exact models for a horizontal plane source should be used. The 

resulting calculations from these models would have the effect of reducing the 

fraction of released material subject to inhalation by a reference individual. 

The smaller release fraction, in turn, would increase the inhalation release 

value for the specific radionuclide. 

The approximate increase in a more reasonable inhalation release value 

can'be estimated by setting the width of the center strip to 3 times the 

horizontal dispersion coefficient for 30 meters used by the EPA (3 x 2.6 m = 

7.8 m). The fraction of released radionuclides would be decreased by the 

ratio of the strip area (7.8 m x 100 m) to the total release area (in m2) . 

The inverse of this ratio is the relative increase in the inhalation release 

value (IRV): 

IRV (adjusted)/IRV (unadjusted) = Total Release Area (in m2)/780 

For sites with release areas of 800,000 m2 (200 acres), the maximum 

allowable inhalation release value would increase by a factor of 1,000. 

T-76 
P.42 

Response Number: 7 (continued) 

Alternately, a method described by Turner could be employed that treats 

a square area source as a cross-wind line source with a normal distribution. 

One then derives a virtual distance to be. added to the path length. This 

method also results in a relative increase in the inhalation release value by 

a factor of approximately 1000. For a 400 acre site, the relative increase in 

the release value is approximately 2000, in close agreement with the 

corresponding value from the "strip method" equation described above. 

Changing the point of exposure from ground level to between 1 and 2 

meters to take account of the person's height would result in diluting the 

radionuclide concentration in air, but only by less than a factor of 2. 

Furthermore, assuming natural atmospheric conditions is likely to result 

in an increased exposure estimate. If wind changes are considered, increasing 

wind velocity would tend to lower the released concentration at the point of 

exposure. Assuming that the wind is blowing in the opposite direction 50 

percent of the time would decrease the exposure level by half. 

Response: 

As stated previously, the Agency recognizes that the point source 

release model used in the calculation of inhalation release values is not 

representative of releases from area sources. The Agency also acknowledges 

that the alternative release models suggested by the commenter probably would 

yield more accurate results for area release sources. To adopt either of 

these models, however, would require assumptions about the size of the area 

source, as well as values for several other parameters. At present, the 

Agency has no data to judge how representative an area of 200 or 400 acres 

would be for area sources across the nation. Also, regardless of the area(s) 

selected for the calculation of RQs, one always could argue that their site is 

actually smaller or larger and, therefore, is not being considered fairly. 

Therefore, rather than attempt to tailor the RQs to different release 

situations and end up with multiple RQs for each radionuclide (a more 

complicated and confusing reporting trigger), the Agency has selected a single 

model that will help assure timely reporting in most situations including 

release from point sources. It also is important to add that releases from 

area sources probably could comply with the reporting requirements under 

CERCLA section 103(f)(2), making the reporting burden relatively small. 

Releases of naturally occurring radionuclides from certain area sources have 

been administratively exempted from the RQ reporting requirements (see 

"Exemptions/Exclusions - Response 2 and 6"). 

For more discussion of these issues see "Inhalation Pathway -

Response 6." 

T-77 
P.43 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

16 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 8 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Inhalation Pathway 

The reference conditions, assumptions and methodologies were chosen so 

that the final RQ value for each radionuclide was a conservative value. While 

some of these assumptions maybe appropriate in certain situations, the 

assumption of a point source release for the inhalation pathway unreasonably 

overestimated (by approximately three orders of magnitude) the fraction of a 

radionuclide release over a large area that contributes to the exposure to a 

reference individual. 

For coal ash sites, radionuclide releases through the different pathways 

are substantially less than the proposed RQ values, with the possible 

exception of radon-222 emission into ambient air due to improper modeling 

assumptions used to establish the RQ value. In fact, given the improper 

modeling assumptions, for an average soil release rate of 0.7 pCi/m2/sec for 

radon-222, national parks, golf courses, cattle ranches, and any facility 

containing more than 410 acres, could exceed the proposed RQ value of 

radon-222. 

A more appropriate model for the inhalation pathway (or a correction 

factor for uniform releases over large areas) should be established. Two 

techniques which provide approximate corrections were discussed; both give 

similar results. 

Response: 

See "Inhalation Pathway 

Responses 2 and 6." 

Responses 6, 7," and "Exemptions/Exclusions 

T-7i 
P.44 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 1 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Ingestion Pathway 

Comment: 

Ground water flows are so slow that radioactive decay corrections should 

be made. The flow rate adopted is outside of the range of values reported in 

the literature. When combined with the selection of sorption coefficients, 

estimated plume size and time to contact, the impossible situation of having 

radionuclides "swim" upstream a distance of 13 meters against a 0.5 meter/day 

current results. 

Response: 

Radioactive decay has been incorporated into the drinking water pathway 

model. The Agency disagrees that the ground-water velocity used in this model 

(0.5 m/day) is outside the range of values reported in the literature. For 

example, Codell and Duguid1 document a range of measured ground-water 

velocities of 0.2 m/day to 1,382 m/day. Also, Geraghty and Miller2 examined 

hydrogeologic studies for 67 sites distributed throughout various 

hydrogeologic regions of the U.S. These sites were estimated to have 

horizontal ground-water velocities generally between 0.003 m/day and 70 m/day, 

with roughly 60 percent of the sites having velocities less than or equal to 

0.3 m/day. These results served as the basis for the range of ground-water 

velocities (0.003 m/day to 30 m/day) used in EPA's Liner Location Risk and 

Cost Analysis Model,3 a model commonly used by EPA in assessments of hazardous 

waste sites.v Finally, EPA agrees that it is impossible for radionuclides to 

"swim" upstream and therefore has only considered possible exposures at a 

downgradient location. 

1C6dell, R., and Duguid, J., "Transport of Radionuclides in 

Groundwater," Chapter 4, Radiological Assessment, Till, J., and Meyer, H., 

eds., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1983. 

2Geraghty and Miller Incorporated, Liner Location Risk and Cost Analysis 

Model, Phase I Report, Appendix B, January 1985. 

3EPA, Liner Location Risk and Cost Analysis Model. Draft Phase II 

Report, Office of Solid Waste, 1986. 

T-79 
P.45 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

11-12 

John J. Kearney 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 2 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Ingestion Pathway 

In calculating the ingestion release values based on ICRP Annual Limits 

of Intake, the EPA limited the radionuclide plume contact time at the well 

position to 365 days (corresponding to Kd = 4 cm3/g) or less. For 

radionuclides with Kd values greater than 4 cm3/g, this would result in an 

increasingly conservative release limitation, by arbitrarily forcing the 

radionuclide to pass the well position within 1 year rather than much later. 

Again, as with the conservative model, the use of a point source release 

is an overly conservative approximation to the release of a radionuclide over 

a large area into an aquifer. Calculating the affect of using a point source 

release on the dilution factor (as well as on the plume contact time) is more 

difficult, however, because of the probable distortion of the actual plume 

shape. 

First, with a release to an aquifer covering a large area (hundreds of 

acres) or with at least several release points throughout a large area, the 

assumption of a homogeneous and isotropic aquifer would be much less realistic 

for a radionuclide. 

Secondly, the actual pathlength for most of the radionuclides released 

within a large area site will likely be more than 30 meters. As a result, the 

three dispersion coefficients (along each dimensional axis), will increase; 

the dilution factor will decrease; and consequently, the ingestion release 

value will increase. 

As stated earlier, the presence of the conservative factors resulting 

from a point source release for the above conditions could result in orders of 

magnitude of underestimation in determining RQ values. 

Response: 

In calculating release values for the ingestion pathway, EPA did limit 

the radionuclide plume contact time to 365 days for nuclides with Kd values of 

4 cm3/g or more. Contrary to what the commenter states, however, this 

limitation does not result in more conservative (i.e., lower) RQs by forcing 

the radionuclide to pass the well within 1 year. The limitation implies that 

an individual will ingest contaminated ground water for only a year, even if 

it would take several years for a contaminant plume to pass. The limitation, 

therefore, results in less conservative RQs. This is demonstrated by the 

equation used to calculate release values for the drinking water pathway. The 

contact time (CT) is in the denominator, such that values greater than 365 

days would lead to more conservative release values than currently calculated. 

EPA believes it is appropriate to limit the contact time to 365 days because 

the ALIs, on which the RQs are based, are annual limits of intake. 

T-80 
P.46 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

EPA agrees that the point source release model used in the drinking 

water pathway model is not representative of an area source and yields lower 

release values than would be calculated if an area (i.e., plane) source had 

been assumed. Similar to the responses to comments on the inhalation pathway 

model, however, EPA wants to use a single ground-water dispersion model to 

calculate RQs that would assure timely reporting in most release situations. 

EPA believes that the complications added by having multiple RQs for different 

release configurations would outweigh the benefits to be gained by such an 

approach. A plane source model was considered early in the RQ adjustment 

process but was rejected because it would yield RQs that are too large in many 

cases and because a plane source mostly would represent continuous releases 

from a surface impoundment, landfill, or storage area -- not sudden, episodic 

releases or spills that should be reported quickly. 

T-81 
P.47 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

10 

4 

M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Direct Exposure Pathway 

Response Number: 1 

The direct exposure release values for submersion in a cloud of 

radioactive nobel gas assume that the nobel gas concentration at a point 30 m 

from the source remains constant for 24 hours, and the exposed individual 

remains in that position for 24 hours. Both of these assumptions are highly 

improbable. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that both of these assumptions will not likely occur with 

great frequency. However, RQs are based on releases occurring over no more 

than one day, such that the maximum period of exposure by submersion in a 

cloud is also one day for the purpose of RQ adjustments. Therefore, even 

though a 24-hour exposure period may not occur frequently, EPA could not 

conclude that this maximum period was impossible. In addition, EPA has 

selected conservative models to assure that the National Response Center will 

be notified of any release event for which the government may want to respond. 

Upon notification, the event situation will be evaluated on a case-by-case 

basis to determine the need for a federal, state, or local response. EPA 

prefers to use conservative models that may produce lower RQs (and some 

additional reporting burden) rather than risk having RQs that are too high and 

do not allow for proper evaluation of release events of concern. 

T-82 
P.48 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

13 

5 

Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Direct Exposure Pathway 

Response Number: 

In the calculation of direct exposure, correctly calculated gamma ray 

constants should be used for all gamma emitting nuclides. 

Response: 

The direct exposure pathway equation incorporates the following accepted 

equation for gamma ray constants: 

I = 0.156 nE (105Ua) 

where, I = gamma ray constant (millirem/hr at 1 meter per millicurie) 

n = gamma quanta per disintegration 

E = energy of gamma quanta (MeV) 

Ua = energy absorption coefficient for.. gamma in air (at standard 

temperature and pressure), in cm 

EPA believes that this equation is applied correctly in the determination of 

direct exposure release values for all gamma emitting radionuclides. 

T-83 
P.49 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 3 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Direct Exposure Pathway 

Comment: 

BID section of direct exposure. There are a number of problems with the 

equations. The part of the equation representing attenuation correction 

requires a coefficient with units of reciprocal meters, not reciprocal 

centimeters as shown. Also, linear attenuation coefficients should be used 

instead of linear absorption coefficients, as it is the exposure at the target 

that we are interested in, not the absorbed dose to the intervening air. The 

other error concerns the use of distances. The first part of the equation 

gives exposure to 1 meter, thus the inverse square law correction should be 

applied to the remaining 29 meters, not 30. The authors apparently failed to 

realize that the first part of the equation already has attenuation and 

inverse square corrections built in. 

Response: 

This comment raises three separate issues. First, the linear energy 

absorption coefficient (ua) in the direct exposure pathway model must be in 

units of reciprocal centimeters according to equations presented in The Health 

Physics and Radiological Health Handbook.1 These equations were used to 

derive the direct exposure pathway model as presented in Appendix D of the 

Technical Background Document supporting the final RQs. EPA believes that the 

pathway model has been derived correctly using the available equations and 

that correct units have been used for all the input variables. 

Second, with respect to the use of absorption versus attenuation 

coefficients, the equations used to derive the direct exposure pathway model 

call for the use of energy absorption coefficients for gamma rays in air (see 

the Health Physics and Radiological Health Handbook). Again, EPA believes 

that these equations have been adapted correctly for the calculation of RQs. 

Finally, EPA agrees that "the first part of the equation gives exposure 

to 1 meter." However, EPA has re-analyzed the equation and believes that its 

earlier decision to use a distance of 30 meters (not 29 meters) in the 

calculation of release values is correct. 

1 Nucleon Lectern Associates, The Health Physics and Radiological Health 

Handbook. Olney, Maryland, 1984, pages 41 and 45. 

T-84 
P.50 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

2 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Direct Exposure Pathway 

Response Number: 4 

Page 8179, 3rd column, 1st paragraph. The use of gamma ray constants 

instead of the equation in column 2 would yield a far better result, assuming 

reasonable corrections for attenuation and distance. 

Response: 

See "Direct Exposure Pathway - Response 2." 

T-85 
P.51 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

LI 

13 

John J. Kearney 

Senior Vice President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 5 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Direct Exposure Pathway 

As with the inhalation release value discussed above, gamma-emitting 

radionuclides uniformly spread over a larger area present less exposure to a 

reference individual 30 meters from the boundary of the area than 

radionuclides contained at a point source. 

Not only is the distance greater, but the gamma rays are attenuated by 

the air. The adsorption varies with the gamma energy, but over the typical 

energy range, the intensity of the gamma rays decreased by one-half for every 

200 meters of air along the path. Attenuation through 30 meters of air is 

approximately 10 percent. Standard models correcting for gamma ray emission 

over a large area can be used in this case. 

Response: 

As noted in response to comments on the inhalation and drinking water 

pathway models, EPA agrees that a point source release model is not 

representative of area sources, and that release values based on a point 

source may be low for area sources. EPA prefers not to develop multiple RQs 

(or correction factors) to take into account many different release 

configurations - - EPA believes that such an approach would add more 

complications than benefits. Instead, EPA has adopted a single reasonably 

conservative model to calculate direct exposure release values that are 

applicable broadly (i.e., that will assure timely reporting in most release 

situations). A direct exposure pathway model assuming an area source would 

not be sufficiently conservative to lead to timely reporting for many 

releases. 

T-86 
P.52 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

3 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Remaining Radionuclides 

Response Number: 1 

Page 8181, middle column, middle. In the absence of meaningful data, 

EPA should adhere to the "1 pound" RQ rule. Monsanto encourages EPA to gather 

more information prior to any further tightening of the proposed RQ of 1 

curie. 

Response: 

EPA has rejected the option of establishing radionuclide RQs in terms of 

pounds. Using one pound as the RQ for radionuclides not listed in ICRP 

Publication 30 might be useful to ensure reporting of very large releases of 

radionuclides but is not appropriate to trigger timely reporting of releases 

of many radionuclides because releases of radionuclides that are several 

orders of magnitude smaller than one pound may represent a serious health and 

environmental threat. In addition, a one-pound RQ does not conform to 

commonly accepted units of measurement for radionuclides. 

T-87 
P.53 

I 

i Commenter Number: 8 Response Number: 1 

Page: 1-2 

Commenter Name: Mark A. Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Issue: Alternative Methodologies 

Comment: 

It appears that the intent of these proposed rules is to provide federal 

personnel the opportunity to evaluate the need for remedial action following 

notification of a release of radionuclides (or other hazardous material) to 

the environment above certain RQ values. 

Such regulations have already been placed upon certain facilities under 

USNRC rule in a similar fashion as a result of NRC NUREG-0767. Facilities 

possessing radionuclides in quantities above EPA Protective Action Guidelines 

(PAGs), as determined by EPA-520-/1-75-0O1, must file Radiological Contingency 

Plans with NRC in a format presented in NRC NUREG-0762. Plans of this type 

have provided pertinent NRC licensees the obligation to report incidents 

involving releases of radioactive materials to a variety of federal and local 

authorities. 

The notification requirement, as a part of the requirement to maintain a 

contingency plan, is based on PAGs developed by EPA which would result in an 

off-site dose to a member of the public of 1 rem to the whole body, 5 rems to 

the thyroid and 3 rems to any other critical organ. It seems sensible to 

adjust the PAG values already determined by EPA in EPA-5201/1-75-001 to RQs 

which would result in an off-site dose equivalent of 500 millirem. This could 

initially be done by multiplying PAGs by 0.5 to obtain RQs for the purpose of 

these proposed rules. Any other multiplication factor could be applied later 

by EPA to proportionally lower the RQ value to meet a more restrictive dose 

commitment value. 

This method of determining RQ values would be consistent with the 

program which has been successfully implemented and familiar with a large 

number of licensees and regulatory personnel. This method would utilize a 

system which has taken into account variables that the proposed accepted 

method would replace with conservative constants. Furthermore, we see no real 

benefit in reinventing the wheel. 

Response: 

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) are published in the "Manual of 

Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" (EPA520/1-75-001) and are designed to provide practical guidance to state, local, 

and other officials on criteria to use in planning protective actions for 

radiological emergencies that could present a hazard to public health. The 

Manual does not deal with specific radionuclides nor does it calculate or 

provide guidance for the calculation of specific quantities of radionuclides 

that would equal or exceed the guides. 

T-88 
P.54 

Response Number: 1 (continued) 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in NUREG-0767, makes use of the PAGs 

in developing Limiting Possession Limits (LPLs) for radionuclides. If a 

licensee is authorized to possess more than the quantities of radionuclides 

that define the LPLs, the licensee is required to submit a Radiological 

Contingency Plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Recently, in 51 FR 

1092 (January 9, 1986), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed 

revision to 10 CFR Part 20 to account for "improvement in radiation protection 

standards by reflecting developments in the principles that underlie radiation 

protection and advances in related sciences that have occurred since the 

promulgation of 10 CFR Part 20 nearly thirty years ago." These improved 

standards proposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are based upon Annual 

Limits of Intake (ALIs) developed by the International Commission on Radiation 

Protection (ICRP) and published in ICRP Publication 30; ALIs also are the 

basis for the RQs. 

For these reasons, the Agency believes that its use of ALIs for 

calculation of RQs not only reflects the most recent thinking in the area of 

radiation protection, but also follows the newest and most modern 

international and federal guidelines in applying these principles. 

Also, see "Model Assumptions - Response 9" for additional discussion 

relevant to this issue. 

I 

I 

T-89 
P.55 

Commenter Number: 10 Response Number: 2 

Page: 1/4 

Commenter Name: M.S. Whittaker 

Corporate Health Physicist 

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. 

Issue: Alternative Methodologies 

Comment: 

Since DOT has proposed additional shipping paper and marking 

requirements for transport of RQ values of hazardous substances, the 

establishment of RQ quantities for radionuclides will have a major impact on 

shippers of radioactive materials. Shippers currently classify radioactive 

material shipments using radionuclide specific values published by DOT that 

are based on an assessment of the possible exposure following an accident, 

i.e., the A., and A„, values defined in 49 CFR 173.433. Instead of requiring 

shippers to assess their shipments with an additional set of radionuclides 

specific limits, the DOT A. limits should be used. Note that the A„ values do 

not vary significantly from the proposed RQs. 

If the DOT and all the shippers of radioactive materials can deal with 

A1/A„ values specific for each radionuclide, surely the EPA can administer a 

program with a single value for each radionuclide. If the goal is simplicity, 

use of the DOT A-/A„ values is the best alternative. 

Response: 

The Department of Transportation at 49 CFR 173.435 develops a table of 

A-L and A2 values that define content limits for type A packages as described 

in 49 CFR 173.431. This section states that "[a] Type A package shall not 

contain a quantity of radioactivity greater than Ax (for special form 

radioactive material) or A2 (for normal form radioactive material) as listed 

in [49 CFR] Section 173.435..." Normal form and special form radioactive 

material are defined at 49 CFR §173.403; the radionuclide RQ rule is concerned 

most closely with normal form radioactive materials and the A2 limits would be 

more applicable than the Aj. values. 

The explanation of the derivation of the Ax and A2 values is not 

described fully in 49 CFR Part 173, but is explained reasonably well in a 

publication of the Central Electricity Generating Board of Berkeley Nuclear 

Laboratories (Great Britain) called "The Q System for the Calculation of A: 

and A2 values within the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Regulations 

for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials." 

According to the Berkeley Laboratories publication, the A2 values 

include the following assumptions: 

o "[t]he effective or committed effective dose 

equivalent to a person exposed in the vicinity of a 

transport package following an accident should not 

exceed the annual dose limit for radiation workers, 

namely 50 mSv (5 rem);" 

T-90 
P.56 

Response Number: 2 (continued) 

o the distance from point of release to point of 

exposure is 1 meter; 

o the period of exposure is 30 minutes; and 

o "subjective assumptions are made regarding the 

extent of package damage and release of contents 

... without reference to„a median9accident." It is 

assumed that between 10 and 10 of the package 

contents are released as a.respirable aerosol and 

that somewhere between 10 and 10 of this 

released material is inhaled by the exposed 

individual leading to a combined uptake factor of 

10 . 

The Agency believes that these assumptions and the methodology used for 

calculating Ax and A2 values are not applicable to the calculation of RQ 

values and assumes situations and conditions not compatible with the purpose 

of determining the size of release that should trigger a notification to the 

National Response Center. The A1/A2 values are established only for 

transportation releases and are not applicable for releases from fixed 

facilities. Also, Ax and A2 values are available only for about 250 

radionuclides and, by adopting the A2 values for purposes of the RQs, the 

Agency would face the difficult task of establishing RQs for a large number of 

radionuclides that do not have A2 values. The Agency believes that the method 

selected for establishing RQs is reasonable because it is based on the most up 

to date scientific data available on health and human intake levels (i.e., 

ALIs) and it uses reasonably conservative models to estimate release 

quantities potentially of concern. The A2 values serve better to confirm the 

reasonableness of the radionuclide RQs than to serve as the basis for 

establishing RQs. 

T-91 
P.57 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

15 

3 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Alternative Methodologies 

Response Number: 

Page 8180, 3rd column, bottom. A "one size fits all" approach is an 

inappropriate alternative to calculating RQs. Also, in the extreme case where 

a person ingests 100 percent of a release, there would be no environmental 

contamination left to sample to confirm that a release even took place. 

Response: 

The Agency agrees that "a one size fits all" approach to radionuclide 

RQs is inappropriate for those radionuclides for which health data exist 

(i.e., the ICRP Publication 30 list of 757 radionuclides). For this reason, 

EPA chose not to set the RQ for these radionuclides at 1 pound, 1 curie, or 

any other single level but instead chose to develop several separate release 

scenarios and to use the latest available health data for calculating RQs. As 

a result, RQs in curies range over 7 orders of magnitude (0.001 to 1000 

curies) and more than 20 orders of magnitude in terms of pounds. 

A release event in which an individual ingests the entirety of the 

release is considered a release "into the environment" by EPA (see the 

definition of release in 50 FR 13462, April 4, 1985). Additionally, CERCLA 

does not require "sampling" or any testing to determine when a release must be 

reported. A release must be reported when the person-in-charge has knowledge 

that an RQ or more of a hazardous substance has been released (50 FR 13463, 

April 4, 1985) . 

T-92 
P.58 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 4 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Alternative Methodologies 

Comment: 

The discussion of EPA policy regarding the RQs and interpretation and 

use by the regulated community should be more explicit. In particular, the 

EPA should address accidental, intermittent, and continuous releases; 

realistic exposure scenarios; any relationship of RQs to environmental 

standards for both radionuclides and hazardous chemicals; and protection of 

public health and the environment. EPA should also address the inherent 

differences in approaches used to set RQs for hazardous substances and 

radionuclides, including whether the Agency intends to adopt a more consistent 

approach in the future. 

Response: 

The Agency acknowledges that it has taken a different approach in 

developing RQs for radionuclides as opposed to developing RQs for other 

hazardous substances. For example, other hazardous substances have RQs that 

range from 1 pound to 5000 pounds. These RQ categories were established 

originally under the Clean Water Act and were deemed to be applicable for 

purposes of developing RQs for other hazardous substances. 

There are several reasons why the method of determining hazardous 

chemical RQs based on EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group's (CAG) methodology 

would not be appropriate for the adjustment of radionuclide RQs. First, 

because all radionuclides produce ionizing radiation and ionizing radiation is 

known to be carcinogenic, radionuclides would be assigned either a one- or 

ten-pound RQ according to the structure of the CAG ranking system. Neither of 

these levels are appropriate for radionuclide RQs because as little as one 

billionth of a pound of certain radionuclides might pose a threat to human 

health, welfare, or the environment. Second, the RQs awarded by the CAG 

methodology vary by only one order of magnitude while the hazards associated 

with radionuclides can differ by many orders of magnitude. Third, 

establishing RQs in mass units such as pounds is inappropriate because most 

radiation measurements and standards in the U.S. are established in terms of 

curies or rem, not pounds. 

The Agency believes, therefore, that it is appropriate to develop a 

completely new framework and methodology for the radionuclide RQs. The 

modeling effort was facilitated further because radionuclides have an 

internationally-agreed upon exposure limit for the general public of 500 

millirem; this same consensus does not exist for other hazardous substances. 

It also should be noted that the risks posed by the release of an RQ of 

chemical carcinogens and radionuclides generally are comparable. For example, 

T-93 
P.59 

Response Number: 4 (continued) 

the calculated risks associated with the release of an RQ of seven moderate to 

weak potential chemical carcinogens (using the same air dispersion model used 

in the final radionuclide RQ rulemaking) range from 5 x 10 to 8 x 10 . By 

comparison, the risk from exposure of a 500 mrem dose-equivalent of ionizing 

radiation, on which the radionuclide RQs are based, is 8 x 10 . Therefore, 

although the methodology for adjusting RQs for hazardous chemicals and 

radionuclides is different, the results are not inconsistent in terms of 

relative risks that might result from the release of an RQ. 

T-94 
P.60 

Commenter Number: L3 Response Number: 5 

Page: 4 

Commenter Name: James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Issue: Alternative Methodologies 

Comment: 

Alternative Approach #2: RQs should not be established as a multiple of 

the ALIs. 

Response: 

. EPA has not received any comments favorable to establishing RQs as a 

multiple of ALIs and has not adopted this alternative. 

T-95 
P.61 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Response Number: 

Marc Bowman 

Environmental Engineering Supervisor 

FMC Corporation 

Mixture Rule 

Comment: 

Companies involved in mining operations frequently (depending, on the ore 

body) encounter naturally occurring radionuclides such as uranium and its 

decay-chain daughters. FMC supports the concept of establishing a single RQ 

for common radionuclide mixtures. Some clarification is requested, however, 

on the RQ for naturally occurring uranium which is set at 0.1 curie. It is 

our understanding from reading the preamble, that for a radionuclide mixture 

of natural uranium and its decay-chain daughters, the RQ is reached with the 

release of 0.1 curie of uranium-238 while all other decay products are 

ignored. If this is indeed what is intended by the proposed rulemaking, then 

FMC can support this concept. If this is not what is intended, then further 

clarification is needed before FMC can determine whether or not we support the 

concept. 

Response: 

A method for the determination of the RQ for mixtures has been provided 

in the NPRM and in the final rule. EPA agrees that, as a convenience, the RQ 

for commonly occurring mixtures should be provided to the regulated community 

and had presented proposed RQs in the NPRM for radium-226 in equilibrium with 

its daughters (secular equilibrium) and natural uranium. The RQ questioned by 

the commenter is for natural uranium, meaning a mixture of uranium-234, 

uranium-235, and uranium-238 in their natural abundancies and separated from 

their decay chain daughters. An RQ for natural uranium and thorium with all 

their daughters present also is provided in the preamble to the final rule. 

T-96 
P.62 

Commenter Number: 14 Response Number: 2 

Page: 3/14-16 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Issue: Mixture Rule 

Comment: 

Specifically, we endorse EPA's proposals to establish a 1-curie RQ for 

radionuclides or radionuclide mixtures where the identity of the radionuclide, 

or of the radionuclides in a mixture, is unknown. 

For radionuclide "mixtures" in which the identity of one or more of the 

radionuclides is unknown, the Agency proposes to establish a reportable 

quantity for the mixture of the lower of (1) the lowest reportable quantity of 

any known radionuclide in the mixture, or (2) 1 curie. This approach appears 

to be generally reasonable and is consistent with the 1-curie proposed RQ for 

individual unknown radionuclides and for radionuclides for which insufficient 

data are available. By contrast, however, EPA also suggests a possible 

reduction in the reportable quantity for "unknown mixtures" to 0.001 curie, 

the lowest RQ level. This suggestion is unreasonable. 

A 0.001-curie RQ for "unknown mixtures" would inundate the National 

Response Center, as well as the recipients of emergency notifications under 

Section 304 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), with 

reports of releases that are of little or no relevance to emergency response 

requirements. This approach would, therefore, conflict with EPA's goals of 

establishing reportable quantities at levels that allow the Agency to 

concentrate its investigatory and response efforts on true public health and 

environmental dangers and to eliminate reporting burdens that are unnecessary 

to achievement of the statutory requirements. Accordingly, EPA should adopt 

its proposed approach (i.e., the lower of 1 curie or the lowest RQ for a known 

radionuclide) for these mixtures. 

EPA's decision to adopt a 1-curie reportable quantity for any individual 

radionuclide whose identity is unknown appears, on the whole, to be 

reasonable. This decision is also consistent with the Agency's proposal to 

establish a "generic" 1-curie reportable quantity for radionuclides for which 

insufficient data exist to assign individual reportable quantities. 

Response: 

The Agency agrees that a 0.001 curie RQ for unknown mixtures of 

radionuclides is too small and would lead to many reports of minor releases to 

which the government would not respond. EPA believes that 1 curie is an 

adequate reporting level for unknown mixtures and has retained this level in 

the final rule. 

T-97 
P.63 

Commenter Number: 15 Response Number: 3 

Page: 3 

Commenter Name: D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Issue: Mixture Rule 

Comment: 

Page 8181, middle column, top. When comparing the RQ of the 

unquantified isotope to the total release, the total release should be reduced 

by the known (isotope and quantity) releases. The remainder of the release 

can then be assumed to be the isotope with the most restrictive RQ. Then the 

rule for mixtures of known composition and amount can be applied. There also 

should be some de minimis applied to the determination that an isotope "is 

known to be present," since even "pure" isotopic sources often have trace 

quantities of other radionuclides present. A suggested cutoff would be less 

than 1 percent by activity. 

Response: 

EPA agrees that, in theory, it would make sense to separate the released 

quantity into two parts: (1) the known isotope(s) and quantities; and (2) the 

unknown isotope(s) and quantities. From a practical standpoint, however, EPA 

believes that the adoption of such a mixture rule would add a considerable 

complication to the determination of an RQ and, hence, could prevent timely 

reporting of the release to the government. At the same time, the Agency sees 

no real benefits to be gained by adopting the suggested mixture rule. 

It is well known that radioisotopes (and other chemicals) often contain 

trace amounts of impurities, both radioactive and nonradioactive. If a 

release of such a "mixture" occurs, and if it is known to the person-in-charge 

that the RQ for either the major component or a contaminant (either 

radioactive or nonradioactive) has been reached or exceeded, or, based upon 

application of the mixture rule, the RQ for the mixture has been reached or 

exceeded, then the release must be reported to the National Response Center. 

EPA wishes to clarify the reporting requirements for compounds and 

mixtures of radionuclides and other hazardous substances. EPA recognizes that 

because the radionuclide RQs are applicable to all chemical forms, some 

substances containing radionuclides will have two applicable RQs, one based on 

radiation hazard and the other based on chemical toxicity. For these 

substances, the lowest applicable RQ should serve as the reporting trigger. 

For example, naturally occurring cadmium consists of roughly 12 percent 

cadmium-113, a radioactive isotope, and several other isotopes of cadmium that 

are not radioactive. The RQ for cadmium has been finalized at 10 pounds and 

the RQ for cadmium-113, just one component of naturally occurring cadmium, is 

0.1 Ci. A releaser of cadmium metal is required to report if either 10 pounds 

of the metal (if the diameters of the particles of the released metal are less 

than or equal to 100 micrometers) or 0.1 Ci of cadmium-113 (regardless of the 

particle size of the cadmium-113) is released. In this case, the RQ based on 

T-98 
P.64 

Response Number: 3 (continued) 

chemical toxicity is much more limiting than the RQ based on radiotoxicity (a 

release of 10 pounds of cadmium metal or 10 pounds of cadmium-113 constituents 

far less than 0.1 Ci). For other materials, however, the RQ based on 

radiotoxicity is more limiting than the one based on chemical toxicity. In 

both situations, the lowest RQ applicable to the substance released would be 

the reporting trigger. 

Uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate are additional examples of substances 

with two applicable RQs, one based on chemical toxicity and the other based on 

radiation hazard. Both substances are specifically listed as CERCLA hazardous 

substances because they are included under section 311 of the CWA; however, 

they both consist of about 60 percent uranium-238, a radionuclide. Based on 

their chemical toxicity, uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate have a final 

adjusted RQ of 100 pounds (51 FR 34534, September 29, 1986). The final RQ for 

uranium-238, based upon radiological hazard, is 0.1 Ci, which is equivalent to 

roughly 660 pounds of uranium-238. Both the 0.1 Ci RQ for uranium-238 and the 

100 pound RQ are applicable to releases of uranyl acetate and uranly nitrate, 

but the 100-pound RQ will always trigger reporting first because it is the 

lower, more protective level. The RQ of 100 pounds will assure timely 

reporting of releases of uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate from both a 

radiological hazard and chemical toxicity standpoint. 

T-99 
P.65 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

15 

3 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Mixture Rule 

Response Number: 4 

Comment: 

Page 8181, 3rd column. An RQ for natural uranium or thorium with all 

its daughters in equilibrium would also be useful. 

Response: 

In the preamble to the final rule, as a convenience for the regulated 

community, an RQ for natural uranium in secular equilibrium with its daughters 

and an RQ for thorium in secular equilibrium with its daughters is provided. 

T-100 
P.66 

Commenter Number: 1 Response Number: 1 

Page: 2 

Commenter Name: Garris D. Parker, Jr. 

Department Head, Radiation Protection Department 

The Wellcome Research Laboratories 

Burroughs Wellcome Co. 

Issue: Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

With regard to the proposed concentration cutoff of 0.002 microcuries 

per gram (uCi/g), we feel that a more lenient figure should be considered. In 

10 CFR 20.306, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses 0.05 uCi/g for two 

specific isotopes (H-3 and C-14) in two specific waste streams (animal tissue 

and scintillation media). We feel this figure should be adopted for 

additional radioisotopes in additional types of material. 

Response: 

The Agency realizes that there is some concentration of radionuclides 

below which a government response is unlikely. Determination of that precise 

level, however, is complicated. There is no universally accepted risk-free 

level; that is, a level below which the Agency is sure the government would 

never want to respond. In fact, large volumes of radionuclides in low 

concentrations can accumulate over time in the environment. EPA currently 

does not have a sufficient basis for determining the appropriate concentration 

cutoff level and believes that an RQ adjustment regulation is an inappropriate 

forum in which to perform the extensive risk analysis needed to derive such a 

concentration level. A more appropriate forum for such a determination would 

be a rulemaking specifically designed to limit public health risks from 

exposure to radiation. The Agency currently is developing two rules related 

to de minimis/exemption/below regulatory concern levels and residual 

radioactivity criteria that may have a bearing on this issue. 

To address some of the concerns associated with potential over-reporting 

of releases of radionuclides in low concentrations, the Agency will, in 

response to public requests, evaluate government release data to determine if 

certain releases can be administratively exempted from the RQ reporting 

requirements. Any administrative exemptions that are justified will be 

incorporated into the rule in technical updates. 

In response to this comment and other similar comments, EPA has decided 

to exempt from CERCLA notification requirements radionuclide releases from 

three large area sources containing low concentrations of radionuclides (see 

"Exemptions/Exclusions - Responses 2 and 6"). 

T-101 
P.67 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

4 

1 

Response Number: 

B.H. Webster, Manager 

Radiological and Chemical Support 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

We would encourage EPA to adopt a cutoff similar to DOT and would 

further encourage EPA to classify radioactive material below 0.002 microcuries 

per gram as "Below Regulatory Concern." At present, the NRC does not have an 

established cutoff limit for the broad spectrum of radionuclides. We feel 

that if EPA established such a limit, that it would encourage the NRC to at 

least consider or adopt a similar cutoff for radionuclides. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-102 
P.68 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Comment: 

Response Number: 

Dennis Naff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Mobil Mining and Minerals Company 

Concentration Cutoff 

Mobil also recognizes the necessity for a concentration cutoff for large 

volume low activity materials and supports the DOT established value of 0.002 

microcuries per gram. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-103 
P.69 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Response Number: 

Marc Bowman 

Environmental Engineering Supervisor 

FMC Corporation 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

FMC strongly supports the concept of a concentration cutoff below which 

the RQs for radionuclides would not apply. Mining operations which mine ore 

which is slightly above background levels of naturally occurring uranium, for 

example, could easily exceed the 0.1 curie RQ in a 24-hour period. While the 

0.1 curie RQ may be necessary for a more concentrated mixture, FMC believes 

that the low concentrations encountered in naturally occurring ores could 

never pose the same threat to human health and the environment. FMC also 

believes that it was not the Congressional intent that such materials be 

reported when placed on the ground as in a normal stockpiling operation. The 

0.002 microcurie per gram value (the DOT value) proposed would be sufficient 

to allow large-scale mining operations to remove ore from the mine and place 

it in a stockpile without having to report under CERCLA. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-104 
P.70_ 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Response Number: 

R.L. Arscott, Director 

Health, Environment and Loss Protection 

Chevron Corporation 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

Chevron also recommends that the Agency pursue a modified approach to 

reporting using a combination of reportable quantity as now stated coupled 

with a tabulation of specific activity below which no reporting is needed. 

Suggestions for de minimis levels for releases to air and water are presented 

in the following paragraphs. 

In determining the specific activity level for airborne releases, we 

recommend using the air levels shown in the proposed changes to Title 10, Code 

of Federal Regulations, Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 1, which are 

approximately the same as those of the International Commission on 

Radiological Protection (ICRP), as upper limits of exposure,1 and calculating 

specific activities under very dusty conditions (as total dust) that would 

yield such exposures for materials insoluble in body fluids. 

SUGGESTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES FOR CERTAIN NATURALLY 

OCCURRING RADIOISOTOPES BELOW WHICH REPORTING IS NOT REQUIRED 

Isotope 

10 CFR 20 

Limit 

uCi/m3 

Dusty 

5 mg/m3 

Condition 

Very Dusty 

10 mg/m3 

Extremely Dusty 

20 mg/m3 

Uranium (N) 

Thorium (N) 

Radium 226 

Polonium 216 

Lead 210 

Bismuth 210 

9 x 10 

4 x 10 

9 

9 

4 x 

x 10 

x 10 

10 

4 x 10 

-14 

-15 

-13 

-13 

-13 

11 

18.0 pCi/g 

0.8 pCi/g 

180 pCi/g 

180 pCi/g 

80 pCi/g. 

8000 pCi/g 

9.0 pCi/g 

0.4 pCi/g 

90 pCi/g 

90 pCi/g 

40 pCi/gm 

4000 pCi/g 

4.5 pCi/g 

0.2 pCi/g 

45 pCi/g 

45 pCi/g 

20 pCi/g 

2000 pCi/g 

For release into water, Chevron recommends the concentrations listed in 

the newly proposed 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 3 for instantaneous releases 

and those in Table 2, Column 2 for continuous releases be used as de minimis 

levels. 

1 See 51 FR 1092, January 1, 1986, pp.1147 -1200. 

T-105 
P.71 

Response Number: 5 (continued) 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

It also is important to clarify that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

discharge concentration limits in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2 

represent federally permitted limits and any releases from Commission 

licensees in compliance with those limits (or less than an RQ above those 

limits) would not need to be reported under CERCLA to the National Response 

Center. 

T-106 
P.72 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Mark A. Doruff 

Radiation Safety Officer 

Amersham Corporation 

Concentration Cutoff 

Response Number: 6 

Comment: 

Amersham Corporation,agrees with the proposed concentration cut-off of 

0.002 microcuries per gram since activity this dilute poses little or no 

danger to public health. Keeping the number cut-off constant between 

regulatory agencies (DOT and EPA) is also beneficial. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-107 
P.73 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

11 

2/3-4 

Gary D. Myers, President 

The Fertilizer Institute 

Response Number: 7 

Issue: Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

As EPA recognizes, the proposed radionuclide RQs will necessarily require 

reporting of releases of dilute materials which present little or no immediate 

danger to public health. In addition, many of these releases of large volumes 

of dilute material are already well-known and understood by EPA as a result of 

agency studies and other activities under the many statutes administered by 

the agency. Therefore, the reporting of such well understood releases of 

large volumes of dilute material would not only do nothing to protect public 

health, it would also be unnecessary to achieve the other statutory goal 

emphasized by EPA: alerting the appropriate government officials of releases. 

Under these circumstances, TFI submits that a concentration cut-off is 

essential to eliminate unnecessary and excessive reporting that would not 

serve to further any of the objectives of the CERCLA release reporting 

program. 

The establishment of a concentration cut-off below which the RQs for 

radionuclides would not apply is one method of addressing unnecessary and 

excessive reporting in the phosphate industry, as well as other industries 

similarly situated. TFI endorses the concept of a concentration cut-off as 

discussed in the March 16, 1987 Federal Register notice (52 FR 81821). TFI 

also endorses the use of the DOT cut-off value of 0.002 microcuries per gram. 

This cut-off level is sufficient to ensure that the reporting requirements 

will provide EPA with the prompt notice necessary to address whether or not 

federal action is required to protect human health and the environment. In 

addition, the adoption of the DOT value will promote regulatory consistency, 

always a desirable goal when threats to human health or the environment are 

not involved. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-108 
P.74 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

13 

4/5 

Mark J. Wetterhahn 

Connor & Wetterhahn, P.C. 

Concentration Cutoff 

Response Number: 8 

Comment: 

Beyond the issue of applicability of the proposed regulation to nuclear 

utilities, it is clear that reportable quantities (RQ) for radionuclides 

should be revised to reflect the appropriate and accepted units of measurement 

of radioactivity. The RQs should, as stated in the Summary section of the 

proposed rule, be revised in such a way as to allow EPA "to focus its 

resources on the most serious releases and to protect public health ... and 

the environment more effectively." However, contrary to the stated intent, 

the proposed regulation fails to distinguish between single discrete incidents 

and long-term, low-level releases, both of which may constitute releases 

exceeding the quantitative limits proposed. 

The concept providing for a concentration (such as 0.002 uci/gm) below 

which no reporting would be required is similar to a concept of release rate, 

uci/sec, below which there should be no concern. In any event, either by 

concentration or by rate, the minimum release to be considered needs to be 

defined. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-109 
P.75 

Commenter Number: 14 

Page: 3/6-7 

Commenter Name: Kearney et al. 

Edison Electric Institute 

Response Number: 9 

Issue: Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

Specifically, we endorse EPA's proposals to adopt a "concentration 

cutoff" of 0.002 microcuries per gram to prevent imposition of unnecessary and 

burdensome reporting requirements. 

We urge EPA to adopt a "concentration cutoff" to ensure that releases of 

material in which radionuclides are present in very low concentrations need 

not be reported under the CERCLA program. As EPA recognizes, such releases 

"present little or no immediate danger to public health." Thus, a 

concentration cutoff is "appropriate to eliminate unnecessary and excessive 

reporting. Adoption of a cutoff would advance the objectives of the 

reportable quantity program by allowing EPA to direct its limited resources to 

the releases that pose the greatest danger to public health and welfare and to 

"[r]educe the burdens of reporting on the regulated community." 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) threshold of 0.002 microcuries per 

gram --an extremely low level of radioactivity -- appears to be a 

conservatively low concentration cutoff. Indeed, DOT does not even consider 

material with a specific activity lower than that level to be "radioactive."1 

Thus, no basis exists for setting a concentration cutoff lower than 0.002 

microcuries per gram. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

1 See 49 CFR Section 173.403(7) (1986); 52 Federal Register 8175, Col. 2 

(1987). As a result, material that contains trace amounts of radionuclides 

below the level of the DOT concentration cutoff, including coal and coal ash, 

should not be considered radioactive, and any naturally occurring 

radionuclides released naturally from such substances should not be counted 

against the RQs established by these rules. See also infra, pp.11-13. 

The DOT concentration cutoff suggested by EPA clearly can be applied to 

emissions of radionuclides contained in solids. As a technical matter, 

however, it may not be feasible to implement a mass-based cutoff in the case 

of gaseous radionuclide emissions. Thus, the cutoff used by EPA for gaseous 

radionuclide emissions from land-based coal ash sites should be derived from 

model that recognizes this important technical consideration. 

T-110 
P.76 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

15 

3 

D.R. Wind 

Senior Environmental Engineer 

Monsanto Corporation 

Concentration Cutoff 

Response Number: 10 

Comment: 

Page 8182. We wholeheartedly endorse a 2 uCi/g regulatory cutoff. 

Similar quantities are also needed for gases and suspensions. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." Also, as stated in 

"Concentration Cutoff - Response 5," 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2 of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations establish maximum permissible 

concentrations (MPCs) for releases to air and water in unrestricted areas. 

Releases from Commission licensees in compliance with (or less than an RQ 

above) these MPCs are considered federally permitted and are thus exempted 

from CERCLA reporting requirements. These MPCs therefore, in effect, serve as 

concentration cutoffs for gases and suspensions. 

T-lll 
P.77 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

17 

2 

Response Number: 11 

Walter R. Quanstrom 

General Manager and Vice President 

Amoco Corporation 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

Even .an activity-based RQ will result in the reporting of numerous 

releases which do not require Agency attention. Specifically, large volume, 

low activity releases, which the Agency acknowledges "present little or no 

immediate danger to public health" (p. 8182), will be reported. A 

concentration cutoff would do much to alleviate this problem. Amoco supports 

a concentration-based approach for radionuclide reporting. We believe that a 

cutoff should be established for each of the radionuclides listed in Appendix 

B for which RQs have been developed. However, we recognize that this could be 

a rather complicated task for the Agency, requiring evaluation of much data on 

the health effects and exposure potentials of the individual radionuclides. 

The DOT limit of 0.002 microcuries per gram could serve as an interim cutoff. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-112 
P.78 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

20 

1 

Response Number: 12 

Steven M. Swanson, Director 

Health and Environmental Affairs Department 

American Petroleum Institute 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

EPA requests comments on the appropriateness of establishing a cutoff for 

the reporting of releases of low concentrations.- API believes it is necessary 

to limit reporting for those instances where a release is of low concentration 

so that "large volumes of dilute material, which present little or no 

immediate danger to public health," do not overwhelm the reporting network. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-113 
P.79 

Commenter Number: 24 (CARC) 

1-2 

Response Number: 13 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Duane A. Siler 

Patton, Boggs & Blow 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

In addition, the RQ for radionuclides should be stated in terms of a 

concentration based activity level. Ideally, EPA should adopt the 0.002 

microcuries per gram limit currently utilized by the Department of 

Transportation to regulate transportation of radionuclides. Use of absolute 

activity-based limits will lead to the unnecessary reporting of releases of 

high volume, low level material which do not present the kinds of exposure 

hazards on which the proposed RQs purportedly are based. 

Response: 

EPA does not believe that RQs for radionuclides should be stated in terms 

of a concentration based activity level. The potential for a radionuclide to 

cause harm to human health and welfare and the environment is not related to 

the concentration of a radionuclide, but to the quantity of radionuclide 

inhaled, ingested, or to which a person is exposed. Quantities of 

radionuclides generally are measured in curies and the Agency has followed 

this precedent. 

Also see "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-114 
P.80 

Commenter Number: 24 (CARC) 

5-6 

Response Number: 14 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

Duane A. Siler 

Patton, Boggs & Blow 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

In addition, the Agency should adopt a concentration-based RQ for 

radionuclides. There appears to be no reasonable basis to depart from that 

already adopted by DOT, i.e.. 0.002 microcuries per gram. DOT has determined 

that material having a specific activity below this level can safely be 

transported, in any volume, through any community or neighborhood in the 

country without the special precautions otherwise required for transportation 

of hazardous radioactive material. It makes little sense to treat a release 

of similarly innocuous material to the environment, possibly in remote 

locations with no potential for human exposure, as a more serious 

environmental hazard requiring notification of the National Response center. 

As a practical matter, failure to adopt this concentration cutoff will 

result in overreporting. The proposed rule acknowledges that "releases of 

large volumes of dilute material, which present little or no immediate danger 

to public health, could be reportable" if the proposed activity levels are 

adopted. This is, of course, because large volumes of only slightly 

radioactive material could have a total activity level exceeding the proposed 

RQ for that material. 

In establishing activity-based RQs, EPA has estimated the smallest number 

of curies which, if released to the environment, would, under certain generic 

assumptions, likely result in a person being exposed to a dose equivalent of 

500 millirems via the inhalation, ingestion, or exposure routes. The Agency 

apparently assumes that the volume of material hypothetically released does 

not affect the resulting risk. That is, a release of 1 cubic foot of material 

could be equated to a release of 100,000 cubic feet of material, so long as 

both releases have, in total, equal activity levels. This appears to be 

contrary to any reasonable model of pollutant fate and transport via air or 

water. It would be far more reasonable for EPA simply to adopt its sister 

agency's concentration-based regulatory threshold. 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-115 
P.81 

Commenter Number: 

Page: 

Commenter Name: 

Issue: 

L3 

4 

Response Number: 15 

James E. Fairobent 

Office of Environmental Guidance and Compliance 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Concentration Cutoff 

Comment: 

The use of a concentration cutoff below which the RQs for radionuclides 

would not apply, is both appropriate and desirable to avoid regulation of 

releases of large volumes of dilute materials. A concentration cutoff of 

0.002 micro Ci/g as discussed in the proposed rule is not unreasonable; 

however, any single cutoff value should be recognized to be inadequate for all 

situations, analogous to the situation that a single RQ value in curies is not 

adequate for all radionuclides. Determination of concentration cutoffs should 

be on a radionuclide-specific basis using a pathways analysis similar to that 

used in determining the RQs and a criterion for negligible dose (e.g., 1, 5, 

or 10 mrem). 

Response: 

See "Concentration Cutoff - Response 1." 

T-116