F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

R O B E R T C O L L A Z O , AKA W easel, Defendant-Appellant. N o. 15-50509

D.C. No. 3:13-cr-04514- B E N -7

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

L I N O D E L G

A D O -V I D A C A , AKA L e onard Delg ado, AKA Spanky

,

Defendant-Appellant. N o. 16-50048

D.C. No. 3:13-cr-04514- B E N -1

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

J U L I O R O D R

I G U E Z , AKA Sniper, Defendant-Appellant. N o. 16-50117

D.C. No. 3:13-cr-04514- B E N -4U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 2

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

S T E V E N A M A D O R , AKA Gordo, AKA I nsane, Defendant-Appellant. N o. 16-50195

D.C. No. 3:13-cr-04514- B E N -2

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

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v

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I S A A C B A L L E S T E R

O S , AKA L az y , Defendant-Appellant. N o. 16-50345

D.C. No. 3:13-cr-04514- B E N -3

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Rog er T. B enitez , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg u ed and Submitted En B anc J anuary 13, 2020 Pasadena, California

F iled December 2, 2020 A mended J anuary

14, 2021U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 3

B efore: Sidney

R. Thomas, Chief J udg e, and W illiam A. F letcher, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, J r., Sandra S. I kuta, J acqueline H. Ng uy en, Paul J . W atford, Andrew D. Hurwitz , Eric D. Miller, B ridg et S. B ade and

Daniel A. B ress, Circuit J udg es.

Order; Opinion by

J udg e I k uta; Dissent by J udg e W . F letcher

SUMMARY *

Crim inal Law

I n appeals b y f

i v e defendants who were convicted o f conspiracy to d istribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § § 846 and 841, the en banc court clarified the

r equirements for conspiracy under § 846 and the facts t h at trig g er the penalties under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ).

The en banc court ex plained that to convict the defendants of conspiracy

under § 846 in this case, the g overnment must prove b ey ond a r easonable doubt that each defendant ag reed wit h an o t her person that some member of the conspiracy would commit the r elev ant underly ing offense (here 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)), and that each defendant h ad the requisite intent for a § 841(a) conviction.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 4

The en banc c ourt held that in order to obtain a particular
sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) a nd § 841(b)(1)(B )(i) for a violation of § 841(a), the g overnment must p rove b ey ond a r easonable doubt the specific ty pe a nd the quantity o f substance involved in the offense, but not the defendant’s knowledg e (or intent) with respect to that ty pe and drug quantity

.

The en banc court clarified that a c onviction under § 846 does not require proof of a leve l of c riminal intent g reater than that required for the underly ing offense merely because it is a conspiracy c onviction. T h e en banc cou r t c o n c luded that to obta i n a c onviction and particular sentence for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under § 846, the g overnment must prove only that the defendant’s mental
state was the same as if the defendant had been charg e d with the underly

ing offense; the g overnme nt need not prove the defendant’s knowledg e (or intent) with r e s p e c t to the d rug ty pe and quantity

under § 841(b).

The en banc court o v e r r uled United States v. B ecerra , 992 F .2d 960 (9th Cir. 1993), and its prog eny to the ex tent they depart from this decision. The en banc court ex p lained that this c ourt’s error in Becerra a n d i ts prog e ny was the failure to recog niz e that the r u le of coconspirator liability for substantive o f

f e nses in Pinkerton v. United S tates , 328 U.S. 6 40 (1946), which was incorporated into the Sente n c i n g Guidelines and applied reg ardless of whether the charg e was conspiracy or a substantive o f f e nse, does not apply to the liability determination for a § 846 conspiracy offense.

Apply ing this approach to the case on appeal, the en banc
court held that the district court’s instruction—requiring the jury to determine “whether the g overnment proved b ey ond aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 5

reasonable doubt that the amount of [ the specified drug ] that

was r easonably foreseeable to [each defendant] or fell within the scope of his p articular ag reement e qualed or ex ceeded” a specified amount—was erroneous.

The en ban c c o u r t r emanded to the three-judg e panel to reconsider the harmless error issue and the balance o f t h e issues raised by the p arties in lig ht of this opinion, and to enter an appropriate judg

ment.

J udg e W

. F letcher—joined by Chief J udg e Thomas a nd J udg e s Ng uy en, W atford, and Hurwitz —dissented. Noti ng that any fact that by law increases the penalty for a c rime is

an element that must b e s u b m i t ted to the jury and proved bey ond a reasonabl e d o ubt, a nd that there is a strong presumption that Cong ress intends to require a culpable mens

rea as to every element of a crime, J udg e F letcher would hold that when the g overnment seeks e n hanc e d penalties under §§ 8 4 1(b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B ), it must p r ove the defendant “knowing ly or intentionally ” distributed the actual controlled

s u bstance and quantity charg ed under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) o r (b)(1)(B ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 6

COUNSEL

B enjamin L

. Coleman ( a

r g ued), Coleman & B alog h L L P, San Dieg o, California; Timothy A. Scott and Nicolas O. J imenez

, Scott Trial L awy ers APC, San Dieg o, Californi a ; f o r Defendant-Appellant Steven Amador.

J ohn C. L emon, San Dieg o, California, for Defe ndantAppellant J ulio Rodrig uez

.

Martin G. Molina, L a

w Office of Mar t i n G. Molina, San Dieg o, California, for Defendant-Appellant L ino D e lg adoVidaca.

Gary P. B u rcham, B u rcham & Z ug man, Sa n Di e g o, California, for Defendant-Appellant Robert Collaz o.

V i c tor N. Pippins, Hig g s F letcher & Mack, San Dieg o, California, for Defendant-Appellant I saac B a llesteros.

Daniel E. Z ipp (arg

ued), Assistant Un i t ed States Attorney ; Helen H. H ong , Chief, A ppellate Section, Criminal D ivision; Robert S. B rewer J r., United S t a t e s Attorney ; United States A ttorney ’s Office, San Dieg o, California; for Plaintif f

Appellee.

Kimberly S. Trimble and V i n c e n t J

. B runkow, F ederal Defenders o f San Dieg o I nc., San Dieg o, California; Rich Curtner, F ed e r a l P u

b l i c D efender, A ncorag e, Alaska; Michael F ilipovic, F eder a l Public Defender, Seattle, W ashing ton; Anthony Gallag h er, F ede r a l Defenders of Montana, Great F al l s , M o n tana; Andrea Georg e , F ederal Defenders o f Eastern W a shing ton and I daho, Spokane, W ashing ton; J o hn T. Gorman, O ffice of the F ederal Public D efender, Mong mong ,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 7

Guam; L isa Hay
, F ederal Public Defender, Portland, Oreg on; Steven Kalar, Office of the F ederal Public D e f e nder, San F rancisco, California; Amy K arlin, Office of th e Fe d eral Public Defender, L o s Ang e l e s , California; Dick Rubin, F ederal Defender Services of I d aho, B oise, I daho; J o n Sands, F ederal Public Defender, Phoenix

, Ariz ona; Heather W i l l iams, Office of the F ederal Defender, Sacramento
, California; Peter W olff, F ederal Public Defender, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Amici Curiae Ninth Circuit F ederal Public a nd Community Defenders.

J effrey L

. F isher, O’Melveny & My ers L L P, Me n lo Park, California; Ashley Robertson, O’Melveny & My ers L L P, W a shing ton, D.C.; for Am i cu s Curiae N ational Association of Criminal Defense L awy ers.

ORDER

The opinion filed on D ecember 2
, 2020, appe a r i n g at 982 F .3d 596 (9th Cir. 2020), is amended as follows:

At pag e 605, footnote 3, replace:

<Defense counsel for each defendant ex pressly joine d t his
arg ument, ex cept Delg ado-Vidaca’s counsel.>

with

<The district court ass u m e d t h at the defense counsel for each defendant joined this arg u ment.>.

At pag e 624, remove footnote 31.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 8

***

Defendants-Appel l ants’ Petition for Rehearing b y F ull Court (ECF No. 185) wa s circulated to the judg e s of the court, a nd no judg e reque s ted a vote for full court en banc consideration. The Pe t i t ion for Rehearing by F ull Court is DENIED

. W ith thi s a m endment, no f urther petitions for rehearing or rehearing

en banc may be filed.

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

F ive defendants convicted of conspiracy to d istribute
cont r o lled substances under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 challeng e jury instructions that required the jury to determine “whether the g overnment proved bey ond a reasonable doubt that the amount of [ the specified drug ] that was reasonably foreseeable to [ each defendant] or f ell within the scope of his particular a g reement equaled or ex ceeded” a specified
amount. We conclude that this instruction was erroneous. After a defendant is c onvicted of c onspira cy under § 846 to distribute controlled subst a n c e s in violation of § 841(a)(1), the g overnment may establish that the defendant is subject to the penalties in § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and § 841(b)(1)(B )(i) b y proving bey ond a r e asonable doubt that the § 841(a)(1) offense involved the drug ty pe a n d quantity set forth in the
two penalty provisions. The g overnment is n ot required to prove that the d efendant knew ( or h ad an intent) w ith respect to the d rug ty pe and q u antity set for t h i n those penalty provisions in order for them to apply

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 9

I

Robert Collaz o, L ino Delg ado-Vidaca, J ulio Rodrig uez , Steven Amador, and I sa a c Ba l lesteros are members of the Mex ican Mafia, “the larg est p rison g ang in the United States.” United States v. Rodriguez

, 851 F .3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2017). I t was “ f

o r med in the 1950s by Hispanic street g ang members” f

or the purpose of p rotecting “Hispanics from other suc h g ang s within California’s jails and prisons.” United States v. S

hryock

, 342 F .3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2003). Over time, it “ ga i n e d sig nificant power and control over illeg al activities in the California priso n sy stem.” Id. A s

m embers were released from prison, the org aniz a t i o n

ex tended its dominion to c e rtain parts of Southern California. Id. O utside the prison wal l s, the Mex ican Mafia demands
pa y ments (called “tax es”) f

rom local drug dealers and street g ang s in ex chang e for allowing them to di s t r i bute and sell drug s in its territory

. Rodriguez , 851 F

. 3d at 936.

The Mex ican Mafia h as a hierarchical structure. U n i ted States v. Martinez
, 657 F

. 3d 811, 815 ( 9th Cir. 2011). At the top of the s t r u c t u re are the “ made members” who a re independently responsible for their own territory

. E a ch made member has a “secretary ” who e n s u res that the member’s decisions are implemented. F urth e r d own the hierarchy a re the “mesero s ” w h o a

re responsible for making tactical decisions, such as when to initiate prison rio t s, and for overseeing the org aniz ation’s criminal activities within a particular prison y ard. The lower level partici p an t s a re referred to as “ associates.” The primary duty of an associate is to g enerate money fo r t h e Mex ican Mafia throug h the distribution a

nd sale of narcotics. W hether narcotics a re sold in prison or on t h e street, e very transaction is conducted onU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 10

b e h alf of the made member who controls the particul a r territory

.

The f ive defendants in this appeal w orked for L uis “B ooB oo ” Garcia, a made member of the Mex ican Mafia who is serving a life sentence at Pelican B ay State Prison in Northern C a l i fornia. Each defendant had a defined role in th e org aniz ation. Robert Collaz o was in charg e of a prison y ard
at Donovan Prison, and was responsible for coor d i n a t ing narcotics be i n g smug g led into prison on a reg ular basis: methamphetamine w a s s mug g led by the ounce (roug hly 28 g rams), and her oin was smug g led by the piece (roug hly 24 g rams). Once the narcotics w er e s m u g g led into prison, Collaz o work e d with v arious Mex ican Mafia members, including B a llesteros

, to transfer those narcotics throug hout the p rison. Collaz o also sent Garcia $400 every month. L ino Delg ado-Vidaca, a Mex ican Mafia member who h ad b een released from prison, collected tax e s from drug dealers in San Dieg o and convey ed p ay ments to G arcia throug h G a r c i a’s fiancée. J ulio Rodrig uez was initially incarce r a t e d at L ancaster State Prison and then transferred to I ronwood State Prison. H e was responsible for smuggl i n g heroin into both prisons. Rodrig uez smug g led h eroin in 5 0-g ram increments;

e a ch delivery included one 25-g ram bag and two 12.5-g r a m bag s. Steven Ama d o r , who was incarcerated at Centinela Stat e P r i son, served as Garcia’s secretary

. His primary responsibility was c ollecti n g r e nt on behalf o f Garcia. Amador also helped smug g le n arcotics into Centinela. I saac B allesteros wa s i n c arcerated at Donovan State Prison. As a mesero, h e oversaw distribution and tax collection in one o f the prison y ards.

F ollowing a sig nificant investig a tion by a joint state and federal g a

ng task force, the defendants were arrested a ndU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 11

charg ed with two counts of conspiracy

. W e are concerned only wi th the second count: conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 841(b)(1)(B )(i), and 846. 1 The indictment did not charg e any defendan t w i th a substantive offense related to this conspiracy

count.

After a ten-day trial, the parties ag reed to jury instructions and verdi c t forms. F or Count 2 ( conspiracy to distribute controlled substances), the jury was instructed as follows:

The defendants are charg ed in Count 2 of the indictment with c onspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of Sect ion 841(a) and Section 846 o f Title 21 of the Un ited States Code. I n o rder for a defendant
to be found gu i lty of that charg e, the
g overnment must prove each o f the following elements bey o nd a reasonable doubt:

F irst, beg inning o n a d ate unknown a nd continuing up t o a

n d including March 2013, there was an agreement b etween two or more persons to distribute methamphetamine or heroin; and

1 T h e in d ict m en t s p ecif ically alleg ed th at th e d ef en d an t s “ did k n o w i n g ly an d in ten tio n ally co n sp ire

. . . to d istrib u te: 5 0 g ram s an d m ore

o f actu al m eth am

p h etam in e, a Sch ed u le II Co n tro lled S u b stan ce; 5 0 0 g ram s an d m ore o f a m ix t u re co n tain in g m eth am

p h etam in e, a Sch ed u le II Co n tro lled Su b stan ce; a nd 1 0 0 g ram s an d m o re of h ero i n , a Sch ed u le II Co n tro lled Su b s tan ce.” T h e i n d ictm en t also alleg ed a RICO

co n sp iracy

, in v i o latio n o f 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 62 (d ), an d crim in al f o rf eitu re, p u rsu an t to 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 63

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 12

Second, the defendant joine d in the

ag reement knowing o f its purpose a nd intending to help accomplish that purpose.

I f the jury f

ound a defendant g u ilty of c onspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the jury was instructed to make special finding s reg arding drug quantity :

I f y ou find a defendant g u ilty of the charg e in Count 2 of the indictment, y ou a re then to determine as to that d efendant whether the
g overnm e nt proved bey ond a reasonable doubt that the am o u n t of methamphetamine that was r easonably foreseeable to him or fell wit hin the scope of h is p articular ag reement equaled or ex ceeded 50 g rams of actual methamphetamine or 500 g rams of a mix ture containing methamphetamine in co n nection with his criminal activity

. Y our decision as to weig ht must be unanimous.

I f y ou find a defendant g uilty of the charg e in Count 2 of the indictment, y ou are then to dete r mine as to that defendant whether the
g overnment proved bey o n d a reasonable doubt that the amount of heroin that was reasonably foreseea

b le to him or fell within the scope of his particular ag reement equaled

or ex ceeded 1 00 g rams of heroin in connection w i t h his criminal activity

. Your decision as to weig ht must be unanimous.

During deliberation, the j u r y returned a note asking for clarification on its duty to mak e s p e cial finding s reg ardingU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 13

d r u g quantity

. 2 Only then did d efense counsel raise hi s

concern that the jury instructions were not in accordance with Ninth C i r c u i t precedent. Rely ing on United S tates v. Ortiz
, 3 6 2 F .3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2004), defense counsel arg ued t h at the d r u g -quantity instruction should be phrased in the conjunctive (reasonably foreseeable to him and fell within the
scope o f his part i c ular ag reement), rather than in the disjuncti v e (reasonably f

o reseeable to h im or fell within the
scope of his particular ag reement). 3 After a brief recess, the trial cour t r u l ed that Ortiz was not applicable, because it interpreted the U n ited States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), rather than the relevant crimin al statutes; therefore, the court declined to chang e the jury instructions.

The jury found eac h d e fendant g u ilty of conspiracy to distribute c ontrolled substances. 4 As for the special finding s reg arding drug quantity u nder § 841(b)(1) ( A )

– (B ), the jury found the requisite methamphetamine amou n t f o r C o l l a zo a

nd Delg ado-Vidaca, and the r e quisite h eroin amount for

2 T h e n o te read :

Co u n t 2

. If w e f

in d th e def

en d an t gu i l t y o n C o u n t 2 “f o reseeab le to h im o r f

ell w ith in th e sco p e o f h i s p articu lar ag reem en t eq u al to o r ex ceed ed 5 0 g ram s of
p u re m eth o r 5 0 0 g ram s o f a m ix tu re . . .”

Q [ :] Do es th is m ean w e h av e to d eterm in e if ea c h d e fe nd a nt i n d i v i d u a l l y m e t t h e 5 0 /5 0 0 g ram req u i rem en t?

3 T h e d istrict co u rt assu m ed t h at th e d ef

en se c o u n s e l f

o r each d ef en d an t j oin ed th is arg u m en t.

4 T h e j u ry also f

o u n d each d e fe n d an t g u ilty o f p articip atin g in th e RICO co n s p i racy

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 14

Amador, B allester o s , Collaz o, and Rodrig uez

. Each defendant ti m e l y a

p pealed, raising multiple claims of error, including a challeng e to the jury instructions for Count 2. 5

At the sug g es t i o n of the three-judg e panel initially assig ned the c onsolidated appeal s , we voted to hear the appeals en banc to clarify our jury instructions for conspiracy under § 846 and the facts that trig g er the penalti es under § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). 6 As ex plained in more detail below, our prior decisions on this issue relied on the Guidelin e s’ definition of “relevant conduct,” see U.S.S.G

. § 1B 1.3 (199 1 )

, to d etermine a defendant’s liability f or conspiracy under 21 U .S

. C

. § 846 and the appropriate penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See United States v. Torres
, 8 69 F

. 3 d 1089, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2017). A fter the Sentencing Commission

re v i s ed the Guidelines’ definition of “ relevant conduct,” we recog niz ed it was necessary to r e s o l v e en banc how this chang e affected our interpretation of § 846 and § 841. Id. W e

now conclude that the Guidelines’ defi n i t i o n of “relevant conduct” is not applicable to o ur interpretation of § 846 o r § 841. As a result, we must overrule our precedent and beg in

anew to d etermine what the g overnment must prove to secure a conviction and sentence under §§ 846 and 841(b).

W e have j u r i s d iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “W e review de novo whether t h e jury instructions accurately define the elements of a statutory offense.” U

nited States v

. Hicks , 217 F .3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).

5 B a l l e s t e r o s d id n o t j oin h is co

- d ef en d an ts in ch allen g in g th e j u ry in stru ctio n s o n

ap p eal u n til w e req u ested su p p lem en tal b rief

in g

.

6 W e ad d ress o n ly th is issu e, an d retu rn th e ap p eals to th e th ree- j u dg e p an el to ad dress th e rem ain in g issu es.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 15

I I

I n determining wh e t her the jury instructions accurately defined each element of a § 846 conspiracy to dist r i b ute

c o ntrolled substances in violation o f § 841, we beg in b y

ex p laining the leg a l framework for these offenses.

A

T h e defendants were charg ed with conspiracy und e r 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provides: “Any p erson who attempts

or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the c ommission of which was the object of the attempt o r conspiracy .” The pertinent offense in this case is
set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 84 1 ( a ) ( 1 )

, and the penalties prescribed f

or this offense are s e t fo r t h in 21 U .S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). Althoug h the defendants were not charg ed with any substantive offenses under § 841(a)(1), this section and § 841(b) are relevant to d etermining the elements of the § 846 conspiracy

convictions here.

I n enacting § 846, Cong ress adopted the c ommon law understandin g of c onspiracy

. United States v. Shabani

, 513 U .S. 10, 13–1 4 (1994). Therefore, our interpretation o f § 846 is g ui d ed by well-established principles of conspiracy law. See Ocasio v. United S tates , 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016) (stating that the g eneral federal conspiracy s tatute’s “use of the t e r m ‘conspire’ incorporates long -recog niz ed principles of conspiracy

law”).

Fi r s t , the essence of conspiracy “is an ag reement t o commit an unlawful a c t.” Iannelli v. United States
, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); see a lso Ocasio
, 136 S. Ct. at 1429 (“AU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 16

defendant must merely r each an ag reement with the specific intent t h a t the u n derly ing crime be committed b y some member of the c onspiracy .” ( internal quotation marks a nd emphasis omitted)). The ag reement itself is the offense, a nd i t is not necessary for the g overnment to prove that t h e defendant or other part icipants committed the unlawful object of the c onspiracy

. 7 See Salinas v. United States
, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997). The g overnment i s n o t required to prove every de t ail of the ag reement. See, e.g. , United States v. S h arif

, 817 F .2d 1 375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that “there can be no consp i r ac y w i t h out proof of

. . . such
terms as p rice, qu an t i t y , and time, place, and manner o f delivery ”). Rather, a fact-finder may infer the ex istence and
scope of the ag re e m e n t from the f acts and circumstances established at trial. I

a n n elli

, 420 U.S. at 777 n .10; United States v

. E

spinoza-Valdez

, 889 F .3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2018). “Once the ex istence of the conspi r a cy i s shown, evidence establishing bey ond a reasonable doubt a know i ng connection

o f t h e defendant with the conspiracy

, even thoug h the connection is slig ht, is sufficient to convict him of knowing participation in the conspiracy .” U n i ted States v. Meyers
, 847 F .2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir

. 1 9 8 8). At minimum, the
g overnm ent must “show that each defendant knew or had a

reason to know of the scope of the c onspiracy and that e ach defendant had reason to believe that their own benefits were

7 No r do es t

h e g o v ern m en t h av e to p ro v e t h at th e def en dan t o r a

co co n sp irato r to ok an o v ert act in f u rth eran ce o f t h e a g r e em en t. S ee W h itfield v. Un ited S ta tes , 5 4 3 U.S. 2 0 9
, 2 1 3

– 1 4 (2 0 0 5 )

. T h is d istin g u ish es § 8 4 6 f

ro m th e g en eral f

ed eral co n sp iracy statu t e, 1 8 U.S.C. § 3 7 1
, w h i ch req u ires p ro o f o f an ag reem en t am on g tw o or m o re p erso n s to co m m i t an o f f e n s e a g a i n st t

h e Un ited States an d th at “ o n e o r m o re of

su ch p erso n s d o an y

act to ef f ect th e o b j ect o f th e co n sp iracy .”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 17

d e p endent u

pon the success of the entire venture.” 8 Uni t e d States v

. Lapier
, 796 F .3d 1 090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2 015) (quoting United States v. Kostoff

, 585 F .2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)). W hen the g overnment proves that a defendant h ad a knowing connection with an ex tensive enterprise (such as a drug trafficking org aniz a tion) and h ad

reason to know o f i t s s c ope, a fact-finder may infer that the defendant ag reed to the entire u nlawful scheme. 9 See United States v. Smith

, 609 F .2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1 979); see also United States v. Tarantino
, 846 F .2d 1384, 1393 ( D .C. Cir. 1988) (apply ing similar principles in a case involving several defendants who wer e a l leg ed members of an ex tensive d rug conspiracy

).

Second, the g overnm ent must prove that the defendant ha d t h e “ intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy

. ” United S tates v. U.S. Gypsum Co.
, 4 3 8 U.S. 422, 443 n.20 (1978); see also Salinas

, 522 U.S. at 65 (“A conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would

8 “ A lth o u g h co n sp irato rs m u st p u rsu e t

h e sam e crim in al o b

j ectiv e, a

co n sp irato r n eed n o t ag ree to co m m it o r f acilitate each an d ev ery

p art o f th e su b stan t i v e o f

f en se.” Oca sio
, 1 3 6 S. Ct. at 1 4 2 9 (in tern al q u o tatio n

m ark s o m itted an d alteratio n ad op ted ).

9 A d ef en d an t co n

v icted o f co n sp i r a c y m ay also b e h eld crim in ally l i a b le f o r s u b stan tiv e o f

f en ses co m

m itted by o th er m em

bers o f t h e

co n sp iracy

, so lo n g as th e o f f e ns es w ere reaso n ab ly f o reseeab le an d

co m m itted in f

u rth eran ce o f th e co n sp iracy

. S ee Pin kerto n v. U

n i t e d S ta tes , 3 2 8 U.S. 6 4 0
, 6 4 7

– 4 8 (1 9 4 6 ); Un ited Sta tes v. S u lliva n , 52 2 F.3 d 9 6 7
, 9 7 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (p er cu riam ). Su ch liab ility is n o t at issu e h ere. T h e ru le o f c o co n s p irato r liab ility u n d er Pin kerto n ap p lies w h en th e g o v ern m en t ch arg es a d ef en d an t w ith s u

b stan t iv e o f

f en ses th at w ere

co m m itted b y o th er m em

b ers o f th e co n sp iracy

, see Pin kerto n , 3 2 8 U.S. at 6 4 7

– 4 8, n o t w

h en th e g ov ern m en t ch arg es a d ef en d an t w ith th e crim e

o f co n sp iracy

itself

, see id

. at 6 45

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 18

satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal o f fense.”). The Supreme Court h as established t h a t “in order to sustain

a judg ment of conviction on a c harg e of conspiracy to violate

a federal statute, the G o v e rnment must prove at least the deg ree of c riminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.” United States v. Feola , 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975).

Apply ing the foreg oing framework to § 846, in order to convict a defendant of conspira c y , the g o vernment must prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that ( 1 ) the defendant
ag reed w ith anoth e r person that some member of the conspir a c y would c o mmit the relevant underly ing offense (here § 841(a)), a

nd that (2) the d ef

endant had the requisite intent necessary for a conviction of the underly ing offense. 1 0 I f the g overnment satisfies its burden, the defendant “shall be subject to the same penalties as th o s e prescribed for the offense, the commission o f which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy .” 21 U.S.C. § 846.

B

W e n ow turn to the underly ing offense at iss ue h ere, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and t h e p e nalties prescribed for that offense under § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). I n particular, we focus on determining the requisite intent necessary for a conviction o f § 841(a) and the imposition of the p enalties under § 841(b)(A)–(B ).

10 Fo r a co n s p iracy o f

f en se u n d er § 8 4 6
, th e g o v ern m en t n eed n o t p ro v e a lev el o f crim in al in ten t g reater th an th at fo r t h e u n d erly in g

o f f en se, see in

fra Sectio n III. B ecau se th e g o v ern m en t n eed n o t p ro v e th at

a d ef en dan t k n ew (o r h ad an in ten t) w ith resp ect to a sp ecif ic d ru g ty p e

an d q u an tity in o rd er to secu re a co n v ictio n u n d er § 8 41 (a) an d pen alties

u n d er § 8 4 1 (b )(1 )

, s e e i n

fra Sectio n II.B
, th e g o v ern m en t lik ew i se n eed

n o t p ro v e su ch k

n o w led g e o r in ten t f

o r p u rp o ses o f § 8 4 6

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 19

1

Section 841(a)(1) is straig htforward. I t states, “Ex cept a s authoriz ed by this subchapte r , it shall be unlawful for any person knowing ly or intentionally

— ( 1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess w ith intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance

. ” Th e tex t o f the stat u te requires the g overnment to prove bey ond a

reaso n a ble doubt that the d efendant (1) knowing ly o r intentionally (2) distributed 1 1 (3) any “controlled substance,” which is defined as “a d

rug o r o ther substance, or immediate
precursor, included in” schedul e s I

– V listed in 21 U .S.C. § 812. S ee 21 U.S.C. § 802(6); see also McFadden v. United States
, 576 U.S. 186, 192 ( 2 015) ( h o l ding that a s used in § 841(a)(1), the phrase “a controlled substance” means “some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules”).

Section 841(a) does not prescribe any penalties. I nstead, “any person who violates [ § 841(a)] shall be sentenced” pursuant to § 841(b), which sets out the applicable penalties when the violation involves specifie d p r e dicate facts. Two penalty provisions in § 841(b) are at iss u e h e r e , one for off e nses involving methamphetamine and one for those involving heroin. The methamphetamine provision states:

[ A] ny p erson who violates subsection (a) o f this section shall be sentenced as follows:

(1)(A) I n the case o f a violation o f subsection (a) of this section involving

—

11 Fo r co n v en ien ce, w e u se th e term “ d istrib u te” an d its v ariatio n s to ref er co l lectiv ely

to th e actio n s p ro h ib ited b y § 8 4 1 (a)(1 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 20

. . . (viii) 50 g rams o r more o f

me thamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its iso m e rs o r 500 g r ams

or more of a mix t u re or substance containing a d etectable amount o f methamphetamine, its salts, is o mers, or salts of its isomers;

su c h p e r son shall be sentenced to a term o f imprisonment w h i c h may not b e less than 10 y ears or more than life and if death o r

s erious bodily injury results from the use o f such substance shall be not less than 20 y ears

or more than life, a fine not to ex c eed the
g reater of that a

uthoriz ed i n a ccordance with the provisions of T itle 18 or $10,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $50,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, o r both.

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The heroin provision has the

same structure, but applies to o ffenses involving “100 g rams

or more of a mix ture or substance containing a detectableU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 21

amount of heroin” a nd imposes different terms o f i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d f

i n e a m o u n t s

. 1 2 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 841(b)(1)(B )(i).

B e fore the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey
, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a defendant could be sentenced “pursuant to a finding made by a ju d ge

. . . under a preponderance o f the e v i d ence standard” because we understood the drug ty

pe and q u a n t i ty in § 841(b) to be a “sentencing factor, n ot an e l ement of the crime.” United States v. Nordby

, 225 F .3d 1 053, 1058 (9th Ci r

. 2 0 0 0 ), overruled by United States v. B u ckland

, 289 F .3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Buckland

, 289 F .3d at 564 & n.2 (stating th a t “before Apprendi virtually every o ne routine l y t r e a ted drug quantity u nder § 8 41 as a ‘sentencing factor’ that need not be found bey ond a reasonable doubt by a properly

instructed jury ”).

12 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 4 1 (b )(1 )(B )(i) states:

(B ) In t h e case of a v io lat i o n o f s ub sectio n (a) o f th is sectio n in v o lv in g

–
(i) 1 0 0 g ram s o r m o re o f a m ix tu re o r s u b stan ce

co n t ain in g a d etectab le am o u n t o f h ero in ;

. . .

su ch p erso n s h all b e s e n t en ced to a term of im p riso n m en t w

h ich m ay n o t b e less th an 5 y ears an d

n o t m o re th an 4 0 y ears an d if d eath o r s e r i o u s b o d ily in j u ry resu lts f

ro m th e u s e o f su ch su

bstan ce s h a ll b e

n o t l ess th an 2 0 y ears or m o re th an lif e, a f in e n o t t o

ex ceed th e g reater of th at au th o rized i n acco rd an ce w i th th e pro v isio n s o f T itle 1 8 o r $ 5 ,0 00 ,0 0 0 if th e d ef en d an t is an in d i v i d u al o r $2 5 ,0 00 ,0 0 0 if th e d ef en d an t is o th er th an an in d iv id u al, o r b o th

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 22

This c hang ed after Apprendi and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 ( 2 0 13). As ex plained in Alleyne

, the Six th Amendment “provides that those accused of a crime have the rig ht to a trial by an impartial jury

, ” a n d “[ t] his r ig ht, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that e ach element o f a crime b e proved to the jury bey ond a reasonable doubt.” 570 U.S

. a t 104 (cleaned up). T o ensure this rig ht, it is necessary to make a “proper desig nation of the facts that

are elements of the crime.” Id. at 104–05

. I n this contex t, Apprendi held that “[ o] ther than the fact o f a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime bey ond the prescribed statutory max imum” c onstitutes an element of the crime that “must be submitted to a jury

, and p r o v e d bey ond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Alleyne ex panded on Apprendi

, and held that any fact which increases a mandatory minimum also “constitutes an ‘ element’ or ‘ing redient’ o f the charg ed offense” and must be submitted to the jury

. 570 U.S. at 107–08.

Under Alle

y ne ’s reasoning

, the facts of drug ty pe a nd quantity under § 841(b) c onstitute elements or ing r edients o f the crime because they affect the penalty that can be imposed

on a defendant. Therefore, “i n o rder to save [ the] statute from unconstitutionality

, ” we reinterpreted § 841 as requiring such facts to be proved b ey ond a reasonable doubt to the jury

. Buckland

, 289 F .3d at 564–68 (citation omitte d ). As made clear in Apprendi and Alleyne

, however, the purpose o f Buckland ’s requirement is to p r otect a defendant’s Six th a nd F ifth Amendment rig hts. W e treat drug ty pe and quantity a s elements under section 841(b)(1) only for these constitutional
purposes. See United State s v. Toliver

, 351 F .3d 423, 430U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 23

(9th Cir. 2003), abr ogated on o ther grounds b y Blakely v

. W ashington

, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 1 3

B e cause Apprendi and Alleyne “did not rewrite § 841(b)
to add a new mens rea requirement,” United S tates v. D ado

, 759 F .3d 550, 570 (6th C i r

. 2 014), they do not a ssist us in determining the requisite mens rea necessary for the imposition of p e n a l ties under § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ), the issue

now before us. Section 841(b)(1), unlike § 8 41(a), is silent a s to any mens rea r equirement. W e m u st therefore determine whether Cong ress intended to require proof of a defendant’s

mens rea with respect to the requisite drug ty pe and quantity for the penalties in § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ) to apply . W e turn to that issue nex t.

2

S e c t ion 841(a) makes it unlawful for any one t o “knowing ly o r intentionally ” commit the offense o f distributing a controlled substance. W e must therefore decide “how far down” the tex t of the statute “the word ‘knowing ly ’ is intended to travel.” Liparot a v. United S tates , 471 U.S. 419, 424 n.7 (1985) (quoting W

. L aF ave & A. Scott, Criminal L aw § 27 (1972)).

13 T h e dissen t arg u es th at Alleyn e “ ref lects a b ro ad co n cern ab o u t th e

u n fairn ess o f sen ten cin g sch em es in w h ich th e f

acts t h at are l e g a l l y

essen tial t o th e p u n ish m en t n eed n o t b e f o u n d b ey o n d a reaso n ab le d o u b t.” Dissen t a t 6 6

. Co n t

rary to th e d issen t, Alleyn e d id n o t h old th at it w as g en erally u n

fa ir f o r th e d istrict co u rt to f

in d f acts th at co u ld in crease th e

sen ten ce f

o r a “ leg ally p rescrib ed of f en se” by a p rep on d eran ce of

ev id en ce. S

ee Alleyn e, 5 70 U.S. at 1 1 7

. Rath er, Alleyn e h eld th at it w as

u n co n stitu tio n a l (a v io latio n of th e S i x th an d Fif th A m en d m en t) f

or th e

co u rt to f in d su ch a f

act. Id

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 24

I n d e termining whether Cong ress intended a m ens r ea requirement in a criminal statute t o a p p ly to noncontig uous

w o r d s or phrases, the Supreme Court uses ordinary tools o f statutory interpretation. The Court starts “as alway s, with the lang uag e of the statute,” Dean v

. United States
, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) ( quoting W

illi a m s v

. Taylor

, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)), and considers the natural reading of the l an gu a ge using “ordinary Eng lish g rammar,” Flores-Figue r oa v

. United States
, 5 56 U.S. 646, 650 (2009). I n Flores-Figueroa

, for instance, the Court c o nsidered the lang uag e in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)—which punishes “[ w] hoever

. . . knowing ly

. . . uses

. . . a means of identification of another person”—to determine whether “knowing ly ” applied to “means o f identification of another person.” 1 4 556 U.S. at 650. The Court held it did. I

d

. at 657. The statute’s a dverb (“knowing ly ”) was placed before a transiti v e verb (“uses”) that h a s a

n object (“a means of identification of another person”). Id. at 650–51. A ccording ly

, i t w a s “natural to read” this statutory lang uag e as establishing “how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as s e t forth in the sentence.” Id. ; see also Rehaif v. United States
, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) ( holding that the term “knowing ly ” in § 924(a)(2)—which impose s penalties on a person w ho “knowing ly violates” certai n s u b s e c t i o n s

— “ m o d i f

i e s the verb

14 Sectio n 1 0 2 8 A (a)(1 ) states th at:

W h oev er, d u rin g an d in relatio n to an y f elo n y v io latio n

en u m erated in su

b sectio n (c), kn o win g ly tran sf ers, p o ssesses, o r u ses, w i th ou t law f u l au th o rity

, a m ea n s o

f id en tifica tio n o

f an o th er p erso n sh all, in ad d itio n t o th e p u n ish m en t p ro v id ed f

o r su ch f elo n y , b e sen t en ced to a term o f im p riso n m en t o f

2 y ears.

(em p h asis ad d ed ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 25

‘violates’ and its d i rect object,” including a separate, crossreferenced statutory

provision, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )). 1 5

This r ule is not rig id: t h e w o rd “knowing ly ” does not

n ecessarily a

pply to every word in “a long statutory phra s e, such that questions may reasonably arise about how far into the statute the modifier ex tends.” R e haif

, 139 S. Ct. a t 2196;

see also United States v

. Taylor

, 239 F .3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the w ord “knowing ly ” in 18 U .S.C. § 2423(a), which makes it unlawful to “knowing ly transpor[ t]

an individual who has n ot atta i n e d the ag e of 18 y ears in interstate or foreig n commerce

. . . with intent that the individual eng ag e in p r o s titution,” does not require the

15 1 8 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (a)(2 ) p ro v id es:

W h oev er k

n o w i n g ly v io lates s u

b sectio n (a)(6 ), (d ), (g ), (h ), (i)

, (j ), o r (o ) o f sectio n 9 2 2 s h all b e f in ed as p ro v id ed in th is t i t l e , im p riso n ed n o t m o re th an 1 0
y ears, o r b o th

.

1 8 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g )(5 )(A ) p ro v id es:

(g ) It sh all b e u

n law f u l f o r an y p erso n — . . .
(5 ) w h o , b ein g an alien

—(A ) i s illeg ally or

u n law f u lly i n th e Un ited S tates

. . . to

. . . p o ssess

. . . an y f irearm o r am m u n i tio n

. . . .

T h e Co u rt read t

h e w o rd “ k

n o w in g ly ” f

ro m § 92 4 (a)(2 ) in to § 9 2 2 (g ) an d th en ap p lied th e “ k

n o w in g ly ” req u irem en t to each o f th e elem en ts in th e statu to ry sen ten c e i n § 9 2 2 (g )(5 )(A ) “ th at m ak e a d ef en d an t’ s b eh av io r crim in al.” Reh a if

, 1 3 9 S. Ct. at 2 1 9 6

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 26

g overnment to prove that the defendant knew the victim’s
ag e). 1 6

The Court al so considers the “surrounding tex t a nd

s t r ucture.” Maracich v. Spears
, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013). I n Dean
, f or instance, the Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which provides:

[ A] ny person w ho, during and i n r e l ation to any c rime o f v iolence or drug trafficking crime

. . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtheranc e o

f any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, i n addition to the punishment
pr o vided for such crime o f violence or d rug trafficking

crime—

(i) be sentenced to a term o f imprisonment of not less than 5 y ears;

(ii) if the firearm is brandished , be sentenced
to a term of impris o n ment of not less than 7 y ears; and

(iii) if the firearm is disc h a r ged

, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment o f not less than 10 y ears.

16 Co n trary to t

h e d is s e n t’ s assertio n , th e C o u rt d oes n o t co u n t th e

n u m b er o f w o rd s b etw een th e m en s rea req u irem en t an d an elem en t of th e crim e to aid it s d eterm i n atio n as to w h eth er to ap p ly th e m en s rea req u irem en t. Dissen t at 59

– 6 0

. Rath er, th e Co u rt b eg in s b y co n sid erin g t h e n atu ral read in g o f th e statu te u sin g o rd in ary En g lish g ram m ar, a nd a g ram m atical sen ten ce can n ev erth eless b e q u ite lo n g

. S ee, e.g ., T h o m as R. Hag g ard

, Ju stifia b ly Lo n g S en t en ces , S.C. L aw . Feb . 2 0 0 0 , at 1 1

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 27

556 U.S. at 571 (quoting 1 8 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)) (emphasis added). The Court h eld that there i s no intent r equirement with r espect to subsection (iii )

. Id

. at 572–73. Althoug h “Cong ress ex pressly included an intent requirement f o r [ su bsection (ii)] ” by d e f ining “ brandish” in 18 U .S.C. § 924(c)(4) to mean “to display all or part of the firearm . .

. in o rder to intim i d a t e that person,” it did not define “discharg e” to include such a n intent requ i r e m e n t. Id

. (emphasis omitted). “[ W ] here Cong ress includes p ar t i cular lang uag e in one section of a sta t ute b ut omits it in another section o f the same Act, it is g e nerally pres u m e d that Cong r ess acts intentionally and purposely in t h e disparate inclusion or ex clusion.” Id. at 573 (quoting Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).

I n addition to considering the t ex t and structure of the statute, the Court recog niz e s the presumption, traceable to the

common law, that “ Cong ress intends to r e q u ire a defendant
to possess a culpable mental state reg a r d i ng each of the statutory e lements that criminaliz e otherwise innocent conduct.” Rehaif

, 1 39 S. Ct. a t 2195 (c i t a t i o n omitted). I n apply ing this backg round principle, the Court has differentiated between stat u t e s that a re silent on mens rea, and those th a t i n cl ude a mens rea requirement. W here a criminal statute is e ntirely silent o n the mens rea required for

a criminal offense, the Court presumes that Cong ress did not intend to “dispense with a conventional mens r ea element, which would require that the d e f e n d a nt know the facts that make his conduct illeg a l.” Staples v. United States
, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). I n such ca s es , t h e Court deems the presumption of mens rea to be rebutted only when there is a strong indication that Cong ress has created “‘public welfare’

or ‘ r e g ulatory ’ offenses” and imposed “a form of strict

c r i minal liability throug h statutes that do not require t h eU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 28

defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illeg al.” Id

. at 606. Where a statute includes a mens rea requirement, such a s § 841, we are n o t f a ced with the question whether Cong r ess intended to d i s p ense w ith a mens rea r equirement entirely

, as in Staples ; r a t h er, we must determine “ how far into the statute [ does § 841(a)’ s “knowing ly ”] modifier

ex tend[ ] .” R ehaif

, 139 S. Ct. at 2196. 1 7

The presumption that Cong ress intended the defendant to possess a culpable mental state a s to “each of the statutory elements that criminaliz e otherwise innocent co n d uct,” id.
at 2195 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.
, 5 1 3 U

. S. 64, 72 (1994)), is particularly appropriate when a d i f ferent r eading would have the effect of criminaliz ing “ a broad rang e o f apparently i nnocent conduct,” X-Citement Video

, 513 U.S. at 71 (citation omitted). Thus, in X-Citement Video

, the Court concluded that t h e word “knowing ly ” in “knowing ly transports

. . . any visual depiction, if

. . . such visual depiction involves the use of a m i n or,” 18 U .S.C. § 2252(a), also applied to the phrase “inv o l v e s the use of a minor” because “the a g e of the performers is the c rucial element separating leg al innocence from wrong ful conduct.” 513 U .S. at 73. Similarly

, i n R e h a i f

, the Court h eld that the word “knowing ly ” in the p hrase whoever “ k n o wing ly

v iolates” § 922(g ), which p rohibits persons with c ertain
stat u s e s from possessing firearms, applied to the status element in § 922(g ) because this reading “helps advance the
purpose of scie n t e r , for it helps to separate wrong ful from innocent a cts.” 139 S. Ct. at 2 1 9 6

– 97. The Court reasoned
t hat “the p ossession of a g un c an be e ntirely innoce n t , ” a n d

17 B ecau se S ta

p les h as l ittle relev an ce to th e “ h o w f ar” q u estio n raised in o u r case, th e d i s s e n t ’s r elian ce o n Sta p les

, Dissen t at 56
, 6 3, is

m istak en

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 29

only the defendant’s status disting uished an innocent act from
a wrong ful one under the statute. Id. a t 2197.

B y c ontrast, absent statutory lang uag e sug gesting otherwise, the scienter p resumptio n d o e s not apply to elements that do not sep a r ate innocent from wrong f ul conduct. S

ee id. at 2196 (holding that b ecause “jurisdictional elements normally have nothing to do with the wrong fulness of the d efendant’s conduct, such elem e n t s a r e not subject to the presumpt i o n i n favor of scienter”). Thus, the Court declined to apply this pres u m ption in Dean because a defendant found g uilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “ is

a l r eady g uilty of unlawful conduct twice over: a violent o r drug trafficking offense a nd the use, c arry

ing

, or possession of a firearm in the course of that offense,” and the finding that the firearm is discharg ed (which is requir e d under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) in order to impose a ten-y ear sentence) merely enhances the consequences for s u c h u nlawful acts. 556 U.S. at 576; see also United States v

. Crowder

, 656 F .3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 2 011) (holding that the word “knowing ly ” in the Sex Offender R e g istration and Notification A ct (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)—which imposes criminal penalties on any person w ho “k n o w i n g ly fails to reg ister o r update a reg istration as req u i r ed by [SORNA] ”—does not apply to the phrase “as required by [ S ORNA] ” because a defendant would know failing to reg i s t e r was “not an innocent act”).

W h e n the statutory lang uag e is ambig uous, the Court determines the meaning of the statutory tex t using o ther tools of statutory construction, including the rule o f l e n ity

, the

canon o f constitutional avoidance, and consistency w i th leg islative history

. Thu s , in X-Citement Video

, the Court noted that eliminating a scienter requirement as to the ag e o fU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 30

the performers in a video involving sex ual conduct “ would raise serious constitutional doubts” g iven that “nonobscene,

sex ually ex plicit materials involving persons over the ag e o f 17 are protected by the F irst Amendment,” and it was “incumbent upon [ the Court] to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of C o n g ress.” 513 U.S. at 72, 78. I n cases o f “g rievous ambig uity o r uncertainty in the statute, ” D e a n , 556 U.S. at 577 ( q u o ting Muscarello v. United States
, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)), the Court has also applied the “long standing recog nition of t h e p rinciple that ambig uity concerning the ambit o f criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity ,” L i

p a r o t a , 471 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted). F inally

, the Court has considered leg islative history but has g en e r a l l y gi ven it little weig ht. See, e.g ., Liparota
, 471 U.S. at 430 n.13 (rejecting the g o vernment’s arg ument that the leg islative h istory supports its position); Reha i f

, 139 S. Ct. at 2199 (rejecting the g overn m e n t’s leg islative history argu m e n t g iven that the h istory was “ at best inconclusive”).

3

W e now apply these principles to § 84 1 t o determine whether the phrase “knowing ly ” in § 841(a) a p p l i e s to the drug ty pe and quantity

set forth in § 841(b)(1).

Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful fo r “ a n y person knowing ly or intentionally ” to distri bute “a controlled substance,” which is an “unspecified substance listed on the federal d rug schedules.” McFadden

, 576 U

. S

. at 192. Section 841(b)(1)(A)–( B) p r ovide for the penalties to be imposed in the case of a § 8 41(a)(1) violation “involving ”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 31

certain t y

pes and quantities o f drug s. Unlike § 841(a), § 841(b)(1) is silent as to any mens rea requirement.

“As a matter of ordinary Eng lish g rammar,” it is n a tural
to r ead the intent requirement of “knowing ly or intentionally ”

as modify ing only the ele m e n t s contained in the statutory phrase defining the § 841(a)(1) offense, i.e., “distribute” a nd “a controlled su b s t a n ce.” See Flores-Figueroa

, 556 U.S. at 650. Section 841(b) is not the o b j e ct of the verbs in § 841(a)(1). Compare 21 U .S.C. § 841, with Reha i f

, 1 39 S. Ct. a t 2195 (rely

ing on the fact that, in § 924(a)(2), the a dverb “knowin g l y ” modifies the verb “violates” and its direct object, § 922(g )). There is no natural or o rdinary way to read
t he intent requirement in § 841(a)(1) as modify ing the dr u g ty pes and quantities in § 841(b).

W h ile we b eg in by considering the natural reading of the lang uag e, see Flores-Figueroa

, 556 U. S. at 650, we do not end there. W e nex t turn to the structure and c o n t e x t of the
statute. S ee Dean
, 556 U .S. at 572. A s in Dean
, the structure of § 841(b) sug g e s t s that § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) a nd § 841(b)(1)(B )(i) do not r equire proof th a t t h e defendant knew ab o u t t h e drug ty pe and q uantity

. I n § 8 41(b)(6), another p rovision in the same statute, Congr e s s ex pressly provided that those who violate § 8 4 1 ( a ) and “ knowingly or intentionally use a poison

. . . on F ederal land,” thus causing specified harms, are subject to certain penalties. 1 8 21 U .S.C.

18 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 4 1 (b )(6 ) p ro v id es:

A n y p erso n w

h o v io l ates su

b sectio n (a), o r attem

pts to d o s o , an d k

n o w in g l y o r in ten t io n ally u ses a p o iso n , ch em ical, o r o th er h azard o u s su b stan ce o n Fed eral lan d

, an d , b y su ch u se—U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 32

§ 841(b ) ( 6) ( emphasis added). This lang uag e shows that Cong r ess knew how to require proof of mens rea with respect to the predicate facts for sentences under § 841(b), and chose

no t to do so in § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). “W here Cong ress includes p articular lang uag e in one section of a statute but omits it in another section o f the same Act, it is ge n e r a l ly presumed that Cong ress acts intentionally and purpo s e ly in the disparate inclusion or ex clusion.” Dean
, 556 U.S. at 573 (alteration adopted and quotation o mitted). Moreover, if we

were to interpret the intent requirement in § 841(a) a s modify ing the numerous sentencing facts inclu d ed under § 841(b), the inte n t requirement in § 841(b)(6) would be surplusag e. T he “can o n ag ainst surplusag e is strong est”

w h ere, as here, “an interpretation would render superfluo u s another part o f the same statutory s c h eme.” Marx v

. Gen. Revenue Corp ., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013).

B e cause this redundancy fatally undermines the dissent’s position, the dissent attempts to d isting uish § 841(b)(6) from § 841(b)(1). According to the dissent

, w hile the mens r ea requirement in § 841(a) travels to the various subsections of § 841(b)(1), it does not travel t o § 8 4 1 ( b)(6) because this subsection specifies a “sep a r ate criminal act” of “us[ ing ] a

(A ) creates a serio u s h azard t o h u m an s, w ild lif e, or d o m estic an im als,

(B ) d eg rad es o r h arm s th e en v iro n m en t o r n atu ral

reso u rces, o r

( C) p o llu t es an aq u i f

er, sp rin g , stream , riv er, or b o d y o f w ater,

sh all be f in ed in acco rd an ce w ith T itle 1 8 o r im p riso n ed

n o t m o re th an

f iv e y ears, o r b o th

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 33

poison, c hemical, or o t h e r h az ardous substance on F ederal land.” Dissent at 64–65. And because the traveling mens r ea requirement in § 841(a) cannot reach this “separate criminal act,” the dissent contends, Cong ress had to add an additional mens rea requirement to § 841(b)(6). Id

.

This arg ument has no s u p p o rt in g rammar or caselaw. The structure of § 841(b)(1) and § 841(b)(6) is similar; both apply to “any p erson w ho violates subsection (a),” and list certain predicate facts that subject such person to specified penalties. 1 9 As we have e x p l ained, there is no natural o r gr a m m a t ical way to read the mens rea in § 841(a)(1) a s

a pply ing to the p redicate f acts in § 841(b)(1). N o t surprising ly

, it is equally unnatural and un gr ammatical to read the mens rea in § 841(a)(1) to apply to the p redicate facts in § 8 4 1 (b)(6). The dissent fails to ex plain why it is more unnatural and ung rammatical to ap p l y § 841(a)’s mens r ea requirement to § 841(b)(6) than to § 841(b)(1), such that the

mens rea travels to § 841(b)(1) b ut not § 841(b)(6). N or has the dissent ex plained why it makes a diffe re n c e that the conduct described in § 841(b)(6) (poisoning federal lands) could constitute a separate crimi nal act prosecutable under

some other statute. Neither the Supreme Court nor we have endorsed a n y backg round p rinciple that mens r ea requirements are less likely to travel to predicate facts that can be prosecuted separately u n der other federal laws.

19 T h e p red i cate f

acts in § 8 4 1 (b )(6 ) are n ot d istin g u ish ab le f ro m th e p red icate f

acts in § 8 4 1 (b )(1 ) in an y relev an t w ay

. B o t h su b sectio n s p ro v id e th e p red icate f

acts f o r sen ten cin g p u rp o ses. W h en C o n g ress

w an ted to estab lish in d ep en d en tly p ro secu tab le o f f en s es in § 84 1
, it ad ded ad d itio n al sectio n s, su ch as § 8 4 1 (g ) (crim in alizin g in tern et sales o f d ate

r ap e d ru g s) an d § 8 4 1 (h ) (crim in alizin g d isp en sin g o f co n t r o l l e d

su b stan ces b y

m ean s o f th e in tern et).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 34

The presumption that Cong ress did not want to “criminaliz e a broad rang e of appa r ently innocent conduct,” X-Citement Video

, 5 13 U.S. at 71 (cleaned u p )

, and the importance of scienter “ in separating wrong ful from innocent acts,” Rehaif

, 139 S. Ct. at 2196, do not undercut our r eading of the statutory tex t her e

. 2 0 K nowing ly distributing a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1) is n o t an “entirel y i n n o cent” act. Rehaif

, 139 S. Ct. at 2197. Reg ardless of the t y

p e and q

uantity of the controlled substance, there is no risk that a defendant wou l d fail to understand the unlawful nat ure of the act. Our p recedent is in accord; we have l o n g recog niz ed the basic rule that a defendant charg ed w ith a controlled substance offense “need
not know the e x act nature o f the substance with which he was dealing ,” but “can be convicted under § 841

. . . if he believes he has some controlled substance in his possession.” United States v

. R amirez-Ramirez
, 875 F .2d 772, 774 ( 9th Cir. 1 989) (quotation omitted) (collecting cases).

Nor does t h e s t ructure of § 8 41(a) and (b), providing different penalties for d ifferent dru g ty pes and quantities, raise an inference that some scienter is necessary

. See Dean
, 556 U.S. at 573. W here a crim i n a l s t atute d oes not provide

a scienter requirement

, t h e Court h as held the imposition o f h arsh penalties on defendants who w ere unaware they were violating the law supports the inference that Cong ress did not intend to create a strict liability public welfare offense.

20 C o n trary to th e dissen t’ s su g g estio n , Dissen t at 6 5

– 6 6
, J u d g e (n o w J u stice) Kav an au g h

, in d issen tin g in Un ited S t a tes v. Bu rwell

, ch o se n o t to ad d ress th e qu estio n o f “ h o w th e presu m p tio n [o f m en s rea] ap p lies to

a f act th at Co n g ress m ad e a sen ten cin g f acto r b u t th at m u st b e treated as

an elem e n t o f th e o f

f en se f o r Fif th an d Six th A m en d m en t p u rp o ses.” 6 9 0 F.3 d 5 0 0
, 5 4 0 n .1 3 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 12 ) (en b an c ) ( K a v a n au g h

, J
., d issen tin g ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 35

Staples

, 511 U.S. at 6 18. Such a concern is not implicated in § 841, under w hich the defendant must be fou n d g uilty o f knowing ly or intentio n a lly distributing controlled substances. Once a d efendant knowing ly or intentionally violates federal law, “it is not u nusual to punish i n dividuals for the unintended consequences of their u n lawful a cts.” Dean
, 5 56 U.S. a t 575 (emphasis in orig inal). The severi t y o f a penalty need n ot be “precisely calibrated to the level of mens rea.” B urwell

, 690 F .3d at 5 1 0 ( c i ting Dean
, 556 U.S. at 575).

B e cause the statutory lang uag e is not am b ig uous, the other tools of statutory construction a r e unnecessary here. I n any event, t h e y d o n ot conflict with our conclusion. F irst, defendants claim that the rule of lenity su p p o rts imposing

mens r ea requirements for the drug ty p es a n d quantities in § 841(b). W e d isag ree. The r ule of l e nity “applies only when, after consulting traditional canon s o f statutory construction, we are left w ith an ambig uous statute.” Shular

v. United States
, 140 S. Ct. 779, 787 (2020) (q uotation omitted). “To invoke the rule, we must c onclude that there is

a g rievous ambig uity or uncertain t y i n the statute.” Dean
, 556 U .S. at 5 77 (citing Muscarello

, 524 U.S. at 1 38 –39). Given the statutory t e x t a nd structure of § 841(b), it is clear the provision does not contain an intent requirement and the defendants’ “contrary arg uments are not enoug h to render the statute g rievously

ambig u ous.” Id.

Nor does the canon of constitutional avoidance require us to interpret § 8 41 as imposing a mens r ea requirement for the drug ty pe and quantity in order to avoid conflicting with the Due Process Clause and the Six th Amendment. Cong ress’s d e c ision not to impose a mens rea requirement is consistent with th e D u e Process Clause. T h at “the g overnment mustU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 36

prove that the defendant knew he was importi n g s o me amount of a controlled substan c e

. . . is sufficient to ensure the statute p e naliz e s only culpable conduct.” United States v

. Jefferson

, 791 F .3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). Similarly

, the Six th Amendment is not implicated, because the g overnment is required to prove drug ty pe and q uantity to the jury bey ond

a reasonable doubt. See Buckland

, 289 F .3d a t 568. Apprendi and Alleyne d o not affect the question whe t h er t he word “knowing ly ” applies to the drug ty pes and q u antities set out in § 841(b). T he dissent’s arg u ment to the contrary , Dissent
at 5 5, “confuses the requisite burden of proof with the mens

rea standard.” Jefferson, 791 F. 3d at 1017 (citing D ado

, 759 F

. 3d at 570). W e comply with the constitutional mandate announced in Apprendi a n d A l l eyne by requiring d rug ty pe and quantity under § 841(b) to b e found by a jury bey o nd a reasonable doubt. See Buckland , 289 F .3d at 568.

Nor is r ecourse to leg islative history n ec e s sary h ere. W h ere there is settled precedent o n the interpretation of a statute, “we p resume that when Cong ress reenacted the same lang uag e” in subsequent acts, “it adopted the earlier judicial construction of that phrase.” Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
, 1 39 S. Ct. 628, 633

– 3 4 ( 2019). The judicial consensus that the g overn m e n t need not prove that
t h e defendant “knowing ly or intentionally ” distributed a particular d r u g t y

p e and quantity h as long been settled, see infra at 37–38 & n.21, and was not affected by the decisions in Apprendi or Alleyne

. I ndeed, Cong ress has amended § 841 six times since Apprendi w as decided ( o nce since Alleyne ), without altering the statutory framework. Cf

. Rehaif

, 139 S. Ct. a t 2199 (there had been “no definitive judicial consensus”

as to whether a defendant’s knowledg e of his status w a s required under § 922(g )

, and Cong ress responded to the open question b y amending the s t a tute to include such an intentU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 37

requirement). Accor d ing ly

, the structure of § 841(a)–(b) compels the conclusion that Cong ress d i d n ot intend to require the g o ver n m ent to prove a defendant’s knowledg e with respect to the drug

ty pe or quantity

.

Our analy sis is consistent with our prior opinions, which concluded that no intent requirement a pplies to dru g t y

p e s and quantities under § 841. S e e United States v

. S

oto-Zuniga
, 837 F .3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Je f f e rson , 791 F .3d a t 1015. I n Jefferson

, on which Soto-Zuniga relied,

we interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) a nd (b), which a

re substantially identical to § 841(a) a nd (b), and concluded that the g overnment did n o t have “to prove that the defendant knew the ty

pe or quantit y o f the controlled substance he imported to obtain a c onviction under § 960 ( a), or for the penalties under § 960(b) to a p p ly .” 791 F .3d at 1015 (citations omitted). We subsequently confirmed that this i n t e r pretation applies to § 841(a) and (b). See Soto-Zuniga
, 837 F .3d at 1 005. I n reaching this co nclusion, we joined
every other circuit to c onsider this issue; all have h e l d that § 841(b)(1) does not require a finding of a defendant’s mens rea with respect to the drug ty pe and quantity

. 2 1

21 Un ited S t

a tes v. Co lla zo -Ap o n te , 2 81 F.3 d 3 2 0
, 3 26 (1 st C ir. 20 0 2 ); Un ited S ta tes v. An d in o , 6 2 7 F.3 d 4 1
, 4 5

– 4 7 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 0 ); Un ited S ta tes

v. Ba rb o sa , 2 7 1 F .3 d 4 3 8
, 45 8 (3 d Cir. 2 0 01 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Bro w er , 3 3 6 F.3 d 2 7 4
, 2 7 7 (4 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ); Un ited S ta t es v. Beta n co u rt , 58 6 F.3 d 3 0 3
, 3 0 8 –0 9 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ); D a d o , 75 9 F .3 d at 5 6 9

– 7 0 ; U

n ited S t a tes v. Ca rrera , 2 5 9 F .3 d 8 18
, 8 3 0 (7 th Cir. 2 0 01 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Ra mo s , 8 1 4 F.3 d 9 10
, 9 1 5 –1 7 (8 th Cir. 2 0 16 ); U n i t e d S ta tes v. De La To rre , 5 9 9 F .3 d 1 1 9 8
, 1 2 0 4 (1 0 th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ); U n ited S ta tes v. S

an d ers , 6 6 8 F.3 d 1 2 9 8 , 1 3 1 0 (1 1 th

Cir. 2 0 1 2 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Bra n h a m , 5 1 5 F.3 d 1 2 6 8
, 1 2 7 5

– 7 6 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 08 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 38

I n sum, we conclude that in order to obta i n a p a r ticular
sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) a n d § 841(b)(1)(B )(i) for

a violation of § 841(a), the g overnment must p r ove bey ond a

r e a sonable doubt the specific ty pe and the quantit y o f substance involved in the offense, but not the defend a n t ’s knowledg e o f (o r intent) with respect to that ty pe a nd quantity

.

I I I

W e h ave established in Section I I

. A
, supra , that to c onvict the defendants of conspiracy under § 8 46 in th i s c a se, the
g overnment must prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that e ach defendant ag reed with an o t h e r person that some member o f the conspiracy would commit a § 841(a) offense, and that each defendant had the requ i s ite intent necessary for a § 841(a) conviction. W e have also established in Section I I .B
, supra , that the requisite intent nece s s a r y f or a § 841(a) conviction ( and for the imposition of the penalties sp e c i f i ed in § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B )) d oes not include kn o wledg e of the relevant drug ty

pe or quantity

. This concludes o u r

ex p lication of the e lements of a § 846 conspiracy to commit

a violation of § 841(a), and the imposition of penalties under § 841(b)(1). We now turn to defendants’ further arg uments, and clarify that a conviction und e r § 846 does not require proof o f a level o f c r iminal intent g r eater than that r equired for the u nderlying offense merely because it is a conspiracy conviction.

A

The Supreme Court addressed the q u e s t ion whether a

co n s p iracy conviction required a heig htened mens rea in Feola

. I n that case, a defendant had been charg ed withU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 39

conspiracy (under the g eneral federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371) to a ssault a fe deral o fficial in violation o f 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). See Feola

, 420 U .S. at 672–73. The Court first determined that the u nderly ing substantive offense did not require proof that the defendant intended “ to assault

a federal officer,” rather, the g overnment had to pr o v e o nly that the d efendant intended to assault someone. I d

. at 684. The Cour t then considered “whether the rule should be different where persons conspire to commit” such an assault, id

. at 686, and concluded that it should n o t, see id. at 686–96. I n so holding

, the Court st ated the g eneral rule “that where knowledg e of the facts g iving rise to fede r a l j u risdiction is

n o t necessary for conviction of a substantive o ffense embody ing a m e ns rea r equirement, such knowledg e is equally irr e l e vant to questions of r esponsibility for conspiracy to commit that offense.” Id. at 696.

I n r eachin g this conclusion, Feola first considered whether the tex t of the conspiracy statute required proof of a g reater intent than the intent required for the underly ing offense. I t concluded that § 371 (th e c o n spiracy statute at issue) “ offers no tex tual support fo r t he proposition that” a defenda n t who ag reed to assault an individual must have knowledg e as to the em p l o y ment status of the victim. Id. at 687.

Second, Feola concluded that “it is clear that one may be
g uilty a s a conspirator for acts the precise details of which

one does not know at the time of the ag r e ement.” Id. at 692;

see also id. at 694 (ex plaining the common law principle that “conspiracy is an inchoate crime,” which means that the
ag r e e m e n t is, by definition, undeveloped). Feola therefore rejected the defendant’s arg ument “that it is improper to find conspiratorial liability where the parties to the ill i citU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 40

ag reement were n ot aw a r e o f” a ll the elements of the underly ing offense “because the essence of c o n s p i racy is
ag reement and persons cannot be punished for ac t s b e y ond the scope of their ag

reement.” 420 U.S

. at 692.

Third, F eola established the g eneral principle that where

an element of the underly i n g s u bstantive offense does not include a n intent requirement, the same will be tr u e f or a conspiracy to c ommit that offense, “unless one of the policies behind the imposition of conspiratorial liability is not served” by having the same intent. I d

. at 6 9 3

. According to the Court, t h e “two independent values served by the law o f conspiracy

” are: (1) “protection of society from the dang ers of concerted criminal activi t y ; ” and ( 2) “intervention of the criminal law” a t a “point i n the c ontinuum b etween preparation and consummation” of a cr iminal act when “the likelihood of a commission o f a n a ct is sufficiently g reat a nd the criminal intent sufficiently well formed.” I d. at 693–94. W h en apply ing this principle, the central question is whether the act of ag reeing w ith another person that some member o f the conspiracy will commit a crime is as blam eworthy a nd dang erous to society a s the act o f the lone criminal w ho actually c ommits that same cri m e

. I f the ag reement and the commission are equally opprobrious, the conspirator and the
pe r son who commits the act should be held to the same standard, at least with respect to intent. See id. I n the federal assault statute at issue in F eola

, k nowledg e of the victim’s id e n t i ty was not necessary for conviction of the substantive offense, and thus was “ equally irrelevant to questions o f responsib i l i t y for conspiracy to commit that offense.” Id.
at 696. Therefore, “its imposi t i o n

. . . would serve o nly to make it more difficult to o b tain convictions on charg es o f conspiracy , a policy

with no apparent purpose.” Id. at 694.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 41

Althoug h Feola stated its spe c ific holding in terms o f “facts g ivin g r i se to federal jurisdiction,” id

. at 696, its framewo r k f o r d e t ermining whether the intent requirement for

a conspiracy count is “g reater than” the intent required f or the

u n d erly ing substantive offense, id. at 686, is g enera l l y applicable. F irst, Feola did no t limit its analy sis to jurisdictional facts it de e m e d e x traneous to “ the offense Cong r ess intended to describe and to p unish.” Id

. at 676 n.9. To the c ontrary , Feola stated that la b el i n g a requirement a s “jurisdictional” does not mean the requirement “is viewed a s outside the scope of the evil Cong r ess intended to forestall.” Id. I n the case before it, Feola deemed the s t a t u s of the victim as a f

ederal ag ent to be a sig nificant component of the assault offense u n d e r § 111 b ecause Cong ress soug ht “to protect the integ rity of federal functions and the safety o f federal officers.” Id. Giv en that the element of the assault

o f f ense reg arding the v ictim’s status is not mer el y jurisdictional, Feola ’s analy sis read i l y applies to other elements of an offense.

Second, w e have previously reached the conclusion that “the rule of Feola ” is a g eneral one that requires “the same deg ree of intent for the co n s p i racy c h arg e as is required b y the underly

ing statute.” U

n i t e d States v. Thomas

, 8 87 F .2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989); see United State s v. Hubbard

, 96 F .3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 199 6 ) (citing F eola

, 420 U.S.
at 696) (holding t h a t “a federal conspiracy conviction does
not require a g reater level of c r iminal intent than a conviction

on the substantive count”). W e have applied this g eneral rule
to contex ts involving fact s that w ere not jurisdictional. F o r ins t a n c e, we held that when a person was charg ed with

con s p i racy to receive stolen ex p losives, the g overnment did
not have to prove the per s o n k new the dy

namite was stolen, but only that the person h a d “ reasonable cause to b elieve”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 42

that f act, which w a s the same deg r ee of scienter required b y the underly

ing offense. United S

tates v. Karr
, 742 F .2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Thomas

, 887 F. 2 d a t 1347 (ex plaining the ruling in Karr ). Similarly

, in United States v

. Baker

, we held that if a conviction of a violation of a federal
statute does not require proof of an intent to violate that law, “neither does a c onviction for conspiring to eng ag e in activities which violate” that law. 6 3 F

. 3 d 1 478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 2

B

W e apply Feola ’s g eneral r ule here. Adhering to Feola ’s

a n a l y tical framework, we first start by e x amining the pla i n lang uag e of the conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846. L ike the
g eneral conspiracy

statute, § 846 “offers no tex tual support” for the proposition that a defendant must possess a d eg ree o f intent as to the ty

pe and q uantity of dr u g i n v olved in the underly ing offense. 2 3 Rather, § 846’s r e quirement that a

22 T h e Elev en th Circu it h as l ik ew ise ap p lied Feo la o u tsid e t h e co n tex t

o f j u risd ictio n al f

acts. S ee, e.g

. , Un i ted

S ta tes v. W

h yte , 9 2 8 F.3 d 1 3 1 7
, 1 3 3 2 (1 1 th Cir. 2 0 1 9 ) (rely in g o n Feo la f o r th e p ro p o sitio n th at w

h ere th e

“ of f en se o f sex traf

f ick in g of a m i n o r d o es n o t req u ire k n ow led g e o f th e

v ictim ’ s statu s as a m i n o r,” th en th e co n sp irato r “ c an n o t im p o rt su ch a req u irem en t in to h er co n sp iracy o f f en se.”); see a lso Un ited S ta t es v. Du ra n , 5 9 6 F.3 d 1 2 8 3
, 1 2 9 6 (1 1 th C ir. 20 1 0 ) (h o ld in g th at w h ere a d ef en d an t h as b een ch arg ed w ith co n sp i racy to act as an ag en t o f a f o reig n g o v ern m en t w ith o u t p ro v id in g t h e req u ired n o t if

icatio n , th e g o v ern m en t d o es n o t h av e to p ro v e th e d ef en d an t k n ew o f th e n o tif

icatio n req u irem en t

w h en th e u n d erly in g su

b stan tiv e of

f en se d o es n o t re q ui re p ro o f o f su ch k n o w l ed g e).

23 C o mp a re 1 8 U.S.C. § 3 7 1 (“ If tw o o r m o re p erso n s co n sp i re eith er to co m m it an y o f

f en se ag ain st th e U n ited States, o r to d ef rau d t h e Un ited States, o r an y ag en cy t

h ereo f in an y m an n er o r f o r an y pu rp o se, an d on eU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 43

conspirator “shal l b e s u bject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the [ u nderly ing ] of f en s e” indicates that the penalties for a § 8 4 6 o f f e nse must be “the same” as the penalties for the underly ing offense, which also sug g ests that the facts trig g ering those penalties must be “the same.” This undercuts the arg ument that Cong ress intended to require the
g overnment to prove a different (and heig htened) mens rea in the conspiracy

contex t.

Second, beca use “it is clear that one may be g u ilty a s a conspirator for acts the precise details of which one does not know at the time of the ag reement,” Feola

, 420 U.S. at 692,
t h e fact that a defendant (who has been convicted o f conspiracy under § 846 for an a g reement to violate § 841(a))
may not have known about c e rtain details reg arding d rug ty pe and quantity does not preclude subjecting that defendant to a statutory penalty based on those unknown details. Therefore,

we reject the defendants’ arg ument t h a t conspirators w ho
ag ree to distribute controlled substances cannot be punished unless they knew the specific drug ty p e an d a m o unt to be distributed.

Def e n d a nts arg ue that the Supreme Court revived this
arg ument in Ocasio by r efere ncing the “long -recog niz ed principle[ ] of conspiracy law” that “the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy i s a j o int commitment to an ‘endeavor which, if c omplet e d

, would satisfy all o f the

o r m o re o f su ch p erso n s do an y act to ef f ect th e o b j ect o f th e co n sp i racy , each sh all b e f

in ed u n d er th is title or i m

p riso n ed n o t m o re th an f

iv e y ears,

o r b o th .”), with 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 4 6 (“ A n y p erso n w h o attem p ts o r co n sp i res t o co m m it an y o f f en se d ef in ed in th is su

b ch ap ter sh all be su

b j ect to t h e

sam e p en alties as t h o s e p rescrib ed f o r th e o f f en se, th e co m

m issio n of

w h ich w as th e o b

j ect o f th e attem p t o r co n s p iracy .”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 44

e l e m ents of the underly ing substantive criminal offense.’ ” 136 S. Ct. at 1429 (alteration adopted) (quoting Salinas

, 522 U.S. at 65). W e disag ree. Ocasio did n ot consider the specific q uestion raised in Feola

, let alone overrule Feola ’s general rule. I n fact, Ocasio never cited F eola

. B ec a u s e Ocasio merely recites a ge n e r al common law principle without d iscussing h o w i t applies in the contex t o f determining a co n s pirator’s intent, w e are bound by Feola ’s specific direction. 2 4

L ast, as indicated in Feola

, we c onsider whether requiring the same mens r ea for a § 846 cons p i r acy as f or the underly ing offense would fail to serve the values o f protecting society from “the dang ers of conc er t e d criminal activity ” or intervening in a criminal ag reement befor e t h e criminal act took place. Feola

, 420 U.S. at 693. As the Court held in Feola

, we c onclude that the offense of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance is as “ opprobrious” a nd dang erous to society as the a ct of the individual drug d ea l er who actually distributes the controlled substan c e. Id. B ecause the acts are e qually blameworthy

, and t h e person who commits the underly ing act need not know drug ty p e a nd

24 F o r th e sam e reaso n , w e rej ect th e v iew s o f t h e F if th Circu it in Un i t e d S t a t es v. An d

erso n , 9 3 2 F.3 d 34 4
, 3 5 2 (5 th Cir. 2 01 9 ). In An d erso n , th e Fif

th Circu it h eld t

h at w h ere a p erso n h as b een ch arg ed w i th

co n sp iracy to receiv e m o n ey o b tain ed f ro m ex to rtio n , th e g o v ern m en t

m u st p ro v e t

h at th e co n sp i rat o r k

n ew th e m o n ey w as th e p ro ceed s of

ex to rtio n , ev en th o u g h th e u n d erly in g su b stan t iv e o f

f en se d o es n o t req u ire
p ro o f o f su ch k

n o w led g e. Id

. Citin g O ca sio
, t h e F i ft h Circu it reaso n ed th at t h e “ m en s rea f

o r co n s p iracy is d i stin ct an d m o re d em an d in g ” th an f or th e u n d erly in g su

b stan tiv e co u n t b ecau s e th e g o v ern m en t m u st p ro v e th at th e d ef en d an t ag reed th at so m e m em b er o f th e co n sp iracy w o u l d co m m i t

ev ery elem en t of t

h e o f f en se. Id

. T h e Fif

th Circu it stan d s alo n e w ith th is
ap p ro ach

. B ecau se it f

ails to m en tio n , let alo n e d istin g u ish

, Feo la

, w h ich rej ected a sim ilar arg u m en t , w e d eclin e to f o llo w it.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 45

quantity

, that knowledg e “is equally irrelevant to questions o f responsibility for c onspiracy to c o m m i t that offense.” Id.
at 6 9 6. Moreover, as was the case in Feola

, the imposition o f

an additional burden on the g overnment to prove the conspirator’s knowledg e of drug ty pe and quantity “ would serve only to make it more difficult to obtain convictions on charg es of conspiracy

, a policy with n o apparent pu r p o s e

. ” Id. at 694.

According ly

, we c onclude that to o btain a conviction a nd

a particular sentence f

or conspiracy to distribut e controlled substances under § 846, the g overnment must prove only that the defendant’s mental state was the same as if the defendant had been charg ed with the underly ing offense. Apply ing that principle here, the g overnment need not prove the defendant’s knowledg e of the drug

ty pe and quantity

under § 841(b).

I V

W h ile o ur c onclusion is g rounded in the tex t of the statute and principles of conspiracy law, it i s m arkedly different fr o m h ow we have previously characteriz ed the framework for determining drug ty

pe a n d quant ity when a defendant is charg ed u nder § 846 or § 841. 2 5 W e briefly ex plain why our prior approach, which h eavily relied on the formulation in the Guidelines, was mistaken.

The Guidelines provides detai l ed advisory g uidance to federal judg es in determining the sentencing rang e for a convicted d e f

endant. “As a matter o f administration and to secure nationwide consistency , the Guidelines should be the starting point and the i nitial benchmark” for all sentencing

.

25 T h is w as th e cru x o f

th e d isp u te b etw een th e p arties.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 46

Gall v. U nited States
, 552 U.S. 38, 4 9 (2007). B ut we do not defer to the Guidelines when interpreting criminal statutes. See United States v. Morales , 590 F .3d 1 049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Of course, the [ Sentencing ] Commission can’t tell fed e ral courts how to interpret statutes.”). Therefore, while the relevant sections o f the Guidelines g uide a court’s postcon v iction sentencing determinations, w e may not rely on them when determining w hat is required for a conviction a nd statutory sentence.

Under the Guide l i n e s, after a defendant has been convicted for violating § 846 or § 841, a d i strict court must refer to Chapter Two, Part D of t he Guidelines, “Offenses involving Drug s.” See U. S

. S

. G

. § 2D (2018). F or a d rug t rafficking o ffense, including conspiracy to commit su ch a n offense, the Guidelines specifies more than one base offense level (depending on drug ty pe an d quantity

, among other thing s) and identifies several specific offense characteristics that can affect the offense level. 2 6 See U.S .S.G. § 2 D1.1 (2018). To d e termine the appropriate offense level for any g iven defendant, the Guidelines directs courts to consider

ce r t a i n “relevant conduct.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B 1.2(b) & 1B 1.3 (2018). T he Guidelines defines the term “rel e v ant conduct” to mean:

in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, o r enterprise undertaken by the d e f e ndant in
concert with o thers, whether or not charg e d a s

26 Fo r ex am

p le, an o f f en se lev el is in creased b y tw o lev els w h en “ th e

o b j e ct o f th e of

f en se w as th e d istrib u tio n o f a co n tro lled su b stan ce in a p riso n , co rrectio n al f

acility

, o r d eten tio n f

acility .” U.S.S.G.§ 2 D1 .1 (b )(4 ) (2 0 1 8).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 47

a conspiracy

), all acts and o missions of others that were—

(i) within the s cope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity

, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity

, and

(iii) r e a s o n a b l y f

o r e s e e a b l e i n connection with that criminal activity ;

that o ccurred during the c ommission o f the offense of c onviction, i n preparation f or that offense, or in the c ourse of attempting to avoid de tection or responsibility for that offense.

U.S.S.G. § 1 B 1.3(a)(1)(B ) ( 2018). 2 7 Althoug h § 1B 1.3(a) limits a defendant’s accountability for se n t encing purposes, the application not e s to § 1B 1.3 a cknowledg e that the Guidelines does not purport to establish standards of criminal liability

. See U.S.S.G. § 1B 1 .3, cmt. n.1 (2018).

27 T h e m ean in g o f th e term “ relev an t co n d u ct” in th e co n tex t o f a j o in tly u n dert a k e n c r im in al activ ity h as ch an g ed o v er th e y ears. Fo r

ex am p le, in 1 9 9 1, t

h e term “ relev an t c o n d u ct” in clu d ed “ all acts an d

o m issio n s

. . . f

o r w h ich th e d ef

en d an t w o u ld b e o th erw ise acco u n t ab le,” U.S.S.G. § 1 B 1.3 (a)(1 ) (1 9 9 1 ), an d th e ap p licatio n n o tes ex p lain ed th at th e “ [c]o n d u ct f

o r w h ich th e d ef

en dan t ‘ w o u ld be o th erw ise acco u n tab l e’

. . . in clu d es c o n d uc t o f o th ers in f u rth eran ce o f th e ex ecu tio n o f th e j o in tly

- u n d ertak en crim in al activ ity th at w as reaso n ab ly f o reseeab le b y th e d ef en d an t ,” U.S.S.G. § 1 B 1 .3
, cm t. n .1 (1 9 9 1 ). T h e Gu id elin es d i d n o t in clu d e th e “ w ith in th e sco p e” req u irem en t u n til 2 01 5

. See U.S.S.G. § 1 B 1 .3 (a)(1 )(B ) (2 0 1 5 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 48

Under the “relevant c onduct” standard, a defendant’s offens e l e vel is determined based on the conduct o f coconspirators only if the c onduct falls “wi t h i n the scope o f the jointly undertaken crimi nal activity ,” is committed “in furtherance of that criminal activity ,” and is “reaso n ably foreseeable in connect i on with that criminal activity .” 2 8 U

. S.S.G. § 1B 1.3, cmt. n .3(A) (2018). The G uideline s apparently borrowed this standard from Pin k erton , which limits a defendant’s liability for substantive o f f e n ses committed b y c o conspirators to include only those acts that

were “done in furtherance of the conspiracy ,” f ell “within the
scope of the unlawful project,” and were “pa r t of the

r a m i f ications of the plan” w hich could be “reasonably foreseen a s a necessary o r natural consequence of the unlawful ag reement.” Pinkerton

, 3 2 8 U.S. at 647–48. B ut Pinkerton clearly disting uishe s between conspiracy and a substantive offense, see 328 U.S. at 643, while the Guidelines does not. Rather, the G uidelines adopts Pinkerton ’s rule o f coconspirator liability a n d applies it “in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity

. . . whether or not charg e d as a conspiracy .” U.S.S.G. § 1B 1 .3(a)(1)(B ) (2018 ); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3, cmt. n.1 (1991) (same).

Perhaps due to the fact that Cong ress orig inally made the G u i d elines “mandatory and binding o n all judg es,” United States v

. Booker

, 543 U.S. 2 20, 233 (2005), we f ailed to make

a distinction between the Gu i d elines and the sentencing factors set forth in § 841(b). The misstep d ates back to United State s v

. Becerra
, which involved a challeng e to the district court’s imposition of 20-y ear sen tences on two

28 Su ch a sen ten cin g d eterm in atio n m u st b e su

p p o r t ed b y a p rep o n d eran ce o f th e ev id en ce. S ee U n ited S ta tes v. Perez
, 9 6 2 F.3 d 4 2 0
, 4 4 8 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 2 0 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 49

defendants who had be e n p art of a conspiracy to sell narcotics. See 992 F

. 2d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 1993). The defendants arg ued that t h e sentence was erroneous because the transaction, which had involved 2 5 kilog rams of cocaine,

was n either reasonably foreseeable nor within the sco pe o f
t h e c o n s piracy

. Id. Rely ing on the 1 991 version of the Gui d e lines, which provided that “each conspirator may be sentenced only f

o r the quantity of drug s that he reasonably foresaw would be distributed or that fell within the scope o f his own ag reement with his co-conspirators,” Becerra upheld

one defendant’s sentence and reversed the other ’ s

. I d. at 966–67. Becerra noted, in a footnote, that th i s mandatory standard would apply with equal force to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See id. at 967 n.2 (“W e see no reason why se ntencing under the statutory manda t ory minimums should differ [ from sentencing u nder the G uide l i n e s, because the statutory minimums] are, in essence, part of the Guidelines scheme.”). F ollowing Becerra
, we interpreted § 8 4 1 a s if it directly incorporated the standard adopted by t he Guidelines. See United S tates v. Banuelos

, 322 F

. 3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2003). Banuelos held that in order to subject a conspirator to a mandatory minimum or statuto ry m ax imum sentence under § 841(b), the ty

pe and quan t i t y o f the substance involved in the conspiracy must either have fallen “within the scope o f the defendant’s ag reement with hi s c o conspirators” or have been “reasonably

foreseeable to the defendant.” Id.

Our er r o r in Becerra and Banuelos was the failure to recog niz e t hat the rule o f coconspirator liability for substantive offenses in Pinkerton

, which was inco r porated into the Guidelines and a pplied reg ardless of whet h er the charg e was conspiracy o r a substantive offense, does not

a p p ly to the liability determination for a § 846 conspiracy offense. A s a result of this e rror, our cases mistakenlyU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 50

focused o n the questi o n w hether w e should adjust our interpretation of § 8 46 and § 8 41( b ) in accordance with the G u idelines’ shifting formulation, rather than whether t h at formulation is applicable at all. See United States v. Torres

, 869 F .3d 1089, 1095–1100 (9th Cir. 2017) (I kuta, J
., specially concurring ).

W e n ow o verrule Becerra and its prog eny to the ex tent they depart from our decision today

. B ecause P inkerton addresses wh en a defendant c a n be liable for substantive offense s co mmitted by c oconspirators, it is irrelevant to a defendant’s liability for conspiracy

. To the e x tent § 1 B 1.3 o r other applicable Guidelines provisi o n s i n c o r p o r a te Pinkerton

, they cannot g uide our statutory analy sis when the defendants are charg e d only

with conspiracy

.

I n reaching this conclusion, we join the well reasoned opinion of the Six th Circuit, which is g rounded in the tex t o f the statute. See United States v. Robinson

, 547 F .3d 6 32 (6th Cir. 2008). W e note o ur departure from t h e o t h er circuits, which have larg ely made errors that echo our own. 2 9 Some circuits rely on Pinkerton without acknowled gi n g the

29 S ee Un ited S ta tes v. Piza rro , 7 7 2 F.3 d 28 4 (1 s t Cir. 2 0 1 4 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Ma rtin ez , 9 8 7 F.2 d 9 20 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 3 ); Un ited Sta tes v. Ph illip s , 3 4 9 F .3 d 1 38 (3 d Cir. 2 0 0 3), va ca ted o n o t h er g r o u n d

s , Ba rb o u r v. Un ited S ta tes , 5 4 3 U.S. 11 0 2 (2 0 0 5 ); Un ited S t a tes v. Co llin s , 4 1 5 F .3 d 3 0 4 (4 th Cir. 2 0 0 5); Un i ted S ta tes v. H a in es , 80 3 F .3 d 7 1 3 (5 th C ir. 2 01 5 ); Un ited S ta tes v. S

eymo u r , 5 1 9 F.3 d 7 0 0 (7 th Cir. 2 00 8); Un ited S ta tes v. Littrell

, 4 3 9 F.3 d 8 7 5 (8 th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ); Un ited S t a tes v. Ellis

, 8 6 8 F.3 d 1 1 5 5 (1 0 th Cir. 2 0 1 7 ); Un ited

S ta tes v. S to d

d ard , 8 9 2 F.3 d 1 2 0 3 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 1 8 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 51

difference between conspiracy and the substantive offense. 3 0 See, e .g. , Stoddard , 892 F .3d at 1221. Other circuits rely on the G uidelines. See, e.g. , Hai n e s , 8 0 3 F .3d at 7 40; United States v. Irvin
, 2 F .3d 72, 7 7 (4th Cir. 1993). And it appears that two circuits have a d o p t e d one a p proach f or mandatory

m i nimum sentences and a d ifferent approach for statutory

max imum sentences. See Pizarro
, 77 2 F .3d a t 292–93; Haines
, 803 F .3d at 7 41– 4 2

. F or the reasons ex p lained above, we a

re not persuaded by the reasoning of those c ircuits that have relied on P inkerton , the Guidelines, or both.

Even thoug h the Guidelines does not impact our interpretation of the statute, the Guidelines works with the
statute to ensure that a defendant is not e x posed to unlimited liability

. Once a defendant is convicted and the statutory sentencing r ang e is established by the jury ’s f actual finding s, the district c ourt must f ollow the G u i d e l i n es, w hich will

e s t a b lish a fair sentence based o n an individualiz ed
assessment of accountability

. “ Under t h e Guidelines e ach conspirator, for sentencing purposes, is t o b e judg ed n ot on the d istribution made by the entire c onspiracy but on the basis of t h e q uantity of drug s which he reasonably foresaw o r which f e ll within ‘the scope’ of his particular ag reement with the conspirators.” United States v. P etty , 992 F .2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1993).

30 T h e Fo u rth Circu it co n ced es t h at “ [t]h e p rin cip les ou tlin ed in Pin kerto n ” d o n ot ap p l y to co n sp iracy u n d er § 8 4 6
, b u t i t n ev erth eless
req u ires a j u ry to b e in stru cted in Pin kerto n p rin cip les w h en d eterm in in g th e s u b s tan ce ty

p e an d q u an ti t y in v o lv ed i n a co n sp iracy

. C o llin s , 4 1 5 F.3 d at 3 13 , 3 1 4.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 52

V

W e now apply o ur approach to the case on a ppeal. Each defendant was indicted for conspiracy under § 846 to distribute controlled substances in violation of § 841(a)(1).

At trial, the jur y was instructed that if it found the defendant g uilty of the c o nspiracy charg e, it had to determine “whether the g overnment proved bey ond a reasonable doubt that the amount of [ the specified drug ] that was reasonably foreseeable to him or f

ell w ithin the scope o f his particular
ag reement e qualed or ex ceeded” a s p e cified amount. Althoug h the d istrict court was not a t f a ult in attempting to rely on our confusing p recedent, we now conc l u d e that this instruction was errone o u s

. As we have ex plained, a defendant convicted of conspiracy under § 846 is subject to

a penalty u nder § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) i f the g overnment has
p r o v e n bey ond a reasonable doubt that the underly ing § 841(a)(1) offense involved the drug ty pe an d q u antity set forth in § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). The g overnment does not have
to prove that the defendant had any knowledg e or intent with respect to those facts.

A jury instruction misstating the law i s s u b ject to harmless error review. United States v. Conti
, 804 F

. 3d 977, 980 ( 9th Cir. 2015). An e r roneous jury instruction will be deemed harmless if the “reviewing court concludes bey ond a reasonable d oubt that the omitted [ or misstated] element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same ab s e nt the error.” Neder v. United States
, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999). I n this
case, the er r oneous jury instructions could a mount to harmless error if there was overwhelming evidence that e achU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 53

defendant entered into an ag reement i n v o l ving the requisite drug ty pe and quantity

.

To safeg uard a criminal defendant’s Six th A mendment
g uarantee to a jury trial, the reviewing court must “conduct a thoroug h ex amination o f t h e r ecord.” Id. at 19. G iven the

numerous issues raised on a p p e a l and the ex tensive record from the ten-day jury trial, we find it appropriate to return this case to the three-judg e p an e l to reconsider b oth the harmless error issue and the bal a n ce o f the issues raised b y the parties in lig ht of this opinion, and to enter a n appropriate judg ment. See, e.g. , Gonzalez Batoon v. INS , 791 F .2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

REMANDED to the three-judge panel.

W

. F L E TCHER, Circuit J udg e, w ith whom THOMAS, Chief Circuit J udg e , and NGUYEN, W ATF ORD, and HURW I TZ
, Circuit J udg es, join, dissenting :

Under 21 U.S.C. § 8 41( a )(1), it is illeg al for a person “knowing ly or intentionally ” to “p ossess with intent to

. . . distribute

. . . a cont r olled substance.” I t has long been the law in this circuit that “a defen dant who has knowledg e that he p o s s e s s e s a c ontrolled substance may have the state o f mind necessary for conviction even if he does not know which controlled substance h e p ossesses.” United States v

. Jewell

, 532 F .2d 697, 698 ( 9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); see also McFadden v. United States
, 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015) (“The ordinary meaning of § 841(a)

. . . requires a defendant to know only that th e substance he is dealing with is some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules.”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 54

I n g eneral, if the offense involves a Schedule I or Schedule I I

c ontrolled substance (absent ag g ravating circumstances n o t at issue here), the defendant m a y upon conviction receive a

se n t e n c e of “not more than twenty y ears.” 21 U .S.C. § 8 4 1 ( b )(1)(C). I n such a case, there is no mandatory minimum sentence. I

d.

F or ei gh t s pecified Schedule I and I I controlled substances, h owever, §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ) provide for mandator y m i n imum sentences that differ depending on the particular substance a nd q u antity

. F or ex ample, if a defendant distributes 50 o r more g rams of methamphetamine, the mandatory minimum sentence is ten y ears and t he
p e r m i s s i b l e m ax i m u m s e ntence is life. See i d

. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). I f a d efendant distributes 100 or more g rams o f a substance conta i n i n g a detectable amount o f heroin, the mandatory minimum sentence is five y ears and the permissible max imum sentence is forty y ears. S ee id. § 8 4 1 ( b ) (1)(B )(i). I f death or bodily injury results from the distribution, the mandatory minimum sentence u n der both §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ) is twenty y ears.

The defendants in this case were c harg ed with conspiring

, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, t o d i s t r i b ute 50 g rams o r

more o f methamphetamine and 1 0 0 gr ams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount o f heroin, in violation of § § 841(a)(1), 8 4 1(b)(1)(A)(viii) a nd (b)(1)(B )(i). According to the majority

, o n ce the g overnment proves bey ond a r easonable doubt that a defe n d a n t knowing ly o r intentionally distributed a controlled substance, a nd that sub stance turns out to be one of the eig ht controlled substances in an amount specified by §§ 841(b)(1)(A) a nd ( b ) ( 1)(B ), a mandatory minimum and enhanced max imum
sentence automatically apply

. T h e sentences for a violationU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 55

of § 841(a)(1) are thus dramatically and mandatorily increased in the absence of any m ens rea as to drug ty pe a nd amount. I respectfully

disag ree.

Any crime whose penalty

is increased by law based on a specified f

act is an “ag g ravated crime.” Alleyne v. United States
, 570 U.S. 9 0, 113 ( 2 0 1 3 )

. “Any f act that, by law, increases the penalty for a c rime is an ‘element’” of the crime. Id. at 103; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey
, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Any such f

act must be submitted to the jury a nd proved b ey ond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne

, 570 U.S. at 116. T h ere is a strong p resumption that Cong ress intends t o

r e q u i re a culpable mens rea as to every element of a crime. See, e.g. , Rehaif v. United State s , 1 3 9 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019); Flores-Figueroa v. United States
, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009). Apply ing that presumption, I woul d hold that when
t h e g o v e r n m e n t s e e k s e n h a n c e d p e n a l t i e s u n d e r §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or ( b)(1)(B )—specifically

, the mandatory minimums and increased statutory max imums that do not

ex ist for Schedule I or I I drug violations charg e d under § 841(b)(1)(C)—it must prove the defendant “k n o wing ly o r intentionally ” distributed the actual controlled substance a nd quantity charg e d under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B ).

I . Presumption of Mens Rea

“[ T] he ex istence of a mens rea i s the rule of, rather than the ex ception to, the principles of Ang lo-American criminal jurisprudence.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
, 438 U.S. 4 22, 436 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). W illiam B lackstone wrote that it is “absurd” to ap p l y the

same punishment to “crimes of different m alig nity

. ” 4 W illiam B lackstone, Commentaries on the L aws of En g land 17 (1769). I n the leading ninet e e n t h-century treatise, J oelU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 56

Prentiss B ishop wrote that punishment requires concurrence b etween mens rea and the wrong inflicted because “ the ev i l intended is the measur e of a man’s desert of punishment.” 1 J oel Prentiss B ishop, Commentaries on the Crimin a l L aw § 3 3 4 ( 7th ed. 1882). J ustice Robert J ackson wrote in Morissette v. U

nited States that the relation between mens rea and punishment is “ a lmost as instinct i ve as the child’s familiar ex culpatory ‘B ut I didn’t mean to

. ’ ” 3 4 2 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).

The presumption of mens rea reinfor ces other foun d a t i o nal p rinciples of criminal law. F irst, a person’s mistake of fact ordin a r i ly mitig ates g uilt and resulting punishme n t

. As J ustice J ackson wrote, the law often
recog niz es “g ood f

aith or b l a meless intent as a defense, partial defense, or as an element to be considered in mitig ation of p unishment.” I d

. at 2 6 5

. Second, a person should have fair n otice as to the li kely consequences o f voluntary acts. The terms in a penal s t a t u t e defining an offense “must be sufficiently ex plicit to inform those who a re subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties.” Connally v. Gen. Const. Co.
, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

The Supreme Court has never insisted that Cong ress

c l e a rly state its intention to require mens rea as part of the definition of a crime. I ndeed, in one case the Court relied on the presumption to conclude that a mens rea is r equired despite the complete a

bsence of mens rea lang uag e any where in the statute. S

ee Staples v. United S

tates , 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994). I t necessarily follows that the presum p t i o n applies

“ w i th equal or g reater force” w hen Cong ress includes a n

ex p licit mens rea provision. Rehaif

, 1 3 9 S. Ct. at 2195. A

severe criminal penalty makes the already strong presumptionU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 57

even strong er, for the severity of the penalty is a “sig nificant consideration” in determining whether Cong ress intended to require a mens rea

. Staples

, 511 U.S. at 616; see also United States v. X-Citement V

ideo, I nc. , 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1 9 9 4 ) (pointing to the harsh p ena lty a s a reason to apply the presumption). The presu m p t ion is overridden only if Cong r ess makes plain that it intends to foreg o a mens rea requirement. R ehaif

, 139 S. Ct. at 2195.

There are two ex ceptions to the presumption of m ens rea , neither of which applies in the case before us. F irst, there is

an ex c eption for “public welfare” offenses. See id. at 2197. The p u blic welfare ex ception a pplies only to s tatutes that provide for “lig ht penal t i e s such as fines or short jail sentences,” Staples

, 511 U.S. at 616, or wh e r e “conviction does no g rave damag e to an o ffender’s repu tation,” Morissette
, 246 U.S. at 342. Second, m ens rea is not r equired for a jurisdictional element of a c rime, such as a r equirement that a firearm traveled in interstate commerce, because such elements have no bear i n g on the wrong fulness of a defendant’s conduct. Rehaif , 139 S. Ct. at 2196.

There is a strong presumption that a mens rea r equirement

ex ists for all element s o f a crime. See id. at 2195 (citing Model Penal Code § 2

. 0 2 ( 4 ), (Am. L

. I nst. 1985) (when a statute prescribes a level o f c ulpability

, it applies to “ all the material elements of the o f fense, u nless a contrary purpose plainly ap p e a rs”)). I n two cases, the Supreme Court has

ex p lained what constitutes an “element.”

I n Apprendi

, the Court held that a fact underly ing a sentencing enhancement bey ond the statutory max imum is an

e lement of the crime, disag reeing with New J ersey ’s

c o n t ention that a fact resulting in a hig her sentence wa s aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 58

mere “sentencing factor.” 530 U.S. at 4 92. Rather, the Court

ex p lained, the question of w hether a fact is an element of the crime is “one not of f

orm, but of e ffect.” Id. at 4 9 4. Courts

m u s t ask w hether the fact ex poses the defendant to g re a t e r punishment. Id.

I n Alleyne

, the Cour t ap p lied Apprendi to a statute describing a “core crime” and p rescribing escalating criminal penalties d epending on particular facts specified in the
statute. S e e 570 U.S. at 111–16. The core crime was using

or carry ing a firearm in re l a t i o n to a crime of violence. A defendant who committed the core crime, without more, was subject to a 5 -y e a r mandatory minimum. A defendant w ho “brandishe[ d] ” the firearm in committing the core crime was subject to a 7-y ea r mandatory minimum. See 18 U .S.C

. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The Court wrote that “facts increasing the leg ally prescribed floor aggravate th e punishment” a nd “heig hten[ ] the loss of liberty associated with the crime.” Alleyne

, 570 U .S. at 113 (emphasis in orig inal). “[ T] he core crime and the fact trig g ering the ma n d a tory minimum
sentence tog ether constitute a new, a ggravated crime.” Id. According to the Court, “Any f act that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element.’” Id. at 103. A ny such fact must be submitted to th e jury and proved bey ond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 116.

To g ive effect to the presumption of mens rea , the Court has been “reluctan[ t] to simply follow the most g rammatical reading of [ a] statute.” X-Citement Video

, 513 U.S. at 70. XCitement Video is a prime e x ample of ig n oring the niceties o f
g rammar. The statute at issue provided:U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 59

(a) Any person who—

(1) knowing ly transports or ships using

a n y means or f

acility of interstate o r foreig n c ommerce or in or a ffecting interstate or foreig n commerce by any

means including by compute r o r mails,
any visual depiction, if—

(A) the prod ucing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
eng ag ing in sex ually ex plicit c onduct; and

(B ) such visual dep iction is of such conduct;

. . .

shall be punished as p rovided in subsection (b) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). The question was whether the mens rea of “knowing ly ” required that defen d a n t s not o nly knew that they were transporting or shippin g a “ v isual depiction” o f “sex ually ex plicit conduct,” but also required that they knew that the depiction “involve[ d] the u se o f a minor eng ag ing in [ that] conduct.” Id.

Our court had held in X-Citement V ideo that the mens rea requirement applied only to the a ct of transpor t i n g the dep i ction of sex ually ex plicit conduct. United States v. XCitement Video, I

nc. , 9 8 2 F .2d 1285, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 1992). W e had held that mens rea requirement did notU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 60

r e q u i r e knowledg e that the depiction involved the use of a minor. See id. at 1292 (stating that a pply ing mens rea to this element would be “judicial rewriting of [ the ] s t a tute”). The Supreme Court reversed

. I n a n opinion by Chief J u stice Rehnquist, the Court held that the knowledg e mens rea applied to both e lemen t s of the crime. The Court held that “knowing ly ” modif

i ed the p hrase “involves the use of a minor,” e v e n t houg h the key p hrase was not the phrase directly modified by the adverb. X-Citement Video

, 513 U.S. at 68–70.

F urther, the Supreme Court has allowed a con s i d e r able distance between the words specify ing the men s rea and the words describing the element of t h e crime. I n X-Citement Video

, the adverb “knowing ly ” was separated f rom “ involves the use o f a minor” by twenty -six words. I n Rehaif

, the word specify ing the mens rea and the words specify ing e lements o f the crime w ere in entirely different sec t ions of Title 18. Section 924(a)(2) provided a penalty of up to 10 y ears’ imprisonment for “knowing ly ” eng ag ing in acts w ith several different factual predicates. The ac ts were identified in § 924(a)(2) only by cross-references to subsections in § 922. Among the factual predicates in § 9 2 2 ( g ) were two relevant
to the defendant: ( 1 ) t h a t the defendant possessed a firearm, and (2) that the defendant was an alien unla w fully in the United States. The question w as w hether the g overnment needed to p rove that a defe n d a n t charg ed with violating § 924(a)(2) knew both that h e possessed a firearm a nd that his
status a t the time of possession was as an alien unlawfully in the c ountry

. The Court held that Cong ress intended mens rea

as to a l l material elements o f the crime, e ven those in the separate section of the statute. Rehaif , 139 S. Ct. at 2196.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 61

I I . Ag g ravated Crimes under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and

841(b)(1)(B )

Subsection 841(a)(1) criminaliz e s conduct w ith respect to

a wide rang e of controlled substances and quantities, wit h a corresponding ly wide rang e of p enalties, as specified in § 841(b)(1). Su b s e c t i o n 841(a)(1) provides that “it shall be unlawful f

o r any p erson knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, o r dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance.” (Emphasis added.) T he g e neral punishment for § 841(a)(1) violations involving Schedule I a nd I I substan c es is up to t w enty y ears in prison, with no mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

However, § § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ), when combined with § 8 4 1 ( a ) (1), describe “ ag g r avated crimes” under Alleyne

, 570 U.S. at 113. W hen a forbidden act with respect to one o f eig ht specific Schedule I or I I control l ed substances is charg ed un der §§ 841(b)(1)(A) o r (b)(1)(B ), mandatory minimum and hig her max imum senten c e s a pply

. Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides a “term of imprisonment” of “not . . . less than 10 y ears or more than lif e

. . .” for eig ht controlled substances meeting or e x ceeding specified quan tities. Subsection 841(b)(1)(B ) provides for an imprisonment term of “not

. . . less than 5 y ears and not more than 40 y ears

. . . ” for the same eig ht substances in lesser quantities. I f d eath o r bodily injury results from the manufacture, d istribution o r dispensation, the mandatory minimum s e n t e nce under both §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ) is increased to twenty y ears.

W e are concerned in this case with two of the controlled

su b s tances and quantities listed in §§ 841(b)(1)(A) a nd (b)(1)(B ). D efendants were charg ed with con s p iring toU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 62

distribute controlle d substances and quantities listed in § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (methamphet a mine, a Schedule I I substance) and § 841(b)(1)(B ) (i) (heroin, a S chedule I substance).

This should b e an easy case. Th e s t r u c t ure of § 841 is clear and straig htforward. Subsection 841(a)(1) pr ohibits certain k nowing or intentional acts with respect to controlled subst a nces. Subsections 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ), immediat e ly following

, prescribe mandatory enhanced penalties for eig ht specified Schedule I and I I controlled substances in specified quantities. Under § 8 4 1(b)(1)(C),

u n l e s s death or serious b odily injury results, n o mandatory minimum applies to v iola t i o n s of § 841(a)(1). B ut under § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), a sentence o f not less than 10 y ears a nd

no more than life applies to an offense involving 50 g r ams o r

more of methamphetamine. Under § 841(b)( 1 )(B )(i), a sentence of not less than five y ears and no more than 40 y ears applies to an offense involving b etwee n 1 00 g rams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin.

Under Alleyne

, the specific controlled substance and its quantity are e lements of the a g g ravated crimes created by the combination of § 8 41(a)(1) and §§ 841(b)(1)(A) a nd (b)(1)(B ). Even without the presum p t i o n that mens rea applies to all elemen t s o f a crime, I would conclude that a plain reading of § 841 indicate s t h a t Cong ress intended to require th e g overnment to prove knowledg e or intent with respect to the c ontrolled substances and quan t i t ies specified in §§ 841(b)(1)( A ) and (b)(1)(B ). B ut the presumption applies, and it reinforces the conclusion I wou l d reach i ndependently

. I ndeed, the presumption applies wi t h particular force, g iven the severity of the penalties.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 63

Despite the ex plicit mens rea requirement in § 841(a)(1), despite the prox imity of § 841(a)( 1 ) t o § § 841(b)(1)(A) a nd (b)(1)(B ), despite the f

ac t that ty

p e and q uantity of the controlled substances in §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ) a re elements of the c rime, and despite the mandatory nature and severity of the penalties under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ), the majority concludes that § 841 requires that the
g overnment prove knowledg e o r intent only with respect to

a controlled substance—indeed, only with respec t to a ny controlled substance, not limited to the eig ht substances listed in §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ). I respectfully

disag ree.

The m a j o rity makes several arg uments in support o f its conclusion. I

find none of them persuasive.

F irst, the majority writes tha t “ § 841(b)(1), unlike § 841(a), is silent as to any mens rea requirement.” Maj. Op. at 23. I t is of course true that §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ) do not contain a mens rea requirement. The requirement is in § 841(a)(1). B ut the “silence” to which the majority refers is

a far cry from the true silence in Stapl e s , where the statute had no mens rea requirement whatsoever. Y e t the Court in Staples

, relying on the p resumption o f mens rea , h eld that the
statute requ ired mens rea o n the part of the defendant. Staples , 511 U.S. at 619.

Second, the majority writes, r ely ing on “ordinary Eng lish
g rammar,” that “[ t] h ere is no natural or ordinary way to read the intent r eq uirement in § 841(a)(1) as modify ing the d rug t y pes and q uantities in § 841(b).” Maj. Op. at 31. Bu t t h e question before us is not centrally a g rammatical question, to be answered as if we w ere diagr am m i n g a sentence. The question is a broader interpretive q uestion. I t is whether we should infer Cong ressional intent to r equire mens rea whenU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 64

one subsection of the statute specifies a m ens rea for criminal violations, including violatio n s c a r r y i n g m a n d a t o r y s e n t e n ces, and the immediately f

o l l o w ing subsections lists the controlled substances a

nd quantities that r equire those manda tory sentences. I f t h a t is the question, as it surely must be, it is
easy to read the statute in a “natural o r ordinary way ” to a pply the mens rea requirement contained in one subsection to the crimin a l behavior specified in the immediately following subsections that impose mandatory sentences.

Third, the majo rity arg ues that the “knowing ly o r intentionally ” mens rea in § 841(a)(1) cannot apply to

c o n t r olled substances and quantities in §§ 841(b)(1)(A) a nd (b)(1)(B ) b ecause Cong ress ex plicitly provided for a mens rea of “knowing ly or intentionally ” in § 841(b)(6). The majority correctly p oints out “that Cong ress knew how to require proof of mens r e a with respect to the predicate facts for sentences under § 841(b),” and that it did not ex plicitly provide that the

mens rea requirement o f “knowing ly or intentionally ” a pplied
to crimes specified in § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B ). Maj. Op. at 32. I t incorrectly concludes, however, that if the “knowing ly o r intentionally ” mens rea requirement contained in § 841(a)(1) applies to a cts described in § § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ), the identical mens rea spe c ified in § 841(b)(6) is “surplusag e.” Id. According to the majority

, “this redundancy fatally undermines the dissent’s position.” Id.

The majority misunderstands § 8 41(b)(6). There are two criminal acts specified in § 8 4 1 ( b ) (6). I t provides, “Any
pe r son who [ 1] violates subsection (a)

. . . , and [ 2] knowing ly or intentionally uses a poison, chem ical o r other h az ardous substance on F ederal land . .

. shall be fined

. . . o r i mprisoned not more than five y ears, or b oth.” (Emphasis a

nd bracketed numbers added.) The first criminalU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 65

act is a violation of § 841(a). As we know, § 841(a) already contains the mens rea of “knowing ly o r intentionally ,” and it forbids manufacturing

, distributing or dispensing controlled substances. The second criminal act is poisoning federal lan d s

. I t is a separate criminal act that is not forbidden b y § 841(a). B ecause it is a separate criminal act as to which the

mens rea specified in § 841(a) d oes n ot a pply

, Cong ress separately specified t h e m e ns rea of “knowing ly o r intentionally ” for that separ a te act. F ar from supporting the majority ’s conclusion, § 841(b)(6) is inconsistent with it. F o r the first c rime specified in § 841(b)(6), the mens rea o f “knowing ly or intentionally ” is al ready provided in § 841(a)(1). F or the second crime, mens rea is not provided by § 841(a)(1). Section § 841(b) (6) therefore ex plicitly provides that mens re a , i n words that precisely replicate the

mens rea in § 841(a)(1). There is no surp l u s a ge

. Rather, there is a confirmation that the m e n s rea specified in § 841(a)(1) can apply to the crimes and mandatory penalties specified in § 841(b)(1).

F ourth, the majorit y sug g ests that the presumption o f

mens rea should apply only to acts that, a bsent the statute, a

re “entirely innocent.” Maj. O p. at 34 (quoting Rehaif

, 139 S. C t

. at 2197). I t writes, “ T he presumption that Cong re s s intended the defendant to possess a culpable mental state a s to ‘e ac h of the statutory elements that criminaliz e otherwise innocent conduct’ is p articularly appropriate when a different reading would have the effect of c r iminaliz ing ‘a broad r ang e of apparently innocent c o nduct.’” Id. at 28–29 (internal citations omitted). The Sup r e m e Court has never held that the presumption of mens rea protects only the entirely innocent. I n deed, a s J ustice Kavanaugh wrote while a judg e on the D.C. Circuit, it would be “illog ical in the ex treme” to limit the presumption of mens rea in this way

. United StatesU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 66

v. Burwell

, 690 F

. 3d 5 00, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) ( en banc) (Kavanaug

h, J ., dissenting ).

The g overnm e n t has arg ued to the Court that the presumption of mens rea p r o t e c ts only the innocent, and its
arg ument has b een rejected. See B rief for the Unite d States
at 33–38, Flores-Figueroa v. United States
, 556 U.S. 646 ( 2009) ( No. 08-108), 2009 W L 1 91837. The g ove r n m e n t arg ued in Flores-Figueroa that t h e w ord “knowing ly ” in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) did not apply to a certain element o f

an ag g ravated identity thef t c r ime because there w as no risk of “criminaliz ation of any ‘apparently innocent c onduct.’” Id.

a t 3 4 ( quoting Liparota v. United States
, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). B ut the Court refused to adopt that view.

I am, of course, aware that c a ses previously decided b y

our court support the majority ’s conclusion. See
, e.g. , United States v. Soto-Zuniga
, 837 F .3d 992 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Jefferson , 791 F .3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2015). I believe that these cases were wrong ly decided. See Jefferson

, 791 F .3d at 1019 (F letcher, J
., concurring ). I n r e c e nt y ears, the Supreme Court has paid increasing attention to statutory sentencing schemes. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103; H arris v

. United States
, 536 U.S. 545 ( 2002), overrul ed by Alleyne

, 570 U .S. at 103; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. Alleyne reflects a broad concern about the unfairness o f sentencing schemes in which t h e f

a c t s that a

r e leg a lly essential to the punishment need n ot b e found bey o nd a rea sonable doubt. See Alleyne

, 570 U.S. at 112 ( “[ I ] f ‘a statute prescribes a p ar t i cular punishment to be inflicted o n those who co m m i t it under specia l c i r cumstances which it mentions, or with particular
ag g r avations,’ then those special circumstances must be specified in the indictme n t[ .] ” (quoting 1 J oel Prentiss B ishop, Criminal Procedure § 598, at 360–61 (2d ed. 1872)).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C O L L A Z O 67

I t is a small step fr o m Al l e yne to the conclusion I would reach in this case. The same conc e r n a b o u t unfairness that motivated the Court in Alleyne should lead u s to the conclusion that the mens r e a requirement specified in § 8 41(a)(1) applies to the ac t s and mandatory penalties specified in §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B ). Cong ress did not intend in § 841 to impose mandatory sentences of fi v e , ten and twenty y e ars, and max im u m sentences of life, based on mistakes of fact and unintentional acts.