# Official Journal C 137/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 137 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 577 May 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 137

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 577 May 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 137/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7200 — Lenovo/IBM x86 Server Business) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 137/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7200 — Lenovo/IBM x86 Server Business) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 137/02 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| 2014/C 137/03 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 18 January 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M. 6570 — UPS/TNT Express — Rapporteur: Austria | 3 |
| 2014/C 137/04 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — UPS/TNT Express (COMP/M.6570) | 4 |
| 2014/C 137/05 | Summary of Commission Decision of 30 January 2013 declaring a concentration incompatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6570 — UPS/TNT Express) (notified under document C(2013) 431 final)
   (
  1
  ) | 8 |
| 2014/C 137/06 | Communication from the Commission concerning the quantity not applied for to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod 1 July to 30 September 2014 under certain quotas opened by the Union for products in the poultrymeat, egg and egg albumin sectors | 18 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2014/C 137/07 | Publication of decisions by Member States to grant, suspend or revoke operating licenses pursuant to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (recast) (
  1
  ) | 19 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 137/02

Euro exchange rates

2

2014/C 137/03

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 18 January 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M. 6570 — UPS/TNT Express — Rapporteur: Austria

3

2014/C 137/04

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — UPS/TNT Express (COMP/M.6570)

4

2014/C 137/05

Summary of Commission Decision of 30 January 2013 declaring a concentration incompatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6570 — UPS/TNT Express) (notified under document C(2013) 431 final)
   (
  1
  )

(notified under document C(2013) 431 final)

1

8

2014/C 137/06

Communication from the Commission concerning the quantity not applied for to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod 1 July to 30 September 2014 under certain quotas opened by the Union for products in the poultrymeat, egg and egg albumin sectors

18

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2014/C 137/07

Publication of decisions by Member States to grant, suspend or revoke operating licenses pursuant to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (recast) (
  1
  )

1

19

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 137/08 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.7233 — Allianz/Going concern of UnipolSai Assicurazioni) (
  1
  ) | 42 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2014/C 137/08

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.7233 — Allianz/Going concern of UnipolSai Assicurazioni) (
  1
  )

1

42

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7200 — Lenovo/IBM x86 Server Business)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 137/01

On 29 April 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32014M7200. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32014M7200. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/2

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Euro exchange rates (1)

6 May 2014

2014/C 137/02

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3945 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 141,89 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4641 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,82115 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,0666 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2169 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,2420 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,438 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 307,03 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2019 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4420 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,9183 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4932 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,5232 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,8103 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5909 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,7387 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 431,82 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 14,6440 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,6829 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5863 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 16 059,02 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,5377 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 61,729 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 49,4230 |
| THB | Thai baht | 45,094 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,1202 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,1675 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 83,8060 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3945

JPY

Japanese yen

141,89

DKK

Danish krone

7,4641

GBP

Pound sterling

0,82115

SEK

Swedish krona

9,0666

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2169

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,2420

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,438

HUF

Hungarian forint

307,03

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2019

RON

Romanian leu

4,4420

TRY

Turkish lira

2,9183

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4932

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,5232

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,8103

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5909

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,7387

KRW

South Korean won

1 431,82

ZAR

South African rand

14,6440

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,6829

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5863

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

16 059,02

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,5377

PHP

Philippine peso

61,729

RUB

Russian rouble

49,4230

THB

Thai baht

45,094

BRL

Brazilian real

3,1202

MXN

Mexican peso

18,1675

INR

Indian rupee

83,8060

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/3

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 18 January 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6570 — UPS/TNT Express

Rapporteur: Austria

2014/C 137/03

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1 of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1 of the Merger Regulation.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product and geographic markets as stated in the draft decision. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product and geographic markets as stated in the draft decision.

| 4. | In particular, the Advisory Committee agrees that there is a separate market for (international) intra-EEA express services which is national in scope. |
| --- | --- |

4.

In particular, the Advisory Committee agrees that there is a separate market for (international) intra-EEA express services which is national in scope.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration would not lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in the markets concerned in the areas of: (1) air cargo, (2) freight forwarding, and (3) contract logistics. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration would not lead to a significant impediment of effective competition in the markets concerned in the areas of: (1) air cargo, (2) freight forwarding, and (3) contract logistics.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration, as originally proposed by the notifying parties, is likely to give rise to non-coordinated horizontal effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the market for intra-EEA express services in the following countries:






  — | Bulgaria, |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment that the notified concentration, as originally proposed by the notifying parties, is likely to give rise to non-coordinated horizontal effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the market for intra-EEA express services in the following countries:

—

Bulgaria,

| — | The Czech Republic, |
| --- | --- |

—

The Czech Republic,

| — | Denmark, |
| --- | --- |

—

Denmark,

| — | Estonia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Estonia,

| — | Finland, |
| --- | --- |

—

Finland,

| — | Hungary, |
| --- | --- |

—

Hungary,

| — | Latvia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Latvia,

| — | Lithuania, |
| --- | --- |

—

Lithuania,

| — | Malta, |
| --- | --- |

—

Malta,

| — | The Netherlands, |
| --- | --- |

—

The Netherlands,

| — | Poland, |
| --- | --- |

—

Poland,

| — | Romania, |
| --- | --- |

—

Romania,

| — | Slovakia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Slovakia,

| — | Slovenia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Slovenia,

| — | Sweden. |
| --- | --- |

—

Sweden.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s analysis of efficiencies, in particular the netting off against the estimated price increase, and the conclusion that they are not of a nature to counteract the significant impediment to effective competition resulting from the notified transaction on the markets identified in the previous point. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s analysis of efficiencies, in particular the netting off against the estimated price increase, and the conclusion that they are not of a nature to counteract the significant impediment to effective competition resulting from the notified transaction on the markets identified in the previous point.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that in view of the extremely limited number of potentially suitable purchasers for any divested business an upfront buyer or a fix-it-first solution was needed. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that in view of the extremely limited number of potentially suitable purchasers for any divested business an upfront buyer or a fix-it-first solution was needed.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments offered by the notifying party on 29 November 2012, as modified on 16 December 2012 and 3 January 2013, do not address the competition concerns identified by the Commission and will not eliminate the significant impediment to effective competition resulting from the notified transaction. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments offered by the notifying party on 29 November 2012, as modified on 16 December 2012 and 3 January 2013, do not address the competition concerns identified by the Commission and will not eliminate the significant impediment to effective competition resulting from the notified transaction.

| 10. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared incompatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(3) and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared incompatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(3) and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

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| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/4

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Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

UPS/TNT Express

(COMP/M.6570)

2014/C 137/04

I.   BACKGROUND

| 1. | On 15 June 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation (2) by which UPS acquires sole control, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, of TNT by way of a public takeover under Dutch law. (UPS and TNT are referred to as ‘the Parties’). On 20 July 2012, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 15 June 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation (2) by which UPS acquires sole control, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, of TNT by way of a public takeover under Dutch law. (UPS and TNT are referred to as ‘the Parties’). On 20 July 2012, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.

II.   WRITTEN PROCEDURE

The Statement of Objections

| 2. | A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was addressed to UPS on 19 October 2012. UPS was granted 10 working days to submit a written reply. In the SO, the Commission’s preliminary findings indicated that the notified concentration would raise competition concerns in the markets for international intra-EEA express small package delivery services in 29 EEA Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.

A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was addressed to UPS on 19 October 2012. UPS was granted 10 working days to submit a written reply. In the SO, the Commission’s preliminary findings indicated that the notified concentration would raise competition concerns in the markets for international intra-EEA express small package delivery services in 29 EEA Member States.

Access to file

| 3. | UPS was granted access to the file via CD-ROMs on 22, 26 and 29 October, 28 November, 13 and 21 December 2012 and 17 January 2013. In addition, two data rooms were organised in this case. One, concerning a selection of extracts from internal presentations and replies to requests for information of FedEx, took place, upon FedEx’ consent, on 26 and 29 October 2012 and was attended by three UPS outside counsels. The second, concerning bidding data, took place on 26 October 2012 and was attended by UPS’ economic advisers. |
| --- | --- |

3.

UPS was granted access to the file via CD-ROMs on 22, 26 and 29 October, 28 November, 13 and 21 December 2012 and 17 January 2013. In addition, two data rooms were organised in this case. One, concerning a selection of extracts from internal presentations and replies to requests for information of FedEx, took place, upon FedEx’ consent, on 26 and 29 October 2012 and was attended by three UPS outside counsels. The second, concerning bidding data, took place on 26 October 2012 and was attended by UPS’ economic advisers.

| 4. | On 25 October 2012, UPS requested additional access to the file. In response DG Competition partially provided less-redacted versions of documents and granted UPS access via its outside counsels in a data room; partially DG Competition rejected the request. Shortly thereafter UPS referred the matter to me. It asked for additional access to the internal presentations of FedEx detailing the company’s expansion plans in Europe, extracts of which UPS’ external counsels had seen in the data room. UPS argued that since FedEx had played a key role in the investigation acting almost as a ‘plaintiff’ and as the ‘main evidence’ held against the proposed transaction, UPS had an ‘unequivocal right’ to review all documents submitted by FedEx without redactions. According to UPS, access to these documents would allow it to understand FedEx’ objections against the proposed transaction and to assess the plausibility of FedEx’ submissions on the basis of other evidence in the file and publicly available data. |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 25 October 2012, UPS requested additional access to the file. In response DG Competition partially provided less-redacted versions of documents and granted UPS access via its outside counsels in a data room; partially DG Competition rejected the request. Shortly thereafter UPS referred the matter to me. It asked for additional access to the internal presentations of FedEx detailing the company’s expansion plans in Europe, extracts of which UPS’ external counsels had seen in the data room. UPS argued that since FedEx had played a key role in the investigation acting almost as a ‘plaintiff’ and as the ‘main evidence’ held against the proposed transaction, UPS had an ‘unequivocal right’ to review all documents submitted by FedEx without redactions. According to UPS, access to these documents would allow it to understand FedEx’ objections against the proposed transaction and to assess the plausibility of FedEx’ submissions on the basis of other evidence in the file and publicly available data.

| 5. | I rejected UPS’ request for the following reasons. First, UPS has no ‘unequivocal right’ to see all FedEx documents in the Commission file un-redacted because of any special position it may have in this proceeding. The rules and standards for access to the file do not vary in function of the position an information provider adopts in a proceeding. Secondly, UPS had been given full access, either via CD-ROMs or through data room exercises, to the adverse evidence relied upon by the Commission in the SO. Thirdly, the redacted information appeared to consist of very sensitive business secrets and UPS had not shown that access to the information was ‘indispensable’ for the exercise of its rights of defence, as required by Article 8(4) of Decision 2011/695/EU. Finally, I could not find — as UPS alleged — that the content of the redacted documents submitted by FedEx was inconsistent with the findings reached by the Commission in the SO with regard to FedEx’ expansion plans. |
| --- | --- |

5.

I rejected UPS’ request for the following reasons. First, UPS has no ‘unequivocal right’ to see all FedEx documents in the Commission file un-redacted because of any special position it may have in this proceeding. The rules and standards for access to the file do not vary in function of the position an information provider adopts in a proceeding. Secondly, UPS had been given full access, either via CD-ROMs or through data room exercises, to the adverse evidence relied upon by the Commission in the SO. Thirdly, the redacted information appeared to consist of very sensitive business secrets and UPS had not shown that access to the information was ‘indispensable’ for the exercise of its rights of defence, as required by Article 8(4) of Decision 2011/695/EU. Finally, I could not find — as UPS alleged — that the content of the redacted documents submitted by FedEx was inconsistent with the findings reached by the Commission in the SO with regard to FedEx’ expansion plans.

| 6. | However, since the Commission file did not contain descriptions of the non-accessible internal presentations, I requested FedEx to provide justifications for its confidentiality claims and summaries of the information redacted, so as to better enable UPS to fully exercise its rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

6.

However, since the Commission file did not contain descriptions of the non-accessible internal presentations, I requested FedEx to provide justifications for its confidentiality claims and summaries of the information redacted, so as to better enable UPS to fully exercise its rights of defence.

| 7. | UPS also sought full disclosure of other FedEx documents. However, since the notifying party received for some of them less redacted versions from DG Competition while its request was pending with me, I considered that the request had been satisfied. For other documents, I referred the matter, in accordance with Article 3(7) of Decision 2011/695/EU, to DG Competition, as UPS had not first raised the matter with it. |
| --- | --- |

7.

UPS also sought full disclosure of other FedEx documents. However, since the notifying party received for some of them less redacted versions from DG Competition while its request was pending with me, I considered that the request had been satisfied. For other documents, I referred the matter, in accordance with Article 3(7) of Decision 2011/695/EU, to DG Competition, as UPS had not first raised the matter with it.

Third persons

| 8. | Three competitors of the merging entities, i.e., DHL, FedEx, and GeoPost, and one airport, i.e., Liege Airport, demonstrated ‘sufficient interest’ within the meaning of Article 18(4) of the Merger Regulation and were, thus, given the opportunity to be heard as third persons in writing and orally. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Three competitors of the merging entities, i.e., DHL, FedEx, and GeoPost, and one airport, i.e., Liege Airport, demonstrated ‘sufficient interest’ within the meaning of Article 18(4) of the Merger Regulation and were, thus, given the opportunity to be heard as third persons in writing and orally.

Better information

| 9. | DHL and FedEx complained that the edited version of the SO they had received was so heavily redacted that they could not fully understand the nature and subject matter of the merger procedure. DHL, in particular, sought the disclosure of the sections of the SO analysing efficiency claims, price concentration and bidding data. |
| --- | --- |

9.

DHL and FedEx complained that the edited version of the SO they had received was so heavily redacted that they could not fully understand the nature and subject matter of the merger procedure. DHL, in particular, sought the disclosure of the sections of the SO analysing efficiency claims, price concentration and bidding data.

| 10. | DG Competition rejected these complaints on the ground that the information of third persons is left to its discretion as long as the legal minimum requirement is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

10.

DG Competition rejected these complaints on the ground that the information of third persons is left to its discretion as long as the legal minimum requirement is fulfilled.

Access to the reply to the SO

| 11. | In preparation for the oral hearing, FedEx requested access to a non-confidential version of UPS’ reply to the SO as it anticipated that a part of UPS’ observations would focus on FedEx’ particular position in this proceeding. |
| --- | --- |

11.

In preparation for the oral hearing, FedEx requested access to a non-confidential version of UPS’ reply to the SO as it anticipated that a part of UPS’ observations would focus on FedEx’ particular position in this proceeding.

| 12. | I rejected this request pointing out that neither the applicable law nor the Best Practices of the Commission entitle third persons to obtain the reply of the notifying party to the SO. The Commission is, furthermore, equipped with all necessary investigatory and other means to ascertain the evidentiary value of the information it receives. The oral hearing is thus neither the only nor necessarily the most appropriate forum to assess the credibility of third persons. Moreover, since UPS addressed the issue of its credibility in its presentation at the Oral Hearing, FedEx was informed about UPS’ most salient arguments and had the opportunity to react to them. |
| --- | --- |

12.

I rejected this request pointing out that neither the applicable law nor the Best Practices of the Commission entitle third persons to obtain the reply of the notifying party to the SO. The Commission is, furthermore, equipped with all necessary investigatory and other means to ascertain the evidentiary value of the information it receives. The oral hearing is thus neither the only nor necessarily the most appropriate forum to assess the credibility of third persons. Moreover, since UPS addressed the issue of its credibility in its presentation at the Oral Hearing, FedEx was informed about UPS’ most salient arguments and had the opportunity to react to them.

III.   ORAL PROCEDURE

| 13. | The notifying party requested an Oral Hearing, which was held on 12 November 2012. Three closed sessions took place at the Hearing. Two concerned UPS’ presentation on efficiencies and the price concentration analysis. The third related to FedEx’ presentation on the scale and service coverage of its operations in Europe. For the notifying party the same outside counsels attended who participated in the data room of 26 and 29 October. |
| --- | --- |

13.

The notifying party requested an Oral Hearing, which was held on 12 November 2012. Three closed sessions took place at the Hearing. Two concerned UPS’ presentation on efficiencies and the price concentration analysis. The third related to FedEx’ presentation on the scale and service coverage of its operations in Europe. For the notifying party the same outside counsels attended who participated in the data room of 26 and 29 October.

| 14. | UPS also asked for a closed session for a presentation on the theory of harm, where a representative of TNT would discuss customer behaviour on the basis of country-specific case studies. I rejected this request as I considered that it was not necessary for UPS’ right to be heard orally that the TNT representative refers to confidential information. Moreover, I considered that the presence of competitors during TNT’s presentation would be beneficial to clarify relevant facts, as they also have customers and may express views on their behaviour. This was indeed the case, as during the hearing DHL took position on certain demand-related issues. |
| --- | --- |

14.

UPS also asked for a closed session for a presentation on the theory of harm, where a representative of TNT would discuss customer behaviour on the basis of country-specific case studies. I rejected this request as I considered that it was not necessary for UPS’ right to be heard orally that the TNT representative refers to confidential information. Moreover, I considered that the presence of competitors during TNT’s presentation would be beneficial to clarify relevant facts, as they also have customers and may express views on their behaviour. This was indeed the case, as during the hearing DHL took position on certain demand-related issues.

IV.   PROCEDURE AFTER THE ORAL HEARING

Remedies

| 15. | In November 2012, the notifying party submitted a first remedies package, which the Commission considered insufficient to solve the competition concerns arising from the merger. Subsequently, UPS submitted two revised remedies packages in December 2012 and January 2013, consisting of the divestment of assets in a number of EU countries where competition concerns had been identified. The Commission continued to consider these remedies insufficient, in particular in view of the inadequacy of the proposed buyer to qualify as a suitable purchaser and a future viable competitor in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

15.

In November 2012, the notifying party submitted a first remedies package, which the Commission considered insufficient to solve the competition concerns arising from the merger. Subsequently, UPS submitted two revised remedies packages in December 2012 and January 2013, consisting of the divestment of assets in a number of EU countries where competition concerns had been identified. The Commission continued to consider these remedies insufficient, in particular in view of the inadequacy of the proposed buyer to qualify as a suitable purchaser and a future viable competitor in the EEA.

Letter of Facts

| 16. | On 21 December 2012, the Commission sent to UPS a Letter of Facts informing it about additional evidence in support of its findings regarding FedEx’ competitive position in fourteen Member States. UPS was granted two working days to submit written observations. In its written comments, UPS complained that the Letter of Facts was sent at a time when it had no possibility any longer to modify the proposed remedies. It also reiterated its request for access to internal FedEx documents, which DG Competition again rejected. Finally, it requested minutes of meetings between the Commission and FedEx, which it received. |
| --- | --- |

16.

On 21 December 2012, the Commission sent to UPS a Letter of Facts informing it about additional evidence in support of its findings regarding FedEx’ competitive position in fourteen Member States. UPS was granted two working days to submit written observations. In its written comments, UPS complained that the Letter of Facts was sent at a time when it had no possibility any longer to modify the proposed remedies. It also reiterated its request for access to internal FedEx documents, which DG Competition again rejected. Finally, it requested minutes of meetings between the Commission and FedEx, which it received.

| 17. | UPS did not refer these claims to me in accordance with Article 3(7) of Decision 2011/695/EU, thus I did not have to intervene on these matters. However, as regards the point concerning the timing of the Letter of Facts, I do not find that UPS’ rights of defence have been violated. In my view, UPS had sufficient time to modify the remedies, which is confirmed by the fact that it submitted revised remedies one day before its written comments. More importantly, the Letter of Facts did not change the scope or content of the Commission’s competition assessment, which UPS was made aware of in meetings after the Oral Hearing. Therefore, the Letter of Facts did not introduce any new element which UPS could have not taken into account before to prepare a revised remedies package. As regards access to FedEx internal documents, I refer to my observations above (para. 5). |
| --- | --- |

17.

UPS did not refer these claims to me in accordance with Article 3(7) of Decision 2011/695/EU, thus I did not have to intervene on these matters. However, as regards the point concerning the timing of the Letter of Facts, I do not find that UPS’ rights of defence have been violated. In my view, UPS had sufficient time to modify the remedies, which is confirmed by the fact that it submitted revised remedies one day before its written comments. More importantly, the Letter of Facts did not change the scope or content of the Commission’s competition assessment, which UPS was made aware of in meetings after the Oral Hearing. Therefore, the Letter of Facts did not introduce any new element which UPS could have not taken into account before to prepare a revised remedies package. As regards access to FedEx internal documents, I refer to my observations above (para. 5).

| 18. | On 21 January 2013, UPS sent me a request to reassess DG Competition’s refusals to grant it access to FedEx’ internal documents, in particular with regard to FedEx’ expansion plans, and to incorporate the alleged shortcomings as regards the extent and timing of the access to file in this Final Report. Having carried out the requested review, I cannot find that UPS’ rights to access the file were violated. Firstly as regards the extent of the access to file, UPS was granted the opportunity to see all the adverse evidence, including confidential information, concerning FedEx’ expansion plans, on which the SO and the Letter of Facts were based upon. Access was not limited to the 15 SIEC countries but was granted to summaries for all those EEA countries for which such plans exist. UPS also had access to all other FedEx’ submissions, except for the confidential information contained therein. Furthermore, as regards FedEx’ confidential information, UPS received justifications for the redactions and descriptions or summaries of the inaccessible parts. On this basis, I consider that the rules for access to file have been complied with. Secondly as regards the timing of the access to file, since UPS did not sufficiently substantiate its claim, I could not review it. |
| --- | --- |

18.

On 21 January 2013, UPS sent me a request to reassess DG Competition’s refusals to grant it access to FedEx’ internal documents, in particular with regard to FedEx’ expansion plans, and to incorporate the alleged shortcomings as regards the extent and timing of the access to file in this Final Report. Having carried out the requested review, I cannot find that UPS’ rights to access the file were violated. Firstly as regards the extent of the access to file, UPS was granted the opportunity to see all the adverse evidence, including confidential information, concerning FedEx’ expansion plans, on which the SO and the Letter of Facts were based upon. Access was not limited to the 15 SIEC countries but was granted to summaries for all those EEA countries for which such plans exist. UPS also had access to all other FedEx’ submissions, except for the confidential information contained therein. Furthermore, as regards FedEx’ confidential information, UPS received justifications for the redactions and descriptions or summaries of the inaccessible parts. On this basis, I consider that the rules for access to file have been complied with. Secondly as regards the timing of the access to file, since UPS did not sufficiently substantiate its claim, I could not review it.

| 19. | In its request, UPS appears to suggest that the Commission withdrew the objections raised in the SO with regard to certain Member States solely after reassessing FedEx’ expansion plans on the basis of internal documents submitted before the SO and new information provided thereafter. This suggestion is not correct according to the information I have received from DG Competition. The Commission amended its objections in view of the new information obtained from FedEx and, equally important reconducted price concentration analysis and the evaluation of the efficiencies, which became to a large part only possible after UPS had provided DG Competition with more information. |
| --- | --- |

19.

In its request, UPS appears to suggest that the Commission withdrew the objections raised in the SO with regard to certain Member States solely after reassessing FedEx’ expansion plans on the basis of internal documents submitted before the SO and new information provided thereafter. This suggestion is not correct according to the information I have received from DG Competition. The Commission amended its objections in view of the new information obtained from FedEx and, equally important reconducted price concentration analysis and the evaluation of the efficiencies, which became to a large part only possible after UPS had provided DG Competition with more information.

V.   THE DRAFT COMMISSION DECISION

| 20. | In my opinion the draft Decision relates only to objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views. |
| --- | --- |

20.

In my opinion the draft Decision relates only to objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views.

VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS

| 21. | Overall, I conclude that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case. |
| --- | --- |

21.

Overall, I conclude that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case.

Michael ALBERS

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(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1).

2

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| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/8

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 30 January 2013

declaring a concentration incompatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.6570 — UPS/TNT Express)

(notified under document C(2013) 431 final)

(Only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 137/05

On 30 January 2013 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1), and in particular Article 8(3) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   THE PARTIES

| 1. | United Parcel Service Inc. (‘UPS’ – United States of America) is one of the world’s largest logistics providers operating mainly in the small package delivery, freight transport and contract logistics sectors. UPS’ EU hub is located in Köln, Germany. |
| --- | --- |

1.

United Parcel Service Inc. (‘UPS’ – United States of America) is one of the world’s largest logistics providers operating mainly in the small package delivery, freight transport and contract logistics sectors. UPS’ EU hub is located in Köln, Germany.

| 2. | TNT Express N.V. (‘TNT’ – The Netherlands) is active in the small package delivery and freight transport sectors. TNT’s European network has its central hub in Liège, Belgium. |
| --- | --- |

2.

TNT Express N.V. (‘TNT’ – The Netherlands) is active in the small package delivery and freight transport sectors. TNT’s European network has its central hub in Liège, Belgium.

II.   THE OPERATION AND EU DIMENSION

| 3. | On 15 June 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking UPS intended to acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of the undertaking TNT by way of a public takeover under Dutch law (2) (the ‘Merger’). UPS and TNT are hereafter referred to as ‘the Parties’. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 15 June 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking UPS intended to acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of the undertaking TNT by way of a public takeover under Dutch law (2) (the ‘Merger’). UPS and TNT are hereafter referred to as ‘the Parties’.

| 4. | The operation had an EU dimension in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The operation had an EU dimension in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation.

III.   THE PROCEDURE

| 5. | After the first phase market investigation, the Commission concluded that the Merger raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement. Therefore, on 20 July 2012, the Commission opened second phase proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

5.

After the first phase market investigation, the Commission concluded that the Merger raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement. Therefore, on 20 July 2012, the Commission opened second phase proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.

| 6. | A Statement of Objections was sent to the Parties on 19 October 2012. The Parties had the opportunity to present their views through a written response and at an Oral Hearing that took place on 12 November 2012. |
| --- | --- |

6.

A Statement of Objections was sent to the Parties on 19 October 2012. The Parties had the opportunity to present their views through a written response and at an Oral Hearing that took place on 12 November 2012.

| 7. | On 29 November 2012 the Notifying party presented Commitments pursuant to Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. New commitments were submitted subsequently on 16 December 2012 and on 3 January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

7.

On 29 November 2012 the Notifying party presented Commitments pursuant to Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. New commitments were submitted subsequently on 16 December 2012 and on 3 January 2013.

| 8. | A Letter of Facts was sent to UPS on 21 December 2012. UPS submitted its written observations on the Letter of Facts on 4 January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

8.

A Letter of Facts was sent to UPS on 21 December 2012. UPS submitted its written observations on the Letter of Facts on 4 January 2013.

| 9. | On 30 January 2013, the Commission adopted pursuant to article 8(3) of the Merger Regulation a decision declaring the Merger to be incompatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement (the ‘Decision’). |
| --- | --- |

9.

On 30 January 2013, the Commission adopted pursuant to article 8(3) of the Merger Regulation a decision declaring the Merger to be incompatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement (the ‘Decision’).

IV.   COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

1.   Description of the small package sector

| 10. | The small package delivery industry shows at least two major characteristics:






  (a) | significant economies of density/scale as it is a network industry. Pick-up and delivery costs are a major contributor to a parcel service provider’s direct cost. Moreover, coverage at both the origin and destination is important; |
| --- | --- | --- |

10.

The small package delivery industry shows at least two major characteristics:

(a)

significant economies of density/scale as it is a network industry. Pick-up and delivery costs are a major contributor to a parcel service provider’s direct cost. Moreover, coverage at both the origin and destination is important;

| (b) | highly differentiated products as providers are able to differentiate the service supplied across a vast number of dimensions:
  (i) speed of delivery (ranging from early-morning next-day express delivery services to two or more days standard delivery services), (ii) geography (ranging from domestic to international extra-EEA services), and (iii) quality of service (such as reliability, security, late pick-up time, comprehensive track-and-trace ability, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

(b)

highly differentiated products as providers are able to differentiate the service supplied across a vast number of dimensions:

(i) speed of delivery (ranging from early-morning next-day express delivery services to two or more days standard delivery services), (ii) geography (ranging from domestic to international extra-EEA services), and (iii) quality of service (such as reliability, security, late pick-up time, comprehensive track-and-trace ability, etc.).

| 11. | There are a number of different operators active in the industry: integrators, national and local postal operators, partner networks and freight forwarders, each with a different operating model based on the structure and type of its network. The main characteristic of an integrator is that it has full operational control over the logistics of the parcel delivery from origin to destination, including air transport. Within the EEA, there are four integrators: UPS, TNT, DHL and FedEx. |
| --- | --- |

11.

There are a number of different operators active in the industry: integrators, national and local postal operators, partner networks and freight forwarders, each with a different operating model based on the structure and type of its network. The main characteristic of an integrator is that it has full operational control over the logistics of the parcel delivery from origin to destination, including air transport. Within the EEA, there are four integrators: UPS, TNT, DHL and FedEx.

| 12. | National postal operators own extensive domestic ground networks and in some cases are present in international operations. In particular, Royal Mail (United Kingdom), through its subsidiary GLS, and La Poste (France), through its subsidiary DPD, as well as PostNL (Netherlands) and Austrian Post (Austria), qualify as international network operators. La Poste, in particular in France and Spain, offers international intra-EEA express deliveries for many EEA countries, as does Royal Mail in the UK. These operators nevertheless do not have their own air fleet network and offer international intra-EEA express delivery services based on road transportation for neighbouring countries as well as on air transportation that relies on commercial flights (belly space) or on integrators. |
| --- | --- |

12.

National postal operators own extensive domestic ground networks and in some cases are present in international operations. In particular, Royal Mail (United Kingdom), through its subsidiary GLS, and La Poste (France), through its subsidiary DPD, as well as PostNL (Netherlands) and Austrian Post (Austria), qualify as international network operators. La Poste, in particular in France and Spain, offers international intra-EEA express deliveries for many EEA countries, as does Royal Mail in the UK. These operators nevertheless do not have their own air fleet network and offer international intra-EEA express delivery services based on road transportation for neighbouring countries as well as on air transportation that relies on commercial flights (belly space) or on integrators.

| 13. | National small package operators have a predominantly domestic small package business. Companies such as Bartolini in Italy, Yodl in the UK, Siodemka in Poland or Speedex in Greece have rather a national footprint and compete with the Parties only at that level. Partner networks (such as Eurodis, NetExpress, and EuroExpress) hardly have any own operations on the international intra-EEA express markets. Freight forwarders (e.g. Kuehne + Nagel, DB Schenker, DSV, Geodis) focus on heavy consignments but sometimes also deliver small packages, mostly for customers who send cargo through their networks. For the international intra-EEA express market they essentially resell the integrators’ services. |
| --- | --- |

13.

National small package operators have a predominantly domestic small package business. Companies such as Bartolini in Italy, Yodl in the UK, Siodemka in Poland or Speedex in Greece have rather a national footprint and compete with the Parties only at that level. Partner networks (such as Eurodis, NetExpress, and EuroExpress) hardly have any own operations on the international intra-EEA express markets. Freight forwarders (e.g. Kuehne + Nagel, DB Schenker, DSV, Geodis) focus on heavy consignments but sometimes also deliver small packages, mostly for customers who send cargo through their networks. For the international intra-EEA express market they essentially resell the integrators’ services.

2.   Market definition

| 14. | In line with its decisional practice, (3) the Commission identifies the relevant product markets for small package delivery services (4) on the basis of the speed of delivery (i.e. express delivery services — commonly understood as services with a next day delivery commitment, and standard/deferred delivery services) and whether the packages are picked-up and delivered in the same country, in two different EEA countries, or in one EEA country and one non-EEA country (i.e. domestic, international intra-EEA and international extra-EEA services). |
| --- | --- |

14.

In line with its decisional practice, (3) the Commission identifies the relevant product markets for small package delivery services (4) on the basis of the speed of delivery (i.e. express delivery services — commonly understood as services with a next day delivery commitment, and standard/deferred delivery services) and whether the packages are picked-up and delivered in the same country, in two different EEA countries, or in one EEA country and one non-EEA country (i.e. domestic, international intra-EEA and international extra-EEA services).

| 15. | With respect to the geographic dimension, the Commission identified national markets for both domestic and international services |
| --- | --- |

15.

With respect to the geographic dimension, the Commission identified national markets for both domestic and international services

| 16. | The Commission concluded for the purpose of the Decision that there is a separate product market for international intra-EEA express small package delivery services. This market is national in scope. |
| --- | --- |

16.

The Commission concluded for the purpose of the Decision that there is a separate product market for international intra-EEA express small package delivery services. This market is national in scope.

3.   International intra-EEA express small package delivery services

(i)   Competitive constraints on the Parties: non-integrators

| 17. | International intra-EEA express delivery is a network industry requiring operators to ensure a presence in all countries. The required presence in turn entails investments in infrastructure all along the value chain (from pick-up, sorting, line-hauls, hubs, air network, delivery). Even if outsourcing of parts of the value chain to third parties is possible, outsourcing reduces the control over the value chain, the operational efficiency and ultimately the quality of the services rendered. |
| --- | --- |

17.

International intra-EEA express delivery is a network industry requiring operators to ensure a presence in all countries. The required presence in turn entails investments in infrastructure all along the value chain (from pick-up, sorting, line-hauls, hubs, air network, delivery). Even if outsourcing of parts of the value chain to third parties is possible, outsourcing reduces the control over the value chain, the operational efficiency and ultimately the quality of the services rendered.

| 18. | Outsourcing of air transport is a case in point. According to UPS’ estimates, the cost of air transport accounts for a substantial share of direct costs for international deliveries. In order to minimize them, a key determinant is the aircraft load factor, hence the necessity to adapt capacity, schedules and routes to volumes in order to minimize these costs. Non-integrators that outsource air transport services have no control over the routings, frequencies, schedules and capacity of the aircraft operated. They have therefore less opportunities to optimise their cost structure and they face a higher risk of failing to comply with the committed delivery timeframe, a very serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the integrators. |
| --- | --- |

18.

Outsourcing of air transport is a case in point. According to UPS’ estimates, the cost of air transport accounts for a substantial share of direct costs for international deliveries. In order to minimize them, a key determinant is the aircraft load factor, hence the necessity to adapt capacity, schedules and routes to volumes in order to minimize these costs. Non-integrators that outsource air transport services have no control over the routings, frequencies, schedules and capacity of the aircraft operated. They have therefore less opportunities to optimise their cost structure and they face a higher risk of failing to comply with the committed delivery timeframe, a very serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the integrators.

| 19. | On the basis of the market investigation, it turned out that non-integrators are weaker competitors with respect to several key parameters of competition:
  (i) coverage (numbers of countries, postal codes, business addresses served), as their coverage is less than the one offered by the Parties, (ii) air network, so that non-integrators do not serve customers with significant needs for international intra-EEA express services requiring air transport (long-haul segment), (iii) premium services, i.e. timed next-day morning express services. |
| --- | --- |

19.

On the basis of the market investigation, it turned out that non-integrators are weaker competitors with respect to several key parameters of competition:

(i) coverage (numbers of countries, postal codes, business addresses served), as their coverage is less than the one offered by the Parties, (ii) air network, so that non-integrators do not serve customers with significant needs for international intra-EEA express services requiring air transport (long-haul segment), (iii) premium services, i.e. timed next-day morning express services.

| 20. | These weaknesses are also shared by the two ground-based operators, La Poste and Royal Mail, which operate an extensive network across the EEA, but are not fully-fledged competitors of the Parties in the international intra-EEA express market. This was largely confirmed by the Commission’s analysis of the bidding data provided by UPS, TNT, DHL and FedEx. |
| --- | --- |

20.

These weaknesses are also shared by the two ground-based operators, La Poste and Royal Mail, which operate an extensive network across the EEA, but are not fully-fledged competitors of the Parties in the international intra-EEA express market. This was largely confirmed by the Commission’s analysis of the bidding data provided by UPS, TNT, DHL and FedEx.

| 21. | For the above reasons, the Commission concluded that non-integrated players are unable to exert a sufficient competitive constraint on integrators. |
| --- | --- |

21.

For the above reasons, the Commission concluded that non-integrated players are unable to exert a sufficient competitive constraint on integrators.

(ii)   Competitive constraints on the Parties: FedEx and DHL

| 22. | The Parties argued that other than DHL as the current market leader among integrators also FedEx were a fully-fledged competitor. However, the in-depth investigation confirmed that FedEx is currently a weaker competitor for the following reasons:






  a) | in terms of market shares, FedEx is the weakest of the four integrators in most of the EEA-countries. FedEx’ market share does not exceed [5-10 %] in 14 out of the 15 EEA-countries where the Commission found a significant impediment to effective competition and post transaction, FedEx would have held the smallest market share in all 29 EEA-countries among the integrators; |
| --- | --- | --- |

22.

The Parties argued that other than DHL as the current market leader among integrators also FedEx were a fully-fledged competitor. However, the in-depth investigation confirmed that FedEx is currently a weaker competitor for the following reasons:

a)

in terms of market shares, FedEx is the weakest of the four integrators in most of the EEA-countries. FedEx’ market share does not exceed [5-10 %] in 14 out of the 15 EEA-countries where the Commission found a significant impediment to effective competition and post transaction, FedEx would have held the smallest market share in all 29 EEA-countries among the integrators;

| b) | its coverage is inferior compared to other integrators. If measured in terms of business addresses served, this holds true for all express services (end-of day, before noon and before 10 am); |
| --- | --- |

b)

its coverage is inferior compared to other integrators. If measured in terms of business addresses served, this holds true for all express services (end-of day, before noon and before 10 am);

| c) | its network is less developed in Europe in comparison to the other integrators (in terms of number of pick up points, flight points, type of aircrafts, etc.); |
| --- | --- |

c)

its network is less developed in Europe in comparison to the other integrators (in terms of number of pick up points, flight points, type of aircrafts, etc.);

| d) | its European pick-up and delivery (PUD) costs are currently significantly higher than those of UPS and TNT. |
| --- | --- |

d)

its European pick-up and delivery (PUD) costs are currently significantly higher than those of UPS and TNT.

| 23. | The Commission concluded that FedEx represents a weak competitive constraint to the Parties on the market of international intra-EEA express services. This view was shared by customers as well as other competitors. FedEx’ business core activities are related to the extra-EEA deliveries. This was confirmed also by the analysis of the Commission of the UPS and FedEx internal databases. |
| --- | --- |

23.

The Commission concluded that FedEx represents a weak competitive constraint to the Parties on the market of international intra-EEA express services. This view was shared by customers as well as other competitors. FedEx’ business core activities are related to the extra-EEA deliveries. This was confirmed also by the analysis of the Commission of the UPS and FedEx internal databases.

| 24. | The Commission took also into account in the competitive assessment FedEx’ on-going organic expansion plan which aims at strengthening its network infrastructure and increasing its density and coverage, as well as its global domestic expansion. It turned out that, depending on the EEA-country considered, its organic expansion plan was indeed deemed likely to help FedEx to attract additional volumes to fill in the network increasing capacity and, thus, indirectly benefit its competitiveness in the international intra-EEA market. However, the Commission concluded that FedEx would still lag behind the Parties and DHL in terms of market position in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

24.

The Commission took also into account in the competitive assessment FedEx’ on-going organic expansion plan which aims at strengthening its network infrastructure and increasing its density and coverage, as well as its global domestic expansion. It turned out that, depending on the EEA-country considered, its organic expansion plan was indeed deemed likely to help FedEx to attract additional volumes to fill in the network increasing capacity and, thus, indirectly benefit its competitiveness in the international intra-EEA market. However, the Commission concluded that FedEx would still lag behind the Parties and DHL in terms of market position in the near future.

| 25. | As concerns DHL, the outcome of the market investigation confirmed that DHL is a strong and credible player and that it is a close competitor to both UPS and TNT. Post merger, the customers would thus face two very strong integrators: DHL and the merged entity. |
| --- | --- |

25.

As concerns DHL, the outcome of the market investigation confirmed that DHL is a strong and credible player and that it is a close competitor to both UPS and TNT. Post merger, the customers would thus face two very strong integrators: DHL and the merged entity.

(iii)   Theory of harm, closeness of competition and barriers to entry

| 26. | The Commission assessed the effects of the merger in the different national markets as the Merger would have led to a significant increase in the level of concentration of the market and a strong combined market position of the Parties in a large number of EEA countries and reduced the number of competitors from four to three (UPS/TNT, DHL and FedEx) or even from three to two (UPS/TNT and DHL) in a significant portion thereof. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The Commission assessed the effects of the merger in the different national markets as the Merger would have led to a significant increase in the level of concentration of the market and a strong combined market position of the Parties in a large number of EEA countries and reduced the number of competitors from four to three (UPS/TNT, DHL and FedEx) or even from three to two (UPS/TNT and DHL) in a significant portion thereof.

| 27. | In fact, the Parties, together with DHL, can be considered to be close competitors on the international intra-EEA express market while all other companies are seen as offering products which are much more distant substitutes, FedEx included, than the ones offered by UPS, TNT and DHL. Absent any countervailing factors, the Commission concluded that the Parties, which are close competitors, would have had an incentive to increase prices after the merger. The price concentration analysis undertaken by the Commission concluded that there would be a price increase in all 29 EEA countries. UPS disagreed with the Commission on the magnitude of the price increase. |
| --- | --- |

27.

In fact, the Parties, together with DHL, can be considered to be close competitors on the international intra-EEA express market while all other companies are seen as offering products which are much more distant substitutes, FedEx included, than the ones offered by UPS, TNT and DHL. Absent any countervailing factors, the Commission concluded that the Parties, which are close competitors, would have had an incentive to increase prices after the merger. The price concentration analysis undertaken by the Commission concluded that there would be a price increase in all 29 EEA countries. UPS disagreed with the Commission on the magnitude of the price increase.

| 28. | UPS claimed that certain customers could exercise buyer power either by down-trading to less demanding services or by switching to other existing suppliers, either by selecting other suppliers for express, or by shifting non-express volumes to other suppliers (multisourcing). However, this was not confirmed during the course of the market investigation. |
| --- | --- |

28.

UPS claimed that certain customers could exercise buyer power either by down-trading to less demanding services or by switching to other existing suppliers, either by selecting other suppliers for express, or by shifting non-express volumes to other suppliers (multisourcing). However, this was not confirmed during the course of the market investigation.

| 29. | With respect to the barriers to entry, it turned out that a new entrant would have had to set up (i) a sophisticated IT infrastructure, (ii) a sorting infrastructure all across the EEA and (iii) an air network ensuring an efficient air and road corresponding connection. As it is evidenced by the absence of major entry over the last 20 years, these barriers are quite high and cannot be overcome, not even by outsourcing. As regards outsourcing of airlift, in fact, the Commission’s findings were that it was not an effective alternative due to double marginalisation and generally lower service quality. |
| --- | --- |

29.

With respect to the barriers to entry, it turned out that a new entrant would have had to set up (i) a sophisticated IT infrastructure, (ii) a sorting infrastructure all across the EEA and (iii) an air network ensuring an efficient air and road corresponding connection. As it is evidenced by the absence of major entry over the last 20 years, these barriers are quite high and cannot be overcome, not even by outsourcing. As regards outsourcing of airlift, in fact, the Commission’s findings were that it was not an effective alternative due to double marginalisation and generally lower service quality.

| 30. | Given the absence of new entrants and the absence of countervailing buyer power, as even the largest UPS’ customer accounts for less than [0-5] % of its total sales, the Commission concluded that should the merged entity unilaterally increase the prices on the express international intra-EEA market by [5-10] to [10-20] %, such rise would have not created an incentive to induce further entry or expansion in the timeframe relevant for the assessment of this concentration, as confirmed by a large majority of competitors. |
| --- | --- |

30.

Given the absence of new entrants and the absence of countervailing buyer power, as even the largest UPS’ customer accounts for less than [0-5] % of its total sales, the Commission concluded that should the merged entity unilaterally increase the prices on the express international intra-EEA market by [5-10] to [10-20] %, such rise would have not created an incentive to induce further entry or expansion in the timeframe relevant for the assessment of this concentration, as confirmed by a large majority of competitors.

(iv)   Efficiencies

| 31. | The Horizontal Merger Guidelines establish a cumulative set of requirements to take efficiencies into consideration. Efficiencies have to benefit consumers, be merger-specific and be verifiable. UPS claimed that the Merger was expected to give rise to significant efficiencies through the combination of the UPS and TNT’s businesses. It pointed out the expected significant economies of density and of scope, improved service quality, and transactional efficiencies by combining their complementary networks: UPS customers gained access to TNT’s extensive European road and freight network and TNT’s customers benefited from access to UPS’s worldwide network. |
| --- | --- |

31.

The Horizontal Merger Guidelines establish a cumulative set of requirements to take efficiencies into consideration. Efficiencies have to benefit consumers, be merger-specific and be verifiable. UPS claimed that the Merger was expected to give rise to significant efficiencies through the combination of the UPS and TNT’s businesses. It pointed out the expected significant economies of density and of scope, improved service quality, and transactional efficiencies by combining their complementary networks: UPS customers gained access to TNT’s extensive European road and freight network and TNT’s customers benefited from access to UPS’s worldwide network.

| 32. | Following UPS’ analysis, efficiencies would have benefited consumers, as the majority of the cost synergies were variable and merger-specific since they could not be achieved without full integration. To show that efficiencies were deemed verifiable, the Parties provided internal documents with estimates of the efficiencies following a certain number of years after closing the Merger, divided into three main areas: - operational (covering ground transportation costs), air network and management and administrative overheads, amounting to a total of EUR 400-550 million. Based on the Parties estimates, the total savings for the international intra-EEA express services would vary in the different countries. |
| --- | --- |

32.

Following UPS’ analysis, efficiencies would have benefited consumers, as the majority of the cost synergies were variable and merger-specific since they could not be achieved without full integration. To show that efficiencies were deemed verifiable, the Parties provided internal documents with estimates of the efficiencies following a certain number of years after closing the Merger, divided into three main areas: - operational (covering ground transportation costs), air network and management and administrative overheads, amounting to a total of EUR 400-550 million. Based on the Parties estimates, the total savings for the international intra-EEA express services would vary in the different countries.

| 33. | The Commission agreed that the efficiencies were merger-specific, but it confirmed as verifiable only the cost savings related to the European air network and the ground handling, arising during the first three years after the completion of the Merger, that amount to respectively EUR [...] million, for intra Europe air network synergies and to EUR [...] million for ground handling. These savings were allocated on a country by country level based on UPS volume and cost data at the lane level. In order to estimate the pass-through rate of changes in variable costs to consumers, the Commission considered appropriate the estimate of the impact of total average cost changes on the price of international intra-EEA express services provided by the Parties following their price concentration analysis. This is likely to be an underestimation of the actual pass-through of marginal costs. |
| --- | --- |

33.

The Commission agreed that the efficiencies were merger-specific, but it confirmed as verifiable only the cost savings related to the European air network and the ground handling, arising during the first three years after the completion of the Merger, that amount to respectively EUR [...] million, for intra Europe air network synergies and to EUR [...] million for ground handling. These savings were allocated on a country by country level based on UPS volume and cost data at the lane level. In order to estimate the pass-through rate of changes in variable costs to consumers, the Commission considered appropriate the estimate of the impact of total average cost changes on the price of international intra-EEA express services provided by the Parties following their price concentration analysis. This is likely to be an underestimation of the actual pass-through of marginal costs.

| 34. | Based on the computation of the Commission, the total savings for the international intra-EEA express services in the different countries ranged from [0-5] to [5-10] % of the price. |
| --- | --- |

34.

Based on the computation of the Commission, the total savings for the international intra-EEA express services in the different countries ranged from [0-5] to [5-10] % of the price.

| 35. | UPS put forward that the operation would also induce out-of-market efficiencies. However, the Commission concluded that those were not verifiable to the required standard. |
| --- | --- |

35.

UPS put forward that the operation would also induce out-of-market efficiencies. However, the Commission concluded that those were not verifiable to the required standard.

(v)   Country-by-country analysis

| 36. | The Commission evaluated the likely effects of the Merger, country by country, on the basis of four main factors: the market structure, the competitors’ expansion plans in the next years, in particular FedEx’ expansion plans, the results from the market investigation and the price effect taking into account efficiencies. |
| --- | --- |

36.

The Commission evaluated the likely effects of the Merger, country by country, on the basis of four main factors: the market structure, the competitors’ expansion plans in the next years, in particular FedEx’ expansion plans, the results from the market investigation and the price effect taking into account efficiencies.

| 37. | The Decision concludes that the proposed merger would likely lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the markets for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small package in 15 countries:
  (i) Bulgaria, (ii) Czech Republic, (iii) Denmark, (iv) Estonia, (v) Finland, (vi) Hungary, (vii) Latvia, (viii) Lithuania, (ix) Malta, (x) the Netherlands, (xi) Poland, (xii) Romania, (xiii) Slovakia, (xiv) Slovenia and (xv) Sweden, as it is summarized in the following paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

37.

The Decision concludes that the proposed merger would likely lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the markets for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small package in 15 countries:

(i) Bulgaria, (ii) Czech Republic, (iii) Denmark, (iv) Estonia, (v) Finland, (vi) Hungary, (vii) Latvia, (viii) Lithuania, (ix) Malta, (x) the Netherlands, (xi) Poland, (xii) Romania, (xiii) Slovakia, (xiv) Slovenia and (xv) Sweden, as it is summarized in the following paragraphs.

| 38. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares (5) in Bulgaria were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [5-10] %. Because of FedEx’s limited market presence, its very weak geographic coverage (on the destination side) and in view of internal documents relating to expansion plans in Bulgaria, it appeared to exert, at the time of the Decision and for the near future, a limited competitive constraint on the Parties. |
| --- | --- |

38.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares (5) in Bulgaria were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [5-10] %. Because of FedEx’s limited market presence, its very weak geographic coverage (on the destination side) and in view of internal documents relating to expansion plans in Bulgaria, it appeared to exert, at the time of the Decision and for the near future, a limited competitive constraint on the Parties.

| 39. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Bulgaria would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] %, while the estimated net price effects in Bulgaria, by taking into account the efficiency gains would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %. |
| --- | --- |

39.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Bulgaria would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] %, while the estimated net price effects in Bulgaria, by taking into account the efficiency gains would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %.

| 40. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Bulgarian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

40.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Bulgarian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 41. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in the Czech Republic were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, a weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) and longer time-in-transit data. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

41.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in the Czech Republic were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, a weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) and longer time-in-transit data. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 42. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from the Czech Republic would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in the Czech Republic would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

42.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from the Czech Republic would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in the Czech Republic would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %.

| 43. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Czech market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

43.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Czech market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 44. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Denmark were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, a slightly weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) and longer time in transit data. On the basis of FedEx’s organic expansion in Denmark, it was deemed likely that in the near future FedEx would experience only a limited increase of its international intra-EEA express market share, with a resulting market share of less than [5-10] %. |
| --- | --- |

44.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Denmark were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, a slightly weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) and longer time in transit data. On the basis of FedEx’s organic expansion in Denmark, it was deemed likely that in the near future FedEx would experience only a limited increase of its international intra-EEA express market share, with a resulting market share of less than [5-10] %.

| 45. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Denmark would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Denmark would have been negative, ranging between -[0-5] % and -[0-5] %. Although the efficiencies appear to outweigh the price increases, there was a serious risk that the efficiencies alone would have been insufficient to outweigh the overall negative effect of the Merger. In fact, the merger would have eliminated an important competitive force from the Danish international intra-EEA express market and limited the possibilities of switching supplier while there was no sufficient countervailing buyer power and no entry or expansion was likely, timely and sufficient to defeat possible anticompetitive effects. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Denmark would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Denmark would have been negative, ranging between -[0-5] % and -[0-5] %. Although the efficiencies appear to outweigh the price increases, there was a serious risk that the efficiencies alone would have been insufficient to outweigh the overall negative effect of the Merger. In fact, the merger would have eliminated an important competitive force from the Danish international intra-EEA express market and limited the possibilities of switching supplier while there was no sufficient countervailing buyer power and no entry or expansion was likely, timely and sufficient to defeat possible anticompetitive effects.

| 46. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Danish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

46.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Danish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 47. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Estonia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

47.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Estonia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 48. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increases on lanes originating from Estonia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Estonia would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

48.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increases on lanes originating from Estonia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Estonia would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %.

| 49. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Estonian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

49.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Estonian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 50. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Finland were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [60-70] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterized by a very limited market presence, with weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). Even more striking, FedEx does not offer premium services, i.e. morning deliveries to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which are neighbouring countries. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that it was unlikely that FedEx position would have changed in the foreseeable future to such an extent as to counter-act the negative effects of the Merger on competition. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Finland were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [60-70] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterized by a very limited market presence, with weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). Even more striking, FedEx does not offer premium services, i.e. morning deliveries to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which are neighbouring countries. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that it was unlikely that FedEx position would have changed in the foreseeable future to such an extent as to counter-act the negative effects of the Merger on competition.

| 51. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Finland would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Finland would have remained positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %, despite the expected cost savings. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Finland would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Finland would have remained positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %, despite the expected cost savings.

| 52. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Finish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

52.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Finish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 53. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Hungary were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [30-40] %; FedEx [10-20] %. FedEx has a significantly lower market share than each of the other three integrators, with weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Hungary were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [30-40] %; FedEx [10-20] %. FedEx has a significantly lower market share than each of the other three integrators, with weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future.

| 54. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Hungary would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Hungary would have therefore ranged between -[0-5] % and [0-5] %. The quantitative analysis produces an ambiguous result in Hungary given that the net effect is predicted as a slight price decrease or a slight price increase. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Hungary would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Hungary would have therefore ranged between -[0-5] % and [0-5] %. The quantitative analysis produces an ambiguous result in Hungary given that the net effect is predicted as a slight price decrease or a slight price increase.

| 55. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Hungarian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

55.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Hungarian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 56. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Latvia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx can be considered as a weaker player in international intra-EEA express deliveries from Latvia with respect to the other integrators, because its limited market presence and its much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

56.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Latvia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx can be considered as a weaker player in international intra-EEA express deliveries from Latvia with respect to the other integrators, because its limited market presence and its much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future.

| 57. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Latvia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effects in Latvia would have been positive and significant, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %. |
| --- | --- |

57.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Latvia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effects in Latvia would have been positive and significant, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %.

| 58. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Latvian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

58.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Latvian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 59. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Lithuania were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterized by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Lithuania were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterized by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future.

| 60. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Lithuania would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Lithuania would have be positive and significant, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] % |
| --- | --- |

60.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Lithuania would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Lithuania would have be positive and significant, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %

| 61. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Lithuanian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

61.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Lithuanian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 62. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Malta were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. The outcome of the market investigation confirmed that FedEx is the weakest integrator as regards the international intra-EEA express deliveries. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

62.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Malta were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. The outcome of the market investigation confirmed that FedEx is the weakest integrator as regards the international intra-EEA express deliveries. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 63. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Malta would have ranged between [5-10] % and [10-20] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effects in Malta would have been positive, ranging between [5-10] % and [5-10] %. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Malta would have ranged between [5-10] % and [10-20] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effects in Malta would have been positive, ranging between [5-10] % and [5-10] %.

| 64. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Maltese market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

64.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Maltese market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 65. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in the Netherlands were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. All the integrators have 100 % geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

65.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in the Netherlands were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [50-60] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. All the integrators have 100 % geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a limited competitive constraint to the Parties even in the near future.

| 66. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from the Netherlands would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effect in the Netherlands would have been negative and range between -[0-5] to -[0-5] %. However, the quantification of net merger effects was given less weight because the model did not allow to capture the specificities of the Dutch market, as the estimated price effect reflects the fact that FedEx’s coverage in the Netherlands is complete (in fact, all four integrators have 100 % coverage). The Commission noted that in the Netherlands, coverage data and market shares are particularly inconsistent. FedEx has a 100 % coverage but achieves very limited revenues. |
| --- | --- |

66.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from the Netherlands would have ranged between [0-5] % and [0-5] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the estimated net price effect in the Netherlands would have been negative and range between -[0-5] to -[0-5] %. However, the quantification of net merger effects was given less weight because the model did not allow to capture the specificities of the Dutch market, as the estimated price effect reflects the fact that FedEx’s coverage in the Netherlands is complete (in fact, all four integrators have 100 % coverage). The Commission noted that in the Netherlands, coverage data and market shares are particularly inconsistent. FedEx has a 100 % coverage but achieves very limited revenues.

| 67. | The Commission considered that the Merger was likely to eliminate an important competitive force from the Dutch international intra-EEA express market where FedEx does not represent an effective competitive constraint to the Parties and to limit the possibilities of switching supplier while there is no sufficient countervailing buyer power and no entry or expansion is likely, timely and sufficient to defeat possible anticompetitive effects. |
| --- | --- |

67.

The Commission considered that the Merger was likely to eliminate an important competitive force from the Dutch international intra-EEA express market where FedEx does not represent an effective competitive constraint to the Parties and to limit the possibilities of switching supplier while there is no sufficient countervailing buyer power and no entry or expansion is likely, timely and sufficient to defeat possible anticompetitive effects.

| 68. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Dutch market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Dutch market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 69. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Poland were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, with a slightly weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) so that it will represent a limited competitive constraint against the Parties. The recent acquisition by FedEx of Opek would allow FedEx to increase its domestic presence in Poland, but it will not add volume in terms of international intra-EEA express and in domestic express. On balance the Commission concluded that FedEx then is unlikely to become a significantly stronger competitive force on this market in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

69.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Poland were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, with a slightly weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side) so that it will represent a limited competitive constraint against the Parties. The recent acquisition by FedEx of Opek would allow FedEx to increase its domestic presence in Poland, but it will not add volume in terms of international intra-EEA express and in domestic express. On balance the Commission concluded that FedEx then is unlikely to become a significantly stronger competitive force on this market in the near future.

| 70. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Poland would have ranged between [0-5] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Poland would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

70.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Poland would have ranged between [0-5] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Poland would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %.

| 71. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Polish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

71.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Polish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 72. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Romania were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with a much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

72.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Romania were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with a much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 73. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Romania would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Romania would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Romania would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Romania would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [5-10] %.

| 74. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Romanian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

74.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Romanian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 75. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Slovakia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, with a much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Slovakia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [40-50] %; FedEx [5-10] %. FedEx is characterised by a limited market presence, with a much weaker geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weak competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 76. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Slovakia would have ranged between [0-5] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Slovakia would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

76.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Slovakia would have ranged between [0-5] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Slovakia would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %.

| 77. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Slovakian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

77.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Slovakian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 78. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Slovenia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [60-70] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain in the near future a limited competitive constraint on the Parties. |
| --- | --- |

78.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Slovenia were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [30-40] %; DHL [60-70] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with no geographic coverage (on the destination side). In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain in the near future a limited competitive constraint on the Parties.

| 79. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Slovenia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Slovenia would have been positive, ranging from [0-5] % to [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Slovenia would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Slovenia would have been positive, ranging from [0-5] % to [0-5] %.

| 80. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Slovenian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

80.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Slovenian market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

| 81. | Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Sweden were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with a geographic coverage (on the destination side) weaker than UPS and DHL. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weaker competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future. |
| --- | --- |

81.

Post transaction the integrators’ market shares in Sweden were estimated as follows: UPS/TNT [40-50] %; DHL [50-60] %; FedEx [0-5] %. FedEx is characterised by a very limited market presence, with a geographic coverage (on the destination side) weaker than UPS and DHL. In view also of FedEx’ internal documents relating to its expansion plans, on balance, the Commission concluded that FedEx would remain a weaker competitive constraint on the Parties even in the near future.

| 82. | Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Sweden would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Sweden would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %. |
| --- | --- |

82.

Following the Commission’s price concentration analysis, price increase on lanes originating from Sweden would have ranged between [5-10] % and [5-10] % and taking into account the efficiency gains, the net price effects in Sweden would have been positive, ranging between [0-5] % and [0-5] %.

| 83. | For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Swedish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages. |
| --- | --- |

83.

For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the merger would have been likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Swedish market for international intra-EEA express deliveries of small packages.

V.   COMMITMENTS

1.   Description of the Commitments

| 84. | UPS submitted three sets of commitments: (i) on 29 November 2012, (ii) on 16 December 2012 and (iii) on 3 January 2013. |
| --- | --- |

84.

UPS submitted three sets of commitments: (i) on 29 November 2012, (ii) on 16 December 2012 and (iii) on 3 January 2013.

| 85. | The three remedy packages had, to different degrees, a structural and a behavioural pillar:






  — | a divestment remedy: sale of TNT’s subsidiaries, in 17 countries to a single buyer. (6) |
| --- | --- | --- |

85.

The three remedy packages had, to different degrees, a structural and a behavioural pillar:

—

a divestment remedy: sale of TNT’s subsidiaries, in 17 countries to a single buyer. (6)

| — | an access remedy: engagement of UPS to provide access to its intra-European air network from/to the remedies countries. |
| --- | --- |

—

an access remedy: engagement of UPS to provide access to its intra-European air network from/to the remedies countries.

| 86. | Through the divestment, any overlap in the remedy Countries would have been eliminated. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Through the divestment, any overlap in the remedy Countries would have been eliminated.

| 87. | None of the market players interrogated on the Commitments of 29 November 2012 and on the Commitments of 16 December 2012 declared being interested by the divested business as a whole, with the exception of La Poste/DPD. |
| --- | --- |

87.

None of the market players interrogated on the Commitments of 29 November 2012 and on the Commitments of 16 December 2012 declared being interested by the divested business as a whole, with the exception of La Poste/DPD.

| 88. | As a result of the second market test, UPS presented another set of Commitments, on 3 January 2013, trying to accommodate particular needs of La Poste/DPD. |
| --- | --- |

88.

As a result of the second market test, UPS presented another set of Commitments, on 3 January 2013, trying to accommodate particular needs of La Poste/DPD.

2.   Assessment of the Commitments

| 89. | The overall conclusion reached by the Commission was that the proposed commitments were not likely to eliminate the competition concerns raised in the Statement of Objections. On the one hand, UPS was unable to offer a fix-it-first or upfront-buyer solution, and on the other hand the Commitments in combination with the business plan of the only interested purchaser, La Poste/DPD, were insufficient to remove the Commission’s concerns. In this respect, the following concerns were still present after the third package: |
| --- | --- |

89.

The overall conclusion reached by the Commission was that the proposed commitments were not likely to eliminate the competition concerns raised in the Statement of Objections. On the one hand, UPS was unable to offer a fix-it-first or upfront-buyer solution, and on the other hand the Commitments in combination with the business plan of the only interested purchaser, La Poste/DPD, were insufficient to remove the Commission’s concerns. In this respect, the following concerns were still present after the third package:

(i)   Timing of the conclusion of the divestment procedure

| 90. | La Poste/DPD would have had to negotiate with UPS, inter alia, a Share Purchase Agreement, but La Poste/DPD itself indicated that the due diligence could take considerably longer than estimated by UPS. |
| --- | --- |

90.

La Poste/DPD would have had to negotiate with UPS, inter alia, a Share Purchase Agreement, but La Poste/DPD itself indicated that the due diligence could take considerably longer than estimated by UPS.

(ii)   Suitability of La Poste/DPD as a buyer of the divested activities

| 91. | La Poste/DPD provided no evidence that it had made an assessment of the profitability of the acquired international intra-EEA express services, in light of the comparatively small volumes and the required investments to be made in the non-remedy destination countries. Instead, La Poste/DPD assessed the overall profitability of the divested TNT subsidiaries as a whole, per group of countries. From its business plan, it turned out that La Poste/DPD had no precise economic data whatsoever relating to the profitability of the international intra-EEA express businesses. |
| --- | --- |

91.

La Poste/DPD provided no evidence that it had made an assessment of the profitability of the acquired international intra-EEA express services, in light of the comparatively small volumes and the required investments to be made in the non-remedy destination countries. Instead, La Poste/DPD assessed the overall profitability of the divested TNT subsidiaries as a whole, per group of countries. From its business plan, it turned out that La Poste/DPD had no precise economic data whatsoever relating to the profitability of the international intra-EEA express businesses.

| 92. | La Poste/DPD furthermore stated that it did not intend to acquire, lease or charter aircraft once the agreement with UPS would have expired, despite its earlier negative opinion about the possibility to operate effectively in the international intra-EEA air-based express segment on the basis of outsourcing. This increased the above-mentioned doubts considerably with respect to the period that would have followed the expiry of the agreement on access to UPS air network. |
| --- | --- |

92.

La Poste/DPD furthermore stated that it did not intend to acquire, lease or charter aircraft once the agreement with UPS would have expired, despite its earlier negative opinion about the possibility to operate effectively in the international intra-EEA air-based express segment on the basis of outsourcing. This increased the above-mentioned doubts considerably with respect to the period that would have followed the expiry of the agreement on access to UPS air network.

| 93. | As a consequence, there was insufficient evidence to allow the Commission to conclude that, were La Poste/DPD to take up the Commitments of 3 January 2013, it was likely that it would have developed a network able to handle international intra-EEA express deliveries across the EEA as efficiently as an integrator. |
| --- | --- |

93.

As a consequence, there was insufficient evidence to allow the Commission to conclude that, were La Poste/DPD to take up the Commitments of 3 January 2013, it was likely that it would have developed a network able to handle international intra-EEA express deliveries across the EEA as efficiently as an integrator.

VI.   CONCLUSION

| 94. | For the reasons mentioned above, the Decision concludes that the proposed operation whereby United Parcel Service Inc. acquires sole control of TNT Express N.V. within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 is declared incompatible with the internal market and the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

94.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Decision concludes that the proposed operation whereby United Parcel Service Inc. acquires sole control of TNT Express N.V. within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 is declared incompatible with the internal market and the EEA Agreement.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union
  C 186, 26.6.2012, p. 9.

(3)  Case COMP/M.3971 Deutsche Post/Exel paragraphs 8-24.

(4)  The Commission identifies a separate product market for small package delivery services for which 31,5 kg appears as an appropriate threshold to distinguish small packages from freight.

(5)  For all the EEA countries, the Commission reconstructed the integrator’s market positions basing itself on their revenues and on an integrator-only basis.

(6)  (i) Bulgaria, (ii) the Czech Republic, (iii) Denmark, (iv) Estonia, (v) Finland, (vi) Hungary, (vii) Latvia, (viii) Lithuania, (ix) Malta, (x) the Netherlands, (xi) Poland, (xii) Romania, (xiii) Slovakia, (xiv) Slovenia and (xv) Sweden. As of the second package, the remedy also included Spain and Portugal.

---

| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/18

---

Communication from the Commission concerning the quantity not applied for to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod 1 July to 30 September 2014 under certain quotas opened by the Union for products in the poultrymeat, egg and egg albumin sectors

2014/C 137/06

Commission Regulations (EC) No 1384/2007 (1) and (EC) No 1385/2007 (2) opened tariff quotas for imports of products in the poultrymeat sector. The import licence applications lodged during the first seven days of March 2014 for the subperiod 1 April to 30 June 2014 do not, for quotas 09.4091, 09.4092 and 09.4421, cover the quantities available. Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 7(4) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1301/2006 (3), the quantities that were not applied for are to be added to the quantity fixed for the following quota subperiod, from 1 July to 30 September 2014; they are set out in the Annex to this notice.

---

(1)  OJ L 309, 27.11.2007, p. 40.

(2)  OJ L 309, 27.11.2007, p. 47.

(3)  OJ L 238, 1.9.2006, p. 13.

---

ANNEX

| Quota order number | Quantities not applied for, to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod 1 July to 30 September 2014
  (kg) |
| --- | --- |
| 09.4091 | 280 000 |
| 09.4092 | 1 627 000 |
| 09.4421 | 350 000 |

Quota order number

Quantities not applied for, to be added to the quantity fixed for the subperiod 1 July to 30 September 2014

(kg)

09.4091

280 000

09.4092

1 627 000

09.4421

350 000

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/19

---

Publication of decisions by Member States to grant, suspend or revoke operating licenses pursuant to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (1)

(recast)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 137/07

In accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (recast), the European Commission publishes the decisions to grant, suspend or revoke operating licences taken by Member States during the period 1 January to 31 December 2013.

Operating licences granted

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category (2) | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | Agiles Aviation GmbH | Glanegg 2, 5082 Gröding | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 3.6.2013 |
| Austria | X-Jet GmbH | Walfischgasse 8/13, 1010 Wien | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 6.3.2013 |
| Bulgaria | AIR BRIGHT Ltd | 116A, vh.B, app. 27, Geo Milev str., Sofia 1574 | Cargo, mail | A | 22.5.2013 |
| Bulgaria | ‘A L K’ Jsc | 2A, N. Obreshkov str., Sofia 1113 | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 25.1.2013 |
| Bulgaria | JET OPS EUROPE Ltd | App.2, 14 Karnigradska str., Sofia 1000 | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 12.8.2013 |
| Czech Republic | Eclair Aviation s.r.o. | Italská 1580/26, Vinohrady, Praha 2, PSČ 120 00 | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 7.7.2013 |
| Denmark | Jutland Jets Air Taxa A/S | Karup Airport, N O Hansens vej 4, 7470 Karup | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 4.3.2013 |
| Estonia | AS Fort Aero | Viru väljak 2, 10111 Tallinn | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 18.10.2013 |
| Estonia | Nordic Jet OÜ | Paljassaare tee 14, 10313 Tallinn | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 10.10.2013 |
| Finland | Airline Management Technologies ALMT Oy | Siipitie 11, 01530 Vantaa | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 17.5.2013 |
| France | ALPHI | 31 boulevard de la Tour Maubourg |
| 75007 Paris |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category (2)

Decision effective since

Austria

Agiles Aviation GmbH

Glanegg 2, 5082 Gröding

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

3.6.2013

Austria

X-Jet GmbH

Walfischgasse 8/13, 1010 Wien

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

6.3.2013

Bulgaria

AIR BRIGHT Ltd

116A, vh.B, app. 27, Geo Milev str., Sofia 1574

Cargo, mail

A

22.5.2013

Bulgaria

‘A L K’ Jsc

2A, N. Obreshkov str., Sofia 1113

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

25.1.2013

Bulgaria

JET OPS EUROPE Ltd

App.2, 14 Karnigradska str., Sofia 1000

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

12.8.2013

Czech Republic

Eclair Aviation s.r.o.

Italská 1580/26, Vinohrady, Praha 2, PSČ 120 00

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

7.7.2013

Denmark

Jutland Jets Air Taxa A/S

Karup Airport, N O Hansens vej 4, 7470 Karup

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

4.3.2013

Estonia

AS Fort Aero

Viru väljak 2, 10111 Tallinn

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

18.10.2013

Estonia

Nordic Jet OÜ

Paljassaare tee 14, 10313 Tallinn

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.10.2013

Finland

Airline Management Technologies ALMT Oy

Siipitie 11, 01530 Vantaa

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

17.5.2013

France

ALPHI

31 boulevard de la Tour Maubourg

75007 Paris

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

28.2.2013

France

EWA AIR

| Place de France, Immeuble Issoufali |
| --- |
| BP 52, 97610 Dzaoudzi |

Place de France, Immeuble Issoufali

BP 52, 97610 Dzaoudzi

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

23.10.2013

France

HOP!

| Parc tertiaire SILIC, 40 rue d’Arcueil |
| --- |
| 94150 Rungis |

Parc tertiaire SILIC, 40 rue d’Arcueil

94150 Rungis

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

15.3.2013

France

VOLDIRECT SAS

| 22 bis rue des Landes |
| --- |
| 35135 Chantepie |

22 bis rue des Landes

35135 Chantepie

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.3.2013

France

Héli Sphère 45

| Aérodrome des Quatre Vents |
| --- |
| 45500 st Denis de l’Hôtel |

Aérodrome des Quatre Vents

45500 st Denis de l’Hôtel

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

31.5.2013

France

HELISAIR

| Aérodrome de Grenoble Le Versoud |
| --- |
| 38420 Le Versoud |

Aérodrome de Grenoble Le Versoud

38420 Le Versoud

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

6.6.2013

Germany

aeroways GmbH

Clemensstraße 49, 80803 München

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

27.6.2013

Germany

B-Air Charter GmbH & Co. KG

Bernhäuser Hauptstraße 14, 70794 Filderstadt

Passengers

B

14.1.2013

Germany

DL Helicopter Technik GmbH

Walter-Carsten-Straße 1, 27637 Nordholz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

29.7.2013

Germany

Helicopter Business Travel GmbH & Co. KG

Am Plärrer 35, 90443 Nürnberg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

23.9.2013

Germany

HeliSense GmbH

Thalmühlstraße 32, 86739 Ederheim

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

3.5.2013

Germany

Pro Jet GmbH

| Berliner Allee 11-22 |
| --- |
| 66482 Zweibrücken |

Berliner Allee 11-22

66482 Zweibrücken

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

20.11.2013

Greece

AEROSPACE ONE

Koumpi 24 - 19003 Markopoulo Mesogaias Attikis

Cargo, mail

A

17.9.2013

Ireland

National Flight Centre Limited

Weston Airport, Leixlip, Co. Kildare.

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

31.5.2013

Italy

Ariane s.r.l. Unipersonale

Via Colonnello Alessi n.15 – 23100 Sondrio (SO)

Passengers, cargo

B

23.9.2013

Italy

E+S Air s.r.l.

Contrada Ficocelle s.n.c. 84081 — Ogliastro Cilento (SA)

Passengers, cargo

B

10.12.2013

Italy

Hoverfly s.r.l.

Via Benedetto Croce n. 249 – 66100 Chieti (CH)

Passengers, cargo

B

22.2.2013

Lithuania

Air Lituanica, UAB

J. Galvydžio str. 5, 08236 Vilnius

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

6.8.2013

Lithuania

Grand Cru Airlines, UAB

Dariaus ir Gireno str. 81-1, 02189 Vilnius

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

19.7.2013

Poland

Husair sp. z o.o.

ul. Księżycowa 3, Hangar 11, 01-934 Warszawa

Passengers, cargo

B

4.10.2013

Poland

Royal-Star sp. z o.o.

ul. Drogowców 7, 39-200 Dębica

Passengers, cargo

B

15.11.2013

Romania

S.C. BLUE AIR – AIRLINE MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS S.R.L.

17 Teheran Street, sector 1, Bucharest

Passengers, cargo

A

20.8.2013

Romania

S.C. INTERAVIATION CHARTER SRL

Bucuresti, Bd. Regiei nr. 2, sector 6

Passengers, cargo

A

28.1.2013

Romania

S.C. UNITED EUROPEAN AIRLINES S.R.L.

5 Georges Bizet Street, sector 2, Bucharest

Passengers

B

22.8.2013

Slovakia

Air Carpatia, s.r.o.

Slowackého 4673/24, 821 04 Bratislava

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

18.3.2013

Slovakia

Go2Sky, spol. s.r.o.

Ivánska cesta 65/3421, 821 04 Bratislava

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

3.7.2013

Slovakia

EHC service, s.r.o.

Sibírska 2, 080 01 Prešov

Pasengers, cargo, mail

B

19.6.2013

Spain

BIGAS GRUP, S.L.

Carretera del Masnou, Km. 14,300 – 08400 Granollers (Barcelona)

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

23.5.2013

Spain

BIGAS GRUP HELICOPTERS, S.L.

Carretera del Masnou, Km. 14,300 – 08400 Granollers (Barcelona)

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

13.11.2013

Spain

EVELOP AIRLINES, S.L.

José Rover Motta, 27 – 07006 Palma De Mallorca

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

22.11.2013

Sweden

Saab AB

581 88 Linköping

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

12.8.2013

Sweden

Sundt Air Sweden AB

Hässlögatan 6, 721 31 Västerås

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

22.3.2013

Switzerland

Heli Sitterdorf AG

Flugplatz, 8589 Sitterdorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.5.2013

UK

Apem Aviation Ltd

Unit 3 And 4A, Business Park, Flint Road, Saltney Ferry, Chester. CH4 0GZ

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

8.5.2013

UK

Blu Halkin Ltd

Marshall Business Aviation Centre, Cambridge Airport, Newmarket Road, Cambridge. CB5 8RX

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

12.7.2013

UK

London Helicopter Centres Ltd

The Servotec Building, Redhill Aerodrome, Redhill, Surrey. RH1 5JY

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

15.8.2013

UK

Newcastle Aviation Ltd

Number 1, Apex Building Village, Annitsford, Cramlington, Northumberland. NE23 7BF

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

19.12.2013

UK

BAE Systems (Corporate Air Travel) Ltd

Warwick House, PO Box 87 Farnborough, Aerospace Centre, Farnborough, Hampshire. GU14 6YU

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

19.12.2013

Temporary operating licences granted

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since | Temporary licence until |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Italy | Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A. | Viale Liegi n. 32 – 00198 Roma | Passengers, cargo | A | 23.4.2013 | 23.10.2013 |
| Italy | Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A. | Viale Liegi n. 32 – 00198 Roma | Passengers, cargo | A | 23.10.2013 | 23.4.2014 |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Temporary licence until

Italy

Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A.

Viale Liegi n. 32 – 00198 Roma

Passengers, cargo

A

23.4.2013

23.10.2013

Italy

Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A.

Viale Liegi n. 32 – 00198 Roma

Passengers, cargo

A

23.10.2013

23.4.2014

Operating licences revived

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Germany | Advanced Aviation Logistic GmbH | Glockeneichweg 135 |
| 88341 Bad Saulgau |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Germany

Advanced Aviation Logistic GmbH

Glockeneichweg 135

88341 Bad Saulgau

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

13.12.2013

Italy

Air Italy S.p.A.

Corso Sempione n. 111 – 21013 Gallarate (MI)

Passengers, cargo

A

Revocation of Temporary Operating Licence and Reinstatement of the Operating Licence since 14.10.2013

Italy

Meridiana Fly S.p.A.

Centro Direzionale Aeroporto Costa Smeralda – 07026 Olbia

Passengers, cargo

A

Revocation of Temporary Operating Licence and Reinstatement of the Operating Licence since 3.6.2013

Netherlands

AIS Airlines B.V.

Flamingoweg 20, 8218NW Lelystad

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

24.9.2013

CAMO/AOC was temporary suspended 10.9.2013 – 24.9.2013

Romania

S.C. VALAHIA AIR SRL

Bucuresti, sector 1, Bd. Ficusului nr. 1, et. 1, ap 4

Passengers, cargo

B

Suspension cancelled. Operating Licence (1st Edition) valid from 16.12.2013

Operating licences suspended

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Czech Republic | HOLIDAYS Czech Airlines, a.s. | Praha 6, Jana Kašpara 1069/1, PSČ 160 08 | Passengers, mail, cargo | A | 8.11.2013 | |
| France | Taxi Caraïbes Air | Les Hauts de Californie |
| 97232 Le Lamentin |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Comments

Czech Republic

HOLIDAYS Czech Airlines, a.s.

Praha 6, Jana Kašpara 1069/1, PSČ 160 08

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

8.11.2013

France

Taxi Caraïbes Air

Les Hauts de Californie

97232 Le Lamentin

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

12.7.2013

revoked on 1.8.2013

Germany

ACG Air Cargo Germany GmbH

| Gebäude 13 35 |
| --- |
| 55483 Hahn – Airport |

Gebäude 13 35

55483 Hahn – Airport

Cargo

A

17.4.2013

Germany

Arrow Airservice Inhaber: Winfried Gebhardt

| Flugplatz F1/19 |
| --- |
| 15344 Strausberg |

Flugplatz F1/19

15344 Strausberg

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

28.10.2013

Germany

Augsburg Airways GmbH

| Wartungsallee 13 |
| --- |
| 85356 München |

Wartungsallee 13

85356 München

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

1.11.2013

Germany

Condor Berlin GmbH

| Willy-Brandt-Platz 2 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld |

Willy-Brandt-Platz 2

12529 Schönefeld

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

2.5.2013

Germany

DL Helicopter GmbH

| Werkstr. 11 |
| --- |
| 21218 Seevetal |

Werkstr. 11

21218 Seevetal

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

30.7.2013

Germany

Dresdner Luftfahrtgesellschaft mbH

| Heinrich-Mann-Str. 2 |
| --- |
| 01156 Dresden |

Heinrich-Mann-Str. 2

01156 Dresden

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

1.2.2013

Germany

Eifelair Geschäfts- u. Charterflug GmbH

| Vollmert 32 |
| --- |
| 53902 Bad Münstereifel |

Vollmert 32

53902 Bad Münstereifel

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

31.7.2013

Germany

Fly Point Flugservice Haufe KG

| Am Küngelhof 4 |
| --- |
| 99820 Hörselberg-Hainich |

Am Küngelhof 4

99820 Hörselberg-Hainich

Pasengers, mail, cargo

B

9.12.2013

Germany

GAS Air Service GmbH

Am Bahnhof 5, 49201 Dissen – (false: 49201 Greven)

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

12.3.2013

Germany

Germania Express Fluggesellschaft mbH

| Lilienthalstraße 6 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld OT Waltersdorf |

Lilienthalstraße 6

12529 Schönefeld OT Waltersdorf

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

1.11.2013

Germany

Greenbird GmbH

| Dürrheimer Str. 90 |
| --- |
| 78166 Donaueschingen |

Dürrheimer Str. 90

78166 Donaueschingen

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

11.1.2013

Germany

Hanseflug GmbH

Nordstraße 18, 30855 Langenhagen

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

2.9.2013

Germany

Heli AG & Co. KG

| Carl-Benz-Straße 3 |
| --- |
| 79211 Denzlingen |

Carl-Benz-Straße 3

79211 Denzlingen

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

1.11.2013

Germany

OLT Express Germany GmbH

| Henrich-Focke-Str. 6 |
| --- |
| 28199 Bremen |

Henrich-Focke-Str. 6

28199 Bremen

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

28.1.2013

Germany

Rhein-Ruhr-Helicopter Rainer Zemke GmbH & Co.KG

Flughafen 34, 41066 Mönchengladbach

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

6.11.2013

Germany

Vibro-Air Flugservice GmbH & Co. KG

| Mozartstr. 19 |
| --- |
| 41065 Mönchengladbach |

Mozartstr. 19

41065 Mönchengladbach

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

2.9.2013

Germany

VIP-FLIGHTS GmbH

| Einsteinstr. 37 |
| --- |
| 82152 Martinsried, Gemeinde Planegg |

Einsteinstr. 37

82152 Martinsried, Gemeinde Planegg

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

12.2.2013

Germany

Wiesbadener Flugdienst Kunkel KG

Unter den Eichen 7, 65195 Wiesbaden

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

15.4.2013

Greece

AVIATOR AIRWAYS S.A.

| Vouliagmenis Ave. 85 |
| --- |
| Glyfada 16674 |

Vouliagmenis Ave. 85

Glyfada 16674

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

3.4.2013

Greece

HELLENIC IMPERIAL AIRWAYS S.A.

| 102, VOULIAGMENIS AVE. & ERMOU |
| --- |
| 167 77 ELLINIKO |

102, VOULIAGMENIS AVE. & ERMOU

167 77 ELLINIKO

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

16.1.2013

Greece

INTERJET S.A.

| 40,2 Km Attikis Road |
| --- |
| 19002 Paiania Attikis |

40,2 Km Attikis Road

19002 Paiania Attikis

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

23.4.2013

Ireland

Premier Helicopters Limited

Bond Road, East Wall, Dublin 3.

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

10.1.2013

Italy

Aermarche S.p.A.

Via della Vittorina n. 60 – 06024 Gubbio (PG)

Passengers

B

10.1.2013

Italy

Air Vallée S.p.A

Via Flaminia n. 409 – 47924 Rimini (RN)

Passengers

A

24.4.2013

Italy

Belle Air Europe s.r.l.

Piazzale Sandro Sordoni – 60015 Falconara Marittima (AN)

Passengers, cargo

A

27.11.2013

Italy

Palio Air Service s.r.l.

Via dei Fossi n. 14/C – 59100 Prato (PO)

Passengers, cargo

B

7.10.2013

Italy

S.T.C. Aviation S.p.A.

Via Francesco Rolla n. 29 – 16152 Genova (GE)

Passengers

B

19.11.2013

Netherlands

AIS Airlines B.V.

Flamingoweg 20, 8218NW Lelystad

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

3.9.2013

Decree ILT-2013/29211 CAMO/AOC suspended

Romania

BLUE AIR TRANSPORT AERIAN S.A.

Bucuresti, str. Buzesti nr. 71, sector 1

Passengers, mail

A

20.8.2013

Romania

S.C. VALAHIA AIR SRL

Bucuresti, sector 1, Bd. Ficusului nr. 1, et. 1, ap 4

Passengers, cargo

B

20.6.2013

Suspension of the Air Operator Certificate

Romania

SC JETRAN AIR SRL

Bucuresti, str. Coralilor nr 20C, corp C2, sector 1

Passengers, cargo

A

28.1.2013

Romania

S.C. MEDALLION AIR SRL

Bucuresti, str. Nicolae Caramfil nr. 77, parter, sector 1

Passengers, cargo

A

20.6.2013

Suspension of the Air Operator Certificate

Spain

AIR LINK SOLUTIONS, S.L.

Narcisos, 20 – 28016 Madrid

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

27.9.2013

Spain

CANARIAS AERONAUTICA, S.L.

Luis Saavedra Miranda, 26 – 35014 LAS PALMAS (GRAN CANARIA)

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

31.10.2013

Spain

DOMINGUEZ TOLEDO, S.A.

La Orotava, 118 – 29006 MÁLAGA

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

23.4.2013

Spain

HELISWISS IBERICA, S.A.

Aeropuerto de Sabadell – Hangar no 4 – Lado Norte – 08205 Sabadell (Barcelona)

Passengers, mail, cargo

B

22.1.2013

Spain

IBERWORLD AIRLINES, S.A.

Carretera de Valldemosa Km. 7,4 – Edificio Orizonia Parcbit – 07121 Palma de Mallorca

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

17.5.2013

Spain

TURISVOL, S.L.

Santiago Rusiñol, s/n – Apartado de Correos 181 – 17250 Playa de Aro (Girona)

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.2.2013

Operating licence suspended until 8.10.2013

Spain

IMD AIRWAYS, S.L.

Morse, 14 – 28906 GETAFE (MADRID)

Passengers, mail, cargo

A

27.9.2013

Spain

LET`S FLY, S.L.

Port ginesta, local 814 – 08860 LES BOTIGUES DE SITGES (BARCELONA)

Passenger, mail, cargo

A

14.10.2013

UK

RotorMotion UK Limited

14-16 Station Road, Oxted, Surrey. RH8 9EP

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

22.3.2013

7.6.2013

(Revoked)

UK

Suckling Airways (Cambridge) Ltd

Suite 335, The Quorum, Barnwell Drive, Cambridge. CB5 8RE

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

25.4.2013

14.5.2013

(Revoked)

UK

Excel Charter Ltd

Hangar 17, Stapleford Aerodrome, Stapleford Tawney, Essex

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

4.6.2013

UK

PremiAir Aviation Services Ltd

Business Aviation Centre, Blackbushe Airport, Camberley, Surrey

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

12.11.2013

UK

Redhill Aviation Ltd

Standen Farm, Standen, East Grinstead, West Sussex

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

17.12.2013

Voluntary surrender of operating licences

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Denmark | CHC Denmark ApS | John Tranums Vej 20, 6705 Esbjerg Ø | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 31.1.2013 |
| Spain | BIGAS GRUP, S.L. | Carretera del Masnou, Km. 14,300 – 08400 GRANOLLERS (BARCELONA) | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 14.11.2013 |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Denmark

CHC Denmark ApS

John Tranums Vej 20, 6705 Esbjerg Ø

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

31.1.2013

Spain

BIGAS GRUP, S.L.

Carretera del Masnou, Km. 14,300 – 08400 GRANOLLERS (BARCELONA)

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

14.11.2013

Operating licences revoked

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | Air-Styria Luftfahrtunternehmen Ges.m.b.H. | Flughafen Graz, 8073 Feldkirchen bei Graz | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 2.9.2013 | |
| Austria | Early-birds GmbH | Schachenwald 37, 8073 Feldkirchen bei Graz | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 19.7.2013 | |
| Austria | Flugtaxi Gesellschaft m.b.H. | Schillerstraße 19, 4910 Ried im Innkreis | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 19.7.2013 | |
| Austria | JETALLIANCE Flugbetriebs GmbH | Flugplatz 1, 2542 Kottingbrunn | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 8.10.2013 | |
| Austria | JETALLIANCE South GmbH | Flugplatz 1, 2542 Kottingbrunn | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 16.10.2013 | |
| Austria | ‘VIF’ Luftfahrtgesellschaft mbH | Schwefel 91, BT 4, 6850 Dornbirn | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 29.4.2013 | |
| Bulgaria | Air Scorpio Ltd | Ul. Persenk 73, Sofia – 1164 | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 10.9.2013 | Licence: No. BG 1008 – 04/4.7.2011 – revoked |
| Bulgaria | ‘AVB-2010’ Jsc. | 2A, Nikola Obreshkov Str., 1113 Sofia | Passengers, cargo | A | 30.1.2013 | Operating Licence No BG 1008-11 of 7.12.2011 |
| Finland | Airecon Oy | Liikelentotie 8, 01530 Vantaa | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 17.5.2013 | |
| Finland | Oulun Helikopteripalvelu Oy | Lentokatu 2, 90460 Oulunsalo | Passengers, cargo, mail | B | 3.10.2013 | |
| France | AERO ENTREPRISE | Aéroport de Toussus le Noble, Bat 311 |
| 78117 Toussus le Noble |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Comments

Austria

Air-Styria Luftfahrtunternehmen Ges.m.b.H.

Flughafen Graz, 8073 Feldkirchen bei Graz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

2.9.2013

Austria

Early-birds GmbH

Schachenwald 37, 8073 Feldkirchen bei Graz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

19.7.2013

Austria

Flugtaxi Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Schillerstraße 19, 4910 Ried im Innkreis

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

19.7.2013

Austria

JETALLIANCE Flugbetriebs GmbH

Flugplatz 1, 2542 Kottingbrunn

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

8.10.2013

Austria

JETALLIANCE South GmbH

Flugplatz 1, 2542 Kottingbrunn

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

16.10.2013

Austria

‘VIF’ Luftfahrtgesellschaft mbH

Schwefel 91, BT 4, 6850 Dornbirn

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

29.4.2013

Bulgaria

Air Scorpio Ltd

Ul. Persenk 73, Sofia – 1164

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.9.2013

Licence: No. BG 1008 – 04/4.7.2011 – revoked

Bulgaria

‘AVB-2010’ Jsc.

2A, Nikola Obreshkov Str., 1113 Sofia

Passengers, cargo

A

30.1.2013

Operating Licence No BG 1008-11 of 7.12.2011

Finland

Airecon Oy

Liikelentotie 8, 01530 Vantaa

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

17.5.2013

Finland

Oulun Helikopteripalvelu Oy

Lentokatu 2, 90460 Oulunsalo

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

3.10.2013

France

AERO ENTREPRISE

Aéroport de Toussus le Noble, Bat 311

78117 Toussus le Noble

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

23.10.2013

France

Aérozais

| 1 rue du Coin |
| --- |
| 49000 Cholet |

1 rue du Coin

49000 Cholet

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.10.2013

France

Atlantique Air Lines

| 27 rue de la Clef des Champs |
| --- |
| 44118 La Chevrolière |

27 rue de la Clef des Champs

44118 La Chevrolière

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

30.10.2013

Radiation du RCS (annonce officielle BODACC B du 26.6.2013)

Fusion avec Atlantique Air Assistance

France

Avialim

| Aéroport de Limoges |
| --- |
| 87100 Limoges |

Aéroport de Limoges

87100 Limoges

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

14.3.2013

liquidation judicaire à/c du 7.3.2013 par décision du Tribunal de Commerce de Limoges du 6.3.2013

France

Aviaxess

| Héliport de Paris, 61 rue Henri Farman |
| --- |
| 75015 Paris |

Héliport de Paris, 61 rue Henri Farman

75015 Paris

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

15.12.2013

liquidation judiciaire jugement à effet du 12.12.2013 CTA non renouvellé licence temporaire valable jusqu’au 15.12.2013 non reconduite

France

SN THS

| 51 avenue Jean Jaurès |
| --- |
| 69007 Lyon |

51 avenue Jean Jaurès

69007 Lyon

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

30.9.2013

France

Taxi Caraïbes AIR

| Aéroport de Fort de France Le Lamentin |
| --- |
| Zone Aviation générale, Les Hauts de Californie, 97232 Le Lamentin |

Aéroport de Fort de France Le Lamentin

Zone Aviation générale, Les Hauts de Californie, 97232 Le Lamentin

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.8.2013

after suspension on 12.7.2013

France

Transports Aériens Intercaraïbes (TAI)

| SFA La Côte sauvage |
| --- |
| 97098 Saint Barthélemy |

SFA La Côte sauvage

97098 Saint Barthélemy

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

10.9.2013

Germany

ACG Air Cargo Germany GmbH

| Gebäude 13 35 |
| --- |
| 55483 Hahn — Airport |

Gebäude 13 35

55483 Hahn — Airport

Cargo

A

31.10.2013

suspended since 17.4.2013

Germany

Advance Air Luftfahrtgesellschaft mbH

| Buchenweg 17 |
| --- |
| 35789 Weilmünster |

Buchenweg 17

35789 Weilmünster

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

24.7.2013

suspended since 3.12.2012

Germany

Condor Berlin GmbH

| Willy-Brandt-Platz 2 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld |

Willy-Brandt-Platz 2

12529 Schönefeld

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

13.12.2013

suspended since 2.5.2013

Germany

Contact Air Flugdienst GmbH & Co. KG

| Gottlieb-Manz-Strasse 2 |
| --- |
| 70794 Filderstadt |

Gottlieb-Manz-Strasse 2

70794 Filderstadt

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

31.5.2013

suspended since 31.8.2012

Germany

Dresdner Luftfahrtgesellschaft mbH

| Heinrich-Mann-Str. 2 |
| --- |
| 01156 Dresden |

Heinrich-Mann-Str. 2

01156 Dresden

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

22.10.2013

suspended since 1.2.2013

Germany

Elbe Helicopter GmbH & Co. KG

| Flugplatz Bautzen |
| --- |
| 02627 Kubschütz |

Flugplatz Bautzen

02627 Kubschütz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.2.2013

suspended since 2.4.2012

Germany

FSH Luftfahrtunternehmen GmbH

| Schloßplatz 1 |
| --- |
| 04827 Machern |

Schloßplatz 1

04827 Machern

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

31.5.2013

suspended since 1.7.2012

Germany

GAS Air Service GmbH

Am Bahnhof 5, 49201 Dissen

Passengers,cargo,mail

A

24.9.2013

suspended since 12.3.2013

Germany

German Sky Airlines GmbH

| Lierenfelder Str. 45 |
| --- |
| 40231 Düsseldorf |

Lierenfelder Str. 45

40231 Düsseldorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

14.3.2013

suspended since 1.12.2012

Germany

Greenbird GmbH

| Dürrheimer Str. 90 |
| --- |
| 78166 Donaueschingen |

Dürrheimer Str. 90

78166 Donaueschingen

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

21.8.2013

suspended since 11.1.2013

Germany

HOMAC Aviation AG

| Am Flughafen 46 |
| --- |
| 88046 Friedrichshafen |

Am Flughafen 46

88046 Friedrichshafen

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

30.10.2013

suspended since 20.6.2013

Germany

OLT Express Germany GmbH

| Henrich-Focke-Str. 6 |
| --- |
| 28199 Bremen |

Henrich-Focke-Str. 6

28199 Bremen

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

29.8.2013

suspended since 28.1.2013

Germany

PrivateJet International GmbH

| Flughafenallee 24-28 |
| --- |
| 28199 Bremen |

Flughafenallee 24-28

28199 Bremen

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

13.6.2013

suspended since 29.8.2012

Germany

VIP-FLIGHTS GmbH

| Einsteinstr. 37 |
| --- |
| 82152 Martinsried, Gemeinde Planegg |

Einsteinstr. 37

82152 Martinsried, Gemeinde Planegg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

8.10.2013

suspended since 12.2.2013

Germany

Wiesbadener Flugdienst Kunkel KG

Unter den Eichen 7, 65195 Wiesbaden

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

16.10.2013

suspended since 15.4.2013

Germany

XL Airways Germany GmbH

| Hessenring 13 |
| --- |
| 64546 Mörfelden-Walldorf |

Hessenring 13

64546 Mörfelden-Walldorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.7.2013

suspended since 15.12.2012

Greece

INTERJET ΕΛΙΚΟΠΤΕΡΑ Α.Ε.

| 40,2 klm Attikis Road. |
| --- |
| 19002 Paiania Attikis |

40,2 klm Attikis Road.

19002 Paiania Attikis

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

21.3.2013

Greece

SKY WINGS AIRLINES S.A.

58, Vouliagmenis Ave. 16675 Voula Attikis

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.5.2013

Ireland

Premier Helicopters Limited

Bond Road, East Wall, Dublin 3.

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

2.4.2013

Suspended since 10.1.2013

Italy

Air Mach s.r.l.

Via Mazzini n. 225 – 15067 NOVI LIGURE (AL)

Passengers

B

17.9.2013

Italy

Delta Aerotaxi s.r.l.

Via del Termine n. 11 - 50127 Firenze (FI)

Passengers

B

29.8.2013

Italy

Eagles S.p.A.

Via delle Arti n. 101/A - 00054 Fiumicino (RM)

Passengers, cargo

A

2.9.2013

Italy

Executive Aircraft Management s.r.l.

Viale dell’Aviazione n. 65 – 20138 Milano (MI)

Passengers

B

2.10.2013

Italy

Halkin Jet s.r.l.

Via Piera Cillario Ferrero n. 8 – 12051 Alba (CN)

Passengers

B

1.2.2013

Italy

Helica s.r.l.

Via Fratelli Solari n. 10 – Zona Industriale – 33020 AMARO (UD)

Passengers, cargo

B

25.9.2013

Italy

Interfly s.r.l.

Via Aldo Moro n. 10 – 25100 BRESCIA

Passengers, cargo

B

29.8.2013

Italy

Rotkopf Aviation Italia s.r.l.

Via Bartolomeo Cavaceppi n. 113 – 00127 Roma (RM)

Passengers, cargo

B

19.11.2013

Latvia

SIA ‘Simplejet LV’

International airport ‘Riga’, Marupes civil parish, Riga district 1054

Passengers

A

22.11.2013

Lithuania

Aurela, UAB

Rodunios kelias 32, 02187 Vilnius

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

11.6.2013

Netherlands

Air Charters Europe B.V.

Machlaan 26 A- 9761TK Eelde

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

3.7.2013

Air Charters Europe decision nr. ILT-2013/22725 Audit Report nr ILT-2013/22725 Audit basis Category B Chamber of Commerce nr. 4082190

Netherlands

Anti Gravity B.V.

Arendweg 33 - 8218PE Lelystad

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

26.4.2013

Temporary licence expired. AOC limited to A-to-A.

Netherlands

Special Air Services B.V.

Postbus 198 7390 AD TWELLO

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

26.4.2013

AOC NL-AOC-13/23 limited to A-to-A (EU-OPS appendix 1 EU OPS 1.005(a)).

Poland

OLT Express Poland sp. z o.o.

ul. Puławska 465, 02-844 Warszawa

Passengers

A

10.5.2013

Poland

OLT Express Regional sp. z o.o.

ul. Długie Ogrody 8 -14, 80-755 Gdańsk

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

8.4.2013

Poland

Silvair sp. z o.o.

Al. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej 93/B3, 02-777 Warszawa

Passengers, cargo

B

29.7.2013

Romania

Compania Romana de Aviatie ROMAVIA

Bd. Dimitrie Cantemir nr. 1, sector 4 Bucuresti

Passengers, cargo

A

24.5.2013

Romania

S.C. InterAviation SRL

Str. Verii nr. 1 – 3, Sector 2, Bucuresti

Passengers, cargo

B

4.6.2013

Romania

SC JETRAN AIR SRL

Bucuresti, str. Coralilor nr 20C, corp C2, sector 1

Passengers, cargo

A

5.8.2013

Operating Licence was suspended starting with 28.1.2013

Romania

SC ROMSTRADE LOGISTIC EXPRESS SRL

judetul Giurgiu, sat Adunatii-Copaceni, comuna Adunatii-Copaceni (SOLA 50, nr. topografic 783, camera 4)

Passengers, cargo

B

22.5.2013

Romania

SC ALFA AIR SERVICES SRL

Bd. Basarabia nr. 250,etaj 2, Corp administrativ (birouri), etajul 2 al Grupului Industrial TITAN, biroul nr. 215, sector 3, Bucureşti

Passengers

B

18.3.2013

Spain

AEROTEC ESCUELA DE PILOTOS, S.L.

Chalet del RACE s/n — Aeropuerto de Cuatro Vientos - 28044 Madrid

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

18.7.2013

Spain

ISLAS AIRWAYS, S.A.

Avda. Punta de Anaga, 36 – 1a Planta – 38111 Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.7.2013

Islas Airways, S.A. held a temporary licence until 10.7.2013. This licence was suspended on 30.10.2012 and became extincted on 10.7.2013.

Spain

MINT LÍNEAS AÉREAS, S.A.

Los Arfe, 66 – 28027 MADRID

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

10.4.2013

Spain

SOKO AVIATION, S.L.

Base Aérea Civil – Complejo Base Aérea – 28850 TORREJÓN DE ARDOZ (MADRID)

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

3.10.2013

Spain

SPANAIR, S.A.

Plaza de Europa, 54-56 – 08902 L`HOSPITALET DE LLOBREGAT (BARCELONA).

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

29.4.2013

Sweden

JE Time Sweden AB

Kanalvägen10C, 194 61 Upplands Väsby

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

9.9.2013

Sweden

Sweden Airways AB

Ellipsvägen 5, 141 75 Kungens Kurva

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

15.1.2013

UK

Oasis Flight Ltd

One Ash, The Green, East End, Witney, Oxfordshire. OX29 6PY

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

29.1.2013

UK

Veritair Aviation Limited

Cardiff Heliport, Foreshore Road, East Moors, Cardiff. CF10 4LZ

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.5.2013

UK

Suckling Airways (Cambridge) Ltd

Suite 335, The Quorum, Barnwell Drive, Cambridge. CB5 8RE

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

14.5.2013

UK

Blue City Aviation Ltd

Anson House, Coventry Airport West, Coventry. CV8 3AZ

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

7.6.2013

UK

MB Air Ltd

Newcastle City Heliport, Railway Street, Newcastle Upon Tyne. NE4 7AN

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

7.6.2013

UK

Ocean Sky (UK) Ltd

Portland House, Bressenden Place, London. SW1E 5BH

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

7.6.2013

UK

RotorMotion UK Limited

14-16 Station Road, Oxted, Surrey. RH8 9EP

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

7.6.2013

UK

Alan Mann Helicopters Ltd

Fairoaks Airport, Chobham nr Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HX

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

11.6.2013

UK

Bmibaby Ltd

PO Box 737, Donington Hall, Castle Donington, Derby, Derbyshire, DE74 2SB

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

11.6.2013

UK

Manhattan Jet Management Ltd

Suite 217 Business Aviation Centre, Farnborough International Airport, Farnborough, Hampshire. GU14 6XA

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.6.2013

UK

Cranfield Helicopters Ltd

Hangar 1, Cranfield Airport, Cranfield, Bedford. MK43 0JR

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

11.7.2013

UK

Lakeland Seaplane Tours Ltd

Unit 7 St Angelo Airport, Trory, Enniskellen, Co Fermanagh, Northern Ireland. BT94 2FP

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

14.8.2013

UK

HD Air Ltd

Elmdon Building, Birmingham International Airport, Birmingham. B26 3QN

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

18.12.2013

UK

Cambridge Aero Club Ltd

Airport House, The Airport, Cambridge. CB5 8RY

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.12.2013

Change of name of license holder

| Member State | Old name of air carrier | New name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| France | Airlinair | HOP!-AIRLINAIR | Parc d’affaires SILIC |
| 24-26 rue de Villeneuve |
| BP 40193 |
| 94 563 Rungis Cedex |

Member State

Old name of air carrier

New name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

France

Airlinair

HOP!-AIRLINAIR

Parc d’affaires SILIC

24-26 rue de Villeneuve

BP 40193

94 563 Rungis Cedex

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

BODACC B du 26.7.2013

France

Brit Air

HOP!-BRIT AIR

| Aérodrome de Morlaix |
| --- |
| CS 27925 |
| 29679 Morlaix Cedex |

Aérodrome de Morlaix

CS 27925

29679 Morlaix Cedex

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

BODACC B du 17.7.2013

France

DARTA

AERO JET

| Bât H5 |
| --- |
| Aéroport du Bourget |
| 175 Avenue de l’Europe |
| 93350 Le Bourget |

Bât H5

Aéroport du Bourget

175 Avenue de l’Europe

93350 Le Bourget

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

chgt du nom acté par l’AGE actionnaires de DARTA Transport Aérien du 30.11.2012

arrêté du 13.2.2013

France

Regional CAE

HOP!-REGIONAL

| Aéroport de Nantes atlantique |
| --- |
| 44340 Bouguenais |

Aéroport de Nantes atlantique

44340 Bouguenais

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

BODACC B du 11.7.2013

Italy

Air One Executive S.p.A.

Livingston Executive S.p.A.

Corso Sempione n. 111 - 21013 Gallarate (MI)

Passengers and goods

B

10.4.2013

Germany

COMMANDER Flugdienst GmbH

AAA Aviation & Aircraft Assets GmbH

Van-der-Smissen-Str. 9, 22767 Hamburg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.5.2013

Germany

HELI Flight Flugschule-Flugbetrieb GmbH & Co.KG

HELI-FLIGHT GmbH & Co KG

Flugplatz, 61203 Reichelsheim

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

21.6.2013

Germany

WDL Aviation GmbH & Co. KG

WDL Aviation GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft

| Flughafen Köln/Bonn |
| --- |
| Flugzeughalle 6, 51130 Köln |

Flughafen Köln/Bonn

Flugzeughalle 6, 51130 Köln

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

1.1.2013

Netherlands

Lelykopters BV

HeliCentre Helicopter Services BV

| Arendweg 33 |
| --- |
| 8218 PE Lelystad |

Arendweg 33

8218 PE Lelystad

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

3.12.2013

Portugal

Airlinair Portugal — Serviços Aéreo, S.A.

LFAS — Lease Fly Aviation Services, S.A.

Rua Bartolomeu de Gusmão, no 18, 2745-269 São Domingos de Rana

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

28.3.2013

Portugal

Perfect Aviation, S.A.

United Jet Services, S.A.

Rua Bartolomeu de Gusmão, no 118, 2785-269 São Domingos de Rana

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

16.12.2013

Sweden

Andersson Business Jet AB

Bromma Business Jet AB

c/o SCA, Box 200, 101 23 Stockholm

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

5.8.2013

Sweden

Golden Air Flyg AB

Braathens Regional AB

| Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats |
| --- |
| 461 83 Västra Tunhem |

Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats

461 83 Västra Tunhem

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

11.1.2013

Switzerland

Bonsai Helicopter AG

Helialpin AG

| Airport St.Gallen-Altenrhein |
| --- |
| Rütiweg 1340, 9423 Altenrhein |

Airport St.Gallen-Altenrhein

Rütiweg 1340, 9423 Altenrhein

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

19.11.2013

Change of address of the license holder

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Old address of air carrier | New address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | Altenrhein Luftfahrt GmbH | Schwefel 91, 6850 Dornbirn | Office Park 3, Top 312, 1300 Wien-Flughafen | Passengers, cargo, mail | A | 15.7.2013 |
| Austria | Globe Air AG | Linzerstraße 30 |
| 4063 Hörsching |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Old address of air carrier

New address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Austria

Altenrhein Luftfahrt GmbH

Schwefel 91, 6850 Dornbirn

Office Park 3, Top 312, 1300 Wien-Flughafen

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

15.7.2013

Austria

Globe Air AG

Linzerstraße 30

4063 Hörsching

| Polytec-Straße 1 |
| --- |
| 4063 Hörsching |

Polytec-Straße 1

4063 Hörsching

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

11.11.2013

Austria

International Jet Management GmbH

Oppolzergasse 6, 1010 Wien

Concorde Business Park 2/F 14, 2320 Schwechat

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

14.2.2013

Bulgaria

SUNLIGHT AIR Jsc

17, Debar str., 1618 Sofia

fl.12, 159, Tsar Boris III Blvd., 1618, Sofia

Passengers

A

12.11.2013

Czech Republic

HELI CZECH s.r.o.

Světlá pod Hořičkami 39, PSČ 552 05

Pardubice, Luďka Matury 811, Studánka, PSČ 530 12

Passengers, mail

B

13.8.2013

Germany

AirGo Flugservice GmbH & Co. KG

| Am Finther Wald 5833 |
| --- |
| 55126 Mainz-Finthen |

Am Finther Wald 5833

55126 Mainz-Finthen

| Am Finther Wald 5833 |
| --- |
| 55126 Mainz |

Am Finther Wald 5833

55126 Mainz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

Augusta Air Luftfahrtunternehmen, Yachtcharter und Videogeräteverleih Hans Schneider e.K.

| Flughafenstr. 5 |
| --- |
| 86169 Augsburg |

Flughafenstr. 5

86169 Augsburg

| Flughafenstr. 3 |
| --- |
| 86169 Augsburg |

Flughafenstr. 3

86169 Augsburg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

B-Air Charter GmbH & Co. KG

| Bernhäuser Hauptstraße 14 |
| --- |
| 70794 Filderstadt |

Bernhäuser Hauptstraße 14

70794 Filderstadt

| Plieninger Straße 70 |
| --- |
| 70794 Filderstadt |

Plieninger Straße 70

70794 Filderstadt

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

16.10.2013

Germany

BSF Swissphoto GmbH

| Am Flughafen Schönefeld Mittelstraße 7 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld |

Am Flughafen Schönefeld Mittelstraße 7

12529 Schönefeld

| Mittelstraße 7 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld |

Mittelstraße 7

12529 Schönefeld

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

City-Flight Germany GmbH

| Ruhrstraße 54-56 |
| --- |
| 41469 Neuss |

Ruhrstraße 54-56

41469 Neuss

| Flughafenstraße 69 |
| --- |
| 41066 Mönchengladbach |

Flughafenstraße 69

41066 Mönchengladbach

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

11.2.2013

Germany

Classic Wings GmbH

| Ellewick 24 |
| --- |
| 48691 Vreden |

Ellewick 24

48691 Vreden

| Flughafenstraße 48 |
| --- |
| 40474 Düsseldorf |

Flughafenstraße 48

40474 Düsseldorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

29.11.2013

Germany

FAIR AIR GmbH

| Moritzhöfen 7 |
| --- |
| 95447 Bayreuth |

Moritzhöfen 7

95447 Bayreuth

Flugplatzstr. 1, 95463 Bindlach

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

4.7.2013

Germany

FLN FRISIA-Luftverkehr GmbH Norddeich

Flugplatz 26506 Norddeich

| Westerlooger Strohweg 5 |
| --- |
| 26506 Norden |

Westerlooger Strohweg 5

26506 Norden

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

20.9.2013

Germany

Flugschule- und Luftfahrtunternehmen ARDEX GmbH Berlin Land Brandenburg

Flugplatz Heinrichsfelde 16866 Kyritz

| Flugplatz 2b |
| --- |
| 16866 Kyritz |

Flugplatz 2b

16866 Kyritz

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

Heli Aviation GmbH

| Flughafenstr. 7 |
| --- |
| 86169 Augsburg |

Flughafenstr. 7

86169 Augsburg

Flughafenstr. 19, 86169 Augsburg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

27.2.2013

Germany

HHS Hanseatic Helicopter Service GmbH

| Flughafen Hamburg, Geschäftsfliegerzentrum, Gebäude 347 A |
| --- |
| 22335 Hamburg |

Flughafen Hamburg, Geschäftsfliegerzentrum, Gebäude 347 A

22335 Hamburg

| Flughafen Hamburg, Geschäftsfliegerzentrum |
| --- |
| (Geb. 347 A) |
| Flughafenstr. 1 – 3 |
| 22335 Hamburg |

Flughafen Hamburg, Geschäftsfliegerzentrum

(Geb. 347 A)

Flughafenstr. 1 – 3

22335 Hamburg

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

JK JETKONTOR AG

| Pinneberger Str. 243 |
| --- |
| 25488 Holm |

Pinneberger Str. 243

25488 Holm

| Pinneberger Str. 243 d |
| --- |
| 25488 Holm |

Pinneberger Str. 243 d

25488 Holm

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

NIGHTEXPRESS Luftverkehrsgesellschaft m.b.H.

| Gebäude 511, Raum 3056 |
| --- |
| 60549 Frankfurt/Main |

Gebäude 511, Raum 3056

60549 Frankfurt/Main

| Flughafen Tor 109 |
| --- |
| Gebäude 511, Raum 3056, |
| Cargo City Süd 60549 Frankfurt am Main |

Flughafen Tor 109

Gebäude 511, Raum 3056,

Cargo City Süd 60549 Frankfurt am Main

Cargo, mail

A

1.1.2013

Germany

Nordcopters GmbH

| Lachmannweg 3b |
| --- |
| 22589 Hamburg |

Lachmannweg 3b

22589 Hamburg

Bültenkoppel/Flugplatz, 25492 Heist

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

29.5.2013

Germany

Rotorflug GmbH

Heliport Burgholzhausen 61381 Friedrichsdorf

| Peter-Geibel-Straße 24 |
| --- |
| 61381 Friedrichsdorf |

Peter-Geibel-Straße 24

61381 Friedrichsdorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

Silver Cloud Air GmbH

| Waldspitzweg 3 |
| --- |
| 67105 Schifferstadt |

Waldspitzweg 3

67105 Schifferstadt

| Joachim-Becher-Str. 2 |
| --- |
| 67346 Speyer |

Joachim-Becher-Str. 2

67346 Speyer

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

15.10.2013

Germany

Sylt Air GmbH

| Flughafen, Gebäude 101a |
| --- |
| 25980 Sylt-Ost |

Flughafen, Gebäude 101a

25980 Sylt-Ost

| Zum Fliegerhorst 101 |
| --- |
| 25980 Sylt/OT Tinnum |

Zum Fliegerhorst 101

25980 Sylt/OT Tinnum

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

1.1.2013

Germany

WDL Aviation GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft

| Flughafen Köln/Bonn |
| --- |
| Flugzeughalle 6 |
| 51147 Köln |

Flughafen Köln/Bonn

Flugzeughalle 6

51147 Köln

| Flughafen Köln/Bonn |
| --- |
| Flugzeughalle 6 |
| 51130 Köln |

Flughafen Köln/Bonn

Flugzeughalle 6

51130 Köln

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

1.1.2013

Germany

WIKING Helikopter Service GmbH

| Blumenthalstr. 15 |
| --- |
| 28209 Bremen |

Blumenthalstr. 15

28209 Bremen

JadeWeserAirport 26452 Sande

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

25.9.2013

Hungary

A.B.C. Air Hungary Légiközlekedési és Kereskedelmi Kft

1185 Budapest, Ferihegy 1.

1185 Budapest, BUD Nemzetközi Repülőtér 1.

Cargo

B

27.2.2013

Irelande

Airlink Airways Ltd T/A Private Sky

Western Business Park, Ballymurtagh, Shannon, Co. Clare.

First Floor, Block 2, Shannon Business Park, Shannon, Co. Clare.

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

4.2.2013

Italy

Livingston Executive S.p.A.

Viale Abruzzo n. 410 – 66013 Chieti (CH)

Corso Sempione n. 111 - 21013 Gallarate (MI)

Passengers and goods

B

10.4.2013

Poland

Ad Astra Executive Charter S. A.

ul. Czereśniowa 40A, 02-456 Warszawa

ul. Kondratowicza 50, 03-642 Warszawa

Passengers, cargo

B

29.10.2013

Poland

Flyjet sp. z o.o.

Al. Krakowska 110/114, 02-256 Warszawa

ul. Sabały 60, 02-174 Warszawa

Passengers, cargo

A

17.10.2013

Poland

Lotnicze Przedsiębiorstwo Usługowe ‘Heliseco’z o.o.

ul. Al. Lotników Polskich 1, 21-045 Świdnik

ul. Gen. Bryg. S. Kaliskiego 57, 01-476 Warszawa

Passegers, cargo, mail

B

23.4.2013

Poland

Travel Service Polska sp. z o.o.

ul. Żwirki i Wigury 1, 00-906 Warszawa

ul. Gordona Bennetta 2B, 02-159 Warszawa

Passengers

A

8.7.2013

Portugal

HI FLY — Transportes Aéreos, S.A.

| Rua do Borja, no 6 |
| --- |
| 1350-047 Lisboa |

Rua do Borja, no 6

1350-047 Lisboa

Rua Latino Coelho no1, Edifício Hifly Building 7o Andar 1050-132 Lisboa

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

2013

Portugal

ORBEST, S.A.

Av. D. João II, Edifício Central Office, Lote 1.17.03, 6o, Parque das Nações, 1990-084 Lisboa

Edifício Rodrigo Uria, Rua Duque de Palmela no 23, 1250-097 Lisboa

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

2013

Romania

S.C. BLUE AIR – AIRLINE MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS S.R.L.

17 Teheran Street, sector 1, Bucharest

42 – 44 Bucuresti – Ploiesti Street, Baneasa Business&Technology Park, sector 1, Bucharest

Passengers, cargo

A

9.12.2013

Slovakia

Travel Service, a.s. org. zložka Slovensko

Letisko M. R. Štefánika, 823 11 Bratislava

Ivánska cesta 30/B, 821 04 Bratislava

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

8.11.2013

Sweden

Amapola Flyg AB

| Box 912 |
| --- |
| 195 05 Arlandastad |

Box 912

195 05 Arlandastad

Box 57, 230 32 Malmö-Sturup

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

17.5.2013

Sweden

Braathens Regional AB

| Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats |
| --- |
| 461 83 Trollhättan |

Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats

461 83 Trollhättan

| Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats |
| --- |
| 461 83 Västra Tunhem |

Trollhättan Vänersborg Flygplats

461 83 Västra Tunhem

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

11.1.2013

Sweden

Bromma Business Jet AB

| Vetevägen 16 |
| --- |
| 187 69 Täby |

Vetevägen 16

187 69 Täby

c/o SCA, Box 200, 101 23 Stockholm

Passengers, cargo, mail

A

5.8.2013

Sweden

Copterflyg AB

| Lövstigen 2 |
| --- |
| 823 30 Kilafors |

Lövstigen 2

823 30 Kilafors

| Ringvägen 12 |
| --- |
| 831 37 Östersund |

Ringvägen 12

831 37 Östersund

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

5.11.2013

Sweden

Sundt Air Sweden AB

Hässlögatan 6, 721 31 Västerås

Hässlögatan 16, 721 31 Västerås

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

11.4.2013 Valid until 1.4.2014

Change of category

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| France | Corail Hélicoptères | Aéroport de Pierrefonds |
| 97410 Saint-Pierre |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

France

Corail Hélicoptères

Aéroport de Pierrefonds

97410 Saint-Pierre

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

12.11.2013

Germany

AIR HAMBURG Luftverkehrsgesellschaft mbH

Kleine Bahnstr. 8 - 22525 Hamburg

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

5.7.2013

Germany

AIR TRAFFIC Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung EXECUTIVE JET SERVICE

Flughafen, Halle 3, 40474 Düsseldorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

1.3.2013

Germany

Flair Jet Luftverkehrsgesellschaft mbH

Hirschenau 5a, 90607 Rückersdorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

5.3.2013

Germany

Flair Jet Luftverkehrsgesellschaft mbH

Hirschenau 5a, 90607 Rückersdorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category A to Category B

19.4.2013

Germany

Germania Express Fluggesellschaft mbH

| Lilienthalstraße 6 |
| --- |
| 12529 Schönefeld OT Waltersdorf |

Lilienthalstraße 6

12529 Schönefeld OT Waltersdorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category A to Category B

22.4.2013

Germany

HeliJet Charter GmbH

Liebigstraße 3-9, 40764 Langenfeld

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

21.11.2013

Germany

Jet Executive International Charter GmbH & Co. KG

| Mündelheimer Weg 50 |
| --- |
| 40472 Düsseldorf |

Mündelheimer Weg 50

40472 Düsseldorf

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category A to Category B

12.2.2013

Spain

Aeronova, S.L.

Polígono Industrial El Oliveral, Bloque A, Nave 2, Fase 3 - 46394 Ribarroja (Valencia)

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category B to Category A

11.9.2013

UK

British International Helicopter Services Ltd

Anson House, Coventry Airport, Coventry. CV8 3AZ

Passengers, cargo, mail

From category A to Category B

8.10.2013

Change of category transported

| Member State | Name of air carrier | Address of air carrier | Previously permitted to carry | Permitted to carry | Category | Decision effective since |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Germany | B-Air Charter GmbH & Co. KG | Bernhäuser Hauptstraße 14 |
| 70794 Filderstadt |

Member State

Name of air carrier

Address of air carrier

Previously permitted to carry

Permitted to carry

Category

Decision effective since

Germany

B-Air Charter GmbH & Co. KG

Bernhäuser Hauptstraße 14

70794 Filderstadt

Passengers

Passengers, cargo, mail

B

19.2.2013

Poland

Flyjet sp. z o.o.

Al. Krakowska 110/114, 02-256 Warszawa

Passengers

Passengers, cargo

A

11.6.2013

Poland

Small Planet Airlines sp. z o.o.

ul. 17 Stycznia 45B, 02-146 Warszawa

Passengers

Passengers, cargo

A

24.9.2013

---

(1)  OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3.

(2)  Category A: Operating licences without the restriction of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008.

Category B: Operating licences including the restriction of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 7.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/42

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.7233 — Allianz/Going concern of UnipolSai Assicurazioni)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 137/08

| 1. | On 29 April 2014, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Allianz SpA (Italy), controlled ultimately by Allianz Group (Germany) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of a non-life insurance going concern (‘the Target’, Italy) currently owned by UnipolSai Assicurazioni SpA (‘UnipolSai’, Italy), by way of purchase of assets. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 29 April 2014, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Allianz SpA (Italy), controlled ultimately by Allianz Group (Germany) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of a non-life insurance going concern (‘the Target’, Italy) currently owned by UnipolSai Assicurazioni SpA (‘UnipolSai’, Italy), by way of purchase of assets.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:
  —   Allianz: life and non-life insurance and asset management,
  —   Target: non-life insurance. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   Allianz: life and non-life insurance and asset management,

—   Target: non-life insurance.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by e-mail to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number M.7233 — Allianz/Going concern of UnipolSai Assicurazioni to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by e-mail to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number M.7233 — Allianz/Going concern of UnipolSai Assicurazioni to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

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