* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

1 21 U.S.C. §§ 843 & 846.

2 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). She was also convicted of conspiracy and illegal use of a

communications facility, 21 U.S.C. §§ 843 & 846.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-11024

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANGELITA REYES, a/k/a Angela Benevides;

RAQUEL CHAPA-VILLANUEVA,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(4:95-CR-087-6-A)

July 17, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Angelita Reyes appeals her convictions by a jury of conspiracy to distribute

heroin and use of a communications facility to facilitate a narcotics transaction, 1

challenging the admission of coconsp irators’ statements and sufficiency of the

evidence. Raquel Chapa-Villanueva appeals her conviction and sentence for

possession of heroin with intent t o distribute, advancing several challenges. 23 U nited States v. Calverley , 37 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994) ( e n banc ), cert

. denied

, 115

S.Ct. 1266 (1995), citing United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725 (1993).

4 United Stat es v. Fragoso , 978 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1992), c ert

. denied

, 507 U.S. 1012

(1993).

5 United States v. Laury

, 49 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 1995), cert

. denied

, 116 S.Ct. 162 (1995).

6 United States v. Pierre

, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir.) ( en banc ) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted), cert

. denied , 506 U.S. 898 (1992).

2 Finding neither error nor abuse of discretion, we affirm the convictions and

sentence appealed.

Reyes contends that the district court erred in permitting the admission into

evidence of objected-to coconspirators’ statements without conducting a hearing

out of the presence of the j ury. No such hearing was requested. Our review,

therefore, is for plain error only. 3 The district court allowed the evidence with the

proviso that the prosecution would “tie it all up.” A hearing outside of the presence

of the jury was not mandated. 4 Implicit in the trial court’s denial of Reyes’ motion

for judgme nt of acquittal at the close of the government’s case in chief was a

finding that the court’s requirement was met. There was no error.

Reyes’ complaint of evidentiary insufficiency is also viewed under the plain

error standard and we may reverse only to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 5 “Such

a miscarriage of justice would e xist only if the record is devoid of evidence

pointing to guilt, or

. . . because the evidence on a key element of the offense was

so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” 6 The record contains sufficient

evidence of Reyes’ participation in a conspiracy headed by Carmen Flores,

including an intercepted telephone conversation be tween Flores and Reyes7 Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

8 North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

9 United States v. Crain , 33 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 1994), c ert

. denied

, 115 S.Ct. 1142

(1995); United States v. Faubion , 19 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1994).

3 discussing the details and financial arrangements for a heroin transaction as well

as documentary evidence of travel schedules and notes on drug amounts and costs

found in her home. It cannot be said that the record is devoid of evidence of Reyes’

guilt warranting a reversal.

Chapa-Villanueva contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow her

to change her not guilty plea to guilty on the morning of trial. The court earlier had

informed all defendants that guilty pleas would not be accepted on the day of trial.

A defendan t does not have an absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted. 7

Further, a trial judge is not required to accept every con stitutionally valid guilty

plea merely because a defendant submits same. 8 Chapa-Villanueva claims

prejudice because of the court’s refusal, at sentencing, to allow her a two-point

offense computation adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. This allegation

of prejudice is without merit. Our precedents firmly establish that there is no

requirement of a plea of guilty in order to receive the downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibil ity. 9 The type plea is not dispositive of the decision to

allow or disallow the adjustment.

Chapa-Villanueva’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails for the

same reasons as the chal lenge made by Reyes. The record contains adequate

evidence of the appealed conviction, including several intercepted telephone1 0 United States v. Mergerson

, 4 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1993); cert

. denied , 114 S.Ct. 1310

(1994).

11 United States v. Edwards , 65 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1995).

4 conversations arranging the transactions, testimony of a codefendant, and drug

paraphernalia found in her home.

Finally, we find no clear error in the court h olding Chapa-Villanueva

responsible for the quantity of drugs distributed by the conspiracy 10 and in denying

a downward adjustment for her claimed minor participation. 11

AFFIRMED.