FILED 

APRIL 3, 2018 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

V. 

JAIME STEWART ANDREWS, 

Appellant. 

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No. 34678-1-III 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

KORSMO, J. - Jaime Andrews appeals from his conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine, challenging several actions taken by the investigating officers that the 

trial prosecutor rightly acknowledged as "incredibly sloppy police work." Since he 

cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the police actions, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Sunnyside Police Department Officer Christopher Sparks stopped a vehicle driven 

by Mr. Andrews, whom he suspected of driving while license suspended (DWLS), on 

April 19, 2016. Along with Mr. Sparks as a "ride-along" passenger was his wife, Jerrica 

Sparks. Ms. Sparks was employed as a trooper for the Washington State Patrol (WSP). 

She was not on duty for WSP while riding with Officer Sparks. 
No. 34678-1-111 

State v. Andrews 

While pulling his car over in response to the officer's signals, Mr. Andrews threw 

an object from his window. Officer Sparks observed the object, which he believed was a 

glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. The officer asked Mr. Andrews ifhe had 

been smoking meth; Andrews replied in the affirmative. The officer arrested Andrews 

for DWLS and, in a search incident to that arrest, found a small "baggie" of suspected 

methamphetamine. While the officer was arresting Mr. Andrews, Ms. Sparks went and 

recovered the glass pipe from the roadway. 

Ms. Sparks accompanied her husband and his prisoner to the police department 

and, while there, conducted a field test on both the pipe and baggie. The test results were 

positive for methamphetamine. The officer prepared an affidavit in support of a search 

warrant for Mr. Andrew's blood. The affidavit stated that Officer Sparks (rather than his 

wife) had recovered the pipe and conducted the field test. All evidence collected, other 

than the glass pipe (which was destroyed), was placed on evidence at the police 

department. 

The prosecutor filed a charge of possession of methamphetamine based on the 

field test results. Despite notice that charges had been filed and a trial date set, the 

evidence was not transported to the state crime laboratory for confirmation. The State 

successfully obtained a continuance while awaiting the laboratory reports. 

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No. 34678-1-III 

State v. Andrews 

In the interim, Trooper Sparks was found to have lied to a supervisor on June 6, 

2016, concerning a traffic stop she had conducted three days earlier. WSP advised the 

Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys of the finding. Trooper Sparks 

resigned her position with WSP prior to an administrative investigation into the incident. 

Upon discovering that the suspected methamphetamine had still not been sent to the 

crime lab, the assigned deputy prosecutor had an officer drive the materials directly to the 

laboratory for immediate testing. The test results were reported back by e-mail late in the 

day, and the information was e-mailed to defense counsel the next morning. The July 25 

trial date was reset to August 22; Mr. Andrews' speedy trial period expired on August 24. 

The defense moved to suppress evidence or to dismiss charges due to 

governmental mismanagement. CrR 8.3(b). The argument focused on Trooper Sparks' 

participation in the evidence recovery and testing as well as the late transmission to the 

crime laboratory. After hearing testimony from Officer Sparks and former Trooper 

Sparks, the court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant had not 

established prejudice. A jury subsequently convicted Mr. Andrews of possession of a 

controlled substance. 

The court imposed financial obligations totaling $1,950 on Mr. Andrews and 

sentenced him to serve 18 months in prison. He timely appealed to this court. 

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No. 34678-1-111 

State v. Andrews 

ANALYSIS 

Mr. Andrews contends that the court erred in rejecting his CrR 8.3(b) motion. We 

agree with the trial court that Mr. Andrews failed to establish that governmental 

misconduct denied him a fair trial. 

CrR 8.3(b) empowers a court to dismiss an action when, "due to arbitrary action or 

governmental misconduct," "there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which 

materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial." The trial court's rulings under CrR 

8.3(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion; the extraordinary remedy of dismissal is only 

appropriate when there has been such prejudice that no other action would ensure a fair 

trial. State v. Garza, 99 Wn. App. 291, 295, 994 P.2d 868 (2000). Discretion is abused 

when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll 

v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).

Mr. Andrews attacks Trooper Sparks' participation in his case by retrieving the 

pipe and conducting the field tests on the suspected methamphetamine. He challenges 

the trial court's conclusions that it was reasonable for the officer to have the trooper 

retrieve the pipe and that it was not misconduct for her to conduct the field tests. The 

court also determined, and Mr. Andrews also challenges, that the "insertion of Mrs. 

Sparks into peripheral aspects of the criminal investigation had no material impact on the 

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No. 34678-1-111 

State v. Andrews 

chain of custody." Clerk's Papers at 94. He argues that there was a "cloud over the 

credibility" of Officer Sparks and Trooper Sparks. 1 Brief of Appellant at 14. 

The challenged conclusions need not be separately discussed here since all of them 

are reflected in the ultimate conclusion that Mr. Andrews was not prejudiced by the 

actions of Trooper Sparks. It was his burden to establish actual prejudice to his ability to 

defend the case. Garza, 99 Wn. App. at 295. He has failed in that burden. 

He does not suggest how his ability to defend the case was affected in any manner, 

let alone that it was so devastated by the actions of the two officers that he could not 

receive a fair trial. Instead, he simply focuses on trying to establish that the trooper's 

actions were wrong. Even that is a very hard sell. That a trained officer2 retrieved 

evidence and field-tested the suspected controlled substances somehow contaminated the 

case simply because she was off duty and assisting another jurisdiction without 

authorization is a difficult argument to understand. But, even if that was wrongful 

conduct, Mr. Andrews does not explain how he was unable to defend the case due to the 

trooper's action. Her unauthorized intervention probably helped his case by giving him 

something to argue about. The actions of Officer Sparks also were presented at trial and 

1 This was not part of his argument at the CrR 8.3(b) hearing, but it was a basis for 

cross-examining Officer Sparks at trial. Report of Proceedings (Aug. 23, 2016) at 84-109. 

2 Even civilians have been known to assist police by turning over evidence they 

discovered or by assisting officers during emergencies. We know of no ban on civilianobtained evidence, even if someone who is not a law enforcement officer becomes part of 

the chain of custody for evidence. 

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No. 34678-1-111 

State v. Andrews 

his credibility was clearly challenged in cross-examination. Report of Proceedings (Aug. 

23, 2016) at 84-109. Those issues were presented to the jury-the body that decides 

credibility issues. 

Moreover, as tried, the evidence shows that the trooper's involvement was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Having been destroyed earlier, the pipe was not 

presented at trial. The prosecutor expressly eschewed reliance on the residue from the 

pipe as the basis for the conviction, focusing solely on the baggie of methamphetamine 

and expressly asking the jury to return its verdict solely on that evidence. That evidence 

was totally untainted by the trooper's actions. Since the bag of methamphetamine was 

the sole basis for the jury's verdict, there simply was no harm to Mr. Andrews. 

Having failed to satisfy his burden under CrR 8.3(b), Mr. Andrew's appeal lacks 

merit. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.3

3 Mr. Andrews also asks that we waive appellate costs if the State substantially 

prevails. Since he has not complied with our general order regarding request to deny cost 

award by providing more comprehensive information about his financial circumstances, 

we decline his request. See Gen. Order of Division III, In re Court Admin. Orderre 

Request to Deny Cost Award (Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2016), http://www.courts.wa.gov 

/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders&div=III. However, the State has indicated it 

will not seek costs and, therefore, will not be filing a cost bill. Accordingly, Mr. 

Andrews will not end up paying any appellate costs since the State would be estopped 

from claiming them. 

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No. 34678-1-111 

State v. Andrews 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Herre C.J. 

�,g, Pennell, J. 

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