NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0714n.06 No. 09-2360 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DA VI D SC HA UE R, Petitioner-Appellee , v. KENNET H MCKEE, Warden, Warde n of B e l l a m y C r e e k

C o r r e c t i o n a l F a c i l i t y, Re sp on de nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , G I B B ON S, a nd CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. COOK, Circuit J udg e. Petitioner David Schauer filed a wr it of habea s corpus in district court
un de r 2 8 U.S. C. § 2554 fo llo wi ng his state -c ourt c on vic tio n f

or fi rs t- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t. The district cour

t conditionally

g rante d the petition based upon his claims of inef fec tive assistance of counse l and prosec utorial misconduct. The state appea ls. Be cause Schauer ’s def ense c ounsel’s p u r p o rte d e r r o r s d o n o t qu a li f

y a s in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e , an d b e c a

u s e Sc h a u e r c an n o t s h ow the
nece ssary cause to permit collatera l r eview of his pr ocedur ally defa ulted prosec utorial misconduct claim, we r ever se the district cour t’s decision g rantinghabea s relief
. I . Ba ckg round A Michig an jury

convicted Scha

uer of first-degree sexual mi scon d uct ar ising fr om the sexual assault of his t eena g e daughte r (“ the complainant” ). At trial, the pr osecution pre sented no phy sicalNo. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 2 - or c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e . In h is o pe nin g state me nt, defens e cou ns e l e xpla ine d th a t th e c a se focuse d square ly

on the complainant’ s testimony , but t h at h e would prove she wa s unreliable. Specifica lly , he told the j ury he would “ca ll any witness the People don’t [call] that they have ta lked to,” and “ show y ou how her stories have chang ed.” ( Trial Tr. 150.)
Th e c omp la ina

nt t e sti fi e d th a t on

the night o f t

he off ens e sh e wa s a sle e p in

he r b e dr oo m. Sc ha ue r e ntere d th e ro om, wo ke he r, and e ng a g e d in

se xua l in te rc ours e wi th h e r. Af te rw ard s, Schauer threatened t h e compl ainant that if she told anyone about the inc ident, he would har m her or her family members. The complainant did not tell any one; instead she wrote a note to her mother disclosing the se x ual assault, but ne ver delivere d it. The complainant’s mother eventua lly

found the note and c onfronted he r. The c omplainant then admitted that Schaue r had se x ually abused he r.
The prosec ution a lso c alled sever al witnesses who ha d talked to the complaina nt, including he r m oth e r, he r fr ie nd , an d th e po lic e of fi c e rs wh o inte rv ie we d h e r. I n h is c los ingargume nt, de fe ns e
c ouns e l atta c ked th e c omp la ina nt’ s c re dib ili ty

by po int ingout th e dis pa

ri tie s in the se wi tne sse s’ testimony . He pr esente d “inconsistency char ts” hig hlighting how the com p lainant’s stories ha d chang ed. De spite defe nse co u n s el ’s eff orts, the jury

returne d a guilty

verdic t, and the cour

t sentenc ed Schaue r to fiftee n to thirty y ear s’ imprisonment. Following his conviction, Schauer appea led to the Michig an Court of Appe als. He a sserted fi ve g ro un ds fo r r e lie f, inc lud ingpr osecutor ia l mi sc on du c t and ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Specifica lly , Schauer

claimed that the prosec ution prejudicially vouched f

or the c omplainant, andNo. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 3 - that defe nse counse l provided ineff ective a ssistance by

failing to obje ct to this vouching a nd to the prosec ution’s introduction of hear say testimony
. The a

ppellate c ourt reje cted Scha uer’ s claims and aff irmed the c onviction. People v . Schauer , No
. 24 77 21 , 20 04 WL 16 72 45 0 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. July 27, 2004). Schaue r next applied for lea ve to appea l to the Michig an Supreme Court, but the cour t denied relief. People v . Schauer , 697 N.W.2d 156 (Mich. 2005). Schaue r then filed a motion for
rec onsideration, which the court a lso denied.
I n J uly 2006, Schauer

petitioned for ha

beas relief under 28 U .S.C. § 2254. He raised f our claims, including the ineffe ctive assistance and prosec utorial misconduct claims that the state cour t had re jected. T he district cour t gr anted ha

beas r elief, f

inding that (1 ) Schauer

had bee n denied eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel; (2) thoug h Schauer had p ro cedurally

defa ulted his prosecutoria l mis c on du c t c la im, his ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im pr ov ide d a de qu a te c a us e and pr e

jud ic e to p e rm it
c oll a te ra l r e vie w; and

(3 ) the pr os e c uti on ’s c los ingre mark s w e re fl a g ra nt a nd pr e jud ic ia l e no ug h to provide indepe ndent g rounds for ha beas r elief. Schauer v . McKee , 662 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mic h. 20 09 ). F oll ow ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on , th e state mov e d f or a sta y and no w a pp e a ls.
I I . A na ly sis
A. Standard of Re view
We reviewde novo a district c ourt’s g rant of ha beas c orpus. W

olfe v. Brigano , 232 F.3d 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2000). The A ntiterrorism and Effe ctive Death Pena lty Act (A EDPA) allows a fede ralNo. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 4 - court to gra

nt habea s relief if the s tate court’s adjudication of the claim either resulted in a de cision that was contrary to, or i nvolved an unrea sonable application of, clearly established fe dera l law, as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or re sulted in a decision that was ba sed upon
an unre asonable deter

mination of the fac ts in li g ht of th e ev idence prese nted in the state-c ourt p r o c e e d i n g . 2 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 2 5 4 ( d )
. S c h a u e r ’ s p e t i t i o ni n v o l v e s t h e f i r s tc a t e g o r

y.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s unre asonable application prong , “a fede ral habea s court may not issue the writ simply

beca use that cour

t concl u d es in its independent judg ment that the statecourt de cision applied [a Supreme Court ca se] incorrec tly .” W oo df ord v . V isc iot ti , 537 U.S. 19, 24–25 (2002) ( per curiam) (citation omitted). “Rather , it is t he habe as applica nt’s burden to show that the state c ourt applied [that case ] t o the fa cts of his case in an objectively unrea sonable manne r.” Id . at 25. “I f the fe dera l court finds that, viewed obje ctively , the state c ourt has cor rec tly identified the g overningleg al principle f rom the Supreme C o u rt ’s decisions but unrea sonably applied that principle to the fa cts of the pr isoner’s c ase, it may g rant the writ.” Millender v. A dams , 376 F.3d 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Nonethele ss, the statute’s “hig hly defe rential standa

rd

. . . demands that state-c ourt decisions be g iven the benef it of the doubt.” W

oo dfo rd , 537 U.S. at 24 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).
B
. I ne ff

e c tiv e As sis tanc e of

Couns e l Cla im As his first g rounds for h ab ea s re l ief, Scha uer a lleg es that his trial counsel pr ovided ineffe ctive assistanc e by

permitting prosec ution witnesses “to testify extensively

to prior consistentNo. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 5 - hear say statements,” a

nd by “fa iling to object to th e p r o s e c utor ’s hig hly improper vouc hing a

rgument in closing a

rgument.” (A

ppellee’ s Br
. 19.) Unde r Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
a petitioner must de monstrate, considering all of the c ircumstance s, that (1) c ounsel’s per formanc e fell below a

n objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness, id . at 68 7– 88 ; and (2 ) a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity exis ts that, but for counsel’ s conduct, the r esult would have be en diffe rent, id . at 694.
I nas s es s i n g Strickland ’s “objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss” prong , we c onsider whe ther the attorney demonstrated “re asonable ness under preva iling professional norms.” Id . at 688. “The re
are countless way s to provide ef fec tive assistance in any

g iven ca se.” Id
. a t 68 9. A c ou rt “ wi ll ind ulg e a str on g pr e sumpt ion

that coun sel ’s con du c t f a lls wi thi n th e wi de ra

ng e of re a so na ble profe ssional assistance,” O’Hara v . W igginton , 2 4 F. 3 d

8 2 3 , 8 2 8 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Str ickland , 46 6 U.S. a t 689) (i nte rn a l quot a tio n mar ks omi tte d) , an d may no t judg e his pe rf or manc e in h ind sig ht, but “ within the context of the circ umstances at the time of the alleg ed er rors,” McQ ueen v . Scroggy , 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 ( 6th Cir. 1996), overruled on othe r grounds by In re Abdur’Rahm an , 392 F.3d 17 4, 17 8– 82 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . Co un se l’ s r e a so na ble tr ia l decisi on s are pe rm iss ibl e , “ e ve n if
m istaken.” Moss v. Hofbaue r , 286 F.3d 851, 859 ( 6th. Cir. 2002) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a petitioner fa ils to demonstrate that his defe nse counse l’s behavior was objectively unrea sonable, the habe as cour t need not conside r its prejudicial e ffe ct. Strickland , 466 U. S. at 69 7 ( “ [T]he re is n o r e a so n f or a c ourt de c idi ng an in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im .
. . to a dd

re ss both components of the inquiry if the def endant make s an insufficie nt showing on one .”).No. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 6 - Schauer first faults his attorney for allowing the prosec ution to int roduce four instanc es of hear say testimony

into evidence : two from the complainant, in which she re ad stateme nts that she had pre viousl y writ ten; and two fr om office rs who intervie wed the c omplainant, in which they testified as to her

interview state ments. Schauer argues that bec ause this case lacks e y ewitnesses a nd phy sical evide nce, the “def ense c ounsel’s decision not to objec t . . . is both wholl y inexpl icable a

nd utterly inexcusable.” (A

ppellee’ s Br . 23.) The r ecor d does not support this strong a ccusation. As defe nse counse l explained in his opening stateme nt, he intended to “c all ever y witness . . . to show how [complainant’s] st ory ha[d] chang ed.” ( Trial Tr. 153.) Schauer repe atedly

ref ers to the he arsa

y statements as “ consistent,” or “ bolstering ,” but o v er l o o k s how his attorney g leane d numerous inc on sis tenci e s f

ro m th e m and

us e d th e m to un de rm ine the c omp la ina nt’ s c re dib ili ty . D e fe ns e counsel e mphasized these disparities in his closing a rgument with “inconsisten cy char ts.” Other circ uits endorse this trial strateg y as sound. See, e .g. , Bullock v . Carver , 297 F.3d 1036, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 2002) (“ [A] fully informed attorney

could have conclude d t h at admitting the he arsa y statement [to highlight inconsistenc ies] was to [t he defenda nt’s] strateg ic advantag e and, the ref ore, that [defendant’ s] attorney s’ per formanc e wa s not objectively u n re asonable.”). We agree ; “[t] he Constit ution does not gua rante e eve ry

defe ndant a suc cessf

ul defe nse.” Mo ra n v . Tr ipp e tt , 149 F.3d 1 1 8 4 (T ab l e) , 1 9 9 8 W L3 8 2 6 9 8 , at * 3 (6 t hC i r. J u n e 8 , 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690). Although ultimately

unsucce ssful, defe nse counse l’s decision not to object to the hea rsay testimony fell within the wide ra

ng e of r easona

ble assistance permitted under Strickland
.No. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 7 - As alternate g rounds for his inef fec tiv e as sistance c laim, Schauer cites def ense c ounsel’s failure to object t o the prosecution’s improper vouching in closing a rgument. “Improper vouc hing
occur s when a

jury could re asonably

believe that a prosec utor was indicating pe rsonal be l i ef in a witness’ [sic] cre dibilit y ,” Tay l o r v. Un ited States , 985 F.2d 844, 846 ( 6th Cir. 1993), “there by placing the prestige of the [ g overnme nt] behind t he witness,” Un ite d Sta te s v . F ra nc is , 170 F.3d 546, 55 0 ( 6th Cir
. 19 99 ). A p ro se c uti nga tto rn e y may no t of fe r a ny “ imp ro pe r s ug g e sti on s, ins inu a tio ns , and , esp e c ia lly , ass e rt ion s of pe rs on a l know le dg e ,” a s the se “ are a pt to c arr y muc h w e ig ht a g a ins t the acc used when they should pr operly car ry none.” Berger v . United States , 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935);

se e als o Un ite d States v. K e rr , 981 F.2d 1050, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1992) (findingthat the prosec utor may not properly

ask j urors to consider whether four cooperating witnesses wer e “hoodw inking” the g overnme nt).
Schauer challeng es four

sentenc es of the prosecution’s closing argument that asked the jury to consider the c omplainant’s sophistication: Now, ladies a

nd g entlemen, I ’d also like y ou to consider when you’re consideringher cre dibilit y

—ag ain, is this 15-y ear -old g irl so sophisti cate d that she i s able to pull off th is l i e , t h i s c r i m e , t h i s p e r j u r y ? I s s h e s o s o

p h is ti c a te d

th a t s h e wa s a b leto fo ol state troopers and Chil dren’s Protec tive Serv ices’ workers and prosecutors, that she was able t o concoc t a lie so believablethat brought t his case into court? And was she abl e to kee

p it consistent withi n reason ove r the period of the last year in order to pull the wool

over e very body’s e

yes? I s she that so

p h i s t i cated ladies and gentleme n? No. (Tria l Tr. 575–76) (e mphasis added)
.No. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 8 - Ev e n if we a ssume that th e pr os e c uti on ’s re mark s w e re imp ro pe r, the pe rt ine nt q ue sti on is wh e the r c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to o bject was bo th o bje c tiv e ly unre a so na

ble and pr e jud ic ia l. Wh ile Sc h a u e r c la im s th a t “ d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l’ s f

a il u r e to o b

je c t
. . . w a s c o n s ti tuti o n a lly defic ient pe rf or manc e ,” (A

pp e lle e ’s B r. 28 ), the state po sit s that thi s too wa s str a te g y be caus e “def e ns e counsel may

not have wa

nted to dr aw attention to the prosec utor’s re marks,” ( Appellant’s B r. 50). “[N]ot draw ing a

ttention to [a] stateme nt ma y be per fec tly

sound from a ta ctical standpoint.” United States v. Caver , 470 F.3d 220, 244 ( 6th Cir. 2006). To brea ch t h e u n reasonablene ss threshold, “def ense c ounsel must so consistently fail to use objec tions, despite numerous and c lear rea sons for d o i n g s o , t h at co u n s el ’s fa i l u re ca n n o tre as o n ab l y h av e b ee n s ai d t o h av e b ee n p ar t o f a t ri al s t ra t egy or tac tical choice .” Lun dg re n v . M itc he ll , 440 F.3d 754, 774–75 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Conversely , “any single failure to object [to closing arguments] usually cannot be said to ha ve been err or.” Id . at 774; see also Smith v. Bradshaw , 591 F.3d 517, 522 (6th Cir. 2010) (findingthat defe nse counse l’s failure to o bje c t to on e ins tanc e of a lle g e d p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t w a s n ot d e fi cie nt). To g e the r, the se prec epts sug g est that Schauer ’s def ense c ounsel’s fa ilure to object to this aspec t of the prose cution’s closing argument fa l ls within t he broa d rang e of r easona ble trial conduc t under Strickland
. We there fore deny

Schauer ’s ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel claim.
C. Pr os e c uto ri a l Mi sc on du c t Cla im
Schauer also cites prose cutorial m i s co nduct (stemming from the pr osecution’s c losing statements) a s independe nt g rounds for ha beas r elief. A s the state appe llate cour t corre ctly decide d,No. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 9 - howeve r, Schaue r proc edura lly defa ulted the claim due to his fa ilure to object at trial.
F or a ha be a s p e tit ion e r t o d e fa

ult a c lai m pr oc e dura lly , h e mus t ha ve vio late d a

state pr oc e dura l r

ule , a nd “ the la st s tate c ourt

re nd e ri nga

jud gment in

the c a se mus t ha

ve ba se d it s judgme nt on the proce dural de fault.” Simpson v. Jone s , 23 8 F .3 d 39 9, 40 6 (6 th Cir
. 20 00 ). “ A s tate pr iso ne r who [pr oc e dura lly de fa ult s a cla im] w a ive s th e ri g ht t o f e de ra l ha be a s r e vie w [o f t

hat c la im] unless the prisoner can demonstrate c ause f or noncomplianc e and a ctual pre judice ar ising fr om the alleg ed constitutional violation, or a showing of a fundame ntal miscarr iag e of justice.” Id . (citation omitted).
I n a dd re ssi ngSc ha

ue r’ s c la im, the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls lim ite d its ana ly sis to p la in
err or re view bec ause of a contemporane ous-objection rule. Schauer , 2 00 4 WL 16 72 45 0, a t *2 ; see People v . Sharbnow , 1 7 4 Mich. App. 94, 100 (1989) (“The absenc e of a n objection duringtrial prec ludes appe llate review of alleg ed pre judicial prosec utorial rema rks unless the pre

judicial eff

ect was so g reat that it could not have bee n cure d by a cautionar y instruction and fa ilure to consider the iss ue wo uld

re su lt i n a

mis c arr ia g e of

jus tic e .” ). Pr oc e dura l de fa ult the re fo re ba

rs our re vie w unle ss Schauer demonstrates c ause a

nd actua l prejudice , or a f undamental misca

rriag e of justice.
Schauer offe rs the inef

fec tive assistance of his trial counsel t o o v er come this proce dural de fa ult . ( Ap pe lle e ’s B r. 32 .) I ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c an pr ov ide the ne c e ssa ry c a us e to
excuse proce dural de fault. Hofbauer , 228 F.3d at 698. As we have alr eady discussed thoug h,No. 09-2360

Schauer v . McKee

- 10 - de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s a c tiv iti e s d o not co ns tit ute ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e ; Scha ue r’ s atte mpt

to s ho w c a

us e and ac tual prejudice there fore fails. And S chaue r, recog nizi ngthe miscarr iag e of justice e x ception’s
na rr ow ne ss, do e s n ot r a ise thi s argume nt. B e c a us e Sc ha ue r’ s p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t c la im f a lls outside of these two e x ceptions, proc edura l defa ult forec loses this court’s collater al re view.
I I I . Conclusion
Acc ording ly , we r ever se the district cour t’s g rant of ha

beas r elief.