III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 61

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the President currently has authority

under the Constitution to veto individual items of appropriation and

that the President should exercise that authority without awaiting the

enactment of additional authorization.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 17 (legislative day, JANUARY 10), 1995

Mr. SPECTER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the President currently has authority under the Constitution to veto individual items of appropriation and that the President

should exercise that authority without awaiting the enactment of additional authorization.

Whereas article I, section 7, clause 2 of the Constitution authorizes the President to veto bills passed by both Houses

of Congress;

Whereas article I, section 7, clause 3 of the Constitution authorizes the President to veto every ‘‘Order, Resolution,

or Vote’’ passed by both Houses of Congress;

Whereas during the Constitutional Convention, Roger Sherman of Connecticut opined that article I, section 7,
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clause 3 was ‘‘unnecessary, except as to votes taking

money out of the Treasury’’;

Whereas the language of article I, section 7, clause 3 was

taken directly from the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of 1780;

Whereas the provision of the Massachusetts Constitution of

1780 that was included as article I, section 7, clause 3

of the United States Constitution vested in the Governor

of Massachusetts the authority to veto individual items of

appropriation contained in omnibus appropriations bills

passed by the Massachusetts Legislature;

Whereas the Governor of Massachusetts had enjoyed the authority to veto individual items of appropriation passed

by the legislature since 1733;

Whereas in explaining the purpose of the constitutional veto

power, Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No.

69 that it ‘‘tallies exactly with the revisionary authority

of the council of revision’’ in the State of New York,

which had the authority to revise or strike out individual

items of appropriation contained in spending bills;

Whereas shortly after the new Federal Constitution was

adopted, the States of Georgia, Pennsylvania, Vermont,

and Kentucky adopted new Constitutions which included

the language of article I, section 7 of the Federal Constitution, and allowed their Governors to veto individual

items of appropriation on the basis of these provisions;

Whereas the contemporary practice in the States is probative

as to the understanding of the framers of the Constitution as to the meaning of article I, section 7, clause 3;

Whereas President Washington, on a matter of presidential

authority, exercised the prerogative to shift appropriated
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funds from one account to another, effectuating a lineitem veto;

Whereas President Jefferson considered appropriations bills

to be permissive and refused on at least two occasions to

spend funds appropriated by the Congress: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

2 (1) the Constitution grants to the President the

3 authority to veto individual items of appropriation;

4 and

5 (2) the President should exercise that constitu6 tional authority to veto individual items of appro7 priation without awaiting the enactment of addi8 tional authorization.

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