#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fredrick Lynn CAIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-11601

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 10, 2017

Brian W. McKay, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JONES, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Fredrick Cain appeals his sentence in regard to the treatment of his conviction *368under Tex, Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a) as a “serious drug offense” for purposes of an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Finding his argument foreclosed by circuit precedent, we affirm.

I.

Cain pleaded guilty of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction (Count I) and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (Count II). The presentence report (“PSR”) identified three1 Texas drug convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a), triggering enhancements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The district court overruled Cain’s objection and sentenced him, within the enhanced range, to 192 months for Count I with a concurrent 36 months for Count II.

II.

The district court did not err in ruling that Cain’s convictions were serious drug offenses. A conviction under Section 481.112(a) qualifies for the ACCA enhancement under § 924(e).2 Cain acknowledges that binding circuit precedent forecloses his position but contends that *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and *Torres v. Lynch,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016), undermine that precedent. We disagree.

*Johnson*addressed the residual clause under the violent-felonies portion of the ACCA, which *Winbush*and *Vickers*distinguished from the serious-drug-offense portion. *Torres’s*discussion of how to define “described” in the Immigration and Nationality Act does not undermine *Win-bush’s*and Vickers’s discussions of the word “involving” in the ACCA. Those decisions based the interpretation of § 924(e) on an analysis of *Taylor v. United States,*495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and the statutory context of the ACCA.3

Because no Supreme Court decisions “expressly or implicitly”4 overrule *Win-bush*or *Vickers,*we AFFIRM.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *368published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. The PSR listed four convictions as qualifying under the ACCA, but the government conceded at sentencing that the fourth did not support an, ACCA sentence.

2

. *See United States v. Vickers,*540 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Winbush,*407 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2005).

3

. *See Vickers,*540 F.3d at 365; *Winbush,*407 F.3d at 707-08 (citing *United States v. King,*325 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003)).

4

. *United States v. Tanksley,*848 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).