J-S20009-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

v. 

JERRY PRATT 

 Appellant No. 639 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order March 18, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0003073-2013 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MAY 05, 2016 

 Appellant, Jerry Pratt, appeals from his judgment of sentence entered 

by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, following his 

convictions for theft by deception and access device fraud. In this appeal, we 

consider whether the Commonwealth violated Pratt’s Rule 600 rights. We 

affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

as follows. 

[A] criminal complaint was filed against the Defendant on May 

15, 2013. A preliminary hearing was scheduled before the 

Magisterial District Justice, James Ellis, for June 4, 2013. That 

hearing was continued by the Commonwealth. The next hearing 

date was to be on September 10, 2013[,] but, according to the 

electronic docket, it was continued at the Defendant’s request. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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The next hearing was scheduled for November 19, 2013, which 

was also continued at the Defendant’s request according to the 

electronic docket. The record also contains a letter signed by the 

Defendant requesting a continuance of the November 19, 2013 

hearing. Therefore, it was rescheduled to December 17, 2013. 

On December 17, 2013, the Defendant had his preliminary 

hearing before Magisterial District Justice, James Ellis. The 

Defendant appeared by video from the Allegheny County Jail 

(ACJ) and decided to waive his case to court. 

When the Defendant decided to waive his case to court, he had 

been incarcerated at the ACJ since July 17, 2013. Allegheny 

County authorities had charged him with identity theft and theft 

of services for crimes committed in that County. A non-jury trial 

was scheduled for January 15, 2014 on the Allegheny County 

charges, but the Defendant pled guilty. A sentencing hearing 

took place before Judge Edward Borkowski on January 23, 2014, 

at which time he was sentenced. The sentence was for nine to 

eighteen months, plus an additional two years of probation. The 

Defendant was given 191 days of credit toward his minimum 

sentence of nine months. 

After the Defendant’s sentencing by Judge Borkowski, he was 

transported to a federal prison named FCI Cumberland, which is 

in Ohio. This was due to federal probation violations. There was, 

however, no record from the Commonwealth or the Federal 

government about the date the Defendant was released to FCI 

Cumberland. The Defendant testified that he was released from 

the ACJ to Cumberland on February 26, 2014. That being said, 

the Court will use February 26, 2014 as the date the Defendant 

was transferred to FCI Cumberland. 

Chief Detective James McElhaney (detective) testified that he 

learned from Assistant District Attorney, Jerome Moschetta, on 

July 30, 2014 that the Defendant was at a federal corrections 

institution in Cumberland. The detective testified that Denise 

Buterbaugh of FCI Cumberland responded to his inquiry on 

August 1, 2014, and informed him that the Defendant was 

housed at said facility but was scheduled to be released from 

their custody to ACJ on September 26, 2014. To ensure the 

Defendant’s appearance in Washington County, a detainer was 

lodged against the Defendant and a copy was faxed to FCI 

Cumberland. Nevertheless, the FCI Cumberland officials 

informed the detective that the Defendant would not be released 
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to anyone but Allegheny County; obviously, the Defendant’s 

minimum sentence of nine months was not yet completed on the 

identify theft and theft of services charges. 

The detective contacted the ACJ on September 29, 2014 about 

the Defendant being in their custody. Their response was that he 

was not in their custody. He called the ACJ on September 30 as 

well, but was again told he was not in their care. Further, the 

detective testified that the Allegheny County District Attorney’s 

office informed him that they had until October 10, 2014 to 

secure the Defendant FCI Cumberland [sic] and that it would be 

a “long time before Washington County” got the Defendant” due 

to him needing to deal with Allegheny County charges. The 

detective’s next communication with the ACJ was on November 

25, 2014, at which time they verified the Defendant was in their 

care. Consequently, the Court arranged a video hearing with the 

ACJ for December 16, 2014 to determine how the Defendant 

wanted to proceed on the charges. 

The Defendant appeared on that date before this Court. It was 

learned that the Defendant had attempted to contact the 

Washington County Public Defenders’ Office but was 

unsuccessful. Therefore, the Defendant did not want to proceed 

and the Court issued an order directing that office [sic] contact 

the Defendant and scheduled a pre-trial conference for January 

30, 2015. At that hearing, the Defendant requested a 

continuance due to on-going plea negotiations. The Court 

rescheduled the matter for a pre-trial conference on March 6, 

2015. However, the Defendant then filed a Rule 600 motion on 

February 6, 2015. 

Order, 3/18/15, at 1-3. 

 The trial court denied Pratt’s Rule 600 motion after holding a pre-trial 

hearing. Thereafter, a non-jury trial was held, and Pratt was convicted of 

theft by deception and access device fraud. The trial court subsequently 

imposed a sentence of 1 year less 1 day to 2 years less 2 days’ 
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imprisonment for theft by deception, plus 3 years of concurrent probation for 

access device fraud.1 This timely appeal followed. 

 On appeal, Pratt contends that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 

600 motion, thus violating his right to a speedy trial. Specifically, Pratt 

argues that the mechanical run date for Rule 600 was exceeded, and that 

the Commonwealth did not establish that it had exercised due diligence in 

bringing the case to trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-16. 

Rule 600 requires the Commonwealth to bring a defendant to trial 

within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600(A)(2)(a).2 Our scope and standard of review on this issue are as follows. 

Our standard of review relating to the application of Rule 600 is 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review 

is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 

evidentiary hearing and the findings of the trial court. We must 

view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 

Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted). 

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court 

is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. 

Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Pratt was also ordered to pay restitution. 

2

 The parties in this case analyzed the speedy trial rule under this section, so 

we will do the same. 
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to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those 

contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

[600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from 

good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc) (citation omitted; brackets in original). 

“[T]o obtain relief, a defendant must have a valid Rule 600 claim at 

the time he files his motion to dismiss the charges.” Commonwealth v. 

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2005). The first step in 

conducting a Rule 600 analysis is to calculate the “mechanical run date.” 

Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The 

mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must commence under 

Rule 600. It is calculated by adding 365 days ... to the date on which the 

criminal complaint is filed.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the Commonwealth 

attempts to bring a defendant to trial beyond the 365 day-period prescribed 

by Rule 600, and the defendant filed a Rule 600 motion to dismiss, the court 

must assess whether there is excludable time and/or excusable delay.” 

Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1241. The court must exclude from the time for 

commencement of trial any periods during which the defendant was 

unavailable, including any continuances requested by the defendant. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C); Rule 600, Comment. The amount of excludable time is 

added to the mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date. See 

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1103 (Pa. 2007). 
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Mere incarceration in another state does not automatically make a 

defendant unavailable within the meaning of Rule 600. See 

Commonwealth v. Kubin, 637 A.2d 1025, 1026 (Pa. Super. 1994). “A 

defendant is only unavailable if the delay in returning him to Pennsylvania is 

due to the other state causing the delay; the prosecution, however, must 

exercise due diligence in attempting to bring the defendant back for trial.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

Even where a violation of Rule 600 has occurred, we must apply a due 

diligence analysis to assess whether the delay was excusable. See Ramos, 

936 A.2d at 1103. ‘“Excusable delay’ is not expressly defined in Rule 600, 

but the legal construct takes into account delays which occur as a result of 

circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due 

diligence.” Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1241 (citation omitted). Due diligence must be 

determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. “Due diligence does not require 

perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the 

Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Id., at 1241-

1242 (citation omitted). A period of delay that is excusable results in an 

extension to the adjusted run date. See Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1103. 

Extensions added to the adjusted run date produce the final Rule 600 run 

date. See id. The trial court must dismiss the charges if the Commonwealth 

does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the final run date. See id. 

In the instant case, the Commonwealth filed its complaint on May 15, 

2013. Thus, the mechanical run date was May 15, 2014. Pratt had not been 
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brought to trial when he filed his motion to dismiss on February 6, 2015. On 

September 10, 2013, Pratt requested that his preliminary hearing be 

continued. On October 15, 2013, the Commonwealth requested a 

continuance. Pratt requested another continuance on November 19, 2013. 

The preliminary hearing was held on December 17, 2013. The 35-day period 

between September 10, 2013 and October 15, 2013 is excludable pursuant 

to Rule 600(C), as is the 28-day period between November 19, 2013 and 

December 17, 2013. Addition of 63 days of excludable time results in an 

adjusted run date of July 17, 2014. 

According to the record, the Commonwealth was not aware of Pratt’s 

incarceration at FCI Cumberland until July 30, 2014. This Court has 

previously held that a defendant is “unavailable” within the meaning of Rule 

600 when he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction and the Commonwealth 

is unaware of his whereabouts. Commonwealth v. Haynes, 488 A.2d 602, 

605 (Pa. Super. 1985).3 Thus, the 154-day period between February 26, 

2014 and July 30, 2014 is excludable under Rule 600(C). Addition of 154 

days of excludable time results in an adjusted run date of December 18, 

2014. 

Once Detective McElhaney became aware of Pratt’s incarceration at 

FCI Cumberland, he contacted the officials at FCI Cumberland and expressed 

____________________________________________ 

3 Haynes was decided when Rule 600 was known as Rule 1100. 

Nevertheless, the analysis remains the same. 
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the desire to extradite Pratt. Detective McElhaney was told that Pratt would 

not be available for extradition until after he completed his sentence at FCI 

Cumberland. He was also told that Pratt would not be released to any 

authority other than ACJ. Nevertheless, Detective McElhaney filed a detainer 

on August 12, 2014. After reviewing the efforts of Detective McElhaney, the 

trial court found that the time from when the Commonwealth discovered 

Pratt’s whereabouts, July 30, 2014, to when Pratt was delivered to ACJ, 

October 10, 2014, was excludable. See Rule 600, Comment (“[T]he 

defendant should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during which 

the defendant contested extradition, or a responding jurisdiction delayed or 

refused to grant extradition.”) (emphasis added). We see no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s decision. See Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 

A.2d 401, 407 (Pa. Super. 2004). Addition of 72 days of excludable time 

results in an adjusted run date of February 28, 2015. Since Pratt filed his 

Rule 600 motion on February 6, 2015, the trial court properly denied his 

Rule 600 motion.4

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Because it is clear that Pratt filed his Rule 600 motion before the extended 

run date, we need not analyze the entire record to determine whether the 

final run date is February 28, 2015 or some later date. See Hyland, 875 

A.2d at 1189. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/5/2016