COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

LEONARD SIMMS WOODEN 

v. Record No. 2173-93-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 2, 1995 

 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 

 Darrell M. Allen for appellant. 

 Donald R. Curry, Senior Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Leonard Simms Wooden (appellant) was convicted in a jury 

trial of rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61. On appeal, he 

argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to allow 

evidence of the post-incident relationship between appellant and 

the victim; (2) failing to allow evidence of a Maryland acquittal 

verdict in a similar case involving appellant and the victim; and 

(3) denying appellant's counsel's request for reimbursement of 

defense expenses. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

trial court. 

 Appellant and the victim had a sexual relationship that 

began in the summer of 1991 and continued until October 24, 1992, 

when the victim stopped seeing appellant. On the evening of 

November 4, 1992, appellant met the victim as she drove to her 

home. He entered the driver's side of her car and drove to a 
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logging trail on Bull Run Mountain in Prince William County. 

The victim testified that he forced her to have sexual 

intercourse and perform oral sex on him. Appellant then drove to 

Reston, where he left the car. The victim immediately reported 

the rape to the Fairfax County Police Department. In a separate 

incident, appellant was tried by a jury on similar charges in 

Talbot County, Maryland, and was acquitted prior to the Virginia 

trial. 

 Before trial, appellant submitted a motion in limine to 

allow evidence of: (1) the prior sexual relationship of the 

parties, and (2) the Maryland trial and verdict. The court held 

that the prior sexual conduct of the parties was admissible 

pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.7(A)(2). Appellant moved to introduce 

the Maryland trial and verdict to show that the victim had a 

pattern of making false accusations against appellant. The judge 

denied this part of the motion and noted that "a not guilty or an 

acquittal may have been the result of a failure for witnesses to 

appear or failure of evidence--for a whole lot of reasons other 

than the fact that it was just a false statement." Appellant 

objected to the court's ruling. At trial, appellant did not 

attempt to introduce evidence of the post-incident relationship 

of the parties, including the Maryland incident. 

 The court also denied appellant's pre-trial request for 

funds to employ an investigator. After trial, the court found it 

had no authority to grant appellant's ex parte motion for witness 
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fees and expenses for Detective David Sears, a Maryland police 

officer who testified as a fact witness concerning the condition 

of the victim's car. 

EVIDENCE OF THE POST-INCIDENT RELATIONSHIP

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

allow evidence of his post-incident relationship with the victim. 

 Code § 18.2-67.7 provides as follows: 

 general reputation or opinion evidence of the 

complaining witness's unchaste character or 

prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted. 

Unless the complaining witness voluntarily 

agrees otherwise, evidence of specific 

instances of his or her prior sexual conduct 

shall be admitted only if it is relevant and 

is: 

 2. Evidence of sexual conduct between 

the complaining witness and the accused 

offered to support a contention that the 

alleged offense was not accomplished by 

force, threat or intimidation or through the 

use of the complaining witness's mental 

incapacity or physical helplessness, provided 

that the sexual conduct occurred within a 

period of time reasonably proximate to the 

offense charged under the circumstances of 

this case . . . . 

"Prior sexual conduct" of a complaining witness includes "any 

sexual conduct on the part of the complaining witness which took 

place before the conclusion of the trial, excluding the conduct 

involved in the offense alleged." Code § 18.2-67.10(5). See 

also Currie v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 204, 207, 391 S.E.2d 79, 

81 (1990). 

 At the motion hearing, the judge ruled that evidence of 

"prior sexual conduct" between appellant and the victim would be 
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admissible at trial. Under Code § 18.2-67.10(5), "prior sexual 

conduct" includes the Maryland incident because it occurred 

before the conclusion of the Virginia trial and was reasonably 

proximate to the November 4, 1992 incident. The trial court's 

ruling allowed evidence of the parties' ongoing relationship, 

but, as a matter of trial strategy, appellant chose not to pursue 

it. This does not constitute trial error. 

EVIDENCE OF THE ACQUITTAL VERDICT

 Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to allow appellant to introduce the Maryland verdict of 

acquittal into evidence. We hold that the trial court properly 

excluded the Maryland trial results. 

 "'The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" Crews v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118, 442 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1994) 

(quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 

838, 842 (1988)). "'[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to 

establish the proposition for which it is offered.' Evidence is 

material if it relates to a matter properly at issue." 

Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 

441 (1987) (citation omitted). 

 The court's exclusion of the Maryland trial and acquittal 

verdict was not an abuse of discretion. The blanket acquittal in 

the Maryland trial failed to prove that the victim "lied" or made 
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a "false accusation." Rather, a general verdict of acquittal can 

be read only for the proposition that the prosecution failed to 

prove each of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The Maryland verdict is not relevant to whether appellant 

committed rape on November 4, 1992. 

 REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES

 Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for reimbursement of expenses associated with 

an investigator and an out-of-state, non-expert witness. 

 Code § 19.2-163 provides that "[t]he circuit or district 

court shall direct the payment of such reasonable expenses 

incurred by such court-appointed attorney as it deems appropriate

under the circumstances of the case." (Emphasis added). See

Singleton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 841, 842, 433 S.E.2d 507, 

508 (1993). Under the circumstances of this case, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to award appellant his 

requested expenses for an investigator or the $400 appearance fee 

for the Maryland detective. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.