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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KEVIN LOGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED April 20, 2017

v No. 330393
Oakland Circuit Court
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD, LC No. 2015-147927-AW

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: S AWYER , P.J., and S AAD and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
Plaintiff, Kevin Logan, appeals as of right the trial court or der denying his motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor o f defendant, Charter Township
of West Bloomfield. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of disagreements related to the approval and inspection of various renovation projects at plaintiff’s home in West Bloomfield Town ship, Michigan. When plaintiff acquired the foreclosed propert y, it had been registered with d efendant as a vacant property since June 2014 and was subj ect to a “Vacant Prop erty Compliance Requ est” because prio r inspections
revealed code and ordinance viol ations, including the presence of mold, in the house.

After plaintiff purchased it, t he property was reinspected. T he inspection revealed, among other things, the presence of mold in the home as well as other code and ordinance violations. Subsequently, plaint iff and his contractors applie d for various building permits, some of which were granted and some of which were denied for various reasons. After some renovations on the property, plain tiff insisted that defendant inspect his property again. Defendant refused, citing a lack of evidence that plaintiff had alleviated the mold inside the
home. Defendant also stated tha t plaintiff had to do certain t hings to address the mold, which plaintiff refused to do.

In July 2015, plaintiff filed a one-count complaint, which sou ght a writ of mandamus or a similar order compelling defendant (1) to inspect the work comp leted pursuant to the issued permits, (2) lift any order stopping work because of the allege d mold violation, (3) and issue an-2- occupancy certificate after completing a final inspection of th e work. Defendant denied that plaintiff was entitled to the rel ief sought and asked the trial court to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.

In September 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for summary disposi tion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). He argued that the only issues in dispute were t hree issues of law: (1) whether the township possessed the “authority to demand mold[-]related perm its, inspections, and remediation”; (2) whether the township could “lawfully refuse t o perform inspections at the [property] in contravention of MCL 125.1512(1) [under the Singl e State Construction Code Act (‘SSCCA’), MCL 125.1501 et seq .] until[] such time as mold permits, inspections, and remediation are performed[sic]”; and (3) whether plaintiff was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the township to perf orm the inspections as required by statute. Plaintiff maintained that there was no genuine issue of material fact; summary dispo sition in his favor was appropriate; and, accordingly, the trial court should order def endant to perform the statutorily required inspections, stop its unlawful demand for mold remedia tion, and issue an occupancy certificate after completing a f inal inspection of the work. 1

In response, defendant argued that it was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and MCR 2.116(I)(2). It asserted that plaintiff h ad failed to obtain all of the necessary permits for the work that he wished to have inspected , and that additional inspections had not been performed because plaintiff had failed to show tha t several code violations were fixed and ready for inspection. It further argued that plainti ff was not entitled to a writ of mandamus for several reasons. Most significant to the trial co urt’s decision and the instant appeal, defendant asserted that plaintiff had a right to appeal its decision to the construction board of appeals under MCL 125.1514(1), such that plaintiff was unable to establish all of the necessary elements for a writ of mandamus. Therefore, defendan t argued that the trial court should deny plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition and, ins tead, grant summary disposition
in its favor. Plaintiff countered defendant’s claims in his re ply and continued to maintain that the work at the property was ready for inspection. 2

After holding a hearing, the tr ial court denied plaintiff’s mo tion for summary disposition and granted summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). The trial court concluded that plaintiff had failed to meet the requireme nts for a writ of mandamus. Specifically, the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show that there was no other available remedy, as he did, in f act, have a legal remedy under MCL 125.1514. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s entire complaint with prejudi ce. Plaintiff later filed a motion to

1 Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to conduct an air quali ty inspection of the property, which plaintiff opposed. After holding a hearing, the trial co urt granted the motion and ordered the testing to be performe d at defendant’s expense.

2 Defendant later filed an amended response and counter-motion f or summary disposition, which incorporated its previous arguments and argued that the case wa s now moot in light of inspections that were performed while the case was pending. Pl aintiff filed a re ply that contested defendant’s mootness argument.-3- correct the judgment, arguing that the trial court erroneously dismissed his claims with prejudice,
which the trial court denied.

Plaintiff filed a claim of appeal with this Court in November 2015. During oral argument, the parties agreed that plaintiff filed an appeal wit h the construction board of appeals after he filed the appeal in this Court. Plaintiff lost his ap peal before the construction board of appeals.

II. WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Plaintiff argues that he established the requirements for a wr it of mandamus and that the trial court improperly granted s ummary disposition in favor of defendant on that issue. We agree
with defendant that this issue is now moot. In People v Richmond , 486 Mich 29, 34-35; 782 NW2d 187 (2010), reh granted in part 486 Mich 1041 (2010), amen ded by 784 NW2d 204 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Cour t provided an overview of the mootness doctrine: 3

It is well established that a court will not decide moot issue s. This is because it is the “principal duty of this Court . . . to decide actual cases and
controversies.” Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing , 467 Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), citing Anway v Grand Rapids R Co , 211 Mich 592, 610; 179 NW 350 (1920). That is, “ ‘[t]he judicial power . . . is t he right to determine
actual controversies arising between advers e litigants, duly in stituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.’ ” Anway , 211 Mich at 616 (citation omitted). As a result, “this Court does not reach moot questions or declare principles or rules of law that have no practical legal e ffect in the case before” it. Federated Publications

, 467 Mich at 112. Although an issue is moot, however, it is nev ertheless justiciable if “the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review.” Id . It is “ ‘universally understood . . . that a moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, w hen in reality there is none, . . . or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal ef fect upon a then existing controversy.’ ” Anway , 211 Mich at 610, quoting Ex parte Steele , 162 F 694, 701 (ND Ala, 1908). Accordingly, a case is moot when it presents “nothing but abstract questions of law which do not rest upon existing facts or rights.” Gildemeister v Lindsay , 212 Mich 299, 302; 180 NW 633 (1920).

In general, because reviewing a moot question would be a “ ‘pu rposeless proceeding,’ ” Stern v Stern , 327 Mich 531, 534; 42 NW2d 737 (1950) (citation omitted), appellate courts will sua sponte refuse to hear cases that they do not have the power to decide, in cluding cases that are moot, In re MCI Telecom Complaint , 460 Mich 396, 434 n 13; 596 NW2d 164 (1999), citing Ideal Furnace Co v Int’l Molders Union of North America , 204 Mich 311; 169 NW 946 (1918). 2

3 Although Richmond is a criminal case, the Court’s reliance on civil caselaw for each proposition demonstrates that th is overview is equally applicab le in civil cases.-4- Whether a case is moot is a threshold issue that a court addres ses before it reaches
the substantive issues of the case itself. In re MCI , 460 Mich at 435 n 13. [Emphasis added.]

2 Indeed, because a court should, o n its own motion, recognize a nd reject claims that it does not have the power to decide, defendant’s failure to raise the mootness argument at the Court of Appeals is irrelevant to this Court’s analysis. See In re

MCI , 460 Mich at 434-435 n 13.

See also AFT Michigan v State of Michigan , 315 Mich App 602, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016) (Docket Nos. 303702, 303704, 303706); slip op at 6-7.

If we were to issue a decision determining whether the trial co urt erred in dismissing plaintiff’s request for a writ of mandamus based on the fact th at plaintiff had failed to pursue his administrative remedies with the construction board of appeals at that time, that decision would constitute “a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, f or any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a t hen existing controversy.” Richmond , 486 Mich at 34-35 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff now has performed the t ask that served as the basis of the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, resulting in a separa te factual and procedural record outside of our consideration on appeal. See Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc , 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002) (“This Court’s review is limited to the record established by the trial court, and a party may not expa nd the record on appeal.”).

Thus, we hold that this issue is moot, and we are unable to gra nt plaintiff’s requested
relief. 4

III. DISMISSAL OF ADDITIONAL CLAIMS

Next, plaintiff argues that his complaint sought more than jus t a writ of mandamus, and that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint without considering those claims. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

4 Even if we were to agree with plaintiff that this issue is not moot, we would conclude that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was proper. At a mi nimum, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff failed to establish the fourth element req uired to obtain a writ of mandamus,

see Rental Properties Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer , 308 Mich App 498, 518; 866 NW2d 817 (2014), given his ability to appeal defendant’s “d ecisions” related to the SSCCA to the construction board of appeals in accordance with MCL 125 .1514(1). Notably, plaintiff’s ability to pursue such an appeal i s confirmed by the fact that plaintiff actually did so following the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint. See also general ly Cummins v Robinson Twp , 283 Mich App 677, 699; 770 NW2d 421 ( 2009) (discussing a plaintiff’ s opportunity to appeal an
adverse decision to the cons truction board of appeals).-5- “Decisions involving the meaning and scope of pleadings are r eviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Taxpayers of Mich Against Casinos v Michigan , 478 Mich 99, 105; 732 NW2d 487 (2007). “There are circumstances where a trial court must deci de a matter and there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there may be more than one reas onable and principled outcome.
The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls o utside this range of principled
outcomes.” Kincaid v Flint , 311 Mich App 76, 94; 874 NW2d 193 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

“Michigan is a notice-pleading state.” Johnson v QFD, Inc , 292 Mich App 359, 368; 807 NW2d 719 (2011). “Each allegati on of a pleading must be cl ear, concise, and direct.” MCR 2.111(A)(1). See also MCR 2.110(A) (indicating that a complain t constitutes a “pleading”). Pursuant to MCR 2.111(B)(1), a c omplaint must include “[a] stat ement of the facts, without repetition, on which the pleader relies in stating the cause of action, with the specific allegations necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called on to defend[.]” See also Dalley v Dykema Gossett , 287 Mich App 296, 305; 788 NW2d 679 (2010) (“[T]he primary function of a pleading in Michigan i s to give notice of the nature of the claim or defense sufficient to permit the opposite party to take a respons ive position.”) (alteration in original). “[W ]e will look beyond mere procedur al labels and read the complaint as a whole when ascertaining the exact nature of a plaintiff’s cla ims.” Johnson , 292 Mich App at 368. Here, even if we assume that plaintiff’s complaint reason ably informed defendant that it was being called on to defend agai nst claims for declaratory an d injunctive relief, summary disposition was proper. 5

“The existence of an ‘actual controversy’ is a condition prece dent to the invocation of declaratory relief.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lans ing Bd of Ed (On Remand) , 293 Mich App 506, 515; 810 NW2d 95 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MCR 2.605(A)(1). Without “an actual controversy, the trial court lacks subject-m atter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.” Id . (quotation marks and citation omitt ed). “An actual controver sy exists when declaratory relief is needed to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve the plaintiff’s legal rights.” Id . Contrary to plaintiff’s claim on appeal, we have held that t here is no actual controversy when a plaintiff has other means to preserve his or her legal rights. See Genesis Ctr, PLC v Fin & Ins Services Comm’r , 246 Mich App 531, 545, 546 n 10; 633 NW2d

5 Plaintiff is correct that the trial court’s order does not sta te that it granted summary disposition in favor of defendant with regard to these specific claims. Ho wever, it does expressly state that “[d]efendant’s request to dismi ss the [c]omplaint in its entire ty and with prejudice is GRANTED.” Regardless, we review a trial court’s grant of summa ry disposition de novo,
Harbor Watch Condo Ass’n , 308 Mich App at 383, a nd “[a] trial court’s ruling may be uph eld on appeal where the right result i ssued, albeit for the wrong reas on,” Gleason v Michigan Dep’t of Transp , 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003).-6- 834 (2001). 6 Similar to the plaintiffs in Genesis Ctr, plaintiff failed to establish an actual controversy in this case. Because he had the option of pursuin g an appeal with the construction board of appeals when he filed his complaint, he failed to esta blish that declaratory relief was necessary to preserve his legal rights. See id . See also 3 Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (6th ed), § 2605.3 (“[I]t has been held that there is no actual controversy if an administrative action is available that provides plaintiffs wit h the ability to preserve their legal rights.”) (quotation marks omitted), citing Genesis Ctr, PLC , 246 Mich App 531.

For similar reasons, plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief a lso fails. “Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that issues only when justice requires, there is no adequate remedy at law, and there is a real and immi nent danger of irreparable inj ury.” Janet Travis, Inc v Preka Holdings, LLC , 306 Mich App 266, 274; 856 NW2d 206 (2014). Again, at the ti me when he filed his complaint in the trial court, plaintiff had the optio n of filing an appeal with the construction board of appeals, through which he could have chal lenged any of defendant’s
decisions that were related to the SSCCA. Thus, plaintiff failed to establish that he did not have an adequate remedy at law. See Cummins , 283 Mich App at 699 (explaining the subsequent appeals available following an a dverse decision related to the SSCCA); see also generally
Schantz v Ruehs , 348 Mich 680, 683; 83 NW2d 587 (1957) (“It is the general rul e that where there is an adequate and complete remedy at law, a court of equ ity will not take jurisdiction.”). Further, plaintiff failed to sta te any allegations in his compl aint, and he similarl y fails to argue on appeal, that there was “a real and imminent danger of irreparab le injury.” Janet Travis, Inc , 306 Mich App at 274; see also Sch Dist of Royal Oak v Mich State Tenure Comm , 367 Mich 689, 693; 117 NW2d 181 (1962) (“Equity should not be used to obtain injunctive relief where there is no proof that complainant would suffer irreparable injury.”).

Thus, the trial court properl y granted summary disposition on a ll of plaintiff’s claims.

IV. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismiss ing his claims with prejudice and by failing to grant leave to amend the complaint. We disag ree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discret ion a trial cour t’s decision o n a motion for leave to amend a complaint. Kincaid , 311 Mich App at 94. Whether summary disposition should be

6 In Genesis Ctr, PLC , 246 Mich App at 545, we held that the “[p]laintiffs failed to prove an actual controversy because the provider plan review process set out in MCL 550.1509 through 550.1518 provides plaintiffs with the ability to preserve their legal rights.” We also concluded that, “where the commissioner is performing the statutory duty to review [Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan’s] provider cl ass plan and to consider plain tiffs’ concerns with respect to the plan, no order by the trial court is necessary to guide the par ties’ conduct or preserve plaintiffs’ rights.”-7- granted with or without prejudice is a question of law, which w e review de novo . See Rinke v Auto Moulding Co , 226 Mich App 432, 439; 573 NW2d 344 (1997).

B. ANALYSIS

A trial court’s decision as to whether dismissal should be gra nted “with or without prejudice, by definition, determines whether a party may refile a claim or whether the claim is permanently barred.” ABB Paint Finishing, Inc v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co , 223 Mich App 559, 562; 567 NW2d 456 (1997). Consequently, “in deciding whether d ismissal should be with or without prejudice, the trial court should consider whether the doctrine of res judicata would bar subsequent actions involving the same claim.” Id . “[S]ummary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a trial and is a judgment on the merits which bar s relitigation on principles of res judicata.” Capital Mtg Corp v Coopers & Lybrand , 142 Mich App 531, 536; 369 NW2d 922 (1985). “Where a trial court di smisses a case on the merits, t he plaintiff should not be allowed to refile the same suit against the same defendant and dismissal s hould therefore be with prejudice.” ABB Paint Finishing, Inc , 223 Mich App at 563.

Here, the trial court granted summary disposition because plai ntiff could not establish one of the requirements for a writ of mandamus. As a result, b ecause the trial court’s decision was on the merits, see Capital Mtg Corp , 142 Mich App at 536, it did not err when it dismissed the case with prejudice. 7

A trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition does not preclude a plaintiff from requesting leave to amend the complaint. See Weymers v Khera , 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 (1997); ABB Paint Finishing, Inc , 223 Mich App at 564. As the Michigan Supreme Court explained in Weymers , 454 Mich at 658:

If a court grants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C) (8), (9), or (10), the court must give the parties an opportunity to amen d their pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.118, unless the amendment would be futile. M CR 2.116(I)(5). MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides that leave to amend a pl eading “shall be freely given when justice so re quires.” Under subrule A(3), th e court can order the amending party to compensate the opposing party for the add itional expense caused by the late amendment, including reasonable attorney fee s.

A motion to amend ordinarily should be granted, and should be denied only for the following pa rticularized reasons:

7 Plaintiff’s concern that trial court’s dismissal precludes fut ure judicial review is misplaced. Notably, the trial court’s ruling was not on the merits in term s of whether defendant’s decisions were proper. Rather, it was base d on the fact that plaintiff h ad failed to establish that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus at that time. Similarly, to the extent that plaintiff requested declaratory judgment a nd injunctive relief, t he trial court pro perly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on the merits given plaintiff’s fa ilure to establish that he wa s entitled to such relief.-8- “[1] undue delay, [2] bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, [3] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, [4] undue prejudice to the opposing party b y virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and 5] futility . . . .” [[ Ben P Fyke & Sons, Inc v Gunter Co , 390 Mich 649, 656; 213 NW2d 134 (1973).]]

A plaintiff must submit their proposed amended complaint, or a clear statement of the amended claim, to the trial court. See Anton, Sowerby & Assoc, Inc v Mr C’S Lake Orion, LLC

, 309 Mich App 535, 551-552; 872 NW2d 699 (2015). “If a plaintif f does not present its proposed amended complaint to the court, there is no way to determine wh ether an amendment is justified.” Id . at 551; see also Liggett Restaurant Group, Inc v City of Pontiac , 260 Mich App 127, 138-139; 676 NW2d 633 (2003). A trial court does not abus e its discretion when it denies a
motion to amend that does not inc lude “the proposed complaint i n writing or a clear statement of [the] plaintiff’s claim . . . .” See Anton, Sowerby & Assoc, Inc , 309 Mich App at 551-552.

In his motion to correct the j udgment, plaintiff generally arg ued that leave to amend should be freely granted, and he cursorily argued that leave to amend would not be futile in this case. However, he never provided a clear statement of a propos ed amendment in conjunction with his motion or during his ar gument at the motion hearing. Thus, there was no way for the trial court to determine whether an amendment to the complaint would be justified or futile. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Id

.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to demonstr ate that any of his claims war rant relief.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Riordan