were untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Moreover, appellant's petitions 

were successive because he had previously litigated• a post-conviction 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits, and it constituted an 

abuse of the writ to the extent that he raised claims new and different 

from those raised in his previous petition. 2 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 

34.810(2). Appellant's petitions were procedurally barred absent a 

demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); 

NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). 

Appellant indicated that grounds 1, 2, and 3, and portions of 4 

were previously litigated, but that he was raising them again so that error 

could be assessed cumulatively. 3This argument does not provide good 

cause for re-litigating claims in a successive petition that this court has 

previously determined to lack merit because there is simply no error to 

2Lopez v. State, Docket No. 54256 (Order of Affirmance, September 

10, 2010). 

3Grounds 1, 2, and 3 have clearly been presented to this court. 

Citing to "portions" of ground 4 (ineffective assistance of counsel) as being 

previously raised does not meet the pleading requirements of NRS 34.735, 

and does not provide sufficient clarity for a determination of good cause 

and prejudice under NRS 34.810. Appellant indicated that ground 4, 

paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 were new grounds for relief—not previously 

raised in state court. Ground 4 contains 45 paragraphs. The only grounds 

considered as "new" are those specifically identified by appellant. If any 

claims raised in the forty additional paragraphs contained a new ground 

for relief, which was not identified by appellant as such, this court has not 

considered the claim due to the insufficient pleading. And to be clear, we 

have considered as claims previously raised before this court only those 

claims actually argued in Lopez v. State, Docket No. 54256 (Order of 

Affirmance, September 10, 2010). Any claims raised in the first petition 

but not litigated in the first appeal were abandoned and are not 

considered new pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). 

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cumulate. See generally In Re Reno, 283 P.3d 1181 (Cal. 2012) 

(recognizing in the context of California's habeas jurisprudence that 

claims previously litigated and rejected on their "substantive merits—i.e., 

this court found no legal error—cannot logically be used to support a 

cumulative error claim because [the Supreme Court] has already found 

there was no error to cumulate"). Although appellant purportedly 

identified which grounds for relief had been previously raised, he failed to 

include any acknowledgement that his claims were rejected on their 

substantive merits. All of the claims previously raised before this court 

and reviewed by this court have been determined to lack legal error. 4A 

solitary claim involved this court's determination of the merits of a claim 

based solely on the lack of prejudice—the failure of trial counsel to call Dr. 

John Paglini to testify at the penalty hearing. Even assuming that this 

claim could be presented again for its cumulative effect, because appellant 

failed to demonstrate good cause for the new claims, as discussed below, 

appellant necessarily failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice for 

presenting this claim again. 

Next, appellant indicated that ground 4, paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 

and 7, presented new claims for relief. Appellant claimed that he had 

good cause to raise the new claims due to the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. Ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel would not be good cause in the 

instant case because the appointment of counsel in the prior postconviction habeas corpus proceedings was not statutorily or 

4We note that although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

involves a factual component, it is a claim of legal error. See Trujillo v. 

State, 129 Nev. „ 310 P.3d 594, 602 (2013). 

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constitutionally required. 5 Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303, 934 P.2d 

247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 164, 912 P.2d 255, 258 

(1996). Further, we note that this court has recently held that Martinez 

v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (recognizing an equitable 

exception to a federal procedural bar due to the ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel) does not apply to Nevada's statutory postconviction procedures. See Brown v. Warden, 130 Nev. , P.3d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying these petitions as procedurally barred and 

without good cause. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED. 

SAITTA, J., dissenting: 

I would extend the equitable rule recognized in Martinez to 

this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is facing a severe 

sentence. See Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. 

No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would 

5We note that appellant was entitled to the effective assistance of 

counsel in the Lozada appeal because it remedied the loss of a direct 

appeal. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 359, 871 P.2d 944, 950 (1994). 

That right did not extend, however, to the post-conviction claims litigated. 

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reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether appellant 

can demonstrate a substantial underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim that was omitted due to the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. I therefore dissent. 

cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge 

Ricardo Jose Lopez 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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