Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-17-00358-CR

Cristian YEPEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 406th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CRN001641-D4

Honorable Oscar J. Hale, Jr., Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 3, 2019

AFFIRMED

A jury found appellant Cristian Yepez guilty of murder and tampering with evidence and 

assessed punishment at thirty years’ and fifteen years’ confinement, respectively. On appeal, 

Yepez argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; (2) the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Yepez’s motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying Yepez’s

request to include a concurrent cause instruction in the jury charge; and (4) the evidence is 

insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness testimony. We affirm. 
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BACKGROUND

An unidentified caller contacted 9-1-1 and reported a domestic disturbance between a male 

and a female at an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. Fifteen minutes later, another 9-1-1

operator received an anonymous call regarding the same domestic disturbance. The second caller 

stated a woman, later identified as Janette Pantoja, came outside of the apartment and told the 

caller she had been kidnapped and the kidnapper had killed her three-year-old daughter Jasleen. 

Officer Daniel Lunceford of the Houston Police Department responded to the disturbance and 

spoke to Pantoja. Officer Lunceford described Pantoja as crying hysterically. Pantoja stated her 

boyfriend, Yepez, had hit her with a closed fist, and Officer Lunceford observed bruising above 

her eyebrow. Pantoja also told the officer she was from Chicago and Yepez was keeping her 

against her will after killing her daughter, Jasleen, when they were in Laredo. Officer Lunceford 

took Pantoja to the police station, where Detective Robert A. Klementich questioned her. 

Detective Klementich was already familiar with Pantoja. Over the past couple of weeks, 

he had been working on a missing child case with the Chicago Police Department, which reported

the missing child’s mother and the mother’s boyfriend – Pantoja and Yepez – were staying with 

Yepez’s relatives in Houston. Pantoja’s relatives had contacted the Chicago Police Department

about the missing child after Pantoja and Yepez returned to Chicago from Laredo without the 

child. According to Pantoja’s relatives, Pantoja and Yepez told her family the child had been

kidnapped. The Chicago police gave Detective Klementich two Houston addresses, and Detective

Klementich sent officers to both locations. At the second location, one of the investigating officers 

encountered a group of individuals, which included a woman who gave the officers a false name

and acted “squirrely.” Later, Detective Klementich and the investigating officers received 

photographs of Pantoja and Yepez from the Chicago police and realized the woman they 

encountered was Pantoja. However, when the investigating officers returned to the location, 
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Pantoja was no longer there. When Detective Klementich subsequently met Pantoja at the police 

station, he knew Pantoja was from Chicago and connected to the missing child case. He questioned 

Pantoja concerning Jasleen’s whereabouts, and she stated Yepez had assaulted her at the Houston 

apartment and killed Jasleen when they were in Laredo. 

Detective Klementich dispatched two officers to bring Yepez to the station for questioning. 

He believed he had probable cause to arrest Yepez for assault family violence. He also believed

he had enough information to detain Yepez to investigate Jasleen’s whereabouts. After the 

dispatched detectives arrested Yepez for assault family violence and unlawful restraint, they 

brought him to the police station. Detective Klementich informed Yepez of his Miranda rights. 

Although Yepez initially waived his Miranda rights, during the interview he indicated he wanted 

to speak to a lawyer. Detective Klementich ended the interview and informed Yepez he was going 

to be charged with unlawful restraint. Detective Klementich then left, leaving Yepez handcuffed 

in the interview room. 

Approximately an hour later, Yepez asked to speak to the detectives and told them Jasleen

had been kidnapped. Yepez then changed his story and told the detectives that on the day Jasleen

died, she had been swimming at the motel pool when they were in Laredo. After swimming, she

started throwing up and was highly irritable and crying. Yepez stated that when he, Pantoja, and 

Jasleen returned to the motel room, he put Jasleen in “timeout” and placed her face to the wall to

calm her down. She continued to cry and throw up until she collapsed and lost consciousness. 

Yepez said he contacted a man who helped him bury the body. 

Detective Klementich contacted the Laredo Police Department and shared Yepez’s 

statements about burying Jasleen’s body. Laredo Police Detective Greg Cantu drove to a specified

location – an empty lot near a gas station – where he found a child’s skeletal remains. Detective 

Cantu secured the scene, contacted his supervisor, and waited for a crime scene investigator to 
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arrive. Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Corinne Stern arrived at the scene and determined the empty 

lot had recently been cleared, exposing the remains. Dr. Stern collected the remains and sent them 

to Dr. Oscar Harrell Gill-King, a forensic anthropologist who analyzed the remains to determine 

the cause of death. Dr. Gill-King identified the remains as Jasleen. In his report, Dr. Gill-King

indicated the skull displayed signs of “perimortem vertical loading,” and concluded the child’s 

death was caused by her skull striking a static object. 

A grand jury indicted Yepez for felony murder, serious bodily injury to a child, and 

tampering with evidence in connection with Jasleen’s death. At trial, the State argued Yepez 

murdered Jasleen by striking her head with blunt force. The defense argued she died due to dry 

drowning, after which Yepez and Pantoja panicked and buried the body. The jury heard testimony 

from several witnesses including Pantoja, the detectives and officers working on the case, and Dr. 

Gill-King. Pantoja testified Yepez grabbed Jasleen by her ankles, held her upside down, struck 

her head against the bathroom floor and later against the bathroom sink. Pantoja testified Jasleen

reacted by “just sitting” on the countertop. Pantoja testified Yepez then took Jasleen to another 

room and slammed the bathroom door, leaving Pantoja in the bathroom. Thereafter, she heard 

another bang and Jasleen was unconscious when she opened the door. She testified she 

unsuccessfully attempted CPR, but Jasleen never regained consciousness. Ultimately, Pantoja 

explained Yepez decided to bury the body. 

In addition, Dr. Gill-King testified he determined the child’s cause of death was homicide

caused by vertical loading. The forensic anthropologist also testified the injuries to Jasleen’s skull 

were consistent with someone holding her by the ankles with her head hanging down and then 

hitting her head against a hard surface. On cross examination, Dr. Gill-King further opined that

earth moving equipment used to clear the lot where Detective Cantu found the remains did not 
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cause the injuries to Jasleen’s body. The jury also saw photographs of Jasleen’s remains and 

watched a videotape recording of Yepez’s statements made to Houston police. 

At the charge conference, Yepez requested a jury instruction on concurrent cause, arguing 

the evidence showed the child died from dry drowning. The trial court denied the request. The 

jury found Yepez guilty of felony murder and tampering with evidence. Yepez appealed. 

ANALYSIS

Expert Testimony

In his first issue, Yepez argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. GillKing’s expert testimony regarding the child’s cause of death. Yepez claims Dr. Gill-King’s 

testimony was unreliable because the scientific theory and technique he used were not valid and 

there was a large analytical gap between the evidence and his proffered opinion. 

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision on the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of 

discretion. Rhomer v. State, No. PD-0448-17, 2019 WL 408186, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 

2019). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or 

principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Id. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling on the 

admission of evidence unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Layton v. State, 

280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Applicable Law

A witness who qualifies as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 

may testify if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in 

understanding the evidence or determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The proponent of the 

testimony must establish by clear and convincing proof that the proffered testimony is sufficiently 

relevant and reliable to assist the factfinder in reaching an accurate result. Vela v. State, 209 
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S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To assess the reliability of an expert’s opinion based 

on a hard science, the Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the three-prong Kelly test, requiring

that “(1) the underlying scientific theory be valid, (2) the technique applying the theory must be 

valid, and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question.”

Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *4 (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1992)). In addition, courts should consider:

(1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted 

as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be 

ascertained; 

(2) the qualifications of the experts testifying; 

(3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific 

theory and technique; 

(4) the potential rate of error of the technique; 

(5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; 

(6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be 

explained to the court; and 

(7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the 

occasion in question. 

Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. 

When expert testimony concerns a field of study outside the hard sciences, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals instructs us to apply the Nenno test to evaluate the reliability of an expert’s 

testimony. Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *5 (citing Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999)); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The Nenno test 

asks whether (1) the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) the subject matter of the expert’s 

testimony is within the scope of that field, and (3) the expert’s testimony properly relies upon 
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and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field.” Rhomer, 2019 WL 408186, at *5; Weatherred, 

15 S.W.3d at 542. In applying this framework, we must refrain from developing rigid distinctions

between “hard” and “soft” sciences, because the distinction between various types of testimony 

can be blurred. Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Under either the 

Kelly or Nenno test, reliability should be evaluated by referencing the standards applicable to the 

particular professional field in question. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). 

Application

Dr. Gill-King identified himself as a forensic anthropologist who analyzes skeletal remains 

to identify people and determine their cause of death. He testified forensic anthropologists are 

generally contacted by authorities to examine remains. When the remains are brought to him, he 

inventories the material, cleans it, and analyzes it. He explained that forensic anthropologists use 

various cleaning methods depending on the situation. He added that sometimes authorities provide 

background information regarding the scene where the remains are found, and he prefers to have 

limited information regarding the facts of the case to avoid bias. After analyzing the material, he 

creates a biological profile and writes a report with his interpretations. He explained that forensic 

anthropologists make objective and subjective observations, and their reports are not subject to a 

formal peer review process. He further added that no standards of practice have been established 

to guide forensic anthropologists on how to make interpretations, but official standards of practice 

are being developed. 

Turning to the instant case, Dr. Gill-King testified he received a “nearly complete 

skeletonized remains of a human infant” to examine along with information that the Laredo police 

discovered the remains in a shallow grave. He explained the remains were in an advanced state of 
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decomposition because they were recovered in a shallow grave and were exposed to a high level 

of bacteria, which accelerated the decomposition process. 

Dr. Gill-King also testified the remains displayed no sign of antemortem trauma, 

eliminating any indication that the child had old injuries or was abused over an extended period. 

He opined the remains displayed perimortem trauma – trauma that occurred at the time of death. 

Such trauma was significant to Dr. Gill-King because it could explain the cause of death. In this 

case, he observed “the skull was broken in several pieces.” He also noted it exhibited a diastatic 

fracture – breakage at a suture – at the top of the head and fractures on both sides. According to 

Dr. Gill-King, these characteristics – multiple fractures, diastasis, and fractures on the sides of the 

skull – constituted three of the five key criteria forensic anthropologists use to indicate signs of 

“cranial death” – death caused by a head injury or injuries. 

Dr. Gill-King further testified the fractures in Jasleen’s skull were consistent with fractures 

caused by vertical loading, an injury that occurs when the skull strikes a static object, transferring

energy from the top of the skull, down through its base, and along the spinal axis. For support, he 

pointed to the diastatic fracture, an area where a small piece of bone was pressed in when Jasleen’s

skull struck a static object. He explained diastasis is a classic sign of head trauma in infant deaths. 

He further explained the fractures at the base of Jasleen’s skull and radiating out from her spine

indicated that her head had been struck against a static object. When her skull was struck against 

the static object, the shock travelled through her body and transmitted force through the base of 

the skull, resulting in the fractures. He ultimately concluded the injuries were static as opposed to 

dynamic, highlighting that the terms “static” and “dynamic” were widely used in his field. 

Yepez contends Dr. Gill-King’s testimony was unreliable because the scientific theory and 

technique he used were not valid. Specifically, Yepez argues Dr. Gill-King’s report was not 

subject to peer review and another expert disagreed with the report’s conclusions. However, the 
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Court of Criminal Appeals has stressed that “the absence of peer review does not necessarily 

undercut the reliability of the testimony.” Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562. Rather, any doubt created 

by the absence of peer review goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Id. 

Similarly, disagreement between experts also goes to the weight of the evidence, and the jury can 

believe one expert over another. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

Yepez also argues Dr. Gill-King’s testimony was unreliable because a large analytical gap 

existed between his opinion and the underlying facts. According to Yepez, Dr. Gill-King’s opinion 

did not coincide with the State’s theory that Yepez killed Jasleen by striking her head against a 

static object. We disagree. After Dr. Gill-King opined the child’s fractures were perimortem and 

caused by static force, he specifically testified the injuries would be “consistent with” someone 

holding a child upside down and striking the child’s head against a hard surface, like the floor. He 

testified that based on his experience with examining remains of injured children, he believed 

Jasleen died after her head was struck against a static object. 

The record reflects Dr. Gill-King based his opinion on a methodology generally used by 

forensic anthropologists when analyzing skeletal remains and on his years of experience analyzing 

skeletal remains and injuries in children. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 274. And although Dr. GillKing stated his report was not subject to peer review, the record is clear that he based his opinion

on principles relevant in his field of study. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 562; Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 

274. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Gill-King’s 

expert testimony regarding Jasleen’s cause of death. We therefore overrule Yepez’s first 

argument. 

Motion to Suppress

Next, Yepez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he 

made to the Houston police. According to Yepez, the statements constituted fruit of the poisonous 
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tree because they were the product of a warrantless arrest made without probable cause. He further 

contends the subsequent Miranda warnings the police gave him at the police station did not 

sufficiently attenuate the taint of the unlawful arrest. 

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State 

v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A trial court abuses its discretion if its 

decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. In 

reviewing the ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016). We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical 

facts and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the evidence. Id. 

We review de novo the trial court’s determination of pure questions of law and mixed questions 

of law and fact that do not depend on credibility determinations. Id. If, as here, the trial court 

makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and 

determine whether the evidence supports those factual findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 

442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

Applicable Law

Probable cause requires an officer to have a reasonable belief that, based on the facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or of which the officer has reasonably 

trustworthy information, an offense has been committed. Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901–

02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Probable cause must be based on specific, articulable facts rather than 

an officer’s mere opinion. Id. To determine whether probable cause exists, we use a totality of 

the circumstances approach. Id. 

When, as here, a defendant argues his warrantless arrest was illegal, the proper inquiry is 

whether the arrest fell within one of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement. Stull v. 
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State, 772 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Here, the parties dispute whether the Houston 

police were authorized to make a warrantless arrest under the family violence exception outlined 

in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(4). That

exception authorizes an officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause 

“to believe the person committed an offense involving family violence.” Id. An offense involves 

family violence if there is evidence the actor committed acts intended to result in physical harm, 

bodily injury, or assault against a victim with whom the actor has or has had a dating relationship. 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.004, 71.0021(a). “The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine generally 

precludes the use of evidence, both direct and indirect, obtained following an illegal arrest.” 

Monge v. State, 315 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 

Application

The trial court found that Houston police officers had probable cause to believe Yepez 

committed an act of family violence against Pantoja. At the motion to suppress hearing, the trial 

court heard evidence that two anonymous people called 9-1-1 to report a domestic dispute. The 

first caller specifically told the 9-1-1 operator it sounded “like he is beating her.” The other caller 

stated he saw Pantoja run outside, where she told the caller Yepez was hitting her. The court also 

heard testimony from Officer Lunceford, one of the officers dispatched to the scene, who testified 

that when he arrived, Pantoja was crying hysterically. Officer Lunceford also testified he observed 

bruising above Pantoja’s eyebrow and that Pantoja told him Yepez hit her with a closed fist. This 

information was relayed to Detective Klementich, who spoke with Pantoja when she arrived at the 

police station. He testified he personally observed marks on Pantoja’s face and that Pantoja told 

him Yepez had physically restrained her. Based on this information, he dispatched two officers to 

arrest Yepez for family violence. 
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The dispatched officers both testified they received information that there had been a 

physical altercation between Yepez and Pantoja, leaving Pantoja with injuries to her face. The 

dispatched officers further testified that when they arrived at the apartment to arrest Yepez, they 

spoke to a neighbor who showed them a cell phone video of the altercation. The video depicted 

the couple fighting inside the apartment. One of the officers testified, “[y]ou could see the blinds 

moving, her kicking and try to get away. You could see Mr. Yepez actually come out, peek out.” 

When viewing this evidence under a totality of the circumstances approach, the officers had 

probable cause to believe Yepez had committed an act of family violence against Pantoja and arrest 

him for that offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(4); Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901–02. 

Yepez argues the family violence exception outlined in article 14.03(a)(4) applies only 

where an officer needs to defuse a situation immediately. Nothing in article 14.03(a)(4) imposes 

this requirement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(4). Rather, article 14.03(a)(4) permits

an officer to make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe: (1) the suspect 

has committed an assault; (2) the victim of the assault is a member of the suspect’s family or 

household; and (3) the assault resulted in bodily injury to the victim. See id.; see Randolph v. 

State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 773 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (outlining three requirements of 

article 14.03(a)(4)). Here, the record reflects the officers had specific, articulable facts to 

reasonably believe Yepez had committed an assault, Pantoja and Yepez were involved in a 

relationship, and the assault resulted in a bodily injury to Pantoja. Accordingly, the State met its 

burden to justify this arrest pursuant to article 14.03(a)(4). 

Yepez finally argues Detective Klementich could not make a probable cause determination 

because he could not rely on Pantoja’s untrustworthy statements. The record, however, reflects 

Detective Klementich did not rely only on Pantoja’s statements that Yepez hit her when making 

his probable cause determination. He also relied on the information relayed to him by Officer 
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Lunceford, his own observation of the marks on Pantoja’s face, and the information from the 

Chicago police investigation that Pantoja was living with Yepez in Houston. Based on these facts 

and circumstances, we hold Detective Klementich had probable cause to believe Yepez had 

committed an act of family violence against Pantoja. See Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901–02. Having 

determined the Yepez’s arrest was not illegal, we further hold his subsequent statements to the 

Houston police were not fruit of the poisonous tree. See Monge, 315 S.W.3d at 40

Jury Charge Error

Yepez contends the trial court erred in denying his request to include a concurrent cause 

instruction in the jury charge. Yepez argues he was entitled to thisinstruction because he presented 

evidence that the child died from dry drowning.

Standard of Review

We review a claim of jury charge error in two steps. See Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 

440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). First, we determine whether there is error in the charge. Id. Second, 

if there is error, then we review the record to determine whether the error caused sufficient harm 

to require reversal. Id. 

We review a trial court’s decision to exclude a defensive instruction in the charge for an 

abuse of discretion. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). 

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested instruction. Bufkin 

v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction 

on a defensive issue if the issue “is raised by the evidence regardless of the strength or credibility 

of that evidence.” Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

Applicable Law

Where the evidence shows another cause of the same result, the trial court is required to 

give a statutory instruction on concurrent cause. Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351–52 (Tex. 
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Crim. App. 1986). This instruction provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible if the result 

would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another

cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of 

the actor clearly insufficient.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a). To be entitled to a concurrent 

cause instruction, the evidence must show the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient by itself to 

produce the result, and the actor’s conduct was clearly insufficient by itself to produce the result. 

Id. The concurrent cause must be “another cause” in addition to the actor’s conduct, i.e., an 

“agency in addition to the actor.” Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 n.2. In contrast, an alternative 

cause “is simply a different version of facts, one which negates at least one element of the State’s 

case.” Barnett v. State, 709 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

Application

Throughout trial, Yepez denied striking Jasleen and argued Pantoja fabricated allegations 

that he held Jasleen over the sink and slammed Jasleen’s head against it. According to Yepez, 

Jasleen died because of dry drowning. This contention that dry drowning caused the child’s death 

presents an alternative cause and does not entitle Yepez to a concurrent cause instruction. See 

Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 n.2. That is because Yepez’s contention that Jasleen died as a result 

of dry drowning is not “another cause” of Jasleen’s death in addition to Yepez’s conduct, but rather 

is a different version of facts that explain her death. See id. (recognizing concurrent cause not 

presented where actor denies committing charged conduct); Barnett, 709 S.W.3d at 652. 

Accordingly, because no concurrent cause was presented, Yepez was not entitled to a concurrent

cause instruction. See Farmer, 411 S.W.3d at 906. We therefore overrule Yepez’s third issue. 
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Accomplice Witness Corroboration

Finally, Yepez contends the evidence is insufficient to corroborate Pantoja’s accomplice 

witness testimony. According to Yepez, there was no independent evidence that corroborated 

Pantoja’s allegation that he struck Jasleen’s skull on a hard surface. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A conviction obtained based on accomplice testimony must be supported by sufficient 

corroborating evidence tending to connect the defendant to the offense committed. TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate accomplice 

testimony, we eliminate the accomplice testimony and examine the remaining portions of the 

record to determine if there is any evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the offense. Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The 

corroborating evidence need not, standing alone, rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. The evidence must simply link the defendant to the commission of the offense and 

show that a rational juror could conclude the evidence sufficiently “tended to connect” the 

defendant to the offense. Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

Accordingly, corroborative evidence need not be legally sufficient in itself to establish a 

defendant’s guilt. Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

In determining the question of corroboration, courts view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict. Perez v. State, 437 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no 

pet.). Evidence tending to connect the accused to the commission of the offense may be 

circumstantial. See Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Insignificant 

circumstances can satisfy this standard as there is no precise rule governing the amount of evidence 

required to corroborate accomplice witness testimony. Perez, 437 S.W.3d at 616 (citing Gill v. 

State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). 
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Application

Even excluding Pantoja’s accomplice testimony, the State introduced evidence connecting

Yepez to the crime. The record reflects that Jasleen was last seen in Laredo at a motel with Yepez 

and Pantoja. The jury heard testimony from the motel clerk, who testified Pantoja, Yepez, and a 

child who fit Jasleen’s description were staying at the motel. The jury also heard testimony from 

Pantoja’s friend, who testified she spoke with Pantoja and Jasleen on the phone while they were 

staying at the Laredo motel with Yepez. The record further reflects that when Pantoja and Yepez 

returned from Laredo to Chicago, Yepez told several people, including Pantoja’s father, that 

Jasleen had been kidnapped. Yet, as the investigation unfolded, Jasleen’s remains were found in 

a shallow grave in an empty lot in Laredo near the motel where the three stayed. When asked by 

the police about Jasleen, Yepez stated Jasleen died from dry drowning and admitted to burying 

Jasleen at that location. The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Gill-King, who opined that Jasleen

died because the top of her head was struck against a static object. 

When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold this evidence

tends to connect Yepez with Jasleen’s murder. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442. The evidence

clearly places Yepez at the Laredo motel when the offense was committed. It also establishes that 

Yepez told different stories about Jasleen’s disappearance. Proof that an accused was at the scene 

when an offense was committed coupled with other suspicious circumstances is sufficient to tend 

to connect an accused to a crime. See id. Accordingly, the evidence of Yepez’s presence coupled 

with his kidnapping and dry drowning stories and his admission that he buried Jasleen – tends to 

connect Yepez to the motel room where Pantoja testified Yepez killed her daughter. We therefore 

overrule Yepez’s final issue.
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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Beth Watkins, Justice

Do Not Publish