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Lindsay International Sales & Service, 

LLC, appellee, v. Michael J. Wegener, 

an individual, and Jerome Pribil, 

an individual, appellants.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 15, 2017. No. S-16-1051.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law.

2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of 

law independently of the lower court’s conclusion.

4. Jurisdiction: Time: Notice: Appeal and Error. In order to vest an 

appellate court with jurisdiction, a party must file a notice of appeal 

within 30 days of the judgment, decree, or final order from which the 

party is appealing.

5. Motions for New Trial: Time: Notice: Appeal and Error. A timely 

motion for new trial terminates the running of the time for filing a notice 

of appeal, giving the party 30 days from the entry of the order denying 

the motion to file a notice of appeal.

6. Statutes: New Trial. The plain language of the savings clause in Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 25-1144.01 (Reissue 2016) does not contain a finality 

requirement.

Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, 

Moore, Chief Judge, and Inbody and Pirtle, Judges, on appeal 

thereto from the District Court for Platte County, Robert R. 

Steinke, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and 

cause remanded for further proceedings.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/15/2017 09:10 AM CDT
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Stephen L. Ahl and Krista M. Carlson, of Wolfe, Snowden, 

Hurd, Luers & Ahl, L.L.P., and Barry D. Geweke, of Stowell 

& Geweke, P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.

John M. Lingelbach, of Koley Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and

Funke, JJ.

Stacy, J.

The Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal, finding it was not timely filed. On further review, we apply the 

savings clause of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1144.01 (Reissue 2016) 

and conclude the notice of appeal was timely filed. We therefore reinstate the appeal and remand the matter to the Court of 

Appeals for further proceedings.

FACTS

Proceedings in District Court

Lindsay International Sales & Service, LLC (Lindsay), sued 

Jerome Pribil and Michael J. Wegener to collect amounts 

due on a guaranty. The case was tried to a jury, and on July 

21, 2016, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lindsay for 

$1,019,795.38. The court accepted the jury’s verdict on the 

record and discharged the jurors. The verdict forms were filed 

with the clerk the same day, but judgment on the verdict was 

not entered until 5 days later.

Four days after the jury returned its verdict, Lindsay filed 

a motion for costs. On the same day, Pribil and Wegener filed 

a motion for new trial. Both motions were efiled on July 25, 

2016; the time stamp on the motion for costs shows it was 

accepted for filing approximately 2 hours before the motion 

for new trial.

The next day, on July 26, 2016, the court entered judgment 

on the jury’s verdict. The judgment specifically noted, “The 
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assessment of court costs, which is the subject of a separate 

motion filed by [Lindsay] and scheduled for hearing to be conducted on August 5, 2016, will be addressed by separate order 

of the Court.” The judgment did not mention the motion for 

new trial, but in a separate order, the court set a hearing date of 

September 12 for the motion for new trial.

On August 8, 2016, the court entered an order awarding 

Lindsay costs of $3,457.20. On October 14, the court entered 

an order overruling the motion for new trial. On November 9, 

Pribil and Wegener filed a notice of appeal. For easy reference, 

the following timeline summarizes the critical dates:

• July 21: Jury returns verdict; court accepts verdict.

• July 25: Lindsay files a motion for costs.

• July 25: Pribil and Wegener file a motion for new trial.

• July 26: Court enters judgment on the jury verdict.

• August 8: Court grants Lindsay’s motion for costs.

• September 12: Hearing held on motion for new trial.

• October 14: Court overrules motion for new trial.

• November 9: Pribil and Wegener file notice of appeal.

Proceedings in Court of Appeals

After ordering the parties to show cause, the Court of 

Appeals dismissed the appeal without opinion, finding it lacked 

appellate jurisdiction. The court reasoned:

The motion for new trial filed on July 25, 2016 was filed 

before the final order entered on August 8, 2016. See 

J & H Swine v. Hartington Concrete, 12 Neb[.] App. 885, 

687 N.W.2d 9 (2004). A premature motion for new trial 

is a nullity and, thus, the November 9, 2016 notice of 

appeal was untimely. See Despain v. Despain, 290 Neb. 

32, 858 N.W.2d 566 [(2015)] (citing Macke v. Pierce, 263 

Neb. 868, 643 N.W.2d 673 (2002)).

Pribil and Wegener filed a timely motion for rehearing, 

arguing the motion for new trial was effective, and not a nullity, under the plain language of § 25-1144.01. That statute 
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provides, in relevant part, that “[a] motion for a new trial filed 

after the announcement of a verdict or decision but before 

the entry of judgment shall be treated as filed after the entry 

of judgment and on the day thereof.” A divided panel of the 

Court of Appeals denied rehearing, reasoning that the motion 

for new trial had been filed “prior to the district court’s ruling 

on costs, i.e., before the announcement of a final judgment,” 

so the motion was a nullity. We granted Pribil and Wegener’s 

petition for further review. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On further review, Pribil and Wegener assign, restated and 

consolidated, that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) dismissing 

their appeal as untimely, (2) concluding their motion for new 

trial was a nullity, and (3) misapplying the second sentence, or 

savings clause, of § 25-1144.01.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual 

dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.1

[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law.2

[3] An appellate court reviews questions of law independently of the lower court’s conclusion.3

ANALYSIS

[4,5] In order to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of 

the judgment, decree, or final order from which the party is 

1 Holdsworth v. Greenwood Farmers Co-op, 286 Neb. 49, 835 N.W.2d 30 

(2013); In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736 (2011).

2 First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Davey, 285 Neb. 835, 830 N.W.2d 63 (2013); 

Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Omaha, 282 Neb. 200, 803 

N.W.2d 17 (2011).

3 Maclovi-Sierra v. City of Omaha, 290 Neb. 443, 860 N.W.2d 763 (2015); 

VKGS v. Planet Bingo, 285 Neb. 599, 828 N.W.2d 168 (2013).
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appealing.4 But under § 25-1912(3)(a), a timely motion for 

new trial under § 25-1144.01 will terminate the running of 

the time for filing a notice of appeal, giving the party 30 days 

from the entry of the order denying the motion to file a notice 

of appeal.5

Here, the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by Pribil 

and Wegner depends on whether their motion for new trial 

was an effective terminating motion, or instead was a nullity. 

The Court of Appeals concluded the motion was a nullity, 

because it was filed before the announcement of a final order. 

Pribil and Wegner argue that the court did not properly apply 

§ 25-1144.01, which provides:

A motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 

ten days after the entry of the judgment. A motion for 

a new trial filed after the announcement of a verdict 

or decision but before the entry of judgment shall be 

treated as filed after the entry of judgment and on the 

day thereof.

The second sentence of § 25-1144.01 has been referred to as a 

“savings clause”6 and was added to the statute in 2004. Before 

discussing the application of the savings clause to the present 

appeal, we provide some historical perspective.

History of § 25-1144.01

In Macke v. Pierce,

7

 decided in 2002, we interpreted an earlier version of § 25-1144.01. The version in effect at that time 

provided that a motion for new trial had to be filed “no later 

4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Reissue 2016). See Despain v. Despain, 290 

Neb. 32, 858 N.W.2d 566 (2015).

5 See § 24-1144.01.

6 Despain v. Despain, supra note 4, 290 Neb. at 43, 858 N.W.2d at 574 

(Cassel, J., concurring).

7 Macke v. Pierce, 263 Neb. 868, 643 N.W.2d 673 (2002) (superseded by 

statute as stated in Despain v. Despain, supra note 4).
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than ten days after the entry of judgment.”8 Macke held that a 

motion for new trial filed before the entry of a judgment was 

a nullity, as was the trial court’s ruling on such a motion for 

new trial, and that such a motion for new trial did not terminate the time for taking an appeal.

In 2004, presumably in response to our decision in Macke, 

the Legislature added the second sentence, or savings clause, 

to § 25-1144.01. We addressed the effect of this statutory 

change in Despain v. Despain.

9

 In that dissolution action, the 

husband filed a motion for new trial after the court distributed an unsigned journal entry reciting its substantive decision, but before the court filed the signed dissolution decree. 

A few days later, the court filed a signed decree. The court 

ultimately overruled the motion for new trial, and the husband 

filed an appeal within 30 days of the order overruling his 

motion for new trial. The wife asserted the appeal should be 

dismissed as untimely, arguing the motion for new trial was 

a nullity and did not terminate the time for filing an appeal 

because the motion had been filed before the signed decree 

was entered.

We rejected this argument in light of the new savings 

clause language in § 25-1144.01. We noted that “under the 

2004 amendment, a motion for new trial filed after the 

announcement of the decision but before the entry of the 

judgment is no longer a nullity.”10 We implicitly held that 

the unsigned journal entry provided to counsel was the 

requisite “‘announcement of a verdict or decision’” under 

§ 25-1144.01, and we reasoned that because the motion for 

new trial was filed after the announcement of the court’s 

decision but before the court entered judgment by filing the 

signed decree, it was an effective terminating motion under 

8 See § 25-1144.01 (Cum. Supp. 2000).

9 Despain v. Despain, supra note 4.

10 Id. at 39, 858 N.W.2d at 572.
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the plain language of the savings clause in § 25-1144.01.11

Consequently, we found the notice of appeal was timely, 

because it was filed within 30 days after the motion for new 

trial was overruled.

Application of § 25-1144.01 

to Present Case

Pribil and Wegener contend that the savings clause of 

§ 25-1144.01 rendered their motion for new trial effective and 

timely. They argue their motion was “filed after the announcement of a verdict or decision but before the entry of judgment” 

and thus must be “treated as filed after the entry of judgment 

and on the day thereof.”12 At oral argument, Lindsay agreed 

with this argument. We do too.

The motion for new trial was filed after the court announced 

the jury’s verdict, but before the entry of judgment. As such, 

the plain language of § 25-1144.01 requires that the motion 

be treated as filed “after the entry of judgment and on the 

day thereof,” making it a timely and effective terminating 

motion.13

The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in its order denying the 

motion for rehearing suggests it was concerned by the fact 

that Lindsay filed a motion for costs just before the motion 

for new trial was filed. Relying on its decision in J & H 

Swine v. Hartington Concrete,

14 the Court of Appeals reasoned, 

“Because the appellants filed their motion for new trial prior 

to the district court’s ruling on costs, i.e., before the announcement of a final judgment, the filing of their motion for a new 

trial was ineffective.” (Emphasis supplied.) But the reasoning 

of J & H Swine is not applicable here.

11 Id. at 38, 858 N.W.2d at 571.

12 See, § 25-1144.01 (Reissue 2016); Despain v. Despain, supra note 4.

13 Id.

14 J & H Swine v. Hartington Concrete, 12 Neb. App. 885, 687 N.W.2d 9 

(2004). 
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J & H Swine was based on this court’s opinion in In re 

Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath,

15 but neither 

J & H Swine nor In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of 

Woltemath addressed the savings clause under § 25-1144.01. 

Instead, both cases addressed the savings clause in § 25-1912(2), 

a statute that governs notices of appeal.

The savings clause in § 25-1912(2) is similar to the savings clause in § 25-1144.01, with one important distinction: 

§ 25-1912(2) expressly references “final” orders:

A notice of appeal or docket fee filed or deposited after 

the announcement of a decision or final order but before 

the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order shall be 

treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order and on the date of entry.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath

focused on the plain language of § 25-1912(2) and held 

that an “‘announcement of a decision or final order’” under 

§ 25-1912(2) must be of “a decision or final order that would 

have been appealable if followed immediately by the entry of 

judgment.”16 In other words, to trigger the savings clause for 

premature notices of appeal under § 25-1912(2), an announcement must pertain to a decision or order that, once entered, 

would be final and appealable.

The Court of Appeals appears to have applied this same 

reasoning to motions for new trial under § 25-1144.01, 

and concluded that because the motion for new trial was 

filed before the district court’s decision on the motion for 

costs, it was not filed after the requisite “announcement of a 

15 In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath, 268 Neb. 33, 680 

N.W.2d 142 (2004).

16 In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath, supra note 15, 268 

Neb. at 40, 680 N.W.2d at 148, citing FirsTier Mtge. Co. v. Investors 

Mtge. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 111 S. Ct. 648, 112 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1991).
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verdict or decision.”17 But reading a finality requirement into 

§ 25-1144.01 is inconsistent with the plain language of the 

statute. Appellate courts give statutory language its plain and 

ordinary meaning and will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, 

and unambiguous.18 An appellate court will not read into a 

statute a meaning that is not there.19

The plain and unambiguous language of § 25-1144.01, unlike 

§ 25-1912(2), contains no requirement that the “announcement” be of a final “verdict or decision.”20 And the instant case 

illustrates the practical difficulty of reading a finality requirement into the savings clause under § 25-1144.01.

Here, Pribil and Wegener filed their motion for new trial 

after the jury’s verdict was announced on the record. From 

their perspective, the substantive decision on those proceedings had been made, so they filed their motion for new trial 

even though the court had not yet entered judgment on that 

verdict. This appears to be precisely the circumstance the 

Legislature intended to address by adding the savings clause 

to § 25-1144.01 in 2004. The filing of a motion for costs 

after the announcement of the verdict but before the motion 

for new trial was filed does not change the analysis under 

§ 25-1144.01.

[6] The plain language of the savings clause in § 25-1144.01 

does not contain a finality requirement. Section 25-1144.01 

merely requires an “announcement of a verdict or decision.” 

Here, the motion for new trial was filed after the announcement of the jury’s verdict and before the entry of judgment. 

17 See § 25-1144.01.

18 Schuyler Apt. Partners v. Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., 279 Neb. 989, 783 

N.W.2d 587 (2010); State ex rel. Amanda M. v. Justin T., 279 Neb. 273, 

777 N.W.2d 565 (2010).

19 DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 290 Neb. 286, 859 N.W.2d 867 (2015); Flores 

v. Flores-Guerrero, 290 Neb. 248, 859 N.W.2d 578 (2015).

20 See § 25-1144.01.
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As such, it fell within the savings clause under § 25-1144.01, 

and must be treated as having been filed immediately after the 

judgment was entered on the jury’s verdict. The motion for 

new trial was an effective filing and was not a nullity.

Because a proper and timely motion for new trial terminates the running of time for filing a notice of appeal,21 the 

appeal time did not start to run until the motion for new trial 

was ruled upon on October 14, 2016. Pribil and Wegener filed 

their notice of appeal within 30 days of that date, and their 

appeal should not have been dismissed as untimely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reinstate the appeal and 

remand the cause to the Court of Appeals for further 

proceedings.

 Reversed and remanded for

further proceedings.

Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.

21 See Despain v. Despain, supra note 4.