Jus tice Nehring sat on t his c ase and voted pr ior t o his retir ement 1 on January 31, 2015.

Thi s opi ni on i s su bj ec tt o r ev i si on be f or e f i nal pub l i cat i on in t he Pa ci f i c R epor t er

2015 UT 32

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

P R OV O C I TY and W O RKERS C OM P EN S AT I ON F UND ,

Pe ti ti o ners , v

. U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON and D UANE S ER R ANO ,

Responden ts

.
No. 20120724 Filed Febr uary 6, 2015
Origi na l Proc eed in g in thi s Cou rt

Att or neys: Ha ns M. S c he ffle r, S al t La ke C ity, fo r pe titi one rs Alan L. Henneb old, Jaceson R. Maughan, Ga ry E. Atki n, Mars haS . At kin, S al t La ke C ity,

fo r res pon de nts
J UST I CE D U R H A M authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG , 1

J UST I CE P ARRIS H , and J UST I CE L EE joined.
J UST I CE D UR HAM , op in ion of the Cou rt:
INTRODUCTION ¶1 While driving a tr uck within the scope of his employment with Provo City, Duane Ser rano was inju red in a car accident. He later applied for and received per manent tot al disab ility benefits. P rovo Ci ty an d th e W o r k e r s C o mp e n s a t i o n F u n d (c oll ec tive ly, WC F) appealed from the U tah Labor Co mmis sion’s order awarding be ne fi ts , a rgu in g th at ( 1) Mr. S erra no f ai le d to p rove th e el em ents of a p erm anent tota l d is ab il ity c la im; (2) the ad mi ni s trati ve l awj ud ge ab us ed he r di s c reti on b ec au s e s he initi al ly d en ie d Mr. S erra no ’s

c la im, b utthe n a ward ed be ne fi ts after th e l ab or c om mi s s ion in s tru c ted he r to rec onsider the evi de nc e; an d ( 3) any aw ard of benefits s hould no t commenc e on the date that he was deemed to be p e r ma ne nt l y a nd t o t a l l y d i sa bl e d be ca us e o f t he e x t r a o r d i nar y delay in resolving M r. Serr ano’s claim

. W e conclu de that none o f theseP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

2 argu me nts me rit re vers al, an d w e a ffirm the la bo r c om mi s s ion’s award of benefits.
BACKGROUND ¶2 M r

. Ser ran o w as empl oyed byP rovo Ci ty as a f ac il ity service t e chni cian. Wh ile driving a t ruck within the sc ope of his employment, he was inj ured in an automobile acc ident. Mr . Serrano alleged thatthe a cc i dent agg rav ated a congenital spine condition, le ad in g to c hronic pa in an d oth er d isa bi li tie s . After th e a c c id ent, Mr . Serrano cont inued to workfor Pro vo City. But mo re t han four yea rs la ter, he c onc lu de d th at h is s ym ptom s w ere n o lon ger manageable and requeste d a n a ssi gnment to a less p hysicall y de ma nd in g j ob . W he n Provo Ci ty rep li ed tha t a s ui tab le pos ition

w as notava il ab le , Mr. S erra no qui t. ¶3 Mr . Serrano subsequently applied fo r per manent tot al di s ab il ity c om pe ns ati on u nd er the W orkers ’ Compe ns ati on A c t, al le ging tha t b y th e ti me he qu it, hi s c ond iti on h ad de teri orate d to the point t hat he could no longe r work . The admi nistrativ e law j ud ge a s s ign ed to ad

j ud ic ate hi s c la im rece ive d i nto evi de nc e ove r twenty medical evaluations made by do ctor s and other ex pert s. Al tho ugh th e eva lu ators gen era ll y agre ed tha t Mr. S erra no s uf fe red from continuing impairment cau sed by the acci dent, they differed as to it s degree. Some docto rs opined that M r. Serrano was

ma ling er ing, an d th at h e c ou ld w ork if c erta in res tric tion s w ere ob s erved . An oth er ex pe rt c onc lu de d tha t Mr. Se rran o s uf fe red fro m
c hronic pa in

an d oth er a il me nts aggra vate d by ev en ba s ic w ork activities an d that, as a result, h e was permanently a nd t otally disab led. ¶4 After re vie w in g th is evi de nc e, the ad mi ni s trati ve lawj ud ge fo un d th at Mr. S erra no h ad notprove n a ll of the req ui red el em ents to rec ei ve p erm an ent tota l d is ab il ity c om pe ns ati on a nd di s mi s s ed hi s c la im w ith pre

j ud ic e. Mr. S erra no fi le d a mo tion fo r revi eww ith the Ut ah Labor Commission. T he labor c o mm i ssion set aside the ad mi ni s trati ve l awj ud ge’s orde r be c au s e it c onc lu de d th at th e j ud ge
s hou ld ha ve a pp ointed a m ed ic alpa ne l to r ev ie wMr. S erra no’ s claim . The labor commis sion therefor e re m a n d e d the c a se bac k to the j ud ge w ith di rec tion s to ap poi nt a me di c al pa ne l an d to i s s ue a n ew decis ion in light of the ent ire r ecord. ¶5 On remand, the administrativ e law judge refer red the cas e to a m ed ic al pa ne l for re vie w . After re vie w in g th e m ed ic alpa ne l’ s repo rtand the medicalevidence, the a d mi ni strat ive law judge found that t he pr e p o nd e r a nc e o f t he e v i d e nc e sh o we d t ha tM r

. Se r r ano was permanent l y a nd t otally disab led as a result of his acci dent andCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

3 awarded him permanent dis a bility payments. The WCF filed a motion for rev iew wi th the labor commis sion, ass ert ing that t he judge’s order was i n err or . The co mmis sion affirmed the ad mi ni s trati ve l awj ud ge’s orde r. The W CF a pp ea le d, an d th e c ou rt of ap pe al s c erti fi ed the c as e to th is c ou rt.
AN AL YSI S
I. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY ¶6 The elements of a permanent tot al disab ility claim are laid out in Utah Co de section 34A-2-413( 1)(b ):
T o e s t a b l i s he n t i t l e m e n tt o p e r m a n e n tt o t a l d i s a bi li ty

c om pe ns ati on, the empl oyee s ha llprove bya pre pon de ranc e of

evi de nc e th at: (i) t he e mp l o y e e su st a i ne d a signific ant impairment

or combin ati o n o f impai rments as a result of the indus tr ial acc ident or occupational dis ease . . . ; (i i) the empl oyee ha s a p erm an ent, tot aldi s ab il ity; and (iii) the in dustrial acc ident or occupational dis ease is the direct caus e of the employ ee’s permanent totaldi s ab il ity.
The statute furthe r p r ov ides that permanent to tal disabili ty is

c om pri s ed of

fo ur el em ents

. In orde r to “e s tab li s h tha t an empl oyee ha s a p erm an ent, tot aldi s ab il ity[ ,] the empl oyee s ha llprove ” th at: (i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (i i) the empl oyee ha s an impairm ent or combin ation o f impai rments tha tlimit the employee’s ability t o do basic w or k activit ies; (i ii ) t he in du s tria l or oc c up ati ona ll y c au s ed impa irm ent or c ombi na tion of impa irm ents prev ent the employ ee from per for mi ng the essential func tions of the w or k activit ies for whic h the empl oyee ha s be en qu al ifie d until the ti me of the industrial acci dent or occupational dis ease that is the bas is for the employe e’s perm a nent to tal disab ility claim; and (i v) t he empl oyee c annotpe rfo rm o the r w ork reasonably av ailable.P R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

4 U T A H C ODE § 34A-2-413(1) (c) . Thus , take n a s awhole, the permanent tot al disab ility stat ute r e quires worker s to pro ve six elements: (1) “the employee sustained a s ignificant impairment ; ” (2 ) “the emp l oy e e i s n ot ga i nfu l l y e m p l oy e d ; ” ( 3 ) “ th e e m p l oy e e has an impa i r m e nto rc o m

b i n a t i o n o f i mp a i r me nts tha t li mi t th e empl oyee ’s ab il ity t o do b as ic work a c tivi tie s ;” (4 ) t he impa irm ent or impairments “prevent t he employee from perfo rming the essential fu nc tion s of

the wo r k ac tivi tie s fo r w hi c h the empl oyee ” h ad be en qu al ifie d a t th e ti me of the ac c ident; ( 5) “th e empl oyee c annot perfor m other workreasonably av ailable;” and ( 6) “the indus tr ial

ac c id ent or oc c up ati ona l di s ea s e is the di rec t c au s e of the empl oyee ’s permanent to tal disabili ty.” Id. § 34A-2-413(1) (b)

– (c)

. ¶7 Th e WCF ar gues that the labor commis sion erre d when i t awarded permanent tot al disab ility payments becau se Mr. Serr ano failed t o prov e any of the six necess ary elements for such an award. In an al yzi ng t he WC F’s argu me nts , w e firs t de term in e the s tan da rd of rev iew for each element of a permanent to tal disabili ty claim. We the n a pp ly th e ap prop ria te s tan da rd of revi ew to ea c h of the WC F’s

as s erti ons of

error. A. Sta nda rd

o f Re view ¶8 Uta h C ode s ec tion 63 G-4-40 3(4) au tho riz es ap pe ll ate c ou rts to g rant r elief to a party sub stantially prejudiced by an err or in the fi na l d is pos iti on of a cla im ad j ud ic ate d b y an

ad mi ni s trati ve a genc y. Th is s tatu te li s ts s evera l c ate gorie s of rem ed ia bl e errors an d i mp li es a standard of rev iew for some, but not all, of these error s. Murray v. Uta h La bo r Co mm’ n , 2 01 3 UT38 , ¶ 1 9, 30 8 P .3 d 4 61 . T he s tatu te, fo r example, author izes appellate courts to g ran t r elief wh ere an “a genc y ac tion

is ba s ed up on ade term in ati on o f fa c t, m ad e or implied b y the ag ency, that is not su pport ed by sub stantial evidence when viewed in

light of t he whole r e co r d before t he court.” U T AH C ODE § 6 3G -4 -4 03 (4)(g ). T hu s , ac ha ll en ge to a n a dm inis trati ve agency’s findin g of fact is reviewed for sub s tanti al evidence. Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 19. “A d ecisi on i s supp or ted b y subs tantial ev idence if there is a q ua nt um and quality of r elevant e vidence that is adequate t o convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.” Becker v. Su nset City, 2013 UT 51, ¶ 1 0 , 3 0 9 P.3d 223 (i nternal quotat ion marks omitt ed). “In conduc ting a subs tantial ev idence

rev iew, we do not reweigh the evidence and independ ently choose whic h inferences we fin d to be t he most reasonable.” Id. ¶ 21 (i n te rn a l q u ot a ti on m a rk s om i tt e d )

. “ In s te a d , w e d e f e r to [an adminis tr ative agency’s] find ings bec ause w hen reasonably conflict i ng views arise, it is the [agency’s] province to drawCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

5 inferences an d resolv e these conflic ts.” Id. (i nte rna l qu otati on m arks omitte d). ¶9 Other remediable err or s identified i n sec tion 63G-4-403(4) , how ever, are notac c om pa ni ed bya s tand ard of revi ew . W he n
rev iewing these types of err or s, we apply our tr aditional standards of re view

. Mu r ray, 2 01 3 UT38 , ¶ 2 1. One exa mp le is s ub s ec tion (4)( d), wh ich permits appellate court s to gr ant relief where an “agency has erro neously . . . applied the law.” U T A H C OD E § 63G-4- 403(4). When

rev iewing this kind of a l leged age ncy err or , we
empl oy on e of

ou r es tab li s he d sta nd ard s of revi ewfo r mi xed questions of lawand fac t. Murray, 2 01 3 UT38 , ¶ 24 . Th e l evelof deference we aff or d to an a g e ncy’s resolution of mixed questions vari es de pe nd in g u pon the na tu re of

the mi xed question

un de r
rev iew. Id. ¶ 36. ¶10 In o r de r to de term in e th e a pp ropri ate s tan da rd of revi ew for t he WCF’s challenges to the labor commis sion’s fi ndings on the six el e m e n ts of

a p e rm a n e n t t ot a l d i s a b i l i tyc l a i m, w e m u s t d ecide

w he the r ea c h e le me nt p res ents ei the r a p ure qu esti o n o f fa c t or a mixed question of law and f act. “Factual q ue st ions are gener ally reg arded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions,

or conditions happeni ng, e x isting, or takingplace, as well as the sub jective, suc h a s stat e of mind.” Sta tev. Pe na , 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). A mixed question of law and f act, on the o ther hand, involve s the ap pl ic ati on o f ale gal s tan da rd to an es tab li s he d s et of facts. Id. at 936 . In

oth er w ords , th e c ha rac teri s tic tha t di s tin gu is he s a mix e d q ue st i on from a question of fact is “the existence of an art icul ab l e l e ga li ssu e.” Ma rt inezv. Med ia -P a yma ster P lus , 2007 UT 42, ¶ 27, 164 P.3d 384. ¶11 Becaus e the thir d, fourth, and fifth elements of a permanent totaldi s ab il ity c la im

are s im il ar, w e exam in e thes e elem ents fi rs t to de term in e w he the r t he y pr es ent qu es tion s of fa c t or m ixe d qu es tion s . W e th en

de term in e th e s tan da rd of r ev ie wfo r the fi rs t, second, and sixth elements in turn.
1. Th e T hi rd, Fou rth, an d Fi ft h E le me nts ¶12 In Ma rt inez, we establish ed the s tandard of rev i e w f o r the fourth and f i ft h e lements of a permanent tot al disab ility claim. We held that the fourth element—wh ether an employee can perfor m the essential func tions of jobs the employee had been qu alified f or at the time of the ac cident—is a question of fact. Id. ¶ 30. We reasoned t hat the qu es tion s of

w ha t th e es s entia l fu nc tion s of a j ob are an d w he the r a p arti c ul ar p ers on i s m e d i c al ly a bl e to p erf ormtho s e func tion s w ere matter s for exper ts and did not involv e the applicati o n o f a legalP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

6 standard. Id. We li kew is e c onc lu de d tha t th e fifth e le me nt— w he the r an employee can perfor m o t he r wor k r easonably available—is a qu es tion of fa c t b ec au s e th is el em ent d o e s n o tr e qu ire the ap pl ic ati on of a legal standard. Id. ¶ 32. ¶13 We ha ve n ot spe c ific al ly a dd res s ed the s tan da rd of revi ew fo r the thi rd el em ent of a pe rma ne nt t otaldi s ab il ity c la im —w he the r the employee has a limited ability to perfor m basic wor k activit ies. Due to the similarities between the third element and the four th and fi ft h e le me nts , w e c onc lu de tha t the thi rd el em ent li kew is e p res ents a question of fact. The third, fourth, and fifth elements as sess an employee’s ability t o perfor m wor k activities: basic workactivities, the w ork ac tivi tie s of

pri or empl oym ent, or th e w ork ac tiv ities of other employment r easonably available. U T A H C ODE § 34A-2- 41 3( 1) (c )( ii )– (i v). Be c au s e th e th ird el em ent, l ike the fo urt h a nd fi ft h

e l e m e n ts , d e p e n d s on

e m p i ri c a l e vi d e n c e a n d e xp e rtte stimony reg ar d i ng an employee’s ability to perfor m certain func tions, it likewise present a question of fact. SeeMa rt inez , 2007 UT 4 2, ¶¶ 30–32. ¶14 We ther efor e rev iew the ultimate findin gs in the third, fo urt h, an d fifth e le me nts of a p erm an ent to t al di s ab il ity c la im fo r
s ub s tantia l e vid enc e. 2. The First Element ¶15 Un de r the fi rs t el em ent of a tota l, pe rma ne nt d is ab il ity claim, an employee mu st prov e he or she “sus tained a si g ni ficant impairment or comb i na t i o n o f impai rments as a result of the i n d u s tr i a l a c c i d e n t o r o c c u p a ti on a l d i s e ase.” U T A H C ODE § 34A-2- 413(1)(b)( i). Th is element is fund amentally different fro m the third, fourth, and fifth elements disc uss ed above because it is n ot po ssible to r esolve t he question of whether an e mployee has pro ven thathe

or s he ha s s us tai ne d as ignific ant impa irm ent w ith ou t referri ng to a legal standard. The question of whether an employee is ph y si ca lly able to perfor m a particular j ob can be resolv ed thro ug h an examination of t he medic al evidence a nd the opinions of medic al

an d vo cat ion alexp erts . T he ap pl ic ati on o f ale galrul e i s not

necess ary to t he resolution o f this qu est i o n. Ma rt inez , 2007 UT 42, ¶¶ 30–32. ¶16 Th e q uestion of whether a part icul ar impairment is “s ignific ant,” how ever, req ui res a c ou rt to eva lu ate the s everi ty of the impairment and deter min e wh e ther t he level of impairment

exc ee d s ami ni mu m

thr e s h o ld . S im il ar to ade term in ati on o f w he the r
a s ea rc h or s ei zur e is “r ea s ona bl e” in the c ont ext of

the Fou rth Amendment, a court cannot re solve t he question of whether anCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

7 impa irm ent is “s ignific ant” w ith ou t ap plyi ng a l ega l d efiniti on o f that t erm to t he facts of the cas e. SeeMa nz a na res v. By ing to n (In re Adoption of Baby B

. ), 2 0 1 2 U T 35, ¶ 44, 308 P.3d 382 (reasonable search and s eiz ur e d e t erminations are mixed questions of law and fa c t) . T hi s in qu iry, the ref ore, is a m ixe d que s tion of la wan d f ac t. ¶17 A mi xed qu es tion of la w an d fa c t ma y impl ic ate one of thre e
s tan da rds of revi ew , dep en di ng up on the type of c ha ll en ge mad e on appeal. First, we re view the lower tr ibun al’s resolut i o n o f fac tual dispu tes deferentially. Jeffs v. Stubbs , 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). For appeals fr o m administrativ e decisi ons, we review the adminis tr ative bo d y ’ s f i nd i ng s o f f a ctun d e r t he su bs t a nt i a l e v i d ence standard. Dra k e v. In dus . C omm’n , 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Second, w e rev iew the law appl ied t o t he se fac ts for cor rectness. Baby B

. , 2 01 2 UT35 , ¶ 4 7. An d thi rd, w e review the low er tri bu na l’ s ultimate conclu sion of “whether a giv en set of facts comes within the

rea c h of a gi ven rul e o f la w” as a mi xed qu es tion of la wan d f ac t. Pe na , 869 P.2 d a t 9 3 6 . This rev iew may be either deferent ial or de

novo , depending on the nature o f the particular mixed question. Baby B

. , 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42. ¶18 In thi s ap pe al , th e W CF c ha ll en ges the la bo r c om mi s s ion’s fi nd in gs of fa c t rega rdi ng the s everi ty of Mr. S erra no’ s impa irm ent. We accordingly ev aluate this argument under the substantial evidence standard of rev iew.
3. The S econd Element ¶19 Under t he second elem ent, t he l a bor commiss ion mus t deter mine w he t he r the individual seeking benefits is gainfully employed. U T A H C ODE § 34A-2-413(1) (c) (i). As we note b e l ow, the WC F mo unts a l ega l c ha ll en ge to th e l ab or c om mi s s ion’s fi nd in g on this element, asserting that the WCF’s conces sion that M r

. Ser rano
w as un empl oyed w as no l ong er v al id w he n th e c om mi s s ion

aw ard ed be ne fi ts . Bec au s e this is s ue w as not pre s erved , we d o no t address it. In

fra¶¶ 25–27. We therefor e ne e d no t r esolve t he

s tan da rd of

revi ewfo r the s ec ond el em ent. 4. The S ixth Element ¶20 Fin al ly, the s ixth

el em ent require s an

empl oyee to pro ve tha ta w o r ka c c i d e n t“ i s t h e d i r e c tc a u s e o f t h e e m p l o yee ’s permanent to tal disabili ty.” U T A H C ODE § 3 4A- 2-41 3(1 )(b)( ii i) . In

c as e s w h e r e t h e r e i s n o p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n c o n t r i b u t i n g to a di s a b i l i ty , th e e m p l oy e e n e e d onl y p ro ve th a t th e w or k a c c i d e n t is the medical c ause of the disab ility. Murray, 20 13 UT 38 , ¶ 45 . Un de r the medical caus ation t est, the employe e mus t show that an accidentP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

8 is the b ut-for c ause of the disability. Al len v. Ind us. Co mm’ n , 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). ¶21 In cases where a preex isting condition is a con t r ibuting factor t o the disabili ty, t he employee must prov e both medical causation and legal causation. Murray, 2 0 1 3 UT 3 8 , ¶¶ 4 5

– 4 6 . “To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition mus t show that the employ ment contribu t ed something sub stantial to increase the r i sk he already faced in ever yday life be cause of his c ondition.” Al len , 729 P .2 d a t 25 . “ [T ]h is he ighten ed

s how in g of le gal c au s e is ne c es s ary to di s tin gu is h those i nju rie s whi ch

. . . coincid entally o ccu r atworkbecau se a preexisting

c ond iti on re s ul ts in

s ym ptom s w hi c h a pp ea r duri ng workhou rs without any enhanceme nt f ro m the work place.” Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 46 ( s e c o n d a l t e r a t i o ni no r i g i n a l ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o nm a r ks omitte d). ¶22 He re, the WC F c ha ll en ges the ma nn er i n w hich t he la bo r
c om mi s s ion

de term in ed tha t th e c ar a c c id ent w as the le gal c au s e of Mr . Serrano’ s dis ability. In fra¶ 35. Becaus e the WCF asserts a legal

c ha ll en ge to the me tho d of d ete rmi ni ng l ega l c au s ati on, w e revi ew this argument de nov o. See Baby B. , 20 12 UT35 , ¶ 4 7 ( “[ A] pp el la te

c ou rts ha ve tra di tion al ly b een s een as ha vin g the pow er a nd du ty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform thro ughout the jurisdi ction . . . .” (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed)).
B. Substantial Evidence of Permanent Tota l Disability 1. The First Element: Signific ant Impairment ¶23 In s up port o f i ts c onc lu s ion tha t Mr. S erra no s uf fe red fro m a signific ant impairme nt , the labor commission f ound that his inju ries prev ented him “from lifting, push ing or pullin g mor e than 25 p o u n d s o r w o r k i n ga th e i g h t s

. ” T h e c o m m i s s i o nfu r t h e r not ed that t he “medic al panel de t e r mi ne d Mr. Ser rano sustained a 6% whole-person impairment as a resul t of t he acc ident.” ¶24 Ci tin g th e d ef erentia l s ub s tantia l e vid enc e s tandar d of

rev iew, the WCF asserts that t he evidence does not supportthese factual findings. An examination of th e re c or d re ve a ls, however, t hat sub stantial evidence sus tains t he se fin dings. Th e medical p anel,

w hi c hr e v i e w e d a l l o f

t h e r e l e v a n tm e d i c a l e v i d e n c e , d e t e r m i n ed tha t Mr. S erra no c ou ld notw ork on la dd ers “or u np ro tec ted heights” and that he could not move obj ects weighing more t han 25 pounds. T he panel als o concluded that Mr. Ser rano mer i t ed a “6% Whole Person Impairment” r ating as a result of his acc ident. This evi de nc e d ire c tly s upp o r t s the fi nd in gs of fa c t m ad e b y th e l ab orCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

9 commis sion and is sub stantial. See Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Co mm’ n , 2011 UT 54, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 751 (“A decis ion is s upporte d by sub stantial evidence i f t he r e is a quantum and qual ity o f relevant evi de nc e tha t is ad eq ua te to c onvi nc e area s ona bl e m in d to s up port a conclu sion.” (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d)).
2. The S econd Element: No Gainful Emp loyment ¶25 At th e h ea rin g on

Mr

. Ser ran o’s c la im, th e W CF c onc ed ed tha t Mr. Ser r ano w as notgai nful ly e mp loye d. Wh en the la bo r
c om mi s s ion

revers ed the ad mi ni s trati ve la w j ud ge’s initi alde ni alof permanent to tal disab ility payments, it directed t he jud ge t o appoint

a m ed ic alpa ne l to re vie wthe evi de nce. T he la bo r c om mi s s ion further ins t r uc t e d the judge that after she received the medical pa ne l’ s rep ort, s he w as to “i s s ue a n ewde c is ion t hat res olve s M r

. Se r rano’ s vario us c laims in light of the entir e recor d.” The adminis tr ative l a wj u d gei nte rp re te d the l a b orc ommi ssi on’s remand

or der t o mean that t he only new evidence to be considered w ould be the medical pan el’s repor t. The judge, therefor e, i ns t ructed the medicalpanel to r eview only t he evidence presented a t t he initial hearing when preparing it s repor t, and th e p a rt ies presented no additional evidence before t he judg e issu ed her second order . The WC F pre s ented no o bj ec tion to th e a dm inis trati ve l awj ud ge’s decis ion not t o consider new evidence on remand. ¶26 The WCF now ar gues, ho wever, that sinc e no new evidence

w as pre s ented after th e l abor commis s ion rem an de d th e c as e f or reconsideratio n, its conc ession that Mr . Serrano was not g ainfu lly

empl oyed w as no l ong er va li d w he n the a dm inis trati ve l awj ud ge iss ued its sec ond or der. Thus, it ass ert s that no ev idences u p port s the

c onc lu s ion

tha t Mr. S erra no w as un empl oyed at the tim e th e j ud ge iss ued the or der challenged in this appeal. ¶27 The WCF’s position fails becau se it was not asserted below. Th e W CF c ou c he s its argu me nt a s a s ub s tantia l e vid enc e c ha ll en ge, bu t in tru th i t is argu in g tha t the ad mi ni s trati ve la wj ud ge’s de c is ion to rec ons id er the evid enc e as it e xis ted at th e ti me of the evi de nti ary hearing was in err or

. In essenc e, the WCF asserts Mr. Serr ano should ha ve b een req ui red to pro ve th e el em ents of hi s c la im

as of the da te tha t th e j ud ge is s ue d he r s ec ond orde r. B utthe WC F f ai le d to m ake thi s c la im

be low . B y rem ai ni ng s il ent an d w ai tin g f or th e a pp ea l to rai s e th is is s ue , th e WCF unfa irl y pre j ud ic ed Mr. S erra no. If

the WC F had raised this is sue b elow, Mr . Serrano would h ave been on not ice of the pot ential need to pr oduce more currentev i d ence of his employment s tatus. Avo iding this type of unfair prejudice to an

o p p o sing par ty lies at t he heart o f our preser vat ion rule. SeeP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

10 T s ch ag g e ny v

. Mil b a nk I

ns. Co. , 2007 UT 37, ¶ 23, 163 P.3d 615 (preserv ation r ule prev e nt s par ties from obtaining a str ateg ic advantag e by raising an issu e for t he first time on a ppeal). We the ref ore d o no t ad dre s s thi s ne wis s ue rai s ed bythe WC F.
3. The Th ird El em ent: L im ite d A bi li ty to P erf ormBa s ic Work Ac tivi tie s ¶28 Uta h C ode s ec tion 34 A- 2-41 3( 1) (c )( ii ) req ui res an empl oyee seeking permane nt d i sa bi l i ty be ne fi t s t o p r o v e t ha tt he e mp l o y ee has “an impairment o r combin ation o f impai rments that limit t he

empl oyee ’s ab il ity t o do b as ic w ork ac tivi tie s .” Th e empl oyee ne ed not pr ov e a complete inability to per form basic workactivities, only tha t th e empl oyee ’s ab il ity t o pe rfo rm the s e a c tivi tie s is lim ite d. In definin g what constitutes basic workactivities, we lookto ident ical language used in federa l so ci al secu rity law, w hich defines “basic workactivities” as “t he abilities an d aptitudes neces sary t o do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (2012). Thus , the disabili ty must limit an employee’s ability to perfor m the workactiv ities of a broad

s pe c tru m o f j ob s ava il ab le

. ¶29 In this cas e, the lab o r commis sion conc luded that Mr. S erra no’ s ab il it y t o pe rfo rm b as ic w ork ac tivi tie s w as li mi ted becau se he di d no t “ ha v e a full range of motio n with his head and

ne c k an d c annotpu t s tres s on hi s ne c k s uc h th at h e d oes notha ve a
rea s ona bl e d egre e of fl exi bi li ty.” Th e c om mi s s ion’s s pe c ific fi nd in gs rega rdi ng Mr. S erra no’ s ne c k impa irm ents are in ad eq ua te to s how that his ability to per form most ty pes of jobs was l imited. Of course a neck inju ry could limit an e mployee’s ability t o per form physically demandin g jobs, inc luding Mr. S err ano’s prev ious line of w or k. But thi s el em ent de al s w ith w ork ac tivi tie s tha t are s o ba s ic tha t the y are req ui red to pe rfo rm m os t j ob s , i nc lu di ng mo r e sed entary l in es of

w ork. T he c om mi s s ion’s fi nd in gs do n ot ad eq ua tel y de mo ns trate tha t Mr. S erra no’ s di s ab il ity n ega tive ly a ffec ts hi s ab il ity t o pe rfo rm less p hysicall y demanding jobs, s uch as offic e work

. ¶30 We never theless affirm the lab or commis sion’s findin g that this element was satisfi ed becau se it is s upporte d by sub stantial evid e n c e p re s e n te d to th e c omm i s s i on

. Mr

. S e rr a n o te s ti f i e d that

c ert ai n b as ic ac tivi tie s , l ike w al kin g, c ou ld c au s e h is c ond iti on t o
worsen suc h that he could do n othing bu t rest for t wo or three days. He stated that by the time he quit his j ob with Provo City he could onl y w ork f or tw o ho urs be fo re h e w ou ld be c om e too n au s ea ted to

c ont inue . H e furt he r s tate d tha t w ith in an hou r of s itti ng i n frontof a computer he would ex perience naus ea and back pain and w ould have to lie down. Finally, Mr. Ser rano t estified that his inj ury madeCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

11 it d iffi c ul t to s le ep at night, w hi c h interfered w ith hi s ab il ity t o arri ve at w ork on tim e. Al tho ugh Mr. S erra no’ s tes tim onyis c ont rad ic ted in s om e res pe c ts bys om e of the me di c aleva lu ati ons , i t c o nst it ut es sub stantial evidence on whic h the commis sion wa s ent itled to rely in f ind ing that h is in

j uryli mi ted hi s ab il ity t o pe rfo rm b as ic w ork activities thatwould be required for most jobs.
4. Th e Fou rth E le me nt: In ab il ity t o P erf ormForm er W ork ¶31 Th e l ab or c om mi s s ion fo un d tha t Mr. Se rran o w as qu al ifie d to pe rfo rm s evera l type s of empl oym ent. He ha d el even y ea r s of exper ience as a facil ity ser vice technician fixing and maintaining publi c bu ildings a nd o ther facilities. Mr. Serr ano also had jobs maintaining a p ub lic pool and as a s ecurity g uard. Finally, as a member of the National Guard, he perfor med physic al labor as well as typing and filing duties. ¶32 S ubs tantia l e vid enc e s up portsthe la bo r c om mi s s ion’s findin g thatMr . Serrano could no longer perfor m wor k that he was prev iously qualified to per form. H i s jo bs as a facil ity ser vice technici an and s wimming pool mainte n a nc e te c hni c i a n re qu i re d him to climb ladders, look up fo r p ro longed per iods, place h is body in awkward positions in order to fix v arious systems o r machines , and lift heavy objec ts. Both ex pertrepo rt s and Mr. Serrano ’s testimony ad eq ua tel y s up port t he c onc lu s ion tha t Mr. S erra no c ou ld no l ong er safely perform t hese tasks wi thout ex periencing debilitati ng pain. Mr. S erra no a ls o tes tifie d th at h is in j ury pr ev ented hi m from perfor ming the duties of a se cu r ity g uard, suc h as c hasin g and ap pre he nd in g tres pa s s ers . Ad di tion al ly, Mr. Ser ran o pre s ented evidence that he could no longer carry out the clerical tasks he had perfor med in the National G uard becau se he could not perfor m the rep eti tive ne c k m ovem ents req ui red fo r da ta e ntry an d fil in g. Mr

. S e rr a n o fu rt h e r te s ti f i e d th a t a fte r op e ra ti n g a c omp u te r in a

s e a te d p os i ti on

f orl e s s th a na nh ou r, h e b e c om e s d i z z y and exper iences back pain.
5. The F ifth Element: Inability to Per form Ot her Wor k Reasonably Available ¶33 At t he evidentiar y hearing , the WCF’ s vocational reh ab il ita tio n e xpe rt tes tifie d th at s evera l m ai nte na nc e s up ervi s or positions were available and that M r

. Serrano could perfo rm this type o f work. A maintenance sup e rv i s orm a n a ge s oth e r m a i nte n a nce tec hnic ia ns an d p erf orm s offi c e w ork. ¶34 The WCF arg ues in t hi s a ppeal that in light o f the rehabilitatio n couns elor ’s testimony, no substantial ev idence in theP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

12 rec ord s up ports the c onc lu s ion tha t Mr. S erra no c ou ld notpe rfo rm other work reasonably available. We disagree. Even if Mr. Ser rano could have obtained a position thatonly r equired off ice work, as not ed ab ove, he pre s ented s ub s tantia l e vid enc e th at h is in j ury prev ented him from perfor ming clerical ac tivit ies. Supra ¶ 32.
6. Th e S ixth

El em ent: C au s ati on ¶35 Th e W CF d oes notrai s e a s ub s tantia l e vid enc e c ha ll en ge to the labor commission’s finding that th e wo r k accident was the

me di c alc au s e of

Mr. S erra no’ s di s ab il iti es . In s tea d, the WC F as s erts the legal ar gument that because the car a ccident agg rav ated a

c ong en ita l s pi na l c ond iti on, the ac c id ent w as not the “d ire c t c au s e” of Mr

. Serr a no ’ s disabilities. See U T A H C ODE § 34A-2-413(1) (b) (iii)

. Th e W CF c ont en ds tha t w he re a pre exi s tin g c ond iti on p red is pos es
an empl oyee t o sust ai n a m ore s evere in j uryas a re s ul t of

a w ork acci dent, the employ ee cann o t establish a direct causal l ink to the

ac c id ent. ¶36 Th e W CF’s argu me nt i s c le arl y w rong . “ Jus t b ec au s e a pe rs on s uf

fe rs a pree xis tin g c ond iti on, he or s he is notdi s qu al ifie d from obtai ni ng compens ation. O ur cases make clear thatthe aggr avat ion or lighting up o f a pre-existing diseas e by an indus tr ial acci dent is compe ns a bl e

. . . .” Al len , 729 P.2d at 25 (alterat ion in original ) ( intern alqu otati on m arks om itte d) . W he n ac ond iti on o r
exer tion atworkaggr avat e s a n e mp l o y e e ’ s p r e e x i st i ngcondition, the employee must establish that t he work conditio n o r exer tion is the legal caus e of any resulting disability. Id. at 25

– 26

. Bu t the WC F doe s not cite o ur le g a l ca usation cas e law or ar gue that t he car acci dent

was n ot t he legal cause of Mr. Serr ano’s disab ilities. Instead, the WCF argues that a work acci dent that aggr avat es a preex isting condition can never be the dir ect caus e of a disabil ity. We r eject this arg ument and u phold the labor commissi o n’ s fin ding that Mr . Serrano pr ov ed caus ation.
7. Conc lu s ion ¶37 In c ha ll en gin gthe aw ard of pe rma ne nt t otaldi s ab il ity payments to M r. Serr ano, the WCF arg ues, in large p a r t , t hat the award should b e rev ersed becaus e the e v i d e nc e supports a conclu sion tha t M r. Serr ano was not tot ally disabled. B ut these argu me nts do n ot s ati s fythe s ub s t ant ia l e vid enc e s tan da rd of

rev iew. Th e fact that t he e v i d ence might su pport a different

c onc lu s ion

is ins uf fi c ie nt grou nd s fo r revers in g an ad mi ni s trati ve agency’s findin gs of fact. SeeBe cker , 2013 UT 51, ¶¶ 21–22. Bec ause the WCF failed t o sh o w that no subs tantial ev idence s upports theCite as: 2015 UT 32 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

13 labor commiss ion’s findi ngs on t he e l ements of a permanent to tal disab ility award, we affirm the decis ion below. II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’SDECISION TO ARRI VE AT A DIFFERENT RESULT AFTER REMAND ¶38 As noted abov e, the administrativ e law ju d ge initially denied Mr. Serr ano’s permanent to tal disab ility claim. After t he la bo r c om mi s s ion revers ed an d rem an de d the c as e, t he judge considered a new m edical pan el repo rt a long with the ev idence presented in the initial p r o ce e d i ng, and came to a different

c onc lusi o n. T he ad mi ni s trati ve l awj ud ge’s s ec ond orde r aw ard ed benefits. T he WCF ar gues on appeal that the administ r a t i ve law j ud ge a bu s ed he r di s c reti on by arri vin g at adi fferent ou tc om e a ft er the re mand. ¶39 We hold that the admini strat ive law judge did not err . The medicalpanel’s repor t constituted new e v idence that could reasonably lead a different out come. M or eov er, t he WCF cites no

s tatu te, rul e, or le gal pri nc ip le tha t w ou ld pre vent an ad mi ni s trati ve law j udge from ar riv ing at a di ff e r e nt o utcome when the j udge is directed to reweigh the ev idence on remand. Abs e nt a ny legal argu me nt a s to w hy the ad mi ni s trati ve law j ud ge cou ld notc ha nge he r mi nd after th e rem an d, w e a r e u na bl e to e val ua te th e W CF’s bald as sertio n that the judge abused her disc ret ion. See U T A H R. A PP

. P. 24(a) (9) (“The ar gument shall contain the contentio ns and reasons of the ap pe ll ant w ith res pe c t to the is s ue s pre s ented , . . . with

c ita tion s to th e a ut horiti es, statu tes , a nd pa rts of the rec ord re li ed on.”)
III. D EL AY INIS S UIN G T HE AD MIN IS TR AT IV E D EC IS ION ¶40 Mr . Serrano filed his cl aim for benefits in 2006. T he adminis tr a tivelaw j udge denied his permanent to tal disabili ty claim in 2007, and he filed a motion for rev iew with the labor commission. The l a bo r commis sion did not rule on the mot ion for r eview until 2010 , w h e n i t re m a n d e d th e c a s e b a c k to th e a d m i n i s tr a ti ve law j ud ge f or furt he r proc eed in gs . T he ad mi ni s trati ve l awj udge the n is s ue d as ec ond orde r aw ard in g ben efi t s in 20 12an d th e l ab or
c om mi s s ion

affi rme d th e awa rd late r tha t yea r. Th e W CF a pp ea le d to t he court o f appeals and after the case was fully briefed and oral

a r g um e nt was h eld in that court, t he court o f appeals certified the

case to this court for further briefing and oral ar gument before t his

c ou rt. ¶41 The WCF complains about the six-year delay between the filing of Mr. Serr ano’s claim and th e labor commiss ion’s finalP R OV O C I TY v . U T A H L ABO R C OMMI S S I ON Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

14 de ci si o n a ffirming the award of benefits. T he WCF asserts that it

w ou ld be pre

j ud ic ed if it we re requ ire d to ma ke alu mp -s um aw ard for t he year s in w hich

Mr . Serrano was entitled t o benefit s but did not r eceive them becau se of the delay in adjud icating his claim . The WCF somewhat sheepis hly suggests: “Perhaps this Court can appl y the equitable prin ci p l es recently r ecognized [in Em ploye rs’ Rein suranc e Fu nd v. Labor Commission , 2012 UT 76, ¶¶ 30–37, 289 P .3d 572] to modify t he onset date o f benefits.” ¶42 We rej e ct this proposal becaus e our ho lding in Em ploye rs’ Rei nsura nce Fu nddo es no t ap pl y he re. In tha t c as e, an

empl oyee wai t ed thi rtee n ye ars after h e b ec am e d is ab le d to fil e ac la im fo r benefits. Id. ¶¶ 3 4– 36 . W e h el d th at b ecaus e th e emp lo ye e’s

un r e asonable delay prejudic ed the Employer s’ Reinsu rance Fund, the employee ’s benefi ts would be c alcula t e d from the date he first applied for them. Id. ¶ 36

. In thi s c as e, the de la yed aw ard of be ne fi ts is notattribu tab le to Mr. S erra no, bu t rath er to the a dm inis trati ve system set up to adjud i ca t e his c laim. Thus, u nlike the claimant in Em ploye rs’

Rei nsura nce Fu nd, there is no reason why Mr. Ser rano
s hou ld s hou ld er th e b urd en fo r any pre

j ud ic e c au s ed bythe de la y. CONC LUSION ¶43 We affirm the labor commiss ion’s award of permanent to tal di s ab il ity b en efits to Mr. S erra no.

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