1

Filed 3/22/23 Cotzomi v. Universal Protection Service CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

PABLO COTZOMI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

UNIVERSAL PROTECTION 

SERVICE, LP et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A164301

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG20080769)

Defendants Universal Protection Service, LP (UPS LP), Universal 

Protection Service, LLC, Allied Universal Security Services, and Allied 

Universal Security Services, LLC (collectively the Allied defendants) appeal 

from the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of this 

action filed by plaintiff Pablo Cotzomi. The Allied defendants contend the 

trial court’s decision rested on an erroneous legal assumption, to wit, that 

direct evidence of plaintiff’s execution of the electronic signature on the 

alleged arbitration agreement was necessary to authenticate the agreement. 

On the record before us, we conclude the court erroneously declined to 

consider the circumstantial value of the Allied defendants’ evidence

indicating that plaintiff executed the electronic signature on the arbitration 

agreement. We therefore reverse the order and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the Allied defendants and 

Point to Point Global Security, Inc. (P2P) alleging violations of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). The lawsuit arises 

out of defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiff with proper disclosures 

and a summary of rights under FCRA at the time of his hiring. 

The Allied defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that 

plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any claims he had against them as a condition of 

his employment. In support of their motion, the Allied defendants submitted 

the declaration of UPS LP’s regional human resources director, Peggy 

Grzywacz, who stated that her responsibilities included onboarding 

employees and conducting new hire orientations. Based on her review of 

plaintiff’s personnel records, Grzywacz stated on information and belief that 

plaintiff became employed with UPS LP in May 2019 following UPS LP’s 

acquisition of the security firm P2P.1 UPS LP began transitioning former 

P2P employees during two orientation sessions held on April 25, 2019. 

According to Grzywacz, plaintiff and other former P2P employees attended an

April 25 orientation, during which human resources coordinators provided 

each employee with a laptop computer and helped them work through an 

online onboarding packet administered by Emptech, a third-party workforce 

management services provider. The onboarding packet included the Allied 

defendants’ “standard Arbitration Agreement,” a copy of which was attached 

to Grzywacz’s declaration. 

1 As Grzywacz explained, Universal Protection Service, LLC is a direct 

subsidiary of UPS LP, while Allied Security Services, LLC and Allied 

Universal Security Services are fictitious names under which UPS LP does 

business. 
3

The arbitration agreement states in pertinent part: “By continuing 

employment with [UPS LP], you agree to the terms of this Agreement unless 

you affirmatively opt out of the Agreement by returning the opt-out form 

provided at the end of this Agreement within 30 days of receipt of this 

Agreement.” (Bold type omitted.) With exceptions not relevant here, the 

agreement to arbitrate applies to “all claims or causes of action that the 

Employee may have against [UPS LP] . . . which could be brought in a court 

of law” and contains a class and collection action waiver. At the end of the 

agreement is a section entitled “Acknowledgment of Receipt of Arbitration 

Policy and Agreement” that displays plaintiff’s printed name under the 

heading “Signed Name,” an Internet Protocol (IP) address2 of 10.113.3.125, 

and the date and time of “4/25/2019 9:16:46 AM.” (Bold type omitted.)

Grzywacz further stated “on information and belief from [her] review of 

the documents [that] this Arbitration Agreement was signed and submitted 

by [plaintiff],” and that plaintiff did not opt out of the arbitration agreement 

before it became effective in May 2019. Attached to Grzywacz’s declaration 

was a sign-in sheet purporting to show that plaintiff attended the April 25 

orientation and a business record “from Emptech’s employer-facing portal, 

Optima, summarizing the onboarding documents reviewed and e-signed by 

[plaintiff] on April 25, 2019,” including the “Arbitration Policy and 

Agreement.” 

2 An IP address is a numeric identifier for a computer connected to the 

Internet “consist[ing] of ‘four sets of numbers separated by periods’ [citation], 

such as ‘12.34.56.78.’ ‘IP addresses function much like Social Security 

numbers or telephone numbers: each IP address is unique and corresponds to 

a specific entity connected to the Internet.’ ” (Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings 

Corp. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 337.)
4

In opposition to the motion, plaintiff argued that the Allied defendants 

failed to prove the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was his. 

Plaintiff acknowledged that he “was present during the orientation” but 

stated in his declaration that he did not recall seeing, reviewing, or signing 

“any documents” at the April 25 orientation session, including “any document 

entitled Arbitration Policy and Agreement or any other arbitration 

agreement.” Plaintiff further asserted that had he been provided with an 

arbitration agreement, he would have refused to sign it or opted out as he has 

done in the past. Plaintiff objected to the Grzywacz declaration, arguing she 

lacked personal knowledge to authenticate his electronic signature and failed 

to authenticate the documents she relied upon in making her assumptions. 

In reply, the Allied defendants submitted the declaration of Lisa Crane, 

a human resources coordinator for UPS LP who was present at the April 25 

orientation. According to Crane, the orientation session was conducted in a 

large conference room, and she and two colleagues were seated in front of two 

rows of tables where the employees sat. Two employees were seated at each 

table and were provided with computers to access, review, and sign the 

onboarding documents. To access those documents on Emptech, employees 

had to enter their unique employee identification numbers and their Social 

Security numbers. Based on her review of plaintiff’s personnel records, 

Crane stated on information and belief that plaintiff began reviewing his 

orientation packet at around 9:09 a.m., and that he electronically signed the 

arbitration agreement at 9:16 a.m. Attached to the Crane declaration was a 

register of documents that plaintiff purportedly signed on Emptech, including 

the arbitration agreement and an “Emergency Contact Form” that appeared 

to contain contact information for plaintiff’s wife (e.g., her name, address, and 

two different telephone numbers). Each of the onboarding documents 
5

contained date and time stamps purporting to show when they were 

electronically signed.

3

Crane further stated that during the April 25 orientation, her 

colleagues periodically surveyed the room and monitored employee progress, 

and she “[did] not recall seeing any employees moving about the room except 

to go to the restroom.” Based on her review of the arbitration agreement, 

Crane believed the document was signed and submitted by plaintiff. Crane

stated her belief was “supported by the requirement that all prospective [UPS 

LP] employees must enter their unique employee ID number and social 

security number to access Emptech and review [UPS LP’s] new-hire 

onboarding packet. Therefore, an electronic signature in the name of ‘Pablo 

Cozomi [sic]’ could only have been placed on the e-signed Arbitration 

Agreement by a person using [plaintiff’s] unique employee ID and social 

security number. Moreover, [UPS LP] does not have a practice of sharing an 

employee’s unique ID number with other employees.” Crane further stated 

she was unaware of any complaints or allegations that electronic signatures 

were falsified during the onboarding process, which would “be extremely 

difficult due to the unique employee ID and social security numbers required 

to generate the electronic signatures at the same time period in which the 

employee is present at the onboarding meeting” and would “be a terminable 

violation of [UPS LP’s] policies and process.” 

Plaintiff was granted leave to file a surreply, and he also filed 

evidentiary objections to the Crane declaration. 

3 All of the onboarding documents attached to the Crane declaration 

reflected a date of “4/25/2019,” with different times on that day. For instance, 

the arbitration agreement was time stamped “9:16:46 AM,” while the 

emergency contact form was time stamped “9:19:25 AM.”
6

B. Trial Court’s Ruling

After hearing argument, the trial court issued its order denying the 

motion to compel arbitration. The court first found the Grzywacz declaration 

“was not based on [Grzywacz’s] personal knowledge, and, although she 

described the documents as business records, she failed to establish the 

requisites for admission of such records, including the ‘mode of preparation’ 

of such records.” Accordingly, the court sustained plaintiff’s objections “on 

these grounds” and found that Grzywacz failed to “adequately authenticate 

the arbitration agreement as signed by plaintiff.” 

Turning to the Crane declaration, the trial court sustained plaintiff’s 

objections for lack of personal knowledge “as to the portions of the declaration 

that purport to authenticate plaintiff’s signature on the documents.” Relying 

on Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz), the 

court found that Crane’s presence “did not provide her personal knowledge 

that plaintiff in fact executed the electronic signature. The time stamps 

likewise are not helpful since they beg the question of whether plaintiff 

executed the electronic signature.” The court also rejected the Allied 

defendants’ reliance on the emergency contact form because “defendants do 

not establish how this was filled out by plaintiff, and, in any case, it was not 

the arbitration agreement.” Finally, the court rejected the Allied defendants’ 

request to present Crane’s oral testimony, as “Crane’s lack of personal 

knowledge is manifest in her declaration.” 

Based on the foregoing, the trial court determined the Allied 

defendants had not met their burden of proving the existence of a valid 

agreement to arbitrate. This appeal followed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. 

(a).)
7

DISCUSSION

“Under section 1281.2, a trial court must grant a motion or petition to 

compel arbitration only ‘if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the 

controversy exists.’ The court makes this determination in a summary 

process. [Citation.] ‘[T]he trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the 

affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral 

testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.’ ” 

(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164 

(Gamboa).)

“The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the 

existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a 

preponderance of the evidence,” but the burden of production involves a 

three-step process. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165.) At the 

first step, the moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie 

evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate, either by stating the provisions 

verbatim, or “by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly 

bearing the opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California 

Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 (Espejo).) The 

moving party “is not required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature 

on an arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter” (Ruiz, supra, 232 

Cal.App.4th at p. 846, italics omitted), and “the court is only required to

make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary 

determination of its validity” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 

88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219). If the moving party meets its initial burden of 

production, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to produce 

evidence challenging the authenticity of the agreement. (Gamboa, at p. 165.) 
8

If that burden is met, “the moving party must establish with admissible 

evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Ibid.)

“ ‘ “There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order 

denying a motion to compel arbitration.” ’ ” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc.

(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066 (Fabian).) For instance, when an appeal 

challenges the trial court’s finding that the moving party failed to carry its 

burden of proof, “ ‘ “the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence 

was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and 

weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was 

insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1067; see also Trinity v. Life 

Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122, 1125.) This is 

because a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or make its own 

determination of credibility, and instead must view all factual matters 

favorably in support of the judgment. (Fabian, at p. 1067.) But where, as 

here, the appeal challenges a purely legal decision by the trial court that

affirmatively appears on the record—namely, the court’s legal assumption 

that direct evidence of signature authentication was required—we

independently review that claim of legal error. (See Espejo, supra, 246 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1057–1058 [denial of petition to compel arbitration is 

generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, but review is de novo where pure 

question of law is presented].)

Here, there appears to be no dispute that the Allied defendants met 

their initial burden on the motion to compel. Although the trial court 

excluded portions of Grzywacz’s declaration purporting to authenticate the 

arbitration agreement, the Allied defendants were not required to 

authenticate the agreement at this initial step. (Ruiz, supra, 232 

Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) At this stage, UPS LP’s regional human resources 
9

director Grzywacz was a competent witness for purposes of adducing a copy 

of the Allied defendants’ standard arbitration agreement, which sufficed as a 

prima facie showing of an agreement to arbitrate.

There is likewise no dispute that plaintiff met his burden to challenge 

the authenticity of the arbitration agreement. Through his declaration, 

plaintiff stated that he did not recall seeing, reviewing, or signing the 

purported arbitration agreement, and that he would have refused to sign

such an agreement had he been provided one. Courts have affirmed this 

method of satisfying an opposing party’s responsive burden on a motion to 

compel arbitration. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167; Ruiz, 

supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)

Thus, the dispute in this appeal centers around the Allied defendants’ 

ultimate burden of persuasion to establish a valid arbitration agreement 

between the parties. “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction 

of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the 

proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by 

any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) “The means of 

authenticating a writing are not limited to those specified in the Evidence 

Code. [Citations.] For example, a writing can be authenticated by 

circumstantial evidence and by its contents.” (People v. Skiles (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 1178, 1187 (Skiles).) Circumstantial evidence “is testimony not based 

on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of 

other facts from which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts 
10

sought to be proved.” (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 

Cal.App.4th 21, 51.)4

An electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten one. 

(See Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (a).) “An electronic record or electronic 

signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of 

the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy 

of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the 

electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, 

§ 1633.9, subd. (a).) “[T]he burden of authenticating an electronic signature 

is not great.” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 844–845.)

Taken together, these authorities illustrate that on a motion to compel 

arbitration, an arbitration agreement may be authenticated by facts 

reasonably deduced from the evidence indirectly showing that an electronic 

signature on the agreement was the act of the opposing party. We conclude a 

trier of fact could reasonably have found this burden satisfied on the record 

here. As set forth in Crane’s declaration, the attendees at the April 25 

orientation were each furnished with a computer to access an online portal 

where they could review and complete an onboarding packet that included 

the arbitration agreement. The portal could be accessed only by someone 

using an employee’s unique identification number and Social Security 

number, and UPS LP had no practice of sharing these numbers with its 

employees. Plaintiff concedes he attended the April 25 orientation session, 

and a sign-in sheet for the orientation reflects his presence from 8:20 a.m. to 

10:00 a.m. All of the onboarding documents purportedly signed by plaintiff

4 In contrast, “ ‘direct evidence’ means evidence that directly proves a 

fact, without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true, 

conclusively establishes that fact.” (Evid. Code, § 410.)
11

bore date and time stamps for April 25, 2019, between 9:09 a.m. and 9:31 

a.m., as well as the same IP address. In other words, the onboarding 

documents appeared to be executed using the same computer and on the 

same day and around the same time that plaintiff was indisputably at the 

orientation. During that session, Crane was seated at the front of the room

and saw no unusual activity. From this evidence, one could reasonably 

deduce that during the April 25 orientation, plaintiff was the person who 

used plaintiff’s unique credentials to access and electronically sign the 

arbitration agreement at the date and time indicated on the agreement.

In concluding the Allied defendants failed to carry their burden, the 

trial court found that Crane’s presence at the April 25 orientation “did not 

provide her personal knowledge that plaintiff in fact executed the electronic 

signature,” and that the date and time stamps on the arbitration agreement 

simply “beg[ged] the question of whether plaintiff executed the electronic 

signature.” But because case law makes clear that circumstantial evidence is 

sufficient to authenticate a signature (Skiles, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1187),

Crane’s personal knowledge of plaintiff’s execution of the signature—that is, 

direct evidence of the signature’s authenticity—was not required for the 

Allied defendants to authenticate the arbitration agreement. 

On this score, the trial court seemed to dismiss the relevance of the 

emergency contact form on the grounds that the Allied defendants “[did] not 

establish how this was filled out by plaintiff, and, in any case, it was not the 

arbitration agreement.” A trier of fact, however, could reasonably deduce 

that plaintiff filled out the form because it contained specific information 

regarding his wife (see Chaplin v. Sullivan (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 728, 734 

[letter’s authenticity may be established if it “states facts which could only be 

known to or relate to the purported writer”]), and it bore a date and time 
12

stamp that coincided with plaintiff’s undisputed presence at the April 25 

orientation. And because the evidence suggests the emergency contact form 

was completed using the same computer and on the same day and around the 

same time as the arbitration agreement, the combined evidence had some 

tendency in reason to suggest that the electronic signatures on both 

documents were the acts of plaintiff. In declining to ascribe any relevance to

the circumstantial evidence before it, the trial court erroneously restricted

the legal scope of its discretion in evaluating whether the electronic signature 

was likely the act of plaintiff.

Citing Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 836, plaintiff nevertheless

contends the Allied defendants’ evidence failed to establish that no one other 

than plaintiff could have signed the alleged agreement or altered the 

documents. Plaintiff’s reliance on Ruiz is misplaced. In Ruiz, the sum total 

of the evidentiary showing by the moving defendant (Moss Bros.) was an 

initial declaration of its business manager (Mary Main) “summarily 

assert[ing]” that the plaintiff electronically signed the arbitration agreement

followed by a reply declaration in which Main generally stated that each 

Moss Bros. employee was required to log into the company’s human resources 

system with a unique login and password to review and electronically execute 

the arbitration agreement. (Ruiz, at pp. 839, 840–841). As Ruiz explained, 

this showing was deficient because “Main did not explain how, or upon what 

basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was 

‘the act of’ Ruiz. [Citation.] This left a critical gap in the evidence supporting 

the petition.” (Id. at p. 844; see also Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 

[declarant failed to provide specific details about circumstances of contract’s 

execution and offered little more than bare statement that plaintiff entered 

contract].) 
13

Here, in contrast, Crane provided a reasoned explanation for her belief 

that plaintiff was the person who electronically signed the arbitration 

agreement, and her conclusions were based on her personal knowledge of the 

details and events of the April 25 orientation and the onboarding procedures 

that she, as a human resources coordinator, was competent to explain, in 

conjunction with her review of the documentary records attached to her 

declaration. That Crane’s ultimate conclusions involved deductions 

reasonably drawn from the evidence does not mean the showing suffered 

from fatal evidentiary gaps.

We also reject the sweeping principle plaintiff seeks to extrapolate from 

Ruiz—i.e., that a moving party must rule out the possibility that someone 

else signed an arbitration agreement in order to authenticate it. Ruiz applied 

no such standard, and the court otherwise reaffirmed that a party may 

satisfy the undemanding burden of authenticating an electronic signature “in 

any manner.” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 844–845, citing Civ. Code, 

§ 1633.9, subd. (a); Evid. Code, § 1400, subd. (a).)

To be clear, this was not a case in which plaintiff presented evidence

that another person could have caused his electronic signature to appear on 

the arbitration agreement. For instance, in Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, 

LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 544–545 (Bannister)—a case that also 

involved an online onboarding process5—the plaintiff (Maureen Bannister) 

submitted evidence that a human resources manager (Barbara Matson) 

visited the facility where Bannister worked and completed the onboarding 

process and arbitration agreement for her by asking for the necessary 

5 Unlike the instant case, however, Bannister’s onboarding process 

required no employee-specific user name to access the portal. (Bannister, 

supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.)
14

information without showing Bannister what was on the computer. (Id. at 

pp. 546–547.) Bannister also presented evidence that Matson completed the 

onboarding process for other employees remotely and without their 

participation. (Id. at p. 547.) In affirming the denial of the motion to compel 

arbitration, Division Five of this court concluded this was “a classic example 

of a trial court drawing a conclusion from conflicting evidence.” (Id. at 

p. 545.) That is, the trial court disbelieved Matson’s account of the 

onboarding process and instead credited Bannister’s evidence that Matson 

completed the onboarding process for her. (Id. at p. 548.) No similar conflict 

appears in the record here. Plaintiff’s declaration contains no suggestion that 

Crane or other human resources personnel completed his onboarding 

documents (or the onboarding documents for other employees without their 

knowing participation) during the April 25 orientation. The trial court made 

no such factual finding, and the record is lacking in evidence to support an 

implied finding to that effect.

In further defense of the trial court’s order, plaintiff contends the Allied 

defendants failed to submit evidence of “security measures” that would have 

prohibited others from accessing or affixing his electronic signature to the 

alleged arbitration agreement, as well as evidence of “the reliability of 

Emptech’s policies, procedures, or practices” and the reliability of any 

“document retention or security protocols” in place. No matter. By statute, 

an electronic signature may be authenticated “in any manner, including a 

showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the 

person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was 

attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, while a 

showing of the efficacy of document security protocols is one way of 

demonstrating authentication, such a showing is not required in every case.
15

In any event, there was evidence in this case that the Allied defendants 

employed certain precautionary measures regarding the transmission and 

execution of the onboarding documents. As Crane explained, access to the 

onboarding packet on Emptech required knowledge of unique employee 

credentials that UPS LP did not share, and the presentation and review of 

the onboarding documents occurred in a controlled environment overseen by 

human resources personnel, with each employee receiving their own device to 

access Emptech. Of course, a finding as to the ultimate efficacy of these 

measures goes to the weight of the evidence. But for our purposes, it is 

sufficient to recognize that the Allied defendants presented circumstantial 

evidence supporting the reliability of the onboarding process in order to 

explain Crane’s belief that it was plaintiff who executed the electronic 

signature on the arbitration agreement.

Finally, plaintiff contends the IP address evidence does not assist the 

Allied defendants because they “fail[ed] to provide any evidence as to what 

the IP address is associated with, the location of its origin, or any identifying 

information linking the IP address to [plaintiff] in any way.” Although it is 

true that the Allied defendants did not provide detailed evidence regarding 

the IP address (e.g., testimony or documentation that directly linked the 

10.113.3.125 address to the computer assigned to plaintiff at the April 25 

orientation), we cannot say the evidence was incapable of supporting a 

reasonable inference in the Allied defendants’ favor. Because the same IP 

address appeared on all of the onboarding documents in question, including 

the arbitration agreement and the emergency contact form that bore indicia 

of plaintiff’s review and execution, the chain of inferences was at least 

capable of a reasonable conclusion that plaintiff executed all of the 
16

onboarding documents, including the arbitration agreement, from the same 

computer during the April 25 orientation.6

In sum, we conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion to 

compel arbitration for want of direct evidence that plaintiff executed the 

electronic signature on the arbitration agreement. As for the appropriate 

disposition of this appeal, the Allied defendants ask that we reverse and 

remand with instructions to compel arbitration. However, the trial court 

made clear it found the absence of direct evidence dispositive despite the 

law’s contemplation that the arbitration agreement could be authenticated by 

facts reasonably deduced from evidence indirectly showing that the electronic 

signature on the agreement was the act of plaintiff. (E.g., Skiles, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 1187.) As in other cases where the trial court’s decision was 

based on an erroneous legal assumption, we conclude the proper disposition 

here is to reverse and remand so that the trial court may properly consider 

and weigh the circumstantial value of the Allied defendants’ evidence in the 

first instance. (See, e.g., Ramirez v. Balboa Thrift & Loan (2013) 215 

Cal.App.4th 765, 777; F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26.)

6 At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel maintained that the paramount 

issue in this case is not the trial court’s refusal to consider the circumstantial 

evidence of signature authentication, but its evidentiary ruling that the 

Allied defendant’s documents were inadmissible because Grzywacz and 

Crane did not have personal knowledge of the records themselves and failed 

to establish the foundational requirements for the business records exception 

to the rule against hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1271). We disagree, as it is 

reasonably clear from the record that the court did not exclude the Grzywacz 

and Crane declarations or their attached exhibits as inadmissible hearsay or 

for lack of personal knowledge of the records. Rather, the court explicitly 

found that the declarants lacked personal knowledge to authenticate 

plaintiff’s signature on the arbitration agreement. 
17

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to compel is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In the 

interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

FUJISAKI, ACTING P.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

PETROU, J. 

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Cotzomi v. Universal Protection Services LP (A164301)