UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, HERRING, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant MICHAEL B. SCIONEAUX 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20130850 

Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division 

Stefan R. Wolfe, Military Judge (arraignment) 

Jeffery D. Lippert, Military Judge (trial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Devine, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Robert F. Resnick, Staff Judge Advocate (recommendation) 

Lieutenant Colonel Shawn W. Gordon, Staff Judge Advocate (addendum) 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Major Amy E. Nieman, JA; and Captain 

Brian D. Andes, JA (on brief) 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. 

Marchand, JA; and Major Steven J. Collins, JA (on brief). 

13 April 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

A panel with enlisted representation, sitting as a general court-martial, 

convicted appellant, contrary to pleas, of abusive sexual contact and assault 

consummated by a battery in violation of Articles 120 and 128, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § §920, 928 (2006 & Supp. V) [hereinafter UCMJ].* 

The panel sentenced appellant to be discharged from the service with a bad conduct 

discharge, to be confined for ninety days, a reprimand, and to be reduced to the 

 

* The government also charged appellant with wrongful sexual contact and indecent 

exposure in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §920 (2006 & Supp. V). 

Based on instructions from the military judge, the panel did not enter findings for 

the wrongful sexual contact. The panel found appellant not guilty of indecent 

exposure. 
SCIONEAUX—ARMY 20130850 

2 

grade of E-1. The convening authority approved only so much of the sentence as 

provided for a bad conduct discharge, sixty days of confinement, and reduction to 

the grade E-1. 

Appellant’s case is before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. 

Appellant raises two errors, neither of which merit discussion or relief. Appellant 

personally raised four issues pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982), one of which merits discussion and relief. After review of the entire 

record, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt of a 

portion of the language encompassed within the Specification of Charge II. We will 

grant appropriate relief in our decretal paragraph. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

In accordance with Article 66(c), UCMJ, we review issues of legal and factual 

sufficiency de novo. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 

2002). The test for legal sufficiency is “whether, considering the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all 

the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 

324 (C.M.A. 1987); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United 

States v. Humphreys, 57 M.J. 83, 94 (C.A.A.F. 2002). In resolving questions of 

legal sufficiency, we are “bound to draw every reasonable inference from the 

evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 

131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001). The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after 

weighing the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having 

personally observed the witnesses, [we] are [ourselves] convinced of the accused’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Turner, 25 M.J. at 325. 

The Specification of Charge II alleged appellant unlawfully struck Staff 

Sergeant (SSG) AC “on the head and neck with his hand.” The testimony of SSG 

AC is clear that appellant “made the decision to karate chop me in the throat and 

then grab my shoulder.” Her testimony is void of appellant striking her in the head. 

Appellant also admitted to law enforcement, specifically Special Agent CE, that he 

struck SSG AC in the neck. The government presented no evidence appellant struck 

SSG AC in the head. Accordingly, we find the evidence insufficient to uphold that 

portion of the Specification Charge II alleging appellant struck SSG AC in the head. 

CONCLUSION 

Having completed our review and in consideration of the entire record, we 

AFFIRM only so much of the Specification of Charge II as finds: 
SCIONEAUX—ARMY 20130850 

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In that [Appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or near Killeen, 

Texas, on or about 22 April 2012, unlawfully strike SSG 

(E-6) [AC] on the neck with his hand. 

The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. We are able to reassess the 

sentence on the basis of the error noted and do so after conducting a thorough 

analysis of the totality of circumstances presented by appellant’s case and in 

accordance with the principles articulated by our superior court in United States v. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 

305 (C.M.A. 1986). We are confident that based on the entire record and appellant’s 

course of conduct, the panel would have imposed a sentence of at least that which 

was adjudged, and accordingly we AFFIRM the sentence. 

We find this reassessed sentence is not only purged of any error but is also 

appropriate. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been 

deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by our decision, are 

ordered restored. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

JOHN P. TAITT 

 Acting Clerk of Court 

JOHN P. TAITT 

Acting Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: