Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed F e bruary 22 , 202 4

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00886

- CV

MARY RUFFIN , Appellant

V.

MARK HENRY , Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 2

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Caus e No. 1 1875 65

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appe llant Mary Ruffin appeals the lower court ’ s dismissal of her health care liability claim. We affirm

. Background

Ruffin received medical treatment to her left hand and wri st from appellee
Mark Henry, w ho is a doctor specializing in hand and wrist care. Ruffin later sued Henry in Harris County justice court, alleging medical malpractice , which is a2

health car e liability claim governed by the Texas Medical Liability Ac t

. See generally Tex. Civ . Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 74. Attorney Timo thy Hootman initially represented Henry. Henry later notified the court that Hootman was withdrawing as counsel and two other a t torneys, Cris
Feldman and Kimberly Dang , were substituting as counsel of recor d for Henry.

He n ry moved to dismiss Ruffi n ’ s suit for failure to serv e an expert report. See id. § 74.351(b)

. The justice of the peace granted the motion and dismissed
R uffin ’ s claims with prejudice

. See id. § 74.351(b)(2). Ruffin appeal ed the
dismissal order to a co u nty civil court at law. See id. § 51.001 (a) (party to a final judgment in justice court may appeal to the county court).

Ruffin ’ s appeal was initially dockete d in County Civil Court at Law No. 3.
Ru ffin moved to recuse the judg e of Court No. 3, and the j udge voluntarily
recused. The divi sion presiding judg e then transferred Ruffin ’ s appeal to County
Civil Court of Law No. 2.

A case on appeal from a justice court is tried de novo in the county or
district court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3. In county c o urt, Henry again moved to
dismiss Ruffin ’ s suit based on her failure t o file an expert report. He also sought attorney ’ s fees incurred in association with t he motions to di smiss. The cou nty

court dismissed Ruffin ’ s claims with prejudice and ordered th at Ruffin pay Henry attorney ’ s fees

. Ruffin filed a further appeal in th i s court. Analysis

Ruffin
, an unrepresented pa rty, raises seven issues, many of which are not supported by any discernable argument or citation to applicable legal authority or3

to the re c ord

. 1 As a pro se litigant, Ruffin is held to the same st a ndards as a licensed attorney and must comply with all applicab le rules of procedure. See
Harrison v. Reiner , 607 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). A pro se lit i gant must properly present her case on appeal; if this

wer e not the rule, pro se litigants would benefit from an unfair advantage over
th ose part ies represented by counsel. Canton

- Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med. , 271 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14 t h Dist.] 2008, no pet.). We do not apply different standa r ds simply because a case is presented by a pro se litigant.
Id. Nonetheless, we const rue her brief liberally to reach her appellate issues on the
merits whe n possible. Id. We remain mindful of these s tandards as we address
Ruffin ’ s issues.
In her fi r

s t issue, Ruffin challenges the jurisdiction o f the lower courts.
Ruffin filed a small c laims pet ition in the Justice Court of Harris County
, alleging that she had suffered injuries as a result of H enry ’ s negligence. Ruffin sought $20,000 in damages , whic h is within the jurisdictional limits of the ju stice court.
Tex. Gov ’t Code § 27.031(a) (1) ( “ In addition to the jurisdiction and powers provided by the constitution and other law, the ju stice cour t has original jurisdiction of

. . . civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district or county court and in which the amount i n contr oversy is not more than $20,000,
exclusive of interest

. ” ). The justice court had jurisdicti on over Ru f fin ’ s claims.

A case on appeal from a justice court is t ried de novo in the county or
district court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3; Abbott v. Hea rthwood I Ass ’ n, Inc. , No.
14

- 18

- 00333

- CV, 2020 WL 1026443 , at *2, (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 3, 2020 , no pet.) (mem. o p.)

. To invok e the cou nty court ’ s appellate jurisdiction, Ruff

in was r equired to file a bond , cash deposit, or statement of

1 In an appendix, we quote Ruffin ’ s issues verbatim from her appellate brief

.4

inability to pay court costs in the justice court wi thin twenty

- one da ys after the
dismissal order. Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.1(a). The ju stice court ’ s dismissal order was si gned May 18, 2022; Ruffin timely filed a cash deposit on June 6, 2022. The

cou nty court had jurisdiction over Ruffin ’ s appeal

. We overrule Ruffin ’ s first issue.

In her second issue
, Ruffin arg ues t h at the transfer (from County Civil Court
No. 3 to County Civil Court No. 2) was improper because the order of transfer lacked a requisite signature

. T he transfer ord e r was si gned both by the division presid ing judge and the judge of County Court No. 3

. The local rul e s for the Harris County C iv il Courts at Law provide that “ [a]ny case may be transferred from co urt to another court by
written order of the Adm inistrative Judge o f the County Civil Courts at Law
divis ion

. . . . ” See Local R. 3.2.5. Ruffin does not direc t us to any authority requiring any signatures other those re flected in the record. We overrule Ruffin ’ s second issue.
In her third issue, Ruffin contends that H e nry ’ s substitute counsel, Feldman
and Dang , had no authority because the justice court judge d id not sign an order permitting Hootman ’ s withdraw al. Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure gove rns the designation of an attorney

- in

- charge. An attorney

- in

- c h arge may be changed by filing a writte n notice with service to other parties. Tex. R. Civ. P

. 8. The rule does not expressly require a motion or that an order be signed. The motion to substitute counsel express ly states that Hootman would wi thdraw
, and that
Feldman and Dang would represent H enry going forward. Thereafter, Feldman and Dang file d numerous documents and app eared before the cou rt on Hen ry ’ s behalf

. We conclude the motion to substitute counsel, which was not ruled upon by the cou r t , satisfies the requirement of written notice. See Block v. Providian5

Nat ’ l Bank
, No. 05

- 03

- 00734

- CV, 2004 WL 1551485, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Dallas July 12, 2004, pet. denied ) ( mem. op.). We over rule Ru ffin ’ s third issue.
In her fourt h and fifth issue s , Ruf f i n argues that the trial court erred in awarding Henry his attorney ’ s fees. A defendant who successful l y moves to dismiss a plaintiff ’ s health care liability claim is statutori ly entitled to h is attorney ’ s fees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.35 1( b ) (1). We overr ule
Ruf fin ’ s fourth and fifth is sues. In her sixth issue, Ruffin alleges that the county court clerk violated Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 145. R ule 145 provides: A party who fi les a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs c a nnot be required to pay costs except by order of the court as provided by this rule. After the State m ent is filed, the clerk must docket the case, issue citation, and provid e any other servic e that is ordinarily provided to a party. The Statement must e i ther be sworn to before a notary or made under penalty of perjury. In this rule, “declarant” m eans t h e party filing the Statement. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(a).

A declarant under th is rule must use a form approved by the Supreme Court
and made available free of charge by court clerks or, alternatively, include in the statement all information required by the C o urt

- approved form. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(b). The only ground for refusing t o file a rule 145 statement is if is “not sworn to before a notary or made u n de r penalty of perjury.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(d). “No other defect is a ground for refusing to f ile a S tatement or requiring the party to pay costs.” Id. I nstead, if a defect or om ission in a rule 145 statement is material, the court may direct the dec l ar ant to correct or clarify the statement. Id.

As best we can tell from Ruffin ’ s brief, she argu es tha t she attempted to file a statement of inability to pay costs but the clerk allegedly refused to fi le it.6

However, the record shows that the c lerk for t he county court certified, “ Clerk’s record fee of $869.00 was waived do [sic] to Plaintiff Mary R uffin’ s Affidavit of Inability filed with Harris County Civil Courts on November 11, 2022. ” We
overrule Ruffin ’ s si xth issue.

In her seventh issue, Ruffin ar g ue s that she was denied due process of law
because the case was docketed in the “ wrong court

. ” W e do n o t see any support in the record that the case was docketed in the wrong court at any stage of th ese
proce edings . Rather, the record s hows that , after R uf fin moved to recuse the judge
of County Civil Court No. 3 , the administrative judge tra nsferred the c ase to County Civil Court No. 2

. We overrule Ruffin ’ s seventh and final issue.

Submission on Briefs
When she filed her appellant ’ s br ief, Ruffin requested oral argument , as was her right . Tex. R. App. P. 39.1. Because the issues are authori tatively settl ed,
h owever , t he panel denied ora l argument and voted to submit the case on the briefing. Id

. Ruffin moved for reconsideration , which the court denied. Ruffin
then filed a “ Res ponse to the Court Refusal to Allow an Oral Hearing

. ” T his filing
consists of lit tle mo r e than personal attacks and conclusory allegations of

wrong doing by this court, the trial judge, the county clerk, and opposing counsel.

A line exists between zealous advocacy a nd inappropriate co nduct. Though appellant is not a lawyer and is unr eprese n ted by a la wyer in this case, she should
know the boundaries of respectful behavior. Non

- lawyer lit igants are expected to
acq uit themselves in a manner bef itting the dignity of the public forum in which they appear and are e ncouraged to participate

. See Gleason v. Isbell , 145 S.W.3d 354, 355

- 61 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [14th Dist.] 2004 , no pet. ) (Frost, J., concurring and dissenting ) (citing Man sf ield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W.2d 181, 184

- 857

(Tex. 1 978) (stating th at “ [t]he right of self

- r epresentatio n is n o t a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom ” )).

C onclusion
We affirm the judgment of Harris County C iv il Court a t Law No. 2.

/s/ Kevin Jewell Justice

Panel consists of Justices J ewell, Zimmerer
, and W i lson

.8 Appendix

Statement of Is sues
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court have jurisdiction of the subject matter in which the case was Dismis sed? Issue Number 2: Since the trial court transfer must be with agreement of an written signa tu re without t he sig nature is anything ruled on by t he Tr ial Judge valid? Is sue Number 3: Did Cris Feldman and Kimberly Dang have rights according to the Rules that govern the court’s to file any documents in reference to this litigation? Issue Number 4: D id the trial court have jurisdiction to grant atto rney fees for the countle ss hours, wasted money, and resources occurring in the Justice of Peace Court that w as not appealed? Issue Number 5: Did the trial court have jurisdiction to grant any Attorney Fe es ? Issue Num ber 6: Did the clerks failed to obey T ex. R . Civ. P. 145? Issu e Number 7: Did the failure of the court to put the case in the correct court deny d ue process?