T h e H on or abl e Je n n i f er B

. Cof

f man , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e Eas t ern and W est er n D i s t r i ct s of * K ent ucky, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0672n.06 F iled: Septem ber 6, 2006 Case No. 05- 5346 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. WILLIE DIXON, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and SUTTO N, Circ uit Jud ges; COF F MAN , District Judge. * ALICE M. B ATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Wil lie Dix on (“D ix on”) appea ls the sentence imposed by

the district court a fter D ix on pled gui lty to one count of c onspiracy to possess and po sse s s i o no f

a c o n t r o l l e d

s u b s t an c e ( D i l a

u d i d h y dr o m o r

p h o n e ) w i t ht h e i n t e n tt o d i s t r i b u t e , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. B eca use the district cour

t considere d all of the re le va nt f a c tor s c on ta ine d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3 a

nd imp os e d a

re a so na ble se nte nc e , w e a ff

ir m. I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound A gr an d ju r y in th e We s te r

nD is tr ic t o f

T e n n e s s e e r e tu

r n e d a s u p e r s e d in g in d ic tm e n t on Marc h 30, 2004, char g ing D ix on with one count of c onspiracy to posses s and possession of a

c o n tr o ll e d s u

b s ta n c e ( D il a u d id h y dr o mo r

p h o n e ) w it

h th e in te n t to d is tr ib u te , in v io la tion of 21T h e s u per s edi n g i n di ct men t c h ar g ed D i x on a n d t wo co- con s pi r at or s . Cou n t O n e of t h e i nd i ct m en t di d n ot 1 p ert ai n t o D i xo n. 2 U. S.C. § 84 6 (“ Count Tw o” ); on e c ount of po sse ssi on of a c on tr oll e d su bs tanc e (Dil a

ud id hydr omo rp ho ne ) w iththe int e nt t o d istri bute , in vio latio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U. S.C. § 2 (“ Count Th re e ” ); on e c ount of c on sp ir a c y to po sse ss a c on tr oll e d su bs tance ( Ox y contin 2ox y codone) with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Count Four” ); and one count of possession of a controlled substance (Oxy contin 2ox y codone) with the intent to dist ribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) a nd 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count Five” ). 1 Dix on enter ed a guilty

pl ea t o C ount Two of that indictment, and a Pre-Sentenc e I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”) w as pre pare d, which ca lculated Dix on’s base of fense level base d on possession of 2,345 Dilaudid pills at 90 mil ligr ams per pill, and 5,000 a dditional p i l ls that he had g iven to one of his co- defe ndants. Acc ording to the drugconver sion table in the United States SentencingGuidelines Manual, one g ram of Dilaudid is equivalent to 2.5 kilog rams of ma rijuana,

see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt., so 661.05 g rams of Dilaudid (7,345 x .09) equa ls 1,652.63 kilograms of marij u an a . T h a t amo u n t o f ma r ij u an a p r o v id e d a b a s e o f f e n s e le v e l o f 3 2 , w h ic h w a s reduc ed by three levels due to Dix on’s accepta nce of responsibility

. Wit h six criminal history points y ielding

a cr iminal hist ory

cate g ory of I I I , the P SR’s calc ulations under the SentencingGuidelines provided

a ra ng e of 10 8 to 13 5 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt. At the se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e gover nme nt m a de a

mot ion to l imi t th e numbe r o f p ill s possessed to the 2,345 ac tually found on Dixon’s person, which would lowe r the base offe nse leve l to 28 (90 mg Dilaudid/pill x 2345 pills = 211.05 g . Dilaudid = 527.63 kg . marijuana ). SeeU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c )(6) . The g overnme nt then moved for a three -leve l reduc tion in the offense level for3

acc eptanc e of r esponsibility and for a downwa

rd depa rture under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, reque sting that Dix on be sentenc ed at an offe nse level of 18 and criminal history cate g ory of I I I . This would have yielded a r ang e of 33 to 41 months, a nd the g overnme nt a sked for a sentenc e at the low end of that rang e. I n h op e s o f r e c e ivi nga fu rt he r d ow nw ard

de pa rt ur e , D ixon t e sti fi e d th a t he su ffers fr om a

va ri e ty of me dic a l a ilm e nts , th a t he is the on ly pe rs on a va ila ble to a ssi st i n th e c are of

his 93 -ye ar- old mother who lives in an a ssisted-living fa cility , that he does volunteer wor k for the Urban L eague,

and that he wo uld

c on tin ue to c oo pe rate wi th law e nf or c e me nt. Di xon a lso c a lle d B e ve rl y B od die of the Ur ban L eague, who testified t hat Dix on helped with one of its prog rams and maintenance of its computer sy stem, and Ethel McCorke l, a nurse at St. Franc is Nursing Home, who testified that Di xon tr ie s to vis it hi s mothe r e ve ry da y . F ina lly , o ne of

Di xon’ s f

ri e nd s te sti fi e d th a t D ixon i s a g ood person. Dix on argued that the ba se off ense le vel was unr ea s o n able because the U.S. Sentencing Com mis sio n c re a te d th e 2. 5 k g mari jua na : 1 mg Di la

ud id ratio wi tho ut a p ri nc ipl e d b a sis , e sp e c ia lly considering that it would take 400-700 g rams of heroin to re ach the same ba se off ense le vel as that

se t f or the 21 1. 05 g ra

ms o f Dil a

ud id. Di xon ask e d the c ourt to i mpo se a

se nte nc e of

tw e lve months , wi th six months be ing se rv e d in a ha lf -w ay ho us e and

the re ma ind e r s e rv e d in

ho me c on fi ne me nt, consideringhis medical conditions, familial obligation s , a n d s u b s ta nti a l a s s ista

nce in the pr osecution of oth e rs . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re je c te d th is s ug g e sti on . Ho we ve r, g ra nti ngthe g ov e rnme nt’ s mo tio n to limit the number of

pills Dix on possessed, the c ourt found that number to be 2,345, which provided a base offe nse leve l of 28 under the sentenc i n g gu i d el i n es. The c ourt also g rante d a thre e-le vel4

reduc tion for ac cepta

nce of responsibility and depa

rted downw ard to a

n offe nse leve l of 14 with a criminal history

cate g ory of I I I , below the g overnme nt’s reque st for a downwar d depar ture to leve l 18. This y ielded a ran ge o f 2 1 t o 27 months. The court noted that Dix on was a sking it to depa rt downwar d under U .S.S.G. § 5K2

. 0 b as ed on Dix on’s hea lth and his familial responsibiliti es, but declined to do so, findingthat Dix on did not need to visit his m other e very day beca use she wa s being car ed for , an d that he wa s on medication to control his hea lth issues. And the court

a c kn ow le dg e d the te sti mony of Di xon’ s witn e sse s, but expla ine d that th e g oo d w or ks to whic h th os e wi tne sse s te sti fi e d w e re on ly of ve ry re c e nt vin ta g e . Th e c ourt imp os e d a sen te nc e of 21 months ’ imprisonment, the lowest sentenc e in the g uideline ra ng e, to be f

ollowed by

three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. A fter spe cifica lly rec og nizi ng that the s entenc ing guide lines are advisory , the court stated that “ [t ]h e c o u rt b e li e v e s th a t th is s e n te n c e is n e e d e d b a s e d u p o n it s c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e fa ctors under 3553( a), that this ref lects the seriousness of the offe nse[,] to provide re spect for the law[,] and provide just punishment for the off ense[,] and to avoid adequate de terre nce to c riminal conduct[,] and to protec t the public from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt.” Dixon t imely

appea led. II. Ana lys is P u rsuant to t he Supreme Court’s mandate in United States v. Book er , 5 4 3 U

. S. 220, 261 (2005), we revie w for rea sonablene ss a sentenc e imposed under an advisory g uidelines scheme . The dis tr ic t ju dg e mus t c on sid e r the lis t of fa c tor s in 18 U.S. C. § 35 53 (a ), wh ic h in c lud e s th e a pp lic a ble sentenc ing guidelines rang e, whe n deter mining an a

ppropriate sentenc e. See U nited States v. Kirby , 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2005). I n United States v. W illiams , 436 F.3d 706 ( 6th Cir. 2006), we state d th a t a

se nte nc e wi thi n th e g uid e lin e s r ang e c arr ie s a re butta ble pr e sumpt ion

of re a so na ble ne ss. Id. at 708. Moreove r, it is up to a defe ndant who is dissatisfied with his sentence to show how theT ho ugh D i xo n argues on ap p eal t hat hi s sente n c e is u n re a so nab l e f o r t he same reasons t hat he argued f o r a 2 d o wnwa rd d ep art ure i n the d i st ri ct co urt , D i xo n do es not argue on ap p eal t hat t he d i st ri ct co urt s ho ul d have grant ed t he fur the r d o w n w a rd d e p a rtu re . T h is c o u rt h a s h e ld tha t, p o st- B oo ker , a d e fen d a n t sti ll m a y no t ap p e a l a d istric t co u rt’s d e c isio n no t t o d e p a rt d o w n w a rd un le ss th e d e fen d a n t c a n sh o w tha t the d istric t c o u rt d id n o t b e liev e it h a d the a u tho rity to d o so . S e e Un ited S ta te s v . P u c k e tt , 4 2 2 F.3d 3 4 0 , 3 4 5 (6th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ). D i xo n has no t argued t hat t he d i st ri ct co urt co m m i t t ed s uch an err o r. 5 dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to a dd re ss e xplic itl y

a pa rt ic ula r fa c tor or fa c tor s r e su lte d in

an unr e a so na

ble sentenc e. See id. at 708-709. On appe al, Dixon ar g ues that the district court er red be cause it impos ed what it considered to be a r easona

ble sentenc e within the g uid el ines rang e and the reby “in ef fec t found the g uideline

ra ng e wa s p re sumpt ive ly

re a so na ble .” Di xon a

rgue s a s we ll that the dis tr ic t court fa ile d a de qu a te ly to t a ke int o a c c ount t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s b e c a

us e the c ourt did no t “ e la

bo ra te on ho w e a c h o f t

he se fac tors applied in the pre sent ca se.” We find no mer it to either contention. 2 To beg in with, nothing in the transc ript of the sente ncingproce eding s provides any support fo r Di xon’ s c on te nti on that the dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d the g uid e lin e ra ng e to be p res ump tiv e ly

rea sonable. To the contrary , the di strict court ex plained that it was “simply using the g uidelines as

an a dv iso ry

or a ssi sti ve de vice in render ingits de c isi on .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt no t on ly c or re c tly calc ulated the a

pplicable guideline rang e, it depar ted t o a ra ng e we ll below the ra

ng e to which the g overnme nt had aske d for a downwar d depar

ture. F inally , althoug h the court did in fac t impose the lowest sentenc e in that ra ng e, it explained why

it had chosen that sentence
. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e ne e d n ot r e c ite e a c h o f t he fa c tor s se t out in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3 a

nd e xpla in how it either a

pplies or does not ap p l y t o t h e particula r ca se. See W

illiams , 436 F.3d at 708-709 (stating that a “r itual incantation of the fac tors” has ne ver be en re quired). H ere , the district court

e xplic it ly c on sid e re d th e fa c t th a t th e “ int ro du c tio n o f t

he se ty pe s o f d ru g s in to t

his c omm un ity is dang erous,” and explicitly made r efe renc e to five of the § 3553 fac tors. Dix on points to no fac ts or6

fac tors that the court s hould have c onsidered but did not, nor doe s he show that any such fa cts or fa c tor s w ou ld h ave a ff

e c te d h is s e nte nc e fa

vo ra bly ha d th e c ourt

c on sid e re d th e m. As we e x plained in Kirby , and rece ntly reiter ated in United States v. Cage , __ F.3d __, 2006 WL23 46 32 8 ( 6th Cir

. Au g us t 15 , 20 06 ), “ [t]he c ourt ne e d n ot r e c ite the se fa c tor s b ut m us t art ic ulate its re asoning in de ciding to impose a sentenc e in or der to a llow f or rea sonable appe l l at e review.” Kirby , 4 18 F .3 d 6 26 . H e re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xpla ine d at le ng th h owit arr ive d at th e se nte nc e it imposed, and why

it did not impose the m uch lower sentenc e that Dixon believed was a ppropriate

. The c ourt expli citly

stated that the sentenc e it wa s imposing was nece ssary in lig ht of the fac tors set out in § 3553(a) , wh ich it then enumer ated. That the court imposed the se ntence in terms of the g uid e lin e s c a lc ulatio n d oe s n ot d e mon str a te that it fa ile d to e ng a g e in t

he re a so nin g neces sary

to comply with the dictates of § 3553, or that it found the g uidelines sentenc e pre sumpti vely rea sonable. An d e ve n if

the re c or d c ou ld b e sa id t o d e mon str a te that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ma de – e ith e r i mpl ic itl y

or e xplic itl y

– suc h a fi nd ing , w e have he ld t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

do e s n ot e rr

in r e c og nizi ngthat a

corr ectly calc ulated guidelines sentenc e ca rries a rebuttable presumption of rea sonablene ss, and that such re cog nition is not evidence that the c o u rt failed to eng ag e in the re quisite ex erc ise of independe nt judgment in dete rmining a sentenc e. See Cage , 2006 WL 2346328, at *3-4. III. Conclusi on For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.