J-A07042-21

2021 PA Super 84

PCS CHADAGA

v.

AMANDA TORRES AND LUIS 

TORRES-USECHI

APPEAL OF: AMANDA TORRES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1018 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered July 16, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s): 

2017-CV-05480-DJ

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 04, 2021

Appellant Amanda Torres appeals from the Order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Dauphin County on July 16, 2020, granting Appellee PCS 

Chadaga possession of a rental premises following Appellee’s filing of a 

landlord/tenant complaint.1 We affirm. 

The trial court sets forth the procedural history herein as follows: 

[Appellee] commenced this landlord-tenant action by 

Complaint filed September 14, 2017, following [Appellant’s] 

appeal of judgment in [Appellee’s] favor before the magisterial 

district court. [Appellee] alleges that [Appellant] [is] in breach of 

a rental agreement for property at 35 Oak Knoll Estates, a mobile 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant previously was married to Luis Torres-Usechi who had been named 

as a defendant in the Complaint. The two are now divorced, and Mr. TorresUsechi no longer lives on these premises and is not involved in this appeal. 

Brief for Appellant at 4. Thus, we refer to Appellant in the singular throughout 

this Opinion. 
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home community, by [her] frequent delinquencies in rent and 

failure to pay any rent since July 2017. (Complaint, para. 1-7). 

[Appellee] further alleges that [Appellant] breached the terms of 

the rental agreement by harassing a neighboring tenant, allowing 

[her] dog to foul another tenant's property, failing to maintain 

the exterior of [her] mobile home, failing to maintain exterior 

landscaping, and allowing accumulation of debris. (Id., para. 9-

14), [Appellant] filed an Answer with New Matter on October 5, 

2017, to which [Appellee] filed an Answer on March 18, 2019.

During the pendency of the litigation, [Appellant] made monthly 

deposits of escrow funds in accordance with Dauphin County Local 

Magisterial District Justice Rule 1008B.I [Appellee] periodically 

filed motions for release of funds.

On March 26, 2019, following compulsory arbitration, 

arbitrators found in favor of [Appellee] in the amount of $5001.00 

and granted possession of the property to [Appellee]. [Appellant]

appealed. [Appellant] continued to deposit escrow funds, which 

the Court released to [Appellee] upon motion.

On June 10, 2020, we conducted a bench trial. We 

announced our ruling in favor of [Appellee], and the reasons 

therefore, at the close of testimony. On June 30, 2020; we entered 

a written order award[ing] [Appellee] the sum of $6,222.80, which 

included attorneys' fees. On July 16, 2020, we ordered:

Inasmuch as [Appellee’s] Complaint seeks possession of the 

premises and judgment having been granted in [Appellee’s] favor 

on June 10, 2020, [Appellee’s] demand for possession is

GRANTED. (Order, July 16, 2020).

On August 3, 2020 [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal which 

stated:

AND NOW, this day of August 2020 comes [Appellant], by [her]

attorneys Richard K. Konkel, Esquire and CGA Law Firm, and give 

this Notice of Appeal to [the] Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 

appealing the Honorable John F. Cherry's Order of Court entered 

July 16, 2020, granting [Appellee’s] demand for possession 

because no evictions are being permitted to go forward at this

time due to COVID -19. Copy of Order is attached.

([Appellant’s] Notice of Appeal, August 3, 2020).

Pursuant to our order to so, [Appellant] filed a Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on October 9, 

2020. [Appellant] asserted that orders of the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Wolf apply to 

the within action to prohibit eviction of [Appellant].

As stated above, we set forth our findings of fact, reasoning, 

and conclusions of law in open court at the conclusion of the bench 

trial, specifically finding the grounds for grant of possession in 

favor of [Appellee]. Those reasons render [Appellant’s] claims on 

appeal meritless.

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1Dauphin County Local Rule of Magisterial District Court Rule 

10081B, Landlord and Tenant Appeals provides:

In cases where the tenant in possession of real property 

desires to appeal from a judgment for the possession of 

said entered by a Magisterial District Judge of the court and 

does not desire to or is unable to file a bond with surety as 

required by Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008B, such tenant, upon 

application to and approval by the Court, may be permitted 

to deposit rental payments corning due during the 

proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas in an escrow 

account in a bank or trust company approved by the Court. 

No withdrawals shall be permitted from any such escrow 

account except pursuant to court order. At the conclusion 

of the proceedings, such deposits shall be applied to the 

payment of any judgment (Including costs) against the

tenant rendered on appeal,

Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/4/20, at 1-3. 

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court stated the following on 

the record: 

Well, I've listened to the evidence and these things are 

never pleasant because [Appellant] is a decent, hard-working 

woman. She's owned the home since 2008. She admitted that 

she's in violation. She needs to replace the porch and repair the 

skirting and that she's been paying rent into escrow.

She also admitted that she was given notice to get rid of 

the dog and obviously she didn't comply. Of course, those are 

very hard things to do.

Nonetheless, there is a history here of nonpayment. And 

the balance due is $6,222.80, roughly 2,400 of that attorney 
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fees, which brings us to around 3,800 in past due rent and that's 

for a long period of time.

These and other issues involving the property, particularly 

payment problem since 2013 but particularly now it appears to 

be $3,800 in rent for that lot due and – which would amount to 

around three years of rent with attorney fees of $2,399.50.

I find for [Appellee] in the amount of $6,222.80. As I 

indicated, the attorney fees are included in that fee, Thank you.

N.T. Bench Trial, 6/10/20, at 33-34.2 

In her brief, Appellant presents the following question for this Court’s 

review: 

Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting possession of the

premises at issue by its Order dated July 16, 2020, when an 

Executive Order of the Governor of Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania was in effect which extended the evictions and 

foreclosures moratorium through August 31, 2020, and that the 

Governor's Executive Order applied to the Landlord/Tenant Act 

of 1951 and the Manufactured Home Community Rights Act, 

which is the Act under which the present case was brought?

Brief for Appellant at 3. 

Before we determine the merits of this issue, we first consider whether 

Appellant has preserved it for appellate review. 

To preserve a claim of error for appellate review, a party must make a 

specific objection to the alleged error before the trial court in a timely fashion 

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2

In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, after finding no merit to Appellant’s appeal, the 

trial court stressed Appellant’s failure to request a transcript of the Bench Trial 

and include it in the certified record as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1911 impeded 

its ability to consider any issues Appellant raised on appeal and, therefore, 

rendered them waived. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/4/20, at 3-4. 

However, Appellant filed a supplemental record containing the transcripts of 

the proceeding and corresponding exhibits on December 24, 2020, and 

provided this Court with those documents for our review. 
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and at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; failure to raise such objection 

results in waiver of the underlying issue on appeal. Commonwealth v. May, 

584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 832, 127 S.Ct. 58, 

166 L.Ed.2d 54 (2006) (reiterating absence of specific and contemporaneous 

objection to error waives issue on appeal); Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 555 

Pa. 125, 723 A.2d 162 (1999) (explaining if ground upon which objection is 

based is specifically stated, all other reasons for its exclusion are waived). 

Additionally, “the law is clear that issues, even those of constitutional 

dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different 

theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 646 Pa. 735, 187 A.3d 210 (2018); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

At the outset of the June 10, 2020, bench trial, trial counsel and the trial 

court engaged in the following exchange:

Attorney Konkel: Your Honor, I do have a motion to make 

preliminarily, oral motion. Your Honor, making a motion to stay 

this proceeding based on the governor’s order staying all 

evictions, foreclosures, and such actions until July the 11th.

THE COURT: Well, this [c]ourt has an administrative order 

that as of June 1st, any landlord/tenant actions were to continue 

–were to begin. And so based on your motion—and there is a 

Supreme Court order May 11th indicating that all landlord/tenant 

actions may proceed—so based on all that, your motion is denied.

Attorney Konkel: Thank you. 

N.T. Bench Trial 6/10/20, at 3-4. 

As the foregoing evinces, while Appellant initially requested a stay of 

the proceeding based on Governor Wolf’s Executive Order, she neither 
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specified the basis upon which she deemed that Order applied to the within 

matter nor did she object to the trial court’s explanation of its decision to 

continue with the proceeding. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we find 

Appellant's failure to object in a timely and specific manner to the trial court’s 

decision to continue with the landlord/tenant action she now challenges, 

coupled with her acquiescence in the trial court’s explanation for its decision 

to proceed, has resulted in her waiver of the issue raised on appeal.

Notwithstanding, even if we were to deem Appellant’s claim properly 

preserved for our review, it would afford her no relief. In 2020, Governor Wolf 

issued consecutive Executive Orders, pursuant to his emergency powers under 

the Emergency Code, that barred landlords from evicting residential tenants 

for defaulting on their rent obligations or overstaying the terms of their 

residential leases until further notice. See Order of the Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for Staying the Notice Requirements for 

Certain Actions Related to the Dispossession of Property (May 7, 2020),

https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/upolads/ 2020/05/2020057-TWWdispossession-of-property-order.pdf; Order of the Governor of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Staying Notice Requirements for Specified 

Actions Related to the Dispossession of Property (July 9, 2020),

https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200709TWWeviction-order.pdf.

 Section 4 of the July Order, entitled “Scope of Order,” specifically 

provides in relevant part that: 
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The provisions of this Order and the suspension of the Acts under 

this Order apply only to matters involving the nonpayment of 

monies as well as to those proceedings related to the removal of 

any tenant solely because the tenant has held over or exceeded 

the term of a lease. The Order does not apply to suspend notice 

requirements relating to evictions for breaches of any other 

covenants.

See id. 

Herein, Appellant’s eviction for maintenance violations and possession 

of a dog pertain to breaches of covenants other than rent payment. In 

addition, these violations predated and were in no way caused by the 

pandemic. Therefore, Appellant’s position on appeal that her eviction was 

prohibited by Governor Wolf’s Executive Orders does not present an 

appealable issue under the plain terms thereof. Appellant does not advance 

any other viable theory of recovery. Instead, she asks this Court to interpret 

the Governor’s Orders in a manner which would be clearly inconsistent with 

their stated terms and purpose. 

As such, absent waiver, Appellant’s issue would lack merit. In light of 

all of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s July 16, 2020, Order. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/04/2021