alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 No. 333-141827 and Form S-8 No. 333-185892), pertaining to the Triangle Capital Corporation Amended and Restated 2007 Equity Incentive Plan, of our reports dated February 26, 2014 , with respect to the consolidated financial statements and financial highlights and Schedule 12-14 of Triangle Capital Corporation and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Triangle Capital Corporation, included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2013 .








/s/ Ernst & Young LLP


Raleigh, North Carolina


February 26, 2014
Exhibit 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Certification of Chief Financial Officer

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pure Bioscience (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary Brownell, Chief Financial Officer certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

March 15, 2005                   /s/ Gary Brownell
-------------------              -----------------------------------
                                 Gary Brownell
                                 Chief Executive Officer
>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Brian Keith HUETT, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10520 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed December 1, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peter Michael Fleury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Michael Arthur Leh-mann, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Brian Keith Huett challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He contends that the Government failed to establish the interstate commerce and mens rea elements of the offense. Huett also contends that § 922(g) is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him because it exceeds the federal Government’s power under the Commerce Clause. Huett concedes that these arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Huett’s interstate commerce argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Daugherty,*264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), in which this court rejected a similar argument that the Government’s showing that a weapon had travelled across state lines was insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus requirement of § 922(g). His mens rea argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Dancy,*861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), which held that § 922(g) does not contain a mens rea element. His Commerce Clause argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Alcantar,*733 F.3d 143, *300145-56 (5th Cir. 2013), which rejected a similar challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED. Its alternative motion for an extension of time is DENIED as unnecessary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### In the MATTER OF: FIRST REGIONAL BANCORP, Debtor, *566Vikaran Ghei, Co-Liquidating Trustee; Michael Zaitzeff, Co-Liquidating Trustee, Appellants, v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for First Regional Bank of California, Appellee.

No. 16-56336

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit..

Submitted November 16, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed November 20, 2017

Jon L. Dalberg, Attorney, Roye Zur, Esquire, Attorney, Landau Gottfried & Berger LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Appellants

John A. Moe, II, Esquire, Bankruptcy Counsel, Dentons US LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Michelle Ognibene, Counsel, FDIC— Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Legal Division/Appellate Unit, Aldington, VA, for Appellee

Before: KOZINSKI and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and GETTLEMAN,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

1. “Allowing [a] parent [corporation] to keep any refunds arising solely from a subsidiary’s losses simply because the parent and subsidiary chose a procedural device to facilitate their income tax reporting unjustly enriches the parent.” In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1973). The joint filings of the First Regional Bancorp and the First Regional Bank did not establish a tax sharing agreement — express or implied — between the two. Appellants have failed to plausibly allege any relationship between the Bancorp and the Bank that would diverge from the rule of Bob Richards.

2. A court need not grant leave to amend a complaint if amendment would be futile. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). The Bancorp’s Affiliate Transactions Policy stipulated that the Bancorp would not benefit itself financially at the expense of the Bank, which decisively undercuts appellants’ argument that the Bancorp and Bank had an implied-in-fact agreement to share tax responsibilities and refunds. No amendment could have cured that defect.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 16, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RUDOLPH GERMAN SERRANO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

OFFICER G.A. BUHL; OFFICER B.

MCKINNEY,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

GOVERNOR SUSANA MARTINEZ;

MAYOR GREGORY HULL; CHIEF

MICHAEL GEIER,

 Defendants.

No. 16-2076

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01063-KG-KK)

(D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.**

Plaintiff-Appellant Rudolph German Serrano appeals from the dismissal

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
without prejudice of his civil rights complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Serrano

sought damages against several defendants, alleging that he was unlawfully

arrested and the police report on his arrest contained misrepresentations. See

Serrano v. Martinez, No. 15-cv-1063-KG-KK (D.N.M. Dec. 3, 2015). The district

court dismissed his claims against all but a single defendant for failure to state a

claim and ordered Mr. Serrano to show cause by April 13, 2016, why the

remaining defendant should not be dismissed for improper service of process. 

The court received Mr. Serrano’s response on April 14, 2016, and dismissed the

complaint without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with

Rule 4(m) and the district court’s orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), 4. Mr.

Serrano appeals, arguing his health prevented him from meeting the courtimposed deadline and rehashing the merits of his claim.

Rule 4 requires a plaintiff to effect timely service on a defendant. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(m). The court reminded Mr. Serrano twice about the need to serve the

defendant or provide an address so the court could order service itself. Not only

did Mr. Serrano fail to provide an address but he failed to acknowledge or explain

this deficiency. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing the complaint. See Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d 1324, 1326 (10th Cir.

2003) (standard of review); see also Bowens v. Sterling Corr. Facility, 533 F.

App’x 863 (10th Cir. 2013) (dismissing § 1983 suit for failure to comply with

court order).

- 2 -
AFFIRMED. We DENY Mr. Serrano’s motion for leave to proceed without

prepayment of costs or fees. 

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge

- 3 -
# EUR-Lex - 32003R1205 - EN

Important legal notice

*|*

# 32003R1205

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1205/2003 of 4 July 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 laying down certain rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 as regards the description, designation, presentation and protection of certain wine sector products **

*
Official Journal L 168 , 05/07/2003 P. 0013 - 0013 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1205/2003

of 4 July 2003

amending Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 laying down certain rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 as regards the description, designation, presentation and protection of certain wine sector products

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 806/2003(2), and in particular Article 80(b) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 753/2002(3), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2086/2002(4), lays down 1 August 2003 as the date from which it is to apply to allow economic operators in the wine sector and the national authorities concerned enough time to prepare for the new labelling rules laid down in that Regulation.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 provides for a transitional period up to 1 August 2003 during which economic operators may continue to use labels and pre-packaging material bearing particulars which were printed in conformity with the provisions applicable when they were put into circulation but which no longer conform to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 753/2002.

(3) Following discussions between the national authorities concerned and between those authorities and the trade, it is necessary to prolong that transitional period to 1 February 2004 to allow economic operators to use labels and pre-packaging material complying with the previous provisions.

(4) Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 should be amended accordingly.

(5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 is hereby amended as follows:

The second subparagraph of Article 47(1) is replaced by the following:"Labels and pre-packaging material bearing particulars which were printed in conformity with the provisions applicable up to the entry into force of this Regulation may continue to be used until 1 February 2004."

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 4 July 2003.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 179, 14.7.1999, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 122, 16.5.2003, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 118, 4.5.2002, p. 1.

(4) OJ L 321, 26.11.2002, p. 8.
#### Troy DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jonathan A. ROUNDTREE; Kenneth Norris; Collins, Doctor, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-30207

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 7, 2017

Troy Davis, Pro Se

Margaret A. Collier, Louisiana Department of Justice, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before SMITH, WIENER, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Troy Davis, Louisiana prisoner # 356886, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit to seek redress for alleged acts of retaliation and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as well as the disposition of his grievances. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and we dismissed the resulting appeal as frivolous. Davis moved for a new trial, contending that his right to a jury trial was infringed. The district court denied the motion, and Davis moves this court for authorization to procéed *in for-ma pauperis*(“IFP”) on appeal.

By moving to proceed IFP, Davis is challenging the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We may dismiss the appeal if it is frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Davis’s motion is best construed as arising under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) because it was filed more than 28 days after entry of judgment and does not fit into any of the other subsections of that rule. *See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc.,*702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012); *Hess v. Cockrell,*281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002); Rule 60(b). The denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is reviewéd for abuse of discretion. *Diaz v. Stephens,*731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013). To meet that standard, it is not enough that the movant show “that the granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, “denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” *Id.*(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Our review of the record and Davis’s arguments shows that that standard has not been met. Because Davis did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, he was not entitled to a jury trial. *See Plaisance v. Phelps,*845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988). He has failed to establish-that his appeal involves any arguably meritorious issue. *See Howard,*707 F.2d at 220.

Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed IFP qn appeal is DENIED, and the *378appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Mr. Lester D. FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ashton Baldwin CARTER; Department of Defense; Defense Commissary Agency DeCA, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1732

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 24, 2017

Decided: November 2, 2017

Lestef1 D. Fletcher, Appellant Pro 'Se. Jane Elizabeth Anderson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lester D. Fletcher appeals the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his *271complaint filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp. 2017); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 to 7961 (West 2008 & Supp. 2017); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2012); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 to 634 (West 2012 *&*Supp. 2017). Seven days after the district court issued its memorandum opinion dismissing the complaint, Fletcher filed a “response,” arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The district court returned the pleading without consideration, explaining that the case was now closed. “[I]f a post-judgment motion is filed within ten days of the entry of judgment and calls into question the correctness of that judgment it should be treated as a motion under Rule 59(e), however it may be formally styled.” *MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of So. Pines,*532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, Fletcher’s postjudgment motion is properly construed as a timely-filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion.

Accordingly, we order a limited remand directing the district court to promptly docket Fletcher’s response as a Rule 59(e) motion and to consider the motion on its merits. If either party is dissatisfied after the district court disposes of the Rule 59(e) motion and timely files a notice of appeal or amends its current notice, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), any appeal from the district court’s final order will be consolidated with this appeal. Regardless of the outcome of the Rule 59(e) motion, the record, as supplemented, will be returned to this court for further consideration.

In ordering this limited remand, we express no opinion as to the merits of the motion. We dispense with oral argument' because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*REMANDED*
**Exhibit 23.1** **Consent    of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration    Statement    (Form S-8No. 333-140421)    pertaining to the 2006 Omnibus Incentive Compensation Plan of    HFF, Inc. of our reports dated March 14, 2008, with respect    to the consolidated financial statements of HFF, Inc., and the    effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of    HFF, Inc., included in the Annual Report    (Form 10-K)    of HFF, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2007. /s/  Ernst &    Young LLP     Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania    March 14, 2008
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.1

[SILICON VALLEY BANK LETTERHEAD]

                           AMENDMENT TO LOAN AGREEMENT

DATE:           July 9, 1999

BORROWER:       VitalCom Inc.

1.   This amendment to Loan Agreement is entered into between Silicon Valley
     Bank ("Silicon") and the Borrower named above ("Borrower"). The Parties
     agree to amend the Loan and Security Agreement between them, dated February
     26, 1993, as amended from time to time (the "Loan Agreement"), as follows,
     effective as of the date hereof. (Capitalized terms used but not defined in
     this Amendment shall have the meanings set forth in the Loan Agreement).

2.   Section 4.6, Negative Covenants-Exceptions, is hereby amended to read as
     follows:

     Without Silicon's prior written consent, Borrower may do the following,
     provided that, after giving effect thereto, no Event of Default has
     occurred and no event has occurred which, with notice or passage of time or
     both, would constitute an Event of Default, and provided that the following
     are done in compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations: (i)
     repurchase shares of Borrower's stock, provided that the total amount paid
     by Borrower for such stock does not exceed $2,000,000 in any fiscal year.

Except as herein expressly amended, all of the terms and provisions of the Loan
Agreement, and all other documents and agreements between Silicon and Borrower
shall continue in full force and effect and the same are hereby ratified and
confirmed.

BORROWER:
VITALCOM INC.


By:     /s/
        ------------------------------
Title:  Chief Financial Officer

SILICON:

SILICON VALLEY BANK


By:     /s/
        ------------------------------
Title:  Vice President
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERTO SILVA-MONDRAGON,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-71454

Agency No. A087-526-573

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

 

Submitted October 15, 2013** 

Before: FISHER, GOULD, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Roberto Silva-Mondragon, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

FILED

OCT 25 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 
We review de novo questions of law, including constitutional claims. Mohammed

v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for

review.

The agency did not err in admitting Silva-Mondragon’s Form I-213 where

Silva-Mondragon did not demonstrate that the Form I-213 was obtained through an

egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d

488, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1994). The Form I-213 was probative and Silva-Mondragon

does not claim that he was coerced into giving the information in the I-213 or that

the information it contains is incorrect. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th

Cir. 1995) (Admission of a Form I-213 “is fair absent evidence of coercion or that

the statements are not those of the petitioner.”); see also Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259

F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (alienage can be proven with a properly

authenticated Form I-213).

Silva-Mondragon’s claim that he was prevented from exercising his right to

admit or deny the factual allegations and charge of removability contained in the

Notice to Appear is belied by the record, and he has not established prejudice from

the admission of the request for a prompt hearing. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241,

1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (an alien must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due

process claim). 

2 12-71454
In light of our disposition, we need not reach Silva-Mondragon’s remaining

claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 12-71454
III

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 129

To elect Kelly D. Johnston as Secretary of the Senate.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 8 (legislative day, JUNE 5), 1995

Mr. NICKLES (for Mr. DOLE) submitted the following resolution; which was

considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

To elect Kelly D. Johnston as Secretary of the Senate.

1 Resolved, That Kelly D. Johnston, of Oklahoma, be,

2 and he hereby is, elected Secretary of the Senate begin3 ning June 8, 1995.

Æ