22-500-cv

Bradshaw v. Welch

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 1st day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:

ROBERT D. SACK,

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

Jay Bradshaw,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 22-500-cv

Matthew Welch, Correctional Officer, Upstate 

Correctional Facility; Gabriel Orbegozo, 

Correctional Officer, Upstate Correctional 

Facility; Nathan Locke, Correctional Officer,

Upstate Correctional Facility; Russell, 

Correctional Officer, Upstate Correctional 

Facility; Gravlin, Captain, Upstate 

Correctional Facility; John Doe #1-2, 

Correctional Officers, Upstate Correctional 

Facility; Eric E. Marshall, Sergeant, Upstate 

Correctional Facility,
2

Defendants-Appellees,

Soucia, Sergeant, Upstate Correctional 

Facility; Donald Uhler, Veneske, Corrections 

Sergeant, Brunson, Corrections Officer, C.O. 

Lamica, Mallette, Corrections Officer, 

Gadway, Corrections Officer, Gibson, C.O.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jay Bradshaw, pro se, Malone, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Frederick A. Brodie, Assistant Solicitor 

General, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor 

General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor 

General, for Letitia James, Attorney 

General of the State of New York, Albany, 

NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 

York (D’Agostino, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-appellant Jay Bradshaw, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order, 

entered on March 4, 2022, denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. As the district court 

noted, this lawsuit is one of at least twenty-two civil actions brought by Bradshaw since 2008. 

See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 13, at 3 (listing cases). In this lawsuit, Bradshaw brought claims for,

among other things, excessive force and failure-to-intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in 

connection with an alleged series of incidents on July 12, 2021, during which Bradshaw asserts 

he was assaulted by certain defendants while incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility 
3

(“Upstate”).

Over several months following the filing of the complaint on July 21, 2021, Bradshaw 

moved numerous times for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to (1) desist from 

harming him and (2) transfer him from Upstate to another prison. The district court denied these 

motions. Bradshaw did not appeal those decisions. 

On January 18, 2022, Bradshaw filed another request for injunctive relief based on an 

allegedly improper cell search conducted by correctional officers and threats allegedly made by 

defendant Sergeant Eric Marshall on January 6, 2022 (the “January 2022 Allegations”). While 

that motion was being briefed, Bradshaw commenced a separate federal lawsuit based on the 

January 2022 Allegations and moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 

injunction, relief identical to that sought in the motion denied and appealed in this case. See 

Bradshaw v. Uhler, No. 22-cv-94, Dkt. Nos. 1–2 (N.D.N.Y.).

In the instant action, on March 4, 2022, the district court denied Bradshaw’s motion for 

injunctive relief based on the January 2022 Allegations. See Bradshaw v. Marshal, No. 21-cv0826, 2022 WL 630890, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022). The district court determined, among 

other things, that the motion should be denied because Bradshaw’s pending separate lawsuit 

relating to the January 2022 Allegations sought identical injunctive relief, and “[i]t [was] entirely 

inappropriate to pursue the same injunctive relief in two separate actions, based on the same 

underlying conduct.” Id. at *2. 

Bradshaw filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, Bradshaw was transferred 

to another New York State facility to participate in a treatment program but was subsequently 

transferred back to Upstate, where he remains incarcerated today. We assume the parties’
4

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which 

we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Bradshaw’s appeal is moot because

we lack jurisdiction to review a moot appeal. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 

682, 692 (2d Cir. 2013). An appeal becomes moot “if an event occurs while a case is pending 

on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief [whatsoever] to a 

prevailing party.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “[a] prisoner’s transfer to a different 

correctional facility generally moots his request for injunctive relief against employees of the 

transferor facility.” Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2002).

Defendants argue that, because Bradshaw was transferred to Lakeview Correctional 

Facility to participate in a treatment program in September 2022, his motion for injunctive relief 

related to his conditions of confinement at Upstate became moot, and his appeal must be 

dismissed even though he has now been transferred back to Upstate. We disagree. 

Here, Bradshaw seeks an order vacating the district court’s denial of his motion for a 

preliminary injunction that would provide emergency relief because of his conditions of 

confinement at Upstate. Because he is currently at Upstate, regardless of whether he was 

temporarily housed at another facility during the appeal, there is nothing about the present 

situation that would render it impossible for the district court to grant his requested relief, 

including his requested transfer from Upstate to another facility. See, e.g., Davis v. New York, 

316 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a transfer of incarcerated plaintiff to a different 

housing block did not moot claim for injunctive relief where plaintiff alleged that the unlawful 
5

conduct persisted in current location); see also Smith v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 8-

cv-7909, 2010 WL 1191957, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (declining to adopt Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation that inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim was moot because he had been 

transferred out of the facility at issue where inmate alleged that he had been transferred back),

aff’d in part and vacated in part, 500 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Oct. 24, 2012)

(summary order) (addressing merits of Eighth Amendment claim). Put simply, “a live 

controversy” continues to exist between Bradshaw and the defendants regarding his continued 

incarceration at Upstate. Thompson, 284 F.3d at 415. Accordingly, this appeal is not moot.1

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must ordinarily establish (1) irreparable harm; 

(2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to 

the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships 

tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the 

public interest.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, examining 

factual conclusions for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. Green Haven Prison 

Preparative Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. 

Supervision, 16 F.4th 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Green Haven Preparative 

Meeting v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022). We also 

1 In holding that the requested injunctive relief (including a transfer from Upstate) has not been rendered 

impossible by any subsequent events for purposes of the mootness analysis, we make no legal 

determination on the merits as to whether the relief sought may be granted in this case.
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review for abuse of discretion a district court’s handling of duplicative claims or motions in 

separate lawsuits. Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000).

The district court determined in this case (which relates to alleged unconstitutional 

conduct by the defendants at Upstate on July 12, 2021) that it should not consider Bradshaw’s

motion for injunctive relief related to separate events at Upstate months later in January 2022

allegedly involving different defendants (with the exception of Sergeant Marshall), especially 

where Bradshaw filed a separate lawsuit regarding the January 2022 Allegations and has a

pending motion in that case seeking identical injunctive relief. Marshal, 2022 WL 630890, at 

*2–3 & n.8. We find no abuse of discretion in that determination. See Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138 

(“The complex problems that can arise from multiple federal filings do not lend themselves to a 

rigid test, but require instead that the district court consider the equities of the situation when 

exercising its discretion.”).2

 

We have considered Bradshaw’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2

 The district court also concluded that Bradshaw failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success regarding 

his claims arising from the January 2022 Allegations because, “having filed his motion only one week 

after the alleged wrongdoing that gives rise to his request for injunctive relief, plaintiff unquestionably 

failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies, yet he offers no explanation as to why he did not do 

so.” Marshal, 2022 WL 630890, at *3. We express no view on the issue here. Defendants are free to 

raise an exhaustion defense, if they wish, in the separate lawsuit related to the January 2022 Allegations. 

We similarly do not reach the other grounds articulated by the district court for denial of the preliminary 

injunction.