PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-2607

_____________

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,

 Appellant

v.

TRAINER CUSTOM CHEMICAL, LLC; 

JAMES HALKIAS; JEREMY HUNTER 

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-01232)

District Judge: Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno

_______________

Argued

July 16, 2018

Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit 

Judges

(Filed: October 5, 2018)

_______________
2

Alexandra C. Chiaruttini, Chief Counsel

Douglas G. White, Supervisory Counsel [ARGUED]

Brian G. Glass

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

2 East Main Street, 4th Floor

Norristown, PA 19401

 Counsel for Appellant

Lloyd R. Hampton [ARGUED]

Hampton & Hampton

400 Broad Street

Route 61

Ashland, PA 17921

Counsel for Appellees Trainer Custom Chemical, LLC 

and Jeremy Hunter

Joseph A. Malley, III

Law Office of Joseph A. Malley III

15 East Second Street

P. O. Box 698

Media, PA 19063

Counsel for Appellees Trainer Custom Chemical, LLC

and James Halkias

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

We are asked in this interlocutory appeal to decide 

whether the owner of a piece of land is liable for the costs of 
3

an environmental cleanup that took place there before the

owner acquired it. Our answer is yes.

Trainer Custom Chemical, LLC (“Trainer”) acquired a 

property known as the Stoney Creek Site (the “Site”) for 

$20,000, after Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental 

Protection (“PADEP”) had already incurred over $818,000 in 

environmental cleanup costs at the Site. The cleanup costs 

continued to mount following Trainer’s acquisition of the 

property, both because of pre-existing pollution and because 

buildings on the Site were demolished by one or both of 

Trainer’s principals, Jeremy Hunter and James Halkias, which 

caused further contamination.

PADEP sued Trainer, Hunter, and Halkias for

violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 9601-28,1and Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup 

Act (“HSCA”), 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 6020.101-.1305, and sought to 

recover all of its response costs related to the Site, regardless 

of when those costs arose. At summary judgment, the 

District Court drew a temporal line, holding Trainer liable 

under both statutes for the response costs incurred after 

Trainer took ownership of the Site but not for the costs that 

arose before. Although the Court directed the parties to

proceed to trial on damages, PADEP disagreed with the 

temporal distinction drawn by the Court and filed this 

interlocutory appeal.

 

1 CERCLA § 1 et seq. is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601

et seq.
4

We conclude that a current owner of real property is 

liable under both CERCLA and HSCA for all response costs 

in an environmental cleanup, including costs incurred before 

the owner acquired the property. Accordingly, we will affirm 

in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1. The Site Before Trainer Acquired It

The Site is located in Trainer Borough, Delaware 

County, Pennsylvania. In 2007, it was owned by Stoney 

Creek Technologies (“SCT”), which primarily used it for 

making corrosion inhibitors, fuel additives, and oil additives. 

Buildings and equipment used in creating SCT’s products

were located on the Site, including a laboratory and a water 

treatment facility. SCT also kept various hazardous

substances at the Site, including about three million gallons of 

flammable or combustible chemicals that posed a threat of 

release, and over seventeen million pounds of other chemical 

inventory, which included flammable, combustible, and 

corrosive chemicals. 

PADEP investigated the environmental risk at the Site 

and determined in 2007 that “there is a release or threat of 

release of hazardous substances or contaminants, which 

presents a substantial danger to human health or the 

environment[.]” (App. at 34.) Accordingly, PADEP and the 
5

United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 

initiated removal actions.

2

 

SCT was in financial trouble and could not afford the 

expenses involved in the cleanup. One such expense was for 

the electricity to power pollution control and security 

equipment, including a vaporized nitrogen system. The 

nitrogen system was necessary to minimize the threat of fire

posed by the flammable and combustible chemicals on the 

Site. Due to lack of payment, the power company was going 

to shut off the electricity to the Site, so PADEP assumed 

responsibility for paying the electrical bills. 

2. Trainer’s Acquisition of the Site

The same financial straits that had apparently led SCT 

to fall behind in paying for electricity also led it to become 

delinquent in paying real estate taxes. Consequently, the Tax 

Claim Bureau of Delaware County forced a sale of the Site. 

In what was evidently a coordinated effort, Hunter and 

 

2

 Generally, “removal actions are short term responses 

to a release or threat of release while remedial actions involve 

long term remedies.” Black Horse Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow 

Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 293 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation 

omitted). “The statute defines ‘response’ as ‘remove, 

removal, remedy, and remedial action[.]’” Id. at 292 (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)). The record contains some 

inconsistency as to when removal actions at the Site began. 

For example, one report indicates that the EPA began its 

response in October 2008. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that 

removal actions commenced before Trainer became the 

owner of the Site. 
6

Halkias purchased the property and put its title in Trainer’s 

name. Hunter signed the purchase agreement, the recitals of 

which plainly stated that the Site had ongoing “environmental 

issues ... [and] environmental remediation.” (App. at 53.) 

Despite that warning, on October 4, 2012, Halkias tendered a 

cashier’s check for $20,000 and a handwritten note indicating 

that the deed to the property should be made out to Trainer 

Custom Chemical LLC. The next day, Halkias and Hunter 

officially formed Trainer Custom Chemical LLC by filing a 

Certificate of Organization with the Pennsylvania Department 

of State. On October 9, 2012, the deed to the Site was 

executed and put in Trainer’s name. 

3. The Site After Trainer Acquired It

The EPA and PADEP completed their removal actions 

at the Site on December 12, 2012.

3

 But that was not the end 

of the problems there. After Trainer acquired the Site, either 

Hunter or Halkias or both – they point the finger of blame at 

each other – demolished many of the Site’s structures. 

Regardless of who was responsible, it is undisputed that 

metals and other salvageable materials reclaimed from the 

Site were sold for at least $875,000 to JK Myers Contracting, 

a business that Halkias had registered with the Pennsylvania 

Corporations Bureau in April 2012. 

 

3 There is some ambiguity in the record on the date of 

completion. PADEP’s reply brief notes December 10, 2012 

as the date of completion, but an EPA website referenced in 

the briefing indicates the date to be May 2, 2013. The 

discrepancy is immaterial to this case.
7

In June 2014, PADEP received two reports assessing 

environmental concerns at the Site. One noted that “[t]he 

[]EPA has acknowledged that hazards still exist at the Site[.]” 

(App. at 61.) The report further said that, during a recent visit 

to the Site, PADEP “observed active demolition activities 

being conducted on several structures throughout the Site[,]” 

and “[s]everal storage tanks were observed to be cut open and 

unknown contents were noted to be spilling onto the ground.” 

(App. at 62.) The other report indicated that buildings on the 

Site had asbestos-containing materials that needed to be 

removed before demolition. 

B. Procedural History

PADEP sued Trainer, Halkias, and Hunter under 

CERCLA and HSCA to recover the costs incurred in cleaning

up the Site. The complaint was in six counts: separate ones 

against each of the three defendants under CERCLA § 107(a), 

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and, again, separate ones against each of 

them under HSCA §§ 701 and 702, 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 6020.701, 

6020.702. 

Eventually, PADEP moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that the defendants should be jointly and severally 

liable for all of the environmental response costs. In total, 

those costs were $932,580.12, through November 2015. The 

most significant charges were payments for electricity

amounting to $818,730.50 through June 2009, before Trainer 

acquired the Site. PADEP also bore other response costs after 

Trainer took ownership. 

The District Court granted summary judgment in part 

and denied it in part. The Court noted that PADEP’s claims 
8

against Halkias and Hunter were based on a theory of 

piercing Trainer’s corporate veil, so the initial question it 

sought to answer, and the question before us in this

interlocutory appeal, is whether Trainer was liable for 

violations of CERCLA and HSCA. With respect to CERCLA 

liability, “the Court [held] [Trainer] liable for any response 

costs incurred after [Trainer] took ownership of the Site, but 

not for costs incurred beforehand.” (App. at 99-100.) As to 

CERCLA damages, it denied summary judgment because 

there was a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the 

amount of damages for which Trainer was liable. The Court 

reached the same conclusions with respect to HSCA liability 

and damages. 

PADEP disagreed with the District Court’s decision to 

grant summary judgment only in part. It sought an order

certifying for interlocutory appeal the issue of whether federal 

and Pennsylvania law “make an owner liable for response 

actions and response costs attributable to an identified release 

of hazardous substances which continues at the time of that 

person’s ownership, regardless of when such actions or 

response costs were taken or incurred.” (App. at 114-15.)

The District Court granted certification, and PADEP then 

petitioned us for permission to appeal, which we gave

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A. CERCLA

“Congress enacted CERCLA ‘to promote the timely 

cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs 

of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for 
9

the contamination.’” Litgo N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of 

Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 

599, 602 (2009)). Section 107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA gives 

states “the right to recover costs incurred in cleaning up a 

waste site from ‘potentially responsible parties’ (PRPs)—four 

broad classes of persons who may be held strictly liable for 

releases of hazardous substances that occur at a facility.” 

Litgo N.J. Inc., 725 F.3d at 378. Those four classes of PRPs

are: the owner or operator of a facility, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9607(a)(1); anyone who owned or operated the facility 

when there was a disposal of a hazardous substance, id.

§ 9607(a)(2); anyone who arranged for the disposal or 

treatment, or arranged for the transport for disposal or 

treatment, of hazardous substances at the facility, id.

§ 9607(a)(3); and anyone who accepted hazardous substances 

for transport to sites selected by such persons, id.

§ 9607(a)(4). United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 

706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996). “Once an entity is identified as a 

PRP, it may be compelled to ... reimburse the [g]overnment 

for ... past and future response costs.” Burlington, 556 U.S. at 

609.

Our focus here is on the first category of PRPs: “the 

owner ... of ... a facility[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); accord

United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 

1988). We refer to that category of PRP in this appeal as

simply the “owner,” or, more particularly, the “current

owner.”4 CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 713.

 

4

 While CERCLA does not use the word “current” as 

a modifier for “owner,” we have held that § 107(a)(1)

includes “current owners” as potentially responsible parties. 
10

In § 107 cost recovery actions, summary judgment on 

the issue of liability may be appropriate “even when genuine 

issues of material fact remain as to ... damages.” United 

States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 

1993) (“Alcan 1993”). Defendants may be held jointly and 

severally liable in a cost recovery action, United States v. 

Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) 

(“Alcan-Butler”), but they can also seek to limit that liability 

by demonstrating that the contamination “is divisible and

reasonably capable of apportionment[,]” id. at 269; accord

Alcan 1993, 990 F.2d at 721-23.

5

 

See, e.g., Litgo, 725 F.3d at 381; CDMG Realty Co. 96 F.3d 

at 713. And although the statute uses the language “owner 

and operator[,]” stated in the conjunctive, many courts have 

concluded that the language should be read in the disjunctive. 

See e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 

F.3d 321, 328 (2d Cir. 2000) (“It is settled in this circuit that 

owner and operator liability should be treated separately.”); 

Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. 

Living Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Like other 

courts, we read these categories [of ‘owner’ and ‘operator’] in 

the disjunctive.”). We too have described § 107(a)(1) in 

disjunctive language. See CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 713 

(stating a “current owner or operator of a facility” is a PRP).

5 There is some disagreement in the case law over 

whether divisibility is properly addressed at the liability phase 

or damages phase of a cost recovery action. We have said 

that it is best to resolve a divisibility inquiry “at the initial 

liability phase” because “it involves precisely relative degrees 

of liability[,]” Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29, but the 
11

B. HSCA

HSCA is Pennsylvania’s state law counterpart to 

CERCLA. Cf. In re Joshua Hill, Inc., 294 F.3d 482, 489-91 

(3d Cir. 2002) (supporting analysis of HSCA claims by 

relying on analogous CERCLA provisions). Like CERCLA, 

HSCA defines classes of persons who are legally liable for a 

release or threatened release of hazardous substances, and the 

owner of a contaminated site is one such person. 35 Pa. Stat. 

§ 6020.701(a). A current owner is strictly liable for 

environmental response costs, including those incurred by the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. § 6020.702(a). 

Although CERCLA and HSCA have differences, there are 

instances in which “liability under ... HSCA mirrors liability 

under CERCLA” because “§ 702(a) of ... HSCA mirrors 

§ 107(a) of CERCLA.” Agere Sys., Inc. v. Adv. Envtl. Tech. 

Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 236 (3d Cir. 2010). In this matter, no 

one asserts that owner liability under CERCLA § 107(a) and

under HSCA §§ 701 and 702 is anything other than

 

Second Circuit has questioned that approach, see Alcan 1993, 

990 F.2d at 723 (stating that approach “may be contrary to the 

statutory dictates of CERCLA” and instead leaving the choice 

of when to address divisibility “to the sound discretion of the 

trial court”). We do not attempt to resolve that disagreement 

now, however, because no party raised it before the District 

Court or to us on appeal. We simply note that nothing we say 

here with respect to current owner liability under § 107(a)(1) 

is meant to change our precedent addressing divisibility in a 

§ 107 cost recovery action.
12

practically the same for all relevant purposes.

6

 Therefore, our 

resolution of Trainer’s liability under CERCLA also decides 

Trainer’s liability under HSCA.

III. DISCUSSION7

At the outset, we note that all parties and the District 

Court agree that Trainer is the owner of the Site and, pursuant 

to CERCLA § 107(a)(1), is at least liable for environmental 

 

6 Our decision today does not imply that relevant 

distinctions may not emerge in other cases, but no relevant 

difference has been suggested to us here. 

7

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction over this

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “The 

scope of our review in a permitted interlocutory appeal is 

limited to questions of law raised by the underlying order. 

We are not limited to answering the questions certified, 

however, and may address any issue necessary to decide the 

appeal.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 

1999).

“We review the grant or denial of a motion for 

summary judgment de novo,” id., and “apply[] the same 

standard employed by the district court[,]” Trinity Indus., Inc. 

v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2013). 

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if, after drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” 

which in this case is Trainer, “there exists ‘no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact.’” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease 

Holding Co., --- F.3d ---, No. 16-1994, 2018 WL 4324261, at 

*19 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2018) (citation omitted).
13

response costs incurred after it took ownership. Taking that 

concession as our starting point, our task is to decide whether

the meaning of “all costs” in § 107(a) includes response costs 

incurred before Trainer acquired the Site. We conclude that, 

given the structure and text of CERCLA, a current owner

under § 107(a)(1) is indeed liable for all response costs, 

whether incurred before or after acquiring the property.

“Statutory interpretation, as we always say, begins 

with the text.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 424-25 (3d 

Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 

1856 (2016)). We derive the “legislative intent of Congress 

... from the language and structure of the statute itself[.]” 

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997). We

therefore begin our analysis by looking at the text of the 

CERCLA provision that makes a current owner liable for 

response costs and then consider that provision’s place within 

the larger framework of the statute.

Section 107(a) provides that “the owner ... of ... a 

facility ... shall be liable for ... all costs of removal or 

remedial action incurred by ... a State ... not inconsistent with 

the national contingency plan[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); 

accord Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 210. That is a statement of 

remarkable breadth, but a statute may be broad in scope and 

still be quite clear. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 

F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010). 

The term “all costs” means just that; it does not distinguish 

between costs that were incurred before ownership and those

incurred afterwards. Because there is no such distinction, 

there is no temporal limitation on the liability for costs. If 

Congress had intended for “all costs” to mean anything less 

than “all,” we assume it would have so specified. The plain 
14

text thus leads us to conclude that the words “all costs”

include costs incurred before ownership and costs incurred 

after ownership.

The structure of CERCLA, as amended, reinforces that 

reading of the statute. “The Supreme Court has stated 

consistently that the text of a statute must be considered in the 

larger context or structure of the statute in which it is found.” 

United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006). 

And “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain 

exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are 

not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary 

legislative intent.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 

(2001) (citation omitted). CERCLA already provides a 

number of potential limits on PRP liability. There are statutes

of limitations for § 107 cost recovery actions, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9613(g)(2),8the innocent owner defense to § 107(a) 

liability, id. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3); CDMG Realty Co., 

96 F.3d at 716 & n.6,

9

and the bona fide prospective 

 

8 An initial cost recovery action under § 107 “must be 

commenced ... for a removal action, within 3 years after 

completion of the removal action, ... and ... for a remedial 

action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site 

construction of the remedial action[.]” 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(g)(2).

9

“To establish the innocent owner defense, the 

defendant must show that ‘the real property on which the 

facility is located was acquired by the defendant after the 

disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at 

the facility’ and that ‘[a]t the time the defendant acquired the 

facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to 
15

purchaser defense to § 107(a)(1) current owner liability, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r).10 We therefore decline to read

an additional limitation into the statute by imposing a new 

temporal frame on the meaning of “all” in the term “all 

costs.”

Moreover, the provision in CERCLA for contribution 

actions, § 113(f), also supports reading “all costs” to include

costs incurred before a current owner acquired a property. Id.

§ 9613(f). Through § 113(f), response costs can be 

reassigned to a more culpable party. Id.; see Litgo N.J. Inc., 

725 F.3d at 383 (“After identifying PRPs, courts allocate 

response costs based on equitable factors.”). When 

 

know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the 

release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the 

facility.’” CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716 & n.6 

(alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 

9607(b)(3)).

10

 A bona fide prospective purchaser is one who, 

among other things, has “made all appropriate inquiries into 

the previous ownership and uses of the facility” and 

“exercises appropriate care with respect to hazardous 

substances found at the facility[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40). 

Such a purchaser “shall not be liable” as “an owner or 

operator of a facility” under § 107(a)(1) “as long as [it] does 

not impede the performance of a response action or natural 

resource restoration.” Id. § 9607(r)(1). The statute further 

provides that, even if a new owner qualifies as a bona fide 

prospective purchaser, the new owner would not be entitled to 

a windfall profit. Id. § 9607(r)(2)-(3).
16

apportioning cleanup costs, courts consistently pay attention 

to who has participated in response efforts without slowing or 

interfering with that process. See, e.g., id. at 383, 388-89 

(citing cases when cooperative PRP current owners were 

apportioned 0%, 5%, and 10% of remediation costs). Thus,

when a PRP must bear “more than its fair share” of cleanup 

costs resulting from a § 107 cost recovery action, it can seek a 

more equitable distribution of those costs through a 

contribution action against other PRPs. United States v. R.W. 

Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506-08 (6th Cir. 1989).

Finally, the Small Business Liability Relief and 

Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 

115 Stat. 2356 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607),

provides logical support for the conclusion that a current 

owner is liable for response costs incurred before the change 

in ownership of the property.11 As just noted, see supra note 

8, Congress added a provision from that Act – the bona fide 

prospective purchaser defense – to CERCLA to allow a 

prospective purchaser to be exempted from § 107(a)(1) 

liability, if that purchaser, among other requirements, “made 

all appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses 

of the facility” and “exercise[d] appropriate care with respect 

to hazardous substances found at the facility[.]” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9601(40). But that defense is limited because even a 

careful prospective purchaser is not totally off the hook – the 

amendment allows the United States to obtain a lien on the 

property for its “unrecovered response costs.” Id.

 

11

 The District Court noted in its order certifying the 

interlocutory appeal that the bona fide prospective purchaser 

defense “might support [PADEP]’s position.” (App. at 157

(emphasis omitted).)
17

§ 9607(r)(2). No one has invoked the defense here, and, in 

any event, it allows only the United States to obtain a lien, 

while in this instance Pennsylvania is the one seeking to 

recover response costs. Nevertheless, that provision, by its 

very existence, indicates that Congress contemplated

scenarios in which a current owner could be liable for 

response costs incurred before ownership transferred.

Therefore, based on CERCLA’s text and structure, the 

meaning of “all costs” in § 107(a) includes costs incurred 

both before and after a current owner acquired the property.12 

 

12 The District Court concluded otherwise based on 

California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. 

Hearthside Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2010), 

but that decision gives no guidance as to the meaning of “all 

costs” in § 107(a). Rather, the Hearthside court addressed 

which of two entities was a current owner of a property for 

purposes of § 107(a)(1). 613 F.3d at 911-12. One was a 

corporation that had owned the property while all cleanup 

costs were incurred, and the other was the state’s land 

commission that owned the property at the time the lawsuit 

was filed but not at any time when costs had been incurred. 

Id. at 912. The court held that an owner of a property at the 

time cleanup costs are incurred cannot avoid liability for such 

costs by selling the property prior to the filing or initiation of 

a response action by the government and, therefore, that the 

party who owned the property at issue at the time the cleanup 

costs were incurred was a responsible party. Id. at 911, 916. 

Hearthside does not stand for the proposition that it is 

permissible to temporally partition § 107(a)(1) liability with 

respect to cleanup costs. Here, because Trainer “[did] not 

dispute that [it], as the owner and operator of the Site, [was] a 
18

As mentioned at the outset, that means that Trainer is liable 

for the removal costs at the Site regardless of when those 

costs were incurred. And because we conclude that Trainer is 

liable under CERCLA, we also conclude that it is liable under 

HSCA. See supra Section II.B.13

 

responsible party under CERCLA[,]” (App. at 94); see supra

Section III, there was no need to turn to Hearthside to 

determine again whether Trainer was a current owner of the 

Site.

13 Specifically, as under CERCLA, there is no 

ambiguity under HSCA that Trainer is liable for all response 

costs, including those incurred prior to its ownership. First, 

Trainer is a “responsible person” because it “own[ed] or 

operate[d] the site” (1) “when a hazardous substance [wa]s 

placed or [came] to be located in or on the site,”

§ 6020.701(a)(1)(i), or (2) “during the time of the release or 

threatened release,” id. § 60020.701(a)(1)(iii). There were 

hazardous substances located on the site at the time Trainer 

took ownership and there has been a release or threatened 

release since that time. Second, a responsible person is 

“strictly liable for response costs and damages which result 

from the release or threatened release of hazardous 

substances,” id. § 6020.702(a), which includes “[r]easonable 

and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial response 

incurred by the United States [or] the Commonwealth.” id.

§ 6020.702(a)(2). Here, PADEP has incurred “[r]easonable 

and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial response,” id.

§ 6020.702(a)(2), resulting from the release or threatened 

release. Third, exceptions to responsible party status do not 

apply because at least one of the defendants knew or had 

reason to know “a hazardous substance which is the subject 
19

Nothing in our decision today regarding liability for 

“all costs” is meant to affect established precedent concerning 

CERCLA damages. How exactly damages are assessed 

against or apportioned among PRPs in any particular case is a 

matter to be decided according to existing statutory and 

decisional law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part,

vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. We will

affirm the District Court’s order that Trainer is liable under 

CERCLA and HSCA for PADEP’s response costs incurred 

after it acquired the Site, but we will vacate the District 

Court’s order with respect to Trainer’s liability for PADEP’s 

response costs incurred before acquisition of the Site. Given 

that disposition, we do not need to address the remaining

aspects of the District Court’s decision. The matter is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

 

of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or 

at the site.” id.§ 6020.701(b)(vi)(A).