IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Lodge, Cathy Lodge, : Nolan Vance, Brenda Vance, : Richard Barrie , and Irene Barrie , :

Appellant s :

: No. 813 C.D. 2020
v. :

: Argued: May 10, 2021 Robinson Township Zoning Hearing : Board : : v. :

: Robinson Township , Range Resources

- : Appalachia, LLC, and Mo o re Park , L.P. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANN ON, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER , Judge 1

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: August 4, 2022

Christopher Lodge, Cathy Lodge (Lodges), Nolan Vance, Brenda Vance (Vances), Ric h ard Barrie, and Irene Barrie ( Barries) (collectively, Objectors) appeal from the July 16, 2020 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

1 This case was argued before a panel of the Court that included Judge Crompton. Judge Crompton’s service with this Court ended on January 2, 2022, before the Court reached a decision in this matter. Accordingly, Judge Ceisler was substituted for Judge Cro mpton as a panel member in this matter and considered the matter as submitted on the briefs.2

(trial court) , which dismissed their substantive validity challenge to Robinson Township (Township) Ordinance 1

- 2014 2 for lack of stan ding.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
i. History of Ordinance On May 8, 2006, the Board of Supervisors of Robinson Township (Board) enacted a comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (2006 Ordinance). The 2006 Ordinance provided that oil and gas drilling “may b e approved” as a conditional use in all zoning districts, except the Floodplain Overlay District. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1237a.) The 2006 Ordinance articulated standards that included a drilling setback distance of 50 feet from property lines, a pro hibition of drilling within 300 feet of a residence, a requirement that all drilling activities conform to an “Environmental Plan” and such other factors and criteria established by the Township Zoning Hearing Board ( ZHB )

.

On December 23, 2013, departing members of the Board adopted
Ordinance s 3

- 2013 and 4

- 2013 ( collectively, 2013 Ordinances) . Ordinance 3

- 2013 designated “ Oil and Gas Operations and Development ” to be a use by “ special exception. ” (R.R. at 1257a

- 61a, 1868a

- 69a

. ) The 2013 Ordinance s also created an Interchange Business Development (IBD) District to provide for high impact land uses that require significant infrastructure. (R.R. at 782a.) Ordinance 3

- 2013 provided that Oil and Gas Operations and Development was a use by spe cial exception in an IBD
District.
O n August 7, 2014, a new ly elected majority of the Board amended the Township Zoning Ordinance and zoning map and adopted Ordinance 1

- 2014, the challenged ordinance at issue here

. According to Ordinance 1

- 2014, Oil an d Gas Well

2 Township of Robinson, Washington County Ordinance No. 1

- 2014 (Ordinance 1

- 2014), adopted August 7, 2014, effective August 12, 2014.3

Site Development, Oil and Gas Sub

- Surface Facilities and Activities and Natural Gas Compressor Stations are “permitted principal uses” in the IBD District , Agricultural, Rural Residential, and Industrial Districts. (R.R. at 1286a

- 336a

. ) Pursua nt to Ordinance 1

- 2014, Oil and Gas Well

- Site Development is defined to include: well location, preparation, construction, drilling hydraulic fracturing , seismic operations, and water or fluid storage operations. Id

. Ordinance 1

- 2014 amended the

“ Performance Standards ” for the IBD District. Specifically, a “ 65 dBA ” maximum
noise level for the IBD District was enacted. Id

. Ordinance 1

- 2014 further amended
the 2013 Ordinance s to allow “oil and gas development” as permitted by conditional
use in th e Special Conservation and Commercial Districts and not permitted in Single Family Residential and General Residential Districts. Id

.

ii. First Substantive Validity Challenge On September 2, 2014, based in large part on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Robins on Township v. Commonwealth , 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013), 3 Objectors
submitted a pre

- enforcement, substantive validity challenge to the ZHB pursuant to

s ection 909.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)

. 4 Objectors argued that O rdinance 1

- 2014 is invalid because it does not promote the public health,

3 In Robinson Township , the Supreme Court held that a single, statewide zoning standard for oil and gas operations in every zoning district in the Commonwealth, as specified in former s ection 3304 of Act 13, formerly 58 Pa.C.S. §3304, violated Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvan ia Constitution (Environmental Rights Amendment ) , Pa. Const. art. I, § 27

. The Supreme Court concluded that statewide land use standards altered “existing expectations of communities and property owners and substantially diminish ed natural and esthetic va lues of the local environment[.]” 83 A.3d at 979.

4 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended , added by Act of Dec ember 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. §10909.1(a)

. A validity challenge generally attacks zoning on substantive due process grounds, i.e. , whether an ordinance is substantially related to a legitimate interest. Plaxton v. Lycoming County Zoning Hearing Board , 986 A.2d 199, 205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).4

safety and welfare , fail s to satisfy the constitutional and statutory mandate that zoning laws promote and protect the preservation of the natural, scenic and historic values of
the environment under the Environmental Rights Amendment

. 5 They further alleged
that Ordinance 1

- 2014 violates both the federal due process protections for property owners and State Constitutional protections regarding private property (Pa. Const. art. I, §1 ) because it fails to conserve and maintain the constitutionally protected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life for all the people

. (R.R. at 73a.)

iii. Moore Park Well Pad On September 15, 2014, shortly after Objectors’ substanti ve validity challenge was filed, the Township , pursuant to Ordinance 1

- 2014, approved the issuance of a zoning permit application for Range Resources. The permit application involved the construction of the “Moore Park well pad ,” a natural gas drilling an d production site on property located next to U.S. Route 22 , a four

- lane highway

. (F inding of Fact (F .F. ) Nos. 4

- 5

. ) The Moore Park well pad is located in an IBD
District. Under Ordinance 1

- 2014, s uch use is now a use permitted by right. The Moore Park well pad and its associated pig launcher is located approximately 2,725 feet from the Vance property, approximately 1.17 miles from the Barrie property, and approximately 2.22 miles from the Lodge property. (R.R. at 1342a, 1579a.)

iv. Hearing before the Z oning Hearing Board
The ZHB conducted a hearing on October 30, 2014, concerning Objectors’ substantive validity challenge. During the hearing, Range Resources moved

5 T he Environmental Rights Amendment provides the people of Pennsylvania with the “right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.” The Environmental Rights Amendment further re quires the Commonwealth and local governments, as trustees of Pennsylvania ’ s public resources, to “conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” Pa. Const. art. I, §27

.5

to dismiss the challenge for lack of standing an d ripeness. The ZHB allowed the parties to file legal briefs and took the matter under advisement.

v. Second Substantive Validity Challenge While their first substantive validity challenge was still pending, Objectors submitted a second substantive validity challenge on December 17, 2014 , asserting claims as applied to the Township’s approval of Range Resources’ Moore
Park well p ad. The ZHB held a hearing on January 6, 2015, concerning the first and second validity challenges. Objectors argued that they ar e longtime residents of Robinson Township who have enjoyed the Township ’ s rural, residential, and agricultural character , and the assurances that such character would continue as provided in the zoning ordinance in the districts in which they live. Object ors argued that they have children, grandchildren, and animals who could be exposed to industrial
noise and traffic and/or pollution from the Moore Park well pad and related operations

. The Vances argued that, i n reliance on the stated purposes of the Special Conservation zoning district in which they live, they made a significant investment in, recently completed construction on, and moved into their new home at 9812 Steuben ville Pike. They did not expect they would be living next door to an oil and g as well pad and other
related industrial facilities and activities. The Vances argued that they have reasonable concerns that the construction, development, and operation of the Moore Park well pad and other nearby oil and gas industrial facilities will a ffect their health, property values, aesthetic values, and way of life.

The Barries argue d that they have lived at their residence for 39 years and that during this time, they have enjoyed the rural, residential, and agricultural nature of
Robinson Town ship and have come to rely on that way of life. The Barries complained that they did not expect to live near industrial operations. They feared that because the6

Moore Park well pad is less than a mile and a half from their property , it is likely that
the actual site operations and horizontal wellbores will be much closer. They asserted
that in the last few years, they began to experience the construction and operation of nearby oil and gas facilities and operations, including neighboring well pads and a pipeline. These new impacts have affected the Barries ’ way of life, particularly due to the related traffic, noises, emissions, and concerns for their well water.

On January 21 , 2015, the ZHB issued two decisions, dismiss ing Objectors’ first and second s ubstantive v alidity c hallenge s. The ZHB dismissed the
first validity challenge because Objectors did not allege that the use or development of their properties were prohibited or restricted by Ordinance 1

- 2014 and they also failed
to establish that they had standing because they only presented generalized interests common to the entire Township ’ s population, and their interests are neither substantial
nor immediate. With respect to the second challenge, the ZHB dismissed this challenge pursuant to s ection 916.1(i) of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10916.1(i), 6 because it was filed while the first substantive validity challenge had not been finally determined or
withdrawn. On February 20, 2015, Objectors filed a Notice of Land Use Appeal in the

t rial c ourt

. R ange Resources and others intervened in support of the Ordinance. ( R. R.

at 86a

- 92a

. ) Upon review of the record of proceedings before the ZHB, the trial court

6 Section 916.1(i) of the MPC provides , in relevant part :
(i) A lan downer who has challenged on substantive grounds the validity of a zoning ordinance or map

. . . shall not submit any additional substantive challenges involving the same parcel, group of parcels or part thereof until such time as the status of the landown er ’ s original challenge has been finally determined or withdrawn

. . . . 53 P.S. §10916.1(i) , added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329

.7

concluded that the ZHB record was insufficiently developed on the issue of standing

. Specifical ly, on matters relevant to whether any Objectors would be impacted by
activities at the Moore Park w ell p ad the evidentiary record was incomplete and critical findings including credibility determinations were lacking. Accordingly , the trial court scheduled a hearing to address the issue of Objectors’ standing. (R.R. at 653a.) Prior
to that future hearing, the parties agreed that the issue of Objectors ’ standing should be
bifurcated and determined first.

In advance of the hearing, Range Resources presented a motion, and the
trial court entered an order for a view of the Moore Park w ell p ad and the area in the vicinity of the Vance Objectors’ residence, which at over a half mile away, is the closest Objector residence to the well pa d. ( R. R. at 705a

- 16a, 719a

- 20a

. ) Range Resources requested the site view under Section 908(8) of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10908(8), which authorizes a zoning board or hearing officer to inspect a site or its surroundings with any party or his representative if all parties are present or given an opportunity to do so. Range Resources argued that even though the ZHB was not inspecting the site, it was acceptable for the trial court to do so because the trial court was serving as a trier of fact. Moreover, Range Resources stated that it would take responsibility for costs and expenses associated with the view. Objectors did not file a written response to Range Resources ’ motion for a view or present their own motion for a view of any properties during the five

- ye ar plus pendency of the v alidity c hallenge before the t rial

c ourt. On December 20, 2019, the t rial c ourt, joined by all counsel of record, conducted
the view of the Moore Park w ell p ad and the Vance Objectors’ property. ( R. R. at 721a

25a

. ) The t rial c ourt held two days of hearing s on January 24 and January 27, 2020, at which time all parties were given the opportunity to present and cross

- examine8

witnesses and introduce and object to exhibits. ( R. R. at 727a

- 1234a

. ) No objections
were made on th e record to the site view at this hearing. ( R. R. at 727a

- 1234a

. )

vi. Trial Court’s Findings
On July 16, 2020, the t rial c ourt issued its f indings, holding that Objectors lacked standing to pursue the v alidity c hallenge

. 7 In essence, t he t rial c ourt found that Objectors had failed to meet their burden to establish that any of the ir concerns and alleged adverse impacts raised were caused by the application of the challenged Ordinance to the permit application for the Moore Park w ell p ad. ( R. R. at 1886a

. ) The court concluded that Objectors failed to show how the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 or the issuance of a permit for the Moore Park well pad resulted in “concretely demonstrable harm to them or their interests.” ( Conclusions of Law ( C.L. ) No. 127

. ) Specifically, the trial court held that Objectors failed to demonstrate a present impact to their interests, and that the complained of noise, vibrations, odors, and air pollution could be attributed to a variety of sources and causes which existed pri or to the passing
of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the permit application for the Moore Park well pad . (C.L.
No. 129

. ) The court held that there was no causal connection between the adoption of
Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the impacts alleged by Objectors and that the ev idence did “not credibly demonstrate” that Objectors suffered any direct, substantial, and immediate harms caused by the Moore Park well pad. (C.L. Nos. 131

- 132

. ) The trial court also held that the evidence did “not credibly demonstrate” that Objectors s uffered any “greater direct, substantial[,] and immediate deleterious impacts from unconventional

7 The trial court dismissed Objectors’ appeal of the Second Validity Challenge on July 5, 2019. (R.R. at 653a.) Objectors did not appeal the trial court’s decision on the Second Validity Challenge (raising an “as

- applied” claim) to this Court. Therefore, our analysis of the standing issue pertains to Objectors’ standing to bring a facial validity challenge to Ord inance 1

- 2014, and we do not offer any opinion as to Objectors’ standing to bring an “as

- applied” claim.9

oil and natural gas drilling than those they encountered prior to the passage of
Ordinance 1

- 2014. ” (C.L. No. 133

. ) T he trial court made the following findi ngs of fact, determining them to be “credible and reliable.”

118. This trial court finds the Objectors ’ contention, that they suffered actual harm from facilities authorized by Ordinance 1

- 2014 to be speculative, unpersuasive and unsupported by the hear ing record as a whole.

. . . 127. The Objectors have not shown how the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 or the issuance of a permit for the Moore Park [well pad] resulted in concretely demonstrable harm to them or their interests

.

. . . 129. The Objectors hav e not demonstrated a present impact to their interests. The hearing evidence established that many of the adverse effects they complained of such as noise, vibrations, odors, air pollution, were due to a variety of sources and existed prior to the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the permit application for the Moore Park [well pad] . The hearing evidence is unconvincing that the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 or the Moore Park [well pad] permit immediately impacted the Objectors’ interests.

. . . 131. The Objec tors all live in excess of one - half mile from the Moore Park [well pad]

. Objectors did not prove a causal connection between the Township’s adoption of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the impacts the Objectors alleged

. 132. The evidence does not credibly demonstrate that the Objectors suffered direct, substantial and immediate deleterious impacts caused by the Moore Park [well pad] operations.
133. Similarly, the evidence does not credibly demonstrate that the Objectors suffered any greater direct, substantial and immediate deleterious impacts from unconventional10

oil and natural gas drilling than those they encountered prior to the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014

. (Trial ct. op. , 07/17/2020 , Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 118 , 127, 129, 131

- 33.) ( Emphasis added).

a. Christopher and Cathy Lodge

Christopher and Cathy Lodge reside at 257 Meinrad Drive in the Township, approximately 2.22 miles away from the Moore Park well pad and did not testify or appear at the hearings before the t rial c ourt. ( R. R. at 1870a

. ) The t rial c ourt found that: 36. No t estimony or evidence was presented to credibly and

persuasively establish that Christopher and Cathy Lodge have suffered any consequences or identifiable harm due to the issuance of a permit for the operation of the Moore Park [well pad]

. 3 7. No testimony or evidence was presented to credibly and persuasively establish that Christopher and Cathy Lodge possess a discernable interest that surpasses the abstract interest “of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.”
( Trial ct. op., 07/17/2020 , F.F. Nos. 36

- 37

. )

b. Richard and Irene Barrie Richard and Irene Barrie reside at 5215 Maple Grove Road in the Township’s R

- 1A Rural Residential Zoning District, 1.17 miles away from the Moore
Park well pad . (R.R. at 1871a.) M r s. Barrie testified that beginning in December of 2012, she maintained a jo urnal in which she recorded her sensory experiences at her property caused by what she believed to be oil and gas development activities. ( R. R.

at 1872a .) The t rial c ourt found that M r s. Barrie’s journal entries predated the application and issuance of a permit for the Moore Park well pad , and/or coincided with unrelated construction projects occurring near the Barrie residence, including (1)11

the Kendall Station Well Site, which is located much closer to the Barrie property tha n the Moore Park w ell p ad an d was not approved under the challenged Ordinance, (2)
the Kresic w ell p ad, developed prior to adoption of the Ordinance and approval of the
Moore Park w ell p ad, (3) the Richard Moore w ell p ad, located in Smith Township, and (4) certain unrelated pipeline work. ( R. R. at 1871a

- 74a

. ) Mrs. Barrie conceded on

cross

- examination that she could not directly attribute the impacts she experienced to
the Moore Park w ell p ad and that she could not see the Moore Park w ell p ad from her property, but that she could hea r air traffic from the Pittsburgh International Airport
and road traffic from U.S. Route 22. ( R. R. at 1873a

- 74a

. ) Mrs. Barrie admitted that she could not differentiate between the various noises she allegedly heard on her property. ( R. R. at 1874a

. ) The t rial c ourt found that Mrs. Barrie’s testimony regarding the diminution of her property’s value due to oil and gas operations was “speculative and not persuasive.” ( R. R. at 1874a

. )

c. Nolan and Brenda Vance
Nolan and Brenda Vance reside at 9812 Old Steub enville Pike Road, approximately 2,725 feet from the Moore Park w ell p ad in the Township’s Special Conservation Zoning District. (R.R. at 1875a.) U.S. Route 22, which hundreds of trucks traverse daily, separates the Vances ’ current residence from the Moor e Park
Well Pad. (R.R. at 1875a, 1876a

. ) Mrs. Vance contended during her testimony that the activity at the Moore Park w ell p ad disrupted her sleep, created constant noise, disturbing vibrations, mechanical o dors, and increased levels of truck traffic. (R.R. at 1876a.) The trial court made the following findings concerning Mrs. Vance’s standing:

72. Mrs. Vance acknowledged that the Moore Park [well p] ad is not visible from her home.
73. She indicated that she was uncertain if trucks going to and from the Moore Park [well pad] passed her home.12

74. Mrs. Vance conceded that during concert season for the Key Bank Pavilion there is an increase in traffic on U.S. 22, more vehicles passing her home on weekends in order to avoid back

- ups on U.S. 22 and more v ehicle fumes.

. . . 76. She could not recall the last time she smelled an odor from the Moore Park [w] ell [p] ad.
77. She recalled that noise was most constant in April of 2015 and March of 2016. 78. Most recently in December of 2019, she heard “sounds” but is unable to attribute that noise to the Moore Park [well p] ad. 79. She recalled one instance of “flaring.” She indicated she had a photograph to confirm the incident but such evidence was not offered during the hearings on this challenge.
80. Mrs. Vance testified to having discolored water from her well. She attributed that occurrence to National Fuel’s replacing of pipelines. On that instance, she contacted the Pennsylvania Department of Envi ronmental Protection. The DEP performed testing and found chemicals from fracking, but could not conclude that the chemicals came from the Moore Park [w] ell [p] ad.
81. She acknowledged that her property is separated from the Smith Township border by a sma ll creek.

82. This trial court finds that Mrs. Vance’s recollection of high noise levels, vibrations, and “mechanical odors” is credible.

83. This trial court finds that Mrs. Vance’s conclusion that the high noise levels, vibrations and mechanical odors are attributable to the Moore Park [well pad] was not proven. ( Trial ct. op., 07/17/2020, F.F. Nos. 72

- 74, 76

- 83.)13 d. Other Testimony The Township called two residents, Bonnie Moore, a neighbor of the Vances, and John Campbell, a Township resident and owner of property adjacent to
the Moore Park w ell p ad. (R.R. at 1878a, 1881 a .) Ms. Moore testified that she had never seen, felt or smelled the impacts reported by Mrs. Vance. (R.R. at 1878a.) Mr. Campbell, a longtime resident and farmer , testified that the site of the Moore Park w ell
p ad is unusable for farming due to the impact of the expansion of U.S. Route 22 into a
four

- lane highway approximately 50 to 55 years ago. ( R. R. at 1193a

- 97a

. ) His farming activities on the property adjacent to the Moore Park w ell p ad include mowing, conditioning, raking, and baling, which require equipment that emits both noise and fumes, a normal byproduct of agricultural activity. ( R. R. at 1646a

. ) Additionally, Mr. Campbell testified that from his property he does not hear noises from the Moore Park

w ell p ad, but rather hears constant noise from U.S. Route 22 and the nearby outdoor amphitheater during concert season. (R.R. at 1202a, 1208a.)

The trial court found Justin Welker, Range Resource s ’ Water Operations Manager , to be credible. (R.R. at 1879a.) Mr. Welker testified that the truck routes
used to service the Moore Park w ell p ad did not travel on portions of roads adjacent to any of Objectors’ respective properties. (R.R. at 1878a.) Additionally, Mr. Welker

tes tified that hydraulic fracturing, which necessitates higher truck use, only occurred at
the Moore Park w ell p ad during the periods from March 1, 2016, to March 21, 2016, and from August 24, 2017, to September 27, 2017. (R.R. at 1879a.) Mr. Welker
testifi ed that the Moore Park w ell p ad is now in “permanent production,” which only requires two water trucks per day, as well as three condensate trucks per week. (R.R.
at 1097a

- 98a.) Finally, Mr. Welker testified that Range Resources does not anticipate14

or h ave any drilling or hydraulic fracturing activity planned for the Moore Park w ell
p ad for the next five years. (R.R. at 1114a

. )

The trial court also found credible the testimony of Range Resources ’
witness John R. Over, a civil engineer with K2 Engineeri ng, that Objectors were not able to view the Moore Park w ell p ad from their homes. (R.R. at 1879a

- 80a.) Mr. Over opined that Range Resources’ truck traffic in the area did not degrade the level
of service for the Township’s roads. ( R. R. at 1880a

. ) Mr. Over provided testimony concerning other construction projects in the Township, including the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission’s Interstate 576 Southern Beltway project, which disturbed over 450 acres of land in the Township. ( R. R. at 1880a

. ) Mr. Over testified that the Lodge property is closer to the Interstate 576 project than it is to the Moore Park w ell p ad and the Barrie property is equidistant to both the Interstate 576 project and the Moore Park

w ell p ad. ( R. R. at 1149a

- 50a

. )

Range Res ources’ witness Brent Cummings, an acoustical engineer with TruHorizon Environmental Solutions, was qualified and accepted as a sound expert by
the t rial c ourt. ( R. R. at 1880a). Mr. Cummings testified with respect to three studies
undertaken to evaluate s ound impacts associated with the Moore Park w ell p ad. First, he reviewed and concurred with the pre

- development sound impact assessment prepared by Bergmann and Associates in 2014 (2014 Sound Impact Assessment), which concluded that during drilling and hy draulic fracturing operations at the Moore
Park w ell p ad there would be no sound impact beyond 1 , 000 feet from the pad. ( R. R.

at 1882a

. ) Second, he oversaw a sound monitoring study conducted east of the Moore
Park w ell p ad while hydraulic fracturing oper ations were ongoing at the pad during the period between March 10, 2016, and March 16, 2016 (2016 Sound Monitoring Study). (R. R. at 1881a

. ) Mr. Cummings testified that the 2016 Sound Monitoring Study picked15

up a significant amount of road and air traffic sound from the nearby U.S. Route 22 and the Pittsburgh International Airport. ( R. R. at 1882a

. ) According to Mr. Cummings, the study did not detect cyclical hydraulic fracturing stage data from the
Moore Park w ell p ad due to the U.S. Route 22 road noise. ( R. R. at 964a

. ) TruHorizon also deployed a sound monitor at 9784 Steubenville Pike, near the Vance Objectors’ property, lo cated to the northwest and on the opposite side of U.S. Route 22 from the
Moore Park w ell p ad from October 25, 2019, to October 28, 2019 (2019 Sound Monitoring Study). ( R. R. at 931a

- 38a

. ) Based on the 2019 Sound Monitoring Study and his personal observat ions, Mr. Cummings determined that the primary sources of noise at the monitoring point were vehicle traffic from U.S. Route 22 and Steubenville Pike and air traffic from Pittsburgh International Airport, and that sound from the permanent production operat ions of the Moore Park w ell p ad would not be audible at the monitoring point or the Vance Objectors’ residence. Id

.

vii. Trial Court’s Legal Conclusions Regarding Standing The trial court found “Objectors ’ contention, that they suffered actual harm from facilities authorized by Ordinance 1

- 2014 to be speculative, unpersuasive[,] and unsupported by the hearing record as a whole.” (F.F. No. 118

. ) Applying the standard for standing espoused in William Penn P arking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh , 346 A.2d 269, 282

- 83 (Pa. 1975), t he trial court determined that Objectors failed to show how the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 or the issuance of a permit for the Moore
Park well p ad resulted in “concretely demonstrable harm to them or their interests.” (C.L. No. 127

. ) Specifically, the trial court held that Objectors failed to demonstrate a present impact to their interests, and that the ir complain ts o f noise, vibrations, odors, and air pollution could be attributed t o a variety of sources and causes which existed prior to the passing of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the permit application for the Moore Park16

well pa d . (C.L. No. 129

. ) The trial court concluded that there was no causal connection between the adoption of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the impacts alleged by Objectors and that the evidence did “not credibly demonstrate” that Objectors suffered any direct, substantial, and immediate harms caused by the Moore Park well pad . (C.L. Nos. 131

- 132

. ) The trial court also held that the evidence did “not credibly demonstrate” that Objectors suffered any “greater direct, substantial[,] and immediate deleterious impacts from unconventional oil and natural gas drilling than those they encountered prior to the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014. ” (C.L. No. 133

. ) The trial court further found , citing Laughman v. Zoning Hearing Board of Newberry Township , 964 A.2d 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) , that n one of the O bjectors established sta nding by geographic proximity as the Lodge, Barrie, and Vance properties are 2.22 miles, 1.17 and .51 miles from the Moore
Park well pad , respectively. (C.L. No. 122

. ) Following the trial court’s ruling, Objectors appealed to this Court.
II. Objectors ’ Appeal On appeal, 8 Objectors raise a myriad of issues. The first issue, which relates to standing , has multiple subparts. Objectors argue that the trial court erred by concluding that they had not articulated an interest in the outcome of the litigation that was substantial, direct, and immediate. Objectors assert that , contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, they not only articulate d interests that were substantial, direct, and immediate through testimony of the multiple harms they had expe rienced , but they also expressed reasonable concerns as to prospective harms from future facilities and

8 “When the court below considers additional evidence in a zoning appeal, we must determine on review whether that court committed legal error or abused its discretion.” Boss v. Zoning Hearing Board of Borough of Bethel Park , 443 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). This Court has stated on numerous occasions that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequat e to support a conclusion.” Coal Gas Recovery, L.P. v. Franklin T ownship Zoning Hearing Board , 944 A.2d 832, 838 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).17

development allowed by Ordinance 1

- 2 014. They contend that the trial court failed to apply or address this Court’s and the Supreme Court’s standing pre cedent from In re
Broad M ountain Dev elopment Co ., LLC , 17 A.3d 434, 440 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) , and Grant v. Zoning Hearing B oard of Township of Penn , 776 A.2d 356, 359 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), which held that landowners possess substantial, direct, and immediate i nterests when they have expressed reasonable concerns regarding how proposed uses will affect their property, change their enjoyment and expectations of their property, alter their zoning districts and surrounding environment, and affect their health and quality of life

. Objectors also assert that the trial court should have applied the standard for standing applied by the Supreme Court in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth , 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013), which held that the very enactment of the statute and its preemption of protective zoning ordinances across Pennsylvania was sufficient to confer standing on
the landowners.

In addition to asserting errors with respect to standing, Objectors raise several evidentiary challenges, arguing that the trial court capriciously disregarded the
fact that the Moore Park well pad is not in a state of “permanent production” but will
be developed in the future

. Specifically, Range Resources’ witness, Justin Welker, testified that Range Resources had only completed 9 of t he 10 originally planned wells on the Moore Park well pad and has reserved the 10 th well for the development of Utica
shale. See R.R. at 1118a. When asked whether that meant there was “another [well] that [Range Resources was] going to drill in the future,” Mr. Welker responded, “[a]t some point, yes, sir.” Id . Objectors claim this fact , which the trial court disregarded ,

corro borated the reasonableness of their concerns as to ongoing and future harms from oil and gas development and facilities and contradicted the trial court’s finding of fact that the Moore Park well pad is in “permanent production.”18

Next, Objectors contend that the trial court capriciously disregarded the
2015 Washington County Hazard Mitigation Plan , prepared by a private company, Michael Baker, Jr. Inc. for the Washington County Department of Public Safety, which they introduced into evidence as a party admission against the Township. (R.R. at
1409a

- 23a.) The Hazard Mitigation Plan, according to Objectors, provides that populations living within 1 ,000 feet of an unconventional oil or gas well are uniquely vulnerable to “oil and gas well incidents” inclu ding “explosions or other catastrophic
incidents. ” (R.R. at 1419 a .) Objectors argue that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not include the Hazard Mitigation Plan anywhere in its findings of fact and failed to address it in any way. Ob jectors argue that the Hazard Mitigation Plan is important because it supports that the Vances have standing because they live within
1 ,000 feet of the Moore Park well pad.

Additionally , t hey assert that the trial court abused its discretion by acceptin g as reliable and persuasive the opinions of Brent Cummings, the acoustical engineering expert witness offered by Range Resources with respect to certain sound
studies. Objectors contend that Mr. Cummings applied a flawed methodology that did not comport with the industry standard.

Finally, Objectors argue that the trial court erred in granting a motion for a view of Range Resources ’ Moore Park well pad, while declining Objectors’ request to include a well site in “active development” or one not in the d irect control of Range
Resources. They assert that by allowing a view of an inactive, quiet site and rejecting their request, the trial court improperly allowed into the record only evidence of a site not exhibiting negative impacts and not allowing i nto the record evidence that would corroborate and more accurately reflect Objectors’ claims regarding their experiences with the Moore Park well pad and other similar sites.19

Objectors ask that we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter
so that they may proceed with their challenge to overturn Ordinance 1

- 2014 “ in order to prevent future, additional harms

. . . from [ Range Resources ’] planned development
of [ a future well ] at the Moore Park well pad

. . . and further industrialization of their neighborhoods, their zoning districts, and the Township

. ” (Objectors’ Br. at 56.)
III. Discussion
i. Standing Objectors submitted a facial challenge to the substantive validity of
Ordinance 1

- 2014 pursuant to section 916 .1 of the MPC , 53 P.S. §10916.1

. 9 That section sets forth those persons who have the right to bring a substantive validity challenge:
(a) A landowner who, on substantive grounds, desires to

challenge the validity of an ordinance or map or any provision thereof which prohibits or restricts the use of development of land in which he has an interest shall submit the challenge. . . .
(b) Persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land of another by an ordinance or map, or any prov ision thereof, who desires to challenge its validity on substantive grounds shall first submit their challenge to the zoning hearing board. . . .
53 P.S. §10916.1

.

Under subsection (a), Objectors would not have standing as a landowner because they do no t allege that Ordinance 1

- 2014 affect s the use or development of their land. However, subsection (b) allows persons who do not own the land affected

9 Section 916.1(b) of the MPC was added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.20

by an ordinance to challenge the ordinance if they are aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land by virtue of an ordinance.

In order to be aggrieved in th e zoning context , a party must have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the claim sought to be litigated. William
Penn , 346 A.2d at 284; Laughman , 964 A.2d at 22

. To have a substantial interest,
there must be some discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply with the law. Pilchesky v. Doherty , 941 A.2d 95, 99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Therefore, a property owner who asserts no interest in the zoning challenge other than the interest common to all citizens does not have standing. Broad Mountain, 17 A.3d at 440 ; Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment , 922 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Therefore, it is not sufficient for the person claiming to be aggrieved to assert the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to
the law. William Penn , 346 A.2d at 280

- 281 ; Fumo v. City of Philadelphia , 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009)

.

The interest must also be direct and immediate and not a remote consequence of the judgment. Laughman , 96 4 A.2d at 22. The interest is direct “if there is a causal connection between the asserted violation and the harm complained of; it is immediate if that causal connection is not remote o r speculative.” Fumo , 972
A.2d at 496 ; s ee also Empire Coal Min ing & Dev elopment , Inc. v. D epartment of
Environmental Resources , 623 A.2d 897, 899 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 10

10 “[P]roperty that is adjacent to or abuts the zoning area in question is in close proximity for standing purposes.” Worthington v. Mount Pleasant Township , 212 A.3d 582, n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). We have also held that “the owner of [a] property that is within 400 to 600 feet of the ch allenged zoning district is also within close proximity and has standing. However, the owners of property one

- half mile and one mile or more away from the challenged zoning area have been deemed to not be in close proximity in order to confer standing.” Laughman , 964 A.2d at 22

- 23 (holding that (Footnote continued on next page...)21

Objectors claim that direct and corroborative evidence showed that they have experienced actual harm from facilities authorized by Ordinance 1

- 2014 , includ ing specifically the Moore Park well pad . Specifically, they assert that Mrs.
Vance and Mrs. Barrie both testified as to the unbearable loud noises, vibrations, offensive odors, mechanical smells, and heavy traffic.

However , the trial c ourt found that Objectors Vance and Barrie did not establish that either the challenged Ordinance or the Moore Park w ell p ad were the
cause of their alleged harms. The trial court concluded that the hearing evidence established that many of the adverse effects they compl ained of such as noise, vibrations, odors, and air pollution, were due to a variety of sources and existed prior to the passage of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and the permit application for the Moore Park well pad. The trial court found that the impacts felt by the se Objectors could be due to any number of causes including unrelated oil and gas well sites in close proximity to Objectors ’ propert ies that are closer than the Moore Park well p ad and predate
Ordinance 1

- 2014 (F.F. Nos. 38

- 41), unrelated pipelines (F. F. No. 47), oil and gas drilling in neighboring townships (F.F. Nos. 51

- 51), air traffic from the Pittsburgh International Airport and road traffic from U.S. Route 22 (F.F. Nos. 53, 55), a nearby outdoor amphitheater which increases traffic and noise durin g certain times of the year (F.F. No s . 61

- 64), illuminated billboards (F.F. No. 75), a 450 highway project that was closer in proximity to the Barries ’ and Lodges ’ property than the Moore Park well p ad (F.F. No. 102), and discolored water which could not b e attributed to the Moore Park

objector whose closest property was located .8 miles from a newly created overlay district was not a landowner in close proximity and, thus, lacked standing). Here, n one of the findings indicate that any of Obj ectors’ propert ies abut or are adjacent to the Moore Park well p ad or any other well site . The Lodge, Barrie, and Vance properties are 2.22, 1.17, .51 miles away from the Moore Park well p ad, respectively. As such, none of the Objectors are in close prox imity

.22

well p ad even after a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ( DEP ) investigation. (F.F. No

. 80).

When a trial court takes additional evidence in a land use appeal, and
exercises its own de novo review, it shou ld make its own factual findings and legal
conclusions. Newtown Square E ast , L.P. v. Township of Newtown , 38 A.3d 1008, 1012 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), aff’d , 101 A.3d 37 (Pa. 2014). The trial court, as the fact finder in this case, is the ultimate judge of credibility and resolves all conflicts in the evidence.
Protect PT v. Penn T

ownship Zoning Hearing Board , 220 A.3d 1174, 1191 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). As the fact finder , the trial court may reject even uncontradicted testimony if it finds that testimony lac king in credibility. Id

. This Court may not substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court. Tennyson v. Zoning H earing Board of W

est Bradford T

ownship , 952 A.2d 739, 743 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)

. Essentially, by arguing that the trial court ignored their testimony , Objectors are asking us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our credibility findings for the trial court’s findings

. Our role is not to reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnes ses, but to determine whether, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, the trial court’s findings have the requisite measure of support in the record.
Protect PT

. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that t here was ample
evidence to s upport the trial court’s determination that n either the challenged
Ordinance n or the Moore Park w ell p ad were the cause of Objectors’ concerns or alleged harms

. See Spahn , 9 22 A.2d at 1151 (“In order to be immediate, there must be
a causal connection betw een the action complained of and the injury to the person challenging it.”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found23

Objectors failed to establish standing by this testimony of the Vance or Barrie Objectors. Next, Objectors argue that they established standing by expressing their concerns of possible future harm from the enactment of Ordinance 1

- 2014 and future operations of the Moore Park well pad. We must disagree.

A key component of the William Penn standing analysis, and whether an objector is “aggrieved” for purposes of the MPC, is whether the proposed use in question, or, in a substantive validity challenge, the challenged ordinance, actually causes the injury complained of by the objector. Willi am Penn , 346 A.2d at 282 ; s ee also Worthington , 212 A.3d at 593 (“theoretical concerns do not satisfy the legal requirement that [the objector] have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest to have standing”); Laughman , 964 A.2d at 23 (a mere concern of remote consequences is not direct because all citizens share concerns regarding traffic and safety ).

In Frederick v. Allegheny T ownship Zoning Hearing Board , 196 A.3d 677, 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), the objectors testified that the construction at the Porter Pad site was “noisy” and “inconvenient[;]” voiced concern that their property may become “polluted[;]” and opined that their property values would decrease. We held
that t he z oning b oard ’ s rejection of that evidence as lacking p robative value wa s consistent with this Court ’ s precedent and that “[t] estimony that merely speculates on possible harm lacks probative value. ” Id . at 690.

In Gorsline v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfield Township , 123 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), rev ersed on other grounds , 186 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2018), a gas company sought a conditional use permit to operate an oil and gas well. Neighboring landowners objected, expressing concerns about their well water, the increase in truck traffic, noise and light poll ution. This Court explained that the objectors “expressed24

concerns” consisted of no more than “speculation of possible harms[,]” which was “insufficient to show that the proposed natural gas well will be detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood.” 123 A.3d at 1153.

This Court reached the same conclusion in EQT Production Company v. Borough of Jefferson Hills , 162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). In that case, the objectors presented evidence about the negative impacts oil and gas op erations have
caused in other communities. This Court held that this evidence was insufficient to satisfy the objectors’ burden of proof because their evidence was not specific to the well site at issue. Nor did the objectors relate the experience of oth er communities to the well site they challenged. Id . at 563.

Here, Objectors’ concerns about the “sprawling nature of the construction and development of oil and gas facilities and infrastructure in Robinson Township and their concerns and feelings as to future development and the transformation of the vicinity of t heir homes and the Township into industrial areas” (Objectors’ Br. at 23) were speculative. The trial court’s rejection of that evidence was entirely consistent with this Court’s precedent that t estimony that merely speculates on possible harm lacks prob ative value.

Objectors contend that the trial court should have applied Grant and
Broad Mountain , where this Court held that in the context of land use matters , landowners’ reasonable concerns as to the effects of proposed development were enough to co nfer standing. Objectors’ reliance on these cases is misplaced. Grant , involved two permanent 60

- foot exhaust towers that were demonstrated to blow waste products and noise to the objector’s property. Grant , 776 A.2d at 359. Additionally, unlike here, the power company in Grant did not object to standing, nor was there any dispute about the continual impact the plant would have on the objectors’ home. Id . at25

358

- 59. Likewise, t he challenged use in Broad Mountain consisted of 27 wind turbines, with obj ectors who lived within a half mile of the use and who demonstrated that they experienced constant noise, light flickering, and potential ice shedding in freezing conditions. Broad Mountain , 17 A.3d at 440

- 41. Here, by contrast, n o record evidence presen ted by Objectors established that they live in proximity to the Moore Park well pad or that the Moore Park w ell p ad caused any of the adverse impacts complained of by Objectors.

Objectors ’ reliance on Robinson Township to establish standing is also mispla ced. Robinson Township did not establish legal precedent with respect to the issue of standing of individual landowners and residents in the context of ordinance validity challenges under the MPC

. Robinson Township in no way announced a new rule of law that individual objector s have automatic standing to pursue the validity of a zoning ordinance in the a bstract or that oil and gas development is necessarily incompatible with Pennsylvania citizens’ constitutional rights

. In fact, Pennsylvania
courts have , after Robinson Townshi p was decided, held that oil and gas development is compatible with other uses in rural and agricultural districts upon an analysis and decision by the local governing body. See Gorsline , 186 A.3d 389 (holding that pursuant to section 601 of the MPC, the governing body of a municipality may amend its zoning ordinance to permit oil and gas development in any or all of its zoning districts); Frederick (affirming a decision of a zoning hearing board that upheld unconventional natural gas development as a pe rmitted use by right in all of the township’s zoning district); Kretschmann Farm v. T ownship of New Sewickley , 131 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (upholding the conditional use approval of a gas compressor station located in New Sewickley Township’s A

- 1 Agri cultural District);26

Brockway Borough Mun icipal Authority v. Dep artment of Environmental Protection , 131 A.3d 578 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)

. ii. Evidentiary Issues Objectors first argue that the trial court capriciously disregarded testimony
from Justin Welker indic ating that another well would have to be drilled at the Moore
Park well p ad . They argue that this testimony corroborates their concerns regarding their safety, and is relevant to the standing issue. However, as we have just explained, Objectors’ speculative concerns regarding safety are not sufficient to confer standing

. Laughman , Gorsline , Frederick , EQT . As to a capricious disregard of evidence this Court has stated that where substantial evidence supports the findings of fact, and the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, “it should remain a rare instance where an appellate court disturbs an adjudication based on capricious disregard.” Taliaferro v. Darby T

ownship Zoning H

earing Board , 873 A.2d 807, 815 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (emphasis added). “A capricious disregard occurs only when the fact

- finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence. Capricious disregard of evidence is a deliberate and baseless disregard of apparently reliable evide nce.” Id . (citations omitted).
E arlier in his testimony, Justin Welker clearly testified that the Moore
Park well p ad was in permanent production and had been for several years. (R.R. at
1097a

. ) In fact, he testified that the Moore Park well p ad was anticipated to be in permanent production for several decades. (R.R. at 1114a

. ) Objectors contend that his testimony is contradictory to the trial court’s finding that the well was in “permanent production.” We disagree. This testimony is easily reconc ilable with the trial court’s finding. The trial court found as a fact that the Moore Park well p ad “is now in ‘permanent production.’” (F.F. No. 93) (emphasis added). This finding can easily be27

read to understand that the Moore Park well p ad is currently in permanent production and does not preclude the possibility that it may need to be drilled in the future. The trial court’s finding does not indicate that the Moore Park well p ad will be in permanent production for perpetuity. This is consist ent with Justin Welker’s testimony.

Next , with regard to the trial court’s allegedly improper rejection of
evidence , Objectors argue that the trial court entirely ignored the Hazard Mitigation
Plan they offered into evidence , which provides that popula tions living within 1 ,000 feet of an unconventional oil or gas well are uniquely vulnerable to oil and gas well
incidents. The Hazard Mitigation Plan covers a variety of topics including winter storms, blizzards, dam failure, and conventional and unconven tional well drilling. (R.R. at 1408a

- 23a

. ) Objectors rely on a portion of the Hazard Mitigation Plan , which

states : Vulnerability to oil and gas well incidents is defined as being

located within 1,000 yards of an unconventional oil or gas well. This buf

fer is what DEP uses as its “zone of culpability” for oil and gas well incidents. While explosions or other catastrophic incidents at an oil or gas well could cause property damage, of primary concern is the population living near these wells.
(R.R. at 141 9a

. ) As noted, the Hazard Mitigation Plan was admitted without any corroborating witness testimony. The trial court explained that the findings that it made

w ere based upon the evidence in the record that it deemed credible and reliable. Indeed, althoug h the trial court admitted the Hazard Mitigation Plan into evidence, the fact that
it did not refer to it indicates that it did not find the Hazard Mitigation Plan to be
credible or reliable. C ritically, t he trial court is free to believe all, part, or no ne of the testimony presented at trial and this Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Southwest Regional Tax Bureau v. Kania , 4928

A.3d 529, 532 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Commonwealth v. Hoffman , 938 A.2d 1157, 1160 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Moreover, Objectors have pointed to no authority that required the trial court to propound , in its opinion, how it weighed every piece of evidence presented by either or both parties. The trial court made the find ings necessary to resolve the issues raised by the evidence and relevant to the decision. Accordingly, we find the omission of th is evidence by the trial court did not amount to a capricious disregard and d id not constitute legal error.

Next, Objectors ar gue that the trial court erred when it found credible and persuasive the testimony of Range Resources’ expert witness, Brent Cummings, on the basis that he allegedly applied a “flawed methodology.” Objectors argue that the trial
court should not have acce pted his opinion because he admittedly did not rely on “industry standard” methods. We find Objectors’ assertion to be without merit

.

In projecting sound levels and measuring ambient levels, Mr. Cummings averaged sounds hourly based on measurements taken every minute. Mr. Cummings
further testified that because Ordinance 1

- 2014 did not specify what methodology is to be used when conducting a sound study, he could “make a choice [as to the method] as a professional.” (R.R. at 964a

. ) Mr. Cummings explain ed that averaging minute by minute data points will still accurately capture peak sounds. (R.R. at 963a

- 64a.) Mr. Cummings’ testimony was challenged extensively on cross

- examination and was therefore disputed evidence that the trial court was free to acc ept or reject. Township of Salem v. Miller Penn Development , 142 A.3d 912, 922 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
iii. View of the Well Pad Objectors argue that the trial court erred by granting Range Resources’ motion to view the Moore Park well pad when it was not in active development, and by denying Objectors’ request to include in the view a site during active development29

not within the control of Range Resources.

Both the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the MPC permit the
trial court to order a view. Pa.R.C iv .P. 219, 4009.32; 53 P.S. §10908(8). The decision to grant a view is totally within the trial court’s discretion and Pennsylvania courts have rarely reversed a trial court’s decision to grant or not grant a view. See 1 West’s Pa. Prac., Evidence § 425

- 6 ( Views ) (4th ed. 2021 ). The view’s function is illustrative, not evidentiary, and its purpose is to aid the fact finder in understanding the evidence presented in court and resolve conflicts in testimony. Id

.

As the Moore Park well p ad was the w ell at issue, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in only allowing a view of that site.
IV. Conclusion Accordingly, because the record provides substantial evidence for the
trial court’s decision and there is no basis for finding capric ious disregard of the evidence, we affirm the decision.

________________________________ PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Lodge, Cathy Lodge, : Nolan Vance, Brenda Vance, : Richard Barrie , and Irene Barrie , :

Appellants :

: No. 813 C.D. 2020
v. :

: Robinson Township Zoning Hearing : Board : : v. :

: Robinson Townshi p, Range Resources

- : Appalachia, LLC, and More Park, L.P. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 4th day of August , 20 2 2 , the July 16, 2020 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County is hereby AFFIRMED.

________________________________ PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge