[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

House v. Iacovelli, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-435.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-435

HOUSE, APPELLEE, v. IACOVELLI ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as House v. Iacovelli, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-435.] 

Torts—Wrongful termination in violation of public policy—Employee terminated 

after questioning employer’s failure to accurately report earnings to 

Bureau of Unemployment Compensation—Employee failed to meet 

jeopardy element of claim for wrongful termination—R.C. Chapter 4141 

does not contain a personal remedy for an employee when employer fails to 

accurately report earnings—Remedies in statutes sufficiently protect 

society’s interest in discouraging employers from engaging in prohibited 

behavior. 

(No. 2018-0434—Submitted April 23, 2019—Decided February 12, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, 

No. 16CA0087-M, 2018-Ohio-443. 

__________________ 

 
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FISCHER, J. 

{¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal to address whether appellee, 

Christine House, can maintain a claim for wrongful termination in violation of 

public policy based upon an allegation that her employer unlawfully terminated her 

employment because she had confronted the employer for failing to report 

accurately her earnings to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation as required 

by R.C. Chapter 4141. We conclude that the dismissal of employees under 

circumstances such as those involved in this case does not jeopardize any public 

policy that employers must accurately report employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau 

of Unemployment Compensation. Therefore, we determine that House’s wrongfultermination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim fails and reverse the judgment of 

the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 

I. Background 

A. House’s Employment 

{¶ 2} House worked as an employee at the Riverstone Taverne, a restaurant 

operated by appellant Bruce Iacovelli and owned by his business, appellant 

Windward Enterprises, Inc. House alleged in her complaint that she approached 

Iacovelli regarding the accuracy of the payroll. Iacovelli soon thereafter terminated 

House’s employment, allegedly because she created “drama.” 

{¶ 3} House claimed that Iacovelli had underreported her income to the 

state. If her income was underreported, House would receive less unemployment 

compensation than what she would have been entitled to otherwise receive. 

B. Trial-Court Proceedings 

{¶ 4} House filed a complaint against Iacovelli for conversion, violations of 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy. House amended her complaint to include Windward 

Enterprises as a defendant and to proceed solely on the claim of wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy. She asserted in her amended complaint 
January Term, 2020 

3

that the appellants’ conduct amounted to “a violation of Ohio public policy 

expressed or gleaned from statutes under Ohio R.C. Chapter 4141 related to 

employer obligations to make payment of unemployment compensation insurance 

premiums, and the common law of wrongful termination in violation of Ohio public 

policy.” 

{¶ 5} After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss House’s complaint, the 

appellants moved the trial court to determine whether House’s claim met the 

elements of the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. House 

opposed the motion. 

{¶ 6} The trial court determined that House could not maintain her claim. 

The court determined that while there is a clear public policy manifested in the 

provisions of R.C. Chapter 4141 that employers should accurately report 

employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (the clarity 

element of the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy), dismissing 

employees under circumstances like those involved in House’s dismissal would not 

jeopardize the stated public policy (the jeopardy element of the tort). The trial court 

concluded that because R.C. 4141.27 sets forth a remedy for violating the public 

policy embodied in the statute and the remedy adequately protects society’s 

interests, House’s tort claim necessarily failed. Therefore, the court dismissed 

House’s complaint. 

C. Appellate-Court Proceeding 

{¶ 7} House appealed the judgment of the trial court. She asserted that the 

trial court erred in dismissing her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-publicpolicy claim on the theory that the jeopardy element was not met. The Ninth 

District sustained House’s assignment of error and reversed the trial court’s 

dismissal of her complaint. 

{¶ 8} The Ninth District determined that the trial court erred by concluding 

that House could not satisfy the jeopardy element. The appellate court concluded 
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that the statutory remedies contained in R.C. Chapter 4141 were insufficient to 

provide House with a meaningful opportunity to return to the position she had 

occupied prior to the adverse employment action. 

{¶ 9} The Ninth District found that “[a]bsent adequate statutory remedies, 

House must be allowed to pursue a public policy wrongful termination claim in 

order to avoid fostering an environment where employees face the prospect of 

losing their jobs when they seek to obtain the benefits they have earned under the 

law.” 2018-Ohio-443, 94 N.E.3d 599, ¶ 19. The appellate court reasoned that a 

decision to the contrary might have a chilling effect on the willingness of employees 

to report such violations. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 10} We accepted the following proposition of law: “That in a wrongful 

termination action under Greeley v. Miami Valley [Maintenance Contrs.], 49 Ohio 

St. 3d 228 [552 N.E.2d 981] (1990), the jeopardy element is not met when statutes 

provide for the protection of the public policy, even when they provide no direct 

remedy for an employee herself.” 153 Ohio St.3d 1429, 2018-Ohio-2418, 100 

N.E.3d 446.

A. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy 

{¶ 11} The employment-at-will doctrine, the rule that general or indefinite 

hiring is terminable at the will of either party for any cause or no cause, is the 

traditional rule in Ohio. Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67-68, 652 N.E.2d 

653 (1995). The tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also 

known as a Greeley claim, is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 

Greeley at 234. 

{¶ 12} In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a wrongful-termination-inviolation-of-public-policy claim, 
January Term, 2020 

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a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that a clear public policy 

existed and was manifested either in a state or federal constitution, 

statute or administrative regulation or in the common law (“the

clarity element”), (2) that dismissing employees under 

circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would 

jeopardize the public policy (“the jeopardy element”), (3) the 

plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public 

policy (“the causation element”), and (4) the employer lacked an 

overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (“the 

overriding-justification element”). 

Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 157 Ohio St.3d 413, 2019-Ohio-3308, 

137 N.E.3d 1110, ¶ 12; see Collins at 69-70. The clarity and jeopardy elements are 

questions of law to be determined by the court. Collins at 70. The causation and 

overriding-justification elements are, however, questions to be determined by the 

finder of fact. Id.

B. Clarity Element 

{¶ 13} We note that neither House nor the appellants appealed the trial 

court’s legal determination that House had met the clarity element. According to 

the trial court, there is a clear public policy, manifested in the provisions of R.C. 

Chapter 4141, that employers should accurately report employees’ pay and tips to 

the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. The appellate court did not disturb 

the trial court’s determination on appeal. 

{¶ 14} While some may question whether the public policy identified by the 

trial court in this case is sufficient to establish the clarity element in light of this 

court’s recent opinion in Miracle, we do not address that matter in this decision, 

because the issue is not before this court. Therefore, we presume the clarity element 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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is satisfied and move on to the analysis of the jeopardy element of House’s 

wrongful-discharge-in-violation-of-public-policy claim. 

C. Jeopardy Element 

{¶ 15} Under the jeopardy-element analysis, we determine whether 

dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in House’s 

dismissal would jeopardize the public policy expressed in R.C. Chapter 4141 that 

employers should accurately report employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of 

Unemployment Compensation. See Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70, 652 N.E.2d 653. 

We conclude that a dismissal under these circumstances does not jeopardize the 

public policy identified by the trial court. 

{¶ 16} The jeopardy-element analysis generally involves inquiring into the 

existence of any alternative means of promoting the particular public policy to be 

vindicated by a wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim. Wiles v. 

Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 15 

(lead opinion). When the sole source of the public policy is a statutory scheme that 

provides rights and remedies for its breach, as it is here, we must consider whether 

those remedies are adequate to protect society’s interest as to the public policy. 

Wiles at ¶ 15; see Collins at 73. It is less likely that a wrongful-termination-inviolation-of-public-policy claim is necessary when remedies for statutory 

violations are included in the statutory scheme. Id. at ¶ 15 (“there is no need to 

recognize a common-law-action for wrongful discharge if there already exists a 

statutory remedy that adequately protects society’s interests”). This is especially 

true “when remedy provisions are an essential part of the statutes upon which the 

plaintiff depends for the public policy claim and when those remedies adequately 

protect society’s interest by discouraging the wrongful conduct.” Leininger v. 

Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, ¶ 27. 

{¶ 17} House’s wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim 

was based on multiple provisions in R.C. Chapter 4141, specifically R.C. 4141.20, 
January Term, 2020 

7

4141.24, 4141.27, 4141.30, 4141.37, 4141.38, 4141.40, and 4141.99. After 

reviewing R.C. Chapter 4141, it is apparent that the General Assembly has provided 

remedies that discourage employers from inaccurately reporting employees’ pay 

and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (violating R.C. Chapter 

4141) and that punish employers who fail to comply with the requirements in R.C. 

Chapter 4141. For example, R.C. 4141.20(B) orders the director of Job and Family 

Services to assess a forfeiture to the employer, amounting to .25 of 1 percent of the 

total remuneration reported by the employer, not less than $50 and no more than 

$1,000, for failing to properly file the quarterly contribution and wage report. 

Further, R.C. 4141.27 sets forth a detailed process by which the director, through 

the attorney general, may institute a civil action against an employer who has failed 

to comply with the sections of R.C. Chapter 4141. Finally, R.C. 4141.99 provides 

that for various violations of R.C. Chapter 4141, the employer may be subjected to 

fines or criminal penalties. The question becomes whether these statutory 

remedies, which do not include a personal remedy for a dismissed employee, 

adequately discourage the employer’s wrongful conduct and are sufficient to 

protect society’s interests in ensuring employers accurately report employees’ pay 

and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. See Leininger, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, at ¶ 27. 

{¶ 18} House argues that the remedies in R.C. Chapter 4141 are insufficient 

to protect her or society’s interests and to discourage wrongful conduct by an 

employer. She contends that the public policy is jeopardized and a wrongfultermination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim is necessary because there is no 

personal remedy to protect employees who were dismissed after informing their 

employers of R.C. Chapter 4141 violations. We disagree. In this circumstance, 

looking only at the public policy and R.C. Chapter 4141, a personal remedy is not 

necessary to discourage wrongful conduct by employers and the remedies in the 

statute are sufficient to protect society’s interest in the public policy that employers 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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should accurately report employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment 

Compensation. 

{¶ 19} In addressing the jeopardy prong of the wrongful-termination-inviolation-of-public-policy tort, we have previously looked to see whether the 

statutory scheme contains a sufficient personal remedy for the aggrieved employee. 

See Leininger at ¶ 14, citing Livingston v. Hillside Rehab. Hosp., 79 Ohio St.3d 

249, 680 N.E.2d 1220 (1997). However, in such instances, this court has focused 

only on the existence of a personal remedy for the employee in circumstances that 

involved public policies that protect substantial rights of the employee. See Wiles, 

96 Ohio St.3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 N.E.2d 526, at ¶ 17 (Family and Medical 

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 

134, 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997) (Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), 29 

U.S.C. 651 et seq.); Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 760 

N.E.2d 385 (2002) (OSHA); Leininger (age discrimination); Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d 

at 73, 652 N.E.2d 653 (sexual harassment and discrimination); and Bickers v. W. & 

S. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 351, 2007-Ohio-6751, 879 N.E.2d 201 (workers’ 

compensation). 

{¶ 20} The public policy identified by the trial court in this case, 

uncontested by the parties, is not like the public policies that this court recognized 

in Kulch, Collins, Wiles, Leininger, and Bickers, which specifically protect 

employees. Instead, the public policy announced in this case protects a particular 

government interest: the accurate reporting of employees’ wages to the Bureau of 

Unemployment Compensation. The lack of a personal remedy in the statutory 

scheme does not jeopardize the policy because the remedies contained in the statute 

sufficiently protect society’s interest and discourage employers from engaging in 

the prohibited behavior. 

{¶ 21} But even assuming that we were to grant House’s remedy and order 

the appellees to pay damages, or were to hypothetically order House’s 
January Term, 2020 

9

reinstatement, such a personal remedy may only discourage retaliation, i.e. 

termination, for confronting the appellants about their failure to accurately report 

her wages. A personal remedy may not, however, be sufficient to prevent the public 

policy from being jeopardized. The appellants could still decide not to pay into the 

unemployment-compensation fund, and the issue of the appellants’ failure to 

comply with R.C. Chapter 4141 would still not be resolved. The existence of a 

wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim would not act as 

sufficient encouragement to ensure that employers accurately report their 

employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. As we 

have stated above, the mechanism protecting the public policy in this case is the 

statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly, which is specifically aimed at 

ensuring that all employers comply with their statutory duties. Thus, the public 

policy stated in this case is not jeopardized by the lack of either a personal remedy 

for employees like House or the existence of a wrongful-termination-in-violationof-public-policy claim in this circumstance. 

{¶ 22} While House may have sought to assert a claim based on a public

policy protecting employees embodied in other statutes or administrative code 

sections, she did not raise any such claims. We must recognize that R.C. Chapter 

4141 does not contain a whistleblower provision and does not serve to protect the 

employee. See Kaminski v. Metal Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-

Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 61 (“it is not the role of the courts to establish their 

own legislative policies or to second-guess the policy choices made by the General 

Assembly”). Had the General Assembly wished to create substantive rights for the 

employee in this case, it could have done so. Simply stated, the public policy 

recognized by the trial court is sufficiently protected by the remedies in R.C. 

Chapter 4141. 

{¶ 23} Therefore, we hold that the remedies in R.C. Chapter 4141 are 

sufficient to protect the public policy requiring employers to accurately report 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation and that 

the lack of a personal remedy for the employee does not jeopardize the public 

policy. We conclude that House’s dismissal does not jeopardize the public policy 

identified by the trial court and that House cannot satisfy the jeopardy element of 

her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 24} We conclude that House has not met the jeopardy element of her 

wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim because the remedies in 

R.C. Chapter 4141 are sufficient to protect society’s interest in the public policy 

that employers should accurately report employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of 

Unemployment Compensation and the lack of a personal remedy in R.C. Chapter 

4141 for the dismissed employee does not jeopardize the stated public policy. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and 

conclude that the trial court properly dismissed House’s wrongful-termination-inviolation-of-public-policy claim. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 

STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 

_________________ 

 STEWART, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} The majority concludes that the administrative remedies found in 

R.C. Chapter 4141 sufficiently “protect society’s interest in the public policy that 

employers should accurately report employees’ pay and tips to the Bureau of 

Unemployment Compensation and the lack of a personal remedy in R.C. Chapter 

4141 for the dismissed employee does not jeopardize the stated public policy.” 

Majority opinion at ¶ 24. I fail to see how the administrative remedies in R.C. 

Chapter 4141 adequately protect the public policy of ensuring an employer’s 
January Term, 2020 

11 

accurate and honest wage reporting without allowing a remedy for appellee, 

Christine House, and others like her, who may have been fired for reporting this 

kind of employer misconduct. I therefore dissent from the majority’s conclusion 

that House cannot establish the jeopardy component of her claim for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy. 

I. An Individual Remedy for the Employee 

{¶ 26} For an employee to engage in conduct that furthers a public policy—

either by exercising one’s right to engage in the policy (e.g., taking leave under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)) or objecting to an employer’s violation 

of a policy (e.g., reporting violations under the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration)—without the threat of retaliation discouraging that conduct, there 

must be a remedy available to the employee if an employer were to engage in a 

retaliatory discharge. See H. Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, 

Section 7.07[A], at 7-126 to 7-127 (6th Ed.2018).1 The employee’s remedy, 

whatever form it might take (e.g., a private right of action or an administrative 

appeal) and whatever relief might be available (e.g., reinstatement of employment, 

compensatory damages, or punitive damages), must be enough to overcome the 

threat of retaliation. See id. 

{¶ 27} The assertion by appellants, Bruce Iacovelli and Windward 

Enterprises, Inc., that the “jeopardy element is not met when statutes provide for 

the protection of the public policy, even when they provide no direct remedy for an 

employee herself,” is a dubious one. A statutory remedial scheme that does not 

 

1. This court adopted Ohio’s four-part framework for determining wrongful-termination-inviolation-of-public-policy claims from a law-review article written by Professor Henry Perritt. See 

Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 69-70, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995), citing H. Perritt, The Future 

of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U.Cin.L.Rev. 397, 398-

399 (1989). Since then, we have repeatedly turned to Professor Perritt for his interpretation and 

analysis of the various components of a wrongful-termination claim. See, e.g., Wiles v. Medina 

Auto Parts, Inc., 96 Ohio St.3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 14-15, and Pytlinski v. 

Brocar Prods., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 760 N.E.2d 385 (2002), fn. 3. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

provide any remedy to an aggrieved employee who was fired in contravention of a 

public policy would seem to fail, as a matter of course, to adequately protect the 

public policy. 

{¶ 28} Indeed, until now, this court seemingly understood this concept. In 

the past, when examining whether statutory remedies adequately protected the 

public policy at issue, this court focused on the adequacy of the remedies available 

to the individual employee. See Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 

311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, ¶ 33 (holding that the “jeopardy element 

necessary to support a common-law claim is not satisfied, because R.C. Chapter 

4112 adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in 

employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees” [emphasis 

added]); Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 

N.E.2d 526, ¶ 15, 17 (finding no need to recognize a common-law wrongfultermination claim for an employee who experienced an adverse employment action 

after taking time off to care for ailing father because the employee had “an alternate 

means of vindicating his or her statutory rights” by way of the FMLA’s remedial 

scheme, which provided the “employee with a meaningful opportunity to place 

himself or herself in the same position the employee would have been absent the 

employer’s violation of the FMLA” [emphasis added]); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, 

Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 155, 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997) (court allowed employee to 

proceed on common-law wrongful-termination claim, with the lead opinion stating 

that the statutory “civil remedies set forth in R.C. 4113.52 are not adequate to fully 

compensate an aggrieved employee who is discharged, disciplined, or otherwise 

retaliated against in violation of the statute” [emphasis added]); Collins v. Rizkana, 

73 Ohio St.3d 65, 74, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) (availability of remedies under R.C. 

Chapter 4112, which prohibits sexual discrimination, could not serve to defeat 

employee’s wrongful-discharge claim because those remedies, which included 

equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and back pay, were not personally 
January Term, 2020 

13 

available to employee when her employer did not employ the requisite number of 

employees required to be considered an “employer” within the meaning of the 

statute). 

{¶ 29} The majority opinion distinguishes its decision in the present case 

from the past decisions cited above by explaining that the public policy at issue in 

each of those cases protected a substantial right of the employee, whereas in the 

present case the public policy—requiring accurate reporting of employee wages—

exists only to protect a particular governmental interest. According to the majority 

opinion, only when a substantial right of the employee is at stake will the court 

“look[] to see whether the statutory scheme contains a sufficient personal remedy 

for the aggrieved employee.” Majority opinion at ¶ 19. The court should be wary 

of drawing this distinction. 

{¶ 30} Generally, governmental interests are those interests that impact the 

health, safety, and welfare of the community. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 

417, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998); see also Miami Cty. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 223, 

110 N.E. 726 (1915). In order to protect these interests, governments promulgate 

laws prohibiting certain conduct found to be harmful to society. Often, criminal 

and regulatory laws do not provide substantive rights to any single individual but 

rather protect society at large. And although criminal and regulatory laws may 

discourage whatever conduct is prohibited by threatening the imposition of fines 

and other penalties, many do not provide a personal remedy to an employee who is 

fired for refusing to violate the law. 

{¶ 31} Following the majority opinion to its logical conclusion would 

foreclose an employee who is fired for refusing to violate the law from bringing a 

common-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. This 

could jeopardize important public policies at the heart of a number of Ohio’s laws 

even if those public policies do not necessarily protect the right of an individual 

employee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

{¶ 32} For instance, imagine a scenario in which an employee of a 

chemical-manufacturing company is told by his supervisor to dump toxic waste in 

the Ohio River. Knowing that this would violate a number of criminal and 

environmental laws and could harm thousands of people, the employee refuses. If 

the employee is fired for refusing to comply with his supervisor’s demand, 

according to the majority opinion, that employee would not be able to maintain a 

common-law wrongful-termination claim. When there is no private remedy for the 

wrongfully terminated employee, that employee, and others like him, are going to 

have a difficult choice to make—break the law or be fired for not breaking the law. 

When the employee has some recourse against his employer for the wrongful 

termination, this choice becomes much easier, and the employer might think twice 

before asking an employee to engage in illegal conduct in the first place. See Perritt, 

Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, Section 7.07[A], at 7-124 (“The central idea 

of the public policy tort is to create privately enforceable disincentives for private 

employers to use their power in the workplace to undermine important public 

policies”). 

{¶ 33} It does not matter whether the public policy is intended to protect 

some right of the employee or is intended to protect a governmental interest, the 

same analysis applies to the jeopardy component—does the discharge of an 

employee under the circumstances alleged by a plaintiff jeopardize the public 

policy. See Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70, 652 N.E.2d 653. Regardless of the type 

of public policy involved, one of the central questions underlying the jeopardy 

component is whether a privately enforceable remedy for the aggrieved employee 

is needed to adequately protect the public policy. When the source of the public 

policy is a statute that contains a remedy for a wrongfully terminated employee, 

recognizing a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy may not 

be necessary. However, I can find no support in the law for the majority’s 

conclusion that it does not matter whether an adequate personal remedy for 
January Term, 2020 

15 

employees exists within the statute when the public policy protects only a 

governmental interest. This assertion appears to be created to justify the majority’s 

departure from this court’s jeopardy analysis in prior decisions. 

{¶ 34} However, even if the majority is correct in its assumption that this 

court treats public policies protecting governmental interests differently than those 

protecting employee rights, the majority has failed to sufficiently explain why the 

public policy at issue here does not involve the protection of an employee right. 

“The fund out of which unemployment compensation is paid to employees is 

represented entirely by compulsory contributions on the part of employers and is in 

effect a tax on the privilege of doing business in Ohio.” Leach v. Republic Steel 

Corp., 176 Ohio St. 221, 223, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964). This court has explained that 

the purpose of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 4141, and 

the funds created by the act “is to enable unfortunate employees, who become and 

remain involuntarily unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to 

subsist on a reasonably decent level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and 

enlightened concepts of this modern day.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.; see also Irvine 

v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985); 

Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, 697, 

653 N.E.2d 1207 (1995), quoting Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 61 Ohio 

St.2d 35, 39, 399 N.E.2d 76 (1980) (“ ‘The [A]ct was intended to provide financial 

assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to work, but was 

temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of his own’ ”). 

Contrary to the majority’s position, this court’s earlier case law shows that the 

public policy behind accurately reporting employee wages is meant to protect a 

substantial right of the employee—the right to receive his fair share of 

unemployment compensation—in the event of an employee’s termination through 

no fault of his own. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

II. Inadequacy of Statutory Remedies 

{¶ 35} Without an individual remedy for the discharged employee, the 

statutory remedies contained in R.C. Chapter 4141 do not adequately protect 

against employers who purposefully underreport wages to avoid paying their fair 

share of unemployment taxes. To begin, although R.C. 4141.99 subjects an 

employer to possible criminal penalties for certain violations of R.C. Chapter 4141, 

it does not—as the majority suggests—contain provisions that criminalize the 

underreporting of wages to avoid paying the requisite unemployment tax. Instead, 

R.C. 4141.99, along with R.C. 4141.20(B), imposes modest fines on an employer 

and individuals working for the employer who have failed to properly file a 

quarterly wage-earning report or pay required contributions to the unemployment 

fund. See R.C. 4141.20(B) (imposing forfeiture of $50 to $1,000, which can be 

waived by the director of job and family services pursuant to R.C. 4141.20(D)); 

R.C. 4141.99(C) (imposing a fine of $500 upon an employer or its officer who fails 

to comply with the requirements of R.C. 4141.38 “relating to the making of reports 

or the payment of contributions to the unemployment compensation fund”). Given 

the mild penalties involved, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which an 

unscrupulous employer might choose to forgo its legal obligations by 

underreporting employee wages when the benefit outweighs the risk. If the 

allegations in House’s complaint are true, that appears to be what has happened 

here. 

{¶ 36} Further, although R.C. 4141.27 permits the director of job and 

family services, through the attorney general, to bring a civil action against an 

employer to recover unpaid contributions, including interest, once liability has been 

determined pursuant to R.C. 4141.26 and the employer still refuses to pay, this 

section does not penalize the purposeful underreporting of wages. Instead, it is a 

legal mechanism that the director may use to compel payment from a recalcitrant 

employer. See R.C. 4141.27; see also R.C. 131.03. 
January Term, 2020 

17 

{¶ 37} How the majority concludes that the provisions contained in R.C. 

4141.20(B), 4141.99, and 4141.27 serve as deterrents against wage-reporting 

violations in and of themselves is perplexing. The procedures outlined in R.C. 

4141.27 for recovering contributions are activated only “[i]f the director of job and 

family services finds that * * * an employer subject to [R.C. Chapter 4141] * * * 

has failed to comply with such sections.” Id. The little word “if” is a big reason 

why House’s claim has met the jeopardy element under the facts of this case. None 

of the statutory remedies that the majority finds adequately protect the public policy 

at issue here are even triggered unless, or until, a violation is made known to the 

director. It requires no stretch of the imagination to conclude that often an 

employee will be the only one, other than the employer, to know of a violation. If 

employees know they can be terminated with no recourse for reporting a potential 

violation or for cooperating with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation to 

uncover a potential violation, it is highly unlikely that they will ever report or 

cooperate. In turn, employers are unlikely to ever be identified and subjected to the 

administrative remedies for their wrongdoing. In light of the majority’s decision in 

this case, the General Assembly might as well amend R.C. 4141.27 to apply when 

“the director just so happens to discover” that an employer subject to R.C. Chapter 

4141 failed to comply with the statute. 

{¶ 38} In essence, because employee reporting in this instance is necessary 

for the effective enforcement of the public policy, employees must be protected 

from retaliatory discharge either by remedies contained in the statutory provisions 

or by remedies in a common-law tort claim for wrongful termination. 

III. Application of the Majority Decision to the Facts of this Case 

{¶ 39} As the majority notes, the jeopardy-element analysis requires the 

court to determine whether dismissing House under the circumstances involved in 

this case jeopardizes the public policy expressed in R.C. Chapter 4141. Without 

any meaningful analysis, the majority goes on to find that the circumstances under 
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which House was dismissed would not jeopardize the public policy requiring 

employers to accurately report wage and tip earnings. But a simple application of 

the law to the alleged facts exposes the majority’s error. 

{¶ 40} House alleged in her complaint that she was terminated from her job 

as a waiter at the Riverstone Tavern, where she had worked for over seven years, 

for confronting Iacovelli, her boss, about underreporting her wage and tip earnings 

to the Ohio Unemployment Commission’s Insurance Fund. If the allegation is true, 

Iacovelli’s conduct violated R.C. 4141.38, which provides that no employer shall 

fail to comply with R.C. Chapter 4141’s reporting requirements. 

{¶ 41} According to the complaint, after House was terminated, Iacovelli 

contacted House and counseled her to misrepresent to the Bureau of Unemployment 

Compensation the true reason for her termination. Specifically, as alleged by 

House, Iacovelli instructed her to state that she was terminated for lack of work so 

that she might still be eligible for unemployment benefits. The complaint alleged 

that Iacovelli told House that he would pay her $150 every two weeks to make up 

for the reduction in unemployment benefits that she might receive due to his 

reporting violation. House declined to participate in the alleged scheme and 

proceeded to bring an action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

{¶ 42} These latter allegations are left out of the majority opinion. But they 

are extremely important because, to be eligible for unemployment benefits under 

the statute, employee-applicants cannot be found to have quit their employment 

without just cause or to have been terminated for just cause in connection with their 

work. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). When, however, an employee is terminated for “lack 

of work,” that employee’s eligibility is preserved. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a)(ii). 

Moreover, pursuant to the statute, an eligible applicant is entitled to receive 

unemployment benefits in an amount of up to 50 percent of the person’s average 

weekly wage, the calculation of which derives from the employee’s wage as 

reported by the employer in its quarterly reports. R.C. 4141.30(B). 
January Term, 2020 

19 

{¶ 43} When considering these facts, it is unclear what the majority 

expected House to do. Had she kept silent about her employer’s reporting violation, 

she would not have received her full unemployment benefits in the event of a nofault termination. Had House lied to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation 

by stating that she was terminated for lack of work, she would have committed a 

fraudulent misrepresentation in order to obtain benefits—an action that carries its 

own fines and penalties under R.C. 4141.35. The same is true if she had collected 

the payments her former employer offered her as hush money. See id.; see also

R.C. 4141.31(A). 

{¶ 44} If the facts in the complaint are true, House did everything right 

under the circumstances. Not only did she attempt to discourage unlawful behavior 

by confronting her employer about its reporting violations, but later, after being 

fired for her actions, she declined to engage in conduct akin to fraud and bribery 

even though her unemployed status and diminished capacity to collect 

unemployment benefits might have put pressure on her to do otherwise. In light of 

the circumstances in which House was dismissed, I find the majority’s assurances 

that the administrative remedies in R.C. Chapter 4141 protect the public from an 

employer’s wage-reporting violations entirely unconvincing. In my estimation, by 

refusing to recognize the necessity of a wrongful-termination claim, the majority 

opinion does more to encourage employer underreporting than the statutory remedy 

provisions could ever do to discourage it. 

DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Michael T. Conway & Company and Michael Terrance Conway, for 

appellee. 

The Bailey Law Firm and Steve C. Bailey, for appellants. 

The Gittes Law Group, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, urging 

affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
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Willis Spangler Starling and Jason E. Starling, urging affirmance for amicus 

curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 

_________________