alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6165 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6165

    To require the Federal Communications Commission to take action 
 relating to promoting broadband Internet access service for veterans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 26, 2016

 Mr. McNerney introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To require the Federal Communications Commission to take action 
 relating to promoting broadband Internet access service for veterans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Improving Broadband Access for 
Veterans Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. RULEMAKING RELATING TO PROMOTING BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS 
              SERVICE FOR VETERANS.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``broadband Internet access service'' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 8.2 of title 47, Code of 
        Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto; and
            (2) the term ``veteran'' has the meaning given the term in 
        section 101 of title 38, United States Code.
    (b) Rulemaking.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall release a 
notice of inquiry relating to examining and promoting broadband 
Internet access service for veterans, in particular low-income veterans 
and veterans residing in rural areas.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul MORENO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50420

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2017

Nicole Ries Fox, Assistant U.S., Todd W. Robinson, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Johanna S. Schiavoni, Law Office of Johanna S. Schiavoni, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: ■ CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Raul Moreno appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Moreno argues that the district court erred by failing to consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. He also contends that the court failed to consider his argument that he was entitled to a sentence reduction because the only fact that had changed since his original sentencing was a reduction in his allegedly overinflated Guidelines range. The record reflects that the court acknowledged the reduced Guidelines range and Moreno’s eligibility for a reduction before discussing several of the section 3553(a) factors and its reasons for denying the reduction in light of those factors. On this record, we conclude that the court considered the section 3553(a) factors and adequately explained the sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (describing what constitutes an adequate explanation and stating that “[t]he district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them”).

Moreno also contends that his 168-month sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his post-sentencing rehabilitation and other mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce Moreno’s sentence. *See United States v. Dunn,*728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). The 168-month sen*524tence, which is within the amended Guidelines range, is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the offense. *See Dunn,*728 F.3d at 1158-59.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 13987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05274]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting Notice

TIME AND DATE: Wednesday, March 9, 2022; 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: This meeting will be conducted by remote means.

STATUS: Commission Meeting--Closed to the Public.

MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED: Briefing Matter.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Alberta E. Mills, Secretary, 
Division of the Secretariat, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East-West Highway, Bethesda, 
MD 20814, (301) 504-7479 (Office) or 240-863-8938 (cell). The 
Commission unanimously determined by recorded vote to close the meeting 
and that agency business requires calling the meeting without seven 
calendar days advance public notice.

    Dated: March 8, 2022.
Alberta E. Mills,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-05274 Filed 3-9-22; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
#### Kimberly H. STODDARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-2065

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 5, 2017

Decided: December 19, 2017

ARGUED: Edward G. Connette, ESSEX & RICHARDS, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. James Aaron Dean, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Caitlin H. Walton, ESSEX RICHARDS, P,A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ryan H. Niland, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Patrick G. Spaugh, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

After paying plaintiff Kimberly H. Stod-dard long-term disability benefits for a decade, defendant First Unum Life Insurance Company terminated those benefits as of December 1, 2014. In these proceedings, Stoddard asserts that—although her benefits plan accords First Unum discretion in rendering eligibility determinations—First Unum acted unreasonably and violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001*et seq.*On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court disagreed with Stoddard and awarded judgment to First Unum. *See Stoddard v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.,*No. 1:15-ev-00965 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2016), EOF No. 36. Stoddard timely noted this appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo the district court’s award of summary judgment to First Unum on Stoddard’s ERISA claim, applying the same standard employed by the district court in its assessment of First Unum’s benefits decision. *See Harrison v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,*773 F.3d 15, 20 (4th Cir. 2014). That is, because of the discretion conferred upon First Unum by the plan, we consider whether First Unum abused its discretion in terminating Stod-dard’s long-term disability benefits. *See id.*Under that deferential standard, we must uphold First Unum’s decision “if it is reasonable,” even if we “would have come to a different conclusion independently.” *See United McGill Corp. v, Stinnett,*154 F.3d 168, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Having had the benefit of oral argument and having carefully considered the briefs, the record, and the applicable authorities, we are satisfied that First Unum did not abuse its discretion in rendering its benefits decision against Stoddard. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered by the district court in favor of First'Unum.

*AFFIRMED*
#### David FELTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Claudette EDWARDS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6946

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 21, 2017

David Felton, Appellant Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Felton seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2264 (2012) petition as successive and unauthorized. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v.*McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Felton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and *192dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of FFD Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Trent
B. Troyer, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/Trent B. Troyer
-----------------------------------------
Trent B. Troyer
President and Chief Executive Officer
May 16, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Lee OSTERLOTH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30267

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

SEPTEMBER 29, 2017

Paulette Lynn Stewart, Assistant U.S., USHE-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Helena, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., USBI-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Christopher Lee Osterloth, Atlanta, GA, pro se.

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Christopher Lee Osterloth appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Osterloth contends that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo whether a district court had authority to modify a sentence under section 3582(c)(2), *See United States v. Leniear,*574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009). The record makes clear that the district court imposed Osterloth’s sentence for reasons unrelated to the guideline range lowered by Amendment 782. Because Osterloth’s sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” he is ineligible for a sentence reduction. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); *United States v. Rodriguez-Soriano, 855*F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, contrary to Os-terloth’s contention, the record reflects that the district court gave due consideration to his motion, consulted the relevant documents, and explained its reasons for denying the motion.

AFFIRMED,

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JEFFREY ROGERS,

Appellant,

v.

GRIFFIN COMMERCE CENTER, INC. d/b/a VERSATILE 

WAREHOUSING,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-1961 

[January 4, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

CACE21018235.

Jeffrey Rogers, Dania Beach, pro se.

Peter Sobota of Sobota P.L., Davie, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Goodall v. Whispering Woods Ctr., L.L.C., 990 So. 2d 

695, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (stating that “[w]hen there are conflicts 

between the allegations of a complaint and the documents attached as 

exhibits to the complaint, the plain language of the documents control”); 

Horizon Images, Inc. v. Delta Color Graphics, Inc., 639 So. 2d 186, 187 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (holding that there must be “a clear intention in the 

contract between [the contracting parties] to directly and substantially 

benefit [the third party], in order for [the third party] to sue on the third

party beneficiary theory”); Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc. v. Cmty. 

Ass’n Servs., Inc., 770 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that 

dismissal of a complaint for breach of contract based on a third party 

beneficiary theory is warranted where “the contract attached to the 

complaint shows no intent to directly and substantially benefit” the third 

party).

GROSS, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur. 

* * *
2

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
PHHMC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2006-4
Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest
Distributions to Certificateholders for 2006

Class      Interest            Principal            Realized           Ending
          Distribution            Paid               Losses            Balance

A1           80,809.41           35,394.33            0.00       15,424,036.67
A2            2,579.02            1,129.61            0.00          492,256.39
A3                0.00                0.00            0.00        1,131,750.11
A4          142,554.95                0.00            0.00       31,959,229.00
A5           24,502.08                0.00            0.00                0.00
A6          276,182.44          152,120.54            0.00       52,683,597.46
A7           52,286.67           17,944.88            0.00        9,984,876.12
A8                0.00                0.00            0.00        2,971,189.22
A9                0.00                0.00            0.00        6,892,581.60
131          33,306.61            5,554.01            0.00        6,366,242.99
B2            4,026.07              671.36            0.00          769,545.64
B3            2,562.05              427.23            0.00          489,710.77
B4            1,464.03              244.13            0.00          279,834.87
B5            1,464.03              244.13            0.00          279,834.87
B6            1,098.02              183.11            0.00          209,876.96
RI                0.52              100.00            0.00                0.00
RII               0.52              100.00            0.00                0.00
#### Ricardo GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 17-1440

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 20, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON *&*ASSOCIATES, PC, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director, John M. McAdams, Jr., Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ricardo Gonzalez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal of the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have. thoroughly reviewed the record, including the transcript of Gonzalez’s merits hearing and all supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to the finding that Gonzalez could safely relocate in El Salvador to avoid future persecution, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, *INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We further conclude that, because Gonzalez failed to exhaust his challenge to the IJ’s decision denying his application for protection under the CAT, we are without jurisdiction to review that portion of his claim. *See Urbina v. Holder,*745 F.3d 736, 741 *297(4th Cir. 2014) (dismissing in part petition for review for failure to exhaust).

Accordingly, we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials - before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART*
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications

  I, Kristen Ann Cronin, certify that:

  1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A and all reports on Form 10-D
     required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report
     on Form 10-K/A of Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-6;

  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
     whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
     to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
     light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
     misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
     information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
     covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
     reports;

  4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
     servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
     conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
     this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
     in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
     their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects;
     and

  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
     criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
     reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
     asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in
     accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
     13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report,
     except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances
     of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in
     this report on Form 10-K/A.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
     information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
     Cenlar, FSB as Sub-Servicer, Colonial National Mortgage f/k/a Colonial
     Savings, F.A. as Servicer, Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. as Sub-Servicer,
     Mellon Trust of New England, National Association as Named Servicer, First
     Horizon Home Loan Corporation as Servicer, Morgan Stanley Credit
     Corporation as Servicer, Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP as Servicer,
     First Republic Bank as Servicer and Thornburg Mortgage as Named Servicer.

     Dated: May 27, 2008


     /s/ Kristen Ann Cronin
     Signature

     Vice President
     (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master servicer)
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 98 Referral Instructions Senate (RIS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 98

To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to establish a process to 
                 identify and control tax expenditures.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 4, 1995

  Mr. Bradley (for himself, Mr. Daschle and Mr. Kerry) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred jointly pursuant to 
   the order of August 4, 1977, to the Committees on the Budget and 
Governmental Affairs, with instructions that if one committee reports, 
    the other committee have thirty days to report or be discharged

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to establish a process to 
                 identify and control tax expenditures.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Tax Expenditure Control Act of 
1995''.

SEC. 2. TAX EXPENDITURES INCLUDED IN BUDGET RESOLUTION.

    Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2) by inserting after ``Federal 
        revenues'', both places it appears, the following: ``and tax 
        expenditures (including income tax expenditures or other 
        equivalent base narrowing tax provisions applying to other 
        Federal taxes)''; and
            (2) in subsection (a)(4) by inserting after ``budget 
        outlays,'' the following: ``tax expenditures (including income 
        tax expenditures or other equivalent base narrowing tax 
        provisions applying to other Federal taxes),''.

SEC. 3. TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS IN REPORT ACCOMPANYING BUDGET 
              RESOLUTION.

    Section 301(e)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
amended by inserting after ``revenues'' the following: ``and tax 
expenditures''.

SEC. 4. RECONCILIATION MAY INCLUDE TAX EXPENDITURE CHANGES.

    Section 310(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
amended by inserting after ``revenues'' the following: ``and tax 
expenditures''.

SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT.

    Section 202(f)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
amended in the matter following subparagraph (B) by striking ``and 
budget outlays'' and inserting ``, budget outlays, and tax 
expenditures''.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on 
the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```