If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re WILKS, Minors. April 14, 2022

No. 359294

Jackson Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 21-001351-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, Kristopher Wilks, appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his

parental rights to his minor children. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent is the father to two minor children, SW1 and SW2. On March 13, 2021, SW1

woke up her mother at around 10:30 p.m. due to profuse bleeding coming from the child’s vagina. 

Respondent was already awake and sitting up at the time and did not seem to react to the emergency 

or the child’s distress. No other adults were in the home, and SW1’s mother was asleep when the

bleeding started. SW1’s mother took her to the emergency room, and the child was ultimately 

treated for a vaginal laceration near the cervix. Given the nature of this injury and SW1’s lack of 

any history with inserting anything into her own vagina, Bethany Mohr, a medical expert with 

experience in child sexual abuse cases, opined that SW1 was likely sexually assaulted.

Petitioner Department of Health and Human Services subsequently filed a petition in the 

trial court alleging that respondent caused SW1’s injury via sexual assault and requesting that his 

parental rights to SW1 and SW2 be terminated. The children were adjudicated to be within the 

trial court’s jurisdiction, and a combined disposition and termination hearing was held.

The trial court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent 

sexually assaulted SW1 and, therefore, there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights to SW1 and SW2 under MCL712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury 

or physical or sexual abuse to child or sibling of child) and MCL712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable 

likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent). The trial court also concluded that termination 

was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. 
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“The trial court’s decision that a ground for termination of parental rights has been proved 

by clear and convincing evidence is reviewed for clear error.” In re Pops, 315 Mich App 590, 

593; 890 NW2d 902 (2016). We also review for clear error the trial court’s determination that 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 

713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial 

court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 

NW2d 505 (2004). “This Court gives deference to a trial court’s special opportunity to judge the 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it.” In re TK, 306 

Mich App 698, 710; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).

III. ANALYSIS

Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found that petitioner 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of his parental rights under MCL

712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (j). We disagree.

The trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) if it finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical 

injury or physical or sexual abuse under circumstances in which “[t]he parent’s act caused the 

physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s 

home.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). The trial court may also “terminate parental rights if it finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that there ‘is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or 

capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.’ ” In re Pops, 315 Mich App at 599, quoting MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). “ ‘If the court finds 

that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is 

in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that 

additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.’ ” In re VanDalen, 

293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011), quoting MCL 712A.19b(5).

Respondent contends the trial court erred by finding these provisions satisfied on the basis 

of purely circumstantial and insufficient evidence of an alleged sexual assault. Respondent notes 

that no warrant was ever issued against him for assaulting SW1, despite an extensive police 

investigation. Furthermore, respondent asserts that no evidence was introduced whatsoever to 

indicate that he ever harmed SW2. And respondent cites In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713; 858 

NW2d 143 (2014), for the proposition that the doctrine of anticipatory neglect is inapplicable when 

there is no evidence that any other children were abused or neglected. According to respondent, 

anticipatory neglect was also inappropriate here considering the limited circumstantial evidence 

that SW1 was ever abused.

We disagree with respondent and conclude that the trial court’s findings regarding the 

potential for future harm to SW1 were not clearly erroneous. As an initial matter, a fact-finder can 
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make inferences from circumstantial evidence when such conclusions are reasonably supported by 

the record. See Ykimoff v WA Foote Mem’l Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 87; 776 NW2d 114 (2009) 

(“If circumstantial evidence is relied on to establish proximate cause, the evidence must lead to a 

reasonable inference of causation and not mere speculation.”). Here, the trial court focused on the 

egregious nature of SW1’s injury, reasoning that it must have resulted from blunt trauma to the 

area. Noting that respondent was the only adult present and awake with SW1 when the bleeding 

started, the trial court reasonably concluded that respondent assaulted SW1. Moreover, respondent 

did not appear concerned about SW1’s bleeding—nor did he offer any assistance—despite being 

in the room and awake before SW1 woke up the mother. And SW1’s lack of disclosure and 

repeated denials that respondent, or anyone else, ever touched her, do not sufficiently refute this 

other evidence supporting that respondent assaulted the child. Specifically, it was reasonable to 

conclude that SW1’s silence and denials were due to either fear of, or threats from, respondent, 

especially considering that she later described respondent as a “monster.” Considering Mohr’s 

specific—and unrefuted—expert testimony that SW1’s injury was likely from an assault, and not

self-inflicted, the trial court was justified in finding grounds for termination.

Having concluded the evidence supports petitioner’s allegation that respondent sexually 

assaulted SW1, it was proper for the trial court to apply the doctrine of anticipatory neglect 

regarding respondent’s other minor child, SW2. It is well established that “[h]ow a parent treats 

one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re LaFrance, 306 

Mich App at 730 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). And this Court 

has permitted termination concerning multiple children when the allegations involve sexual assault 

against only one child. See In re Jenks, 281 Mich App 514; 760 NW2d 297 (2008).

Respondent’s reliance on LaFrance is unavailing. In LaFrance, statutory grounds for 

termination were met regarding the respondents’ youngest child, but not their three older children. 

LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 726-732. And while the Court in LaFrance refused to apply the 

doctrine of anticipatory neglect, in part, because “the trial court nowhere suggested, and no 

evidence was offered to prove, that either respondent had ever abused or neglected any of their 

three older children,” the Court also stated that its conclusion was based on the “unusual 

circumstances of this case.” Id. at 731. Specifically, the Court refused to apply anticipatory 

neglect because:

the ages and medical conditions of the three older children stand in sharp contrast 

to that of the youngest child. Unlike the latter, who requires special medical care 

for which respondents seemed to under-appreciate the need, no such special care 

was required for the older children. Moreover, respondents had cared for those 

children from birth without incident, including any allegation, let alone proof, that 

they had abused or neglected the three older children at any time.

* * *

[Furthermore,] the only allegations of negligence underlying this case concern 

respondent-mother’s continued substance abuse during her pregnancy with the 

youngest child, and respondent-father’s failure to act promptly in response to that 

infant’s rapid medical deterioration. The three older children ranged in age from 

five to twelve years at the time of termination, and, thus, did not share their infant 
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sister’s medical vulnerabilities or inability to articulate personal needs or 

discomforts. Moreover, concerns over the youngest child’s cerebral palsy hardly 

militated in favor of terminating parental rights to the older children, who suffered 

from no such special need. [Id. at 730-731.]

In contrast with this case, however, respondent is alleged to have actively assaulted one of 

his children. And there are no unique facts, such as the children having distinct medical needs, 

that would undermine the likelihood that this type of abuse would be repeated with SW2. Indeed, 

if the children were returned to respondent’s care, SW2’s younger age and inability to report abuse 

makes him even more vulnerable to assault than SW1. Accordingly, we are not left with a definite 

and firm conviction that the trial court was mistaken in finding statutory grounds for termination 

satisfied as to both children. See In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297. Therefore, we conclude 

that the trial court’s findings on the statutory grounds for termination were not clearly erroneous.

Next, respondent argues that the trial court also clearly erred by finding that termination of 

his parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We disagree.

To terminate a parent’s parental rights, the trial court must “find[] by a preponderance of 

the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 

Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). All available evidence should be weighed by the trial 

court, which should consider factors such as “ ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home 

over the parent’s home.’ ” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713, quoting In re Olive/Metts Minors, 

297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 114 (2012). “If the court finds that there are grounds for 

termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, 

the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification 

of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).

Respondent’s claim of error centers on the trial court’s focus on the alleged assault and its 

alleged failure to analyze respondent’s bond with the children or parenting abilities, or any other 

relevant factor when determining whether termination is in the children’s best interest. Relatedly, 

respondent claims that the trial court failed to consider the children’s existing placement with the 

mother, which he alleges should weigh against termination. Respondent also argues that it was 

improper for the trial court not to analyze each child’s best interests individually. Rather than 

terminating his parental rights, respondent asserts that it was in the children’s best interests for the 

trial court to merely retain jurisdiction over the children, grant the mother sole custody, and order 

an evaluation to determine whether there were indeed risks associated with respondent’s parenting.

We acknowledge that the trial court’s best-interest analysis was limited and largely based 

on respondent’s assault of SW1. However, the trial court explicitly stated:

I realize that normally when the court is making a best interest determination it 

focus on, [sic] it focuses on things like the child’s bond to the parent, the child’s 

need for permanency, the parent’s parenting ability. When child sexual abuse is 

involved, either of a child or of a sibling of a child, there would have to be a very 

strong affirmative showing that termination is not in the child’s best interest for the 

court to consider any other alternative than termination.
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Thus, while it did not detail precise findings concerning these other factors, the trial court 

still acknowledged their relevance to its analysis. Accordingly, the trial court’s statement that 

strong affirmative proof is required to refute termination in child sexual abuse cases—made 

immediately before its best interest determination—was an implicit conclusion that such evidence 

was lacking regarding any factor separate from the assault. We also note that both children resided 

with the mother since SW1’s injury and had no contact with respondent, despite him being allowed 

parenting time with SW2. SW1 also stated that she disliked respondent and did not wish to spend 

time with him. Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court’s limited analysis, the totality of the 

evidence still weighed in favor of termination. 

Concerning the trial court’s failure to explicitly recognize that the children were placed 

with the mother, we disagree with respondent that this was in error. It is true that placement with 

relatives must generally be considered and will weigh against termination. See In re Olive/Metts, 

297 Mich App at 43 (“the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the 

termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the 

children’s best interests”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a biological mother 

is not a “relative” for purposes of MCL 712A.19a. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 413; 890 

NW2d 676 (2016). Therefore, the trial court was not required to consider placement with the 

mother. See id.

Furthermore, we also disagree with respondent that the trial court erred by not evaluating 

the children’s best interests individually for each child. Such separate analysis is only required 

when “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ.” White, 303 Mich App 

at 715 (emphasis in original). And while respondent is only alleged to have assaulted SW1, his 

propensity to assault one child puts both at risk. The children’s best interests with respect to this 

case are, therefore, not significantly different.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding statutory 

grounds for termination and concluding that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Sima G. Patel