Affirm and Opinion Filed August 3, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00959-CV

LULU SCHWARTZ AND ROBERT SCHWARTZ, Appellants

V.

JODY LYNN JOHNSON AND JODY LYNN JOHNSON P. C., Appellees

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-11113

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Reichek

Opinion by Justice Molberg

Lulu and Robert Schwartz appeal the trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment to appellees Jody Lynn Johnson and her law firm on the multiple tort, 

quasi-contract, and statutory claims filed against them.

1 The Schwartzes argue the 

trial judge abused her discretion by granting summary judgment in appellees’ favor, 

by refusing to rule on their motion for new trial, and by refusing to recuse herself

 

1 To the extent we need to distinguish between Johnson and her law firm, we refer to Johnson by name 

and to her law firm as “Firm.” Otherwise, we refer to them collectively as “appellees.”
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and follow the procedures in civil procedure rule 18a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a. We 

affirm the judgment in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

BACKGROUND

“[M]isery acquaints a man with strange bed-fellows.”2

The Schwartzes—once spouses and later adversaries in an underlying family 

law proceeding that they claim originated in May 2013—sued Johnson and her Firm 

in August 2020, asserting multiple tort, quasi-contract, and statutory claims against 

them based on Johnson’s prior appointment as the amicus attorney for the 

Schwartzes’ children in the underlying proceeding. 

In this case, the Schwartzes essentially claim Johnson and her Firm engaged 

in “a pattern of ongoing fraud, deceit, negligence, overbilling, [and] 

misrepresentation” to their own benefit and to the detriment of the Schwartzes and 

their children. They filed an original, first amended, and second amended original 

petition against appellees and assert thirteen causes of action against appellees.

3

In June 2021, about two months after the Schwartzes filed their latest 

pleading, appellees moved for traditional summary judgment on all of the 

Schwartzes’ claims. They asserted three bases for summary judgment, arguing that 

(1) the Schwartzes’ claims are barred by qualified immunity under Texas Family 

 

2 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 2, l. 41–42. 

3 The Schwartzes’ latest pleading describes these causes of action as fraud in the inducement, fraudulent 

representation, common law fraud, statutory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, 

negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of fiduciary property, abuse of process, money had 

and received, civil conspiracy, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment.
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Code § 107.009(a), (2) the Schwartzes’ claims are barred by res judicata and/or 

collateral estoppel, and (3) the Schwartzes lack standing because appellees owed 

them no duty as a matter of law. 

The Schwartzes responded to appellees’ summary judgment motion, objected 

to certain evidence, and moved for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing. 

The trial court denied the Schwartzes’ motion for continuance, ruled on their 

evidentiary objections, and granted summary judgment for appellees on the 

Schwartzes’ claims in an order signed July 27, 2021. The order did not state any 

particular reason why the trial court granted the motion. 

Thirty days later, the Schwartzes moved for a new trial. Appellees filed a 

response, and the trial court heard the motion on September 28, 2021. In their 

motion for new trial, the Schwartzes argued, for the first time, the trial judge should 

recuse herself “because her husband served as an attorney for one of the 

[Schwartzes] in the underlying family law matter which is the basis for [their] 

Petition.” The Schwartzes also made this argument in the September 28, 2021 

hearing but did not file a written motion to recuse until October 21, 2021, twentythree days after the hearing. The motion to recuse was filed by both appellants but 

was only verified by appellant Lulu Schwartz. The trial court did not hear or rule on

the motion to recuse and did not refer the motion to another judge for consideration. 

The Schwartzes’ motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law on 

October 11, 2021. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c).
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Schwartzes describe the issues presented as follows:

[1] Whether the trial court abused its discretion when [the trial judge] 

granted Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment when genuine 

issues of fact or law existed; [2] refused to recuse herself; [3] refused 

to rule on Appellants’ Motion for New Trial; and [4] refused to follow 

the procedures governing motions for recusal outlined in Texas Rule of 

Civil Procedure [18a].4

Although the Schwartzes do not number their issues in this manner, we have

added the bracketed numbers in the quoted information so that we may more easily 

consider and discuss these issues.

A. Issue One: Motion for Summary Judgment

In their first issue, the Schwartzes argue the trial court “abused its discretion” 

by granting appellees’ traditional motion for summary judgment when genuine 

issues of law and fact existed.

We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 

Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019); Valence Operating 

Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). In conducting our review, “we 

take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every 

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Ortiz, 589 

S.W.3d at 131 (quoting Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661).

 

4 For purposes of this appeal, we construe the Schwartzes’ various references to Texas Rule of 

Procedure “18” and “18(a)” as referring to rule 18a, which explains the procedures for motions to recuse in 

certain cases.
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A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to show 

that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Ortiz, 589 S.W.3d at 131; Lujan v. Navistar, 

Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). If the movant does so, the burden then shifts 

to the nonmovant to come forward with competent controverting evidence sufficient 

to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element. Lujan, 555 

S.W.3d at 84. A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence regarding the 

challenged element “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded 

people to differ in their conclusions.” First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont 

v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. 

Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).

When a party moves for summary judgment on multiple grounds and the trial 

court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds on 

which it was based, the appellant must negate all possible grounds upon which the 

order could have been granted, see Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 313 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied), and if an appellant does not do so, we must 

uphold the summary judgment on the unchallenged grounds. See id.; see also Adams 

v. First Nat’l Bank of Bells/Savoy, 154 S.W.3d 859, 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, 

no pet.) (“a reviewing court will affirm the summary judgment as to a particular 

claim if an appellant does not present argument challenging all grounds on which 

the summary judgment could have been granted”).
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In this case, appellees asserted three bases for summary judgment. On appeal, 

the Schwartzes challenge only one of them, focusing in their first issue only on 

whether their claims are barred by qualified immunity under Texas Family Code

§ 107.009(a). They do not challenge res judicata5 or their own standing, the other 

two bases asserted in appellees’ summary judgment motion. 

Because the Schwartzes have not negated all possible grounds upon which the

trial court’s summary judgment order could have been granted, we must uphold the 

summary judgment on the two unchallenged grounds. See Jarvis, 298 S.W.3d at 

313; Adams, 154 S.W.3d at 875. Under the circumstances, we need not consider the 

Schwartzes’ arguments regarding immunity under Texas Family Code § 107.009 

and conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees.

We overrule the Schwartzes’ first issue.

B. Issue Three: Motion for New Trial 

In their third issue, the Schwartzes argue the trial court abused its discretion 

by failing to rule on their motion for new trial. We review a trial court’s ruling on a 

motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See In re J.P., 365 S.W.3d 833, 836 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“Whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial 

is generally a matter addressed to the broad discretion of the trial court, and [its] 

 

5

In this instance, our reference to res judicata refers to the general doctrine of res judicata, which, 

broadly speaking, “is the generic term for a group of related concepts concerning the conclusive effects 

given final judgments” and within which two principal categories exist: “(1) claim preclusion (also known 

as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel).” Barr v. Resolution Trust 

Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). 
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action will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.”) “[W]e 

may not overrule the trial court’s decision unless the trial court acted in an arbitrary 

or unreasonable manner, without reference to guiding rules or principles.” Id.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to rule on 

the Schwartzes’ motion for new trial. “Trial courts are not required to rule on 

motions for new trial because the passage of time serves to overrule a new trial 

motion by operation of law.” In re McCoy, No. 05-14-00727-CV, 2014 WL 

2609233, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 10, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) 

(citing, among other cases, Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 28 (Tex. 

1994)). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion by not ruling on a motion for new 

trial and by allowing the motion to be overruled by operation of law.” In re McCoy,

2014 WL 2609233, at *1 (citing Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied)). 

We overrule the Schwartzes’ third issue.

C. Issues Two and Four: Motion to Recuse

In their second and fourth issues, the Schwartzes argue the trial court abused 

its discretion by failing to rule on their motion to recuse (issue two) and by failing 

to follow the procedures set forth in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a (issue four).

We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. 

Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); see TEX.

R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1). The party moving for recusal bears the burden of proving 
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recusal is warranted, and the burden is met only through a showing of bias or 

impartiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial. Drake, 

529 S.W.3d at 528. “The test for recusal is ‘whether a reasonable member of the 

public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s 

conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.’” Id. 

(quoting Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).

Rule 18a requires that motions to recuse be verified. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

18a(a)(1). While appellant Lulu Schwartz was the only party to verify the motion 

to recuse in this case, because the motion to recuse was filed on behalf of both 

appellants, whose interests in this case were aligned, we assume, but do not decide, 

that her sworn affidavit was sufficient to satisfy rule 18a(a)(1)’s requirement that the 

motion to recuse be verified. See, e.g. Phillips v. Chapman, 288 S.W. 1100, 1103 

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1926, no pet.) (concluding verification of pleas by one party 

and adoption of pleas by other parties was sufficient); Pounds v. Marler, 50 S.W.2d 

382, 384 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1932, no pet.).

6

 

6 Phillips and Pounds do not involve a review of a motion to recuse but instead raise questions regarding 

the sufficiency of certain verified pleas in cases involving multiple co-parties. In Pounds, the appellants 

argued the appellees’ controverting affidavit was insufficient because it was not signed and sworn to by all 

the appellees instead of by only one. Our sister court rejected that argument, stating there was “no merit”

in it, and concluded the controverting plea should be held sufficient because it purported to be on behalf of 

all the plaintiffs, was signed by their attorneys of record, and was sworn to by one of the plaintiffs. Pounds, 

50 S.W.2d at 384.
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Motions to recuse must meet certain other requirements as well, including 

regarding the time in which they are filed. Rule 18a states:

(b) Time for Filing Motion.

(1) Motion to Recuse. A motion to recuse:

(A) must be filed as soon as practicable after the movant knows 

of the ground stated in the motion; and

(B) must not be filed after the tenth day before the date set for 

trial or other hearing unless, before that day, the movant neither 

knew nor reasonably should have known:

(i) that the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at the 

trial or hearing; or

(ii) that the ground stated in the motion existed.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b).

In Bourgeois v. Collier, 959 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no 

pet.), we vacated an order denying a motion to recuse or disqualify as untimely, 

concluding that while the motion was filed after entry of a final order, it was filed 

timely in relation to the party’s motion for rehearing. We also stated that, even if 

the motion was not timely, the trial judge was still required to either recuse himself 

or refer the motion to the presiding administrative judge before he took any further 

action, and we noted that after the motion was filed in that case, the trial judge 

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. Under those circumstances, we 

vacated the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court’s order on the 

motion to recuse or disqualify, concluding that the trial judge “was not authorized to 

rule on the motion to disqualify and/or recuse, . . . was required to comply with the 
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mandates of rule 18a[,] and, after the motion was filed, was not authorized to take 

any action except for those actions specifically authorized by rule 18a.” Id.

Bourgeois is distinguishable, and the circumstances in this case require a 

different result. Here, the motion and hearing in which the Schwartzes first argued 

the trial judge should have recused herself was in their motion for new trial, and their 

verified motion to recuse was filed twenty-three days after that hearing, not ten days 

before it. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(1)(B).7 Also, after the Schwartzes filed their 

verified motion to recuse, the trial judge did not take any action, unlike Bourgeois, 

959 S.W.2d at 246. 

Additionally, in Carmody v. State Farm Lloyds, 184 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.), we concluded the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in concluding appellants’ motion to recuse was untimely when parties 

filed a motion to recuse based on grounds known to the parties prior to the 

commencement of the hearing and did not make the motion until after the judge 

heard argument and made rulings regarding the subject matter of the hearing. In this 

case, appellant Lulu Schwartz states in the affidavit accompanying the motion to 

recuse that she filed for divorce from appellant Robert Schwartz on May 10, 2013, 

 

7 Rule 18a(b)(1)(B) states the motion to recuse:

(B) must not be filed after the tenth day before the date set for trial or other hearing unless, 

before that day, the movant neither knew nor reasonably should have known:

(i) that the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at the trial or hearing; or

(ii) that the ground stated in the motion existed.
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and during the period from 2013 to 2015, although she was primarily represented by 

one particular lawyer in a certain firm, she “was also represented” by Michael 

Wysocki, another lawyer in the same firm, and who, according to the Schwartzes’ 

motion to recuse, is the husband to the trial judge in this case. Appellant Lulu 

Schwartz’s affidavit also states that the trial judge in this case “was initially assigned 

to be the Judge overseeing [the] divorce proceedings but recused herself due to the 

conflict of interest of her husband representing” her, and she states that due to that 

recusal, the final divorce decree was entered in August of 2020 by a different judge. 

Thus, the record reflects that the Schwartzes knew the circumstances that form the 

basis for their motion to recuse at least as early as 2013 and certainly no later than 

August 2020. Yet they did not file their written motion to recuse until October 21, 

2021, eighty-six days after the trial court granted appellees’ summary judgment 

motion, twenty-three days after the hearing on their motion for new trial,8and ten 

days after their motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. 

Based on this record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by failing to rule on their motion to recuse and by failing to follow the procedures 

set forth in rule 18a. 

We overrule the Schwartzes’ second and fourth issues.

 

8 As indicated earlier, the Schwartzes first argued that the trial judge should recuse herself in this case 

in their motion for new trial. 
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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

210959f.p05

/Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

LULU SCHWARTZ AND ROBERT 

SCHWARTZ, Appellants

No. 05-21-00959-CV V.

JODY LYNN JOHNSON AND 

JODY LYNN JOHNSON P. C., 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-11113.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Chief Justice Burns and 

Justice Reichek participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee JODY LYNN JOHNSON AND JODY 

LYNN JOHNSON P. C. recover their costs of this appeal from appellant LULU 

SCHWARTZ AND ROBERT SCHWARTZ.

Judgment entered this 3

rd day of August, 2023.