J-S62043-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JUNELL RAE WRIGHT

Appellant No. 113 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 17, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-SA-0000165-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2016

Appellant, Junell Rae Wright, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following 

her de novo summary appeal trial in which the court convicted Appellant of 

two counts of operating an unsafe vehicle and imposed a fine in the total 

amount of $50.00 plus costs of prosecution.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On June 18, 2015, Officer Robert Bennett observed Appellant driving a 

Plymouth Duster in Derry, Pennsylvania. Officer Bennett noticed the tint on 

the windows of Appellant’s vehicle was too dark, in violation of vehicle 

inspection regulations. Officer Bennett conducted a traffic stop of 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). 
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Appellant’s vehicle. During the traffic stop, Appellant acknowledged she was 

aware the vehicle window tinting was illegal. Appellant refused to allow 

Officer Bennett to perform a tint test on the windows. Upon investigating 

Appellant’s vehicle, Officer Bennett estimated the window tint permitted 

between twenty and fifty percent light transmittance, in violation of Section 

67 Pa. Code 175.263(a) and (b) and 67 Pa. Code Table X, which regulate 

sun screening on motor vehicle windows. Officer Bennett issued a citation to 

Appellant with two charges of operating an unsafe vehicle under Section 

4107(b)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Code, which proscribes the operation of a 

vehicle that is in an unsafe condition or violates department regulations. 

On July 30, 2015, a district magistrate found Appellant guilty of two 

counts of operating an unsafe vehicle. On August 6, 2015, Appellant filed a 

timely pro se notice of summary appeal requesting a de novo trial before the 

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. On September 29, 2015, Appellant 

failed to appear for a summary appeal trial; and the court convicted 

Appellant of two counts of operating an unsafe vehicle and imposed a fine in 

the total amount of $50.00 plus costs. On October 19, 2015, Appellant filed 

a motion to reconsider the September 29th judgment of sentence. The court 

granted Appellant’s motion and held a second summary appeal trial on 

December 17, 2015, at which Appellant appeared pro se and testified. 

At the December 17th summary appeal trial, Officer Bennett testified 

about the details of the June 18, 2015 traffic stop. Officer Bennett also 
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stated he had encountered many vehicles with windows tinted too darkly 

during his ten years of experience as a police officer. The court convicted 

Appellant of two counts of operating an unsafe vehicle and imposed a fine in 

the total amount of $50.00 plus costs. On December 23, 2015, Appellant 

filed a motion to reconsider the December 17th judgment of sentence. 

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 13, 2016. The 

court denied Appellant’s December 23rd motion to reconsider on January 15, 

2016. Appellant filed a Superior Court Criminal Docketing Statement and 

attached a document entitled “Issue(s) to be Raised” on February 2, 2016. 

On February 10, 2016, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). On March 4, 2016, Appellant filed in this Court a pro se Rule 

1925(b) statement, which differed from Appellant’s “Issue(s) to be Raised.” 

Appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement in the trial court on April 

13, 2016.2

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

IN FINDING THAT THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD 

REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP...APPELLANT AND 

PROBABLE CAUSE TO CITE APPELLANT FOR A VIOLATION 

OF 75 PA.C.S.A. § 4107(B)(2)?

____________________________________________

2 Nothing in the record indicates Appellant served a copy of her March 4, 

2016 and April 13, 2016 Rule 1925(b) statements on the trial court and the 

Commonwealth. 
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WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND 

APPELLANT GUILTY OF 75 PA.C.S.A. § 4107(B)(2) BASED 

ON AN ALLEGED WINDOW TINT VIOLATION?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

In her first issue, Appellant claims the Commonwealth did not 

demonstrate Officer Bennett had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s 

vehicle for illegal window tint. Appellant avers the Commonwealth offered 

inadequate testimony concerning Officer Bennett’s background to justify his 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant contends the 

Commonwealth should have presented additional evidence to establish 

Officer Bennett’s experience and/or training in inspecting vehicles and 

investigating vehicle equipment violations. 

In her second issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient at 

the summary appeal trial to support the court’s convictions. Appellant 

maintains her vehicle had a valid inspection sticker at the time of the traffic 

stop, which should have provided a presumption that her vehicle complied 

with inspection requirements. Appellant submits Officer Bennett testified he 

could see through the windows of Appellant’s vehicle; Officer Bennett stated 

he saw Appellant’s silhouette through the vehicle windows. Appellant also 

asserts her vehicle is exempt from window tint regulation because the 

regulation applies to vehicles made in 1998 or later and Appellant’s vehicle 

was made in 1993. Appellant alleges she has owned her vehicle for sixteen 

years, and the tint was on the windows when she bought it. Appellant 
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concludes this Court should reverse the convictions. We disagree with 

Appellant’s contentions. 

With respect to a sufficiency claim:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 

2003)). 

“Traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity 

or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 

6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory purpose.” Commonwealth v. 

Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 650, 

25 A.3d 327 (2011). “Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle 
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stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose 

relevant to the suspected violation.” Id. “Where a vehicle stop has no 

investigatory purpose, the police officer must have probable cause to 

support it.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 482 (2014). “Probable cause is made 

out when the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the 

officer at the time of the [stop], and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 

information, are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 203, 985, A.2d 928, 931 

(2009). “Probable cause does not require certainty, but rather exists when 

criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely 

inference.” Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa.Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 672. 868 A.2d 1198 (2005). 

As a preliminary matter, however, we observe that to preserve claims 

for appellate review, “appellants must comply whenever the trial court 

orders them to file a Statement of [Errors] Complained of on Appeal 

pursuant to [Rule] 1925. [As a general rule, a]ny issues not raised in a 

[Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. 

Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 403, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 420, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998)). 

Likewise, an appellant’s concise statement must identify the errors to be 
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addressed on appeal with sufficient specificity. Commonwealth v. 

Dowling, 778 A.2d 683 (Pa.Super. 2001). A Rule 1925(b) statement that is 

too vague for the trial court to identify and address the issue(s) the 

appellant wishes to raise on appeal can result also in waiver. 

Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 

591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 956 (2007). 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1925(b) provides in 

relevant part:

Rule 1925. Opinions in Support of Order

* * *

(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained 

of on appeal; instructions to the appellant and the 

trial court.—If the judge entering the order giving rise to 

the notice of appeal (“judge”) desires clarification of the 

errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an 

order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial 

court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the 

errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”). 

(1) Filing and service.−Appellant shall file of record the 

Statement and concurrently shall serve the judge. Filing of

record and service on the judge shall be in person or by 

mail as provided in Pa.R.A.P. 121(a) and shall be complete 

on mailing if appellant obtains a United States Postal 

Service Form 3817, Certificate of Mailing, or other similar 

United States Postal Service form from which the date of 

deposit can be verified in compliance with the 

requirements set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1112(c). Service on 

parties shall be concurrent with filing and shall be by any 

means of service specified under Pa.R.A.P. 121(c).

(2) Time for filing and service.−The judge shall allow the 

appellant at least 21 days from the date of the order’s 

entry on the docket for the filing and service of the 
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Statement. Upon application of the appellant and for good 

cause shown, the judge may enlarge the time period 

initially specified or permit an amended or supplemental 

Statement to be filed. Good cause includes, but is not 

limited to, delay in the production of a transcript necessary 

to develop the Statement so long as the delay is not 

attributable to a lack of diligence in ordering or paying for 

such transcript by the party or counsel on appeal. In 

extraordinary circumstances, the judge may allow for the 

filing of a Statement or amended or supplemental 

Statement nunc pro tunc.

(3) Contents of order.—The judge’s order directing the 

filing and service of a Statement shall specify:

(i) the number of days after the date of entry of 

the judge’s order within which the appellant must file 

and serve the Statement;

(ii) that the Statement shall be filed of record;

(iii) that the Statement shall be served on the 

judge pursuant to paragraph (b)(1);

(iv) that any issue not properly included in the 

Statement timely filed and served pursuant to 

subdivision (b) shall be deemed waived. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1)-(3). For many years, full compliance with a court’s 

Rule 1925(b) order was strictly mandatory; but later revisions in the rule 

now provide certain avenues for relief from waiver in the criminal appeal 

context. Pa.R.A.P 1925(c); Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.2d 270, 272 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (enumerating extraordinary circumstances, such as where 

counsel fails to file court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, which would 

warrant remand for filing of statement, based upon per se ineffectiveness of 

counsel). See also Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 986 A.2d 1241, 1244 n.4 
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(Pa.Super. 2009) (noting counsel’s failure to file court-ordered Rule 

1925(b) statement requires remand for filing of concise statement nunc pro 

tunc under revised Rule 1925(c)(3)); Commonwealth v. Scott, 952 A.2d 

1190, 1192 (Pa.Super. 2008) (recognizing relaxed strict application of Lord

under recent amendment to Rule 1925 and stating “the complete failure by 

counsel to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, as ordered, is presumptively 

prejudicial and clear ineffectiveness”). Additionally, this Court may address 

the merits of a criminal appeal where the appellant failed to file a timely 

Rule 1925(b) statement, if the trial court had adequate opportunity and 

chose to prepare an opinion addressing the issues raised on appeal. See 

generally Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (addressing post-amendment Rule 1925 and ramifications regarding 

untimely Rule 1925(b) statement). 

Instantly, Appellant did and continues to proceed pro se in this 

summary case. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 13, 

2016. On February 2, 2016, Appellant filed her Superior Court Criminal 

Docketing Statement and attached a document entitled “Issue(s) to be 

Raised.” The court ordered Appellant on February 10, 2016, to file of record 

and serve on the judge and the Commonwealth a Rule 1925(b) statement 

within twenty-one days. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(i)-(iii). The court’s order 

also stated that any issue not raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement would be 

deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv). Thus, the court’s order 
J-S62043-16

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triggered Appellant’s obligation to file her statement of record and serve it 

on the trial court and the Commonwealth by March 2, 2016. See id. On 

Friday, March 4, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se Rule 1925(b) statement in 

this Court that differed from the Superior Court Criminal Docketing 

Statement and attached “Issue(s) to be Raised” she had previously filed. 

Appellant later filed another Rule 1925(b) statement in the trial court on 

April 13, 2016. Nothing in the record indicates Appellant served a copy of 

either Rule 1925(b) statement on the trial court and the Commonwealth. 

Moreover, Appellant appeared pro se throughout her summary case, so she 

alone was responsible for filing her court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement in 

a timely manner. Appellant failed to comply with the Rule 1925(b) order. 

Therefore, she waived her issues on appeal. 

Even if Appellant had properly preserved her issues, we would deny 

relief based on the opinion of the Honorable Lawrence F. Clark, Jr., who was 

only able to refer to Appellant’s Superior Court Criminal Docketing 

Statement and attached “Issue(s) to be Raised.” (See Trial Court Opinion, 

filed April 21, 2016, at 1-2, 4-6) (finding: as prefatory matter, Appellant 

waived issues on appeal because Appellant’s “Issue(s) to be Raised” in her 

docketing statement lacked specificity and failed to comply with Rule 

1925(b); to extent Appellant appears to challenge reasonable 

suspicion/sufficiency of evidence, Officer Bennett testified credibly; Officer 

Bennett stated he encountered many vehicles with windows tinted too darkly 
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during his ten years as police officer; Officer Bennett stated that before he 

stopped Appellant’s vehicle, he observed window tint on Appellant’s vehicle 

was well below regulatory 70% light transmittance threshold; after Officer 

Bennett pulled Appellant over, Appellant refused to permit Officer Bennett to 

test her vehicle window tint; Officer Bennett estimated window tint to permit 

between 20% and 50% light transmittance; Officer Bennett issued citation 

to Appellant under Section 4107(b)(2) of Motor Vehicle Code for violations of 

67 Pa.Code 175.263(a) and (b); Appellant testified she had attempted to 

obtain exemption for her vehicle window tint from PennDOT for last four 

years, which indicated she was aware her vehicle window tint was illegal; 

officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant and evidence was 

sufficient to convict her of violating Section 4107(b)(2) of Motor Vehicle 

Code). Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2016
1 

I This Court notes that Defendant's Issues To be Raised is attached to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania Criminal 

Docketing Statement filed February 2, 2016. Defendant's Issues To be.Raised was filed before this Court's 1925(b) 

Order which was filed on February 10, 2016. 

1. PennDOT refused to issue medical waiver as allowed in§ 4524(e). 

2. Police are to be following § 4524(e) for tint violations as shown is [sic] (2) separate 

DUI/Drug related arrestis) from York Co. PA before Superior Court. 

3. PennDOT may not issue inspection sticker to ANY vehicle in violation as specificed in 

§4727(b). 

4. Inspection code still has tint. 

5. My vehicle is grandfathered in per PennDOT bulletin(s). 

6. In Commonwealth v. Brubaker it was stated regulation is being incorrectly applied as a 

safety standard and is unreasonable interpretation of 4524(e)(l). 

7. Officer did not have enough reasonable suspcion [sic]. 

8. Tint meters not regulated in statute. 

as follows1: 

The basis for the appeal has been expressed by the Defendant in an "Issue(s) To be Raised:" 

of two counts of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). 

this Court's Order following a hearing held on December 17, 2015, finding the Defendant guilty 

In this summary appeal· case, Junell Rae Wright (hereinafter "Defendant") appeals from 

CLARK, SJ., April 2l5t, 2016. 

IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 

JUNELL RAE WRIGHT, 

Appellant/Defendant 

vs. : NO. 165-SA-2015 

Appellee 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DAUPi.HIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

Circulated 10/06/2016 04:20 PM
2 

2 Defendant's Issues To be Raised filed February 2, 2016 attached to Superior Court of Pennsylvania Criminal 

Docketing Statement. 

3 Officer Bennett has been deployed as a police officer for ten years. 

4 Transcript of Proceedings, 3,4 Summary Appeal Hearing, December 17, 2015 (hereinafter "N.T. _") 

175.263 under two sections (a) and (b ), one for being the doors and one for being the rear window 

vehicle were all tinted. Id. at 6. As such, Officer Bennett ~barged her for violation of Pa. Code § 

67 Pa. Code§ I 75.263 (a) and (b) testifying that the front door, rear door, and rear windows of the 

I 

percent. Id. Officer Bennett issued a citation for unlawful activities Section 4701(b)(2) using the 

Bennett testified that, in his estimation, the window tint was somewhere between 20 and 50 

testified that it was clear to him that the window tint was well below the 70 percent and Officer 

police officer, he has experienced many vehicles that were tinted too darkly. Id .. Officer Bennett 

conduct a tint test on the windows. Id. Officer Bennett testified that during his ten years as a 

5. The Defendant refused to put the window up or any of the windows down so the Officer could 

. ,, 

refused to allow the Officer to use a TMl 00 tint meter to test the percentage of the windows. Id at 

testified that the Defendant was aware that her window tinting was illegal and that the Defendant 

the 70 percent that's required by the inspection regulation, title 67." Id at 4: Officer Bennett 

passed his vehicle, he took notice that her window tinting on her Plymouth Duster was "well below 

Lingle Avenue, Derry Township, Dauphin County.4 Officer Bennett testified that as the Defendant 

Township Police Department3 conducted a traffic stop on the Defendant in the 300 block of North 

On June 18, 2015, Officer Robert Bennett (''Officer Bennett"), employed by the Derry 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

Appellate Procedure 1925(a). 

This opinion in support of the judgment of sentence is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

9. FMVSS 205 is a manufacture standard. It is for driver and occupant safety not police safety 

or outside visibility.2 
3 

5 The Defendant represented herself pro se at the summary appeal hearing. 

6 The Defendant also attempted to ask questions about a "nonconorming tint waiver," and PennDOT's regulatory 

reviews. See N.T. 7-9. 

on appeal." Id. Further, the Superior Court may find a waiver where a concise statement is too 

be specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues an appellant wishes to raise 

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (citation omitted). "[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must 

to be addressed on appeal." Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410,415 (Pa. Super.2011), appeal 

It is well-established that "Appellant's concise statement must properly specify the error 

DISCUSSION 

have one." Id. at 14. 

told me you've been fighting with PennDOT for four years to get an exemption, and you don't 

bought it. Id. at 13, 14. However, the Court responded that' "it doesn't conform because you just 

grandfathered in because her vehicle is from 1993 and that her vehicle has been tinted before she 

says there's no such thing." Id. at 13. Finally, the Defendant testified that she should have been 

And when asked again if she has a certificate for exemption, she answers "PennDOT absolutely 

instead states "I've applied. Been fighting with them [PennDOT] for years over this." Id. at 12,13. 

asked whether the Defendant had a certificate for exemption, she clearly evades the answer and 

(b) and how she should have been issued a certificate for exemption. Id. at 11. However, when 

being a PennDOT problem with PennDOT failing to comply with Section 4524(e)(3)(iii)(a) and 

The Defendant elected to testify on her own behalf. · Defendant began testifying about this 

Id. at 8. 

Bennett testified that he knew that her windows were dark enough when her vehicle passed his. 

that Officer Bennett did not have a reasonable suspicion to pull her over. 6 Id. at 8. However, Officer 

of her vehicle. Id. On cross-examine, the Defendant, 5 attempted to elicit from Officer Bennett 
4 

7 This Court believes that Defendant's argument can best be described as set forth in her 61" issue to be raised and is 

stated as follows: "In Commonwealth v. Brubaker it was stated regulation is being incorrectly applied as a safety 

standard and is unreasonable interpretation of 4524(e)(l)." 

8 This Court notes that Houch was a non-precedential decision. However, Superior Court Internal Operating 

Procedures, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 65.37 (A) provides that "[a]n unpublished memorandum decision shall not be relied 

upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or proceeding, except that such a memorandum decision may 

be relied upon or cited (1) when it is relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judiciata, or collateral 

estoppel." As such, this Court finds the reasoning set forth in Houch' to be persuasive. 

and are stated below8: 

Commonwealth v. Houck, 2016 WL 379561, No. 489 WDA 2015 (Super. 2016) are persuasive 

Defendant here was charged with violating Section 4107(b)(2). The reasons as set forth in 

inapposite as the appellant in Brubaker was charged with violating Section 4524(e)(l) while the 

v. Brubaker, 5 A.2d 261 (Pa.Super.2010). However, Defendant's reliance on Brubaker is wholly 

guilty of Section 4107(b )(2). The Defendant in the instant matter, relies heavily on Commonwealth 

Defendant argues that the Commonwealth does not meet its burden of showing that Defendant is 

Defendant should be found guilty of two counts of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2)7. In essence, the 

If, however, this Honorable Court finds that Defendant's issues to be raised were sufficient, 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, at 415 (Pa.Super.2011). 

appeal in this matter by failing to identify any specific issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4); 

that he had with the trial court. Therefore, Appellant has waived any issues she may have had on 

to identify any specific issues on appeal. Instead, Defendant proceeds to 'list' numerous problems 

In the instant matter, the pro se Defendant has raised a number boilerplate claims that fail 

on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all." Id. at 686-87. 

omitted). A Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised 

meaningful review." Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super.2001) (citation 

vague. Id. "When a comi has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for 
5 

9 This Court found Officer Bennett's testimony to be credible. 

statute. As such, the officer charged the Defendant under Section 4107 of the Vehicle Code as 

Defendant's Plymouth Duster to be well-below the 70 percent that is required by the vehicle 

In the instant matter, Officer Bennett testified" that he noticed the window tinting on 

Here, section 4524(e)(l) is more specific than section 4107(b)(2). The 

former regulates window tint "which does not permit a person to see or view 

the inside of the vehicle through the windshield." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(l). 

Contrarily, section 4107(b)(2) regulates all types of equipment violations. 

Indeed, because of the broad application of section 4107(b)(2), it contains 

elements outside of the more specific section 4524(e)(l), and a violation of 

section 4107(b )(2) does not necessarily involve a violation of section 

4524(e)(l). See Brubaker, 5 A.2d at 264-65 (stating that "the language of 

[section 4524(e)(I)] does not prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle 

which possesses sun screening material that 'reduces the transmittance of 

light below 70%. '"), Indeed, the Commonwealth can prove an equipment 

violation if it shows a window tint that does perinit a person to see or view 

the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, but does not meet the light 

transmittal requirements of Table X. See id. at 265 (stating that "[ section 

4524(e)(l)] also does not prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle 

which possesses sun screening material that reduces the transmittance oflight 

to below a standard to be determined and published by PennDOT."). 

therefore, we conclude that, because the general statute at section 4107(b )(2) 

is not encompassed by the more specific statute at section 4524(e)(l), there 

is no bar against the Commonwealth pursuing, Houck under the general 

statute at section 4107(b )(2). 

Our holding in Brubaker does not inure to Houck's benefit, as the 

appellant in Brubaker, unlike Houck in the instant case, was not charged with 

violating section 4107(b )(2). Rather, the appellant in Brubaker was charged 

under section 4524(e)(l), which does not prohibit a person from driving a 

· motor vehicle which possesses sun screening material that reduces 

transmittance of light to below any particular standard. Brukaer, 5 A.3d at 

264-65. Indeed, the court in Brubaker seemingly suggested that, given the 

officer's ability to see into the appellant's vehicle, the proper charge would 

have been under section 175.67{d)(4), which specifically references Table X 

and its specific requirements for light transmittance. See Brubaker; 5 A.2d 

at 264. Unlike the appellant in Brubaker, Houck was charged with violating 

section 4107(b )(2), which prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle 

in violation of PennDOT regulations, including the 70% light transmittance 

standard referenced in section 175.67(d)(4) and Table X. As such, Brubaker 

is inapposite. 
6 

10 The Officer has been a police officer for ten years and has been involved with numerous instances where window 

were tinted too darkly. 

11 Defendant argues that PennDOT should have issued her an exemption and that because they did not, she should 

not have been found guilty. However, this Court notes that if Defendant has a problem with the issuance of an 

exemption from PennDOT, this is not the proper jurisdiction to bring this matter. 

Defendant is guilty of violating Section 4107(b)(2) of the vehicle code. 

transmittal requirements, and the Defendant herself knew her window tinting was illegal, the 

I 

exemption from PennDOT for the last four years.11 As Defendant's vehicle did not meet the light 

herself even admitted that she was aware that her windows were illegal as she was trying to get an 

testified that he estimated the window tint to be between 20 and 50 percent. And the Defendant 

to test the window tint, the Officer issued a citation under Section 4107(b )(2). The Officer!" clearly 

her windows tested. Instead of impounding the vehicle and causing major inconvenience in order 

known as "sun screening"). Officer continued to pull her over and the Defendant refused to have 

was stopped by an Officer who observed that her windows were equipped with window tint (also 

of Section 4107(b )(2)), Defendant, in the instant matter is faced with a similar situation. Defendant 

I 

regulations." Just like the scenario in Houck (whereas the befendant was charged with violation 

under department regulations or when the driver is in violation of department regulations or the 

vehicle or combination is otherwise in an unsafe condition or in violation of department 

Commonwealth any vehicle or combination which is not equipped as required under this part of 

person to "operate, or cause or permit another person to operate, on any highway in this 

opposed to the more stringent Section 4524. Section 4107(b)(2) provides that is unlawful for any 
L 7 

Distribution: 

Stephen Mcclendon, Esquire- District Attorney's Office 

Joseph Cardinale, Esquire- District Attorney's Office 

Junell Rae Wright 

Jttdges' Csam..aen; UegaJ.:1-Klsmiek 

Court Administration - Deb FreemaThd}) 

Court Administration - Bobby Sissock 

Honorable Lawrence F. Clark, Sr.~ 

-Judges' Chambers-Megan KlemiclGff 

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...... -; --, 

N (f' -J 

ISSUED AT HARRISBURG, the date first above written. 

Defendant guilty of Section 4107 of the vehicle code was properly entered. 

For the foregoing reasons, it is believed that our December 17 i 2015 Order finding the