Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John J. Schwarz, II

Schwarz Law Office, PC

Hudson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William A. Ramsey

Barrett McNagny, LLP

Edmund P. Kos

David M. Mustard

Kos & Associates

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Harold David Walters,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Lima Elevator Company, Inc.,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 26, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

44A03-1609-CC-2214

Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable J. Scott 

VanDerbeck

Trial Court Cause No.

44C01-1604-CC-52

May, Judge.
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[1] Harold David Walters (“Walters”) appeals the trial court’s grant of Lima 

Elevator Company’s (“Lima”) motion to correct error. He argues the trial court 

erred when it determined it had specific personal jurisdiction over him. We 

affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 26, 2016, Lima filed a claim against Walters, a resident of Michigan, 

in LaGrange Circuit Court for non-payment of a purchase made on April 30, 

2010. On June 17, 2016, Walters filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. On June 20, 2016, the trial court granted Walters’ motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

[3] On July 18, 2016, Lima filed a motion to correct error, alleging the court erred 

when it granted Walters’ motion to dismiss because the facts underlying 

Walters’ motion were unsupported by affidavit or verified pleading. Based 

thereon, Lima claimed Walters failed to meet his burden to prove lack of 

personal jurisdiction.1

 Walters responded on August 10, 2016, and on August 

30, 2016, the trial court granted Lima’s motion to correct error, concluding it 

had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters.

 

1 Lima also argued the court’s order was premature because Lima had not been given an opportunity to 

respond to Walters’ motion. 
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Discussion and Decision

[4] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to correct error.2

Volunteers of Am. v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2001). We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse 

of discretion occurs if the decision was against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before the court or if the court misapplied the law. Id.

[5] Our review of a trial court’s decision regarding personal jurisdiction is wellsettled:

“Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power to bring a person into 

its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment over a 

person.” Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002). “The existence of personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant is a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid 

judgment, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Anthem Ins. Cos. v. Tenet Healthcare 

Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1237 (Ind. 2000). “Because Indiana 

state trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction, jurisdiction is 

presumed. Therefore, the plaintiff need not allege jurisdiction in 

its complaint.” Id. at 1231 (footnote [o]mitted). “[O]nce the 

party contesting jurisdiction, usually the defendant, challenges 

the lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present 

evidence to show that there is personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant. However, the defendant bears the burden of proving 

the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 

 

2 The court’s order is a final judgment under Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(H)(4), which states a 

judgment is a final judgment if “it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion to Correct Error 

which was timely filed under Trial Rule 59.” Our court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments

under Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(A).
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evidence, unless the lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of 

the complaint.” Id. “It is within the trial court’s sound discretion 

to decide the jurisdictional facts.” Brockman, 779 N.E.2d at 1255. 

“A trial court’s findings of jurisdictional facts are generally 

reviewed for clear error. Once the court has decided those facts, 

however, whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of 

law. We review a trial court’s determination of personal 

jurisdiction de novo.” Id. (citations omitted).

Keesling v. Winstead, 858 N.E.2d 996, 1000-1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[6] Here, the trial court found Walters “purposefully availed himself of the 

privilege of conducting business with Lima Elevator within Indiana, such that 

he could reasonably anticipate defending a lawsuit in Indiana related to his 

failure to pay for his credit purchases that he picked up from Lima Elevator in 

Indiana.” (App. Vol. II at 7.) Based on that finding, the trial court concluded it 

had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters in Lima’s claim against him. 

[7] Regarding the determination of specific personal jurisdiction, our Indiana 

Supreme Court has explained

specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related 

to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 

[Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,]

414 & n. 8, 104 S. Ct. 1868 [(1984)]. Specific jurisdiction 

requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state so that 

the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court there. 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S. Ct. 

2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A single contact with the forum 

state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a 

defendant, if it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum 
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state and the suit is related to that connection. McGee v. Int’l Life 

Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). 

But a defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction “solely as a 

result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the 

unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Burger 

King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868; 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 

1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 

(1980)).

LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006). Walters contends 

the trial court did not have specific personal jurisdiction over him because the 

transaction from which Lima’s claim arose was not sufficiently substantial to 

satisfy the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction. We disagree.

[8] To support his argument, Walters contends:

Lima has sued Walters for non-payment of money. The entirety 

of Walters’ contact with Indiana, as to the 2010 transaction with 

Lima was a) ordering seed from an Indiana company and b) 

crossing into Indiana to pick up the seed. Lima is not suing 

Walters for ordering the seed. Nor is it suing Walters for picking 

up the seed. Lima is suing Walters alleging the non-payment of 

money for the seed he received.

(Reply Br. of Appellant at 9.) We are hard pressed to conclude anything other 

than that Walters has described facts to support the exact opposite of what he 

purports to argue. His argument provides facts to satisfy the contacts required 

for specific personal jurisdiction. Lima’s suit against Walters alleges he did not 
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pay for seed he ordered from an Indiana business and picked up in Indiana. 

Further, the record indicates this is the third such order Walters made with 

Lima. There is no doubt Walters availed himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in Indiana such that he could anticipate being sued in Indiana. 

Walters consented to Indiana courts having specific personal jurisdiction when 

he ordered seed from an Indiana company and traveled to Indiana to pick up 

the seed. See Attaway v. Omega, 903 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (specific 

personal jurisdiction proven in case involving non-payment for a vehicle sold by 

Indiana plaintiff to Idaho defendant, even when Indiana plaintiff traveled to 

Idaho to deliver vehicle), reh’g denied. 

[9] Once we determine the trial court’s conclusion regarding specific personal 

jurisdiction is correct, due process requires the assertion of personal jurisdiction 

“does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Boyer 

v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). To determine this requirement, we 

must balance five factors:

(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest in 

adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 

convenience and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in 

furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).

[10] Here, the balance falls squarely in favor of the trial court’s determination of 

specific personal jurisdiction. Regarding the burden to Walters, Lima directs us 
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to the fact Walters lives less than twenty miles from the courthouse and to the 

fact it was not an imposition for Walters to come into Indiana to pick up the 

seed for which he allegedly did not pay. As we held in Attaway, a case in which 

we affirmed the trial court’s decision to assert personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant in Idaho:

[I]t is certainly within the bounds of fair play and substantial 

justice to allow Indiana to exercise personal jurisdiction over 

individuals who have entered into a contract with an Indiana 

resident for the purchase of property in Indiana, have removed 

that property from the state of Indiana, and then rescinded 

payment.

903 N.E.2d at 79. The trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over 

Walters and it therefore did not abuse its discretion when it granted Lima’s 

motion to correct error.

Conclusion

[11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Lima’s motion to 

correct error because it had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters. We 

affirm and remand for further proceedings.

[12] Affirmed and remanded.

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.