NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0395n.06

No. 20-6098

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STELLA DULANEY; DAVID FOWLER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FLEX FILMS (USA), INC.; AUDI CHATURVADI; 

VIJAY YADAV,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Stella Dulaney and David Fowler sued 

their former employer, Defendant Flex Films, Inc., and two of its employees, Defendants Audi 

Chaturvadi and Vijay Yadav, alleging discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted 

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor, and we AFFIRM. 

I.

Defendant Flex Films manufactures flexible polyester packaging films for a wide range of 

consumer products. Based in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, it is the only American subsidiary of the 

UFLEX group, an India-based corporation that operates polyester packaging-film manufacturing 

facilities around the world. Plaintiff David Fowler worked at Flex Films as its Chief Marketing 

Officer from May 20, 2016, until his employment was terminated on April 5, 2017. Plaintiff Stella 

Dulaney worked at Flex Films as Field Services Manager from February 1, 2016, until her 

employment was terminated on February 7, 2017. At all times relevant to this appeal, Defendant 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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AnantShree “Audi” Chaturvadi was the Vice Chairman of Flex Films and Defendant Vijay Yadav 

was the Head of Business. Both are men of Indian descent.

Fowler was interviewed and hired by Chaturvadi. According to Chaturvadi, he had to “do 

a lot of convincing” to get corporate in India to hire Fowler because Fowler had “changed a lot of 

jobs” in the prior 10 years. R. 22-5, PID. 284–85. As Chief Marketing Officer, Fowler was 

responsible for managing certain sales accounts and a team of four salespersons. He reported to 

Chaturvadi.

According to Flex Films, Fowler’s employment was terminated for two reasons. The first 

was for violating company policy by giving unapproved price discounts (in the form of rebates 

and price reductions) to two clients, which Flex Films says caused an unexpected $223,000 loss 

of profit. 

Second, Flex Films cites Fowler’s and his team’s repeated failure to meet monthly sales 

goals. Fowler and the four members of his team were each assigned target sales goals. Flex Films 

management tracked Fowler’s team’s progress toward their goals and provided Fowler with both 

an in-progress and a final monthly report. On March 2, 2017, after Fowler’s team hit only 76.62% 

of its February sales goal, Chaturvadi sent Fowler an email informing him that his failure to 

improve his team’s sales numbers was a “troubling trend” and that Fowler needed to “push [his] 

team further as discussed.” R. 22-4, PID. 277. On March 20, 2017, Deepak Chopra, the Manager 

of Sales and Marketing, circulated an in-progress report to Fowler and management showing 

Fowler’s team had hit only 29.87% of its March goal as of that date. Chaturvedi replied in an 

email to Fowler the same day, saying, “Dave, [w]e can’t really be planning to close the month on 

less than 50 percent of the product target . . . [p]lease push and let’s get close to the target this 

month[.]” R. 22-4, PID. 278. Fowler’s team finished at 56.34% of its March sales goal; Tanvir 
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Singh hit 1.67% of his goal, Joe Hearne 46.60% of his goal, Vikrant Khurana 80.51% of his goal, 

and Fowler himself 0% of his goal (zero tons sold out of a goal of twenty). Fowler admitted in his 

deposition that the performance of everyone except Khurana was unsatisfactory.

On April 5, 2017, Chaturvadi terminated Fowler’s employment. Chaturvadi cites Fowler’s 

unauthorized pricing changes, which Chaturvadi described as a “blatant disregard of . . . protocol” 

that cost Flex Films $223,000, and Fowler’s team’s failure to meet sales targets a single time 

“despite multiple follow-ups from [Chaturvadi].” R. 22-5, PID. 287–93. According to Chaturvadi, 

Fowler “wasn’t really managing” his team, there was “very little communication” between Fowler 

and members of his team, and when issues did arise, Fowler “would not take ownership of the 

situation, but instead point to his team and put th[at] salesperson under scrutiny.” Id. at 288. After 

Fowler’s employment was terminated, his duties and accounts were assigned to other existing 

employees. He was not replaced.

As Field Services Manager, Plaintiff Stella Dulaney was tasked with supervising the 

Research and Development Department. She was hired by Dr. Steve Sargeant, then the Director 

of Research and Development. Dulaney attended community college for a year and a half but 

never obtained a degree. Sargeant testified that he hired Dulaney because it was “not possible to 

hire people with all the skills you want” in Elizabethtown, and he “switched to the mode of hiring 

people with relevant experience that were intelligent and [that he] could train.” R. 31-1, PID. 

1486. While Dulaney was working at Flex Films, she began taking community-college courses 

again. According to Sargeant, while she was under his leadership she was “doing very well[.]” R. 

31-1, PID. 1481. Sargeant does acknowledge, however, that in at least one instance—the “Soft 

Touch – Dec 7, 2016 Run at Dunmore” report—he had to rewrite one of Dulaney’s reports because

Yadav asked a series of questions about the report and Dulaney was not able to provide the 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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requisite level of technical detail desired by Yadav. In an email, Dulaney admitted that her 

“responsibilities and background do not include the technical depth that [Yadav] is requiring on 

[the Soft Touch – Dec 7, 2016 Run at Dunmore report].” R. 23-7, PID. 722.

In January 2017, Flex Films’ Research and Development Department underwent an 

internal restructuring at the recommendation of Sargeant. The department was effectively split in 

two, with Sargeant taking over Research and Development and a new hire, Deepak Mehta, 

overseeing the new “Technical Services Department.” Under the restructuring, Dulaney’s position 

was moved from Sargeant’s chain of command to Mehta’s. According to Defendants, at the time 

Dulaney was moved to Mehta’s supervision, plans were already underway to eliminate the Field 

Services Manager position in favor of a new, higher-level position called “Application Engineer,” 

which would require at least a “BA/BS in Chemical, Polymer, Plastics Engineering,” along with 

other scientific-education requirements.

On February 7, 2017, Dulaney’s position was eliminated and Dulaney’s employment was 

terminated. According to Chaturvadi, Dulaney’s position was eliminated because “it was not 

providing the value that it needed to provide[.]” R. 23-8, PID. 771. According to Yadav, Dulaney 

was not kept on because “[d]espite management’s efforts to train and educate Dulaney . . . her 

performance demonstrated a lack of technical education, technical understanding, and 

technical/scientific proficiency.” R. 23-4, PID. 660. Defendants cite Dulaney’s performance on 

the “Soft Touch – Dec 7, 2016 Run at Dunmore” report as evidence that she did not have the 

technical background necessary for the new position. Since Dulaney was fired, her former duties 

are either “not being done” because there is “no focus anymore” on her prior responsibilities, or 

have been picked up by Sargeant and other existing employees. R. 31-1, PID. 1484. Defendants 

began external advertising for the new Application Engineer position online in March 2017.
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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According to Fowler and Dulaney, the reasons cited by Flex Films for their respective 

terminations do not tell the whole story. They say that Flex Films’ management favored Indian 

nationals and American citizens of Indian descent over Caucasian Americans, and sought to 

replace Caucasian-American employees with employees of Indian descent. As evidence, Fowler

testified that during a managers’ meeting sometime between May and September 2016, Chaturvadi 

told those present, “[i]f you guys can’t get this plant in line, we will fire everybody and replace 

them with Indians.” Sargeant recalled being part of a meeting where Chaturvedi said “something 

like that,” but could not recall if Chaturvedi said “with Indians.” R. 31-1, PID 1485. 

Plaintiffs also cite a January 13, 2017 Facebook chat message Dulaney received from John 

Phillips, Flex Films’ Human Resources Manager, whose employment had recently been 

terminated. Phillips wrote:

Vijay [Yadav] was very uncomfortable with my level of push back and challenging 

relative to employee safety concerns and the behavior of Indian leaders. So, I know 

how Vijay [Yadav] felt, but what has shocked me is that Audi [Chaturvadi] did not 

engage me at all and just totally went with whatever Vijay [Yadav] told him. I don’t 

know why they would tell folks not to speak to me. I left professionally, not with 

any emotion. I’m sure it just part of Vijay [Yadav]’s hidden agenda. Anyway, 

definitely for the best. I’m [sic] feel bad for the Americans that remain. Vijay 

[Yadav]’s agenda is absolutely about protecting the Indians right or wrong and once 

Audi [Chaturvadi] turns a blind eye, Americans will get tortured and push [sic] out 

in a big way. I was the only one challenging that behavior which is why I was 

terminated. Very disappointed that Audi did not speak with me. My challenges to 

Vijay [Yadav] were all about Audi’s agenda for the culture of the site. . . . You’re 

definitely on his radar, it’s just a matter of time. You should look for opportunities

to help Deepak [Mehta] and see if he’s receptive to utilizing your skills, but 

simultaneously you should be evaluating external opportunities. Unless Deepak 

[Mehta] truly becomes your advocate, Vijay will have you terminated, probably 

before the summer. And there is no one to advocate your case to Audi [Chaturvadi]. 

That’s why I had to go. . . . That’s all posturing. That’s Vijay doesn’t want him 

there, that’s why Deepak’s skill set is so high. He’s being positioned. If he could 

remove Steve [Sargeant] and Dave [Fowler] tomorrow he would. Both of them are 

senior enough to know this is true. It’s all political gamesmanship now. I can’t 

comment about Steve’s [Sargeant] trust, but I can say that he’s much more 

concerned and focused on his own future, than yours. Major accounts being moved 

(Dave) [Fowler], Deepak’s selection (Steve) [Sargeant], it’s all petty chess moves. 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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The environment at Flex will be volatile and borderline hostile in 2017. Again, 

that’s why I had to be the first to go. It’s all very clear to me. If folks have their 

eyes open, my termination sends a clear signal.

R. 32-1, PID. 1633–37.1 Plaintiffs never deposed Phillips because he was “not cooperative,” 

though they admitted he was “not unavailable” for a deposition. R. 44, PID. 1708. Sargeant also 

heard from Phillips that Yadav “was out to get five people[,]” two of whom were Dulaney and 

Fowler, but said he never heard Yadav say anything to that effect directly. R. 31-1, PID. 1482–

83. Additionally, Sargeant testified that he had heard “many people,” including Yadav, make 

generally demeaning remarks about Americans, including that “American people don’t work very 

hard, or they are stupid, or they don’t listen.” R. 31-1, PID. 1481.2 He also said he had “heard . . 

. on several occasions” that Indian nationals were given healthcare at no additional cost while 

American employees had to pay part of their healthcare costs, R. 31-1, PID. 1489, and that some 

Indian nationals were not asked to move to Elizabethtown when they accepted their jobs. Plaintiffs 

provided no additional evidence of either assertion, however.

According to Dulaney, Flex Films’ management also disfavored women. Dulaney testified 

that she was told by Sargeant during a meeting that there were no women in management positions 

at UFLEX globally prior to the opening of the Elizabethtown location, and that the company only 

1 Phillips’s Facebook chat message was entered into the record as a series of screenshots. 

It appears that portions of the message were cut off from the screenshots, causing some 

discontinuity in the quoted text.

The district court declined to consider Phillips’s message or his conversation with Sargeant 

about Yadav’s purported “hidden agenda” because both statements are hearsay and Plaintiffs did 

not argue below that the statements fall into a hearsay exception. Because Plaintiffs abandoned 

their discrimination claims and Phillips’s statements are not relevant to the prima facie analysis of 

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, we need not address whether the district court erred in excluding 

Phillips’s statements.

2 We note that, like Phillips’s Facebook chat message, the anti-Caucasian American

statements attributed to Chaturvadi and Yadav are not relevant to the prima facie analysis of 

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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had five women in management. Dulaney complained to Sargeant during her time at Flex Films

that Yadav, when reviewing her work product, was “harassing [her], nitpicking everything [she] 

did again, [and that] nothing was ever good enough.” R. 23-3, PID. 544. Dulaney testified that 

she told Sargeant that she believed she was being picked on by Yadav because she was non-Indian 

and a woman. Sargeant told her to talk to Phillips, who was still Human Resources manager at the 

time. Dulaney testified that in December 2016, she complained to Phillips that Yadav was 

“harassing” her, but she could not “recall if [she] specifically bought up sex, race, or nationality” 

in those conversations. R. 23-3, PID. 549. Phillips told Dulaney that she should “take the time 

over the holidays to think about if [she] wanted to continue on with the company.” R. 23-3, PID. 

550. Sargeant also spoke with Phillips about Dulaney. Sargeant told Phillips that Dulaney felt the 

environment was “very uncomfortable for her” and a “hostile work environment” but Sargeant 

could not recall whether he told Phillips that Dulaney was being harassed or discriminated against 

on the basis of her sex, race, or national origin. R. 31-1, PID. 1492. Sargeant also “passed 

complaints” from Dulaney up to Flex Films’ former CEO, Pradeep Tyle, “a few times,” before he 

left in mid-2016. R. 31-1, PID. 1483. On January 31, 2017, Dulaney forwarded an email chain to 

Peggy Salmon, a Human Resources Generalist, that Dulaney believed showed that Yadav was 

“trying to humiliate [her] infront [sic] of fellow employees.” R. 23-7, PID. 762. In the email 

chain, Yadav said that he was “miffed” that Dulaney had (earlier in the email chain) been 

“dubious[ly]” praised by (eventual co-Plaintiff) Andrea Harshfield for bringing to light a consumer 

error that the consumer had self-reported to Dulaney. Id. at 758–59. Dulaney met with Salmon 

the same day but could not remember if she brought up her complaints that Yadav was 

discriminating against her based on her sex, race, or national origin. 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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On July 14, 2017, Fowler, Dulaney, and another recently terminated employee, Andrea 

Harshfield, filed this action against Flex Films, Yadav, and Chaturvadi. Plaintiffs alleged four 

claims: (I) unlawful discrimination under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 344.040; (II) retaliation 

under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 344.280; (III) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and (IV) wage discrimination under Kentucky Revised Statutes

§ 337.423. Harshfield was the sole plaintiff in Counts III and IV, and those counts were dismissed 

when Harshfield settled and voluntarily dismissed her claims with prejudice. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine 

issue of fact on their discrimination and retaliation claims. After oral argument, the district court 

granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both claims. The district court first found 

that Phillips’s Facebook message and conversation with Sargeant about Yadav’s “hidden agenda” 

were hearsay and declined to consider them. Then the district court found that Plaintiffs had 

abandoned their discrimination claims because instead of responding to the discretediscriminatory-act arguments Defendants made in their motion for summary judgment addressing 

Count I, Plaintiffs attempted to recharacterize Count I of their complaint to have been asserting 

hostile-work-environment claims instead of discrete-discriminatory-act claims. The district court

further determined that Fowler’s retaliation claim failed because he never engaged in protected 

activity and Dulaney’s failed because she presented no evidence that Chaturvadi, Mehta, and 

Yadav, the decisionmakers who terminated her employment, were aware of her protected activity.

This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. M.J. ex rel. S.J. 

v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436, 445 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A.

Count I of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged discrimination under a discrete-discriminatory-act 

theory. Specifically, Fowler and Dulaney alleged that their employment was terminated because

they are Caucasian and American, and Dulaney’s also because she is female. They cited their 

respective terminations as the adverse employment action taken against them. Defendants filed a 

motion for summary judgment addressing these claims. Instead of responding to Defendants’ 

arguments that Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under a discretediscriminatory-act theory, Plaintiffs argued that they had made out viable hostile-workenvironment claims. The district court declined to address Plaintiffs’ new hostile-workenvironment claims, since they were not alleged in the Complaint, and it declined to address the 

merits of Plaintiffs’ discrete-discriminatory-act claims because Plaintiffs failed to address them in 

their opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in dismissing their discretediscriminatory-act claims because their opposition to the motion for summary judgment cited facts 

that supported their discrete-discriminatory-act claims, even if they did not provide any argument 

as to how those facts supported their discrete-discriminatory-act claims. Appellants’ Br. at 24–25.

The district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ discrete-discriminatory-act claims. The district court held that Plaintiffs abandoned 

their discrete-discriminatory-act claims when they failed to discuss them in their opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Our precedents support a finding of abandonment in 

those circumstances. See Nathan v. Great Lakes Water Auth., 992 F.3d 557, 564 n.1 (6th Cir. 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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2021) (plaintiff abandoned Title VII claims not discussed in opposition to motion for summary 

judgment or on appeal); Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (“This 

Court’s jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned 

a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.”); Lisan 

v. Wilkie, 835 F. App’x 831, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2020); Alexander v. Carter ex rel. Byrd, 733 F. 

App’x 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2018); Nowlin v. Nova Nordisk Inc., No. 17-5507, 2018 WL 1805141, at 

*3 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2018) (order); Haddad v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 610 F. App’x 

567, 568 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll., 449 F. App’x 484, 487 

(6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

B.

In their opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that 

they had created a genuine issue of fact on their hostile-work-environment claims. Instead of

asking to amend their complaint, Plaintiffs proceeded as if their complaint alleged hostile-workenvironment claims. The district court found that the Complaint alleged no such claim, and 

declined to entertain them.

Count I of the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs “were discriminated against in their 

employment on the basis of” protected characteristics, and that “Defendants took unlawful adverse 

employment actions against Plaintiffs based on their national origin by terminating their 

employment and replacing them with H1-B visa Indian nationals.” R. 1-1, PID. 13 (Compl. ¶ 53–

55). Count II alleges retaliation. Nowhere does the Complaint mention a hostile work 

environment or allude to a claim based on a hostile work environment. Discrete-discriminatoryact and hostile-work-environment claims are both species of discrimination claims, but they are 

“different in kind.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). They are
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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different theories with different elements, and alleging one is not enough to put a defendant on 

notice that it must defend against the other. See, e.g., Taylor v. Donahoe, 452 F. App’x 614, 620 

(6th Cir. 2011) (finding allegations of discrete acts of discrimination insufficient to allege a hostilework-environment claim); see also Schramm v. Slater, 105 F. App’x 34, 40 (6th Cir. 2004) 

(“Disparate treatment and hostile work environment arguments both allege violation of Title VII 

rights. However, a disparate treatment argument is analytically distinct from a hostile work 

environment argument—the tests for the two theories of liability have different elements—thus 

indicating that [p]laintiff’s hostile work environment argument was not sufficient to preserve the 

disparate treatment argument before this Court.”). Because Plaintiffs never moved to amend their

complaint and a party cannot allege a new claim in response to a motion for summary judgment, 

the district court did not err in declining to address Plaintiffs’ new hostile-work-environment 

claims. See Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 

2005).

C.

Count II alleges that Flex Films terminated Plaintiffs’ employment in retaliation for 

complaining about discriminatory treatment. The district court dismissed Fowler’s retaliation 

claim because he never engaged in protected activity and dismissed Dulaney’s claim because she 

failed to present evidence that the relevant decisionmakers—Yadav, Chaturvadi, and Mehta—

were aware of her protected activity when they eliminated her position.

Section 344.280(1) of the KCRA makes it unlawful “for a person, or for two (2) or more 

persons to conspire . . . [t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has 

opposed a practice declared unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a 

complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or 
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hearing[.]” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.280(1). Retaliation claims under the KCRA are evaluated 

under the same standards as Title VII retaliation claims. Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 

428, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). A Title VII retaliation claim can be established “either by introducing 

direct evidence of retaliation or by proffering circumstantial evidence that would support an

inference of retaliation.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)). In the absence of direct 

evidence, 

[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee 

must establish that (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer 

knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was 

subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 

Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). If the employee makes out a 

prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a 

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its actions. Id. If the employer satisfies this burden, the 

employee must then demonstrate that the employer’s proffered nonretaliatory reason for its actions 

was in fact only pretext for retaliatory conduct. Id. 

Neither Fowler nor Dulaney provided direct evidence of retaliation, so each must make out 

a prima facie case of retaliation based on circumstantial evidence. Fowler admitted during his 

deposition that he never complained to management about discriminatory treatment, thus 

conceding that he never engaged in protected activity, which his counsel acknowledged at oral 

argument before the district court. Fowler’s retaliation claim therefore fails at the first step and 

was appropriately dismissed. See id. 

Defendants do not contest that Dulaney engaged in protected activity or that her 

employment was terminated. Accordingly, only the second and fourth elements of her prima facie 

retaliation claim are at issue. The district court found that Dulaney could not satisfy the second 
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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element because there was no evidence that Chaturvadi, Yadav, or Mehta—the relevant 

decisionmakers—knew about Dulaney’s protected activity when they terminated her employment. 

Dulaney contends that was error because she followed company policy in reporting her sex, race, 

and national-origin-discrimination complaints to her supervisor, Sargeant.3 Appellants’ Br. at 31.

But Defendants deny knowledge of Dulaney’s protected activity, and Dulaney never 

provided evidence that Sargeant or Phillips (or anyone else) ever relayed her complaints about sex, 

race, or national-origin discrimination to Chaturvadi, Yadav, or Mehta. Dulaney could have 

deposed Phillips to learn whether he discussed her complaints with any of the decisionmakers, but 

she did not do so. And though there are some situations where a decisionmaker’s knowledge of 

protected activity can be inferred from the circumstances, see Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 

552–53 (6th Cir. 2002), Dulaney failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 

circumstances here give rise to an inference that any of the decisionmakers knew about her 

protected activity. See Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff failed 

to satisfy the second element of prima facie retaliation claim even though plaintiff followed 

company policy in complaining about harassment to her supervisor because there was no evidence 

that the relevant decisionmaker was aware of her complaint at the time of adverse action); see also 

Evans v. Pro. Transp., Inc., 614 F. App’x 297, 301 (6th Cir. 2015) (general corporate knowledge 

of protected activity is not enough; plaintiff’s claim failed because there was no evidence that the

relevant decisionmaker had knowledge of protected activity); Frazier v. USF Holland, Inc., 250 

F. App’x 142, 148 (6th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment was proper because decisionmaker who 

3 Dulaney also complained to Chaturvadi, Phillips, and Salmon directly about Yadav being 

critical of her, but Dulaney could not recall whether she ever told them that she believed Yadav

was discriminating against her because of her race, sex, or national origin.
Case No. 20-6098, Dulaney v. Flex Films, Inc.

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terminated plaintiff’s employment had no knowledge of plaintiff’s prior discrimination claim). 

Accordingly, Dulaney cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation and Defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment on her retaliation claim.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.