Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1119 | January 30, 2019 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR 

APPELLANT/FATHER

Kyle K. Dugger

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR 

APPELLANT/MOTHER

Karen E. Wrenbeck

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of Ay.H., Ar.H., and C.B. 

(Minor Children);

S.B. (Father) and R.H. (Mother), 

Appellants-Respondents, 

v. 

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-1119 

Appeal from the Monroe Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

53C07-1701-JT-43 

53C07-1701-JT-44 

53C07-1701-JT-45 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1119 | January 30, 2019 Page 2 of 12

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] R.H. (“Mother”) and S.B. (“Father”) each appeal the termination of the parentchild relationship with their child C.B. (“C.B.”). Mother also appeals the 

termination of the parent-child relationships with her older children Ay.H. 

(“Ay.H.”) and Ar.H. (“Ar.H.”). Both parents claim that there is insufficient 

evidence to support the terminations. Specifically, both parents argue that the 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the 

home will not be remedied; and (2) termination of the parent-child relationship 

is in the children’s best interests. Father also argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it denied his motion to continue the termination hearing. 

Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s 

motion to continue the termination hearing and that there is sufficient evidence 

to support the termination of the parent-child relationships, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Father’s motion to continue the termination hearing.
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2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 

termination of the parent-child relationships.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Mother is the parent of 

twin daughters Ay.H. and Ar.H., who were born in 2008 and son C.B., who 

was born in 2010.1 Father is the parent of C.B. Father was incarcerated in 

2012 following his convictions for felony burglary and theft. 

[4] In September 2015, Mother failed to pick up the children after school. School 

officials were unable to reach her so they contacted DCS. When a DCS case 

worker spoke with Mother by telephone the following day, the case worker 

advised Mother that her children had been placed in foster care. Mother, who

was in the psychiatric unit at a Bloomington hospital, was very emotional on 

the phone. Mother explained that she “had had what she called a mental 

breakdown due to [] being homeless and reported that she needed to use 

marijuana in order to calm down . . . .” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 16). Mother also 

admitted that she used marijuana regularly. 

[5] DCS filed a petition alleging that Ay.H., Ar.H., and C.B. were children in need 

of services (“CHINS”). In November 2015, the trial court adjudicated the 

children to be CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the trial court 

ordered Mother to: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all 

 

1 The father of Ay.H. and Ar.H. is deceased.
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recommendations with 95% compliance; (2) complete a psychological 

evaluation and follow all recommendations with 95% compliance; (3) 

participate in individual therapy and follow all recommendations with 95% 

compliance; (4) keep her home clean and appropriate; (5) submit to weekly

drug screens; and (6) attend all scheduled supervised visits with her children. 

The trial court ordered Father to complete similar services “[u]pon his release 

from prison.” (Ex. 48). 

[6] In January 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights. The trial court scheduled the termination hearing for April 

2017. After at least twelve continuances attributable to the parties’ requests, the 

trial court’s own motions, the trial court’s grant of Mother’s change of judge 

motion, and other reasons, the termination hearing was scheduled for March 

2018. One week before the scheduled hearing, Father filed a motion for 

another continuance, which the trial court denied. The day of the hearing, 

Father renewed his request for a continuance, but the trial court again denied 

the motion. 

[7] Testimony at the March 2018 termination hearing revealed that, at the time of 

the hearing, Mother was unemployed and lacked stable housing. During the 

course of the CHINS proceeding, Mother had lived with different family 

members and friends in different cities and states. Mother testified that she was 

still using marijuana and planned to do so “until [marijuana] gets legal.” (Tr. 

Vol. 1 at 110). According to Mother, marijuana would “eventually get 

legalized in every state.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 110). In addition, Mother had not 
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participated in any of the court-ordered therapeutic services or visited with her 

children during the year before the hearing.

[8] Regarding Father, the testimony at the 2018 hearing revealed that he had been 

incarcerated since 2012. Further, in 2017, Father had received three prison 

violations. Specifically, in January 2017, Father had had a positive drug test 

and had lost ninety days of credit time. In May 2017, Father had received a 

violation for unauthorized possession and destruction relating to batteries, and 

in July 2017, Father had been removed from a substance abuse treatment 

program following another violation. A July 2017 Department of Correction 

(“DOC”) record provides that Father’s “motivation was poor” and that he had 

“struggled with understanding the rules and developing the willingness to leave 

the criminal lifestyle.” (Ex. Vol. 4 at 217). At the March 2018 hearing, Father 

testified that he would be released from the DOC between June and November 

2018; however, the DOC’s Offender Locator provides that his release date is in 

March 2019. See https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs (last visited 

01/10/2019).

[9] Also at the hearing, DCS Family Case Manager Katie Bostic (“FCM Bostic”) 

testified that the children had been removed from Mother because of her 

housing instability and drug use. FCM Bostic explained that Mother’s housing

instability had not been remedied and that Mother was living in a hotel at the 

time of the hearing and was unemployed. In addition, FCM Bostic testified

that Mother’s drug use had not been remedied as demonstrated by Mother’s 

failure to complete substance abuse treatment and her continued use of 
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marijuana. Regarding Father, the case manager testified that Father had not 

been fully compliant with DOC’s programs as demonstrated by his three recent 

violations within the prior year. In addition, FCM Bostic pointed out that C.B. 

had been only two years old when Father had been sent to DOC, which was six 

years prior to the hearing, and that foster mother had provided more care for 

C.B. than Father had. 

[10] FCM Bostic asked the trial court to terminate the parental rights of both parents 

“so that the permanency plan could be achieved for these children.” (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 10). According to FCM Bostic, the foster parent planned to adopt the three

children, and the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights 

would provide consistency and stability for them and would be in their best 

interests. Lastly, court-appointed special advocate Lester Wadzinski (“CASA 

Wadzinski”) also testified that termination was in the children’s best interests. 

Specifically, CASA Wadzinski explained that, “It’s just hard on the kids[,] and 

they are in a good place with [foster mother].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21, 28).

[11] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating the parental 

relationships between Mother and Ay.H., Ar.H., and C.B. In addition, the trial 

court terminated the parental relationship between Father and C.B. Each 

parent separately appeals the terminations.
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Decision

1. Denial of Father’s Motion to Continue the Termination Hearing

[12] Father first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to continue the termination hearing. Generally, the decision to grant or 

deny a motion to continue is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 

we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. In re J.E., 45 N.E.3d 1243, 1246 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s conclusion is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court or the reasonable and probable deductions to be 

drawn therefrom. Id. When a motion to continue has been denied, an abuse of 

discretion will be found if the moving party has demonstrated that there was 

good cause for granting the motion and that he was prejudiced by the denial.

Id.

[13] Here, Father argues that he has demonstrated the requisite good cause and 

prejudice because the “denial of [his] motion to continue resulted in the loss of 

his parental rights.” (Father’s Br. at 11). We agree with DCS that the 

gravamen of this argument is that Father “wanted more time to show he was a 

fit parent.” (DCS’s Br. at 19). However, our review of the evidence first reveals 

that the termination hearing had already been continued at least twelve times 

from its initially scheduled date of April 2017. Father therefore had an 

additional year to show his fitness as a parent. Despite this opportunity, Father 

continued to use drugs and break rules while incarcerated. He was also 

removed from a substance abuse program, and a DOC record noted that, even 
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after serving six years in the DOC, Father “struggled with understanding the 

rules and developing the willingness to leave the criminal lifestyle.” (Ex. Vol. 4 

at 217). Based upon these facts and circumstances, Father has failed to 

demonstrate both that there was good cause for granting the motion and that he 

was prejudiced by the denial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Father’s motion to continue the termination hearing. 

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Terminations

[14] Both parents argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination 

of their parental rights. The traditional right of parents to establish a home and 

raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a 

termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper 

where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. 

Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely 

because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be 

terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental 

responsibilities. Id.

[15] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 

1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[16] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh 

the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 

628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the 

trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

[17] Mother and Father both argue that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not 
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be remedied.

2

 In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s 

removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a 

two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify 

the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include 

parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, 

failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. 

A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), 

trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by 

DCS and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether 

conditions will be remedied. Id. 

[18] Here, our review of the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom that support the judgment reveals that the children were removed 

 

[1] 2 Father also argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationships poses a threat to the children’s well-being. However, because INDIANA CODE § 31-

35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, DCS is required to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

only one of the three requirements of subsection (B). In re A.K., 924 N.E.3d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), 

trans. dismissed. We therefore discuss only whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the children’s removal or the reasons for their placement outside the home will not be remedied.
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from Mother because of unstable housing and Mother’s drug use. C.B. could 

not be placed with Father because Father was incarcerated for several felonies. 

At the time of the termination hearing, Mother did not have stable housing and 

was unemployed. In addition, she continued to use marijuana and did not 

participate in any of the court-ordered therapeutic services or visited with her 

children during the year before the hearing. In 2017, after being incarcerated 

for five years, Father was still failing to comply with prison regulations. 

Specifically, Father had a positive drug test, received a violation for 

unauthorized possession and destruction relating to batteries, and was removed 

from a substance abuse treatment program. These violations caused Father to 

lose accrued credit time that would have led to an earlier release from the DOC.

This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal would not 

be remedied. We find no error. 

[19] Next, Mother and Father both argue that there is insufficient evidence that the 

termination was in the children’s best interests. In determining whether 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is 

required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the 

parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened. In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002), trans. denied. “A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate 
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housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the 

same will support a finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship is 

contrary to the child’s best interest.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 203 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000). Further, the testimony of the service providers may support a 

finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. McBride v. Monroe Cty. 

Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[20] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Mother and Father have 

historically been unable to provide housing, stability, and supervision for their 

children and were unable to provide the same at the time of the termination 

hearing. In addition, FCM Bostic and CASA Wadzinski both testified that 

termination was in the children’s best interests. The testimony of these service 

providers, as well as the other evidence previously discussed, supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interests.

[21] We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 

1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial 

court. 

[22] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.