alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, David K. Spohr, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Futures Strategic Trust for the period April 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Quarterly Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  
|------------------
|/s/ David K. Spohr
|David K. Spohr    

Date: August 14, 2007
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

5 

KA 10-02295 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BILLIE JO WEBSTER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

JAMES L. DOWSEY, III, ELLICOTTVILLE (KELIANN M. ELNISKI OF COUNSEL),

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

LORI PETTIT RIEMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LITTLE VALLEY (KELLY M. BALCOM

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M.

Himelein, J.), rendered September 13, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of attempted forgery in the second

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment

of County Court convicting her upon her guilty plea of attempted

forgery in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 170.10). In appeal

No. 2, defendant appeals from a judgment of the same court revoking

her sentence of probation for a misdemeanor charge to which she

previously had pleaded guilty and resentencing her to one year in

jail. Defendant’s plea in appeal No. 1 necessarily constituted an

admission that she violated the terms and conditions of her probation

in appeal No. 2. 

Defendant’s primary contention in each appeal is that she did not

receive the sentence promised by the court and thus that her pleas in

both appeals were not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently

entered. Although that contention survives defendant’s valid waiver

of the right to appeal entered in connection with the plea in appeal

No. 1 and thus in connection with the plea in appeal No. 2, defendant

failed to preserve that contention for our review by moving to

withdraw her pleas or to vacate the judgments of conviction (see

People v Montanez, 89 AD3d 1409). We decline to exercise our power to

review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of

justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Defendant’s contention that she

received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed

to move to vacate the judgments is based on matters outside the record
-2- 5 

KA 10-02295 

and therefore is not reviewable on direct appeal (see People v

Rodriguez, 59 AD3d 173, 173-174, lv denied 12 NY3d 858). Contrary to

defendant’s further contention, the sentence imposed with respect to

both appeals is legal, and her challenge to the severity of the

sentence in each appeal is foreclosed by her valid waiver of the right

to appeal (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256). 

Entered: January 31, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
# EUR-Lex - 32001R2380 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R2380

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 2380/2001 of 5 December 2001 concerning the 10 year authorisation of an additive in feedingstuffs (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 321 , 06/12/2001 P. 0018 - 0019 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2380/2001

of 5 December 2001

concerning the 10 year authorisation of an additive in feedingstuffs

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 70/524/EEC of 23 November 1970 concerning additives in feedingstuffs(1), as last amended by Directive 2001/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), and in particular Article 4 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 2(aaa) of Directive 70/524/EEC requires authorisations for coccidiostats to be linked to the person responsible for putting them into circulation.

(2) Article 9 of Directive 70/524/EEC provides that a substance may be authorised if all conditions laid down in Article 3a of that Directive are met.

(3) The assessment of the dossier submitted shows that the coccidiostat described in the Annex satisfies all the requirements of Article 3a of Directive 70/524/EEC, when used for the animal category and under the conditions described in the Annex to this Regulation: the substance should therefore be authorised under those conditions.

(4) Article 9b of Directive 70/524/EEC provides that the authorisations of such substances shall be given for a period of 10 years from the date on which the final authorisation takes effect.

(5) The assessment of the dossier shows that certain procedures may be required to protect workers from exposure to the additives. Such protection should however be assured by the application of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work(3).

(6) The Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition has delivered a favourable opinion with regard to the safety and with regard to the favourable effect on animal production of the coccidiostat under the conditions described in the said Annex.

(7) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee for Feedingstuffs,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The additive belonging to the "Coccidiostats and other medicinal substances" listed in the Annex to the present Regulation is authorised for use as additive in animal nutrition under the conditions laid down in that Annex.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 15 December 2001.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 December 2001.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 270, 14.12.1970, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p. 55.

(3) OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1.

ANNEX

">TABLE>"
# EUR-Lex - 32002R1174 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002R1174

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1174/2002 of 28 June 2002 fixing the maximum subsidy on exports of husked long grain rice to Réunion pursuant to the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2011/2001 **

*
Official Journal L 170 , 29/06/2002 P. 0067 - 0067 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1174/2002

of 28 June 2002

fixing the maximum subsidy on exports of husked long grain rice to Réunion pursuant to the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2011/2001

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 of 22 December 1995 on the common organisation of the market in rice(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 411/2002(2), and in particular Article 10(1) thereof,

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 of 6 September 1989 laying down detailed rules for exports of rice to Réunion(3) as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1453/1999(4), and in particular Article 9(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2011/2001(5) opens an invitation to tender for the subsidy on rice exported to Réunion.

(2) Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 allows the Commission to fix, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 3072/95 and on the basis of the tenders submitted, a maximum subsidy.

(3) The criteria laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 2692/89 should be taken into account when fixing this maximum subsidy. Successful tenderers shall be those whose bids are at or below the level of the maximum subsidy.

(4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Cereals,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

A maximum subsidy on exports to Réunion of husked long grain rice falling within CN code 1006 20 98 is hereby set on the basis of the tenders lodged from 24 to 27 June 2002 at 319,00 EUR/t pursuant to the invitation to tender referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2011/2001.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 29 June 2002.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 28 June 2002.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 329, 30.12.1995, p. 18.

(2) OJ L 62, 5.3.2002, p. 27.

(3) OJ L 261, 7.9.1989, p. 8.

(4) OJ L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 19.

(5) OJ L 272, 13.10.2001, p. 21.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-12163

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00008-RWS-JCF-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff–Appellee,

 versus

SERGIO LUIS HILARIO-CANA, 

 Defendant–Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(October 7, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 19-12163 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 1 of 3 
2

Sergio Hilario-Cana appeals his sentence of eight months of imprisonment 

for unlawfully reentering the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Hilario-Cana 

challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. After the parties 

submitted their briefs, the Bureau of Prisons released Hilario-Cana from custody.

We dismiss Hilario-Cana’s appeal as moot.

We consider sua sponte whether Hilario-Cana’s appeal is moot. “[B]ecause

the question of mootness is jurisdictional in nature, it may be raised by the court 

sua sponte, regardless of whether the district court considered it or if the parties 

briefed the issue.” Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1331–32 

(11th Cir. 2005). We review de novo the issue of mootness. Id. at 1331.

The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to actual cases and 

controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. An appeal becomes moot when it no 

longer presents a “live” controversy or a ruling on the issues would have no 

practical significance. See Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th 

Cir. 2002). “[P]ut another way, a case is moot when it no longer presents a live 

controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Id.

(quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. 

Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2000)). In such a circumstance, 

“dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional.” Id. (quoting Al Najjar v. 

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Case: 19-12163 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 2 of 3 
3

Hilario-Cana’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence is 

moot. “In criminal cases, . . . a defendant wishing to continue his appeal after the 

expiration of his sentence must suffer some ‘continuing injury’ or ‘collateral 

consequence’ sufficient to satisfy Article III.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 

U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1998)). HilarioCana’s only argument on appeal is that his sentence of imprisonment for eight 

months is substantively unreasonable, but he has already served that sentence of 

imprisonment. So we can provide Hilario-Cana no meaningful relief and his appeal 

is moot.

We DISMISS Hilario-Cana’s appeal.

Case: 19-12163 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 3 of 3
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 660 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 660

  To amend section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, to allow the 
      President not to make an annual budget resolution until all 
       appropriations for the preceding fiscal year are enacted.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 2, 2015

Mr. Perlmutter introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                        Committee on the Budget

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, to allow the 
      President not to make an annual budget resolution until all 
       appropriations for the preceding fiscal year are enacted.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PRESIDENT'S BUDGET SUBMISSION.

    Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: ``If, on 
the later date specified in this section, there is in effect an Act 
making or continuing appropriations for part of the current fiscal year 
for any of the annual regular appropriations bills, then the President 
may delay the submission of the budget for the following fiscal year 
until full-year appropriations for the current fiscal year are enacted 
for such bill.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Timothy Allen FOXWORTH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harvey CLAY, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6996

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Timothy Allen Foxworth, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-lee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Allen Foxworth seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). *285When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Foxworth has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Gurley E. GLENN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METECH RECYCLING, INC.; Mike McMorrow, Chief Financial Officer; Andrew McManus, Chief Executive Officer, Creedmoor, N. C. Facility, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1920

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 17, 2017

Decided: October 19, 2017

Gurley E. Glenn, Appellant Pro Se. Patricia Lee Holland, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-lees.

Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gurley E. Glenn seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as moot the two postjudgment motions he filed after the district court dismissed his employment discrimination action. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P, 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on June 22, 2017. The notice of appeal was filed on July 31, 2017. Because Glenn failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the *266appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Olandio Ray WORKMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DIRECTOR GREENVILLE COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, Respondent-Appellee, and State of South Carolina; Greenville County Courthouse 13th; John Vandermosten, Assistant Administrative Director; Mr. Bodiford, Deputy Director, Respondents.

No. 17-6951

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Olandio Ray Workman, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Olandio Ray Workman, a state pretrial detainee, seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief without prejudice on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is • debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Workman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Workman’s motion to dismiss the indictment, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Dated:  March 29, 2007                                                                            In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:By: /s/     E. Todd Whittemore                                                                Title:Executive Vice President, Master ServicingAurora Loan Services LLC,   as Master ServicerI, E. Todd Whittemore, certify that:1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-8  (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");2.  Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.  Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;4.  I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and5.  All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.E. Todd Whittemore**Exhibit 31 : Sarbanes-Oxley Certification**Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as CustodianDeutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Sub-Contractor for IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.First American Real Estate Solutions of Texas, L.P., as Sub-Contractor for Aurora Loan Services LLCIndyMac Bank, F.S.B., as ServicerLaSalle Bank National Association, as CustodianNewport Management Corporation, as Sub-Contractor for Aurora Loan Services LLCNewport Management Corporation, as Sub-Contractor for IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Paying Agent and CustodianWells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Custodian