14-3151 

Jiang v. Lynch 

BIA 

A200 729 952

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

9th day of December , two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

PETER W. HALL, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

JUNRAN JIANG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 14-3151 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Xin Miao, Flushing, N.Y. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto 

H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director; 

Nancy N. Safavi, Trial Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Junran Jiang, a native and citizen of China, 

seeks review of an August 1, 2014 decision of the BIA denying 

his motion to reopen. In re Junran Jiang, No. A200 729 952 

(B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse 

of discretion, and review any findings regarding changed 

country conditions for substantial evidence. Jian Hui Shao v. 

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). An alien may move 

to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This 

time limitation does not apply if Jiang established changed 

country conditions in China by submitting material evidence 

that was not available at his previous hearing. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 

 There is no dispute that Jiang’s motion to reopen was 

untimely by approximately four years, and so he needed to 
3

present reliable evidence of changed country conditions to 

support his claim that the Chinese government will persecute 

him for practicing Christianity. 

 Jiang argues that the BIA failed to attribute proper weight 

to the country reports in the record. However, the BIA 

discussed and cited these reports, finding that they 

demonstrated that the Chinese government “continues to allow 

the practice of Christianity, although there have been some 

reports of the detention of some leaders of underground, or 

‘house,’ churches and harassment of some church members.” A 

review of the three reports in the record confirm the BIA’s 

finding, and the BIA was not compelled to conclude that this 

evidence reflected a change in conditions material to Jiang’s 

claimed fear of harm. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 171. 

 Although Jiang states that conditions have worsened and 

relies on a 2010 country report, this report was not made part 

of the record. As it is Jiang’s burden to present evidence 

supporting his motion, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(c)(1), he cannot fault the BIA for not considering a 

report that was never submitted for its review. 

Jiang also argues that the BIA erred by attributing 
4

diminished weight to documents submitted in support of his 

motion. In particular, the BIA discounted the letter and 

documents from Jiang’s friend, Hai Yu, because the letter was 

created for this litigation and was from an interested witness 

not subject to cross-examination, and the documents were not 

authenticated in any manner. The BIA also considered the 

underlying adverse credibility determination in Jiang’s 

underlying proceedings. The BIA acted well within its 

discretion. See H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 

(B.I.A. 2010) (according diminished weight to letters from the 

alien’s friends because they were interested witnesses not 

subject to cross-examination and the letters were created for 

the purpose of litigation), remanded on other grounds by Hui 

Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). Although the 

agency may err in rejecting a government document solely based 

on a failure to authenticate it under the regulations, see Cao 

He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 404-05 (2d Cir. 

2005), it does not err where, as here, it discounts documentary 

evidence for failure to authenticate by any means and there are 

“legitimate concerns” about the applicant’s credibility, see

Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). 
5

 Jiang also argues that the BIA did not provide “any 

independent consideration” of his CAT claim. The BIA, however, 

explicitly denied CAT relief because Jiang’s evidence was 

insufficient to establish his prima facie eligibility for CAT 

relief. Jiang’s claim is, therefore, meritless. See also 

Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk