13452 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2021–0002] 

New Car Assessment Program 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Request for comments (RFC). 

SUMMARY: NHTSA’s New Car 

Assessment Program (NCAP) provides 

comparative information on the safety 

performance of new vehicles to assist 

consumers with vehicle purchasing 

decisions and to encourage safety 

improvements. In addition to star 

ratings for crash protection and rollover 

resistance, the NCAP program 

recommends particular advanced driver 

assistance systems (ADAS) technologies 

and identifies the vehicles in the 

marketplace that offer the systems that 

pass NCAP performance test criteria for 

those systems. This notice proposes 

significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by 

proposing to add four more ADAS 

technologies to those NHTSA currently 

recommends. The new technologies are 

blind spot detection, blind spot 

intervention, lane keeping support, and 

pedestrian automatic emergency 

braking. Other plans on updating NCAP 

are discussed in the Supplementary 

Information. 

DATES: Comments should be submitted 

no later than May 9, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to 

the docket number above and be 

submitted by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Portal: https:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday 

through Friday, except Federal 

Holidays. 

• Instructions: For detailed 

instructions on submitting comments, 

see the Public Participation heading of 

the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section 

of this document. Note that all 

comments received will be posted 

without change to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

• Privacy Act: Anyone can search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received in any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

comment (or signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78) or at https://

www.transportation.gov/privacy. For 

access to the docket to read background 

documents or comments received, go to 

https://www.regulations.gov or the street 

address listed above. Follow the online 

instructions for accessing the dockets. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical issues, you may contact Ms. 

Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New 

Car Assessment Program, Office of 

Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: 

202–366–1810). For legal issues, you 

may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office 

of Chief Counsel (Telephone: 202–366– 

2992). You may send mail to either of 

these officials at the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New 

Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

notice also proposes changes (including 

an increase in stringency) to the test 

procedures and performance criteria for 

the four currently recommended ADAS 

technologies in NCAP to enable 

enhanced evaluation of their 

capabilities in current vehicle models 

and to harmonize with other consumer 

information programs. Second, this 

notice describes (but does not propose 

at this time) how NHTSA could rate 

vehicles equipped with these ADAS 

technologies and requests comment on 

how best to develop this rating system. 

Third, NHTSA seeks (but does not 

propose at this time) to provide a crash 

avoidance rating at the point of sale on 

a vehicle’s window sticker, consistent 

with the 2015 Fixing America’s Surface 

Transportation (FAST) Act, and 

discusses ways of implementing the 

program, including a potential process 

for updating such information. Fourth, 

as part of a new NHTSA approach to 

NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a 

‘‘roadmap’’ of the Agency’s plans to 

upgrade NCAP in phases over the next 

several years and presents the roadmap 

for comment. Fifth, as another first for 

NCAP, NHTSA is considering utilizing 

NCAP to raise consumer awareness of 

certain safety technologies that may 

have the potential to help people make 

safe driving choices. This information 

may be of particular interest to parents 

or other caregivers shopping for a 

vehicle for a new or inexperienced 

driver in the household, or parents 

wanting to know more about rear seat 

alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and 

finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA’s 

ideas for updating several programmatic 

aspects of NCAP to improve the 

program. The proposal on ADAS 

technologies and the aforementioned 

initiatives pave the way for the Agency 

to focus on a much broader safety 

strategy, including fulfilling not only 

the 2015 FAST Act directive but also 

the recent mandates included in Section 

24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law, enacted as the 

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, 

to improve road safety for motor vehicle 

occupants as well as other vulnerable 

road users. 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Background 

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program 

A. Lane Keeping Technologies 

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning 

(LDW) 

a. Haptic Alerts 

b. False Positive Tests 

c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications 

2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS) 

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies 

1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW) 

a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test 

Conditions 

b. Test Procedure Harmonization 

2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI) 

C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic 

Emergency Braking (PAEB) 

D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention 

Technologies 

1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) 

2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) 

a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS) 

b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) 

c. Current State of AEB Technology 

d. NHTSA’s CIB Characterization Study 

e. Updates to NCAP’s CIB Testing 

f. Updates to NCAP’s DBS Testing 

g. Updates to NCAP’s FCW Testing 

h. Regenerative Braking 

3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in 

Response to 2015 RFC Notice 

a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) 

Effective Time-to-Collision 

b. False Positive Test Scenarios 

c. Procedure Clarifications 

d. Expand Testing 

e. AEB Strikeable Target 

IV. ADAS Rating System 

A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to 

Consumers 

1. Star Rating System 

2. Medals Rating System 

3. Points-Based Rating System 

4. Incorporating Baseline Risk 

B. ADAS Rating System Concepts 

1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and 

Nomenclature 

2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet— 

Concept 1 

3. Select Test Conditions to Meet—Concept 

2 

4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on 

Real-World Data—Concept 3 

5. Overall Rating 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13453 

1Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ‘‘A Compilation of 

Motor Vehicle Crash Data.’’ U.S. Department of 

Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

2Traffic Safety Facts 2000 ‘‘A Compilation of 

Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality 

Analysis Reporting System and the General 

Estimates System.’’ U.S. Department of 

Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

3National Center for Statistics and Analysis. 

(2021, October), Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle 

Traffic Fatalities for the First Half (January–June) of 

2021. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 813 

199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

4See https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020- 

fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalitiesduring-pandemic. 

5 (Pub. L. 117–58). 

6 Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in 

the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 

(Dec. 16, 2015). This is the notice that will be 

finalized once the final decision notice for today’s 

RFC is published. 

7This notice refers to the advanced crash 

avoidance technologies as Advanced Driver 

Assistance Systems (ADAS) technologies. 

V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window 

Sticker) 

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP 

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies 

for Safe Driving Choices 

A. Driver Monitoring Systems 

B. Driver Distraction 

C. Alcohol Detection 

D. Seat Belt Interlocks 

E. Intelligent Speed Assist 

F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist 

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System 

A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept 

B. Baseline Risk Concept 

C. Half-Star Ratings 

D. Decimal Ratings 

E. Rollover Resistance Test 

IX. Other Activities 

A. Programmatic Challenges With SelfReported Data 

B. Website Updates 

C. Database Changes 

X. Economic Analysis 

XI. Public Participation 

XII. Appendices 

I. Executive Summary 

NHTSA’s New Car Assessment 

Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA’s 

mission to reduce the number of 

fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S. 

roadways. NCAP, like many other 

NHTSA programs, has contributed to 

significant reductions in motor vehicle 

fatalities. In the decade prior to the 1978 

start of NCAP, fatalities from motor 

vehicle crashes exceeded 50,000 

annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still 

lost their lives on U.S. roads. Passenger 

vehicle occupant fatalities decreased 

from 32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.1

This reduction is notable, particularly in 

light of the fact that the total number of 

vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. 

has increased over time. However, 

during that same timeframe, pedestrian 

fatalities increased by 33 percent, from 

4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.2

Furthermore, a statistical projection of 

traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021 

shows that an estimated 20,160 people 

died in motor vehicle traffic crashes— 

the highest number of fatalities during 

the first half of the year since 2006, and 

the highest half-year percentage increase 

in the history of data recorded by the 

Fatality Analysis Reporting System 

(FARS).3 In addition, the projected 

11,225 fatalities during the second 

quarter of 2021 represents the highest 

second quarter fatalities since 1990, and 

the highest quarterly percentage change 

(+23.1 percent) in FARS data recorded 

history. Preliminary data reported by 

the Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA) show that VMT in the first half 

of 2021 rebounded from a large 

pandemic-related dip that occurred in 

the first half of 2020, increasing by 

173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 

percent increase over the comparable 

period in 2020. The fatality rate for the 

first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 

fatalities per 100 million VMT, up from 

the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 

100 million VMT in the first half of 

2020. Early evidence suggests that these 

fatality rates have increased as a result 

of increases in risky behaviors like 

driving and riding while unbelted, 

impaired driving, and speeding.4

Although there have been notable gains 

in automotive safety over the past fifty 

years, far more work must be done. 

This notice discusses how NCAP can 

support NHTSA’s mission through its 

multi-faceted initiatives and broad 

safety strategies to address vehicle 

safety involving motor vehicle 

occupants, other vulnerable road users, 

and safe driving choices to further 

reduce injuries and fatalities occurring 

on the nation’s roads. As stated in the 

Department of Transportation’s National 

Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to 

update NCAP are expected to emphasize 

safety features that protect people both 

inside and outside of the vehicle, and 

may include consideration of pedestrian 

protection systems, better 

understanding of impacts to pedestrians 

(e.g., specific considerations for 

children), and automatic emergency 

braking and lane keeping assistance to 

benefit bicyclists and pedestrians. In a 

first-of-its-kind focus—especially 

relevant in light of increases in fatalities 

caused by risky driving behaviors—this 

notice seeks comment on how 

automakers could encourage consumers 

to choose safety technologies that could 

prevent risky behaviors from occurring 

in the first place. This notice also 

proposes significant upgrades to NCAP 

by adding four additional crash 

avoidance technologies (also termed 

ADAS throughout this notice) to the 

program, increasing the stringency of 

the tests for currently recommended 

ADAS technologies in NCAP for 

enhanced evaluation of their current 

capabilities, and exploring, for the first 

time, expanding NCAP to include safety 

for road users outside of the vehicle. 

Finally, this document presents a 

roadmap of NHTSA’s current plans to 

upgrade NCAP in phases over the next 

several years. 

Many of these efforts align with 

Section 24213 of the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law, enacted as the 

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 5

and signed on November 15, 2021. First, 

this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the 

requirements of Section 24213(a) of the 

Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because 

NHTSA intends for the addition of the 

four technologies proposed in this RFC 

to ‘‘finalize the proceeding for which 

comments were requested’’ on 

December 16, 2015.6 Specifically, the 

finalization of this RFC will close the 

December 16, 2015 proceeding and 

notice. While NHTSA has future plans 

described in the roadmap that the 

Agency discussed in the December 16, 

2015 notice, none are considered an 

extension of the December 16, 2015 

proceeding, though all information 

previously collected by NHTSA may be 

used in the development of future 

notices. 

Second, this RFC fulfills portions of 

the requirements in Section 24213(b) of 

the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that 

mandates the Agency ‘‘publish a notice, 

for the purposes of public comment, to 

establish a means for providing 

consumer information relating to 

advanced crash-avoidance 

technologies’’ within one year of 

enactment that includes: (1) An 

appropriate methodology for 

determining which advanced crash 

avoidance technologies should be 

included in the information, (2) 

performance test criteria for use by 

manufacturers in evaluating those 

technologies, (3) a distinct rating system 

involving each technology, and (4) 

updating overall vehicle ratings to 

include the new rating. Through this 

RFC, NHTSA is proposing four 

additional advanced crash avoidance 

technologies 7 for inclusion in NCAP, 

proposing the test criteria for evaluating 

the advanced crash avoidance 

technologies, and seeking comment on 

the future development of a crash 

avoidance rating system. NHTSA 

described in detail why it chose the four 


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13454 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

8NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a 

recommended technology when NHTSA has data 

verifying that the technology meets the minimum 

performance requirements set by NHTSA for 

acceptable performance. If a vehicle’s ADAS is 

reported to have satisfied the performance 

requirements using the test methods specified by 

the Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system 

to indicate on the NHTSA website that the vehicle 

is equipped with the technology. Each year, NHTSA 

also selects a sample of vehicles from that model 

year to verify ADAS system performance by 

performing its own tests. 

9https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driverassistance-technologies. 

technologies that it did and how those 

technologies meet NHTSA’s established 

criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since 

NHTSA is proposing the addition of 

four advanced crash avoidance 

technologies and test criteria for 

evaluating those technologies, NHTSA 

meets two of the four requirements for 

fulfillment of the Advanced Crash 

Avoidance section of Sec. 24213(b). 

Section 24213(b) of the law also 

requires that the Agency publish a 

notice ‘‘to establish a means for 

providing to consumers information 

relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other 

vulnerable road user safety 

technologies’’ within one year of 

enactment. This notice must meet 

requirements very similar to the 

advanced crash avoidance notice 

mentioned above. Since NHTSA is 

today proposing to include pedestrian 

automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in 

the program and is including test 

criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA 

meets two of the four requirements for 

fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User 

Safety section of Sec. 24213(b). The 

remaining requirements will be fulfilled 

once NHTSA proposes and then 

finalizes a new rating system for the 

crash avoidance technologies in NCAP. 

The law also requires that NHTSA 

submit reports to Congress on its plans 

for fulfilling the abovementioned 

requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill 

these reporting requirements in a timely 

manner. 

Third, this RFC, once finalized, 

fulfills the requirements of Section 

24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a 

roadmap for implementation of NCAP 

changes that covers a term of ten years, 

with five year mid-term and five year 

long-term components, and with 

updates to the roadmap at least once 

every four years to reflect new Agency 

interests and public comments. The first 

roadmap must be completed within one 

year of the law’s enactment. Once 

finalized, the roadmap on future 

updates to NCAP proposed in this RFC 

in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year 

roadmap requirement, as some proposed 

initiatives will be considered in NCAP 

in the first five years while others will 

be proposed in the second half of the 

ten-year plan. The details and analysis 

of this fulfillment are available in the 

Roadmap section of this RFC. 

Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will 

fulfill a provision in Section 24213(c) of 

the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that 

requires NHTSA to make the roadmap 

available for public comment and to 

consider the public comments received 

before finalizing the roadmap. These 

provisions are in accordance with the 

Agency’s current practice for updating 

NCAP and will be followed to finalize 

the roadmap. Section 24213(c) of the 

Law also requires that NHTSA identify 

opportunities where NCAP would 

‘‘benefit from harmonization with thirdparty safety rating programs.’’ The 

Agency is taking steps to harmonize 

with existing consumer information 

rating programs where possible, and 

when appropriate, as noted in various 

sections of this RFC. 

Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law 

requires the Agency to engage with 

stakeholders with diverse backgrounds 

and viewpoints not less than annually 

to develop future roadmaps. Again, this 

provision is in accordance with the 

Agency’s current practice. 

Components of the Notice 

There are six main parts to this notice: 

1. Proposes to add four new ADAS 

technologies to NCAP and updates to 

current NCAP test procedures, 

2. Discusses the Agency’s plan to 

develop a new rating system for 

advanced driver assistance technologies, 

3. Describes steps to list the crash 

avoidance rating information on the 

vehicle’s window sticker (the Monroney 

label) at the point of sale, 

4. Describes roadmap of the Agency’s 

plans to update NCAP in phases over 

the next ten years, 

5. Requests comments on expanding 

NCAP to provide consumer information 

on safety technologies that could help 

people drive safer by preventing or 

limiting risky driving behavior, and 

6. Discusses NHTSA’s ideas for 

updating several programmatic aspects 

of NCAP to improve the program as a 

whole. 

Each of the aforementioned aspects of 

the notice are described in greater detail 

that follows. First, the notice discusses 

in detail the Agency’s proposed upgrade 

to add four more ADAS technologies to 

those currently recommended by 

NHTSA through NCAP and that are 

highlighted on the NHTSA website. 

Since 2010, NCAP has recommended 

four kinds of ADAS technologies to 

prospective vehicle purchasers, and has 

identified to shoppers the vehicles that 

have these technologies and that meet 

NCAP performance test criteria.8 The 

current technologies are forward 

collision warning (FCW), lane departure 

warning (LDW), crash imminent braking 

(CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) 

(with the latter two collectively referred 

to as ‘‘automatic emergency braking).9

This notice proposes changes (including 

an increase in stringency) to the test 

procedures and performance criteria for 

LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to (1) enable 

enhanced evaluation of their 

capabilities in current vehicle models, 

(2) reduce test burden, and (3) 

harmonize with other consumer 

information programs. This notice also 

describes and proposes four more ADAS 

technologies: Blind spot detection, blind 

spot intervention, lane keeping support, 

and pedestrian automatic emergency 

braking. 

These four new ADAS technologies 

are candidates for NCAP because data 

indicate they satisfy NHTSA’s four 

prerequisites for inclusion in the 

program. The prerequisites are: (1) The 

update to the program addresses a safety 

need; (2) there are system designs 

(countermeasures) that can mitigate the 

safety problem; (3) existing or new 

system designs have safety benefit 

potential; and (4) a performance-based 

objective test procedure exists that can 

assess system performance. In order to 

address (1), a safety need, the Agency 

inherently looks first to address injuries 

and fatalities stemming from ‘‘highfrequency and high-risk crash types’’— 

as these crashes command the largest 

safety need and thus may also afford the 

biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does 

not calculate relative costs and benefits 

when considering inclusion in NCAP as 

it is a non-regulatory consumer 

information program. NHTSA discusses 

in this notice how each of the proposed 

ADAS technologies meets the four 

prerequisites. As explained in detail in 

this notice, the four new ADAS 

technologies proposed in NCAP are the 

only technologies that the Agency 

believes meet the four prerequisites for 

inclusion at this time. Each technology 

has demonstrated the ability to 

successfully mitigate high frequency 

and high-risk crash types. With the 

proposal to include pedestrian 

automatic emergency braking, NCAP 

would be expanded, for the first time, to 

include safety for people outside of the 

vehicle. 

Second, this notice discusses the 

Agency’s plan to develop a future rating 

system for new vehicles based on the 

availability and performance of all the 

NCAP-recommended crash avoidance 

technologies. Currently, NCAP only 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13455 

10This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule 

to require vehicle manufacturers to include crash 

avoidance information next to the crashworthiness 

information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney 

labels). 

11See www.regulations.gov, See 

www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA–2020– 

0016 for a report of ‘‘New Car Assessment Program 

5-Star Quantitative Consumer Research.’’ 

12 72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC 

included a request for comments on a NHTSA 

report titled, ‘‘The New Car Assessment Program 

(NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future 

Enhancements.’’ 

13 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008). 

14ESC was removed from the Agency’s list of 

recommended ADAS technologies through NCAP 

beginning in model year 2014 when the technology 

became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, 

‘‘Electronic stability control.’’ NHTSA also included 

rear video systems in its list of recommended 

technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to 

2017 and removed that technology from its list 

when it became mandated under FMVSS No. 111, 

‘‘Rear Visibility.’’ 

recommends crash avoidance 

technologies to shoppers, and identifies 

the vehicles that offer the recommended 

technologies that pass NCAP system 

performance criteria. Unlike its 

crashworthiness and rollover protection 

programs that offer a combined rating 

based on vehicle performance in frontal, 

side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash 

avoidance program does not currently 

have a rating system to differentiate the 

performance of ADAS technologies. 

NHTSA seeks to remedy this by 

developing a rating system for ADAS 

technologies to provide purchasers 

improved data with which to compare 

and shop for vehicles, and to spur 

improved vehicle performance. 

Accordingly, this document seeks 

public input on how best to develop this 

rating system. 

Third, this notice announces 

NHTSA’s steps to list the crash 

avoidance rating information on the 

vehicle’s window sticker (the Monroney 

label) at the point of sale, as directed by 

the FAST Act.10 NHTSA requests 

comment on ideas for the Monroney 

label information. Research is underway 

to maximize the effectiveness of the 

information in informing purchasing 

decisions. A follow-on notice will 

propose the crash avoidance rating 

system and explain how NHTSA would 

use the ratings. NHTSA will consider 

the comments received on this notice in 

conjunction with the information gained 

from the consumer research, to develop 

a proposal for a revised label. To help 

shoppers make more informed 

purchasing decisions, NHTSA also 

plans to provide fuel economy and 

greenhouse gas rating information with 

the NHTSA safety ratings, not only at 

the point of sale but also on the NHTSA 

website. 

Fourth, as part of a new approach to 

advancing NCAP, NHTSA has 

developed a roadmap of the Agency’s 

current plans to upgrade NCAP in 

phases over the next several years. The 

roadmap sets forth NHTSA’s near-term 

and longer-term strategies for upgrading 

NCAP. The roadmap takes a gradual 

approach, which contemplates 

NHTSA’s issuing proposed upgrades in 

phases, as the technologies mature to 

readiness for proposed inclusion in 

NCAP. Following a proposal will be a 

final decision document that responds 

to comments and provides NHTSA’s 

decisions for that phase of NCAP 

updates, including the lead time 

provided for the implementation. The 

roadmap presents an estimated 

timeframe of the phased request for 

comment (RFC) notices. 

Fifth, this notice also considers 

expanding NCAP to provide consumer 

information on safety technologies that 

could help people drive safer by 

preventing or limiting risky driving 

behavior. The Agency is examining the 

possibility of expanding NCAP to 

include technologies that promote 

NHTSA’s continuing efforts to combat 

unsafe driving behaviors, such as 

distracted and impaired driving, riding 

in a vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. 

NHTSA currently uses many 

approaches to reduce dangerous driving 

behaviors, including high visibility 

enforcement and advertising campaigns 

like ‘‘Click it or Ticket’’ and ‘‘Buzzed 

Driving is Drunk Driving.’’ These 

campaigns have succeeded in reducing, 

but not eliminating, human causes of 

crashes and there is some evidence that 

their success has reached a plateau. 

NHTSA is considering how NCAP can 

promote technologies that would reduce 

unsafe driving or riding behavior like 

distracted and impaired driving, 

speeding, or riding in a vehicle 

unrestrained by targeting the human 

behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. 

This information may be of particular 

interest to parents or other caregivers 

who are shopping for a vehicle for a 

new or inexperienced driver in the 

household, or caregivers wanting to 

know more about rear seat alerts for hot 

car/heatstroke. 

Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses 

NHTSA’s ideas for updating several 

programmatic aspects of NCAP to 

improve the program as a whole. 

NHTSA requests comment on the 

Agency’s ideas for revising the 5-star 

safety ratings program. This document 

also discusses ways NHTSA would like 

to update the existing ADAS technology 

program components, outlines 

challenges the Agency has encountered 

relating to manufacturer self-reported 

data, and proposes possible solutions to 

those problems. Lastly, the RFC 

discusses (1) updates to the NCAP 

website to improve the dissemination of 

vehicle safety information to consumers 

and (2) the development of an NCAP 

database to modernize the operational 

aspects of the program, including a new 

vehicle information submission process 

for vehicle manufacturers. 

This RFC includes numbered 

questions throughout the notice that 

highlight specific topics on which 

NHTSA seeks comments. Although 

several questions may be posed unnumbered within the body of certain 

sections, these un-numbered questions 

are reiterated at the conclusion of the 

topic discussion and in Appendix B. To 

help ensure that NHTSA is able to 

address all comments received, the 

Agency requests that commenters 

provide corresponding numbering in 

their responses. 

II. Background 

NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 

in response to Title II of the Motor 

Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 

Act of 1972. When the program first 

began providing consumers with vehicle 

safety information derived from frontal 

crashworthiness testing, attention 

within the industry to vehicle safety 

was relatively new. Today’s consumers 

are much more interested in vehicle 

safety, and this has become one of the 

key factors in vehicle purchasing 

decisions.11 Vehicle manufacturers have 

responded to these consumer demands 

by offering safer vehicles that 

incorporate enhanced safety features. 

This has resulted in improved vehicle 

safety performance in NCAP, which has 

historically translated into higher NCAP 

star ratings. 

Over the years, NHTSA began to 

incorporate ADAS technologies into 

NCAP’s crash avoidance program. In 

2007, NHTSA, for the first time, issued 

an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS 

technologies in NCAP.12 Later, based on 

feedback received from written and oral 

comments, NHTSA published a final 

decision 13 expanding NCAP to include 

certain ADAS technologies and specific 

performance thresholds that a NHTSArecommended ADAS system must meet. 

Beginning with model year 2011, the 

Agency began recommending on its 

website forward collision warning 

(FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), 

and electronic stability control (ESC),14

and identified to shoppers which 

vehicles have the technologies that meet 

NCAP’s performance requirements. 

NHTSA updated NCAP further to 

include crash imminent braking (CIB) 

and dynamic braking support (DBS) 


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13456 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

15 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015). 

16October 1, 2018. 

17Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

18 78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013). 

19Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 20A typology is the study or analysis of 

something, or the classification of something, based 

on types or categories. 21Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019), Statistics of lightvehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011–2015 

national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 745), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

22The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: 

FCW, DBS, CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist 

(LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/merge warning, 

PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert. 

23Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, 

crossovers, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), light 

trucks, and vans having a gross vehicle weight 

rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less. 

technologies, beginning with model year 

2018 vehicles. 

This RFC continues those efforts. 

Through several notices and public 

meetings, NHTSA has continued 

discussions with stakeholders about 

which technologies should be included 

in NCAP and the minimum performance 

thresholds those technologies should 

meet. NHTSA has set forth in Appendix 

C to this RFC a detailed history of the 

requests for comment, public meetings, 

and other relevant events that underlie 

this notice. 

The last RFC NHTSA published to 

discuss potential changes to NCAP was 

published in 2015. It was broad in 

subject matter and sought comment on 

NCAP’s potential use of enhanced tools 

and techniques for evaluating the safety 

of vehicles, generating star ratings, and 

stimulating further vehicle safety 

developments.15 On the 

crashworthiness front, the RFC sought 

comment on establishing a new frontal 

oblique test and on using more 

advanced crash test dummies in all 

tests. The RFC also sought comment 

about establishing a new crash 

avoidance rating category and including 

nine advanced crash avoidance 

technologies. Additionally, the RFC 

sought comment on establishing a new 

pedestrian protection rating category 

involving the use of adult and child 

head, upper leg, and lower leg impact 

tests and adding two new pedestrian 

crash avoidance technologies. The RFC 

sought comment on combining the three 

categories (crash avoidance, 

crashworthiness, and pedestrian 

protection) into one overall 5-star rating. 

NHTSA also received comments at two 

public hearings, one in Detroit, 

Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the 

second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in 

Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. 

The numerous comments received on 

the RFC are discussed in a section 

below. 

In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a 

third public meeting to re-engage 

stakeholders and seek up-to-date input 

to help the Agency plan the future of 

NCAP.16 The Agency has also been 

working to finalize its research efforts 

on pedestrian crash protection, 

advanced anthropomorphic test devices 

(crash test dummies) in frontal and side 

impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash 

test, and an updated rollover risk curve. 

As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA 

plans to upgrade the NCAP 

crashworthiness program in phases over 

the next several years with the 

knowledge it has acquired from the 

research programs. 

III. ADAS Performance Testing 

Program 

ADAS technologies have the potential 

to increase safety by preventing crashes 

or mitigating the severity of crashes that 

might otherwise lead to injury and 

death. NCAP currently conducts 

performance verification tests for four 

ADAS technologies: Forward collision 

warning (FCW), lane departure warning 

(LDW), crash imminent braking (CIB), 

and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB 

and DBS are collectively referred to as 

automatic emergency braking (AEB). 

Vehicles that are equipped with one or 

more of these systems and pass NCAP’s 

performance test requirements are listed 

as ‘‘Recommended’’ on NHTSA’s 

website. When the Agency first began 

recommending FCW and LDW systems 

for model year 2011 vehicles, the 

fitment rate for these systems was less 

than 0.2 percent (where ‘‘fitment rate’’ 

means the percent of vehicles equipped 

with a particular ADAS system). For 

model year 2018 vehicles, 38.3 percent 

were equipped with FCW and 30.1 

percent were equipped with LDW.17

Providing vehicle safety information 

through NCAP can be an effective 

approach to advance the deployment of 

safer vehicle designs and technology in 

the U.S. market, inform consumer 

choices, and encourage adoption of new 

technologies that have life-saving 

potential. 

With this notice, NHTSA is proposing 

to incorporate four additional ADAS 

technologies into NCAP’s crash 

avoidance program: Lane keeping 

support (LKS), pedestrian automatic 

emergency braking (PAEB), blind spot 

warning (BSW), and blind spot 

intervention (BSI). Each of these 

technologies meets the Agency’s 

established criteria for inclusion in 

NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a 

safety need; (2) system designs exist that 

can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the 

technology provides the potential for 

safety benefits; and (4) a performancebased objective test procedure exists 

that can assess system performance.18

Details about how each of the proposed 

ADAS technologies addresses a safety 

need (criterion 1) will be discussed 

immediately below, while the remaining 

criteria will be discussed in the relevant 

sections under each technology. 

To gain an understanding of the safety 

need that current ADAS technologies 

may address, NHTSA analyzed crash 

data for 84 mutually exclusive pre-crash 

scenarios.19 The pre-crash scenarios 

used in the Agency’s analysis were 

devised using a typology 20 concept 21

published by the Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center (Volpe), 

which categorizes crashes into 

dynamically distinct scenarios based on 

pre-crash vehicle movements and 

critical events. As detailed in the 

referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA 

mapped the pre-crash scenario 

typologies to twelve currently available 

ADAS technologies 22 believed to 

potentially address certain pre-crash 

scenarios by assisting the driver to avoid 

or mitigate a crash. These mappings 

served to define the corresponding crash 

populations (i.e., target crash 

populations). 

Since several ADAS technologies 

presently available on passenger 

vehicles 23 are designed to mitigate the 

same crash scenarios, NHTSA first 

grouped the technologies with similar 

design intent into categories. The five 

technology categories that resulted from 

this grouping process include: (1) 

Forward collision prevention, (2) lane 

keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) 

forward pedestrian impact, and (5) 

backing collision avoidance. As shown 

in Table A–6, these categories address 

the following high-level crash types: (1) 

Rear-end; (2) rollover, lane departure, 

and road departure; (3) lane change/ 

merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, 

respectively. Of the original 84 precrash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 

relevant pre-crash scenario typologies to 

the five resulting technology categories 

that represented these crash types. 

The forward collision prevention 

category included three ADAS 

technologies: Forward collision 

warning, crash imminent braking, and 

dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and 


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24The study uses the term ‘‘lane keeping assist’’ 

(LKA), but NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses 

the term ‘‘lane keeping support’’ throughout this 

document instead. 25Similarly, the study uses the term ‘‘blind spot 

detection’’ (BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot 

warning (BSW) throughout this document instead. 26SAE International (2018), Taxonomy and 

definitions for terms related to driving automation 

systems for on-road motor vehicles (SAE J3016). 

Level 0: No Automation—The full-time 

performance by the human driver of all aspects of 

the dynamic driving task, even when enhanced by 

warning or intervention systems. Level 1: Driver 

Assistance—The driving mode-specific execution 

by a driver assistance system of either steering or 

acceleration/deceleration using information about 

the driving environment and with the expectation 

that the human driver performs all remaining 

aspects of the dynamic driving task. 

27PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injuryproducing crashes (i.e., crashes in which vehicles 

only incur property damage and no occupants incur 

injury). 

28 Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT 

HS 812 653. 

29 In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 

5,480,886 light vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 

through 2015, crossing path crashes, which totaled 

1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all light 

vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all 

fatalities (25,350). 

30NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are 

currently available on a small number of light 

vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA testing has 

shown that current-generation ISA systems have 

only limited capabilities and therefore would not 

effectively mitigate intersection-related crashes at 

this time—which is one of the requirements in the 

four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP. 

31 Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-toeverything (V2X) technologies have the potential to 

address crossing path crashes, but, while NHTSA 

remains strongly interested in these technologies, 

they are not included in the current roadmap. 

NHTSA is continuing to consider the various issues 

that bear upon the deployment path of V2X, 

including technological evolution and regulatory 

changes to the radio spectrum environment. 

32Crash scenarios were categorized by the first 

sequence of a crash event. Target crashes for a 

technology (e.g., lane-keeping crashes) were a 

collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to the 

technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle 

scenario was defined as crashes where the first 

event was initiated by a passenger vehicle, and the 

event was coded as jackknife or traction loss. This 

crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those 

included in the lane-keeping crashes. 

33Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are 

about 1% of crashes and associated with 3% of 

fatalities. 

34Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126. 

35 In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent 

(470,733) of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) 

occurring from 2011 through 2015 as control loss 

crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all fatal 

crashes (25,350) were due to control loss. 

36The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a 

classification system for assessing impact injury 

severity developed and published by the 

Association for the Advancement of Automotive 

Medicine and is used for coding single injuries, 

assessing multiple injuries, or for assessing 

cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS 

ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale 

of 1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 

4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 = maximum 

(untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury 

severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., 

the highest single AIS for a person with one or more 

injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury. 

DBS, respectively). The lane keeping 

category included lane departure 

warning (LDW), lane keeping support 

(LKS),24 and lane centering assist (LCA). 

The blind spot detection category 

included blind spot warning (BSW),25

blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane 

change/merge warning. The forward 

pedestrian impact avoidance category 

included pedestrian automatic 

emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the 

backing collision avoidance category 

included rear automatic braking (RAB) 

and rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). 

These ADAS technologies are 

characterized as SAE International 

(SAE) Level 0–1 26 driving automation 

systems. 

NHTSA derived target crash 

populations for each of the five 

technology categories using 2011 to 

2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting System 

(FARS) and National Automotive 

Sampling System General Estimates 

System (NASS GES) data sets, which 

serve as records of police-reported fatal 

and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on 

the nation’s roads. For a given 

technology category, we compiled data 

for each of the corresponding pre-crash 

scenarios to generate target crash 

populations surrounding the number of 

crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and 

property-damage-only vehicles 

(PDOVs).27 See Table 1 for a breakdown 

of target crash populations for each 

technology category. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF TARGET CRASHES BY TECHNOLOGY GROUP

Safety systems Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 injuries PDOVs 

1. FCW/DBS/CIB ..................................................... 1,703,541 (29.4%) 1,275 (3.8%) 883,386 (31.5%) 2,641,884 (36.3%) 

2. LDW/LKA/LCA ..................................................... 1,126,397 (19.4%) 14,844 (44.3%) 479,939 (17.1%) 863,213 (11.9%) 

3. BSW/BSI/LCM ..................................................... 503,070 (8.7%) 542 (1.6%) 188,304 (6.7%) 860,726 (11.8%) 

4. PAEB ................................................................... 111,641 (1.9%) 4,106 (12.3%) 104,066 (3.7%) 6,985 (0.1%) 

5. RAB/RvAB28 RCTA ............................................. 148,533 (2.6%) 74 (0.2%) 35,268 (1.3%) 231,317 (3.2%) 

Combined ......................................................... 3,593,18 (62%) 20,841 (62.2%) 1,690,963 (60.3%) 4,604,125 (63.3%) 

It is important to note that target crash 

populations for the five technology 

categories covered 62 percent of all 

crashes. Crossing path crashes, which 

also represented a large crash 

population and a significant number of 

fatalities, were not part of our analysis 

because we are not aware of a currently 

available ADAS technology that can 

effectively mitigate this crash type.29

However, there are emerging safety 

countermeasures that hold potential to 

address some portion of these crashes in 

the future and these technologies will be 

considered for NCAP as they mature. 

These include intersection safety assist 

(ISA) systems that use onboard sensors 

with a wide field of view (e.g., cameras, 

lidar, radar) as well as vehicle 

communications systems.30 31 Loss-ofcontrol in single-vehicle crashes 32 also 

had a relatively high target population 

and fatality rate,33 but were not 

included because, aside from electronic 

stability control (ESC) systems, which 

are mandated,34 the Agency is not aware 

of an ADAS technology that effectively 

prevents this crash type and also meets 

NHTSA’s criteria for inclusion in NCAP 

at this time.35

Of the pre-crash typologies included 

in NHTSA’s March 2019 study, rear-end 

collisions were found to be the most 

common crash type with an annual 

average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end 

collisions represented 29.4 percent of all 

annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by 

lane keeping typologies (1,126,397 

crashes or 19.4 percent), and those 

relating to blind spot detection (503,070 

crashes or 8.7 percent). Backing crashes 

(148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all 

crashes, followed by forward pedestrian 

crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent. 

Rear-end collisions also had the 

highest number of Maximum 

Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) 36 1–5 

injuries at 883,386, which represented 

31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries 

(2,806,260) in Table A–1. Lane keeping 

crashes had the second highest number 

of injuries at 479,939 (17.1 percent), as 

shown in Table A–2, and blind spot 

crashes had the third highest at 188,304 

(6.7 percent), as shown in Table A–3. 

These typologies were followed by 

forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7 


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37The study uses the term ‘‘impacts’’ but for 

consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term 

‘‘crashes’’ in this paragraph. 38The Agency notes that the highest number of 

serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3–5 injuries) were 

recorded for lane keeping crashes (21,282 or 0.76 

percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed by rearend crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward 

pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind 

spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing 

crashes (454 or 0.02 percent). 39Similarly, the study uses the term ‘‘impacts’’ 

but for consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term 

‘‘crashes’’ in this paragraph. 40 49 CFR 571.111. See 79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 

2014). 

41Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., 

Mynatt, M., & Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis 

of fatal run-out-of-lane crashes using the National 

Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to assess 

lane keeping technologies, 25th International 

Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 

Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper Number 17– 

0220. 

42The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation 

Survey (NMVVCS) was a nationwide survey of 

5,471 crashes involving light passenger vehicles, 

with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, 

which were investigated by the U.S. Department of 

Transportation and NHTSA over a 2.5-year period 

from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007. 

43Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

44When only serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3–5 

injuries) were considered, lane keeping crashes 

represented the highest number of non-fatal injuries 

(21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), 

followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 

percent), forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 

percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), 

and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent). 

45 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008). 

46Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

47Note that performance of LDW systems may be 

adversely affected by precipitation or poor roadway 

conditions due to construction, unmarked 

intersections, faded/worn/missing lane markings, 

markings covered with water, etc. 

percent and backing crashes at 1.3 

percent, as shown in Table A–4.37 38

NHTSA found that the lane keeping 

technology category, represented by 

rollover, lane departure, and road 

departure crashes, included the highest 

number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 

percent of all fatalities (33,477), as 

shown in Table A–2. This was followed 

by the forward pedestrian impact 

category, which included 4,106 

pedestrian fatalities (12.3 percent), as 

shown in Table A–4. The forward 

collision prevention category, made up 

of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 

fatalities (3.8 percent), as shown in 

Table A–1.39 The blind spot detection 

technology category, represented by 

lane change/merge crashes, accounted 

for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown 

in Table A–3. This was followed by 

backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown 

in Table A–5, which defined the 

backing collision avoidance category. 

The Agency notes that forward 

pedestrian crashes, which comprised 

the forward pedestrian impact category, 

ranked second highest for fatalities, and 

were the deadliest based on frequency 

of fatalities per crash. 

In selecting the ADAS technologies to 

include in this proposal, the Agency 

wanted not only to target the most 

frequently occurring crash types, but 

also prioritize the most fatal and highest 

risk crashes. Based on the target crash 

populations studied, NHTSA believes 

that those represented by the forward 

collision prevention, lane keeping, blind 

spot detection, and forward pedestrian 

impact technology categories account 

for the most significant safety need. 

The Agency notes that ADAS 

technologies representing the backing 

collision avoidance category (i.e., RAB, 

RvAB, and RCTA) are not being 

proposed for this program update. The 

backing collision avoidance category 

did not appear in the top third for 

number of crashes, number of fatalities, 

or number of MAIS 1–5 injuries. This 

may be due, in part, to the fact that a 

significant part of this crash target 

population is addressed by FMVSS No. 

111, ‘‘Rear visibility.’’ 40 The Agency 

needs additional time to assess all 

available real-world data and study the 

effects of the recent full implementation 

of FMVSS No. 111 prior to considering 

adoption of ADAS technologies 

designed to prevent backing crashes in 

NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency 

acknowledges that it previously 

proposed adding rear automatic braking 

(RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 

notice, it is continuing to make changes 

to the RAB test procedure published in 

support of that proposal to address the 

comments received. Thus, it is not 

proposing to add this technology to 

NCAP at this time. The Agency may 

propose adding to NCAP ADAS 

technologies that address the backing 

pre-crash typologies as the Agency 

continues to analyze the real-world data 

and refine test procedure revisions. 

Units of measure contained within 

this notice include meters (m), 

kilometers (km), millimeters per second 

(mm/s), meters per second (m/s), 

kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), 

inches per second (in./s), feet per 

second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), 

seconds (s), and kilograms (kg). 

A. Lane Keeping Technologies 

A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal 

crashes 41 from the National Motor 

Vehicle Crash Causation Study 

(NMVCCS) 42 identified that 42 percent 

of lane departure crashes (i.e., where the 

driver left the lane of travel prior to the 

crash) resulted in a rollover and 37 

percent resulted in an opposite 

direction crash. 

After analyzing NHTSA’s 2019 target 

population study, NHTSA believes that 

lane keeping technologies such as lane 

departure warning (LDW), lane keeping 

support (LKS), and lane centering assist 

(LCA), can address ten pre-crash 

scenarios including the prevention or 

mitigation of roadway departures and 

crossing the centerline or median (i.e., 

opposite direction crashes). These precrash scenarios represented on average 

1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 

percent of all crashes that occurred on 

U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 

fatalities and 479,939 MAIS 1–5 

injuries, as shown in Table A–2. This 

equals 44.3 percent of all fatalities and 

17.1 percent of all injuries recorded.43 44

NCAP currently provides information 

on the performance of LDW, one of the 

lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW 

was introduced in the program in 2010 

for model year 2011 vehicles.45 At the 

time, the fitment rate for LDW was less 

than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it 

was 30.1 percent.46 Although the 

adoption rate for LDW has increased 

over this period, it has not increased as 

significantly as the fitment rate for 

forward collision warning (FCW), which 

saw an approximate 40 percent increase 

over the same time period. A possible 

explanation regarding the lower fitment 

rate for LDW will be discussed in the 

next section. A second lane keeping 

ADAS technology that the Agency 

believes is appropriate for inclusion in 

NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS 

may provide additional safety benefits 

that LDW cannot and may more 

effectively address the number of 

fatalities and injuries related to lane 

departure crashes. 

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning 

(LDW) 

Lane departure warning is a NHTSArecommended technology that is 

currently included in NCAP to mitigate 

lane departure crashes. LDW systems 

are used to help prevent crashes that 

result when a driver unintentionally 

allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane 

of travel. These systems often use 

camera-based sensors to detect lane 

markers, such as solid lines (including 

those marked for bike lanes), dashed 

lines, or raised reflective indicators such 

as Botts’ Dots, ahead of the vehicle.47

Lane departure alerts are presented to 

the driver when the system detects that 

the vehicle is laterally approaching or 

crossing the lane markings. The alert 

may be visual, audible, and/or haptic in 


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48National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. (2013, February). Lane departure 

warning system confirmation test and lane keeping 

support performance documentation. See http://

www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA–2006– 

26555–0135. 

49The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the 

vehicle’s axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer 

edge of the vehicle’s tire in the Y-direction (lateral), 

and the ground in the Z-direction (vertical). 

50Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests 

conducted under the same test conditions 

(including test speed) with the same subject 

vehicle. 

51Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

52For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent 

of the travel speed data, respectively, is unknown 

or not reported in FARS and GES. For opposite 

direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data, 

respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS 

and GES. 53 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). 

nature. Visual alerts may show which 

side of the vehicle is departing the lane, 

and haptic alerts may be presented as 

steering wheel or seat vibrations to alert 

the driver. It is expected that an LDW 

alert will warn the driver of the 

unintentional lane shift so the driver 

can steer the vehicle back into its lane. 

When a turn signal is activated, the 

LDW system acknowledges that the lane 

change is intentional and does not alert 

the driver. 

As NHTSA continues its assessment 

of LDW systems under NCAP, it plans 

to use the current NCAP test procedure 

titled, ‘‘Lane Departure Warning System 

Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping 

Support Performance Documentation,’’ 

dated February 2013.48 This protocol 

assesses the system’s ability to issue an 

alert in response to a driving situation 

intended to represent an unintended 

lane departure and to quantify the test 

vehicle’s position relative to the lane 

line at the time of the LDW alert. In 

NCAP’s LDW tests, a test vehicle is 

accelerated from rest to a test speed of 

72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a 

straight line parallel to a single lane line 

comprised of one of three marking 

types: Continuous white lines, 

discontinuous (i.e., dashed) yellow 

lines, or discontinuous raised pavement 

markers (i.e., Botts’ Dots). The test 

vehicle is driven such that the 

centerline of the vehicle is 

approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane 

edge. This path must be maintained, 

and the test speed must be achieved, at 

least 61.0 m (200 ft.) prior to the start 

gate. Once the driver reaches the start 

gate, he or she manually inputs 

sufficient steering to achieve a lane 

departure with a target lateral velocity 

of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with respect to the 

lane line. The driver of the vehicle does 

not activate the turn signal at any point 

during the test and does not apply any 

sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, 

steering wheel, or brake pedal. The test 

vehicle is driven at constant speed 

throughout the maneuver. The test ends 

when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m 

(1.7 ft.) over the edge of the lane line 

marking. The scenario is performed for 

two different departure directions, left 

and right, and for all three lane marking 

types, resulting in a total of six test 

conditions. Five repeated trials runs are 

performed per test condition. 

LDW performance for each test trial is 

evaluated by examining the proximity of 

the vehicle with respect to the edge of 

a lane line at the time of the LDW alert. 

The LDW alert must not occur when the 

lateral position of the vehicle, 

represented by a two-dimensional 

polygon,49 is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) 

from the inboard edge of the lane line 

(i.e., the line edge closest to the vehicle 

when the lane departure maneuver is 

initiated), and must occur before the 

lane departure exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To 

pass the test, the LDW system must 

satisfy the pass criteria for three of the 

first five valid individual trials 50 for 

each combination of departure direction 

and lane line type (60 percent) and for 

20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent). 

NCAP’s LDW test conditions 

represent pre-crash scenarios that 

correspond to a substantial portion of 

fatalities and injuries observed in realworld lane departure crashes. In its 

independent review of the 2011–2015 

FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed 

that approximately 40 and 30 percent of 

fatalities in fatal road departure and 

opposite direction crashes, respectively, 

occurred when the posted speed was 

72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.51 Similarly, 

the data indicated 64 and 63 percent of 

injuries resulted from road departure 

and opposite direction crashes, 

respectively, that occurred when the 

posted speed was 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 

less. 

Although travel speed was unknown 

or not reported for a high percentage of 

crashes in FARS and GES,52 when travel 

speed was reported, approximately 6 

and 9 percent of fatal road departure 

and opposite direction crashes, 

respectively, occurred at travel speeds 

of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, 

the data showed 22 and 25 percent of 

the police-reported non-fatal road 

departure and opposite direction 

crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 

kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe’s data 

review indicates that speeding is 

prevalent in lane departure relevant precrash scenarios, but most road 

departure- and opposite directionrelated fatalities and injuries did not 

occur on highways. For instance, 79 

percent of road departure-related fatal 

crashes and 89 percent of road 

departure-related police-reported 

injuries occurred on roads that were not 

highways. Similarly, for opposite 

direction-related crashes, 87 percent of 

fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did 

not occur on highways. Because 

highway driving speeds are on average 

much higher than non-highway speeds, 

the Volpe data about a high percentage 

of crashes occurring at speeds under 

72.4 kph (45 mph) appears accurate. 

The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) 

appears to address a large portion of the 

travel speeds where the crashes are 

occurring. 

Furthermore, 62 percent of road 

departure-related fatalities and 76 

percent of road departure-related 

injuries occurred on straight roads, 

thereby aligning with NCAP’s test 

procedure. For opposite directionrelated crashes, 69 percent of fatalities 

and 67 percent of police-reported 

injuries occurred on straight roads. 

In its December 2015 notice,53

NHTSA expressed concern that the 

safety benefits afforded by LDW 

technology were being diminished due 

to false activations. Several studies 

referenced in that notice had found that 

drivers were choosing to disable their 

vehicle’s LDW system because it was 

issuing alerts too frequently. The 

Agency was also concerned about 

missed detections resulting from tar 

lines reflecting sun light or covered with 

water and other unforeseen anomalies 

that cause unreliable driver warnings. 

To address these issues and improve 

consumer acceptance, NHTSA 

requested comment in 2015 on whether 

to revise certain aspects of NCAP’s LDW 

test procedure. Specifically, the Agency 

solicited comment on whether it is 

feasible to (1) award NCAP credit to 

LDW systems that only provide haptic 

alerts, and (2) develop additional test 

scenarios to address false activations 

and missed detections. The Agency also 

proposed to tighten the inboard lane 

tolerance for its LDW test procedure 

from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0 ft.). In doing 

this, an LDW alert could only occur 

within a window of +0.3 to ¥0.3 m 

(+1.0 to ¥1.0 ft.) with respect to the 

inside edge of the lane line to pass 

NCAP’s LDW procedure. This proposal 

effectively increased the space in which 

a vehicle could operate within a lane 

before triggering of an LDW alert was 

permitted. Each of these topics are 


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13460 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

54Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., 

Nobukawa, K., Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., 

Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., and Lobes, K. 

(2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 

collision alert and lane departure warning systems 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 247), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

55Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., 

Huey, R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, 

September), Human factors for connected vehicles: 

Effective warning interface research findings 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

56After submitting individual comments on the 

2015 RFC, the Alliance and Global Automakers 

merged to form the Alliance for Automotive 

Innovation. This document addresses the 

individual comments from the organizations that 

were then the Alliance and Global Automakers. 

57Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. 

(2012, April 16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane 

Departure Warning System using ASSTREET. SAE 

Int. J. Passeng. Cars—Electron. Electr. Syst. 

5(1):133–145, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012- 

01-0289. 

discussed in detail in the sections that 

follow. 

a. Haptic Alerts 

With respect to haptic warnings, 

NHTSA mentioned in its December 

2015 notice that these alerts may offer 

greater consumer acceptance compared 

to audible alerts, and thus improve the 

effectiveness of LDW alerts if the driver 

does not view the alerts as a nuisance 

and disengage the system. In response to 

the notice, commenters generally did 

not support a haptic alert requirement. 

Some commenters suggested that 

requiring a specific feedback type would 

unnecessarily limit the manufacturer’s 

flexibility to issue warnings to the 

driver, particularly when considering 

the potential effectiveness of different 

feedback types and the need to optimize 

human-machine interface (HMI) designs 

to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch 

suggested the Agency should allow all 

warning options to promote the 

availability of such systems in a greater 

number of vehicles, which should 

ultimately increase consumer awareness 

and encourage vehicle safety 

improvements. Advocates stated that 

the Agency should provide details on 

the effectiveness of the different types of 

sensory feedback (visual, auditory, 

haptic) to justify its decision to 

encourage one warning type over 

another. Consumers Union (CU) 

suggested awarding credit for all LDW 

feedback types and awarding additional 

points or credit for haptic alerts to 

encourage this feedback type in the 

future. The Automotive Safety Council 

(ASC) acknowledged that haptic 

warnings may improve driver 

acceptance of LDW systems but 

suggested that false activations must 

also be reduced to realize improved 

consumer acceptance and additional 

safety benefits. 

In a large-scale telematics-based study 

conducted by UMTRI 54 for NHTSA on 

LDW usage, researchers investigated 

driver behavior in reaction to alerts. 

Two types of vehicles were included in 

the study: Vehicles with audible-only 

alerts and vehicles where the driver had 

the option to select either an audible or 

haptic alert. When the latter was 

available, the driver selected the haptic 

warning 90 percent of the time. 

Otherwise, the LDW system was turned 

‘‘off’’ 38 percent of the time and thus 

was not providing alerts. For the system 

that only provided the audible warning, 

the LDW was turned ‘‘off’’ 71 percent of 

the time. 

Based on the findings from the 

UMTRI’s research, NHTSA concludes 

that haptic alerts improve driver 

acceptance of LDW systems. However, 

the Agency is not certain if an increase 

in driver acceptance will translate to an 

improvement in the overall efficacy of 

the LDW system in reducing crashes. 

Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to 

hinder optimization of HMI designs 

given the increasing number of ADAS 

technologies available in vehicles today. 

Therefore, the Agency has decided not 

to require a specific alert modality for 

LDW warnings in its related NCAP test 

procedure at this time, but is requesting 

comment on whether this decision is 

appropriate. Although NHTSA has 

limited data on the effectiveness of the 

various alert types, it has some concern 

(similar to the one raised for FCW) that 

certain LDW systems, such as those that 

may provide only a visual alert, may be 

less effective than other alert options in 

medium or high urgency situations.55

b. False Positive Tests 

In responding to the 2015 RFC, 

vehicle manufacturers and suppliers 

asserted that additional false positive 

test requirements were not needed even 

though they acknowledged NHTSA’s 

concern regarding the effect of nuisance 

alerts on consumer acceptance. 

Specifically, the Alliance 56 stated that 

vehicle manufacturers will optimize 

their systems to minimize false positive 

activations for consumer acceptance 

purposes, and thus such tests will not 

be necessary. Similarly, Honda stated 

that vehicle manufacturers must already 

account for false positives when 

considering marketability and HMI. The 

manufacturer also indicated that it 

would be difficult for the Agency to 

create a valid false positive test 

procedure that is robust and repeatable. 

Mobileye, Bosch, and MTS Systems 

Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, 

Mobileye explained that it would be 

hard to reproduce the exact test 

conditions, especially with respect to 

weather, over multiple test locations. 

Also, Bosch stated that the specialized 

tests required to address the Agency’s 

concern may not be truly representative 

of all real-world driving situations that 

the system encounters. MTS suggested 

that, alternatively, a new test could be 

added to NCAP’s LDW test procedure 

that would evaluate whether an LDW 

system can inform the driver that it is 

no longer able to issue warnings due to 

poor environmental conditions or other 

reasons. 

Given the concerns expressed 

regarding repeatability and 

reproducibility of test conditions, and 

the fact that the Agency’s data do not 

currently support adoption of a false 

positive assessment for lane keeping 

technologies, NHTSA continues to 

monitor the consumer complaint data 

related to false positives to help inform 

an appropriate next step. 

With respect to the recommendation 

from MTS, the Agency recognizes that 

vehicle manufacturers install LDW 

telltales on the instrument panel that 

illuminate to inform drivers when the 

system is operational. The systems are 

typically operational when the vehicle’s 

travel speed has reached a preset 

activation threshold speed and the lane 

markings and environmental conditions 

are appropriate. The telltale will 

disappear if those conditions are not 

met to inform the driver that the system 

is no longer operational. In such a state, 

the system will not provide an alert if 

the vehicle departs the travel lane. 

Given this feature, NHTSA has decided 

a test to inform the driver that the 

system is no longer issuing warnings is 

unnecessary at this time. 

c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications 

Support was varied with respect to 

NHTSA’s proposal in the December 

2015 notice to modify the LDW test 

requirements to reduce the leeway for 

system activation inside of a lane line 

from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0 ft.). Global 

Automakers stated that the proposed 

change was ‘‘unduly prescriptive’’ and 

recommended that the Agency retain 

the existing lane line tolerance. The 

organization explained that research 

showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 

s to react to a warning.57 Citing NCAP’s 

LDW test procedure, which requires a 

steering input having a target lateral 

velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./ 

s), the trade association remarked that 

this requirement equates to a necessary 

warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 

to 2.4 ft.) to ensure that 90 percent of 

drivers can react in time to prevent a 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13461 

58Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts’ Dots, after 

a half-century, will disappear from freeways, 

highways, The Orange County Register, https://

www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-ahalf-century-will-disappear-from-freewayshighways/. 

59 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008). 

60 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, 

August 23), Lane departure warning, blind spot 

detection help drivers avoid trouble, https://

www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lineslane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-helpdrivers-avoid-trouble. 

61Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance 

Technology Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, 

DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle Electronics Systems 

Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan 

Transportation Research Institute Final Report, 

March 22, 2018. 

lane departure. Advocates agreed that 

nuisance notifications are a concern for 

driver acceptance, but noted that the 

Agency provided little information 

about the effectiveness of LDW systems 

meeting the proposed criteria. 

Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS 

commented that some of the more 

robust systems that are currently 

available should be able to comply with 

the narrower specification. However, 

ASC suggested that the Agency may 

want to evaluate the impact of the 

proposed changes before finalizing the 

requirements to ensure that narrowing 

the lane line tolerances translates to a 

reduction in false positive alerts, and 

thus higher consumer acceptance for 

LDW systems. Mobileye stated that the 

tolerance reduction should increase the 

required accuracy and quality of lane 

keeping systems. MTS remarked that 

systems meeting the tighter 

specification will produce higher driver 

satisfaction, and, in turn, system use, 

compared to those that meet only the 

current requirements. Hyundai Motor 

Company (Hyundai) also supported the 

tolerance revision. Consumers Union 

(CU) agreed with others that the 

narrowed lateral tolerance should 

reduce the issuance of false alerts on 

main roadways but cautioned the 

Agency that this change may not 

effectively address false alerts on 

secondary or curved roads, as vehicles 

not only tend to approach within one 

foot of lane lines, but also may cross 

them. The group suggested that false 

alert conditions be subject to speed 

limitations or GPS-based position 

sensors to avoid ‘‘over activation’’ on 

secondary or curved roads. 

Given NHTSA’s goal of reducing 

nuisance notifications to increase 

consumer acceptance of LDW systems 

and the statements from several 

commenters that current LDW systems 

can meet the proposed reduced test 

specification, the Agency believes it is 

reasonable to propose adopting the 

reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m 

(1.0 ft.). 

In addition to the comments received 

pertaining to the lane line tolerance, the 

Agency also received several 

suggestions to adopt additional test 

scenarios for NCAP’s LDW test 

procedure or make alternative 

procedural modifications. Similar to 

CU’s suggestion above for curved roads, 

Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add 

inner and outer curve scenarios that 

allow a larger tolerance for the inner 

lane boundary than that permitted on a 

straight road. The company further 

recommended that the Agency add road 

edge detection scenarios, including 

curbs and non-structural delimiters 

such as gravel or dirt, to reflect realworld conditions and crash scenarios 

more accurately. Similarly, Bosch 

suggested that NHTSA consider 

introducing road edge detection 

requirements in addition to lane 

markings since not all roads have lane 

markings. Additionally, Mobileye 

suggested that NHTSA alter the Botts’ 

Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, 

raised markers that mark lanes) to align 

with California detail #13, which is 

more common, and modify the test 

procedure to include Botts’ Dots on both 

sides of the lane or Botts’ Dots and a 

solid line, as these are the most 

frequently observed marking pairings. 

The Agency appreciates suggestions 

from commenters and agrees that there 

is merit to considering other procedural 

modifications for NCAP’s lane departure 

test procedure(s). As will be discussed 

in the next section, the Agency is 

planning to conduct a feasibility study 

to determine whether curved roads can 

be considered for inclusion in NCAP 

test procedures to evaluate LKS systems 

objectively. NHTSA also plans to 

perform research to assess how lane 

keeping system performance on a test 

track compares to real-world data for 

different combinations of curve radius, 

vehicle speed, and departure timing. 

Additionally, the Agency recognizes 

that the European NCAP program (Euro 

NCAP) has adopted a road edge 

detection test that is conducted in a 

similar manner to their ‘‘lane keep 

assist’’ tests (described in the next 

section), but the road edge detection test 

does not use lane markings. Although 

NHTSA believes the number of vehicles 

equipped with an ability to recognize 

and respond to road edges not defined 

with a lane line is presently low, it has 

identified roadways where this 

capability could prevent crashes. 

Therefore, the Agency is requesting 

comment on whether a road edge 

detection test for either LDW and/or 

LKS is appropriate for inclusion in 

NCAP. In consideration of the lane 

markings currently assessed, the Agency 

proposes to remove the Botts’ Dots test 

scenario from the current LDW test, as 

the lane marking type is being removed 

from use in California.58 At this time, 

the Agency believes the traditional 

dashed and solid lane marking tests 

would be sufficient. 

Although NHTSA has tentatively 

decided not to adopt additional false 

activation requirements for this NCAP 

upgrade, the Agency is still concerned 

about the low effectiveness of LDW and 

its lack of consumer acceptance 

stemming from nuisance alerts and 

missed detections. 

When NHTSA decided to include 

ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,59

LDW was selected because it met 

NCAP’s four established criteria: (1) The 

technology addressed a major crash 

problem; (2) the system design of LDW 

had the potential to mitigate the crash 

problem; (3) safety benefits were 

projected, and (4) test procedures and 

evaluation criteria were available to 

ensure an acceptable performance level. 

At the time, the Agency estimated that 

existing LDW systems were 6 to 11 

percent effective in preventing lane 

departure crashes. Although the 

system’s effectiveness was relatively 

low, NHTSA cited the large number of 

road departure and opposite direction 

crashes occurring on the nation’s 

roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ 

injuries, as reasons to include LDW in 

NCAP. Several recent studies have 

provided varying results with respect to 

LDW effectiveness. 

In a 2017 study,60 the Insurance 

Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) 

concluded that LDW systems were 

effective in reducing three types of 

passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, 

side-swipes, and head-on) by 11 

percent, which is the same rate NHTSA 

originally estimated. Importantly, IIHS 

also concluded that LDW systems 

reduce injuries in those same types of 

crashes by 21 percent. In its recent 

study of real-world effectiveness of 

crash avoidance technologies in GM 

vehicles,61 UMTRI found that LDW 

systems showed a 3 percent reduction 

for applicable crashes that was 

determined to be not statistically 

significant. Conversely, the active safety 

technology, LKS (which also included 

lane departure warning capability), 

showed an estimated 30 percent 

reduction in applicable crashes. 

Other studies that examined driver 

deactivation rates also suggest that LDW 

effectiveness may be lower than 

originally estimated. In a survey of 

Honda vehicles brought into Honda 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES3
13462 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

62 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, 

January 28), Most Honda owners turn off lane 

departure warning, Status Report, Vol. 51, No. 1, 

page 6. 

63Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., 

Nobukawa, K., Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., 

Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., and Lobes, K. 

(2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 

collision alert and lane departure warning systems 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 247), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

64Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to 

lane departure warning & lane keeping assist: 

Explaining how these systems can keep drivers on 

the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/ 

car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keepingassist-guide/. 

65Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

66Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash 

Avoidance Technology Evaluation Using RealWorld Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle 

Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of 

Michigan Transportation Research Institute Final 

Report, March 22, 2018. 

67Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5), Guide to 

lane departure warning & lane keeping assist: 

Explaining how these systems can keep drivers on 

the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/ 

car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keepingassist-guide/. 

68The ASC argued that data from the Highway 

Loss Data Institute (HLDI) have shown no 

statistically significant difference in collision claim 

frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW 

compared to those without, and questioned whether 

LDW systems are effective in reducing crashes or 

fatalities. 

69European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (2015, November), Test Protocol— 

Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0. 

70European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (2019, July), Test Protocol—Lane 

Support Systems, Version 3.0.2. See section 7.2.5, 

Lane Keep Assist tests. 

dealerships for service,62 IIHS 

researchers found that for 184 models 

equipped with an LDW system, only a 

third of the vehicles had the system 

activated. Furthermore, in its telematicsbased study on LDW usage,63 UMTRI 

found that, overall, drivers turned off 

LDW systems 50 percent of the time. 

However, in Consumer Reports’ August 

2019 survey of more than 57,000 CR 

subscribers, the organization found that 

73 percent of vehicle owners reported 

that they were satisfied with LDW 

technology. In fact, 33 percent said that 

the system had helped them avoid a 

crash, and 65 percent said that they 

trusted the system to work every time.64

In light of these findings, the Agency 

believes that, in addition to LDW, there 

is merit to adopting an active lane 

keeping system, such as lane keeping 

support (LKS), in NCAP. As an 

enhanced active system, LKS offers the 

steering and/or braking capability 

necessary to guide a vehicle back into 

its lane without consumer action and 

should therefore further enhance safety 

benefits beyond those that can be 

realized by LDW. A detailed discussion 

pertaining to LKS technology is 

provided in the following section. 

2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS) 

LDW systems warn a driver that their 

vehicle is unintentionally drifting out of 

their travel lane, while lane keeping 

support (LKS) systems are designed to 

actively guide a drifting vehicle back 

into the travel lane by gently counter 

steering or applying differential braking. 

During an unintended lane departure 

where the driver is not using the turn 

signal, LKS systems help to prevent: 

‘‘Sideswiping’’ where a vehicle strikes 

another vehicle in an adjacent lane that 

is travelling in the same direction; 

opposite direction crashes where a 

vehicle crosses the centerline and 

strikes another vehicle travelling in the 

opposite direction; and road departure 

crashes where a vehicle runs off the 

road resulting in a rollover crash or an 

impact with a tree or other object. LKS 

systems may also help to prevent 

unintended lane departures into 

designated bicycle lanes in situations 

where the system’s speed threshold is 

met. 

LKS systems typically utilize the 

same camera(s) used by LDW systems to 

monitor the vehicle’s position within 

the lane, and determine whether a 

vehicle is about to drift out of its lane 

of travel unintentionally. In such 

instances, LKS automatically intervenes 

by: Braking one or more of the vehicle’s 

wheels; steering; or using a combination 

of braking and steering so that the 

vehicle returns to its intended lane of 

travel. LKS is one of two active lane 

keeping technologies mentioned in the 

Agency’s March 2019 report,65 with the 

other being lane centering assist (LCA). 

LKS assists the driver by providing 

short-duration steering and/or braking 

inputs when a lane departure is 

imminent or underway, whereas LCA 

provides continuous assistance to the 

driver to keep their vehicle centered 

within the lane. 

As discussed in the previous section, 

UMTRI evaluated the real-world 

effectiveness of ADAS technologies, 

including LDW and LKS.66 The results 

of the LKS study (which also included 

lane departure warning functionality) 

showed an estimated 30 percent 

reduction in applicable crashes. 

Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 

74 percent of vehicle owners reported 

that they were satisfied with LKS 

technology, and 35 percent said that it 

had helped them avoid a crash. Sixtyfive percent of owners said that they 

trusted the system to work every time.67

In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA 

did not propose including LKS 

technology as part of the update to 

NCAP. However, many commenters 

recommended that the Agency consider 

including the technology. For instance, 

Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS 

systems have the potential to prevent or 

mitigate a greater number of collisions 

involving injuries and fatalities than 

LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi 

recommended that the Agency adopt 

LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC 

adding that Euro NCAP has included 

LKS in its Lane Support Systems test 

protocol since 2016.68 69 The ASC, 

Bosch, and Continental noted the 

maturity of LKS technology and stated 

that such systems were already widely 

available in vehicles produced at the 

time. Other proponents of adopting LKS 

technology in NCAP include the 

National Safety Council (NSC), ZF TRW, 

and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that 

the Agency adopt both active lane 

keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and 

lane centering systems (termed LCA in 

this notice) due to the high frequency of 

fatal road departure crashes. Honda also 

supports the active safety benefits of 

LKS and the system’s potential to help 

prevent crashes. NSC suggested that the 

Agency include LKS, as it would 

complement LDW, which is already in 

the program, similar to the way the 

warning component of FCW 

complements the active safety 

functionality of AEB. 

As mentioned previously, the Agency 

agrees with commenters that there is 

merit to adopting LKS technology in 

NCAP. However, NHTSA believes an 

LDW system integrated with LKS may 

be a better approach for the Agency to 

consider rather than replacing LDW 

with LKS. NHTSA believes, as NSC 

commented, that an integrated approach 

(inclusive of passive and active safety 

capabilities for lane support systems) 

would be similar to what the Agency is 

proposing for frontal collision 

avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later 

in this notice. 

NHTSA is considering the adoption of 

certain test methods (e.g., those for 

‘‘lane keep assist’’) contained within the 

Euro NCAP Test Protocol—Lane 

Support Systems (LSS) 70 to assess 

technology design differences for LKS. 

Since the test speeds and road 

configurations specified in this protocol 

are similar to those stipulated in the 

Agency’s LDW test procedure, the 

Agency believes Euro NCAP’s test 

protocol will sufficiently address the 

lane keeping crash typology previously 

detailed for LDW. 

Euro NCAP’s LSS test procedure 

includes a series of ‘‘lane keep assist’’ 


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71At the time of testing, an older version of Euro 

NCAP’s LSS test procedure was available. This 

version stipulated a lane keep assist assessment 

criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum 

excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. 

European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro 

NCAP). See Assessment Protocol—Safety Assist, 

Version 7.0 (2015, November). 

72Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & 

Shain, K. (2019), Applying lane keeping support 

test track performance to real-world crash data, 26th 

Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, 

Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 

19–0208. 

73Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

74For data where the travel speed was known, 63 

and 65 percent of the data is unknown or not 

reported in FARS for road departure and opposite 

direction crashes, respectively. For road departure 

and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 

1 percent of the posted speed data is unknown or 

not reported in FARS. 

75Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

76 Ibid. 

trials that are performed with iteratively 

increasing lateral velocities towards the 

desired lane line. Each ‘‘lane keep 

assist’’ trial begins with the subject 

vehicle (SV) (i.e., the vehicle being 

evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 

mph) down a straight lane delineated by 

a single solid white or dashed white 

line. Initially, the SV path is parallel to 

the lane line, with an offset from the 

lane line that depends on the lateral 

velocity used later in the maneuver. 

Then, after a short period of steady-state 

driving, the direction of travel of the SV 

is headed towards the lane line using a 

path defined by a 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) 

radius curve. The lateral velocity of the 

SV’s approach towards the lane line 

(from both the left and right directions) 

is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 

1.6 ft./s) in 0.1 m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments 

until acceptable LKS performance is no 

longer realized. Acceptable LKS 

performance occurs when the SV does 

not cross the inboard leading edge of the 

lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0 ft.). 

NHTSA conducted a limited 

assessment of five model year 2017 

vehicles equipped with LKS systems. 

The Agency used a robotic steering 

controller to maximize the repeatability 

and minimize variability associated 

with manual steering inputs. For this 

study, NHTSA also used a slightly 

modified and older version of Euro 

NCAP’s LSS test procedure from what 

was discussed above. Specifically, the 

lateral velocity of the SV’s approach 

towards the lane line was increased 

from 0.1 m/s to 1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s 

increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./ 

s increments) to assess how LKS 

systems would perform at higher 

velocities. In addition, LKS performance 

was considered acceptable (when 

compared to Euro NCAP’s assessment 

criteria at the time of NHTSA’s testing) 

for instances where the SV did not cross 

the inboard leading edge of the lane line 

by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).71

A preliminary analysis of the five 

tested vehicles identified performance 

differences between the vehicles 

depending on the lateral velocity used 

during the test. Some vehicles only 

engaged a steering response at lower 

lateral velocities and others continued 

to provide a steering input as the lateral 

velocity was increased.72 The maximum 

excursion over the lane marking after an 

LKS activation was also found to be 

inconsistent, particularly as lateral 

velocity increased. These preliminary 

findings suggested that there are 

performance differences in how vehicle 

manufacturers are designing their 

systems for a given set of operating 

conditions. 

The results from these tests, as 

measured by the maximum excursions 

over the lane marking, were compared 

to the measured shoulder width of roads 

where fatal road departure crashes 

occurred. The analysis identified 

roadways where the shoulder width of 

the roadway was less than the 0.4 m (1.3 

ft.) maximum excursion limit (e.g., 

certain rural roadways) used in the 

Agency’s testing. It was observed that 

only vehicles displaying robust LKS 

performance, including at higher lateral 

velocities, would likely prevent the 

vehicle from departing the travel lane 

on these roadways. However, most of 

the roadway departure crashes were on 

roads where the shoulder width 

exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On these 

roadways, assuming the LKS was 

engaged, the lane departure could have 

been avoided. However, some vehicles 

did not perform well, with several 

exhibiting no system intervention, and 

others exceeding the maximum 

excursion limit as the lateral velocity 

was increased. To supplement these 

initial findings, additional LKS testing 

has since been conducted and is 

undergoing analysis. 

Since the analysis showed that most 

fatal crashes identified in the study 

were on roadways having shoulder 

widths that exceeded the current Euro 

NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 

ft.), NHTSA believes that adopting the 

Euro NCAP criterion may provide 

significant safety benefits, but is 

requesting comment on whether an even 

smaller excursion limit may be more 

appropriate. Furthermore, as the study 

also identified fatal crashes where lane 

markers were not present on the side of 

the roadway where a departure occurred 

(such that LKS would not provide any 

benefit unless it had the capability to 

identify the edge of the roadway), the 

Agency is also requesting comment (as 

mentioned previously) on adding Euro 

NCAP’s road edge detection test to 

NCAP so that it may begin to address 

crashes that occur where lane markings 

may not be present. 

Based on the findings from NHTSA’s 

LKS testing, which showed differences 

in LKS performance at greater lateral 

velocities, the Agency is concerned 

about LKS performance at higher travel 

speeds when the vehicle first transitions 

from a straight to a curved road where 

lateral velocity may inherently be high. 

In its independent analysis of the 2011– 

2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 

percent of fatal road departure crashes 

and 26 percent of fatal opposite 

direction crashes occurred at known 

travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 

mph). The analysis also showed that 55 

percent of fatal road departure crashes 

and 67 percent of opposite direction 

crashes occurred on roads with posted 

speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 

mph).73 74 Furthermore, the study 

revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 

percent and 13 percent of fatal road 

departure and opposite direction 

crashes, respectively.75 Since NHTSA 

does not currently have data to show 

that LKS system performance at Euro 

NCAP’s current test speed of 72 kph 

(44.7 mph) would be indicative of 

system performance when tested at 

higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting 

comment on whether it would be 

beneficial to incorporate additional, 

higher test speeds to assess the 

performance of lane keeping systems in 

NCAP. 

To date, NHTSA has only performed 

test track LKS evaluations using the 

straight road test configuration specified 

in the Euro NCAP test procedure. 

However, the Agency recognizes that a 

significant portion of road departure 

and opposite direction crashes resulting 

in fatalities and injuries occur on curved 

roads. A review of Volpe’s 2011–2015 

data set 76 showed that for road 

departure crashes, 37 percent of 

fatalities and 20 percent of injuries 

occurred on curved roads. For opposite 

direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities 

and 31 percent of injuries occurred on 

curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how 

LKS performance observed during 

straight road trials performed on a test 


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13464 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

77Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., 

Mynatt, M., & Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis 

of fatal run-out-of-lane crashes using the National 

Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to assess 

lane keeping technologies, 25th International 

Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of 

Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper 

Number 17–0220. 

78 It should be noted that the paper identified 

crashes where lane markings were not present on 

the side of the departure. 

79Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, 

G., & Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: 

Could partial automation make our roads safer? 

26th International Technical Conference on the 

Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Eindhoven, 

Netherlands, June 2019, Paper Number 19–0339. 

80Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), 

Prevalence of driver physical factors leading to 

unintentional lane departure crashes, Traffic Injury 

Prevention, 18(5), 481–487, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 

15389588.2016.1247446. 

81Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts’ Dots, after 

a half-century, will disappear from freeways, 

highways, The Orange County Register, https://

www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-ahalf-century-will-disappear-from-freewayshighways/. 

track would correlate to real-world 

system performance on curved roads. 

However, NHTSA believes, based on onroad performance testing experience of 

newer model year vehicles, that some 

current system designs include 

provisions to address lane departures on 

curved roads. The Agency observed that 

some LKS systems engage by providing 

limited operation throughout a curve— 

which may offer little (if any) safety 

benefits. However, other more 

sophisticated LKS systems maintain 

engagement longer and offer more 

directional authority throughout a 

curve. These systems may provide 

additional safety gains because the 

driver has more time to re-engage (i.e., 

restore effective manual control of the 

vehicle). 

In NHTSA’s study of the 2005 through 

2007 fatal crashes 77 from NMVCCS, 

crashes that occurred on curved roads 78

where the driver departed the travel 

lane were analyzed. The analysis 

showed that, unlike for straight roads 

where LKS systems may provide smaller 

corrective steering inputs to prevent the 

vehicle from departing the lane, LKS 

systems would have to provide 

sustained lateral correction (i.e., 

corrective steering) on a curved road to 

prevent the vehicle from departing the 

lane. 

Furthermore, in fleet testing of select 

model year 2012 through 2018 vehicles 

equipped with LDW and LKS 

(referenced in the report as LKA), 

Transport Canada 79 found variability in 

test results and generally unpredictable 

system behavior on curved roads. Thus, 

Transport Canada stated that it was not 

possible to gather enough data to assess 

the potential safety benefits associated 

with the technology. 

To address these unknowns and 

further understand the potential 

effectiveness of LKS systems in the real 

world, the Agency is considering 

additional research to study whether 

testing on curved roads should be 

considered for objective evaluation of 

LKS systems, and collect a combination 

of test track and real-world data to 

quantify how LKS systems will operate 

when exposed to different combinations 

of curve radius, vehicle speed, and 

departure timing (e.g., at curve onset or 

midway through the curve). 

With respect to LDW and LKS, 

NHTSA is seeking comment on the 

following: 

(1) Should the Agency award credit to 

vehicles equipped with LDW systems 

that provide a passing alert, regardless 

of the alert type? Why or why not? Are 

there any LDW alert modalities, such as 

visual-only warnings, that the Agency 

should not consider acceptable when 

determining whether a vehicle meets 

NCAP’s performance test criteria? If so, 

why? Should the Agency consider only 

certain alert modalities (such as haptic 

warnings) because they are more 

effective at re-engaging the driver and/ 

or have higher consumer acceptance? If 

so, which one(s) and why? 

(2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane 

keeping assist test methods from the 

Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the 

Agency’s LKS test procedure, should the 

LDW test procedure be removed from its 

NCAP program entirely and an LDW 

requirement be integrated into the LKS 

test procedure instead? Why or why 

not? For systems that have both LDW 

and LKS capabilities, the Agency would 

simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW 

test if both systems are to be assessed 

separately. What tolerances would be 

appropriate for each test, and why? 

(3) LKS system designs provide 

steering and/or braking to address lane 

departures (e.g., when a driver is 

distracted).80 To help re-engage a driver, 

should the Agency specify that an LDW 

alert must be provided when the LKS is 

activated? Why or why not? 

(4) Do commenters agree that the 

Agency should remove the Botts’ Dots 

test scenario from the current LDW test 

procedure since this lane marking type 

is being removed from use in 

California? 81 If not, why? 

(5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum 

excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.) over the 

lane marking (as defined with respect to 

the inside edge of the lane line) for LKS 

technology acceptable, or should the 

limit be reduced to account for crashes 

occurring on roads with limited 

shoulder width? If the tolerance should 

be reduced, what tolerance would be 

appropriate and why? Should this 

tolerance be adopted for LDW in 

addition to LKS? Why or why not? 

(6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP 

specifies use of a 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) 

curve and a series of increasing lateral 

offsets to establish the desired lateral 

velocity of the SV towards the lane line 

it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA 

tests have indicated that use of a 200 m 

(656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a 

clearer indication of when an LKS 

intervention occurs when compared to 

the baseline tests performed without 

LKS, a process specified by the Euro 

NCAP LSS protocol. This is because the 

small curve radius allows the desired 

SV lateral velocity to be more quickly 

established; requires less initial lateral 

offset within the travel lane; and allows 

for a longer period of steady state lateral 

velocity to be realized before an LKS 

intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m 

(656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather than 

1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for 

inclusion in a NHTSA LKS test 

procedure? Why or why not? 

(7) Euro NCAP’s LSS protocol 

specifies a single line lane to evaluate 

system performance. However, since 

certain LKS systems may require two 

lane lines before they can be enabled, 

should the Agency use a single line or 

two lines lane in its test procedure? 

Why? 

(8) Should NHTSA consider adding 

Euro NCAP’s road edge detection test to 

its NCAP program to begin addressing 

crashes where lane markings may not be 

present? If not, why? If so, should the 

test be added for LDW, LKS, or both 

technologies? 

(9) The LKS and ‘‘Road Edge’’ 

recovery tests defined in the Euro NCAP 

LSS protocol specify that a range of 

lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 

to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system 

performance, and that this range is 

representative of the lateral velocities 

associated with unintended lane 

departures (i.e., not an intended lane 

change). However, in the same protocol, 

Euro NCAP also specifies a range of 

lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 

to 2.0 ft./s) be used to represent 

unintended lane departures during 

‘‘Emergency Lane Keeping—Oncoming 

vehicle’’ and ‘‘Emergency Lane 

Keeping—Overtaking vehicle’’ tests. To 

encourage the most robust LKS system 

performance, should NHTSA consider a 

combination of the two Euro NCAP 

unintended departure ranges, lateral 

velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 

ft./s), for inclusion in the Agency’s LKS 

evaluation? Why or why not? 

(10) As discussed above, the Agency 

is concerned about LKS performance on 

roads that are curved. As such, can the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13465 

82Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

83Monticello, M. (2017, June 29), The positive 

impact of advanced safety systems for cars: The 

latest car-safety technologies have the potential to 

significantly reduce crashes, Consumer Reports, 

https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/ 

positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-forcars/. 

84 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019). 

Agency correlate better LKS system 

performance at higher lateral velocities 

on straight roads with better curved 

road performance? Why or why not? 

Furthermore, can the Agency assume 

that a vehicle that does not exceed the 

maximum excursion limits at higher 

lateral velocities on straight roads will 

have superior curved road performance 

compared to a vehicle that only meets 

the excursion limits at lower lateral 

velocities on straight roads? Why or 

why not? And lastly, can the Agency 

assume the steering intervention while 

the vehicle is negotiating a curve is 

sustained long enough for a driver to reengage? If not, why? 

(11) The Agency would like to be 

assured that when a vehicle is 

redirected after an LKS system 

intervenes to prevent a lane departure 

when tested on one side, if it 

approaches the lane marker on the side 

not tested, the LKS will again engage to 

prevent a secondary lane departure by 

not exceeding the same maximum 

excursion limit established for the first 

side. To prevent potential secondary 

lane departures, should the Agency 

consider modifying the Euro NCAP 

‘‘lane keep assist’’ evaluation criteria to 

be consistent with language developed 

for NHTSA’s BSI test procedure to 

prevent this issue? Why or why not? 

NHTSA’s test procedure states the SV 

BSI intervention shall not cause the SV 

to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the 

inboard edge of the lane line separating 

the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent 

and to the right of it within the validity 

period. To assess whether this occurs, a 

second lane line is required (only one 

line is specified in the Euro NCAP LSS 

protocol for LKS testing). Does the 

introduction of a second lane line have 

the potential to confound LKS testing? 

Why or why not? 

(12) Since most fatal road departure 

and opposite direction crashes occur at 

higher posted and known travel speeds, 

should the LKS test speed be increased, 

or does the current test speed 

adequately indicate performance at 

higher speeds, especially on straight 

roads? Why or why not? 

(13) The Agency recognizes that the 

LKS test procedure currently contains 

many test conditions (i.e., line type and 

departure direction). Is it necessary for 

the Agency to perform all test 

conditions to address the safety problem 

adequately, or could NCAP test only 

certain conditions to minimize test 

burden? For instance, should the 

Agency consider incorporating the test 

conditions for only one departure 

direction if the vehicle manufacturer 

provides test data to assure comparable 

system performance for the other 

direction? Or, should the Agency 

consider adopting only the most 

challenging test conditions? If so, which 

conditions are most appropriate? For 

instance, do the dashed line test 

conditions provide a greater challenge 

to vehicles than the solid line test 

conditions? 

(14) What is the appropriate number 

of test trials to adopt for each LKS test 

condition, and why? Also, what is an 

appropriate pass rate for the LKS tests, 

and why? 

(15) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

current LDW or proposed LKS test 

procedure that need further refinement 

or clarification? Is so, what additional 

refinements or clarifications are 

necessary? 

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies 

NHTSA’s 2019 target population 

study showed that blind spot detection 

technologies such as blind spot warning 

(BSW), blind spot intervention (BSI), 

and lane change/merge warning (LCM) 

(which is essentially a BSI warning 

system), can help prevent or mitigate 

five pre-crash lane change/merge 

scenarios. These pre-crash movements 

represented, on average, 503,070 crashes 

annually, or 8.7 percent of all crashes 

that occurred on U.S. roadways, and 

resulted in 542 fatalities and 188,304 

MAIS 1–5 injuries, as shown in Table 

A–3. This equated to 1.6 percent of all 

fatalities and 6.7 percent of all injuries 

recorded.82

Currently, NCAP does not include any 

ADAS technology that is designed to 

address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. 

NHTSA requested comment on the 

inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade 

to the program in its 2015 notice. 

Although the Agency did not 

recommend BSI for inclusion at that 

time, the Agency is proposing that both 

BSW and BSI technologies be adopted 

as part of this program update. 

Although the target population for 

blind spot detection technology may not 

be as large as the populations for AEB 

or lane keeping technologies, NHTSA 

believes there is merit to including 

blind spot technologies in NCAP. 

Consumer Reports found in its 2019 

survey that 82 percent of vehicle owners 

were satisfied with BSW technology, 60 

percent said that it had helped them 

avoid a crash, and 68 percent stated that 

they trusted the system to work every 

time.83 The Agency believes the 

technology’s high consumer acceptance 

rate, in addition to its potential safety 

benefits discussed later in this section, 

supports its inclusion in the Agency’s 

signature consumer information 

program. 

1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW) 

A BSW system is a warning-based 

driver assistance system designed to 

help the driver recognize that another 

vehicle is approaching, or being 

operated within, the blind spot of their 

vehicle in an adjacent lane. In these 

driving situations, and for all 

production BSW systems known to 

NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically 

presented to the driver, and is most 

relevant to a driver who is 

contemplating, or who has just initiated, 

a lane change. Depending on the system 

design, additional BSW features may be 

activated if the system is presenting an 

alert and then the driver operates their 

turn signal indicator. 

BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or 

ultrasonic-based sensors, or some 

combination thereof, as their means of 

detection. These sensors are typically 

located on the sides and/or rear of a 

vehicle. BSW alerts may be auditory, 

visual (most common), or haptic. Visual 

alerts are usually presented in the side 

outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the 

mirror housing, or at the base of the 

front a-pillars inside the vehicle. When 

another vehicle enters, or approaches, 

the driver’s blind spot while operating 

in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert 

will typically be continuously 

illuminated. However, if the driver 

engages the turn signal in the direction 

of the adjacent vehicle while the visual 

alert is present, the visual alert may 

transition to a flashing state and/or be 

supplemented with an additional 

auditory or haptic alert (e.g., beeping or 

vibration of the steering wheel or seat, 

respectively). 

NHTSA requested comment on a draft 

research blind spot detection (BSD) test 

procedure (referred to in this notice as 

BSW) published on November 21, 

2019 84 to assess systems’ performance 

and capabilities in blind spot related 

pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure 

exercises the BSW system in two 

different scenarios on the test track: the 

Straight Lane Converge and Diverge 

Test, and the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. 

These two tests assess whether the BSW 

system displays a warning when other 

vehicles, referred to as principal other 


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13466 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

85SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular 

regions that extend to the side and rear of the SV. 

Each rectangle is 8.2 ft. (2.5 m) wide and is 

represented by lines parallel to the longitudinal 

centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m) 

from the outermost edge of the SV’s body excluding 

the side view mirror(s). The rearward projection 

begins at the rearmost part of the SV side mirror 

housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is 

dependent on the relative speed between the SV 

and POV. The blind zone is fully described in the 

test procedure. 

86The posted speed limit was either not reported 

or was unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change 

crashes and 18 percent of lane change crashes that 

resulted in injuries. 

87The travel speed was either not reported or was 

unknown in 60 percent of fatal lane change crashes 

and 68 percent of lane change crashes that resulted 

in injuries. 

88Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

89 It was unknown or not reported whether 

speeding was a factor in 3 percent of fatal lane 

change crashes and 7 percent of lane change crashes 

that resulted in injuries. 

90Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & 

Flannagan, C. A. (2019), Analysis of the field 

effectiveness of General Motors production active 

safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 

University of Michigan Transportation Research 

Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI–2019–6. 

91For GM’s Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in 

the vehicle’s rear bumper are utilized to warn the 

driver of vehicles approaching from the rear on 

either the left or right side. 

92Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van 

Buskirk, T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July), Blind spot 

monitoring in light vehicles—System performance 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 045), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

vehicles (POVs), are within the driver’s 

blind spot. The test occurs without 

activation of the tested vehicle’s, 

referred to as the subject vehicle (SV), 

turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV 

turn signals are to be activated at any 

point during any test trial. A short 

description of each test scenario and the 

requirements for a passing result is 

provided below: 

• Straight Lane Converge and Diverge 

Test—The POV and SV are driven 

parallel to each other at a constant 

speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) such that 

the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m 

(3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of 

the SV in the outbound lanes of a threelane straight road. After 2.5 s of steadystate driving, the POV enters (i.e., 

converges into) the SV’s blind zone 85 by 

making a single lane change into the 

lane immediately adjacent to the SV 

using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 

m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of 

steady-state driving resumes for at least 

another 2.5 s and then the POV exits 

(i.e., diverges from) the SV’s blind zone 

by returning to its original travel lane 

using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 

m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). This test is 

repeated for a POV approach from both 

the left and the right side of the SV. 

—To pass a test trial: during the 

converge lane change, the BSW alert 

must be presented by a time no later 

than 300 ms after any part of the POV 

enters the SV blind zone and must 

remain on while any part of the POV 

resides within the SV blind zone; and 

during the diverge lane change, the 

BSW alert may remain active only when 

the lateral distance between the SV and 

POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less 

than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW 

alert shall not be active once the lateral 

distance between the SV and POV 

exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.). 

• Straight Lane Pass-by Test—The 

POV approaches and then passes the SV 

while being driven in an adjacent lane. 

For each trial, the SV is traveling at a 

constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) 

whereas the POV is traveling at one of 

four constant speeds—80.5, 88.5, 96.6, 

or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). 

The lateral distance between the two 

vehicles, defined as the closest lateral 

distance between adjacent sides of the 

polygons used to represent each vehicle, 

shall nominally be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the 

duration of the trial. This test is 

repeated for a POV approach towards 

the SV from an adjacent lane to the left 

and to the right of the SV. 

—To pass a test trial, the BSW alert 

must be presented by a time no later 

than 300 ms after the front-most part of 

the POV enters the SV blind zone and 

remain on while the front-most part of 

the POV resides behind the front-most 

part of the SV blind zone. The BSW 

alert shall not be active once the 

longitudinal distance between the frontmost part of the SV and the rear-most 

part of the POV exceeds the BSW 

termination distance specified for each 

POV speed. 

For the BSW tests, each scenario is 

tested using seven repeated trials for 

each combination of approach direction 

(left and right side of the SV) and test 

speed. This translates to a total of 14 

tests overall for the Straight Lane 

Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests 

overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by 

Test. NCAP is proposing that to pass the 

NCAP system performance 

requirements, the SV must pass at least 

five out of seven trials conducted for 

each approach direction and test speed. 

The proposed BSW tests represent 

pre-crash scenarios that correspond to a 

substantial portion of fatalities and 

injuries observed in real-world lane 

change crashes. A review of Volpe’s 

2011–2015 data set showed that 

approximately 28 percent of fatalities 

and 57 percent of injuries in lane 

change crashes occurred on roads with 

posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 

lower.86 For crashes where the travel 

speed was reported in FARS and GES, 

approximately 14 percent of fatalities 

and 24 percent of injuries occurred at 

speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.87

Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding 

was a factor in only 18 percent of the 

fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent 

of lane change crashes that resulted in 

injuries. This suggests that posted speed 

corresponds well to travel speed in most 

lane change crashes.88 89

As noted earlier, market research 

conducted by Consumer Reports (CR) 

indicated that BSW systems are 

desirable in consumer interest surveys 

of various ADAS technologies. In fact, 

CR found not only that an 

overwhelming majority of vehicle 

owners were satisfied with BSW 

technology, but also that 60 percent of 

them believed BSW technology had 

helped them avoid a crash. However, in 

its study to evaluate the real-world 

effectiveness of ADAS technologies in 

model year 2013–2017 General Motors’ 

(GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM’s 

Side Blind Zone Alert produced a nonsignificant 3 percent reduction in lane 

change crashes. When the Side Blind 

Zone Alert technology was combined 

with an earlier generation technology, 

GM’s Lane Change Alert, the 

corresponding effectiveness increased to 

26 percent.90 UMTRI attributed this 

increase to substantially longer vehicle 

detection ranges for the Lane Change 

Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system 

compared to GM’s earlier generation 

Side Blind Zone Alert system.91 An 

Agency study of three BSW-equipped 

vehicles also showed that that currently 

available BSW systems may likely 

exhibit differences in detection 

capabilities and operating conditions 

such that their effectiveness estimates 

could vary significantly.92 For instance, 

one vehicle’s system may simply 

augment a driver’s visual awareness 

whereas another may effectively prevent 

crashes by warning of higher speed lane 

change events. In its response to NCAP’s 

December 2015 notice, Bosch provided 

similar insight. The company stated that 

some BSW systems may only provide 

benefit for shorter detection distances, 

such as 7 m (23.0 ft.) rearward, whereas 

other systems may provide detection for 

distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) 

rearward, which would help the driver 

avoid collisions with vehicles 

approaching from the rear in adjacent 

lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans 

to study these performance differences 

in its testing. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13467 

93SAE International (2018), SAE J3016_201806: 

Taxonomy and definitions for terms related to 

driving automation systems for on-road motor 

vehicles, Warrendale, PA, www.sae.org. 

94The sustained driving automation system of 

both the lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion 

control with the expectation that the driver 

supervises the driving automation system. 

95Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., Yanagisawa, M., & 

Najm, W. (2018, September), Pre-Crash Scenario 

Characteristics of Motorcycle Crashes for Crash 

Avoidance Research (Report No. DOT HS 812 902), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. In Press 

NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW 

tests in NCAP in accordance with the 

Agency’s BSW test procedure. The 

Agency believes that the Straight Lane 

Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates 

incrementally higher test speeds for the 

POV, could be used to distinguish 

between vehicles that have basic versus 

advanced BSW capability. For instance, 

an SV that can only satisfy the BSW 

activation criteria when the POV 

approaches with a low relative velocity 

may be considered as having basic BSW 

capability, whereas a vehicle that can 

look further rearward, to sense a passing 

vehicle travelling at a much higher 

speed, may be considered to have 

superior BSW capability. NHTSA 

believes such an assessment is 

important because when one vehicle 

encroaches into the adjacent lane of the 

other, the crashes associated with higher 

speed differentials can be expected to be 

more severe than those that occur when 

the two vehicle speeds are more similar. 

Furthermore, the capability of a vehicle 

to detect when another vehicle has 

entered an extended rear zone could be 

important for the application of other 

ADAS technologies such as blind spot 

intervention (BSI) or SAE 93 Level 2 

partial driving automation 94 systems 

that incorporate automatic lane change 

features. Therefore, the Agency believes 

that long-range vehicle detection may 

not only increase the effectiveness of 

blind spot technologies such as BSI, but 

also enhance capabilities and robustness 

of other ADAS applications. For these 

reasons, NHTSA is proposing (later in 

this notice) the incorporation of BSI 

technology in NCAP to encourage the 

proliferation of such systems along with 

sensing strategies that offer a greater 

field of view. 

Commenters to NHTSA’s December 

2015 notice overwhelmingly supported 

the addition of BSW in NCAP. In fact, 

many commenters suggested the Agency 

expand the testing requirements to 

encompass additional test targets, such 

as motorcycles, and test conditions. 

Several commenters also recommended 

that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test 

procedure with International 

Organization for Standardization (ISO) 

standards. Each of these topics will be 

discussed below. 

a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test 

Conditions 

Commenters, including the ASC, 

Continental, Bosch, NSC, and others, 

recommended that the Agency expand 

the BSW testing requirements to include 

motorcycle detection. Delphi, MTS, 

Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW), 

and CU suggested that NHTSA evaluate 

a vehicle’s ability to detect bicycles in 

addition to motorcycles. Similarly, 

Subaru suggested that changes to the 

Straight Lane Pass-by Test should be 

made to address motorcycle detection. 

MTS and MCW added that motorcycle 

riders and bicyclists are more 

vulnerable to serious and fatal injuries 

compared to occupants of motor 

vehicles. A few commenters were not 

supportive of adding a motorcycle 

detection test in NCAP. Global 

Automakers and Hyundai stated that 

although it was a reasonable goal for the 

future, no standardized test devices 

currently existed at the time. Similarly, 

Honda and the Alliance recommended 

that the Agency focus on vehicle 

detection as a first step since no 

standard test procedure exists for 

motorcycle detection. The Alliance 

added that since the location of a 

motorcycle within a lane can vary 

greatly, test procedures would need to 

specify motorcycle behavior and 

reasonable detection distances. 

Furthermore, MTS stated that the 

position of the motorcycle POV within 

the lane (near, center, far) should be 

specified, and the radar cross section 

and projected area of the motorcycle 

should be considered as well. 

NHTSA agrees that BSW systems 

capable of detecting motorcycles would 

improve safety. A review of the 2011 

through 2015 FARS and GES data sets 95

showed that there were 106 fatal crashes 

and nearly 5,100 police-reported crashes 

annually, on average, for same direction 

lane change crashes involving a vehicle 

and motorcycle. In comparison, as 

mentioned earlier, there were 542 

fatalities and 503,070 police-reported 

crashes annually, on average, for lane 

change crashes involving motor 

vehicles. These data show that more 

occupants of motor vehicles die in lane 

changing crashes than do motorcyclists. 

However, the fatality rate for 

motorcyclists is greater than that for 

vehicle occupants. 

At this time, the Agency has decided 

to prioritize testing of BSW systems on 

motor vehicles for NCAP. NHTSA 

believes that performing BSW testing on 

light vehicles, particularly at higher 

POV closing speeds, and for active 

safety systems (as will be discussed 

next), should encourage development of 

robust sensing systems, which may 

improve the detection of other objects 

such as motorcycles. That being said, 

the Agency has planned an upcoming 

research project designed to address 

injuries and fatalities for other 

vulnerable road users, specifically 

motorcyclists. The Agency will continue 

to observe the development of BSW 

technology and is likely to include test 

procedures for motorcycle detection in 

NCAP at a later date if the technology 

meets the four prerequisites mentioned 

above. 

Several commenters offered 

additional suggestions for ways NHTSA 

could expand the BSW test procedure. 

MCW suggested that the Agency adopt 

test scenarios that address curved roads 

and low light conditions. CU proposed 

that the Agency should assess whether 

BSW systems provide a clear indication 

to the driver that the system is not 

operating since sensors are sometimes 

rendered inoperable in poor weather or 

when blocked. 

As with all the ADAS technologies, 

NHTSA recognizes that there is a need 

to understand and assure crash 

mitigation performance of BSW systems 

under all practical situations that the 

driver and vehicle will encounter in the 

real world. However, such 

comprehensive testing is not always 

practical within the scope of the NCAP 

program. Thus, for technologies that met 

the four principles for inclusion in 

NCAP, the Agency primarily attempted 

to address the most frequently 

occurring, most fatal, and most injurious 

pre-crash scenarios when prioritizing 

tests to add to the program. When ADAS 

technologies penetrate the fleet in 

sufficient numbers, then the Agency can 

evaluate how these systems are 

performing in the real world and adjust 

the system performance criteria 

accordingly to address additional test 

conditions, such as those mentioned by 

MCW. Regarding CU’s suggestion, the 

Agency believes, after reviewing vehicle 

owner’s manuals, that most vehicle 

manufacturers are including provisions 

in their system designs to provide a 

malfunction indicator to the driver if the 

system is no longer operational because 

the sensors are blocked or due to severe 

weather conditions. 

NHTSA has also considered Bosch’s 

request to expand the definition of BSW 

to encourage adoption of systems that 

provide longer detection distances. 

NHTSA believes, as discussed above, 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES3
13468 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

96Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & 

Flannagan, C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field 

effectiveness of General Motors production active 

safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 

University of Michigan Transportation Research 

Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI–2019–6. 

97 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019). 

98The Agency notes that these test scenario 

descriptions assume the SV is operating in SAE 

Automation Level 0 or Level 1 operation with only 

the Automatic Cruise Control (ACC) enabled. 

Though the Agency’s BSI test procedure has 

provisions to evaluate vehicles operating in SAE 

Automation Levels 2 or 3. Test scenario 

descriptions for these evaluations are not discussed 

herein. 

that by using higher POV closing speeds 

to assess BSW system performance, it 

may effectively drive enhanced blind 

spot system capabilities such as those 

required for other rearward-looking 

ADAS applications, like BSI, or 

automatic lane change functions. 

b. Test Procedure Harmonization 

Several commenters suggested that 

NHTSA harmonize its BSW test 

procedure with International 

Organization for Standardization (ISO) 

standard 17387:2008, Intelligent 

transport systems—Lane change 

decision aid systems (LCDAS)— 

Performance requirements and test 

procedures or with various aspects of 

this standard. Global Automakers and 

Hyundai commented that NHTSA 

should shift the forward edge of the 

blind zone rearward from the outside 

rearview mirrors to the eye point of a 

95th percentile person, as specified in 

ISO 17387. Hyundai stated that the ISO 

procedure is designed such that when 

the POV is in-line with the SV driver’s 

eye ellipse, the driver’s peripheral 

vision allows him/her to see the POV 

without the assistance of BSW systems. 

The ASC, Continental, and Subaru also 

suggested that the Agency align the 

warning zones in the Agency’s BSW test 

procedure with those specified in ISO 

17387. 

The Agency does not agree with 

commenters’ suggestion to adopt the 

ISO procedure for defining the forward 

edge of the blind zone as measured 

using the eye ellipse from a seated 95th 

percentile person. NHTSA believes that 

the blind zone should be defined not by 

a specific seated individual but by the 

vehicle’s characteristics, since a realworld blind spot for any particular 

vehicle would differ depending on the 

size characteristics of the individual 

driving the vehicle at the time. Since 

people vary in size, they will sit in 

different seating positions and have 

different seating preferences. For 

instance, a 95th percentile male will be 

seated more rearward whereas a 5th 

percentile female will be seated more 

forward. In addition, drivers have 

personal preferences for adjusting their 

side view mirrors that may not be 

considered optimal and may not 

provide a full field of view when 

checking the mirrors to make change 

lanes. For these reasons, the Agency 

tentatively concludes that it is more 

appropriate and better for the safety of 

consumers to set the forward plane of 

the blind zone at the rearmost part of 

the side view mirrors, as specified in its 

BSW test procedure. This approach 

should not only best accommodate a 

wide variety of driver sizes and seating 

positions, but also reduce test 

complexity when defining the blind 

zone. 

2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI) 

Blind spot intervention (BSI) systems 

are similar to AEB and LKS systems in 

that they provide active intervention to 

help the driver avoid a collision with 

another vehicle. BSW systems alert a 

driver that a vehicle is in his/her blind 

spot, whereas BSI systems activate 

when the BSW alert is ignored, and 

intervene either by automatically 

applying the vehicle’s brakes or 

providing a steering input to guide the 

vehicle back into the unobstructed lane. 

With their active capability, BSI systems 

can help a driver avoid collisions with 

other vehicles that are approaching the 

vehicle’s blind spot, in addition to 

preventing crashes with vehicles 

operating within the vehicle’s blind 

spot. 

Like BSW systems, BSI systems 

utilize rear-facing sensors to detect other 

vehicles that are next to or behind the 

vehicle in adjacent lanes. Depending on 

the design of these systems, BSI 

activation may or may not require the 

driver to operate his/her turn signal 

indicator during a lane change. 

Furthermore, some BSI systems may 

only operate if the vehicle’s BSW 

system is also enabled. 

As discussed earlier, UMTRI found 

that GM’s BSW system, Side Blind Zone 

Alert, produced a non-significant 3 

percent reduction in lane change 

crashes. However, when Side Blind 

Zone Alert was combined with a later 

generation technology, GM’s Lane 

Change Alert, the corresponding 

effectiveness increased to 26 percent.96

Given BSI is only now penetrating the 

fleet, NHTSA is unaware of any 

effectiveness studies for this technology. 

However, as discussed earlier, the 

Agency believes that active safety 

technologies are more effective than 

warning technologies. The UMTRI study 

concluded that AEB is more effective 

than FCW alone and that LKS is more 

effective than LDW. The Agency 

believes the same relationship will 

likely hold true for blind spot systems, 

and that BSI will be more effective than 

BSW alone. NHTSA also believes, as 

mentioned above, that adopting ADAS 

technologies such as BSI should also 

encourage development of enhanced 

BSW system capabilities (e.g., 

motorcycle and bicycle detection), and 

may increase the robustness of other 

ADAS applications. 

NHTSA is proposing to use its 

published draft test procedure titled, 

‘‘Blind Spot Intervention System 

Confirmation Test,’’ 97 to evaluate the 

performance of vehicles equipped with 

BSI technology in NCAP. The Agency’s 

test procedure consists of three 

scenarios: Subject Vehicle (SV) Lane 

Change with Constant Headway, SV 

Lane Change with Closing Headway, 

and SV Lane Change with Constant 

Headway, False Positive Assessment. In 

the first two scenarios, an SV initiates 

or attempts a lane change into an 

adjacent lane while a single POV is 

residing within the SV’s blind zone 

(Scenario 1), or is approaching it from 

the rear (Scenario 2). The third scenario 

is used to evaluate the propensity of a 

BSI system to activate inappropriately 

in a non-critical driving scenario that 

does not present a safety risk to the 

occupants in the SV. In each of the tests, 

the POV is a strikeable object with the 

characteristics of a compact passenger 

car. The system performance 

requirements stipulate that the SV may 

not contact the POV during the conduct 

of any test trial. NHTSA is requesting 

comment on the number of trials that 

are appropriate for each test. Each of 

these scenarios, along with the proposed 

evaluation criteria, is detailed below: 98

• SV Lane Change with Constant 

Headway—The POV is driven at 72.4 

kph (45 mph) in a lane adjacent and to 

the left of the SV also traveling at 72.4 

kph (45 mph) with a constant 

longitudinal offset such that the frontmost part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) 

ahead of the rear-most part of the SV. 

After a short period of steady-state 

driving, the SV driver engages the left 

turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all 

pre-SV lane change test validity criteria 

have been satisfied. Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s 

after the turn signal has been activated, 

the SV driver initiates a manual lane 

change into the POV’s travel lane. The 

SV driver then releases the steering 

wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting 

a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve during 

the lane change. To meet the 

performance criteria, the BSI system 

must intervene so as to prevent the left 

rear of the SV from contacting the right 

front of the POV. Additionally, the SV 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13469 

99The posted speed limit was either not reported 

or was unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change 

crashes and 18 percent of lane change crashes that 

resulted in injuries. 

100The travel speed was either not reported or 

was unknown in 65 percent of fatal lane change 

crashes and 67 percent of lane change crashes that 

resulted in injuries. 

101The GVT is a three-dimensional surrogate that 

resembles a white hatchback passenger car. It is 

currently used by other consumer organizations, 

including Euro NCAP, and vehicle manufacturers in 

their internal testing of ADAS technologies. See 

Section III.D.2. of this notice for an expanded 

discussion of the GVT. 

BSI intervention shall not cause the SV 

to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond 

the inboard edge of the lane line 

separating the SV travel lane from the 

lane adjacent and to the right of it 

within the validity period. 

• SV Lane Change with Closing 

Headway Scenario—The POV is driven 

at a constant speed of 80.5 kph (50 mph) 

towards the rear of the SV in an adjacent 

lane to the left of the SV, which is 

traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph 

(45 mph). During the test, the SV driver 

engages the turn signal indicator when 

the POV is 4.9 ± 0.5 s from a vertical 

plane defined by the rear of the SV and 

perpendicular to the SV travel lane. 

Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s after the turn signal 

has been activated, the SV driver 

initiates a manual lane change into the 

POV’s travel lane. The SV driver then 

releases the steering wheel within 250 

ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 

ft.) radius curve. To meet the 

performance criteria, the BSI system 

must intervene to prevent the left rear 

of the SV from contacting the right front 

of the POV. Additionally, the SV BSI 

intervention shall not cause the SV to 

travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the 

inboard edge of the lane line separating 

the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent 

and to the right of it within the validity 

period. 

• SV Lane Change with Constant 

Headway, False Positive Assessment 

Test—The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 

mph) in a lane that is two lanes to the 

left of the SV’s initial travel lane with 

a constant longitudinal offset such that 

the front-most part of the POV is 1 m 

(3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of 

the SV, which is also travelling at 72.4 

kph (45 mph). The SV driver engages 

the left turn signal indicator at least 3 

s after all pre-SV lane change test 

validity criteria have been satisfied. 

Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s after the turn signal 

has been activated, the SV driver 

initiates a manual lane change into the 

left adjacent lane (the one between the 

SV and POV). For this test, the driver 

does not release the steering wheel. 

Since the lane change will not result in 

an SV-to-POV impact, the SV BSI 

system must not intervene during any 

valid trials. To determine whether a BSI 

intervention occurred, the SV yaw rate 

data collected during the individual 

trials performed in this scenario are 

compared to a baseline composite. After 

being aligned in time to the baseline, the 

difference between the data must not 

exceed 1 degree/second within the test 

validity period. 

The proposed crash-imminent BSI test 

scenarios represent pre-crash scenarios 

that correspond to a substantial portion 

of fatalities and injuries observed in 

real-world lane change crashes. As 

discussed in the BSW crash statistics 

section, Volpe showed that 

approximately 28 percent of fatalities 

and 57 percent of injuries in lane 

change crashes occurred on roads with 

posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 

lower.99 Furthermore, approximately 14 

percent of fatalities and 24 percent of 

injuries were reported for crashes that 

occurred at known travel speeds of 72.4 

kph (45 mph) or lower.100

NHTSA has conducted a series of 

tests utilizing its proposed BSI test 

procedure. Since BSI systems are not 

widely available in the fleet, the Agency 

selected vehicles in order to cover as 

many manufacturers as possible that 

have implemented this technology. All 

vehicles selected for BSW testing also 

underwent BSI testing. Test reports 

related to both test programs can be 

found in the docket for this notice. For 

the purposes of this testing, the Agency 

used the Global Vehicle Target (GVT) 

Revision G to represent the POV, which 

is specified in the BSI test procedure as 

a strikeable object.101 When the BSI 

technology assessment is incorporated 

into NCAP, the Agency plans to use the 

GVT Revision G as a strikeable target to 

be consistent with Euro NCAP’s ADAS 

test procedures that specify a strikeable 

target. In the context of testing BSW and 

BSI technologies in NCAP to address 

lane change crashes, NHTSA is seeking 

comment on the following: 

(16) Should all BSW testing be 

conducted without the turn signal 

indicator activated? Why or why not? If 

the Agency was to modify the BSW test 

procedure to stipulate activation of the 

turn signal indicator, should the test 

vehicle be required to provide an 

audible or haptic warning that another 

vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a visual 

warning sufficient? If a visual warning 

is sufficient, should it continually flash, 

at a minimum, to provide a distinction 

from the blind spot status when the turn 

signal is not in use? Why or why not? 

(17) Is it appropriate for the Agency 

to use the Straight Lane Pass-by Test to 

quantify and ultimately differentiate a 

vehicle’s BSW capability based on its 

ability to provide acceptable warnings 

when the POV has entered the SV’s 

blind spot (as defined by the blind zone) 

for varying POV–SV speed differentials? 

Why or why not? 

(18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable 

POV in the BSI test procedure 

appropriate? Is using Revision G in 

NCAP appropriate? Why or why not? 

(19) The Agency recognizes that the 

BSW test procedure currently contains 

two test scenarios that have multiple 

test conditions (e.g., test speeds and 

POV approach directions (left and right 

side of the SV)). Is it necessary for the 

Agency to perform all test scenarios and 

test conditions to address the real-world 

safety problem adequately, or could it 

test only certain scenarios or conditions 

to minimize test burden in NCAP? For 

instance, should the Agency consider 

incorporating only the most challenging 

test conditions into NCAP, such as the 

ones with the greatest speed differential, 

or choose to perform the test conditions 

having the lowest and highest speeds? 

Should the Agency consider only 

performing the test conditions where 

the POV passes by the SV on the left 

side if the vehicle manufacturer 

provides test data to assure the left side 

pass-by tests are also representative of 

system performance during right side 

pass-by tests? Why or why not? 

(20) Given the Agency’s concern 

about the amount of system 

performance testing under consideration 

in this RFC, it seeks input on whether 

to include a BSI false positive test. Is a 

false positive assessment needed to 

insure system robustness and high 

customer satisfaction? Why or why not? 

(21) The BSW test procedure includes 

7 repeated trials for each test condition 

(i.e., test speed and POV approach 

direction). Is this an appropriate number 

of repeat trials? Why or why not? What 

is the appropriate number of test trials 

to adopt for each BSI test scenario, and 

why? Also, what is an appropriate pass 

rate for each of the two tests, BSW and 

BSI, and why is it appropriate? 

(22) Is it reasonable to perform only 

BSI tests in conjunction with activation 

of the turn signal? Why or why not? If 

the turn signal is not used, how can the 

operation of BSI be differentiated from 

the heading adjustments resulting from 

an LKS intervention? Should the SV’s 

LKS system be switched off during 

conduct of the Agency’s BSI 

evaluations? Why or why not? 

C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic 

Emergency Braking (PAEB) 

Another important ADAS technology 

NHTSA proposes to include in its 

upgrade of NCAP is pedestrian 

automatic emergency braking (PAEB). 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES3
13470 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

102Carpenter, M.G., Moury, M.T., Skvarce, J.R., 

Struck, M. Zwicky, T. D., & Kiger, S.M. (2014, June), 

Objective tests for forward looking pedestrian crash 

avoidance/mitigation systems: Final report (Report 

No. DOT HS 812 040), Washington, DC: National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

103 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019). 

104 Yanagisawa, M., Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., & 

Najm, W.G. (2017, April), Estimation of potential 

safety benefits for pedestrian crash avoidance/ 

mitigation systems (Report No. DOT HS 812 400), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

105As explained previously, the Abbreviated 

Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification system for 

assessing impact injury severity. AIS ranks 

individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 

to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 

4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 = maximum 

(untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury 

severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., 

the highest single AIS for a person with one or more 

injuries). 

106Overlap is defined as the percent of the 

vehicle’s width that the pedestrian would traverse 

prior to impact if the vehicle’s speed and 

pedestrian’s speed remain constant. 

PAEB systems function similar to AEB 

systems but detect pedestrians instead 

of vehicles. PAEB uses information from 

forward-looking sensors to issue a 

warning and actively apply the vehicle’s 

brakes when a pedestrian, or sometimes 

a cyclist, is in front of the vehicle and 

the driver has not acted to avoid the 

impending impact. Similar to AEB, 

PAEB systems typically use cameras to 

determine whether a pedestrian is in 

imminent danger of being struck by the 

vehicle, but some systems may use a 

combination of cameras, radar, lidar, 

and/or thermal imaging sensors. 

Many pedestrian crashes occur when 

a pedestrian is in the forward path of a 

driver’s vehicle. Four common 

pedestrian crash scenarios include 

when the vehicle is: 

1. Heading straight and a pedestrian is 

crossing the road; 

2. Turning right and a pedestrian is 

crossing the road; 

3. Turning left and a pedestrian is 

crossing the road; and 

4. Heading straight and a pedestrian is 

walking along or against traffic. 

These four crash scenarios are defined 

as Scenarios S1–S4, respectively, by the 

Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership 

(CAMP) Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) 

Consortium.102

Two of these scenarios, S1 and S4, are 

included in NHTSA’s draft research 

PAEB test procedure, published on 

November 21, 2019, and referenced 

herein as the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure.103 The S1 scenario 

represents a pedestrian crossing the 

road in front of the vehicle, while the S4 

scenario represents a pedestrian moving 

with or against traffic along the side of 

the road in the path of the vehicle. Both 

test scenarios are repeated for multiple 

pedestrian impact locations. The S1 and 

S4 crash scenarios were chosen for 

inclusion in NHTSA’s 2019 PAEB test 

procedure because a review of 

pedestrian crashes from the 2011 

through 2012 GES and FARS data 

sets 104 found that, on average, these two 

pre-crash scenarios (S1 and S4) 

accounted for approximately 33,000 (52 

percent) of vehicle-pedestrian crashes 

and 3,000 (90 percent) fatal vehiclepedestrian crashes with a light-vehicle 

striking a pedestrian as the first event. 

Furthermore, these crashes accounted 

for 67 percent of MAIS 2+ and 76 

percent of MAIS 3+ injured 

pedestrians.105 The 2019 PAEB test 

procedure only considered daylight test 

conditions for both the S1 and S4 crash 

scenarios. 

The Agency’s 2019 PAEB test 

procedure does not include CAMP 

scenario S2 (vehicle turning right and a 

pedestrian crossing the road), and 

CAMP scenario S3 (vehicle turning left 

and a pedestrian crossing the road). In 

response to the December 2015 notice, 

several commenters stated that 

addressing these scenarios with 

available technology may generate a 

significant number of false positive 

detections. Such false detections could 

have the unintended consequences of 

causing hazardous situations (e.g., 

unexpected sudden braking while 

turning in traffic) that could lead drivers 

to disable their PAEB systems, or even 

lead to an increase in rear-end 

collisions. The commenters explained 

that the S2 and S3 test scenarios require 

more sophisticated algorithms as well as 

more robust test methodologies than 

those required for scenarios S1 and S4. 

However, ZF TRW mentioned that 

ADAS sensors designed to meet Euro 

NCAP’s Vulnerable Road Users test 

procedures would have increased fields 

of view (FOV), which should improve 

their effectiveness in turning scenarios. 

Others stated that the articulating 

mannequins may not be representative 

of a real human for all sensing 

technologies in turning scenarios. Most 

commenters indicated that it was more 

appropriate to focus on the scenarios 

affording the most significant safety 

benefits first—S1 and S4. Commenters 

stated that adding the S2 and S3 

scenarios would be more practical when 

the technology matures. NHTSA will 

continue to evaluate PAEB systems to 

assess the feasibility of expanding the 

suite of PAEB tests as technological 

advancements are made. The Agency 

will consider adding these test scenarios 

(S2 and S3) to NCAP in the future once 

the Agency has repeatable and reliable 

test data to support their inclusion. 

In the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the 

S1 test scenario includes seven different 

test conditions—S1a, S1b, S1c, S1d, 

S1e, S1f, and S1g. For these tests, the SV 

travels in a straight, forward direction at 

40 kph (24.9 mph). Additionally, the SV 

also travels at 16 kph (9.9 mph) for test 

conditions S1a, S1b, S1c, and S1d. A 

pedestrian mannequin crosses 

perpendicular to the subject vehicle’s 

line of travel at 5 kph (3.1 mph) for all 

test conditions, except for S1e, in which 

the mannequin crosses at 8 kph (5.0 

mph). In test condition S1a, the SV 

encounters a crossing adult pedestrian 

mannequin walking from the nearside 

(i.e., the passenger’s side of the vehicle) 

with 25 percent overlap of the 

vehicle.106 In test conditions S1b and 

S1c, the SV encounters a crossing adult 

pedestrian walking from the nearside 

with 50 percent and 75 percent overlap 

of the vehicle, respectively. In test 

condition S1d, the SV encounters a 

crossing child pedestrian mannequin 

running from behind parked vehicles 

from the nearside with 50 percent 

overlap of the vehicle. In test condition 

S1e, the SV encounters a crossing adult 

pedestrian running from the ‘‘offside’’ 

(i.e., the driver’s side of the vehicle) 

with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle. 

In test condition S1f, the SV encounters 

a crossing adult pedestrian walking 

from the nearside that stops short 

(¥25% overlap) of entering the 

vehicle’s path. In test condition S1g, the 

SV encounters a crossing adult 

pedestrian walking from the nearside 

that clears the vehicle’s path (125% 

overlap). 

The S4 test scenario in the 2019 PAEB 

test procedure includes three different 

test conditions—S4a, S4b, and S4c. In 

this test scenario, the SV travels in a 

straight, forward direction at 40 kph 

(24.9 mph) and/or 16 kph (9.9 mph) (for 

test conditions S4a and S4b) and a 

pedestrian mannequin moves parallel to 

the flow of traffic at 5 kph (3.1 mph) (for 

test condition S4c) or is stationary (for 

test condition S4a and S4b) in front of 

the SV. For all S4 test conditions, the 

SV is aligned to impact the pedestrian 

at 25 percent overlap. In test condition 

S4a, the SV encounters an adult 

pedestrian standing in front of the 

vehicle on the nearside of the road 

facing away from the approaching SV. 

In test condition S4b, the SV encounters 

an adult pedestrian standing in front of 

the vehicle on the nearside of the road 

facing towards the approaching SV. In 

test condition S4c, the SV encounters an 

adult pedestrian walking in front of the 

vehicle on the nearside of the road 

facing away from the approaching SV. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13471 

107Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

108The posted speed limit was either not reported 

or was unknown in 4 percent of fatal pedestrian 

crashes and 29 percent of pedestrian crashes that 

resulted in injuries. 

109The travel speed was either not reported or 

was unknown in 59 percent of fatal pedestrian 

crashes and 72 percent of pedestrian crashes that 

resulted in injuries. 

110Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

111 In 4 percent of pedestrian crashes, it was 

unknown or not reported whether speeding was a 

factor. 

112Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of 

automatic emergency braking systems on 

pedestrian crash risk, Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastor

edocument/bibliography/2243. 

113These test speeds represent the maximum test 

speeds potentially utilized for a given test 

condition. The actual speeds used for a given 

combination of vehicle and test condition depended 

on observed PAEB system performance. 

114European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP). (2019, July). TEST PROTOCOL—AEB 

VRU systems 3.0.2. 

The Agency is proposing to make 

several changes to the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure for the purpose of adopting it 

for use in NCAP. These changes involve 

the pedestrian mannequins, test speeds 

and included test conditions, the 

specified lighting conditions, and the 

number of test trials required to be 

conducted for each test condition. 

The first change the Agency is 

proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB 

test procedure concerns the pedestrian 

targets. As was recommended by several 

commenters who responded to the 

December 2015 notice, the Agency 

proposes to utilize state-of-the-art 

mannequins with articulated, moving 

legs, instead of the posable child and 

adult pedestrian test mannequins 

specified in the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure. NHTSA believes that the 

articulating pedestrian targets are more 

representative of walking pedestrians 

and expects that these more realistic 

targets will encourage development of 

PAEB systems that detect, classify, and 

respond to pedestrians more accurately 

and effectively. In turn, this should 

allow manufacturers to improve the 

effectiveness of current PAEB systems. 

The Agency also recognizes that 

adopting the child and adult articulating 

targets would harmonize with other 

major consumer information-focused 

entities that use articulating 

mannequins, such as Euro NCAP and 

IIHS. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law 

mandated that NHTSA identify 

opportunities where NCAP would 

‘‘benefit from harmonization with thirdparty safety rating programs,’’ and the 

Agency believes that the pedestrian 

mannequins represent one such 

opportunity. 

The second change the Agency is 

proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB 

test procedure for incorporation into 

NCAP involves test speeds. The test 

speeds specified in the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure correspond to a relatively 

small percentage of crashes that result 

in pedestrian injuries and fatalities. 

Volpe’s analysis of 2011–2015 FARS 

and GES crash data sets showed that 9 

percent of pedestrian fatalities and 25 

percent of pedestrian injuries resulted 

from crashes that occurred on roadways 

with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 

mph) or less, whereas 88 percent of 

fatalities and 43 percent of injuries 

occurred for crashes on roadways with 

posted speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25 

mph).107 108 For crashes that occurred on 

roadways where the travel speed was 

known, 6 percent of pedestrian fatalities 

and 19 percent of pedestrian injuries 

were reported for travel speeds of 40.2 

kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 36 

percent of fatalities and 7 percent of 

injuries occurred for travel speeds 

greater than 40.2 kph (25 mph).109

NHTSA notes that speeding was a factor 

in only 5 percent of the fatal pedestrian 

crashes, which suggests that the posted 

speed could correlate closely with the 

travel speed of the vehicle prior to 

impact with the pedestrian.110 111

As Volpe’s analysis focused on 2011– 

2015 FARS and GES crash data sets, it 

is likely that most vehicles studied were 

not equipped with PAEB systems. 

Recently, IIHS studied approximately 

1,500 police-reported crashes involving 

a wide variety of 2017–2020 model year 

vehicles from various manufacturers to 

examine the effects of PAEB systems on 

real-world pedestrian crashes.112 In this 

study, the Institute found that 

‘‘pedestrian AEB was associated with a 

32 percent reduction in the odds of a 

pedestrian crash on roads with speed 

limits of 25 mph or less and a 34 

percent reduction on roads with 30–35 

mph limits, but no reduction at all on 

roads with speed limits of 50 mph or 

higher. . .’’. These findings highlight 

the limitations of existing PAEB systems 

and the importance of adopting higher 

test speeds for PAEB testing (where 

feasible) to encourage additional safety 

improvement. 

To establish feasible speed thresholds 

for adoption in its PAEB test procedure, 

the Agency conducted a series of tests 

on a selection of MY 2020 vehicles from 

various manufacturers to assess the 

operational range and performance of 

current PAEB systems. Vehicles for the 

PAEB characterization tests were 

selected with the intent of testing a 

variety of vehicle makes, types, sizes; 

global and domestic products; and 

forward-facing sensor types (camera 

only, stereo camera, fused camera plus 

radar, etc.) for a given manufacturer and 

across all manufacturers. 

For the purpose of this study, the 

Agency used the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure, but employed the 

articulating mannequins in lieu of the 

posable mannequins and expanded the 

test procedure specifications to include 

increased vehicle test speeds for the 

S1b, S1d, S1e, S4a, and S4c test 

conditions. For these tests, the SV speed 

was incrementally increased to identify 

when each SV reached its operational 

limits and did not respond to the 

pedestrian target. Before the tests were 

initiated, the maximum test speeds for 

the S1 and S4 scenarios were set to 60 

kph (37.2 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph), 

respectively.113 These maximum speeds 

are consistent with Euro NCAP’s AEB 

Vulnerable Road User test protocol and 

correspond to up to 74 percent of fatal 

pedestrian crashes and 65 percent of 

injurious pedestrian crashes that 

occurred on U.S. roadways, per Volpe’s 

2011–2015 FARS and GES analysis of 

posted speed data.114 When no or late 

intervention occurred for a vehicle and 

test condition (i.e., combination of test 

scenario and speed), NHTSA repeated 

the test condition at a test speed that 

was 5 kph (3.1 mph) lower. This 

reduced speed defined the system’s 

upper capabilities. 

A test matrix of the PAEB 

characterization study regarding test 

speed is provided below. 

• Full PAEB test series (includes S1 

a–g and S4 a–c) 

Daytime light conditions, articulating 

dummies, and additional SV test speeds 

in kph (mph) for S1b, d, and e, and S4a 

and c, as shown in Table 4. 


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115One difference in the Agency’s proposed S4c 

test condition and Euro NCAP’s CPLA test 

condition is the amount of pedestrian overlap with 

the vehicle at the lower speed (NHTSA uses a 25 

percent overlap while a 50 percent overlap is used 

in Euro NCAP’s CPLA test). NHTSA believes that 

for the 25 percent overlap condition in S4c, a 

minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) is 

appropriate and does not see a reason to deviate 

from the minimum test speed (10 kph (6.2 mph)) 

proposed for the other PAEB test conditions. 

TABLE 4—COMPLETE MATRIX OF THE PAEB CHARACTERIZATION STUDY

Scenario S1a S1b S1c S1d S1e S1f S1g S4a S4b S4c 

Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph) ............ 16.0/9.9 

40.0/24.9 

16.0/9.9 

20.0/12.4 

16.0/9.9 

40.0/24.9 

16.0/9.9 

20.0/12.4 

40.0/24.9 

50.0/31.1 

40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 

40.0/24.9 

16.0/9.9 

40.0/24.9 

16.0/9.9 

40.0/24.9 

................ 30.0/18.6 ................ 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 ................ ................ 50.0/31.1 ................ 50.0/31.1 

................ 40.0/24.9 ................ 40.0/24.9 ................ ................ ................ 60.0/37.3 ................ 60.0/37.3 

................ 50.0/31.1 ................ 50.0/31.1 ................ ................ ................ 70.0/43.5 ................ 70.0/43.5 

................ 60.0/37.3 ................ 60.0/37.3 ................ ................ ................ 80.0/49.7 ................ 80.0/49.7 

The Agency’s characterization testing 

showed that many MY 2020 vehicles 

were able to repeatedly avoid impacting 

the pedestrian mannequins at higher 

test speeds than those specified in the 

2019 PAEB test procedure. In fact, 

several vehicles repeatably achieved full 

crash avoidance at speeds up to 60 kph 

(37.3 mph) or higher for the assessed S1 

and S4 test conditions. Test reports 

related to this testing can be found in 

the docket for this notice. 

In light of these results, NHTSA is 

proposing to increase the maximum SV 

test speed from the 40 kph (24.9 mph) 

specified in the 2019 PAEB test 

procedure to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for all 

PAEB test conditions the Agency is 

proposing to include in NCAP. These 

include S1a–e and S4a–c. The Agency 

notes that it is not proposing to include 

PAEB false positive test conditions (i.e., 

S1f and S1g) in NCAP at this time, but 

is requesting comment on whether the 

omission of these test conditions is 

appropriate. NHTSA also notes that 60 

kph (37.3 mph) is the maximum vehicle 

speed Euro NCAP uses to assess PAEB 

performance for test conditions that are 

similar to, if not identical to, some of 

those proposed for use in NCAP, namely 

S1a, c, d, and e, and S4c. Adopting this 

higher test speed will also drive 

improved PAEB system performance to 

address a larger portion of real-world 

fatalities and injuries. 

The Agency is also proposing a 

minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 

mph) for all of the proposed test 

scenarios. Although this speed is lower 

than the minimum test speed used in 

the 2019 PAEB test procedure and in its 

characterization testing (i.e., 16 kph (9.9 

mph)), it is the minimum test speed 

specified in Euro NCAP’s pedestrian 

tests, with the exception of Euro NCAP’s 

Car-to-Pedestrian Longitudinal Adult 

(CPLA) scenario. The minimum vehicle 

test speed for the CPLA scenario, which 

is similar to the Agency’s PAEB S4c test 

scenario, is 20 kph (12.4 mph).115 As 

stated earlier, in accordance with the 

Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the 

Agency is taking steps to harmonize 

with existing consumer information 

rating programs where possible and 

when appropriate. NHTSA also believes 

that reducing the minimum test speed to 

10 kph (6.2 mph) will assure PAEB 

system functionality for crashes that 

may still cause injuries. 

In an effort to harmonize with other 

consumer information programs on 

vehicle safety, NHTSA is also proposing 

to adopt Euro NCAP’s approach to 

assessing vehicles’ PAEB system 

performance by incrementally 

increasing the SV speed from the 

minimum test speed for a given scenario 

to the maximum. The Agency is 

proposing 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments 

for this progression in test speed. In 

their comments to the December 2015 

notice, Global Automakers and 

Mobileye encouraged NHTSA to expand 

the applicability of the PAEB tests, 

particularly the S1 scenario, to include 

a broader range of test speeds because 

pedestrian injuries occurred over a wide 

range of crash speeds, as the Agency has 

also indicated. The organizations also 

mentioned that PAEB system 

performance reflects a trade-off between 

FOV and collision speed/detection 

distance. Systems that have a narrow 

FOV are more effective at addressing 

higher speed crashes since they can see 

further, and systems that have a wider 

FOV are more effective at addressing 

lower speed impacts. 

As its third change to the 2019 PAEB 

test procedure, the Agency is proposing 

to expand PAEB evaluation to include 

different lighting conditions. NHTSA’s 

PAEB characterization study included 

performance assessments for dark 

lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime 

testing), in addition to the daylight 

conditions specified in the 2019 PAEB 

test procedure, for the same test 

vehicles. For each vehicle model tested, 

one set of tests was conducted with the 

pedestrian mannequin illuminated only 

by the vehicle’s lower beams and a 

second set of tests with the pedestrian 

mannequin illuminated by the upper 

beams. The area where the mannequin 

was located was not provided any 

additional (i.e., external) light source. 

This repeat testing was conducted 

because Volpe’s 2011–2015 FARS data 

set showed that 36 percent of pedestrian 

fatalities occurred in the dark with no 

overhead lights. Test matrices of the 

PAEB characterization study with 

respect to dark lighting conditions are 

provided in Tables 5 and 6. 

• PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, 

and e, and S4a and c) 

Dark conditions with lower beams, 

articulating dummies, and additional 

SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown 

in Table 5. 

TABLE 5—PAEB TEST SERIES FOR DARK CONDITIONS WITH LOWER BEAMS

Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c 

Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph) ....................................... 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 

20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 

30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 

40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 ........................ 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 

50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 ........................ 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5 

60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 ........................ 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13473 

116Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of 

automatic emergency braking systems on 

pedestrian crash risk, Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastor

edocument/bibliography/2243. 

117This is a divergence from assessment of LKS, 

BSW, and BSI where a vehicle must meet 

performance requirements for five out of seven 

valid test trials for a particular test condition to pass 

that test condition. 

• PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, 

and e, and S4a and c) 

Dark conditions with upper beams, 

articulating dummies, and additional 

SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown 

in Table 6. 

TABLE 6—PAEB TEST SERIES FOR DARK CONDITIONS WITH UPPER BEAMS

Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c 

Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph) ....................................... 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 

20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 

30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 

40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 ........................ 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 

50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 ........................ 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5 

60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 ........................ 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7 

The Agency’s characterization testing 

(Tables 5 and 6) revealed that PAEB 

system performance generally degraded 

in dark conditions compared to daylight 

conditions. Additionally, certain test 

conditions, such as S1d and S1e, were 

particularly challenging in dark 

conditions, especially when the 

vehicle’s lower beams were used. 

However, a few vehicles were able to 

repeatedly avoid contact with the 

pedestrian mannequins at speeds up to 

60 kph (37.3 mph) for certain test 

conditions when the vehicles’ lower 

beams provided the only source of light. 

NHTSA’s findings for PAEB system 

performance during testing align 

generally well with those from IIHS’ 

recent system effectiveness study for 

2017–2020 model year vehicles. IIHS 

found that although PAEB systems were 

associated with a 32 percent reduction 

in pedestrian crashes occurring during 

daylight, and a 33 percent reduction in 

pedestrian crashes for areas with 

artificial lighting during dawn, dusk, or 

at night, there was no evidence that 

PAEB systems were effective at 

nighttime without street lighting.116

Based on the results of the PAEB 

characterization study and IIHS’ 

findings in its recent study, NHTSA is 

proposing to perform the proposed test 

conditions (S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under 

daylight conditions and under dark 

conditions with the vehicle’s lower 

beams. NHTSA notes that Euro NCAP 

conducts PAEB testing that is similar to 

the Agency’s S4c test condition under 

dark conditions with vehicles’ upper 

beams in use. Because the Agency 

cannot be assured that a vehicle’s upper 

beams are in use during nighttime (i.e., 

dark lighting conditions) real-world 

driving, NHTSA is proposing only to 

perform nighttime PAEB assessments 

using vehicles’ lower beams for all test 

conditions included in NCAP at this 

time. However, if the SV is equipped 

with advanced lighting systems such as 

semiautomatic headlamp beam 

switching and/or adaptive driving beam 

head lighting system, they shall be 

enabled to automatically engage during 

the nighttime PAEB assessment. The 

Agency believes this approach covers 

the two extreme light conditions and as 

such, information regarding 

performance with the upper beams or 

under infrastructure lighting can be 

reasonably inferred. 

The Agency recognizes that Euro 

NCAP performs testing similar to S1a 

and S1c at speeds of 10 kph (6.2 mph) 

to 60 kph (37.3 mph) in dark conditions 

with the SV lower beams in use; 

however, overhead streetlights are also 

used in these tests to provide additional 

light source. To study potential 

performance differences attributable to 

the use of overhead lights during dark 

conditions, NHTSA performed 

additional testing for PAEB scenarios S1 

b, d, and e and S4 a and c for a subset 

of test speeds, 16 kph (9.9 mph) and 40 

kph (24.9 mph), for two of the MY 2020 

vehicles used in its initial 

characterization study. This study was 

performed using the vehicles’ lower 

beams under dark conditions with 

overhead lights. For this limited testing, 

the Agency observed slightly better 

PAEB performance in dark lighting 

conditions with overhead lights than in 

dark lighting conditions without 

overhead lights. 

NHTSA believes that testing with the 

vehicles’ lower beams in dark 

conditions without overhead lights is 

appropriate, particularly at higher test 

speeds, as it would assure system 

performance for real-world situations 

where visibility is the most limited. 

Furthermore, as mentioned previously, 

dark lighting conditions with no 

overhead lights represented 36 percent 

of pedestrian fatalities and dark lighting 

conditions with overhead lights 

represented 39 percent of pedestrian 

fatalities in Volpe’s 2011–2015 FARS 

data set. Additionally, PAEB systems 

that meet the performance test 

specifications under dark lighting 

conditions with no overhead lights are 

likely to meet the performance 

specifications under dark lighting 

conditions with overhead lights. Thus, 

the Agency believes assessment of PAEB 

systems under dark conditions with no 

overhead lights and with the vehicle’s 

lower beams will encourage vehicle 

manufacturers to make design 

improvements to address a significant 

portion of crashes that currently result 

in pedestrian fatalities. 

For the PAEB performance criteria, 

NHTSA is proposing that a vehicle must 

achieve complete crash avoidance (i.e., 

have no contact with the pedestrian 

mannequin) in order to pass a test trial 

conducted at each specified test speed 

(i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 kph (6.2, 

12.4, 18.6, 24.9, 31.1, and 37.3 mph)) for 

each test condition (S1a, b, c, d, and e 

and S4a, b, and c). NHTSA believes that 

this approach, used in conjunction with 

an incremental increase in SV speed, 

should limit damage to the pedestrian 

mannequin and/or the SV during 

testing. 

Along these lines, NHTSA is 

proposing a fourth change to the 2019 

PAEB test procedure regarding the 

number of test trials conducted for each 

combination of test condition and test 

speed. The 2019 PAEB test procedure 

specifies seven test trials be conducted 

for each test speed under each test 

condition. The Agency is proposing, 

however, to not require that more than 

one test be conducted per test speed and 

test condition combination if certain 

criteria are met, and is proposing that 

the pass rate for a given test speed will 

be dependent on whether additional test 

trials are required to be performed.117

For a given test condition, the test 

sequence is initiated at the 10 kph (6.2 

mph) minimum speed. To achieve a 

pass result, the test must be valid (i.e., 

all test specification and tolerances 

satisfied), and the SV must not contact 


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118The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail 

criterion (i.e., a vehicle must meet performance 

requirements for three out of five trials for a 

particular test condition to pass the test condition) 

is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced 

earlier. 

119American Automobile Association (2019, 

October), Automatic emergency braking with 

pedestrian detection, https://www.aaa.com/AAA/ 

common/aar/files/Research-Report-PedestrianDetection.pdf. 

120Cicchino, J. B (2022, February), Effects of 

automatic emergency braking systems on 

pedestrian crash risk, Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastor

edocument/bibliography/2243. 

the pedestrian mannequin. If the SV 

does not contact the pedestrian 

mannequin during the first valid test, 

the test speed is incrementally increased 

by 10 kph (6.2 mph), and the next test 

in the sequence is performed. Unless the 

SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, 

this iterative process continues until a 

maximum test speed of 60 kph (37.3 

mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the 

pedestrian mannequin, and the relative 

longitudinal velocity between the SV 

and pedestrian mannequin is less than 

or equal to 50 percent of the initial 

speed of the SV, the Agency will 

perform four additional (repeated) test 

trials at the same speed for which the 

impact occurred. The vehicle must not 

contact the pedestrian mannequin for at 

least three out of the five test trials 

performed at that same speed to pass 

that specific combination of test 

condition and test speed.118 If the SV 

contacts the pedestrian mannequin 

during a valid test of a test condition 

(whether it be the first test performed 

for a particular test speed or a 

subsequent test trial at that same speed), 

and the relative impact velocity exceeds 

50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, 

no additional test trials will be 

conducted at the given test speed and 

test condition and the SV is considered 

to have failed the test condition at that 

specific test speed. 

The Agency is pursuing an 

assessment approach for PAEB systems 

that differs from the evaluation criteria 

proposed for the other four proposed 

ADAS technologies discussed earlier in 

an attempt to reduce test burden, but 

still ensure that passing systems include 

robust designs that will afford an 

enhanced level of safety. NHTSA 

recognizes that it is proposing a large 

number of PAEB test conditions for 

inclusion in NCAP—eight total. The 

Agency also acknowledges that these 

test conditions must be repeated for 

multiple test speeds and lighting 

conditions, which inherently imposes 

additional test burden. Therefore, the 

Agency believes that it is reasonable to 

reduce the number of test trials that 

must be conducted at a given test speed 

for a particular test condition since the 

SV’s PAEB system will also be assessed 

at subsequent test speeds, which would 

help system robustness. This would 

further be supported by the Agency’s 

proposal to require that five test trials be 

performed in instances where the SV is 

unable to meet the no contact 

performance requirement in the initial 

valid trial for that combination of test 

condition and speed. 

Although NHTSA believes that the 

assessment approach for PAEB systems 

proposed herein is the most reasonable 

one, the Agency is requesting comment 

on whether it should instead pursue an 

alternative approach, such as 

conducting seven trials for each test 

condition and speed combination, and 

requiring that five of the seven trials 

meet the no contact performance 

criterion. Again, this latter approach 

would be similar to the one proposed 

for the other ADAS technologies 

discussed earlier. 

Previously, NHTSA noted that it did 

not conduct the S2 and S3 test scenarios 

as part of the characterization study and 

is not proposing these test scenarios for 

inclusion in this proposal. The Agency 

agrees with the comments mentioned 

previously that the majority of vehicles 

in the U.S. fleet are not currently 

equipped with sensing systems capable 

of detecting pedestrians while a vehicle 

is turning, as they do not have the 

necessary FOV. The American 

Automobile Association (AAA) 119

recently conducted PAEB tests, 

including an S2 scenario where the 

vehicle is turning right with an adult 

pedestrian crossing. The PAEB systems 

in four model year 2019 vehicles that 

were tested did not react to the test 

targets during a testing scenario that is 

similar to NHTSA’s S2 scenario 

described above, resulting in all test 

vehicles colliding with the pedestrian 

target. These systems performed better 

in a scenario that was similar to 

NHTSA’s S1; however, the vehicles 

avoided a collision with the pedestrian 

target 40 percent of the time at a 32.2 

kph (20 mph) test speed and nearly all 

the time at a 48.3 kph (30 mph) test 

speed. Furthermore, in its recent study 

on PAEB system effectiveness, IIHS 

found that while AEB with pedestrian 

detection was associated with 

significant reductions in pedestrian 

crash risk (∼27 percent) and pedestrian 

injury crash risk (∼30 percent), there 

was no evidence to suggest that existing 

systems were effective while the PAEBequipped vehicle was turning.120

Considering these findings, NHTSA 

believes that it is more beneficial at this 

time to focus our efforts on performing 

PAEB testing at higher speeds and with 

various lighting conditions using the 

proposed S1 and S4 test scenarios. 

In the context of the NCAP PAEB 

testing program, NHTSA is seeking 

comment on the following: 

(23) Is the proposed test speed range, 

10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph), 

to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) 

increments, most appropriate for PAEB 

test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why 

not? 

(24) The Agency has proposed to 

include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4 a-c in 

its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for 

the Agency to perform all test scenarios 

and test conditions proposed in this 

RFC notice to address the safety 

problem adequately, or could NCAP test 

only certain scenarios or conditions to 

minimize test burden but still address 

an adequate proportion of the safety 

problem? Why or why not? If it is not 

necessary for the Agency to perform all 

test scenarios or test conditions, which 

scenarios/conditions should be 

assessed? Although they are not 

currently proposed for inclusion, should 

the Agency also adopt the false positive 

test conditions, S1f and S1g? Why or 

why not? 

(25) Given that a large portion of 

pedestrian fatalities and injuries occur 

under dark lighting conditions, the 

Agency has proposed to perform testing 

for the included test conditions (i.e., S1 

a-e and S4 a-c) under dark lighting 

conditions (i.e., nighttime) in addition 

to daylight test conditions for test speed 

range 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 

mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle’s 

lower beams would provide the source 

of light during the nighttime 

assessments. However, if the SV is 

equipped with advanced lighting 

systems such as semiautomatic 

headlamp beam switching and/or 

adaptive driving beam head lighting 

system, they shall be enabled to 

automatically engage during the 

nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this 

testing approach appropriate? Why or 

why not? Should the Agency conduct 

PAEB evaluation tests with only the 

vehicle’s lower beams and disable or not 

use any other advanced lighting 

systems? 

(26) Should the Agency consider 

performing PAEB testing under dark 

conditions with a vehicle’s upper beams 

as a light source? If yes, should this 

lighting condition be assessed in 

addition to the proposed dark test 

condition, which would utilize only a 

vehicle’s lower beams along with any 

advanced lighting system enabled to 

automatically engage, or in lieu of the 

proposed dark testing condition? 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13475 

121NHTSA notes that this research will also 

include motorcycles. 

122National Center for Statistics and Analysis 

(2019, June), Bicyclists and other cyclists: 2017 data 

(Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 812 765), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

Should the Agency also evaluate PAEB 

performance in dark lighting conditions 

with overhead lights? Why or why not? 

What test scenarios, conditions, and 

speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime 

(i.e., dark lighting conditions) testing in 

NCAP, and why? 

(27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, 

the Agency proposed to perform one test 

per test speed until contact occurs, or 

until the vehicle’s relative impact 

velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial 

speed of the subject vehicle for the 

given test condition. If contact occurs 

and if the vehicle’s relative impact 

velocity is less than or equal to 50 

percent of the initial SV speed for the 

given combination of test speed and test 

condition, an additional four test trials 

will be conducted at the given test 

speed and test condition, and the SV 

must meet the passing performance 

criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least 

three out of those five test trials in order 

to be assessed at the next incremental 

test speed. Is this an appropriate 

approach to assess PAEB system 

performance in NCAP, or should a 

certain number of test trials be required 

for each assessed test speed? Why or 

why not? If a certain number of repeat 

tests is more appropriate, how many test 

trials should be conducted, and why? 

(28) Is a performance criterion of ‘‘no 

contact’’ appropriate for the proposed 

PAEB test conditions? Why or why not? 

Alternatively, should the Agency 

require minimum speed reductions or 

specify a maximum allowable SV-tomannequin impact speed for any or all 

of the proposed test conditions (i.e., test 

scenario and test speed combination)? If 

yes, why, and for which test conditions? 

For those test conditions, what speed 

reductions would be appropriate? 

Alternatively, what maximum allowable 

impact speed would be appropriate? 

(29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian 

mannequin during the initial trial for a 

given test condition and test speed 

combination, NHTSA proposes to 

conduct additional test trials only if the 

relative impact velocity observed during 

that trial is less than or equal to 50 

percent of the initial speed of the SV. 

For a test speed of 60 kph (37.3 mph), 

this maximum relative impact velocity 

is nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), and for 

a test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph), the 

maximum relative impact velocity is 

nominally 5 kph (3.1 mph). Is this an 

appropriate limit on the maximum 

relative impact velocity for the proposed 

range of test speeds? If not, why? Note 

that the tests in Global Technical 

Regulation (GTR) No. 9 for pedestrian 

crashworthiness protection simulates a 

pedestrian impact at 40 kph (24.9 mph). 

(30) For each lighting condition, the 

Agency is proposing 6 test speeds (i.e., 

those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 

to 37.3 mph) in increments of 10 kph 

(6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed 

test conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and 

S4a, b, and c). This results in a total of 

48 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds to be 

evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 

total combinations for both light 

conditions. The Agency mentions later, 

in the ADAS Ratings System section, 

that it plans to use check marks, as is 

done currently, to give credit to vehicles 

that (1) are equipped with the 

recommended ADAS technologies, and 

(2) pass the applicable system 

performance test requirements for each 

ADAS technology included in NCAP 

until it issues (1) a final decision notice 

announcing the new ADAS rating 

system and (2) a final rule to amend the 

safety rating section of the vehicle 

window sticker (Monroney label). For 

the purposes of providing credit for a 

technology using check marks, what is 

an appropriate minimum overall pass 

rate for PAEB performance evaluation? 

For example, should a vehicle be said to 

meet the PAEB performance 

requirements if it passes two-thirds of 

the 96 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds for the two 

lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 

unique combinations of test conditions 

and test speeds)? 

(31) Given previous support from 

commenters to include S2 and S3 

scenarios in the program at some point 

in the future and the results of AAA’s 

testing for one of the turning conditions, 

NHTSA seeks comment on an 

appropriate timeframe for including S2 

and S3 scenarios into the Agency’s 

NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from 

vehicle manufacturers information on 

any currently available models designed 

to address, and ideally achieve crash 

avoidance during conduct of, the S2 and 

S3 scenarios to support Agency 

evaluation for a future program upgrade. 

(32) Should the Agency adopt the 

articulated mannequins into the PAEB 

test procedure as proposed? Why or 

why not? 

(33) In addition to tests performed 

under daylight conditions, the Agency 

is proposing to evaluate the 

performance of PAEB systems during 

nighttime conditions where a large 

percentage of real-world pedestrian 

fatalities occur. Are there other 

technologies and information available 

to the public that the Agency can 

evaluate under nighttime conditions? 

(34) Are there other safety areas that 

NHTSA should consider as part of this 

or a future upgrade for pedestrian 

protection? 

(35) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

proposed PAEB test procedure that need 

further refinement or clarification before 

adoption? If so, what additional 

refinement or clarification is necessary, 

and why? 

In addition to the fleet 

characterization research conducted for 

this upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is 

conducting additional research that may 

be used to support future program 

enhancements. One such research 

project is designed to address injuries 

and fatalities for other vulnerable road 

users, specifically cyclists.121 While 

some PAEB systems may be capable of 

detecting cyclists and activating to 

avoid a crash, NHTSA’s current PAEB 

test procedure does not include a 

specific cyclist component. However, 

since the number of cyclists killed on 

U.S. roads continues to rise,122 the 

Agency plans to perform research to 

determine the viability of Euro NCAP’s 

AEB cyclist tests. NHTSA will then 

compare test data with preliminary 

crash populations to assess the 

adequacy of the test procedure for the 

U.S. vehicle fleet and roadway system. 

The Euro NCAP test includes four test 

scenarios: One in which the cyclist 

crosses in front of the vehicle from the 

near-side; one in which the cyclist 

crosses in front of the vehicle from the 

near-side from behind an obstruction; 

one in which the cyclist crosses in front 

of the vehicle from the far-side; and the 

other in which the cyclist travels in the 

same direction as the vehicle. The latter 

test scenario is repeated for both 25 

percent and 50 percent overlaps, while 

the first three scenarios are conducted at 

50 percent overlap (i.e., the vehicle 

strikes the bicyclist at 50 percent of the 

vehicle’s width). In all tests, a cyclist 

target comprised of an articulating 

dummy, which replicates the pedaling 

action of a cyclist, is seated on a bicycle 

mounted on a moving platform. 

NHTSA believes that detecting 

cyclists is technically more challenging 

for vehicle AEB systems than detecting 

pedestrians since cyclists often move at 

higher speeds. Vehicles must not only 

be equipped with sensors that have 

wider fields of view (similar to that 

required for the turning PAEB test 

scenarios), but must also process 

information more quickly as to whether 


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13476 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

123Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653). 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

124 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008). 

125 80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

126https://www.regulations.gov, Docket Nos. 

NHTSA–2010–0093 and NHTSA–2015–0006. (Only 

one test failure was observed for FCW.) 

127National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. (2013, February). Forward collision 

warning system confirmation test. https://

www.regulations.gov. Docket No. NHTSA–2006– 

26555–0134. 

128As noted in the Agency’s 2015 AEB final 

decision notice (80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015)), the 

Agency believes passing five out of seven tests 

successfully discriminates between functional 

systems versus non-functional systems. To date, the 

Agency allows two failures out of seven attempts 

to afford some flexibility in including emerging 

technologies into the NCAP program. Furthermore, 

NHTSA test laboratories have experienced 

unpredictable vehicle responses due to the vehicle 

algorithm designs. Test laboratories have observed 

systems that improve their performance with use, 

systems degrading and shutting down when they do 

not see other vehicles, and systems failing to reactivate if the vehicle is not cycled through an 

ignition cycle. 

129Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

to alert the driver and/or automatically 

brake. 

In the context of this additional 

research testing, NHTSA requests 

comment on the following: 

(36) Considering not only the 

increasing number of cyclists killed on 

U.S. roads but also the limitations of 

current AEB systems in detecting 

cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on 

the appropriate timeframe for adding a 

cyclist component to NCAP and 

requests from vehicle manufacturers 

information on any currently available 

models that have the capability to 

validate the cyclist target and test 

procedures used by Euro NCAP to 

support evaluation for a future NCAP 

program upgrade. 

(37) In addition to the test procedures 

used by Euro NCAP, are there others 

that NHTSA should consider to address 

the cyclist crash population in the U.S. 

and effectiveness of systems? 

D. Updating Forward Collision 

Prevention Technologies 

As previously mentioned, NHTSA 

will retain the currently available ADAS 

technologies (forward collision warning, 

crash imminent braking and dynamic 

brake support) designed to address 

forward collisions (rear-end crashes) in 

NCAP’s crash avoidance program. As 

discussed in NHTSA’s March 2019 

study, these technologies have the 

potential to prevent or mitigate eight 

rear-end pre-crash scenarios, which 

represented approximately 1.70 million 

crashes annually, on average, or 29.4 

percent of all crashes that occurred on 

U.S. roadways. As shown in Table A– 

1, these crashes resulted in 1,275 

fatalities, on average, and 883,386 MAIS 

1–5 injuries annually, which 

represented 3.8 percent of all fatalities 

and 31.5 percent of all injuries, 

respectively.123

FCW technology evaluations were 

introduced into NCAP starting with 

model year 2011 vehicles,124 while CIB 

and DBS systems (referred to 

collectively as Automatic Emergency 

Braking (AEB)) were added to the 

program starting with model year 2018 

vehicles.125 These technologies are not 

being offered as standard equipment on 

all passenger vehicles, so it remains 

important for NCAP to recommend the 

technologies and inform shoppers 

which vehicles have the technologies. 

Further, NHTSA observed performance 

test failures for each of these 

technologies during NCAP’s model year 

2019 vehicle performance verification 

testing; 126 thus, NCAP should continue 

to inform shoppers as to which systems 

perform to NHTSA’s benchmark. 

Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the 

next few sections, NHTSA believes 

there are opportunities for updating the 

current NCAP performance 

requirements for these three 

technologies. 

1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) 

An FCW system is an ADAS 

technology that monitors a vehicle’s 

speed, the speed of the vehicle in front 

of it, and the distance between the two 

vehicles. If the FCW system determines 

that the distance from the driver’s 

vehicle to the vehicle in front of it is too 

short, and the closing velocity between 

the two vehicles is too high, the system 

warns the driver of an impending rearend collision. 

Typically, FCW systems are 

comprised of two components: A 

sensing system, which can detect a 

vehicle in front of the driver’s vehicle; 

and a warning system, which alerts the 

driver to a potential crash threat. The 

sensing portion of the system may 

consist of forward-looking radar, lidar, 

camera systems, or a combination of 

these. The warning system may provide 

drivers with a visual display, such as a 

light on the dash, an audible signal (e.g., 

buzzer or chime), and/or a haptic signal 

that provides tactile feedback to the 

driver (e.g., rapid vibrations of the seat 

pan or steering wheel) to alert the driver 

of an impending crash so that they may 

manually intervene (e.g., apply the 

vehicle’s brakes or make an evasive 

steering maneuver) to avoid or mitigate 

the crash. 

Currently, NCAP’s FCW test 

procedure 127 consists of three scenarios 

that simulate the most frequent types of 

rear-end crashes. These include: Lead 

vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle 

decelerating (LVD), and lead vehicle 

moving (LVM) scenarios. In each 

scenario, the vehicle being evaluated is 

the SV, and the vehicle positioned 

directly in front of the SV, a production 

mid-size passenger car, is the POV. The 

time-to-collision (TTC) criteria 

prescribed for each scenario represent 

the time needed for a driver to perceive 

an impending rear-end crash, decide the 

corrective action, and respond with the 

appropriate mitigating action. The TTC 

for each scenario is calculated by 

considering the speed of the SV relative 

to the POV at the time of the FCW alert. 

If the FCW system fails to provide an 

alert within the required time during 

testing, the professional test driver 

brakes or steers away to avoid a 

collision. A short description of each 

test scenario and the requirements for a 

passing result based on TTC is provided 

below: 

• LVS—The SV encounters a stopped 

POV on a straight road. The SV is 

moving at 72.4 kph (45 mph), and the 

POV is stationary. To pass this test, the 

SV must issue an FCW alert when the 

TTC is at least 2.1 s. 

• LVD—The SV encounters a POV 

slowing with constant deceleration 

directly in front of it on a straight road. 

The SV and POV are both driven at 72.4 

kph (45 mph) with an initial headway 

of 30.0 m (98.4 ft.). The POV then 

decelerates, braking at a constant 

deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. 

To pass this test, the SV must issue an 

FCW alert when the TTC is at least 2.4 

s. 

• LVM—The SV encounters a slowermoving POV directly in front of it on a 

straight road. The SV and POV are 

driven at constant speeds of 72.4 kph 

(45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), 

respectively. To pass this test, the SV 

must issue an FCW alert when the TTC 

is at least 2.0 s. 

Each scenario is conducted up to 

seven times. To pass the NCAP system 

performance criteria, the SV must pass 

at least five out of seven trials 128 for 

each of the three test scenarios. 

NCAP’s FCW test scenarios are 

directly related to real-world crash data. 

From its analysis of 2011 to 2015 FARS 

and GES data, the Agency found that 

crashes analogous to the LVS test 

scenario, where a struck vehicle was 

stopped at the time of impact, occurred 

in 65 percent of the rear-end crashes 

studied.129 The LVD scenario, in which 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13477 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

130Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., 

Huey, R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, 

September), Human factors for connected vehicles: 

Effective warning interface research findings 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

131Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., 

Nobukawa, K., Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., 

Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., and Lobes, K. 

(2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward 

collision alert and lane departure warning systems 

(Report No. DOT HS 812 247), Washington, DC: 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

132The Agency would give credit to FCW systems 

that have both passing audible and haptic alerts if 

both alert types were available. However, if a 

vehicle with such a system provided only a passing 

haptic alert and the Agency decided only to give 

credit to systems that provided passing audible 

alerts, then the vehicle would not receive credit as 

having met the Agency’s FCW test requirements. 

133Nodine, E., Fisher, D., Golembiewski, G., 

Armstrong, C., Lam, A., Jeffers, M.A., Najm, W., 

Miller, S., Jackson, S., and Kehoe, N. (2019, May), 

Indicators of driver adaptation to forward collision 

warnings: A naturalistic driving evaluation (Report 

No. DOT HS 812 611), Washington, DC: National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

134 80 FR 68614 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

135European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (2019, July), Test Protocol—AEB Carto-Car systems, Version 3.0.2. See section 7.4.1.1. 

136 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008). 

137Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness 

of forward collision warning and autonomous 

emergency braking systems in reducing front-to-rear 

crash rates, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 2017 

Feb;99(Pt A):142–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 

j.aap.2016.11.009. 

the struck vehicle was decelerating at 

the time of impact, occurred in 22 

percent of the rear-end crashes, and the 

LVM scenario, in which the struck 

vehicle was moving at a constant, but 

slower, speed compared to the striking 

vehicle at impact, occurred in 10 

percent of the rear-end crashes. 

Collectively, these test scenarios 

represented 97 percent of rear-end 

crashes. With respect to test speed, in its 

independent review of the 2011–2015 

FARS and GES data sets, Volpe 

concluded that 28 percent of fatal rearend crashes and 63 percent of all rearend crashes occurred on roadways with 

posted speed limits of 72.4 kph (45 

mph) or less. 

Currently, NHTSA gives credit on its 

website by assigning a check mark to 

vehicles equipped with FCW systems 

that send visual, audible, and/or haptic 

alerts and meet the TTC requirements. 

However, the Agency’s research has 

shown that presenting drivers with an 

audible warning in medium or high 

urgency situations significantly reduced 

crash severity relative to visual and 

tactile (or haptic) warnings, which did 

not differ.130 This being said, in a largescale field test of FCW and LDW 

systems on model year 2013 Chevrolet 

and Cadillac vehicles, the University of 

Michigan Transportation Research 

Institute (UMTRI) and GM found that 

GM’s Safety Alert Seat, which provides 

haptic seat vibration pulses, increased 

driver acceptance of both FCW and 

LDW systems compared to audible 

alerts.131 The study concluded that the 

FCW system was turned off 6 percent of 

the time when the Safety Alert Seat was 

selected (rather than audible alerts), 

whereas it was turned off 17 percent of 

the time when only audible alerts were 

available. In light of these findings, the 

Agency seeks comment on whether to 

give credit to vehicles equipped with 

FCW systems that only provide a 

passing audible alert, or whether it 

should also give credit to those systems 

that only provide passing haptic 

alerts.132 If the Agency elects to give 

credit to vehicles with haptic alerts, are 

there certain haptic alert types that 

should be excluded from consideration 

(e.g., because they may be such a 

nuisance to drivers that they may be 

more likely to disable the system)? 

NHTSA also seeks comment on whether 

it should no longer give credit to FCWequipped vehicles that offer only visual 

FCW alerts. 

NCAP’s current FCW test procedure 

states that if an FCW system provides a 

warning timing adjustment setting for 

the driver, at least one timing setting 

must meet the TTC warning criteria 

specified in the procedure. Therefore, if 

a vehicle is equipped with a warning 

timing adjustment, only the most 

conservative (i.e., earliest) warning 

setting is tested. Selecting the most 

conservative setting is beneficial for 

track testing where the driver of the SV 

must steer and/or brake to avoid a crash 

with the POV after the FCW alert is 

issued. However, the Agency is 

concerned that many consumers may 

not adjust the warning timing setting for 

FCW alerts. Furthermore, consumers 

that choose to adjust the alert timing 

may be unlikely to select the earliest 

setting, as this setting is most likely to 

result in false positive alerts (i.e., 

nuisance alerts) during real-world 

operation.133 The Agency also 

recognizes that the earliest FCW setting 

can be used to pass the NCAP test— 

essentially allowing a vehicle to get 

NCAP credit even though it may not 

otherwise earn credit if the later 

warning settings are tested. Therefore, 

by testing the earliest timing adjustment 

setting, the Agency’s FCW performance 

assessment may not be indicative of 

many drivers’ real-world experiences. 

This concern was previously 

addressed in NHTSA’s 2015 AEB final 

decision notice, but the Agency has not 

since made updates to its FCW test 

procedure.134 In that notice, the Agency 

stated that because NCAP is a consumer 

information program, it should test 

vehicles as delivered, using the factory 

default FCW warning adjustment setting 

for FCW and AEB testing, including 

PAEB. Although the Agency believes 

there is still merit to testing the default 

setting, NHTSA tentatively believes 

testing the middle alert setting may be 

more appropriate. Selection of the 

middle or next latest alert setting for 

testing would harmonize with Euro 

NCAP’s AEB Car-to-Car systems test 

protocol, thus potentially driving costs 

down for manufacturers and attempting 

to ensure that consumers in both the 

U.S. and European markets benefit from 

similar FCW system settings.135

Harmonization was a common theme 

among commenters responding to 

NCAP’s December 2015 notice, with 

most vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, 

and other industry groups requesting 

that NHTSA harmonize test procedures, 

test targets, and test requirements with 

other NCAPs around the world, 

particularly Euro NCAP. As mentioned 

earlier, the Bipartisan Infrastructure 

Law also required that NHTSA consider 

harmonization with third-party safety 

rating programs when possible. In light 

of these considerations, the Agency is 

proposing that it is most appropriate to 

test the middle (or next latest) FCW 

system setting in lieu of the default 

setting when performing FCW, CIB, 

DBS, and PAEB NCAP tests on vehicles 

that offer multiple FCW timing 

adjustment settings. 

FCW systems have been recognized as 

the first generation of ADAS 

technologies designed to help drivers 

avoid an impending rear-end collision. 

In 2008, when NHTSA decided to 

include ADAS in the NCAP program, 

FCW was selected because the Agency 

believed (1) this technology addressed a 

major crash problem; (2) system designs 

existed that could mitigate this safety 

problem; (3) safety benefit projections 

were assessed; and (4) performance tests 

and procedures were available to ensure 

an acceptable performance level.136 At 

the time, the Agency estimated that 

FCW systems were 15 percent effective 

in preventing rear-end crashes. More 

recently, in a 2017 study, IIHS 137 found 

that FCW systems may be more effective 

than NHTSA’s initial estimates. IIHS 

found that FCW systems reduced rearend crashes by 27 percent. Moreover, 

consumers have shown favorable 

acceptance of these systems. For 

instance, in a 2019 survey of more than 

57,000 Consumer Reports subscribers, 

69 percent of vehicle owners reported 

that they were satisfied with their 


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13478 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

138Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to 

forward collision warning: How FCW helps drivers 

avoid accidents, https://www.consumerreports.org/ 

car-safety/forward-collision-warning-guide/. 

139Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & 

Flannagan, C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field 

effectiveness of General Motors production active 

safety and advanced headlighting systems, The 

University of Michigan Transportation Research 

Institute and General Motors LLC. UMTRI–2019–6. 

140The Agency notes that the FCW effectiveness 

rate (21%) observed by UMTRI is similar to that 

observed by IIHS in its 2019 study (27%). 

Differences in data samples and vehicle selection 

may contribute to the specific numerical 

differences. Regardless, the AEB effectiveness rate 

observed by UMTRI (46%) was significantly higher 

than the corresponding FCW effectiveness rate 

observed in either the IIHS or UMTRI study. 

141Low-speed AEB showed a 43% reduction. 

142The UMTRI study was limited to GM vehicles. 

143 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). CIB and DBS 

together are considered Automatic Emergency 

Braking (AEB). 

144Consumer Reports, (2019, August 5), Guide to 

automatic emergency braking: How AEB can put 

the brakes on car collisions, https://www.consumer

reports.org/car-safety/automatic-emergencybraking-guide/. 

145Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness 

of forward collision warning and autonomous 

emergency braking systems in reducing front-to-rear 

crash rates, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 2017 

Feb;99(Pt A):142–152, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 

j.aap.2016.11.009. 

146Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & 

Flannagan, C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the 

field effectiveness of General Motors production 

active safety and advanced headlighting systems, 

The University of Michigan Transportation 

Research Institute and General Motors LLC, 

UMTRI–2019–6. 

147The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted 

of camera-only, radar-only, and fused camera-radar 

AEB systems, the latter two systems of which also 

included adaptive cruise control functionality. 

148Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 

Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving 

passenger vehicles with automatic emergency 

braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019, VOL. 20, 

NO. S1, S112–S118 https://doi.org/10.1080/ 

15389588.2019.1576172. 

149 In this instance, over-represented means a 

higher frequency as a percentage for AEB-equipped 

vehicles versus non-AEB-equipped vehicles on a 

normalized basis. 

vehicle’s FCW technology, 38 percent of 

vehicle owners said that it had helped 

them avoid a crash, and 54 percent of 

them remarked that they trust the 

system to work every time.138 As 

consumer acceptance has been positive, 

and system performance has improved 

over the years, fitment rates have also 

increased. As mentioned previously, 

less than 0.2 percent of model year 2011 

vehicles were equipped with FCW 

systems compared to 38.3 percent of 

model year 2018 vehicles. 

One limitation of FCW systems is that 

they are designed to warn the driver, but 

not to provide significant automatic 

braking of the vehicle (some FCW 

systems use haptic brake pulses to alert 

the driver of a crash-imminent driving 

situation, but they are not intended to 

effectively slow the vehicle). Since the 

introduction of FCW systems into 

NCAP, active safety systems, such as 

those with automatic braking capability 

(i.e., AEB), have entered the 

marketplace. In a recent study 

sponsored by GM 139 to evaluate the 

real-world effectiveness of ADAS 

technologies (including FCW and AEB) 

on 3.8 million model year 2013–2017 

GM vehicles, UMTRI found that, for 

frontal collisions, camera-based FCW 

systems produced an estimated 21 

percent reduction in rear-end striking 

crashes, while the AEB systems studied 

(which included a combination of 

camera-only, radar-only, and fused 

camera-radar systems) produced an 

estimated 46 percent reduction in the 

same crash type.140 Similarly, in a 2017 

study, IIHS found that vehicles 

equipped with FCW and AEB showed a 

50 percent reduction for the same crash 

type.141 NHTSA is drawing from these 

research studies, generally, since each 

has limitations and deviations from how 

NHTSA might evaluate fleet-wide 142

system effectiveness. 

From a functional perspective, 

research suggests that active braking 

systems, such as AEB, provide greater 

safety benefits than corresponding 

warning systems, such as FCW. 

However, NHTSA has found that 

current AEB systems often integrate the 

functionalities of FCW and AEB into 

one frontal crash prevention system to 

deliver improved real-world safety 

performance and high consumer 

acceptance. Consequently, the Agency 

believes that this system integration 

may have implications for NCAP FCW 

testing because current NCAP FCW 

requirements were developed at a time 

when FCW and AEB functionalities 

were not always linked. As will be 

detailed later in this notice, NHTSA 

believes that FCW could now be 

considered a component of AEB and 

PAEB such that FCW operation could be 

evaluated using NCAP’s AEB and PAEB 

tests. 

2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) 

To address the rear-end crash problem 

further, in November 2015, NHTSA 

published a final decision notice 

announcing the addition of two AEB 

technologies, CIB and DBS, into NCAP 

effective with model year 2018 

vehicles.143

Unlike FCW systems, AEB systems 

(i.e., CIB and DBS), are designed to help 

drivers actively avoid or mitigate the 

severity of rear-end crashes. CIB systems 

provide automatic braking when 

forward-looking sensors indicate that a 

crash is imminent and the driver has not 

braked, whereas DBS systems provide 

supplemental braking when sensors 

determine that driver-applied braking is 

insufficient to avoid an imminent crash. 

In Consumer Reports’ 2019 subscriber 

survey, 81 percent of vehicle owners 

reported that they were satisfied with 

AEB technology, 54 percent said that it 

had helped them avoid a crash, and 61 

percent stated that they trusted the 

system to work every time.144

Furthermore, IIHS found in its 2017 

study that rear-end collisions decreased 

by 50 percent for vehicles equipped 

with AEB and FCW.145 Similarly, as 

mentioned earlier, UMTRI 146 found that 

AEB systems produced an estimated 46 

percent reduction in applicable rear-end 

crashes when combined with a forward 

collision alert, which alone showed 

only a 21 percent reduction.147

A recent IIHS study 148 of 2009–2016 

crash data from 23 States suggested that 

the increasing effectiveness of AEB 

technology in certain crash situations is 

changing the rear-end crash problem. 

The Institute’s analysis provided insight 

into the performance of current AEB 

systems and future opportunities for 

improvement. The study identified the 

types of rear-end crashes in which 

striking vehicles equipped with AEB 

were over-represented compared to 

those without AEB.149 For instance, 

IIHS found that striking vehicles 

involved in the following rear-end 

crashes were more likely to have AEB: 

(1) Where the striking vehicle was 

turning relative to when it was moving 

straight; (2) when the struck vehicle was 

turning or changing lanes relative to 

when it was slowing or stopped; (3) 

when the struck vehicle was not a 

passenger vehicle or was a special use 

vehicle relative to a passenger car; (4) on 

snowy or icy roads; or (5) on roads with 

speed limits of 112.7 kph (70 mph) 

relative to those with 64.4 to 72.4 kph 

(40 to 45 mph) speed limits. Overall, the 

study found that 25.3 percent of crashes 

where the striking vehicle was equipped 

with AEB had at least one of these overrepresented characteristics, compared 

with 15.9 percent of impacts by vehicles 

that were not equipped with AEB. 

These results suggest that the tests 

used to evaluate the performance of 

AEB systems by the Agency’s NCAP and 

other consumer information programs 

are influencing the development of 

countermeasures capable of minimizing 

the crash problems that they were 

intended to address. However, the 

results also imply that AEB systems 

have not yet provided their full crash 

reduction potential. While they are 

effective at addressing the most 

common rear-end crashes, they are less 

effective at addressing those crashes that 


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150National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2012, June), Forward-looking 

advanced braking technologies research report, 

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA2012-0057-0001. 

151The Agency notes that for the rear-end precrash scenario group, the driver avoidance 

maneuver was unknown in 25 percent and 54 

percent of the FARS and GES crashes, respectively. 

152National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2014, August), Automatic 

emergency braking system (AEB) research report, 

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA2012-0057-0037. 

153FCW, CIB, and DBS combined on all light 

vehicles could potentially prevent approximately 

200,000 minor/moderate injuries (AIS 1–2), 4,000 

(AIS 3–5) serious injuries, and save approximately 

100 lives annually. 

154 DBS systems differ from traditional brake 

assist systems used with the vehicle’s foundation 

brakes. Whereas both systems rely on brake pedal 

application rate to determine whether supplemental 

braking is required, DBS has a lower activation 

threshold since it also uses information from the 

aforementioned sensors to verify that more braking 

is needed. 

155National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2015, October), Dynamic brake 

support performance evaluation confirmation test 

for the New Car Assessment Program, http://

www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA–2015– 

0006–0026. 

are more atypical. IIHS found that in 

2016, nearly 300,000 (15 percent) of the 

police reported two-vehicle rear-end 

crashes involved one of the rear-end 

crashes mentioned above. The Institute 

suggested that vehicle manufacturers 

would be encouraged to improve AEB 

system designs for situations where AEB 

was over-represented if consumer 

programs incorporated tests that 

replicate these rear-end crash events, 

such as an angled target vehicle that 

simulates a struck vehicle changing 

lanes. IIHS cautioned (and NHTSA 

agrees) that new testing protocols 

should not drive performance 

degradation in more typical crash 

situations, create unintended safety 

consequences, or adversely affect AEB 

use due to nuisance activations. 

While these recent studies suggest 

that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) 

have collectively been effective in 

reducing rear-impact crashes, it is not 

clear how effective each of these 

systems are as standalone systems, and 

whether their individual effectiveness 

may change for certain crash scenarios, 

environmental conditions, or driver 

factors (e.g., poor judgement, 

distraction, etc.). Furthermore, the 

Agency is not aware of any studies of 

current-generation AEB systems that 

have determined the extent to which 

CIB and DBS individually contributes to 

crash reduction. 

Prior to considering adopting AEB 

into NCAP, NHTSA conducted a review 

of 2003–2009 National Automotive 

Sampling System Crashworthiness Data 

System (NASS CDS) data to define the 

target population for rear-end 

crashes.150 At the time of the analysis, 

the Agency concluded that CIB and DBS 

target crash populations were mutually 

exclusive. In other words, they included 

crashes in which the driver either did 

not brake (CIB) or braked (DBS). The 

analysis of the crash data showed that 

the driver braked in approximately half 

of the crashes and did not brake in the 

other half. However, in its analysis of 

the 2011–2015 FARS and GES data sets, 

Volpe found much more conservative 

brake rates. The organization found that 

the driver braked in just 8 percent of 

rear-end crashes involving fatalities and 

20 percent of those crashes involving 

injuries. The study also showed that the 

driver made no attempt to avoid the 

crash (e.g., no braking, steering, 

accelerating) for 56 percent of the 

crashes involving fatalities and for 21 

percent of those involving injuries.151 It 

is possible that the brake rate differed 

for the two studies because of the target 

crash population refinements made for 

NHTSA’s original analysis and because 

of difference in data collection methods 

between the crash databases. For 

instance, high-speed crashes were 

excluded from NHTSA’s target crash 

population review because the AEB 

systems tested at the time had limited 

speed reduction capabilities. 

From the refined target crash 

population, NHTSA computed 

preliminary safety benefits for both CIB 

and DBS from a limited number of CIBand DBS-equipped vehicles subjected to 

early versions of the Agency’s test 

procedures based upon speed reduction 

capabilities.152 The Agency recognized 

that CIB and DBS systems available at 

the time had limited capabilities and 

could not address serious crashes where 

fatalities were likely to occur. 

Nevertheless, the Agency tentatively 

found that if a CIB system alone was 

equipped on all light vehicles, it could 

potentially prevent approximately 

40,000 minor/moderate injuries (AIS 1– 

2), 640 serious-to-critical injuries (AIS 

3–5), and save approximately 40 lives, 

annually. If a DBS system alone was 

equipped on all light vehicles, it could 

potentially prevent approximately 

107,000 minor/moderate injuries (AIS 

1–2), 2,100 serious-to-critical injuries 

(AIS 3–5), and save approximately 25 

lives, annually. These safety benefits 

from CIB and DBS were considered 

incremental to the benefits stemming 

from an FCW alert.153

NHTSA’s analysis showed there was 

merit to performing testing to assess 

vehicle performance in situations where 

a driver either does not brake (CIB) or 

brakes (DBS). Volpe’s recent analysis on 

braking behavior/rate further validates 

the need to assess CIB and DBS 

separately. Considering this and the fact 

that NHTSA cannot currently 

differentiate the individual effectiveness 

of CIB and DBS systems, NHTSA 

tentatively believes NCAP should 

continue to assess CIB and DBS system 

performance individually. However, the 

Agency acknowledges that, because it 

believes AEB systems have advanced 

significantly in recent years, it is 

appropriate at this time to consider 

revising performance envelopes and 

dynamic scenarios in NCAP to 

acknowledge and encourage such 

advances. 

The following sections discuss in 

detail CIB and DBS systems, and more 

specifically, NCAP’s current test 

procedures and a potential updated test 

program for modern AEB systems. The 

Agency seeks comment on how NCAP 

can encourage the maximum safety 

benefits of AEB and potentially reduce 

the number of tests conducted. 

Comments are also sought on future 

suggestions for AEB beyond any nearterm upgrade. 

a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS) 

In response to an FCW alert or a 

driver noticing an imminent crash 

scenario, a driver may initiate braking to 

avoid a rear-end crash. In situations 

where the driver’s braking is insufficient 

to prevent a collision, DBS can 

automatically supplement the driver’s 

braking action to prevent or mitigate the 

crash. Similar to FCW and CIB systems, 

DBS systems employ forward-looking 

sensors such as radar, lidar, and/or 

vision-based sensors to detect vehicles 

in the path directly ahead and monitor 

a vehicle’s operating conditions such as 

speed or brake application. However, 

DBS systems can actively supplement 

braking to assist the driver whereas 

FCW systems serve only to warn the 

driver of a potential crash threat, and 

CIB systems are activated when a rearend crash is imminent, but the driver 

has not manually applied the vehicle’s 

brakes.154

NCAP’s current DBS test 

procedure 155 consists of the same three 

rear-end crash scenarios specified in the 

FCW system performance test 

procedure—LVS, LVD, and LVM, but 

most of the test speed combinations 

specified in the DBS test procedure 

differ (the single exception is that the 

FCW and DBS test procedures both use 

an LVM test performed with SV and 

POV speeds of 72.4 and 32.2 kph (45 

and 20 mph), respectively). In addition, 


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156Minimal activation is defined as a peak SV 

deceleration attributable to DBS intervention that is 

less than or equal to 1.25 times the average of the 

deceleration recorded for the vehicle’s foundation 

brake system alone during its approach to the steel 

trench plate. The 1.25 multiplier serves to provide 

some system flexibility, meaning a mild DBS 

intervention is acceptable, but one where the 

vehicle thinks it must respond to the STP as if it 

was a real vehicle is not. 

157The shell is constructed from lightweight 

composite materials with favorable strength-toweight characteristics, including carbon fiber, 

Kevlar®, phenolic, and Nomex honeycomb. It is 

also wrapped with a commercially available vinyl 

material to simulate paint on the body panels, rear 

bumper, and a tinted glass rear window. A foam 

bumper having a neoprene cover is attached to the 

rear of the SSV to reduce the peak forces realized 

immediately after an impact from a test vehicle 

occurs. 

158 If the Agency decides to assess FCW in 

separate tests to that for DBS and CIB, those FCW 

tests would also be conducted using GVT. 

159Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

160National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. (2015, October). Crash imminent 

brake system performance evaluation for the New 

the DBS performance assessment 

includes a Steel Trench Plate (STP) false 

positive suppression test, which is 

conducted at two test speeds. This 

fourth test scenario is used to evaluate 

the propensity of a vehicle’s DBS system 

to activate inappropriately in a noncritical driving scenario that would not 

present a safety risk to the vehicle’s 

occupants. For the first three test 

scenarios, where braking is expected, 

the SV must provide enough 

supplemental braking to avoid contact 

with the POV to pass a trial run. In the 

case of the DBS false positive test 

scenario, the performance criterion is 

minimal to no activation for both test 

speeds.156

As in the FCW system performance 

tests, the vehicle that is subjected to the 

DBS test scenarios is the SV. The FCW 

test procedure (which uses professional 

drivers for acceleration, braking, and 

steering during test conduct) stipulates 

that a mid-size passenger car serve as 

the POV during testing. The DBS test 

procedure (which relies solely on the 

use of a programmable brake controller 

and the vehicle’s DBS system for 

braking), however, utilizes a surrogate 

(i.e., target vehicle) to limit the potential 

for damage to the SV and/or test 

equipment in the event of a collision. 

The target vehicle presently used as 

the POV by NCAP for the Agency’s DBS 

testing is known as the Subject 

Surrogate Vehicle, or SSV. The SSV, 

developed by NHTSA for the purpose of 

track testing, appears as a ‘‘real’’ vehicle 

to the camera, radar, and lidar sensors 

used by existing AEB systems. The SSV 

system is comprised of (a) a shell,157

which is a visually and dimensionally 

accurate representation of a passenger 

car; (b) a slider and load frame assembly 

to which the shell is attached, (c) a tworail track on which the slider operates, 

(d) a road-based lateral restraint track, 

and (e) a tow vehicle, which pulls the 

SSV and its peripherals down the test 

track during trials where the POV (i.e., 

SSV) must be in motion. A brief 

discussion on the use of the GVT, 

discussed earlier in the BSI section, as 

an alternative to the SSV for future DBS 

and CIB testing, is included later in this 

notice.158

A short description of each DBS 

system performance test scenario, and 

the requirements for a passing result, is 

provided below: 

• Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)—The 

SV encounters a stopped POV on a 

straight road. The SV is moving at 40.2 

kph (25 mph) and the POV is stationary. 

The SV throttle is released within 500 

ms after the SV issues an FCW alert, and 

the SV brake is applied at a TTC of 1.1 

s (i.e., at a nominal headway of 12.2 m 

(40 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must 

not contact the POV. 

• Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)— 

The SV encounters a POV slowing with 

constant deceleration directly in front of 

it on a straight road. The SV and POV 

are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) 

with an initial headway of 13.8 m (45.3 

ft.). The POV brakes are then applied at 

a constant deceleration of 0.3g in front 

of the SV. The SV throttle is released 

within 500 ms after the SV issues an 

FCW alert, and the SV brakes are 

applied at a TTC of 1.4 s (i.e., at a 

nominal headway of 9.6 m (31.5 ft.)). To 

pass this test, the SV must not contact 

the POV. 

• Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)—The 

SV encounters a slower-moving POV 

directly in front of it on a straight road. 

In the first test, the SV and POV are 

driven on a straight road at a constant 

speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 16.1 

kph (10 mph), respectively. In the 

second test, the SV and POV are driven 

at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) 

and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. In 

both tests, the SV throttle is released 

within 500 ms after the SV issues an 

FCW alert, and the SV brakes are 

applied at a TTC of 1 s (i.e., at a nominal 

headway of 6.7 m (22 ft.) in the first test, 

and 11.3 m (37 ft.) in the second test). 

To pass these tests, the SV must not 

contact the POV. 

• Steel Trench Plate (STP) test (to 

assess false positive suppression)—The 

SV is driven over a 2.4 m x 3.7 m x 25.4 

mm (8 ft. x 12 ft. x 1 in.) steel trench 

plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 72.4 kph 

(45 mph). If no FCW alert is issued by 

a TTC of 2.1 s, the SV throttle is 

released within 500 ms of a TTC of 2.1 

s, and the SV brakes are applied at a 

TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal distance 

of 12.3 m (40 ft.) from the edge of the 

STP at 40.2 kph (25 mph), or 22.3 m (73 

ft.) at 72.4 kph (45 mph)). To pass this 

test, the performance criteria is nonactivation, as defined above. 

To pass NCAP’s DBS system 

performance criteria, the SV must 

currently pass five out of seven trials for 

each of the six test conditions. 

As previously mentioned, NCAP’s 

LVS, LVM, and LVD test scenarios for 

its DBS evaluations are similar to those 

for the FCW assessments and therefore 

correspond well with real-world crash 

data and have similar target crash 

populations. NHTSA’s analysis of the 

2011–2015 rear-end crash data from 

FARS and GES showed target crash 

populations of 65 percent for the LVS 

scenario, 22 percent for the LVD 

scenario, and 10 percent for the LVM 

scenario.159 Furthermore, Volpe’s 

independent review of the 2011–2015 

data sets showed that for rear-end 

crashes that occurred on roadways with 

posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or 

less, 56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 72.4 

kph (45 mph) or less, the fatality rate 

was 2 percent, 11 percent, and 28 

percent, respectively. Additionally, 

MAIS 1–5 injuries were observed in 6 

percent of all rear-end crashes that 

occurred on roadways with posted 

speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, 30 

percent with posted speeds of 56.3 kph 

(35 mph) or less, and 63 percent with 

posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 

less. 

b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) 

If a driver does not take any action to 

brake when a rear-end crash is 

imminent, CIB systems utilize the same 

types of forward-looking sensors used in 

DBS systems to apply the vehicle’s 

brakes automatically to slow or stop the 

vehicle. The amount of braking applied 

varies by manufacturer, and several 

systems are designed to achieve 

maximum vehicle deceleration just 

prior to impact. In reviewing model year 

2017–2019 NCAP CIB test data, NHTSA 

observed a deceleration range of 0.31 to 

1.27g during test trials that provided 

speed reductions capable of satisfying 

the CIB performance criteria for a given 

test condition. Unlike DBS systems, 

which only provide additional braking 

to supplement the driver’s brake input, 

CIB systems activate when the driver 

has not applied the brake pedal. 

The Agency’s current CIB test 

procedure 160 is comprised of the same 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13481 

Car Assessment Program. http://

www.regulations.gov. Docket No. NHTSA–2015– 

0006–0025. 

161Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

162 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, 

March 17), U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic 

commitment of 20 automakers to make automatic 

emergency braking standard on new vehicles, 

https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihsannounce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakersto-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standardon-new-vehicles. 

163To achieve an advanced rating in IIHS’ front 

crash prevention track tests, a vehicle’s AEB system 

must show a speed reduction of at least 16.1 kph 

(10 mph) in either the Institute’s 19.3 or 40.2 kph 

(12 or 25 mph) tests, or a speed reduction of 8.0 

kph (5 mph) in both of these tests. https://

www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihsannounce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakersto-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standardon-new-vehicles. 

164National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2019, December 17), NHTSA 

announces update to historic AEB commitment by 

20 automakers, https://www.nhtsa.gov/pressreleases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aebcommitment-20-automakers. 

165The Agency also believes that its 

recommendation of AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) 

that meet NCAP performance criteria on its website 

since the 2018 model year has further encouraged 

adoption of these technologies. 

four test scenarios (LVS, LVD, LVM, and 

the STP false positive suppression test) 

and accompanying test speeds as set 

forth in the DBS test procedure. 

However, the performance criteria vary 

slightly. The LVM 40.2 kph/16.1 kph 

(25 mph/10 mph) test condition 

stipulates that the SV may not contact 

the POV. The LVS, LVD, and the LVM 

72.4 kph/32.2 kph (45 mph/20 mph) test 

conditions permit SV-to-POV contact 

but require minimum reductions in the 

SV speed. In the case of the CIB false 

positive tests, the performance criterion 

is little-to-no activation. Similar to 

NCAP’s DBS tests, the SSV is the POV 

presently used in the program’s CIB 

testing. A short description of each test 

scenario and the requirements for a 

passing result is provided below: 

• LVS—SV encounters a stopped 

POV on a straight road. The SV is 

moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the 

POV (i.e., the SSV) is stationary. The SV 

throttle is released within 500 ms after 

the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass this 

test, the SV speed reduction attributable 

to CIB intervention must be ≥15.8 kph 

(9.8 mph). 

• LVD—The SV encounters a POV 

slowing with constant deceleration 

directly in front of it on a straight road. 

The SV and POV are both driven at 56.3 

kph (35 mph) with an initial headway 

of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). The POV then 

decelerates, braking at a constant 

deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV, 

after which the SV throttle is released 

within 500 ms after the SV issues an 

FCW alert. To pass this test, the SV 

speed reduction attributable to CIB 

intervention must be ≥16.9 kph (10.5 

mph). 

• LVM—The SV encounters a slowermoving POV directly in front of it on a 

straight road. In the first test, the SV and 

POV are driven on a straight road at a 

constant speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) 

and 16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In 

the second test, the SV and POV are 

driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph 

(45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), 

respectively. In both tests, the SV 

throttle is released within 500 ms after 

the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass the 

first test, the SV must not contact the 

POV. To pass the second test, the SV 

speed reduction attributable to CIB 

intervention must be ≥15.8 kph (9.8 

mph). 

• STP test (to assess false positive 

suppression)—The SV is driven towards 

a steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) 

in one test and 72.4 kph (45 mph) in the 

other test. If an FCW alert is issued, the 

SV throttle is released within 500 ms of 

the alert. If no FCW alert is issued, the 

throttle is not released until the test’s 

validity period (the time when all test 

specifications and tolerances must be 

satisfied) has passed. To pass these 

tests, the SV must not achieve a peak 

deceleration equal to or greater than 

0.5g at any time during its approach to 

the steel trench plate. 

To pass NCAP’s CIB system 

performance criteria, the SV must pass 

five out of seven trials for each of the 

six test conditions. 

Similar to FCW and DBS, NCAP’s CIB 

test scenarios correlate to the 

dynamically distinct rear-end crash data 

discussed earlier. The Agency’s analysis 

of the 2011–2015 crash data showed 

that the LVS, LVD, and LVM scenarios 

represented 65 percent, 22 percent, and 

10 percent, respectively, of all rear-end 

crashes.161 With respect to test speed, in 

its independent review of 2011–2015 

FARS and GES data sets, Volpe 

concluded that 2 percent of fatal rearend crashes and 6 percent of all rear-end 

crashes occurred on roadways with 

posted speed limits of 40.2 kph (25 

mph) or less. Eleven percent of fatal 

rear-end crashes and 30 percent of all 

rear-end crashes occurred on roads with 

posted speeds of 56.3 kph (35 mph) or 

less. For posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 

mph) or less, these statistics are 28 

percent and 63 percent, respectively. 

c. Current State of AEB Technology 

When NHTSA’s CIB test scenarios 

were developed, relatively few vehicles 

were equipped with this technology, 

and those that were equipped had 

systems with limited capabilities. Since 

then, fitment rates for CIB systems have 

increased significantly. The increased 

fitment was due in part to an industry 

voluntary commitment made in March 

2016. At that time, 20 vehicle 

manufacturers, representing more than 

99 percent of light motor vehicle sales 

in the U.S., voluntarily committed to 

install AEB systems on light motor 

vehicles.162 Pursuant to this voluntary 

commitment, the manufacturers would 

make FCW and CIB standard on 

virtually all light-duty vehicles with a 

gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 

3,855.5 kg (8,500 pounds) or less 

beginning no later than September 1, 

2022, and all trucks with a GVWR 

between 3,856.0 and 4,535.9 kg (8,501 

and 10,000 pounds) beginning no later 

than September 1, 2025. Conforming 

vehicles must be equipped with (1) an 

AEB system that earns at least an 

‘‘advanced’’ rating from IIHS in its front 

crash prevention track tests and (2) an 

FCW system that meets the performance 

requirements specified in two of 

NCAP’s three FCW test scenarios.163

The manufacturers further pledged to 

submit annual progress reports, which 

IIHS and NHTSA agreed to publish. In 

2017, the first reporting year, 

approximately 30 percent of the fleet 

was equipped with CIB systems (though 

many of those systems were not 

designed to meet the voluntary 

commitment thresholds), whereas 

participating manufacturers equipped 

75 percent of their fleet in 2019.164

While the voluntary commitment 

worked to increase fitment rates, the 

stringency included in the agreement for 

AEB systems is lower than that included 

in NCAP. The voluntary commitment 

included front crash prevention track 

tests that differed in stringency from the 

NCAP performance thresholds, and in 

number. The Agency was aware of those 

differences at the time, but considered 

the voluntary commitment to be a path 

toward greater fleet penetration.165

As fitment has increased, the sensor 

technology for CIB systems has also 

advanced significantly. For instance, in 

2017, many systems were not designed 

to meet the voluntary commitment 

thresholds, whereas in 2019, most 

vehicles with FCW and CIB systems 

were able to pass all relevant NCAP test 

scenarios. NHTSA notes that NCAP’s 

CIB test requirements currently require 

a speed reduction of at least 15.8 kph 

(9.8 mph) in the program’s LVS test. 

These test requirements are more 

stringent than those required by the 

voluntary commitment, which allow a 


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13482 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

166 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, 

March 17), U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic 

commitment of 20 automakers to make automatic 

emergency braking standard on new vehicles, 

https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihsannounce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakersto-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standardon-new-vehicles. 

167 In this instance, ‘‘vehicles’’ refers to the total 

number of vehicles in the 2021 fleet, and not the 

total number of vehicle models for that year. 

168These values assume a fifty percent take rate 

for vehicles having optional equipment. 

169No contact was assumed if the test vehicle did 

not contact the POV in 5 or more of the 7 required 

trial runs. 

170 Insufficient intervention was defined as a 

maximum (peak) deceleration of less than 0.5g. 

171Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

172This is not to suggest that camera systems are 

superior to radar systems in all tests. 

173Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

vehicle to comply with the 

memorandum for a speed reduction of 

8.0 kph (5 mph) in the IIHS 19.3 or 40.2 

kph (12 and 25 mph) LVS tests.166 For 

the 2021 model year, the pass rate (as 

reported by vehicle manufacturers) for 

NCAP’s FCW and CIB tests for 

vehicles 167 equipped with these 

technologies and for which 

manufacturers submitted data was 88.8 

percent and 69.5 percent, 

respectively.168 Furthermore, NHTSA 

found that 63 percent of model year 

2017 vehicles did not contact the POV 

in the LVS scenario during the Agency’s 

testing, whereas 100 percent of model 

year 2021 vehicles did not make contact 

with the POV when tested.169 As such, 

the Agency believes current CIB system 

performance far exceeds NCAP’s current 

testing requirements, such that it is 

feasible to update the program’s CIB test 

conditions to further safety 

improvements. Recent NHTSA research 

supports this assertion. 

d. NHTSA’s CIB Characterization Study 

Similar to the fleet testing performed 

for PAEB, the Agency conducted a 

series of CIB characterization tests using 

a sample of MY 2020 NCAP test 

vehicles from various manufacturers. 

The goal of this testing was to quantify 

the performance of current CIB systems 

using the previously defined LVS and 

LVD test scenarios, but with an 

expanded set of input conditions. 

Testing was conducted in accordance 

with the CIB test procedure prescribed 

above; however, several scenarios were 

then repeated to assess how specific 

procedural changes (i.e., increases in 

test speed and deceleration magnitude) 

affected CIB system performance. 

• For the additional LVS tests, the 

Agency incrementally increased the 

vehicle speed for the LVS test scenario 

(from 40.2 to 72.4 kph (25 to 45 mph) 

in 8.0 kph (5 mph) increments), as 

shown in Table 2 below, to identify 

when/if the vehicle reached its 

operational limits and/or did not react 

to the POV ahead. When insufficient 

intervention occurred for a given 

vehicle, the Agency repeated the test 

scenario at a test speed that was 4.0 kph 

(2.5 mph) lower.170 This reduced speed 

was used to define the system’s upper 

capabilities for the LVS scenario. 

• For the additional LVD tests, the 

Agency evaluated how changes made to 

either the vehicles’ speed (72.4 kph 

versus 56.3 kph (45 mph versus 35 

mph)) or deceleration magnitude (0.5g 

versus 0.3g) affected CIB performance, 

as shown in Table 3 below. 

Details of NHTSA’s CIB 

characterization study are provided 

below (with speeds given in kph (mph)): 

TABLE 2—NOMINAL LVS MATRIX

SV speed, 

(kph/mph) 

POV speed, 

(kph/mph) 

40.2/25 .................................. 0/0 

48.3/30 .................................. 0/0 

56.3/35 .................................. 0/0 

64.4/40 .................................. 0/0 

72.4/45 .................................. 0/0 

TABLE 3—NOMINAL LVD MATRIX

SV speed, 

(kph/mph) 

POV speed, 

(kph/mph) 

Peak 

deceleration 

(g) 

Minimum 

distance, 

(mft.) 

56.3/35 ......................................................................................................................................... 56.3/35 0.3 13.8/45.3 

56.3/35 ......................................................................................................................................... 56.3/35 0.5 13.8/45.3 

72.4/45 ......................................................................................................................................... 72.4/45 0.3 13.8/45.3 

No additional LVM or STP false 

positive assessments were conducted as 

part of the Agency’s CIB 

characterization study. There were 

several reasons for this. First, in its 

review of the 2011–2015 FARS and GES 

rear-end crash data sets, NHTSA 

showed that LVS and LVD rear-end 

scenarios resulted in the highest number 

of crashes and MAIS 1–5 injuries. As 

shown in Table A–1, there were 

1,099,868 LVS, 374,624 LVD, and 

174,217 LVM crashes annually.171

Furthermore, there were 561,842 MAIS 

1–5 injuries resulting from the LVS 

crash scenario, 196,731 for LVD, and 

97,402 for LVM. The LVS scenario also 

had the second highest number of 

fatalities. Secondly, it was unclear 

whether performing a set of additional 

STP false positive tests would provide 

useful data. When the STP test was 

initially developed, many AEB systems 

relied solely on radar for lead vehicle 

detection. Today, most vehicles utilize 

camera-only or fused systems that rely 

on both camera and radar. Although the 

Agency has observed instances of false 

positive test failures during CIB and 

DBS NCAP evaluations performed with 

radar-only systems, none have been 

observed when camera-only or fused 

systems were evaluated in the program. 

While some radar-only systems have 

had difficulty classifying the STP 

correctly, camera-only and fused (i.e., 

camera plus radar) systems have not 

exhibited this issue.172 For these 

reasons, the Agency believes it may be 

appropriate to remove the false positive 

STP assessments from NCAP’s AEB 

evaluation matrix in this NCAP update 

and is seeking comment in that regard. 

The Agency chose to increase the test 

speeds of the scenarios included in its 

CIB characterization study because, in 

its independent analysis of the 2011– 

2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 

speeding was a factor in 42 percent of 

the fatal rear-end crashes.173 A review of 

Volpe’s analysis also showed that 

approximately 28 percent of fatalities 

and 63 percent of injuries in rear-end 

crashes occurred when the posted speed 

on roadways is 72.4 kph (45 mph) or 

less. When the travel speed was 

reported in FARS and GES, 

approximately 7 percent of fatal and 34 

percent of the police reported real-end 

crashes resulting in injuries occurred at 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13483 

174For this crash mode, 62 and 67 percent of the 

travel speed data is not reported in FARS and GES, 

respectively. 

175European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (April 2021), Test Protocol—AEB Carto-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See section 8.2.3. 

speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.174

These data suggested that there was 

merit to assessing the capabilities of 

newer vehicles using LVS tests 

performed at higher speeds since this 

would allow the Agency to gauge the 

ability of current-generation CIB 

systems to address a greater number of 

rear-end crashes, particularly those that 

produce the most serious and fatal 

injuries. The Agency also reasoned that 

it was most appropriate to increase the 

test speed in NCAP’s LVS scenario, in 

particular, since this scenario has the 

potential to require the greatest speed 

reduction authority to realize potential 

safety benefits. Historically, it has also 

been a difficult scenario for forwardlooking sensing systems to address, 

especially at high vehicle speeds. 

Although NHTSA acknowledges that 

the majority of fatal rear-end crashes (72 

percent) occurred on roads with posted 

speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph), 

these higher speeds were not assessed as 

part of the Agency’s characterization 

testing. Prior to testing, the Agency had 

safety concerns with conducting LVS 

tests at speeds of 80.5 kph (50 mph) or 

more due to test track length limitations, 

inherent safety considerations for 

laboratory personnel, and potential 

damage to either the SV or test 

equipment. That said, as will be 

discussed later in this section, data 

collected during the Agency’s testing 

showed that higher test speeds may be 

feasible, as several vehicles provided 

complete crash avoidance at 72.4 kph 

(45 mph). 

NHTSA’s intent in evaluating a 

modified LVD scenario was to 

document the performance of currentgeneration CIB systems using more 

demanding LVD-based driving 

situations. The Agency also planned to 

use these test results to determine the 

feasibility of increasing the stringency of 

NCAP’s LVD test. Compared to the LVD 

test conditions presently specified in 

NHTSA’s CIB test procedure, the 

modified LVD tests, as shown in Table 

3, either (1) maintained the existing 13.8 

m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway and 

0.3g POV deceleration profile, but 

increased the travel speed of both the 

POV and SV from 56.3 to 72.4 kph (35 

to 45 mph), or (2) maintained the 

existing 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV 

headway and existing 56.3 kph (35 

mph) POV and SV speeds, but increased 

the average POV deceleration magnitude 

to 0.5g. 

NHTSA’s interest in the first LVD 

procedural change aligned with that 

mentioned for the LVS scenario 

changes—a significant number of 

injuries and fatalities in rear-end 

crashes occurred at higher speeds. The 

second change was made to address 

situations where the driver of a lead 

vehicle brakes aggressively, causing the 

driver of the following vehicle to have 

even less time to avoid or mitigate the 

crash than had the lead vehicle braking 

been at the 0.3g level presently 

specified. The Agency reasoned that 

implementing these changes for the LVD 

scenario would introduce a more 

stringent scenario than that which is 

currently prescribed in NHTSA’s CIB 

test procedure, and would thus help the 

Agency understand the capabilities of 

current CIB systems more 

comprehensively. 

Test reports related to NHTSA’s CIB 

characterization testing can be found in 

the docket for this notice. 

e. Updates to NCAP’s CIB Testing 

In general, this study has allowed 

NHTSA to assess the performance of 

current CIB systems and evaluate the 

technology’s future potential for the 

new model years’ vehicle fleet. The 

study showed that many vehicles in 

today’s fleet were able to repeatedly 

provide complete crash avoidance at 

higher test speeds, shorter SV-to-POV 

headways, and generally more 

aggressive conditions than those 

specified in the Agency’s current NCAP 

CIB test procedure. This study has also 

provided the Agency with new ways to 

consider differentiating CIB systems’ 

performance for NCAP ratings purposes 

in the future. Furthermore, it has 

provided the Agency with the 

underlying support necessary for NCAP 

to propose adjustments to the current 

CIB performance requirements to 

address rear-end crashes that are 

causing a greater number of injuries and 

fatalities in the real world. Accordingly, 

the Agency is proposing to make several 

changes to its CIB test procedure for this 

NCAP upgrade. These changes are 

outlined below for each test scenario. 

For the LVS scenario, the Agency is 

proposing the following: 

• Increased SV test speeds and an 

assessment methodology that is similar 

to that which it proposed to assess 

PAEB system performance. CIB system 

performance for the LVS scenario will 

be assessed over a range of test speeds. 

The Agency is proposing a minimum SV 

test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which 

is similar to that currently specified in 

NHTSA’s CIB test procedure—40.2 kph 

(25 mph), and a maximum SV test speed 

of 80.0 kph (49.7 mph). The Agency is 

proposing to increase the subject vehicle 

test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) 

increments from the minimum test 

speed to the maximum test speed for the 

LVS assessment. 

The Agency’s characterization testing 

showed that it is feasible to raise the SV 

speed in NCAP’s LVS test to encourage 

improved performance of CIB systems. 

In fact, several vehicles repeatably 

afforded full crash avoidance (i.e., no 

contact) at speeds up to 72.4 kph (45 

mph) for the LVS test scenario. 

Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that 

Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car Rear 

stationary (CCRs) scenario, which is 

comparable to the Agency’s LVS tests, at 

speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph) for 

those systems that offer AEB, which also 

suggests that higher test speeds are 

practicable.175 As such, NHTSA 

believes that it is appropriate to 

harmonize with Euro NCAP on the 

maximum LVS test speed of 80 kph 

(49.7 mph), as this should better address 

the higher severity, high-speed crash 

problem and, in turn, further reduce 

fatalities and serious injuries. Although 

Euro NCAP’s protocol prescribes a 

minimum SV test speed of 10 kph (6.2 

mph) for the CCRs scenario for AEB 

systems that also offer FCW, the Agency 

does not see a reason to perform its LVS 

test at a speed that is less than that 

which is specified in its existing test 

procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)). 

Therefore, it is not proposing to 

harmonize with Euro NCAP with 

respect to the minimum required test 

speed. 

• A revised performance requirement. 

In lieu of a speed reduction, as is 

currently specified in NHTSA’s CIB test 

procedure for the LVS scenario, the SV 

must avoid making contact with the 

POV target to pass a test trial. Similar to 

PAEB, this should limit damage to the 

SV and POV target during testing and 

reduce chances that results are 

questioned or invalidated. 

• Changes to the number of test trials 

required for the LVS scenario. 

Currently, NHTSA’s CIB test procedure 

requires that a vehicle meet the 

performance criteria (i.e., specified 

speed reduction) for five out of seven 

trials. However, similar to that proposed 

by NHTSA for its PAEB assessment, the 

Agency is proposing that only one test 

trial will be conducted per test speed 

assessed (i.e., 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kph 

or 24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) 

if the SV does not contact the POV 

target during the first valid trial for each 

of the test speeds. For a given test 

condition, the test sequence is initiated 

at the 40 kph (24.9 mph) minimum 


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13484 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

176The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail 

criterion (i.e., a vehicle must meet performance 

requirements for three out of five trials for a 

particular test condition to pass the test condition) 

is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced 

earlier. 

177European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (April 2021), Test Protocol—AEB Carto-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See section 8.2.5. 

speed. To achieve a passing result, the 

test must be valid (i.e., all test 

specifications and tolerances satisfied), 

and the SV must not contact the POV. 

If the SV does not contact the POV 

during the first valid test, the test speed 

is incrementally increased by 10 kph 

(6.2 mph), and the next test in the 

sequence is performed. Unless the SV 

contacts the POV, this iterative process 

continues until a maximum test speed 

of 80 kph (31.1 mph) is evaluated. If the 

SV contacts the POV, and the relative 

longitudinal velocity between the SV 

and POV is less than or equal to 50 

percent of the initial speed of the SV, 

the Agency will perform four additional 

(repeated) test trials at the same speed 

for which the impact occurred. The SV 

must not contact the POV for at least 

three out of the five test trials performed 

at that same speed to pass that specific 

combination of test condition and test 

speed.176 If the SV contacts the POV 

during a valid test of a test condition 

(whether it be the first test performed 

for a particular test speed or a 

subsequent test trial at that same speed), 

and the relative impact velocity exceeds 

50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, 

no additional test trials will be 

conducted at the given test speed and 

test condition and the SV is considered 

to have failed the test condition at that 

specific test speed. 

The Agency is pursuing an 

assessment approach for the LVS CIB 

test scenario that is similar to that 

proposed for PAEB systems in order to 

reduce test burden, given that additional 

test speeds are being proposed. NHTSA 

believes that this alternative approach 

will continue to ensure that passing CIB 

systems represent robust designs that 

will offer a higher level of performance 

and safety. 

For the LVD scenario, the Agency is 

proposing the following: 

• A reduction in SV and POV test 

speeds. NHTSA’s CIB test procedure 

currently prescribes a test speed of 56 

kph (34.8 mph) for the SV and POV in 

the LVD scenario. Euro NCAP’s AEB 

Car-to-Car systems test protocol, Version 

3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the Car-toCar rear braking (CCRb) specifies an SV 

speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). For this 

upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is 

proposing to reduce the test speed for 

the SV and POV to 50 kph (31.1 mph) 

to harmonize with Euro NCAP.177 Given 

additional changes proposed for the SVto-POV headway and deceleration 

magnitude (discussed next), NHTSA 

does not believe the proposed reduction 

in test speed will lead to an overall 

reduction in test stringency or loss of 

safety benefits. 

The Agency is also requesting 

comment on whether it is appropriate to 

incorporate additional SV test speeds 

for the LVD test scenario, specifically 

60, 70, and 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 

mph) or, alternatively, whether testing 

at only 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph 

(49.7 mph) would be sufficient. As 

mentioned earlier, Volpe’s analysis of 

the 2011–2015 FARS data set showed 

that the majority of crashes occurred on 

roads with posted speeds exceeding 

72.4 kph (45 mph), suggesting that 

testing at higher speeds for all CIB test 

scenarios may be warranted. The 

Agency has simply not performed 

testing at 80 kph (49.7 mph) to date 

because of concerns surrounding 

laboratories’ abilities to safely execute 

such tests and limited available testing 

real estate, as this test scenario requires 

that both the SV and POV be travelling 

at the same speed at the onset of the test 

validity period. That being said, NHTSA 

believes that, (1) given the results from 

its characterization study, and in 

particular, the braking performance 

demonstrated in the LVS tests, (2) the 

fact that tested vehicles may have higher 

POV classification confidence for the 

LVD test compared to the LVS test since 

the POV is always in motion during the 

LVD test, and (3) the POV will be the 

GVT, which relies on a robotic platform 

for movement, rather than the SSV 

which must be towed along a monorail 

secured to the test track, vehicles in the 

current fleet will likely also perform 

well in higher speed LVD tests. To 

validate this assumption, NHTSA will 

be conducting research next year to 

assess vehicle performance at speeds 

ranging from 50 kph (31.1 mph) to 80 

kph (49.7 mph) for 12 and 40 m (39.4 

and 131.2 ft.) headways and POV 

deceleration magnitudes of 0.4 and 0.5 

g for the LVD CIB test scenario. Pending 

the outcome of that research, the 

Agency may consider adopting 

additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 

70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 

49.7 mph)) for the LVD test scenario in 

NCAP. The Agency requests comment 

on what SV-to-POV headway and 

deceleration magnitude(s) would be 

appropriate if the Agency was to adopt 

any or all of these additional test 

speeds. If additional test speeds are 

adopted, the Agency would implement 

an assessment methodology similar to 

that proposed for the CIB LVS test 

scenario, whereby NHTSA would 

increase the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 

mph) increments from the minimum 

test speed to the maximum test speed 

for the LVD assessment. 

• A reduction in SV-to-POV headway. 

NHTSA’s CIB test procedure currently 

specifies a 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV 

headway for the LVD scenario. The 

Agency is proposing to reduce the 

prescribed headway to 12 m (39.4 ft.) to 

harmonize with Euro NCAP’s CCRb 

scenario. Given the proposed test speed 

reduction, the Agency believes it is 

appropriate to also reduce the headway 

to maintain similar stringency with its 

current LVD test condition. Whereas 

Euro NCAP also specifies an additional 

SV-to-POV headway of 40 m (131.2 ft.), 

the Agency is not proposing to conduct 

this additional assessment as part of this 

proposal. NHTSA does not believe there 

would be a safety benefit to adopting 40 

m (131.2 ft.) as an additional, and less 

stringent, headway. Therefore, it would 

serve to increase the test burden 

unnecessarily. 

• An increase in deceleration 

magnitude. The Agency is proposing to 

increase the POV deceleration 

magnitude currently specified in its CIB 

test procedure for the LVD scenario 

from 0.3 g to 0.5 g. In the Agency’s CIB 

characterization study, some vehicles 

repeatably afforded full crash avoidance 

(i.e., no contact) for all trials when the 

POV executed a 0.5 g braking maneuver 

in the LVD condition with a SV test 

speed of 35 mph and SV-to-POV 

headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). Although 

the test speed used in the Agency’s 

study was slightly lower than that 

which the Agency is proposing for the 

LVD test condition, and the SV-to-POV 

headway was slightly longer, NHTSA 

believes that it is reasonable to adopt a 

higher POV deceleration magnitude for 

its future LVD testing. The Agency notes 

that a deceleration of 0.5 g falls within 

the range of deceleration magnitudes 

prescribed by Euro NCAP in its AEB 

Car-to-Car systems test protocol, Version 

3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the CCRb 

scenario. In its CCRb test, Euro NCAP 

specifies POV deceleration magnitudes 

of 2 m/s2 and 6 m/s2 (approximately 0.2 

to 0.6 g) for an SV-to-POV headway of 

12 m (39.4 ft.) and SV test speed of 50 

kph (31.1 mph). As the Agency has 

proposed this reduced headway and test 

speed for its LVD testing, it reasons that 

adopting a 0.5 g POV deceleration 

magnitude is also practicable. The 

Agency is not proposing 0.6 g as the 

POV deceleration magnitude in its LVD 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13485 

178The GST system is comprised of two main 

parts—a low profile robotic vehicle (LPRV), and a 

global vehicle target (GVT), which is secured to the 

top of the LPRV. 

179Fogle, E.E., Arquette, T.E. (TRC), and 

Forkenbrock, G.J. (NHTSA), (2021, May), Traffic 

Jam Assist Draft Test Procedure Performability 

Validation (Report No. DOT HS 812 987), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

180From Section 4.1 of DOT HS 812 987—‘‘POV 

deceleration validity check failures occurred during 

six trials of the eight LVDAD trials performed. Four 

of the seven 0.6 g failures were because the POV 

was unable to achieve the minimum deceleration 

threshold of 0.55 g. The remaining three 0.6 g 

failures were because the POV was unable to 

maintain a minimum average deceleration of at 

least 0.55 g.’’ 

181European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (April 2021), Test Protocol—AEB Carto-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See section 8.2.3. 

182The Agency notes that the minimum SV test 

for vehicles equipped with only FCW (and no AEB) 

is 50 kph (31.1 mph). 

test because it has observed instances 

where the tires on the POV target 

developed flat spots during research 

testing conducted with the Guided Soft 

Target (GST) system 178 to assess Traffic 

Jam Assist (TJA) systems. The TJA 

testing required a braking maneuver for 

the lead vehicle decelerates, accelerates, 

then decelerates (LVDAD) scenario that 

is similar to that specified in the 

Agency’s CIB LVD test.179 During this 

testing, NHTSA also found that it was 

more difficult to achieve and accurately 

control deceleration when braking 

maneuvers higher than 0.5 g were 

used.180 Extensive tuning efforts related 

to the GST brake applications were 

made in an attempt to rectify the 

problems encountered, but these 

adjustments were unable to consistently 

satisfy the test tolerances associated 

with 0.6 g POV deceleration for the 

LVDAD test and a recommendation was 

made to reduce the maximum nominal 

POV deceleration from 0.6 g to 0.5 g for 

future testing. In its report findings, the 

Agency also noted that a deceleration of 

0.6 g is not only very close to the 

maximum braking capability of the 

GST’s robotic platform used by the 

Agency, it is also very close to the 

default magnitude used by the LPRV 

during an emergency stop (maximum 

deceleration). As such, the Agency 

concluded that a decrease in maximum 

POV deceleration should also reduce 

equipment wear, particularly for the 

system’s tires and braking components, 

thus improving test efficiency. This 

being said, the Agency acknowledges 

that newer robotic platforms designed to 

provide greater capabilities, are now 

becoming available, which may resolve 

the issues observed in the Agency’s TJA 

testing. As such, the Agency is 

requesting comment on whether it is 

feasible to adopt a POV deceleration 

magnitude of 0.6 g in lieu of 0.5 g, as 

proposed. 

• An alternative performance 

criterion. In lieu of a speed reduction, 

as is currently specified in NHTSA’s 

CIB test procedure for the LVD scenario, 

the vehicle must avoid making contact 

with the POV target to pass a test trial. 

• Changes to the number of test trials 

required for the LVD scenario. NHTSA 

is adopting an approach to conducting 

test trials that is identical to that 

described above for the CIB LVS 

scenario, regardless of the number of 

test speeds adopted (i.e., one speed, 50 

kph (31.1 mph); two speeds, 50 kph 

(31.1 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph); or 

four speeds, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kph 

(31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)). If only 

one or two test speeds are selected for 

inclusion, the Agency is seeking 

comment on whether it is more 

appropriate to alternatively require 7 

trials for each test speed, and require 

that 5 out of the 7 trials conducted pass 

the ‘‘no contact’’ performance criterion. 

For the LVM scenario, the Agency is 

proposing the following: 

• Increased SV test speeds. NHTSA is 

proposing to assess CIB system 

performance for the LVM scenario over 

a range of test speeds, similar to that 

proposed for the LVS scenario. The 

Agency is proposing a minimum SV test 

speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is 

nearly equivalent to the 40.2 kph (25 

mph) test speed currently specified in 

NHTSA’s CIB test procedure, and a 

maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7 

mph), which is slightly higher than the 

72.4 kph (45 mph) specified for the 

second LVM test condition in NHTSA’s 

current CIB test procedure. The Agency 

is proposing to increase the SV test 

speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments 

from the minimum test speed to the 

maximum test speed for the LVM 

assessment. 

The Agency did not perform 

additional LVM testing as part of its CIB 

characterization study. Nonetheless, 

NHTSA believes that it is feasible to 

raise the SV speed in NCAP’s LVM test 

to encourage improved performance of 

CIB systems, as the Agency’s current 

CIB LVM tests (conducted with an SV 

speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV 

speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph)) have shown 

that many vehicles are able to stop 

without contacting the POV target for 

each of the required test trials. 

Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that 

Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car Rear 

moving (CCRm) scenario, which is 

comparable to the Agency’s LVM tests, 

at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph), 

which also suggests that higher SV test 

speeds are practicable.181 As such, 

NHTSA believes that it is appropriate to 

harmonize with Euro NCAP on the 

maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7 

mph) in the Agency’s LVM test, as this 

should also address high-speed crashes 

and thus further reduce fatalities and 

serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP’s 

protocol prescribes a minimum SV test 

speed of 30 kph (18.6 mph) for the 

CCRm scenario for vehicles that have 

AEB systems,182 the Agency does not 

see a reason to perform its LVM test at 

a speed that is less than that which is 

specified in its existing test procedure 

(40.2 kph (25 mph)). Therefore, it is not 

proposing to harmonize with Euro 

NCAP with respect to the minimum 

required test speed. 

• An alternative POV test speed for 

all test conditions. While the Agency’s 

CIB test procedure currently specifies a 

POV test speed of 16.1 kph (10 mph) 

when the SV speed is 40.2 kph (25 mph) 

and a POV test speed of 32.2 kph (20 

mph) when the SV speed is 72.4 kph (45 

mph), the Agency is proposing to use a 

POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph) for 

every SV test speed that will be assessed 

for the LVM scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 

to 49.7 mph), increased in 10.0 kph (6.2 

mph) increments. NHTSA recognizes 

that Euro NCAP’s CCRm protocol 

specifies a POV test speed of 20 kph 

(12.4 mph), and this POV speed is 

stipulated for similar testing conducted 

by various other vehicle safety ratings 

programs. With this proposed NCAP 

upgrade, NHTSA sees no reason to 

deviate from the other testing 

organizations with respect to the POV 

speed for its LVM test. 

• A performance criterion of ‘‘no 

contact’’. In lieu of a speed reduction, as 

is currently specified in NHTSA’s CIB 

test procedure for the Agency’s higher 

speed LVM scenario (i.e., POV of 72.4 

kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 

kph (20 mph)), the SV must avoid 

making contact with the POV target to 

pass a test trial for each test speed 

assessed for the LVM scenario; 40 to 80 

kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph), increased in 10 

kph (6.2 mph) increments. 

• Changes to the number of test trials 

required for the LVM scenario. NHTSA 

is adopting an approach to conducting 

test trials that is identical to that 

described above for the CIB LVS 

scenario. For the proposed CIB LVM 

tests, the Agency would require one test 

trial per SV speed increment, and four 

repeat trials in the event of a test failure 

for instances where the SV has a relative 

velocity at impact that is equal to or less 

than 50 percent of the initial speed. 

NHTSA has chosen to harmonize with 

Euro NCAP in many respects since it 


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13486 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

183Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 

Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving 

passenger vehicles with automatic emergency 

braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019, VOL. 20, 

NO. S1, S112–S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 

15389588.2019.1576172. 

184The Agency notes that the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers (The Alliance) merged 

with Global Automakers in January 2020 to create 

the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto 

Innovators). Both automotive industry groups 

separately submitted comments to the December 

2015 notice. 

185European New Car Assessment Programme 

(Euro NCAP) (April 2021), Test Protocol—AEB Carto-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See Annex A. 

recognizes that the rear-end crash 

problem, as defined by the most 

frequently occurring and dynamically 

distinct pre-crash scenarios, could be 

changing as AEB-equipped vehicles 

become more prolific in the fleet. 

Accordingly, the Agency believes that it 

is beneficial to standardize the current 

CIB test specifications with other 

consumer information programs and 

focus resources on emerging trends.183

However, the Agency also notes that it 

will consider making additional updates 

to its CIB test evaluation as the crash 

problem evolves. 

f. Updates to NCAP’s DBS Testing 

NHTSA did not conduct any testing, 

as part of its characterization study, to 

evaluate DBS system performance 

capabilities beyond what is currently 

stipulated in NCAP’s DBS test 

procedure. However, the Agency notes 

that its CIB and DBS test procedures are 

currently aligned with respect to test 

scenarios, test speeds, headways, etc. 

Differences exist only with respect to 

the use of an SV manual brake 

application (i.e., for DBS) and most 

performance criterion. NHTSA’s DBS 

test procedure currently specifies ‘‘no 

contact’’ as the performance criterion for 

all DBS test conditions, whereas the 

Agency’s CIB test procedure currently 

requires a specified speed reduction for 

each of the CIB test conditions (with the 

exception of the lower speed LVM 

condition where the POV speed is 16.1 

kph (10 mph) and the SV speed is 40.2 

kph (25 mph), which requires ‘‘no 

contact’’). Therefore, NHTSA believes it 

is reasonable to adopt the CIB test 

conditions (i.e., test speeds, headways, 

etc.) for the comparable DBS test 

conditions. However, given the 

Agency’s proposal to embrace the more 

stringent ‘‘no contact’’ performance 

criterion for each of the CIB test 

conditions, and for the additional 

reasons mentioned previously, the 

Agency also believes, as suggested prior, 

that there may be merit to removing the 

DBS test conditions from NCAP entirely 

to reduce test burden and the associated 

cost. 

In its comments to the NCAP’s 

December 2015 notice, the Alliance 184

stated that since crash avoidance (i.e., 

no vehicle contact) is the desired 

outcome for all imminent rear-end crash 

events, if an SV avoids contact with the 

POV in all CIB tests, DBS testing should 

not be necessary. Although NHTSA 

agrees with the Alliance’s rationale in 

principle, the Agency also believes there 

is merit to ensuring that both AEB 

systems perform as designed and help 

the driver to mitigate or prevent the 

crash. The Agency reasons that it is 

possible for the driver to apply the 

brakes, but with a magnitude that does 

not result in achieving the vehicle’s 

maximum crash avoidance potential 

(i.e., deceleration). In the past, some 

manufacturers assumed the driver was 

in control when the brake pedal was 

depressed and would not override the 

driver’s input when necessary to avoid 

a crash. Accordingly, NHTSA hesitates 

to assume that if CIB systems work 

effectively during testing, then DBS 

systems will automatically do so as 

well. 

In light of these considerations, the 

Agency is tentatively proposing to retain 

both CIB and DBS system performance 

tests in NCAP, and to align all test 

conditions for comparable test scenarios 

(e.g., SV and POV test speeds, headway, 

etc.) to evaluate whether the DBS 

system will provide supplemental 

braking if the driver brakes but 

additional braking is warranted. For this 

testing, the Agency is proposing to 

adopt an assessment approach for DBS 

that is identical to that described 

previously for PAEB and CIB. The 

Agency would require one test trial per 

speed for each test scenario, and four 

repeated trials for any specific test 

condition and speed combination that 

results in a test failure and where the SV 

has a relative velocity at impact that is 

equal to or less than 50 percent of the 

initial speed. Speeds will be increased 

in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the 

minimum test speed to the maximum 

test speed. However, the Agency is also 

requesting comment on whether 

removal of the DBS test scenarios from 

NCAP would be more appropriate. 

As an alternative to retaining all DBS 

tests in NCAP, or removing the DBS 

performance evaluations from NCAP 

entirely, the Agency believes it may be 

more reasonable to conduct only the 

LVS and LVM tests at the highest two 

test speeds proposed for CIB—70 and 80 

kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)—to ensure 

system functionality and that the SV 

will not suppress AEB operation when 

the driver applies the vehicle’s 

foundation brakes. The Agency would 

also consider conducting the LVD DBS 

test at 70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 

mph) if the Agency decides to also 

adopt these test speeds for the related 

CIB test. Comments are requested on 

this alternative proposal and whether an 

alternative assessment method would be 

more appropriate if any or all of the DBS 

test scenarios were conducted only at 

the two highest test speeds. For a more 

limited speed assessment of the two 

highest test speeds, 70 and 80 kph (43.5 

and 49.7 mph), instead of up to four test 

speeds (50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1, 

37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVD, or 

five test speeds (40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 

kph (24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 

mph)) for LVS and LVM), should the 

Agency require one trial per test 

condition (i.e., align with the 

assessment method outlined for the 

other AEB test conditions) or multiple 

trials? If multiple trials were to be 

required, how many would be 

appropriate, and what would be an 

acceptable pass rate? 

If the Agency continues to perform 

DBS testing in NCAP, it also proposes 

to revise when the manual (robotic) 

brake application is initiated. The 

current DBS test procedure prescribes 

this shall occur at specific TTCs per test 

scenario: 1.1 seconds (LVS), 1.0 seconds 

(LVM), and 1.4 second (LVD). The 

proposed revision would initiate 

manual braking at a time that 

corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW 

alert is issued for all DBS test scenario 

and speed combinations, regardless of 

whether a CIB activation occurs after the 

FCW alert but before initiation of the 

manual brake application. The Agency 

reasons that this change is more 

representative of real-world use and 

driving conditions, and is in basic 

agreement with the approach specified 

for FCW performance evaluations in 

Euro NCAP’s AEB Car-to-Car systems 

test protocol.185 Alternatively, the 

Agency requests comment on 

appropriate TTCs for the modified test 

conditions. 

g. Updates to NCAP’s FCW Testing 

As mentioned earlier, NHTSA is 

proposing to consolidate its FCW and 

CIB tests such that the CIB tests will be 

used as an indicant of FCW operation. 

The Agency is also proposing to 

similarly assess FCW in the context of 

its PAEB tests. NHTSA believes there is 

merit to assessing the presence of an 

FCW alert within the CIB and PAEB test 

because operation of FCW and AEB/ 

PAEB systems, in the test scenarios to 

be used by NCAP, are complementary 


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186Previous NHTSA research indicates that 

human drivers are capable of releasing the 

accelerator pedal within 500 ms after returning 

their eyes to a forward-facing viewing position in 

response to an FCW alert. Forkenbrock, G., Snyder, 

A., Hoover, R., O’Harra, B., Vasko, S., Smith, L. 

(2011, July), A Test Track Protocol for Assessing 

Forward Collision Warning Driver-Vehicle Interface 

Effectiveness (Report No. DOT HS 811 501), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

187To pass a test trial, the vehicle must issue the 

FCW alert on or prior to the prescribed time-tocollision (TTC) specified for each of the three FCW 

test scenarios. 

188 In essence, the Agency would require one test 

trial per speed for each test scenario and four repeat 

trials in the event of a test failure for instances 

where the SV has a relative velocity at impact that 

is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial 

speed. Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) 

increments from the minimum test speed to the 

maximum test speed. 

189The Agency does not plan to make any 

procedural modifications for vehicles that have 

regenerative braking that cannot be switched off or 

adjusted, as those vehicles should operate similarly 

in the real world. 

and fundamentally intertwined. Also, 

combining the Agency’s FCW tests with 

those used to assess AEB system 

performance would reduce test burden. 

The Agency proposes that it would 

evaluate the presence of a vehicle’s 

FCW system during its CIB tests by 

requiring the SV accelerator pedal be 

fully released within 500 ms after the 

FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert is 

issued during a CIB test, the SV 

accelerator pedal will be fully released 

within 500 ms after the onset of CIB 

system braking.186 Here, the onset of 

CIB activation is taken to be the instant 

SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g. If 

no FCW alert is issued and the vehicle’s 

CIB system does not offer any braking, 

release of the SV accelerator pedal will 

not be required prior to impact with the 

POV. The Agency is also proposing to 

make similar procedural changes to its 

PAEB test procedure. NHTSA is seeking 

comment as to whether the proposed 

FCW assessment method is reasonable. 

Furthermore, given that most FCW 

systems are currently able to pass all 

relevant NCAP test scenarios, as 

mentioned earlier, the Agency believes 

that, as an alternative to integrating the 

assessment of FCW into the Agency’s 

CIB tests, it may be feasible for NCAP 

to perform one FCW test that could 

serve as an indicant of FCW system 

performance (while still retaining the 

previously-stated accelerator pedal 

release timing to ensure CIB activation 

is not unintentionally suppressed). This 

would also reduce test burden. If the 

Agency were to choose one of the 

proposed CIB test scenarios to adopt for 

an FCW test to assess the performance 

of FCW systems, which CIB test 

scenario do commenters believe would 

be most appropriate and why? 

The Agency notes that if it maintains 

any or all of the FCW test scenarios that 

are currently included in its FCW test 

procedure, it proposes to align the 

corresponding maximum SV test 

speeds, POV speeds, headway, POV 

deceleration magnitude, etc., as 

applicable, with the included CIB tests, 

similar to that which it has proposed for 

the DBS tests. Accordingly, the Agency 

would adopt the following for the FCW 

tests: 

• LVS—SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 

mph); POV is stationary. 

• LVD—SV and POV speed of 50 kph 

(31.1 mph) or up to 80 kph (49.7 mph), 

depending on the final test speed 

adopted for the CIB LVD scenario; a 12 

m (39.4 ft.) SV-to-POV headway; and a 

POV deceleration magnitude of 0.5 g. 

• LVM—SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 

mph); POV speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph). 

If the Agency continues to conduct 

separate FCW assessments, it will need 

to revise the prescribed TTCs currently 

used to assess FCW performance to 

align with the revised test scenario and 

speed combinations.187 Given the 

Agency’s thoughts about FCW–AEB 

integration and the revised test 

conditions that would be adopted for 

any future FCW tests, NHTSA requests 

comment on what TTC would be 

appropriate for each test scenario. 

Although the Agency is proposing to 

adopt an assessment approach for FCW 

that is identical to that described 

previously for PAEB, CIB, and DBS,188

it is also requesting comment on 

whether an alternative assessment 

method would be appropriate in 

instances where it retains one or more 

FCW scenarios that are performed at a 

single test speed. In such instances, 

should the Agency require one trial per 

test condition (i.e., align with the 

assessment method outlined for the 

other AEB test conditions) or multiple 

trials? If multiple trials were to be 

required, how many would be 

appropriate, and what would be an 

acceptable pass rate? 

h. Regenerative Braking 

In addition to the FCW alert setting, 

discussed earlier, there are additional 

system settings that the Agency must 

now consider during its AEB and PAEB 

testing. One such setting is that for 

regenerative braking. Regenerative 

braking, which has become more 

common as electric vehicles have begun 

to proliferate the fleet, can slow the 

vehicle when the throttle is released. As 

such, when the throttle is fully released 

upon the issuance of the FCW alert in 

the Agency’s AEB and PAEB testing, 

vehicle speed can reduce significantly 

prior to the onset of braking associated 

with these technologies, particularly in 

instances where the FCW alert is issued 

early. For vehicles with regenerative 

braking that have multiple settings (e.g., 

nominal, more aggressive, less 

aggressive), the Agency is proposing to 

use the ‘‘off’’ setting or the setting that 

provides the lowest deceleration when 

the accelerator is fully released in its 

AEB and PAEB tests.189 Although 

NHTSA reasons that the nominal setting 

may be the setting most commonly 

chosen by a typical driver, it prefers the 

least aggressive setting, as it would be 

more indicative of ‘‘worst case’’. 

Selecting a setting that affords the 

lowest deceleration allows the vehicle 

to travel faster at the onset of braking 

associated with AEB and PAEB. This 

approach would produce a situation 

that is more comparable to that for 

vehicles that do not have regenerative 

braking. 

The Agency believes that regenerative 

braking may also introduce 

complications for the Agency’s DBS 

tests (if the DBS tests are retained in 

NCAP). NHTSA reasons that some 

vehicles may offer regenerative braking 

that is already so high that there would 

be only a relatively small boost in 

braking from the braking actuator 

(acting to provide a combined 0.4 g 

deceleration). For instance, if the 

regenerative braking from simply 

releasing the accelerator pedal results in 

0.3 g braking, the additional braking 

required to get to 0.4 g from the actuator 

would be a very low force and/or brake 

pedal displacement. The Agency is 

requesting comment on whether 

regenerative braking may introduce 

additional testing issues and on any 

recommendations for test procedural 

changes to rectify possible testing issues 

related to regenerative braking. 

With respect to FCW, CIB, and DBS 

testing in NCAP, NHTSA is seeking 

comment on the following: 

(38) For the Agency’s FCW tests: 

—If the Agency retains one or more 

separate tests for FCW, should it 

award credit solely to vehicles 

equipped with FCW systems that 

provide a passing audible alert? Or, 

should it also consider awarding 

credit to vehicles equipped with FCW 

systems that provide passing haptic 

alerts? Are there certain haptic alert 

types that should be excluded from 

consideration (if the Agency was to 

award credit to vehicles with haptic 

alerts that pass NCAP tests) because 

they may be a nuisance to drivers 

such that they are more likely to 

disable the system? Do commenters 


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believe that haptic alerts can be 

accurately and objectively assessed? 

Why or why not? Is it appropriate for 

the Agency to refrain from awarding 

credit to FCW systems that provide 

only a passing visual alert? Why or 

why not? If the Agency assesses the 

sufficiency of the FCW alert in the 

context of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what 

type of FCW alert(s) would be 

acceptable for use in defining the 

timing of the release of the SV 

accelerator pedal, and why? 

—Is it most appropriate to test the 

middle (or next latest) FCW system 

setting in lieu of the default setting 

when performing FCW and AEB 

(including PAEB) NCAP tests on 

vehicles that offer multiple FCW 

timing adjustment settings? Why or 

why not? If not, what use setting 

would be most appropriate? 

—Should the Agency consider 

consolidating FCW and CIB testing 

such that NCAP’s CIB test scenarios 

would serve as an indicant of FCW 

operation? Why or why not? The 

Agency has proposed that if it 

combines the two tests, it would 

evaluate the presence of a vehicle’s 

FCW system during its CIB tests by 

requiring the SV accelerator pedal be 

fully released within 500 ms after the 

FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert 

is issued during a CIB test, the SV 

accelerator pedal will be fully 

released within 500 ms after the onset 

of CIB system braking (as defined by 

the instant SV deceleration reaches at 

least 0.5g). If no FCW alert is issued 

and the vehicle’s CIB system does not 

offer any braking, release of the SV 

accelerator pedal will not be required 

prior to impact with the POV. The 

Agency notes that it has also proposed 

these test procedural changes for its 

PAEB tests as well. Is this assessment 

method for FCW operation 

reasonable? Why or why not? 

—If the Agency continues to assess FCW 

systems separately from CIB, how 

should the current FCW performance 

criteria (i.e., TTCs) be amended if the 

Agency aligns the corresponding 

maximum SV test speeds, POV 

speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV 

deceleration magnitude, etc., as 

applicable, with the proposed CIB 

tests, and why? What assessment 

method should be used—one trial per 

scenario, or multiple trials, and why? 

If multiple trials should be required, 

how many would be appropriate, and 

why? Also, what would be an 

acceptable pass rate, and why? 

—Is it desirable for NCAP to perform 

one FCW test scenario (instead of the 

three that are currently included in 

NCAP’s FCW test procedure), 

conducted at the corresponding 

maximum SV test speed, POV speed, 

SV-to-POV headway (as applicable), 

POV deceleration magnitude, etc. of 

the proposed CIB test to serve as an 

indicant of FCW system performance? 

If so, which test scenario from NCAP’s 

FCW test procedure is appropriate? 

—Are there additional or alternative test 

scenarios or test conditions that the 

Agency should consider incorporating 

into the FCW test procedure, such as 

those at even higher test speeds than 

those proposed for the CIB tests, or 

those having increased complexity? If 

so, should the current FCW 

performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) and/ 

or test scenario specifications be 

amended, and to what extent? 

(39) For the Agency’s CIB tests: 

—Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-toPOV headway, deceleration 

magnitude, etc. the Agency has 

proposed for NCAP’s CIB tests 

appropriate? Why or why not? If not, 

what speeds, headway(s), deceleration 

magnitude(s) are appropriate, and 

why? Should the Agency adopt a POV 

deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g for its 

LVD CIB test in lieu of 0.5 g 

proposed? Why or why not? 

—Should the Agency consider adopting 

additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 

70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 

49.7 mph)) for the CIB (and 

potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in 

NCAP? Why or why not? If additional 

speeds are included, what headway 

and deceleration magnitude would be 

appropriate for each additional test 

speed, and why? 

—Is a performance criterion of ‘‘no 

contact’’ appropriate for the proposed 

CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or 

why not? Alternatively, should the 

Agency require minimum speed 

reductions or specify a maximum 

allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for 

any or all of the proposed test 

conditions (i.e., test scenario and test 

speed combination)? If yes, why, and 

for which test conditions? For those 

test conditions, what speed 

reductions would be appropriate? 

Alternatively, what maximum 

allowable impact speed would be 

appropriate? 

(40) For the Agency’s DBS tests: 

—Should the Agency remove the DBS 

test scenarios from NCAP? Why or 

why not? Alternatively, should the 

Agency conduct the DBS LVS and 

LVM tests at only the highest test 

speeds proposed for CIB—70 and 80 

kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)? Why or why 

not? If the Agency also adopted these 

higher tests speeds (70 and 80 kph 

(43.5 and 49.7 mph)) for the LVD CIB 

test, should it also conduct the LVD 

DBS test at these same speeds? Why 

or why not? 

—If the Agency continues to perform 

DBS testing in NCAP, is it appropriate 

to revise when the manual (robotic) 

brake application is initiated to a time 

that corresponds to 1.0 second after 

the FCW alert is issued (regardless of 

whether a CIB activation occurs after 

the FCW alert but before initiation of 

the manual brake application)? If not, 

why, and what prescribed TTC values 

would be appropriate for the modified 

DBS test conditions? 

(41) Is the assessment method NHTSA 

has proposed for the CIB and DBS tests 

(i.e., one trial per test speed with speed 

increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for each 

test condition and repeat trials only in 

the event of POV contact) appropriate? 

Why or why not? Should an alternative 

assessment method such as multiple 

trials be required instead? If yes, why? 

If multiple trials should be required, 

how many would be appropriate, and 

why? Also, what would be an 

acceptable pass rate, and why? If the 

proposed assessment method is 

appropriate, it is acceptable even for the 

LVD test scenario if only one or two test 

speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is 

it more appropriate to alternatively 

require 7 trials for each test speed, and 

require that 5 out of the 7 trials 

conducted pass the ‘‘no contact’’ 

performance criterion? 

(42) The Agency’s proposal to (1) 

consolidate its FCW and CIB tests such 

that the CIB tests would also serve as an 

indicant of FCW operation, (2) assess 14 

test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for 

LVM, and potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) 

assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2 for LVS, 

2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), 

would result in a total of 20 unique 

combinations of test conditions and test 

speeds to be evaluated for AEB. If the 

Agency uses check marks to give credit 

to vehicles that (1) are equipped with 

the recommended ADAS technologies, 

and (2) pass the applicable system 

performance test requirements for each 

ADAS technology included in NCAP 

until such time as a new ADAS rating 

system is developed and a final rule to 

amend the safety rating section of the 

Monroney label is published, what is an 

appropriate minimum pass rate for AEB 

performance evaluation? For example, a 

vehicle is considered to meet the AEB 

performance if it passes two-thirds of 

the 20 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds (i.e., passes 

14 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds). 

(43) As fused camera-radar forwardlooking sensors are becoming more 


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prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the 

Agency has not observed any instances 

of false positive test failures during any 

of its CIB or DBS testing, is it 

appropriate to remove the false positive 

STP assessments from NCAP’s AEB (i.e., 

CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in this 

NCAP update? Why or why not? 

(44) For vehicles with regenerative 

braking that have setting options, the 

Agency is proposing to choose the ‘‘off’’ 

setting, or the setting that provides the 

lowest deceleration when the 

accelerator is fully released. As 

mentioned, this proposal also applies to 

the Agency’s PAEB tests. Are the 

proposed settings appropriate? Why or 

why not? Will regenerative braking 

introduce additional complications for 

the Agency’s AEB and PAEB testing, 

and how could the Agency best address 

them? 

(45) Should NCAP adopt any 

additional AEB tests or alter its current 

tests to address the ‘‘changing’’ rear-end 

crash problem? If so, what tests should 

be added, or how should current tests be 

modified? 

(46) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

current FCW, CIB, and/or DBS test 

procedure(s) that need further 

refinement or clarification? If so, what 

refinements or clarifications are 

necessary, and why? 

3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in 

Response to 2015 RFC Notice 

NHTSA received several comments in 

response to the December 2015 notice 

pertaining to NCAP’s DBS and CIB tests. 

These included comments on FCW 

effective time-to-collision (TTC), false 

positive test scenarios, procedure 

clarifications, expanding testing, and 

the AEB strikeable target. These will be 

discussed over the next few subsections. 

a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) 

Effective Time-To-Collision (TTC) 

In its response to NCAP’s December 

2015 notice, BMW suggested that the 

Agency adopt an ‘‘effective TTC’’ for 

NCAP’s FCW test that differs from the 

‘‘absolute TTC’’ currently stipulated in 

the associated test procedure. The 

manufacturer contended that the 

deceleration due to an activated AEB 

system effectively prolongs the reaction 

time for the driver such that ‘‘an FCW 

warning with AEB intervention at an 

absolute TTC of 2.0 seconds is assumed 

to show an equal or greater effectiveness 

in comparison to an FCW warning at 2.4 

seconds without AEB intervention.’’ 

BMW suggested that if AEB 

functionality is intrinsic to the frontal 

crash prevention system, the assessment 

of the warning TTC in the FCW 

performance test should consider the 

time gained by AEB deceleration and 

therefore the Agency should assess the 

‘‘effective TTC,’’ not an ‘‘absolute TTC.’’ 

The Agency agrees with BMW that 

FCW and AEB are interrelated and is 

thus proposing to assess the presence of 

an FCW alert as an integral component 

of the CIB test. To assess the adequacy 

of the FCW alert in that context, the 

Agency has proposed to evaluate the 

presence of a vehicle’s FCW system 

during its CIB tests by requiring the SV 

accelerator pedal be fully released 

within 500 ms after the FCW alert is 

issued. If no FCW alert is issued during 

a CIB test, the SV accelerator pedal will 

be fully released within 500 ms after the 

onset of CIB system braking. If no FCW 

alert is issued and the vehicle’s CIB 

system does not offer any braking, 

release of the SV accelerator pedal will 

not be required prior to impact with the 

POV. The Agency believes that this 

proposal is philosophically aligned with 

BMW’s request, as it would no longer 

require the direct assessment of FCW 

timing relative to an ‘‘absolute TTC.’’ 

Rather, FCW timing, and how it relates 

to the intended onset of CIB activation, 

would be at the discretion of the vehicle 

manufacturer (who will have explicit 

knowledge of how the operation of their 

vehicles’ CIB systems affect the 

‘‘effective TTC’’). That said, the Agency 

continues to believe that well-designed 

FCW alerts can provide significant 

safety benefits in crash-imminent rearend crash scenarios, and encourages 

vehicle manufactures to present them 

such that the driver may be able to 

respond with sufficient time to avoid a 

crash (i.e., not to solely rely on CIB 

activation for crash avoidance). If a 

vehicle manufacturer chooses to issue 

an FCW alert in a way that assumes a 

CIB intervention will effectively extend 

the precrash timeline, but then the AEB 

system does not activate under realworld driving conditions, or activates 

late, drivers may not have enough time 

to react to avoid an impending crash. 

b. False Positive Test Scenarios 

Citing the potential for redundancy 

with the three active/supplemental 

braking scenarios for systems exhibiting 

lower deceleration rates, Mobileye 

suggested that the Agency impose a 

maximum speed reduction of 2 kph 

(1.24 mph) for the CIB and DBS tests, or 

a maximum duration of braking over the 

maximum allowable deceleration 

threshold for the false positive tests. The 

STP test is designed to provide an 

indication as to whether a vehicle’s AEB 

system may have a false activation 

problem. Some vehicles use haptic 

braking and/or low-level braking as part 

of their FCW alert strategy. These brake 

activations are not intended to slow the 

vehicle significantly; rather, they 

attempt to get the driver’s attention so 

that he/she will respond to the crashimminent situation. That said, it is quite 

possible that FCW-based braking could 

reduce speed more than the 2 kph (1.24 

mph) threshold suggested by Mobileye. 

Recognizing the potential problem for 

a vehicle to fail the CIB false positive 

test as a consequence of how its FCW 

system was designed to work, NHTSA 

built some flexibility into the 

assessment criteria used to evaluate how 

the subject vehicle (SV) responds to the 

STP. In the CIB test, activations can 

produce peak decelerations of up to 

0.5g, which was beyond any FCW-based 

level at the time. In the DBS test, the 

peak deceleration of a given test trial 

must not exceed 150 percent of the 

average peak deceleration calculated for 

the baseline test series performed at the 

same nominal SV speed. These 

provisions are intended to tolerate small 

levels of deceleration, but not the larger 

magnitudes indicative of an AEB 

intervention. 

BMW objected to the inclusion of the 

false positive test scenario in general for 

both DBS and CIB systems and raised 

concerns that such tests ‘‘can 

incentivize vehicle manufacturers to 

focus on one artificial situation, instead 

of considering the myriad of potential 

real-world traffic situations.’’ The 

manufacturer suggested that if this test 

scenario remains for DBS, then the 

Agency should allow manufacturers to 

specify a brake pedal application rate 

limit beyond 279 mm/s (11 in./s) and up 

to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) for the false 

positive test scenario, to harmonize with 

Euro NCAP requirements. BMW further 

stated that limiting the rate to 279 mm/ 

s (11 in./s) could increase a DBS 

system’s sensitivity, and thereby 

increase the likelihood of additional 

false activation events in the real world. 

The manufacturer mentioned that as 

more frontal crash prevention systems 

combine both FCW and AEB 

functionalities, speed should reduce for 

all pedal application speeds. 

Regarding BMW’s objection to 

continuing with the false positive test 

scenario for CIB and DBS in NCAP, 

NHTSA notes that it has requested 

comment on whether eliminating the 

false positive tests would be appropriate 

at this time. As discussed previously, 

the Agency has not observed false 

positive test failures in CIB or DBS 

testing since these ADAS technologies 

were added to NCAP. 

If NHTSA decides it is appropriate to 

keep the false positive test scenario for 

DBS, BMW requested that 


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13490 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

190 80 FR 68608 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

191Forkenbrock, G.J., & Snyder, A.S. (2015, June), 

NHTSA’s 2014 automatic emergency braking test 

track evaluations (Report No. DOT HS 812 166), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

192Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., 

Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics 

of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011– 

2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 

745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration. 

193Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August), 

Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving 

passenger vehicles with automatic emergency 

braking, Traffic Injury Prevention. 2019, VOL. 20, 

NO. S1, S112–S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 

15389588.2019.1576172. 

194 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

manufacturers should be permitted to 

specify a brake pedal application rate up 

to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) since this is the 

upper brake application rate limit 

established by Euro NCAP. In its 

November 2015 final decision notice for 

AEB, NHTSA addressed a similar 

request from the Alliance, which 

suggested that the Agency harmonize 

with Euro NCAP’s brake application rate 

range of 200 to 400 mm/s (8 to 16 in./ 

s).190 At the time, the Agency stated that 

it would retain its proposed brake 

application rate of 254 ± 25.4 mm/s (10 

± 1 in./s) in the DBS system 

performance test. In justifying this 

decision, NHTSA contended that the 

current application rate value is well 

within the range of the Euro NCAP 

specification. Also, NHTSA reasoned 

that the current application rate appears 

to be a feasible representation of the 

activation of DBS systems. DBS systems 

are designed to stop rather than slow 

down, but not too fast like conventional 

brake assist systems, which typically 

address emergency panic stop situations 

where the brake application rate 

exceeds 360 mm/s (14.2 in./s). For 

NHTSA to focus on evaluating system 

performance for DBS technology (not 

conventional brake technology), the 

Agency plans to retain the current brake 

pedal application rate of 254 ± 25.4 mm/ 

s (10 ± 1 in./s) for the DBS test. 

c. Procedure Clarifications 

In response to the November 2015 

final decision notice, Mobileye asked 

NHTSA to clarify the process of 

releasing the accelerator pedal within 

500 ms of the FCW alert prior to 

braking. The commenter questioned 

whether the throttle was gradually 

released over 500 ms, or abruptly 

released over 50 ms. Mobileye also 

asked that the Agency clarify how 

braking is affected if there is no FCW 

alert, or if the FCW alert occurs very 

close to the brake activation. 

NHTSA notes that the throttle pedal 

release rate is not restricted in NCAP’s 

CIB test procedure. The test procedure 

requires only that the SV throttle be 

fully released within 500 ms after the 

FCW alert is issued. As previously 

mentioned, as part of the Agency’s 

proposed changes to the CIB tests, it 

also intends to include test procedure 

language stating that if no FCW alert is 

issued during a CIB test, the SV 

accelerator pedal will be released within 

500 ms after the onset of CIB system 

braking, and that if no FCW alert is 

issued and the vehicle’s CIB system 

does not offer any braking, release of the 

SV accelerator pedal will not be 

required prior to impact with the POV. 

With respect to how SV braking is 

affected, if there is no FCW alert, or if 

the alert happens very close to brake 

activation, different steps are taken for 

the crash imminent braking (CIB) and 

dynamic brake support (DBS) tests. 

In the existing DBS tests, the test 

procedure states that the accelerator 

pedal must be released within 500 ms 

after the FCW alert is issued, but prior 

to the onset of the manual SV brake 

application by a robotic brake 

controller. The Agency recognizes that 

this can create an issue if no FCW alert 

occurs because the throttle may still be 

depressed (since no warning was 

issued) while the SV brakes are applied 

by the robot at the prescribed TTC. The 

Agency has documented this possibility 

where the SV throttle and brake pedals 

are applied at the same time and 

provided a recommendation that up to 

a 250 ms overlap be allowed.191 In other 

words, once the SV driver detects that 

the robot has applied the brakes, the 

driver will have 250 ms to release the 

accelerator fully. The test would not be 

valid unless this criterion is met. 

Although the Agency has proposed to 

revise when the manual (robotic) brake 

application is initiated to a time that 

corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW 

alert is issued (regardless of whether a 

CIB activation occurs after the FCW 

alert but before initiation of the manual 

brake application) if it continues to 

perform DBS testing in NCAP, it has 

also requested comment on appropriate 

TTCs for the modified DBS test 

conditions as an alternative to this 

proposal. Therefore, NHTSA is also 

requesting comment on the following: 

(47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV 

throttle and brake pedal application be 

acceptable in instances where no FCW 

alert has been issued by the prescribed 

TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW 

alert occurs very close to the brake 

activation. If a 250 ms overlap is not 

acceptable, what overlap would be 

acceptable? 

d. Expand Testing 

Magna suggested that NHTSA expand 

testing to encompass low light and 

inclement weather situations. The 

Agency’s proposal for PAEB systems 

includes testing under less-than-ideal 

environmental conditions (specifically 

at nighttime). The Agency notes that 

approximately half (51 percent) of 

fatalities caused by rear-end crashes and 

most MAIS 1–5 injuries (80 percent) 

occurred under daylight conditions. 

Furthermore, nearly all fatalities (92 

percent) and injuries (88 percent) 

stemming from rear-end collisions 

occurred in clear weather.192 Having 

said that, IIHS’s review of 2009–2016 

rear-end crash data suggested that AEBequipped vehicles are over-represented 

for crashes occurring in certain weather 

conditions, such as snow and ice.193

Therefore, NHTSA is requesting 

comment on the following: 

(48) Should the Agency pursue 

research in the future to assess AEB 

system performance under less than 

ideal environmental conditions? If so, 

what environmental conditions would 

be appropriate? 

e. AEB Strikeable Target 

Numerous commenters recommended 

that NHTSA harmonize its Strikeable 

Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) with the test 

target used by other testing 

organizations such as IIHS and Euro 

NCAP. The commenters reasoned that 

harmonization would further advance 

the implementation of AEB technology 

by reducing the development and 

testing burden and thereby result in 

lower-cost systems. Mercedes 

recommended that NHTSA recognize 

other targets as being equivalent devices 

to the SSV and requested that NHTSA 

allow vehicle manufacturers the option 

to choose which target is used for 

testing. 

Currently, NHTSA uses the SSV as 

the principal other vehicle (POV) in 

NCAP testing of DBS and CIB systems. 

The SSV is a target vehicle modeled 

after a small hatchback car and 

fabricated from light-weight composite 

materials including carbon fiber and 

Kevlar®.194 Using this target imposes 

certain limitations, most importantly the 

maximum speed it can be operated at, 

or be struck by, the SV. Due to its 

material properties, the SSV can inflict 

damage to vehicles that impact it at 

higher speeds. 

Another target, the Global Vehicle 

Target (GVT), which was referenced 

earlier with respect to BSI (blind spot 

intervention) testing, resembles a white 

hatchback passenger car. This threeVerDate Sep<11>2014 19:53 Mar 08, 2022 Jkt 256001 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09MRN3.SGM 09MRN3

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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13491 

195Currently, manufacturers use test results from 

their internal testing and submit them to NHTSA 

for NCAP’s recommendation of vehicles that pass 

its performance testing requirements. 

196National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2019, September), Intersection 

safety assist system confirmation test: Working 

draft, http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2019–0102–0006. 

197National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (2019, September), Opposing traffic 

safety assist system confirmation test: Working 

draft. http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2019–0102–0008. 

198Snyder, A.C., Forkenbrock, G.J., Davis, I.J., 

O’Harra, B.C., & Schnelle, S.C. (2019, July), A test 

track comparison of the global vehicle target and 

NHTSA’s strikeable surrogate vehicle (Report No. 

DOT HS 812 698), Washington, DC: National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

199Comparable observations were made upon 

review of test data from the Agency’s CIB 

characterization testing. Upon review of test data 

from the Agency’s CIB characterization testing, 

FCW and CIB onset timings for identical vehicles 

were highly comparable regardless of whether the 

SSV or GVT Revision G targets were used. 

200While the Agency used GVT Revision E in its 

comparative testing with the SSV, and it believes 

that no significant differences exist between 

Revision E and Revision F that would affect AEB 

test results, the Agency does not believe it is 

necessary to accept from vehicle manufacturers 

AEB test data that was derived using Revision E 

because Revision E is no longer in production. 

Therefore, the Agency believes that any OEM data 

that is submitted should reflect the use of GVT 

Revision F or Revision G. 

201Although the Agency used GVT Revision E in 

its comparative testing with the SSV, the Agency 

does not believe that modifications made for 

Revision F would have changed the results of that 

testing. It is the Agency’s understanding that several 

modifications were made to the rear of Revision E, 

which included adding additional radar material to 

the bottom skirt of the target to attenuate internal 

reflections, and reducing the slope of the rear top 

portion of the hatchback to increase the power of 

the radar return. 

202To improve the real-world characteristics from 

the front and side of the target, several changes to 

the radar treatment were integrated into the 

components of the GVT body for Revision G 

compared to Revision F, including changes to the 

skin and wheel treatment. There were also some 

minor shape changes to the front of the GVT body 

to improve front radar return and to the side to 

improve the ability to hold its shape. http://

www.dynres.com/2020/02/25/the-new-globalvehicle-target-gvt-has-arrived/. 

dimensional surrogate is currently used 

by other consumer organizations, 

including Euro NCAP. It is also used by 

many vehicle manufacturers in their 

internal testing to NCAP test 

specifications, and by NHTSA to 

facilitate ADAS research using pre-crash 

scenarios beyond those included in the 

Agency’s FCW, CIB, and DBS test 

procedures.195

The GVT consists of 39 vinyl-covered 

foam pieces (held together with hook 

and loop fasteners) that form the 

structure the outer skins are attached to. 

It is secured to the top of a Low-Profile 

Robotic Vehicle (LPRV) using hook and 

loop fasteners, which separate upon an 

SV-to-GVT collision. When the GVT is 

hit at low speed, it is typically pushed 

off the LPRV but remains assembled. At 

higher impact speeds, the GVT breaks 

apart as the SV essentially drives 

through it, and can then be reassembled 

on top of the LPRV. 

The use of this surrogate vehicle 

would allow the Agency to perform tests 

at higher speeds, thus increasing safety 

benefits. For this reason, the Agency 

used the GVT in its characterization 

study for CIB testing at higher speeds. 

The SSV initially limited the test speeds 

the Agency could adopt for CIB and 

DBS testing because of concerns over 

potential damage to the testing 

equipment and test vehicle. Using the 

GVT significantly reduces that 

possibility for the test speeds proposed. 

Also, as future upgrades for NCAP are 

planned, the GVT can be used to 

evaluate more challenging crash 

scenarios, such as those required for 

other ADAS technologies (Intersection 

Safety Assist and Opposing Traffic 

Safety Assist). NHTSA has recently 

docketed draft research test procedures 

for these technologies.196 197 If, in the 

future, the Agency was to consider 

adopting other test procedures requiring 

a strikeable target, incorporating the 

GVT would allow harmonization across 

the program. 

NHTSA has conducted vehicle testing 

to evaluate the FCW alert and CIB 

intervention onset timing observed 

using the GVT Revision E and compared 

that with the timing recorded for 

identical tests performed with NHTSA’s 

SSV benchmark.198 Three light vehicles 

and three rear-end crash scenarios were 

used for this evaluation. A secondary 

objective of this study was to assess the 

characteristics and durability of the 

GVT for various test track 

configurations, specifically its dynamic 

stability and in-the-field reconstruction 

time after being struck by a test vehicle. 

GVT stability was evaluated using 

straight line and curved path maneuvers 

at various speeds and lateral 

accelerations. Reconstruction times of 

the GVT after impact were examined 

using different impact speeds, 

directions of impact, and assembly crew 

sizes. 

Overall, the results from the study 

suggested that the onset timing of FCW 

and CIB systems observed during rearend tests performed with the GVT was 

similar to that recorded for the SSV.199

The GVT was also found to be 

physically stable and remained affixed 

to the robotic platform used to facilitate 

its movement during the high-speed 

longitudinal tests as well as those 

performed at the limit of the platform’s 

lateral road holding capacity. Although 

the time between test trials was longer 

than that associated with use of the 

SSV, GVT reassembly tests 

demonstrated that the GVT could be 

reconstructed in a reasonable time 

between tests after being struck. 

However, the physical reconstruction 

time is one of three considerations when 

determining the time between tests 

when the GVT is used. After being 

reassembled and secured to the top of 

the robotic platform, the platform must 

re-establish its communication with the 

other equipment needed to perform the 

tests, and a ‘‘zero-offset’’ check is used. 

This check not only ensures the GVT 

orientation relative to the platform 

remains consistent for all tests, but also 

confirms the distance from the SV to the 

GVT at the point of impact is accurately 

reported as zero when the two first 

make contact. 

NHTSA proposes to use the GVT in 

lieu of the SSV in future NCAP testing. 

Similar to that noted earlier regarding 

the use of the articulated pedestrian 

mannequins, the use of the GVT 

provides another opportunity for 

NHTSA to harmonize with other 

consumer information safety rating 

programs as mandated by the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law. Comments are 

sought on its adoption regardless of 

whether modifications are made to test 

speeds, deceleration, test scenarios, 

combining test procedures, et cetera, as 

has been discussed. 

The Agency also recognizes that there 

have been ongoing revisions to the GVT 

to address its performance in other 

crash modes that exercise different 

ADAS applications. At this time, 

NHTSA believes the latest Revision G is 

appropriate for testing in NCAP. 

However, for the purpose of AEB testing 

only, NHTSA is proposing to accept 

manufacturer verification data for AEB 

tests conducted using GVT Revision 

F.200 201 It is the Agency’s 

understanding that Revision G 

incorporates changes to the front, side, 

and oblique aspects of Revision F.202

NHTSA believes that modifications 

implemented for Revision G have not 

altered the physical characteristics of 

the rear of the target such that a 

vehicle’s performance in the rear-end 

crash mode would be impacted. The 

Agency requests comment on: 

(49) The use of the GVT in lieu of the 

SSV in future AEB NCAP testing, 

(50) whether Revisions F and G 

should be considered equivalent for 

AEB testing, and 

(51) whether NHTSA should adopt a 

revision of the GVT other than Revision 

G for use in AEB testing in NCAP. 


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13492 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

203 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

204 80 FR 68607 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

205https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2015–0119. 

With respect to Mercedes’ request that 

NHTSA consider several targets and 

allow manufacturers the option to 

choose which target is used for testing, 

the Agency does not believe such an 

approach is feasible. The Agency 

currently accepts and uses, for 

recommendation purposes on 

www.NHTSA.gov, data submitted by 

vehicle manufacturers for internal CIB 

and DBS testing that was conducted 

using a target other than the SSV, such 

as the Allgemeiner Deutscher 

Automobil-Club e.V (ADAC) target, 

which was previously used by Euro 

NCAP and IIHS.203 However, during its 

system performance verification testing, 

the Agency has observed several test 

failures, which may be attributed to 

differences in target designs. 

In NHTSA’s November 2015 AEB 

final decision notice,204 NHTSA stated 

that manufacturers do not need to use 

the SSV to generate and submit selfreported test data in support of their 

AEB systems that pass NCAP’s system 

performance requirements and are 

recommended to consumers on the 

Agency’s website. However, if the 

vehicle does not pass NCAP’s system 

performance criteria for AEB systems 

during the program’s random system 

performance verification testing, the 

Agency would remove the 

recommendation from its website. To 

uphold the credibility of the program 

and reasonably assure that consumers 

are receiving vehicles that meet a 

specified minimum performance 

threshold, NHTSA believes that it is 

critical to accept self-reported data from 

manufacturers that was obtained using 

tests conducted in accordance with 

NHTSA test procedures. As such, 

NHTSA is proposing not to accept 

vehicle manufacturer test data that was 

derived from an alternative test target 

other than that which is specified in 

NCAP’s test procedures. 

IV. ADAS Rating System 

NHTSA is planning to create a rating 

system based on assessments related to 

the performance of ADAS technologies, 

including, but not necessarily limited 

to, the technologies already part of the 

program and others proposed above. 

Currently, NCAP places a check mark by 

the relevant ADAS technology on 

NHTSA’s website, www.nhtsa.gov, if 

two conditions are met: (1) A vehicle is 

equipped with the safety technology 

recommended by NHTSA; and (2) the 

system meets NCAP’s performance 

specifications. Consumers are 

encouraged to look for vehicles 

equipped with ADAS that meet NCAP’s 

performance tests, which are intended 

to establish a minimum level of 

performance on which consumers can 

rely and compare among vehicles 

equipped with similar technologies. 

In the Agency’s December 2015 

notice, NHTSA discussed a series of 

point values for the ADAS technologies 

at that time. These points would have 

been used in a star rating system for 

these technologies. Vehicles with ADAS 

that met the criteria set forth in the 

Agency’s test procedures would earn 

full points if offered as standard 

equipment on a particular model and 

half points if offered only as optional 

equipment for that model. In response 

to that proposal, commenters provided 

mixed support regarding the feasibility 

and appropriateness of developing such 

an ADAS rating system versus the 

current process of just identifying the 

presence of recommended technologies 

with check marks.205 Proponents of a 

rating system were generally supportive 

of the broad concept of rating ADAS, 

but did not propose specific suggestions 

for how the Agency could develop such 

a rating system. Some commenters 

responded that ADAS technologies have 

not yet matured to the point that a rating 

system would be appropriate, while 

others believed that one could be 

developed. In the responses for the 

October 1, 2018 public meeting, support 

still varied, even when the discussion 

was more focused on how the FAST Act 

mandate to provide crash avoidance 

information on the Monroney label 

might be fulfilled in the context of an 

ADAS rating system. 

A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to 

Consumers 

As mentioned previously, NHTSA’s 

current method of providing ADAS 

information to consumers conveys 

which systems meet NCAP’s system 

performance requirements, but provides 

no overall ADAS technology rating for 

the vehicle. However, as more emerging 

ADAS technologies are available in the 

market, the Agency believes that a rating 

mechanism for these systems would be 

more beneficial for consumers because 

it could better distinguish the 

technologies, including different levels 

of system performance and the 

technologies’ life-saving potential, 

rather than simply listing how many 

technologies a given vehicle is equipped 

with that meet NCAP’s system 

performance requirements. As will be 

discussed in the sections that follow, 

ADAS ratings could be communicated 

to consumers using stars, medals, 

points, or other means, thereby allowing 

them to make better-informed decisions. 

Also, the ratings could be based on the 

safety benefit potential afforded by 

vehicles’ ADAS technologies and 

system performance. In addition, 

NHTSA plans to explore several 

approaches on how to present such 

rating information in the Agency’s 

planned consumer research. In this RFC, 

NHTSA is soliciting input solely on the 

creation of an ADAS rating system, not 

the visual representation or placement 

of that rating system at points of sale. As 

described in greater detail below, issues 

related to the visual representation and 

placement of the rating system at points 

of sale will be a topic covered in future 

notices and research. 

1. Star Rating System 

NCAP currently uses 1 to 5 stars to 

communicate vehicle crashworthiness 

ratings to consumers, with both ratings 

for the individual tests and an overall 

rating. Given the familiarity that 

consumers have with NHTSA’s current 

5-star ratings system, the Agency could 

also consider the use of stars for a future 

ADAS rating system. However, the 

Agency has some reservations about 

pursuing such an approach. 

A future star-based ADAS rating 

system could produce lower ratings for 

technologies than consumers are 

accustomed to seeing in 

crashworthiness and rollover resistance 

tests, and may cause unnecessary 

consumer confusion about the 

additional safety the technology on their 

vehicle provides. For instance, although 

NHTSA believes ADAS could 

potentially add significant safety 

benefits in addition to the 

crashworthiness protection afforded on 

vehicles, the Agency questions whether 

consumers would interpret 1- and 2-star 

ADAS ratings as conveying added 

benefits beyond the crashworthiness 

protection offered by a vehicle. In 

addition, vehicles that do not have any 

ADAS ratings could mistakenly be 

interpreted to have an advantage (i.e., 

additional safety benefits) over those 

that have low ADAS star ratings. Thus, 

vehicles that have low ADAS star 

ratings could inadvertently discourage 

consumers from considering ADAS in 

their purchasing decisions, when in 

fact, those vehicles with 1- and 2-stars 

may offer significant safety benefits over 

their unrated peers. 

Given these concerns, the Agency 

could consider reserving star ratings to 

convey crashworthiness results only 

and distinguish ADAS ratings by using 

another visualization approach, such as 

a medals system or points-based system. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13493 

206 In certain test conditions that do not have a 

multitude of assessments (e.g., test condition 

variants), the test condition and assessment would 

be one and the same. 

2. Medals Rating System 

Another potential method of 

presenting ADAS rating information to 

consumers could be a three-tiered award 

system similar in concept to Olympic 

medals. Presumably, most consumers 

are already familiar with the 

designations of bronze, silver, and gold 

as increasingly more prestigious levels 

of achievement. 

Using an awards system (e.g., medals) 

rather than stars to represent NCAP’s 

rating of ADAS technologies would not 

only distinguish ADAS grades from 

crashworthiness ratings, but also 

visually communicate that the two 

ratings are conveying different types of 

vehicle safety information. However, it 

could cause consumer confusion by 

having two separate rating systems that 

consumers would need to consider and, 

to the extent there is a divergence 

between the two systems, potentially 

weigh against one another for a given 

vehicle. 

3. Points-Based Rating System 

NHTSA could use points to convey 

ADAS rating information. Points could 

be used in lieu of stars or medals or in 

addition to these alternative rating 

communication concepts, and they may 

serve as the basis for any of the potential 

rating system approaches discussed in 

the sections that follow. One advantage 

of a points-based system is that it can 

provide improved delineation in ratings, 

thus benefiting consumers who may 

want to compare ratings between several 

vehicle models. However, the inherent 

granularity of a points-based system 

may cause consumer confusion if 

conveyed in addition to another, 

coarser, communication rating concept, 

such as stars or medals. As mentioned 

previously, NHTSA plans to conduct 

consumer research surrounding the 

concept of an overall NCAP rating that 

would combine results from 

crashworthiness, rollover resistance, 

and ADAS technology testing. 

4. Incorporating Baseline Risk 

Another consideration for the Agency 

that may add value to an ADAS rating 

system is the notion of conveying a 

vehicle’s performance relative to the 

baseline (or average) performance 

observed for today’s vehicle fleet. As 

detailed later in this notice, this concept 

is currently an element of NCAP’s 

crashworthiness rating system. Star 

ratings generated in NCAP today are a 

measure of how much more (or less) 

occupant protection (in terms of injury 

risk) a given vehicle affords when 

compared to an ‘‘average’’ vehicle. The 

Agency could consider incorporating 

the baseline concept when developing 

an ADAS rating system as well. For 

instance, today’s ‘‘average’’ vehicle may 

achieve 60 out of a possible 100 points 

(or 3 out of 5 stars) during NCAP’s 

testing. This score (or rating) may 

translate to a 30 percent reduction in the 

risk of crashes, injuries, deaths, etc. 

Scores (or ratings) for future vehicles, 

which could also potentially be tied to 

a percent reduction in crashes, could be 

compared relative to the baseline rating 

of today’s fleet, thus affording 

consumers the opportunity to compare 

scores (or ratings) for vehicles spanning 

different model years. 

B. ADAS Rating System Concepts 

Just as there are several ways to 

communicate ADAS ratings to 

consumers, there are also several ways 

to rate ADAS technologies, a few of 

which are discussed below. As each of 

these rating system concepts center 

around vehicle performance in NCAP 

tests, it was necessary to consider the 

primary components of these tests 

during concept development. 

1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and 

Nomenclature 

As discussed extensively in this 

notice, each ADAS technology and 

associated test procedure the Agency is 

considering for inclusion in NCAP has 

the potential to address a real-world 

safety problem. Each test procedure is 

designed to replicate certain injurious 

and fatal real-world events (termed 

‘‘scenarios’’ in this new rating concept) 

that can be approximated in a laboratory 

setting to assess the capabilities of a 

given ADAS. Within each scenario, the 

Agency defines test conditions to 

replicate types of real-world incidents. 

Within each test condition, one or more 

test variants (as illustrated in Figures 1 

and 2 below) that assess the limitations 

of each ADAS technology under that 

test condition is also defined.206 Finally, 

for each test variant, the technology 

would have to pass a certain number of 

trials to receive credit for that part of the 

ADAS rating. Figure 1 illustrates a 

generic structure for describing a given 

ADAS test procedure and its 

nomenclature in NCAP. 

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The above methodology and diagram 

can be illustrated further using one of 

the ADAS technologies discussed in this 

document, PAEB. PAEB is intended to 

address a real-world safety issue 

involving vulnerable road users, like 

pedestrians. The current test procedure 

is designed to replicate S1 and S4 

scenarios (vehicle heading straight with 

a pedestrian crossing the road, and a 

vehicle heading straight with a 

pedestrian walking along or against 

traffic, respectively). Within each 

scenario, one or more test conditions are 

defined. For example, within the S1b 

test scenario (as previously discussed), 

several test condition variants are 

defined. In this case, the same test 

condition would have to be executed at 

various speeds (test condition variants). 

Finally, NHTSA would prescribe the 

number of trials for which the system 

would have to exhibit conformance to 

receive credit for these particular test 

condition variants and, in turn, 

scenario. Figure 2 illustrates this 

example. 


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To illustrate further the multitude of 

assessments simplified in Figure 1, 

certain test scenarios only include one 

test condition and one test variant. A 

specific example of this would be the 

previously mentioned Lead Vehicle 

Stopped (LVS) scenario, evaluated as 

part of the Crash Imminent Braking 

(CIB) test procedure, where the Subject 

Vehicle (SV) encounters a stopped 

Principal Other Vehicle (POV) on a 

straight road moving at 40.2 kph (25 

mph). This example is illustrated in 

Figure 3. 


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207When ‘Did not meet’ is listed for an ADAS 

category, the vehicle failed to pass the requirements 

for the test condition/variant when tested. ‘Did not 

run’ may be used to signify that the vehicle is not 

equipped with the technology to pass the related 

test procedure(s), and as such, the tests were not 

conducted. 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C 

2. Percentage of Test Conditions To 

Meet—Concept 1 

Given the test procedures’ structure, 

an ADAS rating system could be 

designed with standards of increasing 

stringency that must be achieved to 

receive higher award levels (as shown in 

Table 7 below). In such a system, 

different ADAS technologies, each with 

a related test procedure (e.g., FCW, CIB, 

LKS), are combined into categories 

where each technology addresses a 

similar crash problem. For instance, 

ADAS Category 1 in Table 7 could 

represent the Forward Collision 

Prevention category that would be 

comprised of the three forward collision 

prevention technologies, FCW, CIB, and 

DBS. Vehicles would have to meet 

increasing numbers of test conditions 

across all test procedures in that 

particular ADAS category (i.e., three test 

procedures for the example given) to 

achieve higher ratings (e.g., medals, 

stars, points). For the example rating 

system concept shown in Table 7, 50 

percent of test conditions would have to 

be met to achieve a bronze award, 75 

percent to achieve a silver award, and 

100 percent to achieve a gold award for 

each ADAS category.207 The lowest 

ADAS rating among the categories could 

serve as the overall ADAS award if a 

summary rating is established across all 

included ADAS technologies. 

Alternatively, an overall ADAS award 

could reflect the average ADAS rating 

amongst the technology categories. 

TABLE 7—3-TIER ADAS RATING SYSTEM CONCEPT 1 

All test procedures & conditions in ADAS category 

ADAS category award Bronze 

(50% of test conditions met) 

Silver 

(75% of test conditions met) 

Gold 

(100% of test conditions 

met) 

ADAS Category 1 ....................................... Meets .................................. Did not meet ........................ Did not run .......................... Bronze. 

ADAS Category 2 ....................................... Meets .................................. Meets .................................. Meets .................................. Gold. 

ADAS Category 3 ....................................... Meets .................................. Did not meet ........................ Did not run .......................... Bronze. 

ADAS Category 4 ....................................... Meets .................................. Meets .................................. Did not meet ........................ Silver. 

Overall ADAS Award .......................... Bronze 

3. Select Test Conditions To Meet— 

Concept 2 

Table 8 demonstrates another possible 

NCAP ADAS rating system concept. As 

with Concept 1, ADAS technologies are 

grouped into categories that address 

similar crash problems. Instead of 

having to meet a percentage of all test 

conditions, NCAP could specifically 

require certain test conditions to be met 

for each of three award levels. These 

award levels could be based on the 

following increasingly challenging 

delineations: 


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(1) Bronze (Basic performers)—test 

conditions that are achievable for 

current systems to meet; 

(2) Silver (Advanced performers)— 

test conditions that are more difficult for 

current systems to meet but are more 

easily achievable than the current 

known system limitations; and 

(3) Gold (Highest performers)—test 

conditions that approach the current 

limits of system testing feasibility, 

vehicle operations, and event extremes. 

Depending on a given technology’s 

test procedure, the number of test 

conditions, test condition variants, and 

trial passes necessary to meet the 

Agency’s requirements could vary. 

Thus, the ADAS performance 

requirements necessary for reaching 

each subsequent award level could be 

based on meeting a single test condition 

variant or meeting a number of test 

conditions. To explain further in the 

context of Table 8, ADAS Group 1 could 

be the Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) 

technology category, where technology 

1 could be LDW, and technology 2 

could be LKS. In this example, the 

vehicle’s LDW system meets all 

applicable test conditions (bronze, 

silver, gold). However, its LKS system 

fails to meet the test conditions required 

for silver, but meets the test conditions 

to earn bronze. Therefore, the highest 

award this vehicle could achieve for the 

LKA category would be bronze, as it is 

the highest award achieved by both of 

the technologies (LDW and LKS) 

included in the LKA category. Similar to 

Concept 1, the lowest or average ADAS 

rating amongst the category groups 

could serve as the overall ADAS award 

if a summary rating is established across 

all included ADAS technologies. 

TABLE 8—3-TIER ADAS RATING SYSTEM CONCEPT 2 

Bronze test 

conditions 

Silver test 

conditions 

Gold test 

conditions 

ADAS group award 

ADAS Group 1 .............. 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 3 ...................... 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 1 ...................... Bronze. 

Tech 1 .................... Meets .............. Meets .............. ......................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets ..............

Tech 2 .................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Did not meet ... Did not run ......

ADAS Group 2 .............. 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 3 ...................... 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 1 ...................... Gold. 

Tech 1 .................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets ..............

Tech 2 .................... Meets .............. ......................... ......................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets ..............

ADAS Group 3 .............. 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 3 ...................... 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 1 ...................... Bronze. 

Tech 1 .................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Did not meet ... Did not run ...... Did not run ......

ADAS Group 4 .............. 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 3 ...................... 1 ...................... 2 ...................... 1 ...................... Silver. 

Tech 1 .................... Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Meets .............. Did not meet ...

Overall ADAS 

Award.

Bronze 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

A more detailed example of this 

ADAS rating system concept, which 

uses some of the test conditions and test 

condition variants discussed in this 

document (distinguished by variables 

such as speed), is shown below in Table 

9. In this example, check marks are used 

to indicate that the vehicle’s ADAS 

technology has met the requirements for 

a given test procedure’s conditions and 

test condition variants. An ‘‘X’’ symbol 

is used to indicate where vehicles did 

not meet the test condition and/or 

variants, either because the vehicle was 

not equipped with the technology and 

therefore could not be tested, or because 

the vehicle’s technology was tested, but 

failed to meet the test procedure 

requirements. Units are in kph unless 

otherwise noted. 

To further explain the three-tier rating 

system illustrated in Table 9 with 

context, ADAS Group 3 in the example 

utilizes Blind Spot Detection (BSD) to 

demonstrate multiple test conditions 

and test condition variants. BSW 

(categorized as Technology 1 for the 

BSD grouping) has five test condition 

variants, and BSI (categorized as 

Technology 2 for the BSD grouping) 

includes three test condition variants. In 

order for BSD to achieve a bronze award 

in this example, the BSW system must 

meet the three test condition variants 

included for this technology under the 

‘Bronze Test Conditions/Variants’ 

heading. No BSI test conditions, or test 

condition variants, must be met. In 

order for BSD to achieve a silver award, 

BSW must meet two test conditions 

(comprised of five test condition 

variants) and BSI must meet two test 

conditions, both of which are included 

under the ‘Silver Test Conditions/ 

Variants’ heading. If the vehicle was 

also able to meet the third test condition 

included in the BSI test procedure, ‘SV 

Lane Change w/Closing Headway 72.4/ 

80.5’, which is included under the ‘Gold 

Test Conditions/Variants’ heading in 

Table 9, the vehicle would earn a gold 

award. In the Table 9 example, however, 

BSI does not meet one of the silver test 

conditions/variants (‘SV Lane Change 

w/Constant Headway 72.4/72.4’). 

Consequently, in this example, BSD 

achieves the next lowest award— 

bronze. 


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208Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

The approach presented in Tables 8 

and 9 would address the Agency’s 

desire to introduce a dynamic ADAS 

rating system. As technologies become 

more mature, the Agency expects ADAS 

system performances will begin to 

exceed NCAP testing requirements, and 

as such, systems will have an easier 

time meeting the required test 

conditions across all test procedures. 

The Agency could begin providing 

information on higher performing 

systems by periodically increasing the 

stringency of requirements to achieve 

the highest NCAP ratings. Lower award 

levels could be reserved for test 

conditions that are easily achieved by 

ADAS in the current vehicle fleet. 

Higher award levels could be reserved 

for test conditions that current ADAS 

have difficulty achieving, or for new test 

scenarios (e.g., PAEB S2 or S3), 

conditions (e.g., using a motorcycle or 

cyclist as the POV), or variants (e.g., 

increased SV/POV speeds, decreased 

headways, additional weather 

conditions, varying deceleration rates) 

that are added to the program over time. 

This approach is expected to continue 

to provide consumers information on 

vehicle safety designs that introduce 

truly exceptional ADAS performance 

compared to their peers. It should also 

incentivize vehicle manufacturers to 

improve their ADAS capabilities to meet 

consumers’ expectations for system 

performance. 

Along these lines, NHTSA could also 

introduce a slight deviation to rating 

system Concept 2. In this deviation, not 

only would vehicles have to meet the 

most demanding requirements across all 

ADAS test procedures to receive higher 

ratings, but also the Agency could set 

the performance target for the highest 

level rating (gold, 5 stars, maximum 

points, etc.) for those test conditions 

that are required for an ADAS 

technology that is just emerging in the 

marketplace, such as Intersection Safety 

Assist (ISA), mentioned later in this 

notice. In doing so, consumers could be 

assured that purchasing a vehicle that 

earns the highest award level would 

offer the most advanced ADAS 

capabilities available at that time. 

4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on 

Real-World Data—Concept 3 

The Agency believes it is important to 

develop an ADAS rating system that is 

not only flexible (i.e., one that can adapt 

or change over time) to keep pace with 

advancements in technologies, but also 

effective in providing consumer 

information that encourages the 

proliferation of life-saving technology. 

As such, a third rating system concept 

that the Agency could consider would 

be one which weights the technology 

groups based on the target population 

data and effectiveness attributable to 

each technology to derive the overall 

ADAS award. In essence, the more 

critical, more lifesaving, and/or more 

advanced/effective technology systems 

would have more contribution (i.e., be 

worth more) in the rating system. 

Furthermore, for a given technology 

group, the Agency could weight the test 

conditions that approximate more 

frequent or injurious real-world events 

so that they have more influence in the 

rating for that group. The selected 

evaluation method could be normalized 

in such a way that the results of each 

test condition within a scenario could 

be appropriately combined and 

concisely presented for consumer 

information or ratings purposes. Such 

an approach could also be incorporated 

for either Concept 1 or Concept 2, 

discussed above. 

Utilizing real-world data to inform the 

structure of a future ADAS rating system 

is challenging for several reasons. For 

one, there is no single metric (such as 

target crash populations, fatalities, or 

injuries) that can be used to weight 

every technology appropriately in a 

rating system when both the related 

real-world safety problem and 

meaningful influence are considered. In 

an effort to correlate rating system 

weights directly with potential realworld safety benefits, too little weight 

may be assigned to technologies that 

have lower target populations (such as 

those for Blind Spot Detection) 

compared to technologies that have 

much higher target populations (such as 

those for Forward Collision Prevention). 

Thus, the Agency is concerned that it 

may be possible for manufacturers to 

offer one or two ADAS systems that 

perform well in the NCAP tests, if those 

technologies with higher target 

populations are apportioned significant 

weight in a rating system, while 

choosing not to include the other, 

lower-weighted technologies on their 

vehicles, or opting to include them even 

if the systems perform poorly. 

Therefore, the Agency believes that it is 

critical to find an acceptable balance 

between weights dictated solely by realworld data and those that ensure each 

component provides a meaningful 

contribution to the rating system. In 

essence, each technology should be 

apportioned within the rating system 

such that it provides a significant 

contribution while also reflecting the 

relative safety improvement that each 

technology may afford consumers. 

Changes in target population data 

(based on real-world crashes) and 

improvements made to ADAS 

technologies over time pose additional 

challenges for the Agency in using realword data and system effectiveness 

estimates to inform appropriate weights 

or proportions to assign to the 

individual test conditions or the 

corresponding test condition variants in 

an ADAS rating system.208 As 

technology systems improve to meet 

NCAP test scenarios/conditions, system 

effectiveness estimates may increase. 

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in 

this notice, the real-world crash data 

may change as technologies are 

designed to address certain crash 

scenarios, but not others. Ideally, the 

Agency would adjust rating system 

weights to keep pace with these 

changes, as this would align with 

NHTSA’s goal of developing a flexible 

ADAS rating system that can respond 

appropriately to improvements or 

changes seen for the fleet. 

Unfortunately, real-world data for 

system performance advancements is 

not always readily available to support 

dynamic program upgrades, as the crash 

data, which takes time to reflect changes 

in the vehicle fleet accurately, lags 

system updates and deployments. 

Having said that, the Agency sees 

merit in using available real-world data, 

specifically target populations, to 

determine which ADAS technologies 

should be considered for inclusion in 

the program. The additional time 

between technology development and 

NHTSA’s ability to collect real-world 

data on target populations has proven in 

the past to be sufficient to ensure that 

the technology is mature prior to 

considering it in NCAP. As mentioned 

previously, the four ADAS technologies 

discussed in this proposal focus on the 

most frequently occurring and/or most 

severe crash types, which the Agency 

believes is a feasible and prudent 

approach to use when considering 

whether an ADAS technology should be 

incorporated into NCAP. NHTSA will 

continue to leverage all information and 

safety studies on ADAS technologies, 

such as those cited in this notice, to 

support the Agency’s proposal. In 

addition, NHTSA plans to leverage all 

available data to assess real-world 

insights into advanced safety technology 

performance. 

5. Overall Rating 

As discussed herein, there are many 

considerations when developing a 

potential ADAS rating system. These 

include: (1) What type of system to 


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209Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise 

known as the ‘‘Safety Through Informed Consumers 

Act of 2015.’’ 

210 49 CFR part 575, Section 302, ‘‘Vehicle 

labeling of safety rating information (compliance 

required for model year 2012 and later vehicles 

manufactured on or after January 31, 2012),’’ 

specifies that the safety ratings information 

landscape should be at least 4.5 in. wide and 3.5 

in. tall or cover at least 8 percent of the total area 

of the Monroney label—whichever is larger. 

Currently, any change that requires modification of 

the safety rating information presented on the 

Monroney label would require a notice and 

comment rulemaking action pursuant to the 

Administrative Procedure Act. 

adopt; (2) whether to use points, 

medals, or awards to convey ratings; 

and (3) whether to weight system 

components based on real-world data. 

Another consideration is whether to 

have an overall rating. Although the 

concepts discussed thus far have 

included an overall rating, NHTSA 

could also simply list individual ratings 

for the included ADAS technologies, but 

not adopt an overall rating. NHTSA 

believes that consumers may have 

preferences as to which specific ADAS 

technologies they would or would not 

want on their vehicles and may be 

interested only in how those individual 

technologies perform in the Agency’s 

testing, not in how the vehicle systems 

perform overall. The Agency notes that 

the assignment of ratings for individual 

technologies could simply supplement 

the NCAP program’s existing list 

approach, or individual technology 

ratings could be listed concurrently 

with an overall rating. Thus, the Agency 

requests comment on whether an overall 

rating system is necessary and, if so, 

whether it should replace or simply 

supplement the existing list approach. 

With regard to a future ADAS rating 

system, the Agency seeks comments on 

the following: 

(52) The components and 

development of a full-scale ADAS rating 

system, 

(53) the aforementioned approaches 

as well as others deemed appropriate for 

the development of a future ADAS 

rating system in order to assist the 

Agency in developing future proposals, 

(54) the appropriateness of using 

target populations and technology 

effectiveness estimates to determine 

weights or proportions to assign to 

individual test conditions, 

corresponding test combinations, or an 

overall ADAS award, 

(55) the use of a baseline concept to 

convey ADAS scores/ratings, 

(56) how best to translate points/ 

ratings earned during ADAS testing 

conducted under NCAP to a reduction 

in crashes, injuries, deaths, etc., 

including which real-world data metric 

would be most appropriate, 

(57) whether an overall rating system 

is necessary and, if so, whether it 

should replace or simply supplement 

the existing list approach, and 

(58) effective communication of 

ADAS ratings, including the 

appropriateness of using a points-based 

ADAS rating system in lieu of, or in 

addition to, a star rating system. 

In responding to these approaches, or 

in developing new approaches for 

consideration, NHTSA requests that 

commenters consider a potential ADAS 

rating system that would allow 

flexibilities for continuous 

improvements to the program and crossmodel year comparisons. In this notice, 

the Agency is seeking feedback on the 

appropriateness of the test scenarios, 

test conditions, test condition variants, 

and number of trials within each test 

variant for the four proposed 

technologies (PAEB, LKS, BSW, and 

BSI) discussed in this RFC, in addition 

to the four technologies currently 

included in NCAP. After NHTSA 

reviews comments in response to this 

notice, particularly those in response to 

questions raised within each of the 

ADAS technology sections and the 

rating system concepts discussed 

herein, the Agency anticipates finalizing 

the related test procedures and would 

then develop the selected ADAS rating 

system based on the technologies, test 

scenarios, test conditions, etc. that have 

support for incorporation into the 

program. Until NHTSA issues (1) a final 

decision notice announcing the new 

ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule 

to amend the safety rating section of the 

vehicle window sticker (Monroney 

label), the Agency plans to continue 

assigning NCAP credit, using check 

marks on www.nhtsa.gov, to vehicles 

that (1) are equipped with its 

recommended ADAS technologies, and 

(2) pass the applicable system 

performance test requirements. 

V. Revising the Monroney Label 

(Window Sticker) 

The third part to this notice relates to 

the Fixing America’s Surface 

Transportation (FAST) Act, which 

includes a section that requires NHTSA 

to promulgate a rule to ensure crash 

avoidance information is displayed 

along with crashworthiness information 

on window stickers (also known as 

Monroney labels) placed on motor 

vehicles by their manufacturers.209 At 

the time of the FAST Act, NHTSA was 

already in the process of developing an 

RFC notice to present many proposed 

updates to NCAP, including the 

evaluation of several new ADAS and a 

corresponding update of the Monroney 

label. 

NHTSA currently requires vehicle 

manufacturers to include safety rating 

information, obtained from NHTSA 

under its NCAP program, on the 

Monroney labels of all new light 

vehicles manufactured on or after 

September 1, 2007 (49 CFR part 575). 

This requirement was mandated by 

Section 10307 of the Safe, Accountable, 

Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 

Act; A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU). 

The purpose of the law is to ensure that 

vehicle manufacturers provide 

consumers with relevant vehicle safety 

ratings information on all new light 

vehicles at the point of sale so that they 

can make informed purchasing 

decisions. 

Although the safety rating information 

included on the Monroney label has 

provided consumers with valuable 

information at the point of sale, there 

are limitations with the current label for 

NCAP. For instance, currently the 

vehicle safety rating section of the 

Monroney label only includes vehicle 

performance information for the 

crashworthiness program in NCAP 

(known as the 5-star safety ratings), 

which is comprised of a full-frontal 

impact test, a side impact barrier test, a 

side impact pole test, a static 

measurement of the vehicle’s stability 

factor, and a dynamic assessment of the 

vehicle’s risk to rollover in a singlevehicle crash. The other consumer 

information program in NCAP, which is 

the ADAS technologies assessment, is 

not included in the current vehicle 

safety rating section of the Monroney 

label. This information is only available 

on www.nhtsa.gov, along with the 5-star 

safety ratings information.210

Thus, NHTSA plans to issue a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2023 

to include ADAS performance 

information from NCAP in the vehicle 

safety rating section of the Monroney 

label, as mandated by the FAST Act. 

However, NHTSA seeks a flexible 

means to keep pace with the 

technological advancement and the 

frequent development of new ADAS 

technologies while also providing 

adequate public participation and 

transparency. NHTSA would like to 

develop a way to allow the Agency both 

to convey NCAP vehicle safety 

information in the safety rating section 

of the Monroney label and minimize the 

number of rulemaking actions needed 

each time the Agency incorporates a 

new technology in NCAP. 

At this time, NHTSA believes it may 

be able to achieve these goals by 

adopting all or some combination of the 

following three main categories for the 


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211NHTSA published a notice on April 28, 2020, 

seeking public comment on the information 

collection aspect of the consumer market research. 

212The four requisites are: (1) The technology 

addresses a safety need; (2) system designs exist 

that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the 

technology provides the potential for safety 

benefits; and (4) a performance-based objective test 

procedure exists that can assess system 

performance. 

213Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213. 

214Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(b). 

215 Id. 

216Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(2)(A). 

217Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(1)(A). 

safety rating section of the Monroney 

label: (1) Crash protection information— 

which would be comprised of a rating 

(possibly one which maintains the 

Agency’s 5-star ratings brand) that is 

tied to a vehicle’s performance in NCAP 

crashworthiness and rollover testing; (2) 

safety technology information—which 

could be comprised of a rating (possibly 

one that uses the Agency’s 5-star ratings 

brand, a three-tier medal award system, 

or points) that is tied to a vehicle’s 

ability to avoid a crash based on its 

performance in ADAS testing conducted 

by NCAP; and (3) overall vehicle safety 

performance information—which could 

give recognition to vehicles that are top 

performers in both the crash protection 

and safety technology information 

categories for a given model year. 

NHTSA believes that efforts to 

develop a label that incorporates these 

three main overarching categories— 

crash protection information, safety 

technology information, and overall 

vehicle safety performance 

information—should also strive to 

reduce the need to update the Monroney 

label by way of rulemaking when future 

changes are made to the NCAP program. 

NHTSA intends to develop potential 

label changes by conducting consumer 

research. In the past, NCAP has 

benefitted from research on the 

illustration of NCAP vehicle safety 

information in the safety rating section 

of the Monroney label. NHTSA plans to 

conduct qualitative and quantitative 

consumer market research to: (1) 

Evaluate the overall appeal of the safety 

rating label concept mentioned above 

and identify specific likes and dislikes 

associated with each of the three main 

categories on the label; (2) measure the 

ease of comprehension for the safety 

rating label concept and understand 

which visual and text features are most 

effective at conveying vehicle safety 

information; (3) assess the 

distinctiveness of how the information 

is displayed and understand how best to 

make the vehicle safety information 

stand out on the Monroney label; and 

(4) identify additional areas of 

improvement related to the three 

potential main label categories relating 

to crash protection information, safety 

technology information, and overall 

vehicle performance information.211

NHTSA plans to use the results of this 

research to determine how best to 

convey safety rating information to the 

public. 

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP 

The fourth part to this notice 

discusses, for the first time in NCAP, a 

roadmap that sets forth NHTSA’s plans 

for upgrading NCAP over the next 

several years. As mentioned at the 

beginning of this notice, the Agency’s 

efforts outlined herein include both 

NHTSA’s near- and long-term strategies 

for upgrading NCAP. 

Fulfillment of the roadmap will 

involve NHTSA’s issuing planned 

proposed upgrades in phases as vehicle 

safety-related systems and technologies 

mature and data about their use and 

efficacy become known. The systems 

and technologies would include new 

vehicle-based crashworthiness and 

crash avoidance systems as well as 

systems-based improvements, such as 

occupant restraints and headlamp 

system performance upgrades. NHTSA 

would issue a final decision document 

following an RFC that responds to 

comments and provides appropriate 

lead time. This phased process allows 

stakeholders to provide data and views 

on proposed program updates, and 

allows NHTSA more flexibility to 

pursue program updates quicker. 

Since 2015, NHTSA has worked to 

finalize its research on pedestrian crash 

protection (head, and upper and lower 

leg impact tests), advanced 

anthropomorphic test devices (crash test 

dummies) in frontal and side impact 

tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, 

and an updated rollover risk curve. 

NHTSA has included these initiatives in 

the mid-term component of the 10-year 

roadmap because the Agency reasonably 

believes they would meet the four 

prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.212

Initiatives in the mid-term component 

of the 10-year roadmap identify and 

prioritize safety opportunities and 

technologies that are practical and for 

which objective tests and criteria, and 

other consumer data exist.213

In addition to the items in the 

roadmap discussed below, NHTSA is 

taking an unprecedented step to 

consider expanding NCAP to include 

safety technologies that may have the 

potential to help drivers make safe 

driving choices, as discussed in the next 

section. This aspect of NCAP would 

focus on the relationship between 

technology and behavioral safety, and 

would provide comparative information 

on devices that can shift driver behavior 

that contribute to crashes (e.g., 

speeding, and drowsy-, impaired- and 

distracted-driving). Initiatives on these 

technologies could be woven into both 

the first and second half (i.e., long-term 

portion) of the 10-year roadmap, 

depending on whether the technologies 

and objective tests and criteria are 

sufficiently developed to meet NHTSA’s 

four prerequisites for inclusion in 

NCAP. Initiatives in the long-term 

component of the roadmap include an 

identification of any safety opportunity 

or technology not included in the midterm component for a variety of reasons, 

and those initiatives that would most 

benefit from stakeholder input and 

comments from the public. The Agency 

believes the plans outlined below would 

fulfill the requirements set forth in 

Section 24213 of the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law for the 10-year New 

Car Assessment Program roadmap once 

this RFC is finalized. 

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law 

requires that NHTSA establish a 

roadmap for the implementation of 

NCAP not later than one year after the 

law’s enactment.214 This roadmap must 

cover a term of ten years, consisting of 

a mid-term component and a long-term 

component.215 This roadmap aligns 

with relevant Agency priorities, 

performance plans, agendas, and any 

other relevant NHTSA plans.216

Additionally, the contents of the 

roadmap must include a plan for any 

changes for NCAP, which includes 

descriptions of actions to be carried out 

and shall, as applicable, incorporate 

objective criteria for evaluating safety 

technologies and reasonable time 

periods for changes to NCAP that 

include new or updated tests.217

NHTSA has long-established criteria for 

evaluating safety technologies for 

inclusion in NCAP, which is discussed 

in detail earlier in this notice and in 

several previous notices. NHTSA also 

uses the notice and comment period to 

ensure the time periods for changes to 

NCAP are reasonable, and the Agency 

expects this practice to continue. As 

part of the Agency’s development of 

next steps for NCAP, NHTSA regularly 

evaluates other rating systems within 

the United States and abroad, including 

whether there are safety benefits of 

consistency with those other rating 


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218Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(4). 

219Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(1)(B). 

220Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(2)(A). 

221Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(2)(B). 

222Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(c)(3). 

223Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(e). 

224Public Law 117–58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 

32310(d). 

225 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pp. 78547–78550. 

226NHTSA included new rulemakings in the 

Spring 2020 Regulatory Agenda that would adopt 

the THOR–50M and WorldSID–50M into NHTSA’s 

regulation for anthropomorphic test devices, 49 

CFR part 572 (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127– 

AM20 and https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127– 

AM22, respectively). NHTSA also included 

rulemakings that would adopt use of the THOR– 

50M and WorldSID–50M at the manufacturers’ 

option in NHTSA compliance tests for FMVSS No. 

208, ‘‘Occupant crash protection,’’ (https://

www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127–AM21) and FMVSS No. 

214, ‘‘Side impact protection,’’ (https://

www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127–AM23), respectively. 

227 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pages 78530 

through 78531; https://one.nhtsa.gov/Research/ 

Crashworthiness/Small%20Overlap%20and

%20Oblique%20Testing. 

228See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA– 

2020–0016 for document Repeatability and 

Reproducibility of Oblique Moving Deformable 

Barrier Test Procedure (Saunders 2018); Saunders, 

J. and Parent, D., ‘‘Repeatability and 

Reproducibility of Oblique Moving Deformable 

Barrier Test Procedure,’’ SAE Technical Paper 

2018–01–1055, 2018, doi:10.4271/2018–01–1055; 

https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/41934 Structural 

Countermeasure Research Program; https://

www.nhtsa.gov/crash-simulation-vehicle-models 

Vehicle Interior and Restraint Modeling and 

Structural Countermeasure Research Program 

sections. 

systems.218 There are other benefits for 

being consistent, but safety is NHTSA’s, 

and thus, NCAP’s, top priority. 

Next, the roadmap shall include key 

milestones, including the anticipated 

start of an action, completion of an 

action, and effective date of an 

update.219 While NHTSA can 

reasonably anticipate when the start of 

actions may occur in the mid-term 

portion of the roadmap, many 

technologies in the long-term portion of 

the roadmap will require additional 

research, test procedure development, 

product development and maturity, and 

a number of other factors that prevent 

the Agency from providing more detail 

on the anticipated start of an action. As 

such, NHTSA can only provide the 

estimated start date of 2025–2031. 

Completion of action is highly 

dependent upon the notice and 

comment process, and the effective date 

would be highly dependent on the 

completion of an action. Completion 

dates are dependent on the number and 

depth of the comments received in 

response to an RFC, along with the 

technical research necessary to resolve 

any challenging issues in the comments. 

Effective dates are dependent on 

completion dates. As such, NHTSA 

cannot reasonably anticipate those 

timelines in advance. 

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also 

requires that the mid-term portion of the 

roadmap identify and prioritize safety 

opportunities and technologies that are 

practical and for which objective rating 

tests, evaluation criteria, and other 

consumer data exist.220 In the mid-term 

portion of the roadmap, NHTSA has 

included only those technologies that 

are practical and that otherwise meet 

the requirements in the law. With 

respect to the long-term portion of the 

roadmap, NHTSA must identify and 

prioritize safety opportunities and 

technologies that exist or are in 

development.221 NHTSA has met both 

of these requirements in the following 

sections, prioritizing safety 

opportunities and technologies that are 

practical and for which objective rating 

tests, evaluation criteria, and other 

consumer data exist in the mid-term 

portion, and identifying safety 

opportunities and technologies that 

exist or are in development in the longterm portion. 

Any safety opportunity or technology 

not included in this roadmap was 

omitted because NHTSA is not 

considering inclusion in NCAP at this 

time.222 In the next five years, addition 

of other technologies or opportunities to 

the roadmap would be subject to 

NHTSA’s four prerequisites for 

inclusion in NCAP, the requirements of 

the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for 

inclusion in any part of the roadmap, 

and the appropriateness of the 

technology or opportunity for a 

consumer information program. 

Per Sec. 24213(c), NHTSA must 

request comment on the roadmap and 

review and incorporate these comments, 

as appropriate.223 This RFC requests 

comments from the public on the 

roadmap. NHTSA considers the notice 

and comment process to be the primary 

form of stakeholder engagement, though 

the Agency reserves the right to conduct 

other forms of engagement to ensure 

that input received represents a 

diversity of technical background and 

viewpoints.224 With regard to a 

roadmap, NHTSA requests feedback on 

the following: 

(59) Identification of safety 

opportunities or technologies in 

development that could be included in 

future roadmaps, 

(60) opportunities to benefit from 

collaboration or harmonization with 

other rating programs, and 

(61) other issues to assist with longterm planning. 

2021–2022 Timeframe 

• As discussed in detail in this 

notice, NHTSA proposes to add four 

new ADAS technologies (LKS, BSD, 

BSI, and PAEB) in NCAP. 

• In addition to improving the safety 

and protection of motor vehicle 

occupants, NHTSA continues its efforts 

and focus to improve the safety of 

pedestrians and vulnerable road users. 

NHTSA plans to propose a 

crashworthiness pedestrian protection 

testing program in NCAP in 2022. The 

pedestrian protection program would 

incorporate three crashworthiness tests 

(i.e., head-to-hood, upper leg-to-hood 

leading edge, and lower leg-to-bumper) 

discussed in the December 2015 RFC.225

A crashworthiness pedestrian protection 

testing program would measure how 

well passenger cars, trucks, and sport 

utility vehicles protect pedestrians in 

the event of a crash. The program would 

further complement the safety achieved 

by pedestrian automatic emergency 

braking by measuring the safety 

performance of new vehicles to 

pedestrian impacts and encouraging 

safer vehicle designs for pedestrians. 

2022–2023 Timeframe 

• NHTSA plans to propose using the 

THOR–50M in NCAP’s full frontal 

impact tests and the WorldSID–50M in 

the program’s side impact barrier and 

side impact pole tests soon after work 

commences to add the dummies to 49 

CFR part 572 and FMVSSs.226 The 

Agency would inform the public (in 

request for comment notices) how these 

crash test dummies would be utilized in 

various NCAP test modes. 

• In the December 2015 notice, 

NHTSA announced it would like to 

include a frontal oblique crash test in 

NCAP.227 In response to that notice, 

commenters requested that the Agency 

provide the public with additional 

information on the target population as 

well as costs and benefits. They also 

argued that countermeasure studies 

have not been completed and 

questioned the repeatability and 

reproducibility of both the test 

procedure and the oblique moving 

deformable barrier. NHTSA has 

continued its frontal oblique research 

and kept the public informed of its 

findings.228 A cornerstone of the 

procedure is the use of THOR–50M 

dummies in the driver and right front 

passenger positions. NHTSA plans to 

determine in 2022 whether this new 

crash test mode is appropriate for 

inclusion in an FMVSS and/or NCAP. If 


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229Brown, T., Lee, J., Schwarz, C., Fiorentino, D., 

McDonald, A., Traube, E., Nadler, E. (2013). 

Detection of Driver Impairment from Drowsiness. 

23rd Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, 

Seoul, Republic of Korea. May 2013. Paper Number 

13–0346. 

a determination is made to include the 

test in NCAP, the notice and comment 

process would follow soon thereafter. 

• NHTSA will consider incorporating 

several additional advanced crash 

avoidance technologies including 

lighting systems for improved nighttime 

pedestrian visibility into NCAP in the 

near future, and will be announcing 

next steps during this timeframe. These 

include: (1) Adaptive driving beam 

headlights; (2) upgraded lower beam 

headlighting; (3) semiautomatic 

headlamp beam-switching; and (4) rear 

automatic braking for pedestrian 

protection. 

2023–2024 Timeframe 

• A multi-year consumer research 

effort is underway to modernize the 

vehicle safety rating section of the 

Monroney label. Once the consumer 

research is complete, the Agency plans 

to begin a rulemaking action in 2023 to 

update the Monroney label with a new 

labeling concept. 

• Also in 2023, NHTSA plans to 

commence revising its 5-star safety 

ratings system. The Agency has sought 

comment on several approaches to 

provide consumers with vehicle safety 

ratings that provide more meaningful 

safety information and discriminate 

performance of vehicles among the fleet. 

NHTSA discusses this issue in detail in 

a section below. 

2025–2031 Timeframe 

In NHTSA’s long-term component of 

the roadmap, NHTSA includes a variety 

of technologies and foci that attempt to 

overcome many safety challenges for 

which the technologies available may 

not be as mature or may warrant 

additional study from NHTSA. NHTSA 

is seeking stakeholder input on the 

appropriateness of each of these 

technologies for the program and 

whether commenters believe that these 

technologies will meet the program’s 

four prerequisites within the next 5- or 

10-year time frame. 

NHTSA will be further assessing and 

developing tests for the following crash 

avoidance technologies: (1) Intersection 

safety assist; (2) opposing traffic safety 

assist; and (3) automatic emergency 

braking for all vulnerable road users 

(including bicyclists and motorcyclists) 

in all major crash scenarios including 

when the vehicle is turning left or right. 

NHTSA will also be assessing the 

effectiveness of systems that are or will 

become available in the fleet. The 

Agency hopes that information will be 

available that would support a proposal 

in 2025 or beyond to include these three 

technologies in NCAP. 

Based on comments received from 

stakeholders, if a technology 

development is mature and the available 

data in the next several years meet the 

Agency’s four prerequisites, NHTSA 

would issue a proposal for inclusion in 

NCAP during the five-year mid-term 

timeline. 

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle 

Technologies for Safe Driving Choices 

NCAP has traditionally focused on 

crashworthiness technologies that 

protect the vehicle occupants in the 

event of a collision. The more advanced 

ADAS technologies that are the focus of 

this notice take the next step and 

provide technologies that can assist 

drivers, or in certain cases correct 

drivers’ action in ways that can avoid or 

mitigate crashes. NHTSA has also begun 

to consider ways NCAP could be used 

to encourage technologies that protect 

road users other than the vehicles 

occupants, such as pedestrians and 

pedalcyclists. 

As beneficial as these technologies 

may be, NHTSA recognizes that risky 

driving behaviors and poor driver 

choices continue to amplify crash, 

injury, and fatality risks on our 

roadways. Accordingly, NHTSA is 

interested in safety technologies that 

have the ability to address the prevalent 

driver behaviors that contribute to 

roadway fatalities. For example, there 

are several available and emerging 

safety technologies that have the 

potential to address speeding and 

drowsy-, impaired-, distracted-, and 

unbelted-driving, thereby reducing the 

risk of crashes that lead to injury or 

death, which are the subjects of 

analysis, research, and examination. 

NHTSA is exploring opportunities to 

encourage the development and 

deployment of these technologies. 

While more must be known about the 

effectiveness and consumer acceptance 

of these systems, NHTSA strongly 

believes that these technologies will 

mature and show efficacy. In the nearer 

term, then, the Agency sees potential in 

highlighting vehicles equipped with 

these technologies on its website, and 

possibly elsewhere, to improve public 

awareness, and encourage vehicle 

manufacturer development and 

adoption. NHTSA will conduct research 

to develop objective test procedures and 

criteria to evaluate the performance and 

effectiveness of these technologies. 

Initiatives on these technologies would 

be woven into both the first and second 

half (i.e., long-term portion) of the 10- 

year roadmap, depending on whether 

the technologies and objective tests and 

criteria are sufficiently developed to 

meet NHTSA’s four prerequisites for 

inclusion in NCAP. 

A. Driver Monitoring Systems 

Driver monitoring systems use a 

variety of sensors and software to detect 

and/or infer driver state based on 

estimation approaches. For example, 

certain types of driver monitoring 

systems have shown promise in 

detecting the state of a driver’s 

drowsiness.229 As vehicle technologies 

have evolved, driver monitoring systems 

have been more commonly introduced 

and applied to various driver states, 

particularly as one of the 

countermeasures against potential 

misuse of ADAS. Currently, there are 

varied approaches to driver monitoring 

across vehicle and equipment 

manufacturers. 

NHTSA is considering adding driver 

monitoring systems as an NCAP 

technology to encourage further 

deployment of effective driver 

monitoring systems into vehicles. 

NHTSA seeks comment on the 

following to help the Agency determine 

whether to implement driver monitoring 

systems in NCAP: 

(62) What are the capabilities of the 

various available approaches to driver 

monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel 

sensors, eye tracking cameras, etc.) to 

detect or infer different driver state 

measurement or estimations (e.g., visual 

attention, drowsiness, medical 

incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated 

confidence or reliability in detecting or 

inferring such driver states and what 

supporting data exist? 

(63) Of further interest are the types 

of system actions taken based on a 

driver monitoring system’s estimate of a 

driver’s state. What are the types and 

modes of associated warnings, 

interventions, and other mitigation 

strategies that are most effective for 

different driver states or impairments 

(e.g., drowsy, medical, distraction)? 

What research data exist that 

substantiate effectiveness of these 

interventions? 

(64) Are there relevant thresholds and 

strategies for performance (e.g., alert 

versus some degree of intervention) that 

would warrant some type of NCAP 

credit? 

(65) Since different driver states (e.g., 

visual distraction and intoxication) can 

result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., 

wide within-lane position variability), 

comments regarding opportunities and 


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230National Center for Statistics and Analysis. 

(2020, December). Overview of Motor Vehicle 

Crashes in 2019. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. 

DOT HS 813 060). Washington, DC: National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

231 In 2013, NHTSA published ‘‘Visual-Manual 

NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle 

Electronic Devices.’’ These voluntary guidelines 

apply to original equipment in-vehicle electronic 

devices used by the driver to perform secondary 

tasks (communications, entertainment, information 

gathering, navigation tasks, etc. are considered 

secondary tasks) through visual-manual means. 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/ 

04/26/2013-09883/visual-manual-nhtsa-driverdistraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronicdevices. 

232 Ibid. 

233NHTSA has researched the Driver Alcohol 

Detection System for Safety (DADSS) program. 

234 85 FR 71987 (November 12, 2020). 

235https://www.regulations.gov/document/ 

NHTSA-2020-0102-0001/comment. 

236 DOT HS 812 683. Latest agency estimate 

available. 

237 DOT HS 812 875. 

238 DOT HS 813 060. 

239Based on known restraint use. Restraint use 

was unknown for 8.7 percent of passenger vehicle 

occupant fatalities in 2019. 

240 49 CFR 571.208. 

tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when 

the originating cause is not conclusive 

are of specific interest. 

(66) What types of consumer 

acceptance information (e.g., consumer 

interest or feedback data) are available 

or are foreseen for implementation of 

different types of driver monitoring 

systems and associated mitigation 

strategies for driver impairment, 

drowsiness, or visual inattention? Are 

there privacy concerns? What are the 

related privacy protection strategies? 

Are there use or preference data on a 

selectable feature that could be 

optionally enabled by consumers (e.g., 

for teen drivers by their parents)? 

B. Driver Distraction 

According to NHTSA’s statistics, 

driver distraction resulted in at least 

3,000 known deaths in 2019.230 Often 

discussions regarding distracted driving 

center around cell phone use and 

texting, but distracted driving also 

includes other activities such adjusting 

the radio or climate controls or 

accessing other in-vehicle systems. Invehicle devices and Human-Machine 

Interfaces (HMI) can be strategically 

designed to avoid or limit opportunities 

for driver distraction.231 Easy access to 

manual controls in traditional or 

expected locations can minimize the 

amount of time a driver’s eyes are off 

the road and hands are off the steering 

wheel, as well as the time needed for 

the driver to activate the control quickly 

in time-critical traffic conflict scenarios 

(e.g., a driver reaches to activate the 

horn button in a crash-imminent 

situation, but finds that the control of 

horn activation is not in the expected, 

typical location). 

NHTSA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(67) What in-vehicle and HMI design 

characteristics would be most helpful to 

include in an NCAP rating that focuses 

on ease of use? What research data exist 

to support objectively characterizing 

ease of use for vehicle controls and 

displays? 

(68) What are specific 

countermeasures or approaches to 

mitigate driver distraction, and what are 

the associated effectiveness metrics that 

may be feasible and appropriate for 

inclusion in the NCAP program? 

Methods may include driver monitoring 

and action strategies, HMI design 

considerations, expanded in-motion 

secondary task lockouts, phone 

application/notification limitations 

while paired with the vehicle, etc. 

(69) What distraction mitigation 

measures could be considered for NCAP 

credit? 

C. Alcohol Detection 

Alcohol-impaired driving continues 

to be a pervasive contributing factor to 

roadway fatalities, with over 10,000 

deaths in the U.S. in 2019.232 NHTSA 

has explored many ways in which 

alcohol-impaired driving risks can be 

effectively mitigated both through 

vehicle technologies and strategic 

public outreach and enforcement.233 In 

2020, NHTSA published a Request for 

Information notice seeking input on 

Impaired Driving Technologies in the 

Federal Register.234 Specifically, the 

notice requested information on 

available or late stage technology under 

development for impaired driving 

detection and mitigation. A total of 12 

comments were received.235 Comments 

were submitted about emerging 

technologies that can directly measure 

impairment though blood alcohol 

concentration at the beginning of a trip 

as well as technologies that infer alcohol 

impairment through a combination of 

driver monitoring and other vehicle 

sensors tracking during the course of a 

trip. 

NHTSA seeks comment on the 

following aspects of alcohol detection 

systems: 

(70) Are there opportunities for 

including alcohol-impairment 

technology in NCAP? What types of 

metrics, thresholds, and tests could be 

considered? Could voluntary 

deployment or adoption be positively 

influenced through NCAP credit? 

(71) How can NCAP procedures be 

described in objective terms that could 

be inclusive of various approaches, such 

as detection systems and inference 

systems? Are there particular challenges 

with any approach that may need 

special considerations? What supporting 

research data exist that document 

relevant performance factors such as 

sensing accuracy and detection 

algorithm efficacy? 

(72) When a system detects alcoholimpairment during the course of a trip, 

what actions could the system take in a 

safe manner? What are the safety 

considerations related to various 

options that manufacturers may be 

considering (e.g., speed reduction, 

performing a safe stop, pulling over, or 

flasher activation)? How should various 

actions be considered for NCAP credit? 

(73) What is known related to 

consumer acceptance of alcoholimpaired driving detection and 

mitigation functions, and how may that 

differ with respect to direct 

measurement approaches versus 

estimation techniques using a driver 

monitoring system? What consumer 

interest or feedback data exist relating to 

this topic? Are there privacy concerns or 

privacy protection strategies with 

various approaches? What are the 

related privacy protection strategies? 

D. Seat Belt Interlocks 

Seat belt use in passenger vehicles 

saved an estimated 14,955 lives in 

2017.236 The national seat belt use rate 

in the United States was 90.7 percent in 

2019.237 Among the 22,215 passenger 

vehicle occupants killed in 2019, almost 

half (47 percent) were unrestrained. For 

those passenger vehicle occupants who 

survived crashes where someone else 

died, only 14 percent were unrestrained 

compared to 47 percent of those who 

died.238 239

Currently, NHTSA uses an array of 

countermeasures, including the Click It 

or Ticket campaign and State primary 

enforcement laws, to encourage seat belt 

use. The Agency requires seat belt 

reminders for the driver’s seat.240 As of 

the 2018 model year, about 95 percent 

of vehicles voluntarily offer front 

passenger warnings. NHTSA also 

informs consumers searching for vehicle 

ratings on www.NHTSA.gov as to the 

availability of optional front passenger 

and rear seat belt reminder systems, 

which typically provide a visual and 

auditory warning to the driver at the 

onset of a trip and if a passenger 

unbuckles during a trip. 

Methods for detecting seat belt misuse 

have advanced in recent years. A 2018 

NHTSA report, ‘‘Performance 

Assessment of Prototype Seat Belt 

Misuse Detection System,’’ showed that 


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241 DOT HS 812 496. 

242 ‘‘NHTSA’ Research on Seat Belt Interlocks,’’ 

SAE Government Industry Meeting, January 24–26, 

2018. 

243Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ‘‘A Compilation of 

Motor Vehicle Crash Data.’’ U.S. Department of 

Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

the system correctly identified seat belt 

misuse in 95 percent of trials on average 

across multiple common seat belt 

misuse scenarios.241 This type of seat 

belt misuse or non-use detection could 

be coupled with various types of seat 

belt interlock systems to encourage seat 

belt use. Although NHTSA is not aware 

of any such system being currently in 

production, various prototype systems 

have been developed by 

manufacturers.242 These systems could 

include transmission interlock, ignition 

interlock, and entertainment system 

interlock. Such systems could prevent 

drivers from shifting into gear, starting 

their vehicle, or using their vehicle’s 

entertainment system, respectively, if 

the driver and/or front passenger is 

unbelted. Another potential strategy 

could be speed limiter interlock 

systems. Such a system could first issue 

a seat belt reminder warning if the 

driver begins driving and is unbelted, 

and then automatically reduce vehicle 

speed to a very low speed after a certain 

warning period if the driver remains 

unbelted. 

NHTSA requests comment on the 

following related to seat belt interlock 

systems: 

(74) Should NCAP consider credit for 

a seat belt reminder system with a 

continuous or intermittent audible 

signal that does not cease until the seat 

belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 

second FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? 

What data are available to support 

associated effectiveness? Are certain 

audible signal characteristics more 

effective than others? 

(75) Is there an opportunity for 

including a seat belt interlock 

assessment in NCAP? 

(76) If the Agency were to encourage 

seat belt interlock adoption through 

NCAP, should all interlock system 

approaches be considered, or only 

certain types? If so, which ones? What 

metrics could be evaluated for each? 

Should differing credit be applied 

depending upon interlock system 

approach? 

(77) Should seat belt interlocks be 

considered for all seating positions in 

the vehicle, or only the front seats? 

Could there be an opportunity for 

differentiation in this respect? 

(78) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of seat belt interlock systems 

and/or persistent seat belt reminder 

systems in vehicles? What consumer 

interest or feedback data exist on this 

topic? 

(79) Could there be an NCAP 

opportunity in a selectable feature that 

could be optionally engaged such as in 

the context of a ‘‘teen mode’’ feature? 

E. Intelligent Speed Assist 

Speeding continues to be one of the 

critical factors in fatal crashes on 

American roadways. Specifically, 

driving too fast for conditions and 

exceeding the posted limit are two 

prevalent factors that contribute to 

traffic crashes. For more than two 

decades, NHTSA has identified speed as 

being a factor in at least nearly one-third 

of all motor vehicle related fatalities. 

For example, in 2019, of the 36,096 

traffic-related fatalities occurred on U.S. 

roadways, 9,478 of those were positively 

identified as speeding-related.243 These 

totals may underreport speeding, 

potentially to a significant degree, as 

they are based on whether any driver in 

the crash was charged with a speedingrelated offense or if a police officer 

indicated that racing, driving too fast for 

conditions, or exceeding the posted 

speed limit was a contributing factor in 

the crash. As this reporting is based on 

aggregated police actions rather than an 

engineering analysis of individual 

crashes, it may tend to underestimate 

the presence of speeding, particularly in 

crashes where the speeding was not 

clearly obvious but still a factor in either 

the occurrence or severity of the crash. 

Too few drivers view speeding as an 

immediate risk to their personal safety 

or the safety of others, including 

pedestrians and vulnerable road users. 

Yet, the consequences of speeding 

include: Greater potential for loss of 

vehicle control; reduced effectiveness of 

occupant protection equipment; 

increased stopping distance after the 

driver perceives a danger; increased 

degree of crash severity leading to more 

severe injuries; economic implications 

of a speed-related crash; and increased 

fuel consumption and cost. The 

probability of death, disfigurement, or 

debilitating injury grows with higher 

speed at impact. 

NHTSA engages with State and local 

jurisdictions as well as national law 

enforcement partners to provide funding 

and educational materials which 

address speeding. Speed limiter 

features, which prevent a vehicle from 

traveling over a certain speed by 

limiting engine power, are available in 

the U.S. market and widely used in 

heavy-duty tractor-trailers and other 

fleet-based vehicles. In addition, nearly 

all vehicles are equipped with a 

mechanism that limits their top-end 

speed, even if that speed is quite high. 

These systems either prevent a vehicle 

from exceeding a preset specific speed 

regardless of location, or they use GPS 

and/or camera data to determine the 

speed limit of the current road and 

apply mitigation measures to reduce 

speeding. Vehicles equipped with an 

intelligent speed assist system can 

display the current speed limit to the 

driver at all times. Should the driver 

exceed the speed limit for the road, the 

system can provide a visual or auditory 

alert or actively slow the vehicle to an 

appropriate speed. Typically, many 

existing intelligent speed assist systems 

can be temporarily overridden by the 

driver by depressing the accelerator 

pedal firmly. 

NHTSA is committed to addressing 

this important safety issue to further 

reduce fatalities and injuries. NHTSA 

requests comment on the following 

aspects of intelligent speed assist 

systems in passenger vehicles as well as 

other approaches that are not discussed 

in this notice. 

(80) Should NHTSA take into 

consideration systems, such as 

intelligent speed assist systems, which 

determine current speed limits and 

warn the driver or adjust the maximum 

traveling speed accordingly? Should 

there be a differentiation between 

warning and intervention type 

intelligent speed assist systems in this 

consideration? Should systems that 

allow for some small amount of 

speeding over the limit before 

intervening be treated the same or 

differently than systems that are 

specifically keyed to a road’s speed 

limit? What about for systems that allow 

driver override versus systems that do 

not? 

(81) Are there specific protocols that 

should be considered when evaluating 

speed assist system functionality? 

(82) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of intelligent speed assist 

systems? What consumer interest or 

feedback data exist on this topic? 

(83) Are there other means that the 

Agency should consider to prevent 

excessive speeding? 

F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist 

Data indicate that since 1998, nearly 

900 children (an average of 38 per year) 

have died in the U.S. of hyperthermia 

(vehicular heatstroke) because they were 

left or became trapped in a hot vehicle. 

2018 and 2019 saw a record number of 

vehicular heatstroke related deaths at 53 


jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13507 

244www.noheatstroke.org. 

245 Id. 

246Rudd, R., Prasad, A., Weston, D., & Wietholter, 

K. (2015, July). Functional assessment of 

unattended child reminder systems. (Report No. 

DOT HS 812 187). Washington, DC: National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

247https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=

NHTSA-2019-0126. 

248https://www.autosinnovate.org/safety/ 

heatstroke/Automakers%20

Commit%20to%20Helping%20

Combat%20Child%20Heatstroke.pdf. 

249 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008), http://

regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA–2006–26555– 

0114. 

each year.244 Children were in the 

vehicles due to a variety of 

circumstances—some gain entry to a 

parked vehicle, whereas over 50 percent 

are forgotten in the vehicle by 

caregivers.245

To address these tragedies, many 

companies have developed aftermarket 

devices to remind parents and 

caregivers that a child may be left inside 

the vehicle. NHTSA has assessed 

several products and developed a test 

methodology for evaluating future 

products.246 NHTSA subsequently 

opened a public docket inviting all 

interested parties to submit information 

regarding efforts or technological 

innovations to help prevent vehicular 

heatstroke.247 Also, NHTSA has media 

campaigns, such as ‘‘Where’s Baby? 

Look Before You Lock,’’ to raise 

awareness to parents and caregivers on 

the dangers of vehicular heatstroke. 

In recent years, in-vehicle rear seat 

child reminder technology has been 

introduced into a number of vehicle 

makes and models. Many of these 

technological solutions utilize ‘‘door 

logic’’ to determine if there is 

potentially a child in the rear seat of the 

vehicle. The vehicle door logic checks 

to see if the rear seat doors were opened 

and closed at the start of the trip and 

then displays a reminder in the dash 

board with an audio cue for the driver 

to check the back seat when the vehicle 

is turned off. In September 2019, the 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 

and the Association of Global 

Automakers (now collectively known as 

the Alliance for Automotive Innovation) 

announced that a voluntary agreement 

had been formed by its member 

companies to incorporate rear seat child 

reminder systems into their vehicles as 

standard equipment no later than the 

2025 model year.248

NHTSA requests comment on the 

following issues related to rear seat 

child reminder systems designed to 

prevent vehicular heatstroke. 

(84) If NHTSA considers this 

technology for inclusion in NCAP, are 

door logic solutions sufficient? Should 

NHTSA only consider systems that 

detect the presence of a child? 

(85) What research data exist to 

substantiate differences in effectiveness 

of these system types? 

(86) Are there specific protocols that 

should be considered when evaluating 

these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder 

systems? 

(87) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of integrated rear seat child 

reminder systems in vehicles? What 

consumer interest or feedback data exist 

on this topic? 

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating 

System 

NHTSA is seeking comment on 

several approaches to provide 

consumers with vehicle safety ratings 

that provide more meaningful safety 

information and provide consumers 

with more ways to determine relative 

performance of vehicles among the fleet. 

In the current 5-star safety ratings 

system, as described in detail in the July 

2008 final decision notice, injury 

readings recorded from crash test 

dummies used in NCAP’s frontal 

impact, side impact barrier, and side 

impact pole tests are assessed using 

injury risk curves designed to predict 

the chance of a vehicle’s occupant 

receiving similar injuries.249 For each 

occupant in each crash test, the risks of 

injury to each body region assessed are 

combined to produce a combined 

probability of injury to each occupant. 

The combined probabilities of injury for 

each occupant are divided by a 

predetermined baseline risk of injury. 

This baseline risk of injury 

approximates the fleet average injury 

risk for each crash test. Dividing each 

combined occupant probability of injury 

by the baseline risk of injury results in 

a relative assessment of that occupant’s 

combined injury risk versus a known 

fleet average. These calculations result 

in six summary scores for each vehicle 

representing the relative risk of injury 

for the following occupants: (1) The 

driver and front seat passenger in the 

frontal impact test; (2) the driver and 

rear seat passenger in the side impact 

barrier test; (3) the driver in the side 

impact pole test; and (4) the relative risk 

for all occupants in rollovers with 

respect to a baseline injury risk. These 

relative risks are then converted to star 

ratings to help consumers make 

informed vehicle purchasing decisions. 

NHTSA seeks public comment on a 

few potential concepts it could use to 

develop a new 5-star safety ratings 

system in the future. Some areas of 

consideration discussed below could be 

used in conjunction with one another, 

while others could work better as 

standalone options. Ideally, any future 

5-star safety ratings system should not 

only fulfill the program mission, but 

also be sufficiently flexible to allow for 

continuing updates to NCAP to 

encourage further vehicle safety 

improvements. 

A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept 

NHTSA is seeking comment on the 

use of a potential points-based system to 

calculate future 5-star safety ratings for 

the crashworthiness testing program 

when the Agency decides to update that 

program. In this system, star ratings 

could be assigned directly from point 

values related to the results from crash 

test dummies. The current system is 

based on a linear combination of the 

probability of injury for multiple body 

regions, some at different severity 

levels, which can result in some body 

regions being overlooked. A point-based 

system, on the other hand, would 

provide more flexibility to target injury 

criteria more representative of realworld injury incidence. The Agency 

believes that this potential method 

would provide more flexibility in the 

future when updating the program 

through a phased approach. For 

instance, new testing devices (e.g., crash 

test dummies), procedures, injury 

measurements, or other criteria could be 

added to the 5-star-ratings system. 

Points could be based on critical injury 

risk curve values or on criteria, such as 

reference values from existing Federal 

regulations or other Agency data. 

This points-based rating system 

approach would be similar to those used 

in other vehicle safety consumer 

information programs such as IIHS and 

Euro NCAP. Upper and lower 

performance targets would be 

established for each test dummy body 

region assessed in crash tests. Maximum 

points would be awarded if Injury 

Assessment Reference Values (IARVs) 

meet the lower target or better. A 

linearized number of points would be 

awarded for injury assessment values 

that are between the lower and upper 

targets. No points would be assigned for 

those that exceed the upper target for 

the respective body region (or perhaps 

the entire occupant). Risk curves would 

no longer be used exclusively to 

calculate a combined injury probability 

from the various body regions and 

ultimately star ratings. Critical risk 

curve values, IARVs, or other accepted 

injury limits would be used to establish 

performance targets and related points 

assignments. 


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13508 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

250 Id. 251This is based on comments by participants in 

the October 1, 2018 public meeting and respondents 

to the related docket https://www.regulations.gov/ 

docket?D=NHTSA-2018-0055. 

252Prior to the 2010 program enhancements, 

NCAP star ratings were based on an absolute, 

independent scale of combined injury probability. 

That is, the combined probability of injury from a 

given occupant was converted directly into a star 

rating with no intermediate calculation except 

rounding. 

253Park, B., Rockwell, T., Collins, L., Smith, C., 

Aram, M. (2015), The enhanced U.S. NCAP: Five 

years later. 24th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles 

Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2015, Paper 

Number 15–0314. 

254 Depending on possible rating scales from 0– 

5 stars, 0.5–5 stars, or 1–5 stars, the amount of total 

distinct ratings available would vary. 

In addition to the injury criteria 

currently included in the 5-star safety 

ratings system, data to support several 

other injury criteria are collected for 

Agency monitoring and consumer 

information on the respective NCAP 

dummies (Hybrid III and ES–2re 50th 

percentile males, Hybrid III and SID–IIs 

5th percentile females). NHTSA is 

seeking comment on whether any 

additional measurements that are not 

part of the existing 5-star ratings system 

are appropriate for use in a points-based 

calculation of the future star ratings. 

Currently, if measurements of certain 

injury criteria that are included in 

related FMVSSs exceed standard limits, 

the Agency would assign a ‘‘safety 

concern’’ designation on its website and 

on the vehicle window sticker 

(Monroney label).250 If measurements of 

certain injury criteria that are not part 

of FMVSSs exceed established limits, 

the Agency highlights those on its 

website (but not on the Monroney label) 

with footnotes. In both of these cases, 

the Agency seeks to inform consumers 

of potentially higher injury risks in body 

regions that are not captured by the 

existing 5-star safety ratings system. The 

Agency recognizes that consumer 

confusion may result from the 

presentation of a vehicle with high (4- 

or 5-star) ratings that is also assigned a 

safety concern or injury-related 

footnote. One potential solution to 

reduce confusion would be to 

implement a points-based system that 

allows the Agency to include the 

assessment of all injuries within the 

calculation of the star rating, even those 

that may not have associated risk 

curves. Thus, the Agency is seeking 

comment on the appropriate method. 

Furthermore, NHTSA is exploring 

several options regarding the 

distribution of points across a potential 

points-based ratings system. Real-world 

data could be used to apportion the total 

number of available points to each crash 

mode, dummy, and/or injury value 

according to severity or prevalence in 

the field. Alternatively, each dummy or 

injury value could be allotted the same 

number of points, effectively 

normalizing each dummy or injury. 

B. Baseline Risk Concept 

Support for adjusting the baseline risk 

value associated with 5-star safety 

ratings has been mixed in the past, with 

some in favor and others advising 

against it.251 As mentioned earlier, the 

Agency is again seeking comment on 

whether the baseline risk concept 

should be preserved when considering 

updates to its 5-star safety ratings 

system in the future. 

With the July 2008 final decision 

establishing the existing 5-star safety 

ratings system, the concept of a relative 

star rating system was introduced for 

the first time.252 As discussed 

previously, after injury readings from 

various body regions are converted to 

combined probabilities of injury risks, 

those combined probabilities are 

divided by a baseline (or average) risk 

of injury that is an approximation of the 

vehicle fleet average injury risk. Star 

ratings generated in NCAP today are a 

measure of how much more (or less) 

occupant protection the vehicle affords 

when compared to an ‘‘average’’ vehicle. 

The intent of the baseline risk as 

described in the July 2008 notice was to 

update its value at regular intervals so 

that, as the average risk of injury 

decreased over time, ratings could 

become more stringent without 

changing the underlying criteria. In 

practice, the baseline risk has never 

been adjusted, which results in recent 

star ratings being assigned using an 

older benchmark less representative of 

current vehicle safety levels.253

C. Half-Star Ratings 

In the December 2015 notice, the 

Agency sought comments on the merits 

of providing ratings to consumers in 

half-star increments. Commenters were 

generally supportive of the notion. In 

this notice, NHTSA continues to seek 

comment on whether the Agency should 

disseminate its 5-star safety ratings with 

half-star increments. This approach 

could allow better discrimination of 

vehicle performance for consumer 

information purposes by creating 

additional levels within the existing 

1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-star levels. Though 

the Agency has not conducted consumer 

research on this potential approach, 

NHTSA believes that the public is 

familiar with the general impression of 

half-star ratings as it is commonly found 

in other consumer product rating 

schemes. 

Future crashworthiness 5-star safety 

ratings systems most likely would 

contain more elements on which 

vehicles are assessed. Thus, NHTSA 

believes that using half-star increments 

may be necessary in future rating 

systems because they allow better 

discrimination of vehicle safety 

performance. The half-star increments, 

depending on future Agency decisions, 

could create anywhere from 9 to 11 

levels 254 of discrimination for use in 

rating vehicles. 

NHTSA could design any half-star 

rating system to require a vehicle to 

reach the minimum threshold for 

receiving that rating level. Ratings in a 

system such as this would be ‘‘rounded 

down’’ to the nearest half- or whole-star 

rating and would not be ‘‘rounded up’’ 

to the next half- or whole-star rating. 

D. Decimal Ratings 

NHTSA is also seeking comments on 

whether it should consider assigning 

star ratings using a decimal format in 

addition to or in place of assigning 

whole- or half-star ratings. The decimal 

rating could be based on a conversion of 

NCAP test results by using a linear 

function approach. For instance, in the 

current 5-star safety ratings system, this 

could be achieved by relating a linear 

function to the VSS calculation and its 

associated ranges. In a potential future 

5-star safety ratings system, like one 

where the previously discussed pointsbased concept is used, a decimal value 

could also be easily integrated. 

Providing NCAP ratings in decimal 

format could provide consumers with 

an additional, high delineation method 

of discriminating vehicle performance 

among the fleet for purchasing reasons. 

Considering these ongoing Agency 

initiatives currently being pursued for 

future NCAP upgrades, NHTSA requests 

comment on the following: 

(88) What approaches are most 

effective to provide consumers with 

vehicle safety ratings that provide 

meaningful information and 

discriminate performance of vehicles 

among the fleet? 

Specifically with regard to a pointsbased rating system, the Agency seeks 

comment on the following: 

(89) Is the use of additional injury 

criteria/body regions that are not part of 

the existing 5-star ratings system 

appropriate for use in a points-based 

calculation of future star ratings? Some 

injury criteria do not have associated 

risk curves. Are these regions 

appropriate to include, and if so, what 

is the appropriate method by which to 

include them? 

Regarding the baseline risk concept 

and the general concept of relative 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13509 

255 72 FR 3473 (Jan. 25, 2007), Docket No. 

NHTSA–2006–26555. 

ratings, NHTSA is seeking comment on 

the following: 

(90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star 

safety ratings system continue to 

measure a vehicle’s performance based 

on a known or expected fleet average 

performer, or should it return to an 

absolute system of rating vehicles? 

(91) Considering the basic structure of 

the current ratings system (combined 

injury risk), the potential overlapping 

target populations for crashworthiness 

and ADAS program elements, as well as 

other potential concepts mentioned in 

this document such as a points-based 

system, what would the best method of 

calculating the vehicle fleet average 

performance be? 

(92) Should the vehicle fleet average 

performance be updated at regular 

intervals, and if so, how often? 

(93) What is the most appropriate way 

to disseminate these updates or changes 

to the public? 

Considering a change in approach to 

how to present star ratings to the public, 

NHTSA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(94) Should the Agency disseminate 

its 5-star ratings with half-star 

increments? 

(95) Should the Agency assign star 

ratings using a decimal format in 

addition to or in place of whole- or halfstars? 

E. Rollover Resistance Testing Program 

Currently, there are two rollover 

resistance tests that the Agency 

conducts and are part of the existing 5- 

star safety ratings system. The first 

component of this assessment is the 

static measurement of the vehicle’s 

center of gravity height and the track 

width to determine the vehicle’s static 

stability factor. The second component 

of this assessment is the dynamic 

rollover test (Fishhook test) that 

simulates a driver taking a panic 

steering action in a loss-of-control 

situation. The Agency uses two 

formulas (no tip-up and tip-up results) 

for calculating the risk of rollover and 

then assigns a rollover rating based on 

the risk. NHTSA sought comment on the 

approach published in the December 

2015 notice to recalculate its current 

rollover risk curve given the full 

implementation of electronic stability 

control (ESC) systems as standard 

equipment in all vehicles manufactured 

on or after September 1, 2011. 

Commenters who responded to the 

December 2015 notice were generally 

supportive of the Agency’s desire to 

update the rollover risk curve to reflect 

the role of ESC deployment. However, 

few specific comments on the 

appropriateness of the approach that 

was described in the notice were 

received at the time. 

NHTSA is not proposing changes to 

its two existing rollover resistance tests 

at this time. However, when the Agency 

proposes changes to the existing 5-star 

ratings system, it may be feasible to 

consider an update to how it assesses 

the rollover resistance testing 

component. Thus, the Agency is seeking 

comment on whether any future overall 

vehicle ratings should continue to 

include rollover resistance evaluations. 

Also, if the Agency updates the rollover 

risk curve, suggestions on how to 

transition that data into a future overall 

vehicle rating would be encouraged. 

The Agency expects that any future 

overall vehicle ratings would, at 

minimum, require reweighting the 

contribution of each test mode to that 

overall rating and thus the need to 

determine the most appropriate program 

area to include the rollover resistance 

tests. 

(96) Should the Agency continue to 

include rollover resistance evaluations 

in its future overall ratings? 

IX. Other Activities 

A. Programmatic Challenges With SelfReported Data 

Since model year 2011, vehicle 

manufacturers have been reporting to 

NHTSA their internal test data that 

show whether vehicles equipped with 

the recommended ADAS technologies 

pass NCAP’s system performance test 

requirements in order to receive credit 

from the Agency. NHTSA assesses the 

information provided and then assigns 

check marks for systems whose 

conformance with NCAP’s performance 

test requirements are supported by the 

data. As the Agency stated in its July 

2008 final decision notice, commenters 

were generally supportive of NHTSA’s 

plan to use self-reported data from the 

vehicle manufacturers, in conjunction 

with its own spot-check verification 

testing, to determine whether vehicles 

met NCAP’s system performance test 

requirements.255 The process by which 

the Agency has accepted self-reported 

ADAS technology data for 

recommended technologies has been 

crucial to the successful administration 

of the program. 

However, this process has not been 

without challenges. Throughout the 

administration of the ADAS assessment 

program in NCAP, NHTSA has 

identified inconsistencies in vehicle 

manufacturers’ self-reported data 

submissions. The Agency has 

determined that many of these 

inconsistencies stem from unfamiliarity 

with NCAP’s system performance test 

procedures, including the use of test 

targets and other parameters. 

It is critical to maintain program 

credibility and public trust when 

accepting manufacturers’ ADAS selfreported data and disseminating it to the 

public. One approach to addressing 

some of the aforementioned challenges 

is to encourage all vehicle 

manufacturers to provide NHTSA with 

ADAS self-reported data from an 

independent test facility that meets 

criteria demonstrating competence in 

NCAP testing protocols. For instance, 

NHTSA’s rigorous procurement process 

for awarding contracts to test 

laboratories provides that qualified 

laboratories meet specific competence 

requirements. 

To address the challenges mentioned 

above, NHTSA is considering refusing 

to accept self-reported data and not 

posting recommendations for the 

vehicle’s systems on its website, when: 

• Manufacturers’ self-reported ADAS 

test data is provided from a test facility 

that is not designated as NHTSA’s 

contracted test laboratory, or 

• The corresponding ADAS tests are 

not conducted in accordance with 

NCAP’s testing protocols (including test 

devices). 

NHTSA seeks comment on the 

following: 

(97) Considering the Agency’s goal of 

maintaining the integrity of the 

program, should NHTSA accept selfreported test data that is generated by 

test laboratories that are not NHTSA’s 

contracted test laboratories? If no, why 

not? If yes, what criteria are most 

relevant for evaluating whether a given 

laboratory can acceptably conduct 

ADAS performance tests for NCAP such 

that the program’s credibility is upheld? 

(98) As the ADAS assessment program 

in NCAP continues to grow in the future 

to include new ADAS technologies and 

more complex test procedures, what 

other means would best address the 

following program challenges: Methods 

of data collection, maintaining data 

integrity and public trust, and managing 

test failures, particularly during 

verification testing? 

B. Website Updates 

NHTSA uses its website and the 

safety rating section of the Monroney 

label to convey to consumers vehicle 

safety information provided by NCAP. 

Although the Monroney label is an 

important tool NHTSA uses to 

communicate vehicle safety ratings to 

consumers at the point of sale, it has 

limitations: 


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13510 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

256The Agency implemented the Monroney label 

requirement by regulation (49 CFR 575.302) 

pursuant to Section 10307 of the Safe, Accountable, 

Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act; A 

Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU). 

(1) The Agency must undergo a 

rulemaking action to change any of its 

content, including minor and nonsubstantive changes.256

(2) The label is limited to a certain 

size, only some of which is dedicated to 

NCAP information, which only allows 

for the communication of limited safety 

information. 

(3) By virtue of being posted on 

individual vehicles, the label provides 

limited utility as a comparative 

shopping tool unless compared to labels 

on vehicles in the same physical 

location. 

Thus, NHTSA uses its website to 

communicate a wealth of information 

about vehicle safety beyond what is 

displayed on the Monroney label. 

NHTSA has structured the information 

displayed on its website to align with 

the structure of the Monroney label. The 

same crashworthiness and rollover star 

ratings are shown on both the label and 

the website. However, crash avoidance 

(ADAS technologies) recommendations 

are not included on the Monroney label 

because they were too new to be 

included at the time of the most recent 

Monroney label update, whereas they 

are provided on the website. 

In light of the Monroney label 

limitations, increasingly complex 

vehicle ratings and results, and 

NHTSA’s desire to communicate safety 

information as timely as possible, 

NHTSA is considering enhancing the 

information on its website. However, 

some of these enhancements may 

necessitate that the information 

provided on the Monroney label and 

website deviate from one another in 

structure or in content. There are 

limitations on the amount of 

information that can be usefully 

conveyed on the Monroney label, so 

NHTSA is currently considering placing 

some information on the website alone. 

However, while it makes sense to 

provide additional information and 

comparative tools on the website, 

NHTSA is concerned that consumers 

could be confused if the information in 

both places is not presented in the same 

manner. For example, the Monroney 

label is currently limited to displaying 

whole star ratings. If, as a result of this 

RFC, NHTSA decides to improve the 

differentiation between vehicles by 

displaying star ratings on its website 

using new methods like a decimal 

equivalent value or half-stars, such a 

discrepancy between the Monroney 

label and the website may confuse 

consumers. 

During the October 2018 public 

meeting, Consumers Union suggested 

that NHTSA could provide ratings on its 

website in a ‘‘more granular, sortable 

and readily comparable manner.’’ 

Currently, the website’s functionality 

allows for users to input limited search 

terms. For instance, a consumer may 

search for all vehicles in a given model 

year, all vehicles of a specific make, or 

vehicles with a specific model name. 

Consumers may then filter these results 

by body style, but the current body style 

categories are very broad and can 

encompass hundreds of models. 

Consumers are currently limited to 

viewing ten vehicle models at a time in 

search results, meaning that they may 

need to sift through many pages of 

results if they are simply browsing and 

do not have a particular make or model 

in mind. NHTSA plans to address these 

issues by improving the organization 

and versatility of the safety ratings data 

presented to the public. 

Once a consumer selects a vehicle for 

further details, they may choose to 

compare up to three vehicles, but they 

must input the year, make, and model 

of the vehicles to be compared. NHTSA 

intends to make changes to its 

www.nhtsa.gov user interface to allow 

for simpler comparisons between 

vehicle manufacturers and types. For 

example, when a consumer searches for 

safety rating information for a particular 

make and model, similar vehicles could 

also be shown. These vehicles could be 

classified according to body style. The 

Agency expects to make other changes 

to NHTSA.gov to increase the 

comparability of safety information. 

NHTSA continues to seek comment 

on the following aspects of vehicle 

information provided on its website: 

(99) What is the potential for 

consumer confusion if information on 

the Monroney label and on the website 

differs, and how can this confusion be 

lessened? 

(100) What types of vehicles do 

consumers compare during their search 

for a new vehicle? Do consumers often 

consider vehicles with different body 

styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large 

sport utility)? 

(101) When searching for vehicle 

safety information, do consumers have a 

clear understanding for which vehicles 

they are seeking information, or do they 

browse through vehicle ratings to 

identify vehicles they may wish to 

purchase? 

(102) When classifying vehicles by 

body style, what degree of classification 

is most appropriate? For example, when 

purchasing a passenger vehicle, do 

consumers consider all passenger 

vehicles, or are they inclined to narrow 

their searches to vehicles of a subset of 

passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact 

passenger vehicle)? 

(103) Within the context of the 

updates considered in this notice, what 

is the most important top-level safetyrelated information that consumers 

should be able to compare amongst 

vehicles? Which of these pieces of 

information should consumers be able 

to use to sort and filter search results? 

C. Database Changes 

NHTSA wishes to take this 

opportunity to inform the public about 

other ways the Agency is significantly 

enhancing the NCAP program. We have 

undertaken a considerable 

developmental effort to modernize the 

OEM submission process and our 

processing of data, so that consumer 

information can be provided to 

consumers quickly and accurately. We 

are not requesting comment in this 

section but are presenting this 

information for the benefit of the reader. 

Each year NHTSA requests vehicle 

manufacturers to submit new model 

year vehicle information voluntarily on 

new passenger cars and light trucks 

with gross vehicle weight ratings of 

4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less. This 

information is used by NCAP primarily 

for consumer information on the 

Agency’s website, presentation on the 

vehicle window stickers, and for the 

selection of new model year vehicles to 

be tested under NCAP. 

The manner in which NHTSA and 

vehicle manufacturers communicate 

information has changed over the 

years—from mailed letters and faxes to 

spreadsheets and emails. However, 

NHTSA realized a modernized process 

of data submission, collection, analysis, 

and dissemination is necessary due to 

the ever-growing list of data elements 

needed to support an evolving test 

portfolio and diverse vehicle fleet. In 

the last model year alone, more than 400 

makes and models of passenger vehicles 

were sold in the United States, thus 

requiring vehicle manufacturers not 

only to assemble detailed new vehicle 

data and submit them to NHTSA, but 

also NHTSA to collect, sort, and analyze 

tremendous amounts of information. 

Managing this data has become more 

complex, utilizing electronic 

spreadsheets and email. In addition to 

processing spreadsheets from more than 

20 organizations, maintaining version 

control, checking data for accuracy, 

clarifying ambiguities, sending ratings 

letters, and processing requests have 

limited the ability of the Agency’s 

current IT systems in storing and 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13511 

257See. 

258See https://www.iihs.org/media/9517c308- 

c8d5-42e6-80fd-a69ecd9d2128/3aaYqQ/ 

HLDI%20Research/Bulletins/hldi_bulletin_37- 

11.pdf. Bulletin Vol. 34, No. 28: September 2017, 

‘‘Predicted availability and fitment of safety features 

on registered vehicles,’’ Highway Loss Data 

Institute. 

analyzing data. These limitations have 

been exacerbated by the incorporation 

of ADAS assessments into NCAP, which 

accepts self-reported test data from 

vehicle manufacturers. Historically, 

these ADAS technologies have been 

available in a mix of vehicles within a 

technology package or trim line at the 

make and model level, which can cause 

consumer confusion as to which 

vehicles have the technologies. 

Furthermore, as NCAP is only able to 

offer consumer information details at 

the make and model level, the 

additional complexity of parsing trim 

lines and technology packages has been 

overly burdensome given NHTSA’s 

current resources and limitations. 

NHTSA is mindful that any expansion 

in NCAP’s ADAS assessment program 

will create a long-term need to collect 

considerably more data elements from 

vehicle manufacturers. The current data 

collection process of spreadsheets and 

emails will not suffice to fulfill this 

need. To that end, NHTSA has 

undertaken a multi-year, multi-phase 

project to modernize the way in which 

NCAP communicates with and receives 

data from relevant stakeholders. NHTSA 

is currently developing a new, secure 

online web portal and database that will 

be used to send, receive, track, store, 

and process program data elements and 

communications. 

The first phase of this online portal 

and database development focuses on 

the data submission process from the 

vehicle manufacturers to NHTSA. The 

online web portal would allow 

designated representatives from each 

vehicle manufacturer to submit data and 

correspondence by secure and trackable 

means. Vehicle manufacturers would be 

able to have multiple representatives 

contribute to and approve the data 

submissions, and submissions could be 

done in a more dedicated and focused 

manner than is currently feasible with 

conventional spreadsheets. The data 

submission application would include 

business rules to help vehicle 

manufacturers identify invalid data or 

typographical errors. The database 

portion of the project would allow 

NHTSA not only to capture and store 

data more efficiently, but also to manage 

program functions more quickly—such 

as faster posting of NCAP ratings to the 

Agency’s website. In addition, it would 

allow NCAP to determine twin and 

carryover status in a timelier manner. 

Furthermore, the database is 

significantly more flexible and robust 

than existing spreadsheets and would 

allow more accurate processing of 

manufacturers’ self-reported data 

submitted for the ADAS assessment 

program as well as the side air bag outof-position testing program. In addition, 

this database would allow NCAP to 

review vehicle fleet trends and easily 

compare and track changes in 

individual vehicle models from one 

model year to the next. This phase of 

the project has already produced a 

prototype, and NHTSA has received 

preliminary feedback from initial beta 

testing. 

A second phase of the project will 

focus on data and correspondence 

between NHTSA and its test 

laboratories. NCAP collects vehiclespecific test setup information from the 

vehicle manufacturer and separately 

transmits this data to its designated test 

laboratory. This phase of the project 

would streamline the way in which the 

program communicates its day-to-day 

operations that include the review, 

transmission, and archive of test data. 

The result of these upgrades would 

allow NCAP to schedule tests, review 

test data, analyze test anomalies and 

failures, respond to manufacturer 

contests, and publish safety ratings in a 

timelier manner. 

X. Economic Analysis 

The various changes in NCAP 

discussed in this proposal all enable a 

rating system that improves consumer 

awareness of ADAS safety features, and 

encourages manufacturers to accelerate 

their adoption. This accelerated 

adoption of ADAS would drive any 

economic and societal impacts that 

result from these changes, and are thus 

the focus of this discussion of economic 

analysis. Hence, the Agency has 

considered the potential economic 

effects for ADAS technologies proposed 

for inclusion in NCAP and the potential 

benefit of introducing a rating system 

for ADAS technologies. 

Unlike crashworthiness safety 

features, where safety improvements are 

attributable to improved occupant 

protection when a crash occurs, the 

impact that ADAS technologies have on 

fatality and injury rates is a direct 

function of their effectiveness in 

preventing crashes or reducing the 

severity of the crashes they are designed 

to mitigate. This effectiveness is 

typically measured by using real-world 

statistical data, laboratory testing, or 

Agency expertise. 

With respect to vehicle safety, the 

Agency believes, as discussed in detail 

in this notice, the four proposed ADAS 

technologies have the potential to 

reduce vehicle crashes and injury 

severities further. As cited in this 

notice, researchers have conducted 

preliminary studies to estimate the 

effectiveness of ADAS technologies. 

Although these studies have been 

limited to certain models or 

manufacturers, which may not represent 

the entire fleet, they do illustrate how 

these systems can provide safety 

benefits. Thus, although the Agency 

does not have sufficient data to 

determine the monetized safety impacts 

resulting from these technologies in a 

way similar to that frequently done for 

mandated technologies—when 

compared to the future without the 

proposed update to NCAP, NHTSA 

expects that these changes would likely 

have substantial positive safety effects 

by promoting earlier and more 

widespread deployment of these 

technologies. 

NCAP also helps address the issue of 

asymmetric information (i.e., when one 

party in a transaction is in possession of 

more information than the other), which 

can be considered a market failure.257

Regarding consumer information, the 

introduction of a potential new ADAS 

rating system is anticipated to provide 

consumers additional vehicle safety 

information (e.g., rating based on ADAS 

performance and capability as well as 

the types of ADAS in vehicles) as 

opposed to the information provided in 

the current program (e.g., check mark 

based on ADAS performance as pass/ 

fail) to help them make more informed 

purchasing decisions by better 

presenting the relative safety benefits of 

different ADAS technologies. NHTSA 

believes that the future ADAS rating 

would increase consumer awareness 

and understanding of the safety benefits 

in these technologies, and, in turn, 

incentivize vehicle manufacturers to 

offer the ADAS technologies that lead to 

higher ratings across a broader selection 

of their vehicles. Furthermore, as these 

ADAS technologies mature and become 

more reliable and efficient, a large 

portion of vehicles equipped with such 

systems would achieve higher ADAS 

ratings, and in turn consumers would 

have an increasing number of safer 

vehicles to choose from. There is an 

unquantifiable value to consumers in 

receiving accurate and comparable 

performance information about those 

technologies among manufacturers, 

makes, and models. 

According to NHTSA sponsored 

research,258 IIHS/HLDI predicted that 

the number of vehicles equipped with 

ADAS technologies, including BSW and 

Lane Keeping Warning, will increase 


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13512 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 

259Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash 

population for crash avoidance technologies in 

passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT HS 812 653), 

Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration. 

260The crash scenarios referenced for the FCW/ 

CIB/DBS target population are those that comprise 

the subset of the 84 mutually exclusive pre-crash 

scenarios analyzed by VOLPE (Report No. DOT HS 

812 745) that were considered relevant for the 

forward collision prevention crash category (Report 

No. DOT HS 812 653). Each of the 84 scenarios is 

assigned a pre-assigned number and is followed by 

a brief description. 

substantially from 2020 to 2030 and 

reach near full market penetration in 

2050. Although the Agency has limited 

data on costs of ADAS technologies to 

consumers, assuming consumer demand 

for safety remains high, the future 

ADAS rating system would likely 

accelerate the full adaptation of the four 

technologies included in this RFC—not 

to mention the four existing ones. 

Nevertheless, the Agency does not have 

sufficient data, such as unit cost and 

information on how soon the full 

adaptation will be reached with the 

ADAS rating, to predict the net increase 

in cost to consumers, with a high degree 

of certainty. 

XI. Public Participation 

Interested parties are strongly 

encouraged to submit thorough and 

detailed comments relating to each of 

the relevant areas discussed in this 

notice. Please see Appendix B for a 

summarized list of specific questions 

that have been posed in this notice. 

Comments submitted will help the 

Agency make informed decisions as it 

strives to advance NCAP by encouraging 

continuous safety improvements for 

new vehicles and enhancing consumer 

information. 

How do I prepare and submit 

comments? 

To ensure that your comments are 

filed correctly in the docket, please 

include the docket number of this 

document in your comments. 

Your comments must not be more 

than 15 pages long (49 CFR 553.21). 

NHTSA established this limit to 

encourage you to write your primary 

comments in a concise fashion. 

However, you may attach necessary 

additional documents to your 

comments. There is no limit on the 

length of the attachments. 

Please submit one copy (two copies if 

submitting by mail or hand delivery) of 

your comments, including the 

attachments, to the docket following the 

instructions given above under 

ADDRESSES. Please note, if you are 

submitting comments electronically as a 

PDF (Adobe) file, NHTSA asks that the 

documents submitted be scanned using 

an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 

process, thus allowing the Agency to 

search and copy certain portions of your 

submissions. 

How do I submit confidential business 

information? 

If you wish to submit any information 

under a claim of confidentiality, you 

should submit three copies of your 

complete submission, including the 

information you claim to be confidential 

business information, to the Office of 

the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the 

address given above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you 

may submit a copy (two copies if 

submitting by mail or hand delivery), 

from which you have deleted the 

claimed confidential business 

information, to the docket by one of the 

methods given above under ADDRESSES. 

When you send a comment containing 

information claimed to be confidential 

business information, you should 

include a cover letter setting forth the 

information specified in NHTSA’s 

confidential business information 

regulation (49 CFR part 512). 

Will the Agency consider late 

comments? 

NHTSA will consider all comments 

received before the close of business on 

the comment closing date indicated 

above under DATES. To the extent 

possible, the Agency will also consider 

comments received after that date. 

Please note that even after the comment 

closing date, we will continue to file 

relevant information in the docket as it 

becomes available. Accordingly, we 

recommend that interested people 

periodically check the docket for new 

material. You may read the comments 

received at the address given above 

under ADDRESSES. The hours of the 

docket are indicated above in the same 

location. You may also see the 

comments on the internet, identified by 

the docket number at the heading of this 

notice, at www.regulations.gov. 

XII. Appendices 

Appendix A. Target Population 

Statistics for Crash Scenarios 259

TABLE A–1—TARGET POPULATION STATISTICS, FCW/CIB/DBS 

Crash scenarios 260 Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle (LV) Stopped ................................................... 1,099,868 474 561,842 1,719,177 

2001 Rear-End, LV Slower .............................................................................. 174,217 527 97,402 252,341 

2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated ..................................................................... 374,624 155 196,731 587,031 

2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher Speed ..................................... 598 3 273 829 

2009 Rear-End, Other/Unspecified ................................................................. 50,105 70 24,951 77,034 

2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Stopped ............................... 1,842 37 839 2,510 

2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Slower ................................. 813 6 486 1,063 

2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Decelerated ......................... 1,475 3 860 1,900 

Combined Total ........................................................................................ 1,703,541 1,275 883,386 2,641,884 

Percent of Total Crashes ......................................................................... 29.4 3.8 31.5 36.3 

TABLE A–2—TARGET POPULATION FOR LDW/LKA/LCA 

Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

100 1V Rollover 1st Event ............................................................................... 4,411 63 3,155 2,104 

150 2+V Rollover 1st Event ............................................................................. 243 3 337 197 

1000 1V, Roadway Departure (RD) ................................................................ 966,709 9,751 359,238 679,402 

1050 2+V, Roadway Departure ....................................................................... 43,957 1,021 32,069 55,856 


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TABLE A–2—TARGET POPULATION FOR LDW/LKA/LCA—Continued 

Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median .................................................................. 8,560 75 2,910 6,214 

1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median ................................................................ 3,427 106 2,678 4,239 

3000 ST Opposite Dir(OD), Head-On ............................................................. 32,751 2,761 37,848 23,992 

3009 ST OD Forward Impact, Other ............................................................... 115 11 69 135 

3100 ST OD, Angle Sideswipe ........................................................................ 62,214 1,042 38,655 86,054 

3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching OD ............................... 4,008 11 2,979 5,019 

Combined Total ........................................................................................ 1,126,397 14,844 479,939 863,213 

Percent of Total Crashes ......................................................................... 19.4 44.3 17.1 11.9 

TABLE A–3—TARGET POPULATION FOR BSD/BSI/LCM 

Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

8000 LCM in Rear End .................................................................................... 48,749 128 26,040 71,977 

8001 LCM in ST SD Forward Impact .............................................................. 212 4 62 371 

8002 LCM in ST SD AS .................................................................................. 371,504 332 129,595 651,962 

8003 LCM CT VT SD ...................................................................................... 58,389 40 20,685 99,476 

8004 LCM Other .............................................................................................. 24,216 38 11,924 36,940 

Combined Total ........................................................................................ 503,070 542 188,304 860,726 

Percent of Total Crashes ......................................................................... 8.7 1.6 6.7 11.8 

TABLE A–4—TARGET POPULATION FOR PAEB 

Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

300 1V2Ped RD, Forward Impact ................................................................... 60,322 3,264 57,480 1,836 

309 1V2Ped, Other .......................................................................................... 306 26 264 0 

350 2+V2Ped ................................................................................................... 511 259 452 0 

400 1V2Cyc RD, Forward Impact .................................................................... 50,094 531 45,529 4,910 

409 1V2Cyc, Other/Unspecified ...................................................................... 175 4 172 0 

450 2+V2Cyc ................................................................................................... 234 23 169 239 

Combined Total ........................................................................................ 111,641 4,106 104,066 6,985 

Percent of Total Crashes ......................................................................... 1.9 12.3 3.7 0.1 

TABLE A–5—TARGET POPULATION FOR RAB/RVAB/RCTA TECHNOLOGIES

Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1–5 

injuries PDOVs 

302 1V2Ped, Backup ....................................................................................... 2,811 44 2,590 88 

402 1V2Cyc, Backup ....................................................................................... 439 3 407 48 

602 1V2ParkedV, Backup ............................................................................... 41,957 2 5,293 40,389 

802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup ......................................................................... 1,824 2 217 1,732 

6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object ................................................................. 101,503 23 26,761 189,059 

Combined Total ........................................................................................ 148,533 74 35,268 231,317

Percent of Total Crashes ......................................................................... 2.6 0.2 1.3 3.2 

TABLE A–6—MAPPING OF CRASH SCENARIOS WITH SAFETY SYSTEMS

Crash scenarios 1 

FCW/CIB/DBS 

2 

LDW/LKA/LCA 

3 

BSD/BSI/LCM 

4 

PAEB 

5 

RAB/RvAB/ 

RTA 

100 1V Rollover 1st Event ................................................... • 

150 2+V Rollover 1st Event ................................................. • 

200 1V Jackknife 1st Event .................................................

250 2+V Jackknife 1st Event ...............................................

300 1V2Pedestrian Roadway Departure, Forward Impact .. • 

302 1V2 Pedestrian, Backup ............................................... • 


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TABLE A–6—MAPPING OF CRASH SCENARIOS WITH SAFETY SYSTEMS—Continued 

Crash scenarios 1 

FCW/CIB/DBS 

2 

LDW/LKA/LCA 

3 

BSD/BSI/LCM 

4 

PAEB 

5 

RAB/RvAB/ 

RTA 

309 1V2 Pedestrian, Specifics Other/Unknown .................. • 

350 2+V2 Pedestrian ........................................................... • 

400 1V2Cyclist Roadway Departure, Forward Impact ........ • 

402 1V2Cyclist, Backup ....................................................... • 

409 1V2Cyclist, Specifics Other/Unknown .......................... • 

450 2+V2Cyclist ................................................................... • 

500 1V2Animal Roadway Departure, Avoid Animal ............

502 1V2Animal, Backup ......................................................

509 1V2Animal, Specifics Other/Unknown ..........................

550 2+V2Animal ..................................................................

600 1V2Parked Vehicle Roadway Departure, Forward Impact ...................................................................................

602 1V2Parked Vehicle, Backup ......................................... • 

609 1V2Parked Vehicle, Specifics Other/Unknown ............

650 2+V2Parked Vehicle .....................................................

700 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact ......................................................................

701 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, 

Traction Loss ....................................................................

702 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Backup ...........................

709 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Other ..............................

750 2+V2Other Non-Fixed Object .......................................

800 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact 

801 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss ..

802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup ............................................. • 

809 1V2Fixed Object, Other ................................................

850 2+V2Fixed Object .........................................................

1000 1V, Roadway Departure ............................................. • 

1001 1V RD, Traction Loss .................................................

1002 1V RD, Avoid Vehicle/Pedestrian/Animal ...................

1003 1V Forward Impact, Ped or Animal ............................

1004 1V Forward Impact, End Departure ...........................

1005 1V Forward Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown ..........

1009 1V Other/No Impact ....................................................

1050 2+V, Roadway Departure ........................................... • 

1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median ....................................... • 

1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median * .................................. • 

2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle Stopped ............................... • 

2001 Rear-End, LV Slower .................................................. • 

2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated ......................................... • 

2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher Speed ......... • 

2009 Rear-End, Specifics Other/Unknown .......................... • 

2101 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, 

Loss Control .....................................................................

2102 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction 

Forward Impact, Avoid Vehicle ........................................

2103 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, 

Avoid Objects ...................................................................

2109 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction 

Forward Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown ......................

2200 Same Trafficway Same ..............................................

Direction, Angle-Sideswipe ..................................................

2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Stopped ... • 

2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Slower ..... • 

2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Decelerated ............................................................................... • 

3000 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Head-On ......... • 

3001 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, 

Traction Loss ....................................................................

3002 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, 

Avoid Vehicle ....................................................................

3003 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, 

Avoid Object .....................................................................

3009 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, 

Other ................................................................................. • 

3100 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Angle Sideswipe ................................................................................ • 

3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching Opposite Direction ................................................................. • 


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TABLE A–6—MAPPING OF CRASH SCENARIOS WITH SAFETY SYSTEMS—Continued 

Crash scenarios 1 

FCW/CIB/DBS 

2 

LDW/LKA/LCA 

3 

BSD/BSI/LCM 

4 

PAEB 

5 

RAB/RvAB/ 

RTA 

4000 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across 

Path, Initial Opposite Direction .........................................

4001 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across 

Path, Initial Same Direction ..............................................

4009 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across 

Path, Specifics Other/Unknown .......................................

4100 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, 

Into Same Direction ..........................................................

4101 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, 

Into Opposite Direction .....................................................

4109 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, 

Specifics Other/Unknown .................................................

5000 Intersect Paths, Straight Across Path ........................

5009 Intersect Paths, Straight Path, Specifics, Specifics 

Other/Unknown .................................................................

6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object ..................................... • 

7000 1V Negotiating a Curve ..............................................

7050 2+V Negotiating a Curve ............................................

8000 Lane Change/Merge Before Rear-End ....................... • 

8001 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact .................................................... • 

8002 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Angle Sideswipe ................................................... • 

8003 Lane Change/Merge in Change Trafficway Vehicle 

Turning Initial Same Direction .......................................... • 

8004 Lane Change/Merge Other ......................................... • 

9000 Equipment Failure .......................................................

9020 Loss of Control Due to Tire/Engine/Poor Road .........

9030 2+V, Left/Right Turn, Unspecified ..............................

9040 2+V U-Turn .................................................................

9050 2+V Backing to Moving Vehicle .................................

9060 2+V No Impact ............................................................

9070 2+V Other ...................................................................

9999 2+V Unknown .............................................................

Appendix B. Questions Asked 

Throughout This Notice 

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program 

(1) Should the Agency award credit to 

vehicles equipped with LDW systems that 

provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert 

type? Why or why not? Are there any LDW 

alert modalities, such as visual-only 

warnings, that the Agency should not 

consider acceptable when determining 

whether a vehicle meets NCAP’s performance 

test criteria? If so, why? Should the Agency 

consider only certain alert modalities (such 

as haptic warnings) because they are more 

effective at re-engaging the driver and/or 

have higher consumer acceptance? If so, 

which one(s) and why? 

(2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane 

keeping assist test methods from the Euro 

NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency’s LKS test 

procedure, should the LDW test procedure be 

removed from its NCAP program entirely and 

an LDW requirement be integrated into the 

LKS test procedure instead? Why or why not? 

For systems that have both LDW and LKS 

capabilities, the Agency would simply turn 

off LKS to conduct the LDW test if both 

systems are to be assessed separately. What 

tolerances would be appropriate for each test, 

and why? 

(3) LKS system designs provide steering 

and/or braking to address lane departures 

(e.g., when a driver is distracted). To help reengage a driver, should the Agency specify 

that an LDW alert must be provided when the 

LKS is activated? Why or why not? 

(4) Do commenters agree that the Agency 

should remove the Botts’ Dots test scenario 

from the current LDW test procedure since 

this lane marking type is being removed from 

use in California? If not, why? 

(5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion 

limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.) over the lane marking 

(as defined with respect to the inside edge of 

the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, 

or should the limit be reduced to account for 

crashes occurring on roads with limited 

shoulder width? If the tolerance should be 

reduced, what tolerance would be 

appropriate and why? Should this tolerance 

be adopted for LDW in addition to LKS? Why 

or why not? 

(6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP 

specifies use of a 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) curve 

and a series of increasing lateral offsets to 

establish the desired lateral velocity of the 

SV towards the lane line it must respond to. 

Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that 

use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius 

provides a clearer indication of when an LKS 

intervention occurs when compared to the 

baseline tests performed without LKS, a 

process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS 

protocol. This is because the small curve 

radius allows the desired SV lateral velocity 

to be more quickly established; requires less 

initial lateral offset within the travel lane; 

and allows for a longer period of steady state 

lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS 

intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 

ft.) curve radius, rather than 1,200 m (3,937.0 

ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS 

test procedure? Why or why not? 

(7) Euro NCAP’s LSS protocol specifies a 

single line lane to evaluate system 

performance. However, since certain LKS 

systems may require two lane lines before 

they can be enabled, should the Agency use 

a single line or two lines lane in its test 

procedure? Why? 

(8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro 

NCAP’s road edge detection test to its NCAP 

program to begin addressing crashes where 

lane markings may not be present? If not, 

why? If so, should the test be added for LDW, 

LKS, or both technologies? 

(9) The LKS and ‘‘Road Edge’’ recovery 

tests defined in the Euro NCAP LSS protocol 

specify that a range of lateral velocities from 

0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to 

assess system performance, and that this 

range is representative of the lateral 

velocities associated with unintended lane 

departures (i.e., not an intended lane 

change). However, in the same protocol, Euro 

NCAP also specifies a range of lateral 

velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./ 

s) be used to represent unintended lane 


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departures during ‘‘Emergency Lane 

Keeping—Oncoming vehicle’’ and 

‘‘Emergency Lane Keeping—Overtaking 

vehicle’’ tests. To encourage the most robust 

LKS system performance, should NHTSA 

consider a combination of the two Euro 

NCAP unintended departure ranges, lateral 

velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./ 

s), for inclusion in the Agency’s LKS 

evaluation? Why or why not? 

(10) As discussed above, the Agency is 

concerned about LKS performance on roads 

that are curved. As such, can the Agency 

correlate better LKS system performance at 

higher lateral velocities on straight roads 

with better curved road performance? Why or 

why not? Furthermore, can the Agency 

assume that a vehicle that does not exceed 

the maximum excursion limits at higher 

lateral velocities on straight roads will have 

superior curved road performance compared 

to a vehicle that only meets the excursion 

limits at lower lateral velocities on straight 

roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the 

Agency assume the steering intervention 

while the vehicle is negotiating a curve is 

sustained long enough for a driver to reengage? If not, why? 

(11) The Agency would like to be assured 

that when a vehicle is redirected after an LKS 

system intervenes to prevent a lane departure 

when tested on one side, if it approaches the 

lane marker on the side not tested, the LKS 

will again engage to prevent a secondary lane 

departure by not exceeding the same 

maximum excursion limit established for the 

first side. To prevent potential secondary 

lane departures, should the Agency consider 

modifying the Euro NCAP ‘‘lane keep assist’’ 

evaluation criteria to be consistent with 

language developed for NHTSA’s BSI test 

procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why 

not? NHTSA’s test procedure states the SV 

BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to 

travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the 

inboard edge of the lane line separating the 

SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to 

the right of it within the validity period. To 

assess whether this occurs, a second lane line 

is required (only one line is specified in the 

Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). 

Does the introduction of a second lane line 

have the potential to confound LKS testing? 

Why or why not? 

(12) Since most fatal road departure and 

opposite direction crashes occur at higher 

posted and known travel speeds, should the 

LKS test speed be increased, or does the 

current test speed adequately indicate 

performance at higher speeds, especially on 

straight roads? Why or why not? 

(13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS 

test procedure currently contains many test 

conditions (i.e., line type and departure 

direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to 

perform all test conditions to address the 

safety problem adequately, or could NCAP 

test only certain conditions to minimize test 

burden? For instance, should the Agency 

consider incorporating the test conditions for 

only one departure direction if the vehicle 

manufacturer provides test data to assure 

comparable system performance for the other 

direction? Or, should the Agency consider 

adopting only the most challenging test 

conditions? If so, which conditions are most 

appropriate? For instance, do the dashed line 

test conditions provide a greater challenge to 

vehicles than the solid line test conditions? 

(14) What is the appropriate number of test 

trials to adopt for each LKS test condition, 

and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass 

rate for the LKS tests, and why? 

(15) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

current LDW or proposed LKS test procedure 

that need further refinement or clarification? 

Is so, what additional refinements or 

clarifications are necessary? 

(16) Should all BSW testing be conducted 

without the turn signal indicator activated? 

Why or why not? If the Agency was to 

modify the BSW test procedure to stipulate 

activation of the turn signal indicator, should 

the test vehicle be required to provide an 

audible or haptic warning that another 

vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a visual 

warning sufficient? If a visual warning is 

sufficient, should it continually flash, at a 

minimum, to provide a distinction from the 

blind spot status when the turn signal is not 

in use? Why or why not? 

(17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use 

the Straight Lane Pass-by Test to quantify 

and ultimately differentiate a vehicle’s BSW 

capability based on its ability to provide 

acceptable warnings when the POV has 

entered the SV’s blind spot (as defined by the 

blind zone) for varying POV–SV speed 

differentials? Why or why not? 

(18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV 

in the BSI test procedure appropriate? Is 

using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why 

or why not? 

(19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW 

test procedure currently contains two test 

scenarios that have multiple test conditions 

(e.g., test speeds and POV approach 

directions (left and right side of the SV)). Is 

it necessary for the Agency to perform all test 

scenarios and test conditions to address the 

real-world safety problem adequately, or 

could it test only certain scenarios or 

conditions to minimize test burden in NCAP? 

For instance, should the Agency consider 

incorporating only the most challenging test 

conditions into NCAP, such as the ones with 

the greatest speed differential, or choose to 

perform the test conditions having the lowest 

and highest speeds? Should the Agency 

consider only performing the test conditions 

where the POV passes by the SV on the left 

side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test 

data to assure the left side pass-by tests are 

also representative of system performance 

during right side pass-by tests? Why or why 

not? 

(20) Given the Agency’s concern about the 

amount of system performance testing under 

consideration in this RFC, it seeks input on 

whether to include a BSI false positive test. 

Is a false positive assessment needed to 

insure system robustness and high customer 

satisfaction? Why or why not? 

(21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 

repeated trials for each test condition (i.e., 

test speed and POV approach direction). Is 

this an appropriate number of repeat trials? 

Why or why not? What is the appropriate 

number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test 

scenario, and why? Also, what is an 

appropriate pass rate for each of the two 

tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it 

appropriate? 

(22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI 

tests in conjunction with activation of the 

turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn 

signal is not used, how can the operation of 

BSI be differentiated from the heading 

adjustments resulting from an LKS 

intervention? Should the SV’s LKS system be 

switched off during conduct of the Agency’s 

BSI evaluations? Why or why not? 

(23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 

kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph), to be 

assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, 

most appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 

and S4? Why or why not? 

(24) The Agency has proposed to include 

Scenarios S1 a–e and S4 a–c in its NCAP 

assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to 

perform all test scenarios and test conditions 

proposed in this RFC notice to address the 

safety problem adequately, or could NCAP 

test only certain scenarios or conditions to 

minimize test burden but still address an 

adequate proportion of the safety problem? 

Why or why not? If it is not necessary for the 

Agency to perform all test scenarios or test 

conditions, which scenarios/conditions 

should be assessed? Although they are not 

currently proposed for inclusion, should the 

Agency also adopt the false positive test 

conditions, S1f and S1g? Why or why not? 

(25) Given that a large portion of 

pedestrian fatalities and injuries occur under 

dark lighting conditions, the Agency has 

proposed to perform testing for the included 

test conditions (i.e., S1 a–e and S4 a–c) under 

dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime) in 

addition to daylight test conditions for test 

speed range 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 

mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle’s 

lower beams would provide the source of 

light during the nighttime assessments. 

However, if the SV is equipped with 

advanced lighting systems such as 

semiautomatic headlamp beam switching 

and/or adaptive driving beam head lighting 

system, they shall be enabled during the 

nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing 

approach appropriate? Why or why not? 

Should the Agency conduct PAEB evaluation 

tests with only the vehicle’s lower beams and 

disable or not use any other advanced 

lighting systems? 

(26) Should the Agency consider 

performing PAEB testing under dark 

conditions with a vehicle’s upper beams as 

a light source? If yes, should this lighting 

condition be assessed in addition to the 

proposed dark test condition, which would 

utilize only a vehicle’s lower beams along 

with any advanced lighting system enabled, 

or in lieu of the proposed dark testing 

condition? Should the Agency also evaluate 

PAEB performance in dark lighting 

conditions with overhead lights? Why or why 

not? What test scenarios, conditions, and 

speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., 

dark lighting conditions) testing in NCAP, 

and why? 

(27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the 

Agency proposed to perform one test per test 

speed until contact occurs, or until the 

vehicle’s relative impact velocity exceeds 50 

percent of the initial speed of the subject 

vehicle for the given test condition. If contact 

occurs and if the vehicle’s relative impact 

velocity is less than or equal to 50 percent 


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of the initial SV speed for the given 

combination of test speed and test condition, 

an additional four test trials will be 

conducted at the given test speed and test 

condition, and the SV must meet the passing 

performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at 

least three out of those five test trials in order 

to be assessed at the next incremental test 

speed. Is this an appropriate approach to 

assess PAEB system performance in NCAP, 

or should a certain number of test trials be 

required for each assessed test speed? Why 

or why not? If a certain number of repeat 

tests is more appropriate, how many test 

trials should be conducted, and why? 

(28) Is a performance criterion of ‘‘no 

contact’’ appropriate for the proposed PAEB 

test conditions? Why or why not? 

Alternatively, should the Agency require 

minimum speed reductions or specify a 

maximum allowable SV-to-mannequin 

impact speed for any or all of the proposed 

test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test 

speed combination)? If yes, why, and for 

which test conditions? For those test 

conditions, what speed reductions would be 

appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum 

allowable impact speed would be 

appropriate? 

(29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian 

mannequin during the initial trial for a given 

test condition and test speed combination, 

NHTSA proposes to conduct additional test 

trials only if the relative impact velocity 

observed during that trial is less than or 

equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the 

SV. For a test speed of 60 kph (37.3 mph), 

this maximum relative impact velocity is 

nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), and for a test 

speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph), the maximum 

relative impact velocity is nominally 5 kph 

(3.1 mph). Is this an appropriate limit on the 

maximum relative impact velocity for the 

proposed range of test speeds? If not, why? 

Note that the tests in Global Technical 

Regulation (GTR) No. 9 for pedestrian 

crashworthiness protection simulates a 

pedestrian impact at 40 kph (24.9 mph). 

(30) For each lighting condition, the 

Agency is proposing 6 test speeds (i.e., those 

performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 

mph) in increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for 

each of the 8 proposed test conditions (S1a, 

b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results 

in a total of 48 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds to be evaluated 

per lighting condition, or 96 total 

combinations for both light conditions. The 

Agency mentions later in the ADAS Ratings 

System section, that it plans to use check 

marks, as is done currently, to give credit to 

vehicles that (1) are equipped with the 

recommended ADAS technologies, and (2) 

pass the applicable system performance test 

requirements for each ADAS technology 

included in NCAP until it issues (1) a final 

decision notice announcing the new ADAS 

rating system and (2) a final rule to amend 

the safety rating section of the vehicle 

window sticker (Monroney label). For the 

purposes of providing credit for a technology 

using check marks, what is an appropriate 

minimum overall pass rate for PAEB 

performance evaluation? For example, 

should a vehicle be said to meet the PAEB 

performance requirements if it passes twothirds of the 96 unique combinations of test 

conditions and test speeds for the two 

lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique 

combinations of test conditions and test 

speeds)? 

(31) Given previous support from 

commenters to include S2 and S3 scenarios 

in the program at some point in the future 

and the results of AAA’s testing for one of 

the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks 

comment on an appropriate timeframe for 

including S2 and S3 scenarios into the 

Agency’s NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from 

vehicle manufacturers information on any 

currently available models designed to 

address, and ideally achieve crash avoidance 

during conduct of the S2 and S3 scenarios to 

support Agency evaluation for a future 

program upgrade. 

(32) Should the Agency adopt the 

articulated mannequins into the PAEB test 

procedure as proposed? Why or why not? 

(33) In addition to tests performed under 

daylight conditions, the Agency is proposing 

to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems 

during nighttime conditions where a large 

percentage of real-world pedestrian fatalities 

occur. Are there other technologies and 

information available to the public that the 

Agency can evaluate under nighttime 

conditions? 

(34) Are there other safety areas that 

NHTSA should consider as part of this or a 

future upgrade for pedestrian protection? 

(35) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

proposed PAEB test procedure that need 

further refinement or clarification before 

adoption? If so, what additional refinement 

or clarification is necessary, and why? 

(36) Considering not only the increasing 

number of cyclists killed on U.S. roads but 

also the limitations of current AEB systems 

in detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks 

comment on the appropriate timeframe for 

adding a cyclist component to NCAP and 

requests from vehicle manufacturers 

information on any currently available 

models that have the capability to validate 

the cyclist target and test procedures used by 

Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future 

NCAP program upgrade. 

(37) In addition to the test procedures used 

by Euro NCAP, are there others that NHTSA 

should consider to address the cyclist crash 

population in the U.S. and effectiveness of 

systems? 

(38) For the Agency’s FCW tests: 

—If the Agency retains one or more separate 

tests for FCW, should it award credit solely 

to vehicles equipped with FCW systems 

that provide a passing audible alert? Or, 

should it also consider awarding credit to 

vehicles equipped with FCW systems that 

provide passing haptic alerts? Are there 

certain haptic alert types that should be 

excluded from consideration (if the Agency 

was to award credit to vehicles with haptic 

alerts that pass NCAP tests) because they 

may be a nuisance to drivers such that they 

are more likely to disable the system? Do 

commenters believe that haptic alerts can 

be accurately and objectively assessed? 

Why or why not? Is it appropriate for the 

Agency to refrain from awarding credit to 

FCW systems that provide only a passing 

visual alert? Why or why not? If the 

Agency assesses the sufficiency of the FCW 

alert in the context of CIB (and PAEB) tests, 

what type of FCW alert(s) would be 

acceptable for use in defining the timing of 

the release of the SV accelerator pedal, and 

why? 

—Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or 

next latest) FCW system setting in lieu of 

the default setting when performing FCW 

and AEB (including PAEB) NCAP tests on 

vehicles that offer multiple FCW timing 

adjustment settings? Why or why not? If 

not, what use setting would be most 

appropriate? 

—Should the Agency consider consolidating 

FCW and CIB testing such that NCAP’s CIB 

test scenarios would serve as an indicant 

of FCW operation? Why or why not? The 

Agency has proposed that if it combines 

the two tests, it would evaluate the 

presence of a vehicle’s FCW system during 

its CIB tests by requiring the SV accelerator 

pedal be fully released within 500 ms after 

the FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert is 

issued during a CIB test, the SV accelerator 

pedal will be fully released within 500 ms 

after the onset of CIB system braking (as 

defined by the instant SV deceleration 

reaches at least 0.5g). If no FCW alert is 

issued and the vehicle’s CIB system does 

not offer any braking, release of the SV 

accelerator pedal will not be required prior 

to impact with the POV. The Agency notes 

that it has also proposed these test 

procedural changes for its PAEB tests as 

well. Is this assessment method for FCW 

operation reasonable? Why or why not? 

—If the Agency continues to assess FCW 

systems separately from CIB, how should 

the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., 

TTCs) be amended if the Agency aligns the 

corresponding maximum SV test speeds, 

POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV 

deceleration magnitude, etc., as applicable, 

with the proposed CIB tests, and why? 

What assessment method should be used— 

one trial per scenario, or multiple trials, 

and why? If multiple trials should be 

required, how many would be appropriate, 

and why? Also, what would be an 

acceptable pass rate, and why? 

—Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one 

FCW test scenario (instead of the three that 

are currently included in NCAP’s FCW test 

procedure), conducted at the 

corresponding maximum SV test speed, 

POV speed, SV-to-POV headway (as 

applicable), POV deceleration magnitude, 

etc. of the proposed CIB test to serve as an 

indicant of FCW system performance? If so, 

which test scenario from NCAP’s FCW test 

procedure is appropriate? 

—Are there additional or alternative test 

scenarios or test conditions that the 

Agency should consider incorporating into 

the FCW test procedure, such as those at 

even higher test speeds than those 

proposed for the CIB tests, or those having 

increased complexity? If so, should the 

current FCW performance criteria (i.e., 

TTCs) and/or test scenario specifications 

be amended, and to what extent? 

(39) For the Agency’s CIB tests: 

—Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV 

headway, deceleration magnitude, etc. the 

Agency has proposed for NCAP’s CIB tests 


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appropriate? Why or why not? If not, what 

speeds, headway(s), deceleration 

magnitude(s) are appropriate, and why? 

Should the Agency adopt a POV 

deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD 

CIB test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why or 

why not? 

—Should the Agency consider adopting 

additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 70, 

and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 

mph)) for the CIB (and potentially DBS) 

LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why 

not? If additional speeds are included, 

what headway and deceleration magnitude 

would be appropriate for each additional 

test speed, and why? 

—Is a performance criterion of ‘‘no contact’’ 

appropriate for the proposed CIB and DBS 

test conditions? Why or why not? 

Alternatively, should the Agency require 

minimum speed reductions or specify a 

maximum allowable SV-to-POV impact 

speed for any or all of the proposed test 

conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed 

combination)? If yes, why, and for which 

test conditions? For those test conditions, 

what speed reductions would be 

appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum 

allowable impact speed would be 

appropriate? 

(40) For the Agency’s DBS tests: 

—Should the Agency remove the DBS test 

scenarios from NCAP? Why or why not? 

Alternatively, should the Agency conduct 

the DBS LVS and LVM tests at only the 

highest test speeds proposed for CIB—70 

and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)? Why or 

why not? If the Agency also adopted these 

higher tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 

and 49.7 mph)) for the LVD CIB test, 

should it also conduct the LVD DBS test at 

these same speeds? Why or why not? 

—If the Agency continues to perform DBS 

testing in NCAP, is it appropriate to revise 

when the manual (robotic) brake 

application is initiated to a time that 

corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW 

alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB 

activation occurs after the FCW alert but 

before initiation of the manual brake 

application)? If not, why, and what 

prescribed TTC values would be 

appropriate for the modified DBS test 

conditions? 

(41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has 

proposed for the CIB and DBS tests (i.e., one 

trial per test speed with speed increments of 

10 kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and 

repeat trials only in the event of POV contact) 

appropriate? Why or why not? Should an 

alternative assessment method such as 

multiple trials be required instead? If yes, 

why? If multiple trials should be required, 

how many would be appropriate, and why? 

Also, what would be an acceptable pass rate, 

and why? If the proposed assessment method 

is appropriate, it is acceptable even for the 

LVD test scenario if only one or two test 

speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it 

more appropriate to alternatively require 7 

trials for each test speed, and require that 5 

out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ‘‘no 

contact’’ performance criterion? 

(42) The Agency’s proposal to (1) 

consolidate its FCW and CIB tests such that 

the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant 

of FCW operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds 

for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM, and potentially 

4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for 

DBS (2 for LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 

2 for LVD), would result in a total of 20 

unique combinations of test conditions and 

test speeds to be evaluated for AEB. What is 

an appropriate minimum pass rate for AEB 

performance evaluation? For example, a 

vehicle is considered to meet the AEB 

performance if it passes two-thirds of the 20 

unique combinations of test conditions and 

test speeds (i.e., passes 14 unique 

combinations of test conditions and test 

speeds). 

(43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking 

sensors are becoming more prevalent in the 

vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not 

observed any instances of false positive test 

failures during any of its CIB or DBS testing, 

is it appropriate to remove the false positive 

STP assessments from NCAP’s AEB (i.e., CIB 

and DBS) evaluation matrix in this NCAP 

update? Why or why not? 

(44) For vehicles with regenerative braking 

that have setting options, the Agency is 

proposing to choose the ‘‘off’’ setting, or the 

setting that provides the lowest deceleration 

when the accelerator is fully released. As 

mentioned, this proposal also applies to the 

Agency’s PAEB tests. Are the proposed 

settings appropriate? Why or why not? Will 

regenerative braking introduce additional 

complications for the Agency’s AEB and 

PAEB testing, and how could the Agency best 

address them? 

(45) Should NCAP adopt any additional 

AEB tests or alter its current tests to address 

the ‘‘changing’’ rear-end crash problem? If so, 

what tests should be added, or how should 

current tests be modified? 

(46) Are there any aspects of NCAP’s 

current FCW, CIB, and/or DBS test 

procedure(s) that need further refinement or 

clarification? If so, what refinements or 

clarifications are necessary, and why? 

(47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle 

and brake pedal application be acceptable in 

instances where no FCW alert has been 

issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, 

or where the FCW alert occurs very close to 

the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is 

not acceptable, what overlap would be 

acceptable? 

(48) Should the Agency pursue research in 

the future to assess AEB system performance 

under less than ideal environmental 

conditions? If so, what environmental 

conditions would be appropriate? 

(49) The Agency requests comment on the 

use of the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future 

AEB NCAP testing, 

(50) The Agency requests comment on 

whether Revisions F and G should be 

considered equivalent for AEB testing. 

(51) The Agency requests comment on 

whether NHTSA should adopt a revision of 

the GVT other than Revision G for use in 

AEB testing in NCAP. 

IV. ADAS Rating System 

With regard to a future ADAS rating 

system, the Agency seeks comments on the 

following: 

(52) The components and development of 

a full-scale ADAS rating system, 

(53) the aforementioned approaches as well 

as others deemed appropriate for the 

development of a future ADAS rating system 

in order to assist the Agency in developing 

future proposals, 

(54) the appropriateness of using target 

populations and technology effectiveness 

estimates to determine weights or 

proportions to assign to individual test 

conditions, corresponding test combinations, 

or an overall ADAS award, 

(55) the use of a baseline concept to convey 

ADAS scores/ratings, 

(56) how best to translate points/ratings 

earned during ADAS testing conducted 

under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, 

injuries, deaths, etc., including which realworld data metric would be most 

appropriate, 

(57) whether an overall rating system is 

necessary and, if so, whether it should 

replace or simply supplement the existing 

list approach, and 

(58) effective communication of ADAS 

ratings, including the appropriateness of 

using a points-based ADAS rating system in 

lieu of, or in addition to, a star rating system. 

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP 

With regard to a roadmap, NHTSA requests 

feedback on the following: 

(59) Identification of safety opportunities 

or technologies in development that could be 

included in future roadmaps, 

(60) opportunities to benefit from 

collaboration or harmonization with other 

rating programs, and 

(61) other issues to assist with long-term 

planning. 

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies 

for Safe Driving Choices 

(62) What are the capabilities of the various 

available approaches to driver monitoring 

systems (e.g., steering wheel sensors, eye 

tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer 

different driver state measurement or 

estimations (e.g., visual attention, 

drowsiness, medical incapacity, etc.)? What 

is the associated confidence or reliability in 

detecting or inferring such driver states and 

what supporting data exist? 

(63) Of further interest are the types of 

system actions taken based on a driver 

monitoring system’s estimate of a driver’s 

state. What are the types and modes of 

associated warnings, interventions, and other 

mitigation strategies that are most effective 

for different driver states or impairments 

(e.g., drowsy, medical, distraction)? What 

research data exist that substantiate 

effectiveness of these interventions? 

(64) Are there relevant thresholds and 

strategies for performance (e.g., alert versus 

some degree of intervention) that would 

warrant some type of NCAP credit? 

(65) Since different driver states (e.g., 

visual distraction and intoxication) can result 

in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide 

within-lane position variability), comments 

regarding opportunities and tradeoffs in 

mitigation strategies when the originating 

cause is not conclusive are of specific 

interest. 

(66) What types of consumer acceptance 

information (e.g., consumer interest or 


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feedback data) are available or are foreseen 

for implementation of different types of 

driver monitoring systems and associated 

mitigation strategies for driver impairment, 

drowsiness, or visual inattention? Are there 

privacy concerns? What are the related 

privacy protection strategies? Are there use 

or preference data on a selectable feature that 

could be optionally enabled by consumers 

(e.g., for teen drivers by their parents)? 

(67) What in-vehicle and HMI design 

characteristics would be most helpful to 

include in an NCAP rating that focuses on 

ease of use? What research data exist to 

support objectively characterizing ease of use 

for vehicle controls and displays? 

(68) What are specific countermeasures or 

approaches to mitigate driver distraction, and 

what are the associated effectiveness metrics 

that may be feasible and appropriate for 

inclusion in the NCAP program? Methods 

may include driver monitoring and action 

strategies, HMI design considerations, 

expanded in-motion secondary task lockouts, 

phone application/notification limitations 

while paired with the vehicle, etc. 

(69) What distraction mitigation measures 

could be considered for NCAP credit? 

(70) Are there opportunities for including 

alcohol-impairment technology in NCAP? 

What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests 

could be considered? Could voluntary 

deployment or adoption be positively 

influenced through NCAP credit? 

(71) How can NCAP procedures be 

described in objective terms that could be 

inclusive of various approaches, such as 

detection systems and inference systems? Are 

there particular challenges with any 

approach that may need special 

considerations? What supporting research 

data exist that document relevant 

performance factors such as sensing accuracy 

and detection algorithm efficacy? 

(72) When a system detects alcoholimpairment during the course of a trip, what 

actions could the system take in a safe 

manner? What are the safety considerations 

related to various options that manufacturers 

may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, 

performing a safe stop, pulling over, or 

flasher activation)? How should various 

actions be considered for NCAP credit? 

(73) What is known related to consumer 

acceptance of alcohol-impaired driving 

detection and mitigation functions, and how 

may that differ with respect to direct 

measurement approaches versus estimation 

techniques using a driver monitoring system? 

What consumer interest or feedback data 

exist relating to this topic? Are there privacy 

concerns or privacy protection strategies with 

various approaches? What are the related 

privacy protection strategies? 

(74) Should NCAP consider credit for a 

seat belt reminder system with a continuous 

or intermittent audible signal that does not 

cease until the seat belt is properly buckled 

(i.e., after the 60 second FMVSS No. 208 

minimum)? What data are available to 

support associated effectiveness? Are certain 

audible signal characteristics more effective 

than others? 

(75) Is there an opportunity for including 

a seat belt interlock assessment in NCAP? 

(76) If the Agency were to encourage seat 

belt interlock adoption through NCAP, 

should all interlock system approaches be 

considered, or only certain types? If so, 

which ones? What metrics could be 

evaluated for each? Should differing credit be 

applied depending upon interlock system 

approach? 

(77) Should seat belt interlocks be 

considered for all seating positions in the 

vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there 

be an opportunity for differentiation in this 

respect? 

(78) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/ 

or persistent seat belt reminder systems in 

vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback 

data exist on this topic? 

(79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity 

in a selectable feature that could be 

optionally engaged such as in the context of 

a ‘‘teen mode’’ feature? 

(80) Should NHTSA take into 

consideration systems, such as intelligent 

speed assist systems, which determine 

current speed limits and warn the driver or 

adjust the maximum traveling speed 

accordingly? Should there be a 

differentiation between warning and 

intervention type intelligent speed assist 

systems in this consideration? Should 

systems that allow for some small amount of 

speeding over the limit before intervening be 

treated the same or differently than systems 

that are specifically keyed to a road’s speed 

limit? What about for systems that allow 

driver override versus systems that do not? 

(81) Are there specific protocols that 

should be considered when evaluating speed 

assist system functionality? 

(82) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of intelligent speed assist 

systems? What consumer interest or feedback 

data exist on this topic? 

(83) Are there other means that the Agency 

should consider to prevent excessive 

speeding? 

(84) If NHTSA considers this technology 

for inclusion in NCAP, are door logic 

solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only 

consider systems that detect the presence of 

a child? 

(85) What research data exist to 

substantiate differences in effectiveness of 

these system types? 

(86) Are there specific protocols that 

should be considered when evaluating these 

in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems? 

(87) What information is known or 

anticipated with respect to consumer 

acceptance of integrated rear seat child 

reminder systems in vehicles? What 

consumer interest or feedback data exist on 

this topic? 

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating 

System 

(88) What approaches are most effective to 

provide consumers with vehicle safety 

ratings that provide meaningful information 

and discriminate performance of vehicles 

among the fleet? 

(89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/ 

body regions that are not part of the existing 

5-star ratings system appropriate for use in a 

points-based calculation of future star 

ratings? Some injury criteria do not have 

associated risk curves. Are these regions 

appropriate to include, and if so, what is the 

appropriate method by which to include 

them? 

(90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety 

ratings system continue to measure a 

vehicle’s performance based on a known or 

expected fleet average performer, or should it 

return to an absolute system of rating 

vehicles? 

(91) Considering the basic structure of the 

current ratings system (combined injury risk), 

the potential overlapping target populations 

for crashworthiness and ADAS program 

elements, as well as other potential concepts 

mentioned in this document such as a pointsbased system, what would the best method 

of calculating the vehicle fleet average 

performance be? 

(92) Should the vehicle fleet average 

performance be updated at regular intervals, 

and if so, how often? 

(93) What is the most appropriate way to 

disseminate these updates or changes to the 

public? 

(94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5- 

star ratings with half-star increments? 

(95) Should the Agency assign star ratings 

using a decimal format in addition to or in 

place of whole- or half-stars? 

(96) Should the Agency continue to 

include rollover resistance evaluations in its 

future overall ratings? 

IX. Other Activities 

(97) Considering the Agency’s goal of 

maintaining the integrity of the program, 

should NHTSA accept self-reported test data 

that is generated by test laboratories that are 

not NHTSA’s contracted test laboratories? If 

no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most 

relevant for evaluating whether a given 

laboratory can acceptably conduct ADAS 

performance tests for NCAP such that the 

program’s credibility is upheld? 

(98) As the ADAS assessment program in 

NCAP continues to grow in the future to 

include new ADAS technologies and more 

complex test procedures, what other means 

would best address the following program 

challenges: Methods of data collection, 

maintaining data integrity and public trust, 

and managing test failures, particularly 

during verification testing? 

(99) What is the potential for consumer 

confusion if information on the Monroney 

label and on the website differs, and how can 

this confusion be lessened? 

(100) What types of vehicles do consumers 

compare during their search for a new 

vehicle? Do consumers often consider 

vehicles with different body styles (e.g., 

midsized sedan versus large sport utility)? 

(101) When searching for vehicle safety 

information, do consumers have a clear 

understanding for which vehicles they are 

seeking information, or do they browse 

through vehicle ratings to identify vehicles 

they may wish to purchase? 

(102) When classifying vehicles by body 

style, what degree of classification is most 

appropriate? For example, when purchasing 

a passenger vehicle, do consumers consider 

all passenger vehicles, or are they inclined to 

narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset 


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261 78 FR 20597 (Apr. 5, 2013). 

262 80 FR 4630 (Jan. 28, 2015). 

263 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). 

264Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise 

known as the ‘‘Safety Through Informed Consumers 

Act of 2015.’’ 

265 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015). 

266See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA– 

2015–0119 for a full listing of the commenters and 

the comments they submitted, as well as records of 

the public hearings and smaller meetings relating to 

the RFC that occurred. 

267For example, one commenter, the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers, recommended ‘‘that 

NHTSA revise NCAP in phases to maintain a datadriven, science-based foundation for the program 

by, in part, completing the standardization, 

federalization, and docketing of all ATDs and test 

fixtures to be used in NCAP.’’ 

268Section 24322 ‘‘Passenger Motor Vehicle 

Information’’ of this Act requires the Secretary of 

the Department of Transportation to issue a rule no 

later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act ‘‘to 

ensure that crash avoidance information is 

indicated next to crashworthiness information on 

stickers placed on motor vehicles by their 

manufacturers.’’ 

269https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2018–0055. 

of passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact 

passenger vehicle)? 

(103) Within the context of the updates 

considered in this notice, what is the most 

important top-level safety-related 

information that consumers should be able to 

compare amongst vehicles? Which of these 

pieces of information should consumers be 

able to use to sort and filter search results? 

Appendix C. History of Relevant Events 

and Documents Pertaining to This 

Notice 

A. April 5, 2013 Request for Comments 

On April 5, 2013, NHTSA published an 

RFC notice 261 asking the public to ‘‘help 

identify the potential areas of study for 

improvement to the program that have the 

greatest potential for producing safety 

benefits.’’ Specifically, NHTSA requested 

comments on areas in which the Agency 

believed enhancements to NCAP could be 

made either in the short term or over a longer 

period of time. Several ADAS applications 

were discussed for possible future inclusion 

in the crash avoidance program in NCAP, 

including blind spot warning, lane keeping 

assistance, crash imminent braking, dynamic 

brake support, and pedestrian detection and 

intervention systems. 

A total of 68 organizations or individuals 

submitted comments in response to the April 

2013 notice. The comments received from 

stakeholders, though generally supportive of 

making improvements to NCAP’s crash 

avoidance program by including assessment 

of additional ADAS technologies, exhibited 

disagreement about how and when a 

particular technology should be added to the 

program. Specifically, these disagreements 

included the conditions under which these 

technologies should be incorporated into 

NCAP. 

Generally, most commenters supported the 

assessment of ADAS technologies, such as 

CIB, DBS, and rearward pedestrian detection, 

in NCAP. There was also support from 

commenters on the addition of pedestrian 

safety assessment in NCAP. However, 

opinions varied regarding whether an active 

and/or passive pedestrian safety program 

should be included in NCAP. Moreover, 

consumer demand for blind spot warning 

technology resulted in many commenters 

recommending the technology for inclusion 

in NCAP. 

Many commenters encouraged NHTSA to 

ensure that any program area considered for 

inclusion in NCAP should have the necessary 

supporting data (e.g., safety benefits) and 

address a safety need. Furthermore, many 

commenters (including both vehicle 

manufacturers and safety advocate groups) 

asked the Agency to also consider a 

regulatory, as well as a non-regulatory 

(NCAP) approach, for any vehicle safety 

improvements—especially regarding the 

introduction of new advanced crash test 

dummies. Vehicle manufacturers requested 

that the Agency consider providing sufficient 

lead time for implementation of any program 

update. Lastly, many commenters 

recommended harmonizing test procedures, 

test requirements, test devices, and the like 

with other government agencies and 

standards development organizations, such 

as the International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO), SAE International 

(SAE), and other consumer information 

programs worldwide. 

B. January 28, 2015 Request for Comment 

and November 5, 2015 Final Decision 

On January 28, 2015, in response to 

favorable feedback received on crash 

imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic brake 

support (DBS) through the 2013 RFC, NHTSA 

published an RFC proposing to add these 

technologies to NCAP.262 On November 5, 

2015, NHTSA issued the final decision to 

include these technologies, which became 

effective for model year 2018 vehicles.263

C. December 4, 2015 Fixing America’s 

Surface Transportation Act 

On December 4, 2015, the President signed 

the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation 

(FAST) Act, which included a section that 

requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to 

ensure crash avoidance information is 

displayed along with crashworthiness 

information on window stickers placed on 

motor vehicles by their manufacturers.264 At 

the time the FAST Act was enacted, NHTSA 

was already in the process of developing an 

RFC notice to present many proposed 

updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of 

several new ADAS and a corresponding 

update of the Monroney label. 

D. December 16, 2015 Request for Comments 

On December 16, 2015, NHTSA published 

a broad RFC notice seeking comment on 

using enhanced tools and techniques for 

evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating 

star ratings, and stimulating further vehicle 

safety developments.265 On the 

crashworthiness front, the RFC sought 

comment on establishment of a new frontal 

oblique test and use of the more advanced 

crash test dummies in all tests. The RFC also 

sought comment on creation of a new crash 

avoidance rating category and included nine 

advanced crash avoidance technologies. 

Additionally, the RFC sought comment on 

creation of a new pedestrian protection rating 

category involving the use of adult and child 

head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests 

and two new pedestrian crash avoidance 

technologies. The RFC sought comment on 

combining the three categories into one 

overall 5-star rating. 

In response to the notice, NHTSA received 

more than 300 comments, more than 200 of 

which were from individuals supporting 

comments made by the League of American 

Bicyclists. More than 30 individuals filed 

comments addressing a specific program area 

or several topics in the RFC. 

The Agency also received responses to the 

notice at two public hearings, one in Detroit, 

Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the 

second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in 

Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. By 

request, NHTSA also held several meetings 

with stakeholders.266

In response to the notice, commenters 

raised many issues involving both supporting 

data for the proposed changes and procedural 

concerns. Commenters stated that the public 

comment period was inadequate for purposes 

of responding because of the complexity of 

the program described in the RFC, and 

claimed that the technical information 

supporting the notice was not sufficient to 

allow a full understanding of the 

contemplated changes. According to the 

commenters, this hindered their ability to 

prepare substantive comments in response to 

the notice. In addition, most vehicle 

manufacturers stated that the significant cost 

burden associated with fitment of the 

proposed new technologies and the inclusion 

of a new crash test and new test dummies 

would increase the price of new vehicles. 

Manufacturers also noted that the advanced 

crash test dummies described in the RFC 

were not yet standardized and needed 

additional work. Manufacturers, along with 

safety advocates, further expressed the need 

for data demonstrating that each proposed 

program change would provide sufficient 

safety improvement to warrant its inclusion 

in NCAP. In addition, several commenters 

suggested that NHTSA develop near-term 

and long-term roadmaps for NCAP and revise 

NCAP in a more gradual, ‘‘phased’’ 

approach.267

E. October 1, 2018 Public Meeting 

In response to the issues raised by those 

who commented on the December 2015 

notice and in light of the FAST Act 

mandate 268 NHTSA issued a notice 

announcing its plan to host a public meeting 

to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date 

input to help the Agency plan the future of 

NCAP. Interested parties were also able to 

submit written comments to the docket.269

Thirty-five parties participated in the 

public meeting, 32 of which submitted 

written comments to the docket. Additional 

written comments were submitted by others 

who did not attend the public meeting. These 

commenters included: Automobile 

manufacturers, consumer organizations, 

suppliers, industry associations, academia, 

individuals, and other organizations. A large 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 / Notices 13521 

number of individuals submitted comments 

requesting that NCAP account for pedestrians 

and bicyclists in its rating system, as 

members of the League of American 

Bicyclists. 

Many commenters said an update to NCAP 

was taking too long. The prominent theme 

from the commenters included the request 

for an NCAP roadmap that lays out planned 

changes to the program and details when 

those changes are likely to occur. Some 

commenters pointed to the roadmaps of Euro 

NCAP. In addition, many of the comments 

focused on ADAS and the need for NCAP to 

stimulate further the incorporation of these 

technologies on vehicles. While supporting 

an overall rating, many commenters stated 

that the individual ratings for the 

crashworthiness and ADAS programs should 

be part of the new ratings system and be 

made available to consumers. Automaker 

commenters suggested that any changes to 

NCAP should allow adequate time for 

manufacturers to incorporate vehicle design 

changes in response to NCAP updates. Some 

commenters suggested that a vehicle’s 

attributes and status following a crash (e.g., 

notifying appropriate authorities) should be 

part of NCAP ratings as well. 

Several commenters said changes to NCAP 

should be supported by sound science and 

data and address the safety problem with 

potential effectiveness of any countermeasure 

being rated. Some commenters also suggested 

that NCAP’s promotion of ADAS 

technologies will lay the groundwork for 

automated driving systems (ADS). Several 

commenters suggested that there should be as 

much harmonization as possible with related 

global vehicle rating programs to minimize 

the cost and testing burden on vehicle 

manufacturers. Most commenters supported 

the idea that NHTSA continue to accept 

manufacturer-conducted, self-reported test 

results as evidence that the vehicles are 

equipped with one or more NCAPrecommended technologies (i.e., that the 

Agency does not need to verify that the 

ADAS meet the NCAP system performance 

requirements). 

Some commenters noted that NHTSA has 

yet to implement the requirement of the 2015 

FAST Act to provide crash avoidance 

information on the Monroney label. Those 

who commented on this issue generally 

supported moving forward and completing 

this as soon as possible. A few additional 

commenters addressed the issue of possible 

new crash test dummies used in NCAP, but 

indicated that any new dummies should be 

‘‘Federalized’’ by adding the dummies into 

49 CFR part 572, ‘‘Anthropomorphic test 

devices,’’ before incorporating them into 

NCAP. 

Regarding the dissemination and 

promotion of NCAP’s vehicle safety 

information, some of the commenters urged 

the expanded use of new media and other 

technological approaches to communicating 

NCAP vehicle safety information. Others 

recommended that there should be 

traditional public information ‘‘campaigns’’ 

to make the public more aware of NCAP. 

Commenters requested a more robust search 

capability on NHTSA’s website, particularly 

to facilitate consumer comparisons of 

vehicles within a class. 

Among those addressing the utility and 

effectiveness of the 5-star ratings system, all 

supported the continued use of star ratings 

with some suggesting that the use of half-star 

increments would be a way to introduce 

more differentiation between vehicles and 

provide an incentive for manufacturers to 

improve vehicle safety in situations where 

doing so would result in an additional half 

star. One commenter suggested a 10-star 

rating system. 

Comments were split on the question of 

whether new crash tests should be added to 

NCAP. Some supported adjusting the 

baseline injury risks associated with 

crashworthiness ratings. One commenter 

stated that NCAP should not pursue 

differentiation just for the sake of 

differentiation, instead suggesting that the 

highest priority should be to examine the 

correlation and validity of the current star 

rating system with real-world injury data. 

Several commenters suggested that there be 

a silver star rating as part of NCAP that 

would highlight safety aspects of vehicles 

that are of importance to older drivers. 

Others who commented on providing vehicle 

safety information for specific demographic 

groups either opposed the idea of 

information directed at demographic groups, 

expressed concerns, or said additional 

research is needed. 

Issued in Washington, DC, under authority 

delegated in 49 CFR 1.95 and 501.5. 

Steven S. Cliff, 

Deputy Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–04894 Filed 3–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 


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