alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11
                                                                      ----------
<TABLE>
                                 Bacou USA, Inc.
                 Statement Re: Computation Of Per Share Earnings
                 -----------------------------------------------
                                   (Unaudited)


<CAPTION>
                                                       Three Months Ended
                                                       ------------------
                                                             March 31,
                                                             ---------
                                                  1997                   1996
                                                  ----                   ----
<S>                                           <C>                    <C>
Primary:
Weighted average shares
   outstanding                                 17,312,200             13,860,000

Net effect of dilutive stock options 
   options based on the treasury stock 
   method using the average market
   price                                           10,177                ---
                                              -----------            -----------
 
  Total                                        17,322,377             13,860,000
                                              ===========            ===========

Net income                                    $ 4,131,953            $ 4,106,227
                                              ===========            ===========

Per share amount                              $      0.24            $      0.30
                                              ===========            ===========

Fully Diluted:
Weighted average shares
   outstanding                                 17,312,200             13,860,000

Net effect of dilutive stock options
   based on the treasury stock
   method using the greater of
   average or period end price                     10,177                ---
                                              -----------            -----------

   Total                                       17,322,377             13,860,000
                                              ===========            ===========

Net income                                    $ 4,131,953            $ 4,106,227
                                              ===========            ===========

Per share amount                              $      0.24            $      0.30
                                              ===========            ===========
</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Coley Terrance HOLMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7077

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 27, 2017

Decided: December 13, 2017

Coley Terrance Holman, Appellant Pro Se. Harry L. Hobgood, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Coley Terrance Holman seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Holman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
**Exhibit 35.1**

**SERVICER      COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)**

**First      Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-FA8**

|         |                                               |                             |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|         | First                Horizon Home Loan Corporation |
|    |                                          |                        |
|              | By:                                      | /s/Kim              Yowell  |
|         | Date: 03/01/07Name: Kim Yowell                     |
|         | Title:              SVP, Servicing Manager         |

|         |                                                   |                                         |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|         | First                Tennessee Mortgage Services, Inc. |
|    |                                              |                                    |
|              | By:                                          | /s/              Terry              L. McCoy |
|         | Date: 03/01/07Name: Terry L. McCoy                     |
|         | Title:                Vice President                   |

----
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

              CASE CREDIT CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Case Credit Corporation (the "Company") Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mario
Ferla, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer of the Company,
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.

Date: November 12, 2002

                                By /s/ MARIO FERLA
                                ------------------
                                       Mario Ferla
                  Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer
             (Principal Executive and Operations Officer and Director and
                   Authorized Signatory for Case Credit Corporation)

                                       22
----

| (1) | the annual report on Form 10-K of NanoViricides, Inc. for the period ended June 30, 2011 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of NanoViricides, Inc. |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: October 13, 2011 | /s/ Eugene Seymour, MD                                                              |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | Name:  Eugene Seymour, MD                                                 |
|                   | Title:  Chief Executive Officer andInterim Financial Officer and Director |
|                   | (principal executive and accounting officer)                                        |

----
#### Winston O’MALLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PNC BANK, N.A.; Select Portfolio Servicing, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55700

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 **

Filed November 17, 2017

Winston O’Mally, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

Jonathan D. Fink, Gwen Heather Ribar, Esquire, Wright, Finlay *&*Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee.

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM *

Winston O’Mally appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claims related to disputed information on his credit report. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Lacey v. Maricopa County,*693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed O’Mally’s FCRA claims because O’Mally cannot bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) as an individual, and he did not properly notify a consumer reporting agency of disputed information as required for a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s—2(b). *See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP,*584 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) can be brought only by federal or state agencies, and consumer’s dispute sent directly to a lender or other furnisher of information does not trigger duties under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)).

We do not consider O’Mally’s arguments regarding his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim because O’Mally failed to replead it in his operative complaint. *See Lacey,*693 F.3d at 928 (claims dismissed with leave to amend are waived if not replead); *see also Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc.,*710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiffs claims were effectively abandoned when plaintiff did not replead them after district court dismissed with leave to amend).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

*636All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20
- 0409 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. HOLLY ANNE MATHIS, a.k.a. HOLLY ANNE NORLING, Defendant and Appellant.

**GRANT**
Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until January 8, 2021, to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court December 2 2020

12/02/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0409
#### Roberto GARCIA-ROSALES, AKA Javier Chavez, AKA Raul Juarez Martinez, AKA Roberto Rosales-Piedra, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72222

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

Jeffrey D. Gold, The Law Offices of Jeffrey D Gold, Norwalk, CA, for Petition- . er

Robbin Kinmonth Blaya, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Roberto Garcia-Rosales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo constitutional claims. *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Garcia-Rosales’ motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than ten months after his final order of removal, and failed to comply with the procedural requirements of *Matter of Lozada,*19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); *Singh v. Holder,*658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) *(Lozada*compliance required to qualify for equitable tolling of the filing deadline based on ineffective assistance of counsel); *Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge).

Because the timeliness determination is dispositive, we do not consider Garcia-Rosales’ remaining contentions regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of prior counsel or his eligibility for relief. *See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

Garcia-Rosales’ request to stay his removal is denied as moot. The currently effective temporary stay of removal will expire upon issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### IN RE: Joerg ROCKENBERGER, Mao Takashima, Fabio Zurcher, Kevin Hubert, Klaus Kunze, Wenzhuo Guo, Brent Ridley, Appellants

2017-1035

United States Court of Appeals,* Federal Circuit.

November 14, 2017

Andrew David Fortney, Central California IP Group, PC, Fresno, CA, argued- for appellants.

Brian Racilla, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas W. Krause, Robert Mcbride.

(Taranto, Clevenger, and Stoll, Circuit Judges).

*988JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
P.1 

OAR Box 1867 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

35) ll-B-89 

Docket Number: 

A-90-19 

Printed 12/2/2008 6:27:21 AM Sheet 35 of 95 
_E2_ 

A-90-19 

ll-B-89 

PENDING CONFIDENTIAL 

The following information is located in the confidential 

files of the Director, Emission Standards Division, Office ,of Air 

Quality Planning and Standards, U. S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711. This 

information is confidential pending final determination by the 

Administrator and is not available for public inspection. 

W. Floyd, Radian Corporation, to Process"Vents Docket 

A-90-19, January 1991, HON NESHAP: Industry 

Characteristics/Methyl Isocyanate. 21 pages. 

CBI Document Control No. 86/23, PPS-89.
#### Tony SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTIANA TRUST, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as trustee of ARLP Trust 3, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35536

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

John Cochran, IV, Attorney, Pacific Property Law LLC, Forest Grove, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Lukasz I. Wozniak, Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tony Schwartz appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of federal statutes related to his mortgage loan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).

The district court properly dismissed Schwartz’s Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim because Schwartz did not send a notice of rescission to defendant within three years of consummation of the loan. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); *Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); *Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,*309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Schwartz’s contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

The district court properly dismissed Schwartz’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim because it was based solely on his TILA claim.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised arid argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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EXHIBIT 10.18    
  


 
 

First Amendment to the Lease
  between Testchip Technologies, Inc. as Tenant
  And Research Interchange One L.P. as Landlord
  for the Premises at 9300 United Drive, Suite 180, Austin, Texas    




        Research Interchange One L. P. as Landlord and Testchip Technologies, Inc. as Tenant mutually agree to the following modifications to the Lease for
the Premises at 9300 United Drive, Suite 180, Austin, Texas entered into on November 17, 2000: 



	1.
	Notwithstanding
anything in the Lease to the contrary, the Commencement Date of the Lease shall be March 16, 2001 and the Base Rental and Additional Rental shall commence on
March 16, 2001.



	2.
	Any
and all expenses generated by or through the Waddill Group architecture firm shall be capped at $68,228.40 for the purpose of reimbursement through the Allowance provided in
Exhibit G, paragraph 3 of the Lease. Any and all expenses relating to the wiring of the Tenant supplied power poles shall be capped at $2,000.00 for the purpose of reimbursement through
the Allowance provided in Exhibit G, paragraph 3 of the Lease. Any excess expense over $68,228.40 for the Waddill Group or $2,000.00 for the wiring of Tenant's power poles shall be paid
directly by Tenant and not included in the minimum $150,000 of Excess (Tenant's Costs over the Allowance) required under Exhibit G, paragraph 3. 




        All
other terms in the Lease shall remain the same and in full force and effect. 



	Tenant
	 	Landlord

	
Testchip Technologies, Inc.	
 	

Research Interchange One, L.P.
	

By:	

/s/ Mark Harward
	
 	

By:	

/s/ Brian F. Gaston

	

Name:	

Mark Harward
	
 	

Name:	

Brian F. Gaston

	

Title:	

President and CEO
	
 	

Title:	

President of the General Partner

	

Date:	

March 28, 2001
	
 	

Date:	

March 28, 2001












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EXHIBIT 10.18


First Amendment to the Lease between Testchip Technologies, Inc. as Tenant And Research Interchange One L.P. as Landlord for the Premises at 9300 United Drive, Suite 180, Austin, Texas
#### James Martin HOUSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YONCALLA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 32, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35558

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 30, 2017

James Martin Houston, Pro Se

Haley Elizabeth Percell, Attorney, Oregon School Boards Association, Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Houston’s request for oral argument, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

James Martin Houston appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Thomas v. City of Beaverton,*379 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Houston’s First Amendment retaliation claims because Houston failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he engaged in speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. *See Dahlia v. Rodriguez,*735 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim as a public employee, plaintiff must demonstrate that he spoke on a matter of public concern and did so as a private citizen); *see also Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino,*572 F.3d 703, 708-09 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Houston’s claim alleging that defendants restricted his free speech Jn violation of the First Amendment bjr preventing him from attending Yoncalld School District’s and Douglas Education Service District’s board meetings because Houston failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that he was barred from any meetings.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.