Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 55 / Tuesday, March 22, 2022 / Proposed Rules 16123 

(2) For more information about this AD, 

contact Andrea Jimenez, Aerospace Engineer, 

COS Program Management Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, Compliance & 

Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1600 Stewart 

Ave., Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 

telephone (516) 228–7330; email 

andrea.jimenez@faa.gov. 

Issued on March 10, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05606 Filed 3–21–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2022–0284; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2021–01369–A] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air 

Limited (Type Certificate Previously 

Held by Bombardier Inc. and de 

Havilland, Inc.) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for 

certain Viking Air Limited (type 

certificate previously held by 

Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) 

Model DHC–6–1, DHC–6–100, DHC–6– 

200, DHC–6–300, and DHC–6–400 

airplanes. This proposed AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe 

condition as binding of the rod end 

bearing connecting the lower fuel 

control unit (FCU) push rod assembly to 

the FCU power lever. This proposed AD 

would require performing tests, 

inspections, and lubrication of the FCU 

push rod assemblies, and replacing 

them with improved parts as necessary. 

The FAA is proposing this AD to 

address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: The FAA must receive comments 

on this proposed AD by May 6, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this NPRM, contact Viking Air Ltd., 

1959 de Havilland Way, Sidney British 

Columbia, Canada V8L 5V5; phone: 

(800) 663–8444; email: 

continuing.airworthiness@

vikingair.com; website: https://

www.vikingair.com. You may view this 

service information at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, 

Kansas City, MO 64106. For information 

on the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2022–0284; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

NPRM, the MCAI, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for Docket Operations is 

listed above. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Elizabeth Dowling, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 

1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 

Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228– 

7300; email: elizabeth.m.dowling@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments about this proposal. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under the ADDRESSES section. Include 

‘‘Docket No. FAA–2022–0284; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2021–01369–A’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the proposal, explain the 

reason for any recommended change, 

and include supporting data. The FAA 

will consider all comments received by 

the closing date and may amend this 

proposal because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. The 

agency will also post a report 

summarizing each substantive verbal 

contact received about this NPRM. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this NPRM 

contain commercial or financial 

information that is customarily treated 

as private, that you actually treat as 

private, and that is relevant or 

responsive to this NPRM, it is important 

that you clearly designate the submitted 

comments as CBI. Please mark each 

page of your submission containing CBI 

as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such 

marked submissions as confidential 

under the FOIA, and they will not be 

placed in the public docket of this 

NPRM. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Elizabeth Dowling, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, New York 

ACO Branch, FAA, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 

11590. Any commentary that the FAA 

receives which is not specifically 

designated as CBI will be placed in the 

public docket for this rulemaking. 

Background 

Transport Canada, which is the 

aviation authority for Canada, has 

issued Transport Canada AD CF–2021– 

42, dated November 26, 2021 (referred 

to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to address 

an unsafe condition on certain serialnumbered Viking Air Limited Model 

DHC–6 series 1, DHC–6 series 100, 

DHC–6 series 110, DHC–6 series 200, 

DHC–6 series 210, DHC–6 series 300, 

DHC–6 series 310, DHC–6 series 320, 

and DHC–6 series 400 airplanes with 

certain part-numbered FCU push rod 

assemblies installed. The MCAI states: 

There have been in-service reports of 

binding of [part number] P/N VSC30–3A rod 

end bearings used in the linkage for the lower 

FCU push rod assembly P/N C6CE1398–7. 

The lower FCU push rod assembly is 

connected to the FCU power lever and 

contains a rod end bearing at each end. P/N 

VSC30–3A rod end bearings, fabricated with 

a metal inner race and a dry film lubricant, 

have been incorporated on FCU push rod 

assemblies introduced through Viking Air 

Ltd (Viking) MOD 6/2347. P/N VSC30–3A 

rod end bearings may have also been 

installed in-service as a replacement part in 

lower FCU push rod assembly P/N 

C6CE1398–3. In one instance, binding of the 

lower FCU push rod bearing resulted in one 

engine failing to return to a lower power 

setting from a higher power setting when 


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16124 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 55 / Tuesday, March 22, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

commanded, which subsequently resulted in 

the need to perform an in-flight engine 

shutdown during final approach. An 

investigation also revealed that binding of P/ 

N VSC30–3A rod end bearings can occur 

after a period of non-utilization of the 

aeroplane. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, may lead to the inability to reduce 

power on the affected engine, resulting in the 

need to perform an in-flight engine 

shutdown, and consequently leading to 

reduced control of the aeroplane and 

increased pilot workload during this critical 

phase of flight. 

To address this unsafe condition, this 

[Transport Canada] AD mandates initial and 

repetitive functional checks, special detailed 

inspection (SDI) and lubrication of the 

affected FCU push rod assembly, and its 

replacement, as required, with a redesigned 

FCU push rod assembly with improved 

reliability (MOD 6/2484), in accordance with 

Viking Service Bulletin (SB) V6/0063. This 

[Transport Canada] AD also prohibits the 

installation of an affected FCU push rod 

assembly as a replacement part on applicable 

aeroplanes. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2022– 

0284. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed the following: 

• Viking DHC–6 Twin Otter Service 

Bulletin (SB) No. V6/0063, Revision A, 

dated February 1, 2021 (Viking SB V6/ 

0063, Revision A), which specifies 

procedures for performing tests, 

inspections, and lubrication of the FCU 

push rod assemblies; and 

• Viking DHC–6 Twin Otter 

Technical Bulletin No. V6/00155, 

Revision NC, dated September 14, 2020, 

which specifies procedures for replacing 

the FCU push rod assemblies with 

improved parts. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

Other Related Service Information 

The FAA also reviewed Viking DHC– 

6 Twin Otter SB No. V6/0063, Revision 

NC, dated June 7, 2019 (Viking SB V6/ 

0063, Revision NC), which specifies 

procedures for performing tests, 

inspections, and lubrication of the FCU 

push rod assemblies. Viking revised this 

service information and issued Viking 

SB V6/0063 Revision A to extend the 

lubrication requirement of Mod 6/2347 

rod ends to all operating environments, 

add repeat inspections, and introduce a 

test and lubrication for airplanes that 

have not been in operation after a period 

of time before re-entry into service. 

FAA’s Determination 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to the 

FAA’s bilateral agreement with this 

State of Design Authority, it has notified 

the FAA of the unsafe condition 

described in the MCAI and service 

information referenced above. The FAA 

is issuing this NPRM after determining 

the unsafe condition described 

previously is likely to exist or develop 

in other products of the same type 

design. 

Proposed AD Requirements in This 

NPRM 

This proposed AD would require 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

the service information described 

previously. 

Differences Between This Proposed AD 

and the MCAI 

The MCAI applies to Viking Air 

Limited Model DHC–6 series 110, DHC– 

6 series 210, DHC–6 series 310, and 

DHC–6 series 320, and this proposed 

AD would not because these models do 

not have an FAA type certificate. 

Transport Canada Model DHC–6 series 

1, DHC–6 series 100, DHC–6 series 200, 

DHC–6 series 300, and DHC–6 series 

400 airplanes correspond to FAA Model 

DHC–6–1, DHC–6–100, DHC–6–200, 

DHC–6–300, and DHC–6–400 airplanes, 

respectively. 

The MCAI requires reporting 

information to the manufacturer, and 

this proposed AD would not. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD, if 

adopted as proposed, would affect 34 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA 

estimates the following costs to comply 

with this proposed AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per airplane Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Test, inspect, and lubricate 

the FCU push rod assemblies.

1 work-hour × $85 per hour = 

$85.

N/A $85 per inspection cycle ........ $2,890 per inspection cycle. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to replace the FCU push rod 

assemblies. The agency has no way of 

determining the number of airplanes 

that might need these replacements: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

airplane 

Replace both FCU push rod assemblies ..................... 3 work-hours × $85 per hour = $255 ........................... $60 $315 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 55 / Tuesday, March 22, 2022 / Proposed Rules 16125 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

The FAA determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate 

Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and 

de Havilland, Inc.): Docket No. FAA– 

2022–0284; Project Identifier MCAI– 

2021–01369–A. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

The FAA must receive comments on this 

airworthiness directive (AD) by May 6, 2022. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Viking Air Limited 

(Type Certificate Previously Held by 

Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) 

Model DHC–6–1, DHC–6–100, DHC–6–200, 

DHC–6–300, and DHC–6–400 airplanes, 

serial numbers 001 through 989, certificated 

in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7600, Engine Controls. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of another 

country to identify and correct an unsafe 

condition on an aviation product. The MCAI 

identifies the unsafe condition as binding of 

the rod end bearing connecting the lower fuel 

control unit (FCU) push rod assembly to the 

FCU power lever. The unsafe condition, if 

not addressed, could lead to the inability to 

reduce power on the affected engine, which 

could result in an in-flight engine shutdown 

and reduced airplane control. 

(f) Definitions 

(1) For purposes of this AD, an ‘‘affected 

FCU pushrod assembly’’ is one of the 

following: 

(i) Lower FCU push rod assembly part 

number (P/N) C6CE1398–7; or 

(ii) Lower FCU push rod assembly P/N 

C6CE1398–3 with P/N VSC30–3A rod end 

bearing installed. 

Note 1 to paragraph (f)(1): P/N C6CE1398– 

7 may also be referred to as modification 

(MOD) 6/2347. 

(2) For purposes of this AD, a ‘‘serviceable 

FCU push rod assembly’’ is lower FCU push 

rod assembly P/N C6CE1398–9. 

Note 2 to paragraph (f)(2): P/N C6CE1398– 

9 may also be referred to as MOD 6/2484. 

(g) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(h) Required Actions 

(1) Within 125 hours time-in-service (TIS) 

after the effective date of this AD or within 

30 days after the effective date of this AD, 

whichever occurs first, test each affected FCU 

push rod assembly for binding and restriction 

in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraphs A.1. through A.3., in 

Viking DHC–6 Twin Otter Service Bulletin 

No. V6/0063, Revision A, dated February 1, 

2021 (Viking SB V6/0063, Revision A). 

(i) If there is any binding or restriction, 

before further flight, remove both affected 

FCU push rod assemblies from service and 

install serviceable FCU push rod assemblies 

in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph A.4., in Viking SB 

V6/0063, Revision A, and the 

Accomplishment Instructions, Sections A 

through C, in Viking DHC–6 Twin Otter 

Technical Bulletin No. TB V6/00155, 

Revision NC, dated September 14, 2020 

(Viking TB V6/00155, Revision NC). 

(ii) If there is no binding and no restriction, 

before further flight, remove each affected 

FCU push rod assembly, clean the push rod 

ends, and inspect each affected FCU push 

rod assembly for corrosion and condition of 

the lubricant. Pay particular attention to the 

bearing ball and race. 

(A) If there is no corrosion and the 

lubricant color and texture is normal, before 

further flight, lubricate each affected FCU 

push rod assembly in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions, Section C, in 

Viking SB V6/0063, Revision A. 

(B) If there is corrosion or if the lubricant 

is abnormal in color (too dark) or texture (too 

sticky), before further flight, remove both 

affected FCU push rod assemblies from 

service and install serviceable FCU push rod 

assemblies in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph A.4, 

in Viking SB V6/0063, Revision A and the 

Accomplishment Instructions, Sections A 

through C, in Viking TB V6/00155, Revision 

NC. 

(2) Repeat the requirements of this AD as 

follows until both affected FCU push rod 

assemblies are replaced. 

(i) Test and lubrication: At intervals not to 

exceed 125 hours TIS or before further flight 

anytime the airplane has not been operated 

for a period of 30 days, whichever occurs 

first. 

(ii) Inspection: At intervals not to exceed 

1,500 hours TIS. 

(3) As of the effective date of this AD, do 

not install an affected FCU push rod 

assembly on any airplane. 

(i) Credit for Previous Actions 

You may take credit for the test, 

inspection, replacement, and lubrication 

required by paragraphs (h)(1) and (2) of this 

AD if you performed those actions before the 

effective date of this AD using Viking DHC– 

6 Twin Otter Service Bulletin No. V6/0063, 

Revision NC, dated June 7, 2019. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, New York ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of 

this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Elizabeth Dowling, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, New York ACO Branch, FAA, 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 

11590; phone: (516) 228–7300; email: 

elizabeth.m.dowling@faa.gov. 

(2) Refer to Transport Canada AD CF– 

2021–42, dated November 26, 2021, for more 

information. You may examine the Transport 

Canada AD in the AD docket at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for and 

locating it in Docket No. FAA–2022–0284. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Viking Air Ltd., 1959 de 

Havilland Way, Sidney British Columbia, 

Canada V8L 5V5; phone: (800) 663–8444; 

email: continuing.airworthiness@

vikingair.com; website: https://

www.vikingair.com. You may review this 

referenced service information at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
16126 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 55 / Tuesday, March 22, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

1The docket folder for USCG–2020–0172 is 

available at: Regulations.gov. 

Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 

64106. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

Issued on March 11, 2022. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05668 Filed 3–21–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 110 

[Docket Number USCG–2019–0822] 

RIN 1625–AA01 

Anchorage Grounds; Atlantic Ocean, 

Delaware 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is proposing 

to amend the anchorage regulations for 

the Delaware Bay and River, and 

adjacent waters, by establishing two 

new, offshore deep-water anchorages. 

The purpose of this proposed rule is to 

improve navigation safety by 

accommodating recent and anticipated 

future growth in vessel size and volume 

of vessel traffic entering the Delaware 

Bay and River, and to preserve areas 

traditionally used or needed for 

anchoring. We invite your comments on 

this proposed rulemaking. 

DATES: Comments and related material 

must be received by the Coast Guard on 

or before May 23, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

identified by docket number USCG– 

2019–0822 using the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal at https://

www.regulations.gov. See the ‘‘Public 

Participation and Request for 

Comments’’ portion of the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for 

further instructions on submitting 

comments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions about this proposed 

rulemaking, call or email Marine 

Science Technician First Class (MST1) 

Jennifer Padilla, Sector Delaware Bay, 

U.S. Coast Guard; telephone (215) 271– 

4889, email Jennifer.L.Padilla@uscg.mil; 

or Mr. Matt Creelman, Fifth Coast Guard 

District (dpw), U.S. Coast Guard; 

telephone (757) 398–6230, email 

Matthew.K.Creelman2@uscg.mil. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Table of Abbreviations 

ACPARS Atlantic Coast Port Access Route 

Study 

AIS Automatic Identification System 

BOEM Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

COTP Captain of the Port 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FR Federal Register 

NOI Notice of Intent 

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

OREA Offshore Renewable Energy Area 

PARS Port Access Route Study 

§ Section 

U.S.C. United States Code 

II. Background, Purpose, and Legal 

Basis 

In 2011, the Coast Guard received 

requests to formally establish 

anchorages in the Atlantic Ocean 

offshore from the Delaware coast in 

response to the Atlantic Coast Port 

Access Route Study (ACPARS), a 

multiyear study that included public 

participation and identified the 

navigation routes customarily followed 

by ships engaged in commerce between 

international and domestic U.S. ports. 

The ACPARS is available at https://

navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=

PARSReports. To preserve areas 

traditionally used for anchoring from 

offshore development, the Federal Pilots 

and the Mariners’ Advisory Committee 

for the Bay and River Delaware 

requested formal anchorage grounds be 

established to the east and the west of 

the southeastern approach traffic 

separation scheme. While these requests 

were noted in the ACPARS, the Coast 

Guard took no action in the pursuing 

years, and the areas to the east and the 

west of the southeastern approach traffic 

separation scheme continued to be used 

as traditional and unregulated 

anchorage grounds. 

On July 12, 2018, and August 21, 

2018, the Coast Guard held meetings 

with maritime stakeholders and 

waterway users to discuss the impacts 

to vessel traffic and navigation safety on 

the Delaware Bay and River due to the 

expansion of the Panama Canal and the 

planned deepening of the Delaware 

River from 40 to 45 feet. Meeting 

attendees included the Pilots’ 

Association for the Bay and River 

Delaware, the Mariners’ Advisory 

Committee for the Bay and River 

Delaware, Interport Pilots Association, 

and port and terminal representatives. 

The attendees concluded the increased 

volume of vessel traffic and the size of 

vessels calling on the Delaware Bay and 

River, and planned and potential 

offshore development, heightened the 

need to formally establish three new 

anchorage grounds: Two offshore in the 

Atlantic Ocean and an additional 

inshore anchorage located in the 

Delaware Bay near the Cape Henlopen 

breakwaters. The participants suggested 

the anchorages would preserve areas 

traditionally used for anchoring and 

provide for the ongoing and future 

growth of the marine transportation 

system on the Delaware Bay and River. 

On November 29, 2019, the Coast 

Guard published a Notice of Inquiry 

(NOI) in the Federal Register (81 FR 

25854) to formally seek feedback on 

whether the Coast Guard should 

consider a proposed rulemaking to 

establish the three new anchorages. 

Following the naming convention in 33 

CFR 110.157, the anchorages were 

referred to as Anchorage B—Breakwater, 

Anchorage C—Cape Henlopen, and 

Anchorage D—Indian River. We 

received 42 comments in response to 

the NOI. Five comments were 

supportive; twenty eight were opposed 

to the proposed inshore anchorage, 

Anchorage B; and fourteen were 

opposed to the proposed offshore 

anchorages, Anchorages C and D. 

On May 5, 2020, the Coast Guard 

published a Notice of Study; request for 

comments entitled ‘‘Port Access Route 

Study (PARS) for the Seacoast of New 

Jersey Including Offshore Approaches to 

the Delaware Bay, Delaware’’ in the 

Federal Register (85 FR 26695). The 

initial comment period closed on July 5, 

2020. The Coast Guard conducted two 

virtual public meetings on October 28, 

2020, and November 4, 2020, and the 

initial comment period was re-opened 

through November 10, 2020. The study 

included an in-depth analysis of 

historical anchoring patterns in the 

approaches to the Delaware Bay and 

River. Anchorage related comments 

received during the study are discussed 

in Section III, and a full list of 

comments can be found in the Port 

Access Route Study ‘‘PARS,’’ docket 

number USCG–2020–0172.1

Based on feedback received to date, 

primary objections to the proposed 

inshore anchorage are environmental in 

nature and concern potential impacts on 

Atlantic Sturgeon, an endangered 

species under the Endangered Species 

Act. Primary objections to the proposed 

offshore anchorages concern potential 

conflicts between the siting of the 

anchorage grounds and the need to 

route electricity transmission export 

cables to the proposed or future offshore 

wind developments. Based on the 

differences and nature of concerns 

between the anchorages located inshore, 

in the Delaware River estuary, and the 


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