alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Franklin BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Franklin Brown, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7524, No. 16-7525

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2017

Decided: April 11, 2017

Charles Franklin Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Jean Barrett Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia; Craig Jon Jacobsen, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia; Drew Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Charles Franklin Brown seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. *355§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Brown has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss these consolidated appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 34.2


[ERNST & YOUNG LOGO]   Ernst & Young LLP             Phone: (404) 674-8300
                       Suite 2800                           www.cy.com
                       600 Peachtree Street
                       Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2215

             Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Report on
Assessment of Compliance with Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB
Servicing Criteria, that ZC Real Estate Tax Solutions Limited (the Company)
complied with certain servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122 (d) of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for the ZC Tax Source (ZCTS)
Real Estate Tax Outsourcing Platform (Platform) as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2006. The Company has determined that only certain servicing
criteria 1122 (d) 1(iv), 1122 (d) 2(vi), 1122 (d) 4(xi), 1122 (d) 4(xii) and
1122 (d) 4(xiii) are applicable to the activities performed by them with respect
to the Platform covered by this report. The Company has determined that the
remaining servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122 (d) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Regulation AB are not applicable to the activities
performed by them with respect to the Platform covered by this report. See
Appendix A of management's assertion for the Platform covered by this report.
Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with those servicing
criteria, Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion
about the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria based on our
examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining,
on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the applicable
servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of less than
all of the servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether
the Company performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing
criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the servicing activities
performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our
procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurred
either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances
or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by
this report for the Platform. We believe that our examination provides a
reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal
determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006
for the ZCTS Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.


                                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP


March 1,2007


       Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
#### Alan Duane ROSE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden Larry CARTLEDGE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6792

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 27, 2017

Alan Duane Rose, Appellant Pro Se. Alphonso Simon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alan Duane Rose seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order granting his request to proceed in forma pauperis and directing the respondent to file an answer to the petition. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Rose seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we deny Rose’s motion for review and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS RESTATED SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR
THERMOQUEST CORPORATION FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 30, 1996
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000
       
<S>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-END>                     MAR-30-1996
<CASH>                               177,199
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                         84,723
<ALLOWANCES>                           4,940
<INVENTORY>                           63,171
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     330,020
<PP&E>                                76,619
<DEPRECIATION>                        23,491
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       533,159
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                130,740
<BONDS>                              105,291
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                                 480
<OTHER-SE>                           273,959
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         533,159
<SALES>                               67,299
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      67,299
<CGS>                                 35,410
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         35,410
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       4,695
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           5
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     1,699
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       10,039
<INCOME-TAX>                           4,197
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    5,842
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                           5,842
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                           0.13
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Euro Group of Companies, Inc. (formerly ICT Technologies, Inc.), a Delaware corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2020 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:




(1)    The Report of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act; and




(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date   May 17, 2011
By:
/s/   Andrew EracleousAndrew EracleousChief Financial Officer
-. 

SPA 

RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 135: Recovered Oil Exclusion (cont'd) 

• RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 135 

Recovered Oil Exclusion
 

59 FR 38536-38545
 

July 28, 1994
 

(RCRA Cluster V, Non-HSWA provisions)
 

FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FEDERAL RCRA CITATION ANALOGOUS STATE CITATION 

WAC 173-303-

STATE ANALOG IS: 

EQUIV- LESS MORE BROADER 

ALENT STRIN- STRIN- IN SCOPE 

GENT GENT 

PART261 - IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
 

SUBPART A -GENERAL
 

t DEFINITION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
 

change "(v) through 261.3(c)(2)(ii)(B) 071(3)(p) X 

(viii)" to "(iv) through 

(vi)" 

t EXCLUSIONS 

• add new paragraph 

addressing 

exclusion for 

recovered oil from 

261.4(a)(12) 071(3)(cc) X 

petroleum refining, 

exploration and 

production, and from 

transportation 

incident thereto, 

which is inserted in 

the petroleum _.~

refining process; 

applies to recovered 

oil stored or 

transported prior to 

insertion; definition 

of recovered oil; 

what "recovered oil" 

does not include 

• CL135.16 - Revised: 1/31/97 

Printed: 10/21198 July 28, 1994 - Page 1 of 2 
SPA 

RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 135: Recovered Oil Exclusion (cont'd) 

G 

t REQUIREMENTS FOR RECYCLABLE MATERIALS
 

after "practices", 261.6(a)(3)(iv) 120(2)(a)(v) X 

add parethetical 

phrase "this 

exemption does not 

apply to fuels 

produced from oil 

recovered from oilbearing hazardous 

waste, where such 

. recovered oil is 

already excluded 

under 

§ 261.4(a)(12)" 

remove old 261.6(a)(3)(v) Removed X 

261.6(a)(3)(v) and 

redesignate old 120(2)(a)(vi) 

261.6(a)(3)(vi) as 120(2)(a)(viii) 

new 261.6(a)(3)(v) 

redesignate old 261.6(a)(3)(vi) 120(2)(a)(ix) X 

261.6(a)(3)(vii) as 

new 261.6(a)(3)(vi); 

replace the phrase 

"at the same facility 

at which such 

wastes were 

generated" with "by 

the same person 

who generated the 

Waste" 

G
 

PART 266 - STANDARDS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF SPECIFIC HAZARDOUS WASTES
 

AND SPECIFIC TYPES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES
 

SUBPART H - HAZARDOUS WASTE BURNED IN BOILERS AND INDUSTRIAL FURNACES 

t APPLICABILITY 

replace "(v-viii)" with 266.100(b)(3) No analog 

"(iv) through (vi)" Have not adopted 

yet 

·c\ 

CL135.16 - Revised: 1/31197 

Printed: 10/21198 July 28, 1994 - Page 2 of 2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALVIN E. WILLIAMS; JUDITH M.

BROWN

- WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.

BENTLEY MOTORS, INC.; RUSNAK

PASADENA,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 56317

D.C. No. 2:12

- cv

- 05685

- GW

- JCG

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 26, 2017 **

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Alvin E. Williams and Judith M. Brown

- Williams appeal pro se from the

district court’s order denying their post

- judgment motion for reconsideration in

their action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously conclud es this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 6 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 56317

U.S.C. § 1291. We rev iew for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dis t. No. 1J,

Multnomah Cty., Or. v. AC andS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We

affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ fourth

motion for reconsideration because appel lants failed to establish any basis for such

relief. See id. at 1262

- 63 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)).

Appellants’ pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 22, 23, and 24) are denied.

AFFIRMED.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45822

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff

- Respondent

,

v.

BRYAN JOHN CURTTRIGHT

,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: December 28, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,

Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of eight years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years, for attempted strangulation, affirmed

.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lo ri A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and LORELLO, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Bryan John Curttright pled guilty to attempted strangulation . I.C. § 18

- 923(1)

. In

exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court sentenced

Curttright to a unified term of eight years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years.

However, the district court retained jurisdiction and sent Curttright to participate in the rider

program

. Curttright appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and2 need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. Ap p. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Curttright ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
**EXHIBIT
32.1**
 
 **CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
906 OF THE**
 **SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002**
 
 I, Joseph
L. Sullivan, President of CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)
    the
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period
      ended March 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
      U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and(2)
    the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 
 
 Date: May
6, 2005
 
 
 
 /s/
Joseph L. Sullivan
 Joseph L.
Sullivan
 President
 (chief
executive officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6959

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 21, 2017

Walter Brooks, Appellant Pro Se.. Stephen David Schiller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Walter Brooks seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion, and dismissing it as successive. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Brooks has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Brooks’ motion for appointment of counsel, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 80

To amend the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, to include

marketing of fresh cut flowers and fresh cut foliage in the coverage

of the Act, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

A BILL

To amend the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act,

1930, to include marketing of fresh cut flowers and

fresh cut foliage in the coverage of the Act, and for

other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. INCLUSION OF FRESH CUT FLOWERS AND

4 FRESH CUT FOLIAGE IN PACA COVERAGE.

5 Section 1(b)(4)(A) of the Perishable Agricultural

6 Commodities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C. 499a(b)(4)(A)), is

7 amended by striking ‘‘fruits and fresh vegetables’’ and in-
2

•S 80 IS

1 serting ‘‘fruits, fresh vegetables, fresh cut flowers, and

2 fresh cut foliage’’.

Æ
Filed 6/13/13 In re D.J. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re D.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B242917

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK92457)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHELE B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed with directions. Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Tracey Dodds, Deputy Coun ty Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 M.B., the mother of D.J ., appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 361 dependency orders . The mother contends ther e was noncompliance with the

Indian Child Welfare Act and related Californi a provisions. The Department of Children and Family Services agrees. We agree likewise. ( In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 736-740; In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 471-472.) Upon remittitur issuance, the j uvenile court is to comply with the with the fede ral Indian Child Welfare Act requirements and related state provisions. We n eed not reverse the dispositional order. ( In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.Ap p.4th 179, 187; In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 385.). We leave th e issue of what to do if a tribe asserts jurisdiction over the child in the good hands of th e juvenile court.

The orders under review are affirmed and the cause is remanded for compliance

with the federal Indian Ch ild Welfare Act requirements

NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TURNER, P. J.

We concur:

KRIEGLER, J.

O’NEILL, J. *

* Judge of the Ventura County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.