[Cite as State v. Power, 2013-Ohio-4254.]

STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) CASE NO. 12 CO 14 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

PAUL POWER, ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court, Case No. 10CR15. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Robert Herron 

Prosecuting Attorney 

Attorney Timothy McNicol 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

105 South Market Street 

Lisbon, Ohio 44432 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Dominic Frank

 1717 Lisbon Street 

East Liverpool, Ohio 43920 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Dated: September 23, 2013
[Cite as State v. Power, 2013-Ohio-4254.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Paul Power appeals the decision of the 

Columbiana County Common Pleas Court sentencing him to consecutive four year 

sentences on two counts of gross sexual imposition. Appellant argues that the judge 

showed bias and impartiality at sentencing and should have disqualified himself. He 

also contends that the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences by failing to 

fulfill its judicial fact-finding duties under R.C. 2929.14(C). For the following reasons, 

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶2} On January 29, 2010, appellant was indicted for raping his 

granddaughter by performing oral sex on her in 2009 when she was four or five years 

old. This was a felony-life offense. See R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (sexual conduct with 

child under 13), (B) (rape of child under 10). Appellant was also indicted for gross 

sexual imposition for having sexual contact with this child by touching her vaginal 

area in March or April of 2009, just before her fifth birthday. 

{¶3} On January 17, 2012, appellant entered a plea to two counts of gross 

sexual imposition after the state reduced the rape count to its lesser included offense. 

Both offenses were third degree felonies with sentencing options ranging from 12 to 

60 months. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3). A presentence investigation report was 

ordered. 

{¶4} At the March 9, 2012 sentencing hearing, the state recommended 

consecutive three-year sentences. In seeking consecutive sentences, the prosecutor 

asked the court to consider the nature of the offenses and the special harm caused 

to the victim. The prosecutor referenced the relationship, trust, and position of 

authority appellant held over his granddaughter. (Sent. Tr. 4-5). The defense asked 

for a lesser sentence or community control, stating that appellant previously led a 

law-abiding and productive life. (Sent. Tr. 5-6). 

{¶5} The victim’s mother, who is appellant’s daughter, read a prepared 

statement. She related that the last two years of her daughter’s life have been a 

nightmare as she no longer feels safe out of her mother’s arms, explaining that the 
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child also experienced emotional abuse due to these acts committed against her and 

now suffers socially and academically as well. She expressed regret that she had 

always told her daughter that appellant was the one man who would never hurt her 

and would protect her at all costs, and she voiced incomprehension as to how her 

father, who had always protected her, could do this to her daughter, characterizing 

him as a monster and a stranger. (Sent. Tr. 8-9). She expressed disagreement with 

the plea to the lesser included offense and voiced that he should get life with parole 

no earlier than after twenty years. (Sent. Tr. 10). 

{¶6} The court then criticized the victim’s mother, which discussion is quoted 

under assignment of error number one. (Sent. Tr. 11-12). (The court’s criticism was 

derived from the fact that the victim’s mother did not report the abuse when the 

victim’s grandmother told her that she caught appellant spreading the child’s labia in 

the bathtub.) 

{¶7} Appellant then spoke, stating that he accepted full responsibility for the 

charges in the interest of sparing his granddaughter from the continued trauma of 

having to testify in court. The court inquired if he committed the acts, and appellant 

answered that he was accepting responsibility. The court noted that it had read 

appellant’s statement, and appellant responded that he did what it said in his 

statement. (Sent. Tr. 13). (His statement only said that he touched her one time in a 

joking manner while she was urinating in the bathtub). Appellant then apologized to 

the victim and his family. (Sent. Tr. 13-14). 

{¶8} The court sentenced appellant to consecutive four-year sentences on 

each count and ordered him to register as a tier II sexual offender for a period of 25 

years. The court expressed that its job was to protect the public, punish offenders, 

and decree a fair sentence under the purposes and principles of the felony 

sentencing law. (Sent. Tr. 14-15). The court then opined that what appellant did was 

despicable and beyond understanding. (Sent. Tr. 15). The court voiced that it was 

imposing consecutive sentences because the harm was so great and so unusual that 

a single term would be insufficient. (Sent. Tr. 16). 

{¶9} The March 13, 2012 sentencing entry explained that consecutive 

sentences were imposed because a single term would be insufficient to punish the 
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offender and protect the public, consecutive terms were appropriate due to the great 

harm to the victim, and anything less than consecutive terms would fail to reflect the 

seriousness of appellant’s conduct. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

{¶10} Appellant sets forth two assignments of error, the first of which alleges: 

{¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT 

BY THE JUDGE NOT DISQUALIFYING HIMSELF DUE TO BIAS OR IMPARTIALITY 

AFFECTING THE SENTENCING OF THE APPELLANT AND THEREBY DENIED 

THE APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL SENTENCING AS WELL AS 

HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTIONS.” 

{¶12} Appellant urges that the court was biased in sentencing him to 

consecutive four-year sentences instead of the consecutive three-year sentences 

recommended by the state. He provides two examples from the sentencing hearing, 

which he believes demonstrate bias: the court’s criticism of the victim’s mother and 

the court’s criticism of appellant. Appellant quotes the following exchange, occurring 

after the victim’s mother read her statement: 

COURT: And you admit you let your daughter down? Didn’t you say 

that? 

[MOTHER]: I do not admit I let my daughter down. 

COURT: You think you protected her? How did this situation - - how 

was it allowed to occur? 

[MOTHER]: Why are you attacking me, sir? I am not the one that did 

anything wrong. 

COURT: I’m not attacking you. I’m just asking you. 

[MOTHER]: I just remember my child and what he did. 
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COURT: Well, ma’am, at first you lied about this. You tried to cover it 

up yourself. And the first - - 

[MOTHER] Because I didn’t want to go through this and I didn’t want to 

put my child through this. 

COURT: So you tried to protect your father at first. 

[MOTHER]: No, I did not. I tried to protect my daughter. And nobody 

has protected her. Through this whole thing he has been able to walk 

free and be around other grandchildren. 

COURT: Ma’am, what he did was wrong. It makes him a felon. But 

you are not a model mother, and far from it. 

[MOTHER]: Yes, I am. Yes, I am. I am a good mother. And you don’t 

know me. You don’t live with me. You don’t know how I am with my 

daughter. And don’t judge me. 

COURT: Ma’am, I’m very well acquainted with the facts of this case 

and you’re a poor excuse for a mother. I’ve heard enough from you. 

Sit down. 

(Sent. Tr. 11-12). 

{¶13} The second example appellant provides of the judge’s alleged bias and 

impartiality is the court’s pronouncement: “What you did here is despicable. It’s 

beyond understanding.” (Tr. 15). Appellant concludes that the “verbal attack” on the 

victim’s mother and the derogatory comments about him demonstrates that the judge 

was not acting fair and impartially at sentencing. 

{¶14} Appellant relies on a Supreme Court decision on an affidavit of 

disqualification and an older Tenth Appellate District case applying that 

disqualification decision to a direct appeal. See Columbus v. Pierce, 77 Ohio App.3d 

841, 603 N.E.2d 1104 (1991) (reversing resentencing decision on grounds that judge 

should have disqualified himself upon the defendant’s request due to statements he 
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made in denying bond pending appeal of the original sentence), applying In re 

Disqualification of Ruehlman, 74 Ohio St.3d 1229, 657 N.E.2d 1339 (1991). 

{¶15} In Ruehlman, the trial court made the following “unsolicited remark” to 

the defendant at sentencing: “[I]f the parole board calls me I am going to tell them 

that you should serve the full three and one-half years.” Ruehlman, 74 Ohio St.3d at 

1229. The defendant filed a Motion to Suspend Further Execution of Sentence in the 

sentencing court and then an affidavit of disqualification in the Ohio Supreme Court, 

alleging that the comment made by the judge at sentencing shows bias and prejudice 

and a prejudgment of the merits of the pending motion. Id. 

{¶16} The Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court agreed, concluding that 

the remark suggested “the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of 

the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind” and that a reasonable 

person could question whether the decision on the pending motion would be 

governed by the law and the facts. Id. at 1229-1230, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. 

Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956). The Chief Justice then 

ordered that the original judge participate no further in the case to avoid “even the 

appearance of any bias or prejudice and to ensure the absolute confidence of the 

parties and the public in the fair and impartial resolution of all matters * * *.” Id. at 

1230. 

{¶17} That case is distinguishable. As the state points out, appellant did not 

raise the issue of bias at sentencing. Nor did appellant raise the matter in a motion 

prior to the entry of the sentencing order. Notably, the court here did not file its 

sentencing entry until four days after the sentencing hearing, meaning there was time 

during which an affidavit of disqualification could have been filed. Finally, there is no 

motion pending before the trial court currently. 

{¶18} Furthermore, Ruehlman is inapplicable as it deals with the Supreme 

Court’s Chief Justice ruling on an affidavit of disqualification. An appellate court has 

no authority to render a decision with regard to disqualification or to void a trial court's 

judgment on the basis of personal bias or prejudice on the part of a trial judge as 

those matters are left exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or his 

designee. Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-42, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978); 
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Section 5(C), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2701.03. See also State v. 

Melhado, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-272, 2006-Ohio-641, ¶ 11. 

{¶19} In Beer, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed an appellate court's decision 

that the trial judge had a conflict of interest. Notably, the dissent opined that the 

appellate court was permitted to address the issue because one instance of bias did 

not become known to the plaintiff's attorney until oral argument (when the appellate 

judges mentioned that the defendant's counsel was the trial judge's nephew). Beer, 

54 Ohio St.2d at 442 (Locher, J., dissenting). However, the majority of the Supreme 

Court held that the appellate court had no authority to make disqualification rulings 

and to void judgments on that basis. Id. at 441–442. 

{¶20} As we pointed out in Payne, an affidavit of disqualification is to be filed 

in the Supreme Court seven days before the next scheduled hearing, but if the 

reason for the affidavit is unknown until after that deadline, then the affidavit is not 

considered untimely if filed at the earliest possible moment after the reason has been 

disclosed to the affiant. State v. Payne, 149 Ohio App.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-5180, 777 

N.E.2d 333, ¶ 6 (7th Dist.). Thus, had appellant filed an affidavit after the sentencing 

hearing and before the entry of judgment, the trial court would have been unable to 

act until a decision was made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. at ¶ 7, 

citing State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 299-300, 691 N.E.2d 253 

(1998). 

{¶21} We have stated that there is an exception to our lack of jurisdiction over 

allegations of a biased judge where the appellate court is reviewing whether a judge's 

behavior prejudiced or biased jurors. State v. Drummond, 7th Dist. No. 05MA197, 

2006-Ohio-7078, ¶ 81, citing State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 188; Scibelli 

v. Pannunzio, 7th Dist. No. 05MA170, 2006-Ohio-5652, ¶ 26. Here, no jury was 

involved, and the allegation deals with statements made at sentencing after a guilty 

plea. 

{¶22} Still, it has also been added that biased comments at sentencing can be 

reviewed for due process violations. Although, this is typically reserved for extreme 

cases or those involving a constitutionally protected status. See, e.g., State v. Arnett, 
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88 Ohio St.3d 208, 218, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) (addressing a comment alleged to 

involve religion). 

{¶23} Bias or prejudice means a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue 

favoritism toward one of the parties or their attorney where there is the formation of a 

fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as opposed to an open state of 

mind which will be governed by the law and the facts of the case. In re 

Disqualification of Olivito, 74 Ohio St.3d 1261, 1262, 657 N.E.2d 1361 (1994). The 

law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters over which he 

presides, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling in order to 

overcome this presumption. Id. at 1263. 

{¶24} As to the trial court’s statements to the victim’s mother, these were 

unsympathetic to the mother of the victim or represent a misunderstanding of her 

statements regarding how she felt she let her daughter down because she told her 

that her grandfather would always protect her. However, allegations of uncalled for 

criticism of the victim’s mother for her failure to report, do not show bias against 

appellant. See State v. Clay, 8th Dist. No. 89763, 1008-Ohio-1415, ¶ 22-23 

(sentencing court’s criticism of defendant’s mother was not reversible). This is 

especially true where the person being criticized was present to speak against, rather 

than in support of, the defendant. Compare id. 

{¶25} As to the court’s comment that what appellant did was “beyond 

understanding,” does not demonstrate bias. Acts of gross sexual imposition against 

one’s four year granddaughter are, in fact, beyond understanding. And, the court did 

not say appellant was despicable. Rather, the court stated that what appellant did 

was despicable. These comments of a sentencing court after reading the 

presentence investigation report in a case involving a grandfather’s sexual actions 

towards his granddaughter when she was four and five years old do not come near 

the level of a due process violation or otherwise constitute reversible sentencing 

error. 

{¶26} That is, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts in the record 

do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. State v. Dean, 127 
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Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 49. Hence, critical, disapproving, 

or even hostile statements ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Id. 

{¶27} It is not reversible error for a sentencing judge, in explaining his 

sentence, to make critical statements about a defendant’s conduct based upon the 

facts of the case presented to the court. See, e.g., State v. Cemino, 2d Dist. No. 

24442, 2011-Ohio-5690, ¶ 8, 18-20 (scolding defendant and characterizing what he 

did as nasty, despicable, disgusting, and awful was not indicative of bias); State v. 

Coomer, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2009-09-016, CA2009-09-017, 2010-Ohio-3474, ¶ 18 

(trial court’s statement that the defendant was a psychopath may have been illadvised, but it was not reversible). 

{¶28} Moreover, a judge is encouraged to place a rationale for a sentence on 

the record, and we cannot reverse every time a judge happens to label the behavior 

at issue with an adjective that offends a child molester. As noted infra, the 

characterization of appellant’s acts with adjectives are often part of the court’s 

findings as to why consecutive sentences are imposed. 

{¶29} In further dispelling any impression of bias, the state notes that a court 

is not bound by the state’s recommendation. State v. Kelly, 7th Dist. No. 08-CO-17, 

2009-Ohio-1035, ¶ 29. The fact that the trial court sentenced the defendant to 

consecutive four-year sentences instead of the recommended consecutive three-year 

sentences does not assist appellant in demonstrating bias merely because the court 

opined that having sexual contact with one’s four or five year old granddaughter is 

despicable and beyond understanding. 

{¶30} As the state points out, the sentencing court could have rejected the 

agreement regarding the dismissal of the rape charge. Instead, the court accepted 

appellant’s plea to a lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition, lowering the 

available maximum sentence on the charge from life to five years. 

{¶31} In addition, the sentencing court did not impose the maximum sentence 

on either count. As the court imposed four-year sentences instead of the available 

five-year sentences, allegations of bias are even further diminished. Lastly, no fine 

was imposed even though appellant had been a high earner for years (until his job 

was discontinued in December of 2010, a year after the indictment in this case). 
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{¶32} For all of these reasons, this assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

{¶33} Appellant’s second assignment of error contends: 

{¶34} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 

APPELLANT BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS FOR GROSS 

SEXUAL IMPOSITION CONVICTION SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO 

ORC §2929.14(C)(4).” 

{¶35} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to make the proper 

findings in imposing consecutive sentences and failed to provide reasons in support 

of those findings. 

{¶36} Under the new legislation, effective September 20, 2011, a court 

imposing consecutive sentencing must make certain findings. 2011 H.B. 86. This 

legislation was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s statement that its Foster

decision was incorrect in striking down statutory consecutive sentence provisions and 

that the legislature would need to enact a new statute to revive any requirement of 

findings for consecutive sentences. State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio6320, 941 N.E.2d 768, ¶ 3 of syllabus. 

{¶37} Now, the court can impose sentences consecutively only if the court 

finds that: (1) consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime 

or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the 

public; and (3) two of the offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of 

conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of these offenses was so great or 

unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of 

the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). 

{¶38} Thus, the court is once again required to make findings. But, contrary 

to one of appellant’s arguments here, reasons are no longer required to support the 

findings. State v. Galindo-Barjas, 7th Dist. No. 12MA37, 2013-Ohio-431, ¶ 16-17, 19; 

State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. No. 24978, 2012-Ohio-4756, ¶ 18 (court need not 

specifically identify the factual bases for its findings); State v. Frasca, 11th Dist. No. 
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2011-T-0108, 2012-Ohio-3746, ¶ 57 (reasons were required by former R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2), which was not reenacted). 

{¶39} Appellant argues that reciting the “magic words” in the statute is 

insufficient, citing State v. Bradley, 5th Dist. No. 2012CA11, 2012-Ohio-4787. 

However, that case held that the mere statement by the trial court, “the statutory 

conditions for consecutive sentences have been met,” is not judicial fact-finding. This 

does not mean that a recitation of the statutory factors would have been insufficient. 

{¶40} To the contrary, the reference to “magic words” is typically to explain 

that the sentencing court should, but need not, use the exact statutory language to 

make the findings required by statute. See State v. Verity, 7th Dist. No. 12MA139, 

2012-Ohio-1158, ¶ 28-29. See also State v. Thompson, 7th Dist. No. 05JE16, 2005-

Ohio-6792, ¶ 58. That is, the trial court is not required to recite any “magic” or 

talismanic” words when imposing consecutive sentences, as long as it is “clear from 

the record that the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis.” State v. 

McKenzie, 3d Dist. No. 15-12-07, 2012-Ohio-6117, ¶ 10; State v. Nowlin, 5th Dist. 

No. CT2012-0015, 2012-Ohio-4923, ¶ 70; State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Nos. 97689, 

97691, 97692, 2012-Ohio-3951, ¶ 8. 

{¶41} Accordingly, the record can either contain magic words or words which 

reflect that a finding was actually made. See id. Our final task is thus to determine if 

the record reflects that the three consecutive sentence findings were made the 

sentencing court. 

{¶42} At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that its job was to protect the 

public, to punish offenders, and to decree a fair sentence. (Sent. Tr. 14). The court 

explained that this was accomplished by following the purposes and principles of the 

Ohio Felony Sentencing Law. (Sent. Tr. 14-15). The court noted that what appellant 

did was despicable and beyond understanding. (Sent Tr. 15). The court then 

announced its sentence, concluding: “The Court imposes today consecutive 

sentences because the harm here was so great and so unusual that a single term 

would be insufficient to accommodate the purposes and principles of the Ohio Felony 

Sentencing Law.“ (Sent. Tr. 16). 
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{¶43} The sentencing entry states that the court considered the purposes and 

principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors 

in R.C. 2929.12. The entry then provides: “The Court imposes consecutive terms 

because a single term would be insufficient to punish the offender and protect the 

public. Further the Court finds consecutive terms to be appropriate here due to the 

great harm to the victim. Anything less than consecutive terms would fail to reflect 

the seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct.” Considering all of these statements 

together, we conclude that the court made sufficient findings for imposing 

consecutive sentences. 

{¶44} Correlating to the first finding, the court found that non-consecutive 

terms would be insufficient to punish the offender and protect the public. This is 

sufficient to satisfy the finding that consecutive service “is necessary to protect the 

public from future crime or to punish the offender.” That is, if concurrent is 

insufficient, then consecutive would be necessary. Rote recitation is preferred to 

avoid these linguistic arguments on appeal, but it is not required of a trial court; 

synonymous words and phrasing can fulfill a court’s obligation with regards to 

sentencing findings. See Thompson, 7th Dist. No. 05JE16 at ¶ 58 (upholding 

consecutive sentence but noting that trial court should more closely mirror statute in 

future to avoid misconstruction of its decisions by appellants), citing State v. 

McCarthy, 7th Dist. No. 01BA33, 2002-Ohio-5185, ¶ 12. 

{¶45} The second statutory finding is that consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and the danger to the public. The 

court characterized appellant’s conduct as despicable and beyond understanding, 

stated that concurrent service was insufficient to protect the public and that 

concurrent service would fail to reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. If 

concurrent service would not reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, then 

consecutive service would not be disproportionate to the conduct. This is 

conceptually equivalent phraseology. See State v. Lenigar, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-53, 

2003-Ohio-5493, ¶ 15 (if court does not use exact language, it should use 

“conceptually equivalent phraseology”). See also Thompson, 7th Dist. No. 05JE16 at 

¶ 57-58 (also noting that the court’s stopping its sentence after stating “consecutive 
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sentences * * * are not disproportionate” {without stating what they are not 

disproportionate to} was sufficient because talismanic words are not required). The 

absence of the word disproportionate is not per se reversible. 

{¶46} As to the third statutory finding, the court explained that the purposes 

and principles of sentencing involved seriousness and recidivism factors. The court’s 

entry declared that consecutive terms were imposed “due to the great harm to the 

victim” and that “[a]nything less than consecutive terms would fail to reflect the 

seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct.” Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, 

the trial court explained that it was imposing consecutive sentences “because the 

harm here was so great and so unusual that a single term would be insufficient to 

accommodate the purposes and principles of the Ohio Felony Sentencing Law.” 

(Sent. Tr. 16). This is sufficient to satisfy the court’s duty to make a finding under the 

third prong in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).1

 This assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶47} For all of the foregoing reasons, the imposition of consecutive 

sentences is upheld and the trial court’s judgment affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, P.J., concurs. 

 1

In fact, appellant concludes by stating that “the court did nothing more than merely restate the 

statutory conditions.” However, a sentencing court’s restating of the statutory findings is in fact 

sufficient to fulfill its duty.