### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 19, 200 6 S es sio n MICH AEL B. TO DD v. DEAN JACK SON, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Henderson Coun ty No. 03157-1 Roy B. Mor gan, Jr., Judge

No. W2005-01526-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 6, 2006

Mic ha e l B . T od d ( “ Pla int if f” ) f ile d a re ta liatory

disc harge claim a ft e r b e ing te rm inate d f ro m hi s position as a water

plant operator for the Cityof L exington, Tenne ssee. At trial, the court dismissed his retaliatory

discharg e claim after f

inding that Plaintiff failed to make out a prima fac ie ca se. Plaintiff appea ls raising the issues of whe ther t h e t ri al court e rre d in dismi ssing his re taliatory discharg e claim and whether the trial judg e er

red in failing to re cuse himself f rom this case. F or the re a so ns se t f

orth b e low , w e a ff

irm. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t heCi r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Michae l B. Todd, Pro Se

. Dale Conde r, Jr., J ackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellees, D ean Jackson, Phil Bele w, Mark D ickson, Be nnie Scott, May or of the City of L exington, and City

of L exington. OP IN ION Fac tua l Ba c kg

ro und a nd P

ro c e dur al H ist or y On Octobe r 11, 2002, Michae l B. Todd ( “Plaintiff”) was hire d by the Cityof L exington, Te nn e sse e , a s a

wate r p la nt o pe rator . Pl a int if f w a s a n at- wi ll e mpl oy e e a ndwa s r e qu ir e d to c omp le te a

nin e ty -d ay

pr ob a tio na

ry pe ri od . A s a n o pe rator

fo r the wate r t

re a tme nt p la nt, Plaintiff’s job included, among other thing s, backw ashing the filters whe n the g aug es indicate d a certain “loss of hea d.” Howe ver, be sides rea ding the g aug es, oper ators must also consider othe r fa c tor s su c h a s w a te r d e ma ndon the ir sh if t a s c omp are d to thefo llo wi ng sh if t a nd , th us , mu st d ec i d e i f i two u l db e b et t ert o b ac k wa s h t h e f i l t er s ea rl y

ra t h ert h an try i n g t o b ac k wa s h d u ri n g a peak de mand time. I n this case, Plaintiff wor ked the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift which ra n from-2-

J anuary 1, 2003, to the morning of January 2, 2003. When the operators arrived on the morning of January

2, they discovere d that Plaintiff had not backw ashed any of the filter s. Phil Be lew (“D efe ndant B elew” ), assistant manag er of the wate r treatment plant, confronte d Plaintiff about his failure to ba ckwa sh, and Plaintiff later c laimed that he wa s assaulted by Def endant B elew during this confrontation. Plaintiff was subseque ntly terminated by

Dean J ackson ( “De fendant J ackson” ), mana g er of thewate r s y ste m f

or theCity of L e xing ton , o n Jan ua

ry 3, 20 03 , p ri or

to the c omp le tio n o f h is probationary

period. On D ece mber 31, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit ag ainst Defe ndant J ackson, Def endant B elew, Ma

rk Dickson ( “De fendant Dickson”), B ennie Scott (“ Def endant Scott”) , and the Cityof L exington, Tenne ssee ( all parties c umulatively ref err ed to at times as “the Def endants” ). In his complaint, Pl aintiff asse rted that (1) Def endant B elew and the Cityof L e xing tonwe relia

blefo r a ssa

ult , ( 2) that D e fe nd a nts Jac ks on , B e le w, a ndDi c ks on a ndtheCity of L exington wer e liable f or criminal conspiracy

to commit assault ag ainst Plainti ff, ( 3) that Def endants Scott, J ackson, and the Cityof L exington wer e liable f or wrong ful dischar g e and intentional infliction of emotional distress ag ainst Plainti ff, ( 4) that De fendants Bele w, J ackson, and the City

of L exington wer e liable f or intentional infliction of emotional distress by attempting to c ompel Plaintiff to violate fede ral a nd state law, and (5) that De fendant J ackson and the City

of L exington wer e liable f or bre ach of

contac t for terminating Plaintiff’s employ ment in bad fa ith. On September 24, 2004, the tria l court partially g rante d a motion for summary judgme nt filed by

the Def endants, thus g ranting the Def endants a judgme nt as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s c laims of conspirac y to commit assault, breac h of contra ct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Trial on Plaintiff’s re maining issues w as held on April 28, 2005. At trial, Pl aintiff pu rs ue d h is r e ta liatory

dis c ha rg e c la im u nd e r b oththewh ist le blo we r s tatut e a s w e ll a s th e Pub lic Employ ee Political Fr eedom Ac t which provides that it is unlawful for an employ er to discipline, threaten to discipline, or otherw ise discriminate a g ainst an employ ee be cause such employ ee e xer c ise d th e ir

ri g ht t o c ommun ic a te wi th an e le c te d o ff ic ia l. H e a lso pu rs ue d h is a ssa ult c la im ag ainst Defe ndant B elew and the Cityof L exington. Howeve r, af ter Plaintiff pre sented his proof, the trial court gr anted the D efe ndants’ motion for involuntary dismiss al pursuant to Rule 41.02 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure . I n dismiss ing Plaintiff’ s claim, the trial court noted that Plaintiff had fa iled to prove that he had bee n assaulted by Def endant B elew, and had further failed to provethat he had be en fire d for r eporting or re fusing to participate in illega l activity , or for spe aking with an elec ted offic ial. The trial c ourt furthe r found that, e ven had Plaintiff c arried the burde n of proof

for wr ong ful dischar g e, he ha d failed to put on any proof r eg arding damag es. Plaintiff appea ls. Issues Presented We f indtheiss ue s inthi s a

pp e a l to be a s f

oll ow s: 1 ) w he the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing that Plaint if

f w a s n ot w ro ng fu lly

dis c ha rg e d f or c ommun ic a tin g wi th an e le c te d o ff ic ia l,-3-

and 2) w hether

the trial judg e er

red in failing to re cuse himself f rom Plaintiff’s ca se. F or the re a so ns state d b e low , w e a ff irm. Stan dard of Revie w Th is C ou rt

ha s st a te d th e stand ardof re vie w f or a mot ionto d ism iss a s f

oll ow s: When a motion to dis miss is made at the close of a plaintiff’s proof

in a no n- jury c a se , th e tria l c ou rt

mus t impa

rt ia lly we ig h th e e vid e nc e a s th ou g h it wer e making finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law a fter pr esentation of all of the evidenc e. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). I f a pla intiff’s ca se has not bee n established by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e, then the c ase should be dismissed if, o n th e fa c ts f

ou nda ndtheapp lic ablela w, theplaint if f h a s sh ow n n o rig ht t o relief

. See City of Columbia v. C.F.W . Constr. C o. , 557 S.W .2d 734, 740 (Tenn. 1977); Atkins v. Kirkpatrick , 823 S.W .2d 547, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). T he standard of

revie w of a

trial court’ s decision to g rant a Rule 41.02 involuntary dismiss al is in acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Atkins , 823 S.W .2d at 552. As such, the f

actua l findings of

a trial c ourt areacc orded a presumption of corr ectne ss, and we w ill not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m. T e nn . R. Ap p. P 13 (d ); Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our re view is conduc ted “under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Count

y Bd. Of Educ ., 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

. Thompson v. Hensley , 136 S.W .3d 925, 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. May 10, 2004). Anal y sis W rongful T ermination for Communicating wi th an Elected O fficial Pla int if f a sse rt s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d indis mis sin g his wr on g fu l di sc ha rg e c la im a s s e rt e d u n d e r

s e c t i o n 8

- 5 0

- 6 0 2 ( a ) o f

t h e P u b l i c E m p l o ye e P o l i t i c a l F r e e d o mA c t

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Plaintiff arg ues that he pr oved by a pre ponderance at trial that he wa s discharg ed for speaking with an elec ted offic ial. For the re asons set forth below, we disa g ree . “In Tenne ssee, the g ener al rule is that an at-will employ ee may be fire d for g ood cause , bad ca use or no c ause.” W

ill ar d v . G old e n G all on -T

N, LL C ., 15 4 S. W.3 d 5 71 , 5 75 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Payne v. W . & Atl. R.R. Co. , 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 ( 1884), overruled on oth e r g ro un ds by Hu tto n v . W atte rs , 1 79 S.W. 13 4, 13 8 ( Te nn . 1 91 5) ; Fo rre ste r v . S toc k sti ll , 869 S.W .2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1994) ). Howe ver, “ [b] oth statutory and ca se law ha ve plac ed restric tions upon an employ er’ s fre edom to discharg e an e mploy ee, usua lly for r easons of

clea r-4-

public policy .” Id. (c i t i n g Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc ., 762 S.W .2d 552, 555 (Tenn. 19 88 ). Suc h a

re stric tio n is se t f

orth u nd e r s e c tio n 8 -5 0- 60 2( a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ [i]t is un la wf ul f or a ny pu bli c e mpl oy e r t o d isc ipl ine , th re a te n to dis c ipl ineor oth e rw ise dis c ri min a te a g a ins t a n e mpl oy e e be c aus e su c h e mpl oy e e e xer c ise d th a t e mpl oy e e ’s ri g ht t o c ommun ic a te wi th an e le c te d p ub lic of

fi c ia l.” Te nn . Co de An n. § 8 -5 0- 60 2( a ) ( 20 02 ). I n in te rp re tin g thi s statute, this Court has noted that “[o] bviously , the word ‘ beca use’ . . . r equire s that the discriminatory

actions of the public e mploy er must have resulted f rom the employ ee’ s communication with an ele cted of ficial.” Pe witt

v . B ufo rd , No. 01A01-9501- CV-00025, 1995 WL 614327, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1995). At trial, the only

evidenc e set forth by

Plaintiff in support of his claim under sec tion 8-50- 60 2 w a s h is o wnte sti mon y , w hic h w a s a s f oll ow s: I contac ted [Defendant] J ackson, asked if I could come to his office

. He sa id I could. So I went to his office that morning around 7:00 a

. m . W ent t o his office that mornin g aro un d 7 :00 a .m. a nd I ha d a c on ve rs a tio n wi th [De fe nd a nt] Jac ks on . I tol d h i m t h at [Defendant] Be lew–I don’t think I

used the wor d assault, but I said, y ou k now, he ha d had thre atening actions towar d me. You know, he was–y ou know, made me ve ry

upset. And I

did tell him, y ou know–y ou know, I do not ha ve to dea l with this. You know, that I expect him to do s o m et h i n g about this matter. You know, y ou’ve g ot to have saf ety at y our workpla ce. An d me and [De fe nd a nt] Ja c ks on ha d a sh ort c on ve rs a tio n. I n th is conver sation, I

did tell [ Def

endant] J ackson that I

was planning on talking to the ma y or abo ut this matte r. An d [D e fe nd a nt] J acks on said , “ Ar e y ou thr e a te nin g me with the may or? ” And I said, “No, I ’m not.” And so that was pretty much the end of that conve rsation. T h en wh en I l ef

t [ De fe n d an t ] J ac k s o n ’s o ff i ce , I

– ats o m e p o i n tt h atm o rn i n g, I think after I

had lef t [ Def endant] J ackson’ s office , I talked with the may or. Ye ah, in fac t, I did. I talked with him afte r I left [Defendant] J ackson’ s office and–on the te le ph on e , c a lle d h is h ou se , a ndI tol d h im w hat ha d h appe ne d. Yo u kno w, I tol d him–He said he w ould che ck i nto the matter. And I think he–he did have [Defendant] J ackson g o chec k into the matter. [Defendant] J ackson c laimed to have done an inve stigation sometim e later

. Then–L ets see. That was the m orning of J anuary 2 , and that wa s a Thursday nd morning . And I

was not sche duled to g o back to work ti ll that Friday night, the nig ht of January

the 3

. rd But I would g o to the office on J anuary the 3 to pic k up my pay chec k for the rd wee k. We g ot paid e very Friday

. I think that’ s rig ht. And so when I went to pick up my pay c he c k o n th a t Fri day

mornin g or

so , [D e fe nd a nt] Ja c ks on , h e c a lle d meint o his office . He told me that thing s werejust not worki ng out and that he wa s g oing to let me g o.-5-

De fe nd a nt S c ott , M a y or

of theCity of L e xing ton , te sti fi e d th a t Plaint if f w a s a n at- wi ll employ ee subje ct to a ninety -day probationary

period to ensur e ca

pability of performing job duties. The re cord shows that May or Scott never testified that he informed Def endant Jackson about Plaintiff’s contac ting him, but did state that he did not believe Plaintiff was fire d for speaking with an elec ted offic ial. Plaintiff never prese nted any

testimonyfrom De fendant Jac ks on re g ard ing e ith e r D e fe nd a nt Ja c ks on ’s kn ow le dg e re g ard ing Pla int if f’ s c on ve rs a tio n w ith May or Sc ott or there a so ns De fe nd a nt Ja c ks on te rm inate d Pl a int if f’ s e mpl oyme nt. Ho we ve r, in relation to potential reasons for Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff himself testified that one re ason he believe d he wa s fired w as due to his last name. Furthermor e, Ji mmy Kee , former

Plant Manag er of

the L exington Water Sy stem, testified that Plaintiff had trouble making decisions while on the job. Such testimony was c orrobor ated by

Mark Dic kenson, Plaintiff’s former c owo rk e r at th e wate r t

re a tme nt p la nt, wh o s tate d th a t Plaint if f h a d p ro ble ms c omp lying wi th h is job du tie s. I n dismiss ing Plaintiff’ s wrong ful dischar g e claim under sec tion 8-50-602(a ), the trial c ou rt fo un d th a t Plaintiff failed to prove h e wa s discharg ed bec ause he communicated w ith May or Scott. Furthermore, Plaintiff off ere d no proof that [Defe ndant] J ackson had knowledg e Plaintiff ac tually talked with May or Scott. Plaintiff offer ed no testimony or a ny oth e r e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ing hi s termin a tio n w a s ina ny way re late d to his c ommun ic a tio n w ithMay or Sc ott

. After a re view of the rec ord, we find that the evide nce f ails to preponder ate a g ainst the finding of thetria l c ou rt

that Plaint if

f w a s n ot t e rm inate d f

or sp e akin g wi th an e le c te d o ff ic ia l. A s a

re su lt, we f ind that the trial court did not er r in dismissi ng Plaintiff’s cause of ac tion. Rec usal of T

rial Judge I n h is b ri e f, Pla int if

f a sse rt s th a t th e tria l ju dg e sh ou ld h a ve re c us e d h ims e lf fr om the c a se at bar beca use he ha d previously

acc epted a

campaign c ontribution from a former membe r of the law firm r epre senting the Def endants in this case . We disag ree . Te nn e sse e c ou rt s h a ve lon g re c og nize d th a t a ll p art ie s ina su it “ ha ve a

ri g ht t o h a ve the ir case s hear d by

fair and impartial judg es.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 137 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), perm. app. de nied (T en n . M ar . 1 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)) . As set forth by this Court i n Eldridge , I nitially , the judg e has the duty to determine w hether

rec usal is warr anted in a particular c ase. Kin ar d , 986 S.W .2d at 228. These decisions ar e discretionary , unless otherwise mandated by the Tenne ssee Constitution or by statute. Id. See Tenn. Const. Art 6 § 11; Tenn. Code Ann. § 17- 2-101 (1994) . A judgemust be objective whe n making his or her de termination. Kin ar d , 986-6-

S.W. 2da t 22 8. Th us , w he n p art ie s c ha lle ng e a jud g e ’s imp art ia lit y , th e y “ mus t come f orwa rd with some evidenc e that would prompt a r easona ble, disinterested person to believethat the judg e’s impartiality might re asonably

be questioned. Davis v. D ep’t of Employm ent Sec ., 23 S.W .3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

. . . . Parties may

lose the rig ht to challeng e a judg e’s impartialityif they do not fi le re c us a l mo tio ns so on a ft e r the fa c ts f ormin g theba sis of

themot ionbe c ome known. Id. The fr equently cited rule that “a pa

rty must complain and seek r elief imm e diate ly

a ft e r the oc c ur

re nc e of a pr e jud ic ia l e ve nt andma y

no t si le ntl y pr e se rv e thee ve nt a s a n ‘ a c e in the ho le ’ t o b e us e d inthee ve nt o f an a dv e rs e decision,” a

pplies in cases w here a party challeng es a judg e’s impartiality

. Go twa ld v . G otw ald , 7 68 S.W. 2d68 9, 69 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8) ; se e als o D av is , 23 S.W. 3da t 31 3; Kin ar

d , 9 86 S.W. 2da t 22 8. Ac c or din g ly , th e failu reof a pa rty to seek the r ecusa l of a judg e in a timely manner results in a wa iver of the issue. Da v is , 23 S.W .3d at 313. Eldridge , 137 S.W .3d at 7-8. I n th is c a se , w e no te that Plaint if f d id n ot r a ise theiss ue of re c us a l at tria l. D e sp ite thi s, Plaintiff arg ues that he should nonethe less be allowe d to raise this issue for the first time on ap p e a l b e c au s e P l a i n t i f

f d i d n o tl e ar n o f

t h e a l l e g e d c o n f

l i c to f i n t e r e s tu n t i l m o r e t h a n t h i rt y d a ys afte r the trial c ourt’s judg ment. Although Plaintiff a lleg es that he f ailed to learn of any

potential conflict until more than thirty day s after

the trial court rende red f

inal judgme nt, the rec ord shows that he failed to file any

motions for post-judgme nt relief pur suant to Rule 60 of the Tenne ssee R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e i n o r d e r

t o tr y a n d b r i n g t h i s i s s u e b e f o r e t h e tr i a l c o u rt

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we a re inc lined to hold that Pl aintiff has w aived this issue. Howe ver, in orde r to foster and prese rve c onfidenc e in judicial neutra lity , we will nonethele ss addre ss the merits of Plaintiff’s c la im. As previously

noted, a pa

rty challeng ing the impartiality of a judg e “must come forwa rd with some evidenc e that would prompt a r easona ble, disinterested pe rson to believe that the judge ’s impartiality

might re asonably

be questioned.” Da v is , 2 3 S. W.3 d 3 04 , 3 13 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 99 ). As a lr e a dy

state d, Pla int if

f a rg ue s th at th e tria l ju dg e sh ou ld h a ve re c us e d h ims e lf due to the ac ceptance by

the trial judg e of a

campaign c ontribution from a former pa rtner w ith the Def endants’ la w firm. Specif ically , Plaintiff, in his brief, asserts that he is entitled to relief beca use the “ Supreme Court Rules Commentary [t o Rule 10, Canon 5(C)(2) (b) of the Tenne ssee S u p re m e C o u rtR u l es ] s t at e, ‘[ t ] h o u gh n o tp ro h i b i t ed , ca m p ai gn co n tri b u t i o n s o f w h i ch a j u d ge ha s kno wl e dg e , ma de by

la wy e rs or

oth e rs wh o a

pp e ar b e fo rethejud g e , may be re le va nt t o disqualification under

Section 3E.’” We disag ree . The ba sis of Plainti ff’ s arg ument stems from a c ampaig n contribution occur ring betwee n J uly 1998 and September

1998 by an attorne y

not appea

ring on behalf

of any party to this case. Furthermore , the Plaintiff has failed to present, e ither in the re cord or in his brief, evide nce-7-

s h o wi n g t h att h e t ri al j u d ge i n t h i s ca s e h ad an y k n o wl ed ge o f t h e s o u rc es o f p ri o r c am p ai gn contributions. Nor has Plaintiff pre sented a ny evidenc e showing that the trial judg e g ave pr e fe re nti a l tr e a tme nt t o th e De fe nd a nts in this c a se , o r t o p art ie s r e pr e se nte d b y theDe fe nd a nts ’ la w f irm in a ny

oth e r c a se . In li g ht o f the se fa c ts, we c a nn ot s a y that a re a so na blepe rs on wo uld be prompted to que stion the trial judge ’s impartiality in this m atter. We a ccor dingly find Pla int if f’ s is su e re g ard ing re c us a l to be wi tho ut m e ri t. Conclu sion Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e af firm the trial c ourt. Costs of this appeal ar e aw arde d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l a n t , M i c h a e l B

. T o d d , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE