alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Form 10Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>       <C> 
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                             45
<SECURITIES>                                        0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                   1,740 
<ALLOWANCES>                                       30 
<INVENTORY>                                         0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    0       
<PP&E>                                              4      
<DEPRECIATION>                                      1    
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  1,990      
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               0    
<BONDS>                                           410  
<COMMON>                                            0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0 
<PREFERRED>                                         0 
<OTHER-SE>                                        318       
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    1,990
<SALES>                                             0          
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  201          
<CGS>                                               0          
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      37
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    1
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 72
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    91       
<INCOME-TAX>                                       29      
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                62      
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0  
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0      
<CHANGES>                                           0  
<NET-INCOME>                                       62 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0 
<FN>
<F1> THE BALANCE SHEET PRESENTED BY CASE CREDIT CORPORATION IS UNCLASSIFIED.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

DEMONE RUSHING,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-1834

November 15, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
#### IN RE; Juan Carlos PINALES, Movant

No. 17-11080

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 22, 2017

Juan Carlos Piñales, Pro Se

Before SMITH, WIENER, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges,

*354PER CURIAM: *

Juan Carlos Piñales, federal prisoner # 50040-177, pleaded guilty to possession ■with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting. He filed a pro se motion to “vacate, correct[ ], or ... set aside” his sentence on account of a “clarifying amendment.” His motion contended that the district court erred in declining to apply a mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and that he deserved a sentence reduction in light of Amendment 794 to the Guidelines. Construing his motion as one for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the district court denied it. In a fifing that we construe as a notice of appeal,1 Piñales re-urges the arguments he made to the district court.

Pinales’s arguments on appeal are unavailing. Section 3582(c)(2) applies only to retroactive guidelines amendments as set forth in U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(d). *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Amendment 794 is not fisted in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) as an amendment for which a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) may be granted. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that Amendment 794 is not a basis for the sentence reduction requested by Piñales. *See Dillon,*560 U.S. at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683; *United States v. Jones,*596 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2010). Likewise, Pinales’s other challenges, largely based on *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) and *Mathis v. United States,*— U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), are not cognizable under § 3582(c)(2).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. Although Pinales's filing was initially characterized as a motion for authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, our review of its substance leads us to conclude that it is a constructive notice of appeal. *United States v. Santora,*711 F.2d 41, 42 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983).
EXHIBIT 32





CORTRONIX BIOMEDICAL ADVANCEMENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Cortronix Biomedical Advancement Technologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ending August 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Yoel Palomino, as Principal Executive, Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  April 21, 2014
By:
/s/ Yoel PalominoName:
Yoel PalominoTitle:
Principal Executive, Financial and Accounting Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Report pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code and, accordingly, is not being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of the Report and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.)
#### Said Acosta NEPOMUCENO, also known as Said Acosta, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 15-60804 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 28, 2017

*389Brian Vincent Schaeffer, YMCA International Services, Houston, TX, for Petitioner

Patricia Elia Bruckner, Joanna Leigh Watson, Trial Attorneys, Bernard Arthur Joseph, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before JONES, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Said Acosta Nepomuceno, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing his appeal, regarding the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal. He claims the BIA and IJ erred in concluding he could not meet the required seven years of continuous residency after finding he was paroled into the United States, but not admitted in any status, prior to his 17 August 2005 adjustment to lawful permanent resident.

Nepomuceno does not dispute the finding he was removable according to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based upon his convictions for offenses involving controlled substances and has, therefore, abandoned any challenge on that basis. *Sama v. Hannigan,*669 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2012); *Soadjede v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003). And, because Nep-omuceno is removable as a criminal alien, we have jurisdiction to consider only constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); *Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales,*482 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Nepomuceno’s fact-based claims. *Escudero-Arciniega v. Holder,*702 F.3d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 2012); *Nakimbugwe v. Gonzales,*475 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2007). Moreover, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the IJ should have made an adverse inference regarding the Government’s failure to produce a more substantial immigration file because, by failing to raise the issue before the BIA, Nepomuce-no did not exhaust his administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); *Omari v. Holder,*562 F.3d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2009); *Wang v. Ashcroft,*260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2001).

To the extent Nepomuceno raises a question of law by asserting he was admitted in any status when immigration officials allegedly “waved” him through inspection, his claim is without merit because the IJ expressly concluded he was paroled into the country, not admitted; therefore, because we lack jurisdiction for this fact-based claim, the question of his “status” is immaterial. *Tula Rubio v. Lynch,*787 F.3d 288, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2015).

DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6135 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6135

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 719 Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, as the ``Fred D. Thompson 
            Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The Federal building and United States courthouse located at 719 
Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, shall be known and designated as 
the ``Fred D. Thompson Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building and United States 
courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 
to the ``Fred D. Thompson Federal Building and United States 
Courthouse''.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 29, 2016.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
114th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6135

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 719 Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, as the ``Fred D. Thompson 
            Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario SENIOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17738 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(November 9, 2017)

Michelle Lee Schieber, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Macon, GA, Michael J. Moore, U.S. Attorney, Pope McGlamry Kilpatrick Morrison *&*Norwood, PC, Atlanta, GA, Crawford Seals, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Columbus, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Erin Leigh Pinder, Christina Lee Hunt, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Macon, GA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Mario Senior pleaded guilty to one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U;S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e), and he now appeals his 235-month sentence. Senior’s guilty plea stipulated that he had been convicted of three felonies, including obstruction of a law enforcement officer under Georgia law. At the sentence hearing, Senior objected to his classification as an armed career criminal on the ground that his Georgia obstruction conviction was not a qualifying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The district court overruled that objection, citing our holding in United States v. Brown, 805 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015), that felony obstruction under Georgia law is a violent felony under the ACCA’s element’s clause. This is his appeal.

Senior contends that our Brown decision was incorrectly decided, but under the “prior panel precedent rule of this Circuit, the holding of the first panel to address an issue is the law of this Circuit, thereby binding all subsequent panels unless and until the first panel’s holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001). That rule “is not dependent upon a subsequent panel’s appraisal of the initial decision’s correctness.” Id. at 1301-02 (quotation marks omitted). Because there is no en banc or Supreme Court decision overruling Brown, that decision forecloses Senior’s argument that felony obstruction under Georgia law is not a qualifying ACCA felony.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                     Exhibit 3.8

                                  OnePak, Inc.
              (Incorporated under the laws of the state of Nevada)

  Number                          CUSIP: 68275H107                      Shares:
CERT. 9999                        ISIN: UA68275H1077                 *9,000,000*

This certifies that * * SPECIMEN * *

Is the owner of *Nine Million and 00/100*

Fully-paid and non -assessable shares of common stock, $0.001 par value per
share, of

                                  ONEPAK, INC.

Transferable on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or
by duly authorized attorney on surrender of this certificate properly endorsed.
This Certificate is not valid until countersigned and registered by the Transfer
Agent and Registrar.

WITNESS the facsimile seal of the Corporation and the facsimile signatures of
its duly authorized officers.


/s/ Steve Andon                                    Dated January 01, 2009
Steve Andon, President                             Countersigned and Registered
                                  ONEPAK, INC.     CAPITAL TRANSFER AGENCY, INC
                                      SEAL         (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)
                                      2005         Transfer Agent and Registrar
                                     Nevada
                                                   By _________________
/s/ Charles Andon                                     (AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE)
Charles Andon, Secretarty

<PAGE>

                                  ONEPAK, INC

     For  Value  Received,  I/We  ________________  hereby  sells,  assigns  and
transfers unto


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPEWRITE NAME AND ADDRESS, INCLUDING ZIP CODE, OR ASSIGNEE)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shares of the Capital Stock represented by the within Certificate, and do hereby
irrevocably constitute and appoint

Attorney to transfer the said stock on the books of the within named
Corporation, with full power of substitution in the premises.

Dated:_______________

Signature:
          ----------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTICE: THE SIGNATURE TO THIS ASSIGNMENT MUST BE CORRESPONDE WITH THE NAME AS
WRITTEN UPON THE FACE OF THE CERTIFICATE, IN EVERY PARTICULAR, WITHOUT
ALTERATION OR ENLARGEMENT, OR ANY CHANGE WHATSOEVER, AND MUST BE GUARENTEED BY A
SCHEDULE 1 CANADIAN CHARTERED BANK OR AN ELIGIBLE GUARANTOR INTSTITUION WITH
MEMBERSHIP IN AN APPROVED SIGNATURE GUARANTEE MEDALLION PROGRAM.


Guaranteed by:

--------------------------------
II

Calendar No. 127

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 939

To amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 16 (legislative day, JUNE 5), 1995

Mr. SMITH (for himself and Mr. GRAMM) introduced the following bill; which

was read the first time

JUNE 19, 1995

Read the second time and placed on the calendar

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to ban partialbirth abortions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Partial-Birth Abortion

5 Ban Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title 18, United States Code, is

8 amended by inserting after chapter 73 the following:
2

S 939 PCS

‘‘CHAPTER 74—PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS

‘‘Sec.

‘‘1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited.

1 ‘‘§ 1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited

2 ‘‘(a) Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign

3 commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion

4 and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this

5 title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

6 ‘‘(b) As used in this section, the term ‘partial-birth

7 abortion’ means an abortion in which the person perform8 ing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus

9 before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.

10 ‘‘(c)(1) The mother, father, and if the mother has

11 not attained the age of 18 years at the time of the abor12 tion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus, may in a civil

13 action obtain appropriate relief.

14 ‘‘(2) Such relief shall include—

15 ‘‘(A) money damages for all injuries, psycho16 logical and physical, occasioned by the violation of

17 this section; and

18 ‘‘(B) statutory damages equal to three times

19 the cost of the partial-birth abortion;

20 even if any party consented to the performance of an abor21 tion.

22 ‘‘(d) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion

23 is performed may not be prosecuted under this section for
3

S 939 PCS

1 a conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense under

2 section 2, 3, or 4 of this title based on a violation of this

3 section.

4 ‘‘(e) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution or

5 a civil action under this section, which must be proved by

6 a preponderance of the evidence, that the partial-birth

7 abortion was performed by a physician who reasonably be8 lieved—

9 ‘‘(1) the partial-birth abortion was necessary to

10 save the life of the woman upon whom it was per11 formed; and

12 ‘‘(2) no other form of abortion would suffice for

13 that purpose.’’.

14 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of chapters

15 for part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by

16 inserting after the item relating to chapter 73 the follow17 ing new item:

‘‘74. Partial-birth abortions ...................................................................... 1531’’.
Calendar No. 127

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 939

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to ban

partial-birth abortions.

JUNE 19, 1995

Read the second time and placed on the calendar
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7341

FREDERICK LYNN SELLERS, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

BRYAN K. DOBBS, Warden, 

Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Orangeburg. R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (5:20-cv-01683-RBH) 

Submitted: February 17, 2022 Decided: February 23, 2022

Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Frederick Lynn Sellers, Appellant Pro Se. Lauren L. Hummel, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 1 of 3
2

PER CURIAM: 

Frederick Lynn Sellers, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order adopting 

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in which he sought to challenge his conviction by way of the 

savings clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pursuant to § 2255(e), a prisoner may challenge his 

conviction in a traditional writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if a § 2255 motion 

would be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a 

conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or 

the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent 

to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law 

changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed 

not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping 

provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law. 

In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000). 

We have reviewed the record and, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021), find no reversible error in the district 

court’s determination that Sellers failed to demonstrate that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is an 

inadequate or ineffective means of challenging his conviction. However, because the 

district court lacked jurisdiction over Sellers’ § 2241 petition, Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 

807-08 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), we modify the court’s order to reflect that the 

dismissal of Sellers’ petition is without prejudice and affirm the order, Sellers v. Dobbs, 

No. 5:20-cv-01683-RBH (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2021), as modified, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106; 

S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 

713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013). We deny Sellers’ motion to appoint counsel and

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 2 of 3
3

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7341 Doc: 11 Filed: 02/23/2022 Pg: 3 of 3