alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 28, 2009 

s0921 

Order 

 

September 28, 2009 

139136-7 

_________________________________________ 

In re Estate of ELMA ZYLA, Deceased. 

_________________________________________ 

PETER S. GRAPP, as Personal Representative of 

the Estate of ELMA ZYLA, Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 139136-7 

 COA: 281355, 281356 

Oakland Probate Court: 

2000-272816-DA, 

2006-305456-CZ 

LAURIE HILL-PTASHNIK and CYNTHIA 

BERTOLINI, as Personal Representatives of the 

Estate of CLARENCE HILL, Deceased, 

Defendants/Third-Party-PlaintiffsAppellees, 

and 

DOUGLAS S. TOUMA and TOUMA, WATSON, 

WHALING, COURY & CASTELLO, P.C., f/k/a 

TOUMA, WATSON, NICHOLSON, WHALING, 

FLETCHER & DEGROW, 

Third-Party-Defendants. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 14, 2009 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6526 

To eliminate the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding 

the definition of the term ‘‘official purpose’’ as it applies to drivers’ 

licenses and personal identification cards, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 12, 2016 

Mr. EMMER of Minnesota introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To eliminate the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security regarding the definition of the term ‘‘official 

purpose’’ as it applies to drivers’ licenses and personal 

identification cards, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF ‘‘OFFICIAL PURPOSE’’ FOR 

4 DRIVERS’ LICENSES AND PERSONAL IDENTI5 FICATION CARDS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 201(3) of the Emergency 

7 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 

8 War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (Public Law 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6526 IH

1 109–13; 119 Stat. 312; 49 U.S.C. 30301 note) is amend2 ed— 

3 (1) by striking ‘‘includes but is not limited to’’ 

4 and inserting ‘‘means’’; 

5 (2) by striking ‘‘aircraft, entering’’ and insert6 ing ‘‘aircraft, and entering’’; and 

7 (3) by striking ‘‘, and any other purposes that 

8 the Secretary shall determine’’. 

9 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days 

10 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

11 of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report 

12 on the implementation of the amendments made by this 

13 Act. 

Æ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Joshua PATERNOSTER-COZART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jim O’SULLIVAN, Acting Superintendent, Hampton Roads Regional Jail; Hampton Roads Regional Jail, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-6855

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 30, 2017

Decided: December 11, 2017

Joshua Paternoster-Cozart, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joshua Paternoster-Cozart seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. The final page of the court’s dismissal order indicated that the disposition was recommended by a magistrate judge, yet no report or recommendation was separately filed on the docket. All parties must be served with and given an opportunity to object to the *210findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1)(C) (2012). Here, the record establishes that Paternoster-Cozart did not receive notice of the magistrate judge’s recommendation until the district court issued its dismissal order, thus depriving Paternoster-Cozart of his right to file objections.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with instructions to serve the magistrate judge’s recommendation on Paternoster-Cozart and to provide him with an opportunity to file objections. We deny Paternoster-Cozart’s motion for a temporary restraining order and for a stay of execution of his sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*VACATED AND REMANDED*
#### DEUTCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee FOR SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006-1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-1, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Helen Valencia THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1949

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Helen Valencia Thomas, Appellant Pro Se. Travis Emil Menk, BROCK & SCOTT, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Helen Valencia Thomas has noted an appeal from the district court’s order remanding a removed foreclosure action to South Carolina state,court. “[A] district court may remand a case *sua sponte*for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) [(2012)], and such an order is not reviewable, *id.*§ 1447(d).” *Doe v. Blair,*819 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2016). The district court remanded Thomas’ removed action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that the complaint did not present a federal question and that diversity of citizenship was lacking. Because the district court remanded the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we lack jurisdiction to review its order. *Id.*Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oi'al argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 4(q)

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST
                                       OF
                                 COMPASS TRUST V


         THIS CERTIFICATE OF TRUST of Compass Trust V (the "Trust"), dated May
20, 2002, is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as trustee of the
Trust, to form a business trust under the Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del.
C. sec. 3801 et seq.).

         1. NAME. The name of the business trust being formed hereby is Compass
Trust V.

         2. DELAWARE TRUSTEE. The name and business address of the trustee of
the Trust with a principal place of business in the State of Delaware is Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, National Association, c/o JPMorgan Chase, 500 Stanton
Christiana Road, 3rd Floor/OPS4, Newark, DE 19713.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the sole trustee of the
Trust, has executed this Certificate of Trust as of the date first above
written.


                                CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
                                As Delaware Trustee

                                By:
                                      /s/  John J. Cashin
                                      --------------------------------------
                                     Name:    John J. Cashin
                                     Title:   Vice President
Exhibit 99.1

                   CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

          Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                           (18 U.S.C.Section 1350)

    The undersigned executive officer of Jacksonville Bancorp, Inc., (the
"Registrant") hereby certifies that the Registrant's Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended March 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained therein
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Registrant.

                              /s/ Jerry M. Chancellor
                              --------------------------------------------
                              Name: Jerry M. Chancellor
                              Title: President and Chief Executive Officer


Date: November 24, 2003


     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benito REYES-SANTANA, a.k.a. Gerardo Reyes, a.k.a. Benito Reyes-Santano, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10492

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 17, 2017

Shelley Kay-Glenn Clemens, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU—Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jeffrey Glenn Buchella, Esquire, Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Benito Reyes-Santana appeals his guilty-plea conviction and 46-month sentence for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Reyes-Santana argues that, during his plea colloquy, the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by failing to (1) advise him of the elements of the offense and (2) obtain a factual basis for his plea. Because Reyes-Santana did not raise these objections below, we review for 'plain error. *See United States v. Dominguez Benitez,*542 U.S. 74, 80, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004).

To convict a defendant of attempted reentry, the government must show that the defendant entered the United States “with the specific intent to enter the country free from official restraint.” *United States v. Argueta-Rosales,*819 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). The record reflects that the district court did not advise Reyes-Santana of this aspect of the offense during the plea colloquy. We nevertheless affirm Reyes-Santana’s conviction because he has not shown that the court’s error affected his substantial rights. *See Dominguez Benitez,*542 U.S. at 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (to prevail on plain error review, defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea”).

Reyes-Santana also argues the district court erred by applying the 2015 Guidelines instead of the 2016 Guidelines. Reviewing for plain error, *see United States v. Waknine,*543 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2008), we affirm Reyes-Santana’s sentence. *642In light of a recent decision of this court, see *United States v. Martines,*870 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017), the sentencing range under the 2016 Guidelines is the same as under the 2015 Guidelines. Thus, any error in the court’s use of the 2015 Guidelines did not affect Reyes-Santana’s substantial rights. *See Waknine,*543 F.3d at 552 (a nonprejudicial error does not affect substantial rights).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Joshua WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-4243

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 19, 2017

Decided: December 21, 2017

Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marvin Joshua White seeks to appeal his 180-month sentence, imposed pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. White’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the district court imposed an un*134reasonable sentence. White filed a pro se brief contending that the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress, and that he is entitled, to a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 794 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. We dismiss in part and affirm in part,

We generally review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “However, not all sentences are subject to appellate review.” *United States v. Williams,*811 F.3d 621, 622-23 (4th Cir. 2016). In this case, we lack jurisdiction to review. White’s sentence of imprisonment because the district court sentenced White in accordance with the terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the sentence is not unlawful, and the sentence is not based on the Sentencing Guidelines. *See id.*at 623-25. We therefore dismiss White’s appeal of his sentence.

We have considered the arguments assorted in White’s pro se supplemental brief and conclude they are without merit. In accordance with *Anders,*within the constraints set forth in *Williams,*we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm White’s conviction. This court requires that counsel inform White, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If White requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on White.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART*
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with this Annual Report of A5 Laboratories Inc. (the Company), on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2011, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Richard Azani, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) Such Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2011, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date: February 16, 2012By:/s/ Richard AzaniRichard AzaniPrincipal Executive Officer
A5 Laboratories Inc.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ruben C. Gomez v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-18-00864-CR

Trial court case number: 1564007

Trial court: 351st District Court of Harris County

In response to a joint motion from the parties, the Court abated the appeal and remanded 

to the trial court for preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the denial 

of appellant’s motion to suppress. The Court ordered these findings and conclusions to be filed in 

this Court in a supplemental clerk’s record by June 30, 2019. A supplemental clerk’s record was 

filed on June 26, 2019, which contained three documents purporting to be findings and conclusions 

but none of these documents was signed by the trial court. On July 25, 2019, appellant filed a 

motion for extension of time to file his brief, stating that the trial court had signed new findings 

and conclusions. Because the trial court has not yet complied with this Court’s order, the appeal 

remains abated.

We order the trial court to file a supplemental clerk’s record within 10 days of the date of 

this order containing the most recent findings and conclusions, signed by the trial court, 

concerning the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s motion for extension of time 

is granted until 30 days after the supplemental clerk’s record containing the signed findings and 

conclusions is filed in this Court. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ____/s/ Richard Hightower___

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __August 8, 2019__
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hervey Allen RANSOM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6768

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 28, 2017

Decided: December 11, 2017

Hervey Allen Ransom, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Donald Russell Pender, Rudy E. Renfer, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON,. KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

*209Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Hervey Allen Ransom seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ransom has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0626 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0626

**2002/626/EC: Commission Decision of 25 July 2002 approving the plan submitted by France for the eradication of classical swine fever from feral pigs in Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 2826) **

*
Official Journal L 200 , 30/07/2002 P. 0037 - 0037 *

Commission Decision

of 25 July 2002

approving the plan submitted by France for the eradication of classical swine fever from feral pigs in Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle

(notified under document number C(2002) 2826)

(Only the French text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/626/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever(1), and in particular Article 16(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) In April 2002 classical swine fever was confirmed in the feral pig population in the department of Moselle in France, at the border with the department Meurthe-et-Moselle, Luxembourg and Germany.

(2) In accordance with Article 16 of Directive 2001/89/EC, the French authorities have submitted a plan for the eradication of classical swine fever from feral pigs in Moselle and in the bordering department of Meurthe-et-Moselle.

(3) The submitted plan has been examined and found to comply with the provisions of Directive 2001/89/EC.

(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The plan submitted by France for the eradication of classical swine fever from feral pigs in Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle is hereby approved.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.

Done at Brussels, 25 July 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5.
WELLS                                              Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
FARGO                                              Document Custody
                                                   1015 10th Avenue SE
                                                   Minneapolis, MN 55414


                                                   Appendix I

       ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA

Corporate Trust Services division of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
(the "Company" is responsible for assessing compliance with the servicing
criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Company has determined that the
servicing criteria are applicable in regard to the servicing platform for the
period as follows:

Platform: Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction-level reporting required under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed
securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities issued on or after January
1, 2006, for which the Company provides document custody services, excluding
any publicly issued transactions issued by any government sponsored entity (the
"Platform").

Applicable Servicing Criteria: The servicing criteria set forth in Item
1122(d)(4)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(ii), in regard to the activities performed by the
Company with respect to the Platform (the "Applicable Servicing Criteria"). The
Company has determined that all other servicing criteria set forth in Item
1122(d) are not applicable to the Platform.

Period: Twelve months ended December 31, 2006 (the "Period").

With respect to the Platform, the Company provides the following assessment of
compliance with respect to the Applicable Servicing Criteria:

1. The Company is responsible for assessing the Company's compliance with the
Applicable Servicing Criteria as of and for the Period.

2. The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.
In performing this assessment, the Company used the criteria set forth by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in paragraph (d) of Item 1122 of Regulation
AB.

3. Based on such assessment, as of and for the Period, the Company has
complied, in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

KPMG LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report
with respect to the Company's assessment of compliance as of and for the
Period.


                                       WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION


                                        By: /s/ Shari L. Gillund
                                            ---------------------
                                            Shari L. Gillund

                                        Its: Senior Vice President

                                        Dated: March 1, 2007