#### Nathaniel J. BUCKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLIEDBARTON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC, Adam Rees, Jacqueline M. Jackson, Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees, Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Manufacturers & Traders Trust Company, Richard Russo, individually and in his official capacity as Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority police officer, Adam Brodsky, individually and in his official capacity as Niagara Frontier Transportation *38Authority police officer, George Gast, individually and in his official capacity as Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority police chief, David Mondry, Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Cross-Defendants.*

No. 17-186-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 10, 2018

FOR APPELLANT: James Ostrowski, Buffalo, NY.

FOR APPELLEES: James H. Cosgriff III, Petrone <& Petrone, P.C., Williamsville, NY.

PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, CHRISTINA REISS, District Judge.*

*

The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.

*

 Judge Christina Reiss, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Nathaniel J. Buckley appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Telesca, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Buckley’s sole argument on appeal is that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to his common law malicious prosecution claim against Adam Rees, Jacqueline M. Jackson, and their employer AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC (“AlliedBarton”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Under New York law, “[t]he elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice.” De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 760, 47 N.E.3d 747 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). The failure to establish a single element defeats the malicious prosecution claim. Brown v. Sears Roebuck *&*Co., 297 A.D.2d 205, 746 N.Y.S.2d 141, 145 (1st Dep’t 2002).

We do not need to decide whether Rees and Jackson commenced the prosecution by making false statements to law enforcement authorities. See De Lourdes Torres, 26 N.Y.3d at 760, 47 N.E.3d 747. Summary judgment was appropriate because even without reference to the alleged false statements, the authorities had probable cause to initiate and continue the proceeding against Buckley. See Brown, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (holding that false statements made by a civilian defendant did not vitiate probable cause because “probable cause existed for plaintiffs arrest without any reference to the alleged statements”). Statements by Jackson and video recordings of the incident adequately establish probable cause for the trespass charge. Indeed, Buckley concedes that he was standing on property that Rees and Jackson (correctly) believed to be private property when he and his fellow protesters were directed to leave the area. According*39ly, we assign no error to the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Buckley’s common law malicious prosecution claim against Rees, Jackson, and AlliedBarton.

We have considered Buckley’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.