United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 25, 2022

Decided October 26, 2022 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1091 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN L. LEE III, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:20CR00343-001 

James Patrick Hanlon, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

John Lee, while on probation for child molesting, was discovered in 2019 to have 

hundreds of sexually explicit images of minors, including infants, that depicted acts of 

sadism and masochism. He later pleaded guilty to 12 counts of receiving and 2 counts 

of possessing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (4)(B). The district judge

accepted the plea and sentenced Lee to prison terms of 300 months for receipt and 

240 months for possession—to be served concurrently—with a life term of supervised 

release. Lee appealed, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 22-1091 Page 2 

moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Because the 

analysis in counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Lee has not responded to counsel’s 

motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues that counsel has properly 

identified. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel first informs us that she consulted with Lee and confirmed that Lee does 

not wish to withdraw his plea. Thus, counsel appropriately declines to discuss any

potential challenge to the plea’s validity. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel then considers whether Lee could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to his 

sentence and rightly concludes that he could not. To begin, counsel accurately explains

that Lee’s 300- and 240-month prison terms did not exceed the statutory maximums. 

Accounting for Lee’s prior convictions of child molesting, the district judge could have 

lawfully imposed a prison term of up to 480 months for receiving child pornography, 

18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), and 240 months for possessing it, id. § 2252(b)(2). 

Next, counsel correctly determines that a procedural challenge to the calculation 

of the advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines would be pointless. The district 

judge adopted the guidelines range from the presentence investigation report, which 

advised 262 to 327 months in prison. (Both offenses were grouped for guidelinescalculation purposes. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).) Lee made one written objection to that 

calculation after reviewing the report: He argued that the four-level enhancement for 

possessing material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct should not apply. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). But he withdrew that objection at his sentencing hearing and 

made no other objections. Thus, Lee waived any procedural challenge to the calculation 

of the guidelines range. See United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022). 

We also agree with counsel that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness 

of Lee’s sentence would be futile. Lee’s 300-month prison term for receipt (which 

subsumes the concurrent 240-month sentence for possession) falls within the guidelines 

range, and so we would presume that it is reasonable. See United States v. Jarigese, 

999 F.3d 464, 471 (7th Cir. 2021). Like counsel, we cannot identify anything in the record 

that might rebut that presumption. The district judge reasonably balanced the 

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by highlighting Lee’s “extremely serious” 

offense of child pornography, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), his history of repeating this type of

crime, see id. § 3553(a)(1), and the need to protect the public, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), 
No. 22-1091 Page 3 

against Lee’s principal mitigating arguments, including his mental health and history of 

sexual abuse. See United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Finally, counsel contemplates whether Lee could plausibly challenge the term or 

conditions of supervised release, but she appropriately decides that any such challenge 

would be pointless. As with the objection to the calculation of the guidelines range, Lee

made a written objection to one condition of supervised release outlined in the 

presentence investigation report (polygraph testing). But here too he withdrew the 

objection at sentencing and declined to raise any additional concerns when invited to 

object to the report or the final sentence. He thus waived any objections. See United

States v. Anderson, 948 F.3d 910, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 

545, 555 (7th Cir. 2016). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.