# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7 , 20 20 * Decided December 8 , 20 20

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION , Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE , Circuit Judge

No. 19

- 3424

RONALD R. SHEA , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.

DOUGLAS KOEHLER , et al., Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Western Division

.

No. 12 C 50201
Philip G. Reinhard , Judge

.

O R D E R
This is the second appeal in proceedings that arose out of an altercation between Ronald Shea and family members . In a prior order, we sorted out a sprawling assortment of claims

— uph olding the dismissal of Shea’s federal claims and some state

law claims bu t vacat ing the dismissal of other state

- law claims and remand ing for further proceedings. Shea v. Winnebago Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 746 F. App’x 541 (7th Cir.

* We have agreed to decide th is case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 3424 Page 2

2018). On remand, the district court concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction and relinquish ed supplemental jurisdiction over th e remaining state

- law claims

. In this appeal, Shea concedes that diversity jurisdiction is absent but contends that the absence requires vacating the entire judgment

. We affirm.
As he alleged in his operative complaint , Shea moved in with his elderly mother in Roscoe, Illinois, to prevent his sister and her husband from seiz ing her estate. Shortly afterward s, t he sister and brother

- in

- law violently kicked him out and then falsely reported him to the police for battery

. Shea sued the couple and several other defendants , asserting mostly state

- law tort claims but also several federal claims , including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the Americans with Disabilities Act , and the Rackete er Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

. The district court dismissed all claims except a state

- law claim for battery against his sister . A jury trial was held on that claim , and the jury found against Shea

. On appeal, we upheld the dismissal of certain claims but determined that several state

- law claims (civil conspiracy, assault, false imprisonment, battery, and malicious prosecution) should not have been dismissed

. Shea, 746 F. App’x at 547

– 50. But we questioned the district court’s diversity j urisdiction , so we remanded with instructions for the court to examine whether diversity jurisdiction existed and , if it didn’t, to consider relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction

. Id. at 550.
The district judge a dopt ed a magistrate judge’s recommendation that diversity jurisdiction was lacking and relinquish ed supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

- law claims, which he dismissed without prejudice. The judge concluded that Shea had established permanent domic ile at his mother’s house in Illinois in November 2011 and that he had not shown a physical presence and intent to remain in the two other states where he had ties

— California and Nevada

— at the time he filed his complaint

. And given that Shea’s federal stat utory claims already had been dismissed, the judge decided to follow the general presumption that a district court in that situation will relinquish jurisdiction over remaining state

- law claims

. On appeal, Shea now argues that the absence of diversity jur isdiction requires vacating all prior decisions in the proceedings

— the dismissal with prejudice of some of his state

- law claims and the entry of judgment on the jury ’s verdict against him. If we construe his brief generously, he argues that once the distri ct court dismissed his federal claims, it abused its discretion by not relinquish ing jurisdiction over his state

- law claims. By proce ed ing to dismiss some of his state

- law claims and enter judgment onNo. 19

- 3424 Page 3

the jury’s verdict, the court, he says, produced disfav ored “piecemeal adjudication” that offends principles of comity.
Shea waived this argument , however, by failing to raise it in the district court

. See Duncan Place Owners Ass'n v. Danze, Inc. , 927 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2019)

. In any event , a court’s decision whether to exercis e supplemental jurisdiction over state

- law claims after dismissing all federal claims is “purely discretionary.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ( “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

. . . if

. . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction) (emphasis added); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. , 556 U.S. 635, 6 39

– 40 (2009) (citing cases). Although a district court may relinquish supplemental jurisdiction after all federal claims have been dismissed, “it is not required to do so.” Bailey v. City of Chicago , 779 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2015 ) (citation omitted)

. Further, g iven the substantial

resources the court invested in Shea’s case (spanning two years and 150 docket entries) before it dismissed his federal claims , the district court ’s decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction was permissible and “ does not justify forcing the litigants to start from scratch in state court .” See Myers v. Cty. of Lake, Ind. , 30 F.3d 847, 8 49

– 50 (7th Cir. 1994)

.

AFFIRMED