alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 778 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 778

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to permit the selection of an 
employee labor organization through the signing of a labor organization 
 membership card by a majority of employees and a subsequent election, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                  May 9 (legislative day, May 1), 1995

   Mr. Simon introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the National Labor Relations Act to permit the selection of an 
employee labor organization through the signing of a labor organization 
 membership card by a majority of employees and a subsequent election, 
                        and for other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Labor Relations Representative 
Amendment Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. RECOGNITION OF SELECTED LABOR REPRESENTATIVE.

    Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 159) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(f)(1) Not later than 30 days after the receipt of signed union 
recognition cards, which designate an entity as the employee's labor 
organization, from 60 percent of the employees of the employer, the 
Board shall direct an expedited election with respect to the selection 
of the entity as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of 
such employees.
    ``(2) The expedited election, as directed by the Board, may not be 
delayed for any reason or purpose.
    ``(3) The Board shall promulgate regulations that implement rules 
and procedures to address any challenges with respect to the 
designation or selection of an exclusive collective bargaining 
representative under this subsection.
    ``(4) The challenges described in paragraph (3) may be brought only 
after the expedited election described in paragraph (1).''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Buford RANDLE, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee

No. 17-40293

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 30, 2017

Buford Randle, Pro Se

Susan Frances San Miguel, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Edward Larry Marshall, Office of the Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee

Before SMITH, WIENER, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Petitioner-Appellant Buford Randle, Texas prisoner # 1970284, filed a motion in this court seeking a certificate of ap-pealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application in which he challenges his convictions for evading arrest and possession of cocaine. Randle raised claims in the district court that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in numerous respects, mainly related to (1) his mental health or (2) his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was heavily medicated when he pleaded. To obtain a COA, Randle must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

This court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary. *Hernandez v. Thaler,*630 F.3d 420, 424 *&*n.1 (5th Cir. 2011). Randle’s notice of appeal was'filed more than 30 days after the entry of the final judgment denying his § 2254 petition. That made his notice of appeal untimely. *See*Fed. R. Apr. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (c)(1). A federal habeas proceeding is civil in nature. When the time in which to file a notice of appeal in a civil case is set by statute, it is jurisdictional. *283*Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. of Chicago,*- U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 13, - L.Ed.2d - (2017); *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). We therefore lack jurisdiction in this case because Randle’s notice of appeal was untimely. Randle’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, and his request for a COA is DENIED as MOOT.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5.4.
1 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-3077

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Kevin Dean Lambert, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 13, 2001 Filed: March 27, 2001

___________ Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM 1 , Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.2 The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa. -2- KevinDean Lambert appeals his drug and firearm convictions entered upon a guilty plea in the district court. 2 We affirm.
InNovember 1999, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Lambert, charging him with (1) conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 856; (2) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and (3) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lambert pleaded guilty to counts one and three, noting that he and the government disagreed as to drug quantity but admitting he was responsible for at least 200 grams of methamphetamine. At sentencing, Lambert and the government agreed that he was responsible for between 350 and 500 grams of methamphetamine. Accepting this drug quantity agreement, the district court sentenced Lambert at the bottom of the resulting Guidelines range to 120 months imprisonment and also imposed the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the gun charge.
Lamb ert's sole argument on appeal is that the district court violated the constitutional principles articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) by sentencing him above the mandatory five-year minimum required by § 924(c) even thoughthe government did not prove drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. Lambert's argument

is misguided, however, as Apprendi mandates proof beyond a reasonable doubt only of those facts that increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Id. at 2362-63; UnitedStates v. Aguayo-Delgado , 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 121 S.Ct. 600 (2000). Even if we ignore Lambert's admissions as to drug quantity, his 180-month total sentence is within the 20-year-3-

maximum authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) for the drug offense simpliciter

. Lambert's sentence thus presents no Apprendi error. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Ernst & Young LLP                      Phone: (612) 343-1000
                   220 South Sixth Street, Ste. 1400      www.ey.com
                   Minneapolis, MN 55402-4509


                                                                   Exhibit 34.1


                       Report of Independent Accountants

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying Report
on Assessment of Compliance with SEC Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that
U.S. Bank National Association (the Company) complied with the servicing
criteria set forth in Item 1122 (d) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Regulation AB for the Structured Repackaging platform (the
Platform) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006, except for criteria
1122 (d)(1)(i), 1122 (d)(1)(iii), 1122 (d)(2)(iii), 1122 (d)(4)(i), 1122
(d)(4)(vi), and 1122 (d)(4)(ix) through 1122 (d)(4)(xv), which the Company has
determined are not applicable to the activities performed by them with respect
to the servicing platform covered by this report. Management is responsible
for the Company's compliance with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility
is to express an opinion on management's assertion about the Company's
compliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of
less than all of the individual asset backed transactions and securities that
comprise the Platform, testing of less than all of the servicing activities
related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those
selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance
with the servicing criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the
selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during
the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to
determine whether errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to
our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or
reported by the Company during the period covered by this report for the
selected transactions or any other transactions. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does
not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with the
servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31,
2006, for the Structured Repackaging platform is fairly stated, in all
material respects.

                                                          /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

February 26, 2007


                                      13
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

EL PASO COUNTY WATER 

IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 1,

 

 Appellant,

v.

ROGELIO TREVIZO,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-21-00206-CV

Appeal from the

243rd District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 2019DCV1164)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion to Reestablish Appellate Timetable. This 

Court ORDERS this appeal to continue, the appellate timetable suspension is lifted, and the Record 

shall be filed in this Court on or before March 17, 2022.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2022.

PER CURIAM

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox and Alley, JJ.
#### MERCATO ELISIO, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant v. John J. DEVENEY, III, improperly named John Deveney; Deveney Communication Consulting, L.L.C.; Chris Costello, individually and as employee of Deveney Communication Consulting, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees

No. 17-30202

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed December 13, 2017

Marie Roach Yeates, Esq., Zach Howe, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Stephen Michael Gele, Randall Alan Smith, Smith & Fawer, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Paul J. Verlander, Attorney, Daniel Redmann, Duplass, Zwain, Bourgeois, Pfister & Weinstock, Metairie, LA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light of the briefs, oral argument and pertinent portions of the record. Having done so, we conclude that the claims appellant asserts against these appellees accrued, under either federal or state law, as early as August 2012 or April 2013, triggering the commencement of the one-year Louisiana prescription period. *Piotrowski v. City of Houston,*51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995); *Elzy v. Roberson,*868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989); *Zeigler v. Hous. Auth. Of New Orleans,*118 So.3d 442, 452 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013). Appellant’s suit, filed on February 20, 2015, is well outside this period. Further, there was no basis for equitable tolling of prescription because appellees’ actions did not amount to the level of active concealment necessary to implicate the jurisprudential exception, *contra non valentem. F.D.I.C. v. Barton,*96 F.3d 128, 135 (5th Cir. 1996) (to suspend the running of the prescriptive period there must be evidence of “fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or concealment by the defendants that led to the plaintiffs failure to file the claim within the statutory period”). These conclusions were well stated in the district court’s opinion, with which we essentially agree. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.'

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 972 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 972

 To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for medicaid 
   coverage of all certified nurse practitioners and clinical nurse 
                         specialists services.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 27 (legislative day, June 19), 1995

  Mr. Daschle (for himself, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Hollings, Mr. 
  Bingaman, Ms. Boxer, and Mr. Akaka) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for medicaid 
   coverage of all certified nurse practitioners and clinical nurse 
                         specialists services.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MEDICAID COVERAGE OF ALL CERTIFIED NURSE PRACTITIONER AND 
              CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST SERVICES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1905(a)(21) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1396d(a)(21)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(21) services furnished by a certified nurse practitioner 
        (as defined by the Secretary) or clinical nurse specialist (as 
        defined in subsection (t)) which the certified nurse 
        practitioner or clinical nurse specialist is legally authorized 
        to perform under State law (or the State regulatory mechanism 
        provided by State law), whether or not the certified nurse 
        practitioner or clinical nurse specialist is under the 
        supervision of, or associated with, a physician or other health 
        care provider;''.
    (b) Clinical Nurse Specialist Defined.--Section 1905 of such Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1396d) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(t) The term `clinical nurse specialist' means an individual 
who--
            ``(1) is a registered nurse and is licensed to practice 
        nursing in the State in which the clinical nurse specialist 
        services are performed; and
            ``(2) holds a master's degree in a defined area of clinical 
        nursing from an accredited educational institution.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
become effective with respect to payments for calendar quarters 
beginning on or after January 1, 1996.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

JOSEPH BAUER, 

 Petitioner 

 v. 

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 

BOARD OF REVIEW, 

 Respondent 

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION, 

 Intervenor 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 914 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6526 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6526

   To eliminate the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
regarding the definition of the term ``official purpose'' as it applies 
 to drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 12, 2016

    Mr. Emmer of Minnesota introduced the following bill; which was 
      referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To eliminate the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
regarding the definition of the term ``official purpose'' as it applies 
 to drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF ``OFFICIAL PURPOSE'' FOR DRIVERS' LICENSES AND 
              PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 201(3) of the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief, 2005 (Public Law 109-13; 119 Stat. 312; 49 U.S.C. 30301 note) 
is amended--
            (1) by striking ``includes but is not limited to'' and 
        inserting ``means'';
            (2) by striking ``aircraft, entering'' and inserting 
        ``aircraft, and entering''; and
            (3) by striking ``, and any other purposes that the 
        Secretary shall determine''.
    (b) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the amendments 
made by this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> 
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from internally
prepared consolidated financial statements for the 9 months ended April 30, 1998
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such form 10-Q for period ended
April 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         JUL-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                            AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              APR-30-1998
<CASH>                                        105,357
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  31,067
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              139,309
<PP&E>                                          2,930       
<DEPRECIATION>                                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                244,204      
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          19,046       
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                       95,869     
<OTHER-SE>                                      3,231
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  244,204
<SALES>                                             0 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              146,012
<CGS>                                               0         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 105,172 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               26,661
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                113
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                14,066
<INCOME-TAX>                                    6,189
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             7,877
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0 
<NET-INCOME>                                    7,877    
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .71<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .68<F2>
        
<FN>
<F1>EPS is reported as "Basic EPS," as prescribed by SFAS No. 128
<F2>EPS is reported as "Diluted EPS," as prescribed by SFAS No. 128
<FN>

</TABLE>
#### Dewan CHAND, Dewand Chand AKA Dewan Puri, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71842

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 3, 2017

William Frick, Law Office of William Frick, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner

OIL, Jason Wisecup, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: LEAYY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dewan Chand, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his third untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. *Avagyan v. Holder,*646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chand’s motion to reopen as time and number barred, where it was his third such motion, he filed it more than eleven years after the filing deadline, and he failed to demonstrate that any exception to the time or number bars was warranted. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(i)-(iv) & (3); *Avagyan,*646 F.3d at 679.

Because these determinations are dis-positive, we need not reach Chand’s contentions regarding his eligibility for adjustment of status or a waiver of inadmissibility. *See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to reach non-dispositive issues).

Chand’s motion for a stay of removal is denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.