F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C .; W I L L I A M S -S O N O M

A A D V E R

T I S I N G , I N C .; W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A DTC, I

N C .,

______________________
W I L L I A M S -S O N O M

A , I N C ., a Delaware corporation, DB A Pottery B arn, DB A W illiams-Sonoma, DB A W illiams-Sonoma Home; W I L L I A M S -S O N O M

A A D V E R

T I S I N G , I N C ., a California corporation; W I L L I A M S -S O N O M

A DTC, I N C ., a California corporation, Petitioners
,

v

.

U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R

T
F O R T H E N O R

T H E R N D I S T R I C T O F C A L I F O R

N I A , S A N F R A N C I S C O , Respondent
,

W I L L I A M R

U S H I N G , I n dividually and on B ehalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Real Party in Interest. N o. 19-70522

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01421- W HO

OPI NI ONI N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

. 2

A ppeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California W illiam Horsley

Orrick, District J udg e, Presiding

A rg ued and Submitted October 2, 2019 San F rancisco, California

F iled J anuary

13, 2020

B e fore: F erdinand F . F ernandez and Richard A. Paez
, Circuit J udg es, and J ennifer Choe-Groves, * J udg e.

Opinion by

J udg e F ernandez ; D issent by

J u d g e Paez

SUMMARY * *

Writ of Mandam us / Discovery

The panel g ranted W illiams-Sonoma Advertisi n g, I nc.’s petition for a writ of mandamus, and ordered the district court to vacate a p r e-class-certification discovery order that directed W illiam s -Sonoma to produce a list of California customers who had purchased certain bedding products.

* T h e Ho n o rab le J en n if

er Ch o e- Gro v es, J u dg e f

o r t h e Un i t ed States Co u rt o f In tern atio n al T rad e, sittin g b y d esig n atio n

.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

. 3

W illiam Rushing broug ht a n un derly

ing action ag ainst W illiams-Sonoma to recov er damag es that he alleg edly suffered d ue to W illiams-Sonoma’s alleg ed misrepresentations about thread co u n t on bedding he purchased. B e fore a class a ct ion was certified, the district
court determined that Kentucky law g overned Ru shing ’s

c l a i m and that Kentucky c onsumer law prohibited c las s actions. The district cour t g ranted Rushing ’s request to obtain di s covery from W illiams-Sonoma for the purpose o f aiding his counsel’s attempt to find a Californi a cu s t omer who purchased similar bedding

.

I n determining whether to issue mandamus relief, t h e panel applied the Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court
, 557 F .2d 650, 656-661 (9th Cir. 1 9 77), factors. The panel held that Supreme Court authority dem o n s t rated clear error in the district court’s decision. T h e panel h eld that t he Supreme Court has determined that seeking discov e r y of the name o f

a c l a ss member (here an u nknown person, who could sue W illiams-Sonoma) was not relevant w ithin the me a n i n g o f F ed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), which limits the scope of discovery

. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
, 437 U.S. 340, 353 (1978). The p anel conclude d t h a t the d istrict court clearly erred as a matter of law when it ordered th e d i s c o very in
q u e s t i o n , and the balance of factors weig hed in favor o f g ranting the writ of mandamus.

J udg e Paez dissented because in his view the district court had not erred, let alone committed the clear error required for the ex traordinary

remedy of mandamus relief.I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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COUNSEL

P. Craig Cardon (arg

ued), Robert J . Guite, and B e njamin O

. Ai g b oboh, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton L L P, San F rancisco, California, for Petitioners.

Kathry n Honecker (arg

ued) and J onathan Udell, Rose L aw Group, PC, Scottsdale, Ariz ona; Amber L

. Eck and Robert D

. Prine
, H a e g g quist & Eck, L L P, San Dieg o, California; G e o rg e Richard B aker, B a ker L a w , PC, L os Ang e le s , California; for Real Party in I nterest.

No appearance for Respondent.

Timothy G. B lood a

n d Paula R

. Br own, B lood H urst & O’Reardon, L L P, San Dieg o, Cal i f ornia, for Amicus Curiae Consumer Attorney s of California.

OP INION

F ERNANDEZ , Circuit J udg e:

Wi l l i a m s

- S o n o m a , I

n c

. , Wi l l i a ms-Sonoma DTC, I nc., and W illiams-Sonoma Advertising
, I nc. (collectively “ W illiamsSonoma”) pe t i tion for a writ of mandamus 1 ordering the district court t o vacate a pre-class-certification discovery order that direct e d W illiams-Sonoma to produce a list o f California custo m ers who had purchased certain bedding products. The purpose of the discovery was to enable opposing coun s e l t o find a lead plaintiff to pursue a class

1 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 5 1 (a).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

. 5

action ag a inst W illiams-Sonoma under Cali f ornia law. W e g rant the petition.

B ACKGROUND

W illiam Rushing
, a resident and c i t i z e n of the State o f Kentucky
, alleg edly p urchased beddi n g from W illiamsSonoma, and an important reason for his doing so was based
upon the advertised thread count. W illiams-Sonoma said that the thread count was 600 threads per square inch, but Rushing alleg edly later discovered that it was actually much lower than that. Thus, h e b r o ug ht an action ag ainst W illiamsSonoma to re c o v e r d amag es u nder the law of the State o f California t h a t h e alleg e dly suffered due to W illiamsSonoma’s alleg e d misrepresentations. He also soug ht damag es under California law for a c l as s of consumers w ho boug ht bedding from W illiams-Son o m a due to the selfsame alleg ed misrepresentations.

B e fore a class action was certified, 2 t h e district court determined, inter alia
, that Kentucky l a w g overned Rushing ’s claims and tha t Kentucky consumer law prohibited class actions. Rushing g a v e notice that he would pursue his personal claims under Kentucky law, but soug h t to obta i n discovery

3 from W illiams-Sonoma for the so l e p urpose o f aiding his counsel’s a ttempt to find a California purchaser o f bedding f rom W illiams-Sonoma who mig ht be willing to sue. The district c ourt oblig ed, and to that e nd ordered W illiamsSonoma to pro d u c e a list of all California customers w ho
p urchased bedding products of the ty pe referred t o i n

2 S ee Fed . R. Civ . P . 2 3(c)(1 )(A ).

3 S ee Fed . R. Civ . P . 2 6, 3 3.I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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Rushing ’s complaint since J an u ary 2 9, 2012. W illiamsSonoma’s request f

or leave to file a motion for reconsideration was denied; this petition followed.

D I SCUSSI ON

W illiams-Sonoma seeks a w rit of mandamus to avoid the strictures of the district court’s discovery order. I n deciding whether to issue a writ of mandamus we apply the Bauman factors, which we have described as follows:

(1) The party seeking the writ h a s n o other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires.

(2) The p etitioner w i l l b e d amag ed o r prejudiced in a w ay not c orrectable on appeal

. . . . ( 3 ) T he d istrict court’s order is c learl y erroneous as a matter of law.

(4) The district c ourt’s order is an oft-repeated
error, o r manifests a p ersistent disreg ard o f the federal rules.

(5) T he district court ’ s o rder raises new a nd important problems, or issues of l a w of first impression.

SG Cowen S

ec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court
, 189 F .3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1999) (alteration in orig inal) (citation omitted); Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court
, 557 F .2d 6 50, 656–661 (9th Cir. 1977). Not all of those factors n eed to be satisfie d
, a nd allI N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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must be “weig hed tog ether” on a case-by -case basis. See SG Cowen
, 189 F

. 3d at 91 3

– 1 4 ; Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court
, 881 F

. 2d 1486, 1491 (9th C i r

. 1 989). I n considering the factors, we keep in mind the drastic and ex traordi n a ry nature of that remedy
, and the f a c t that W illiams-Sonoma has the weig hty burden of convincing u s to prescribe it. See Van Dusen v. U.S. Dist. Court ( In re Van Dusen)
, 654 F

. 3 d 8 38, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) ; see also United States v. Guerrero
, 693 F .3d 990, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2012); SG Cowen
, 1 89 F .3d at 913.

I n any event, “[ b] ecause we have held that ‘the absence o f factor three—clear error a s a matter o f law—will alway s defeat a petition f

or mandamus,’” 4 we will address that factor first. W e are mindful that we do not g enerally find clear error when there is no prior N inth Circuit authority prohibiting the district court’s action. See Morgan v. U.S. Dist. Court ( In re Morgan)
, 506 F .3d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. B arnes v. S ea Haw. Raftin g, LLC
, 889 F .3d 517, 537 (9th Cir. 2 018) (holding that when an “‘important issue of first impression’” is raised, the standard is ordinary error).

I n the present case, contrary Supreme C o u r t authority demonstrates the c l e a r error in the district court’s decision. Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope o f discovery to “nonprivileg ed
matter that is relevant to any party ’ s claim or defense.” A nd the Supreme Court has determined that seeking discovery o f the name of a class member (here an unknown person, w ho could sue W illiams-Sonoma) is not rele v a n t within the meaning of that rule. As the Court held:

4 S u ssex v. U.S

. Dist. Co u rt ( In r e Su s sex)
, 78 1 F.3 d 1 0 65
, 1 0 71 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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The g eneral scope o f discovery is defined by F ed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) as follows:

“Parties may obtain disco v ery reg arding a

ny matt e r, n ot privileg e d, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to th e c laim or defense of the party seeking discovery

or t h e claim o r d efense of any other party . . . .”

The k ey phrase in thi s definition—“relevant to the subject matter involved in t h e pending action”—has b een co n s trued broadly to encompass any mat t e r that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter t hat could bear o n, a

n y issue that is or may be in the case. . . .

At the same time, “di s c o very , like all
matters of procedure, has ultimate a nd necessary boundaries.”

. . . Discovery o f
matter not “reasonably c al c u lated to lead to the disco v e ry of admissible evidence” is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). . . .

Re s pondents’ attempt to obtain the c lass members’ n ames a

n d addresses cannot be forced into the concept of “ relevancy ” described a

bove. The difficulty is that respondents d o not see k t h is information for any bearing that it mig ht have on issues in the

case.

. . . I f respondents had soug h t theI N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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information b ecause of its relevance to the issu e s , they would not h a v e been willing
, a s they were, to abandon their request if the District Court w o uld accept their proposed redefinition of the class and method o f sending notice. Respondents arg ued to the D i s t r i c t Court that they d e s i r e d t h i s information to enable them to send t he c lass notice, and not for any other p urpose. Taking them at their word, it would app e a r that respondents’ request is not within the scope o f Rule 26(b)(1).

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
, 437 U.S. 340, 350–53, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389–90, 57 L

. Ed. 2d 253 (1978) (footnotes omitted). The Court then concluded: “ [ W ] e do not think that the discovery rules are the rig ht tool for this job.” Id. a t 354, 98 S. Ct. a t 2391 (footnote omitted); see also Reed v. Bowen
, 849 F .2d 1 307, 1313–14 (10th Cir. 1988) (power of the court should n ot be used to solicit clients); Do u g l as v. Talk Am., Inc.
, 2 6 6 F .R.D. 464, 467–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (same). There

are two distinctions between the case at hand a nd Oppenheimer
, but both cu t a g ainst the district court’s decision here.

One of those d istinctions is that Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to its current form after 1978 when Oppenheimer

was decided. A s q u o t e d a bove, the rule then indicated that discovery must be “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” that related to a p arty ’s claim o r defense. Now, the “ subject matter” reference has b een e liminated from the rule, and the matt e r s o u g ht must be “ relevant to any party ’s claim or defense. ” R u l e 2 6(b)(1). That chang e , however, w as intended to r estric t , not broaden, the scope o fI N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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d i s c o v ery

. See Rule 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note t o 2000 amendment; see also id

. advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; cf. E lvig v

. Calvin Presbyteria n C hurch
, 375 F .3d 951, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2004).

The other d i stinction is that Oppenheimer dealt with a

case where class certification had already been gr a nted, a nd the moving party s o u gh t to obtain a list of members of that class. This case is a step removed f rom that—here counsel is without a lead plaintiff for the class issues th a t counsel wishes to pursue, so no class has been certified. I t f o l lows that the r equest here is less relevant than th e request in Oppenheimer. The district court clearly erred as a matter o f law when it ordered the discovery in question.

Rushing contends that the information soug ht in discove r y wa s relevant to class certification issues, such a s commonality
, ty

picality , ascertainability , and reliance. That does not undercut, or water d own, the p r i m ary p oint that using d iscovery to f

ind a client to be the named p laintiff before a c lass action is certified is n o t w i t h i n the scope o f Rule 26(b)(1). Oppenheimer
, 437 U .S

. a t 3 5 3, 98 S. Ct. at 2390. I n short, the district c o u rt clearly e rred when it decided otherwise. 5

5 By th e w ay , th e d istrict co u rt also erred to th e ex ten t th at i t ap p lied Calif o rn ia d isco v ery ru les. It w as req u ired to ap p ly th e Fed eral Ru les of Civ il P ro ced u re reg ard in g d isco v ery , w h ich
, o f co u rse, in clu d ed th e restrictio n s u

p o n g ran tin g d isco v ery u n d er th o se ru les. S ee Fed

. R. Civ

. P

. 2 6 (b )(1 ) (h ereaf

ter, Ru le 2 6 (b )(1 )); i d

. at 8 1 (c)(1 ); Ga sp erin i v. Ctr. f o r Hu ma n ities, In c. , 5 18 U.S. 4 1 5
, 4 2 7 & n .7
, 1 1 6 S. Ct. 2 2 1 1
, 2 2 1 9 & n .7
, 1 3 5 L

. Ed

. 2 d 6 5 9 (1 9 96 ); Bea rin t ex rel. Bea rin t v. Do rell Ju ven ile Grp

., In c. , 3 8 9 F.3 d 1 33 9
, 1 35 2

– 53 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ); Vess v. Cib a -Geig y Co rp

. US A
, 3 1 7 F .3 d 1 0 9 7
, 1 10 3 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 03 ); Meta b olife In t’l, In c. v. W o rn ick , 2 6 4 F.3 d 8 3 2 , 8 4 5– 46 (9 th Cir. 2 00 1 ).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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As to the f

irst B auman factor, W illiams-Sonoma has n o other adequate means for relief available to it at t h i s t ime, 6 and before a direct appeal could be taken and h e a r d
, the disclosure a

nd damag e to its ( a n d its customers’) interests would be complete—its claim would be mooted. 7 Thus, the first and second factors w eig h i n favor of g r anting the petition.

W e are unable to say that the district court’s error was o ne that is oft-repeated, or that it is a nove l issue. 8 Thus, “the fourth and fift h B auman f actors do not weig h in f avor o f g ranting the petition.” Tillman
, 756 F .3d at 1153.

The b alance of the factors w eig hs in favor of g ranting the writ of mandamus. See id. ; Hernandez v. Tanninen
, 604 F .3d 1095, 1 101–02 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. S a n J o se Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court
, 187 F .3d 1096, 1099–1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, we g rant the petition for a writ of m a n d amus and vacate the district court’s discovery order.

Petition G R

ANTED

.

6 S ee S G Co wen , 18 9 F.3 d a t 9 1 3 ; Ad mira l In s. C

o

. v. U.S

. Dist. Co u r t , 8 8 1 F.2 d 1 4 8 6 , 1 49 1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ).

7 S ee S G Co wen , 1 8 9 F.3 d at 9 1 4

.

8 B ecau s e th e Co u rt h as so clearly sp o k e n, w e can n o t call th e issu e

o n e o f f i rst im p ressio n

. If it w ere o n e, it w o u ld w eig h in f av o r o f g ran tin g th e p etitio n

. S

ee Un i ted S ta tes v. Tillma n , 7 5 6 F.3 d 1 1 4 4
, 1 1 5 0
, 1 1 5 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 4 ).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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PAEZ , Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

Mandamus is an e xt

r a o r d inary remedy

—among “the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal”—and one we must not resort to a

bsent c lear e rror. C

h eney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C.
, 542 U.S. 367, 380 ( 2004) (quoting W ill v. United States
, 3 89 U.S. 90, 107 (1 9 6 7 ) ) ; see also Bauman v. U .S. Dist. Court
, 5 57 F .2d 650, 6 5 8–60 (9th Cir. 1977). I n my view, the district court h as not erred, let a lone committed “clear and i n d i s p u table” error. Cheney
, 542 U.S. at 381 (quotation m a rks omitted). I therefore respectfully dissent.

The majority relies on the Supreme Court’s deci s i o n i n Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), to hold that the district court’s dis covery order is leg ally incorrect. As I read Oppenheimer
, h owever, it stan d s f o r a much n arrower proposition. The Court h eld only that once a district court certifies a class a ction, class counsel must rely

on the class action procedures outlined i n F ederal Rule o f C i vil Procedure 23—and not the federal discovery r u les

c o ntained in Rules 2 6 throug h 37—to notify absent cl a s s members of certification. Oppenheimer did not h o l d that plaintiffs cannot seek the identities and contact information of absent class members f or a diff e rent purpose before the class is certified, as here.

B u t even if the federal discovery rules do n o t authoriz e th e district court’s order, that still leaves Rule 2 3, which broadly empowers t h e d istrict court to take measures necessary to maintain a cl a s s action, protect the interests o f putative class members, and provide notice to absent class members when necessary to protec t t heir interests. Oppenheimer certainly did not n arrow the scope of Rule 23 and, indeed, relied on it.I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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The majority points to no clear leg al error or a b u se o f discretion by the district court. And even if the court’s order

were questionable, our intervention is unnecessary

. Mandamus, under these circumstances, is not warranted.

I

.

I beg in with Oppenheimer

. T here, the plaintiffs soug ht to pursue a class action ag ainst a n investment fund. 437 U .S. at 342–44. T he district court certified the class u n d er Rule 23(b)(3), which trig g ered mandatory notice to a bsent class members under Rule 23(c)(2). See id. at 346; F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B ). The thrust of the dispute was which p arty must pay the costs of identify ing a nd notify ing the unnamed class members. Oppenheimer
, 437 U

. S

. at 349–64. The district court ordered the defendants to do so. Id. at 346.

The Second Circuit rev er s ed. I t reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in E isen v. Ca rlisle & Jacquelin ( Eisen IV)
, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), required the p l a i n t i f fs, a nd
not defendants, to pay because “the identification of class members is an integ ral step in the process of notify ing them.” Opp e n heimer
, 437 U .S. at 347. On rehearing en banc, however, the Second Circuit affirmed the di s t rict court’s order, holding that Eise n IV did not n ecessarily g overn the issue because the plaintiffs could rely on a lternative procedu r a l rules to obtain the same information: the federal di s c o v e r y rules. Id. (citing Sanders v

. Levy
, 558 F .2d 636, 649–50 (2d Cir. 1 9 7 6) ( en banc)). The en banc court concluded that the district court had not a bused its discretion in allocating the costs of notice to the defendants. Id. (citing Sanders , 558 F .2d at 646).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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The Supreme Court d isagr e e d

. The Court beg an b y emphasiz ing that Rule 2 6 only al l o ws a p arty to seek

m a t e rials “relevant” to the subject matter of any claim o r defense. Id. at 350–51. T h e C ourt reasoned that the plaintiffs’ procedural o b l ig ation to c omply with the Rule 23(c)(2) n otice oblig at i o ns did not, by itself, relate to the subject matter of a c l a i m o r d efense under Rule 26. Id. at 352–54. The “critical” issue, according to the Court, was that plaintiffs “soug ht [ the infor m a t i on] to facilitate the sending of notice rather than to define or c larify issu e s in the case.” Id. at 350. The “proper[ ] ” channel to accomplish this purpose, the Court held, was Rule 23(d)—the “natural place
to look for authority for orders r eg ulating the sending o f notice.” I

d. at 350, 354. T h e C o u r t reasoned that this rule “vests p ower in the district court to order one of the parties to perform the ta s k s necessary to send notice.” Id. at 354. I n reversi n g , the Court ex pressly left open the possibility that Rule 26 could be u sed to obtain the s a m e i n f ormation when it is relevant to other issues in the case. Id. at 354 n.20 (“W e do not hold that class members’ names a n d ad dresses never

can be obtained under the discovery rule s

. ” ) ; id. at 353 n.18 (“The d ifference between the cases relied on b y [ plaintiffs] and this case is that [ plaintiffs] d o not seek information because it may bear on some issue wh i ch the District Court must decide, but o n ly for the purpose of sending notice.”); see also id. at 351 & n.13 (noting that discovery is not “limited to the merits o f a case” such as, for ex ample, when “issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue”).

The present case is markedly different than Oppenheimer

. Unlike in Oppenheimer
, Plai n t i ff ’ s action has not y et been certified under Rule 23(c), and Plaintiff does not necessarily seek to provide n otice. Plaintiff’s counsel instead seeks to substitute the named c lass r epresentative with one w ho hasI N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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standing under California law. W hether the federal discovery rules may be u s ed f

or this purpose is an open question. I ndeed, the majority does not point to any case t h a t h a s cl early addressed it. To answer this question, the majority ask s whether the absent c lass member names and contact information is “relevant” 1 to a “ p arty ’s” claim or defense. F ed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )(1). While the majority reads Oppenheimer to hold that it is n ot, I do not read Oppenheimer

so strictly

. I n any e v ent, we need n ot r e solve that q uestion at this stag e : the sole issue befor e u s i s whether the district court’s discovery o rder is s o c l e a rly wrong that our intervention is necessary

. B ecause neither Oppenheimer nor

our c ourt’s precedent dictates otherwise, I do not believe that it is.

I I

.

Even if Oppenheimer f oreclosed use of t h e f

e deral discovery rules to aid the identificat i on of class member

names a nd contact information, its reasoning su g g e s t s another b a s i s for the district court’s order: Rule 23. S e e Oppenheimer , 437 U.S. at 354. Rule 23(d) provides district
courts w ith “substantial residual pow e r s ” to reg ulate communications with absent class members outside of formal notice r equirements. W illiam B . Rubenstein, 3 Newberg on Class A ctions § 9:2 (5th ed.) ( citing
, among o t h er s , Rule

1 Co n trary to th e m aj o rity ’ s su g g estio n , relev an ce co n tin u es to h av e

a b ro ad m ean in g , ev en af

t er t h e 2 0 0 0 A m en d m en ts to th e p ro ced u ral ru les. S ee A lan W rig h t & A rth u

r R. Miller, 8 Fed

. P rac. & P ro c. Civ

. § 2 0 0 8 (3 d ed .) (“ Mo st co u rts w

h ich h av e ad d ressed th e issu e f in d th at th e [ 20 0 0]

am en d m en ts t o R

u l e 26 still c o n t e m

p l ate lib eral d isco v ery , an d th at relev an cy u n d er Ru le 2 6 i s ex trem ely b ro ad .”) (q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted ).I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

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2 3 ( d ) (1)(A)). 2 That is because class actions are a form o f representative litig ation, and, before certification, counsel “may wi s h to advise p otential plaintiffs of their rig hts a nd

en co u r a g e their involvement in a class suit, to seek helpful evidence f

rom them, or simply to inform them of the status o f the litig ation.” Id. § 9 : 6

. The ability to communicate with members of the class is a cutely important g iven the fiduciary duties t h a t c lass counsel owes unnamed class members. 6 Newberg

on Class A ctions § 19:2 (5th ed.); see also Koby

v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc.
, 846 F .3d 1 071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2 017) (acknowledg ing fiduciary obliga t i o n s o wed to absent class members before certification); In re Gen. Motors Corp. PickUp Truck Fue l Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.
, 55 F .3d 768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995). And “ [ s] ince identification simply is another task that must be perf

o r m e d i n order to” communicate to potential plaintiffs their ri ghts and encourag e their involvement in a class suit, it w a s reasonable for the district
court “to require [ W illiams-Sonoma’s] co o p e r ation” to cull that list. S

ee Oppenheimer , 437 U.S. at 355.

L ikewise, Rule 23(d)(1)(B )(i) authoriz es district courts to order that c lass members be notified of “any ste p i n the action” to “protect class members.” 3 The district court’s ruling that the sole named p l a i n t i ff n o long er had standing under California law is, c ertainly
, a “step in the action.” A nd it is a step that, without some protective measure, would harm

2 R u le 2 3 (d )(1 )(A ), f

o r ex am p le, au th o rizes a co u

rt to issu e ord ers th at

“ determ in e th e co u rse o f t h e p ro ceed i n g s o r p rescrib e m easu res to p rev en t

u n d u e rep etitio n o r co m

p licatio n i n p resen tin g ev id en ce o r arg u m en t.” Fed . R. Civ . P . 2 3 (d )(1 )(A ).

3 T h e ad v iso ry co m

m ittee d escrib es th e reaso n s to p ro v i d e n otice

u n d er R u le 23 (d ) as “ n on

- ex h a u s t i v e.” S ee Fed

. R. Civ

. P

. 2 3 (d )(2 ) ad v iso ry co m m ittee’ s n o te to th e 1 9 6 6 am en d m en t.I N R E : W I L L I A M S -S O N O M A , I N C

. 17

class members’ interests in at least one sig nificant way . F o r

ex a mple, when a class action is filed, p utative class members enjoy a tolling of the statute of limitations until c ertification is denied or the case is resolved. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co.

v. U tah
, 414 U .S. 538, 553–54 (1974). I n an action that has been pending for almost three y e a r s , t he putative class members’ interests in keeping the suit a live w ould well be jeopardiz e d, absent notice. 4

The district court thus a c t e d well within its authority b y facilitating c lass counsel’s attempts to communicate with absent class members a n d to notify the m o f i mportant developments in the lawsuit. B ecause the dis t r ict court’s order was a “matter

. . . committed to d iscretion, it c annot be said that [ W illiams-S o n o m a ’ s] rig ht to a particular result is cl e a r and indisputable.” See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.
, 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) ( p er curiam) (quotation marks omitted). I would thus deny the p eti t i o n f or a w r it o f mandamus. I

respectfully dissent.

4 T h at n o tice is p ro v i d ed

to allo w ab s en t class m em b ers to i n terv en e

o r o th erw ise k eep th e s u i t aliv e is h ard ly co n tro v ersial. S ee Ru le 2 3 ( d )(1 )(B )(iii); W rig h t & Miller, 7 B Fed

. Prac. & P ro c. Civ

. § 1 7 9 3 (3 d ed .) (“ In d eed
, it h as b een h eld th at [Ru le 2 3 (d )(1 )(B )] m ay b e in v ok ed
to sen d n o tice to p u tativ e class m em b ers to in terv en e w

h en th e o rig in al p lain tif f rep resen tativ e m o v es to s trik e th e class alleg atio n s an d settle h is in d iv i d u al claim o r w

h en th e class certif

i catio n is den ied .”); see a l so 1 New berg o n Class A ctio n s § 2 :1 7 (“ On ce a class co m p lain t is f i led
, b u t certain ly f

o llo w in g certif

i catio n , Ru le 2 3 is desig n ed t o assu re th at th e rig h ts o f ab sen t class m em b ers are n o t p rej u d i ced b y th e v o lu n tary actio n s

o f th e rep resen tativ e p lain tif f

. A cco rd in g l y , w

h en m o o tn ess o f th e n am ed p lain tif f ’ s claim s o ccu rs af

ter in itiatio n o f th e su it o r certif icatio n , th e p ro ced u res i n h eren t in Ru le 2 3 en ab le so m e ef f ort to b o lster rep resen tatio n

o r to f in d so m e su itab le su

b s t i t u te class rep resen tativ e, f o llo w in g n otice
to all o r p art o f

th e class.”).