alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6853 

To amend the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 

to require the Congressional Budget Office to provide to Congress information on payments from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 

Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2023 

Mr. FEENSTRA (for himself, Mr. DUNN of Florida, Mr. LATURNER, Mr. 

EDWARDS, Mr. GUEST, Mr. BACON, Ms. FOXX, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, Mr. 

WEBER of Texas, Mr. YAKYM, Mrs. MILLER-MEEKS, Mr. WITTMAN, Mr. 

FITZGERALD, Mrs. HARSHBARGER, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mrs. BICE, 

Ms. HAGEMAN, Mr. DONALDS, Mr. MCCORMICK, Mr. ROUZER, Mr. 

CAREY, and Mr. CARTER of Texas) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on the Budget 

A BILL 

To amend the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to require the Congressional Budget 

Office to provide to Congress information on payments 

from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund 

and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6853 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Save Our Seniors Act’’ 

3 or the ‘‘SOS Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. INFORMATION ON PAYMENTS FROM THE OLD-AGE 

5 AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST FUND 

6 AND THE DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST 

7 FUND. 

8 Section 202(e)(1) of the Congressional Budget and 

9 Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 602(e)(1)) 

10 is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Such re11 port shall include a comparison, expressed in graph format 

12 and included with other information in the report on the 

13 Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the 

14 Disability Insurance Trust Fund, between: (A) the 

15 amount assumed under section 257(b)(1) of the Balanced 

16 Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 

17 U.S.C. 907(b)(1)); and (B) outlays from payments from 

18 such Trust Funds based on the assumption that payments 

19 would be consistent with the amounts payable from dedi20 cated funding sources as under current law.’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 25, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-21080

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FRANCISCO DE LA CRUZ-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CR-236-ALL

--------------------

Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Francisco De La Cruz-Rodriguez appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

De La Cruz-Rodriguez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8

U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have

been alleged in his indictment. De La Cruz-Rodriguez maintains
No. 02-21080

-2-

that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple

reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence

exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment and supervised release

which may be imposed for that offense. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

De La Cruz-Rodriguez acknowledges that his arguments are

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision

has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his arguments for further

review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 35
                                  ----------


                      COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                             OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                    ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                  CWALT, INC.
                       ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-39CB
             MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-39CB


      The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer
of Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing
LP (the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant to
Section 3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned
Series (the "Agreement") that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer
has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
respects throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                      Dated: March 14, 2007
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance
<PAGE>



                                   Exhibit 4.3

Series 2002-2 Supplement, dated as of June 18, 2002, to the Amended and Restated
Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of May 1, 1998, as amended
(incorporated herein by reference to the Form 8-K filed by the registrants on or
about the date hereof).
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5946 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 

any prizes or awards won in competition in the Olympic Games or 

the Paralympic Games. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 

Mr. DOLD (for himself and Mr. FARENTHOLD) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude 

from gross income any prizes or awards won in competition in the Olympic Games or the Paralympic Games. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States Appre5 ciation for Olympians and Paralympians Act’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5946 IH

1 SEC. 2. OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC MEDALS AND USOC 

2 PRIZE MONEY EXCLUDED FROM GROSS IN3 COME. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 74 of the Internal Rev5 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

6 following new subsection: 

7 ‘‘(d) EXCEPTION FOR OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC

8 MEDALS AND PRIZES.—Gross income shall not include the 

9 value of any medal awarded in, or any prize money re10 ceived from the United States Olympic Committee on ac11 count of, competition in the Olympic Games or Paralympic 

12 Games.’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

14 this section shall apply to prizes and awards received after 

15 December 31, 2015. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of FFD Financial  Corporation
(the  "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Trent B. Troyer,  the President and Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.




/s/Trent B. Troyer
----------------------------------
Trent B. Troyer
President and Chief Executive Officer
February 14, 2006
#### Stanley RIMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brian SANDOVAL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15384

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Stanley Rimer, Pro Se

D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas), Las Vegas, NV, Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Brian Sandoval

Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees Catherine Cortez-Masto, Ross Miller, E. K. McDaniel, Harold Wickham, James G. Cox, Dwight Neven, Tesla Wilson, John Doe Lee, Jamie Rainone, Robert Houke, Frank Dreeson, Efrain Lona, Robert Owens, Linda Adams, Richard Bannister, Cary Leavitt, Cynthia Sablica, Tatiana So-well, Jane Doe Doni

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Stanley Rimer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &*Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Rimer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his anxiety condition. *See id.*at 1074, 1081-82 (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner; “[m]ere indifference,” negligence, or medical malpractice are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).

We reject as meritless Rimer’s contentions that the district court violated his constitutional rights and was biased.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22
- 6542

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JAVIER GUILLEN ISLAS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Charlotte

. Robert J. Conrad, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:19

- cr - 00079

- RJC

- DCK

- 1 )

Submitted : September 8, 2022 Decided: September 13, 2022

Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Javier Guillen Islas , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-6542 Doc: 6 Filed: 09/13/2022 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Javier Guillen Islas ap peals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

. We have reviewed the record a nd discern no reversible error. Accordingl y, we affirm the district court’s order. United States v. Islas , No. 3:19

- c r - 00079

- RJC

- DCK

- 1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 2022). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 22-6542 Doc: 6 Filed: 09/13/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
Exhibit 35 ITEM 1123 CERTIFICATION I, Amy B. Byrnes, Senior Vice President of U.S. Bank National Association (the "Servicer"), hereby certify that:  (1) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the fiscal year covered by this annual report on Form 10-K and of the performance of the Servicer under the Standard Terms for Trust Agreement, dated as of November 9, 2006, between the Servicer and the depositor (the "Agreement") has been made under my supervision; and  (2)To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period, or, if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any material respect, I have specified below each such failure known to me and the nature and status thereof. Date: March 20, 2018 /s/ Amy B. Byrnes Amy B. Byrnes Senior Vice President
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                                                        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  /s/      Meg A. Gentle                                                                                |
| Meg      A. Gentle                                                                                          |
| Chief      Financial Officer of Sabine Pass LNG-GP, Inc., the general partner of      Sabine Pass LNG, L.P. |

----
#### Leon Sabra BLATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pete SHOVE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35583

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Leon Sabra Blatt, Pro Se

Brian C. Augenthaler, Attorney, Jeremy W. Culumber, Attorney, Keating Bucklin McCormack, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees Pete Shove, Jeffrey Franzen, Adam Vermuelen, Fred Gillings, John Doe Gehlsen, Lome C. Towers

Bridget E. Casey, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Michael C. Held, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney, Everett, WA, for Defendant-Appellee John Lovick

Brian C. Augenthaler, Attorney, Jeremy W. Culumber, Attorney, Keating Bucklin McCormack, Seattle, WA, Jon J. Walker, Attorney, City of Marysville, Marysville, WA for Defendants-Appellees City of Marysville, City of Lake Stevens

Vance Patrick Odell, Pro Se

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*899MEMORANDUM **

Leon Sabra Blatt appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying Ms motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from an arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, *Venegas v. Wagner,*831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blatt’s motion for a new trial because Blatt did not show clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through perjury or that defense counsel’s conduct prevented Blatt from fully and fairly presenting his defense. *See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc.,*212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (a motion for a new trial may be granted on the basis of false or perjurious evidence); *Wharf v. Burlington Northern R. Co.,*60 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting forth the standard for granting a motion for a new trial due to “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of FFD Financial Corporation
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Robert R. Gerber, the Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.




/s/ Robert R. Gerber
--------------------------------------------
Robert R. Gerber
Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
February 14, 2003
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 60 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.Con.Res.60
                                          Agreed to May 23, 1996        

                       One Hundred Fourth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
   the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

                          Concurrent Resolution

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That when the Senate recesses or adjourns at the close of business on 
Thursday, May 23, 1996, Friday, May 24, 1996, or Saturday, May 25, 
1996, pursuant to a motion made by the Majority Leader or his designee, 
in accordance with this resolution, it stand recessed or adjourned 
until noon on Monday, June 3, 1996, or Tuesday, June 4, 1996, or until 
such time on that day as may be specified by the Majority Leader or his 
designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or until noon on the 
second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 
2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when 
the House of Representatives adjourns on the legislative day of 
Thursday, May 23, 1996, it stand adjourned until 2:00 p.m. on 
Wednesday, May 29, 1996, or until noon on the second day after Members 
are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 
resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of 
the Senate and Minority Leader of the House, shall notify the Members 
of the Senate and the House, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in 
their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.
  Attest:

                                               Secretary of the Senate.

  Attest:

                                 Clerk of the House of Representatives.
```
#### Brenda MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE COUNTY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15047

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 1, 2017)

Andrew Todd Campbell, Andrew P. Campbell, Campbell Guin, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jamie H. Kidd, Webb & Eley, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellee

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM and HIGGINBOTHAM,* Circuit Judges.

*

 Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Brenda Morgan appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claim in favor of her former employer, the Lawrence County Commission. Morgan contends that after she filed an EEOC discrimination charge the Lawrence County Commission retaliated against her, engaging in several adverse actions.

We evaluate retaliation claims like Morgan’s that are based entirely on circumstantial evidence under the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2016). Under that framework:

> Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse ... action.... If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, ... and drops from the case.... After the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a pretext to mask discriminatory actions.

See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2009).

Even assuming that Morgan established a prima facie case of retaliation, the Commission proffered legitimate reasons for its decisions to terminate her employment with the County and to decline to hire her as the director of the Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency. And Morgan has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those proffered reasons were merely pre-textual. While temporal proximity can serve as evidence of pretext, in the particular circumstances of this case the temporal proximity between the Commission’s actions and Morgan’s EEOC complaint— whether considered alone or in combination with the other evidence Morgan has presented—is not sufficient to do so.

For that reason, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 826

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade for the vessel

PRIME TIME, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 826 ES

1 SECTION 1. CERTIFICATE OF DOCUMENTATION.

2 Notwithstanding section 27 of the Merchant Marine

3 Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. App. 883), section 8 of the Act of

4 June 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 81, chapter 421; 46 U.S.C. App.

5 289), and section 12106 of title 46, United States Code,

6 the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate of

7 documentation with appropriate endorsement for employ8 ment in the coastwise trade for the vessel PRIME TIME,

9 United States official number 660944.

Passed the Senate July 29, 1996.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 826

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to

other purposes.wise trade for the vessel PRIME TIME, and forpriate endorsement for employment in the coastissue a certificate of documentation with appro-