UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

KULWINDER KAUR; MANRAJ 

SINGH, 

 Petitioners, 

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 11-9544 

(Petition for Review)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Petitioners Kulwinder Kaur and Manraj Singh, natives and citizens of India, 

seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as 

untimely their motion to reopen. Exercising our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, 

we affirm. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 10, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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I. Background 

According to different statements by Kulwinder, she entered the United States 

without inspection in either September 1999 or April 2000. Her minor son, Manraj, 

entered in September 2000. Kulwinder filed an application for asylum relief on 

behalf of herself and Manraj in February 2001, alleging persecution by the Indian 

government based on participation by her putative husband, Balbir Singh, in the Sikh 

Student Federation. Petitioners’ request for asylum and withholding of removal was 

denied by an immigration judge (IJ) in January 2002, and affirmed by the BIA on 

appeal in August 2003. Petitioners did not seek judicial review of the BIA’s final 

order of removal. 

In May 2011, eight years after the BIA issued its final order of removal, 

Petitioners filed a motion to reopen in order to pursue an application for adjustment 

of status. The motion asserted that Kulwinder is married to Mohinder Singh Sandhu, 

now a naturalized citizen, who had filed an I-130 visa petition on her behalf in 

August 2002, when he was a lawful permanent resident. The motion also stated that 

Manraj was the son of Kulwinder and Mohinder. Manraj sought to be excused from 

the time limitation on a motion to reopen because he is a minor. And Kulwinder 

asked the BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte

“to keep her family together.” R. at 23. On July 25, 2011, the BIA denied as 

untimely the motion to reopen. 
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II. Discussion 

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision to deny 

Petitioners’ motion to reopen their removal proceedings. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 

386 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 

835, 838 (2010) (because the BIA’s “discretionary authority to act on a motion to 

reopen . . . is specified not in a statute, but only in the Attorney General’s 

regulation,” the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “does 

not proscribe judicial review of denials of motions to reopen”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We review for an abuse of discretion. See Infanzon, 386 F.3d at 

1362. “The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational 

explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any 

reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “On the other hand, there is no abuse of discretion when 

although the BIA’s decision is succinct, its rationale is clear, there is no departure 

from established policies, and its statements are a correct interpretation of the law.” 

Galvez Pineda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Generally, an alien is limited to only one motion to reopen removal 

proceedings, and it must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of the final order 

of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)-(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because 

Petitioners filed their motion to reopen eight years after the final administrative 
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decision in their removal proceedings, their motion is untimely.1

 Further, “untimely 

motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status ... do not fall 

within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to 

reopen before the [BIA] and will ordinarily be denied.”2

 In re Yauri, 25 I. & N. 

Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009). The BIA’s brief order adequately and soundly explained 

its denial of Petitioners’ motion. We perceive no abuse of discretion.3

III. Conclusion 

The petition for review is DENIED. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Harris L Hartz 

 Circuit Judge 

 

1

 The 90-day filing deadline is subject to several exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(iv). We agree with the BIA’s conclusion that none of the 

exceptions is applicable in this case. Although the time limitation may also be 

equitably tolled when the motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, see Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2002), 

Petitioners’ motion to reopen did not make any such claim. 

2

 “The only applications for adjustment of status that are specifically excepted 

from the motion time limits are those that involve a self-petition by a battered spouse, 

child, or parent of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.” In re Yauri, 

25 I. & N. Dec. at 105. 

3

 Petitioners do not argue that the BIA erred in not reopening the removal 

proceedings sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (stating BIA’s authority to reopen 

a case at any time on its own motion). In any event, we would lack jurisdiction to 

consider such an argument. See Belay-Gebru v. I.N.S., 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01 

(10th Cir. 2003).