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Filed 2/6/24 In re K.J. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re K.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C097594 

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV141905)

Minor K.J. was a passenger in a late-night traffic stop. He was arrested after an

officer saw a gun magazine protruding from under the front passenger seat. Two other 

firearms were later seized, one from the car and another from minor’s underwear. After 

the juvenile court denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearms, minor

admitted to carrying a loaded firearm in public. He appeals from the juvenile court’s

disposition order following that admission, contending the juvenile court erred in denying 
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the motion to suppress because the traffic stop was unduly prolonged. We disagree and 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 5, 2022, Officers Schraer and Cumberland were on patrol

as part of Sacramento Police Department’s northern gang enforcement unit. Their duties 

included responding to gunshots and conducting traffic stops in known gang areas. 

While working with the unit, Officer Cumberland was trained in recognizing firearms.

Around 11:30 p.m., the officers saw a car on El Camino turn northbound on 

Truxel at a high rate of speed. Officer Schraer testified that “the area [where] the driver 

was driving” and “the manner in which she was driving” raised his suspicions that “she 

could have been involved in something else.” While catching up to the car, Officer 

Cumberland determined the car was speeding and saw at least one passenger look back at 

the patrol car nervously. The officers turned on their lights and pulled over the car for 

unsafe speed. 

After the car stopped, the officers walked up to it from both sides: Officer Schraer

from the driver side; Officer Cumberland, the passenger side. While Officer Schraer

talked with the driver, Officer Cumberland learned the rear passengers were minors and

observed they were not wearing seatbelts. He testified that he and Officer Schraer had 

“to figure out if [the driver] was a guardian, or a parent, or what their relation to the 

juveniles was. And since it was late at night, we [had] to figure out the disposition of the 

juveniles.” Officer Schraer testified that they needed to do a records check for the minors 

because of their age and the late hour because “usually with juveniles out late, they may 

be missing persons.” 

Officer Cumberland stayed at the passenger side of the car, while Officer Schraer 

returned to the patrol car for a records check of the driver and one of the passengers. As 

Officer Cumberland talked with the passengers, he saw one “reach down to the 

floorboard with his right hand.” When Officer Cumberland “tried to see what [the 
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passenger] was reaching down toward,” the passenger “pulled his hand back up and 

blocked [Officer Cumberland’s] view of his hand.” Officer Cumberland testified, “It 

appeared that [the passenger] could have been reaching for something that was in the car; 

I didn’t know what. But that does make us uncomfortable when we see someone 

reaching toward something[,]” because it “could be a weapon.” Officer Cumberland then 

asked the passengers if they had “anything illegal in the car,” and they responded, “No.” 

Officer Cumberland returned to the patrol car, gave two of the passengers’ names 

to Officer Schraer, and said he was going to have the occupants get out of the car because 

the rear passengers were “shifting.” Officer Cumberland pat searched the occupants as 

they got out and found no weapons. One of the passenger doors remained open after all 

the occupants were out. 

Officer Schraer talked with the occupants while they sat on the curb. He testified 

that he had not completed the records check at this point because “[s]tanding by with

each of them took precedence over sitting on a computer, conducting a records check.” 

Officer Cumberland asked for consent to search the car, but the driver refused. 

Officer Cumberland then took a few steps to the driver side of the car and shined his 

flashlight into the open passenger door to make “sure that there was nothing in plain view 

. . . contraband, weapons, before returning to [the patrol car]” to issue the citations. He 

“saw a magazine protruding from under the front passenger seat, in front of where [the 

passenger who had made the earlier reaching movement] was sitting.” The occupants 

were arrested, and a second weapon was located under the driver’s seat. The officers 

later seized a third weapon from minor’s underwear. The time between the start of the 

traffic stop and the arrest was less than eight minutes. 

The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, alleging

possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610 [all further statutory references 

are to the Penal Code]; count one), carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, 

subd. (a)(3); count two), carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 
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three), and unlawful possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); count four). 

Minor joined a co-minor’s motion to suppress the seized firearms. 

The juvenile court (Judge Michael P. Kenny) denied the motion, finding the traffic 

stop legitimate and not unduly prolonged. Specifically, the court found there was 

“reasonable suspicion to proceed,” given that the stop occurred late at night, involved

children, and one passenger “had engaged in some furtive movements.” The video 

footage also showed, “the last individual made no effort to close [the passenger door], 

and the officer then basically observed the magazine in plain view.” 

Following the denial, minor admitted carrying a loaded firearm in public (count 

three), and the remaining counts were dismissed. The court (Judge Alyson L. Lewis) 

declared minor a juvenile court ward and committed him to the care and custody of his 

mother under the supervision of probation. Minor timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

“The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well 

established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings.” (In re Lennies H. 

(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) We “ ‘defer to [the juvenile court’s] factual 

findings if supported by substantial evidence’ but must ‘independently assess the legal 

question of whether the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment.’

[Citation.]” (People v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1364.) 

Minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 

the traffic stop for speeding was unduly prolonged. Specifically, minor contends the 

officers unlawfully deviated from the traffic stop’s initial mission without the 

independent reasonable suspicion necessary to justify additional detention time. We 

disagree.

“If the police develop reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity during 

a traffic stop of lawful duration, they may expand the scope of the detention to investigate 

that activity. [Citations.]” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.) 
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“Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause and can arise from less 

reliable information than that required for probable cause. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 757.) 

The detaining officer must “ ‘point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of 

the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person 

detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Raymond C. (2008) 

45 Cal.4th 303, 307.) 

Here, before the stop began, Officer Schraer suspected “something else” could be 

amiss based on the location and the driver’s manner of driving. Officer Cumberland also 

saw at least one passenger look back at the patrol car nervously. The entire traffic stop 

lasted less than eight minutes. (See People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1087

[noting time between approach and arrest as only seven minutes].) Within the first

minute, circumstances developed that added to the initial suspicion. While Officer 

Schraer was gathering information from the driver, Officer Cumberland saw that the 

passengers were not wearing seatbelts and learned they were minors. The lack of 

seatbelts alone triggered an additional traffic violation. (Veh. Code, §§ 27315, 27360.5.) 

And the presence of children without seatbelts combined with the late hour added 

concern for the passengers’ safety and compounded the suspicion of other criminal 

activity. (See Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 [nighttime is relevant factor 

in establishing reasonable suspicion]; § 273a [child endangerment].)

The basis for suspicion increased when the passenger nearest Officer Cumberland 

bent over toward the floorboard and blocked Officer Cumberland’s view of his hand. 

Such a pronounced movement was at least nervous, evasive behavior. (See In re H.M., 

supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 144 [“[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 

determining reasonable suspicion”].) Minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland failed 

to articulate why the movement equated to a suspicion of criminal activity lacks merit. 

Officer Cumberland testified that the reaching movement toward something made him 

nervous, given that it “could [have been] a weapon.” And in that regard, “due weight” 
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must be given to the “reasonable inferences [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts 

in light of his experience.” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043.) The totality 

of these factors provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to expand the scope of their 

investigation. 

Minor’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. His attempt to isolate the 

factor of nervous behavior as not unusual or necessarily incriminating falls short. A

“court’s evaluation . . . of . . . factors in isolation from each other does not take into 

account the ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” and courts have “preclude[d] this sort of 

divide-and-conquer analysis.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.)

There is also no merit in minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland lacked the 

requisite level of suspicion to order the occupants out of the car. It is well established 

that officers can order the driver and passengers out of the car, without cause, during a 

lawful traffic stop. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 410 (Wilson).) Courts 

have reasoned that, “ ‘[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is 

minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 414.)

We further reject minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland’s brief departure 

from the speeding car to speak with Officer Schraer undermined his safety concerns. 

There were four occupants in the car versus two police officers, a ratio that presented a 

heightened risk of harm to the officers. (See Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. at pp. 413-415

[deeming the additional intrusion on car’s occupants as minimal when the car has 

multiple occupants, given the increased risk of harm to an officer].) Thus, Officer

Cumberland’s return to the patrol car to tell Officer Schraer of his plan to have the 

occupants get out of the car demonstrated Officer Cumberland’s concern for his safety, 

rather than lack thereof.

Finally, minor’s claim that Officer Cumberland failed to give the passengers the 

opportunity to close the door when they got out of the car lacks merit for three reasons. 
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First, minor provides no authority that Officer Cumberland was required to give such an 

opportunity, nor does minor provide analysis as to the relevance of this asserted fact. 

(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [point not supported with 

reasoned argument and citations to authority is treated as waived].) Second, minor’s 

claim is undermined by the juvenile court’s finding that the last child to get out made no 

effort to shut the door. This finding is supported by independent review of the footage 

from Officer Cumberland’s body-worn camera. (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 

926, 943 [conducting independent review of video evidence in appeal from denial of 

motion to suppress].) And third, an officer’s plain view observation of contraband from a

car’s exterior with the assistance of a flashlight is lawful. (People v. Superior Court

(1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 636, 639.) Here, Officer Cumberland made “his observation of an 

item in plain view from a position where he had the right to be.” (People v. Loma (2010)

49 Cal.4th 530, 564.)

We therefore conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to expand the 

scope of the traffic stop. 
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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s disposition order is affirmed.

 /s/

MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/

EARL, P. J.

 /s/

KEITHLEY, J.*

*

Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.