alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 32003R1985 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32003R1985

**Council Regulation (EC) No 1985/2003 of 10 November 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 427/2003 on a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China **

*
Official Journal L 295 , 13/11/2003 P. 0043 - 0044 *

Council Regulation (EC) No 1985/2003

of 10 November 2003

amending Regulation (EC) No 427/2003 on a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EC) No 427/2003(1) lays down quantitative quotas for certain products originating in the People's Republic of China.

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1351/2003(2) established administrative procedures for the first tranche of the 2004 quantitative quotas for certain products originating in the People's Republic of China.

(3) In view of the enlargement of the European Community on 1 May 2004 it is appropriate to increase the quotas in accordance with Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 and the Understanding of the interpretation of this Article.

(4) It is therefore appropriate to amend Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 427/2003,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 427/2003 shall be replaced by the text in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 November 2003.

For the Council

The President

A. Marzano

(1) OJ L 65, 8.3.2003, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 8.

ANNEX

"ANNEX I

Phasing-out timetable of industrial (non-textile) quotas on imports originating in China

>TABLE>"
#### Rolando STOCKTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Erick WILSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7133

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Rolando Stockton, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rolando Stockton, a federal inmate, seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissing the petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*293We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Stockton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny Stockton’s motion to place the case in abeyance, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 11
                             THERMOQUEST CORPORATION

                        Computation of Earnings per Share


                                                    Three Months Ended
                                              -----------------------------
                                                 March 29,        March 30,
                                                      1997             1996
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Computation of Fully Diluted Earnings
     per Share:

   Income:
     Net income                                $ 8,276,000      $ 5,842,000

     Add: Convertible obligation interest,
          net of tax                               710,000                -
                                               -----------      -----------
     Income applicable to common stock
       assuming full dilution (a)              $ 8,986,000      $ 5,842,000
                                               -----------      -----------
   Shares:
     Weighted average shares outstanding        48,586,038       45,395,604

     Add: Shares issuable from assumed
          conversion of convertible
          obligations                            5,833,333                -

          Shares issuable from assumed
          exercise of options (as determined
          by the application of the treasury
          stock method)                            182,895                -
                                               -----------      -----------
     Weighted average shares outstanding,
       as adjusted (b)                          54,602,266       45,395,604
                                               -----------      -----------

   Fully Diluted Earnings per Share (a)/(b)    $       .16      $       .13
                                               ===========      ===========
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jan-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jun-30-2000
<CASH>                                         114,825
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  804
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         373,003
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 503,197
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        371,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       29
<OTHER-SE>                                     102,018
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   503,197
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               4,509
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             893
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,616
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (810)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            2,806
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   2,806
<EPS-BASIC>                                    3.66
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  3.66



</TABLE>
#### Antione Diray JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert PATTON, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6158

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

October 11, 2017

Antione Diray Johnson, Lawton, OK, pro se.

Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Antione Diray Johnson, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certifícate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pau-peris (IFP). We deny a COA and IFP and dismiss the appeal.

Johnson was convicted of armed robbery, and his convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. His applications for post-conviction relief in the state courts were unsuccessful. His previous § 2254 petition was denied by the district court, and this court denied his application for a COA. *Johnson v. Patton,*634 Fed.Appx. 663, 655 (10th Cir. 2015). Johnson’s current § 2254 petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was successive. *See In re Cline,*531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive ... § 2254 claim until this court has granted the required authorization.”).

To obtain a COA, Johnson must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).

Johnson makes no argument as to how the district court erred in dismissing his unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction. Because reasonable jurists could not debate that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling dismissing the petition, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

Accordingly, we deny Johnson’s request for a COA. We also deny his motion to proceed IFP.

*

This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Diego Alberto CASTILLEJA-LIMON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-10324 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 6, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jerry Van Beard, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Diego Alberto Castilleja-Limon appeals his sentence of 16 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release for illegal reentry after deportation. He argues that the district court erroneously determined that his sentence was subject to an enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). He asserts that his indictment did not allege that he had a prior conviction, and that therefore, the enhancement violated his due process rights because his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, asserting that *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), forecloses Castilleja-Limon’s argument. Castilleja-Limon concedes that his argument is foreclosed and explains that he raises it only to preserve it for further review; thus, summary affirmance is appropriate. *See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED. The judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm, R. 47.5.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6135 Received in Senate (RDS)]

<DOC>
114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6135

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 30, 2016

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 719 Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, as the ``Fred D. Thompson 
            Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The Federal building and United States courthouse located at 719 
Church Street in Nashville, Tennessee, shall be known and designated as 
the ``Fred D. Thompson Federal Building and United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building and United States 
courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 
to the ``Fred D. Thompson Federal Building and United States 
Courthouse''.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 29, 2016.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 08-2477

_____________

LORENZO JOHNSON, 

 Appellant

v.

NEAL MECHLING, SUPERINTENDENT; 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(No. 4-04-cv-01564)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

Argued September 30, 2009

Re-Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 23, 2012

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court (No. 11-1053)

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

____________

JUDGMENT ORDER

____________

On July 19, 2004, appellant Lorenzo Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for first degree murder 

and conspiracy to commit murder in Pennsylvania state court. The District Court denied 

the petition but granted a certificate of appealability with respect to appellant’s claim that 

the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. In a 
divided opinion, this Court reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded with 

instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the 

United States reversed this Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with its opinion.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion, Coleman v. Johnson, 

132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012), it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that this Court’s not 

precedential opinion, filed October 4, 2011, is hereby VACATED and the judgment of 

the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, entered on March 31, 2008, is 

hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion for briefing and reconsideration of this Court’s 

denial of a certificate of appealability with respect to appellant’s Brady claim, filed July 

23, 2012, is hereby DENIED. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate upon the filing 

of this judgment order. 

By the Court,

/s/ Michael A. Chagares

Circuit Judge

Attest:

/s/Marcia M. Waldron

Clerk

DATED: April 17, 2013
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THERMOQUEST
CORPORATION'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 27,
1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-03-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1997
<CASH>                                          70,058
<SECURITIES>                                     1,663
<RECEIVABLES>                                  109,763
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,464
<INVENTORY>                                     72,224
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               264,546
<PP&E>                                          87,675
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,795
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 595,976
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          127,408
<BONDS>                                         92,271
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           510
<OTHER-SE>                                     355,799
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   595,976
<SALES>                                        315,198
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               315,198
<CGS>                                          164,616
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  164,616
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                21,172
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   716
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,405
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 52,099
<INCOME-TAX>                                    22,672
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             29,427
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    29,427
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .56
        

</TABLE>
#### Willie James POOLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-7000

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: December 19, 2017

Decided: December 21, 2017

Willie James Poole, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, Caroline M. Scrantom, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*137PER CURIAM:

Willie James Poole seeks to appeal the district court's order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certifícate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Poole has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Jojo EJONGA-DEOGRACIAS, AKA JoJo Ejonga, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35512

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 21, 2017

Jojo Ejonga-Deogracias, Pro Se

Douglas W. Carr, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Corrections Division, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*640MEMORANDUM **

Jojo Ejonga-Deogracias, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We vacate and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Ejonga-Deogracias’s deliberate indifference claim against the Washington Department of Corrections because this claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. *See Taylor v. List,*880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state agencies, including the department of prisons). However, dismissal of the deliberate indifference claim without leave to amend was premature because it is not absolutely clear that the deficiencies in Ejonga-Deogracias’s complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. *See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,*66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect ... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend[.]”); *Lopez v. Smith,*203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to provide EjongarDeogracias an opportunity to file an amended complaint that names the correct defendants.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.