Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1706-CR-1437 | March 14, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Adam C. Squiller

Squiller & Hamilton, LLP

Auburn, Indiana

Robert J. Hardy

Hardy Law Office 

Auburn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrew M. Cassaday,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A04-1706-CR-1437

Appeal from the

Allen Superior Court

The Honorable

John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D05-1608-MR-4

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Andrew M. Cassaday (“Cassaday”) was convicted after a jury trial of murder,1

a felony, and a sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm in the 

commission of an offense2 and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of sixtyfive years. Cassaday appeals his convictions, contending that the trial court 

erred when it instructed the jury regarding self-defense. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the summer of 2015, Jeffrey Lute (“Lute”), Justin Clark (“Clark”), 

Cassaday, Phil Elkins (“Elkins”), Brandon Briggs (“Briggs”), and other friends 

formed a motorcycle club called the Steel Horse Rebels. Elkins was appointed 

President, Lute was appointed Vice President, and Cassaday was appointed 

Sergeant at Arms. In December of 2015, the relationship between Lute and 

Elkins deteriorated, and the tension escalated to the point that Lute left the club 

along with his father and his best friend, Clark. Cassaday was subsequently 

made Vice President of the club. This tension between Lute and Elkins 

continued despite Lute leaving the club. 

[4] On the evening of August 14, 2016, Lute and Clark went to the Texas 

Roadhouse restaurant located in Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana and met 

three other friends. Lute brought along and open carried his handgun as he 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2

See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11. 
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usually did; he had a license to carry the handgun, and it was generally known 

that he carried it on his person. Tr. Vol. I at 62, 194; Tr. Vol. III at 3, 29, 90. 

The five friends ate dinner and had a good time. At around 8:26 p.m., one of 

the friends, Alma Hrmcic (“Hrmcic”) recorded a Snapchat video of the group 

and posted it so her friends would be able to view it. 

[5] At the same time, several members of the Steel Horse Rebels, including Elkins,

were hanging out at another motorcycle club’s clubhouse and became aware of 

the Snapchat video and the fact that Lute was at Texas Roadhouse. Cassaday

was at his own residence with his girlfriend, Amanda Bovie (“Bovie”), when he 

received a phone call from Elkins. Immediately after receiving the phone call, 

Cassaday “drop[ped] everything,” retrieved his handgun, which he was not 

licensed to carry, and left the house with Bovie. Tr. Vol. I at 72-73. Cassaday

and Bovie then drove to the clubhouse and met the seven or so others who were 

gathered there. 

[6] At the clubhouse, Elkins, who was friends with Hrmcic, viewed her Snapchat 

video and found out that Lute was at the restaurant.

3

 Elkins then decided he 

would go to the restaurant to “chew [Lute’s] ass” and said he was going there to 

confront Lute. Tr. Vol. II at 240. Cassaday decided that he would also go to 

the restaurant in order to give Lute his “two cents.” Tr. Vol. III at 138, 140.

 

3

It is not clear whether Elkins showed the Snapchat video to anyone else, but Bovie testified that, just before 

everyone left the clubhouse, Cassaday and other club members gathered around Elkins’s cellphone and had a 

conversation about what they had viewed on it. Tr. Vol. I at 76-77. 
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Everyone at the clubhouse decided to drive over in their separate vehicles to the 

restaurant. At 9:16 p.m., Elkins sent a text message to Hrmcic, asking her 

whether she was still eating at the restaurant, and Hrmcic responded that she 

was. 

[7] Just after 9:31 p.m., Lute and his friends finished eating dinner, paid their tabs, 

and left the restaurant. Lute and Clark headed through the parking lot to 

Clark’s car, but before they could get in, ten to fourteen people “converged” on 

them and surrounded Lute. Tr. Vol. I at 82, 144, 192-93. Briggs approached 

Lute first and began yelling at him, acting aggressively, and stating, “what’s up,

Bitch, what’s up, Pussy, are ya gonna pull a gun on me now.” Id. at 193-94; Tr. 

Vol. II at 245-46. Lute took out his cell phone and held it up as if to take a 

video, and Briggs immediately stopped yelling at him and just stood there. Tr. 

Vol. I at 195, 233. 

[8] Cassaday then approached Lute and started to attack him verbally and 

physically. Cassaday pushed Lute and “threw a punch at him,” which may not 

have made contact. Id. at 249. Lute began retreating and walking backwards 

towards the sidewalk of the restaurant, and as Lute retreated, Elkins came 

running at full speed, which caused Lute to begin “backtracking a lot faster ... 

almost [at] a run backwards.” Id. at 197-98, 211. Elkins put his finger in Lute’s 

face, bumped chests with Lute, and yelled and argued with Lute. Elkins also 

punched and shoved Lute multiple times. At one point, Lute stumbled over the 

curb but was able to regain his balance. Elkins persisted in acting aggressively 
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toward Lute, even after Lute told Elkins to stop, to leave him alone, and that he 

did not want any problems. Id. at 198; Tr. Vol. II at 10. 

[9] Clark shouted to Lute, “defend yourself, ... pull your gun if you have to.” Tr. 

Vol. I at 198; Tr. Vol. II at 15. Lute then pulled out his handgun, and Elkins 

stated, “if you’re gonna pull that gun you better fucking shoot and kill me.” Tr. 

Vol. I at 199; Tr. Vol. II at 15-16. Elkins continued to move closer to Lute, and 

Lute again told him to stop and to leave him alone. Tr. Vol. I at 199; Tr. Vol. II

at 8, 15, 188. Lute was backed up against the building and could not retreat 

further. Clark yelled to Lute, “shoot that motherfucker if you have to.” Tr. Vol. 

I at 199; Tr. Vol. II at 15-16; Tr. Vol. III at 4, 37, 91. As Elkins “went to push 

[Lute] with his left hand,” and “cocked his right arm to punch [Lute],” Lute 

pointed his handgun at Elkin’s chest and then lowered it and shot him in the

right leg. Tr. Vol. I at 199; Tr. Vol. II at 15-16; Tr. Vol. III at 4, 54-55. Elkins 

went down to the ground and screamed that Lute had shot him, to call 911, and 

for “somebody [to] go get him, somebody go kill that motherfucker.” Tr. Vol. I

at 199-200, 208. 

[10] After shooting Elkins, Lute began retreating backwards saying, “good, call 

911.” Id. at 201. Then, Lute turned his back and retreated by running around 

the corner of the restaurant. Several of those present ran over to assist Elkins,

and others chased after Lute. Briggs yelled to Cassaday that Elkins had been 

shot and that “[Lute’s] coming around the building, somebody grab him, 

somebody get him.” Id. at 201-02, 229; Tr. Vol. II at 38. Cassaday proceeded to

quickly walk over to his vehicle and told Bovie to give him his gun. Tr. Vol. I at 
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85, 92, 111; Tr. Vol. II at 201; Tr. Vol. III at 94-96.

4 Bovie gave Cassaday his 

gun, and Cassaday then walked back toward the entrance of the restaurant. 

[11] When Cassaday was about three or four feet away from the door, Lute came 

from around the corner of the restaurant. As soon as Lute turned the corner, 

Cassaday raised his handgun to shoulder level, paused for about one to two 

seconds to aim, and fired at Lute. Tr. Vol. I at 203-04; Tr. Vol. II at 39-40, 201-

02. Lute fell to the ground when the bullet hit him in the neck, fracturing his 

spinal cord and killing him almost instantaneously. Cassaday stood for a 

second or two, looking over at Lute and then quickly returned to his vehicle, 

where he gave the handgun to Bovie. She placed the handgun in the glovebox. 

Cassaday drove through the parking lot quickly and picked up Elkins and other 

club members. Cassaday drove Elkins to the hospital, and on the way there, he

told Bovie to tell the police that the handgun was hers. 

[12] When Cassaday and the others arrived at the hospital, they were apprehended 

by the police almost immediately. The State charged Cassaday with murder, 

with Level 5 felony carrying a handgun with a prior conviction within the last 

fifteen years, and with a firearm sentencing enhancement. On August 26, 2016, 

Cassaday filed a notice of defense of justifiable reasonable force. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II at 167-68. Both the State and Cassaday filed proposed jury 

instruction with the trial court prior to trial. A jury trial was held from April 17 

 

4 At trial, a witness who was in the parking lot picking up his girlfriend from work, overheard someone say, 

“F [sic] this, I’m going to get my gun” and then saw Cassaday walk toward his car. Tr. Vol. II at 201. 
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through April 20, 2017, and at the conclusion, the jury found Cassaday guilty 

as charged. The State dismissed the Level 5 carrying a handgun charge, and 

Cassaday was sentenced to fifty-five years for murder with ten years for the 

firearm enhancement, which resulted in an aggregate sixty-five-year sentence. 

Cassaday now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Cassaday argues that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury 

on self-defense. Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. Schermerhorn 

v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “The purpose of 

jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without 

misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at 

a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Phillips v. State, 22 N.E.3d 749, 761 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied. When reviewing jury instruction decisions for an 

abuse of discretion, we consider: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the 

law; (2) whether there was evidence in the record to support the instruction; and 

(3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions 

given. Id. To constitute an abuse of discretion, “the instructions given must be 

erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or 

otherwise mislead the jury.” Id. 

[14] Cassaday contends that the manner in which the trial court instructed the jury 

on self-defense was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, he first asserts that it 
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was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury with both the 

pattern jury instruction on self-defense and a separate instruction that repeated 

similar language. By giving these two instructions, Cassaday argues that the 

trial court improperly emphasized that he must have acted without fault in 

order to sustain a claim of self-defense. He claims that the fact that the jury 

requested a definition of “without fault” established that the jury’s attention 

was drawn to that legal concept by the repetitive jury instructions. 

[15] A certain amount of repetition is inherent in the nature of jury instructions. 

Gebhart v. State, 525 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Ind. 1988). The defendant’s substantive 

rights are not violated by instructions that are to some extent repetitive. Id.

Instructions become improper and reversal is required only when the 

instructions are so repetitive as to unduly emphasize a particular point or 

become argument by the court. Id. (citing Robbins v. Fugit, 189 Ind. 165, 126 

N.E. 321, 322 (1920) (giving fourteen or fifteen instructions on undue influence 

in will contest case was needless repetition amounting to argument by the court 

which may mislead the jury)).

[16] In the present case, the trial court provided the jury with the Indiana pattern 

jury instruction, which stated:

The Court further instructs you that one person may kill another 

under such circumstances that the homicide or killing constitutes 

no crime, but is justified by the law. This is known as the law or 

doctrine of self-defense and may be, and is thus stated for your 

guidance: 
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Whoever, being himself without fault and in a place where he 

has a right to be, so far as his assailant is concerned, is assaulted, 

he may, without retreating, repel force by force; and he need not 

believe that his safety requires him to kill his adversary in order 

to give him a right to make use of force for that purpose. 

When, from the act of the assailant, he believes, and has 

reasonable ground to believe, that he is in danger of losing his life 

or receiving great bodily harm from his adversary, the right to 

defend himself from such danger or apprehended danger may be 

exercised by him; and he may use it to any extent which is 

reasonably necessary, and, if his assailant is killed as a result of 

the reasonable defense of himself, he is excusable in the eyes of 

the law. 

The question of the existence of such danger, the necessity or 

apparent necessity, as well as the amount of force necessary to 

employ to resist the attack can only be determined from the 

standpoint of the defendant at the time and under all the then 

existing circumstances. Ordinarily one exercising the right to 

self-defense is required to act upon the instant and without time 

to deliberate and investigate and under such circumstances a 

danger which exists only in appearance, may be as real and as 

imminent to him as if it were actual. 

A person in the exercise of the right of self-defense must act 

honestly and conscientiously. 

When all danger and all apparent danger of the loss of life, or of 

receiving great bodily harm, from the assault of his assailant is at 

an end and passed, then the right to use force is at an end and 

should cease. The person exercising the right of self-defense 

must honestly believe, and have reasonable ground to believe, 

when he makes use of force to protect himself from an assailant, 
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that at the time he uses the force it is then necessary to do so to 

protect his life, or to protect his person from great bodily harm. 

One who is in no apparent danger, and who apprehends no 

danger and who has no reasonable ground for such apprehension 

cannot kill another and successfully interpose the defense of selfdefense. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 16-17. The trial court also gave the following final 

jury instruction at the State’s request and over the objection of Cassaday: 

When a Defendant claims self-defense the following facts must 

exist: 

1. That he was in a place he had a right to be; 

2. That he acted without fault; and 

3. That he had reasonable fear or apprehension of death or great 

bodily harm. 

Id. at 18; Tr. Vol. III at 151-52. 

[17] Both of the instructions given were correct statements of the law, and Cassaday 

does not argue that they were not. The instruction requested by the State 

simplified a portion of the language contained in the pattern jury instruction

and set out the definition of self-defense in clear, concise language. Further, 

although Cassaday argues that the State’s additional instruction was improper 

because it unnecessarily emphasized one particular evidentiary fact, we do not 

agree. The State’s additional instruction did not emphasize any evidentiary 
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facts, and only emphasized the law on self-defense. It did not unduly focus the 

jury’s attention on any one aspect of the case, on any piece of evidence, or on 

any particular witness’s testimony. The State’s instruction contained all of the 

elements of a self-defense claim and not solely the element of without fault. By

including all of the elements of a claim of self-defense, the State’s instruction 

did not give any added or undue emphasis to any particular element. The 

additional instruction provided that, in order for a claim of self-defense to be 

proven, a defendant must be in a place that he had a right to be, must have 

acted without fault, and must have had a reasonable fear or apprehension of 

death or great bodily harm. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 18. Therefore, contrary 

to Cassaday’s assertions, none of the concepts of self-defense was given more 

emphasis than the others.

[18] Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

In deciding this case, you must determine the facts from a 

consideration of all the evidence and the law from these 

instructions and find your verdict accordingly. All of the law of 

this case has not been embodied in any one instruction. 

Therefore, in construing any single instruction you should 

consider it with all the other instructions.

Id. at 5. Therefore, the jury was informed that they should consider the jury 

instructions as a whole and not to put undue emphasis on any one of the 

instructions. We do not find that the pattern jury instruction and the State’s 

additional requested instruction were so repetitive as to unduly emphasize a 

particular point or become argument by the court. See Gebhart, 525 N.E.2d at
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605. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury 

and did not abuse its discretion when it gave the State’s requested additional 

instruction on self-defense. 

[19] Cassaday next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it provided 

an instruction concerning the phrase “without fault,” which purported to define 

the phrase. Cassaday asserts that this additional instruction invaded the 

province of the jury by inappropriately emphasizing certain facts and 

misleading the jury. He maintains that the instruction given by the trial court 

defining “without fault” misled the jury by emphasizing certain facts and misled 

the jury by “emphasizing whether he provoked, instigated, or participated 

willingly in the violence.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. By focusing the jury’s attention 

on whether he provoked, instigated, or participated willingly in the violence, 

Cassaday contends that the trial court heavily emphasized the confrontation at 

the restaurant parking lot and implied that “if Cassaday had any part of the 

violence before the fatal shooting, then it would follow that the doctrine of selfdefense would not apply,” which was misleading to the jury and “prevented the 

jury from considering all of the evidence at trial.” Id. (emphasis in original).

[20] During deliberations, the jury sent a question requesting the trial court to 

further define “without fault,” and over Cassaday’s objection, the trial court 

decided to allow both parties an additional five minutes to argue the issue of the 

meaning of “without fault” to the jury. However, when the jury was brought 

back into the courtroom, the foreperson told the trial court that additional 

argument by counsel would not be helpful and that the jury wanted a “legal 
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definition” of the phrase. Tr. Vol. III at 201. The trial court responded that 

there was not a formal legal definition of “without fault” and sent the jury back 

to continue deliberations. The State then requested a further instruction 

defining “without fault” taken from Driver v. State, 760 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. 2002). 

Cassaday objected, but the trial court decided to give the instruction and 

proceeded to instruct the jury as follows: “According to case law of the State of 

Indiana, a claim of self-defense requires that the Defendant acted without fault, 

which has been defined as: ‘. . . (Defendant) did not provoke, instigate, or 

participate willingly in the violence.’” Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 2; Tr. Vol. III at 

207. 

[21] Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 provides:

If, after the jury retires for deliberation:

(1) there is a disagreement among the jurors as to any part of the 

testimony; or

(2) the jury desires to be informed as to any point of law arising 

in the case; the jury may request the officer to conduct them into 

court, where the information required shall be given in the 

presence of, or after notice to, the parties or the attorneys 

representing the parties.

But once deliberations commence, the trial court should not give additional 

instructions. Dowell v. State, 973 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 

Crowdus v. State, 431 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ind. 1982)). “This rule prevents the trial 

court from giving special emphasis, inadvertent or otherwise, to a particular 
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issue in the case, and thus avoids the possibility that the additional instruction 

might tell the jury what it ought to do concerning that issue.” Id. When 

confronted with a question from a jury that has begun its deliberations, the trial 

judge must respond in a manner that accords with the legal requirements for 

final instructions and is fair. Id. (citing Jenkins v. State, 424 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 

(Ind. 1981)). “The ‘path is extremely hazardous’ for the court that would 

depart from the body of final instructions and do other than reread the final 

instructions in responding to jury questions.” Id. Such a departure will be 

warranted in only the most extreme circumstances and must serve to amend the 

final instructions by adding a necessary one previously omitted or correcting an 

erroneous one and must be fair to the parties in the sense that it should not 

reflect the judge’s view of factual matters. Id.

[22] Only when the jury question coincides with an error or “legal lacuna” in the 

final instructions will a response other than rereading from the body of final 

instructions be permissible. Id. A “lacuna” is an “empty space or missing part; 

a gap.” Downs v. State, 656 N.E.2d 849, 852 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 732). If the trial 

court decides to give an additional instruction because the question relates to a 

“legal lacuna,” the trial court must reread all of the instructions so that the 

additional instruction will not be over-emphasized. Dowell, 973 N.E.2d at 60 

(citing Graves v. State, 714 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

[23] Here, after beginning deliberations, the jury requested further definition of the 

phrase “without fault” as it connected with the previously-given instruction on 
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self-defense because the jury desired clarity as to what the phrase meant. Tr. 

Vol. III at 201. The trial court eventually gave the jury an additional instruction 

concerning the phrase “without fault,” but did not re-read the rest of the 

instructions; the jury later returned a guilty verdict. The procedure employed 

by the trial court gave that instruction “the type of improper emphasis” that 

prior cases have attempted to alleviate because the trial court did not re-read the 

entire set of final instructions contemporaneously with the giving of the 

additional instruction. Dowell, 937 N.E.2d at 62; see Crowdus, 431 N.E.2d at 

798; Graves, 714 N.E.2d at 727. Therefore, “an additional instruction tended to 

‘emphasize that issue as being of primary importance and . . . to tell the jury 

what it ought to do.’” Dowell, 937 N.E.2d at 62 (quoting Hero v. State, 765 

N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). We conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion when it failed to re-read the entire set of final 

instructions contemporaneously with the giving of the additional instruction.

[24] Although we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, reversal 

is not necessary. Any error in instructing the jury is subject to a harmless-error 

analysis. Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

“Errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction 

is clearly sustained by the evidence and the instruction would not likely have 

affected the jury’s verdict.” Id. To obtain reversal on appeal based upon an 

erroneous jury instruction, a defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that the 

instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Minor v. State, 36 N.E.3d 

1065, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. 
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[25] The evidence presented at trial showed that Cassaday and other club members 

traveled to the Texas Roadhouse after discovering that Lute was there and went 

there to confront Lute. Before leaving his home, Cassaday retrieved his 

handgun and had it in his car when he went to give Lute his “two cents.” Tr. 

Vol. III at 138, 140. As Lute left the restaurant after eating dinner with friends, 

Cassaday and his friends converged on Lute and surrounded him. Tr. Vol. I at 

82, 144, 192-93. Cassaday initiated a verbal and physical confrontation with 

Lute by attacking him verbally, pushing him, and “throwing a punch at him.” 

Id. at 249. After this confrontation with Cassaday and after Lute had shot 

Elkins, Lute retreated from the situation and ran behind the restaurant. At this 

point, Briggs yelled that Elkins had been shot and that “[Lute’s] coming around 

the building, somebody grab him, somebody get him.” Id. at 201-02, 229; Tr. 

Vol. II at 38. 

[26] Instead of disengaging from the situation, Cassaday went to his car, retrieved 

his handgun, and proceeded to walk toward the front of the restaurant. As 

soon as Lute turned the corner of the building, Cassaday raised his handgun to

the level of his shoulders, paused for about one to two seconds to aim, and fired 

at Lute. Tr. Vol. I at 203-04; Tr. Vol. II at 39-40, 201-02. After shooting Lute 

and watching him fall to the ground, Cassaday quickly returned to his car and 

gave the handgun back to Bovie and told her to tell the police it was hers. 

Cassaday then rapidly drove around the parking lot in his vehicle, picking up 

club members and the injured Elkins. Cassaday hurriedly left the scene, leaving 

Lute dead on the ground, and did not mention shooting Lute to anyone. The 
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evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Cassaday and his friends 

instigated a violent confrontation with Lute, and when Lute disengaged from 

the conflict, Cassaday continued this violence by obtaining his handgun and 

pursuing Lute, and shooting him, instantly killing him. We, therefore, 

conclude that the evidence presented at trial showed that Cassaday did not act 

without fault, and we cannot conclude that the error in instructing the jury 

affected its verdict or prejudiced Cassaday’s substantial rights. 

[27] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.