[Cite as In re C.C.S., 2016-Ohio-388.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re: [C.C.S.], : 

[C.L.S.], : No. 15AP-884 

 (C.P.C. No. 14JU07-8823)

 Petitioner-Appellant, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

v. : 

Adoption by Gentle Care, : 

 Respondent-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on February 4, 2016 

 

Steven E. Hillman, for appellant.

Tucker Ellis LLP, Jon W. Oebker; and A. Patrick Hamilton, 

for appellee Adoption by Gentle Care. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch. 

TYACK, J. 

{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant, C.L.S., appeals the decision and judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas to grant respondent-appellee, Adoption by 

Gentle Care’s ("Gentle Care"), motion for involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) and 

to dismiss C.L.S.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. C.L.S. seeks the return of the child, 

C.C.S., after signing a "Permanent Surrender Agreement" a few days after the child's birth 

on March 31, 2014. The trial court found the permanent surrender to be valid and 

granted a motion for involuntary dismissal. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial 

court's decision and judgment. 
No. 15AP-884 2 

{¶ 2} Appellant, C.L.S. assigns four errors for our consideration: 

[I.] The Petitioner did not have the capacity to contractually 

permanently surrender her newborn child due to duress, 

undue influence, or fraud and the cumulative affects [sic] of 

the physical limitations from surgery, hormonal dump and 

effects of narcotics prescribed for pain associated with 

surgery. 

[II.] The trial court erred to the Appellant's prejudice by 

improperly excluding evidence of communications between 

Appellant and her domestic partner that would show how 

Appellant was coerced into surrendering her child. 

[III.] The trial court erred in granting a "directed verdict" in a 

bench trial erred by not first determining whether evidence of 

substantial, probative value supports each element of the 

plaintiff's claims. If the plaintiff has indeed presented such 

evidence and the trial court nevertheless granted a "directed 

verdict" without weighing the evidence and determining the 

credibility of the witnesses, then an appellate court cannot 

treat the "directed verdict" as a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary 

dismissal. 

[IV.] The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for 

habeas corpus because the Appellee did not timely and 

adequately discuss the options available to the Appellant in 

lieu of surrendering the child as required by OAC: 5101:2-42-

09(B). 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} The factual history of this case is well-documented in our prior decision, In 

re C.C.S. v. Adoption by Gentle Care, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-739, 2015-Ohio-2126, and the 

subsequent decision of the trial court, In re [C.C.S.], Franklin C.P. No. 14JU-8823 

(Sept. 14, 2015). C.L.S. and her five children lived with J.G. beginning in 2008. J.G. 

worked to support the household while appellant stayed home and tended to the children. 

In 2013, C.L.S. became pregnant by an "old friend," S.L. In March 2014, J.G., who is not 

the father of any of C.L.S.'s five children, told C.L.S. that she could not bring the new baby 

into the home. 

{¶ 4} On March 15, 2014, C.L.S. contacted Gentle Care, a licensed, private child 

placement agency. At the time she contacted Gentle Care, appellant was a 38-year old 
No. 15AP-884 3 

high school graduate who had attended The Ohio State University and Columbus State 

Community College. 

{¶ 5} On March 27, 2014, C.L.S. met with a Gentle Care social worker, Kelly 

Schumaker, at a Bob Evans restaurant. At the meeting, C.L.S. was provided with 

pamphlets and packets of information about adoption including information about birth 

parents’ rights and options. Alternatives to surrender were also discussed as well as preand post-adoption options, temporary custody, and foster care. After the meeting, C.L.S. 

texted Ms. Schumaker and Ms. Schumaker texted that "it's completely up to you, it has to 

be your decision," to which C.L.S. responded later that night, "I know it’s late but I want 

you to know I'm a hundred percent choosing adoption." (July 30, 2014 Tr. 54.) 

{¶ 6} C.L.S. signed papers acknowledging that she knew her rights and 

obligations. She also selected a couple to adopt her child before giving birth to the child 

on March 31, 2014. C.L.S. did not request to see the child at the hospital and left the 

hospital the next day on April 1, 2014. 

{¶ 7} On April 4, 2014, after waiting one day longer than the statutorily-required 

72 hours, C.L.S. signed the permanent surrender agreement. C.L.S. made no request for 

counseling and affirmatively stated that no one was forcing her to go through with the 

adoption. The permanent surrender agreement also stated that, by signing, she was given 

the opportunity to ask questions and that she was surrendering the child voluntarily. 

C.L.S. also signed an "Affidavit of Relinquishment" which stated, "I have the right to seek 

the counsel of any attorney * * * I have the absolute right to refuse to place my child for 

adoption." (July 29, 2014 Tr. 44.) 

{¶ 8} On April 13, 2014, C.L.S. told Ms. Schumaker that the decision to surrender 

the child had never been hers to make. She stated that her boyfriend, J.G., with whom 

she and her other five children were living, had wanted the adoption, and J.G. regretted 

asking her to allow the adoption. C.L.S. requested that the child be returned to her. 

{¶ 9} C.L.S. petitioned the Franklin County Probate Court to revoke the 

permanent surrender agreement. Before a hearing was held on that petition, the 

prospective adoptive parents dismissed their adoption petition voluntarily and returned 

the child to Gentle Care. One reason for the dismissal was concern the prospective 

adoptive parents had about the lifelong ramifications of parenting a child whose biological 
No. 15AP-884 4 

mother wanted the child returned. Gentle Care refused to return the child to C.L.S., 

compelling C.L.S. to file for a writ of habeas corpus, thereby challenging the validity of the 

permanent surrender agreement. 

{¶ 10} Before the trial court, C.L.S. claimed the permanent surrender was made 

involuntarily, as a result of duress, undue influence, misrepresentations, and failure of 

Gentle Care to provide the necessary information for C.L.S. to give a valid consent. 

{¶ 11} The trial court heard many days of testimony. The permanent surrender 

agreement, the affidavit of relinquishment, and the recorded colloquy of the permanent 

surrender were all read into the record. The trial court also heard testimony from C.L.S. 

and from a witness who testified about the personality of C.L.S. The court also heard 

testimony from employees of Gentle Care and from the child's biological father. 

{¶ 12} After C.L.S. had presented her case, Gentle Care moved for an involuntary 

dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2). On August 22, 2014, the trial court granted the motion 

for involuntary dismissal. C.L.S. appealed to this court. 

{¶ 13} On June 2, 2015, in a split decision, we found "[t]he trial court's entry does 

not inform us that it was able or permitted to enter a directed verdict for Gentle Care and 

involuntarily dismiss the matter pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) because the findings required 

to support such action do not exist in the court's judgment entry denying appellant's 

petition." In re C.C.S., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-739, 2015-Ohio-2126, at ¶ 14. The matter was 

remanded to the trial court to "explicate and weigh the circumstances and pressures it 

previously found" C.L.S. to have been under that allowed the trial court to grant an 

involuntary dismissal pursuant Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 14} The trial court responded with a 35-page decision detailing both the facts of 

the case and the court's reasoning. The trial court concluded that C.L.S. was not 

sufficiently credible and therefore did not meet her burden of proof for granting the 

requested habeas corpus. The trial court concluded, after examining the law and the 

evidence presented in her case-in-chief, that C.L.S. really had a choice and the execution 

of the permanent surrender was the product of her freedom of exercising her will. 

(Sept. 14, 2015 Judgment Entry). The trial court granted Gentle Care's motion for 

involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2). C.L.S. has timely appealed once again. 

Involuntary Dismissal Under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) 
No. 15AP-884 5 

{¶ 15} Involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) has been thoroughly addressed 

by this court: 

Civ.R. 41(B)(2) allows a trial court to determine the facts by 

weighing the evidence and resolving any conflicts therein. 

Whitestone Co. [v. Stittsworth, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-371, 

2007-Ohio-233,] ¶ 13; Sharaf [v. Yougman, 10th Dist. No 

02AP-1415, 2003-Ohio-4825,] ¶ 8. If, after evaluating the 

evidence, a trial court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet 

her burden of proof, then the trial court may enter judgment 

in the defendant's favor. Daugherty [v. Dune, 10th Dist. No. 

98AP-1580 (Dec. 30, 1999)]. Therefore, even if the plaintiff 

has presented evidence on each element of her claims, a trial 

court may still order a dismissal if it finds that the plaintiff's 

evidence is not persuasive or credible enough to satisfy her 

burden of proof. Tillman [v. Watson, 2nd Dist. No. 06-CA-10, 

2007-Ohio-2429,] ¶ 11. An appellate court will not overturn a 

Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissal unless it is contrary to 

law or against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Whitestone Co., at ¶ 13; Sharaf, at ¶ 8. 

Jarupan v. Hanna, 173 Ohio App.3d 284, 2007-Ohio-5081, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 16} The trial court can grant a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissal if it, in its 

role as trier of fact, finds that the plaintiff's evidence fails to satisfy the required burden of 

proof. Id. at ¶ 12. "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to 

all essential elements of the case will not by reversed by a reviewing court as being 

against the manifest weight of evidence." C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio 

St.2d 279, 280 (1978). Further, " 'a reviewing court must be guided by the presumption 

that the findings of the trial court are correct, as the trial judge is best able to view the 

witnesses, observe their demeanor, gestures, voice inflections, and use these 

observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.' " Griffin v. Twin 

Valley Psychiatric Sys., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-744, 2003-Ohio-7024, quoting Whiting v. 

Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 141 Ohio App.3d 198, 202 (2001). 

{¶ 17} This court previously found that the trial court initially failed to explain its 

reasoning and consideration of the evidence that permitted it to grant the motion for 

involuntary dismissal. On remand, the trial court responded with a lengthy decision 

setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law and also stating what evidence it 

found to be persuasive and credible. 

Standard to Invalidate a Permanent Surrender Agreement 
No. 15AP-884 6 

{¶ 18} The central issue in this case is whether the permanent surrender 

agreement is valid. A permanent surrender agreement constitutes a valid contract if it is 

accepted and voluntarily entered into without fraud or misrepresentation. In re Miller, 61 

Ohio St.2d 184, 189 (1980). A permanent surrender agreement constitutes prima facie 

evidence that the consent to an adoption is valid. In re Baby Girl E., 10th Dist. No. 04AP932, 2005-Ohio-3565, ¶ 26. "A natural parent's change of heart about an adoption is 

insufficient to revoke a parent's valid consent to the adoption." Id. However, if valid 

consent is lacking, the adoption decree violates due process of law, and giving effect to the 

decree then violates the public policy of Ohio. Id.; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 75 Ohio 

St.3d 418, 421 (1996). 

{¶ 19} In determining the validity of consent and how that consent may have been 

affected by duress or undue influence, the court must determine "whether the party 

affected really had a choice; whether he had his freedom of exercising his will." Morrow 

v. Family & Community Serv. of Catholic Charities, Inc., 28 Ohio St.3d 247, 251 (1986); 

In re Baby Girl E. at ¶ 26 ("[I]f a natural parent establishes by clear and convincing 

evidence that his or her 'consent' was the result of fraud, duress, or some other consentvitiating factor, the 'consent' is invalid as not freely and voluntarily given and the adoption 

decree is void."). "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which 

will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations 

sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). It is an 

intermediate standard, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of 

such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. Id. Clear 

and convincing "does not mean clear and unequivocal." Id., emphasis sic. 

{¶ 20} C.L.S. executed a permanent surrender agreement on April 4, 2014 by 

affixing her signature and in the presence of witnesses. This is prima facie evidence of a 

valid consent. Therefore, C.L.S. was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the consent was not valid due to duress, fraud, or other factor. The trial court's 

thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law found that the consent was valid. We 

must not overturn this decision unless it is contrary to law or against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

C.L.S. Was Not Under Such Duress That She Could Not Consent 
No. 15AP-884 7 

{¶ 21} In her first assignment of error, C.L.S. alleges that she lacked the capacity to 

consent to the permanent surrender due to duress, undue influence, or fraud, and the 

cumulative effects of surgery, hormonal dump, and narcotics. We find the manifest 

weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that C.L.S. failed to present clear 

and convincing evidence that would overcome the prima facie evidence of her valid 

consent manifested in her signing the permanent surrender agreement. After we 

remanded this case, the trial court clearly showed how it weighed the evidence and what 

evidence it found credible. The trial court cured the error we found in its original 

August 22, 2014 decision. 

{¶ 22} On appeal, C.L.S. does not challenge the legal standard applied or the 

validity of the evidence that was presented at trial. C.L.S. only asks that we look at the 

totality of the circumstances to come to a different conclusion than the trial court. C.L.S. 

argues on appeal that duress from her significant other, J.G., along with a combination of 

undue influence from Gentle Care, effects from surgery, the hormonal dump experienced 

after pregnancy, and the effects of narcotic pain prescriptions, rendered her unable to 

consent to a valid permanent surrender agreement. It is clear that the trial court fulfilled 

its role as trier of fact and found that C.L.S.'s evidence was not persuasive or credible 

enough to satisfy her burden of proof. 

{¶ 23} There is ample evidence of a valid permanent surrender agreement. This 

evidence included the agreement itself, an audio recording of the colloquy that 

accompanied the agreement (which was played for the trial court), and the affidavit of 

relinquishment which stated many times the permanent, but non-mandatory nature of 

the surrender agreement. (July 29, 2014 Tr. 34-52.) This affidavit of relinquishment was 

read out loud, and C.L.S. answered questions about it, all of which was recorded as part of 

the colloquy which the court heard at trial. 

{¶ 24} The trial court found that C.L.S. did in fact have a choice in the permanent 

surrender even though she claimed she was under duress from J.G., her significant other. 

(Sept. 14, 2015 Judgment Entry, 19). The profile of C.L.S. was not one of someone who 

was easily pressured. She was 38 and college educated. She was described as rather bold 

and not a pushover. Id. There was evidence of C.L.S.'s desire to pursue adoption through 

her contact with Gentle Care and meeting and discussing adoption ahead of giving birth. 
No. 15AP-884 8 

C.L.S. was not rushed into making a decision, having weeks to decide after initially 

contacting Gentle Care. Id. at 20. There were also statements made by C.L.S., both before 

and after giving birth, that indicate it was her choice to go through with adoption. After 

meeting with a Gentle Care social worker, C.L.S. texted "I'm a hundred percent choosing 

adoption." (July 30, 2014 Tr. 54.) A hospital record indicated that C.L.S. was even more 

sure about her decision the next day after giving birth. (July 30, 2014 Tr. 74-76.) 

{¶ 25} The trial court found that there was little doubt as to C.L.S.'s state of mind 

regarding the permanent surrender as the court heard C.L.S.'s own voice on the recorded 

colloquy. The trial court also found that evidence of a history of untruthfulness undercut 

C.L.S.'s claims that J.G. left her with no choice but to surrender the child. (Sept. 14, 2015 

Judgment Entry, 22.) The trial court also noted that C.L.S. and her five children 

continued to live with J.G. even as she sought to void the permanent surrender. The trial 

court found that fact undercut the argument that J.G. was so adamant that this new child 

not live with him to cause C.L.S. such duress that she surrendered the child. C.L.S.’s 

arguments about being on pain medication and suffering a hormonal dump are also not 

persuasive as the doctor testifying was not the delivery doctor, was not at the hospital, did 

not see C.L.S. before she signed the permanent surrender agreement, and only spoke in 

generalities. (July 29, 2014 Tr. 98-115.) Ultimately, the trial court found that the 

evidence presented by C.L.S. was not sufficiently credible. (Sept. 14, 2015 Judgment 

Entry, 34.) 

{¶ 26} The trial court found that C.L.S. had failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that her consent to the permanent surrender agreement was not valid. We find 

this decision is supported by some competent and credible evidence going to all essential 

elements of the case. 

{¶ 27} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

Testimony From J.G. Was Not Improperly Excluded 

{¶ 28} In her second assignment of error, C.L.S. argues that the trial court 

improperly excluded evidence of a communication between C.L.S. and J.G., the man with 

whom she was living with. The trial court sustained an objection about this testimony. 

While not specific as to the grounds for the objection, it was likely made based on hearsay. 
No. 15AP-884 9 

During trial, C.L.S was under direct examination and being asked when she first 

considered adoption. The entirety of the objection is as follows: 

A. I – I never considered adoption until March, the middle of 

March. 

Q. Why did you begin to consider it then? 

A. Because I was getting ready to give birth and my significant 

other told me that I had to choose – 

ATTORNEY OEBKER: Objection. 

ATTORNEY HAMILTON: Objection. Sorry. 

JUDGE LOUDEN: Sustain. 

A. – because I felt like I didn't have a choice. 

Q. You didn't have a choice to do what? 

A. Other than adoption at that day – that point. 

(July 28, 2014 Tr. 145-46.) 

{¶ 29} "The admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and a reviewing court may reverse only upon the showing of an abuse of that 

discretion." Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 296, 299 (1992). "The 

term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that 

the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 30} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection. 

Counsel for C.L.S. did not argue at trial against it, or why the statement would not be 

considered hearsay. Further, there was no indication that C.L.S.'s significant other, J.G., 

was unavailable to testify. 

{¶ 31} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

The Trial Court Did Not Grant a Directed Verdict 

{¶ 32} In her third assignment of error, C.L.S. argues that the trial court erred in 

granting a directed verdict in a bench trial by not first determining whether evidence 

supports each element of the claim. This assertion is without merit. The trial court, in its 

second decision, on September 14, 2015 granted an involuntary dismissal. This is distinct 
No. 15AP-884 10 

from the first decision when we found that the trial court could not enter an involuntary 

dismissal because the findings to support such action did not exist in the August 2014 

judgment entry. In re C.C.S., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-739, 2015-Ohio-2126. 

{¶ 33} In our June 2, 2015 decision, we only discussed a directed verdict standard 

to determine if the trial court’s decision could meet the more stringent standard of 

construing the evidence most strongly in favor of C.L.S, rather than the less rigorous 

standard for involuntary dismissal. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 

Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842. "There is no prejudice if a trial court 

erroneously applies the Civ.R. 50(A) standard for directed verdict instead of the standard 

for involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) because the directed verdict standard is 

much more rigorous than the involuntary dismissal standard. * * * Satisfaction of the 

Civ.R. 50(A) standard implies satisfaction of the Civ.R. 41(B)(2) standard." Whitestone 

Co. v. Stittsworth, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-371, 2007-Ohio-233, ¶ 15; quoting Fenley v. 

Athens County Genealogical Chapter, 4th Dist. No. 97CA36 (May 28, 1998). 

{¶ 34} We found that the trial court's September 14, 2015 judgment entry lacked 

the factual findings to grant an involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) and therefore 

examined if it could pass a directed verdict standard. In re C.C.S. Appellant's counsel 

does not recognize this distinction in his brief and instead alleges factual errors 

committed by the trial court. 

{¶ 35} The third assignment of error is overruled. 

Options Other Than Adoption Where Adequately Discussed 

{¶ 36} In her fourth assignment of error, C.L.S. argues that the petition for habeas 

corpus should have been granted because Gentle Care failed to discuss all the options 

available to C.L.S. in lieu of surrendering the child as required by the Ohio Administrative 

Code. Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-09 states: 

(B) At least seventy-two hours prior to the PCSA or PCPA 

execution of the JFS 01666, the assessor shall meet with the 

parents, guardian or other persons having custody of the child 

to do the following: 

(1) Discuss with the parents, guardian, or persons having 

custody of the child other options available in lieu of 

surrendering the child. 
No. 15AP-884 11 

The trial court stated that "[t]here was, in fact, sufficient discussion between [C.L.S.] and 

[Gentle Care] staff to meet the 'discussion' element of the permanent surrender." 

(Sept. 14, 2015 Judgment Entry, 26.) The trial court found Gentle Care did discuss the 

surrender options as required by Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-09(B)(1). (Sept. 14, 2015 

Judgment Entry, 27.) This finding of fact is supported by competent and credible 

evidence in the record. 

{¶ 37} On March 27, 2014, C.L.S. met with a Gentle Care social worker, Kelly 

Schumaker, at a Bob Evans restaurant for about an hour. (July 28, 2014 Tr. 137.) At the 

meeting, C.L.S. was provided with pamphlets and packets of information about adoption 

including information about birth parent's rights and options. (July 31, 2014 Tr. 127-28.) 

Alternatives to surrender were also discussed as well as pre- and post-adoption options, 

temporary custody with an agency, and foster care. This information was also contained 

in a pamphlet that was given to C.L.S. at this meeting, including the option to place the 

child with a friend or non-relative temporarily or permanently. (July 31, 2014 Tr. 87-88.) 

{¶ 38} Further, during the colloquy when the permanent surrender was signed, 

C.L.S. was asked if she understood her options: 

Q. And how long have you been considering adoption? 

A. For approximately a month. 

Q. Okay. 

A. Three, four weeks. 

Q. Three to four weeks? Do you feel like that's a long enough 

time to consider all of your options? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you understand that you will be signing a permanent 

surrender of child document and that this is not a temporary 

custody form? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And do you understand that you're not obligated to 

proceed with surrender today, and that baby could be placed 

in foster care or discharged to you to give you more time? 
No. 15AP-884 12 

A. I understand. 

Q. Okay. Would you like to consider any of there options? 

A. No. 

(July 29, 2014 Tr. 36-37). Ample evidence exists to support the trial court's conclusion 

that all the options of what could be done with the child were discussed with C.L.S. 

{¶ 39} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

It is Irrelevant That J.G. Was Not a Party to Permanent Surrender 

{¶ 40} The trial court also found an independent reason why duress from J.G. 

could not void C.L.S.'s consent; stating that under Ohio law the duress to void a contract 

must come from a party to that contract. The trial court quoted: 

To avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must prove 

coercion by the other party to the contract. It is not enough to 

show that one assented merely because of difficult 

circumstances that are not the fault of the other party. 

Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243 (1990), at paragraph one of syllabus. 

{¶ 41} Whether this is a correct statement of Ohio law in the context of a 

permanent surrender agreement is not a question that needs to be addressed here. We 

have already found that trial court's judgment that C.L.S. really had a choice in consenting 

is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, such a question pits the 

public policy that duress to invalidate a contract must originate with a contract party 

against the policy that birth parents must not be in such duress that it overcomes their 

freedom to exercise their will. One can only speculate as to which policy takes precedence 

in other circumstances that may be driven by other facts. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 42} Having found that C.L.S. really had a choice, we will not invalidate the 

permanent surrender agreement. The evidence presented by C.L.S at trial is insufficient 

to overcome the prima facie evidence of the signed permanent surrender agreement. 

Essentially this case was a question of fact, not law. The trial court, as the fact finder, 

made its determination after a lengthy trial that C.L.S. failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence that the surrender agreement is invalid as a result of duress or other 

factors. It is a great misfortune therefore that this case has resulted in a newborn child 

living in foster care since birth for the last 21 months. 
No. 15AP-884 13 

{¶ 43} Having overruled the four assignments of error, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.