In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 00-3762, 00-3763

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Juan Pedroza and Hilario Pedroza,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 CR 192--George W. Lindberg, Judge. 

Argued March 29, 2001--Decided October 18, 2001

 Before Easterbrook, Rovner, and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. In March

1999, federal agents found two kilograms

of cocaine in Juan Pedroza’s car, $61,000

in cash and various drug paraphernalia in

his house, and $10,000 in cash and

ledgers recording drug transactions in

the home of his brother Hilario Pedroza.

After the district court denied the

brothers’ motions to suppress this

evidence, they entered conditional guilty

pleas to conspiracy to possess cocaine

with intent to distribute in violation of

21 U.S.C. sec. 846. In this appeal, the

Pedrozas challenge the district court’s

denial of their suppression motions as

well as the district court’s refusal to

dismiss their indictment for violation of

the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. sec.

3161. We affirm both convictions.

I

 On March 18, 1999, Drug Enforcement

Agency (DEA) agents were conducting

surveillance of Juan Pedroza, whom they

suspected of being involved in drug

activity. In the early afternoon, Juan

drove to Hilario’s house in a 1991 Ford

Thunderbird, parked in front of the

house, and went inside. About twenty

minutes later, he returned to the

Thunderbird and drove around to an alley

behind the house, where Hilario passed a
brown cardboard box to Juan through the

car window. Juan then drove back to his

own residence. After he stopped the car,

he sat in it for a few minutes and then

went into the house empty-handed. About

thirty minutes later, Juan left again,

this time driving a Jeep Cherokee. Agents

looked through the windows of the

Thunderbird but were unable to see the

cardboard box. This roused their

suspicions that the Thunderbird had a

secret compartment, and that Juan had

hidden the box in it.

 Other agents followed Juan when he left

in the Cherokee. After awhile, it became

evident from the way Juan was driving

that he knew he was being followed, and

so the agent in charge instructed the

pursuing agents to contact Juan and

question him if possible. A few minutes

later, Agent Dan Foley pulled up next to

Juan at a stop light, showed Juan his

police badge, and said, "Police, would

you mind talking to us?" According to

Foley, Juan said, "Yes, he would," and

then drove through the intersection and

promptly pulled over to the curb. Foley

turned right and pulled over just around

the corner from Juan. At that point, a

traffic officer at the corner directed

Juan and the agents to move from the

intersection to a laundromat parking lot

a short distance away, which they did.

 After Juan stopped his car in the

parking lot, a total of four DEA agents,

each in his own car, also pulled into the

lot. Although Juan testified that his car

was blocked by the agents’ cars, the

agents testified, and the district court

specifically found, that Juan’s car was

not blocked. Initially, two Englishspeaking agents spoke briefly with Juan.

A bilingual agent, Agent Lou Dominguez,

then approached Juan, identified himself

as a police officer, and asked Juan if he

was more comfortable speaking English or

Spanish. Juan preferred to speak Spanish,

so Dominguez conducted the remainder of

the encounter in Spanish. Dominguez told

Juan that the agents were investigating

drug trafficking and asked Juan if he was

involved in any such activities. Juan

said he was not. Dominguez next asked

Juan if he had any contraband in the

Jeep. Juan replied that he did not and

volunteered permission for the agents to

search the vehicle. 
 At that point, Dominguez told Juan he

was going to pat him down for the agents’

protection. Dominguez conducted a brief

pat-down search which turned up cell

phones and pagers, but no weapons or

contraband. The cell phones and pagers

were eventually confiscated, although

Agent Dominguez could not recall whether

they were taken at the time of the patdown search or later. After the pat-down

search, Dominguez continued to question

Juan, and Juan continued to respond to

the agent’s questions. Three other agents

searched the Jeep while Dominguez and

Juan continued to talk. The agents found

no contraband in the Jeep.

 While the Jeep was being searched,

Dominguez asked Juan where he lived and

if he owned any other cars. Juan gave his

address and said he owned a Ford

Thunderbird. Dominguez asked if Juan had

any contraband at home or in the

Thunderbird, and Juan again said that he

did not. Juan then volunteered permission

for the agents to search his home and the

Thunderbird and said that his wife was at

home and could give the agents the keys

to the Thunderbird. Dominguez radioed an

agent who was conducting surveillance at

Juan’s house and notified him of the

consent to search the house and the

Thunderbird. Agents at the house knocked

on the door and informed Mrs. Pedroza

that Juan had given them consent to

search the Thunderbird; she gave them the

keys. The search of the Thunderbird

revealed that the missing cardboard box

was in fact hidden in a secret

compartment, and the box turned out to

hold two kilograms of cocaine.

 The agents at the house then radioed

back to Dominguez and had him arrest

Juan. Dominguez read Juan his Miranda

rights in Spanish, and Juan said that he

understood them. The agents next

transported Juan back to his house,

unhandcuffed, where they conducted the

search of the house to which Juan had

previously consented. Agents found drug

paraphernalia, a gun, and approximately

$61,000 in cash in the house. 

 After Juan was arrested, he told the

arresting agents that he had obtained the

two kilograms of cocaine from Hilario. On

the basis of this information, the agents

decided to arrest Hilario also. About

five agents met at a parking lot near
Hilario’s home to carry out the arrest.

The agents wore gun belts and bulletproof vests with the word POLICE

emblazoned on them. Three of the agents

approached Hilario’s front door while the

other two went around to the back. When

the agents approached the door, it was

ajar, although the storm door was closed.

The agents could see Hilario walking

toward the front of the house. Agent

Dominguez, who was the first one on the

porch, knocked and said, "Police, we’d

like to talk to you," to which

Hilarioreplied, "Come on in." The agents

entered the house and immediately

arrested Hilario. Agent Dominguez asked

Hilario in Spanish if he would mind if

the agents looked around for any other

individuals, and Hilario said no. The

agents then conducted a security sweep of

the house while Dominguez explained to

Hilario why he was being arrested and

read Hilario his Miranda rights. Hilario

waived his rights and agreed to speak to

the agents. Dominguez asked Hilario if he

had any drugs, guns or contraband in the

house; Hilario said he did not. Dominguez

asked Hilario if the agents could search

the house, and Hilario gave his consent.

Dominguez also asked Hilario if the

garage attached to the house and the

vehicles in it were his and if the agents

could search them; Hilario indicated that

they were his and gave his permission for

the search. Ultimately, the search of

Hilario’s home and garage turned up

$10,000, which Hilario admitted was drug

money. The agents also found several

ledgers detailing drug transactions. 

II

 In the district court, both Juan and

Hilario moved to suppress the evidence

seized from the Thunderbird and from

their homes. Juan argued that the agents

effectively arrested him without probable

cause when they initially stopped him,

and that his subsequent consent to the

search of his home and the Thunderbird

was the fruit of the illegal arrest.

Hilario argued only that he did not

voluntarily consent to the search of his

home. The district court, relying on the

recommendation of a magistrate judge,

found that Juan’s encounter with the

agents was consensual and that Hilario

voluntarily consented to the search of

his home. 
 Many of the arguments that the Pedrozas

make in this appeal are nothing more than

challenges to the factual findings and

credibility determinations of the

magistrate judge. Such arguments are

almost always fruitless on appeal. As

there is nothing physically impossible or

otherwise disqualifying about these

findings and determinations, we reject

those arguments here. The magistrate

judge held two days of hearings at which

he heard testimony from both brothers and

from several of the agents who were

involved in the searches. The story that

the Pedrozas told about the events of

March 18 differed markedly from the

agents’ description of the events. At the

conclusion of the hearings, the

magistrate judge expressly found that the

agents all gave testimony that was nonevasive and internally consistent and

that each agent’s testimony was

consistent with that of the other agents.

In contrast, the magistrate found that

both Juan and Hilario gave testimony that

was inconsistent, evasive, and

unreliable. Accordingly, the judge

credited the agents’ version of the

events and refused to credit the

Pedrozas’ versions. We give special

deference to such credibility

determinations, which can virtually never

be clear error. See, e.g., Clark v.

Runyon, 116 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.

1997). Accordingly, we will evaluate the

legality of the stops on the basis of the

facts as the magistrate judge found them.

 With that much established, we cannot

find that Juan’s consent to the search of

his house and the Thunderbird was the

product of an illegal seizure. Whether an

encounter with the police is consensual

is a factual question dependent on all

the circumstances surrounding the

encounter. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Ultimately, whether

an encounter is consensual depends on

whether "a reasonable person would [have

felt] free to disregard the police and go

about his business." Florida v. Bostick,

501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). 

 Juan points out that, according to the

agents’ testimony, when Agent Foley first

asked Juan if he would mind pulling over

and speaking to the agents, Juan verbally

responded, "Yes." According to Juan, this

answer signified that, yes, Juan would

mind speaking to the agents; in other
words, Juan did not want to speak with

them. Because Juan initially stated that

he did not wish to speak to the police,

his counsel reasons, the fact that Juan

nevertheless wound up pulling over and

speaking with them indicates that he was

not free to leave.

 But Juan’s response was at best

ambiguous: it could just as easily have

signified, "Yes, I will speak with you."

Taken together with his conduct

immediately following the verbal

exchange, any ambiguity disappears, and

it becomes clear that Juan was agreeing

to have a conversation with the agents.

Juan did not hesitate in pulling his car

over to the curb after Agent Foley’s

request. According to the agents’

testimony, although Foley also stopped,

he did not pull up behind Juan but

instead turned a corner and stopped

there. Juan argues that, when the traffic

officer waved him away from the curb and

into the laundromat parking lot, he

believed that he was being ordered to

stop, but this conflicts with both the

magistrate judge’s credibility findings

and the objective circumstances of the

situation. It would have been clear to a

reasonable person in this situation that

the traffic officer was interested only

in keeping a busy intersection clear of

obstructions and was not ordering Juan to

do anything other than clear the

intersection. Even more telling is the

fact that the traffic officer gave Juan

no directions at all until after he had

voluntarily pulled over to the curb.

Nothing Agent Foley or any of the other

agents present did should have made Juan

feel he was being compelled to stop. A

reasonable person faced with Agent

Foley’s question whether he would mind

speaking with police would have thought

that he was free to "disregard the police

and go about his business." Bostick, 501

U.S. at 434. That Juan instead stopped to

speak with the agents indicates that the

encounter, at its inception, was

consensual.

 The next phase in Juan’s encounter with

the agents was the pat-down. Early in

their conversation, Agent Dominguez told

Juan that he was going to pat Juan down

for the agents’ protection. Apparently

without giving Juan an opportunity to

object, Dominguez proceeded to do just

that. A protective pat-down search of
this nature is appropriate only if the

agents have at a minimum some articulable

suspicion that the subject is concealing

a weapon or poses a danger to the agents

or others (unless, of course, the subject

consents to the search). See Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Dominguez

never sought Juan’s consent to conduct

the pat-down search, and we have serious

doubts as to whether the facts the agents

chose to present at the suppression

hearing meet even the minimal standards

of articulable suspicion. If the pat-down

search had turned up incriminating

evidence, we would find the question

whether any such evidence should be

suppressed a very close one. 

 We need not decide that question,

however, because the pat-down search

revealed no such incriminating evidence,

and it thus contributed nothing to the

later discovery of the drugs, money, and

paraphernalia. Instead, after the patdown, Agent Dominguez continued to talk

with Juan, and Juan continued to answer

Dominguez’s questions freely. The

evidence that Juan wants suppressed was

discovered not as a result of the patdown search but during the search of the

Thunderbird and his home. As to the

latter searches, there can be no question

about the voluntariness of Juan’s

consent. On the record as established by

the district court, in fact, Juan

volunteered permission for the agents to

search his home and the Thunderbird even

before the agents asked for it. The only

question we face, then, is whether,

assuming the pat-down search was illegal,

that illegality tainted the remainder of

the encounter between Juan and the agents

and vitiated Juan’s consent to the later

searches. In our view, it did not. 

 As a general rule, if a seizure of a

suspect, such as the pat-down search

here, is illegal, the illegal seizure

will vitiate the suspect’s subsequent

consent to a search unless the state

proves that the consent "resulted from an

independent act of free will." United

States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798

(7th Cir. 1997), citing Florida v. Royer,

460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983). Stated

differently, the question is "’whether,

granting establishment of the primary

illegality, the evidence to which instant

objection is made has been come at by

exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently

distinguishable to be purged of the

primary taint.’" United States v. Green,

111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 1997),

quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471, 488 (1963). In determining

whether the consent is sufficiently

distinguishable from the primary taint,

three factors are relevant: "(1) the time

elapsed between the illegality and the

acquisition of the evidence; (2) the

presence of intervening circumstances;

and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the

official misconduct," id. at 521,

although none of these factors alone is

determinative.

 In this case, even assuming that the

pat-down search was illegal, we believe

that there was ample evidence that Juan’s

consent to the search of his home and his

Thunderbird resulted from an independent

act of free will and not from any

exploitation of the questionable pat-down

search. As we noted above, there is no

question that Juan’s encounter with the

agents began with his voluntary consent

to speak with them; this is not a

situation in which an illegal arrest or

Terry stop is the sole reason the suspect

is talking to the police at all. Prior to

the pat-down search, Juan was apparently

willing to talk freely with the agents,

and according to Agent Dominguez, he was

equally willing to do so after the

pat-down search was concluded. Juan was

told that the pat-down was for the

agents’ protection, and the pat-down did

not turn up any weapons or incriminating

items. It is unlikely that a reasonable

person would have felt free to leave

before the pat-down search, but then

would have felt she was being restrained

after the search was concluded and the

agents found nothing incriminating. 

 With this context in mind, we turn to

the moment at which Juan gave the agents

permission to search his house and the

Thunderbird. At this point, it is

critical to note that Agent Dominguez

never asked Juan for permission to

conduct this search. Rather, Dominguez

asked Juan where Juan lived and whether

he had any other cars, and Juan gave his

address and told the agent he owned a

Ford Thunderbird. Dominguez asked if Juan

had any drugs or other contraband in his

house or the Thunderbird, and Juan said

he did not. At that point, without
further prompting by Dominguez, Juan not

only volunteered permission for the

agents to search his house and the

Thunderbird, but also went on to tell the

agents that his wife would be at home and

could give them the keys to the

Thunderbird. The fact that Juan offered

permission for the searches without being

asked, and even went so far as to give

the agents instructions for getting the

car keys from his wife, strongly suggests

that Juan’s consent was an independent

act of free will. The fact that the house

and car were at a remote location

bolsters this conclusion, as a reasonable

person could not have thought, based only

on the questions that Agent Dominguez

asked, that he was being required to

submit to a search of his home and all

his vehicles. 

 It is true that the consent followed

closely on the heels of the questionable

pat-down search, which could suggest that

the consent was a product of that search.

In this case, however, we find that the

other two factors indicate the

voluntariness of the consent and outweigh

the temporal proximity. First, Juan’s

decision to volunteer permission for the

search, without being asked by the

agents, can be seen as an intervening

circumstance that removed the taint of

the illegal pat-down. This was not a

situation in which the agents demanded

(or even asked) that Juan consent to a

search, and they surely were not required

to turn down Juan’s offer merely because

the encounter was possibly tainted by the

pat-down search. Similarly, we find that,

although the agents may have lacked an

articulable suspicion to justify the patdown search, that is also a close

question. The agents’ violation of Juan’s

rights, if one occurred, was not

flagrant. More importantly, it is clear

from Agent Dominguez’s account that the

only purpose of the pat-down search was

to determine if Juan was carrying any

weapons. There is no suggestion that the

search was a ruse to intimidate Juan or

to force him to answer the agents’

questions. 

 The record simply provides no indication

that the agents tried to exploit the

questionable pat-down search to secure

Juan’s consent to search his home and

Thunderbird. To the contrary, it is not

even clear that the agents would have
sought such permission had Juan not

raised the subject. On these facts, we

have no trouble concluding that Juan’s

decision to permit the search was an

independent act of free will, and we

therefore affirm the district court’s

decision not to suppress the evidence

found at Juan’s home and in the

Thunderbird.

III

 We turn now to Hilario’s arguments for

suppression. The agents who arrested

Hilario did not have a warrant either for

the arrest or for a search of his home,

and the government recognizes that they

could not legally have entered the home

or conducted the search without Hilario’s

consent. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.

573, 586 (1980) ("[S]earches and seizures

inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable."). The agents

maintain, and the district court found,

that Hilario freely invited the agents

into his home and consented to the

search. Hilario, on the other hand,

argues that he did not freely consent to

the entry or the subsequent search, but

instead merely submitted to an

"exuberant" show of force by the DEA

agents. Whether Hilario freely and

voluntarily consented to the search of

his home is a fact question, which we

review only for clear error. United

States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069, 1076

(7th Cir. 2001). 

 Hilario’s argument that the agents

used an excessive amount of force in

arresting him and in coercing his

"consent" to the search is based largely

on Hilario’s own version of the facts,

not on the agents’ version. Unfortunately

for him, the magistrate judge

specifically found that the agents’

version was the more credible of the two.

In light of this finding, it is plain

that Hilario freely consented both to the

agents’ entry into his home and to their

search. According to the agents’

testimony, they approached the front door

at around 7 p.m., knocked, identified

themselves, and asked to speak to

Hilario. Hilario responded by saying,

"Come on in." No guns were drawn.

Hilario’s consent to their entry was

immediate; the agents did not make

repeated requests, and Hilario was not in

police custody at the time. 
 Similarly, there was ample evidence to

conclude that Hilario’s consent to search

his house was free and voluntary.

Although Hilario had been arrested when

he gave that consent, he had been in

custody only a short time, and he

immediately gave his consent the first

time the agents asked to conduct the

search. Hilario had been read his rights,

said he understood them, waived them, and

agreed to speak with the agents. No guns

were drawn. Hilario was not handcuffed,

nor was he threatened in any way. The

district court specifically found that

the agents conducted the encounter in a

cordial and professional manner and that

no coercive tactics were used. We have no

reason to believe that this conclusion

was clearly erroneous, and we therefore

affirm the denial of Hilario’s

suppression motion.

IV

 Finally, we must consider the Pedrozas’

assertion that the indictment against

them should have been dismissed because

delays in the trial court violated the

Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161.

That statute requires that defendants be

brought to trial within 70 days of the

date of indictment, excluding certain

periods. The periods excludable from the

70-day period include all the time

between the filing of a pretrial motion

and the hearing on that motion, 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3161(h)(1)(F); Henderson v. United

States, 476 U.S. 321, 326-30 (1986), any

time between the hearing and the date on

which the district court receives the

last filing necessary to make a decision

on the motion, id. at 331, and, in the

case of a single pretrial motion, up to

thirty additional days during which the

motion is under advisement, 18 U.S.C.

sec. 3161(h)(1)(J). 

 Juan and Hilario were indicted on April

13, 1999. They filed their motions to

suppress on May 20, 1999. The Pedrozas

agree that the time between April 13 and

May 20 was excludable from the speedy

trial clock because of various

continuances. On June 18, 1999, Juan and

Hilario filed motions to revoke

detention. The district court determined

that it would not hold a hearing on the

motions to revoke detention until after

the suppression motions were resolved.
The magistrate held a two-day hearing on

the suppression motions on August 18-19,

1999, and the last brief on the motions

was filed September 15, 1999. The time

between May 20 and September 15 was

properly excludable as time between the

filing of the suppression motions and the

date on which the last brief necessary to

the decision of the motions was filed.

See Henderson, 476 U.S. at 326-31. The

troublesome delay arose here because the

district court did not rule on the

suppression motions until January 14,

2000, 121 days after the last document

necessary to decide the motions was

filed. Because only the first 30 days

after the suppression motions were taken

under advisement were excludable, the

Pedrozas reason, the district court

missed the 70-day deadline by 21 days.

(The Pedrozas have not argued that any of

the time between January 14 and July 12,

when the Pedrozas entered their guilty

pleas, affects the Speedy Trial Act

calculus.)

 The government argues that the time it

took for the district court to decide the

suppression motions was irrelevant,

because throughout that time, the

Pedrozas’ motion to revoke detention was

pending. It finds support for this

argument in the Henderson decision, which

held that 18 U.S.C. sec. 3161(h)(1)(F)’s

exclusion for the time between the filing

of a motion and its hearing applies to

that entire time, regardless of whether

the delay before the hearing is

"reasonably necessary." 476 U.S. at 329-

30. The Pedrozas respond, not without

reason, that the district court had

refused to act on their motion to revoke

detention until the suppression motions

were decided, and that to allow the

pendency of the motion to revoke

detention to toll the Speedy Trial Act

limitation no matter how long the court

then took to decide the suppression

motions would thwart the purposes of the

Act. While we are sympathetic to the

Pedrozas’ argument on this point, we

ultimately need not decide this question,

because we find that the district court’s

resolution of the suppression motions was

timely.

 Although the Speedy Trial Act allows

only 30 days of excludable time after the

last brief on a motion is filed if only

a single pretrial motion is pending, when
a district court must contend with

multiple motions, we have held that the

30-day period can be extended as long as

the court resolves all pending motions

with "reasonable promptness." United

States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 737 (7th

Cir. 1997). While the "reasonable

promptness" standard is not susceptible

to mathematically precise definition (and

we specifically reject any mechanical

standard such as 30 days per motion), we

have found that trial courts have acted

with reasonable promptness when they have

taken 42 days to decide seven motions,

United States v. Tibboel, 753 F.2d 608,

612 (7th Cir. 1985), 68 days to decide

eight motions, United States v. Latham,

754 F.2d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1985), and 50

days to decide 24 motions, United States

v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1066-67 (7th Cir.

1993). 

 In this case, the district court was

considering a total of four suppression

motions brought by two different

defendants. Each motion raised a number

of constitutional questions, and the

hearings on the motions lasted two days.

Although the district court took 121 days

to decide the motions, we need not decide

whether the entire 121 days was

excludable. Rather, if we can consider 51

of these days to be excludable time, then

the district court resolved the motions

within the 70 days of non-excludable time

that the Speedy Trial Act allows. Taking

51 days to decide four complex

suppression motions is reasonable and is

in keeping with the time periods we have

approved in the past. Therefore, we find

that at least 51 of the days while the

suppression motions were under advisement

were excludable from the speedy trial

clock, and that the district court met

the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day deadline.

 The Speedy Trial Act was not violated in

this case, and the district court did not

err in denying the Pedrozas’ suppression

motions. Accordingly, we Affirm both

judgments of the district court.