### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 21 , 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEN NY RA Y O ’D ELL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Coc ke County Nos. 0015, 0016 Ben W. Hooper, II, Jud ge

No. E2006-02471-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Novem ber 7, 2007

D e f e n d an ta p p e a l s h i s s e n t e n c e s a s a r e s u l t o f g u i l t y p l e a s t o t w o c o u n t s o f r o b b e r y, a c l a s s C f e l o n y. Def endant wa s sentence d by the trial court as a Rang e I Standard Of

fende r to one six-y ear

term for
c a se numbe r 0 01 5 to be se rv e d in the Te nn e sse e De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n a nd on e six- y e ar t e rm , suspended, f

o r ca s e number 0016 to be serve d on probation. De fenda nt was also orde red to pa y $6,999.00 in restitution for case number 0015 and $621.00 in restitution for case number 0016. The sentenc es ar e to be se rved c onsecutively . On appe al Def endant a rg ues t hat he should have rec eived
a se nte nc inga lte rn a tiv e oth e r tha n inc arc e ra

tio n an d tha t the se nte nc e s shou ld have be e n o rd e re d to be ser ved conc urre ntly

with e ach other. He does not cha lleng e the leng th of the individual sentence s or the amounts of restitution. After a thorough review of the re cord, w e af

firm the judg ments of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J . joined.

Edwar d Cantrell Miller, Dis trict Public Def ender ; Keith E. Ha as, Assistant Public Defe nder, f or the
a pp e lla nt, Ke nn y Ray O’ De ll.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E. Wil lis , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; J ames B . Dunn, District Attorney Gene ral; and A manda H. I n m an, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee
OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

Def endant pled guilt y

to robbing Ms. J oann Shelton at Food City in Newpor

t on April 30, 2006. Ms. Shelton testified that Def endant, while se ated in his ca r, aske d for dire ctions and whe n she lea ned in towar ds the passeng er’ s side window t o tell him where to g o, Def endant g rabbe d her-2-

purs e str a p. Ms. She lto n te sti fi e d that De fe nd ant the n b e g an to dr ive wh ile sh e wa s st ill ho ldi ngon to her pur se, ef

fec tively drag g ing he r ac ross the par king l o t

. M s

. S h elton stated that she suff ere d bruises as a result of this. Ms. Shelton testified that her pur se conta ined jewe lry and $4.00 in ca sh. Ms. Shelton’s driver’s lice nse wa s in her purse when i t was stolen and he r g lasses we re br oken during the alter cation.

De fe nd ant a lso ple d g uil ty to ro bb ing Ms. L y nd a Gr ay on Ma

y 12 , 20 06

. De fe nd ant too k M s. Gr ay ’s purs e wh ile sh e wa s sho pp in g fo r a Mot he r’ s D ay c ard a t a Do lla r G e ne ra l in

Ne wp or t. De fe nd ant g ra

bb e d h e r pur se and pu lle d he r dow n the a isl e

. She te sti fi e d tha t she did no t le t g o unti l he drug her into a display case forc ing he r to rele ase the purse. Ms. Gr ay testified she ha d $580.00 in cash. Also, her

driver’ s license wa s in her purse and had to be repla ced.

Def endant testified at the hear ing that he did not rea lly reme mber the r obberie s beca use he was hig h on methamphetamine a nd cra ck coc aine. Def

endant said he was a

“cr ack f eine [sic]” at the time the robbe ries we re c ommitt ed. Def endant testified that when he hear d about the robbe ries he had some memory of them and turned himself in to the police. He stated that he did not n o t ice any jewelr y in Ms. Shelton’s purse, but w ould pa y back whateve r she felt he owe d her. D efe ndant apolog ized during his testimony and also testified that he had a pologized to Ms. Shelton on the day of his arr aig nment. Def

endant ha s two small boy s, ag es two and four, and a wife. He is employ ed and the r ecor d includes a le tter fr om his employ er statingthat Def endant is a g ood worke r.
The State introduce d the pre sentenc e re port as evide nce. T he pre sentenc e re p o rt shows defe ndant has thre e convic tions for theft under $500.00, qualifying him as a R an ge I Standard Offe nder. It also repor

ts that D efe ndant has been convicted of seve n traff ic offe nses, one possession of dr ug s o ff e ns e , f ou r as sa ult s, tw o d ome sti c vio le nc e c ha rg e s, on e va

nd a lis m, o ne e va din g arr e st, one fa ilure to appe ar, o n e cr iminal impersonation, and one c riminal trespassing . These of fense s b ega nwh en De fe n d an t wa s ei gh t ee n , an d h e i s n o w t we n t y -e i gh t y ea rs o l d at t h e t i m e o f s en t en ci n g.

II. Ana lys is

A. Standard of Review

Whe n a de fe nd ant c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th o r t he mann e r o f se rv ic e of his or he r s e nte nc e , th is Court must conduct a de novo r eview w ith a presumption that the deter minations made by

the trial
c ourt are c or

re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ); Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W. 3d 69 8, 70 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . T his presumption, howeve r, is conting ent upon an a ffirmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 543-44 (Te nn. 1999). I f the re cord f ails to show such consider ation, the re view of the sentenc e is purely

de novo. State v. Shelton , 854 S.W .2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
I n making it s s en t encing de terminations the trial cour t must consider: (1) the e vidence prese nted at the sentenc ing hear ing; (2) the prese ntence repor t; ( 3) the princ iples of sentenc ing a nd
argume nts a s to se nte nc inga lte rn a tiv e s; ( 4) the natur e and c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f the c ri min a l c on du c t;-3-

(5) e vidence and information offe red by the par ties on the mitigating and enha nceme nt fac tors; (6) the def endant’ s potential o r l ack of potential for r ehabilitation or trea tment; (7) any

statistical information provided by

the administrative office of the cour t as to sentencing

prac tices for

simil ar offe nses in Tenne ssee; and ( 8) any statements made by

Def endant in his own behalf. T.C.A. §§ 40- 35 -1 03 and

-2 10 ; State v. W

illiams , 920 S.W .2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The de fenda nt bear s the burden of

showing that his sentence i s i m p ro p er. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) Sentencing Com mis sio n Co mme nts ; State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

.
I f our revie w ref

lects that the trial court, following the statutory sentenc ing proce dure, imposed a lawful sentenc e afte r having g iven due consideration a nd proper weig ht to the fa ctors and principles set out under

the s entenc ing law, and made findings of fac t that are adequately supported by the re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent result. State v. Fletc her , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . The g ener al principles of sentenc ing r equire that the leng th of sentenc e be “ justly deser ved in relation to the seriousness of the off en s e” and “be no g reater than that deserve d for the of fense committed.” Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W .3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) (citing T. C. A. §§ 40-35-102( 1) and - 103(2))

. B. Tr ial Court’s Ruling

I n the instant case , the t rial j udg e sentenced Defe ndant t o a si x -y ear term of inca

rce ration for
case number 0015 a

nd a six -y ear

suspended se ntence to be serve d on probation for case number 0 0 1 6

. T h e t r i a l c o u rt s t at edt h at t h es e o ff en s es we re “a s s er i o u s as o ff en s es ca nget

. ” T h e j u d ge detailed De fenda

nt’s leng thy

criminal history

and obser

ved that in th e l as t ei ght out of ten y ear s Def endant ha s been “ in trouble.”

The trial c ourt found De fe n d ant i s a Rang e I offe nder. H e found the following “advisory fa c tor s” to e xist in

de te rm ini ngthe se nte nc e . F ir st, the tr ia l c ourt de te rm ine d that De fe nd ant h a s a previous history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior . T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 1). Ne x t, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d tha t the vic tim s we re pa rt ic ula rl y vu lne ra ble be c a us e of a g e or ph y sic a l di sa

bil iti e s. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 11 4( 4) . M s. She lto n te sti fi e d th a t sh e is a str ok e vic tim , ha s h a d f ive he art a tta c ks , and qualifie s for ha

ndicappe d parking privileg es. Ms. G ray testified that she collects disability . The trial court a lso found applicable enhanc ement fa ctor number five, that Def endant treated or allowed the victim to be tre ated with exceptional cr uelty during the commission of eac h offe nse. Ac cording to M s. She lto n’ s te sti mony , D e fe nd ant, wh ile dr ivi ng his c ar, dr ughe r a ro un d th e pa

rk inglot . M s. Gra y also testified that in tr

y ing to ke ep Def

endant from stealing her pur se she wa s pulled down the aisle by Def endant a nd into a d i splay

case . The trial c ourt used these same fa cts to support
e nh anc e me nt u

nd e r f a c tor numbe r t e n, that D e fe nd ant h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me when the r isk to human life was hig h. T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 5), (10) . The trial c ourt mentioned fa ctor eig h t, th a t D e f

e n d an t, b e f

o r e tr ia l o r

s e n te n c in g , f

a il e d to c o mp ly

w it h c o n d it io n s o f

a s e n te nce involving in re lea s e i n t o t h e communit y . Howeve r, the trial c ourt elec ted not to give this factor much weig ht beca

use the e vidence available was not “ove rly clea r.” T.C.A. § 40- 35-114(8)

.-4-

Th e tr ia l c ourt

the n a c kn ow le dg e d that he found on e mit ig a tin g fa c tor

to b e po ssi bly
a pp lic a ble . T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 13 (3 ) p ro vid e s, “ [s]ub sta nti a l g ro un ds e xist tending to excuse or j ustify the def endant’ s criminal conduc t, though f ailing to e stablish a defe nse” as a mitig ating fac tor. The tria l court stated that he believed the re w as “someth i n g t o t h at” but beca use the ing estion of m ethampheta mine and crac k coca ine was voluntary , no weig ht should be g iven t o this fac tor. After revie wing the enhanceme nt fac tors and finding no mitigating fac tors that should be g iven any weig ht, the t rial court sentenc ed Defenda nt to the m axim um of six y ear s to serve
as a Rang e I offe nder for case 0015 and to six y ear s, suspended, for case 0016. The trial c ourt ruled that the sentenc es must be serve d consec utive to eac h other. C. Consecutive Sentencing

A trial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon a dete rmination that one or more of the cr iteria set f

orth in Tennesse e Code Annotated s ection 40-35- 115(b) e x ists. I ncluded is a f inding that “[t] he def

endant is a

n offe nder whose rec ord of cr iminal activity is ex tensive.” T.C.A. § 40- 35- 11 5( b) (2 ). Th e le ng th o f th e sen ten c e , w he n c on se c uti ve in n a tur e , mu st b e “ jus tly de se rv e d in relation to the seriousness of the of fense ” and “ no g reater than that d es er v ed” under the circ umstances. T.C.A. § 40-35-102(1); § 40-35-103( 2). Additionally , whether sentenc es are to be
se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y or c on se c uti ve ly

is a ma tte r ad dr e sse d to the so un d disc re tio n of the tr ia l c ourt

. State v. Hastings , 25 S.W .3d 178, 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. Def endant c halleng es his consec u t i v e sente nces on the g rounds that he doe s not meet the
consec uti v e s en t en ci n g re qu i re m en t s o f T en n es s ee C ode Annotate d section 40-35- 115(b). De fenda nt outl in e s h o w h e d o e s n o t f it in an y o f th e s e v e n f

a c to r s r e qu ir e d f

o r c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n cing . The statute requir es that the trial c ourt find only one of the seven f

actor s in or der to impose consecutive sentenc es. T.C.A. 40-35- 115(a) , SentencingCommi ssion Com ments. I n the instant case , the trial court found that Defe ndant had a n extensive criminal history and that def

endant is a “ dan g erous offe nder” whose b eh av i or indicate s no reg ard f or human life, a

nd no hesitation about committing
a c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to h uma n li fe is h ig h. T. C.A . 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b )( 2) , ( 4) . T he tr ia l c ourt , howeve r, did not make the r equire d additional finding s in ord er to base its decision on De fenda nt being a “da

ng erous of

fende r.” See State v . W

ilkerson , 9 05 S.W. 2d

93 3, 93 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) . T he Sta te
conce des this point.

De fe nd ant’ s c ri min a l hi sto ry , a s o utl ine d a bo ve , is e xten siv e , an d w hil e it i s tr ue that th e se are his first felony

convictions, the statute does not re quire that the D efe ndant’s cr iminal hist ory consist of felony

char g es

. T

. C .A. 40-35-115 Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments, see State v

. Ro be rt S mi th , No.W2006-00998-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 162181, at *4 (Ten n

. C ri m. App., at J ackson, Jan. 23, 2007) perm. app. denied (T e nn . May 21 , 200 7)

. We co nc lud e that the re is a mpl e e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the tr ia l court ’s de te rm inatio n th a t c on se c uti ve se nte nc ingis a pp ro pr ia te du e to Def endant’ s ext ensive c riminal history

. There fore , Def endant is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.-5- D. Alternative Sentencing Robbery is a Class C felony and Def endant is a Rang e I standard offe nder. The trial court’ s deter mination of whether

a def endant is entit led t o an alternative sentence a nd whether

a def endant is a suitable ca

ndidate for

full probation are differ ent inquiries with dif fer ent burde ns of proof. Sta te v. Boggs , 932 S.W .2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . When a def en d an t i s entitled to the statutory presumption favor ing alternative sentenc ing, the state must ove rcome the presumption by the showing of “e vidence to the contra ry .” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W. 2d a t 16 9; State v. Bingham , 9 1 0 S

. W

. 2 d

4 4 8 , 4 5 5 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 ) , o v e r r u l e d i n p arto no t h e r

g r o u n d s b y State v. Hooper , 2 9 S. W.3 d 1 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; see T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(6), -103(1) . Howeve r, eve n if the defe ndant is entitled to the statutory presumption favor ing a lternative se ntencing , it is t he def endant who has the burden of

demonstrating his or her suitability for f ull probation. Bingham , 910 S.W .2d
a t 45 5; see T.C.A. § 40-35-303( b). Senten ci n g i s s ues must be deter mined by the fa cts and circ umstances of

eac h case

. S

e e S ta tev. Taylor , 744 S.W .2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (c i t i n g Sta te v . M

os s , 727 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986) ).

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 02 (5 ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I n rec og nition that state pr ison capa cities and the f unds to build and maintain them
are limit ed, convicted felons committing the most seve re offe nses , p o s s essing criminal histories evincing a clea r disreg ard f

or the law s and morals of soc iety , and evincingfailure of past ef forts at reha

bilitation shall be g iven first priority reg arding sentenc ing involving incar cer ation.

A defen d an t w h o d o e s n o t f a ll w it h in th is c la s s o f

o f f e n d e r s “ an d

w h o is ane s p e c ia ll y

mi ti g a te d of fe nd e r o r s tand ard

of fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a Cla ss C, D, or E fe lony is pr e su me d to be a fa vo ra ble candidate for a lternative se ntencingin the absenc e o f ev i d ence to the contra ry .” T.C.A. § 40-35- 102(6).

I n the i nstant case , Def endant arg ues t hat because these are hi s first felony convictions and be c a us e he ha s c omp le te d mi sd e me ano r p ro batio n b e fo re , th a t he is a pr op e r c and idate fo r f

ull probation. F irst, we must clarif y that Def endant did rece ive an a lternative se ntence as to ca se 0016. The trial court sentenc ed De fenda nt to six y ear s, suspended, to be se rved on pr obation. Howeve r, simply beca use the trial c ourt sentenc ed De fenda nt in this manner

for c ase 0 016 does not mean De fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to fu ll p ro batio n a s to his oth e r s e ntenc e. Th e tr ia l c ourt wa s ju sti fi e d in order ing D efe ndant to serve by full incarc eration h i s s en t en ce in case 0015 due to his ex tensive criminal history and the failure of past eff orts at reha

bilitation. The trial court would also have be en justified in or dering Def

endant to se rve the sentenc e for case 0016 in incarc eration; however, the tr ia l c ourt , in its dis c re tio n, or de re d that se nte nc e to be se rv e d on pr ob a tio n. “ [G]iv e n th e ir a bil ity to review the offe nder’ s demea nor and char acte ristics first hand, trial c ourts are in the best position to asce rtain an offe nder’ s amena bility to [probation or] a community corr ections prog ram.” State v. Grigsby , 9 57 S.W. 2d 54 1, 54 7 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 7)

. De fe nd ant is not e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.-6- CO NC LU SION

For the forg oing r easons, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE.