United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 31, 2022*

Decided September 2, 2022 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1062 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

EMMANUEL ODIAH, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 19-cr-81-wmc

William M. Conley, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Emmanuel Odiah appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court correctly ruled that Odiah, who is 

vaccinated, did not show an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate 

release based on a risk from COVID-19 or any error at sentencing. We therefore affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 22-1062 Page 2 

In 2020, the district court sentenced Odiah to a 54-month sentence for money 

laundering. He laundered money for a wire-fraud scheme in which his co-conspirators 

stole more than $600,000 from at least 19 victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(1), (h). 

Odiah’s direct appeal was dismissed as untimely. He moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255, arguing, in part, that the district judge miscalculated his guideline range by 

applying the wrong offense level. While that motion was pending, Odiah moved for 

compassionate release. He asserted that two extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warranted his release: First, he was at risk of contracting a severe case of COVID-19 

because of his obesity and the poor sanitation in his prison; and second, his sentence 

was erroneous, as asserted in his § 2255 motion. He also argued that the sentencing 

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed in favor of his release because he was a 

first-time, nonviolent offender.

The judge denied the motion for compassionate release, ruling that Odiah had 

not shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He explained that Odiah had little risk of contracting COVID-19 

because he was vaccinated; no medical evidence suggested that Odiah’s weight would 

affect the efficacy of the vaccine; and no inmate and only one staff member at his prison 

had then tested positive for the virus. He declined to address Odiah’s sentencing-error

argument, explaining that it was a collateral attack on his conviction, not a ground for 

compassionate release. Finally, he concluded that the sentencing factors listed in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against Odiah’s release because the financial and 

psychological injuries he caused to 19 victims showed he was a danger to the public.

We pause to discuss the scope of the appeal. After the judge denied his motion 

for release, Odiah moved for reconsideration. Before the judge ruled on that motion,

Odiah appealed the denial of compassionate release, but the notice of appeal was 

docketed only after the judge denied the motion for reconsideration. Then, while this 

appeal was pending, Odiah filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the judge 

denied. This appeal is limited to review of the initial order denying release and the first 

order denying reconsideration. When Odiah appealed, the order denying release was 

not final because he had moved the judge to reconsider his ruling. See United States v.

Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2010). The appeal took effect when the judge denied 

the motion to reconsider and the clerk docketed the notice of appeal, see id., placing both 

the denial of the motion for release and of the first motion for reconsideration within 

our jurisdiction. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4). At that point, jurisdiction over the case 

transferred from the district court to ours, so the district judge could not grant Odiah’s 

second motion for reconsideration. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a). 
No. 22-1062 Page 3 

On the merits, Odiah argues that the district judge erred by relying on his 

vaccination status to determine his risk from COVID-19 instead of conducting an 

individualized assessment. But we ruled in United States v. Broadfield that COVID-19 is 

not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for immediate release of a vaccinated 

prisoner unless he provides evidence that he cannot benefit from the vaccine. 5 F.4th 

801 (7th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Barbee, 25 F.4th 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2022). Odiah 

did not present any evidence that vaccines would be ineffective for him. He responds 

that he submitted evidence of his obesity. But he furnished that evidence in his second 

motion for reconsideration, which is outside the scope of this appeal. In any case, 

evidence of obesity is not enough; Odiah must show that his weight impairs the 

vaccine’s efficacy, and he has not.

Odiah also argues that the district judge wrongly refused to consider his claim of 

a sentencing error, but again circuit precedent forecloses his argument. Defendants may 

not use compassionate-release motions to bypass the normal process for challenging 

sentences. United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). Thus, a claim of a 

sentencing error is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. Id.; see also 

United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022). 

Finally, Odiah argues that, in finding that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

weighed against release, the judge ignored his argument that his crime was nonviolent.

Because Odiah did not present any extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting 

relief, the judge was not required to analyze the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Ugbah, 

4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021). Regardless, the judge’s analysis was sound. He

explained that Odiah was a danger to his community based on the extensive financial 

and psychological harm he caused his many victims. See § 3553(a)(1). No further 

discussion was needed; “[i]t is enough to state one reason adequate to support the 

judgment.” Ugbah, 4 F.4th at 598. 

AFFIRMED