UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4186

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LONNIE LEROY CARTRETTE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:11-cr-00400-RBH-1)

Argued: December 5, 2012 Decided: December 31, 2012

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge Duncan and Judge Agee joined.

ARGUED: James P. Rogers, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Ernest Booth, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, 

Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred W. Bethea, Assistant United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, 

South Carolina; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, 

John D. Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. 
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Lonnie Cartrette appeals his conviction of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 

and a two-level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement 

imposed under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 after 

the district court found he committed perjury on the witness 

stand. Cartrette principally argues that the police did not 

properly impound his vehicle after he was arrested for 

shoplifting, and that the subsequent inventory search (which 

revealed the weapon) was thus invalid. He also contends the 

district court improperly excluded certain photographic evidence 

and improperly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement. 

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

I.

A.

Conway, South Carolina, Police Department (“CPD”) officers 

Joshua Hardee and Chevis Ridgeway responded to a shoplifting 

report at a local Wal-Mart around 8:30 p.m. on February 4, 2011. 

Wal-Mart loss prevention employees had detained Cartrette after 

he had attempted to shoplift a bottle of perfume. The officers 

arrested Cartrette for shoplifting and took him out of the WalMart to their patrol car. They asked Cartrette where his car was 
4

in the parking lot, and he indicated the aisle in which his car 

was located.1 The officers determined that Cartrette’s license 

was suspended and decided to have his car towed from the lot, 

even though Cartrette told them that both his wife and brother 

were not far away and could pick up the car. Indeed, Cartrette 

told the officers his brother was at a restaurant next to the 

Wal-Mart parking lot.

Nonetheless, the officers opted to impound the vehicle and 

conduct an inventory search. While the CPD has no written policy 

addressing when vehicles should be impounded (as opposed to when 

they should be searched after impoundment), Officers Ridgeway 

and Hardee testified that the standard procedure is to impound a 

vehicle when the driver is arrested and no other driver is 

present to take custody of the vehicle. Thus, while Cartrette 

remained in the police cruiser with Hardee, Officer Ridgeway 

walked to Cartrette’s vehicle and began an inventory search. 

The CPD policy for inventory searches states: 

G. Automobile Inventories

 1 Apparently, the Wal-Mart employees had questioned 

Cartrette before the officers’ arrival and the officers quickly 

learned that Cartrette had a vehicle nearby. Cartrette confirmed 

at oral argument that he makes no contention that the officers 

learned of the car’s presence through custodial questioning by 

the officers. Indeed, Cartrette apparently requested that the 

officers place in his vehicle a container of dog food (which, 

unlike the purloined perfume) he had paid for at the register in 

the Wal-Mart. We are told they did as he requested.
5

1. Officers will routinely conduct a warrantless 

inventory of any lawfully impounded vehicle.

2. Warrantless inventories are done to:

a. Protect the owner’s property

b. Protect the Department against claims of lost 

or stolen property

c. Make sure that no weapons or other dangerous 

instruments fall into the hands of vandals or 

thieves.

3. Officers will complete a Vehicle Impound Form on 

every impounded vehicle.

J.A. 82. Ridgeway found a machete and a BB gun in the vehicle’s 

passenger compartment. He then opened the trunk and found, 

wrapped in shirts or sweatshirts, a short-barrel, pump action 

shotgun. Cartrette stipulated at trial that he had previously 

been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year, and thus was ineligible to possess firearms.

B.

Cartrette was indicted in the United States District Court 

for the District of South Carolina on March 22, 2011, on one 

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e). Cartrette filed a motion to 

suppress the shotgun, arguing that the search of his car’s trunk 

violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. In a pre-trial 

motions hearing and at trial, the arresting officers testified 

to the CPD impoundment procedure. Officer Hardee testified that 

the standard procedure is to impound a vehicle when no other 

driver is present:
6

Q: And is that standard operating procedure with 

Conway Police Department, that if you arrest a suspect 

and there is no other driver present, that you would 

call a wrecker and impound the car?

A: Yes, sir. We do that to cover ourselves. That way 

nothing happens to the gentleman’s vehicle.

J.A. 32. 

Officer Ridgeway testified that “[o]nce we place somebody 

under arrest, any of their property that’s not able to go with 

them to the jail becomes our responsibility, to include 

vehicles.” J.A. 117. Officer Ridgeway also testified:

Q: Now, the defense asked a question as to whether or 

not you have any discretion as to wait for another 

driver to come and get the vehicle.

A: My understanding is that there is not – I mean I’ve 

never personally practiced it, and I don’t know that 

it is practiced in the department.

Q: Standard procedure is you would impound the vehicle 

--

A: Correct.

Q: -- when someone’s arrested unless there is another 

driver present?

A: Yes, sir.

J.A. 45-46. The court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning 

that the search of the trunk was a proper inventory search after 

police had reasonably impounded the vehicle because there was no 
7

known individual immediately available to take custody of the 

vehicle. See J.A. 80-85.2

At trial, Cartrette testified that he, his brother, Richard 

“Ricky” Loggins, and Loggins’ girlfriend had driven to the WalMart to get dog food, and that the brother and his girlfriend 

went to a nearby restaurant while Cartrette went into Wal-Mart. 

He paid for the dog food but admitted to shoplifting a bottle of 

perfume, valued at $6, for his stepdaugther.3 When Wal-Mart loss 

prevention employees stopped him for shoplifting, they took him 

to the loss prevention office in the back of the store. When the 

police officers arrived, he said, they laid out his possessions 

on a counter, noticed the keys, and asked him where the car was. 

He allegedly responded, “the car’s setting in the parking lot, 

but it’s not mine.” J.A. 62. Cartrette, denying any knowledge 

that the shotgun was in the car, testified that the shotgun 

belonged to another brother, Jason Mishoe, and that he had seen 

it only once before.

 2 The district court did, however, suppress Cartrette’s 

statements to the officers regarding the shotgun after they 

discovered it, finding that, contrary to the officers’ 

testimony, Cartrette had not been advised of his right to remain 

silent.

3 The value of the perfume is not in the record, but 

Cartrette’s counsel indicated at oral argument it was worth $6.
8

Mishoe, however, testified that while the gun had 

previously belonged to him, he had given up possession of it 

before the night of Cartrette’s arrest. Specifically, he 

testified that the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk first 

belonged to Lisa Pate, a former girlfriend of Mishoe’s who had 

once lived with him. Mishoe said he had other guns in his house, 

but after he was convicted for assault and battery and child 

neglect, he was no longer allowed to possess firearms. He 

testified that his father therefore took the guns, and that

Cartrette then took the guns from the father. 

On cross examination, defense counsel introduced a photo, 

uploaded to Facebook in 2010, of Mishoe holding two shotguns –

one of them the shotgun later found in Cartrette’s trunk. Mishoe 

said the photo was taken in 2009, before he was barred from 

possessing firearms. When the prosecutor objected on relevancy 

grounds to the introduction of additional photos showing Mishoe 

with guns, the court excluded the other photos under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a court to exclude relevant 

evidence for reasons including undue delay, waste of time, and 

the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The court 

ultimately admitted the photo of Mishoe holding two shotguns, 

and a Facebook printout of the same, but excluded the other 

photos.
9

A jury found Cartrette guilty of one count of unlawfully 

possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the court 

applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, 

finding that Cartrette perjured himself at trial in that he “was 

not credible in the opinion of The Court” and “g[a]ve false 

testimony on a material matter with the willful intent to 

deceive.” J.A. 353. With a criminal history category of III and 

an offense level of 22, including the two-level obstruction of 

justice enhancement, the Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months. 

Without the enhancement, the range would have been 41 to 51 

months. The court sentenced Cartrette to 54 months’ imprisonment 

and three years of supervised release.

Cartrette filed a timely notice of appeal. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

Cartrette argues on appeal that (1) the impoundment of his 

vehicle was unlawful, and thus the shotgun found in the 

subsequent inventory search should have been suppressed; (2) the 

district court erred in excluding certain photos of his brother 

holding firearms; and (3) the court erred in applying a twolevel sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. We 

address each issue in turn.
10

A.

1.

Cartrette first argues the district court erred in its 

denial of his motion to suppress the shotgun found in the trunk 

of his car. We review a district court’s factual findings on a 

suppression motion for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

novo. United States v. Hernandez–Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, 206 (4th 

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1833 (2011).

2.

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a 

general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a 

warrant before conducting a search. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 

U.S. 465, 466 (1999). “Any evidence obtained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” 

United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 738 (4th Cir. 2007). The 

Supreme Court, however, has held warrantless searches to be 

valid if the search “‘falls within one of the narrow and welldelineated exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement.” United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 

(1999)). 
11

An inventory search is a well-recognized exception to the 

warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 

369-72 (1976). Opperman held that when vehicles are lawfully 

impounded, it is reasonable for the police to secure and 

inventory the vehicle’s contents so long as there exists a 

“standard police procedure” for doing so. Id. at 372. The Court 

gave three reasons for allowing inventory searches: (1) to 

protect the vehicle owner’s property while it remains in police 

custody; (2) to protect the police against claims or disputes 

over lost or stolen property; and (3) to protect the police from 

potential danger. Id. at 369.

We have stated: “A proper inventory search is merely an 

incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding 

incarceration, conducted to protect the arrestee from theft of 

his possessions, to protect the police from false accusations of 

theft, and to remove dangerous items from the arrestee prior to 

his jailing.” United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 739 

(4th Cir. 2007)). The vehicle must be in the lawful custody of 

the police at the time of the search, United States v. Brown, 

787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986), and the search must be 

conducted pursuant to standard criteria, Colorado v. Bertine, 

479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6 (1987). For an inventory search policy to 

be valid, “it must curtail the discretion of the searching 
12

officer so as to prevent searches from becoming a ‘ruse for a 

general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’” 

Banks, 482 F.3d at 739 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 

(1990)). Officers must administer the search in good faith. 

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374. 

For the police to lawfully impound a vehicle after an 

arrest, the officer must reasonably believe that “there was no 

known individual immediately available to take custody of the 

car, or [that] the car could have constituted a nuisance in the 

area in which it was parked.” Brown, 787 F.2d at 932. The 

Supreme Court has stated that the impoundment of a vehicle is a 

valid “community caretaking” function of police. Cady v. 

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-43 (1973). And while the Court has 

been consistent in holding that inventory searches must be 

conducted according to standardized criteria, see Bertine, 479 

U.S. at 374 n.6, the Court has afforded police more discretion 

when it comes to the decision to impound vehicles. The Bertine

Court stated that “[n]othing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits 

the exercise of police discretion [in the impoundment of 

vehicles] so long as that discretion is exercised according to 

standard criteria and on the basis of something other than 

suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 375.

In Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 

528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), we upheld the impoundment and 
13

inventory search of a vehicle left in the driveway of a hospital 

emergency department. The police followed Cabbler’s car to a 

Roanoke, Virginia, hospital, where Cabbler parked the car in the 

driveway and went into the hospital. Id. at 1144. Police entered 

the hospital and arrested Cabbler on an outstanding warrant. Id.

While being placed in the police car, Cabbler gave the officers 

the keys to his car and asked them to roll up the windows. Id.

In so doing, the officers found a pistol in the back seat. Id.

Cabbler was taken away, and the officers impounded his car and 

conducted an inventory search. Id. We upheld the search, noting 

the “overwhelming” evidence that the purpose of the impoundment 

was to protect the car and its contents. Id. at 1145. We also 

observed that the car was a “nuisance” where it was parked – a 

hospital driveway. Id. at 1145-46. We thus held that “the police 

do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they impound a vehicle 

to protect it or to remove a nuisance after arresting the driver 

away from his home, and he has no means immediately at hand for 

the safekeeping of the vehicle.” Id. at 1146.

We reaffirmed our Cabbler holding in Brown, 787 F.2d 929. 

In Brown, a police officer noticed Brown’s car weaving down the 

highway and striking a parked car. Id. at 930. The officer 

stopped Brown and administered a field breath test, confirming 

that Brown was intoxicated. Id. The officer then determined that 

the passengers in the car had also been drinking, making them 
14

unavailable to take custody of the vehicle. Id. at 931. The 

officer impounded the car, drove it to a police station, and

conducted an inventory search, finding a short-barreled rifle 

under the driver’s seat. Id. Brown challenged the impoundment 

and search, arguing that the car should have been left in the 

custody of his girlfriend, who lived above the business in whose 

parking lot the car was located. Id. at 932. We upheld the 

impoundment and subsequent search, stating that the question was 

not whether there was a need for police to impound the vehicle, 

but whether the officer’s decision to impound the vehicle “was 

reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. We observed that while 

the officer could have tried to reach the girlfriend and leave 

the vehicle with her, the decision to not do so did not render 

the impoundment unreasonable. Id. We noted that the parking lot 

where the vehicle was located was for both apartment dwellers 

and business patrons, and so the officers could have reasonably 

concluded that the car would have been a nuisance if left in the 

lot. Id. Therefore, we held, the police “could reasonably have 

impounded Brown’s vehicle either because there was no known 

individual immediately available to take custody of the car, or 

because the car could have constituted a nuisance in the area in 

which it was parked.” Id.
15

3.

In the instant case, no one was immediately available to 

take custody of Cartrette’s vehicle, and a reasonable officer

could have concluded that it constituted a nuisance where it was 

parked, in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Even if we credit Cartrette’s 

testimony that his brother was nearby – testimony the district 

court did not find credible, see J.A. 353 – the police were not 

required to stay on the scene and wait for the brother to 

return. See Brown, 787 F.2d at 932 (impoundment reasonable when 

no known individual is “immediately available to take custody of 

the car”).

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Cartrette’s argument 

that the Conway Police Department’s lack of a written 

impoundment policy renders the impoundment unlawful. Bertine

requires standard criteria for impounding vehicles, 479 U.S. at 

375, but it does not require the criteria to be in writing. 

Here, the testimony of Officers Ridgeway and Hardee indicates 

there was a standard procedure to impound vehicles when no one 

is immediately available to take custody of the vehicle, and 

that they understood and followed that procedure. The district 

court was entitled to credit that testimony.4

 4 Even apart from its non-precedential status, our 

unpublished opinion in United States v. Johnson, Nos. 11-5049, 

11-5050, 2012 WL 3538876 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2012) (per curiam), 

(Continued)
16

We also find that the inventory search conducted subsequent 

to the impoundment was a lawful search that followed the CPD’s 

inventory search policy. We therefore hold that Cartrette’s 

vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to standard CPD

procedure, and the inventory search was lawfully conducted 

pursuant to a written policy. 

B.

1.

Cartrette next argues that the district court erred in 

declining to admit certain photos of his brother, Mishoe, 

holding various firearms. “We review rulings on the 

admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion and will only 

overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and 

 

cited by Cartrette at oral argument, is of no help to him. In 

Johnson, we upheld a vehicle impoundment and inventory search 

where the driver was not properly licensed, the owner of the 

vehicle was not present, and the vehicle presented a road 

hazard. Id. at *1. We held the impoundment properly followed the 

procedure spelled out in the Prince George’s County, Maryland, 

Police Department General Order Manual, which provides for the 

immediate impoundment of vehicles that are “impeding the 

movement of traffic” or parked “in a manner constituting a 

threat to public safety.” Id. at *3. The Prince George’s County 

Police Department’s commendable decision to commit to writing 

its impoundment policy does not require other departments to do 

the same, nor are other departments required to follow its 

standards. Here, it is sufficient that the CPD had a standard 

procedure that comported with our holdings in Brown and Cabbler, 

and that the district court found that the officers followed 

this procedure.
17

irrational.” United States v. DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 326 (4th 

Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th 

Cir. 2011)).

2.

The district court admitted a photo of Mishoe holding two 

guns, one of them the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk. J.A. 

244(a). The court also admitted a printout of Mishoe’s Facebook 

page showing that photo. J.A. 244(b). But the court declined to 

admit six photos of Mishoe with guns, and eight pages of 

Facebook printouts showing those photos, citing the marginal 

relevance of the photos and principles underlying Federal Rule 

of Evidence 403. Cartrette argues that the court’s refusal to 

admit these additional photos prejudiced him in that he was not 

able to show that Mishoe had a penchant for weapons. Cartrette 

also argues that the other pictures “would have buttressed the 

defendant’s contention that it was Mishoe who placed the sawedoff shotgun in the trunk.” Cartrette Br. 11. These excluded 

photos indeed show Mishoe with weapons, but they do not show him 

with the vehicle in which the shotgun was found. The photos are 

duplicative of the photo that was admitted: All are undated 

photos, uploaded to Facebook in 2010, that show Mishoe with 

various firearms. (One excluded photo depicts Mishoe making an 

obscene gesture, but does not show a firearm.)
18

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, “All relevant evidence 

is admissible,” and evidence which is not relevant is not 

admissible. However, Rule 403 states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. 

Fed. R. Evid. 403. The six additional photos excluded by the 

district court were cumulative. The court admitted a photo 

showing Mishoe with the shotgun found in Cartrette’s trunk, and 

Cartrette cross-examined Mishoe about the photo. Cartrette has 

not shown how the additional, undated photos would have aided 

his defense.

Nor has Cartrette shown the district court abused the broad 

discretion it is afforded on questions of evidence 

admissibility. In explaining the high bar for successfully 

challenging a Rule 403 decision by a district court, the 

District of Columbia Circuit stated, “Rule 403 contemplates the 

thoughtful consideration of the trial court and leaves the 

admission of evidence to the sound discretion of the trial 

judge.” United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C. Cir. 

1992). The Third Circuit further observed, “If judicial selfrestraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a 

trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” United States 
19

v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit 

added, “Special deference also is due the district court’s 

assessment of the probative value of evidence because that court 

is in the best position to balance probative value against the 

danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 

651 (7th Cir. 1993).

We think these observations have significant salience here. 

Because the additional photographs Cartrette sought to admit 

were cumulative of an already admitted photo and would have done 

little to bolster Cartrette’s theory of defense, we decline to 

find that the court abused its discretion in excluding them.

C.

1.

Lastly, Cartrette argues that the district court erred in 

adding a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for 

obstruction of justice. In assessing whether a district court 

has properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal 

conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United 

States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).

2.

Cartrette argues that we should vacate the obstruction of 

justice enhancement because he did not perjure himself. Under 

the Sentencing Guidelines, a two level upward adjustment under § 

3C1.1 is warranted
20

[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 

administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 

instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive 

conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of 

conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely 

related offense.

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 The covered conduct includes “committing, 

suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 

cmt. n.4(b). When a defendant objects to an obstruction of 

justice enhancement stemming from his testimony at trial, the 

sentencing court “must review the evidence and make independent 

findings necessary to establish [perjury].” United States v. 

Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). Otherwise, imposition of the 

enhancement would “be automatic whenever the convicted defendant 

had exercised her constitutional right to testify in her own 

behalf at trial.” United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 647–48 

n.3 (4th Cir. 1995).

For a sentencing court to apply the obstruction of justice 

enhancement based on perjury, it must find by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant when testifying under oath (1) 

gave false testimony, (2) concerning a material matter, (3) with 

the willful intent to deceive, rather than as a result of 

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. United States v. Jones, 

308 F.3d 425, 428 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 

at 92-98). We recently clarified how district courts are to 
21

apply U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1: “If a district court does not make a 

specific finding as to each element of perjury, it must provide 

a finding that clearly establishes each of the three elements.” 

United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 2011). We

added, “With respect to willfulness, for example, it would, in 

the usual case, be enough for the court to say, ‘The defendant 

knew that his testimony was false when he gave it,’ but it could 

not simply assert, ‘The third element is satisfied.’” Id. In 

Perez, we held the district court improperly applied the 

obstruction of justice enhancement because it did not indicate 

that the false testimony concerned a material matter or that it 

was willfully given. Id.

In the instant case, the district court properly found all 

three elements of the obstruction of justice enhancement had 

been satisfied. As to the first element – that the defendant 

gave false testimony – the court stated: “I listened to the 

testimony in the evidence that was presented. He was not 

credible in the opinion of The Court. I didn’t believe him when 

he testified. I don’t think the jury believed him when he 

testified. I’m convinced that he did perjure himself.” J.A. 353. 

As to the second and third elements – that the false testimony 

concerned a material matter and was given with a willful intent 

to deceive – the court stated, “I think he did give false 

testimony on a material matter with the willful intent to 
22

deceive.” J.A. 353. The court repeated that statement later in 

the sentencing hearing. See J.A. 354. The court also repeated 

that it did not believe Cartrette’s testimony, and stated, “I 

find that this enhancement applies not just by a preponderance 

of the evidence but also beyond a reasonable doubt.” J.A. 354.

Having made such a finding, the court imposed the two-level 

enhancement, giving Cartrette a total offense level of 22 with a 

criminal history category of III, resulting in a Guidelines 

range of 51 to 63 months. The court sentenced Cartrette to 54 

months’ imprisonment. 

We hold that the court properly made a specific finding as 

to each element of perjury, and we therefore affirm the 

obstruction of justice enhancement.

III.

For the reasons stated, we hold that (1) the impoundment 

and inventory search of Cartrette’s vehicle were lawfully 

conducted pursuant to standard police procedures, and therefore 

were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding cumulative 

photos of Cartrette’s brother holding firearms; and (3) the 

district court properly applied a two-level obstruction of 

justice sentencing enhancement after it made specific findings 
23

that Cartrette had committed perjury. Accordingly, the judgment 

of the district court is

AFFIRMED.