F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A L E X B E R

E Z O V S K Y , P laintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellant
,

v

.

G R E G O R Y M O N I Z ; I D E L L M O

N I Z ; R E D R O C K F I

N A N C I A L S E R

V I C E S , L L C, W E L L S F A R

G O B A N K , N.A.; G A R D E N T E R R A C E H O M E O W

N E R S A S S O C I A T I O N , Defendants
,

and

B A N K O F A M E R

I C A , N.A., Defendant-Appellee
,

F E D E R A L H O M E L O A

N M O R T G A G E C O R P O R A T I O N ; F E D E R

A L H O U S I

N G F I N A N C E A G E

N C Y , as Conservator for the F ederal Home L oan Mortg a g e Corporation, D efendants-Counter-ClaimantsA ppellees. N o. 16-15066

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01186- GMN-GW F

OPI NI ONB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 2

A ppeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted F ebruary 17, 2017 San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 25, 2017

B e fore: Marsha S. B erz on and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit J udg e s, and Kimberly

J . Mueller, * District J udg e.
Opinion by J udg e Mueller

* T h e Ho n o rab le Kim

b erly J

. Mu eller, Un i ted States District J u d g e f or th e Eastern District o f

Calif o rn ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 3

SUMMARY * *

F ederal F oreclosure Bar

The panel affirmed the district c ourt’s summary judg ment in favor of the F ederal H ome L oan Mortg ag e Corporation, o r F reddie Mac, in a quiet title action broug ht by a plaintiff w ho
pu rc h ased real property at a homeowners a ssociation foreclosure sale.

The plaintiff a r gu e d that the Nevada superpriority lien
prov i s ion, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116, e mpowered the homeowners association to sell the property to him f r e e o f
any other liens or interests, priority status aside. F r eddie Mac is under F e deral Housing F inance Ag ency conservatorship. The panel held that the F ederal F oreclosure B ar’s p rohibition

on nonconsensual foreclosure of Ag e ncy asset s p r eempted Nevada law, invalidating a n y purported ex ting u i s h m ent o f F reddie Mac’s interest throug h the associatio n f oreclosure sale. F irst, the p anel held that the F ederal Fo r e c l o s u re B ar applies to private association foreclosures g enerally
, and does
not protect the Ag ency ’s property o n ly from state and local
tax liens. The panel rejected the plaintiff’s arg ument that the F ederal F oreclosure B ar did not apply specifically to this case because F reddie Mac and the Ag ency implicitly consented to the foreclosure when they took no action to stop the sale.

I n analy zing preemption, t h e panel beg an w ith a presumpti o n ag ainst preemption because real estate foreclosure traditionally is a n area reg ulated by stat e law.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 4

The panel held that the presumption was rebutted because Cong r ess had made its intent to supersede state law clear a nd manifest. The panel concluded t hat the F ederal F oreclosure B ar implicitly demonstrated a clear intent to preempt Nevada’s superpriority lien law by ex pressly p rohibit ing foreclosures o n Ag ency pr o perty w ithout consent. B ecause the federal and state statutes impliedly conflicted, the F ederal F orecl o s ure B ar superseded the Nevada superpriority lien provision.

The panel held th at , u n der Nevada law, F reddie Mac proved that it held an enforcea b l e property interest, a

nd therefore was entitled to summary judg ment even thoug h the recording d ocument listed the deed-of-trust beneficiary but
not the note owner, F reddie Mac. The note was thus “s p lit” from the deed of trust, but d u e t o F r eddie Mac’s ag ency relationship with the recorded b e n e f iciary
, F reddie Mac remained a secured creditor with a property i n t e r est in the collateral.

COUNSEL

L uis A. Ay on (arg

u e d), Maier Gutierrez Ay on, L as Veg as, Nevada; Michael V. I nfuso and Keith W

. B arlow, Green I nfuso L L P, L as Ve g a s, N evada; for Plaintiff-CounterDefendant-Appellant.

Michael A.F . J ohnson (argued), Matthew J . Oster, Elliott C. Mog u l, Dirk C. Phillips, Asim Varma, and Howard N. Cay ne, Arnold & Porter L L P, W ashi n g t o n, D.C.; L eslie B ry an Hart and J ohn D. Tennert, F ennemore Craig P.C., Reno, Nevada; Darren T. B renner, Akerman L L P, L a s Veg as, Nevada; Marc J ames Ay e rs and R. Aaron Chastain, B radley Arant B o u l tB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 5

Cumming s L L P, B ir m ing ham, Alabama; for DefendantsCounter-Claimants-Appellees.

OP INION

MUEL L ER, District J udg e :

I f a h omeowners association member in Nevada misses
prop e rt y pay

ments for six months, Nevada law e quips the association w ith the a

b ility to foreclose on a “superpri o r ity lien,” qu a s h ing all other property liens or interests recorded after the recordati o n of the Covenants, Conditions, a nd Restrictions a ttached to the title. On its face, this superpriority lien has the p o t e ntial to trump certain federal property interests, despite Cong ress’s passag e of a provision known as the F ederal F oreclosure B ar, which prohibits nonconsensual foreclosure of F ederal Housing F inance Ag ency (“Ag ency ”) assets. This clash of state and federal law has spawned considerable litig ation in Nevada

. This decision resolves the c lash in favor of the F ederal F oreclosure B ar.
Appellant Alex B erez ovsky purchased a home at a homeowners association foreclosure sale in 2013. He arg ues the Nevada superpr i o r ity lien provision e mpowered the association to sell the home to him free of any other liens or interests, priori t y status aside. The F ederal Home L o an Mortg ag e Corporation ( “Fr e ddie Mac”) claims it has a priority interest in the home B erez ovsky purchased. F reddie M a c i s under A g ency conservatorship, meaning the Ag e nc y temporarily owns and controls Fr e d die Mac’s assets. The F ederal F oreclosure B ar’s prohibition on non c o n sensualB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 6

foreclosure g ives teeth to the A g ency ’s statutory mandate to
g uard its conservatorship assets.

B e rez ovsky sued to quiet t itle in Nevada state court. Armed with the F ederal F oreclosure B ar, F reddie Mac intervened and counterclaimed fo r t he property ’s title, removed the c ase to federa l d istrict court, and moved for
summary judg ment. The Ag ency joined F reddie Mac’s countercl ai m. T og e ther the federal entities arg ued that B erez ovsky did not acquire “ clean title” in the home because the F ederal F oreclosure B ar preempts Nevada law, invalidating any purported ex ting uishment o f F reddie Mac’s interest throug h the association foreclosure sale. I n resolving the parties’ cross-motions, the district court ag reed with the federal entities.

On a ppeal, B erez ovsky disputes th e F ederal F oreclosure B ar’s applicability a

nd contends F reddie Mac l a cks an enforceable property interest. W e are unpersuaded and affirm the district court’s holding

.

I

.

The home B erez ovsky purchased is located in L as Veg as, Ne v a d a. G reg ory and I dell Moniz previously owned the home, which is located in a community g overned by a homeowners association. On March 5, 2007, the Moniz e s took out a $220,000 loan secured by a deed of t r u s t

. T he deed o f trust listed the Moni z es a s the loan borrowers a nd named Mortg ag e Electronic Re gi s tration Sy stems, I nc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary u n d er the security instrument, and as n ominee for the lender, C o u n t ry wide Home L oans, I nc., and its successors and assig ns. F reddie Mac purchased the Moniz es’ loan in 200 7 a n d has owned it ever since. OnB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 7

J u l y 22, 2011, MERS assig ned its b eneficial interest unde r the deed of trust to B ank of America, N.A. ( “B ANA”), a nd B ANA immediately

recorded the assig

nment.

I n early 2011, the Moniz e s missed $1,767.38 in pay ments they owed to the h omeown e r s association. This lapse trig g ered Nevada’s superpr i o rity lien law, empowering the homeowners association to r ec o r d a lien ag ainst the h ome, which it did on March 17, 2011. The association recorded a formal notice of default on May 9, 2013, and then ex ercised its pow er to foreclose on the home and ex ting u ish all other property interests. B erez ovsky acquired the home at the J u ne 4
, 2 013, foreclosure sale for $10,500; he then recorded the deed in his name.

I n his state action to quiet title, B erez ovsky sued a ll those holding a property interest in th e h ome, including the M o n i z e s a n d B A N A

. Fr e d d i e M a c i n t e r v e n e d
, counterclaimed for title, removed the case to f e d e ra l court, and moved f

or summary judg ment. T o es tablish its priority property interest under Nevada law, F reddie M a c produced evidence showing it had owned the Moniz es’ loan since 2007, and that B ANA, the recorded deed-of

- t r ust beneficiary
, h ad been its loan-servicing ag ent.

The A g e ncy also intervened as F r e d die Mac’s conservator and joined the summary judg ment motion. See Housing a nd Economic R e co very Act of 2008 (“HERA”), 12 U .S.C. §§ 4511, 4 513 (empowering A g ency to p l a ce e ntities like F reddie Mac into conservatorship to protect n ation’s housing market and participate in l i t ig a tion toward same end). I n placing F r eddie Mac into conservatorship in 2008, the Ag ency a cquired F reddie M ac’s “rig hts, titles, powers, a nd privileg es

. . . with respect to [ its] assets” for the life of theB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 8

conservatorship. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(I ). The Ag ency ’s conservators h i p assets are shielded from c ertain adverse actions as spelled out by statute. S e e g e n erally id. § 4617. The asset prot e c t i o n c lause known a s the F ederal F oreclosure B ar 1 provides that “[ n] o property of the Ag ency shall be subject to levy
, a ttachment, g arnishment, foreclosure,

or sale without the consent of the A g ency , nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of the Ag ency .” Id. § 4617(j)(3). I n this case, the Ag ency did not consent to the association’s foreclosure of F reddie Mac’s lien. Fo r this
reason, the district court concluded, the F ederal Foreclosure B ar supported g r anting summary judg ment for F reddie Mac.

B e rez ovsky t i m e l y a

ppealed. He arg ues the F ederal F oreclo sure B a

r does not apply and, even if it does, F reddie Mac lacks a

n enforceable property interest

. W e review the district c ourt’s decision to g rant summary judg ment de novo. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc
., 575 F .3d 1 040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Burrell v. McIlroy
, 4 6 4 F .3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2006)).

I I

.

B e rez ovsky o ffers two reasons the F ederal F ore closure B ar does not apply

. He say s (1) t h e Ba r d o e s not apply to private association foreclosures g enerally
, because it protects the Ag ency ’ s property only from state and local tax liens; a nd (2) it d oes not apply specifically to this foreclosure, because

1 Nev ad a d istrict co u rts co n sisten t ly ref er to th e s tatu to ry b ar in 1 2 U .S.C. § 46 1 7 (j )(3 ) as th e “ Fed eral Fo reclo su re B ar,” a sh o rth an d th is

o p i n i o n ad o p ts. S

ee, e.g

. , Fed

. Na t’l Mo rtg

. Ass’n v. S FR In vs. Po o l 1

, LLC
, No

. 2 : 1 4 -c v

- 0 2 0 4 6

- J A D- P A L
, 20 1 5 W L 57 2 3 6 47
, at * 3 (D. Nev

. Sep t. 2 8 , 2 0 1 5).B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 9

F reddie Mac and the Ag ency im plicitly consented to the foreclosure when they

took no action to stop the sale. 2

W h ether the F ederal F oreclosure B ar applies to pri v a t e foreclosures g enerally is a matter of first impression. I n answering the question, we turn first to the statute’s structure and p lain lang uag e. See Avila v. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81
, 852 F

. 3 d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2017). HERA i d e n t i f ies the
powers g ranted to the Ag e ncy as a c onservator and the

e x e m p tions from which it benefits. A subsection of t h e statute entitled “ Other ag ency ex emptions” 3 i n c l u des the F ederal F o reclosure B ar as the third ex emption, a nd provides as follows:

(1) Applicability

The p rovisions o f this subsection shall apply with respect to the Ag ency i n any

case in which the Ag ency is acti n g as a conservator or a receiver.

2 B erezo v sk

y also arg u es th e Fed eral Fo reclo su re Bar v i olat e s d u e p ro cess b ecau se th e statu te “ l ack [s] p ro ced u res f o r n o tice to in t e r ested
p arties an d p ro ced u res f

o r an y h earin g .” A t o ral arg u m en t, B erezo v s k y ’ s

co u n sel co n ced ed h is d u e p ro cess arg u m en t seek s to v in dicate th e

asso ciatio n ’ s p ro p erty rig h ts, n o t h i s o w n , an d so h e lack s stan d in g t o raise th is arg u m en t

. S

ee Lu ja n v. Defs. o

f W ild life , 5 0 4 U.S. 5 5 5 , 5 6 0 (1 9 9 2 ).

3 T h e w o rd “ o th er” in th is co n tex t ref ers b ack to th e ex cep tio n

co d if ied in a p reced in g su

b se ctio n titled “ Ex em

p t tax statu s.” S

ee 1 2 U.S.C. § 4 6 1 7 (i)(5 ).B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 10

(2) Tax ation

The A g e n cy , including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income, shall be ex e mpt from all tax ation i m p o s e d b y a n y S t a t e , c o u n t y , municipality
, or local tax ing authority
, ex c ept that any real pro p erty of the Ag ency shall be subject to State, territorial, c o unty , municipal, or local
tax ation to the s a m e ex tent according to its value a s o ther real property i s t a x ed,

ex c ept that, notwithstanding the failure o f
any p erson to cha lleng e an assessment under State law o f the value of such property , and the tax thereon, shall be determined as of the period f o r which such tax is imposed.

(3) Property

protection

No property o f the Ag ency sh a l l be subject to levy
, attachment, g arnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent o f the Ag ency , nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property

of the Ag ency

. (4) Penalties and fines

The Ag ency shall not be liable f o r any amounts in the nature of penalties or fines, including those arising from the failure o f
any p erson to p ay a n y real property , personal property , probate, or recordingB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 11

tax or any recording or fil i ng fees when due.

12 U.S.C. § 4617(j).

On its fac e , t h e first provision makes clear that this subsection applies to “any case” in which the Ag ency serves

as conservator, without limitation. Id. § 4617(j)(1). Cong ress

ex p ressly limited the second ex emption to tax ation under the plain lang uag e of th e p r o v ision. See id. § 4617(j)(2) (“shall be ex empt from a ll tax ation,” with specified ex ceptions). B ut the F ederal F oreclosure B a r , titled “ Property p rotection,” is
not so limited and does not ex pressly use the word “tax es” at all. See id. § 4 6 1 7 (

j ) ( 3 )

. Notably
, it does not limit “foreclosure” to a subset of foreclosure ty pes. Id. The tex t o f

ex e mption f

our, titled “Penalties and fines,” r eferences tax es, neg atin g ag ency liability f or penalties or fines arising from unpaid property , p robate, or recording t a x e s. See id. § 4617(j)(4). A plain reading o f the statute discloses that the F ederal F oreclosure B a

r is n ot focused o n o r limited to tax liens. The tex t of subsection ( j) om i t s t a x a tion from the
g eneral applicability p rovision, identifies tax es in the second and fourth ex emptions, and then ag ain omits any reference to tax ation in the third ex emption, the F ederal F oreclosure B ar. On its face, the Fe d er a l F o reclosure B ar applies to any property for which the Ag ency serves as conservator a nd immuniz es such property from any f oreclosure wi t h o u t Ag ency consent. Id. § 4617(j)(1), (3).

B e rez ovsky cites the F ifth Circuit’s decision in F.D.I.C.

v. McFarland
, 243 F .3d 876 ( 5 t h Cir. 2 001), to support his
arg ument that the F ederal F oreclosure B ar does not apply to p rivate foreclosures. The court in McFarland interp r e t e d 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)( 2 )
, a provision of the F inancialB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 12

I nstitutions Reform, Recovery
, a nd Enforcement Act of 1989 (“F I RREA” ) t hat g o verns F ederal Deposit I nsurance Corporation (“F D I C”) r e ceiverships. See id. at 885. The F I RREA provision is worded identically to HERA’s F ederal F oreclosure B ar ex c e pt that the word “Corporation” appears in the former where “Ag ency ” appears in the latter. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) with 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3). 4

The court in McFarland declined to ex tend § 1825(b)(2)
to private foreclosures. See 243 F .3d at 885–86. I n doing so, it considered the statutory framework in which § 1825(b)(2)
appears. See id. B ec a u s e that framework is disting uishable from the framework surrounding the F ederal F oreclosure B ar, McFarland does not provide the answer in this case.

As the court in McFarland o bserved, b e f ore F I RREA’s
passag e in 1989, § 1 825 included only the provision currently codified as § 1825(a), e x empting the F DI C from all tax ation of any kind while it acted in its corporate capacity

. See id. at 886 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1825 (1988))

. FI RREA added subsection (b), ex tending the ex empti o n to the F DI C in its role as receiver. T his leg islative history demonstrates that the
purpose of § 1825 is to ex tend the F DI C’s g eneral ex emption from tax ation to the receivership contex t. See id

. The titles o f th e r elevant section and subsection, McFarland n oted, confirmed th is conclusion. See id. Section 1825 is labeled “Ex emption from tax ation; limitations on borrowing .” B y adding the h eading “General rule” to subsection (a), a nd

4 Sp ecif ically
, th e FDIC p ro v i sio n read s as f o llo w s: “ No pro perty of th e Co rp o ratio n sh all b e su b j ect t o lev y , at t a ch m en t , g arn ish m en t, f o reclo su re, o r sale w ith o u t th e co n sen t o f th e Co rp o ratio n , n o r s h all an y in v o lu n tary lien a t tach to t h e p ro p erty o f th e Co rp o ratio n .” 12 U.S.C. § 1 8 2 5(b )(2 ).B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 13

“Other ex emptions” to subsection ( b), Cong ress sig naled that subsection 1825(b), which includes the property protection provision B e rez ovsky points to, was intended to a ddress tax

ex e mptions other than those set out in the “General r ule.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(1)–(3); McFarland
, 243 F .3d at 8 86. I n contrast, the p rotection provided by the F ederal F or e closure B ar applicable here c a nnot fairly be read as limited to tax liens because, unlike § 1825, § 4617(j) includes no lang uag e limiting its g eneral applicability provision to tax es alone.

B e rez ovsky also contends even if the F ederal F oreclosure B ar applies to private association foreclo s u r es g enerally
, it does not apply to the sale at which he purchased the Moniz es’ home because Freddie Mac and the Ag e ncy implicitly consented to the f

oreclosure when they took no action to stop it. B erez ovsky cites no a uthority for the proposit i o n t hat inaction in this contex t convey s consent, implicit o r otherwise. The F ederal F oreclosure B ar does not require the A ge n c y to a ctively resist foreclosure. See 12 U .S.C. § 4 617(j)(3) (flatly providing that “ [ n ] o property of the Ag ency shall be subject to

. . . foreclosure, or sale w ithout the
consent of the Ag ency ”). Rather, the statutory l an g uag e cloaks Ag ency property with Cong ressional protection unless

or until the A g enc y af

f i rmatively r elinquishes it. Id. Here, the Ag ency

did not ag r ee to foreg o its property interest.

The F ederal F oreclosure B ar applies g enerally to private association foreclosures a nd s p e cifically to the contested foreclosure sale here.

I I I

.

Th e p arties dispute whether the F ederal F oreclosure B ar preempts Nevada state law. T h e d i strict c ourt f ound theB E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 14

F ederal F oreclosu r e B ar invalidated the homeowners association’s use of a state-sanctioned superpriori t y lien to foreclose on the A g ency ’s property without its c onsent. The inherent tension betwe en the federal and state laws has tri gge red multiple lawsuits, the outcomes of which may depend on our resolution here. 5

“The Supremacy Clause unambig uously provides t h a t if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.” Gonzales v. Raich
, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005). This is so e ven if the federal statutory lang ua ge does not

ex p licitly manifest Cong r ess’s preemptive intent. See Altria Grp., I nc. v. G ood
, 555 U.S. 7 0, 76–77 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Preemption arises when “compliance with both federal and state reg ulations is a phy sical impossibility
, or .

. . state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex ecution of the full purposes and objectives o f

5 Ev ery f ed eral d istrict co u rt to f

ace th i s p reem

p tio n qu estio n h as f o u n d § 4 6 1 7 (j )(3 ) p reem

p ts Nev ad a R ev ised Statu tes sectio n 11 6 .3 1 1 6
, w h ich en ac t s th e su

p erp rio rity lien

. See
, e.g ., Fed

. Ho me Lo a n Mo rtg

. Co rp

. v. Do n el
, No

. 2 :1 6

- CV- 1 76 J CM (P A L ), 2 0 1 7 W L 2 6 92 4 0 3
, at * 3 (D. Nev

. J u

n e 2 1 , 2 0 1 7 ); G & P In v. En t ers., LLC v. W ells Fa rg o Ba n k, N.A.
, 1 9 9 F. S u

p p

. 3 d 1 26 6
, 1 26 9 (D. Nev

. 2 0 1 6 ); Elmer v. Fred d ie Ma c , No

. 1 4

- 0 1 9 99
, 20 1 5 W L 4 3 93 05 1
, at * 3 (D. N ev

. J u ly 1 3
, 20 15 ); S kylig hts LLC v. Byro n , 1 1 2 F. Su p p

. 3 d 1 1 4 5
, 1 1 5 9 ( D

. Nev

. 2 0 1 5 ), a pp ea l d i s m i ssed (Feb

. 2, 2 0 1 6 ). T h o u g h th ese co u rts are u n an im o u s o n th e p reem p tio n issu e, a f

ew co u rts h av e d en i ed su

m m ary j u d g m en t in sim i lar

cases af ter f in din g , u n lik e h ere, Fred d ie Mac o r Fan n ie Mae d id n o t ad eq u ately estab lish a prio rity p ro p erty in t erest. S ee, e.g

. , LN M

g mt., LLC S eries 5 6 6 4 Divo t v. Kit Da n sker
, No

. 2 : 1 3

- cv

- 01 4 2 0

- RCJ -G W F
, 2 0 1 7 W L 1 3 8 0 4 1 4
, a t * 2 ( D. Nev

. A p r. 1 3
, 2 0 1 7 ) (f

i n d in g a g en u in e issu e of

m aterial f act as to w

h eth er th e A g en cy o w ne d t h e n o te an d d eed o f tru st at th e tim e o f sale); Na t io n sta r Mo r tg

. LLC v. D’An d rea C mty. Ass’n
, No

. 3 :1 5

- cv

- 0 0 3 77

- RCJ

- VP C, 2 0 1 7 W L 5 8 5 8 2
, at * 4 (D. Nev

. J an

. 4
, 20 1 7) (sam e).B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 15

Cong r ess.” B ank of

A m. v. City & Cty. of S.F.
, 309 F .3d 551, 558 ( 9th Cir. 2002) (internal cita t i o ns and quotation marks omitted).

A court beg ins its preemption analy sis by ass e s s i ng whether the presumption ag ainst preemption a pplies. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., I nc ., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“Consideration o f issues arising under th e S upremacy Clause start[ s] with the assumption that the historic police powers o f the States [ are] not to be superseded by

. . . F ederal Act unless that [ is] the clear and manifest purpose of Cong r ess.”) (internal citation and quotatio n m a r ks omitted); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp
., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) ( “ [A ]p p e l l e e s must overcome the presumption a g ainst findi n g pre-emp t i on of state law in areas traditionally reg ulated b y the States.”) (citation omitted).

Real estate foreclosure traditionally is an area r eg ulated by state law, so we beg in our analy sis with a presumption
ag ainst p re-emption of the Nevada superpriority lien law. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp

. , 511 U .S. 531, 544 (1994); In re Bledsoe
, 569 F .3d 1106, 1112 (9t h Cir. 2009). The presumption a g ainst preemption is rebutted, however, where Cong r ess makes its intent t o supersede state law “ clear a nd manifest.” See Arizona v

. United States
, 567 U .S. 387, 400 (2012).

W e a ssess first whether the F ederal F o r eclosure B ar demonstrates clear and manife st intent to preempt Nevada’s superpriority lien provision throug h an ex press preemption clause a nd conclude it d o e s not. Cong ress did not use sufficiently definite lang uag e to brand § 4617(j)(3) a s

ex p ressly preemptive, althoug h it unquestionably knows h ow to do so. See, e.g ., Nat’l M eat Ass’n v. Harris
, 565 U.S. 452,B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 16

458 (2012) (finding ex p ress preemption in 21 U.S.C. § 678’s directive that a

ny requirements “in addition to, or d i fferent than those made under [the F ederal Meat I nspection Act] may not be imposed by any

State”); Perez v. Nidek Co. , 711 F .3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 201 3 ) (finding ex press preemption in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)’s p ronouncement that “no State

. . . may

e s t a blish or continue

. . . any requirement

. . . w h i ch i s different f

r o m, or in addition to, a

ny r e q uirement applicable under this chapter”).

The question, then, is whether the F ederal F o r e c losure B ar implicitly demonstrates a clear intent t o p reempt N e v a da’s superpriority lien law. W e conclude it does. The F ederal F ore c l o s ure B ar’s declaration that “[ n] o p roperty o f the A g e ncy shall be subject to

. . . foreclosure” unequivocally

ex p resses Cong ress’s “clear a nd manifest” intent to supersede
any contrary law, including stat e law, that would allow foreclosur e o f Ag e n c y property without its consent. Althoug h the F ederal F oreclosure B ar permits the A g ency to consent to relinquish its interest in the face of an association’s superpriority lien, the same B a r ex pressly prohibits foreclosures on A g ency property without consent. Nevada law, in contrast, allows homeowners association foreclosures under the c ircumstances p resent in this c ase to automatically

ex ting uish the Ag e ncy ’s property interest without the Ag ency ’s consent. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 1 1 6 .3116. 6

6 Sectio n 1 1 6 .3 1 1 6
, titled “ L ien s ag ain s t u n its f or assessm e nt s , ”
p ro v id es as f

o llo w s:

1

. T h e asso ciatio n h as a lien o n a u n it f o r a n y

co n s tru ctio n p en alty th at is im p o sed a g ain st th e u n it’ s

o w n er p u r s u a n t to NRS 1 1 6 .3 10 3 0 5
, an y assessm en t lev i ed ag ain st th at u n it o r an y f in es im p o sed ag ain st th e

u n it’ s o w n er f ro m th e tim e th e co n stru ctio n p en alty
,B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 17

assessm en t o r f

in e b eco m es d u e. Un less th e declaratio n

o th erw i se p ro v i d es, an y p en alties, f ees, ch arg es, l ate ch arg es, f

in es an d i n t erest ch arg ed p u rsu an t to p arag rap h s (j ) to (n ), in clu s iv e, o f su b sectio n 1 o f NRS 1 1 6 .3 01 2 an d an

y co st s o f co l lectin g a p ast du e

o b lig atio n ch arg ed p u rsu an t to NRS 1 1 6 .3 1 0 3 1 3 are

en f o rceab le as assessm en ts u n d er t h is s e c tio n

. If an

assessm en t is p ay ab l e in in stallm en ts, th e f u l l am o u n t

o f th e assessm en t i s a l i en f ro m th e tim e th e f

irst in stallm en t th ereo f

b eco m es d u e.

2

. A lien u

n der th is sectio n is p rio r to all o th er l i e n s

an d en cu m

b ran ces o n

a u n it ex cep t :
(a) L ien s an d en cu m

b ran ces reco rd ed b ef

o re th e

reco rd a t i o n o f th e d eclaratio n an d
, in a co o p erativ e, lien s an d en cu m

b ran ces w

h ich th e asso ciatio n creates,

assu m es o r tak es su

b j ect to ;
(b ) A f irst secu rity

in terest o n

th e u n it reco rd ed b ef

ore th e d ate o n w

h ich th e assessm en t so u g h t to b e en f o rced b ecam e d elin q u en t o r, in a co o p erat i v e , th e f irst

secu rity in t erest en cu m

b erin g o n ly th e u n it’ s o w n er’ s in terest an d p erf

ected b ef ore t h e d ate o n w

h ich th e

assessm en t so u g h t t o b e en f orced b ecam e d elin q u en t,

ex cep t th at a lien u n d er th is sectio n is p rio r to a secu rity in terest d escrib ed in th i s p arag rap h to th e ex ten t set f o rth in su bsectio n 3 ;
(c) L ien s fo r r e al estate tax es an d o th er g o v ern m en t al

assessm en ts o r ch arg es ag ain s t th e u n it o r co o p erativ e;

an d

(d ) Li e n s fo r an y f

ee o r ch arg e lev ied p u rsu an t to

su bsectio n 1 o f NRS 5 5 5 .5 2 0

.

Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 1 1 6 .3 1 1 6

. A s th e Nev ad a Su p rem e Co u rt h as ex p lain ed
, su b sectio n 1 1 6 .3 1 1 6 (2 ) “ elev ates th e p rio rity o f th e [h o m eo w n ers

asso ciatio n ] lien o v er oth er l ien s,” w i th s o m e e x cep tio n s. S FR In vest.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 18

Nevada’s law is an obstacle to Cong ress’s clear and manifest
g oal of protecting the Ag e n cy ’s assets in the face of multiple potential threats, including threats arising from state foreclosure law.

“[ E] ven if it is possible to com p l y with both state a nd fed e ral law, state law is conflict-preempted w henever it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and e x e cution of the full p urposes and obj e c t i v e s of Cong ress.’” Ariz. Dream Act Co a l

. v. B rewer , 757 F .3d 1053, 1061 ( 9 th Cir. 2014) ( quoting Arizona
, 567 U .S. at 3 99). As the two statutes im p l iedly conflict, the F ederal F oreclosure B ar supersedes the Nevada superpriority lien provision. The district court did not err in so concluding

.

I V.

B e rez ovsky maintains that even if the F ederal F oreclosure Bar applies to his case and is preemptive, the distric t co u r t should not h ave g ranted summary judg ment to F re d d i e Mac because F r eddie Mac did not prove b ey ond d isp u te that it holds a n enforceable property intere st. B erez ovsky faults F reddie Mac for never reco rd i n g its interest, for “splitting ” the note from t h e deed of trust, and for pointing to

Po o l 1
, 3 3 4 P.3 d at 41 0

. T h e ex cep tio n s clarif y th at th e s tatu te “ sp l its [a h o m eo w n ers asso ciatio n ’ s] lien in to tw o pieces, a su p erp rio rity p i ece an d

a su b p rio rity p iece. T h e s u

p erp rio r i t y p iece, co n sistin g o f th e last n in e

m o n th s o f u n

p aid [asso cia tio n ] du es an d m ain ten an ce an d n u isan ceab atem en t ch arg es, i s ‘ p rio r to ’ a f irst d eed o f tru st. T h e su

b p rio rity p iece,

co n sistin g o f all o th e r [h om eo w n ers asso ciatio n ] f

ees o r assessm en ts, is

su b o rd in ate to a f

i rst d eed of tru st

. ” I

d

. at 4 1 1

. In th is case, th e h o m eo w n ers asso ciatio n ’ s lien qu alif ies as su perp rio rity as it co v ers d u es

n o t p aid in early 2 01 1
, w i th th e lien reco rd ed w ith i n n i n e m o n th s, b y March 2 0 1 1

.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 19

insufficient e videnc e t o establish its interest for purposes o f
summary judg ment.

Here, we look to the Nevada Supreme Court’s resolution of these issues. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Ex c ept in matters g overned by the F ederal Constitution or by

acts of Cong r e ss, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the s t a t e

. ” )

. Nevada law requires recording of a lien f

or it to be enforceable, but d o es n ot mandate that the recorded instrument identify the note owner by name. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 1 06.210. 7 I f the named beneficiary under the recorded deed of trust is someone other than the note own e r , the recordation separates “the note a nd the security d eed [ and] creates a q u e s t i on of what entity would have authority to foreclose, but does not render either instrument v oid.” Edelstein v

. Bank o f N.Y

. Mellon
, 286 P.3d 249, 259 (Nev. 2012) (citation omitted).

The Nevada Supreme Court has relied on the Restatement Third of Property to clarify lien enfor c e a bility when the recording document lists the deed-of- t r u s t beneficiary
, here B ANA, but not the note owner, here F reddie Mac. See In re Montierth
, 3 54 P.3d 648, 6 5 0–51 (Nev. 2 015) (citing Restatement ( T h ird) of Property : Mortg ag es § 5.4 cmt. c (Am. L aw. I nst. 1997)). U nder these circumstances—that is, where the note is “split” from the deed of trust—an “ag ency relationship” with the recorded beneficiary preserves the n ote owner’s po w er to enforce its interest under the security

7 T h is reco rd in g p ro v isio n p ro v id es i n relev an t p art, “ A n y assig n m en t

o f a m ortg ag e o f real p ro p erty

. . . an d an y assig n m en t o f th e b en ef icial in terest u n d er a d eed o f tru st m u st b e reco rd ed i n th e o f

f ice o f th e reco rd er

o f t h e co u n ty in w

h i c h t h e p r o p e r ty i s lo cated

. . . .” Nev

. Rev

. Stat. § 1 0 6 .2 1 0

.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 20

instrument, because the note owner can direct the b eneficiary
to foreclose on its behalf. See id

. An ag ency relationship

ex ists if the note owner has the a bility to reclaim the d eed o f
trust f rom the beneficiary b y o r d e r ing that the b eneficiary make an assig nment. I

d. at 651.

Nevada law thus r e c og niz es that, in an ag ency relationship, a note owner remains a secur e d c r e d itor with a property interest in the collateral even if the recorded deed o f
trust names o nly t h e owner’s ag ent. Id

. (noting the Restatement (Third) o f Property acknowledg es the n ote hold e r r etains its security interest even if the beneficial interest under the deed o f trust is assig ned to its loanservicing ag ent).

Althoug h the recorded deed of trust here omitted F reddie Mac’s name, F reddie Mac’s propert y i n terest is v alid a nd enforceable under Nevada law. F reddie Mac in t r o d u ced evidence 8 in the district court show i ng it acquired the M o n iz es’ loan secured by the property in 2007; B ANA is identified a s F reddie Mac’s loan servicer in those documents. F reddie Mac also introduced ex cerpts of its Sing le-F amily Seller/Servicer Guide ( “Guide”), which def ines its ag ency

8 B e r e z o v sk

y ’ s o bj ectio n to th e tim elin ess an d ad m issib ility of Fred d i e Mac’ s ev id en c e i s u n av ailin g

. Fred d ie Mac tim ely f iled its

ev id en ce w ith i ts cro ss- m o tio n f o r su m m ary j u d g m en t, an d Fred d ie Mac’ s d atab ase p rin t o u ts are ad m issib le b u sin ess reco rd s. U-Ha u l In t’l, In c. v. Lu mb ermen s Mu t. Ca s. C o

. , 5 7 6 F.3 d 1 0 4 0
, 1 0 4 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). Al t h o u g h disco v ery h ad n o t y et o p en ed
, B erezo v sk y h im self m o v ed f

or

su m m ary j u d g m en t an d ag reed to th e district co u rt’ s reso lv in g th e m o tio n s

w ith o u t f u rth er d isco v ery

.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 21

relationship with B ANA. 9 The G uide provides that when F reddie Mac purchases a mortg ag e, the “Servi ce r ag ree[ s] F reddie Mac may , at any time and without limitation, require the [ ] Servicer, at the [ ] S e r vicer’s ex pense, to make such endorsements to and assig nments and recordations of any of
t h e Mortg ag e documents so as to reflect the interests of F reddie Mac.” G uide at 1301.10. The Guide also provides that “F reddie Mac may , at its sole discretion and at any time, require a Seller/Servicer, at the Seller/Servicer’s ex pense, to prepare, ex ecute and/or record assig nments of th e Security I nstrument to F r eddie Mac

. . . . ” G uide at 6301.6. The Guide’s l a n g uag e mirrors M ontierth ’s description of the requisite ag ency relationship. B A NA is F reddie Mac’s ag ent with respect to the Moniz es’ loan. F reddie M a c ’ s property interest is therefore valid and enforceable under Nevada law.

B e rez ovsky points to no evidence before the district court t h a t created a material dispute reg arding the leg al import of F reddie Mac’s ex hibits concerning its interest in the property

. He must have shown more than “metaphy sical doubt as to the material facts” to warrant reversal, and has not done so h ere. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp
., 475 U.S. 574, 58 6 (1986) (citation omitted). The district court correctly f

ound F r eddie Mac’s priority property intere st enforceable under Nevada law.

V.

B e cause F reddie Mac possessed an enforceable property interest and was under the A ge n c y ’ s conservatorship at the

9 W e tak e j u d icial n o tice o f th e Gu id e, w h ich g o v ern s Fred d ie Mac’ s relatio n sh ip w ith i t s serv icers. S ee Fed

. Ru l e Ev id

. 2 0 1 (b ), (d ). T h e Gu i d e w as p ro p erly

b ef o re th e District Co u rt.B E R E Z O V S K Y V

. B A N K O F A M E R

I C A 22

time o f the homeowners association f o recl o s u r e sale, the F ederal F oreclosure B ar served to p r o t e ct the deed o f trust from ex ting uishment. F reddie Mac continued t o own the deed of trust and the note after the s a l e to B erez ovsky

. The district court properly g ranted summary judg ment in favor o f F reddie Mac.

AF F IRMED.