alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31

CERTIFICATION

I, Todd Noble, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Advanced ID
Corporation.

2. Based on my knowledge, the quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present, in all material
respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

(c) Presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the registrant's board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

(a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date:  November 12, 2004

/s/ Todd Noble
Todd Noble, Chief Financial Officer
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 18

- 00352

- CV

C HICO A UTO P ARTS & S ERVICE

, I NC

., Appellant

V

.

M ARY M AXEY , Appellee §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 342nd District

Court

of Tarrant County (342

- 269821

- 13)

July 3, 2019

Opinion by Justice Bassel

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant Chico Auto Parts & Service, Inc., shall pay

all of the costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

__ /s/ Dabney Bassel

_ _________________ Justice Dabney Bassel
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 606 Received in Senate (RDS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 606

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 13, 2015

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
     To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude certain 
 compensation received by public safety officers and their dependents 
                           from gross income.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Don't Tax Our Fallen Public Safety 
Heroes Act''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN COMPENSATION RECEIVED BY PUBLIC SAFETY 
              OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.

    Subsection (a) of section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4), by striking 
the period at the end of paragraph (5) and inserting ``; and'', and by 
inserting after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:
            ``(6) amounts received pursuant to--
                    ``(A) section 1201 of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
                Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796); or
                    ``(B) a program established under the laws of any 
                State which provides monetary compensation for 
                surviving dependents of a public safety officer who has 
                died as the direct and proximate result of a personal 
                injury sustained in the line of duty,
        except that subparagraph (B) shall not apply to any amounts 
        that would have been payable if death of the public safety 
        officer had occurred other than as the direct and proximate 
        result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 12, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 708

To repeal section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 6 (legislative day, APRIL 5), 1995

Mr. NICKLES introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

A BILL

To repeal section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory

Policies Act of 1978.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as ‘‘The Electric Utility Rate5 payer Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 The Congress finds that—

8 (1) implementation of section 210 of the Public

9 Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 results in

10 many consumers paying excessive rates for elec11 tricity;
2

S 708 IS

1 (2) the Energy Policy Act of 1992 gives produc2 ers of electricity additional access to the wholesale

3 electric market through transmission access and ex4 emption from the Public Utility Holding Company

5 Act; and

6 (3) in light of the increasingly competitive

7 wholesale electric marketplace being brought about

8 by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, there no longer

9 is any justification for section 210 of the Public

10 Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.

11 SEC. 3. REPEAL.

12 Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies

13 Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 824a–3) is hereby repealed.

14 SEC. 4. TRANSITION.

15 Nothing in this Act abrogates any existing contract.

16 SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.

17 The provisions of this Act are effective April 7, 1995.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 24, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40044 Conference Calendar

VERLIE LEE HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION; RISSIE OWENS, Chairwoman, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; DAN JONES, Special Review Unit, Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:05-CV-383

-------------------- Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Verlie Lee Henderson, Texas prisoner # 199786, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In that complaint, Henderson challenged the constitutionality of Texas’ parole procedures. Henderson’s brief, however, does not address the district court’s determinations that (1) Fifth Circuit precedent deemed his ex post facto claim frivolous and (2) his due process challenge wasNo. 06-40044 -2- not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding. These issues are therefore waived. See Brinkman v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Henderson’s appeal is frivolous and is therefore dismissed.
See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. We remind Henderson that, after the docketing of the instant appeal, we imposed the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) bar in Henderson v. Enns , No. 05-40279 (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 2006) (unpublished). Consequently, Henderson is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. § 1915(g). APPEAL DISMISSED.
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 827

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to limit an employer’s deduction

for health care costs of its employees if the employer fails to honor

its commitment to provide health care to its retirees.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 18 (legislative day, MAY 15), 1995

Mr. PRESSLER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to limit an

employer’s deduction for health care costs of its employees if the employer fails to honor its commitment to

provide health care to its retirees.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REDUCTION IN HEALTH CARE DEDUCTION OF

4 EMPLOYERS FAILING TO HONOR COMMIT5 MENT TO PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO RE6 TIREES.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 162 of the Internal Reve8 nue Code of 1986 (relating to deduction for trade or busi-
2

•S 827 IS

1 ness expenses) is amended by redesignating subsection (o)

2 as subsection (p) and by inserting after subsection (n) the

3 following new subsection:

4 ‘‘(o) REDUCTION IN CERTAIN HEALTH CARE DE5 DUCTIONS OF EMPLOYEES.—

6 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other

7 provision of this chapter, if—

8 ‘‘(A) an employer provided medical care to

9 its retired employees and their spouses and de10 pendents during the 10-year period ending on

11 December 31, 1993, and

12 ‘‘(B) the employer does not provide that

13 medical care for any period after December 31,

14 1993,

15 the amount allowable as a deduction under this

16 chapter for expenses incurred in providing medical

17 care to officers and employees of the employer (and

18 their spouses and dependents) during the period de19 scribed in subparagraph (B) shall not exceed 25 per20 cent of the amount of the deduction without regard

21 to this subsection.

22 ‘‘(2) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For

23 purposes of this subsection—
3

•S 827 IS

1 ‘‘(A) MEDICAL CARE.—The term ‘medical

2 care’ has the meaning given such term by sec3 tion 213(d)(1).

4 ‘‘(B) FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL

5 CARE.—For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), an

6 employer shall be treated as failing to provide

7 medical care for any period if there is a sub8 stantial reduction in the level of medical care

9 provided during the period from the level pro10 vided on December 31, 1993.

11 ‘‘(C) PREDECESSORS.—For purposes of

12 paragraph (1)(A), an employer shall be treated

13 as having provided any medical care which any

14 predecessor of the employer provided.

15 ‘‘(D) CONTROLLED GROUPS.—All employ16 ers who are treated as one employer under sub17 section (a) or (b) of section 52 shall be treated

18 as one employer for purposes of this sub19 section.’’.

20 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

21 this section shall apply to periods beginning on and after

22 January 1, 1994, in taxable years ending after such date.

Æ
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph BELCIK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17558 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(October 16, 2017)

Ivan Clay Dale, Michael J. Haungs, U.S. Department of Justice, Chief Appellate Section Tax Division, Washington, DC, Karin Bethany Hoppmann, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, John F. Rudy, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Joseph Belcik, Pro Se

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Belcik, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the district court’s November 18, 2016, order revoking his bail and issuing a warrant for his arrest for violating *904court orders, failing to appear for a show cause hearing, and violating the conditions of his release. Belcik is currently a fugitive from that order.

“The United States Supreme Court has long recognized an appellate court’s ability to exercise its discretion by refusing to hear or to decide the appeal of a fugitive from justice.” *United States v. Barnette,*129 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing *Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,*507 U.S. 234, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993); *Molinaro v. New Jersey,*396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970)). The fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies where an appellant is a fugitive and his status as such has a connection, or nexus, to his appeal. *Id.*In *Barnette,*we dismissed an appeal under the doctrine where the appellants from a civil contempt order had repeatedly defied court orders and evaded arrest. *Id.*at 1182-83. We held that the appellants’ avoidance of court orders and contempt sanctions rendered them fugitives. *Id.*at 1183. We determined that their appeal had the requisite nexus to their fugitive status because they had effectively stayed contempt judgments against them by violating district court orders. *Id.*We reasoned that the appellants were unlikely to abide by any judgment other than one favorable to them and declined to hear their appeal, as “[h]e who offends against the law seeks in vain the help of the law.” *Id.*at 1184 (quotation omitted).

Here, dismissal of Belcik’s appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is appropriate. It is undisputed that Belcik violated at least three district court orders. The government argues that Belcik is a fugitive and that the district court’s bench warrant for his arrest remains outstanding, and there is currently no information to the contrary. Furthermore, his appeal has the requisite nexus to his fugitive status because, like the appellants in *Bar-nette,*he has effectively stayed the district court’s sanctions against him by evading court orders and would presumably submit only to an appellate ruling in his favor. 129 F.3d at 1183-84. Thus, we decline to participate in Belcik’s flouting of district court orders, and we dismiss his appeal.

DISMISSED.
#### Miguel Angel SAENZ-LOPEZ, also known as Miguel Saenz, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 15-60401 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 7, 2017

Barry J. McWhirter, McWhirter Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Memphis, TN, for Petitioner

Craig Alan Newell, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Miguel Angel Saenz-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions this court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Tor*459ture (CAT). Saenz-Lopez asserts that the BIA erred in affirming the order of removal because the IJ’s adverse credibility-determination was based on an erroneous application of the law. Saenz-Lopez further asserts that the BIA was incorrect in its determination that, aside from objecting to the adverse credibility determination, he had not challenged the IJ’s denial of his deferral of removal claim.

Saenz-Lopez was previously convicted of an aggravated felony. We do not have jurisdiction to review his claims regarding the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT because these claims, however labeled, do not actually present either a constitutional issue or a question of law. *See Milat v. Holder,*755 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2014); *Siwe v. Holder,*742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir. 2014); *Rodriguez v. Holder,*705 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D). Accordingly, his petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Eric Michael STOBIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL,* Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35135

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 2017 **

Filed MAY 16, 2017

Todd R. Renda, Esquire, Attorney, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kerry Keefe, Esquire, DOJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, Jeffrey Raymond McClain, Assistant Regional Counsel, SSA — Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee

Before: NELSON, TROTT and OWENS, Circuit Judges

*

 Nancy A. Beriyhill is substituted for her predecessor as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*911MEMORANDUM ***

Eric Stobie appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Stobie’s application for Title II disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Molina v. Astrue,*674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.

The ALJ’s credibility finding was not impermissibly general. The ALJ identified the relevant testimony, immediately rejected the testimony as not credible, discussed the relevant objective medical evidence, and summarized the two reasons for rejecting the testimony. *Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,*806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nor did the ALJ’s credibility finding impermissibly rely exclusively on a lack of medical evidence. The ALJ gave two specific and legitimate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Stobie’s testimony. First, there was insufficient objective medical evidence to establish disability during the insured period. *Burch v. Barnhart,*400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although.laek of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”). Second, Stobie’s subjective symptom testimony conflicted with the objective medical evidence. Specifically, the medical treatment records from the insured period and the months soon thereafter demonstrated that Stobie’s symptoms were mild, and Stobie’s treating physician opined that Sto-bie could perform sedentary work eight months after his last insured date. *Molina,*674 F.3d at 1113 (the ALJ can reject symptom testimony that is inconsistent with the objective medical evidence); *Ghanim v. Colvin,*763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (treating physician opinions are entitled to the greatest weight).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory Vonzell COMER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6849

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Gregory Yonzell Comer, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Vonzell Comer seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion as successive and unauthorized. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitution.al claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Comer has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Charles Abernethy, Respondent, v. George T. Knight, Appellant.

(Argued April 23, 1872;

decided November 19, 1872.)

All concur for affirmance, except Folger and Grover, JJ., dissenting.

Ho opinion.

Judgment affirmed.