Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1412-CR-562 | August 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as

precedent or cited before any court except for the

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Clifford M. Davenport

Davenport Law Offices

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Garrard, Senior Judge

[1] Emery D. Scruggs appeals from the revocation of his probation. We affirm.

1 Scruggs spells his first name as “Emergy” on the cover of his Appellant’s Brief and Appendix. During trial

court hearings, he spelled his name as “Emery.” We will use the spelling he provided during court hearings.

Emery D. Scruggs,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A04-1412-CR-562

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court.

The Honorable Christopher A.

Cage, Judge Pro Tempore.

Cause No. 48D03-1102-FA-147

1
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[2] The State charged Scruggs with robbery as a Class A felony. The parties

executed a plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Scruggs pleaded guilty

to robbery resulting in bodily injury, a Class B felony. The trial court accepted

the plea agreement and sentenced Scruggs to serve fifteen years in the

Department of Correction, with six years executed and nine years suspended to

probation. The court ordered Scruggs to comply with “the usual and ordinary

conditions of probation.” Appellant’s App. p. 38.

[3] Scruggs completed the executed portion of his sentence and was released to

probation. On March 28, 2014, the State filed a Notice of Violation of

Probation, alleging that Scruggs violated the terms of his probation by failing to

pay probation fees, failing to pay administrative fees, failing to report timely to

the probation department, and failing to either maintain employment or verify

employment with the probation department. Later, the State amended its

Notice to further assert that Scruggs violated his curfew and failed to behave

well in society because he was charged with a new criminal offense, resisting

law enforcement.

[4] The trial court held a hearing, and Scruggs admitted to committing all of the

violations alleged by the State except the curfew violation. The court ordered

Scruggs to be placed at a work release facility. Later, the court released Scruggs

from work release and returned him to probation.

[5] Scruggs had been in a relationship with Leslie Chiccine, but it ended and he

married someone else. On July 11, 2014, Chiccine obtained a protective order
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against Scruggs, barring him from contacting her. On September 20, 2014,

Scruggs called Chiccine three times in a row. She recognized his voice.

Scruggs told Chiccine that he wanted her to come pick him up. She did not

respond to him and hung up each time.

[6] On September 22, Chiccine printed off a log showing recent calls to her cell

phone. She reported the calls to the police and gave them the log. An officer

called the phone number that Chiccine indicated was the source of Scruggs’

calls and learned that the number was assigned to Scruggs’ home.

[7] On October 10, 2014, the State filed a second Notice of Violation of Probation,

which it later amended. The State alleged that Scruggs had violated the laws of

Indiana and had failed to behave well in society because he committed a new

criminal offense, specifically invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.

[8] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined by a preponderance

of the evidence that Scruggs had violated the terms of his probation, specifically

the requirement to “behave well in society,” because he committed the offense

of invasion of privacy. Tr. p. 102. The court ordered Scruggs to serve the

balance of his sentence at the Department of Correction. He now appeals.

[9] Scruggs raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the

revocation of his probation.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

Scruggs to the Department of Correction.
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Scruggs argues that the State failed to prove that he violated the terms of his

probation because Chiccine had a grudge against him, and his mother was the

person who called Chiccine.

[11] A court may revoke a person’s probation if the person has violated a condition

of probation during the probationary period. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a) (2012).

When the alleged probation violation is the commission of a new crime, the

State does not need to prove that the probationer was convicted of the crime.

Whatley v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Instead, the trial

court only needs to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

committed the offense. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Ind. 2013).

[12] On appeal, we look to the evidence most favorable to the State and neither

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Dokes v. State, 971

N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). If substantial evidence of probative

value exists to support the trial court’s finding that a violation occurred, we will

affirm the trial court’s judgment. Id.

[13] A person commits the offense of invasion of privacy by knowingly or

intentionally violating a protective order. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2014).

Chiccine testified that Scruggs called her three times on September 20, 2014. She

recognized his voice and denied that Scruggs’ mother was the caller. In

addition, Chiccine provided a cell phone call log to the police, and an officer

determined that the number from which the calls came was assigned to Scruggs’
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residence. Testimony from Scruggs’ wife demonstrated that she and Scruggs

were aware that Chiccine had obtained a protective order.

[14] This is sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have reasonably

determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Scruggs knowingly or

intentionally contacted Chiccine in violation of a protective order, thereby

committing the offense of invasion of privacy. See Dokes, 971 N.E.2d at 180

(evidence sufficient to support trial court’s determination that defendant had

violated probation by committing a new criminal offense).

II. Sentencing

[15] Scruggs argues that the trial court should have placed him on work release or

community corrections instead of sending him back to the Department of

Correction.

[16] If a court finds that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the

court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at

the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). When the trial court

revokes probation and imposes a sentence, we review the sentencing decision

for an abuse of discretion. Brandenburg v. State, 992 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[17] Scruggs, who was twenty-seven at the probation revocation hearing, has a

lengthy criminal history. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated a delinquent for

committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would have been considered
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three counts of battery and two counts of disorderly conduct. As an adult, he

has been convicted of two counts of possession of marijuana, four counts of

battery resulting in bodily injury, domestic battery, and criminal mischief. In

addition, Scruggs has been placed on probation in seven previous cases and

violated probation five times. Scruggs violated the terms of probation earlier in

this case, but after a term on work release the trial court returned him to

probation.

[18] Scruggs’ history of misconduct, including his repeated probation violations,

demonstrates that he is unlikely to respond positively to alternatives to

incarceration, such as work release. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

by ordering Scruggs to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence.

See Alford v. State, 965 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (no abuse of

discretion in imposing balance of suspended sentence for probation violation

where defendant contacted a person in violation of a no-contact order), trans.

denied.

[19] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

[21] Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.