[J-48-2014] [MO: Saylor, J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

IN RE: NOMINATION PETITION OF 

ROBERT GUZZARDI FOR THE 

REPUBLICAN NOMINATION FOR 

GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA IN 

THE REPUBLICAN PRIMARY OF MAY 

20, 2014 

APPEAL OF: RICHARD W. STEWART, 

ROBERT K. ROBINSON, RICHARD 

TEMS AND DONNA M. COSMELLO 

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No. 29 MAP 2014 

Appeal from the order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated April 15, 2014 

at No. 158 MD 2014 

SUBMITTED: April 21, 2014 

DISSENTING OPINION 

MADAME JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: May 1, 2014 

 OPINION FILED: August 18, 2014

I join Justice Baer’s Dissenting Opinion. I write separately to address two points 

raised by the majority. 

First, the majority notes that “[s]ince the present situation is vastly different from 

the ‘natural disaster, fire, or bomb threat’ scenarios envisioned by the dissent, we do not 

address those here.” Majority Opinion at 9 n.5 (citation omitted). Admittedly, an appeal 

for nunc pro tunc relief because “I was misinformed” (as herein) is “different” from an 

appeal for nunc pro tunc relief because, for example, a fire prevented access to the 

filing office, as the latter claim appears to present a much stronger case for granting 

nunc pro tunc relief than the former. But, significantly, from the standpoint of whether 

equity is available to provide the requested relief, the claims are the same. If, as the 

majority holds, equity is not available under its construction of the election statute, the 

particular details underlying the claim — be it official misinformation, or disaster — are 

irrelevant. Cf. Majority Opinion at 10 (conceding that “our enforcement of the governing 
[J-48-2014] [MO: Saylor, J.] - 2 

statutory fatal-defect rule was dispositive of this appeal”). Thus, an appeal to equity 

such as made in this case and an appeal to equity because of a fire at the filing office 

are emphatically not “vastly different” — they are, in point of fact, identical legal claims. 

As a result, the majority’s contention that “we do not address those [claims] here” rings 

hollow, as I perceive no principled basis — and the majority offers none — for 

categorically distinguishing between the instant claim for nunc pro tunc relief and one 

based on the “natural disaster, fire, or bomb threat” scenarios proffered by Justice 

Baer.1

 Under the majority’s analysis, all are barred. 

 Relatedly, the majority goes on to state: “We reiterate, however, that judicial 

enforcement of the fatal-defect rule extends only to the limits of the federal and state 

Constitutions and recognize that such enforcement in impossibility scenarios may test 

such boundaries.” Id. at 9 n.5. I take this to mean that the majority recognizes that its 

interpretation of the statute may be so unfair in its application in certain scenarios that it 

could be unconstitutional. On the majority’s terms, I would agree. However, this 

constitutional-safety-value tack reveals another problem with the majority’s approach, in 

addition to those identified by Justice Baer. 

A cardinal presumption of statutory interpretation is that the legislature does not 

intend to violate the Constitution. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(3) (“[T]he General Assembly does 

not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth.”); 

Bricklayers of W. Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott's Dev. Co., 90 A.3d 682, 

692 (Pa. 2014) (“The Legislature is presumed not to intentionally pass unconstitutional 

laws, and courts give statutes a constitutional interpretation if that is reasonably 

possible.”). In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the fatal defect language violates 

 

1

 If the majority’s distinction is meant to signal that its fatal defect interpretation 

somehow may not be as absolute as it appears to be — i.e., that it contemplates that 

some equity claims may be more worthy than others — it should say so explicitly. 
[J-48-2014] [MO: Saylor, J.] - 3 

this precept. In addition to the natural disaster, fire, or bomb threat scenarios suggested 

by Justice Baer, I would add the much more prosaic power outage, snow storm (filings 

are due in late winter), or water line break. In brief, short of negligence, there are any 

number of highly foreseeable events that could hamper or prevent the timely filing of a 

statement of financial interests. Surely, the legislature must have been aware of such 

possibilities in crafting the fatal defect language. However, by concluding the legislature 

intended to preclude equitable relief in toto, the majority nearly guarantees a 

constitutional contravention, flouting the above precept of statutory construction. 

In this regard, I do not mean to suggest the majority’s interpretation of the fatal 

defect language is unfounded: such language can reasonably be viewed as disallowing 

equitable relief. At the same time, I regard Justice Baer’s alternative interpretation — 

that the fatal defect language was added to reverse this Court’s dilution of the filing 

requirement in State Ethics Comm’n v. Baldwin, 445 A.2d 1208 (Pa. 1982), and thus is 

unrelated to restricting a court’s ability to grant equitable relief — also to be eminently 

reasonable. Yet, critically, Justice Baer’s interpretation has the advantage of avoiding 

the constitutional infirmity to which the majority alludes, and so comports with the 

presumption against unconstitutional interpretations. Given the panoply of highly 

foreseeable scenarios which may result in a non-negligent failure to timely file a 

statement of financial interests, I would interpret the fatal defect language in a manner 

which avoids, not presumes, constitutional impediments.