Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1709-CR-2084 | May 1, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher Sturgeon

Clark County Public Defender’s Office

Jeffersonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Elliot Edward Shelton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 1, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

10A05-1709-CR-2084

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bradley B. Jacobs, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

10C02-1502-F6-154 

10C02-1505-F4-037 

Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Elliot Edward Shelton brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial 

court’s denial of his motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2015, the State charged Shelton with multiple drug-related 

offenses, and a warrant was issued for his arrest under cause number 10C02-

1502-F6-154 (“Case 154”). He still had not been arrested when, on May 16, 

2015, he was pulled over while driving. He was arrested on the outstanding 

warrant in Case 154. Then on May 21, the State filed additional gun- and drugrelated charges against Shelton stemming from the traffic stop under cause 

number 10C02-1505-F4-37 (“Case 37”).1 Shelton was later released on bond. 

[3] Both cases were initially set for trial on October 20, 2015, but were moved to 

January 5, 2016, at Shelton’s request. In December 2015, the State failed to 

appear at a pretrial conference, so the trial court canceled the January 5 trials. 

The court reset the pretrial conference for January 20, 2016. Beginning on 

January 20, Shelton sought and was granted a series of continuances that 

delayed the case for eight months to September 22. Each entry that granted 

 

1

In its brief, the State incorrectly says that Shelton was arrested and charged on March 16 and March 21, 

respectively. Appellee’s Br. p. 12. The State then uses these dates to calculate the Rule 4(C) timeline, 

resulting in an incorrect calculation of the one-year periods.
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Shelton a continuance stated that the delay was charged to the defendant, and 

Shelton or his attorney personally signed each form. Appellant’s App. Vol. II 

pp. 164, 171-73. On September 22, Shelton failed to appear at a pretrial 

conference, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Shelton was arrested five 

months later in February 2017. A pretrial conference was held on February 27, 

and the court then set Shelton’s trials for July 18, 2017, without objection.2 

[4] On May 26, 2017, Shelton was appointed a new attorney, who immediately 

objected to the trial date in Case 154. Four days later, Shelton’s attorney

moved for discharge under Rule 4(C) in Case 37. With some exceptions, Rule 

4(C) guarantees a defendant the right to stand trial within one year of arrest or 

the date charges are filed, whichever is later. A hearing on the motion was held 

on July 5, and Shelton’s attorney asked the court to “incorporate[] the same 

type of arguments” for his objection in Case 154. Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Shelton’s 

attorney argued that the State was beyond the one-year deadline set by Rule 

4(C) but that he had not been able to object or move for discharge because the 

State had failed to request and the court did not set trial dates after the January 

2016 trials were canceled. The trial court calculated the one-year periods and 

concluded that they had ended on July 4.

3

 The court, however, stated that due 

 

2 Case 37 was originally reset for trial on June 6, 2017, but on June 2 it was moved to July 18 due to court

congestion. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 119-20. Case 154 was originally reset for trial on July 11, 2017, but

on July 6 it was moved to October 31 due to court congestion. Id. at 9-10. 

3 The trial court incorrectly calculated the Rule 4(C) deadline. The court began the one-year period for both 

cases on May 27, 2015, when the initial hearing in each case was held. The period started on May 16, 2015

(the date of arrest) in Case 154 and on May 21, 2015 (the date charges were filed) in Case 37. See Ind. Crim. 

Rule 4(C) (“No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in 
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to court congestion it would not have been possible to try Shelton before July

18. Id. at 19-20. The court then certified its order for interlocutory appeal.

[5] This interlocutory appeal now ensues. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] Shelton argues that he should not be charged with the eight-month delay from 

January 2016 to September 2016. He also contends that he was unable to raise 

an objection or move for discharge under Rule 4(C) during these eight months. 

[7] Rule 4(C) provides:

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer 

a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than 

one year from the date the criminal charge against such 

defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, 

whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his 

motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was 

not sufficient time to try him during such period because of 

congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the 

last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a 

timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this 

rule. Provided further, that a trial court may take note of 

congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, 

and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any continuance 

granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be 

 

aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, 

or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later[.]”) (emphases added). The court also erred 

when it counted Shelton’s request for a continuance of the October 20, 2015 trials against the State. See Tr. 

Vol. II p. 19; Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41, 155. All other calculations by the court were correct, and we 

thank the court for its detailed explanation of its calculations, which aided in our review. 
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reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial 

within a reasonable time. Any defendant so held shall, on 

motion, be discharged.

“The State’s duty to try the defendant within one year is affirmative, and the 

defendant is under no obligation to remind the State of its duty.” State v. Delph, 

875 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. But the one-year period 

may be extended for various reasons, including “if a delay is caused by the 

defendant’s own motion or action[.]” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 

(Ind. 2014). 

[8] Shelton contends that the delay from January 2016 to September 2016 should 

be charged to the State because he was negotiating a plea agreement with the 

State during this time. He acknowledges that he requested each continuance

that resulted in the eight-month delay, Appellant’s Br. p. 10, but argues that his 

situation is similar to the defendant in State v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1986), reh’g denied. In Smith, the State argued that the one-year period was 

tolled because it was engaged in plea negotiations with Smith. The trial court 

discharged Smith. We upheld the order because Smith did not abandon his 

right to be tried within one year because he engaged in plea negotiations and 

because Smith did not request a continuance and his actions did not delay the 

State in bringing him to trial within the one-year period. Here, Shelton is 

correct that engaging in plea negotiations does not relieve the State of its duty to

bring him to trial within one year. However, unlike Smith, it is undisputed that 
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Shelton requested each continuance that resulted in the eight-month delay, 

thereby extending the time the State had to bring him to trial. 

[9] Nevertheless, Shelton contends that the eight-month delay cannot be charged to 

him because it did not cause a delay in the trials since no trial dates were ever 

set during this time. This argument ignores the fact that, when the 

continuances were granted, Shelton personally signed the entry form which 

attributed the delay to him. His argument also runs afoul of our Supreme 

Court’s holding in Cook: “[W]hen a defendant takes action which delays the 

proceeding, that time is chargeable to the defendant and extends the one-year 

time limit, regardless of whether a trial date has been set at the time or not.” 

810 N.E.2d at 1066-67. Accordingly, the eight-month delay from January 2016 

to September 2016 is charged to Shelton, not the State. Shelton was not 

entitled to discharge under Rule 4(C). 

[10] To assist the court with scheduling each case for trial, we calculate the time 

remaining under Rule 4(C). In Case 154, the period began on May 16, 2015, 

and ran until October 20, 2015—158 days. The period resumed on January 6, 

2016, and ran until January 20, 2016—15 days. The period did not start again 

until February 27, 2017, and ended on July 11, 2017—135 days. In total, 308 

days have elapsed in Case 154, leaving the State with 57 days in the one-year 

period. As for Case 37, the State’s time began on May 21, 2015, and ran until 

October 20, 2015—153 days. The period ran again from January 6, 2016, to 

January 20, 2016—15 days. The period resumed on February 27, 2017, and 

stopped on June 6, 2017—100 days. In total, 268 days have elapsed in Case 37, 
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leaving the State with 97 days in the one-year period. All other time periods in 

both cases are charged either to Shelton or the court.

[11] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.