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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CARLA PEEBLES,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED September 15, 2016

v No. 327649 Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, LC No. 15-000034-MD

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: O WENS , P.J., and S AWYER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. In this action involving an alle gedly defective highway, plain tiff appeals as of right from an order of the Michigan Court of Claims granting defendant’s m otion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (imm unity granted by law). We affi rm.
On January 18, 2014, plai ntiff struck a pot hole as she was dr iving on the tr aveled portion of an interstate highway. Plaintiff lost control of her vehicl e and sustained serious and permanent injuries. On May 7, 2014, plaintiff mailed a notice of intent (NOI) to file claim pursuant to MCL 691.1404, which was addressed to: “Court of Cl aims, 313 W. Kalamazoo, PO Box 40771, Lansing, Michigan 48901.” Plaintiff asserts that th is notice was received by the court of claims on May 12, 2014, because she received a domesti c return receipt signed by “GLES, Inc.—Authorized Agents, C. Hand” on that date. Thereaft er, plaintiff mailed another NOI to: “Court of Claims, Fourth District, 2nd Floor, Hall of Justice, 925 West Ottawa St., P.O. Box 30022, Lansing, Michigan 48909-7522.” This second notice w as received by the court of claims on May 23, 2014. Defendant brought a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), urging the court to dis miss plaintiff’s case becau se her NOI was untimely.

In granting summary disposition, the court noted that the corr ect address for the court of claims since November 12, 2013, is “the district office of each district of the Court of Appeals, not 313 W. Kalamazoo, P.O. Box 40711, Lansing.” According to t he court, “How and why the [domestic return] receipt was handled and stamped when it was r eceived at the wrong address is immaterial to whether the plaintiff complied with MCL 691.1404( 2).” Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.

On appeal, plaintiff does not dispute that her second notice w as untimely. However, she argues that the trial court erre d in granting summary dispositi on because the first NOI was timely-2- or, in the alternative, discovery of how and why the domestic r eturn receipt was handled and stamped was material to whether she complied with MCL 691.1404( 2). Our review is de novo. Stone v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 307 Mich App 169, 173; 858 NW2d 765 (2014).

“A defendant is entitled to su mmary disposition under MCR 2.11 6(C)(7) if the plaintiff’s claims are barred because of immunity granted by law.” Pew v Mich State Univ , 307 Mich App 328, 331; 859 NW2d 246 (2014). The moving party may support it s motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence that wou ld be admissible at trial. MCR 2.116(G)(5), (6). This Court must consider this evidence and d etermine whether it indicates that the defendant is entitled to immunity. Snead v John Carlo, Inc , 294 Mich App 343, 354; 813 NW2d 294 (2011). The Court must also consider the contents of the plaintiff’s complaint as true, unless contradicted by the documentary evidence. Pew , 307 Mich App at 332. “If reasonable minds could not differ on the legal effects of the f acts, whether governmental immunity bars a plaintiff’s claim is a question of law.” Id.

MCL 691.1404 states, in part:

(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by r eason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact loc ation and nature if the defec t, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claiman t.

(2) . . . In case of the state, such notice shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of claims.

In Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm , 477 Mich 197, 219; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), the Supreme Court concluded that “MCL 69 1.1404 is straightforward, clear, u nambiguous, and not constitutionally suspect. A ccordingly, . . . it must be enforc ed as written.”

Plaintiff had until May 18, 2014 to file her NOI. Plaintiff c ontends that she filed a timely notice with the court of claims, which was received by the cour t on May 12, 2014. Plaintiff’s first notice was sent to “Court of Claims, 313 W. Kalamazoo, PO Box 40771, Lansing, Michigan 48901.” By Administrative Order, No. 2013-1, and Administrativ e Order, No. 2014-02, the Kalamazoo address ceased to be the court of claims address on F ebruary 13, 2014. In addition, the staff of the Thirtieth Circuit Court, then and presently lo cated at the Kalamazoo address, were no longer authorized to “process all pleadings, documents, and fees” on behalf of the court of claims as of February 13, 2014. These orders were available to the public on the court’s website.-3- Because plaintiff did not timely file her NOI, the case was pr operly dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). 1

Affirmed.

/s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

1 Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery was also properly denied. She argues that she should have been allowed to condu ct discovery to determine if t he signatory was somehow acting for the court of claims or if he delivered the notice to the court of claims after receipt. However, the court of claims record contains no indication that the initial NOI was ever received by the court. Further, plainti ff’s suggestion that additional information regarding the fate of the initial NOI was available carries little weight given that plai ntiff did not attempt to contact the recipient of the NOI or his comp any in order to seek that infor mation.