alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 12

             CASE CREDIT CORPORATION AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES

               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                             (dollars in millions)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                            Post-acquisition   Pre-acquisition
                                                                                                basis of          basis of
                                                                                               accounting        accounting
                                                                                            ----------------- -----------------
                                                                                            Nine Months Ended Nine Months Ended
                                                                                              September 30,     September 30,
                                                                                                  2000              1999
                                                                                            ----------------- -----------------
<S>                                                                                         <C>               <C>
Net income.................................................................................       $ 14              $ 63
Add:
  Interest expense.........................................................................        172               141
  Amortization of capitalized debt expense.................................................        --                  2
  Income tax expense and other taxes on income.............................................          8                36
                                                                                                  ----              ----
    Earnings as defined....................................................................       $194              $242
                                                                                                  ====              ====
Interest expense...........................................................................       $172              $141
Amortization of capitalized debt expense...................................................        --                  2
                                                                                                  ----              ----
  Fixed charges as defined.................................................................       $172              $143
                                                                                                  ====              ====
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges.........................................................       1.13x             1.69x
--------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  ====              ====
</TABLE>
#### IN RE: Richard MONTGOMERY, Petitioner.

No. 17-1143

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

*291Richard Montgomery, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Montgomery petitions for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order requiring the district court to order the Government to show cause why Montgomery’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition should not be granted. We conclude that Montgomery is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court must either grant the motion or “issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant ... is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012). In this case, the magistrate judge recently issued a report and recommendation concluding that Montgomery is not entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           5,835
<SECURITIES>                                     1,697
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,551
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (398)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,454
<PP&E>                                          11,254
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,962
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  15,928
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,287
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            69
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,572
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    15,928
<SALES>                                          5,480
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,480
<CGS>                                            1,929
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,929
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,220
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,571)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,963
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,534)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,534)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.86)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.86)


</TABLE>
#### Robert BONCZEK, Plaintiff-Appellant v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES NATIONAL ROOFING INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN; Zenith Administrators, third-party administrative manager, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-3474

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2017

Filed: May 2, 2017

Robert Bonczek, Pro Se

Librado Arreola, Asher & Gittler, Chicago, IL, Thomas Charles Atmore, Leonard & O’Brien, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants-Appellees

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM,

Robert Bonczek appeals, the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judg*598ment in his action under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, in which he challenged a decision on the amount and type of retirement benefits to which he was entitled under a pension plan. We conclude summary judgment was proper, as our review of the record convinces us that the determinations Mr. Bonczek is challenging here did not amount to an amendment to the pension plan, or an abuse of the discretion afforded to defendants under that plan. See Manning v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo grant of summary judgment regarding ERISA plan administrator’s benefits determination; viewing evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in light most favorable to nonmovant).2 Because Mr. Bonczek was not entitled to any relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend his requested relief. See Hammer v. City of Osage Beach, 318 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable John R, Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the *598District of Minnesota.

2

. Mr. Bonczek does not contest the district court’s determination that the pension plan expressly invoked the abuse-of-discretion standard; and thus, like the district court, this court must uphold the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and based on a reasonable interpretation of the pension plan. See Ingram v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis Pension Plan for Nonschedule Emps., 812 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2016).
EXHIBIT 35.3
                   SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                           HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC
               RAAC SERIES 2006-SP4 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of Homecomings  Financial,  LLC, as
servicer (the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable  servicing agreement,  does
hereby certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:       /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
          Name: Anthony N. Renzi
          Title: Managing Director
#### Gregory G. HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CLARKSBURG, a municipal Corporation and political subdivision; Martin G. Howe; James C. Hunt; Ralph Pederson; Margaret Bailey; Adam Barberio; H. Keith Kesling; Jonathan R. Davis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-2251

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: September 28, 2017

Decided: November 13, 2017

Steven Brett Offutt, LAW OFFICE OF BRETT OFFUTT, Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, for Appellant. Keith C. Gamble, Kenneth L. Hopper, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN & POE, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gregory G. Hall appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights *268complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Hall v. City of Clarksburg,*No. 1:14-cv-00090-IMK-MJA, 2016 WL 5680218 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2016). We grant the City of Clarksburg’s motion to strike a portion of Hall’s appendix and deny Hall’s motion for leave to supplement the record.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 The stricken pages appear in the corrected appendix at 69-72.
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 81

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a credit for the

purchase of child restraint systems used in motor vehicles.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

a credit for the purchase of child restraint systems used

in motor vehicles.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CREDIT FOR PURCHASE OF CHILD RESTRAINT

4 SYSTEMS.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart A of part IV of sub6 chapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of

7 1986 (relating to nonrefundable personal credits) is

8 amended by adding at the end the following new section:
2

•S 81 IS

1 ‘‘SEC. 25A. PURCHASE OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM.

2 ‘‘(a) GENERAL RULE.—In the case of an individual,

3 there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed

4 by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to

5 the costs incurred by the taxpayer during such taxable

6 year in purchasing a qualified child restraint system for

7 any child of the taxpayer.

8 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

9 ‘‘(1) QUALIFIED CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM.—

10 The term ‘qualified child restraint system’ means

11 any child restraint system which meets the require12 ments of section 571.213 of title 49 of the Code of

13 Federal Regulations.

14 ‘‘(2) CHILD.—The term ‘child’ has the meaning

15 given to such term by section 151(c)(3).’’

16 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sec17 tions for subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of chapter

18 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by

19 inserting after the item relating to section 25 the following

20 new item:

‘‘Sec. 25A. Purchase of child restraint system.’’

21 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

22 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after

23 December 31, 1994.

Æ
#### THE TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY vs. WHEAT.

Appeal from Tarrant county.

Davis, Beall & Rogers, for appellant.

Ball & McCart for appellee.

*Practice*— Evidence.—In action against a railroad for damages to stock being transported, the plaintiff’s petition declared upon a bill of lading and not against the defendants in their capacity as public carriers. Held, That under such an action the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment, unless he produced the bill of lading in evidence, or accounted for its non-production.

*Common Carriers*— Liability *of.*— When the question is whether the defendant bears to the property the relationship of ware-houseman or common carrier, Article 283 of the Revised Statutes, is decisive, and unless a bill of lading is given, the liability of common carrier does not attach. If, however, the goods have been placed on board the cars, or in transit, the liability of a common carrier attaches, with or without a bill of sale.

*Same*— .Charge *of the Gourt.*— The suit being based upon a bill of lading, the court erred in refusing a charge to the effect that the plaintiff, having failed to offer in evidence the bill of lading or contract of shipment, the defendant could not be held liable for any damage sustained, unless it was shown to have occurred on the line of defendant’s road.

*Same.*— When the cattle were injured while in possession of the common carrier, subsequent return of the same to the shipper, and death of the cattle after such return, will not relieve the carrier from liability, and it was not error to refuse a charge to that effect.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Hurt, J.
#### Commonwealth, Appellant, *v.*Starcher.

*412Argued March 31, 1953.

Before Stern, C. J., Stearns, Jones, Chidsey, Musmanno and Arnold, JJ.

*Randolph C. Ryder,*Deputy Attorney General, with him *Robert B. Greer, Jr.,*and *Robert E. Woodside,*Attorney General, for appellant.

No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.

April 22, 1953:

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne,

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the court of common pleas setting aside an order of the Secretary of Revenue suspending defendant’s *reciprocal, nonresident’s*operating privileges for operating a motor vehicle.

The Vehicle Code, §603, 75 PS 163, provides that a non-resident, duly licensed in his home state, may operate in Pennsylvania without obtaining a Pennsyl*413vania license. And §615(d) of The Vehicle Code, 75 PS 192, provides that the Secretary of Revenue may suspend a non-resident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania *for any reason which would justify suspension of a resident’s license.*

It therefore follows that what we said in *Commonwealth v. Emerick,*373 Pa. 388, 96 A. 2d 370, relating to suspension of operator’s licenses for operating motor vehicles has similar application. By necessary implication, a non-resident under the above language of the Code possesses the same right of appeal under §616 of The Vehicle Code, 75 PS 193, as a resident.

Billy Starcher, non-resident defendant, was charged by a state police officer on April 25, 1951, at 8:45 p.m., on a clear, dark night with driving a motor vehicle on a public highway at seventy miles an hour where the lawful speed limit was fifty miles an hour. Defendant does not deny the charge and offers no extenuating circumstances.

The learned court below revoked the Secretary of Revenue’s order of suspension solely upon the ground of economic hardship. Such an order in the circumstances of this case constituted a manifest abuse of discretion.

The order is reversed at the cost of appellee.
#### Anthony PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOISE CASCADE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and Jill Coleman, HR Director, Defendant.

No. 16-2372

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

Anthony Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Mat- • thew Stanley Brown, Stephen Douglas *283Dellinger, LITTLER MENDELSON PC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Parker seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and dismissing his complaint for failure to prosecute. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 22, 2016. The notice of appeal was filed on December 1, 2016. Because Parker failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 925 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 925

To impose congressional notification and reporting requirements on any 
 negotiations or other discussions between the United States and Cuba 
              with respect to normalization of relations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 15 (legislative day, June 5), 1995

  Mr. Mack (for himself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Helms, and Mr. 
Dole) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
                 to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To impose congressional notification and reporting requirements on any 
 negotiations or other discussions between the United States and Cuba 
              with respect to normalization of relations.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CONTACTS WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT 
              OFFICIALS.

    (a) Advanced Notification Required.--No funds made available under 
any provision of law may be used for the costs and expenses of 
negotiations, meetings, discussions, or contacts between United States 
Government officials or representatives and officials or 
representatives of the Cuban government relating to normalization of 
relations between the United States and Cuba unless 15 days in advance 
the President has notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in 
accordance with procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications 
under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
    (b) Reports.--Within 15 days of any negotiations, meetings, 
discussions, or contacts between individuals described in subsection 
(a), with respect to any matter, the President shall submit a report to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate detailing the individuals 
involved, the matters discussed, and any agreements made, including 
agreements to conduct future negotiations, meetings, discussions, or 
contacts.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-20671

Conference Calendar

 

OLALUMADE BAMIDELE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE CITY OF HOUSTON POLICE

DEPARTMENT; THE CITY OF HOUSTON,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-96-CV-3823

- - - - - - - - - -

June 15, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Olalumade Bamidele, Texas prisoner # 684802, appeals from

the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint

as duplicative and thus malicious. Bamidele asserts for the

first time on appeal that he did not receive a complete copy of

the district court’s order of dismissal. The record does not

reflect any attempt by Bamidele to obtain a copy of the order

even though he received notice of the court’s dismissal and
No. 98-20671

-2-

timely filed a notice of appeal. Bamidele also refers to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 2 and 4, but he has failed to explain how the district

court violated these rules. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Bamidele

has not demonstrated that the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e). Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.

1988). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.