alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel G. KIRAZ, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George D. Kiraz, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30269, No. 16-30272

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 5, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed November 1, 2017

*722Seth D. Uram, Quinn Patrick Harrington, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, Leslie A. Goemaat, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Noel Grefenson, Attorney, Noel Grefen-son, P.C., Salem, OR, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, PAEZ and BEA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

George and Daniel Kiraz were both involved in a family-run strip-club business owned by David Kiraz (George’s son and Daniel’s brother). The Government alleged that the Kiraz family engaged in a scheme to underreport the clubs’ income by failing to report door fees, which were charged for customer entry, and house fees, which were charged for working as a dancer. George and Daniel were both convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) for participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States and aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns for tax year 2010. George was additionally convicted of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns for tax years 2008 and 2009. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, both George and Daniel moved for judgments of acquittal, which the district court denied, and they have timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The jury heard evidence that George participated in a scheme to maintain two separate sets of books—an accurate, unreported set, and an inaccurate, reported set—with the goal of setting aside the house and door fees for his family, and that he helped mislead the clubs’ tax preparers on several occasions. The jury also heard evidence that Daniel knowingly aided in the scheme to maintain two sets of books, and that he answered the tax preparer’s questions for tax year 2010 on club expenditures. Despite knowing that the financial documents in the tax preparer’s possession were missing house and door fees, at no point during his conversation with the tax preparer did Daniel raise the omission. Therefore, taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of each conviction. *United States v. Nevils,*598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1

# CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, the undersigned officer of PURE Bioscience (the Company) hereby
certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

| | (i)        the
accompanying report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended January 31,
2009 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (ii)        the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                     |     |                                                                     
|-------------------- | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 11, 2009 | By: | /s/ Michael L. Krall                                                
|                     |     | Michael L. KrallChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)

This certification has not been, and
shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

---
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 962

AN ACT

To extend authorities under the Middle East Peace

Facilitation Act of 1994 until August 15, 1995.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES.

4 Section 583 of the Foreign Relations Authorization

5 Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103–236)

6 is amended by striking ‘‘July 1, 1995’’ and inserting in

7 lieu thereof ‘‘August 15, 1995’’.

Passed the Senate June 23 (legislative day, June

19), 1995.

Attest:

Secretary.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 962

AN ACT

To extend authorities under the Middle East Peace

Facilitation Act of 1994 until August 15, 1995.
#### Joseph C. SISNEROS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BROWN, Sergeant at RJ Donovan Facility; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56331

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Joseph C. Sisneros, Pro Se

Christopher Findley, AGCA — Office of the Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*515MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Joseph C. Sisneros appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Sisneros failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted all steps of the grievance process, or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion [of administrative remedies] demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]”); *Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 823-24, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing limited circumstances where improper screening renders administrative remedies unavailable or where administrative remedies might otherwise be unavailable).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sisneros’ discovery motions because Sisneros did not show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the denial. *See Hallett v. Morgan,*296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review and actual prejudice requirement).

We reject as unsupported by the record Sisneros’ contentions regarding the district court’s alleged failure to appoint counsel because the record shows that Sisneros did not properly move for appointment of counsel.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Russell Ray PRYOR, Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-20470 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 20, 2017

REVISED November 21, 2017

Andrew R. Gould, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee-

Russell Ray Pryor, Pro Se

Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Russell Ray Pryor, federal prisoner #38706-179, and proceeding *pro se*on appeal, was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment for possessing a firearm after being adjudged guilty of a felony, and possessing a firearm to further a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1), and 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing with intent to distribute dihydrocódeinone, and possessing with intent to distribute codeine, in violation of 21. U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), and 841(b)(3). Following being denied 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief, Pryor was denied a certificate of appealability (COA).

After additional litigation contesting the final judgment, Pryor moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and (6) for relief from the judgment denying § 2255 relief. The district court denied Pryor’s motion.

Our court granted Pryor a COA on one issue: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief from the denial of his § 2255 motion, by refusing to consider pages missing from his affidavit in opposition to counsel’s affidavit, and not holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding the voluntariness of consent to a premises search that resulted in the introduction of evidence seized in that search.

Pryor’s opening brief, which only twice mentions Rule 60(b), does not address the issue allowed by his COA. As in this instance, it is insufficient to allude to a legal theory. *McIntosh v. Partridge,*540 F.3d 315, 325 n.12 (5th Cir. 2008). And, because Pryor does not address the issue on which the COA was granted, the issue is abandoned. *E.g., Davis v. Maggio,*706 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1983); *Cinel v. Connick,*15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994); *Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 224-225 (5th Cir. 1993).

*246Pryor asserts his innocence. and contends his convictions were constitutionally invalid as a result of, *inter alia,*ineffective assistance of counsel. But our jurisdiction does not extend to those issues; it is restricted to the above-described issue on which Pryor was granted a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); *Carty v. Thaler,*583 F.3d 244, 266 (5th Cir. 2009); *United States v. White,*307 F.3d 336, 339 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EXHIBIT 31.02A

 

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 302 

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Randy R. Wiese, certify that:

 

| 1. | I have reviewed this amended quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of CSG Systems International, Inc.; |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| Date:  | October 23, 2014 |   | /s/ Randy R. Wiese                                   |
|--------|------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
|   |             |   | Randy R. Wiese                                       |
|   |             |   | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

 

1
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 29, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-60184 Summary Calendar

CHARLES CHIE OSABEDE, also known as Charles Chize Osabede, Petitioner,

versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A75 232 237

--------------------

Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Charles Osabede, a native and citizen of Nigeria, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying as untimely his motion to reopen the removal proceedings that he filed in December 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In July 1999 the BIA dismissed Osabede’sappeal of a decision by an immigration judge denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal and ordering that he beremoved to Brazil. Osabede’s motion to reopen proceedings was due

within ninety days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). In his motion to reopen, Osabede frivolously suggested that his motion was based on his failure to appear at his immigration hearing, an allegation that is flatly contradicted by the record of that hearing. Although a failure to appear may support the filing of an untimely motion to reopen under an exception enumerated in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iii) and may support an exercise of jurisdiction by this court, see Panjwani v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2005), Osabede has abandoned any reliance on such exception in his petition for review, see Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003). Osabede’s petition for review relies onno exception listed in § 1229a(c)(7)(C) and cites no equitable basis for avoiding thestatutory ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over Osabede’s petition, because there is “‘no meaningful standard against which to review’” the BIA’s decision. See Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The petition for review is thus DISMISSED, and Osabede’s motion to stay removal is DENIED.
#### Mitchell Lee VARNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth SAWYER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35096

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Mitchell Lee Varnell, Pro Se

Aaron Williams, Attorney, State Attorney General’s Office—Corrections Division, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appel-lees

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Washington state prisoner Mitchell Lee Varnell appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco,*746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Varnell’s request for mandatory injunctive relief seeking transportation to medical appointments in a car with cushioned seats because Varnell failed to establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim alleging deliberate indifference to his back injury. *See id.*(plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in the public interest); *Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Trust,*636 F.3d 1150, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2011) (mandatory injunctions are not generally granted unless “extreme or very serious damage will result” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Varnell’s request for injunctive relief seeking pain medication and surgery.

We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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#### XUEQIANG XU, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 12-73356

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Xueqiang Xu, Pro Se

Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Keith Ian Mc-Manus, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Xueqiang Xu, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

We do not consider the materials Xu references in his opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, even if credible, Xu’s experiences in China did not rise to the level of persecution. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2003) (record did not compel finding of past persecution where petitioner did not suffer economic deprivation rising to the level of persecution and did not suffer any significant physical harm); *see also Jiang v. Holder,*611 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) (petitioner “cannot qualify for refugee status solely on the basis of [his wife’s] forced abortion”). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion Xu failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See Gu v. Gonzales,*454 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) (applicant did not present compelling evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution). Thus, Xu’s asylum claim fails.

In this case, because Xu failed to establish eligibility for asylum, his withholding of removal claim fails. *See Zehatye,*453 F.3d at 1190. We lack jurisdiction to consider Xu’s contentions regarding a pattern and practice of persecution or membership in a disfavored group. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must exhaust claims in administrative proceedings below).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Xu *856failed to show it is more likely than rjot he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Chinese government. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6843 

To expand the boundaries of the Atchafalaya National Heritage Area to 

include Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 15, 2023 

Mr. SCALISE (for himself, Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana, Ms. LETLOW, Mr. HIGGINS of Louisiana, and Mr. CARTER of Louisiana) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To expand the boundaries of the Atchafalaya National 

Heritage Area to include Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ATCHAFALAYA NATIONAL HERITAGE AREA EX4 PANSION. 

5 Section 213 of the Atchafalaya National Heritage 

6 Area Act (subtitle B of title II of Public Law 109–338) 

7 is amended— 

8 (1) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘and Ascen9 sion Parish’’ and inserting ‘‘Ascension, and 

10 Lafourche Parish’’; and 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6843 IH

1 (2) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ‘‘14’’ and 

2 inserting ‘‘15’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS