alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Seth Anthony JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30307

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

Katherine Lee Horwitz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Thomas Monaghan, Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defender *549Services of Idaho, Boise, ID, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Seth Anthony Johnson appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the sentence of 12 months and one day imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Johnson contends that his due process rights were violated by the district court’s consideration of his probation officer’s unreliable hearsay testimony at sentencing concerning his alleged possession of child pornography in 2013. Contrary to Johnson’s claim, his probation officer did not testify that Johnson possessed child pornography. Rather, he accurately reported that, in a prior revocation proceeding, Johnson was alleged to have been in possession of child pornography after officers viewed “suspected” child pornography on his cell phone. The probation officer also made clear that the possession allegation was dismissed. Even assuming these statements contained hearsay, Johnson has not shown that the statements were false or unreliable and the district court did not violate Johnson’s due process rights by considering them. *See United States v. Vanderwerfhorst,*576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009).

Johnson also argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court relied too heavily on his original crime in imposing it. The court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The record does not support Johnson’s contention that the district court overemphasized his original crime, and the within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Johnson’s multiple breaches of the court’s trust and the threat he poses to the public. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; *United States v. Simtob,*485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED,

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Herbert BUTLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Darrel VANNOY, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-30312

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 13, 2017

Herbert Butler, Pro Se

Dale R. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, District Attorney’s Office for the 9th JDC—Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Herbert Butler, Louisiana prisoner # 124959, was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He moves for a certificate of appeala-bility (“COA”) and for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*(“IFP”) to challenge the denial of his motion for permission to file a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion. That proposed motion sought to challenge a state appellate court’s finding that Butler had failed to preserve a particular issue for review on direct appeal.

Because the proposed motion does not address any aspect of the denial of Butler’s

28 U.S.C. § 2254 application, it raises new claims, so it is a successive Section 2254 application. *See Gonzalez v. Crosby,*545 U.S. 524, 532-33, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). Because Butler did not have this court’s permission to file a second or successive application, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. *See In re Sepulvado,*707 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. *See United States v. Key,*205 F.3d 773, 774-75 (5th Cir. 2000).

To the extent that Butler is required to obtain a COA, his request is DENIED, because he has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal also is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Sandra Libai NAJERA-MEJIA, also known as Cheyla Turcios, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60704 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 17, 2017

Sandra Libai Najera-Mejia, Pro Se

John M. McAdams, Jr., U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, David Michael McConnell, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sandra Libai Najera-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions this court for review of the dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of a motion to reopen proceedings in which she was ordered removed in absentia. Najera-Mejia argues that the BIA failed to consider the exceptional circumstances that warranted reopening of the proceeding.

Due to her failure to brief any challenge to the BIA’s determination that her third motion to reopen was numerically barred from consideration pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), Najera-Mejia has abandoned any such challenge. *See Soadjede v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing *Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)). Additionally, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Najera-Mejia’s challenge to the BIA’s wholly discretionary determination that her ease did not present exceptional circumstances warranting sua sponte reconsideration. *See Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 246, 248-50 (5th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, Najera-Mejia’s petition for review is DISMISSED, in part, for lack of jurisdiction and DENIED, in part.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# EUR-Lex - 32003D0012 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32003D0012

**2003/12/EC: Commission Decision of 10 January 2003 amending Decision 92/452/EEC establishing lists of embryo collection teams and embryo production teams approved in third countries for export of bovine embryos to the Community as regards the United States of America and Switzerland (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 5560) **

*
Official Journal L 007 , 11/01/2003 P. 0084 - 0085 *

Commission Decision

of 10 January 2003

amending Decision 92/452/EEC establishing lists of embryo collection teams and embryo production teams approved in third countries for export of bovine embryos to the Community as regards the United States of America and Switzerland

(notified under document number C(2002) 5560)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2003/12/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine speciesOJ L 302, 19.10.1989, p. 1., as last amended by Commission Decision 94/113/ECOJ L 53, 24.2.1994, p. 23., and in particular Article 8 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The competent veterinary services of the United States of America and Switzerland have forwarded requests for amendments to the list established by Commission Decision 92/452/EECOJ L 250, 29.8.1992, p. 40., as last amended by Decision 2002/637/ECOJ L 206, 3.8.2002, p. 29., of teams officially approved in their territory for the export of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species to the Community.

(2) Guarantees regarding compliance with the requirements specified in Article 8 of Directive 89/556/EEC have been provided to the Commission by the competent veterinary services of the countries concerned, and they have officially approved the collection teams concerned for exports to the Community.

(3) Decision 92/452/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In the Annex to Decision 92/452/EEC:

1. the row for the US team No 96ID083 is deleted;

2. the row for US team No 01WI098 is replaced by the following:

">TABLE>"

3. the following row is added concerning US teams:

">TABLE>"

4. the following row is added concerning Switzerland teams:

">TABLE>"

Article 2

This Decision shall apply as from 31 January 2003.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 January 2003.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan Allen ENTSMINGER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6933

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 30, 2017

Decided: November 16, 2017

*291Nathan Allen Entsminger, Appellant Pro Se, Jennifer R, Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia; Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Nathan Allen Entsminger seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We grant the Government’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on April 6, 2017. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest,* on June 13, 2017. Because Entsminger failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*

*

 This is the date Entsminger asserts that he placed the notice of appeal in the prison mail system. *See*Fed. R. App.- P. 4(c) (prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (same).
<PAGE>


                                                                  EXHIBIT 11.1

                        HEALTH SYSTEMS DESIGN CORPORATION
                        COMPUTATION OF NET LOSS PER SHARE
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                  THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31,  SIX MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31,
                                                      1997         1996              1997         1996
                                               -------------  --------------  -------------   ------------
<S>                                            <C>             <C>            <C>             <C>
Net loss                                       $  ( 443,433)    $  (762,539)  $ (1,533,522)   $ (1,047,306)
                                                ------------   -------------   ------------   -------------
                                                ------------   -------------   ------------   -------------
                                      
Weighted average common and common equivalent 
      shares outstanding                          6,456,108       4,995,571      6,446,240       4,722,713

Common shares, options and warrants granted 
(using the treasury stock method assuming an 
initial public offering price of $13.00) 
since March 16, 1995 included pursuant to 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rules                  -         275,009              -         275,009
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
Weighted average common and equivalent shares 
      outstanding                                 6,456,108       5,270,580       6,446,240      4,997,722
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
Net income (loss) per common and common 
       equivalent share                        $      (0.07)    $     (0.14)   $      (0.24)   $     (0.21)
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
                                               ------------    ------------    ------------    ------------
</TABLE>
PROMISORY NOTE


It  is hereby agreed on this the 27th day of June 2001, That Stanley K. Stilwell
(borrower)  repay  to  Sports Tack, Inc. (lender) the principle amount of $8,000
and  any  such  interest  as  accrues  until  fully  repaid.

It  is  further  agreed  that  the terms and conditions of this note shall be as
follows:

1.  The  borrower  will fully repay this note on or before the first anniversary
of  this  date.

2.  The  borrower  agrees to pay the lender interest at the rate of 12% per year
compounded annually until paid in full.  That if the full year is taken to repay
the  note  that  the  amount due to the lender on June 27th 2002 will be $8,900.

3.  It  is mutually agreed that the borrower can at any time repay the principal
and  accrued  interest  without  penalty.

4.  It  is  also mutually agreed that should the borrower default on any part of
this  note  that  borrower  will  bear all costs of collection including but not
limited  to  court  costs  and  legal  expenses.

5.  It  is  further  agreed  that  this  note can become due and payable in full
within  a  five-day  notice  upon  the  lenders  request.



/s/  Gary  E.  Johnson
------------------------
President  and  Director
Sports  Tack,  Inc.

/s/  Stanley  K.  Stilwell
--------------------------
Exhibit 35.1

                                                       IMPAC FUNDING CORPORATION
                                        19500 JAMBOREE ROAD | IRVINE, CA | 92612
                                         WWW.IMPACCOMPANIES.COM | 1-800-597-4101

                    ITEM 1123 ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

                            Impac Funding Corporation

                        Impac Secured Assets Corp, 2006-4

            I, Mario Fegan, a duly authorized officer of Impac Funding
      Corporation, as master servicer (the "Master Servicer") pursuant to the
      Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the "Agreement"), hereby certify that:

            1. A review of the Master Servicer's activities during the period
      from and including January 1, 2006 through and including December 31, 2006
      (the "Reporting Period") and of the Master Servicer's performance under
      the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

            2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master
      Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all
      material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

            IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this
      Certificate this 20th day of March 2007.


[LOGO] IMPAC(R)

                                                  By: /s/ Mario Fegan
                                                      --------------------------
                                                  Name: Mario Fegan
                                                  Title: V.P., Master Servicing
<PAGE>
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906  OF  THE  SARBANES-OXLEY  ACT  OF  2002

Pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act  of  2002,  I,  Barry  Bennett,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of
Advanced  ID  Corporation  (the  "Company"),  hereby  certify,  that  to  the
best of my knowledge, the Quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and  that  information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.

Date:  November  12,  2003

/s/Barry  I.  Bennett
----------------------------------------
Barry  I.  Bennett,  Chief  Executive  Officer


<PAGE>



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906  OF  THE  SARBANES-OXLEY  ACT  OF  2002

Pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act  of  2002,  I,  Todd  Noble,  Chief  Financial  Officer  of
Advanced  ID  Corporation  (the  "Company"),  hereby  certify,  that  to  the
best of my knowledge, the Quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and  that  information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.

Date:  November  12,  2003

/s/Todd  D.  Noble
----------------------------------------
Todd  D.  Noble,  Chief  Financial  Officer




<PAGE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Starks FINCHER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7177

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Starks Fincher, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Alan Lance Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Starks Fincher, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s .order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Fincher has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### IN RE: Gloria TYNDLE, Petitioner.

No. 17-1983

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Gloria Tyndle, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gloria Tyndle petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has' unduly delayed in ruling on her 28 U.S.C- § 2256 (2012) motion. She seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny the motion to expedite, and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne Shelby SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7065

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

Wayne Shelby Simmons, Appellant Pro Se. Karen Ledbetter Taylor, James L. Trump, Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

*288Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Wayne Shelby Simmons seeks to appeal the district court’s order denyiñg relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Simmons has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*