Filed 11/5/15 P. v. DeGuzman CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY DeGUZMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

B258908

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VA118241)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Thomas McKnew, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Sanger Swysen & Dunkle and Stephen K. Dunkle, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John 

Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________
Appellant Anthony DeGuzman appeals from the judgment entered following his 

jury convictions for multiple sexual offenses.1 The court sentenced appellant to prison

for 15 consecutive terms of 15 years to life (counts 1 – 15, respectively), with concurrent 

determinate terms on the remaining counts. We affirm.

ISSUES

Appellant claims (1) the trial court erroneously precluded him from crossexamining a witness as an expert and erroneously failed to give sua sponte a limiting 

instruction concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) 

testimony, (2) appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s 

failure to impeach witnesses, (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during jury 

argument, and (4) cumulative error violative of due process occurred.

DISCUSSION

1. The Court Did Not Erroneously Restrict Cross-Examination or Commit Instructional 

Error.

a. Pertinent Facts.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Rudy Acevedo, the detective assigned to 

the present case, testified for the People at trial as follows. Acevedo had been a sworn 

peace officer for about 24 years and a detective in the Special Victims Bureau (SVB) of 

the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department for about eight years. SVB investigated 

only cases of sexual assault and child abuse. Acevedo received special training to be an 

 

1

The jury convicted appellant on five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child 

(Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1) (subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code); 

counts 1, 4 , 7, 10 & 13), five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. 

(a)(4); counts 2, 5, 8, 11 & 14), five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, 

subd. (a)(5); counts 3, 6, 9, 12 & 15), two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); 

counts 16 & 19), two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); counts 17 & 

20), and two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1); counts 

18 & 21). There is no dispute as to the sufficiency of the evidence that appellant 

committed the present offenses; a detailed recitation of their facts is unnecessary to 

resolve this appeal. It is sufficient to state the evidence established appellant committed 

the offenses against R., his stepdaughter, in Los Angeles County beginning in about 2001 

when she was nine years old.
SVB detective. Acevedo had investigated, or had been involved in the investigation of, 

over 800 or 900 cases of child sexual assault.

During direct examination of Acevedo, the following occurred: “Now, in your 

personal experience investigating crimes of child sexual abuse and the experience you’ve 

gained in the Special Victims Bureau, how common is it for a child to disclose later in 

life?” The court overruled appellant’s foundation objection and observed, “[Acevedo] is 

qualified as a detective in the Special Victims Bureau and he has been so for at least 8 or 

more years. He can testify as to what he does in connection with that work.”

Acevedo testified as follows. It was very common for victims to disclose late. 

This was called “late reporting.” In more than half of Acevedo’s cases, victims reported 

after the fact, and it was usually “not an immediate disclosure.” The prosecutor asked 

Acevedo, “And in your experience when you’re investigating cases where there’s late 

reporting, do you talk to the victims about why they reported late?” Acevedo replied he 

usually did.

The prosecutor later asked Acevedo what reasons victims gave him for late 

reporting. Acevedo testified that many times victims felt ashamed, felt embarrassed, and 

had received threats, and that “there is a gamut of reasons why they don’t disclose.” 

Acevedo also testified that many times “we deal with younger victims” and “we try to 

tend to give them the cognitive abilities of an adult. We try to think that they think like 

an adult would think.” However, an eight-year-old and an adult think differently.

The following also occurred during direct examination: “Q So, in your 

experience, why would a victim who’s been molested for a long period of time feel 

shame or embarrassment about talking about it to adults, or reporting it I should say? [¶] 

The Court: In your experience.” The court overruled appellant’s hearsay objection, then

observed, “[Acevedo] has eight years. That’s over five years which is the presumptive 

time in a particular specialty in the Sheriff’s Department. . . . He can render his opinion 

with respect to what he has learned as to late reporting.”
Acevedo then testified, “sometimes when victims are . . . molested, . . . usually the 

person that’s doing the molesting is a close family member, like in this case, like a 

stepfather or a father.” Following an objection, the court indicated Acevedo was to 

answer “without relating it to this case.” The court then asked, “We’re talking about your 

experience with respect to why late reporting [occurs], particularly with younger alleged 

victims, and you have indicated because of being a close family member, that is a reason 

why a young person does not report. Is that correct?” (Sic.) Acevedo indicated yes and 

later stated, “That is one reason.”

The prosecutor subsequently asked Acevedo whether, in cases he had investigated 

involving late reporting, Acevedo had found “a commonality in the reasons” for late 

reporting. Acevedo said, “The commonality is that there is usually a link between the 

person that’s actually doing the abuse, person that’s either in a position of trust or of 

authority.” (Sic.) Acevedo also stated, “the child doesn’t want to abuse that trust or that 

authority. They feel that they are subservient to that person and they have to follow what 

they say.”

During cross-examination, appellant asked Acevedo whether he had followed 

“POST”

2

guidelines during the investigation. During later discussions outside the 

presence of the jury, appellant maintained the court repeatedly had vouched for Acevedo 

because of his 800 or 900 investigations; therefore, appellant should be allowed to crossexamine Acevedo concerning the guidelines. Appellant’s counsel indicated if Acevedo 

was “going to be declared an expert by the court,” appellant’s counsel should be allowed 

to cross-examine Acevedo as an expert, “including hypotheticals, but I’m not going to get 

into that.”

 

2

POST is an acronym for Peace Officer Standards and Training.
The court disagreed and stated “[Acevedo] is skilled as an officer in the [SVB]. 

He has that skill as part of his job. He would not qualify as an expert in anything other 

than what he is required as part of his job . . . .” The court indicated it had permitted 

appellant to ask about the guidelines. The court later stated, “This is a matter of his 

professional skills as a detective, not his skills as to the mental state, . . . or anything else. 

Only within his skill level, and you have been allowed to ask those questions, and you’re 

still asking those questions.”

The court denied it had said Acevedo qualified in court as an expert. The court 

indicated Acevedo was, however, a professional in his field and, as such, he could testify 

how he operated within his field. The court also indicated Acevedo was a detective doing 

his work as he understood it and, although appellant could cross-examine him on any 

deviation from guidelines, appellant could not pose hypothetical questions to Acevedo.

b. Analysis.

Appellant claims the trial court erroneously precluded him from cross-examining 

Acevedo on his expert CSAAS testimony and erroneously failed to give sua sponte a 

limiting instruction concerning CSAAS testimony. We reject the claim.

Detective Acevedo did not testify as an expert on CSAAS. He was not listed as an 

expert, nor was he qualified as one under Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a). 

His testimony did not provide the jury with recent findings of professional research on a 

victim’s reaction to child abuse. (Compare People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247;

People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393-394.) He was not qualified to testify, 

nor did he testify, as a mental health professional. He did not explicitly refer to CSAAS, 

nor did he refer to the characteristics of that syndrome.

Detective Acevedo’s testimony was not “limited to discussion of victims as a 

class.” (People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1100.) Rather, he testified 

concerning those child molestation victims who were the subject of investigations that he 
conducted or in which he had been involved.3

 His testimony on that issue was not 

“supported by references to literature.” (Ibid.) Further, appellant’s counsel denied to the 

trial court that he was going to pose hypothetical questions. We conclude the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by precluding appellant from cross-examining Detective 

Acevedo as a CSAAS expert. The subject matter of the predicate direct examination 

testimony of Detective Acevedo was not expert testimony about CSAAS.

Finally, appellant, citing People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 (Housley), 

argues the trial court erroneously failed to instruct sua sponte (using, e.g., CALCRIM 

No. 1193) that expert CSAAS testimony could not be used by the jury to determine if a 

molestation claim was true, but only to determine if the alleged victim’s conduct was not 

inconsistent with having been abused. We reject the claim.

Housley stated, “in all cases in which an expert is called to testify regarding 

CSAAS we hold the jury must sua sponte be instructed that (1) such evidence is 

admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by 

the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert’s 

testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s 

molestation claim is true.” (Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 959, italics added.)

However, it is not clear Housley is controlling. A number of appellate cases have 

concluded that the instruction appellant seeks is a limiting instruction that a court must 

give only upon the defendant’s request. (Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.) 

Moreover, as we have concluded that a CSAAS expert was not called to testify in this case 

and CSAAS testimony was not given, Housley is inapplicable. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion or violate appellant’s constitutional rights by restricting his crossexamination of Acevedo as discussed or by failing to give the limiting instruction.

 

3 Acevedo’s testimony relating what children told him was hearsay, the 

admissibility of which appellant does not challenge on appeal. He has thus forfeited the 

admissibility issue (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)), and even if he challenged on appeal the 

admissibility of the hearsay, any error in its admission into evidence would be harmless.
2. Appellant Was Not Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel.

a. Pertinent Facts.

Appellant is appealing following his conviction after a retrial; his first trial 

resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial. All testimony referred to below is from the first 

trial.4 Joseph DeGuzman (Joseph), R.’s brother, testified that about December 1, 2010, 

he overheard a telephone conversation between R. and his mother Z. During the 

conversation, R. looked at Joseph and said, “We have something to blackmail your dad.” 

R. testified that, at the preliminary hearing, she admitted making a statement to 

Joseph about blackmail. The following occurred between R. and appellant’s counsel at 

the first trial: “Q . . . does blackmail mean to you that you hold something over 

someone’s head, and if you they [sic] don’t give you something, then you . . . let the S hit 

the fan? [¶] A The truth be told, yes. [¶] Q So what were you hoping to get from your 

father? [¶] A Nothing. I just wanted the truth to be told.” R. did not remember exactly 

what she said to Joseph, denied saying “I know a way we can blackmail your dad,” and 

testified she “blurted something out like, ‘Well, I have a blackmail.’ ” (Sic.) R. denied 

she was on the phone with Z. or that R. talked to Z. about blackmail. Z. denied R.

mentioned blackmail to Z.

R. testified that on Father’s Day, June 20, 2010, when Z. and appellant were 

getting divorced, R. sent to appellant a message saying, “Happy Father’s Day again, 

[D]ad. Love you.” She also testified she posted on a blog, “It’s funny to watch them 

think they have all control when in reality all control is in my hands. Too bad they can’t 

get that through their head. They are about to get a taste of their own medicine.” R. did 

not know what that post concerned. Z. testified she sent to appellant a text message to 

the effect, “I decline your $10,000 and now I’m going to take everything that you have. I 

 

4

The testimony below is derived from transcripts attached to appellant’s motion for 

a new trial. There is no dispute the transcripts reflect testimony given at the first trial, 

that Joseph and Z. referred to in those transcripts are Joseph DeGuzman and Z.

DeGuzman, R.’s brother and mother, respectively, and that Joseph was also known as JC.
was trying to be nice; you just turned me into a bitch. From here on out, only call me 

when it’s pertaining to our kids. Otherwise, talk to my lawyer.”

Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 

counsel failed to impeach R. and Z. with their above testimony from the first trial. We 

reject the claim. Defense counsel made a sensible tactical decision in declining to 

introduce such evidence. The testimony was, at best, vague and, had the impeachment 

occurred, it would have provided both the victim and her mother with an opportunity to 

explain the damage caused by appellant’s abuse and the victim’s desire to have him be 

held to answer for his misconduct. While appellant asserts that this type of impeachment 

would have been useful, it was fraught with danger. Defense counsel’s decision not to 

roll the dice cannot be held constitutionally inadequate. Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim, therefore, fails and no violation of his constitutional 

rights occurred.

3. No Prejudicial Prosecutorial Misconduct Occurred.

During rebuttal jury argument, the prosecutor commented without objection, “A 

bailiff once told me, he goes, what a lot of defense attorneys like to do is throw up the 

fireworks while they pick your pocket. So you’re looking up at the fireworks and picking 

your pocket.”

Later, the prosecutor commented without objection, “And you’re also, you know, 

you’re writing the next chapter in the victim’s life. You are writing the next chapter in 

R.’s life. R., who deserves to have justice, who deserves to have closure, you are writing 

the chapter in her life where she gets the happy ending, where she gets to have closure, 

where she gets to say, you know, I went through a very painful process, I stood up for 

myself, and you heard her say that repeatedly on the stand that she was learning to stand 

up for herself. You are helping reward her for standing up for herself in a way that 

people did not in her life, and you are writing the next chapter in her life for that.”
Appellant claims the above two sets of comments constituted prosecutorial 

misconduct. The claim is unavailing. Appellant failed to object on the ground of

prosecutorial misconduct and request a jury admonition with respect to either set of 

comments, and a jury admonition would have cured any harm. Appellant waived the 

issue of whether the comments constituted misconduct. (Cf. People v. Gionis (1995) 

9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 471.)

Even if the misconduct issues were preserved for appellate review, no prejudicial 

prosecutorial misconduct occurred from these brief, isolated comments on the absence of 

a plausible defense. (Cf. People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1002-1003 [no 

prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor commented the job of defense 

counsel was to create straw men and put up smoke and red herrings]; People v. Medina 

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 759-760 [no prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct where 

prosecutor asked the jury to “do the right thing, to do justice, not for our society, 

necessarily or exclusively, but for [the 18-year-old victim employee].”].) No violation of 

appellant’s constitutional rights occurred.5

 

5 As there were no cognizable errors in appellant’s trial, we reject his claim that 

cumulative error violative of due process occurred.
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

JONES, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ALDRICH, J.

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.