alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### IN RE: William A. WHITE, Petitioner

No. 17-1722

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. May 25, 2017

(Opinion filed: June 13, 2017)

William A. White, Pro Se

United States Attorney Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Respondent

Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

OPINION *

PER CURIAM

Williams A. White petitions for a writ of mandamus. White, who is currently incarcerated, requests an order compelling the United States District Court for the East*799ern District of Pennsylvania to docket his motion to compel or, in the alternative, provide him with the case number and docket sheet for an “improperly not publicly reported, and, presumably sealed, criminal matter” [sic] involving Joshua Caleb Sutter.

It appears that Sutter was arrested and charged with firearm-related offenses in the Eastern District in February 2003. See United States v. Sutter, Crim. No. 2:03-mj-00137-1; 2:03-cr-00158-ER-1 (E.D. Pa.). White alleges that Sutter spent 22 months in prison and then became a “deep-cover informant for an unlawful FBI-JTTF counter-intelligence program,” where he engaged in numerous illegal activities and, notably, stole White’s identity, used White’s stolen identity to commit other unspecified crimes, threatened an unnamed witness who could testify to the identity theft, and conspired to murder White.

White alleges that he learned of Sutter’s previous arrest in the Eastern District in August 2016, and wrote to the Clerk of Court requesting a copy of the docket and record. White did not include a case number in his initial letter, and the District Court did not respond. He filed a motion to compel in December 2016 which merely included one reference to the proceedings before the magistrate judge. After the District Court did not respond or docket his motion to compel, he petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, In re Pasquariello, 16 F.3d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1994), and-is appropriate only when a petitioner shows that he has (1) no other adequate means of obtaining the desired relief and (2) a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976)).

White does not meet this standard. The docket listing that White apparently seeks is available at United States v. Sutter, 2:03-cr-00158-ER-1 (E.D. Pa.). White did not reference this number in any of his previous requests. White may request copies from the record by contacting the Clerk’s Office and paying the appropriate fee. As White has adequate means to obtain what he seeks, the petition for mandamus is denied.

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dorian Shareef FOWLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50462

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

NOVEMBER 17, 2017

Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Michael Emerson Lasater, Esquire, U.S., Colin M. McDonald, Assistant U.S., Anne Kristina Perry, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dorian Shareef Fowler, Memphis, TN, pro se.

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dorian Shareef Fowler appeals pro se from the district eodrt’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a section 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion, *see United States v. Dunn,*728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

Fowler contends that in denying his section 3582(c)(2) motion, the district court placed too much weight on his criminal history and failed to consider the purpose of Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. After finding that Fowler was eligible for a reduction under Amendment 782, the district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in analyzing whether a reduction was warranted. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). The district court then' concluded that the original 180-month sentence, which was a 30-month variance below the then-applicable guideline range, “fully accounted for [Fowler’s] equities, and no new circumstances have been presented to alter that conclusion.” Considering the section 3553(a) factors and the totality of. the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fowler’s motion. *See Dunn,*728 F.3d at 1159-60; *see also United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez,*587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various [section 3553(a)] factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 pjjjg disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Angel Alberto PRIETO-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11623 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Angel Alberto Prieto-Garcia, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Angel Alberto Prieto-Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Prieto-Garcia has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marcelous Jacolbi TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20346 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 18, 2017

Anna Elizabeth Kalluri, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marcelous Jacolbi Tucker, Pro Se

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Marcelous Jacolbi Tucker appeals the 24-month prison sentence that he received upon the revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, arguing that the district court *359impermissibly based it on the need to provide just punishment for the offense.

Because Tucker did not object that the district court relied on an improper factor, our review of the procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence is for plain error only. *See United States v. Whitelaw,*580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). In announcing the revocation sentence, the district court mentioned the need to punish Tucker among the factors it considered. A court may not rely on the need for a revocation sentence to provide just punishment for the offense. *United States v. Miller,*634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011). However, to the extent that the court relied in part on an improper factor, *cf. United States v. Rivera,*797 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2015), it was not the dominant factor, *see United States v. Walker,*742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2014). The other, permissible factors that the court considered, including the sentencing worksheet, the guidelines policy statements, and the need for incapacitation and deterrence, would have supported the revocation sentence. *See id.*at 617. Accordingly, the court committed no clear or obvious error. *See id.*at 616.

As for Tucker’s argument that the revocation sentence was substantively unreasonable, he has not overcome the presumption that his prison term, which was recommended by the guidelines policy statements, is reasonable. *See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez,*526 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court considered several factors in choosing an appropriate revocation sentence and did not give significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor. *See United States v. Warren,*720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# EUR-Lex - 32002R1333 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002R1333

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1333/2002 of 23 July 2002 derogating from Regulation (EC) No 2535/2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards the import of milk and milk products and opening tariff quotas **

*
Official Journal L 195 , 24/07/2002 P. 0015 - 0015 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1333/2002

of 23 July 2002

derogating from Regulation (EC) No 2535/2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 as regards the import of milk and milk products and opening tariff quotas

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 509/2002(2), and in particular Article 26(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The Lithuanian authorities have informed the Commission of the introduction of additional veterinary checks to ensure that the skimmed-milk powder for export to the Community under quota No 09.4554 as provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 2766/2000 of 14 December 2000 establishing certain concessions in the form of Community tariff quotas for certain agricultural products and providing for an adjustment, as an autonomous and transitional measure, of certain agricultural concessions provided for in the Europe Agreement with Lithuania(3) complies with the conditions laid down in Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products(4), and Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products(5). In view of the difficulties that this causes for importers holding licences whose validity expires on or before 30 June 2002, the validity of those licences should be extended.

(2) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Notwithstanding Article 16(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2535/2001(6), the term of validity of the import licences issued during the first six months of 2002 for imports of products covered by quota No 09.4554, listed in Annex I(B)(9) to that Regulation, shall expire on 30 September 2002.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 23 July 2002.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 48.

(2) OJ L 79, 22.3.2002, p. 15.

(3) OJ L 321, 19.12.2000, p. 8.

(4) OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 1.

(5) OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 10.

(6) OJ L 341, 22.12.2001, p. 29.
II

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 94

[Report No. 104–354]

To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to prohibit the consideration

of retroactive tax increases.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. SMITH, Mr. LOTT, Mr.

KEMPTHORNE, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. WARNER, Mr. COCHRAN, and Mr.

INHOFE) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

jointly pursuant to the order of August 4, 1977, to the Committees on

the Budget and Governmental Affairs, with instructions that if one committee reports, the other committee have thirty days to report or be discharged

AUGUST 27, 1996

Reported under authority of the order of the Senate of August 2, 1996 by

Mr. STEVENS, with amendments

[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to prohibit

the consideration of retroactive tax increases.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 94 RS

1 SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDG2 ET ACT OF 1974.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title III of the Congressional

4 Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the

5 following:

6 ‘‘PROHIBITION ON THE CONSIDERATION OF RETROACTIVE

7 TAX INCREASES

8 ‘‘SEC. 314. (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall not be in order

9 in the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider

10 any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or con11 ference report, that increases a tax and applies such in12 crease to taxable years beginning before the date of the

13 enactment of the law before a date contemporaneous with

14 congressional action specifying such date.

15 ‘‘(b) INCREASES A TAX.—The term ‘increases a tax’

16 shall include a change in any rate of tax, deduction, ex17 emption, credit, exclusion, or similar change to the Inter18 nal Revenue Code of 1986 that will result in an obligation

19 to pay a larger tax.’’.

20 (b) SUPERMAJORITY POINT OF ORDER.—Subsections

21 (c) and (d) of section 904 of the Congressional Budget

22 Act of 1974 are amended by inserting ‘‘314,’’ after

23 ‘‘313,’’.

24 (c) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The

25 table of contents for the Congressional Budget and Im-
3

•S 94 RS

1 poundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting

2 after the item relating to section 313 the following:

‘‘Sec. 314. Prohibition on the consideration of retroactive tax increases.’’.

3 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments to the Con4 gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

5 made by subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall be effective on

6 January 1, 1997.

Æ
Filed 7/11/18 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2018 ND 160

In the Interest of N.F.F., a child

Danielle Tinquist, L.S.W., Cass County

Social Services, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

N.F.F., a child, M.F., father, and

Lisa Borseth, Guardian ad LitemRespondents

           and

H.T., mother,                                                                      Respondent and Appellant

No. 20180219

In the Interest of N.F.F., a child

Danielle Tinquist, L.S.W., Cass County

Social Services, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

N.F.F., a child, M.F., father, and

Lisa Borseth, Guardian ad LitemRespondents

           and

H.T., mother,                                                                      Respondent and Appellant

No. 20180220

In the Interest of N.C.T., a child

Danielle Tinquist, L.S.W., Cass County

Social Services, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

N.C.T., a child, M.F., father, and

Lisa Borseth, Guardian ad LitemRespondents

           and

H.T., mother,                                                                     Respondent and Appellant

No. 20180221

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Scott A. Griffeth, Judicial Referee.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Constance L. Cleveland, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for petitioner and appellee; submitted on brief.

Daniel E. Gast, Fargo, ND, for respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.

Interest of N.F.F., N.F.F. and N.C.T.

Nos. 20180219, 20180220 & 20180221

Per Curiam.

[¶1]H.T. appealed from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to N.F.F., N.F.F., and N.C.T. The juvenile court found the children are deprived, the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue, the children are suffering or will probably suffer serious harm in the future, and that reasonable efforts were made to keep the family together. On appeal, the mother argues there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a termination of her parental rights. We conclude the juvenile court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are not clearly erroneous. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Jerod E. Tufte

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jon J. Jensen
1

Filed 12/7/21 P. v. Banks CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication 

or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered 

published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBBIE BANKS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C093571

(Super. Ct. No. 98F10219 )

In 2001, a jury found defendant Robbie Banks guilty of second degree murder and 

found true she personally used a knife and had a prior serious felony. On June 1, 2001, the 

trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years to life for the murder, one year for the weapon 

enhancement, and five years for the prior serious felony, for a total term of 30 years to life plus 

six years.

On March 6, 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 

1170.95, alleging she is eligible for resentencing because she was not the actual killer. After 

briefing by the parties, the trial court denied the petition finding the “jury was not instructed on 

either felony-murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice 

liability.”

DISCUSSION

Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts and procedural history 

of the case and requests this court review the record and determine whether there are any 
2

arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised 

by counsel of her right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the opening 

brief was filed. More than 30 days have elapsed, and defendant has not filed a supplemental 

brief.

Whether the protections afforded by Wende and the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493] apply to an appeal from 

an order denying a postconviction petition is an open question. Our Supreme Court has not 

spoken on that issue, although the issue is currently pending before it. (People v. Delgadillo, 

review granted Feb. 17, 2021, S266305.) In Figueras, we described the Anders/Wende

procedure we believed applicable to appeals from postconviction petitions: “ ‘[C]ounsel 

appointed in such appeals is required to independently review the entire record and, if counsel 

so finds, file a brief advising the appellate court that there are “no arguable issues to raise on 

appeal”; [counsel must inform] the defendant [that he or she] has a right to file a supplemental 

brief [within 30 days of the filing of counsel’s brief]; and this court has the duty to address any 

issues raised by the defendant but otherwise may dismiss the appeal without conducting an 

independent review of the record.’ ” (People v. Figueras (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 108, 112-113, 

review granted May 12, 2021, S267870.) 

We consider defendant’s appeal abandoned and order the appeal dismissed.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Raye, P. J.

/s/ 

Hull, J.
Exhibit 21.1


LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES


Triangle Mezzanine Fund LLLP, a North Carolina limited liability limited partnership


Triangle Mezzanine Fund II LP, a Delaware limited partnership


Triangle Mezzanine Fund III LP, a Delaware limited partnership


New Triangle GP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company


New Triangle GP, LLC, a North Carolina limited liability company.


ARC Industries Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation


Brantley Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation


Emerald Waste Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation


Energy Hardware Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation


Minco Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation


Peaden Holdings, Inc. a Delaware corporation


Technology Crops Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Served: May 13, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, DC

------------------------------------------------------------

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC.

-----------------------------------------------------------

NOTICE OF REGISTRATION OF TRADE NAME

On May 12, 2011, SkyWest Airlines Inc. (“SkyWest”), a U.S. certificated air carrier,1 requested that the 

Department register the trade name “AlaskaSkywest” for use in certain air transportation operations. 

Part 215 (14 CFR Part 215) of the Department’s regulations provides that any air carrier wishing to use 

an alternative trade name must first register that name with the Department. The rule further states that 

the Department may register such name after the air carrier gives notification to similarly named air 

carriers of the proposed use of the name. In this case, SkyWest states that Alaska Airlines, Inc. 

(“Alaska”), a U.S. certificated air carrier,2 consents to the registration of the trade name.

We note that SkyWest states that Alaska will make all required disclosures of the identity of the 

operating air carrier and trade name in accordance with the provisions of Part 257 of the Department’s 

regulations (14 CFR Part 257). In addition, SkyWest states that the aircraft to be used to operate service 

on behalf of Alaska will clearly indicate that SkyWest is the operating carrier. 

Since SkyWest has complied with the requirements of Part 215, we acknowledge the registration of the 

trade name “AlaskaSkywest” for immediate use in its operations.

Dated at Washington, D.C., May 13, 2011.

TODD M. HOMAN

Director

Office of Aviation Analysis

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.regulations.gov

 

1 SkyWest’s interstate certificate was last reissued by Order 98-7-6, on July 8, 1998.

2 Alaska’s interstate certificate was last reissued by Order 98-7-6, on July 8, 1998.
Attachment A 

SERVICE LIST FOR SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC.

 MR GERALD MURPHY

 COUNSEL FOR SKYWEST AIRLINES INC 

 CROWELL AND MORING LLP

 1001 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW

 WASHINGTON DC 20004 

MR BERNARD STANKUS RTS-42

OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMATION

DOT/RSPA/BTS E-36

1200 NEW JERSEY AVE SE

WASHINGTON DC 20590

MR DANIEL NYE

SENIOR ATTORNEY

ALASKA AIRLINES INC

19300 INTERNATIONAL BLVD 

SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98198

MR WILLIAM J WEBER

CERTIFICATION MANAGER

FAA AFS-900

45005 AVIATION DRIVE SUITE 131

DULLES VA 20166

 MR TODD EMERSON

 SKYWEST AIRLINES INC

 444 SOUTH RIVER ROAD

 ST GEORGE UTAH 84790

 

MR PETER LYNCH 

ASST CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ENFORCEMENT 

FAA/AGC-300

800 INDEPENDENCE AVE SW

WASHINGTON DC 20591

 

 MS ANNE SUISSA

 OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMATION

 DOT/RSPA/BTS E-36

 1200 NEW JERSEY AVE SE

 WASHINGTON DC 20590