alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BULLARD *v.*CULPEPPER, ordinary, *et al.*

No. 13420.

September 24, 1940.

Rehearing denied October 15, 1940.

*849
      *Edward T. Hughes,*for plaintiff.

*Robert Culpepper Jr., E. M. Davis,*and *F. S. Twitty,*for defendants.

Grice, Justice.

Error is assigned on the order dismissing the petition on general demurrer. As it then stood, the ease was one solely against Palmer and Crow, chairman and secretary, respectively, of the Democratic Executive Committee of Mitchell County, “and the Democratic Executive Committee of said county.” The petition sets out in detail violations of the election law contained in the Code, §§ 34-1902, 34-2002, and a complete disregard of the same in so far as a primary election held in Mitchell County on February 21 was concerned. The applicable statute, found in the Code as just indicated, imposes no legal duty on the committee calling the primary election, nor any officer or member thereof. This court has often declared that elections belong to the political branch of the government, and that courts of equity will not interfere to protect a *purely*political right. See *Avery*v. *Hale,*167 *Ga.*252 (145 S. E. 76), and the authorities there cited and reviewed. The plaintiff relies on *Moon*v. *Seymour,*182 *Ga.*702 (186 S. E. 744), and particularly the language in the first headnote to the effect that the law declared in the Code, § 34-1902, is mandatory, and that a complete disregard of that statute by the county authorities renders void and illegal an election. That decision, however, did not deal with a purely political right, but the case was made by equitable petition seeking to declare void *850an election at which the question of the imposition of a tax was submitted to the voters. The distinction between that case and the one at bar is obvious. There are two rules, one of which is applicable when only a purely political right is involved; the other, where one’s property or person is imperiled. This was pointed out in *Ogburn*v. Elmore, 121*Ga. 72*(48 S. E. 702), as follows: “Elections by the people, either for the choice of public officers, or for the determination of other matters submitted to the popular vote, being the éxercise of the political power, the general rule is that a court of equity will not interfere in any matter concerning the same. However, if under the guise of an election which is really unauthorized by law, the property or person of the citizen is imperiled, equity will interfere.” This difference was also recognized in *Coleman*v. *Board of*Education, 131 *Ga.*643 (63 S. E. 41) (5). The judge did not err in dismissing the petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### Patrick CHRISTIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1198

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 30, 2017

Decided: June 8, 2017

Patrick O. Christian, Appellant Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Patrick O. Christian appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his complaint filed pursuant to *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,*403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Christian v. Attorney Gen.,*No. 3:16-cv-00609-HEH, 2017 WL 694981 (E.D. *733Va. Feb. 9, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Karen M. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALGREENS ARIZONA DRUG COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16189

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Karen M. Baker, Pro Se

James K. Mackie, Attorney, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC, Tucson, AZ, Christopher M. Pastore, Esquire, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart PC, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Karen M. Baker appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s discovery rulings. *Hallett v. Morgan,*296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Baker’s discovery motions because Baker did not comply with the district court’s scheduling order and did not show that denial of her motions resulted in actual and substantial prejudice. *See In re Arizona,*528 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to comply with the scheduling order exposes a party to ‘any just orders,’ as determined by the district judge, including dismissal.”); *Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,*342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court’s decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed unless there is a clear showing that the denial “results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (internal citation omitted)).

Baker waived any arguments regarding the “Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action” because she did not raise this issue before the district court. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Baker does not challenge the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in her opening brief and has therefore waived any objection to the district court’s summary judgment on appeal. *See Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co.,*328 F.3d 1145, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 32.2



              Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly  report on Form 10-Q for the three month period
ended   September  30,  2005  (this   "report"),   of  SPAR  Group,   Inc.  (the
"registrant"), the undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:

1. The report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2. The  information  contained in the report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.

                                        /s/ Charles Cimitile
                                        --------------------------------------
                                        Charles Cimitile
                                        Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and
                                        Secretary
                                        November 14, 2005


A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to SPAR Group,  Inc.  and will be  retained  by SPAR Group,  Inc.,  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.






                                      Ex-4
#### JAMES RIVER EQUIPMENT, VIRGINIA, LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUSTICE ENERGY COMPANY INC., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-2012

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 19, 2017

Decided: July 11, 2017

Richard L. Gottlieb, Ramonda C. Lyons, LEWIS, GLASSER, CASEY & ROLLINS, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Jason S. Hammond, BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Justice Energy Company Inc. (“Justice Energy”), appeals the district court’s order imposing contempt fines and its subsequent order denying Justice Energy’s motion to alter or amend. Justice Energy contends that the nature of the contempt is criminal rather than civil. We conclude that the contempt is civil. The district court plainly designed the imposition of *740the per diem fine to coerce Justice Energy’s compliance with the district court’s discovery order, a purpose consistent with one of the primary aims of civil contempt. *See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,*512 U.S. 821, 827-29, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 (L.Ed.2d 642 1994).

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because the contempt here is civil in nature, we lack jurisdiction to consider this interlocutory appeal. *See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, United Mineworkers of Am.,*683 F.2d 827, 830 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1982) (“A civil contempt proceeding is in effect a continuance of the main action and therefore a party to a suit may not review' upon appeal an order fining or imprisoning him for civil contempt except in connection with appeal from a final judgment of the main claim.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned executive officer of Jacksonville Bancorp, Inc., (the
Registrant) hereby certifies that the Registrants Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained therein
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Registrant.



| | /s/ Jerry M. Chancellor
Name: Jerry M. Chancellor
Title: President and Chief Executive Officer
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 24, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 35

ITEM 1123 CERTIFICATION

I, David J. Kolibachuk, Vice President of U.S. Bank National
Association (the Servicer), hereby certify that:

(1) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the fiscal year covered by
this annual report on Form 10-K and of the performance of the Servicer under the Standard Terms for Trust Agreement, dated as of November 9, 2006, between the Servicer and the depositor (the Agreement) has been made under my
supervision;

and

(2) To the best
of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period, or, if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any material
respect, I have specified below each such failure known to me and the nature and status thereof.



|                       
|-----------------------
|Date: March 31, 2011   
|                       
|/s/ David J. Kolibachuk
|David J. Kolibachuk    
|Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,842,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,405,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (134,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,595,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,940,000
<PP&E>                                     131,714,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            (44,817,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             112,082,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       19,679,000
<BONDS>                                     43,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                (14,867,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               112,082,000
<SALES>                                     93,383,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            93,383,000
<CGS>                                       35,039,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               90,064,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           7,528,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,297,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,297,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,297,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .74
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .74
        

</TABLE>
#### George DONIVAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 74-3802.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 9, 1975.

*435George Donivan, pro se.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, La., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph B. Tosterud, Asst. Dist. Atty., New Orleans, La., for respondent-appellee.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion November 7, 1974, 5 Cir., 1974, 503 F.2d 1401).

Before WISDOM, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

The state asks that we reconsider our earlier decision to apply Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974), retroactively. We adhere to our decision, believing that the factors supporting retroactivity weigh heavier in the balance.

 Of the three considerations pertinent to the retroactivity issue,1 only the third strongly favors the state. There will be administrative difficulties, as there are with any rule applied retroactively. We do not underestimate the impact on state resources; however, the crux of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wingo v. Wedding is concern for the integrity of the fact-finding process.2 The first fact finding may influence heavily, if not dictate, the outcome of the case. Although the question is one of the *degree*of enhancement, “. rules designed to enhance the reliability of determinations of guilt or innocence are usually applied retroactively.” Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 208-209 (5th Cir. 1974).

Nor was there much ground pre- *Wingo*for reliance on the practice of allowing magistrates to hold initial evidentiary hearings. *Wingo*is no more than a reaffirmance of Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 85 L.Ed. 1392 (1941), a recognition that it survived enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act. The Court found that the text and the history of the Act indicate a desire to *retain*the *Holiday*requirement that judges are to hold the evidentiary hearings. Given the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Act — based in material part on the public record — any profound reliance was fatuous.

Particularly swayed by the purpose to be served by *Wingo*— proper finding of facts crucial to the truth — we deny the motion for rehearing. No member of *436this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing en banc is denied. Motion to stay pending application for writ of certiorari is granted.

1

. “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). See also, Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 208-210 (5 Cir. 1974).

2

. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 41 L.Ed.2d 879, 888-889 (1974).
#### IN RE: Robert Franklin VAN ZANDT, Debtor. Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Parisi; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15526

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 27, 2017

Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro, Pro Se

Lynn Searle, Attorney, Law Offices of Lynn Searle, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee William Parisi

Russell Dale Stanaland, Attorney, Sta-naland & Associates, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Edith Mazzaferri

Malcolm Leader-Picone, Barltett, Leader-picone *&*Young, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Lynn Searle, William Shea, Russell Dale Stanaland, Man-sueto Anthony Lenci

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2), Accordingly, appellant's request for oral argument, set forth in his motion to consolidate, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order entering a pre-filing order against Mazzaferro and the district court’s order denying Mazzafaerro’s motion to vacate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standard of review applied by the district court. *In re AFI Holding, Inc.,*525 F.3d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

We lack jurisdiction over the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order because Mazzaferro filed his notice of appeal more than thirty days after entry of the order. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 6(b). Mazzaferro’s untimely motion to vacate filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) did not extend the appeal period. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), 6(b)(1) (notice of appeal from district court decision must be filed within 30 days; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) does not apply in appeals governed by Fed. R. App. P. 6); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 (motion for rehearing must be filed within 14 days to toll appeal period); *see also Theodore v. Daglas (In re D.W.G.K Restaurants, Inc.),*42 F.3d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing bankruptcy appeal be*545cause untimely motion for rehearing did not extend period to appeal district court’s final order).

Though the notice of appeal was timely as to the district court’s order denying Mazzaferro’s motion to vacate, Mazzaferro does not address the order in his opening brief. As a result, he has waived any challenges to the order. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”).

Mazzaferro’s motion to consolidate (Docket Entry No. 28) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**General Industry Comparator Group**

** **

A. O. Smith Corporation

ACCO Brands

Acuity Brands Inc.

Acxiom Corporation

ADESA, Inc.

AGL Resources Inc.

Alliance Data Systems

Alliant Energy Corporation

American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc.

American Greetings Corporation

Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

Barnes Group Inc.

Black Hills Corporation

Boise Inc

Brady Corporation

Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.

Brown-Forman Corporation

Brunswick Corporation

Career Education Corporation

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company

Chiquita Brands International, Inc.

Cleco Corporation

Constellation Brands, Inc.

Convergys Corporation

Covanta Holding Corporation

Crane Co.

Curtiss-Wright Corporation

Cytec Industries, Inc.

Deluxe Corporation

Donaldson Company, Inc.

EnergySolutions, Inc.

Ensco plc

Equifax Inc.

Exide Technologies

Ferrellgas Partners, L.P.

Ferro Corporation

FMC Corporation

Gardner Denver, Inc.

GATX Corporation

GenOn Energy

Georgia Gulf Corporation

Global Crossing Ltd.

Global Payments Inc.

H&R Block, Inc.

H. B. Fuller Company

Herman Miller, Inc.

Hubbell Incorporated

IDEX Corporation

IHS Group

Imation Corp.

Iron Mountain, Inc.

Joy Global Inc.

Kaman Corporation

Leggett & Platt lnc.

Lennox International Inc.

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.

McCormick & Company, Inc.

Mead Johnson Nutrition Company

Meritor, Inc.

Molson Coors Brewing Company

MoneyGram International, Inc.

Moody’s Corporation

Mueller Water Products

Nordson Corporation

OGE Energy Corp.

Olin Corporation

Packaging Corporation of America

Paychex, Inc.

Pentair, Inc.

Pioneer Natural Resources Company

PolyOne Corporation

Portland General Electric Company

Quad Graphics, Inc.

Questar Corporation

Rayonier Inc.

Revlon Inc.

Robert Half International Inc.

Sauer-Danfoss Inc.

Snap-on Incorporated

Solutia Inc.

Steelcase Inc.

Supermedia LLC

Teledyne Technologies Incorporated

Temple-Inland Inc.

The Babcock & Wilcox Company

The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation

The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company

Thomas & Betts Corporation

Total System Services, Inc.

Tower International

TransAlta Corporation

Trinity Industries, Inc.

Tupperware Corporation

USG Corporation

Valmont Industries, Inc.

Verisk Analytics

Vulcan Materials Company

Waters Corporation

WGL Holdings Inc

Woodward Governor Company

Wyndham Worldwide Corporation

 

----
Amendment to employment contract for Executive VP



 


Exhibit 10.54


April 4, 2002


Mr. Dennis Trausch

Sport Chalet, Inc.

920 Foothill Blvd.

La Canada, California 91011


Dear Dennis:


This letter will serve as an amendment to your current employment contract
dated October 1, 1999.


The Agreement is hereby amended as follows:



	Paragraph 2.1 (i)	  	 “necessary or advisable to manage and conduct the
business of Employer as it relates to store selection and
store leasing, including facilities management.”
	 
	Paragraph 3.1	  	Compensation: As compensation for the services to be
performed hereunder, Executive shall receive a salary in
the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars
($155,000) per annum. Payable in bi-weekly equal
installments effective April 29, 2002.



Please retain this letter in your files with your employment contract.



	 	 	 
	/s/ CRAIG LEVRA



Craig Levra

Chairman and CEO	 	
/s/ DENNIS TRAUSCH



Dennis Trausch

Executive Vice President
	 
	4/15/02



Date	 	
4/15/02



Date



Note: The change in salary does not impact any other benefits currently
provided for in the current employment contract.


E-5