- 103 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103



### S tate of 

### N ebraska 

### , appellee 

### , v



### . T

yler 

### A

. L i n tz 

### , appella n t



### . ___ N.W.2d ___

Filed October 27, 2017. No. S-16-1158.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. As a general rule, a trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. 2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by the parties. 3. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. 4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), an order is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. 5. Speedy Trial. Addressing a claimed denial of statutory speedy trial rights in a motion for discharge involves a relatively simple mathemati

cal computation of whether the 6-month speedy trial clock, as extended by statutorily excludable periods, has expired prior to the commence

ment of trial. 6. ____. When ruling on a motion for absolute discharge pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), the trial court shall make specific findings of each period of delay excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) to (e) (Reissue 2016), in addition to the find

ings under § 29-1207(4)(f). Such findings shall include the date and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings which initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number of days composing Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 11/17/2017 01:11 AM CST- 104 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103

each excludable period; and the number of days remaining in which the defendant may be brought to trial after taking into consideration all excludable periods.


### Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, R a n dall 

### L

. L ippstreu 

### , Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for Scotts Bluff County, J ames 

### M . W orde n 

### , Judge. Judgment of District Court reversed, and cause remanded with directions.
Darin J. Knepper, Scotts Bluff County Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Joe Meyer for appellee.

H eavi c a n 

### , C.J., W right 

### , M iller



### - L erma n 

### , C assel 

### , S ta c y 

### , K el c h 

### , and F u n ke 

### , JJ.

K el c h 

### , J. INTRODUCTION Tyler A. Lintz appeals the order of the district court for Scotts Bluff County that affirmed the county court’s order denying his motion for absolute discharge. Lintz claims a violation of his statutory right to speedy trial. We reverse the district court’s order and remand the cause to that court with directions to remand the matter to the county court with direc

tions to enter an order that incorporates specific findings pur

suant to our directive in State v. Williams , 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009).

BACKGROUND Lintz was arrested on suspicion of domestic assault on February 5, 2016. On February 8, the State charged Lintz by complaint with third degree domestic assault, a Class I misde

meanor. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323 (Reissue 2016). Lintz requested a jury trial. The county court scheduled the jury trial for August 9, 2016, with jury selection to begin 2 weeks earlier on July- 105 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103


### 26. Lintz failed to appear for the scheduled jury selection, and the county court ordered a bench warrant. The State amended the complaint to add a misdemeanor charge of fail

ure to appear. Lintz turned himself in on July 28, 2016, and that same day waived his right to a jury trial. The county court scheduled a bench trial for September 22. On August 11, 2016, Lintz filed a motion for absolute dis

charge, alleging his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The county court held a hear

ing on August 16. In a subsequent written order, it considered “[w]hether [Lintz’] right to speedy trial was violated when the court set the case for trial beyond the six month requirement even though [Lintz] failed to appear for jury selection before the six month requirement had expired.” (Emphasis in origi

nal.) The county court reasoned that jury selection is a condi

tion precedent to a jury trial and found that by failing to appear for jury selection, Lintz caused a delay in his trial. The county court further stated: Once a defendant has caused a delay due to a fail

ure to appear for court, the time between the defend

ant’s absence and the next reasonably available trial date is excluded. Neb.Rev.Stat. [§] 29-1207(4)(d) [(Reissue 2016)]. The trial was rescheduled within 60 days. A trial date scheduled within six months of the defendant’s reap

pearance is presumed to be the next reasonably available trial date. The county court denied Lintz’ motion and ordered the case to be tried on September 22, as previously scheduled. Lintz appealed to the district court, asserting only his statu

tory right to a speedy trial. Based on reasoning similar to the county court’s, the district court affirmed. Lintz now appeals to this court.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Lintz assigns as error the denial of his motion for abso

lute discharge.- 106 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103



### STANDARD OF REVIEW [1] As a general rule, a trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Hettle , 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (2014).

ANALYSIS [2-4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by the parties. State v. McColery , 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017). For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. Id. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016), an order is final for pur

poses of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) deter

mines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. State v. McColery,
supra. And we have determined that a ruling on a motion for absolute discharge based upon an accused criminal’s nonfriv

olous claim that his or her speedy trial rights were violated is a ruling affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding and is therefore final and appealable. See State v. Gibbs , 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997). Here, the county court’s order denying Lintz’ motion for absolute dis

charge was final and appealable. However, a final, appeal

able order is not the only prerequisite for meaningful appel

late review. [5,6] Addressing a claimed denial of statutory speedy trial rights in a motion for discharge involves a relatively simple mathematical computation of whether the 6-month speedy trial clock, as extended by statutorily excludable periods, has expired prior to the commencement of trial. See State v. Williams , 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009). But in- 107 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103


### ruling on a motion to discharge, this court unequivocally requires specific findings regarding the statutorily exclud

able periods: Effective March 9, 2009, when ruling on a motion for absolute discharge pursuant to [Neb. Rev. Stat.] § 29-1208 [(Reissue 2016)], the trial court shall make specific findings of each period of delay excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a) to (e), in addition to the findings under § 29-1207(4)(f) . . . . Such findings shall include the date and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings which initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number of days composing each excludable period; and the number of days remaining in which the defendant may be brought to trial after taking into con

sideration all excludable periods. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Williams , 277 Neb. at 143-44, 761 N.W.2d at 524. Therefore, the county court, as part of its ruling on Lintz’ motion for absolute discharge, was required to set forth the above calculation as part of its findings in applying Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(d) (Reissue 2016), but it did not. We require this calculation of any excludable days pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(d) to facilitate appellate review. See State v. Williams, supra . A trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a fac

tual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See State v. Hettle , 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (2014). But we cannot review whether the trial court’s determination of the facts is erroneous unless such factual determination is complete. Certainly, we appreciate the county court’s issuing a written order, but without a computation as required by State v. Williams, supra , we cannot conduct a proper review. Accordingly, the county court’s order must be remanded with directions to add the required computa

tion. See Rutherford v. Rutherford , 277 Neb. 301, 761 N.W.2d 922 (2009) (remanding for failure to include child support- 108 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S heets 298 N ebraska R eports
STATE v . LINTZ
Cite as 298 Neb. 103


### worksheet which was required by our rules and which would have facilitated meaningful review). Then, the parties may file new appeals from the corrected order. And henceforth, if a trial court fails to include the computation as required by State v. Williams, supra , in its order on a motion for absolute discharge, the appeal will be summarily remanded to the trial court so that it can prepare the required computation.

CONCLUSION We reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause to the district court with directions to further remand the matter to the county court with directions to enter specific findings pursuant to our directive in State v. Williams, supra

. R eversed a n d rema n ded w ith dire c tio n s



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