NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

DA & AR HOSPICE CARE, INC., 

 Debtor.

BAP No. CC-22-1128-FLC

Bk. No. 2:21-bk-19219-ER

MICHAEL EUGENE REZNICK,

 Appellant, 

v.

UST- UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, LOS 

ANGELES; YVETTE HARGROVEBROWN; DA & AR HOSPICE CARE, 

INC., 

Appellees.

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California 

Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: FARIS, LAFFERTY, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Attorney Michael Eugene Reznick filed a chapter 111 petition on 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal 

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

FILED

OCT 20 2023

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

behalf of DA & AR Hospice Care, Inc. (the “Hospice”). The bankruptcy 

court found that Mr. Reznick was not retained by the Hospice, did not have 

authority to act on behalf of the Hospice, and knew that he had no basis to 

file the petition. It referred him to a disciplinary panel for fraud on the 

court and violation of Rule 9011. Mr. Reznick appeals, maintaining that the

Hospice’s medical director authorized him to initiate the bankruptcy case.

All of Mr. Reznick’s arguments are meritless, and many of them have 

nothing to do with the matter on appeal. We AFFIRM.

FACTS2

A. Prepetition events

The bankruptcy petition was preceded by a murky dispute over 

ownership and control of the Hospice and its affiliated businesses.

Ailene Rivera was an officer and sat on the boards of directors of the 

Hospice and its affiliated company, NobleQuest Health Foundation, Inc. 

(“NobleQuest”). Mr. Reznick was NobleQuest’s attorney. In September

2021, on Mr. Reznick’s recommendation, Ms. Rivera was placed on 

administrative leave and referred to a special litigation committee for 

investigation into allegations of wrongdoing.

In October 2021, the Hospice and others (represented by Mr. Reznick) 

sued Ms. Rivera for fraud and embezzlement in the Los Angeles superior 

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and related cases. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan 

Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3

court. The complaint alleged that Dr. Jose De La Llana was the CEO, 

medical director, and controlling shareholder of the Hospice and other 

associated companies. But the complaint also contained a contradictory 

allegation that Dr. Daniel Rose’s trust owned and controlled the Hospice.

In early December 2021, Mr. Reznick filed a chapter 11 petition on 

behalf of NobleQuest. The bankruptcy case was dismissed later that month 

for the debtor’s failure to file schedules and other documents.

B. The Hospice’s bankruptcy case

1. The chapter 11 petition

In mid-December 2021, the Hospice filed a skeletal bankruptcy 

petition under chapter 11 subchapter V. Mr. Reznick signed the petition as 

the Hospice’s attorney. Dr. Yvette Hargrove-Brown signed the petition on 

behalf of the Hospice, purportedly as its president.

The petition contained a list of creditors but otherwise did not 

include schedules or any other required documents. The bankruptcy court 

issued a deficiency notice ordering the Hospice to file the missing 

documents within fourteen days.

The Hospice did not file the required schedules and documents by 

the deadline. The bankruptcy court ordered the Hospice to file the missing 

documents by January 19, 2022 or face dismissal.

2. The § 341(a) meeting of creditors

Prior to the deadline, Mr. Reznick and Dr. Hargrove-Brown appeared 

at the § 341(a) meeting of creditors on behalf of the Hospice. The meeting 
4

did not go well.

Mr. Reznick admitted that he did not file a list of related cases, 

including the bankruptcy case he filed for NobleQuest. He acknowledged 

that he did not submit information required by the U.S. Trustee but 

explained that “there’s nothing to – nothing meaningful I should say to 

provide other than we have no clue.”

Dr. Hargrove-Brown stated that she was recently appointed as the 

CEO/president of both the Hospice and NobleQuest. But she could not 

answer basic questions about the Hospice, such as the number of board 

members or their names, whether the Hospice operated an in-patient 

facility or provided in-home care, the number of its employees and 

patients, the nature and amount of the Hospice’s creditors’ claims, or the 

Hospice’s monthly income or expenses, business licenses, cash flow, assets, 

or liabilities. She even admitted that she did not know the actual location of 

the Hospice and had never been into the Hospice’s facilities. She said that 

Dr. Rose owned the Hospice but neither she nor Mr. Reznick could confirm 

that fact or his ownership percentage. Neither Dr. Hargrove-Brown nor 

Mr. Reznick could confirm whether the Hospice was insolvent.

3. Dismissal for failure to file schedule and other documents

The Hospice did not comply with the bankruptcy court’s order to file 

schedules and other missing documents by the January 19 deadline. On 

January 25, the bankruptcy court dismissed the chapter 11 case. No one 

appealed that order.
5

C. The U.S. Trustee’s application for an order to show cause

The U.S. Trustee then filed an application for issuance of an order to 

show cause (“OSC Application”) directing Mr. Reznick and Dr. HargroveBrown to explain (1) why the bankruptcy petition was not filed in bad 

faith; (2) why Mr. Reznick should not be required to disgorge all fees; 

(3) why Mr. Reznick should not be referred to the bankruptcy court

disciplinary panel for filing a fraudulent bankruptcy case; and (4) why 

Dr. Hargrove-Brown should not be ordered to pay the subchapter V 

trustee’s fees and barred from future bankruptcy filings.

The U.S. Trustee based the OSC Application on three points. First, the 

U.S. Trustee noted that the Hospice, Dr. Hargrove-Brown, and Mr. Reznick 

were involved in a total of at least six other bankruptcy cases filed in late 

2021 by medical businesses, including the recent NobleQuest filing, all of 

which were unsuccessful.

Second, the U.S. Trustee described the inability of Dr. HargroveBrown and Mr. Reznick to provide basic facts at the meeting of creditors

and their failure to provide the U.S. Trustee with the requested information

and documents.

Third, the U.S. Trustee said that, shortly after Mr. Reznick filed the 

Hospice’s petition, Ms. Rivera contacted the U.S. Trustee and alleged that 

the bankruptcy case was filed in bad faith and without authorization. 

Ms. Rivera provided the Hospice’s business records and corporate 

documents and a declaration signed under penalty of perjury.
6

In her declaration, Ms. Rivera asserted that she was the president of 

the Hospice and owned fifty percent of its stock; Rosalie Manuel and Paul 

Laurel owned the remaining fifty percent. She said that the Hospice and its

related entities were the targets of takeovers by certain individuals, 

including Mr. Reznick, Dr. De La Llana, Miteshkumar Patel, Carlos 

Escobar, and Daniel Callahan. She claimed that they used false corporate 

filings to remove her as officer of the companies. Ms. Rivera declared that, 

in December 2021, Dr. Hargrove-Brown appeared at the companies’ offices 

claiming to be new management, but she was not an officer or employee of 

the Hospice and had no authority to file the bankruptcy petition.

The U.S. Trustee argued that the court should require Mr. Reznick to 

show cause why he should not be referred to the disciplinary panel 

pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 2090-2(b) for initiating fraudulent 

bankruptcy cases. He also cited Rule 9011 as a basis to impose sanctions.

Finally, the U.S. Trustee urged the court to require Dr. Hargrove-Brown to 

show cause why she should not pay the case trustee’s fees and be barred 

from future bankruptcy filings.

The bankruptcy court granted the OSC Application and issued the 

order to show cause (“OSC”).

D. The OSC proceedings

1. Mr. Reznick’s and Dr. Hargrove-Brown’s responses

In response to the OSC, Mr. Reznick filed a declaration in which he 

asserted that the U.S. Trustee had been “duped” by Ms. Rivera, a “criminal 
7

mastermind.” He asserted that, as a physical therapist, Ms. Rivera could 

not own, control, or operate a medical corporation. Rather, he maintained 

that Dr. De La Llana owned the Hospice and was its medical director.

Mr. Reznick stated that Ms. Rivera and others had engaged in an 

embezzlement scheme against NobleQuest, the Hospice, and an affiliated 

company called Care Plus, Inc. He said that he filed the superior court 

complaint against Ms. Rivera, and JPMorgan Chase Bank froze the 

Hospice’s bank accounts; as a result, the Hospice had to file for bankruptcy 

protection.

Mr. Reznick maintained that the Hospice was insolvent on the 

petition date and that he did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. He 

claimed that he told the U.S. Trustee that he intended to file an amended 

petition and schedules. He said that the U.S. Trustee ignored his requests to 

reschedule the § 341(a) meeting, evidencing bad faith by the U.S. Trustee.

Mr. Reznick attached the following documents in support of his

declaration: (1) California Secretary of State filings showing that Dr. De La 

Llana was the CEO, secretary, CFO, director, agent, and medical director of 

the Hospice; (2) NobleQuest board minutes from September 2, 2021 noting 

his allegation of Ms. Rivera’s misappropriation of funds; (3) an October 15, 

2021 retainer letter from Mr. Reznick to Dr. De La Llana concerning the 

scope of Mr. Reznick’s representation of NobleQuest; (4) the superior court 

complaint against Ms. Rivera; and (5) an e-mail transmitting the superior 

court complaint to the U.S. Trustee.
8

Dr. Hargrove-Brown, represented by counsel, stated in her 

declaration that she was “Global Administrator” for Clinica Medica 

General Medical Center, Inc. (“CMG”). She said that, in September 2021, 

she joined the board of directors for NobleQuest and was appointed CEO.

She stated that Mr. Reznick contacted her in early December 2021 to 

file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of NobleQuest (which was in the 

process of merging with CMG). Later that month, he had her sign another 

bankruptcy petition on behalf of the Hospice.

2. Responses to the declarations

The U.S. Trustee responded to Mr. Reznick’s and Dr. HargroveBrown’s declarations. He contended that neither respondent presented any 

evidence showing that the bankruptcy petition was filed in good faith. He 

pointed out that the scant information provided in the petition was 

unsupported and did not appear to be truthful. Furthermore, he argued 

that Mr. Reznick represented two of the Hospice’s creditors, which created

a conflict of interest.

The Hospice (no longer represented by Mr. Reznick) argued that 

Mr. Reznick and Dr. Hargrove-Brown “neither owned nor had any 

authority” to file the petition and that “[t]he fraudulent filing was an illconceived hostile takeover attempt of the Hospice by Respondents.”3

3 The Hospice stated that it was incorporated in California in 2014 by Lusine 

Harutyunyian. Ms. Harutyunyian initially owned 100% of the Hospice, but in 2017 she 

transferred her interest to four individuals with a 25% share each. In 2020, two of those 

individuals sold their shares to Ms. Rivera, such that Ms. Rivera owns 50%.
9

3. Further responses

Dr. Hargrove-Brown then changed her tune. In a supplemental 

declaration and exhibits that she filed pro se, she said that, based on the 

documents filed by the U.S. Trustee, she believed that “my understanding 

of what may have transpired is different than what I was led to believe.”

Dr. Hargrove-Brown said that she was told that the NobleQuest 

board had elected her its new CEO as a part of CMG’s merger with 

NobleQuest and its affiliated companies. She was led to believe that 

Dr. Rose owned the Hospice. When she signed the Hospice’s bankruptcy 

petition, she believed that she was its president and was authorized to do 

so. She later learned that there was a dispute over NobleQuest’s ownership

and that “Mr. Reznick did not have the information he indicated that he 

did in the Retainer Agreement.” She stated that she never had a chance to 

review her first declaration before it was filed. She concluded that, “[a]t 

this point, I am not sure who or what to believe.”

Dr. Hargrove-Brown attached exhibits to support her statements. 

Among the exhibits was a lengthy April 2022 e-mail from Mr. Reznick to 

Mr. Patel and others, in which Mr. Reznick admitted that he did not have 

information about basic facts related to the Hospice. He stated:

Everything I am doing right now is tied in some way to 

the Bankruptcy OSC involving [the Hospice], a company I have 

been told but have been unable to prove is apparently related 

in some way to NobleQuest, the nonprofit I do represent . . . [,]

and Care Plus, Inc. a company that I was informed in October 
10

2021 was owned or controlled by Jose De La Lallana [sic] . . . .

I was subsequently informed by Daniel Callahan . . . that 

Daniel Rose, M.D., or one of his many related entities . . . now 

owns or controls the Debtor, but I have never confirmed this.

I have also asked repeatedly from [Mr. Callahan] and 

alleged members of “new” management, including HargroveBrown . . . to provide me with any documentation whatsoever 

that proves the legitimacy of your or our team’s management 

and control of any of these entities.

Please be advised that beyond the [special litigation 

committee notice] that I prepared nearly a year ago, I have 

nothing to disprove that Ailene Rivera is not in fact the 

legitimate owner of these medical practices but for the fact 

that she is not a licensed California physicianbed [sic] by 

[Dr. De La Llana]. I asked for anything from [Mr. Callahan], 

Kelli [Williams], or anyone else connected with the underlying

matters to find something to show legitimacy. 

The United States Department of Justice and US Trustee 

are accusing me of filing a fraudulent bankruptcy petition and I 

have no documentation to prove otherwise . . . .

Frankly, the answer I have been given by Hargrove 

Brown, [Mr. Callahan] and Kelli Williams, namely, that 

“Ailene Rivera took all the corporate records we have and we 

don’t have a single document” doesn’t pass the smell test.

Needless to say, I cannot fight this battle on my own but 

if need be I will. Of course, that will make me adverse to you 

and Hargrove Brown and everyone else in this sh*t storm of a 

case. I trust that nobody wants that to happen and perhaps we 

can get some cooperation with your help before the deadlines.
11

. . .

Please be further advised that without some genuine 

showing of legitimacy in my opposition, as opposed to the 

bullsh*t I have received in the past, the OSC will likely be 

granted and I will need to appear before the disciplinary 

committee to justify what I did . . . . In the meantime, the 

California and likely New York and Illinois Bars will suspend 

my law licenses pending the committee’s investigation and 

report. I will be out of business.

Regrettably all of my requests for information 

concerning the companies – since October 2021 – have thus 

far fallen on deaf ears, with the same lame refrain, that 

nobody has a single document because Ailene Rivera 

embezzled everything. 

More importantly I do not know who is running the 

show right now to get the kind of answers I need before filing 

anything else concerning the companies that you and 

[Mr. Callahan] are connected with that are also connected with 

the OSC. I don’t know who if anyone is telling the truth out 

there and don’t understand why we need to play “hide the 

ball”? . . . 

. . .

In summary, the bottom line is that I cannot go into court 

with the scant evidence we now have against Ailene Rivera. 

We will be laughed out of court and it will be binding on us for

any future proceeding, including the pending OSC in the 

[Hospice bankruptcy case].

We will need to explain what happened with Ailene 

without any further bullsh*t. We need to deal with the facts 

we have, even the bad facts. I can fix or spin what I know, but 
12

not what is concealed from me. Right now all I have is thin 

air and I need help from everyone because Ailene looks to me 

and the judge and Department of Justice and Chase [Bank] like 

the one who is wearing the “white hat,” while we all look like 

common criminals.

(Emphases and asterisks added.)

4. The memorandum decision and order

After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued its memorandum 

decision finding that Mr. Reznick committed fraud on the court and 

referring him to the bankruptcy court disciplinary panel.

The bankruptcy court found that, “[a]t the time Reznick filed the 

petition, he did not have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that 

Hargrove-Brown, as opposed to Rivera, was the authorized representative 

of the Hospice.” It considered Dr. Hargrove-Brown’s declaration and 

extensively referenced the e-mail in which Mr. Reznick

acknowledges that he lacked any information to substantiate 

his allegation that Rivera was not the legitimate owner of the 

Hospice; that he had conducted no due diligence to confirm the 

claim . . . that Rose, as opposed to Rivera, owned the Hospice; 

that he had no documentation to demonstrate that the instant 

bankruptcy filing was not fraudulent; and that he feared that 

the filing of the petition could ultimately lead to the suspension 

of his law license.

It similarly found that he “lacked any objectively reasonable basis to 

conclude that he was authorized to [file the petition]. In an attempt to 

distract attention from his own wrongful conduct, Reznick’s response to 
13

the OSC consists not of concrete evidence but rather further 

uncorroborated allegations against Rivera.”

The bankruptcy court found that, on the petition date, Ms. Rivera 

was the president of the Hospice and a 50% shareholder. It found that she 

and the other officers did not authorize Mr. Reznick to represent the 

Hospice or file the bankruptcy petition. It noted that Mr. Reznick never 

produced an executed retainer agreement showing that he was authorized 

to represent the Hospice.

The bankruptcy court concluded that, “[b]y signing the petition on 

behalf of the Hospice, Reznick was representing to the Court that he had 

authority to cause the Hospice to seek bankruptcy protection. That 

representation constituted a fraud on the court” and violated Rule 9011.

Accordingly, his conduct was “sufficiently serious” to warrant referral to 

the bankruptcy court’s disciplinary panel. It declined to order Mr. Reznick 

to disgorge his fees, because he did not receive any fees for representing

the Hospice. Additionally, the bankruptcy court imposed prefiling 

restrictions on Dr. Hargrove-Brown.

The bankruptcy court entered its order (“OSC Order”) that

recommended that Mr. Reznick’s privilege to practice in the bankruptcy 

court in the Central District of California be revoked for at least three years.

It further recommended that he only be allowed to apply for reinstatement 

once he fulfilled certain requirements.

Mr. Reznick timely appealed the OSC Order. Dr. Hargrove-Brown 
14

did not appeal the ruling.

4

E. The disciplinary panel proceedings

Later, a three-judge disciplinary panel issued its memorandum 

decision and agreed with the bankruptcy court that Mr. Reznick had 

committed fraud upon the bankruptcy court and had violated Rule 9011. It 

determined that the bankruptcy court’s recommendation for discipline was 

appropriate and adopted it in full. Mr. Reznick did not appeal the 

disciplinary panel’s order, and it is final.

In May 2023, the United States District Court for the Central District 

of California also conducted a reciprocal disciplinary review and issued a 

similar suspension for three years.5

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(2)(A). Subject to our discussion below, we have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it (1) found that

Mr. Reznick had committed fraud on the court and violated Rule 9011 and 

4 After briefing was completed, Mr. Reznick’s law firm, Law Offices of Michael E. 

Reznick, sought permission to file an amicus brief in this appeal. The motions panel saw 

no reason to allow Mr. Reznick a second bite at the apple and denied the motion. We do

not consider any of the arguments raised therein.

5 Mr. Reznick included in his excepts of record his response to the district court’s 

order to show cause. As discussed below, we will not consider any of this new evidence 

that was not before the bankruptcy court in the first instance.
15

(2) referred the matter to the bankruptcy court’s disciplinary panel.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s 

imposition of sanctions, including referral to a disciplinary panel, under 

both Rule 9011 and under its inherent sanctioning authority. See Cuevas v. 

Chandler (In re Cuevas), BAP Nos. CC-15-1032-KuKiTa, CC-15-1353-KuKiTa, 

2016 WL 5845670, at *3 (9th Cir. BAP Oct. 5, 2016); see also Shalaby v. 

Mansdorf (In re Nakhuda), 544 B.R. 886, 898 (9th Cir. BAP 2016), aff’d, 703 F. 

App’x 621 (9th Cir. 2017).

To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion, 

we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the 

bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief 

requested” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court’s 

application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without 

support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. 

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

“We review our own jurisdiction de novo. Whether a bankruptcy 

court’s decision is final, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)[,] is a question of law 

reviewed de novo.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs (In 

re City of Desert Hot Springs), 339 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations 

omitted). “De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if 

no decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 

505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
16

DISCUSSION

A. This Panel has jurisdiction to decide this appeal.

The U.S. Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court’s OSC Order was 

not a final order and that this appeal is moot. While we agree in part with 

the U.S. Trustee, we hold that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

1. The OSC Order is a final, appealable order.

The Trustee argues that the OSC Order only referred Mr. Reznick for 

“possible discipline,” so it was not a final, appealable order. However, he 

also admits that the OSC Order “might be final nonetheless because the 

bankruptcy court made a finding of specific misconduct.”

The Ninth Circuit has adopted “a pragmatic or flexible approach to 

finality in bankruptcy cases. . . . The test for finality in bankruptcy typically 

asks two questions: (1) whether the bankruptcy court’s order fully and 

finally determined the discrete issue or issues it addressed; and (2) whether 

it resolves and seriously affects substantive rights.” Jue v. Liu (In re Liu), 611 

B.R. 864, 870 (9th Cir. BAP 2020) (cleaned up).

The bankruptcy court’s OSC Order is final, in that it fully addressed 

the issues raised by the OSC (i.e., Mr. Reznick’s alleged misconduct), left

nothing more for the bankruptcy court to do, and seriously affected 

Mr. Reznick’s substantive rights. Although the final determination of the 

appropriate punishment was left to the disciplinary panel, that separate 

proceeding did not affect the finality of the bankruptcy court’s OSC Order.

Alternatively, even if the OSC Order was not final, we would exercise 
17

our discretion to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(1); In re City of 

Desert Hot Springs, 339 F.3d at 787 (“It is within the discretion of the district 

court and the BAP . . . to hear interlocutory appeals.”).

2. This appeal is not moot.

The U.S. Trustee contends that this appeal is moot, because there is 

no longer a live controversy: the bankruptcy court did not impose any 

sanction and merely referred Mr. Reznick to the disciplinary panel; 

conversely, the disciplinary panel imposed the sanction, and Mr. Reznick 

did not appeal. Although the U.S. Trustee is correct that Mr. Reznick’s 

appeal of the suspension is not properly before us, we disagree that we 

could not grant him any effective relief.

“We cannot exercise jurisdiction over a moot appeal.” Ellis v. Yu (In re 

Ellis), 523 B.R. 673, 677 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). “The test for mootness of an 

appeal is whether the appellate court can give the appellant any effective 

relief in the event that it decides the matter on the merits in his favor. If it 

can grant such relief, the matter is not moot.” Pilate v. Burrell (In re Burrell), 

415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Mr. Reznick is confused about which court ordered his three-year 

suspension. He asks that we “vacate the bankruptcy court’s June 27, 2022 

order suspending him from practicing in the bankruptcy court for a period 

of three years.” He later changes tack, arguing instead that the disciplinary 

panel’s ruling was “ancillary” to the bankruptcy court’s ruling and that a 

reversal of the OSC Order would necessarily undo the disciplinary panel’s 
18

ruling.

The U.S. Trustee is correct that we cannot overturn the three-year 

suspension. However, the bankruptcy court also found that Mr. Reznick 

committed fraud on the court. If we were to reverse the bankruptcy court’s 

decision, the suspension would stand, but the court’s fraud finding would 

not. The existence of that finding might affect Mr. Reznick, including his 

bar licenses or malpractice insurance. See Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. 

Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984) (“But 

as long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the 

outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.”). Thus, we could grant him 

some effective relief, even though it is not the primary relief he seeks.6

Therefore, we have jurisdiction to decide this appeal.

B. The bankruptcy court did not err in referring Mr. Reznick to the 

disciplinary panel for committing fraud on the court.

Mr. Reznick focuses his appeal on largely irrelevant arguments 

attacking Ms. Rivera’s purported ownership of the Hospice. He also tries to 

raise new facts and arguments on appeal that he claims (incorrectly) that he 

could not raise in the bankruptcy court. We are not persuaded by any of 

these arguments.

6 Because the disciplinary panel also determined that Mr. Reznick committed 

fraud on the court and we cannot disturb the disciplinary panel’s order, a decision 

overturning the fraud finding in the bankruptcy court might have no appreciable effect. 

But there is still at least a possibility that a reversal of the bankruptcy court’s decision 

might grant Mr. Reznick some relief.
19

1. The bankruptcy court’s finding of fraud on the court is 

adequately supported by the record.

The bankruptcy court determined that Mr. Reznick committed fraud 

on the court when he filed the bankruptcy petition on behalf of the Hospice 

and continued to advocate for the petition’s viability. When considering 

fraud on the court, we must determine “whether it harmed the integrity of 

the judicial process. Fraud on the court must be an intentional, material 

misrepresentation. Thus, fraud on the court must involve an 

unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence 

the court in its decision.” United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d 

1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); see also Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 

989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] court certainly may assess sanctions against 

counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes.” (cleaned up)).

Mr. Reznick completely ignores the bankruptcy court’s finding that 

he knew that he did not have authority to file the bankruptcy petition. As 

the bankruptcy court noted, Mr. Reznick admitted in the April 4, 2022 email that he could not prove the ownership of the Hospice or disprove 

Ms. Rivera’s ownership claims. He characterized the information he had 

been given as “bullsh*t” that “did not pass the smell test.” He begged 

Mr. Patel and others for proof of corporate “legitimacy” and noted that his 

previous requests had gone unanswered. The bankruptcy court also found 

that Mr. Reznick could not produce a signed retainer agreement. In 

addition, we note that Mr. Reznick never offered a declaration from Dr. De 
20

La Llana, the person who supposedly authorized the bankruptcy filing.

Based on Mr. Reznick’s own admissions, the bankruptcy court did 

not err when it found that he had no objectively reasonable basis to 

conclude on the petition date that Dr. Hargrove-Brown was authorized to 

sign the petition. The bankruptcy court rejected Mr. Reznick’s efforts to 

deflect from these issues by pointing to alleged wrongdoing by Ms. Rivera 

and her “cronies.”7

At oral argument, Mr. Reznick attempted to explain away his April 

2022 e-mail by arguing that, when he signed the petition in December 2021, 

he believed in good faith that Dr. De La Llana owned the Hospice and 

could unilaterally authorize the bankruptcy petition, and he did not realize 

until later that his belief might not have been true. But the e-mail 

contradicts his argument: he wrote that he had been asking for information 

about the Hospice since October 2021, two months before the petition date, 

and that “all of my requests for information concerning the companies –

since October 2021 – have thus far fallen on deaf ears . . . .” His claim of 

innocence on the petition date is a recent fabrication.

7 At oral argument, Mr. Reznick insisted that he had presented the bankruptcy 

court with evidence that Dr. De La Llana owned the Hospice and could unilaterally 

authorize the bankruptcy petition. Mr. Reznick repeatedly referenced the California 

Secretary of State filing that he had attached as an exhibit to his declaration. However, 

even if ownership was determinative, that document does not identify any owner of the 

Hospice. More importantly, Mr. Reznick admitted in his April 2022 e-mail that he did 

not have any proof of ownership and control of the Hospice and had not received any 

corroborating information from Dr. De La Llana, Dr. Rose, and others.
21

The record abundantly supports the bankruptcy court’s findings. 

Thus, it did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mr. Reznick 

had committed fraud on the court and made false representations.

2. Ms. Rivera’s ownership interest in the Hospice is irrelevant.

Mr. Reznick primarily argues that the bankruptcy court erred in 

finding that Ms. Rivera owned fifty percent of the Hospice. He contends 

that a physical therapist such as Ms. Rivera cannot lawfully own shares in a 

California professional medical corporation.

As far as we can tell, there is no dispute that Ms. Rivera is a physical 

therapist who cannot own a majority ownership interest in a California 

professional corporation. There is no evidence, however, that the Hospice 

was formed as a professional corporation, as opposed to a simple 

corporation. Further, Mr. Reznick offers no authority for the proposition 

that only a “professional medical corporation” can conduct the business of 

the Hospice. 

But we need not definitively answer these questions, because 

Ms. Rivera’s purported ownership of the Hospice is irrelevant for the 

purposes of appeal. We need only decide whether Mr. Reznick had 

authority to file the bankruptcy petition on behalf of the Hospice. Even if 

Ms. Rivera could not or did not own the Hospice, it does not necessarily 

follow that Mr. Reznick had authority to file the bankruptcy petition.

Mr. Reznick claims that Dr. De La Llana had authority, as “medical 

director” of the Hospice, to file the petition. State law governs whether a 
22

corporation has authorized the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See Price v. 

Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 106 (1945). In California, a corporation generally acts 

through its board of directors. See Cal. Corp. Code § 300(a). Mr. Reznick 

has not established that a “medical director” can unilaterally decide to file 

for bankruptcy on behalf of a corporation.

3. We do not consider Mr. Reznick’s new arguments and 

evidence on appeal.

Mr. Reznick raises a host of new arguments and facts on appeal. He 

contends that the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product 

privilege barred him from offering this evidence to the bankruptcy court. 

This argument is patently frivolous, and we will not consider his new 

evidence.

For the first time, Mr. Reznick claims that he had a face-to-face 

meeting with Dr. De La Llana in late October 2021 at which Dr. De La 

Llana “in fact expressly ‘authorized’ him to represent the Hospice.” He 

says that, at this meeting, he provided Dr. De La Llana with a retainer 

agreement to expand his scope of legal services,8 and Dr. De La Llana 

provided him with a retainer check and proof that he was an officer and 

medical director of the Hospice. Mr. Reznick also refers to events that 

occurred after he filed his notice of appeal.

8 The retainer agreement letter was offered in the bankruptcy court. It only 

proposes to expand the scope of Mr. Reznick’s legal services to NobleQuest. It does not 

mention the Hospice in any way, much less evidence the Hospice’s retention of 

Mr. Reznick.
23

Mr. Reznick admits he did not raise these allegations and evidence in

the bankruptcy court, and therefore we will not consider them on appeal. 

See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (we do not 

consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal). We 

may consider new arguments when: “(1) there are exceptional 

circumstances why the issue was not raised in the trial court; (2) the new 

issue arises while the appeal is pending because of a change in the law; or 

(3) the issue presented is a pure question of law and the opposing party 

will suffer no prejudice . . . .” Momox-Caselis v. Donohue, 987 F.3d 835, 841-

42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 402 (2021). “The court will only excuse a 

failure to comply with this rule when necessary to avoid a manifest 

injustice.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

We discern no manifest injustice here. Mr. Reznick claims on appeal 

that he could not reveal this information because he was prevented from 

doing so by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product

privilege. Yet, contradictorily, he asserts that he is free to break the 

privilege because there is no longer a risk of harm to his client after the 

superior court dismissed a lawsuit by Care Plus, Inc. against him.

Mr. Reznick’s position is untenable. He never raised the privilege 

defense in the bankruptcy court, so he has waived that argument. See

Padgett, 587 F.3d at 985 n.2. Furthermore, his explanation as to why he is 

now free to disclose the allegedly privileged information lacks any 

credibility. Assuming the privileges applied, he may not disregard the 
24

privileges merely because he unilaterally determines that he and the client 

will not personally face any adverse consequences. Finally, he has made no 

showing that any of the basic information that was relevant to the OSC –

that he was retained by the Hospice and that he had been authorized to file 

the bankruptcy petition – would have been subject to any privilege.

Thus, we will not consider any of Mr. Reznick’s new arguments or 

evidence in the first instance on appeal.9

4. Mr. Reznick’s remaining arguments are meritless.

Mr. Reznick contends that the bankruptcy court erred in accepting 

the U.S. Trustee’s argument that he had filed multiple other fraudulent 

bankruptcy petitions. He claims that those cases were filed by a different 

attorney and that he was unaware of any other related bankruptcy case.

Mr. Reznick is misguided. First, the bankruptcy court did not 

attribute the many filings to him. Rather, it noted that Dr. Hargrove-Brown 

had been involved in seven bankruptcy cases and that Mr. Reznick had 

been counsel on two of those cases. It is patently false for Mr. Reznick to 

claim that the bankruptcy court attributed all of those filings to him.

Second, as the U.S. Trustee pointed out, Mr. Reznick filed the 

Hospice’s bankruptcy petition shortly after NobleQuest’s petition was 

dismissed for failure to file documents. He knew that NobleQuest was 

9 Even if we did consider the new allegations, we would reach the same 

conclusion; the new information and exhibits do not convince us that the bankruptcy 

court erred.
25

“definitely” a related entity and admitted as much at the meeting of 

creditors. Therefore, his continued insistence that it was proper for him not 

to disclose any related cases is plainly wrong.

C. The bankruptcy court did not err in referring Mr. Reznick to the 

disciplinary panel for violating Rule 9011.

Finally, we note that Mr. Reznick does not directly address the 

bankruptcy court’s ruling that he violated Rule 9011. He has waived any 

objection to this ruling and, in any event, we discern no error.

Rule 9011(b) provides (in summary) that when an attorney presents a 

bankruptcy petition, the attorney is certifying that the attorney has 

conducted a reasonable inquiry and that the petition is not being presented 

for any improper purpose and has a sufficient basis in fact and law. An 

attorney who presents a petition without proper authorization by the 

debtor violates this rule. See, e.g., Winterton v. Humitech of N. Cal., LLC (In re 

Blue Pine Grp., Inc.), 457 B.R. 64, 77 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (affirming the 

bankruptcy court’s ruling that the attorney violated Rule 9011 when he

proceeded with a frivolous bankruptcy case and “failed to undertake an 

objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law supporting the 

bankruptcy petition, relying instead on information others told him.”), aff’d 

in part, vacated in part, 526 F. App’x 768 (9th Cir. 2013) (vacating sanction 

amount).

Mr. Reznick signed the Hospice’s petition, thus certifying that he had 

undertaken a reasonable inquiry that the petition was not filed for an 
26

improper purpose and that the allegations therein had evidentiary support. 

Yet, as discussed above, Mr. Reznick later admitted that he did not perform 

due diligence to verify that he had authority to sign the petition, did not 

know who owned or controlled the Hospice, had no evidence as to the 

“legitimacy” of Mr. Patel’s and Dr. De La Llana’s representations, and 

knew that the information he had been given was “bullsh*t” that did not 

“pass the smell test.” His signature on the petition and continued advocacy 

for the viability of the petition thus violated Rule 9011.

CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err. We AFFIRM.