UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ANTHONY H. LETT, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

MR. LOVETT, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 22-1124 

(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-03212-RMR) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Anthony Lett, a federal inmate proceeding pro se,1

 appeals the district court’s 

denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging his prison disciplinary 

conviction for possessing a dangerous weapon in federal prison. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. We also dismiss Mr. Lett’s appeal of 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 We construe Mr. Lett’s pro se filings liberally. See Childers v. Crow, 1 F.4th 

792, 798 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2718 (2022). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 24, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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2 

the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction. 

I. Background 

 A prison guard saw Mr. Lett hand a “dark brown” “shaft shaped item” to 

another prisoner, Stanley Walker. R. at 69. The guard saw Mr. Walker “place[] the 

object into his right sock.” Id. The guard searched Mr. Walker and found an 

improvised knife. “The weapon was metal[,] approximately 7.5 inches long[,] and 

sharpened to a point with a dark brown bed sheet ripped into strips to wrap one end 

so it could be used as a handle. A piece of cardboard was used to sheath the 

sharpened end.” Id.

Prison officials later served Mr. Lett with an incident report charging him with 

possessing a dangerous weapon and aiding in destroying or disposing of the weapon. 

They also notified him of his rights in the pending disciplinary proceeding, which 

included access to a staff representative to help him with his case and the right to 

present evidence. Mr. Lett requested a staff representative, and prison officials 

granted this request. 

At the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Lett said he “had no knowledge of the 

weapon.” R. at 13. He called no witnesses and did not submit documentary or video 

evidence in support of his defense. His staff representative told the hearing officer 

Mr. Lett “did not know what a staff rep was for and he requested no video to be 

viewed.” Id. The hearing officer considered these statements, the guard’s statement, 

a photograph of the shank, and Mr. Lett’s failure to make a statement of defense 

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earlier in the investigation. The hearing officer concluded “the greater weight of the 

evidence” supported the possession charge. R. at 15. He sanctioned Mr. Lett by 

imposing 50 disciplinary segregation days and revoking 41 days of good conduct 

time credit and six months of commissary privileges. 

After unsuccessfully appealing his disciplinary conviction through 

administrative channels, Mr. Lett filed a pro se § 2241 habeas petition in the district 

court. The district court construed his § 2241 petition as “specifically challeng[ing] 

only the sufficiency of the evidence” supporting the disciplinary conviction. R. at 

88. The district court evaluated the sufficiency claim according to the “some 

evidence” standard—i.e., “whether there is any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board,” Superintendent, Mass. 

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985)—and determined the evidence 

considered by the hearing officer was sufficient to support Mr. Lett’s disciplinary 

conviction. To the extent Mr. Lett was arguing that other evidence the hearing 

officer failed to consider, such as Mr. Walker’s testimony or video surveillance 

footage, might have produced a different outcome, the district court rejected that 

argument because the record did not show Mr. Lett had asked the hearing officer to 

review anything beyond what had been considered. The district court also found 

unavailing any due process claim based on an argument that Mr. Lett had been 

prevented from presenting video evidence of the incident. According to the district 

court, Mr. Lett did “not allege that he asked the [hearing officer] to view the video 

evidence and he fail[ed] to explain why he did not tell the [hearing officer] that his 

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staff representative had failed to obtain video evidence he had requested.” R. at 91. 

On April 1, 2022, the district court denied the § 2241 petition on the merits and 

entered a final judgment that same day. 

On April 15, 2022, Mr. Lett filed pro se a document titled “Petition for 

Reconsideration on the Alternative Petition Giving Notice of Appeal ‘In[]forma 

Pauper[i]s.’” R. at 93 (capitalization normalized). In this filing, Mr. Lett sought 

reconsideration of the district court’s § 2241 denial order under Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). He argued the district court should have granted his 

petition because his staff representative’s role “equate[d] to that of a court appointed 

counsel in a court proceeding,” R. at 94, and his staff representative rendered 

constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to obtain and present video evidence in 

the disciplinary proceedings. “In the [a]lternative,” Mr. Lett provided notice of his 

intent to appeal and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. R. at 93. 

The district court docketed this document twice, once as a notice of appeal of 

the district court’s April 1 order and judgment, and again as a motion for 

reconsideration of the April 1 order. This court then entered an order abating the 

appeal pending the district court’s resolution of the motion for reconsideration, 

stating “the notice of appeal will become effective when the district court enters an 

order disposing of the post-judgment motion.” Lett v. Lovett, No. 22-1124, Order 

(10th Cir. Apr. 19, 2022). The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on 

April 29, 2022, ruling that any alleged failures by the staff representative would not 

impact its prior “analysis because there is no right to counsel in prison disciplinary 

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proceedings.” R. at 106 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974)). 

Mr. Lett did not file a new or amended notice of appeal related to the district court’s 

April 29 order. 

II. Discussion 

 Mr. Lett argues the district court made two errors in denying his § 2241 

petition: (1) the district court should have found a violation of his due process and 

equal protection rights based on his staff representative’s ineffective assistance in the 

disciplinary proceedings; and (2) the district court should have found a violation of 

his due process and equal protection rights because the evidence presented at his 

disciplinary hearing did not support his disciplinary conviction. We lack appellate 

jurisdiction to consider his first argument and reject his second argument on the 

merits. 

The district court did not address Mr. Lett’s ineffective-assistance argument 

until its April 29 order denying his motion for reconsideration. While Mr. Lett seeks 

to challenge the April 29 order in this appeal, Mr. Lett did not file a new or amended 

notice of appeal designating the April 29 order after he filed his initial notice on 

April 15. “When an appellant challenges an order ruling on a motion governed by 

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), a new or amended notice of appeal is necessary even if 

the issue raised in the motion and sought to be challenged could also have been 

challenged in an appeal from the final judgment.” Husky Ventures, Inc. v. B55 Invs., 

Ltd., 911 F.3d 1000, 1010 (10th Cir. 2018). Because Mr. Lett filed his 

reconsideration motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) 

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within 28 days of the district court’s judgment, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

4(a)(4)(B)(ii) governed the district court’s April 29 order denying the motion. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (stating the rule applies to “an order disposing of any 

motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (vi) 

(listing motions “to alter or amend the judgment under [Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure] 59” and motions “for relief under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 60 if 

the motion is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered”). Mr. Lett 

therefore had to file a new or amended notice designating the April 29 order to 

preserve appellate review of the district court’s rejection of his ineffective-assistance 

argument. Because he did not, we must dismiss his challenge to the April 29 order 

for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See Husky Ventures, 911 F.3d at 1010. 

We acknowledge the apparent harshness of this holding, particularly because 

even the government does not question our jurisdiction and the district court’s 

decision to treat Mr. Lett’s petition for reconsideration as a notice of appeal could 

have understandably caused confusion about the preservation of Mr. Lett’s arguments 

on appeal. But even where “neither party challenges our appellate jurisdiction, we 

have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction.” Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt 

Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001). And “[a]lthough a pro se 

litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, this court has repeatedly insisted that pro 

se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. 

Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets, 

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citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these principles here, we 

lack jurisdiction to review the April 29 order.2

 

Mr. Lett next argues the district court erroneously rejected his claim prison 

officials violated his due process rights by convicting him without sufficient 

evidence. “When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition under § 2241, we review 

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual findings unless 

clearly erroneous.” Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1042 (10th Cir. 2017) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). As we explain, the district court did not err. 

Prisoners possess a liberty interest in their statutorily provided good-time 

credits. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. And prisoners therefore cannot be deprived of 

those credits without due process. See id. But “the requirements of due process are 

satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to 

revoke good time credits.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.3

 “Ascertaining whether this 

2

 Even if we had jurisdiction to consider the argument, we would reject it. 

Mr. Lett did not establish a due process right to assistance in his disciplinary 

proceedings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570 (recognizing a due process right to 

assistance “[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved,” or when “the complexity of the 

issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence 

necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case”). And Mr. Lett likewise did 

not establish a due process violation based on the staff representative’s performance 

in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. See Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 

1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] failure to adhere to administrative regulations does 

not equate to a constitutional violation.”). 

3

 Due process also requires that an inmate “receive: (1) advance written notice 

of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional 

safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in 

his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on 

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standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent 

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the 

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56 (emphasis added). 

“The decision can be upheld even if the evidence supporting the decision is 

‘meager.’” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hill, 

472 U.S. at 457). 

Mr. Lett argues the decision by the prison disciplinary board is not supported 

by sufficient evidence because the hearing officer placed too much weight on the 

prison guard’s statement. He suggests evidence not presented at the disciplinary 

hearing, such as a fingerprint analysis of the shank, security footage, or Mr. Walker’s 

testimony, might have exonerated him. But the record does not show Mr. Lett ever 

asked the hearing officer to consider any of this evidence. Just the opposite. The 

record shows “he requested no video to be viewed,” R. at 65 (internal quotation 

marks omitted), and “waived [his] right to witnesses,” R. at 66. Under the 

circumstances, we discern no due process violation in the hearing officer’s failure to 

consider this evidence. See Ramer v. Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(finding no due process violation where the inmate “effectively den[ied] [prison 

officials] the opportunity to evaluate his request to present . . . testimony at his 

hearing” because the inmate “had waived his right to obtain testimony from these 

and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. Mr. Lett does not 

contend the prison failed to satisfy these due process requirements. 

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witnesses”); cf. Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813–14 (10th Cir. 

2007) (holding that the disciplinary hearing officer’s “unjustified refusal to produce 

and review” a video of the incident in question “deprived [the inmate] of the process 

due him,” where the inmate had “reiterated” to the hearing officer “a request [he] had 

consistently made before” for prison officials to “review videotape records”). 

On de novo review, we agree with the district court that the evidence 

considered by the hearing officer satisfies the “some evidence” standard. The 

guard’s statement describes how the guard saw Mr. Lett hand a “dark brown” “shaft 

shaped item” to Mr. Walker and further describes recovering an improvised knife 

from Mr. Walker. The photograph of the improvised knife recovered by the guard 

illustrates its dangerous nature and confirms the guard’s description. Taken together, 

this amounts to “some evidence” Mr. Lett possessed a dangerous weapon. See, e.g., 

Ruelas v. Zuercher, 240 F. App’x 796, 797 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding an incident 

“report alone constitute[d] ‘some evidence’ of [the convicted inmate’s] guilt”); 

Longstreth v. Franklin, 240 F. App’x 264, 267 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding an “incident 

report was ‘some evidence’”); Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 

2008) (“[A] report from a correctional officer, even if disputed by the inmate and 

supported by no other evidence, legally suffices as ‘some evidence’ upon which to 

base a prison disciplinary violation.”); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 

(7th Cir. 1999) (holding a correctional officer’s “disciplinary report . . . alone 

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provide[d] ‘some evidence’ for the” disciplinary conviction).4

 That Mr. Lett disputed 

the guard’s report by stating he “had no knowledge of the weapon or disposed of it,” 

id. at 13, does not undermine our conclusion because we do not “assess[] the 

credibility of witnesses[] or weigh[] . . . the evidence,” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. We 

instead only consider “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support 

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56. And in this case, 

considered under the applicable legal standard, there was evidence in the record that 

supported the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.5

 

III. Conclusion 

 We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Lett’s § 2241 petition. We dismiss 

Mr. Lett’s appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. 

We grant Mr. Lett’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and 

fees. 

Entered for the Court 

Veronica S. Rossman 

Circuit Judge 

4

 Unpublished cases cited in this decision are not binding precedent, but we 

consider them for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 

32.1(A). 

5

 Mr. Lett’s opening brief also argues prison officials violated his right to 

equal protection. But “government action challenged on equal-protection grounds 

must ‘affect some groups of citizens differently than others.’” Citizens for Const. 

Integrity v. United States, 57 F.4th 750, 765 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Engquist v. Or. 

Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008)). And Mr. Lett does not argue prison 

officials treated him differently than any similarly-situated individual. We therefore 

reject his equal protection argument. 

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