alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2****Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION**I, J. Michael Dodson, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of eTelecare Global Solutions, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.         By: /s/ J. Michael Dodson     J. Michael Dodson    Chief Financial and Accounting Officer    (Principal Financial Officer)    Date: March 14, 2008  
110
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5968 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5968

  To amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 to increase the 
    amount of leverage made available to small business investment 
                               companies.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 8, 2016

    Mr. Knight (for himself, Ms. Meng, and Mr. Curbelo of Florida) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                             Small Business

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 to increase the 
    amount of leverage made available to small business investment 
                               companies.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Small Business Investment 
Opportunity Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. INDIVIDUAL SBIC LEVERAGE LIMIT INCREASE.

    Section 303(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958 (15 U.S.C. 682(b)(2)(A)(ii)) is amended by striking 
``$150,000,000'' and inserting ``$170,000,000''.
                                 <all>
```
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED September 3, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30200 Summary Calendar

ROBERT CRAIG; CLARENCE E. SCOTTSVILLE; BOBBIE J. MCFARLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus GRANT PARISH POLICE JURY; W. C. HOLLOWAY, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; JULIUS FRED SCOTT, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; MICHAEL L. BROWN, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; DONNIE BROWN, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; MARVIN DELONG, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; BOBBY JOE CHELETTE, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury; MELVIN E. GENE ALLEN, Individually and as a Member of the Grant Parish Police Jury, Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (USDC No. 03-CV-147)

_______________________________________________________ 

### Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.* 

### Pursuant to 5 TH 

### C IR 

### . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH 

### C IR 

### . R. 47.5.4. 2 

### PER CURIAM: * 

### The members of the Grant Parish Police Jury appeal the denial of their 12(b)(6) motion, urging their immunity. We affirm for these reasons:
1. The pleading does not allege action necessarily legislative in nature, as the district judge explained.
2. The pleading alleges an uncompensated taking without notice to benefit someone other than for a public purpose.
AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 732 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 732

To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to prohibit Members 
 of Congress from receiving Federal workers' compensation benefits for 
  injuries caused by stress or any other emotional condition, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

               April 27 (legislative day, April 24), 1995

  Mrs. Boxer introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to prohibit Members 
 of Congress from receiving Federal workers' compensation benefits for 
  injuries caused by stress or any other emotional condition, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS BY MEMBERS OF 
              CONGRESS.

    (a) In General.--Section 8101(5) of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
            ``(5) `injury'--
                    ``(A) includes, in addition to injury by accident, 
                a disease proximately caused by the employment, and 
                damage to or destruction of medical braces, artificial 
                limbs, and other prosthetic devices which shall be 
                replaced or repaired, and such time lost while such 
                device or appliance is being replaced or repaired; 
                except that eyeglasses and hearing aides would not be 
                replaced, repaired, or otherwise compensated for, 
                unless the damages or destruction is incident to a 
                personal injury requiring medical services; and
                    ``(B) shall not include, with respect to a Member 
                of Congress, injuries or occupational diseases caused 
                by stress or any mental or emotional condition.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--This Act shall take effect 30 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply only to claims filed 
under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, on or after such 
effective date.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5.4. 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60457

ROBERTO DAVILA, Petitioner,

versus IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Immigration Appeals

(A73 693 090)
September 4, 1998 Before POLITZ, Ch ief Judge, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *


### Roberta Davila petitions for review of an adverse decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Having considered the record and the briefs, and finding no basis for review, the petition for review is DENIED.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF MICHAEL A. CREEL, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**OF DEP HOLDINGS, LLC, THE GENERAL PARTNER OF**

**DUNCAN ENERGY PARTNERS L.P.**

 

In connection with this annual report of Duncan Energy Partners L.P. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael A. Creel, Chief Financial Officer of DEP Holdings, LLC, the general partner of Duncan Energy Partners L.P., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 
| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 
| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

___/s/ Michael A. Creel_________________________________
| Name: | Michael A. Creel |  
Title:  

Chief Financial Officer of DEP Holdings, LLC

 
on behalf of Duncan Energy Partners L.P.

 
 

Date:  

April 2, 2007

 

 

 

  |
|-------|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### IN RE: Avery ARMANI, Avery Armani, Petitioner, v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles, Respondent, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance CompanY, Real Party in Interest.

No. 17-70244

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed May 8, 2017

Charles Fleishman, Attorney, Paul Fle-ishman, The Fleishman Law Firm, Woodland Hills, CA, for Petitioner

Charles Kelechi Chineduh, Meserve, Mumper & Hughes LLP, Los Angeles, *569CA, for Real Party in Interest Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company

Before: D.W. NELSON and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation..

ORDER ***

The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. We vacate the district court’s January 26, 2017 order and direct the district court to enter judgment for the petitioner awarding him payment of his long-term disability benefits, interest, attorney fees, and costs, and reinstatement of the long-term disability policy.

The Clerk shall serve this order on the district court.

PETITION GRANTED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 849

To amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to protect

elected judges against discrimination based on age.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 24 (legislative day, MAY 15), 1995

Mr. D’AMATO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

A BILL

To amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 to protect elected judges against discrimination

based on age.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AMENDMENT.

4 The second sentence of section 11(f) of the Age Dis5 crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.

6 630(f)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, or to persons holding

7 judicial office’’ before the period.
2

•S 849 IS

1 SEC. 2. APPLICABILITY.

2 The amendment made by section 1 shall not apply

3 with respect to conduct occurring before the date of enact4 ment of this Act.

Æ
#### John Randall FUTCH, Petitioner-appellant v. Cheron NASH, Warden, Federal Correctional Institute Bastrop, Respondent-appellee

No. 16-50147 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 13, 2017

John Randall Futch, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John Randall Futch, federal prisoner # 08700-021, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, challenging the sentence he received on federal mail fraud charges on the ground that a prior state court conviction which had been used to calculate, his criminal history was subsequently invalidated. He raised the identical claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed in the court of conviction, but the motion was dismissed as time-barred. As he did below, Futch contends that he is entitled to proceed under § 2241 pursuant to the savings clause of § 2255(e).

*322We review de novo the dismissal of a § 2241 petition. *Pack v. Yusuff,*218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). Generally, claims of trial or sentencing errors are not properly raised in a § 2241 petition. *Tolliver v. Dobre,*211 F.3d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 2000). However, a § 2241 petition that attacks a federal conviction or sentence may be considered if the petitioner shows that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” § 2255(e), which in turn requires him to show that the claims are “based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense,” and that the claims were previously “foreclosed by circuit law,” *Reyes-Requena v. United*States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). Futch must therefore prove that, in light of “a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision, he was convicted for conduct that did not constitute a crime.” *Jeffers v. Chandler,*253 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 2001).

As the district court correctly determined, Futch has failed to make such a showing. He does not rely on a previously unavailable, retroactive Supreme Court decision indicating that he is innocent of the offense of conviction. *See id.*Instead, he argues that he could not have raised his proposed claim in a second § 2255 motion due to successiveness. The argument is belied by the record, which shows that he in fact raised a timely and successful challenge to his similarly calculated sentence on federal drug charges in a second § 2255 motion after the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated his prior state conviction. Even were that not so, § 2255 relief is not inadequate or ineffective merely because such a motion would be time-barred, was previously denied, or would not meet the requirements for authorization to file a second or successive motion. *Pack,*218 F.3d at 452-53.

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Futch’s motions to expedite his appeal and for leave to file a second supplemental brief are DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             734
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,707
<ALLOWANCES>                                    11,673
<INVENTORY>                                      3,558
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                47,783
<PP&E>                                         125,167
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,202
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 210,219
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           25,139
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           176
<OTHER-SE>                                      83,378
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   210,219
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               122,015
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  118,023
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 9,618
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,772
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,992
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,597
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,395
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    134
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,261
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .10
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Diego VILLALOBOS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51105 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 12, 2017

*316Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Diego Villalobos, Jr., federal prisoner # 64259-180, appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction of sentence. He contends that he was entitled to a reduction under Amendment 782 and that the district court abused its discretion in denying relief because the court failed to consider the sentencing factors of § 3553(a), Villalobos’s rehabilitative efforts, and his postsentencing conduct. Vil-lalobos also argues that the court relied too heavily on his aggravating role. He further asserts that a denial of a reduction in his sentence resulted in unwarranted sentencing disparities among coconspira-tors.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). *United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). The record shows that the district court considered Villalobos’s postsentencing conduct and the factors of § 3553(a). Moreover, the sentencing court is not required to provide reasons for its denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See Evans,*587 F.3d at 674. Additionally, the reduction of sentences of other offenders does not establish that the denial of Villalobos’s motion created unwarranted sentencing disparities. *See United States v. Smith,*595 F.3d 1322, 1323 (5th Cir. 2010); *see also United States v. Duhon,*541 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that disparity between codefendants’ sentences was not unwarranted when situations were different).

To the extent Villalobos challenges the validity of the original sentence, his claims are not cognizable in a § 3582(c)(2) motion. *See United States v. Hernandez,*645 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2011). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.