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	9% ()%"5)&.Defendant David Askarov appealshis convictions on drug offenses. He argues that the districtcourt erred by allowing the government to cross-examine himconcerning financial information his counsel provided to theUnited States Probation Office in an effort to obtain newcourt-appointed counsel for him. For the reasons statedbelow, weAFFIRMthe district court.I.United States Customs Service agents arrested Askarovnear the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Airport afterdiscovering 9.5 kilograms of ecstacy in his luggage. Askarovowns and operates a jewelry business in Belgium and hadflown to Cincinnati from Paris.Askarov was later indicted for possessing ecstacy withintent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), andillegally importing ecstacy into the United States, in violationof 21 U.S.C. § 952. Gary Sergent was provisionallyappointed to represent Askarov. However, based on-%&$(that Askarov owned his own business, the court later decidedthat Askarov was ineligible for a public defender, and Sergentmoved for his removal as Askarov’s counsel on December 14,1999. On December 16, Sergent sent a letter to U.S.Probation Officer Stacey Mills along with a fax from theKBC Bank in Antwerp, Belgium. The fax explained thatAskarov had defaulted on home and business loans held bythe bank, and that it had frozen all lines of credit to him andwould, if necessary, foreclose on his home. In the letter,Sergent told Mills that he had moved to be stricken as counseland suggested that the fax might be useful for the magistratejudge in deciding Askarov’s ability to retain other counsel.Sergent also sent a copy of both documents to prosecutorDavid Bunning. The following day, the magistrate judge
	granted Sergent’s motion to withdraw. Askarov later retainedthe services of his current counsel, Thomas and Jon Alig.At trial, Askarov testified on direct examination that heowned and operated a jewelry business in Antwerp. Oncross-examination, the government had the followingexchange with him:Government:Prior to your arrest, isn’t it true that youwere having financial problems with your business?Askarov:No. No, [I] didn’t have any problem.The prosecutor then questioned Askarov about hisoutstanding home and business loans to KBC Bank, readingfrom the fax Sergent sent him. Askarov’s attorney objectedto the government’s use of the document and moved for amistrial. The court overruled the objection and denied themotion. Askarov was convicted of both counts, and wassentenced to seventy-eight months imprisonment on eachcount, to run concurrently.II.Askarov argues that information he used to assert his SixthAmendment right to counsel may not be used against him assubstantive evidence of his guilt. To allow this, Askarovargues, would force him to chose between his SixthAmendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment rightagainst self-incrimination. In support, he relies onSimmonsv. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1968) (evidenceprovided by defendant to assert Fourth Amendment rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure could not be used assubstantive-%&$(of his guilt), andUnited States v.Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding, based onSimmons, that government could not use financial disclosuresdefendant made to obtain court-appointed counsel as evidencethat he was engaged in money laundering).But cf. Michiganv. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 347-52 (1990) (evidence obtained inviolation of Sixth Amendment could be used to impeach1
	defendant’s trial testimony). In the alternative, he argues thatthe government violated federal evidentiary Rules 608(b),611(b), 802 and 901.We need not decide Askarov’s claim of constitutional errorbecause we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any sucherror resulting from the prosecution’s references to the bankfax was harmless.See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967) (articulating "beyond a reasonable doubt"'"$& &for harmless error);see alsoDelaware v. Van Arsdall, 475U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (applying harmless error'"$& &toConfrontation Clause violations). The government’s-%&$(against Askarov was strong: he identified a bagfound to contain more than 30,000 ecstacy pills as his own toundercover Customs agents, and an audiotape of thatidentification was played to the jury. Furthermore, as thedistrict court found, the prosecutor could have obtained thedisputed financial report directly from Askarov’s bank evenif Askarov’s counsel had not provided it to him. For the samereasons, we conclude that any evidentiary errors made by thedistrict court in allowing cross-examination based on thisdocument did not amount to an abuse of its discretion.SeeUnited States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587, 597 (6th Cir. 1992)(evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion). Nordid the court abuse its discretion in denying Askarov’s motionfor a mistrial.See United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 926-27 (6th Cir. 1986) (denial of motion for mistrial reviewed forabuse of discretion).Finally, we conclude that the prosecutor did not engage inactionable misconduct by referring to the fax in his crossexamin"%$  '+ - In order to merit a new trial, aprosecutor’s conduct must be improper and flagrant.SeeUnited States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001).To determine flagrancy, the court considers: (1) whether theconduct tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant;(2) whether the conduct was isolated or extensive; (3) whetherthe remarks were made deliberately or accidentally; and (4)whether the-%&$(against the defendant was strong.Seeid.Here the remarks were limited to a portion of Askarov’s
	cross-examination and, as discussed above, there wassubstantial other evidence to support his conviction.Accordingly, we find that the prosecutor’s conduct was notflagrant and therefore was not sufficient to merit a new trial.AFFIRMED.