alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6730 

To rescind amounts made available for the Department of Commerce Nonrecurring Expenses Fund by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 12, 2023 

Mr. ROY (for himself, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. PERRY, Mr. NORMAN, Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina, Mr. OGLES, Mr. DONALDS, Mr. 

EMMER, and Mr. RESCHENTHALER) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition 

to the Committees on the Budget, Financial Services, Transportation and 

Infrastructure, Science, Space, and Technology, Natural Resources, Oversight and Accountability, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary, for a period 

to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 

concerned 

A BILL 

To rescind amounts made available for the Department of 

Commerce Nonrecurring Expenses Fund by the Fiscal 

Responsibility Act of 2023, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eliminate Congres5 sional Slush Funds Act’’. 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6730 IH

1 SEC. 2. RESCISSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED FOR DE2 PARTMENT OF COMMERCE NONRECURRING 

3 EXPENSES FUND. 

4 (a) RESCISSION.—The total amount of unobligated 

5 funds made available by section 101(e) of the Fiscal Re6 sponsibility Act of 2023 (Public Law 118–5) for the De7 partment of Commerce Nonrecurring Expenses Fund are 

8 hereby permanently rescinded. 

9 (b) CLASSIFICATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.— 

10 The budgetary effects of subsection (a) shall not count for 

11 purposes of section 251 of the Balanced Budget and 

12 Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or allocation pur13 suant to section 302(a) or 302(b) of the Congressional 

14 Budget Act of 1974. 

Æ 


ssavage on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCUS L. HARRISON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

J. SAMPLE, Officer,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 08-17175

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00959-SI

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 15, 2009** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Marcus L. Harrison appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant in Harrison’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action alleging that defendant, a corrections officer, was deliberately indifferent to

FILED

DEC 22 2009

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Harrison’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s

summary judgment. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009). 

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Harrison, a genuine dispute

exists as to whether defendant was subjectively aware that Harrison was suffering

from a medical emergency and responded adequately. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). Harrison offered evidence that he expressly told

defendant that he was experiencing a medical emergency due to his asthma, and

that defendant responded by telling Harrison he would have to wait until rounds to

receive his inhaler. Harrison also offered evidence that his fellow inmates

informed defendant that Harrison was experiencing a medical emergency, and that

defendant responded by “waiving off” their pleas for assistance and slamming shut

the window to the control booth. Because, cumulatively, this evidence creates a

triable issue of fact as to whether defendant was deliberately indifferent, summary

judgment on Harrison’s Eighth Amendment claim was inappropriate. See Conn,

572 F.3d at 1057–58.

A genuine dispute also exists as to whether Sample is entitled to qualified

immunity. As discussed above, there is a triable issue as to whether defendant’s
3

actions violated the Constitution. Furthermore, it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that delaying access to medical treatment in a medical emergency is

unlawful. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

by 1995 “it was . . . clearly established that [an] officer[] could not intentionally

deny or delay access to medical care”). Therefore, the district court erred in

granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Because we reverse the district court’s summary judgment, Harrison’s

challenge to the denial of his motion to reconsider, his motion to supplement the

record on appeal, and defendant’s motion to strike are moot. See Swirsky v. Carey,

376 F.3d 841, 853 n.24 (9th Cir. 2004).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6305 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6305

To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt of basic 
 allowance for housing for members of the Armed Forces in determining 
               eligibility for certain Federal benefits.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 14, 2016

   Mrs. Davis of California introduced the following bill; which was 
  referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the 
Committee on Agriculture, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt of basic 
 allowance for housing for members of the Armed Forces in determining 
               eligibility for certain Federal benefits.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Military Hunger Prevention Act''.

SEC. 2. BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING AND CERTAIN FEDERAL BENEFITS.

    (a) Exclusion of BAH.--Section 403(k) of title 37, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(4) In determining the eligibility to participate in the 
supplemental nutrition assistance program and the Family Subsistence 
Supplemental Allowance program the value of a housing allowance under 
this section shall be excluded from any calculation of income, assets, 
or resources.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 5(d) of the Food and Nutrition 
Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2014(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (18), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
        a semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (19)(B), by striking the period and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(20) allowance covered by section 403(k)(4) of title 37, 
        United States Code.''.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 10.2**

**Consent of Independent Public Accounting Firm**

The Board of Directors 

Atrium European Real Estate Limited:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-188107) on Form F-3 of Gazit-Globe Ltd of our report datedMarch 10, 2015, with respect to the consolidated statements of financial position of Atrium European Real Estate Limited and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the related consolidated income statements, statements ofcomprehensive income/(loss), cash flow statements, and statements of changes in equity for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2014; as well as our report dated March 11, 2014, with respect to the consolidatedstatements of financial position of Atrium European Real Estate Limited and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2013 and 2012, and the related consolidated income statements, statements of comprehensive income, cash flow statements, and statementsof changes in equity for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2013 which reports appear in the December 31, 2014 annual report on Form 20-F of Gazit-Globe Ltd. 

KPMG Channel Islands Limited 

Jersey, Channel Islands 

April 22, 2015
#### LONGRU WEI; Yibiao Liao, Petitioners v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60744 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 21, 2017

Theodore N. Cox, Esq., New York, NY, for Petitioner

Walter Bocchini, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office'of Immigration Litigation, Thankful Townsend Vanderstar, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Longru Wei and Yibiao Liao, natives and citizens of China, petition this court for review of the decision by the Board of *351Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying their asylum application. Wei contends that she was persecuted in China when family planning officials forced her to have three abortions and that she would be involuntarily sterilized if she were to return to China with her second child, who was born while she was in the United States. Wei’s son, Yibiao, seeks asylum as a derivative applicant.

Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s denial of relief, we will review both decisions. *See Wang v. Holder,*569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). We review factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, and legal questions de novo. *Orellana-Monson v. Holder,*685 F.3d 511, 517-18 (5th Cir. 2012).

An alien seeking asylum must' demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution because of one of five protected grounds including political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i). A forced abortion or an involuntary sterilization qualifies as persecution on account of political opinion under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In this case, the IJ’s and BIA’s denial of Wei’s claim for asylum is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ and BIA provided numerous specific, cogent reasons in support of the IJ’s adverse credibility decision against Wei. *See Zhang v. Gonzales,*432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005). The evidence does not compel a conclusion that Wei demonstrated past persecution through her claim of having three abortions while in China or that she demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution based on her alleged fear of involuntary sterilization or economic penalties if she were to return to China with her two children. *See Zhu v. Gonzales,*493 F.3d 588, 597-98 (5th Cir. 2007); *Zhao v. Gonzales,*404 F.3d 295, 306 (5th Cir. 2005).

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In
connection with the Quarterly Report of CytoGenix, Inc. (the Company) on Form
1O-Q for the period ending September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Greg S. Taylor, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
my knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.   /s/Greg S.
Taylor Greg S.
Taylor Chief Financial
Officer  April 4, 2008
#### IN RE: Henry Earl MILLER, a/k/a Stef, a/k/a Stefan, Petitioner.

No. 17-1363

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Henry Earl Miller, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Henry Earl Miller petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the district court to hold a hearing on or grant his motions for a new trial, an order holding the Government in breach of the plea agreement, and vacatur of Miller’s convictions from his 2005 criminal judgment. We conclude that Miller is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute *758for appeal. *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

The relief sought by Miller is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### INTEGRATED CLAIMS SYSTEMS, LLC, Appellant v. TRAVELERS LLOYDS OF TEXAS INSURANCE COMPANY, The Travelers Indemnity Company, Appellees

2016-2163

2016-2164

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 11, 2017

*960John F. Ward, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, New York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by David Lindenbaum.

Robert L. Burns, II, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Reston, VA, argued for appellees. Also represented by Joshua Goldberg, Washington, DO; Justin A. Hendrix, Palo Alto, CA.

(Dyk, Moore, and Reyna, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and con- . sidered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the accompanying Annual Report of Saratoga Investment Corp. on
Form 10-K/A (the "Report") for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Christian
L. Oberbeck, the Chief Executive Officer and President and Richard A. Petrocelli, the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Compliance Officer and Secretary of Saratoga Investment
Corp., each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:

Date:
June 28, 2011

/s/ Christian L. Oberbeck Name: Christian L. Oberbeck
Chief Executive Officer and President/s/ Richard A. Petrocelli Name: Richard A. Petrocelli
Chief Financial Officer, Chief Compliance Officer and Secretary


---



QuickLinks
#### Darryl L. WEBER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 124; Apprenticeship & Board Members & Companies; R.F. Fisher Electric Co.; Thomas Ferman; Gavin Sealy, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-3252

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Filed: May 3, 2017

*503Darryl L. Weber, Pro Se

Bruce C. Jackson, Jr., Arnold & New-bold, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants-Appellees International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 124, Apprenticeship & Board Members & Companies, R.F. Fisher Electric Co., Thomas Ferman

Bruce C. Jackson, Jr., Michael Gerard Newbold, Arnold & Newbold, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee Gavin Sealy

Before COLLOTON, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Darryl Weber appeals after the District Court,1 upon motion, dismissed his employment action with prejudice as a sanction for failure to comply with a court order to provide discovery responses. Weber, -without explanation, failed to comply with the court’s order to provide supplemental discovery responses, and the record reveals other instances of Weber’s failure to cooperate in the discovery process, even after he was given multiple opportunities to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(l)(A)(ii) (stating that the court may order sanctions if *“a*party, after being properly served with interrogatories ..., fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response”); see also 37(d)(3), (b)(2)(A)(v) (explaining that sanctions may include an order dismissing the action); 41(b) (stating that a defendant may move to dismiss if the plaintiff fails to comply with court rules or a court order). We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. See Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526 F.3d 402, 404-05 (8th Cir. 2008) (reviewing a Rule 41(b) dismissal for an abuse of discretion); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1105 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing appellate review of a Rule 37 sanction).

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

1

. The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
#### UNION STEEL MANUFACTURING CO., LTD., Dongbu Steel Co., Ltd., Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. UNITED STATES, United States Steel Corporation, Nucor Corporation, Defendants-Appellees *911Hyundai Steel Company, fka Hyundai HYSCO, Defendant-Appellant

17-1628

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

March 16, 2017

Donald Cameron, Jr., Mary Hodgins, Brady Mills, Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, Donald Harrison, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Kara Westercamp, Trial Attorney, Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Michael Thomas Gagain, Attorney, Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Jeffrey D. Gerrish, Nicholas Klein, Attorneys, Nathaniel Blaine Bolin, Esq., Luke A. Meisner, Skad-den, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Timothy C. Brightbill, Tessa V. Capeloto, Adam Milan Teslik, Maureen E. Thor son, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.

Jaehong David Park, Attorney, Sylvia Y. Chen, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

The parties having so agreed, it is

ORDERED that the proceeding is DISMISSED under Fed. R. App. P. 42 (b).
#### Ricardo CHAVEZ-FLORES, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-71227

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 31, 2017

Zulu Ali, Law Office of Zulu Ali, Riverside, CA, for Petitioner

Nancy Canter, Trial Attorney, Elizabeth Robyn Chapman, Trial Attorney, Dalin Riley Holyoak, Esquire, Trial Attornéy, Tim Ramnitz, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel- unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ricardo Chavez-Flores, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for the review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Chavez-Flores established extraordinary or changed circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum application. *See*8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(4), (5). Thus, we deny the petition as to Chavez-Flores’ asylum claim.

The BIA denied Chavez-Flores’ withholding of removal claim on the ground *769that Chavez-Flores could relocate within Mexico. Substantial evidence supports this finds. *See*8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(3); *Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft,*336 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (substantial evidence supported finding that presumption of future persecution was rebutted). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to Chavez-Flores’ withholding of removal claim.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Chavez-Flores’ CAT claim because he did not establish it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Mexico. *See Silaya,*524 F.3d at 1073.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Rolf NIEUWEJAAR; Gerd Nieuwejaar, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35387

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*724Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 1, 2017

Jill J. Smith, Esquire, Attorney, Natural Resource Law Group, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Cody M. Weston, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAYY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rolf Nieuwejaar and Gerd Nieuwejaar appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Serra v. Lappin,*600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Nieuwejaars’ action as time-barred because the Nieuwejaars did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three years of consummation of the loan. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); *Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); *Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,*309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit the Nieuwejaars’ contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.