alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6960 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 16, 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, 

Labor, and Pensions 

AN ACT 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize the 

Emergency Medical Services for Children program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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2 

HR 6960 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Emergency Medical 

3 Services for Children Reauthorization Act of 2024’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF GRANTS FOR EMERGENCY 

5 MEDICAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN. 

6 Section 1910(d) of the Public Health Service Act (42 

7 U.S.C. 300w–9(d)) is amended by striking ‘‘and 

8 $22,334,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024’’ 

9 and inserting ‘‘$22,334,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 

10 through 2024, and $24,334,000 for each of fiscal years 

11 2025 through 2029’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 15, 2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


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EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications

  I, Kristen Ann Cronin, certify that:

  1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A and all reports on Form 10-D
     required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report
     on Form 10-K/A of ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
     2006-ASAP6 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
     whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
     to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
     light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
     misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
     information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
     covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
     reports;

  4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
     servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
     conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
     this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
     in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
     their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects;
     and

  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
     criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
     reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
     asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in
     accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
     13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report,
     except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances
     of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in
     this report on Form 10-K/A.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
     information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
     Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as Servicer.

     Dated: May 27, 2008


     /s/ Kristen Ann Cronin
     Signature

     Vice President
     (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master servicer)
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

December 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 132313 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 132313 

 COA: 266069 

Oakland CC: 1999-168299-FH 

CHARMAINE LATROSE MARION, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 15, 2006 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

d1218 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 29, 2006 

 Clerk
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin Douglas SHRADER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4734

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, Brook Bowers Andrews, Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Douglas Shrader appeals his 30-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Shrader contends that the district court erred in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range. We affirm.

Shrader asserts the district court erred in classifying one of his violations — the commission of South Carolina strong arm robbery — as a Grade A violation because the offense qualified as a crime of violence, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.2(a), 7Bl.l(a)(l), p.s. (2006). Shrader argues that, following *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), his strong arm robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under either the Guidelines’ force clause contained in § 4B1.2(a)(l) or the residual clause contained in § 4B1.2(a)(2).

Shrader’s claim is unavailing. Shrader acknowledges that this court held in *United States v. Doctor,*842 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1831, 197 L.Ed.2d 773, 2017 WL 1079626 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2017), that South Carolina strong arm robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). Thus, Shrader’s strong arm robbery conviction necessarily qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ force clause. *See United States v.*
      *812
      *Hemingway,*734 F.3d 323, 337 n.13 (4th Cir. 2013); *United States v. Jarmon,*596 F.3d 228, 231 n.* (4th Cir. 2010). Despite Shrader’s assertion that *Doctor*was wrongly decided, “[i]n this circuit, we are bound by the basic principle that one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel.” *United States v. Williams,*808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In any event, Shrader’s strong arm robbery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause, which is not constitutionally infirm, as the Supreme Court stated in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under Due Process Clause). Thus, any *Johnson*challenge is meritless.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6305 

To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt of basic 

allowance for housing for members of the Armed Forces in determining 

eligibility for certain Federal benefits. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 14, 2016 

Mrs. DAVIS of California introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 

Agriculture, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt 

of basic allowance for housing for members of the Armed 

Forces in determining eligibility for certain Federal benefits. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Hunger Pre5 vention Act’’. 


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2 

•HR 6305 IH

1 SEC. 2. BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING AND CERTAIN 

2 FEDERAL BENEFITS. 

3 (a) EXCLUSION OF BAH.—Section 403(k) of title 37, 

4 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 

5 following new paragraph: 

6 ‘‘(4) In determining the eligibility to participate in 

7 the supplemental nutrition assistance program and the 

8 Family Subsistence Supplemental Allowance program the 

9 value of a housing allowance under this section shall be 

10 excluded from any calculation of income, assets, or re11 sources.’’. 

12 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 5(d) of 

13 the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2014(d)) 

14 is amended— 

15 (1) in paragraph (18), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and 

16 inserting a semicolon; 

17 (2) in paragraph (19)(B), by striking the period 

18 and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

19 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

20 paragraph: 

21 ‘‘(20) allowance covered by section 403(k)(4) of 

22 title 37, United States Code.’’. 

Æ 


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#### Jason VICKS; Mekeisha Vicks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; John Does 1-5, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1786

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 20, 2017

Decided: November 27, 2017

Jason and Mekeisha Vicks, Appellants Pro Se. Dennis Kyle Deak, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Jason and Mekeisha Vicks appeal the district court’s order dismissing the remainder of their civil complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).* We review the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. *Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc.,*851 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2017).

Our review of the record reveals no reversible error. First, the district court properly concluded that Appellants’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel. *See State v. Summers,*351 N.C. 620, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000) (describing doctrine); *Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall,*318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986) (same); *Funderburk v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,*241 N.C.App. 415, 775 S.E.2d 1, 6-7 (2015) (applying doctrine to foreclosure context); *see also Sartin v. Macik,*535 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing privily). Further, even assuming, without deciding, that *In re Lucks,*369 N.C. 222, 794 S.E.2d 501 (2016), could impact this holding, we conclude Appellants’ claims remain subject to dismissal as impermissible collateral attacks on the May 2011 order of the Union County Superior Court Clerk authorizing foreclosure on Appellants’ property, as well as the subsequent state appellate court decisions addressing that order. *See Howse v. Bank of Am., N.A.,*804 S.E.2d 552, 555-57 (2017) (addressing collateral attacks in foreclosure context); *Clayton v. N.C. State Bar,*168 N.C.App. 717, 608 S.E.2d 821, 822 (2005) (describing doctrine). Finally, insofar as Appellants raise claims premised on their contention that their mortgage debt was extinguished in 2013, we conclude that those claims patently fail to state a claim for relief. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (stating standard); *Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd.,*822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[I]f a plaintiff attaches documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis for a claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the document negates the claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

*242Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

*

 We previously affirmed the dismissal of Appellants’ complaint in part but vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings on Appellants’ remaining claims. *Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,*676 Fed.Appx. 167, 169 (4th Cir. 2017).
#### HUA TANG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-72231

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Conrad Gregory Badar, Esquire, Badar Law Group, San Gabriel, CA, for Petitioner

OIL, Siu P. Wong, Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hua Tang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We *912deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Tang’s motion to reopen, where Tang did not establish that exceptional circumstances excused his failure to appear at his hearing. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (defining exceptional circumstances as circumstances beyond the control of the alien); *Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft,*298 F.3d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether exceptional circumstances were present).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Tang’s unexhausted contentions regarding fairness and judicial economy. *See Tijani v. Holder,*628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court lacks jurisdiction to consider legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the agency).

We do not consider the extra-record evidence submitted for the first time with Tang’s opening brief. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (judicial review is limited to the administrative record); *Dent v. Holder,*627 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating standard for review of oufc-of-rec-ord evidence).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code), the undersigned officer of China
Agri-Business, Inc. (the “Company”) does hereby certify with respect to the
Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31,
2009 (the “Report”) that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Date:  April 15, 2010
              /s/ Liping DengLiping DengChief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)




The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United
States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate
disclosure document.
EXHIBIT 32.1 – 906 Certification








PEGASUS TEL, INC.





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUNT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Pegasus Tel, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jerry Gruenbaum, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.








By: /s/ Jerry Gruenbaum


Jerry Gruenbaum


Chief Executive Officer


and Chairman of the Board





April 16, 2013





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Section 906"), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Pegasus Tel, Inc., and will be retained by Pegasus Tel, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Michael Eugene REED, II, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Erik A. HOOKS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6771

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 30, 2017

Michael Eugene Reed, II, Appellant Pro Se. .

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Eugene Reed, II, seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reed has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 677 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 437
104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                 S. 677

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 11, 1995

               Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

                           September 17, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
                       and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
     To repeal a redundant venue provision, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL.

    (a) Repeal.--Subsection (a) of section 1392 of title 28, United 
States Code, is repealed.
    (b) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (b) of section 1392 of title 
28, United States Code, is amended by striking ``(b) Any'' and 
inserting ``Any''.

            Passed the Senate June 30 (legislative day, June 19), 1995.

            Attest:

                                             KELLY D. JOHNSTON,

                                                             Secretary.
                                     

                                                 Union Calendar No. 437

104th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                 S. 677

                          [Report No. 104-800]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

     To repeal a redundant venue provision, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 17, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
                       and ordered to be printed
```
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 651 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 651

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 820 Elmwood Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, as the ``Sister Ann 
                          Keefe Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 2, 2015

 Mr. Cicilline (for himself and Mr. Langevin) introduced the following 
 bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government 
                                 Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 820 Elmwood Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, as the ``Sister Ann 
                          Keefe Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SISTER ANN KEEFE POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 820 Elmwood Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Sister Ann Keefe Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sister Ann 
Keefe Post Office''.
                                 <all>
```