alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

Exhibit 32.1 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIALOFFICER 

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

The undersigned, Daniel McKinney, the President and ChiefExecutive Officer of Sino Fibre Communications, Inc. hereby certifies, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report on Form10-K of Sino Fibre Communications, Inc., for the yearended December 31, 2008, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that theinformation contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-Kfairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of Sino Fibre Communications, Inc. 

Date: April 16, 2009 

/s/ Daniel McKinney      Daniel McKinney President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) 

A signed original of this written statement required bySection 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwiseadopting the signature that appear in typed form within the electronic versionof this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to SinoFibre Communications, Inc. and will be retained by Sino Fibre Communications,Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest. 

 

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM UNAUDITED
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF POWERCERV CORPORATION AS OF AND
FOR THE NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10-Q FILING.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,697
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,447
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,509
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,064
<PP&E>                                           5,062
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,382
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   9,513
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,448
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            14
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,224
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     9,513
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,431
<CGS>                                            5,225
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,926
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    24
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 159
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (7,531)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       255
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (7,786)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.57)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.57)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM STERLING COMMERCE,
INC. FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         394,054
<SECURITIES>                                   199,928
<RECEIVABLES>                                  147,170
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               777,410
<PP&E>                                         141,231
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,285
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,027,561
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          175,285
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           952
<OTHER-SE>                                     799,144
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,027,561
<SALES>                                        140,778
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               140,778
<CGS>                                           31,581
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   96,716
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 50,312
<INCOME-TAX>                                    18,379
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             31,933
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    31,933
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.34
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.33
        

</TABLE>
#### Vicente QUIROZ, Appellant v. John Thomas MORAN, Jr., et al., Appellees

No. 17-5139

September Term, 2017

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: November 15, 2017

Rehearing En Banc Denied January 23, 2018

Vicente Quiroz, Pro Se

R. Craig Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, (USA) Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees

BEFORE: Henderson, Kavanaugh, and Millett, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed May 12,2017, be affirmed. Appellant does not challenge the dismissal of his claims against appellee Moran on res .judicata grounds, and accordingly any such challenge is deemed to have been waived. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

With respect to appellant’s claims against the United States and the U.S. Public Defender’s Office, his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law because he offers no basis to conclude those entities acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Appellant’s claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), relies on a theory of respondeat superior based on the assertion that Moran is employed by the U.S. Public Defender’s Office. That assertion is factually incorrect because Moran is a private attorney who was appointed to represent appellant in his criminal trial. The claim also fails as a matter of law because “Bivens claims cannot rest merely on respondeat superior.” Simpkins v. D.C. Government, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Moreover, court-appointed defense attorneys and public defenders do not act under color of state or federal law when acting in their capacity as defense counsel and, therefore, are not subject to claims under either Bivens or § 1983. See Hinton v. Rudasill, 384 Fed.Appx. 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).

To the extent appellant’s appellate brief discusses potential claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), those claims were not presented to the district court and “cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.” United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *2See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Davier DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10349 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(April 10, 2017)

Gregory Schiller, Michelle B. Alvarez, Cary Oren Aronovitz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Laura Thomas Rivero, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Celeste S. Higgins, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Davier Diaz appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 80 months following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Diaz contends that the district court erred in calculating his sentencing range when it relied on the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines to conclude that his prior convictions in Florida of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling qualified as crimes of violence. He argues that the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm.

The district court committed no error. Diaz’s argument is foreclosed by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), and our earlier decision in *United States v. Matchett,*802 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2015). In *Beckles,*the Supreme Court affirmed this Court and ruled, as we had in *Matchett,*that the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) was not unconstitutionally vague because the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to challenges for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. *Beckles,*137 S.Ct. at 890, 895. In *Matchett,*we also determined that a prior conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under Florida law, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), was a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of section *8884B1.2(a)(2). 802 F.3d at 1196-97. We affirm Diaz’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.
Wilshire Credit Corporation
Payments
P.O. Box 30040; Los Angeles, CA  90030-0040
or   P.O. Box 650314; Dallas, TX  75265-0314
Correspondence

P.O. Box 8517; Portland, OR  97207-8517
Phone

(503) 952-7947
(888) 502-0100
Fax

(503) 952-7476
Web Site

www.wfsg.com
Exhibit 31
Exhibit S
SARBANES-OXLEY CERTIFICATION

March 1, 2007
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 250 Vesey Street 4 World Financial Center, 10
th
Floor
New York, New York  10080
U.S. Bank National Association 60 Livingston Avenue Mail Code EP-MN-WS3D St. Paul, Minnesota 55107-2292 Attn: Structured Finance/SURF 2006-BC5
Re:
Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-BC5,

Pool 1413

I, Ken Frye, Senior Vice President, Loan Servicing, certify that:
1.

I, or persons under my supervision, have reviewed the report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., Depositor (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");
2.

Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.

Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under
Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;
4.

I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the Servicer and based on my knowledge and the
compliance review conducted in preparing the Servicer compliance statement required by this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the Servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the Servicing Agreement; and
5.

All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for ABS and their related attestation
reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the Trustee, U.S.
Bank National Association, an unaffiliated party.
Wilshire Credit Corporation, as Servicer
By:__/s/__Ken Frye____________ Name: Ken Frye Title: Senior Vice President Loan Servicing (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the servicer)
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Carl Deon SHINN Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1365

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 6, 2017

Filed: November 9, 2017

Virginia Bruner, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*565Timothy S. Ross-Boon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant-Appellant

Carl Deon Shinn, Pro Se

Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Carl Shinn directly appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed upon revoking his supervised release. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief challenging the substantive reasonableness of Shinn’s above-guidelines prison term. Shinn has filed a *pro se*brief challenging the revocation decision and his revocation sentence, and arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the revocation of Shinn’s supervised release was proper. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (stating that the court may revoke a term of supervised release if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release); *United States v. Miller,*557 F.3d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for clear error factual findings related to a supervised-release revocation). We further conclude that the revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable, as it is within the statutory limits, and the court appropriately considered relevant factors. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (identifying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that the court must consider before revoking a term of supervised release and imposing a sentence); *United States v. Growden,*663 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence for an abuse of discretion). As for Shinn’s ineffective-assistance arguments, we decline to consider them on direct appeal. *See United States v. Hughes,*330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that ineffective-assistance claims are more properly reviewed in collateral proceedings). Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
[Cite as State v. Scroggins , 2015-Ohio-4742.]

8 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-05-083

: D E C I S I O N - vs - 11/16/2015 : PETER E. SCROGGINS, : Defendant-Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2014-10-1562

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, OH 45011-6057, for plaintiff-appellee Haughey & Niehaus, LLC, Neal D. Schuett, 121 West High Street, Oxford, Ohio 45056, for defendant-appellant

Per Curiam. {¶ 1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript of the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. {¶ 2} Counsel for defendant-appellant, Peter Scroggins, has filed a brief with this court pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1)Butler CA2015-05-083

- 2 - indicates that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any errors by the trial court prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may be predicated; (2) lists four potential errors "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders , at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. {¶ 3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to appellant's rights in the proceedings in the tr ial court. The motion of counsel for appellant requesting to wit hdraw as counsel is grant ed, and this a ppeal is dismissed for the reason that it is wholly frivolous.

S. POWELL, P.J., RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Octavia Jermaine WINTERS, also known as Jermaine Octavia Winters, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-60754 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 17, 2017

Annette .Williams, Gaines H. Cleveland, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Mississippi, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James L. Farrior, III, Esq., Biloxi, MS, for Defendant-Appellant

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Octavia Jermaine Winters appeals his 120-month sentence of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea conviction for theft of a firearm from a licensed dealer. Winters argues that the Government breached the terms of the plea agreement wherein it agreed to recommend a sentence in the lower 50% of the guidelines range and to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment. He argues that the inclusion of relevant conduct to calculate his guidelines range constituted a breach. Winters further also challenges the calculation of his offense level and his criminal history score. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for summary affirmance based on the appeal waiver provision in Winters’s plea agreement.

Although “an alleged breach of a plea agreement may be raised despite a waiver provision,” *United States v. Roberts,*624 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2010), our review of the record shows that the Government did not breach the plea agreement as its conduct was not clearly or obviously inconsistent with a reasonable understanding of its obligations, *see Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 133-38, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009); *United States v. Hinojosa,*749 F.3d 407, 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2014).

Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. The Government’s alternative motion for summary affirmance is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# EUR-Lex - 32003D0318(01) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32003D0318(01)

**Council Decision of 6 March 2003 renewing the Management Board of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training **

*
Official Journal C 064 , 18/03/2003 P. 0004 - 0006 *

Council Decision

of 6 March 2003

renewing the Management Board of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training

(2003/C 64/03)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 of 10 February 1975 establishing the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, and in particular Article 4 thereof(1),

Having regard to the lists of nominees submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States as regards their representatives and by the Commission as regards the employees' and employers' representatives,

Whereas:

(1) By its Decision of 17 December 1999(2), the Council appointed the members of the Management Board of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training for the period from 17 December 1999 to 16 December 2002.

(2) The members of the Management Board of that Centre should be appointed for a period of three years,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The following are hereby appointed members of the Management Board of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training for the period from 6 March 2003 to 5 March 2006:

I. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

>TABLE>

II. REPRESENTATIVES OF EMPLOYEES' ORGANISATIONS

>TABLE>

III. REPRESENTATIVES OF EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATIONS

>TABLE>

Article 2

The Council shall appoint at a later date the members not yet nominated from Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published, for information, in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 6 March 2003.

For the Council

The President

D. Reppas

(1) OJ L 39, 13.2.1975, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 354/95 (OJ L 41, 23.2.1995, p. 1).

(2) OJ C 4, 7.1.2000, p. 4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Hector PARRALES-GUZMAN, also known as Hector Guzman Parrales, also known as Hector Guzman Perales, also known as Hector Parrales Guzman, also known as Hector Perales-Guzman, also known as Hector Parrales, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-20700 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 8, 2017

Katherine Lisa Haden, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S, Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Frank Aguilar, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

*383PER CURIAM: *

Hector Parrales-Guzman appeals his conviction of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1826(a) and (b)(1). He contends that his prior removal ultimately rested on the application of the crime of violence definition in 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which he argues is unconstitutionally vague. He correctly acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. *United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria,*831 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), *petition for cert. filed*(Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). Accordingly, we GRANT the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED as unnecéssary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.