Supreme Court of Louisiana

Page 1 of 1 

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #026

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 3rd day of May, 2017, are as follows:

BY CRICHTON, J.: 

2016-C-1809 NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY v. LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE 

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, ET AL. (Parish of Orleans) 

Through the discharge of its duties and responsibilities set 

forth in the CEA with the City of New Orleans, as well as the 

receipt of public money as remuneration for such services, we 

find the LSPCA is functioning as an instrumentality of a 

municipal corporation, and is therefore subject to the Louisiana

Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. We therefore affirm

the court of appeal in that regard. We further find that the

reporting requirements contained in the CEA do not satisfy the 

Public Records Law, as the requirement for access to public

records cannot be circumscribed by contract. The LSPCA is 

required to disclose all documents specifically related to the 

discharge of its duties and responsibilities outlined in the CEA

with the City of New Orleans, and we remand to the district court

to determine which documents satisfy that description.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 

HUGHES, J., dissents in part with reasons. 
1

05/03/2017

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2016-C-1809

NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY

VERSUS

LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION 

OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, 

FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

CRICHTON, J.

We granted the writ in this matter to determine whether the Louisiana 

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“LSPCA”) is subject to the 

Louisiana Public Records Law. New Orleans Bulldog Society v. Louisiana Society 

for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.,16-1809 (La. 1/9/17), ___ So.3d 

___. More specifically, we must determine whether the LSPCA, by virtue of its 

Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (“CEA”) with the City of New Orleans to 

provide animal control services as mandated by the New Orleans Municipal Code, 

is an instrumentality of a municipal corporation such that it must comply with La. 

R.S. 44:1 et seq. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court of appeal, and 

find that the LSPCA, through its function of providing animal control services for 

the City of New Orleans, is an instrumentality of the City of New Orleans and 

must comply with the Public Records Law as set forth herein. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The New Orleans Bulldog Society (“Bulldog”) is a nonprofit corporation 

operating under Louisiana law, and founded in order to advocate for the welfare of 

dogs in New Orleans and elsewhere. The Louisiana Society for the Prevention of 

Cruelty to Animals (“LSPCA”), first chartered in 1888, is a private non-profit 
2

corporation recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as a private charitable 

501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation. According to the affidavit of Ms. Ana Zorilla, the 

Chief Executive Officer of the LSPCA, the LSPCA’s mission is to “advocate for 

the animals of Louisiana by advancing their welfare, promoting their interests, and 

fostering the human-animal bond through innovative programs, education, and 

services.” The LSPCA also provides animal control services for the City of New 

Orleans (“the City”), as required by Chapter 18 of the City of New Orleans Code 

of Ordinances. In order to facilitate those services, the LSPCA maintains a 

“Cooperative Endeavor Agreement” with the City, which states that “[t]he Society 

shall provide the following service to the City. . . . [f]ield and shelter services for 

the City in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement and, except 

as otherwise provided herein, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 18 of the Code 

of Municipal Ordinances for the City. . . . relating to animal control and shelter 

services.”1 The CEA specifically sets forth the duties of the LSPCA to include, 

among others, continuous patrols with radio contact throughout the City;

responding to emergency calls involving animals or threat to human life; 

investigating reports of violations of the provisions of Chapter 18; maintaining 

veterinary services; spaying and neutering, rabies vaccinations, and reviewing 

animal related ordinances with the City.

On May 29, 2015, Bulldog sent a public records request to the City of New 

Orleans, pursuant to La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. In the request, Bulldog set forth several 

inquiries regarding LSPCA’s standard operating procedures for evaluating 

surrendered and stray dogs in terms of determining eligibility for adoption, 

 

1 Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances, entitled “Animals,” sets forth numerous provisions 

related to animal control, which include impoundment of animals, licensing of animals, spaying 

and neutering of dogs, rabies control, as well as the various fines and penalties which can be 

imposed for violations of the Code.
3

documents related to those dogs and cats considered “adoptable” and 

“unadoptable,” specific documents regarding euthanized cats and dogs in certain 

years, and documents and information relating to LSPCA’s participation in court 

proceedings in Orleans Parish. The request also sought information related to the 

transfer or euthanasia of a specific animal named Leatrice. The City responded on 

June 4, 2015, informing Bulldog that it is not the custodian of the records Bulldog 

sought to obtain, and that the request should be forwarded to the LSPCA.

Bulldog forwarded its request to the LSPCA on June 5, 2015, to which the 

LSPCA responded that it is not a “public body” under the Public Records Law, and 

is therefore exempt from the statute. Although the LSPCA acknowledged its CEA 

with the City, it stated that the City maintains all information related to the 

reporting requirements of the CEA.

On July 22, 2015, Bulldog filed a petition for damages and a writ of 

mandamus, asserting that, through its agreement with the City, the LSPCA 

performs a variety of governmental functions that the City is required to discharge 

as a matter of law. As such, Bulldog asserted the LSPCA is subject to the 

Louisiana Public Records Law. In response, the LSPCA filed exceptions of 

unauthorized use of a summary proceeding and no cause of action. The LSPCA 

attached the affidavit of Ms. Ana Zorilla,2 who asserted it is a private nonprofit 

organization, not formed by any public body or pursuant to any legislative or 

statutory authority. Ms. Zorilla further stated that the LSPCA is not obligated to 

perform any governmental function beyond what is set forth in the CEA, and the 

monthly sum of $153,870, paid by the City to the LSPCA, comprises only a 

 2 The LSPCA also provided the affidavit of Ms. Charlotte Parent, who serves as the Director of Health for the City 

of New Orleans. She stated the LSPCA has complied with all reporting requirements set forth in the CEA from 

2013 to the present, as Bulldog had been provided with the LSPCA’s monthly operational reports related to animal 

control services, which are required pursuant to the CEA. Moreover, Ms. Parent asserted that the referenced 

operations reports are the only public records which exist related to the animal control services provided to the City 

by the LSPCA.
4

portion of the LSPCA’s total budget. The LSPCA also emphasized that even if it 

the court found that a public record request may be directed to it, the scope of that 

request should be limited to those documents that are prepared and maintained 

pursuant to the CEA. 

Following a hearing on September 17, 2015, the trial court dismissed 

Bulldog’s writ of mandamus and request for preliminary injunction, and granted 

the LSPCA’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal. In her written reasons for 

judgment, the trial court found the LSPCA is not a “quasi-public” entity subject to 

the Public Records Law, as the LSPCA is a private non-profit entity with a private 

board whose mission is independent from the mission of any governmental entity. 

Furthermore, the trial court concluded the LSPCA was formed as a private nonprofit organization and only 12% of its income is derived from its CEA with the 

City. The trial court also ruled that by virtue of its reporting requirement to the 

City under the CEA, the LSPCA had complied with all reporting requirements as 

set forth therein. 

The court of appeal reversed, finding that the record establishes the LSPCA 

was acting as an instrumentality of the City in rendering mandated municipal 

services such as investigating municipal code violations, seizing animals and 

serving citations in the course of its investigations, euthanizing animals, using 

vehicles maintained and fueled by the municipality, and employing uniformed 

officers who appear in court to testify regarding these violations. Therefore, by 

virtue of its function in complying with the CEA, the court of appeal concluded the 

LSPCA is a quasi-public entity subject to the Public Records Law. New Orleans 

Bulldog Society v. Louisiana Society for the Prevent of Cruelty to Animals, et al., 

15-1351 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 996. 
5

The appellate court also found the trial court erred in ruling that even 

assuming the LSPCA is subject to the Public Records Law, its reporting 

obligations were met by compliance with the CEA reporting requirements. The 

appellate court concluded that the Public Records Law “cannot be circumscribed 

by contract,” as the Public Records statute, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq., is intended to be 

all inclusive, and not limited to certain contractual reporting requirements. 

Consequently, the court of appeal ruled that the LSPCA failed to meet its burden 

(as custodian of the records sought) of proving the documents sought by Bulldog 

are not subject to inspection under the Louisiana Public Records Law. For the 

reasons that follow, we agree. 

DISCUSSION

Article XII, ' 3 of the Louisiana Constitution provides: “No person shall be 

denied the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public 

documents, except in cases established by law.” Moreover, “[t]he right of access 

to public records is a fundamental right guaranteed by La. Const. art. XII, ' 3 of 

the Louisiana Constitution, and whenever there is any doubt as to whether the 

public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in 

favor of the public’s right of access.” Landis v. Moreau, 00-1157, p. 4 (La. 

2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694, citing Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 

933 (La. 1984). The Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq.,

provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) As used in this Chapter, the phrase “public body” means 

any branch, department, office, agency, board, commission, 

district, governing authority, political subdivision, or any 

committee, subcommittee, advisory board, or task force thereof, 

any other instrumentality of state, parish, or municipal 

government, including a public or quasi-public nonprofit 

corporation designated as an entity to perform a governmental 

or proprietary function, or an affiliate of a housing authority.
6

(2)(a) All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter 

books, maps, drawings, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, 

memoranda, and papers, and all copies, duplicates, 

photographs, including microfilm, or other reproductions 

thereof, or any other documentary materials, regardless of 

physical form or characteristics, including information 

contained in electronic data processing equipment, having been 

used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use in 

the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, 

transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, 

transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the 

constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of 

any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body 

or concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or 

paid by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of 

this state, are “public records”, except as otherwise provided in 

this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana.

(b) Notwithstanding Subparagraph (a), any 

documentary material of a security feature 

of a public body's electronic data processing 

system, information technology system, 

telecommunications network, or electronic 

security system, including hardware or 

software security, password, or security 

procedure, process, configuration, software, 

and code is not a “public record”.

(3) As used in this Chapter, the word “custodian” means the 

public official or head of any public body having custody or 

control of a public record, or a representative specifically 

authorized by him to respond to requests to inspect any such 

public records.

* * *

It is well established that legislation is the solemn expression of the 

legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the 

legislative intent. See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Kenner, 15-1175, p.4 (La. 1/27/16), 187 

So. 3d 404, 409-10. See also La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1) (“The text of a law is the best 

evidence of legislative intent.”). When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its 

application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, 

with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. La. R.S. 1:4. 

The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute 
7

itself. See, e.g., Dunn, 15-1175, p.4, 187 So. 3d at 410. When, on the other hand, a 

statute is not clear and unambiguous, or its application leads to absurd 

consequences, we rely on secondary rules of statutory interpretation to discern the 

meaning of the statute at issue. See Red Stick Studio Dev., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. 

Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 10-0193, p. 10 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So. 3d 181, 187-88 

(quotation omitted). In such cases, the statute “must be interpreted as having the 

meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words 

of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in 

which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” Id. 

This Court has consistently held that the Public Records Law should be 

construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to public documents. 

As stated above, whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of 

access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public’s right 

to see; to allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary restriction on the 

public’s constitutional rights. Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-2225, p. 9-10, 

(La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726; In re Matter Under Investigation, 07–1853 

(La.7/1/09), 15 So.3d 972, 989; Capital City Press v. East Baton Rouge Parish 

Metropolitan Council, 96–1979 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 564; Title Research 

Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 937 (La. 1984). Furthermore, throughout the 

public records statutes, “[t]here was no intent on the part of the legislature to 

qualify, in any way, the right of access.” Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-

2225, p. 9, (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726, 734, citing Landis v. Moreau, 00-1157, p. 

4-5 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 691, 694-5 (citing Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 

450 So.2d 933, 937 (La. 1984)).3

 

3 See also, La. R.S. 44:4.1, which provides in pertinent part:
8

In addressing the issue we are presented with today, namely, whether La. 

R.S. 44:1 applies to the LSPCA under these circumstances, we find the court of 

appeal correctly focused on the function the LSPCA serves as an “instrumentality”

of the City of New Orleans, through its CEA to provide animal control services. 

As La. R.S. 44:1 states, a public body subject to the Public Records Law includes 

“. . . .any other instrumentality of state, parish, or municipal government,

[

4

]

including a public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as an entity to 

perform a governmental or proprietary function. . . .” (emphasis added). As set 

forth in the CEA, and correctly noted by the court of appeal, the LSPCA performs 

certain functions as an instrumentality of the City of the New Orleans. In other 

words, the LSPCA’s duties (as well as privileges it enjoys) in providing animal 

control services for the City are at the behest of the municipality and arising out of 

their outlined agreement to do so. The LSPCA acts under color of City authority 

through its enforcement of Chapter 18 infractions, issuance of citations, and 

appearance in court on related matters of animal control. More specifically, the 

evidence in the record establishes that, by virtue of the CEA, the LSPCA is vested 

with authority to investigate compliance with municipal code violations related to 

animals and to take appropriate action. According to the CEA, the LSPCA must 

provide “shelter services for the City” which include “receiving unwanted animals 

 

A. The legislature recognizes that it is essential to the operation of a democratic 

government that the people be made aware of all exceptions, exemptions, and 

limitations to the laws pertaining to public records. In order to foster the 

people's awareness, the legislature declares that all exceptions, exemptions, 

and limitations to the laws pertaining to public records shall be provided for in 

this Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana. Any exception, exemption, and 

limitation to the laws pertaining to public records not provided for in this 

Chapter or in the Constitution of Louisiana shall have no effect.

***

 (emphasis added)

4 Article 6, ' 44 of the Louisiana constitution defines “municipality” as “an incorporated city, 

town, or village.”
9

and impounding, housing, feeding, redemption, adoption, human euthanasia and 

disposal of animals”; responding to emergency calls involving animals; 

investigating reports of violations of Chapter 18 of the Municipal Code, and 

issuing citations to any person who is in violation of any provision. According to 

the CEA, the LSPCA must also require all animals adopted through it to be spayed 

and neutered. The CEA further states that the City has provided vehicles to the 

LSPCA under prior agreements, and those vehicles will “remain with the Society.” 

There is also a provision in the CEA providing that the City shall continue to 

provide the LSPCA with fuel, repairs, and necessary maintenance for those 

vehicles. There is no dispute the LSPCA has performed, and continues to perform, 

these functions (and enjoyed the benefit of City vehicles and fuel) on behalf of the 

City of New Orleans. For these reasons, the court of appeal correctly found the 

LSPCA to be an instrumentality of the municipality through its execution of the 

CEA, and is therefore subject to the Public Records Law as it relates to its specific 

functions and duties under the CEA. 

This court has previously examined the function of an entity to determine 

whether it is subject to the Public Records Law. In State of Louisiana, et al. v. 

Nicholls College Foundation and Donald L. Peltier, 564 So.2d 682 (La. 1990), this 

Court was tasked to determine whether the Nicholls College Foundation, a 

nonprofit corporation, was a “public body” subject to the Public Records Law. In 

that case, the Inspector General sought to examine its financial records when the 

Foundation had received a “donation” of “public funds” from the Nicholls State 

University Alumni Federation, also a non-profit corporation. The Court ultimately 

determined through various factors of function (and some economic) that the 

Alumni Federation is a public body under the Public Records Law. Specifically, 

the Nicholls Court found that the Federation enjoyed a “close affiliation with 
10

Nicholls State University,” as demonstrated by its location on campus in a public 

building for which it pays nominal rent, and by its use of state civil service 

employees to run its office. Id. at 687. Furthermore, the “Alumni Office” is a lineitem in the budget for the University, through which the Federation’s employees 

are paid. The Federation states in its Articles of Incorporation that its purpose is to 

promote the University, which was created for the purpose of providing public 

education, which is a governmental function. Thus, because of this relationship 

with the University, and adhering to our settled notion that that the Public Records 

Law favors a liberal construction of the public records law so as to enlarge, rather 

than restrict, public access to public records, the Court determined the Federation 

is a “quasi-public” nonprofit corporation “designated as an entity to perform a 

governmental or proprietary function,” which therefore made it subject to the 

Public Records Law.5

 

5 It is important to note the distinction of this case from this Court’s opinion in Property 

Insurance Association of Louisiana v. Theriot, 09-1152 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1012, wherein 

the Court concluded that the Property Insurance Association of Louisiana was a private entity, 

finding it fit under four factors previously iterated in State v. Smith, 357 So.2d 505 (La. 1978), 

which were created to determine an entity’s public or private character:

(1) Whether the entity was created by the legislature; 

(2) Whether its powers were specifically defined by the legislature;

(3) Whether the property of the entity belongs to the public; and 

(4) Whether the entity’s functions are exclusively of the public character and 

performed solely for the public benefit.

The Theriot court noted that while the Smith case did not specify that all four factors must 

be met in order to find that an entity was public, they did so by “implication.” Id., 09-1152, p. 3, 

31 So.3d at 1015. In Theriot, however, the Court concluded that “all four factors must be present 

in order for a court to determine that an entity is public.” Id.

The Theriot case has not been cited often since its publication, but this Court has as 

recently as 2013 applied the factors set forth in Theriot and Smith, to find that the Louisiana High 

School Athletic Association (“LHSAA”) is a private entity, created by a group of high school 

principals who wanted to better regulate and develop the high school interscholastic athletic 

program in Louisiana. In Louisiana High School Athletics Ass’n Inc. v. State, 12-1471 (La. 

1/29/13), 107 So.3d 353, this Court ruled that not only was the LHSAA not created by the 

Legislature, its powers are specified in its articles of incorporation, as filed with the Secretary of 

State. Finding that the LHSAA already had not met two of the four Smith factors, the Court 

concluded it was a private entity, not subject to the Open Meetings Law. 

We find, however, both Theriot and the LHSAA opinions are distinguishable, as they did 

not involve the Public Records Law, nor did they involve a contract with a municipality 
11

In addition to the LSPCA serving as an instrumentality of the City through 

its functions performed through the CEA, we also take note of the public money 

paid by the City to the LSPCA. As discussed above, the LSPCA, in exchange for 

the assumption of the City’s municipal animal control obligations, receives from 

the City a monthly amount of $153,870, which totals an annual payment of 

$1,846,440. The court of appeal noted that while this amount is only a percentage 

of the LSPCA budget, it is still a substantial sum of money derived from public 

funds. We agree.6 As mentioned, Louisiana courts have held that the Public 

Records law must be liberally interpreted so as to extend rather than restrict access 

to public records by the public. C.B. Dutton v. William J. Guste, Jr., 395 So.2d 

683, 685 (La. 3/2/81). In keeping with that statutory interpretation, and contrary to 

the defendant’s assertion that it is not primarily funded by public funds, we find 

that the use of public money in this context triggers the Public Records Law. More 

specifically, it is not the amount of money which is of concern, it is only that the 

money provided by the City to the LSPCA in exchange for its animal control 

services under the CEA is derived from the taxpayers. Therefore, the public has a 

fundamental right to know how that money is spent by the LSPCA through its 

animal control services outlined in the CEA. Any finding otherwise would be in 

contravention to the well-established principles of liberal construction of the Public 

Records Law.7

 

specifying that the entity perform a public purpose on behalf of a municipality, such as the 

LSPCA did in this instance. Moreover, it is undisputed from the record that the LSPCA is a 

private entity for purposes other than this Court’s holding herein. 

6 In so holding, however, we specifically note that the consideration of public money in this type 

of inquiry will be on a case-by-case basis, and we decline to set a specific sum which would 

require application of the Public Records Law in this context. 

7 We emphasize that the applicability of the Public Records Law to groups similarly situated as 

the LSPCA will be fact-specific. The nature of whether any entity is an instrumentality as set 

forth in this analysis should be specifically tailored to the facts at hand. Indeed, the LSPCA may 
12

We must also address the defendant’s assertion that if it is found to be 

subject to the Public Records Law, it has satisfied all reporting obligations by 

producing documents related to its CEA with the City. The court of appeal 

declined to accept this argument, finding the trial court was in error. We agree. 

The CEA states that the LSPCA must submit monthly invoices, program reports, 

and monthly budgets to the City. The LSPCA, under the CEA, must also maintain 

records and report the monthly number of animals, including descriptions of each 

animal, date and manner of disposal, treatment received (including spaying and 

neutering), and various fees and charges related to those animals. The CEA also 

requires that the LSPCA maintain records and provide a statement of actual 

expenses involved under the CEA. Although the LSPCA asserts these reporting 

requirements satisfy the Public Records Law, we agree with the court of appeal’s 

finding that the Public Records Law cannot be circumscribed by contract. As the 

court of appeal correctly notes, the Public Records Law is purposefully broad and 

“all inclusive,” Bulldog, 15-1351, p. 11, 200 So.3d at 1002, whereas the reporting 

requirements in the CEA are narrowly delineated. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a) defines a 

“public record” as follows:

(2)(a) All books, records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, 

maps, drawings, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, memoranda, 

and papers, and all copies, duplicates, photographs, including 

microfilm, or other reproductions thereof, or any other documentary 

materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, including 

information contained in electronic data processing equipment, having 

been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed, or retained for use 

in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business, 

transaction, work, duty, or function which was conducted, 

transacted, or performed by or under the authority of the 

constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the authority of any 

ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body or 

concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid 

 

not be deemed a quasi-public body or instrumentality under different facts in a different case for 

purposes of La. R.S. 44:1.
13

by or under the authority of the constitution or the laws of this 

state, are “public records”, except as otherwise provided in this 

Chapter or the Constitution of Louisiana.

(emphasis added)

We do not find that the limited contractual reporting requirements in the CEA 

between the LSPCA and the City constitute compliance with the Louisiana Public 

Records Law, and affirm the court of appeal in this regard.8 As discussed above, 

the Public Records Law was enacted to avoid “arbitrary restriction on the public’s 

constitutional right” to “see,” and there should never be any qualification on that 

right of access. See Shane v. The Parish of Jefferson, 14-2225 (La. 12/8/15), 209 

So.3d 726. However, in terms of documents to be released under the Public 

Records Law in this case, we also limit this holding to only those documents which 

pertain to the LSPCA’s functions, duties, and responsibilities to enforce Chapter 18 

of the Municipal Code, as outlined in the CEA with the City of New Orleans. We 

therefore remand this matter to the district court to determine which documents 

within the LSPCA’s possession qualify as such.

CONCLUSION

Through the discharge of its duties and responsibilities set forth in the CEA 

with the City of New Orleans, as well as the receipt of public money as 

remuneration for such services, we find the LSPCA is functioning as an 

instrumentality of a municipal corporation, and is therefore subject to the 

Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. We therefore affirm the court 

of appeal in that regard. We further find that the reporting requirements contained 

 

8 Amici curiae briefs submitted to this Court assert that such a holding will have a chilling effect 

on private entities contracting with municipalities to provide certain services. This Court is not 

unaware of the necessity of governmental entities contracting out services with private groups, 

but we must also be ever cognizant of the public’s well-established constitutional right to access 

information associated with public money. 
14

in the CEA do not satisfy the Public Records Law, as the requirement for access to 

public records cannot be circumscribed by contract. The LSPCA is required to 

disclose all documents specifically related to the discharge of its duties and 

responsibilities outlined in the CEA with the City of New Orleans, and we remand 

to the district court to determine which documents satisfy that description.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
05/03/2017

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2016-C-1809

NEW ORLEANS BULLDOG SOCIETY

VERSUS

LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION 

OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, 

FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

Hughes, J., dissenting in part.

Respectfully, While I agree that the LSPCA has a duty to comply with the 

public records law, I believe that the scope of its response should be limited to 

those documents prepared and maintained pursuant to the Cooperative Endeavor 

Agreement.