UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4195

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LEONALDO HARRIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:13-

cr-00202-PWG-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2017 Decided: April 5, 2017

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z. SEDDIQ, LLC, Upper Marlboro, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Nicolas A. Mitchell, Bryan E. Foreman, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Leonaldo Harris was charged with conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). 

Harris pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, but he 

subsequently moved to withdraw his plea. He argued that an 

affidavit revealed new information about his case that called into 

question the district court’s previous denial of his motions to 

suppress. The district court denied his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. We affirm.

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 

376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (defining abuse of discretion). “A 

defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,” id. at 

383-84 (internal quotation marks omitted); thus, the defendant has 

the burden of showing a fair and just reason for withdrawal, see 

United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2012). “[A] fair and just

reason . . . is one that essentially challenges . . . the fairness 

of the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 proceeding.” United States v. 

Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). In determining 

whether a defendant has met his burden, courts consider multiple 

factors:

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence 

that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary; 

(2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his 
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legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay 

between the entering of the plea and the filing of the 

motion to withdraw the plea; (4) whether the defendant 

had the close assistance of competent counsel; 

(5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the 

government; and (6) whether withdrawal will 

inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.

Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 384 (citing United States v. Moore, 931 

F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991)).

“The most important consideration in resolving a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at 

which the guilty plea was accepted.” Id. at 384 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, where the district court 

substantially complied with the Rule 11 requirements, the 

defendant must overcome “a strong presumption that [his guilty]

plea is final and binding.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted); United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 

1992) (en banc) (same). Additionally, we have stated that although 

all of the Moore factors should be considered, the first, second, 

and fourth are the most important factors in making the 

determination of whether to allow withdrawal of the plea. United 

States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995). 

We have reviewed the record on appeal, and we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’ 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record shows that the 

district court held a hearing and properly weighed all of the Moore

factors before deciding to deny the motion. The district court 
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conducted a thorough and comprehensive Rule 11 hearing prior to 

accepting Harris’ guilty plea. The record further shows that 

counsel vigorously pursued several pretrial motions on Harris’ 

behalf, and negotiated a favorable sentence for Harris. We also 

agree with the district court that the affidavit Harris presented 

with his motion did not credibly call into question the court’s 

earlier rulings made on the motions to suppress. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the 

motion to withdraw the plea and the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED