alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Michael A. DUKES, a/k/a Michel A. Dukes, Sr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Willie L. EAGLETON, Warden, etc, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7515

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

Michael A. Dukes, Appellant Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael A. Dukes seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition as unauthorized and successive. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).- When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Dukes has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and .dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
# L_2004240EN.01001702.xml

| 10.7.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 240/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.7.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 240/17

---

Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the common fisheries policy

(
  Official Journal of the European Communities L 358 of 31 December 2002
  )

On page 76, in Annex I, point 4 ‘COASTAL WATERS OF DENMARK’, in the first column ‘Geographical areas’:

for:

‘Kattegat’,

read:

‘Kattegat

(3 to 12 miles)’.

---
EXHIBIT 35.1
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                        RESIDENTIAL FUNDING COMPANY, LLC
             RALI SERIES 2006-QA10 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC,
as servicer  (the  "Servicer")  pursuant to the Series  Supplement,  dated as of
November 1, 2006,  and the Standard  Terms of Pooling and  Servicing  Agreement,
dated as of November 1, 2006 (as amended  from time to time,  the  "Agreement"),
among Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., as company, Residential Funding Company,
LLC, as master servicer,  and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,  as trustee,
does hereby  certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled  all of its  obligations  under  the  Agreement  in all  material
     respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      ------------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:    Managing Director
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 205 (Monday, October 24, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 65701]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-27499]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting Notice

DATES: Time and Date: Wednesday, October 26, 2011, 10 a.m.-12 p.m.

PLACE: Room 420, Bethesda Towers, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, 
Maryland.

STATUS: Commission Meeting--Open to the Public.

Matters To Be Considered

    Public Hearing: Alternative Testing Requirements for Small Batch 
Manufacturers.
    A live webcast of the Meeting can be viewed at http://www.cpsc.gov/webcast.
    For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, 
call (301) 504-7948.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Todd A. Stevenson, Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West 
Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 504-7923.

    Dated: October 19, 2011.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretariat.
[FR Doc. 2011-27499 Filed 10-20-11; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
```
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 875

To amend section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services

Act of 1949 to exclude certain property in the State of South Dakota.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 26 (legislative day, MAY 15), 1995

Mr. PRESSLER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

A BILL

To amend section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to exclude certain property

in the State of South Dakota.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. TRANSFER OF EXCESS PROPERTY TO SEC4 RETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE BENEFIT

5 OF INDIAN TRIBES.

6 Section 202(a)(2) of the Federal Property and Ad7 ministrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483(a)(2))

8 is amended in the first sentence by striking ‘‘real property

9 located’’ and inserting ‘‘real property (not including lands

10 in the State of South Dakota that were acquired by the
2

•S 875 IS

1 United States for construction and operation of reservoirs

2 on the main stem of the Missouri River) that is located’’.

Æ
#### Gabriel ARMENDARIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeff AURICCHIO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15752

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 1, 2017

Gabriel Armendariz, Pro Se

Michele Molinario, Lori Lea Voepel, Attorneys, Donald L. Myles, Jr., Esquire, Attorney, Jones, Skelton *&*Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appel-lee

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gabriel Armendariz appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Because Armendariz failed to raise any arguments regarding the basis for the district court’s grant of summary judgment, he has waived any such challenge on appeal. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[Ojn appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant. ...”).

We do not consider arguments or allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Smith,*194 F.3d at 1052 (“As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       6,410,550
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,201,466
<ALLOWANCES>                                   213,043
<INVENTORY>                                     87,307
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,445,724
<PP&E>                                      20,779,212
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,773,595
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              35,627,149
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,859,689
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                        75,256
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                35,627,149
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                               24,604,179
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               702,005
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              28,758
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (3,954,565)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (3,954,565)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (3,954,565)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.53)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.53)
        

</TABLE>
#### Ervin MIDDLETON, Jr.; Ann Gates Middleton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GUARANTEED RATE, INC.; Wells Fargo Bank, NA, DBA Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15151

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 23, 2017

Ervin Middleton, Jr., Pro Se

Michael D. Rawlins, Esquire, Attorney, Bradley Slighting, Attorney, Durham Jones & Pinegar, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Guaranteed Rate, Inc.

Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Daniel S. Ivie, Attorney, Houser & Allison, APC, Las Vegas, NV, Amy F. Sorenson, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*675MEMORANDUM **

. Ervin and Ann Middleton appeal pro se from the district court’s order denying their second motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

In their opening brief, the Middletons fail to challenge the district court’s order denying their second motion for reconsideration, and they have therefore waived any such challenge. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *see also Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant.... ”).

The filing of the second motion for reconsideration did not toll the time to appeal the underlying judgment. *See Swimmer v. IRS,*811 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987), *abrogated on other grounds by Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino,*116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, we do not consider the Middletons’ contentions regarding the merits of the district court’s order dismissing their action, or the district court’s order denying their first motion for reconsideration, because the Mid-dletons failed to file a timely notice of appeal as to those orders. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of judgment); *Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.,*476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A timely notice of appeal is a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement.”); *Swimmer,*811 F2.d at 1344-45.

The Middletons’ request for judicial notice, set forth in their reply brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar David AVILA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50378

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 27, 2017

Karla Davis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Oscar David Avila, Pro Se

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Oscar David Avila appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 60-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Avila’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Avila the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Avila waived his right to appeal his sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. *See id.*at 988.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Herman C. ESKRIDGE, Claimant-Appellant v. David J. SHULKIN, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee

2017-1700

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Decided: June 13, 2017

Herman C. Eskridge, Albany, GA, pro se.

Reta Emma Bezak, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by Chad A. Readler, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr„ L. Misha Preheim; Brian D. Griffin, Andrew J. Steinberg, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Before Dyk, Taranto, and Hughes, Circuit Judges.

*624Per Curiam.

Herman C. Eskridge seeks review of the final decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissing his appeal as untimely. Because Mr. Eskridge has only challenged the Veterans Court’s factual decision that his appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

I

On November 4, 2015, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Mr. Eskridge s request for service-connected disability compensation. On March 28, 2016, 145 days later, the Board received Mr. Eskridge’s motion for reconsideration, which it denied on July 18, 2016. On July 29, 2016, 268 days after the Board issued its rperits decision, Mr. Eskridge mailed a Notice of Appeal to the Veterans Court.

On September 28, 2016, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely arguing that Mr. Eskridge failed to mail his appeal within 120 days required by statute. On November 1, 2016, the Veterans Court issued a show cause order to Mr. Eskridge directing him to explain, within 20 days, wljy the court should not dismiss his appeal as untimely. Mr. Eskridge did not respond to the show cause order and thereforp the Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as untimely. Mr. Eskridge appeals.

II

We have jurisdiction to review the validity of a decision of the Veterans Court to decide “any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). Absent a constitutional issue, this court may not review challenges to factual determinations or challenges to the application of a law or regulation to facts. *Id.*§ 7292(d)(2).

Here, Mr. Eskridge appeals solely on the basis that the Veterans Court “erroneously ruled” that he missed the filing deadline. App. Br. at 1. Whether an appeal is timely filed is a factual determination that this court may not review. *See Hinojosa v. Shinseki,*524 Fed.Appx. 718, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Veterans Court’s finding that [a veteran] missed the 120-day deadline ... is a case-specific factual matter raising no constitutional issue and hence not within our jurisdiction to review.”). Therefore, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

No costs.
#### Colleen Marie KAUWOH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56030

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

Steven Gilbert Rosales, Attorney, Law Offices of Lawrence Rohlfing, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Hay-Mie Cho, Assistant Regional Counsel, Geralyn A. Gulseth, Esquire, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Thomas C. Stahl, Chief Counsel, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Colleen Marie Kauwoh appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo, *Zavalin v. Colvin,*778 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.

At step five of the sequential analysis, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not err in relying on the testimony of a vocational expert. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding included a limitation of a sit/stand option. Although the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ did not include this limitation, the vocational expert’s testimony shows that she understood that Kauwoh had this limitation and she incorporated this limitation in identifying the jobs that Kauwoh could perform. *See Molina v. Astrue,*674 F.3d 1104, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that court will uphold ALJ!s findings if their logic may reasonably be discerned); *cf. Bayliss v. Barnhart,*427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that in order properly to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ must present the expert with a hypothetical question that includes all of the limitations that the ALJ finds credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus CORONA-ROJAS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40224 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 19, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jesus Corona-Rojas, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jesus Corona-Rojas has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Corona-Rojas has filed a response. The record *880is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Corona-Rojas’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Corona-Rojas’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Gib. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Plummer et al. v. The People’s Nat. Bank of Independence et al.

1. Appeal: jurisdiction not given bv appearance of appellee. When an abstract is filed in this court, it is presumed to contain the whole record so far as it is material; and if it fails to show that an appeal was taken, this court has no jurisdiction, even though the appellee appears; and in such case it is the duty of the court to dismiss the appeal on its own motion, and without waiting for the appellee to raise the objection that the abstract fails to show the taking of an appeal.

*Appeal from Buchanan District Oourt.*

Friday, June 10, 1887.

This action was brought to obtain possession of a policy of life insurance. The defendant Edgar Holmes intervened. There was a trial to the court without a jury and judgment was rendered for the intervenor. The plaintiffs appeal.

*John J.*Uey, for appellants.

*Woodward &*OooTc, for appellee.

Adams, Ch. J.

This court cannot take jurisdiction of a case, unless our jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record. Where cases are submitted upon an abstract, we assume that the abstract shows the whole record so far as it *753is material. If the abstract does not show that we have jurisdiction, we can do nothing but dismiss the case.

The abstract before us does not show that an appeal was taken. This it should show. (Rule of court 98.) We have no jurisdiction of the case except upon appeal. It is true that the appellee appears, but appearance does not confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court. In the absence of an appeal, the appellate court lacks more than jurisdiction of the person of the appellee.

It is true also that the appellee does not in this case raise a question of a want of jurisdiction. But a court should see to it of its own motion that the case is one of which it appears to have jurisdiction.

We think that the appeal must be Dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Triangle Capital Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Garland S. Tucker, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ GARLAND S. TUCKER, IIIGarland S. Tucker, IIIChief Executive OfficerMarch 2, 2015