alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0368 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0368

**2001/368/EC,: Council Decision of 7 May 2001 on the adjustment of the allowances paid to members and alternates of the Economic and Social Committee **

*
Official Journal L 130 , 12/05/2001 P. 0039 - 0039 *

Council Decision

of 7 May 2001

on the adjustment of the allowances paid to members and alternates of the Economic and Social Committee

(2001/368/EC, Euratom)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the fourth subparagraph of Article 258 thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular the fourth subparagraph of Article 166 thereof,

Having regard to the request from the Economic and Social Committee of 15 March 2001,

Whereas:

(1) The amounts of the daily allowances paid to members and alternates of the Economic and Social Committee, laid down by Council Decision 81/121/EEC(1), should be adapted.

(2) Provision should be made for the amounts of the daily allowances to be revised after a year, having regard to the principle sought by the Council that reimbursements should be based on the actual costs incurred rather than on a flat-rate arrangement.

(3) The Economic and Social Committee should be allowed to set the amount of experts' allowances,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Article 2 of Decision 81/121/EEC shall be replaced by the following: "Article 2

1. The daily allowance per travel day shall be:

- EUR 120 for members and alternates.

2. The daily allowance per meeting day shall be:

- EUR 181 for members and alternates.

3. Where the beneficiary furnishes satisfactory proof that he has incurred expenditure on an overnight stay at the place of work, he shall be paid a supplementary daily allowance of EUR 25."

Article 2

The Council may revise the amounts laid down in Article 1 of this Decision, on the basis of a report submitted by the Economic and Social Committee as from 1 May 2002.

Article 3

This Decision shall take effect on 1 May 2001.

It shall expire on 31 December 2002.

Done at Brussels, 7 May 2001.

For the Council

The President

B. Ringholm

(1) OJ L 67, 12.3.1981, p. 29. Decision as last amended by Council Decision 93/358/EC, Euratom (OJ L 205, 31.8.1995, p. 38).
#### Larry J. HUDACK; Marianne S. Hudack, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dallas Scott HOLMES, Judge Riverside Superior Court, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56148

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed June 1, 2017

*884Larry J. Hudack, Pro Se

Marianne S. Hudack, Pro Se

Sarah Lee Overton, Attorney, Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho *&*Associates, P.C., Riverside, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Larry J. Hudack and Marianne S. Hu-dack appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a jurisdictional dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Hudacks’ action as barred by the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine because the Hu-dacks’ action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, in which they raise issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. *See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,*525 F.3d 855, 858-60 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine); *Henrichs v. Valley View Dev.,*474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) *(Rooker-Feldman*doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Hudacks’ action without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be futile).

The Hudacks’ motion to strike portions of Judge Holmes’ answering brief (Docket Entry No. 17) and motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 27) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6256 

To provide temporary visitation to spouses of United States citizens. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

Mr. HUFFMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To provide temporary visitation to spouses of United States 

citizens. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ADMISSION OF SPOUSES OF NATIONALS AND 

4 CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AS NON5 IMMIGRANTS. 

6 (a) CLASSIFICATION AS NONIMMIGRANTS.—Section 

7 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) is amended— 

9 (1) in subparagraph (U), by striking ‘‘or’’ at 

10 the end; 


SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6256 IH

1 (2) in subparagraph (V), by striking the period 

2 at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

3 (3) by inserting after subparagraph (V) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(W) an alien who is the spouse of a na6 tional or citizen of the United States, and has 

7 been the spouse of such national or citizen for 

8 a period of not less than 180 days, or who is 

9 the child of such an alien and is accompanying, 

10 or following to join, the alien.’’. 

11 (b) REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION.—Section 214 

12 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184) 

13 is amended by adding at the end the following: 

14 ‘‘(s)(1) The period of authorized admission for an 

15 alien admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant 

16 under section 101(a)(15)(W) shall be 180 days, which 

17 may be extended for one additional 180-day period. 

18 ‘‘(2) The total number of principal aliens who may 

19 be admitted under section 101(a)(15)(W) during any fis20 cal year may not exceed 5,000. 

21 ‘‘(3) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in con22 sultation with the Secretary of State, shall establish a 

23 process to ensure the expedited admission to the United 

24 States of aliens under section 101(a)(15)(W). 


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3 

•HR 6256 IH

1 ‘‘(4) An alien admitted under section 101(a)(15)(W) 

2 is not eligible for work authorization.’’. 

3 (c) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS PROHIBITED.—Section 

4 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

5 1255) is amended by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(n) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, 

7 the Secretary of Homeland Security may not adjust the 

8 status of an alien admitted to the United States as a non9 immigrant under section 101(a)(15)(W) to that of an alien 

10 lawfully admitted for permanent residence.’’. 

Æ 


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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-8519

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ZAMAN ASHRAF, a/k/a Pop, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:03-cr-00458-REP-3; 3:07-cv-00569-REP)

Submitted: September 1, 2009 Decided: September 17, 2009

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Zaman Ashraf, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Zaman Ashraf seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ashraf has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets and Condensed Consolidated Statements
of Earnings as reported in the Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such finanial statements.

</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 AUG-04-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   NOV-02-1996
<CASH>                                         651,700
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  152,700
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  3,582,200
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,519,700
<PP&E>                                       5,203,500
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,190,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,921,500
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,003,700
<BONDS>                                      1,028,300
<COMMON>                                        30,045
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,467,056
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,921,500
<SALES>                                      5,264,900
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,264,900
<CGS>                                        3,582,100
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               149,300
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              66,400
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 70,700
<INCOME-TAX>                                    26,200
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             44,500
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    44,500
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .16
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of
RFG Acquisition II Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), I, David W. Matre, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
      David W. MatreDavid
      W. MatrePrincipal
      Financial OfficerMarch
      18, 2010
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-1252

___________________________

Manuel De Jesus Garcia Ortiz

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner

v.

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General of the United States

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

 Board of Immigration Appeals

____________

 Submitted: February 20, 2017

Filed: February 26, 2018

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Guatemalan citizen Manuel Garcia Ortiz petitions for review of an order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the decision of an
immigration judge (IJ), which denied himasylumand withholding of removal. Ortiz

1

sought immigration relief based on his membership in the particular social group

“former members of the military suffering gang threats and violence due to

noninvolvement in their criminal behavior.”

After careful consideration of Ortiz’s arguments and the record, we conclude

that substantial evidence supports the finding that he failed to show past persecution

in Guatemala, a well-founded fear of future persecution there, or a clear probability

of future persecution there, due to one of the five protected grounds: race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); De Castro-Gutierrez v. Holder, 713 F.3d 375, 379 (8thCir.

2013) (standard of review); Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 707, 711-13 (8th

Cir. 2012). Specifically, we determine that: (1) Ortiz’s proposed group does not

constitute a particular social group, see Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir.

2012); (2) to the extent Ortiz feared general violence in Guatemala, his fear was not

based on a protected ground, see Al Yatim v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 584, 588-89 (8th

Cir. 2008); and (3) he did not establish that the Guatemalan government was unable

or unwilling to control the private actors he fears, see Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709

F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2013). 

The petition is denied. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

The IJ’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture is not on 1

appeal. See Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004).

-2-
#### Obed Omar ESCOBAR-VASQUEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70658

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Kevin Macmurray, Esquire, Attorney, Macmurray & Associates, Boston, MA, for Petitioner

Brett F. Kinney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Obed Omar Escobar-Vasquez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Vitug v. Holder,*723 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Esco-bar-Vasquez’s contentions that his claims should have been analyzed under a child-specific definition of persecution, that victims of child abuse may constitute a particular social group, and his arguments as to his experiences of childhood abuse, because he failed to raise them before the agency. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).

The BIA did not err by affirming, without opinion, the IJ’s decision. *See Falcon**918*Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 850-52 (9th Cir. 2003).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination Escobar-Vasquez failed to establish a nexus between the past harm he experienced in Guatemala and a protected ground. *See Pagayon v. Holder,*675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A personal dispute is not, standing alone, tantamount to persecution based on” a protected ground). Escobar-Vasquez’s contention that he was entitled to a presumption of future persecution therefore fails. *See El Himri v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a petitioner who did not establish past persecution was therefore not entitled to a presumption of future persecution). Escobar-Vasquez does not otherwise challenge the agency’s determination that he failed to establish a likelihood of future persecution. Thus, his withholding of removal claim fails.

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Escobar-Vasquez’s CAT claim because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 813 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 813

To amend the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 to 
authorize appropriations for implementation of the development plan for 
 Pennsylvania Avenue between the Capitol and the White House, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                 May 17 (legislative day, May 15), 1995

  Mr. Murkowski (by request) introduced the following bill; which was 
    read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 to 
authorize appropriations for implementation of the development plan for 
 Pennsylvania Avenue between the Capitol and the White House, and for 
                            other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 17(a) of 
the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 
1266, 40 U.S.C. 871, as amended) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new sentence: ``There are further authorized to be 
appropriated for operating and administrative expenses of the 
Corporation $3,043,000 for fiscal year 1996 and such sums as may be 
necessary for fiscal year 1997.''.
                                 <all>
```
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 33 (Thursday, February 17, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9043-9044]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-03422]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission


Combined Notice of Filings

    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural 
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

Filings Instituting Proceedings

    Docket Numbers: RP22-542-000.
    Applicants: El Paso Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: Non-Conforming Amendment 
Filing (Pioneer) to be effective 3/1/2022.
    Filed Date: 2/10/22.

[[Page 9044]]

    Accession Number: 20220210-5128.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. ET 2/22/22.

    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above 
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00 
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be 
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the 
proceeding.
    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system 
(https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp) by querying 
the docket number.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing 
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying 
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call (866) 208-3676 
(toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

    Dated: February 11, 2022.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-03422 Filed 2-16-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P