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9% ()%"5)&.Defendant David Askarov appeals

his convictions on drug offenses. He argues that the districtcourt erred by allowing the government to cross-examine himconcerning financial information his counsel provided to theUnited States Probation Office in an effort to obtain newcourt-appointed counsel for him. For the reasons statedbelow, we AFFIRM the district court.

I.

United States Customs Service agents arrested Askarov

near the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Airport afterdiscovering 9.5 kilograms of ecstacy in his luggage. Askarovowns and operates a jewelry business in Belgium and hadflown to Cincinnati from Paris.

Askarov was later indicted for possessing ecstacy with

intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), andillegally importing ecstacy into the United States, in violationof 21 U.S.C. § 952. Gary Sergent was provisionallyappointed to represent Askarov. However, based on -%&$(

that Askarov owned his own business, the court later decidedthat Askarov was ineligible for a public defender, and Sergentmoved for his removal as Askarov’s counsel on December 14,1999. On December 16, Sergent sent a letter to U.S.Probation Officer Stacey Mills along with a fax from theKBC Bank in Antwerp, Belgium. The fax explained thatAskarov had defaulted on home and business loans held bythe bank, and that it had frozen all lines of credit to him andwould, if necessary, foreclose on his home. In the letter,Sergent told Mills that he had moved to be stricken as counseland suggested that the fax might be useful for the magistratejudge in deciding Askarov’s ability to retain other counsel.Sergent also sent a copy of both documents to prosecutorDavid Bunning. The following day, the magistrate judge
 

granted Sergent’s motion to withdrthe services of his current counsel

At trial, Askarov testified on d

owned and operated a jewelry bcross-examination, the governmexchange with him:

Government: Prior to your arrewere having financial problems Askarov: No. No, [I] didn’t hav

The prosecutor then questionoutstanding home and business lofrom the fax Sergent sent him. Asto the government’s use of the domistrial. The court overruled the motion. Askarov was convicted sentenced to seventy-eight monthcount, to run concurrently.

II.

Askarov argues that information 

Amendment right to counsel may substantive evidence of his guiltargues, would force him to cAmendment right to counsel and hagainst self-incrimination. In suppv. United States, 390 U.S. 377, provided by defendant to assert against unreasonable search and sesubstantive -%&$( of his guilHardwell, 80 F.3d 1471 (10th CirSimmons, that government could ndefendant made to obtain court-appthat he was engaged in money launv. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 347-52 (1violation of Sixth Amendment c
1 
	
 

defendant’s trial testimony). In the alternative, he argues that

the government violated federal evidentiary Rules 608(b),611(b), 802 and 901.

We need not decide Askarov’s claim of constitutional error

because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any sucherror resulting from the prosecution’s references to the bank

fax was harmless. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967) (articulating "beyond a reasonable doubt" '"$& &for harmless error); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (applying harmless error '"$& & toConfrontation Clause violations). The government’s-%&$( against Askarov was strong: he identified a bagfound to contain more than 30,000 ecstacy pills as his own toundercover Customs agents, and an audiotape of thatidentification was played to the jury. Furthermore, as thedistrict court found, the prosecutor could have obtained thedisputed financial report directly from Askarov’s bank evenif Askarov’s counsel had not provided it to him. For the samereasons, we conclude that any evidentiary errors made by thedistrict court in allowing cross-examination based on thisdocument did not amount to an abuse of its discretion. SeeUnited States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587, 597 (6th Cir. 1992)(evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion). Nordid the court abuse its discretion in denying Askarov’s motionfor a mistrial. See United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 926-

27 (6th Cir. 1986) (denial of motion for mistrial reviewed forabuse of discretion).

Finally, we conclude that the prosecutor did not engage in

actionable misconduct by referring to the fax in his crossexamin"%$  '+ - In order to merit a new trial, a

prosecutor’s conduct must be improper and flagrant. See

United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001).To determine flagrancy, the court considers: (1) whether theconduct tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant;(2) whether the conduct was isolated or extensive; (3) whetherthe remarks were made deliberately or accidentally; and (4)whether the -%&$( against the defendant was strong. Seeid. Here the remarks were limited to a portion of Askarov’s

 cross-examination and, as discsubstantial other evidence to Accordingly, we find that the proflagrant and therefore was not suff

AFFIRMED.