alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Mary S. Burdak et al., Appellants; James F. Egan, as Public Administrator of New York County, et al., Respondents.

Argued January 5, 1943;

decided February 25, 1943.

*556
      *Theodore E. Wolcott*and *Meyer Weltsner*for appellants.

*Joseph A. Cox, Joseph G. Blum, Joseph H. Stern*and *Joseph T. Arenson*for respondents.

Order affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond,, JJ.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of GCA I Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K for the period ending May 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael M. Membrado,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
      Michael M. MembradoMichael
      M. Membrado
                    Principal
      Financial Officer
                    September
      14, 2010
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to the incorporation by reference (i) inthe Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-140576) pertaining to the 2007 Omnibus Equity Incentive Plan of Fortress Investment Group LLC and (ii) in the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-153689) and in the related Prospectusof Fortress Investment Group LLC for the registration of Class A Shares, Preferred Shares, Depositary Shares, Warrants, Subscription Rights, Purchase Contracts and Purchase Units of our reports dated March 15, 2009, with respect to theconsolidated and combined financial statements of Fortress Investment Group LLC and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Fortress Investment Group LLC, included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year endedDecember 31, 2008. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

New York,New York 

March 15, 2009
As a Petitioner for Reconsideration of Document number FAA- 2015-3493, I am supplying a number 

of FAA errors and misinterpretations that have been made in the process leading to my Denial of 

Exemption.

1. Letter of Denial of Exemption, January 19, 2016:

A. Page 3, paragraph 1, “No documentation was submitted”. I did submit USAF official 

! ! orders to instructor status after completing USAF Manual 50-9 Instructor training !!

! ! requirements, logged time as an instructor, First Pilot (Aircraft Commander) check out in 

! ! the KC-135 simulator, and flight checks in the aircraft given by those evaluators who 

! ! evaluated a SAC squadron’s instructor cadre. The ‘Certificates of Instructor ! !

! ! Qualification’ that was requested by FAA did not exist in the mid 1960s during the 

! ! Vietnam war in the USAF, Navy, or Army Aviation for locally trained instructor cadre.

! !

B. Page 3, paragraph 2, “FAA does not recognize Instructor Copilot”. This is a ! !

! ! misinterpretation of the fact that a few of us were removed from Combat Crew Copilot

! ! duties and trained and assigned to pilot instructor duties in the KC-135 simulators. The 

! ! SAC squadrons around the country no longer used aircraft for training or checking at

! ! base level. 

C. Page 3 paragraph 3, This statement, regarding a military pilot’s training skills and 

! ! aeronautical skills was incorrectly denied in my situation. A few high time copilots were 

! ! selected to become instructors by virtue of our perceived instructor skills and our !!

! ! demonstrated flying skills.

2. Letter from James Crotty to Senator John Cornyn, dated March 31, 2016:

Mr Crotty, Acting Director of the Office of Rulemaking, was the official who communicated 

with Senator John Cornyn regarding my Denial of Petition. In that correspondence he ! !

referred to me as a retired Major General USAF, which I am not. He also referred to my 

military involvement as U.S. military co-pilot instructor, which I was not. I was a former Major

in the USAF, and I was removed from copilot position on a combat crew and trained and 

certified as an instructor pilot and evaluator on the KC-135 flight simulator as well as aircraft 

while on an instructor crew.

3. Letter from Lirio Liu to Senator John Cornyn, dated April 29, 2016:

Mr Liu, Director of the Office of Rulemaking, in his correspondence to Senator Cornyn, !!

referred to me as a retired USAF Major, which I am not. I served approximately 8 years active 

duty, with 2 years Air National Guard, before separating from the military and starting my 

career with a major airline.

In Mr. Liu’s comments he stated the FAA had fully considered the facts and circumstances of my 

petition. As I have tried to point out here, the facts used in this determination included misstatements, 

misunderstandings, and in some case, completely wrong interpretations.
If I thought the FAA’s evaluation of my petition had been fair and accurate, I would have accepted 

their conclusions. However, I feel their evaluation has been neither fair nor accurate, so I will 

continue my efforts.

Respectfully,

Robert J. Ponti
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7163

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WILLIAM LEE PATTERSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior 

District Judge. (2:00-cr-00187-RGD-1) 

Submitted: February 26, 2009 Decided: March 5, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William Lee Patterson, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

 William Lee Patterson appeals the extent of the 

reduction granted in his motion for reduction of sentence 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006). We have reviewed the 

record and find no abuse of discretion and no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. United States v. Patterson, No. 2:00-cr-00187-RGD-1 (E.D 

Va. filed May 27, 2008; entered May 28, 2008); see United 

States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2009). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by 9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

* * T he H on orabl e M i chae l W . M osm an, D i stri ctJudg e f or the D i stri ctof O r e gon, s i tt i ng by de s i gna t i on . NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T G LA CI ER ELECTRI C C O O P E R A T I V E , I N C .; P la in tif

f - A p p e lla n t, v. THE E ST ATE OF S COTT SHER BURNE, R O N B I R D , a n d H E R B G I L H A M, Indi vi du al l y and on behal f of G l ac i er C o n s tru c tio n , I n c .; D efen d an t s-A p p el l ees. N o. 09- 35216 D. C. No . CV- 0 8 - 3 0 - SE H

ME MOR AN DU M *

A p p e a l f r o m th e U n ite d S ta te s D is tr ic t C o u r t f orthe D i s tr i c tof

M ont a na S a m E . H a ddon, D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng A r gue d a nd S ubm i tt e d F e brua ry 2, 2010

S e a tt l e , W a s hi ngt on B e f o r e : W. F L E T C HE R a n d R AWL I NS ON , C i r c u i tJ u d g e s , a n d MOS MAN, ** D i stri ctJudg e. 

# FI LED JU N 25 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALSP age 2 of 2

G la c ie rE le c tr ic C o o p e r a tiv e ( " G E C " ) ap p e a ls th e d is tr ic t c o u r t's d e c is io n to grantsum m ary j ud gm enti n favor of A pp el l ee s ( col l ec t i vel y, "G l ac i erC on struct i on ") . A t s u m m a ry ju d g m e n t, G E C a r g u e d th a t atr ib a l c o u r t ju d g m e n t a g a in s t G E C w a s v o id for l ac k o f s ubj ec tm att erj uri sdi ct i on . In 19 98 , the i ss ue of tri bal subj ec tm att er ju r is d ic tio n w a s f

u lly litig a te d in th e d is tr ic t c o u r t d u r in g ad if f e r e n t b u t r e la te d la w s u it be tw e e n the s e s a m e pa rt i e s . A c c or di ngl y , the di s tr i c tc ourtc onc l ude d tha tthe doc tr i ne of re s j ud i ca t a pre cl ud ed G E C fr om re l i t i gat i ng the tri bal court ' s s ubj ec tm att er j ur i s di c t i on i n thi s pr oc e e di ng. I s s ue pr e c l us i on a tt a c he d t o the di s tr i c tc our t ' s 1998 de c i s i on. T he i s s ue of subj ec tm att erl i t i gat i on w as ac tual l y l i t i gat ed i n 1 99 8, det erm i ned b y aval i d and fi nal ju d g m e n t o n r e m a n d , a n d e s s e n tia l to ju d g m e n t. Se e , e . g. , A r iz o n a v . C a lifo rn ia , 530 U . S . 392, 414 ( 2000) ( quot i ng R e s t a t e m e nt( S e c ond) of J udgm e nt s § 27, p. 250 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) ; C oope rv . Fe d. R e s e r v e B ank of R i c hm ond , 46 7 U . S . 86 7, 87 4 (19 84 ). E ven though the appe a l of

thi s c a s e w a s ul t i m a t e l y r e s ol ve d on gr ounds of due pr oc e s s , the det erm i nat i on of subj ec tm att erj uri sdi ct i on m ade by the di stri ctcourtw as never d is tu rb e d . Se e W

i l s on v . M ar c hi ngton , 127 F . 3d 805, 811 ( 9th C i r . 1997) ( " [ T ] he exi st ence of subj ec tm att erj uri sdi ct i on i s athres ho l d i nq ui ryi n v i rtual l y e veryfe dera l exam i nat i on of a tri bal j ud gm ent . ") . AF F I RME D.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-2305

EDMOND MACHIE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

POLICE OFFICER TRAINER; ARLINGTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:18-cv-01146-LMB-IDD)

Submitted: February 26, 2019 Decided: February 28, 2019

Before KING, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Edmond Machie, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Edmond Machie appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his civil complaint 

without prejudice and requiring him to file an amended complaint, dismissing his 

complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with its prior order, and denying his 

motion for reconsideration.∗

 With respect to the district court’s dismissal orders, we have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (pleading 

standard); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (authorizing dismissal for failure to comply with court 

order); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing pleading standard), 

cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 738 (2018); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 

1989) (reviewing Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we affirm 

those orders for the reasons stated by the district court. Machie v. Trainer, No. 1:18-cv01146-LMB-IDD (E.D. Va. filed & entered Sept. 10, 2018; filed Sept. 25 & entered Sept. 

26, 2018). 

The district court should have construed Machie’s motion for reconsideration as a 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, rather than a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, as it was filed 

within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 

403, 412 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (providing current time 

limit for filing motion to alter or amend). Nevertheless, because Machie’s motion failed 

 ∗ Although Machie did not file a new or amended notice of appeal from the district 

court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), 

(B)(ii), we conclude that Machie’s informal brief serves as the functional equivalent of a 

notice of appeal from that order, see Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). 
3

to demonstrate any ground that would entitle him to relief pursuant to Rule 59(e), we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See 

Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 2014) (standard of review); 

Robinson, 599 F.3d at 407 (describing grounds for Rule 59(e) relief). Accordingly, we 

affirm the order denying postjudgment relief. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 51 (Wednesday, March 16, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 14820]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05386]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS


Notice of Public Meeting of the Virginia Advisory Committee; 
Correction

AGENCY: Commission on Civil Rights.

ACTION: Notice; revision to meeting access code.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission on Civil Rights published a notice in the 
Federal Register on Friday, March 4, 2022, concerning a briefing of the 
Virginia Advisory Committee. The document contained the incorrect 
meeting access code.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah Villanueva, 202-499-0263, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0675706f6a6a67687363706746737565657428616970"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="403336292c2c212e352536210035332323326e272f36">[email protected]</span></a>.

Correction

    In the Federal Register on Monday, Friday, March 4, 2022, in FR 
Document Number 2022-04628, second column on page 12425, correct the 
meeting access code to: 2760 681 1173.

    Dated: March 9, 2022.
David Mussatt,
Supervisory Chief, Regional Programs Unit.
[FR Doc. 2022-05386 Filed 3-15-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Commonwealth, Appellant, *v.*Greer.

Argued March 31, 1953.

Before Stern, C. J., Stearns, Jones, Chidsey, Musmanno and Arnold, JJ.

*401
      *Randolph C. Ryder,*Deputy Attorney General, with him *Robert B. Greer, Jr.,*and *Robert E. Woodside,*Attorney General, for appellant.

No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.

April 22, 1953:

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne,

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the Court of Common Pleas setting aside a suspension by the Secretary of Revenue of an operator’s license for operating a motor vehicle. The offense charged was speed on a public highway at eighty miles per hour where the maximum lawful speed was fifty miles per hour.

What we said in *Commonwealth v. Emerick,*373 Pa. 388, 96 A. 2d 370, relating to legal principles and the construction of The Vehicle Code has similar application to the facts in the present case.

Paul M. Greer, defendant, was charged by a state police officer with travelling on a public highway on May 3, 1952, at 7:30 p.m. on a dry, clear night at eighty miles per hour where the lawful maximum speed was fifty miles per hour. The charge is not denied. His only excuse was, “I was going to Ohio and was a little late and making up a little time.” Defendant had been driving for fifteen years, was never before arrested for speeding, was thirty-two years of age, worked in shifts in a machine shop and used his car for transportation both for pleasure and business.

The learned court below revoked the Secretary of Revenue’s order of suspension solely on the ground of *402economic hardship. In the order the court said, “. . . the operator’s license ... is necessary and that the loss thereof would work an undue hardship on [defendant].” Such an order in the circumstances of this case constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion.

The order is reversed at the cost of appellee.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5891 

To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from using funds to carry 

out the Environmental Justice Small Grants Program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 14, 2016 

Mr. SALMON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 

Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within 

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from using 

funds to carry out the Environmental Justice Small 

Grants Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FUNDING PROHIBITION. 

4 The Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

5 Agency may not use any funds to carry out the Environ6 mental Justice Small Grants Program. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       9,752,339
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,581,510
<ALLOWANCES>                                   525,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            17,873,617
<PP&E>                                       4,930,100
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,990,045
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              23,195,569
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,073,507
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,663
<OTHER-SE>                                  17,115,399
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                23,195,569
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,058,621
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,478,658
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,304,747
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (105,247)<F1>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                380,463
<INCOME-TAX>                                    86,053
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   294,410
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04
<FN>
<F1>INTEREST INCOME
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM INTERNALLY
PREPARED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE 3 MONTHS ENDED OCTOBER 31,
1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q FOR PERIOD
ENDED OCTOBER 31, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                                          40,572
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,193
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               127,818
<PP&E>                                           5,213
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 262,348
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,856
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       109,089
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   262,348
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                73,623
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   51,026
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,991
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 515
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,091
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,191
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,900
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,900
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .33<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .32<F2>
<FN>
<F1>EPS IS REPORTED AS "BASIC EPS," AS PRESCRIBED BY SFAS NO. 128
<F2>EPS IS REPORTED AS "DILUTED EPS," AS PRESCRIBED BY SFAS NO. 128
</FN>
        

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