alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### IN RE: Kai D. INGRAM, Petitioner

Nos. 16-4188 & 17-1058

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. January 26, 2017

(Opinion filed: March 23, 2017)

Kai D. Ingram, Pro Se

James L. McMonagle, Jr., Esq., Luzerne County Office of District Attorney, Wilkes-Barre, PA, for Defendants

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

OPINION *

PER CURIAM

Pro se petitioner Kai Ingram has filed two petitions for writs of mandamus. For the reasons set forth below, we will dismiss one petition and deny the other.

In 2007, Ingram was convicted in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas of four counts of aggravated assault and sentenced to 121/2 to 25 years’ imprisonment. In 2012, he filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court. The District Court denied that petition, and we denied Ingram’s request for a certificate of appealability. See C.A. No. 15-2155. Ingram filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) in February 2016, which the District Court denied.

On May 19, 2016, Ingram filed a second Rule 60(b) motion. On November 25, 2016, while that motion remained pending, Ingram filed a mandamus petition, asking this Court to direct the District Court to rule on the motion. That mandamus petition was docketed at C.A. No. 16-4188.

On November 28, 2016, the District Court denied the second Rule 60(b) motion. Ingram filed a notice of appeal as to that order. He also filed a second mandamus petition, which was docketed at C.A. No. 17-1058. In that mandamus petition, Ingram argued that the District Court had erred in denying his § 2254 petition and Rule 60(b) motions.

We will dismiss Ingram’s first mandamus petition—the petition he filed in C.A. 16-4188—as moot. In that petition, he requested an order requiring the District Court to rule on his second Rule 60(b) motion. The District Court has since denied that motion. Because Ingram has now obtained the relief he sought, his petition is moot. See, e.g., Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).

In the mandamus petition that Ingram filed in C.A. No. 17-1058, he challenges the correctness of the District Court’s various orders. However, mandamus relief is unavailable because Ingram could obtain that relief through the normal appellate process. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005). Indeed, Ingram will be able to contest the denial of his second Rule 60(b) motion in the appeal currently pending at C.A. No. 17-1012.

*219Accordingly, we will dismiss as moot the mandamus petition in C.A. No. 16-4188 and deny the mandamus petition in C.A. No. 17-1058.

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
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<CASH>                                      18,360,896
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,612,214
<ALLOWANCES>                                   130,303
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            24,426,864
<PP&E>                                       3,445,611
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,303,940
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              27,540,444
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                27,540,444
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,000,656
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1 ... S eeTe x. R. App . P. 47. 4. 

## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICTOFTEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 2 - 08 - 15 0- CV DAV I D I R VI N, AS I NDE P E NDE NTAD M I NI S T R AT OR AP P E L L ANT O F EST ATE OF W . RAY I RVI N, J R. V . LO RETTA PA RK ER, A S A D M I N I STR A TO R A PPELL EE W I TH W I LLA N N EX ED O F ESTA TE O FN O M A B IS H O PIR V IN

----- ----- FR O M CO UN TY CO URT AT LAW NO . 1 OF W I CH I TA CO UN TY

----- ----- 

### M E M ORANDU M OP I NI ON 1 

### AND J UDGME NT

----- ----- W e h aveco ns i der ed t he “Agr ee d M o ti o n To Di sm i ssA ppe alA nd J oi nt M o ti o n F o r N o n s u i t/D i s m i s s a l O f U n d e r-L y i n g S u i t.”B e c a u s e a l l o f a p p e l l a n t’s cl ai m s w er e f ul l y a nd f i nal l y a dj udi ca t ed by t he t r i alco urt ’ s or dergr ant i ng su m m a ry j u d g m e n t, tha t j u d g m e n t ca n n o t be v i ti a ted b yw a yo f a n o n -su i t. H yun dai

Motor Co. v. A lvar

ado , 892 S . W . 2d 853, 855 ( Tex. 1995 ). A c c o rding l y , w e d e n ythe p a rt i e s’ req u e st fo r a n o n -su i t.N o n e t h e le s s , t h e p a rt ie s h a v e jo in t ly r e q u e s t e d t h a tt h isc o u rtd is m is s t h is

a p p e a l w it h p r eju d ic e . Itist h e r e f o r e t h e c o u rt ’s o p in io n t h a tt h e m o t io n s h o u ld b e g r a n te d . T h i sa p p e a l i sd i s m i s s e d w i th p rej u d i c e . S ee T e x . R . A pp. P. 4 2 .1 (a )(2 ), T e x . R . A p p . P . 4 3 .2 (f). C os t s oft he app ea l s hal l bepa i d byt he part y i ncu r r i ng t he sa m e, f or w h i c h l e t e x e c u ti o n i s s u e . S eeTe x. R. App . P. 43. 4.

P E R CU R I AM

PA N EL: CA YC E, C. J. ; H O LM A N an d GA RD N ER, JJ. DEL I VERE D: Se pt e m be r18, 2008
# L_2004282EN.01001001.xml

| 1.9.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.9.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/10

---

Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No 993/2001 of 4 May 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code

(
  Official Journal of the European Communities L 141 of 28 May 2001
  )

On page 4, in Article 346(1), point 15, third subparagraph:

for:

‘However, where guarantee data is exchanged between the office of guarantee and the office of departure using information technology and computer networks, the original of the guarantee instrument shall be retained at the office of departure.’

read:

‘However, where guarantee data is exchanged between the office of guarantee and the office of departure using information technology and computer networks, the original of the guarantee instrument shall be retained at the office of guarantee and no paper copy shall be presented to the office of departure.’

---
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed December 17, 2014.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D14-1891

Lower Tribunal No. 97-4142

________________

Todrick Roberts,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the

Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Eric W. Hendon, Judge.

Todrick Roberts, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LAGOA, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Todrick Roberts has filed numerous pro se motions and appeals

challenging his conviction and sentence after which this Court ordered him, on

October 29, 2014, to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing any
further pro se pleadings in this Court related to his conviction and sentence

imposed in case number F97-4142.1 Upon consideration of Roberts’ response to

the order to show cause, we conclude that Roberts failed to demonstrate good

cause for his actions. It is therefore ordered that the Clerk of the Third District

Court of Appeal shall refuse to accept any further filings that relate to case number

F97-4142, unless they have been reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a

licensed member of the Florida Bar in good standing. 

1 See Roberts v. State, No. 3d14-1891, 2014 WL 5462532 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 29,

2014).

2
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles HENDERSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-3101

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed July 20, 2017

(D.C. Nos. 2:13-CR-20065-CM-l and 2:15-CV-09197-CM) (D. Kansas)

Carrie N. Capwell, Office of the United States Attorney, District of Kansas, Kansas City, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Charles Henderson, Jr., Pro Se

Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

*782ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

Mr. Charles Henderson, Jr. pleaded guilty in federal court on drug charges and was sentenced to 129 months in prison. After unsuccessfully moving to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Mr. Henderson seeks a certificate of appeala-bility so that he can appeal. We deny Mr. Henderson’s request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Mr. Henderson can appeal only if we issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). This certificate is available only if an applicant can make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing has been made only if reasonable jurists, could debate the merits of Mr. Henderson’s appeal. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).

Mr. Henderson argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claim of ineffective assistance. For this claim, Mr. Henderson had to show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and prejudicial. *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2062, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The district court rejected Mr. Henderson’s claim, concluding that his attorney’s efforts were reasonable and did not prejudice Mr. Henderson’s sentencing. For substantially the same reasons discussed by the district court, we conclude that its ruling is not subject to reasonable debate. Thus, we decline to issue a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.
Order filed September 13, 2016 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-16-00454-CV

____________

DONALD YOUNG, DORIS YOUNG AND DONNA HOLCOMB, Appellants

V.

CHRIS DI FERRANTE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-0052700

ORDER

This appeal is from a judgment signed May 3, 2016. Appellants filed notices

of appeal on June 6, 2016. Appellants filed affidavits of indigence on August 22, 

2016, which this court referred to the trial court. 

On September 8, 2016, the trial court notified this court that the reporter’s 

record had been filed and that no contest was filed to the affidavits of indigence.

“Unless a contest is timely filed, no hearing will be conducted, the affidavit’s 
allegations will be deemed true, and the party will be allowed to proceed without 

advance payments of costs.” See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(f). 

Accordingly, the Galveston County District Clerk is directed to file the clerk’s 

record within 30 days of the date of this order. 

PER CURIAM
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0073 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0073

**2002/73/EC: Commission Decision of 30 January 2002 amending for the seventh time Decision 2000/284/EC establishing the list of approved semen collection centres for imports of equine semen from third countries (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 336) **

*
Official Journal L 033 , 02/02/2002 P. 0018 - 0028 *

Commission Decision

of 30 January 2002

amending for the seventh time Decision 2000/284/EC establishing the list of approved semen collection centres for imports of equine semen from third countries

(notified under document number C(2002) 336)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/73/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 92/65/EEC of 13 July 1992, laying down animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(I) to Directive 90/425/EEC(1), as last amended by Commission Decision 95/176/EC(2), and in particular Article 17(3)(b) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Decision 2000/284/EC(3), as last amended by Decision 2001/734/EC(4), established the list of approved semen collection centres for imports of equine semen from third countries.

(2) The competent authorities of the United States of America officially informed the Commission of the approval in accordance with the provisions of Directive 92/65/EEC of three additional equine semen collection centres.

(3) It is appropriate to amend the list in the light of new information received from the third countries concerned, and to highlight the amendments in the Annex for clarity.

(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2000/284/EC is replaced by the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 30 January 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 54.

(2) OJ L 117, 24.5.1995, p. 23.

(3) OJ L 94, 14.4.2000, p. 35.

(4) OJ L 275, 18.10.2001, p. 19.

ANEXO/BILAG/ANHANG/ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ/ΑΝΝΕΧ/ANNEXE/ALLEGATO/BIJLAGE/ANEXO/LITTE/BILAGA

>TABLE>
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 751

To provide that certain games of chance conducted by a nonprofit organization

not be treated as an unrelated business of such organization.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 3 (legislative day, MAY 1), 1995

Mr. EXON introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to

the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To provide that certain games of chance conducted by a

nonprofit organization not be treated as an unrelated

business of such organization.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CONDUCTING OF CERTAIN GAMES OF CHANCE

4 NOT TREATED AS UNRELATED TRADE OR

5 BUSINESS.

6 Section 1834 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is re7 pealed for games conducted after October 22, 1986, and

8 subparagraph (A) of section 311(a)(3) of the Tax Reform

9 Act of 1984 shall be applied and administered as if such
2

•S 751 IS

1 section 1834 (and the amendments made by such section

2 1834) had not been enacted.

Æ
Exhibit 33.2
                                 ------------


          ASSERTION OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA



The Bank of New York and The Bank of New York Trust Company, N. A.
(collectively, the "Company") provides this platform-level assessment of
compliance with the servicing criteria specified in Item 1122(d) of Regulation
AB promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Management has determined that the following servicing criteria are applicable
in regards to the following servicing platform for the following period:

Platform: Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction-level reporting initially
required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential
mortgage-backed securities and other mortgage-related asset-backed securities
issued on or after January 1, 2006 (and like-kind transactions issued prior to
January 1, 2006) for which the Company provides trustee, securities
administration, paying agent or custodial services. The platform includes like
kind transactions for which the Company provided trustee, securities
administrator, paying agent or custodial services as a result of the Company's
acquisition as of October 1, 2006 of portions of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s
corporate trust business, including structured finance agency and trust
transactions.

Applicable Servicing Criteria: All servicing criteria set forth in Item
1122(d), to the extent required by the related transaction agreements as to
any transaction, except for the following criteria: 1122 (d) (1)(ii), (iii),
(iv), (4) (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii) and (xiii).

Period: Twelve months ended December 31, 2006.

With respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the
following assessment of compliance in respect of the Applicable Servicing
Criteria:

o  The Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable
Servicing Criteria.

o  The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

o  As of December 31, 2006 and for the Period, the Company was in material
compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.



                                      1
<PAGE>


Ernst & Young LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, has
issued an attestation report with respect to the Company's foregoing
assessment of compliance.



      The Bank of New York                    The Bank of New York
      The Bank of New York Trust              The Bank of New York Trust
         Company, N.A.                           Company, N.A.


      /s/ Robert L. Griffin                   /s/ Patrick J. Tadie
      ---------------------------             ---------------------------
      Robert L. Griffin                       Patrick J. Tadie
      Authorized Signer                       Authorized Signer


March 1, 2007


                                      2
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2011-0652

Directorate Identifier: 2010NM045AD

MD90-57A026 --- 2/11/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSHUA MOSES HELLON,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

T. FELKER, Warden and ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

 Respondents - Appellees.

No. 10-16248

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01816-LKK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 27, 2011** 

Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Joshua Moses Hellon appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. 

FILED

OCT 05 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-16248

Hellon contends that the prosecutor engaged in vindictive prosecution by

amending the criminal information to add a second strike prior to his trial. The

state court’s rejection of Hellon’s claim of vindictive prosecution was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined

by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); United States v.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1982) (in cases involving pre-trial charging

decisions, timing of decision alone is insufficient to create presumption of

vindictiveness). 

Furthermore, in light of the prosecutor’s explanation for why she did not

initially charge Hellon’s second strike, the state court’s decision was not based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Hellon’s motion to expand the record is denied.

AFFIRMED.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-28-1998
<CASH>                                          10,203
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,017
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    154,005
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               201,511
<PP&E>                                         650,895
<DEPRECIATION>                                 355,921
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 682,122
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          197,845
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           64,983
<PREFERRED>                                      9,279
<COMMON>                                             4
<OTHER-SE>                                   (184,546)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   682,122
<SALES>                                        474,209
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               474,209
<CGS>                                          356,056
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  467,657
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   544
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,690
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,682)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,260
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,422)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,422)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (17.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (17.73)
        

</TABLE>