alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           2,335
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           4,451
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     11,410
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          33,420
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            33,420
<LOANS>                                        159,431
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,100
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 218,277
<DEPOSITS>                                     176,357
<SHORT-TERM>                                     5,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,203
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            27
<OTHER-SE>                                      34,690
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 218,277
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  3,305
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  696
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    91
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 4,092
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,125
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,156
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,936
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        5
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,320
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    964
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         964
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       652
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                     7.9
<LOANS-NON>                                        736
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   387
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,100
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        4
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,100
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 1
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6254 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit schools and libraries 

that receive universal service support from blocking Internet access to 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer resources, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

Mr. HONDA (for himself, Mr. POCAN, Mr. GALLEGO, Mr. NORCROSS, Mr. 

LOWENTHAL, Ms. MOORE, Ms. NORTON, Mr. QUIGLEY, Mr. GRIJALVA, 

Ms. WILSON of Florida, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, and Ms. EDWARDS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit 

schools and libraries that receive universal service support from blocking Internet access to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer resources, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Don’t Block LGBTQ 

5 Act of 2016’’. 


SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6254 IH

1 SEC. 2. ACCESS TO LGBTQ RESOURCES UNDER UNIVERSAL 

2 SERVICE SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES PRO3 GRAM. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 254(h) of the Commu5 nications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 254(h)) is amended— 

6 (1) by redesignating paragraph (7) as para7 graph (8); 

8 (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the fol9 lowing: 

10 ‘‘(7) ACCESS TO LGBTQ RESOURCES.—Notwith11 standing subsection (l)(2), an elementary school, sec12 ondary school, or library may not receive services at 

13 discount rates under paragraph (1)(B) if such school 

14 or library (under an Internet safety policy with re15 spect to which certification is required under this 

16 subsection or otherwise) blocks Internet access to 

17 lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer re18 sources.’’; and 

19 (3) in paragraph (8) (as redesignated), by add20 ing at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(J) LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 

22 TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER RESOURCES.—The 

23 term ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 

24 queer resources’ means information that is re25 lated to homosexuality, bisexuality, transgender 

26 identity, transgender status, gender nonconVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:57 Oct 05, 2016 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H6254.IH H6254

SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6254 IH

1 formity, gender expansive, gender identity, sex2 ual orientation, or related topics, except that 

3 such term does not include content that is ob4 scene, child pornography, or harmful to mi5 nors.’’. 

6 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO COMMUNICA7 TIONS ACT OF 1934.— 

8 (1) SECTION 254.—Section 254(h)(4) of the 

9 Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 254(h)(4)) 

10 is amended by striking ‘‘paragraph (7)(A)’’ and in11 serting ‘‘paragraph (8)(A)’’. 

12 (2) SECTION 271.—Section 271(g)(2) of the 

13 Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 271(g)(2)) 

14 is amended by striking ‘‘section 254(h)(5)’’ and in15 serting ‘‘section 254(h)(8)’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
J-S74027-14

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

v.

FRANK ROSELLI,

 Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 891 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2012,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-46-CR-0000820-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:FILED JANUARY 13, 2015

I join the Majority Memorandum except for its handling of Roselli’s fifth 

issue, the Alleyne issue. While I agree with the Majority that Alleyne does 

not abrogate the Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions, the 

issue is somewhat more nuanced than the Majority posits. We are not 

dealing here merely with the fact of convictions. We are dealing with an 

issue of what the convictions involve, i.e., were the burglary convictions 

crimes of violence because the buildings were occupied. Certainly an 

argument can be made that this issue involves a factual question that 

requires a jury to decide it beyond a reasonable doubt.

Unfortunately for Roselli, that argument has been repeatedly rejected 

by the courts. See U.S. v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3rd Cir. 2013):

Blair’s arguments fail, however, because Almendarez–

Torres has not been narrowed and remains the law. Alleyne,
J-S74027-14

- 2 -

133 S.Ct. at 2160 n. 1. Descamps and Alleyne do nothing to 

restrict the established exception under Almendarez–Torres

that allows judges to consider prior convictions. When the 

pertinent documents show, as they do in this case, that the prior 

convictions are for separate crimes against separate victims at 

separate times, Alleyne does not somehow muddy the record 

and convert the separateness issue into a jury question. 

Alleyne was written against the backdrop of Almendarez–

Torres and existing ACCA jurisprudence. Had the Supreme 

Court meant to say that all details related to prior convictions 

are beyond judicial notice, it would have said so plainly,as that 

would have been a marked departure from existing law.

Arguments like Blair's have been rejected by numerous 

courts.

Thus, I agree with the Majority that Alleyne provides no succor for 

Roselli.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Richard A. BLAKE, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41145 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 27, 2017

Jessica Carol Akins, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Richard A. Blake, Pro Se

Before JONES, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Richard A. Blake, federal prisoner # 65499-279, and proceeding *pro se*on appeal, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). He was sentenced, *inter alia,*to 135 months’ imprisonment.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a term of imprisonment, based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission, may be reduced. Blake moved under that section for a sentence reduction in the light of Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which reduced his offense level and lowered his advisory Guidelines range. The district court denied Blake’s motion.

He challenges the denial, claiming the court failed to consider appropriate sentencing factors and placed undue weight on the determination, made at his original sentencing proceeding, that he was a leader or organizer of criminal activity.

The denial of an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *E.g., United States v. Henderson,*636 F.3d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 2011). In deciding whether to reduce a sentence under that section, *840the district court must first determine whether defendant is eligible for a reduction, and then consider relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors to determine whether a reduction is warranted. *E.g., Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826-27, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010).

The court followed appropriate procedure by considering Blake’s motion, the amended Guidelines range, whether Blake was eligible for a reduction, and relevant § 3353(a) sentencing factors. *Id.*The court did not err in considering, and did not place undue emphasis on, Blake’s role as a leader in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(l). Moreover, the court is not required to give a detailed explanation of its decision to deny an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion. *United States v. Cooley,*590 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2009). Additionally, to the extent Blake is attempting to re-litigate facts determined at his original sentencing, such an attempt is not cognizable under § 3582(c)(2). *Evans,*587 F.3d at 674. As the court’s decision reflects consideration of Blake’s motion and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the denial of the § 3582(c)(2) motion was not an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Whitebird,*55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
HLD
- 004 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 15

- 1111

___________ IN RE: JASON EMANUEL SMART

- EL, Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:13

- cv - 00164)

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

February 20, 2015 Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge , GARTH and BARRY, Cir cuit Judges

(Opinion filed : April 14, 2015 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Jason Emanuel Smart

- El filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that we direct the District Court to rule on a motion that he had filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Dist rict Court has since granted Smart

- El’s § 2255 motion. In light of the District Court’s action, the question Smart

- El presented is no longer a live controversy, so we will dismiss the petition as moot. See , e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp. , 975 F.2d 964,

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

974 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. , 77 F.3d 690, 698

- 99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being ab le to grant the requested relief, the ca se must be dismissed as moot.”)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       1,374,227
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,177,997
<ALLOWANCES>                                   173,420
<INVENTORY>                                     25,341
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,990,333
<PP&E>                                      11,137,635
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,315,958
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              27,937,031
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       18,506,052
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        52,258
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,378,721
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                27,937,031
<SALES>                                      9,607,883
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,607,883
<CGS>                                        4,759,501
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               14,751,349
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              57,447
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (5,200,913)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (5,200,913)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,200,913)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.13)
                                               

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 11


                                 BACOU USA, INC.
                 STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 (in thousands)
                                   (unaudited)



                                                     Three Months Ended
                                                          March 31,
                                                  -----------------------------
                                                     1998                 1999
                                                  -----------          ---------

Basic:
Weighted average shares outstanding                   17,594              17,616
                                                  ===========          =========

Net income                                            $2,736              $5,474
                                                  ===========          =========
Per share amount                                       $0.15               $0.31
                                                  ===========         ==========

Diluted:
Weighted average shares outstanding                   17,594              17,616
Net effect of dilutive stock options based on the
  treasury stock method using the average market
  price                                                   60                 170
                                                  -----------          ---------

Total diluted shares                                  17,654              17,786
                                                  ===========          =========

Net income                                            $2,736              $5,474
                                                  ===========          =========
Per share amount                                      $ 0.15              $ 0.31
                                                  ===========          =========
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Ebey TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6015

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

*652Robert Ebey Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Ethan A. Ontjes, Donald Russell Pender, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Ebey Taylor seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.- § 2253(c)(2) (2012), When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the- motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Taylor has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although we grant Taylor’s motion to amend page three of his informal brief, we deny a certifícate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented.in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
# EUR-Lex - 32001D1215(01) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D1215(01)

**Council Decision of 6 December 2001 amending the Council Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU-related bodies **

*
Official Journal C 358 , 15/12/2001 P. 0001 - 0001 *

Council Decision

of 6 December 2001

amending the Council Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU-related bodies

(2001/C 358/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Article 42(2), Article 10(4) and Article 18 of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention)(1),

Having regard to the Coucil Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol's external relations with third States and non-European union related bodies(2), and in particular Article 2 of that Act,

Having regard to the Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing the receipt of information by Europol from third parties(3), and in particular Article 2 of that Act,

Having regard to the Council Act of March 1999 adopting the rules governing the transmission of personal data by Europol to third States and third bodies(4), and in particular Articles 2 and 3 of that Act,

Whereas:

(1) Operational requirements and the need to combat in an effective way organised forms of criminality through Europol require that Monaco be added to the list of third States with whom the Director of Europol is authorised to start negotiations.

(2) In Council Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU-related bodies(5) the UNDCP (United Nations Drugs Control Programme) has been listed as one of the non-European Union-related bodies with whom the Director of Europol is authorised to start negotiations.

(3) Operational requirements and the need to combat in an effective way organised forms of criminality through Europol require that the UNDCP is replaced by the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP).

(4) The Decision of 27 March 2000 should therefore be amended,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Council Decision of 27 March 2000 is hereby amended as follows:

In Article 2(1):

a) under the heading "Third States", the following indent shall be added, between Malta and Morocco: "- Monaco";

b) under the heading "Non-European Union-related bodies", the indent

- "UNDCP (United Nations Drugs Programme)" shall be replaced by the following:

- "ODCCP (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention)".

Article 2

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its adoption.

Done at, Brussels, 6 December 2001.

For the Council

The President

M. Verwilghen

(1) OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 2.

(2) OJ C 26, 30.1.1999, p. 19.

(3) OJ C 26, 30.1.1999, p. 17.

(4) OJ C 88, 30.3.1999, p. 1.

(5) OJ C 106, 13.4.2000, p. 1.
EXHIBIT 32.1



Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350

(as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002)



In connection with the Quarterly Report of IDT Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended January 31, 2007 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, James A. Courter, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to my knowledge:



1. The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



Date: March 12, 2007



/s/    JAMES A.
COURTERJames A. Courter Chief Executive Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by
Section 906, has been provided to IDT Corporation and will be retained by IDT Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.