alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0144 - EN

Avis juridique important

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# 32001D0144

**2001/144/EC: Commission Decision of 12 February 2001 amending Decision 93/195/EEC on animal health conditions and veterinary certification for the re-entry of registered horses for racing, competition and cultural events after temporary export (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2001) 347) **

*
Official Journal L 053 , 23/02/2001 P. 0023 - 0024 *

Commission Decision

of 12 February 2001

amending Decision 93/195/EEC on animal health conditions and veterinary certification for the re-entry of registered horses for racing, competition and cultural events after temporary export

(notified under document number C(2001) 347)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2001/144/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 90/426/EEC of 26 June 1990 on animal health conditions governing the movement and import from third countires of equidae(1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 19(ii) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) In accordance with Commission Decision 93/195/EEC(2), as last amended by Decision 2000/754/EC(3), the re-entry of registered horses for racing, competition and cultural events after temporary export is restricted to horses kept for less than 30 days in a third country.

(2) In order to make it easier for horses originating in the Community to take part in the United Arab Emirates Endurance World Cup that period should be extended to less than 60 days.

(3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 93/195/EEC is amended as follows:

1. A seventh indent is added to Article 1 as follows:

"- have taken part in the United Arab Emirates Endurance World Cup and meet the requirements laid down in a health certificate in accordance with the model set out in Annex VII to this Decision."

2. The Annex of this Decision is added as Annex VII.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2001.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 42.

(2) OJ L 86, 6.4.1993, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 34.

ANNEX

"ANNEX VII

>PIC FILE= "L_2001053EN.002403.EPS">"
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-4896
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CHRISTOPHER C. DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CR-02-69) Submitted: August 25, 2004 Decided: November 15, 2004 Before WIDENER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronald E. Justice, Jr., GASPERSON & JUSTICE, P.A., Hendersonville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United States Attorney, Donald D. Gast, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Christopher Chad Davis appeals his conviction for assault on an officer with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004), alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find that any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Accordingly, we affirm Davis’ conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juventino SANDOVAL-LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-30029

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

Matthew F. Duggan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USSP — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Matthew Campbell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDWA — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Eastern WA *&*ID), Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABAR, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Juventino Sandoval-Lopez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 48-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being an alien in the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Sandoval-Lopez argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to ex*555plain the sentence and address the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors sufficiently, and by treating the Guidelines as presumptively reasonable. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered Sandoval-Lopez’s sentencing arguments and adequately explained its reasons for selecting a within-Guidelines term. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, the district court’s sentencing remarks indicate that it considered the section 3553(a) factors. *See id.*(“The district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them”). Finally, the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and noted the advisory nature of the Guidelines.

Sandoval-Lopez also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion. *See Gall v. United*States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Sandoval-Lopez’s significant criminal and immigration histo-xy. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50229 Summary Calendar

MARY ELIZABETH HUMPHREY, As Next Friend of Clint Colby Stoll, A Minor; ANTHONY ALEXANDER STOLL, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Clint Stoll, Deceased; and MYRNA JO STOLL, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Clint Stoll, Deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

CITY OF AUSTIN et al.,

Defendants,

TRAVIS COUNTY TEXAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-95-CV-53

- - - - - - - - - - December 12, 1997 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-appellant Travis County, Texas appeals the district

court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment or, in the2

alternative, to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserted

civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental statelaw tort claims. Travis County’s motion was based in part on

qualified immunity and other immunity doctrines.

The denial of summary judgment generally is not an appealable

order. A ldy v. Valmet Paper Mach.

, 74 F.3d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied

, 1 17 S. Ct. 68 (1997). This court lacks appellate

jurisdiction over the district court’ s denial of Travis County’s

motion for summary judgment because the district court made no

abstract legal conclusions as to the County’s state-law i mmunity

defenses and based the de nial of summary-judgment on a

determination that there remained many genuine issues of material

fact. S ee Behrens v. Pelletier , 116 S. Ct. 834, 841-42 (1996).

The appeal is DISMISSED for want of appellate jurisdiction. S ee

Cantu v. Rocha , 77 F.3d 795, 804 (5th Cir. 1996).

Insofar as the plaintiffs move to dis miss the appeal, that

motion is GRANTED.

The plaintiffs’ motion for the imposition of sanctions alleges

that this is appeal is frivolous and seeks costs and damages based

on F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 38. Defendant has made a non-frivolous, though

ultimately unsuccessful, argument that this court had appellate

jurisdiction under the “collateral order doctrine.” Therefore, the

motion for sanctions is DENIED.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Lovel BRISTOW, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4542

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

*827Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant 'United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Mark Lovel Bristow pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012). The district court sentenced Bristow to one year and one day of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court ordered $799,894.90 in restitution. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Bris-tow’s restitution is reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Bristow has not filed a pro se brief. We affirm.

“We review a district court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion.” *United States v. Leftwich,*628 F.3d 665, 667 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentencing court may “order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (2012). Although Bristow’s restitution total consists, in part, of losses attributable to charged but subsequently dismissed criminal conduct, Bristow’s plea agreement specifically provided for restitution of $799,894.90. Accordingly, the district court did not err by ordering restitution consistent with the plea agreement.

Pursuant to *Anders,*we have reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Bristow, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bristow requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Bristow. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### William Lee ANDERSON, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Philip H. WITHERSPOON, Defendant-Appellee, and Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant.

No. 17-6667

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 22, 2017

William Lee Anderson, II, Appellant Pro Se. Jeff W. -Rosen, PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

*239Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William Lee Anderson, II, appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing Anderson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Anderson v. Witherspoon,*No. 7:15-cv-00236-MFU-JCH, 2017 WL 1194739 (W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process,

*AFFIRMED*
#### Alan HERNANDEZ-VILLA, AKA Guadalupe Hernandez-Villa, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71177

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Ian Silverberg, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Ian Silverberg, Reno, NV, for Petitioner

OIL, Russell John Verby, Trial Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alan Hernandez-Villa, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal. Our ju*897risdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo, *Cerezo v. Mukasey,*512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s determination of the governing statutes and regulations, *Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider contentions as to social groups that Hernandez-Villa raised for the first time in the' opening brief. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

The agency did not err in finding Hernandez-Villa failed to establish membership in a cognizable social group. *See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch,*816 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, we deny the petition as to his withholding of removal claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### IN RE: Jagadeshwar Reddy NOMULA, Appellant

2016-2735

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

September 18, 2017

Jundong Ma, JDM Patent Law PLLC, Riverdale Park, MD, argued for appellant.

Farheena Yasmeen Rasheed, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Jeremiah Helm, Thomas W. Krause, Joseph Gerard Piccolo.

(Newman, Wallach, and Chen, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Mario PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10768 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 13, 2017

*321James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mario Perez, Pro Se

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Mario Perez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Perez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Guillermo Cruz TRUJILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOMEZ, C/O; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16567

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Guillermo Cruz Trujillo, Pro Se

Andrea R. Sloan, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Zewugeberhan Desta, AGCA — Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and . HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Guillermo Cruz Trujillo, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Albino v. Baca,*747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (legal rulings on exhaustion); *Knievel v. ESPN,*393 F.3d 1068, *4531072 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Trujillo’s action because it was clear from the face of the amended complaint that Trujillo failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit. *See McKinney v. Carey,*311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (exhaustion must be completed before a § 1983 action is filed; exhaustion during the pendency of the litigation is insufficient because exhaustion is a precondition to suit); *see also Albino,*747 F.3d at 1169 (“[Wjhere a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Innovative Medical Services Group,
Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael L. Krall, Chief
Executive Officer certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



August 15, 2003               /s/ Michael L. Krall
-------------------              -----------------------------------
                                 Michael L. Krall
                                 Chief Executive Officer


<PAGE>






Certification of Chief Financial Officer

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Innovative Medical Services Group,
Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary Brownell, Chief Financial
Officer certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

August 15, 2003               /s/ Gary Brownell

-------------------              -----------------------------------
                                 Gary Brownell
                                 Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Razhden SHULAYA, AKA Brother, AKA Roma, Zurab Dzhanashvili, AKA Zura, Akaki Ubilava, AKA Ako, Hamlet Uglava, Mamuka Chaganava, Mikheil Toradze, Avtandil Kanadashvili, Nazo Gaprindashvili, AKA Anna, Artur Vinokurov, AKA Rizhy, Evgheni Melman, Timur Suyunov, Zurab Buziashvili, Giorgi Lomishvili, Azer Arslanouk, Ivan Afanasyev, AKA Vanya, Denis Savgir, Bakai Marat-Uulu, Andriy Petrushyn, Diego Gabisonia, Levan Makashvili, Semyon Saraidarov, AKA Sammy, Denys Davydov, Erekle Kereselidze, Alex Mitselmakher, AKA Globus, Yuriy Lerner, AKA Yuri, Avtandil Khurtsidze, Nikoloz Jikia, Defendants, Vache Hovhannisyan, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-2584

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 6, 2017

*70FOR APPELLANT: Bradley L. Henry, The Henry Law Firm PLLC, New York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: Andrew Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

PRESENT: Gerard E. Lynch, Susan L, Carney, Circuit Judges. Alvin K. Hellerstein,* District Judge.

*

 Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Vache Hovhannisyan seeks review of the District Court’s order under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) denying his application for pretrial release. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 9(a). We review for clear error the District Court’s determination that the defendant poses a risk of .flight and that no condition or combination of conditions would guarantee his appearance at trial. *See United States v. Berrios-Berrios,*791 F.2d 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1986). Upon due consideration, we affirm the order denying release pending trial for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court during the defendant’s August 4, 2017 bail hearing. (Ex. H (Aug. 2 [sic: 4], 2017 Tr.) at 26-33.)