alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 161 (Friday, August 19, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 52045]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-21270]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 7561]

Determination on Imposition and Waiver of Sanctions Under 
Sections 603 and 604 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107-228)

    Consistent with the authority contained in section 604 of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107-228) 
(the ``Act''), the Delegation of Authority in the April 30, 2009, 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, and Department of State 
Delegation of Authority No. 245-1, and with reference to the 
determinations set out in the Report to the Congress transmitted 
pursuant to section 603 of that Act, regarding the extent of 
noncompliance by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or 
Palestinian Authority with certain commitments, I hereby impose the 
sanction set out in section 604(a)(2), ``Downgrade in Status of the PLO 
Office in the United States.'' This sanction is imposed for a period of 
180 days from the date that the report under section 603 of the Act is 
transmitted to the Congress or until such time as the next report under 
section 603 is required to be transmitted to the Congress, whichever is 
later.
    Furthermore, I hereby determine that it is in the national security 
interest of the United States to waive that sanction, pursuant to 
section 604(c) of the Act. This waiver shall be effective for a period 
of 180 days from the date hereof or until such time as the next report 
under section 603 of the Act is required to be transmitted to Congress, 
whichever is later.
    This determination shall be reported to Congress promptly and 
published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: August 10, 2011.
William J. Burns,
Deputy Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2011-21270 Filed 8-18-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-31-P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 826 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 826

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
   documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the 
   coastwise trade for the vessel PRIME TIME, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                 May 18 (legislative day, May 15), 1995

 Mr. Thurmond introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
   documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the 
   coastwise trade for the vessel PRIME TIME, and for other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTIFICATE OF DOCUMENTATION.

    Notwithstanding section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 
U.S.C. App. 883), section 8 of the Act of June 19, 1886 (24 Stat. 81, 
chapter 421; 46 U.S.C. App. 289), and section 12106 of title 46, United 
States Code, the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate of 
documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the 
coastwise trade for the vessel PRIME TIME, United States official 
number 660944.
                                 <all>
```
#### IN RE: Antoine HILL, Petitioner.

No. 17-1331

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 20, 2017

Decided: June 22, 2017

Antoine Hill, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Antoine Hill petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court *790to act. The district court’s docket establishes that Hill’s action is proceeding and reveals no undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, although we grant Hill’s application to proceed in forma pau-peris, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
"WBID"	"exclude"
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"998"	0
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION
 CERTIFICATION OF RICHARD H. BACHMANN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OF DEP HOLDINGS, LLC, THE GENERAL PARTNER OF
DUNCAN ENERGY PARTNERS L.P.
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
 /s/ Richard H. BachmannName:
    Richard H. BachmannTitle:
    Chief Executive Officer of DEP Holdings, LLC

on behalf of Duncan Energy Partners L.P.
#### Kiflay Tekleldet GEBRU, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-71242

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*707Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 31, 2017

John L. Wheaton, John L. Wheaton, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner

Elizabeth Robyn Chapman, Trial Attorney, OIL, Julia Tyler, Esquire, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kiflay Tekleldet Gebru, a native of Ethiopia and citizen of Eritrea, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies between Gebru’s testimony and declaration as to the length of his detention at the police station and details of his physical mistreatment during interrogation. *See id.*at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under the “totality of circumstances”). Gebru’s explanations do not compel a contrary result. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). In the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Gebru’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Gebru’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the same statements the agency found not credible, and the record does not otherwise compel a finding that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Eritrea. *See Almaghzar v. Gonzales,*457 F.3d 915, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, we reject Gebru’s contention that the agency failed to consider record evidence. *See Larita-Martinez v. INS,*220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2000); *Almaghzar v. Gonzales,*457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 31.4

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

EXCHANGE ACT
RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a),

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, J. William Holden, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017 of Dynegy Inc.; and
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                                       
|-------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 27, 2018 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ J. William Holden                                                                                 
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | J. William Holden                                                                                     
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of Vistra Energy Corp. (successor to
Dynegy Inc.)
**Exhibit
      32.1**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of GCA II Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-K for the period ending May 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael M. Membrado,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                Michael M. MembradoMichael
                M. Membrado
              Principal
                Executive Officer
              August
                29, 2008
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 4, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00128

- CR

IN RE Eduardo TREVINO

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez , Justice

On July 23 , 2015, relator Eduardo Trevino filed in this original proceeding a motion to

rescind which appears to seek reconsideration of this court’s prior order

. T he court has

considered relator’s motion and it is DENIED

.

It is so ORDERED on September 4, 2015

.



### PER CURIAM

A ttes ted:

______________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No s

. 1999CR4085

, 1999CR6204, and 1999CR6205, each styled The State of

T

exas v. Eduardo Trevino , pending in the 144th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas, the Lorina I. Rummel

presiding.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6033 

To expand the tropical disease product priority review voucher program to 

encourage treatments for the Middle East respiratory syndrome. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 

Mr. PETERS (for himself, Mr. ROTHFUS, and Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of 

Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To expand the tropical disease product priority review voucher program to encourage treatments for the Middle East 

respiratory syndrome. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Adding Middle East 

5 Respiratory Syndrome to the FDA Priority Review Vouch6 er Program Act’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6033 IH

1 SEC. 2. EXPANDING TROPICAL DISEASE PRODUCT PRI2 ORITY REVIEW VOUCHER PROGRAM TO EN3 COURAGE TREATMENTS FOR MIDDLE EAST 

4 RESPIRATORY SYNDROME. 

5 Section 524(a)(3) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 

6 Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360n(a)(3)) is amended— 

7 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (S) as sub8 paragraph (T); and 

9 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (R) the fol10 lowing: 

11 ‘‘(S) Middle East respiratory syndrome.’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Armando LARA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50375

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed July 3, 2017

Adam Lome Braverman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ajay Krishnamurthy, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Amrutha N. Jindal, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Armando Lara appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 12-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lara contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to use the Guidelines range as a starting point for its sentencing determination and by failing to explain its sentencing decision adequately. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and used that range as the starting point and initial benchmark. *See Molina-Martinez v. United States,*— U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016). Moreover, the record shows that the court considered Lara’s mitigating arguments and sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the 12-month sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Lara next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Lara’s sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Lara’s repeated breaches of the court’s trust. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; *United States v. Simtob,*485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6998 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6998

  To ensure equal treatment for certain faith-based organizations in 
            certain Small Business Administration programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 16, 2024

   Mr. Mann introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Small Business

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To ensure equal treatment for certain faith-based organizations in 
            certain Small Business Administration programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fair Assistance and Impartial 
Treatment of Help In Small Business Act'' or the ``FAITH in Small 
Business Act''.

SEC. 2. ENSURING EQUAL TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
              IN CERTAIN SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMS.

    The proposed rule of the Small Business Administration titled 
``Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA's Loan 
and Disaster Assistance Programs'' issued January 19, 2021, shall have 
the force and effect of law.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 33.1Management’s Assertion on Compliance with Regulation AB CriteriaHyundai Motor Finance Company (the “Company”) is responsible for assessing compliance as of and forthe year ended December 31, 2006 (the “Reporting Period”) with the servicing criteria set forth inItem 1122(d) of Regulation AB, except for the criteria set forth in Items 1122(d)(1)(iii),1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(2)(iv), 1122(d)(3)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x),1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), 1122(d)(4)(xiii), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company hasconcluded are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the Platform (the“Applicable Servicing Criteria”). The transactions covered by this report include the asset-backedsecurities transactions for which the Company acted as servicer involving auto loan receivablesissued on or after January 1, 2006 as set forth in Appendix A (the “Platform”).The Company has engaged a certain vendor (the “Vendor”) to perform specific, limited or scriptedactivities, and the Company elects to take responsibility for assessing compliance with theservicing criteria applicable to the Vendor set forth below:Criteria 1122(d)(2)(i) and 1122(d)(2)(iv) — The Vendor posts cash receipts received vialockbox submission to the Company’s lockbox clearing account.The Company has not identified and is not aware of any material instance of noncompliance by theVendor with the applicable servicing criteria for the Reporting Period with respect to the Platformtaken as a whole. The Company has not identified any material deficiency in its policies andprocedures to monitor the compliance by the Vendor with the applicable servicing criteria for theReporting Period with respect to the Platform taken as a whole.The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria by the Company for theReporting Period and has concluded that it has complied, in all material respects, with theApplicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Period with respect to the Platform taken as awhole, with the exception of criteria 1122(d)(3)(i)(A)-(B), as noted in Appendix B. In making thisassessment, management used the criteria set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission inparagraph (d) of Item 1122 of Regulation AB.KPMG LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report on theassessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Period as setforth in this assertion.
#### James FREEMAN, III, Petitioner, Appellant, v. David NOLAN, Respondent, Appellee.

No. 15-2002

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

September 9, 2016

Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender Office, District of Massachusetts, on brief for appellant.

Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, and Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, on brief for appellee.

Before Torruella, Lynch, and Barron, Circuit Judges.

Per curiam.

James Freeman, III appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas coitus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 14, 2011, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Freeman raised four challenges to his 1999 convictions for first-degree murder and other crimes of violence under Massachusetts state law, only three of which he maintains on appeal.1

On October 16, 2012, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that none of Freeman’s claims supported habeas relief. As to the three claims framed by Freeman, the magistrate judge found as follows:

First, Freeman’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to permit a potential defense witness to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify failed on the merits, as the record did not reflect an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See id. § 2254(d)(1). And in any event, the record indicated that any error was harmless.

Second, Freeman’s challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of a deliberating juror likewise failed on the merits, see id. while his corollary challenge to the court’s jury instruction regarding that dismissal was procedurally defaulted, even if properly before the habeas court, see Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47, 62 (1st Cir. 2006).

Third, Freeman’s ineffective-assistance challenge, predicated on his counsel’s failure to seek exclusion of particular evidence, was time-barred.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

On July 13, 2015, the district judge issued an order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, thereby dismissing Freeman’s petition. We agree that the petition must be dismissed substantially for the reasons articulated below, without adoption of the magistrate judge’s opinion. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c). We add only that, even if all of Freeman’s *643claims were properly preserved for consideration on the merits, they would still fail. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The order of the district court is af-fírmed.

1

. Claims not renewed in an appellate brief are waived. See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1991).

2

. Freeman’s brief appears to have jettisoned the broader, cumulative-ineffectiveness component of his challenge, which the magistrate judge rejected on the merits. On appeal, "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).