alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.1


Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm on Supplemental Information


To the Shareholders and Board of Directors


Barings BDC, Inc.:


We have audited and reported separately herein on the consolidated financial statements of Barings BDC, Inc. and subsidiaries (the Company) as of December 31, 2021 and 2020, and for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2021.


The senior securities information for the years ended December 31, 2021 and 2020 included in Part II, Item 5 of the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2021, under the caption “Senior Securities” (the Senior Securities Table) has been subjected to audit procedures performed in conjunction with the audit of the Company’s consolidated financial statements. The Senior Securities Table is the responsibility of the Company’s management. Our audit procedures included determining whether the Senior Securities Table reconciles to the consolidated financial statements or the underlying accounting and other records, as applicable, and performing procedures to test the completeness and accuracy of the information presented in the Senior Securities Table. In forming our opinion on the Senior Securities Table, we evaluated whether the Senior Securities Table, including its form and content, is presented in conformity with the instructions to Form N-2. In our opinion, the Senior Securities Table is fairly stated, in all material respects, in relation to the consolidated financial statements as a whole.


/s/ KPMG LLP


Charlotte, NC


February 23, 2022
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-1606

_____________________________

KENNETH CHAKY,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON 

OFFENDER REVIEW,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

John C. Cooper, Judge.

October 23, 2019

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Mobley v. McNeil, 989 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2008).

WOLF, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Kenneth Chaky, pro se, Appellant.

Rana Wallace, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender 

Review, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 948 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

  1st Session
                                 S. 948

To encourage organ donation through the inclusion of an organ donation 
  card with individual income refund payments, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 20 (legislative day, June 19), 1995

    Mr. Dorgan (for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Leahy, Mr. 
Murkowski, and Mr. Robb) introduced the following bill; which was read 
             twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To encourage organ donation through the inclusion of an organ donation 
  card with individual income refund payments, and for other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Organ Donation Insert Card Act''.

SEC. 2. ORGAN DONATION INFORMATION INCLUDED WITH INCOME TAX REFUND 
              PAYMENTS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall include with 
any payment of a refund of individual income tax made during the period 
beginning on February 1, 1996, and ending on June 30, 1996, a copy of 
the document described in subsection (b).
    (b) Text of Document.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall, after 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
organizations promoting organ donation, prepare a document suitable for 
inclusion with individual income tax refund payments which--
            (1) encourages organ donation;
            (2) includes a detachable organ donor card; and
            (3) urges recipients to--
                    (A) sign the organ donor card;
                    (B) discuss organ donation with family members and 
                tell family members about the recipient's desire to be 
                an organ donor if the occasion arises; and
                    (C) encourage family members to request or 
                authorize organ donation if the occasion arises.
                                 <all>
```
#### Wallace JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BEST SERVICE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-55213

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*581Submitted October 23, 2017 *

FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2017

Wallace Jones, Lakewood, CA, pro se.

Brian Craig Nelson, Assistant General Counsel, Clark Garen, Law Offices of Clark Garen, Rachel C. Zwernemann, Rachel Zwernemann, Culver City, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Wallace Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo . a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell,*845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FCRA claim because Jones failed to allege that the defendant, a debt collector, had requested his credit report for any reason other than to attempt to collect on the debt, and requesting a credit report with the intent to collect on a debt is one of the permissible purposes under the FCRA. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); *Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally, construed, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FDCPA claim because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to show actionable conduct under the FDCPA. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (explaining prohibited practices under the FDCPA); *Hebbe,*627 F.3d at 341-42.

We do not consider claims dismissed with leave to amend that Jones failed to re-allege in his second amended complaint. *See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc.,*710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to replead claims after dismissal with leave to amend amounts to waiver).

AFFIRMED.

***

 jjjjs disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*582ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 12

- 812 V

Filed: July 11, 2013

Not for P ublication

*************************************

JOSEPH LERRO and BRITTANY LERRO

, *

Parents and L egal R epresentatives of the *

Estate of JOSEPH N. LERRO, deceased, *

*

Petitioner s

, * Attorneys’ Fees & Costs Decision

* Based on Stipulation of Fact

v. *

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH *

AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

Respondent. *

*

*************************************

B arbara D. Bonar

, Covington, KY , for petitione r s

. Lisa A. Wa tts , Washington, DC, for respondent.

MILLMAN, Special Master

DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS ’ FEES AND COSTS 1

On July 1 1 , 2013 , the parties filed a stipulation of fact in which they agreed on an appropriate amount for attorneys’ fees and costs in this case

.

I n accordance with t he General Or der #9 requirement, petitioners ’ counsel asserts that

petitioner s did not incur any costs in pursuit of their petition.

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation f or the special master's action in this

case, the special master intends to post this unpublished decision on the United States Court of Federal

Claims's website, in accordance with the E

- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107

- 347, 116 Stat.

2899, 2913 (Dec. 17, 2002). Vaccine Rule 18(b) states that all decisions of the special masters will be

made available to the public unless they contain trade secrets or commercial or financial information that

is privileged and confidential, or medical or similar information whose disclosure would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. When such a decision is filed, a petitioner has 14 days to

identify a nd move to redact such information prior to the document = s disclosure. If the special master,

upon review, agrees that the identified material fits within the banned categories listed above, the special

master shall redact such material from public access.2

Petitioner s informally submitted a draft application for attorneys’ fees and c osts to

respondent. During informal discussions, respondent raised objections to certain items. Based

on these objections, petitioner s now amend their request for attorneys’ fees and costs and request

$ 2 6,872.94 in attorneys’ fees and costs , which consists of $25,880.00 in attorneys ’ fees and

$992.94 in costs . Respondent does not object to the reduced amount. The undersigned finds this

amount to be reasonable. Accordingly, the court awards $ 2 6,872.94

, representing

reimbursement for attorneys’ fees and costs. The award shall be in the form of a check payable

jointly to petitioner s and B . Dahlenb u rg Bonar, P.S.C

. in the amount of $ 2 6,872.94

.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of

the court is directed to enter judgment herewit h. 2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 11, 2013 /s/ Laura D. Millman

Laura D. Millman

Special Master

2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by each party , either separately or

jointly, filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review.
No. 37,962

#### Carl L. Zeller and Floyd F. Sears, a Copartnership doing business as Zeller Company, *Plaintiffs,*v. J. W. Smyth (Defendant-Cross Petitioner), *Appellee,*and Earl Frost (Defendant), *Appellant.*

(223 P. 2d 737)

Opinion filed November 10, 1950.

*Donald R. Newkirk,*of Wichita, argued the cause, and *Howard T. Fleeson, Flomer*V. *Gooing, Wayne Coulson, Paul R. Kiich,*and *Dale M. Stucky,*all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.

*Arnold C. Todd,*of Wichita, argued the cause, and D. *Emmett Foley,*of Wichita, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, C. J.:

This action arose from the collision of two automobiles in the intersection of George Washington Boulevard, an east and west street, and Indianapolis Avenue, a north and south street, in Wichita, where normally there was a stop sign on Indianapolis Avenue as it approached George Washington Boulevard from the north, which plaintiff alleged had been removed and not replaced by the defendant Frost. Plaintiff, driving east on George Washington Boulevard, sued Smyth, who was driving south on Indianapolis Avenue, for damages to his car and personal injuries as a result of the collision of the two cars in the intersection, and joined Frost as defendant, alleging that the negligence of the two of them resulted in his injury. Smyth filed an answer denying the acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff and alleging contributory negligence of plaintiff. He also filed a cross petition against both the plaintiff and Frost, in which he *50alleged that the negligence of Frost was the sole cause of the collision and resulting damages. Frost demurred to the cross petition. This demurrer was overruled and he has appealed. In his brief it is argued that even though he were negligent in taking down the stop sign the same could not have been the proximate cause of the collision.

We have examined the pleadings and find they contain numerous charges, counter-charges and denials. We think we should not attempt to determine the proximate cause of the collision in advance of the trial.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Wertz, J., not participating.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of
China Agri-Business, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the “Report”), I, Liping Deng, Principal Executive Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and result of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.





March
      31, 2009
                By:
                /s/
      Liping DengLiping
      DengPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer(Principal
      Executive Officer)
Exhibit 23

 

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

To the Board of Directors of HSBC Finance Corporation:

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement No. 333-132348-04 on Form S-3  of HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-3 of our reports dated March 5, 2007 included as Exhibits 34.1, 34.2, 34.3 and 34.4 in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-3 for the year ended December 31, 2006.

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

 

Chicago, Illinois

March 28, 2007
# EUR-Lex - 32002R0221 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002R0221

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 221/2002 of 6 February 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 037 , 07/02/2002 P. 0004 - 0006 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 221/2002

of 6 February 2002

amending Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 315/93 of 8 February 1993 laying down Community procedures for contaminants in food(1), and in particular Article 2(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EEC) No 315/93 provides that maximum levels must be set for contaminants in foodstuffs in order to protect public health.

(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 466/2001(2), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2375/2001(3), sets maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs to apply from 5 April 2002. In particular, Annex I thereto sets levels for lead, cadmium and mercury in certain fishery products.

(3) It is essential, in order to protect public health, to keep contaminants at levels which are toxicologically acceptable. Maximum levels for lead, cadmium and mercury must be safe and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) based upon good manufacturing and agricultural/fishery practices. On the basis of new analytical data it is necessary to revise the relevant provisions of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 for these contaminants in certain fishery products. The revised provisions maintain a high level of consumer health protection.

(4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee for Foodstuffs,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 5 April 2002.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 February 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 37, 13.2.1993, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 77, 16.3.2001, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 321, 6.12.2001, p. 1.

ANNEX

Section 3 (Heavy metals) of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 466/2001 is amended as follows:

(a) concerning lead (Pb), the points 3.1.4, 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.6 are replaced by the following: >TABLE>

(b) concerning cadmium (Cd), the points 3.2.5, 3.2.5.1 and 3.2.6 are replaced by the following: >TABLE>

(c) concerning mercury (Hg), the point 3.3.1.1 is replaced by the following: >TABLE>

(1) Where fish are intended to be eaten whole, the maximum level shall apply to the whole fish.

(2) Where fish are intended to be eaten whole, the maximum level shall apply to the whole fish.
Exhibit
3.2
  ARTICLES
OF AMENDMENT


OF


CORNERSTONE
GROWTH & INCOME REIT, INC.





THIS IS
TO CERTIFY THAT:





FIRST:            Pursuant
to Section 2-605 of the Maryland General Corporation Law (the “MGCL”),
Cornerstone Growth & Income REIT, Inc. (the “Corporation”) desires to amend
its charter as currently in effect and as hereinafter amended.





SECOND:       Article
I of the Corporation’s charter shall be amended as follows:





The name of the Corporation is
Cornerstone Healthcare Plus REIT, Inc. (the “Corporation”).





THIRD:           This
amendment to the Corporation’s charter was approved by a majority of the entire
Board of Directors of the Corporation.  This amendment is limited to a
change expressly authorized by Section 2-605(a)(1) of the MGCL to be made
without action by the Corporation’s stockholders.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has
caused the foregoing amendment of its charter to be signed in its name and on
its behalf by its President and Chief Executive Officer and attested to by its
Senior Vice President and Secretary on this 29th day of December,
2009.





CORNERSTONE
      GROWTH & INCOME REIT, INC.By:
              /s/ Terry G. RousselTerry
      G. RousselPresident
      and Chief Executive OfficerATTEST:By:
              /s/ Alfred J. PizzurroAlfred
      J. PizzurroSenior
      Vice President and Secretary
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-12515

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00208-PAS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANDRE DUPREE COGDELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

 (November 14, 2012)

Before BARKETT, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Andre Cogdell, pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

Case: 12-12515 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 1 of 3 
2

post-conviction motion to correct a purported error in the presentence investigation 

report (“PSI”), pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 36, and his motion for reconsideration. 

On appeal, Cogdell makes the following arguments: (1) the district court erred by 

denying his Rule 26 motion; (2) the court at his original sentencing failed to make 

requisite factual findings with regard to his objection to paragraph 43 of the PSI 

and failed to append its written determinations to a copy of the PSI, pursuant to 

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32; (3) the court erred in determining that the crime in paragraph 43 

was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. and (4) he did not plead guilty to 

aggravated assault. 

We review de novo legal questions concerning the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006). We 

also review de novo the district court’s application of Rule 36. United States v. 

Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In this case, the district court did not err in denying Cogdell’s Rule 36 motion 

or motion for reconsideration because there was no clerical error. Further, there

were no controverted facts, and, therefore, the district court was not required to 

make findings or append a copy of such findings to the PSI, pursuant to 

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. Moreover, any challenge to Cogdell’s career-offender 

classification is an attempt to challenge the validity of the district court’s 

Case: 12-12515 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 2 of 3 
3

sentencing guidelines calculation, and, thus, is an inappropriate use of Rule 36. 

See Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164-65. Furthermore, any potential error in paragraph 

43 of the PSI with regard to Cogdell pleading nolo contendere to aggravated 

assault was invited because, in his objection to paragraph 43, he clearly asserted 

that he pled guilty to aggravated assault. Silvestri, 409 F.3d at 1327.

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 12-12515 Date Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 3 of 3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
COMPANY'S  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 27, 1996 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               MAR-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                  SEP-28-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                    DEC-27-1996
<CASH>                                               45,108
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     2,298,448
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (227,343)
<INVENTORY>                                      13,053,079
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 15,952,483
<PP&E>                                            2,396,015
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (1,564,519)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   20,709,694
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             7,601,898
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                             47,010
<OTHER-SE>                                       13,057,588
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     20,709,694
<SALES>                                          27,791,869
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 27,791,869
<CGS>                                            22,199,304
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    22,199,304
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  1,396,486
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     14,268
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  304,367
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   1,436,384
<INCOME-TAX>                                        438,770
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 997,614
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                        997,614
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                           .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           .21
                                               


</TABLE>