alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James Wesley SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6469

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 31, 2017

Decided: November 13, 2017

James Wesley Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before FLOYD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James Wesley Smith seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*278We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Smith has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 23.1





CONSENT OF DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP






CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-152116 and 333-144749 on Form S-8 of our reports dated March 15, 2010 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the adoption of authoritative guidance on Accounting for Deferred Compensation and Postretirement Benefit Aspects of Endorsement Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements on January 1, 2008), relating to the consolidated financial statements of Beneficial Mutual Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries, and the effectiveness of Beneficial Mutual Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries’ internal control over financial reporting, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Beneficial Mutual Bancorp, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2009.









Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


March 15, 2010
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 11, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50691

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL SCOTT WILLIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:00-CR-128-ALL

--------------------

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Scott Willis, pro se federal prisoner # 04279-180,

appeals the district court’s denial of his “Motion Renewing

Objections to Pre-Sentence Report.” The district court concluded

that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion.

Willis’s appellate brief addresses the merits of his

underlying claim but does not address the district court’s ruling

that it lacked jurisdiction. Willis points to no legal authority

for the district court to entertain his motion. Thus, Willis has
No. 05-50691

-2-

abandoned any argument that the district court’s dismissal of his

motion for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Even if we were to construe Willis’s motion liberally as

seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, such a motion would

be successive. Willis’s claims do not meet the criteria for

filing a successive § 2255 motion because (a) they do not rely on

newly-discovered facts that would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would

have found the movant guilty, and (b) they do not rely on a new

rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court

on collateral review. See §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255; see also In re

Elwood, 408 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), provides no basis for a

successive § 2255 motion). 

Willis has failed to show that his appeal involves “legal

points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” 

See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Therefore, we DISMISS the appeal as frivolous.
##### 



Exhibit 10.11
 
   STOCK
    TRANSFER AGENCY AGREEMENT
    between
    TRIANGLE CAPITAL CORPORATION
    and
    THE BANK OF NEW YORK
    Dated as of February 16, 2007
    ACCOUNT NUMBER(S)
  1




---



##### 



STOCK
    TRANSFER AGENCY AGREEMENT
    W I T N E
    S S E T H:
    ARTICLE I
  DEFINITIONS
    Business Day
  Certificate
  Officer
  Shares and/or
  ARTICLE II
  APPOINTMENT
    OF BANK
             2




---



##### 



i.e.
          ARTICLE III
  AUTHORIZATION
    AND ISSUANCE OF SHARES
      i.e.
   3




---



##### 



and/or
    i.e.
  ARTICLE IV
  RECAPITALIZATION
    OR CAPITAL ADJUSTMENT
            i.e.
    ARTICLE V
  ISSUANCE
    AND TRANSFER OF SHARES
     4




---



##### 



e.g.
         5




---



##### 



ARTICLE VI
  DIVIDENDS
    AND DISTRIBUTIONS
    and/or
      ARTICLE VII
  CONCERNING
    THE CUSTOMER
    and/or
 6




---



##### 



ARTICLE VIII
  CONCERNING
    THE BANK
             7




---



##### 



and/or
     8




---



##### 



ARTICLE IX
  TERMINATION
   9




---



##### 



ARTICLE X
  MISCELLANEOUS
                 10




---



##### 



Attest:

TRIANGLE CAPITAL CORPORATION/s/  Sheri
    Colquitt

By: /s/  Garland
    S. Tucker, IIIName: Garland S. Tucker, IIITitle: President and CEOAttest:

THE BANK OF NEW YORK/s/  Doug
    DiToro

By: /s/  John
    SivertsonName: John SivertsonTitle: Vice President  11




---



##### 



SCHEDULE I
 12
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-41212 Summary Calendar

BOBBY PRIOUR, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus PATRICK D. DICKENTS, Lieutenant; GARY HERRING, Sergeant; MICHAEL A. ROESLER,Captain, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 9:96-CV-444

- - - - - - - - - - May 21, 1998 Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1
Bobby Priour, Texas prisoner # 629374, argues that the
district court abuse d its discretion in dismissing his complaint
based on his failure to exhaust admin istrative remedies and his
failure to state a claim.

We have reviewed the record and brief, and affirm the
dismissal of the complaint based on Priour’s failure to state a
claim. Because Priour has failed to show that the prisondisciplinary decision against him has been invalidated or set

aside, he has failed to state an actionable § 1983 claim. S ee Heck

v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994); Clarke v. Stalder , 121 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997).

AFFIRMED.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y A lton Thomas Davis,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk December 20, 2010

s1213 

# Order

December 20, 2010

141671

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner-Appellee,

v SC: 141671 ADB: 08-000022-AI; 08-000085-JC; 08-000140-GA

FREDERICK M. TOCA, JR., Respondent-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not pe rsuaded that the questions pr esented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Devon ARTIS, Defendant-Appellant. *315United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Devon Artis, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7583, No. 16-7584

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 24, 2017

Decided: April 6, 2017

Joel Devon Artis, Appellant Pro Se. Jane J. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Laura Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joel Devon Artis appeals from the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motions to reduce his drug possession sentences in light of Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court first stated that it lacked the discretion to reduce Artis’ sentences. Our subsequent decision in *United States v. Muldrow,*844 F.3d 434, 439 (4th Cir. 2016), undermines this conclusion. However, the district court alternately reasoned that, even if it had the discretion to lower Artis’ sentences, it would decline to do so in order to protect public safety and in view of Artis’ poor performance on supervision. We conclude that this alternate ruling does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Manuel Baeza HERNANDEZ, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. Attorney General, Respondent

No. 16-60018 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 5, 2017

Raed Gonzalez, Esq., Senior Attorney, Gonzalez Olivieri, L.L.C., Houston, TX, Sheridan Gary Green, Sheridan Green Law, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, for Petitioner

*436Anna Emily Juarez, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Manuel Baeza Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his statutory motion to reopen and refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The Government moves to dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.

Baeza Hernandez argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Mata v. Lynch,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2150, 2153-55, 192 L.Ed.2d 225 (2015), held that this court has jurisdiction to review all motions to reopen regardless of the reason for the BIA’s denial of the motion. However, we lack jurisdiction to review whether the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte authority to reopen a case. *Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 246, 248-50 (5th Cir. 2004). The ruling in *Mata*did not disturb that rule and, thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. *See Mata,*135 S.Ct. at 2155; *Enriquez-Alvarado,*371 F.3d at 250.

Baeza Hernandez also contends that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s determination that the departure bar regulation applied to his motion to reopen sua sponte and asserts that this action constituted a gross miscarriage of justice. Given that these arguments also challenge the decision to deny the motion to reopen sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review this decision. *See Enriquez-Alvarado,*371 F.3d at 250.

Finally, Baeza Hernandez asks this court to remand this case to the BIA for a determination of whether his motion to reopen should be considered timely based on equitable tolling. Because the issue of equitable tolling was not properly exhausted, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim. *See Omari v. Holder,*562 F.3d 314, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2009).

The motion to dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED, and the petition for review is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5..4.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5946 Received in Senate (RDS)]

<DOC>
114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5946

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 26, 2016

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 
  any prizes or awards won in competition in the Olympic Games or the 
                           Paralympic Games.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States Appreciation for 
Olympians and Paralympians Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC MEDALS AND USOC PRIZE MONEY EXCLUDED 
              FROM GROSS INCOME.

    (a) In General.--Section 74 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) Exception for Olympic and Paralympic Medals and Prizes.--
            ``(1) In general.--Gross income shall not include the value 
        of any medal awarded in, or any prize money received from the 
        United States Olympic Committee on account of, competition in 
        the Olympic Games or Paralympic Games.
            ``(2) Limitation based on adjusted gross income.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to 
                any taxpayer for any taxable year if the adjusted gross 
                income (determined without regard to this subsection) 
                of such taxpayer for such taxable year exceeds 
                $1,000,000 (half of such amount in the case of a 
                married individual filing a separate return).
                    ``(B) Coordination with other limitations.--For 
                purposes of sections 86, 135, 137, 199, 219, 221, 222, 
                and 469, adjusted gross income shall be determined 
                after the application of paragraph (1) and before the 
                application of subparagraph (A).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to prizes and awards received after December 31, 2015.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 22, 2016.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6960 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.6960

                     One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
         the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-four

                                 An Act

 
  To amend the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize the Emergency 
                 Medical Services for Children program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
    This Act may be cited as the ``Emergency Medical Services for 
Children Reauthorization Act of 2024''.
SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF GRANTS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN.
    Section 1910(d) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300w-
9(d)) is amended by striking ``and $22,334,000 for each of fiscal years 
2020 through 2024'' and inserting ``$22,334,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2020 through 2024, and $24,334,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 
through 2029''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Christa Michalaros, certify that:

1.             Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Rafaella Apparel Group, Inc.;

2.             Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)           Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period which this report is being prepared;

(b)           Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

(c)           Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s Board ofDirectors:

(a)           Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,  process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

----

 

(b)  Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| September 28, 2007 | By:    | /s/ Christa Michalaros                                                                  |
|--------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|               |   | Christa Michalaros  Chief Executive Officer and Director  (Principal Executive Officer) |

 

----
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 921

To establish a Minerals Management Service within the Department of the

Interior; and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 14 (legislative day, JUNE 5), 1995

Mr. MURKOWSKI (for himself, Mr. BROWN, and Mr. JOHNSTON) introduced

the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee

on Energy and Natural Resources

A BILL

To establish a Minerals Management Service within the

Department of the Interior; and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Minerals Management

5 Service Organic Act’’.

6 SEC. 102. ESTABLISHMENT OF MINERALS MANAGEMENT

7 SERVICE.

8 There is established in the Department of the Inte9 rior a service to be called the Minerals Management Serv10 ice, which shall be under the charge of a Director who
2

S 921 IS

1 shall report to the Assistant Secretary for Land and Min2 erals Management. The Director shall be appointed by the

3 President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen4 ate, and shall be compensated at the rate provided for level

5 V of the executive schedule under section 5315 of title 5

6 of the United States Code. The Director shall be ap7 pointed on the basis of professional competence and capac8 ity to administer the provisions of this title. There shall

9 also be in said service such subordinate officers, clerks,

10 and employees as may be appropriated for by Congress.

11 The service thus established shall promote and regulate

12 the use of lands on the Outer Continental Shelf for pur13 poses of energy and mineral resources exploration, produc14 tion and development, and shall administer a program re15 sponsible for the timely and accurate collection, distribu16 tion, accounting for and auditing of revenues owed by

17 holders of mineral leases on Federal and offshore and In18 dian lands. The service shall administer its functions by

19 such means as are reasonably necessary to carry out the

20 purposes of this Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands

21 Act (43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), the Mineral Leasing Act

22 (30 U.S.C. 181–287), and the Federal Oil and Gas Roy23 alty Management Act (30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), and all

24 other applicable Federal laws.

Æ