alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### IN RE: Kenneth Lance HADDIX, attorney disciplinary matter, *649Kenneth Lance Haddix, attorney disciplinary matter, Appellant.

No. 16-56048

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed November 17, 2017

Kenneth Lance Haddix, Pro’ Se

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and LOGAN,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Steven Paul Logan, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

After the California Supreme Court disbarred Kenneth Haddix, the district court imposed a reciprocal discipline of disbarment. We affirm.

1.“[A] federal court’s imposition of reciprocal discipline on a member of its bar based on a state’s disciplinary adjudication is proper unless an independent review of the record reveals: (1) a deprivation of due process; (2) insufficient proof of misconduct; or (3) grave injustice which would result from the imposition of such discipline.” *In re Kramer,*282 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2002). Haddix was not denied due process in the state proceedings. He received notice of the charges against him and the opportunity to challenge them in the state bar court. *See In re Corrinet,*645 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011). Haddix argues that the trial judge in the state bar proceeding was biased. But, the record indicates that the judge asked relevant questions about Haddix’s disciplinary history, health conditions, and his knowledge of and compliance with various probation terms. Nothing in the record suggests bias.

2. There was sufficient proof in the state bar proceeding establishing Haddix’s misconduct. He stipulated to facts establishing his probation violations. Haddix suggests the district court should have investigated his claim that he was falsely accused of the misconduct that gave rise to his probation. But, the district court properly declined to do so because it “would be drawn into an extensive inquiry requiring it to sit in review of a [state court] judgment.” *In re Rosenthal,*854 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

3. The reciprocal discipline does not cause a grave injustice. Haddix contends that his probation violations were the result of his ill health and that of his wife. But, the state bar court considered this argument, finding that Haddix’s probation violations largely predated any health problems, and that medical statements presented at trial fell short of establishing “a nexus between the violations and any prior health problems.” These factual findings receive a “presumption of correctness.” *In re Rosenthal,*854 F.2d at 1188.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Cite as: Opinion No. 00-032 (December 18, 2000)

(unpublished)

GAMING ) BINGO ) CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION MUST

OBTAIN PERMIT TO CONDUCTCHARITABLEBINGO EVENT IN

CALVERT COUNTY

December 18, 2000

Mr. Emanuel Demedis, Esquire

County Attorney for Calvert County

Mr. Robert B. Riddle, Esquire

State’s Attorney for Calvert County

You have requested our opinion as to whether a volunteer fire department, or a

fraternal, civic, war veterans’, religious, or charitable organization or corporation must obtain

a permit from the Board of County Commissioners before conducting a charitable bingo

event in Calvert County. In your letter, a copy of which is attached, you state your opinion

that such an organization must obtain a permit.

We have carefully reviewed the matter and agree with your analysis and conclusions.

We have also reviewed the legislative history of the two statutes referenced in your letter.

Briefly, in 1969 the Legislature amended Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27, §255, to

authorize charitable organizations in Calvert County to conduct carnivals, bazaars, or raffles

and to award prizes “by such devices as ... bingo.” Chapter 617, Laws of Maryland 1969.

No permitting process was established at that time. The next year, the Legislature enacted

Article 27, §259A, which created a licensing regime for commercial bingo in Calvert County,

but excluded charitable organizations “authorized by law to operate any such game,”

presumably referring to the legislation passed the previous year. Chapter 575, Laws of

Maryland 1970. Finally, in 1989 the General Assembly added the permitting process for

charitable gaming events in Calvert County that now appears in Article 27, §255(i). Chapter

198, Laws of Maryland 1989. There was no explicit exception in that bill (House Bill 442)

of bingo operated by a charitable organization. Although there is a brief reference in the

floor report for that bill to the licensing provisions for commercial bingo in Article 27,
1

In your letter you note that bingo operated by charitable organizations has historically

been exempted from the permitting process in Calvert County, but that you have been unable

to ascertain the reason for that practice. Should you obtain more information concerning the

origin of the past practice, we would consider that information in our evaluation of the issue,

although it would not necessarily affect the conclusion.

§259A, there is no indication in the legislative file that the General Assembly intended to

exempt charitable bingo from the permit process that the legislation established.1

We note that this analysis does not apply to other political subdivisions in the State,

because the laws regulating bingo and other forms of gaming differ among various

jurisdictions. 

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Robert N. McDonald

Chief Counsel

 Opinions & Advice

For a copy of the attachment email:opinions@oag.state.md.us
#### Dora L. ADKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HBL, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1940

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Dora L. Adkins, Appellant Pro Se.

Before GREGORtf, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Dora L. Adkins appeals from five district court orders entered in her unsuccessful civil action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. *Adkins v. HBL, LLC,*No. 1:17-cv-00774-TSE-TCB (E.D. Va. filed July 18, 2017 *&*entered July 19, 2017; filed July 25, 2017 & entered July 26, 2017; filed Aug. 1, 2017 & entered Aug. 2, 2017; Aug. 2, 2017; Aug. 11, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### IN RE: Dennis S. FERNANDEZ, Appellant

2016-2611

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 10, 2017

Dennis S. Fernandez, Fernandez & Associates, LLP, Atherton, CA, for appellant.

Nathan K. Kelley, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by Sarah E. Craven, Mai-Trang Due Dang, Thomas W. Krause, Coke Morgan Stewart.

(Dyk, O’Malley, and Hughes, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
EXHIBIT 31.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13(a) or 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of IRIDEX Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this quarterly report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure control and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of the annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect the registrants
internal control over financial reporting;
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
  By:
    /s/ JAMES H. MACKANESSName:
    James H. MackanessTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0455 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0455

**2002/455/EC: Commission Decision of 13 June 2002 amending Decision 2001/881/EC as regards the list of border inspection posts agreed for veterinary checks on animals and animal products from third countries (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 2113) **

*
Official Journal L 155 , 14/06/2002 P. 0059 - 0059 *

Commission Decision

of 13 June 2002

amending Decision 2001/881/EC as regards the list of border inspection posts agreed for veterinary checks on animals and animal products from third countries

(notified under document number C(2002) 2113)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/455/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries(1), and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC, and 90/675/EEC(2), as last amended by Directive 96/43/EC(3), and in particular Article 6(4) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Decision 2001/881/EC(4) draws up a list of border inspection posts approved for veterinary checks of live animals and animal products from third countries.

(2) At the request of the United Kingdom authorities, and following a Community inspection, a border inspection post at the port of Peterhead must be added to the list.

(3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In the Annex to Decision 2001/881/EC, the list of border inspection posts for the United Kingdom is amended by the addition of the following entry: ">TABLE>"

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 June 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 9.

(2) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 56.

(3) OJ L 162, 1.7.1996, p. 1.

(4) OJ L 326, 11.12.2001, p. 44.
* Pursuant to 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-11080 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee
v. GREGORIO CANO-MORALES Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:07-CR-22-ALL Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Gregorio Cano-Morales raises arguments that are foreclosed by Al mendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), whic h held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. United States v. PinedaArrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 872 (2008). United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 2, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-11080

2 The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Francisco Daniel RIVAS, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-72648

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 27, 2017

Francisco Daniel Rivas, Pro Se

Lisa Marie Arnold, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Francisco Daniel Rivas, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion for a continuance. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a continuance. *Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey,*526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

The court lacks jurisdiction to consider Rivas’ contentions regarding the merits of his claims because he did not raise them to the agency. Nee *Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).

We lack jurisdiction' to review Rivas’ unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claim. *See Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS,*213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must first be presented to the BIA).

The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Rivas’ third request for a con*681tinuance because he failed to show good cause. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; *Sandoval-Luna,*526 F.3d at 1247 (finding the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for a continuance).

We do not consider the materials Rivas attached to his opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. *See Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

# A RIZONA 

# C OURT OF 

# A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Appellee ,

v.

BROCK AMELIA HILL , Appellant

.
No. 1 CA

- CR 21

- 0548

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR202000854 The Honorable Billy K. Sipe , Jr. , Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office
, Tucson By Karen Moody Counsel for Appellee
Jill L. Evans, Attorney at Law , Flagstaff By Jill L. Evans C ounsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the c ourt, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. FILED 8-16-2022STATE v. HILL Decision of the Court

2 W I L L I A M S , Judge:

¶1 Brock Amelia Hill was convicted of two counts of negligent ho micide, two counts of aggravated assault, one coun t of failure to stop at the scene of an accident involving death or serious physical injury, and two counts of driving under the influence

. The superior court sentenced Hill to 40.25 years’ imprisonment and, after a contested restitution hearing, ordered h im to pay restitution of $33,799.12

. Hill appeals solely from the court’s restitution order.
¶2 Hill’s counsel filed a brief per Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon , 104 Ariz. 297 (1969) advising us there are no meritorious grounds for reversal. Hill was granted an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona but did not do so. Our obligation is to review the entire record for reversible error. State v. Clark , 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999).
¶3 We have revi ewed the entire record for reversible error with respect to the restitution order and find none

. The superior court ordered Hill to pay restitution totaling $33,799.12
, which included reimbursement for: (1) the cost of two funeral s ; (2) travel costs for victims’ representatives to attend court ; (3) lost wages for a surviving victim ; (4) and medical bills

. R ecord evidence supports the court’s order

. W e , therefore, affirm the restitution order.
¶4 Defense counsel’s obligations pertainin g to Hill’s representation in this appeal have ended. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Hill of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck , 140 Ariz. 582, 584

– 85 (1984). On this court’s motion, Hill has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6165 

To require the Federal Communications Commission to take action relating 

to promoting broadband Internet access service for veterans. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 26, 2016 

Mr. MCNERNEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To require the Federal Communications Commission to take 

action relating to promoting broadband Internet access 

service for veterans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Improving Broadband 

5 Access for Veterans Act of 2016’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RULEMAKING RELATING TO PROMOTING 

7 BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE 

8 FOR VETERANS. 

9 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6165 IH

1 (1) the term ‘‘broadband Internet access serv2 ice’’ has the meaning given the term in section 8.2 

3 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any suc4 cessor thereto; and 

5 (2) the term ‘‘veteran’’ has the meaning given 

6 the term in section 101 of title 38, United States 

7 Code. 

8 (b) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 90 days after the 

9 date of enactment of this Act, the Federal Communica10 tions Commission shall release a notice of inquiry relating 

11 to examining and promoting broadband Internet access 

12 service for veterans, in particular low-income veterans and 

13 veterans residing in rural areas. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
#### Holton *vs.*Greenwell.

*Appeal froú á J. P.*

[Messrs. Sanders and Depetv for plaintiff: Mr. Herndon for defendant.]

From the Circuit Court eor Franklin County.

*November*8.

A justice of the peace may grant a new trial in any civil case in which he has rendefedajudg't. A new trial may be granted (by a justice) on a day subsequent to that on which the first trial was had; but not after the time allowed for appealing, is out; nor after the judgment is satisfied, or replevied; nor without notice to the adverse party.

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the opinion of the Court

The only question in this case is, whether, and within what time, a justice of the peace may grant a new trial in a civil suit in which he shall have rendered a judgment.

As justices of the peace have no regular terms, but 8it and adjudicate as cases may, as they arise, render convenient, we are of the opinion that their right to grant a new trial should not be limited to the day on which the judgment was rendered. And, of course, as there should be some limitation as to time, convenience, policy, justice and analogy must alone prescribe it.

And looking to these criteria, we are disposed to think, that a new trial should not be awarded after the time for appealing shall have expired, nor after the judgment *634shall havd been satisfied by payment, or by being reple* . , Vied.

But that, with these exceptions, the granting of a new tr'a^ ky a jusBce is a matter of sound judicial discretion—never to be exercised, however, without notice to the party to be prejudiced by the new trial.

As the Circuit Judge decided contrary to this view of the case, the judgment is reversed, and the cause re•manded.
No. 85-1647.

#### Rubinstein *v.*Texas.

Ct. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.