alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.3


                                FIRST AMENDMENT
                                    TO THE
                                  PAYMENTECH
                    SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLAN
                       (Effective as of March 22, 1996)

Pursuant to Section 10.1 of the Paymentech Supplemental Executive Retirement
Plan (Effective as of March 22, 1996) (hereinafter the "Plan") the Plan, as
amended to date, is hereby further amended, effective as of July 1, 1997, as
follows:


1.   Article 4 of the Plan is amended by addition of Section 4.6 to read as
follows:

     "4.6 RULES OF CALCULATION

          In calculating amounts under Section 4.1(a), Section 4.2(a), Section
          4.3(a), Section 4.4(a) (including amounts calculated under such
          Sections for purposes of Section 7.1) and under Section 6.2(a), the
          Participant's Compensation for a Plan Year shall include any amount
          deferred by such Participant for such Plan Year under the terms of the
          First USA Deferred Compensation Program."


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed,
effective as of the date set forth above, by its duly authorized officer.



                                        PAYMENTECH, INC.


Date:  April 22, 1998                   By:  /s/ Philip Taken
       --------------                      ------------------

                                        Title: Chief Administrative Officer,
                                               -----------------------------
                                               General Counsel & Secretary
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James BRANCH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16957

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

NOVEMBER 20, 2017

Garth Hire, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Oakland, CA, J. Douglas Wilson, Assistant U.S., DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee. '

John J. Jordan, Law Offices of John J. Jordan, San Francisco, CA, for- Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner James Branch appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion de novo, *see United States v. Reves,*774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.

Branch’s section 2255 motion argued that *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), rendered the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) unconstitutionally vague, and therefore his prior California robbery conviction could no longer support his career offender sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. This argument is foreclosed by *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 895, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017). The government’s concession in the district court that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) was void does not bind this court, *See United States v. Perez-Silvan,*861 F.3d 935, 938 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (courts “are not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning of the law” (internal quotations omitted)).

Branch contends, for the first time in his reply brief, that he is actually innocent of being a career offender because his predicate California robbery conviction no longer constitutes á crime of violence under the 2016 version of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Even if this argument were properly be*465fore this court, see *Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985-86 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), it would be foreclosed. *See United States v. Chavez-Cuevas,*862 F.3d 729, 740 (9th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming *United States v. Becerril-Lopez,*541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2008), which held that California robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0362 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0362

**2001/362/EC: Commission Decision of 27 April 2001 fixing the maximum amount of aid granted for the private storage of olive oil under the third partial invitation to tender provided for by Regulation (EC) No 327/2001 (notified under document number C(2001) 892) **

*
Official Journal L 129 , 11/05/2001 P. 0038 - 0038 *

Commission Decision

of 27 April 2001

fixing the maximum amount of aid granted for the private storage of olive oil under the third partial invitation to tender provided for by Regulation (EC) No 327/2001

(notified under document number C(2001) 892)

(Only the Spanish and Greek texts are authentic)

(2001/362/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation No 136/66/EEC of 22 September 1966 on the establishment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2826/2000(2), and in particular Article 12a thereof,

Whereas:

(1) In accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 327/2001 of 16 February 2001 authorising the conclusion of private storage contracts for olive oil and opening an invitation to tender for a limited period for aid relating thereto(3), the bodies referred to in Article 1 of that Regulation are authorised to conclude contracts for the private storage of virgin and extra virgin olive oil they market.

(2) An invitation to tender has been opened for a limited period. Four consecutive partial invitations to tender are to be opened from 1 March 2001. The first partial invitation to tender was restricted to producer groups or associations of such groups as referred to in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66/EEC. The following three partial invitations to tender are open to all approved operators referred to in Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2768/98 of 21 December 1998 on the aid scheme for the private storage of olive oil(4).

(3) Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66/EEC provides for the granting of aid for the implementation of storage contracts. On the basis of the tenders submitted in response to the third partial invitation to tender and with a view to making a significant contribution to regulating the market, the amount of that aid should be fixed.

(4) The measure provided for in this Decision is in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Oils and Fats,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

For the third partial invitation to tender provided for by Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 327/2001, the maximum amount of the aid referred to in Article 12a of Regulation 136/66/EEC shall be as follows:

Virgin or extra virgin olive oil:

>TABLE>

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Spain and the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 27 April 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ 172, 30.9.1966, p. 3025/66.

(2) OJ L 328, 23.12.2000, p. 2.

(3) OJ L 48, 17.2.2001, p. 9.

(4) OJ L 346, 22.12.1998, p. 14.
#### Andrew M. HUNTER; Angela A. Hunter, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-70308

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 21, 2017

Paul W. Jones, Attorney, Hale & Wood, PLLC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Petitioners-Appellants

Janet A. Bradley, Esquire, Attorney, Jonathan S. Cohen, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Gilbert Steven Rothen-berg, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Andrew M. Hunter and Angela A. Hunter appeal from the Tax Court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction their action related to their tax liability for tax years 2012 and 2013. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo, *Gorospe v. Comm’r,*451 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2006), and we affirm.

The Tax Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition because the petition was not filed within 90 days of the notice of deficiency. *See*26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (establishing a 90-day requirement for appealing a notice of deficiency); 26 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (timely mailing treated as timely filing “only if ... deposited in the mail in the United States in an envelope ... properly addressed to the agency ... ”); *Gorospe,*451 F.3d at 968 (the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its subject matter is determined by Title 26 of the United States Code).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francisco ARROLLO-SILVA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6753

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 27, 2017

*207Francisco Arrollo-Silva, Appellant Pro Se. William Glenn Perry, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Stephen Aubrey West, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Francisco Arrollo-Silva seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Arrollo-Silva that the failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. *Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); *see also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Arrollo-Silva has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal.

We dispensé with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Gary L. PRYDE; Denise E. Pryde, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17041

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 17, 2017

*1011Gary L. Pryde, Pro Se

Denise E. Pryde, Pro Se

Robert W. Shely, I, Litigation Counsel, Bryan Cave LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Douglas E. Winter, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees Bank of America, N.A., Countrywide Home Loans

Colt B. Dodrill, Attorney, Wolfe *&*Wy-man LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Green Tree Servicing LLC

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gary L. Pryde and Denise L. Pryde appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims against mortgage related entities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *Ebner v. Fresh Inc.,*838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Prydes’ quiet title claim because the Prydes failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that they were entitled to such relief. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1987, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); *Manicom v. Citi-Mortgage, Inc.,*236 Ariz. 153, 336 P.3d 1274, 1282 (2014) (requiring mortgagors to pay off any unsatisfied balances in order to quiet title under Arizona law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Prydes’ motion for leave to amend because amendment would be futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Certification of Chief Financial Officer

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Pure Bioscience (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary Brownell, Chief Financial Officer certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

June 14, 2005                    /s/ Gary Brownell
-------------------              -----------------------------------
                                 Gary Brownell
                                 Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 99.13 VIA EDGAR  TO: United States Securities and Exchange Commission  Re: Asanko Gold Inc. (the "Company") Annual Report on Form 40-F Consent of Expert This consent is provided in connection with the Company's annual report on Form 40-F for the financial year ended December 31, 2014, and any amendments thereto (the Annual Report), as filed by the Company with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Annual Report incorporates by reference, among other things, the Companys Annual Information Form for the financial year ended December 31, 2014 (the Annual Information Form). I, John Stansbury, DO HEREBY CONSENT, to:  · the use of my name and the disclosure of my involvement in the preparation of information that forms the basis for disclosure of a technical and scientific nature related to the Companys Asanko Gold Mine Project, contained in the Annual Information Form, and  · the inclusion and incorporation by reference of such information in the Annual Report.  Dated March 16, 2015   // John StansburyJ S Stansbury
Pr Eng.
DRA Mineral Projects (Pty) Ltd.
#### Jeremy Amin NYUWA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Portland Oregon; et al., Respondents-Appellees.

Nos. 16-35099

15-35810

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

NOVEMBER 20, 2017

Jeremy Amin Nyuwa, Portland, OR, pro se.-

James Edward Cox, Jr., Kelly A. Zus-man, Assistant U.S., Assistant U.S., DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Jeremy Amin Nyuwa, a native and citizen of Nigeria, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action appealing from the Administrative Appeals Office’s order dismissing his appeal from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s determination that he had breached his immigration delivery bond, and the district court’s decision declining to disturb the grant of summary judgment on reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment and review for abuse of discretion a motion for reconsideration. *Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.,*727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly.granted summary judgment, where Nyuwa failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the determination that he had breached his bond. The bond agreement was conditioned upon Nyuwa’s appearance “upon each and every written request,” a written request for his presence was made, *463and he failed to appear when and where requested. *See*8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (“A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions.”); *accord Ruiz-Rivera v. Moyer,*70 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 1995) (the primary objective of a delivery bond is to produce the alien whenever and wherever requested by the agency). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disturb its decision on reconsideration.

AFFIRMED.

**

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2).
EXHIBIT 35.3
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                           HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC
             RFMSI SERIES 2006-S12 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of Homecomings  Financial,  LLC, as
servicer (the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable  servicing agreement,  does
hereby certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      ------------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:    Managing Director
#### IN RE: Michael Lawrence EISNER, Petitioner.

No. 17-1942

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

*179Michael Lawrence Eisner, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Lawrence Eisner petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and motion for issuance of a subpoena. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the district court’s docket reveals that the district court has denied the motions. Accordingly, because the district court has recently decided Eisner’s case, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-Q of Regency Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Dragan Bozanic, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
 
 1. The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 2. The information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
 
 
 Date:  March 8, 2011
 
 
 DRAGAN BOZANIC
 Dragan Bozanic
 Chief Accounting Officer
 Chief Financial Officer and Director


-1-
Exhibit 34.3       Ernst & Young LLP Phone: (612) 343-1000    220 South Sixth Street, Ste. 1400   www.ey.com    Minneapolis, MN 55402-4509  Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting FirmWe have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Assessment ofCompliance with SEC Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that U.S. Bank National Association (theCompany) complied with the servicing criteria set forth inItem 1122 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB forthe Corporate Trust Asset Backed Securities platform (the Platform) as of and for theyear ended December 31, 2006, except for criteria 1122 (d)(1)(iii), 1122 (d)(4)(i),1122 (d)(4)(ii), and 1122 (d)(4)(iv) through 1122 (d)(4)(xiv), which the Company has determined arenot applicable to the activities performed by them with respect to the servicing platform coveredby this report. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with those servicingcriteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion about the Company’scompliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination.Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public Company AccountingOversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidenceabout the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such otherprocedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing ofless than all of the individual asset backed transactions and securities that comprise thePlatform, testing of less than all of the servicing activities related to the Platform, anddetermining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and performed those selectedactivities in compliance with the servicing criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited tothe selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the periodcovered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may haveoccurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amountscalculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report for the selectedtransactions or any other transactions. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basisfor our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliancewith the servicing criteria.In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned servicingcriteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2006, forthe Corporate Trust Asset Backed Securities platform is fairly stated, in all material respects./s/ Ernst & Young LLPFebruary 26, 2007A Member Practice of Ernst & Young Global