alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
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<SECURITIES>                                    24,554
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,568<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                69,688
<PP&E>                                         415,259
<DEPRECIATION>                                  38,462
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 532,393
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           56,420
<BONDS>                                        356,743
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<SALES>                                          3,691<F2>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               113,906
<CGS>                                            4,702
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   69,195
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,729
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  9,973
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              9,973
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,973
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Notes and accounts receivable-trade are reported net of allowances for doubtful
accounts in the Statement of Financial Positon.
<F2>Net sales are reported net of promotional allowances applicable to tangible
items.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Gustavus A. Brett *et al.,*Resp’ts, *v.*Grahams Polley, App’lt.

*Wm. W. Goodrich,*for resp’ts; *John Berry,*for app’lt.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Affirming 34 N. Y. State Rep., 799.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Madison WILLIAMS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Madison Williams, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Madison Williams, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Madison Williams, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30327, No. 15-30328, No. 15-30329, No. 15-30330

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 9, 2017 * Seattle, Washington

Filed May 11, 2017

Kyle Forsyth, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Nancy P. Collins, Attorney, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: McKEOWN, BE A, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Johnny Madison Williams, Jr. appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to discharge over $857,000 in criminal restitution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo legal and constitutional challenges to the application of restitution sentences. *United*
      *981
      *States v. Berger,*574 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2009); *United States v. DeSalvo,*41 F.3d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 1994). We affirm.

Williams argues that extending the time period under which he is obligated to pay-restitution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. When Williams was sentenced, his liability to pay restitution terminated “twenty years after the entry of the judgment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1) (1992). However, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of. 1996 (“MVRA”), a defendant’s liability to pay restitution terminates “the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or 20 years after the release from imprisonment of the [defendant].” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b). We recently held that the MVRA’s termination-of-liability provision applies in Williams’s situation. *See United States v. Blackwell,*852 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (per cu-riam). We also concluded that applying the MVRA’s termination-of-liability provision is procedural and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. *Id.; see also United States v. Gianelli,*543 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Procedural changes, ... which do not alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable, do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Mario HAIRSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-6923

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 30, 2017

Decided: November 17, 2017

Mario Hairston, Appellant Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Mario Hairston appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing Hairston’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Hairston v. United States,*No. 2:17-cv-00061-JPB-JES, 2017 WL 2598890 (N.D.W. Va. June 15, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *293this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Maranda *Lynn*ODONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellee v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; Eric Stewart Hagstette; Joseph Licata, III; Ronald Nicholas; Blanca Estela Villagomez; Jill Wallace; Paula Goodhart; Bill Harmon; Natalie C. Flemng; John Clinton; Margaret Harris; Larry Standley; Pam Derbyshire; Jay Karahan; Judge Analia Wilkerson; Dan Spjut; Judge Diane Bull; Judge Robin Brown; Donald Smyth; Judge Mike Fields; Jean Hughes, Defendants-Appellants Loetha Shanta McGruder; Robert Ryan Ford, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Harris County, Texas; Jill Wallace; Eric Stewart Hagstette; Joseph Licata, III; Ronald Nicholas; Blanca Estela Villagomez, Defendants-Appellants

No. 17-20333

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Date Filed: 06/06/2017

Alec George Karakatsanis, Esq., Elizabeth Anne Rossi, Civil Rights Corps, Washington, DC, Rebecca Bernhardt, Susanne Ashley Pringle, Texas Fair Defense Project, Austin, TX, Michael Gervais, Sus-man Godfrey, L.L.P., New York, NY, Neal Stuart Manne, Attorney, Alexandra Giselle White, Krisina Janaye Zuniga, Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Stacy R. Obenhaus, Gardere Wynne Se-well, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Katharine D. David, Philip J. Morgan, Mike Anthony Stafford, Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, Sheryl Anne Falk, John R. Keville, Attorney, John E. O’Neill, Winston *&*Strawn, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Charles Justin Cooper, John R. Keville, Attorney, Michael Kirk, William C. Marra, John David Ohl-endorf, Harold Reeves, Cooper & Kirk, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellants.

Murray Jules Fogler, Esq., Attorney, Fogler, Brar, Ford, O’Neil & Gray, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Amicus Curiae.

JAMES E. GRAVES, JR. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

ORDER:

IT IS ORDERED that the opposed motion of Appellants Judge Robin Brown, Judge Diane Bull, John Clinton, Pam Der-byshire, Judge Mike Fields, Natalie C. Fleming, Paula Goodhart, Bill Harmon, Margaret Harris, Jean Hughes, Jay Kara-han, Donald Smyth, Dan Spjut, Larry Standley and Judge Analia Wilkerson for leave to file a supplemental reply to the responses to the motions for stay pending appeal is DENIED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keldrick Dewayne ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16560 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 18, 2017)

Adam W. Overstreet, Gregory A. Bor-denkircher, Kenyen Ray Brown, Michele Carstens O’Brien, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Brandy B. Hambright, appointed counsel for Keldrick Dewayne Adams in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Adams’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kevin David PETIT, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51382 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 7, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Stanley Lee Schwieger, Law Offices of Stan Schwieger, Waco, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Kevin David Petit pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)' and 924(a)(2), and was sentenced to 71 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He argues that the district court plainly erred in determining that his Texas robbery conviction is a crime of violence for purposes of imposing the base offense level in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). He argues that Texas robbery is not a crime of violence because it lacks the requisite element of the use of force. He concedes, however, that this court has already held that Texas robbery is a crime of violence because it meets the generic definition of the enumerated crime-of-violence offense of robbery. *Compare*U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(l) (force clause), *with*§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (enumerated offense clause). Petit therefore raises his argument to preserve it for further review. .

The request for relief is foreclosed by *United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez,*469 F.3d 376, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2006), *overruled on other grounds by United States v.*
      *375
      *Rodriguez,*711 F.3d 541, 547-58 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc), in which we held that robbery in violation of Texas Penal Code § 29.02 meets the generic definition of the enumerated crime-of-violence offense of robbery. Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM ChiRex Inc.'s first
quarter 2000 Form 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
Form 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
<CURRENCY>                                 US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
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<PP&E>                                         167,797
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,669
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 252,760
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                26,110
<CGS>                                         (22,944)
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,731
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (953)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,900)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,348
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of SKYLYFT MEDIA NETWORK, INC. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard Yanke, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

April 15, 2009

/s/ Richard Yanke

Richard YankeChief Executive Officer

1

---
Exhibit 32.1
  
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of ioWorldMedia, Incorporated, a Florida corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending June 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Thomas Bean, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to my knowledge:
 
 (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/ Thomas J. BeanThomas BeanChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)Date:  August 14, 2012
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-06-00394-CV

Bonnie Carter, individually, and on behalf of J. C., a minor; Scott Carter, individually, and

on behalf of J. C., a minor; Eleanor Draughn; Andrew Draughn and Susan Draughn,

Appellants

v.

Dustin McManus, Ramzi Abbyad, Jason Nuckolls, Travis McLemore, and Tyler Hunkin,

Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-04-003460, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The judgment appealed from is not final because it does not dispose of all issues in

the cause below. Counsel for the Draughn appellants has requested that we abate this appeal while

they seek a severance of the matters appealed from those pending in the cause below. We grant the

motion and abate the appeal until further order of this Court.

 

G. Alan Waldrop, Justice

Before Justices B. A. Smith, Pemberton and Waldrop

Abated

Filed: September 22, 2006
Exhibit 31.3

CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

EXCHANGE ACT
RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a),

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Curtis A. Morgan, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017 of Dynegy Inc.; and
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                        
|-------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 27, 2018 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Curtis A. Morgan                                                                   
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | Curtis A. Morgan                                                                       
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer of Vistra
Energy Corp. (successor to Dynegy Inc.)
EXHIBIT 32.1


Certification Pursuant to


18 U.S.C. Section 1350


(as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of


the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002)




In connection with the Quarterly Report of IDT Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Howard S. Jonas, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: December 15, 2010





/s/    HOWARD S. JONASHoward S. Jonas

Chief Executive Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to IDT Corporation and will be retained by IDT Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felipe MENDOZA-ZAZUETA, a.k.a. Reyes Cintero, a.k.a. Reyes Cortez-Ayon, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 16-50089, 16-50090

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017*

Filed July 3, 2017

Stacey H. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ajay Krishnamurthy, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee

Benjamin P. Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Vincent James Brunkow, Kristi A. Hughes, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated appeals, Felipe Mendoza-Zazueta appeals from the district court’s judgments and challenges the sentences imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the, United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C.' § 1326, and admitted violation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Mendoza-Zazueta first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to calculate the applicable supervised release term as part of its Guidelines calculation for the reentry conviction. Although a district court’s failure to calculate the applicable Guidelines range may constitute plain error, *see United States v. Hammons,*558 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009), it is clear from the record that the district court was aware of the applicable supervised release Guidelines range. Contrary *558to Mendoza-Zazueta’s argument on appeal, the Presentence Investigation Report correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines range for supervised release for this Class C felony. *See*U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). Moreover, the district court’s imposition of a term of supervised release for further deterrence is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5Dl.l(c), with which we presume the district court was familiar. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Mendoza-Zazueta next contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide him with an opportunity to allo-cute prior to the court’s imposition of the supervised release revocation sentence. This argument is unsupported by the record.. In the combined sentencing hearing, the district court invited Mendoza-Zazueta to address the court immediately following arguments from Mendoza-Zazueta’s counsel regarding sentencing on both the reentry conviction and the supervised release violation and prior to the court’s imposition of sentences for both. Thus, the court provided Mendoza-Zazueta with “an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation,” before the sentence was imposed. *See*Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E); *see also United States v. Allen,*157 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.