alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John MITCHELL an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEDTRONIC, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-55888

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed March 21, 2017

*625Michael Lion Tracy, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Michael Tracy, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Donald Manwell Falk, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Ruth Zadikany, Esquire, Attorney, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, CA, John Peter Zaimes, Esquire, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: SCHROEDER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,* District Judge.

*

The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiff-Appellant John Mitchell appeals the district court’s decision to grant Defendant-Appellee Medtronic’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s claims pertaining to the calculation of overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. *Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,*317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Under the FLSA, overtime is calculated from an employee’s regular rate of pay. The “regular rate” under the FLSA means the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime work week, *Walling v. Helmerich & Payne,*323 U.S. 37, 40, 65 S.Ct. 11, 89 L.Ed. 29 (1944), and includes all remunerations paid to the employee, except for those payments exempt under the FLSA. One such exemption is for “extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for certain hours worked ... in excess of the employee’s normal working hours.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5). According to the Department of Labor’s regulations, premium rates paid “pursuant to the requirements of another applicable statute” fall within the § 207(e)(5) exemption. *See*29 C.F.R. § 778.202(d).

Medtronic’s meal payments to its California employees were fully consistent with the payments mandated by California Labor Code § 226.7(c). Because Medtronic’s meal payments were made pursuant to the statutory requirement of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(c), they were properly excluded from the calculation of Medtronic’s California employees’ regular rate of pay.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the quarterly
report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 1996, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           2,648
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           3,989
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     71,821
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          89,642
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            89,629
<LOANS>                                         88,647
<ALLOWANCE>                                    (1,006)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 262,118
<DEPOSITS>                                     194,287
<SHORT-TERM>                                    23,179
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,060
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            36
<OTHER-SE>                                      43,556
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 262,118
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  1,880
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,734
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   126
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 4,740
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,907
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,229
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,511
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       75
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   1
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,583
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,055
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       1,055
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       667
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       22
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.39
<LOANS-NON>                                      2,605
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  1,240
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 (937)
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        8
<RECOVERIES>                                       (2)
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              (1,006)
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           (1,006)
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 35.2



                                                    [LOGO] Countrywide(R)
                                                    ----------------------
                                                          HOME LOANS

                                                      400 Countrywide Way
February 28, 2007                             Simi Valley, California 93065-6298

Impac Secured Assets Corporation
19500 Jamboree Road
Irvine, CA 92612

                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE


I, Joseph Candelario, hereby certify that I am an officer of Countrywide GP,
Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (the "Servicer"). I
further certify, with respect to the applicable servicing agreement relating to
the securitization transaction(s) set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto (the
"Servicing Agreement") that:

      (a) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the preceding
      calendar year and of the performance of the Servicer under the Servicing
      Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

      (b) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
      fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all
      material respects throughout such year.


/s/ Joseph Candelario           February 28, 2007
---------------------           -----------------
Joseph Candelario
First Vice President
Compliance Officer
Loan Administration

See Deal Name listing on following page.

<PAGE>

Exhibit A

ISAC 2006-1 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-1 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-2 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-3 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-4 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-5 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-5 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-3 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-4 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-2 (Subserviced)
ISAC 2006-5 (Subserviced)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN 
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                      10,893,525
<SECURITIES>                                 8,449,438
<RECEIVABLES>                                8,538,487
<ALLOWANCES>                                   451,162
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            29,804,558
<PP&E>                                       8,001,690
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,681,840
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              33,407,681
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,109,437
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        61,530
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  22,236,714
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                33,407,681
<SALES>                                     26,834,996
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            26,834,996
<CGS>                                        5,306,732
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,306,732
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            19,973,940
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,943,309
<INCOME-TAX>                                   711,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,232,309
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,232,309
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .20
        

</TABLE>
#### Patricia KIELTY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and Susan Pathman, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-56737

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 * Pasadena, California

Filed May 10, 2017

Todd M. Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, Beverly Hills, CA, Aaron David Radbil, Attorney, Weisberg & Mey*942ers LLC, Cooper City, FL, Aaron David Radbil, Attorney, Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Timothy St. George, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, VA, Chad R. Fuller, Troutman Sanders LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee •

Before: WALLACE, CHRISTEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Patricia Kielty and Susan Pathman appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their putative class action claims asserted under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679 — 79J.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Reviewing de novo, *see Stout v. FreeScore, LLC,*743 F.3d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 2014), the district court did not err when it concluded plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Midland is a credit repair organization. There is no allegation in the complaint that Midland represented “that it can or will sell, provide, or perform a service for the purpose of providing advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to improving a consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating” in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration. *See Stout,*743 F.3d at 685. Dismissal of the CROA claims was appropriate because the “overall net impression communicated” by Midland was merely that it sought repayment of a debt. *See id.*at 686.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The parties are familiar with the facts so we do not repeat them here. Also, the plaintiffs raised additional claims in the district court but appealed only the dismissal of their CROA claims.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Santonio Lenord MINUS, a/k/a Cheese, a/k/a Baldhead, a/k/a B.G., a/k/a Santonio Minus, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7511

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

Santonio Lenord Minus, Appellant Pro Se.

Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States - Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia; Grayson A. Hoffman, Jeb Thomas Ter-rien, Assistant United States Attorneys, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Jean Barrett Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia; Craig Jon Jacobsen, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Santonio Lenord Minus seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Minus has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10937

(Summary Calendar)

__________________

BARBARA A. ARBUCKLE,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(USDC No. 7:94-CV-127-X)

- - - - - - - - - -

April 5, 1996

Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Barbara A. Arbuckle appeals the grant of summary judgment for

the Commissioner of Social Security affirming the denial of social

security benefits. Arbuckle contends that the administrative law

judge (ALJ) failed to provide reasons for his finding that her

complaints of pain were not credible; that her pain, sleepiness,

moodiness, loss of dexterity, discomfort when sitting, and need to

lie down severely limit her ability to work; that the ALJ's finding

that she can perform a full range of light work is not supported by
2

substantial evidence because her nonexertional limitations preclude

light work; and that the ALJ erred by relying on the medicalvocational guidelines to determine that she was not disabled.

We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for essentially

the same reasons set forth by the district court. See Arbuckle v.

Chater, No. 94-CV-127-X (N.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 1995).

AFFIRMED.
Registration Review; Pesticide Dockets Opened for Review and Comment; Correction

EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register of Friday, March 28, 2014 (79 FR 17539) (FRL‐9907‐97),

concerning the opening of registration review dockets for specific chemical cases. The Notice (FR Doc.

2014‐06814) should be corrected as follows:

1. On page 17541, Table — Registration Review Dockets Opening, under the column heading

Docket ID No., line 16, for Thiabendazole and salts, correct EPA‐HQ‐OPP‐2013‐0175 to read

EPA‐HQ‐OPP‐2014‐0175.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ricardo Jones, Pesticide Re‐Evaluation Division (7508P), Office

of Pesticide Programs, Environmental  Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC

20460‐0001; telephone number: (703) 347‐0493; email address: jones.ricardo@epa.gov.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

April 24, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132989 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 132989 

 COA: 262995 

Oakland CC: 04-194073-FH 

KELLY ROSE BROOKS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 28, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0416 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 24, 2007 

 Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM STERLING
COMMERCE, INC. FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         279,473
<SECURITIES>                                   325,484
<RECEIVABLES>                                  156,609
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               802,013
<PP&E>                                         152,776
<DEPRECIATION>                                  69,034
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,057,330
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          161,600
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           960
<OTHER-SE>                                     832,964
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   833,924
<SALES>                                        293,394
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               293,394
<CGS>                                           64,222
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  200,189
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                105,942
<INCOME-TAX>                                    38,836
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             67,106
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    67,106
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.71
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.69
        

</TABLE>
#### IN RE: Daren Kareem GADSDEN, a/k/a D, Petitioner.

No. 17-1234

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Daren Kareem Gadsden, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Daren Kareem Gadsden, who was convicted of several bank fraud and identity theft offenses, has filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this court. In his petition, Gadsden asks that this court dismiss the criminal indictment against him because he asserts that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support his bank fraud convictions and, thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. Gadsden nonetheless readily admits that 'he has unsuccessfully raised this claim in “several forms” before this court and in the district court.

“[A] writ of prohibition is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which should be granted only when the petitioner has shown his right to the writ to be clear and indisputable and that the actions of the court were a clear abuse of discretion.” *In re Vargas,*723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1983). In fact, a writ of prohibition should not issue unless it “clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.” *Smith v. Whitney,*116 U.S. 167, 176, 6 S.Ct. 570, 29 L.Ed. 601 (1886). Because it is a drastic remedy, a writ of prohibition should only be granted when the petitioner’s right to the requested relief is clear and indisputable, *see Vargas,*723 F.2d at 1468; *see also In re Missouri,*664 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1981), and there are no other adequate means of relief, *In re Bankers Trust Co.,*775 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1985).

Gadsden has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for a writ of prohibition. We dispense with oral argument .because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*