United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 2, 2020*

Decided September 9, 2020 

Before

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1193 

NFOR GIBSON TATA TANDAP, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR 

Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of Orders from the 

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A097-333-108 

O R D E R

Nfor Gibson Tata Tandap, an Anglophone citizen of Cameroon, challenges the 

denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to seek asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He sought reopening based 

on a material change in country conditions since his last hearing—namely the conflict 

between Anglophone Cameroonians and the Francophone majority that had killed

thousands of Anglophone citizens and led to the displacement of hundreds of

thousands more. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion, finding that 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-1193 Page 2

Tandap had demonstrated changed conditions but did not submit enough evidence to 

show that he would be singled out for harm if returned. Tandap has petitioned for 

review, asserting that the Board applied the wrong legal standard, ignored evidence, 

and failed to acknowledge his claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture.

Because the Board abused its discretion by denying Tandap’s motion to reopen, we 

grant the petition for review, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings. 

Tandap’s proceedings have a protracted history which are reviewed here only in 

part. He entered the United States in 1992 on a student visa and overstayed. A decade 

later he married a United States citizen. In 2006, the government placed him in removal 

proceedings. The notice to appear charged him with remaining in the country longer 

than his visa permitted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and committing two crimes of moral 

turpitude after his admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Tandap applied to adjust

his status based on his marriage, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), and an immigration judge 

granted the application. But the government, upon learning that Tandap had lied about 

a recent arrest, persuaded the Board to reopen the proceedings. The IJ then held 

additional hearings, denied Tandap’s application to adjust his status as a matter of 

discretion, and ordered him removed; the Board upheld the decision. Because decisions 

over adjustment of status are discretionary, we dismissed Tandap’s petition for lack of

jurisdiction. Tandap v. Holder, 436 Fed. App’x. 718 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In 2019, Tandap moved to reopen the proceedings based on the increasing

violence towards Anglophone Cameroonians. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2),(3)(ii). He 

supplemented his motion with an expert report by Dr. Charlotte Walker-Said, an 

Africana Studies scholar at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice who has extensively 

studied Cameroon’s politics, history, and human-rights abuses. In her report, 

Dr. Walker-Said explained that conditions for Anglophones in Cameroon deteriorated 

significantly in 2016, when the government’s violent response to peaceful protests 

escalated into a country-wide armed conflict. Tandap faces “grave danger” upon return, 

she opined, because his home city is the conflict’s “epicenter” and would be listed on 

his national identification card (making him a target for arrest at any checkpoint around 

the country) and because his decades abroad, coupled with his father’s long 

involvement with a prominent Anglophone political party, would lead to suspicions 

that he harbors Anglophone separatist sympathies. Tandap also submitted his own

affidavit expressing fear that he would be targeted upon return for kidnapping or 

torture at the hands of Anglophone separatists. And he submitted a letter from an uncle 

in Cameroon describing a spate of such kidnappings for ransom, including that of a 
No. 20-1193 Page 3

family friend whose release was secured only after his captors were paid off by 

Tandap’s family. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen. Acknowledging

the increased violence that builds upon the past conflict between Cameroonian 

Francophones and Anglophones, the Board assumed that Tandap had demonstrated 

changed country conditions. But the Board concluded that Tandap had not established 

prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought: He had not shown either that he 

had experienced past persecution or that he would be singled out if he were returned to 

Cameroon.

Tandap petitioned for review, arguing that the Board misapplied the standard 

for reopening, ignored Dr. Walker-Said’s conclusions about his risk of harm if returned 

to Cameroon, and failed to address his request for relief under the Convention Against 

Torture.

One month later, on the day that its brief was due, the government moved to

remand the case so that the Board could clarify its rationale for denying the motion to 

reopen. Without admitting error, the government urged the Board to examine Tandap’s

prima facie eligibility for relief under the appropriate legal standard, to take into 

account Dr. Walker-Said’s conclusions about Tandap’s risk of harm, and to assess 

Tandap’s request for relief under the Convention Against Torture. In the event that we 

denied its motion, the government requested a 30-day extension to file a response brief.

We denied the government’s motion as “far too late.” Motions for additional 

time, we noted, must be filed at least seven days before the brief is due. See CIR. R. 26. 

We ordered the government to file its brief within three days. 

The government did so and, in its brief, renews its request that we remand this 

case to the Board for further proceedings. The government acknowledges our recent 

decision in W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2018), in which we explained 

that there must be a persuasive reason to grant an opposed remand. Such reasons, the 

government maintains, exist here. First, given the broad discretionary authority 

conferred upon the Board when assessing a motion to reopen, deference should be 

shown to the Board by allowing it to correct procedural irregularities or make any 

necessary findings. Second, regardless of whether this court grants the petition for 

review or allows a voluntary remand, the outcome would be the same: The decision 

whether to reopen can be made only by the Board. See Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 
No. 20-1193 Page 4

620, 631 (7th Cir. 2013). The government made no substantive arguments relating to the

motion to reopen. Tandap replied that he opposed the government’s request to remand.

We do not find the government’s reasons for a voluntary remand persuasive. 

With regard to its request for deference, the Board already had before it everything 

necessary to issue this decision in the first instance. See W.G.A., 900 F.3d at 963 (denying 

an opposed request for a general remand without confession of error because the 

“Attorney General does not explain why the Board needs a second chance to apply case 

law that was available when it decided W.G.A.’s appeal”); see also Ren v. Gonzales, 

440 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006) (granting a voluntary remand without government’s 

concession of error so that Board could reconsider its decision “in light of the emerging 

case law”). Our review of the Board’s decision does not undermine its broad discretion

in handling motions to reopen, but directs the Board to errors it should avoid on 

remand. See, e.g., W.G.A., 900 F.3d at 968–69. The ultimate decision on whether to grant 

the motion still lies with the Board. Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013).

We also are not persuaded by the government’s assertion that a voluntary 

remand would be "more efficient[]" and "not meaningfully different" from an 

adjudicated decision on the merits, given that the decision whether to reopen rests 

ultimately with the Board. A voluntary remand leads to no assurance that the Board 

will reissue a decision quickly or even address the errors identified by the government. 

As we observed in W.G.A., “[i]n some cases where we have accommodated [requests for 

voluntary remands without confession of error], we have been disappointed: the Board 

has disregarded the Attorney General’s stated reasons for remand.” 900 F.3d at 963. 

Review by this court, by contrast, allows us to substantiate specific instructions to the 

Board to address on remand. See id. at 968–69.

Moving to the motion to reopen, we review the Board’s denial for abuse of 

discretion and, here, we find the Board erred in three ways. First, the Board held 

Tandap to the wrong standard by making conclusive findings about his fear of future 

persecution. The Board denied the motion because Tandap did not show that “he 

would be individually singled out if returned” or that “all Anglophones [in Cameroon] 

are in danger of harm.” But at this stage of the proceedings, Tandap needed only to 

submit evidence showing “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” Boika, 

727 F.3d at 742 (quoting In re A–N– & R–M–N–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 953, 956 (BIA 1999)). 

Further, Tandap did not need to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he would be 

singled out as long as he could show “a pattern or practice” of persecution of 

Cameroonian Anglophones. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii). The Board did not explain why 
No. 20-1193 Page 5

such a finding could not be supported by Dr. Walker-Said’s conclusions about the 

Cameroonian Anglophones’ current plight. See Boika, 727 F.3d at 742. 

Second, the Board ignored Dr. Walker-Said’s opinion about the likelihood of 

harm that Tandap would suffer upon return based on his home city, his diaspora status, 

and his father’s political involvement. All these factors, she opined, would place 

Tandap in grave danger anywhere in the country. Although the Board credited her

account of Cameroon’s changed conditions, it failed to explain why it rejected her 

conclusions about Tandap’s risk of harm.

Finally, the Board erred by ignoring Tandap’s claim for relief under the 

Convention Against Torture. In his motion to reopen, Tandap highlighted this claim as 

the “first and foremost” form of relief upon which he sought reopening. A motion to 

reopen under the Convention “is distinct from an asylum claim and deserves 

independent substantive consideration.” Kay v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 

2004). Tandap supported this claim with his own affidavit as well as evidence from his 

uncle and Dr. Walker-Said attesting to the likelihood that, if removed, he would be 

tortured at the hands of the government (for suspected separatist sympathies) or rebel 

separatists (seeking to extort his family for money). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Kay, 

387 F.3d at 673–74. The failure to provide any rational explanation for denying this 

claim is an abuse of discretion. See Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Although we conclude that the Board abused its discretion, “[w]e take no 

position on the merits of the motion to reopen. The only ground of our decision is the 

Board’s failure to articulate a reasoned response to the motion.” Boika, 727 F.3d at 741

(quoting Mekhael v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the Board’s decision,

and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.