alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### THESIS PAINTING, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Thesis Painting, Inc., Respondent.

No. 16-1871, No. 16-2031

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 16, 2017

Decided: April 7, 2017

*322Maurice Baskin, LITTLER MENDEL-SON, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo, Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Usha Dheenan, Molly Sykes, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

No. 16-1871 petition for review denied; No. 16-2031 cross-application for enforcement granted by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Thesis Painting, Inc. (Thesis) petitions for review of a National Labor Relations Board (Board) order granting summary judgment on its complaint alleging Thesis violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012) (NLRA), when it refused to recognize and bargain with the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO, District Council 51 (Union) after the Board certified the Union as the representative of Thesis’ employees. The Board’s order directed Thesis to bargain with the Union upon request. The Board has cross-petitioned, asking this court to enforce its order.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings, and find that the Board’s legal interpretations of the NLRA are rational and consistent with the Act. *See*29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2012); *NLRB v. Air Contact Transp. Inc., 403 F.3d*206, 210 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we deny Thesis’ petition and grant the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

16-1871 *PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED;*16-2081 *CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED*
#### John CUTONILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of MARYLAND, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1667

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 24, 2017

Decided: August 28, 2017

John Cutonilli, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Holdsworth Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, Pikesville, Maryland, for Appel-lee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

John Cutonilli appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion to amend his complaint and dismissing his claims challenging the legality of the Maryland Firearm Safety Act of 2013, Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. §§ 4-301 to 4-306 (West 2017), under Maryland’s Constitution and the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Cutonilli v. Maryland,*No. 1:15-cv-00629-JKB, 251 F.Supp.3d 920, 2017 WL 1364753 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2015, Apr. 14, 2017, & May 24, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED  FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SUPERIOR SERVICES,  INC. AS OF AND FOR THE
NINE  MONTH  ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30,  1998 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         13,490
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  58,449
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,392)
<INVENTORY>                                    1,718
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               75,345
<PP&E>                                         399,617
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (131,117)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 449,501
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          50,181
<BONDS>                                        4,021
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       301
<OTHER-SE>                                     292,286
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   449,501
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               215,885
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  150,388
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               1,199
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,796
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                31,092
<INCOME-TAX>                                   16,374
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            14,718
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   14,718
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .49
        

</TABLE>
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
GA FINANCIAL, INC.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GA Financial, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John M.
Kish, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                              
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.

/s/ John M. Kish




A signed original of this written statement required by ss. 906 has been
provided to GA Financial, Inc. and will be retained by GA Financial, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Carlos Roberto ROJAS-MONDRAGON, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-70518

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

*893Courtney Ann Carter, Attorney, Law Office of Courtney A. Carter, Portland, OR, for Petitioner

Todd J. Cochran, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 Thé panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *893*See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos Roberto Rojas-Mondragon, a native of Nicaragua and a.citizen of both Nicaragua and Honduras, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings and review de novo questions of law. *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review and remand. Contrary to Rojas-Mondragon’s contentions, the agency did not err in designating Honduras as the country of removal, and considering his claims for relief only related to Honduras, after Rojas-Mondragon provided testimony and evidence of his Honduran citizenship. *See Hadera v. Gonzales,*494 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (if a noncitizen declines to designate a country, it is proper for the IJ to order removal “to a country of which the alien is a subject, national or citizen” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *see also Jang v. Lynch,*812 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2015) (“to receive asylum, a person of dual nationality must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in both countries”).

In denying Rojas-Mondragon’s asylum and withholding of removal claims the agency found he failed to establish Honduran authorities were unwilling or unable to protect him from the past harm he alleged or fears will occur upon return because he did not report the mistreatment and failed to establish that doing sp would have been futile. In reaching its conclusion, the agency did not have the benefit of our decision in *Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions,*850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Thus, we grant the petition for. review and remand Rojas-Mondragon’s asylum and withholding of removal claims to determine the impact, if any, of this decision. *See INS v. Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 16-18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam).

In light of this disposition, we do not reach Rojas-Mondragon’s remaining contentions.

Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# EUR-Lex - 32001R0911 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R0911

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 911/2001 of 10 May 2001 extending the list of products given in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 **

*
Official Journal L 129 , 11/05/2001 P. 0003 - 0003 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 911/2001

of 10 May 2001

extending the list of products given in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2001(2), and in particular Article 2(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Classification using common obligatory standards for fresh fruit and vegetables provides a reference framework that encourages fair trading and market transparency and also eliminates products of unsatisfactory quality from the market. It also helps to improve the profitability of production.

(2) With the help of representatives of the sector from the European Association of Mushroom Growers, the Working Party on Standardisation of Perishable Produce and Quality Development of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) has just unanimously adopted a new standard for cultivated mushrooms of the genus Agaricus. Given that, in addition, the now considerable volume and value of intra- and extra-Community trade in cultivated mushrooms justify the adoption of a standard, the product should be added to the list of products which are to be supplied fresh to the consumer and are subject to standards.

(3) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Cultivated mushrooms are added to the list given in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2200/96.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the seventh day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 May 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 100, 11.4.2001, p. 12.
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO





SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of FSP 50 South Tenth Street Corp. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, George J. Carter, President and principal executive officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to his knowledge:





(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











Date:  March 12, 2010
/s/ George J. CarterGeorge J. CarterPresident (Principal Executive Officer)
#### Curtis Clifford INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUINTANA, Deputy, #524044, individual and official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56454

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*880Submitted May 24, 2017 ***

Filed June 1, 2017

Curtis Clifford Ingram, Pro Se

Rina Michelle Mathevosian, Esquire, Henry Patrick Nelson, Esquire, Attorney, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Quintana, Engle, Newhouse, Gonzalez

Amber A. Logan, Attorney, Rina Michelle Mathevosian, Esquire, Henry Patrick Nelson, Esquire, Attorney, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees McDaniel, Thomas Spencep En-gle

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Curtis Clifford Ingram, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a jury verdict in favor of defendants in Ingram’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Ingram waived his challenge to the admissibility of the prior conviction evidence by introducing the evidence at trial, after he previously failed on a motion in limine to exclude it. *See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC,*637 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A party’s preemptive use of evidence at trial before its introduction by the opposing party constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence on appeal.”).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

We reject as without merit Ingram’s contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Eleanor Janet ELGUERA-STINNETT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Stacey A. KINCAID, Fairfax County Sheriff, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6589

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2017

Decided: August 18, 2017

Eleanor Janet Elguera-Stinnett, Appellant Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Eleanor Janet Elguera-Stinnett seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a pi’isoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural.ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*726We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Elguera-Stinnett has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appeala-bility, deny leave to proceed in forma pau-peris, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Jeffrey Brian COHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William D. QUARLES, Jr., U.S. District Judge, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-7412

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 31, 2017

Decided: June 8, 2017

Jeffrey Brian Cohen, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

*727Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey Brian Cohen appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his civil action and denying Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) relief. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. *Cohen v. Quarles,*No. 1:16-cv-02943-ELH (D. Md. Filed Aug. 31, 2016 *&*entered Sept. 1, 2016; filed & entered Oct. 4, 2016); *see also Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey,*368 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing considerations relevant to district court’s exercise of discretion to adjudicate claim for declaratory relief implicating related proceedings). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenton Anthony PETERKIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-15378 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(April 24, 2017)

Nicole D. Mariam, Laura Thomas Rive-ro, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Andrea G. Hoffman, Kevin Quencer, Emily M. Smachetti, Naíina Sombuntham, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*719Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Joaquin E. Padilla, Ian McDonald, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Glenton Peterkin argues that the district court erred by using two Florida convictions to enhance his sentence for being a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. But the arguments are squarely foreclosed by this Court’s prior published opinions. Mr. Peterkin’s career offender enhancement is unaffected by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), because vagueness principles do not apply to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. *See Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017); *United States v. Matchett,*802 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2015). And his Florida convictions that supported the enhancement—for robbery (Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1)) and aggravated assault (Fla. Stat. § 784.021)—remain qualifying predicates under § 4B1.2. *See United States v. Lockley,*632 F.3d 1238, 1240-46 (11th Cir. 2011) (robbery conviction under § 812.13(1) qualifies as crime of violence); *Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium),*709 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (aggravated assault conviction under § 784.021 qualifies as crime of violence).

AFFIRMED.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7046 

To direct the Secretary of Labor to modify the implementation of the adverse 

effect wage rate for H–2A nonimmigrants. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 18, 2024 

Mr. MOOLENAAR (for himself, Mr. HUIZENGA, Mr. NEWHOUSE, Mr. 

BERGMAN, Mr. WALBERG, Mrs. MCCLAIN, and Mr. LUCAS) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Labor to modify the implementation of the adverse effect wage rate for H–2A nonimmigrants. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Supporting Farm Op5 erations Act of 2024’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MODIFIED IMPLEMENTATION OF ADVERSE EFFECT 

7 WAGE RATE FOR H–2A NONIMMIGRANTS. 

8 The Secretary of Labor shall ensure that the adverse 

9 effect wage rate required to be paid under section 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 7046 IH

1 655.1308 of title 20, Code of Federal Regulations, to non2 immigrants admitted under section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) 

3 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

4 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)), that was in effect in a State on 

5 December 31, 2023, remains the adverse effect wage rate 

6 for such employees in that State through December 31, 

7 2025. 

8 SEC. 3. CLARIFICATION OF JOB CLASSIFICATION. 

9 For the purposes of determining the wage required 

10 to be paid referred to in section 2, the Secretary of Labor 

11 shall utilize a primary duties evaluation for such employ12 ees who may be performing more than one duty or task. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB