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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 2002 Decided February 7, 2003

No. 01-5320

GLENN P. LACEDRA,

APPELLANT

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00273)

Elaine J. Goldenberg, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With her on

the briefs were Deanne E. Maynard and David W. DeBruin.

Glenn P. LaCedra filed pro se briefs.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. On the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.
2

U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, and Jane M. Lyons,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Glenn LaCedra wrote a letter to

the Executive Office for United States Attorneys requesting

documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. He

first asked generally for ‘‘all documents pertaining to’’ the

criminal case against him; he then enumerated certain specifically requested items. The EOUSA construed the letter to

request only the specifically enumerated items and therefore

produced only 14 of the approximately 6,000 pages of documents it had concerning LaCedra. The district court, determining that the EOUSA adequately responded to LaCedra’s

request, granted summary judgment for the Agency. We

hold the EOUSA’s interpretation of LaCedra’s request was

not reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of,

and remand the case to, the district court for further proceedings.

I. Background

LaCedra was convicted in 1996 in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. In 1998 he sent

a pro se FOIA request to the U.S. Attorney for the District of

Massachusetts. The request read in pertinent part as follows:

I wish to obtain a copy of all documents pertaining to

my case that was prosecuted by your office, entitled

United States vs. Glenn P. LaCedra, 96–10074 RCL,

Specifically I am requesting the following below; Documents and Information on

1. Any and all inducements, and rewards offered to the

chief government witnesses Susan Yodlin and Jennifer Brown, including Government provided beeper

service, cellular phone service and fees paid in my

case for any, and all information or for testifying

against me.
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2. All scientific fingerprinting results from the inside of

the black electrical tape, that was attached to the

device, and any documents concerning the known or

unknown identities of such.

Having waited almost a year without receiving any documents, LaCedra filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

LaCedra asked the court to compel the EOUSA to produce

‘‘[a]ll information in [the EOUSA’s] files from 1995 to present

concerning [him] in any criminal investigation which includes

Case No. 96–10074–RCL entitled the United States vs. Glenn

P. LaCedra (District of Massachusetts) and all the other

requested information sought.’’ Shortly thereafter the

EOUSA provided LaCedra with 14 pages of documents,

including one it had redacted pursuant to Exemption 7(C) of

the FOIA.

The EOUSA then twice moved for and the district court

twice denied summary judgment. When the Agency filed a

third such motion, it attached the declaration of Maryellen

Barrett, a FOIA official in the office of the U.S. Attorney for

the District of Massachusetts. In her declaration Barrett

described LaCedra’s letter as requesting only the specifically

enumerated items. She also described in detail the steps she

had taken to locate documents responsive to that request.

Along the way she stated that LaCedra’s criminal case file

consisted of ‘‘three boxes of material,’’ of which only the 14

pages already produced were responsive to LaCedra’s request. This LaCedra took as an admission that the EOUSA

had not produced all the documents he had requested.

Responding to the district court’s concern that LaCedra

had ‘‘raise[d] valid questions about the contents of [the] three

boxes of documents,’’ the EOUSA argued that ‘‘the plaintiff’s

original request for information did not include all of the

documents contained in TTT his criminal case file,’’ and accused LaCedra of trying to ‘‘expand his request.’’ According

to the EOUSA, LaCedra’s general request for ‘‘all documents

pertaining to my case that was prosecuted by your office’’

merely ‘‘identif[ies] the location where the documents re-
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quested TTT will be found,’’ whereas his enumeration of

specific items ‘‘describe[s] exactly what is being requested.’’

The district court concluded that the EOUSA’s understanding of LaCedra’s letter as requesting only the specifically

enumerated items was ‘‘not unreasonable.’’ Accordingly, the

court granted the EOUSA’s third motion for summary judgment.

LaCedra timely appealed pro se to this court, and we

appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments in support

of his position. We review the decision of the Agency de

novo. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (district court reviews

agency de novo); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of the

Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (circuit court

reviews summary judgment de novo in FOIA as in other

cases).

II. Analysis

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, requires

federal agencies to grant ‘‘any request for records which TTT

reasonably describes such records,’’ § 552(a)(3)(A), subject to

certain specified exemptions. As the EOUSA interprets

LaCedra’s request, it ‘‘reasonably describes’’ only the items

that it specifically enumerates, whereas LaCedra argues that

the EOUSA should have construed his request more broadly.

Initially we note the EOUSA’s suggestion on brief that, as

a prudential matter, we decline to hear this case because

LaCedra then had pending before it a second, related FOIA

request that might provide LaCedra with all the relief he was

seeking here. Before the oral argument in this case, however, the EOUSA had finished processing the second request

without producing any additional documents. As a result, we

express our appreciation for, but decline the Agency’s suggestion.

And so to the issue. LaCedra points out that his original

letter of request plainly sought ‘‘all documents pertaining to’’

his criminal case. The EOUSA’s interpretation of his request, he claims, reads the just-quoted phrase out of the
5

letter. LaCedra maintains that his subsequent enumeration

of specific items does not limit his initial request but only

indicates a subset of the larger class of documents in which

he is especially interested. He also argues that, to the extent

the scope of his request is ambiguous, (1) the EOUSA was

obliged by our decision in Nation Magazine v. United States

Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885 (1995), to interpret the request

liberally in favor of disclosure; and (2) his petition for mandamus, which the EOUSA received before it began its search,

clarified the request. See Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d

540, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

For its part, the EOUSA argues that it is LaCedra’s

interpretation of the request that renders a portion of it

surplusage. Specifically, if we interpret the letter first to

seek ‘‘all documents,’’ then there is no way to give meaning to

the latter part in which LaCedra ‘‘[s]pecifically TTT request[s]’’ certain enumerated documents. On the EOUSA’s

proffered interpretation, ‘‘the first two sentences of TTT

LaCedra’s request identified the location where the requested

documents would be found, and the latter two sentences

described exactly what was being requested.’’

To be sure, LaCedra’s request is not a model of clarity.

The first portion, ‘‘I wish to obtain a copy of all documents

pertaining to my case,’’ is in considerable tension with the

second, ‘‘Specifically I am requesting the following below.’’

Nevertheless, LaCedra’s request is reasonably susceptible to

the broader reading. The drafter of a FOIA request might

reasonably seek all of a certain set of documents while

nonetheless evincing a heightened interest in a specific subset

thereof. We think it improbable, however, that a person who

wanted only the subset would draft a request that, like

LaCedra’s, first asks for the full set. The EOUSA’s interpretation — that the request for ‘‘all documents pertaining to my

case that was prosecuted by your office’’ identifies the location where the subset of documents may be found — is simply

implausible. In view of the Government’s obligation under

the law of this circuit ‘‘to construe a FOIA request liberally,’’

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890, we think it is also wrong.
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Citing Maydak v. United States Department of Justice, 218

F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the amicus urges us to hold the

EOUSA’s interpretation is so unreasonable that, upon remand to the district court, the Agency should not be allowed

to invoke any of the exemptions in the FOIA. In Maydak

the Agency had invoked one exemption to support nondisclosure of certain information; on appeal it abandoned that

exemption and asked the court to remand the case to the

district court so the Agency could there advance other exemptions. We held that an agency could not raise FOIA

exemptions seriatim and ordered the Agency to produce all

the relevant documents without regard to any belatedly asserted exemptions.

Nothing in Maydak requires an agency to invoke any

exemption applicable to a record the agency in good faith

believes has not been requested. Of course, we can imagine a

case in which the agency’s interpretation of a FOIA request is

so unreasonable as to raise the inference that the agency is

not acting in good faith. What we would do in such a case we

need not decide today. For in this case the EOUSA’s

interpretation, although erroneous, was at least colorable.

Not every error bespeaks a knave.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the

district court. The case is remanded to that court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.