alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.10





AMENDMENT
TO


TARGA
RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC.


KEY
EMPLOYEE LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN








WHEREAS, TARGA RESOURCES INVESTMENTS
INC. (the “Company”) has heretofore adopted the TARGA RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC. KEY
EMPLOYEE LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN(the “Plan”) for the benefit of certain
of the employees of the Company and its affiliates and as an incentive for such
individuals to remain employees of the Company or its affiliates;




WHEREAS, the Company may amend
the Plan at any time in its discretion; and




WHEREAS,the Company desires
to amend the Plan to comply with section 409A of the Internal Revenue of Code of
1986, as amended;




NOW, THEREFORE,the Plan shall
be amended as follows, effective as of December 18th, 2008:




1.           Section
6 of the Plan shall be deleted, and the following shall be substituted
therefore:




“6.           Payment of Incentive Benefit
After Death of Employee.  If an Employee terminates employment
due to death and is entitled to receive the Incentive Benefit which would be
payable on the next following Employment Incentive Date pursuant to Section 4(a)
hereof, such Incentive Benefit shall be paid in a lump sum cash payment, subject
to applicable withholding, as soon as practicable after the date of death but in
no event later than the 15th day of
March following the end of the calendar year during which the death occurs to
(a) the Employee’s beneficiary (or beneficiaries) designated under the
employer’s group life insurance plan, if living, or, (b) if none is so
designated or living, the executor of the Employee’s estate.”




2.
            The
      third sentence of Section 4(a) of the Plan shall be deleted, and the
      following shall be substituted
therefore:




“Except
as provided in Section 6 below with respect to payments made after the death of
an Employee, such Incentive Benefit shall be payable in a lump sum cash payment,
subject to applicable withholding, (A) within 20 business days after the date of
termination in the event of a termination other than for Cause, or (B) in the
event of a determination of Disability, no later than the earlier of (1) March
15 of the year following the year of the date of determination or (2) 30
business days after the Incentive Payment Date.”




EXECUTED and effective as of
December 18, 2008.





TARGA
RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC.








By:                      /s/Rene R.
Joyce________


Name:                                Rene
R. Joyce


Title:                                Chief
Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Ray DEESE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6961

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 21, 2017

Decided: November 28, 2017

*275Charles Ray Deese, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas B. Murphy, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles Ray Deese seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions. The orders are not ap-pealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Deese has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 31

[IMPAC LOGGO]                                          IMPAC FUNDING CORPORATION
                                        19500 JAMBOREE ROAD o IRVINE, CA o 92612
                                         WWW.IMPACCOMPANIES.COM o 1.800.597.4101

            CERTIFICATION TO BE PROVIDED BY THE MASTER SERVICER WITH

                                    FORM 10-K

      Re: Impac Secured Assets Corp.,
          Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4

I, Mario Fegan, certify that:

      1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form
10-K of Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-4 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

      2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report;

      3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

      4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in
preparing the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item
1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic
reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing
agreements; and Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements
required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as
disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
their obligations under the servicing agreements; and

      5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment
of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be
included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and l5d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of
noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on
Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties, Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

                                                      Date: 3/22/07


                                                      /s/ Mario Fegan
                                                      --------------------------
                                                      Mario Fegan
                                                      V.P., Master Servicing
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ashley Regina GOOCH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6841

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Ashley Regina Gooch, Appellant Pro Se. Ripley Eagles Rand, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ashley Regina Gooch appeals the district court’s orders denying her motions for reduction of sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012), and for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v.*Gooch, No. 1:16-cr-00025-WO-1 (M.D.N.C. May 17, 2017; June 22, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Marianne STIKAS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.P MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee, John Does 1-20, Defendants.

16-1629-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 3, 2017

Amended May 31, 2017

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Neal Deyoung, Sharma & DeYoung LLP, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: James L. Brenard, Stroock *&*Stroock *&*Lavan LLP, New York, NY.

PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, Circuit Judges. William H. Pauley III, District Judge.*

*

 Judge William H. Pauley III, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Marianne Stikas appeals the May 13, 2016 district court judgment, granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“J.P. Morgan”). On appeal, Stikas argues that the district court erred by concluding that she lacked standing to bring her claim that J.P. Morgan breached the terms of a mortgage note by seeking non-legal fees in a foreclosure judgment under the guise of attorneys’ fees. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

For substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we hold that this claim is without merit. After discovery, the district court found no evidence that J.P. Morgan billed Stikas for the disputed “referral fee,” or that Stikas actually paid said “referral fee” to J.P. Morgan. *See*Special App’x at 4-6. Accordingly, Sti-kas does not have standing to challenge the “referral fee,” nor has she suffered an “injury in fact” required to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Article III of the Constitution. *See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,*504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Stikas and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
**Exhibit 35.2**

** **

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.**

** **

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATEANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

 

            I, Barbara Campbell, an authorized officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (the “AdministrativeAgent”), do hereby certify to WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. (the “Depositor”) and Washington Mutual Bank (the “Servicer”), pursuant to the Amended and Restated Administrative Agent Agreement dated as of February 1, 2005 (the“Servicing Agreement”) by and between Washington Mutual Bank, as servicer, and the Administrative Agent the following with respect to WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR17 for the 2006 fiscal year (the “RelevantYear”):

 

1.        A review of the activities of the Servicer during the Relevant Year and of performance under the ServicingAgreement has been made under my supervision.

2.        To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under theServicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Relevant Year.

 

Dated as of February 22, 2007.

 
|  

___/s/ Barbara Campbell________________

Name:  Barbara Campbell

Title:    First Vice President |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
## Supreme Court ofthe United States Office ofthe Clerk 

### Washington, DC 20543-0001 November 30, 2015 Clerk Court of Criminal Appeals ofTexas P.O. Box 12308 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 Re: Bobby Joe Peyronel v. Texas No. 15-6267 (Your No. PD-1274-14) Scott S. Harris Clerk of the Court (202)479-3011

Dear Clerk: 

### The Court today entered the following order in the above-entitled case: The petition for a writ ofcertiorari is denied. Sincerely, 

# COUBTORFESrAPPHAUS ^ <£2>fa Scott S. Harris, Clerk 

### DEC 07 2015 

## AbelAcosta, Clerk
**Exhibit
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of GCA I Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-KSB for the period ending May 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael M. Membrado,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                Michael M. MembradoMichael
                M. Membrado
              Principal
                Executive Officer
              August
                24, 2007
1 The Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 02-3021

___________ Mamie C. Wray, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Arkansas. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of * the Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: February 21, 2003 Filed: March 27, 2003

___________ Before HANSEN, Chief Judge, MELLOY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Mamie C. Wray appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court 1 for the Western District of Arkansas, affirming the Commissioner’s decision to deny her application for disability insurance benefits. For reversal, Wray argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in discrediting her subjective complaints of disabling pain and in finding that she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC)-2- to perform her past relevant work. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Wray’s subjective complaints. SeeCunningham v. Apfel , 222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review). The ALJ considered the relevant factors in evaluating Wray’s credibility, found her reported daily-living activities were inconsistent with the lack of limitations placed on her by physicians, and noted that she had not been f ound incapable of performing her past work because of any impairment. See Dunahoo v. Apfel , 241 F.3d 1033, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ’s credibility determination supported by substantial evidence where he recited appropriate factors and noted inconsistencies in record such as lack of physician-ordered functional restrictions). We also find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Wray retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work of secretary. Wray testified she could stand for 5-10 minutes, sit for 20 minutes, and walk 50 feet; no treating physician limited any of her physical activities; and a consulting physician found that Wray had normal range of motion in her spine and all extremities and could lift 10 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (2002) (sedentary work requires occasional walking and standing, and lifting no more than 10 pounds); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles , § 201.362-030 (4th ed. 1991) (classifying secretarial work as sedentary). Accordingly, we affirm.-3- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Republic Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the six months ended June
30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, William R. Falzone, Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)    The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and



(2)    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



Dated: August 7, 2003



|/s/ William R. Falzone                                   
|---------------------------------------------------------
|William R. Falzone Executive Vice President and Treasurer
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6983 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6983

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, as the ``Nell Patten 
                        Roquemore Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NELL PATTEN ROQUEMORE POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, shall be known 
and designated as the ``Nell Patten Roquemore Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Nell 
Patten Roquemore Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 3, 2024.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6983

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, as the ``Nell Patten 
                        Roquemore Post Office''.
```
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see

Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please

also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other

deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the

filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

3 Plaintiff-Appellee,

4 vs. NO. 31,695

5 JOSE GARCIA,

6 Defendant-Appellant.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

8 William C. Birdsall, District Judge

9 Gary K. King, Attorney General

10 Santa Fe, NM

11 for Appellee

12 The Rio Law Firm

13 Francis J. Rio, III

14 Albuquerque, NM

15 for Appellant
2

1 MEMORANDUM OPINION

2 GARCIA, Judge.

3 Summary affirmance was proposed for the reason stated in the notice of

4 proposed disposition. No memorandum opposing summary affirmance has been filed,

5 and the time for doing so has expired.

6 Affirmed.

7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

8 

9 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge

10 WE CONCUR:

11 

12 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge

13 

14 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
Executive Order 12866 

and 

Congressional Review Requirements 

RIN: ^ ^ 

Rulemaking Document Title: 

S \ .. „ : TT7-T71 .j- _ .' z_ ?r_ 

3 ^ . 

With respect to the attached rulemaking document(s): 

1. E.0.12866: The requirements of section 6(a)(3)(E) of E.O. 12866 have been met in accordance with the 

following [initial appropriate line]: 

The rulemaking document(s) was not reviewed by the Office of hiformation and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 

No substantive changes were made to the document(s) after it was submitted to OIRA. 

The required information is attached. 

2. Congressional Review: The requirements of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 

for the submission of final rules to Congress and GAO (§ 801) have been met in accordance with the 

following [initial appropriate line]: 

This document is not a final rule. 

This document is not a rule under (§ 804). 

The document has been submitted to C-50 for transmission to Congress and GAO. 

Signature 

/^i>a#- C- AU r 

Title/Office . C''^ ^ 

Date
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gustavo Davalos TRUEBA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10105

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 11, 2017

Rosaleen O’Gara, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU — Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gustavo Davalos Trueba, Pro Se

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gustavo Davalos Trueba appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 38-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Davalos Trueba contends that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence on the basis that his prior conviction of willful infliction of corporal injury on a *968spouse or cohabitant under California Penal Code § 273.5 was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G.§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2014). This claim is foreclosed by *United States v. Laurico-Yeno,*590 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). Contrary to Davalos Treuba’s claim, *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) is not “clearly irreconcilable” with this precedent. *See Miller v. Gammie,*335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (three-judge panel is bound by circuit precedent unless that precedent is “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening higher authority).

Davalos Trueba also contends that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his conviction under section 273.5 does not qualify as a felony. This claim is without merit. A violation of section 273.5 is punishable by up to four years of imprisonment. *See*Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a). It thus-meets the definition of “felony.” *See*U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2 (2014) (“ ‘[Fjelony’ means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”),

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.