alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1073

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ronnie Lee Langston

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

 Submitted: August 3, 2015

Filed: September 9, 2015

[Published]

____________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

This court previously affirmed Ronnie Lee Langston’s sentence under the

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See United States v. Langston, 772

F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated

the judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). This court again affirmed the sentence. See United States v.
Langston, 2015 WL 4646854 (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (per curiam). Granting

Langston’s petition for rehearing, this court now vacates the opinion of August 6,

2015. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court vacates Langston’s

sentence and remands.

Langston pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to 180 months’

imprisonment. See § 924(e)(1) (mandatory minimum of 180 months if a felon in

possession of a firearm has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug

offenses). At sentencing, the court found that four prior convictions were violent

felonies: terrorism, going armed with intent, theft, and burglary. Langston did not

dispute that the theft and burglary convictions were violent felonies. This court

affirmed, holding that Langston’s going-armed-with-intent conviction was a violent

felony under the “residual clause” of the ACCA. See § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (crime is a

violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk

of physical injury to another”). 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause as

unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (noting vagueness in

criminal statutes is prohibited by due process). In light of Johnson, Langston’s goingarmed-with-intent conviction is not a qualifying violent felony.

Neither, the government concedes, is Langston’s theft conviction. See United

States v. Griffith, 301 F.3d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding theft from a person is a

violent felony under the residual clause). See also United States v. Davidson, 551

F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (discussing plain error review). Thus, the

district court erred by sentencing Langston as an armed career criminal.

The judgment is vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent with

this opinion.

______________________________

-2-
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5870 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5870

 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
   establish a grant program to facilitate land acquisitions made to 
             improve water quality, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 14, 2016

    Mr. Murphy of Florida (for himself and Mr. Clawson of Florida) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
   establish a grant program to facilitate land acquisitions made to 
             improve water quality, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Partnership for Clean Water 
Land Acquisition Act of 2016''.

SEC. 2. CLEAN WATER LAND ACQUISITION GRANT PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency shall establish a program to facilitate land 
acquisitions made for the purpose of improving water quality.
    (b) Grant Authority.--In carrying out the program established under 
subsection (a), the Administrator may make a grant, in accordance with 
this section, to any State.
    (c) Applications.--To be eligible for a grant under subsection (b), 
a State shall submit to the Administrator an application at such time, 
in such form, and containing such information as the Administrator may 
require.
    (d) Grant Use.--A State may use grant amounts provided under 
subsection (b) only--
            (1) to acquire private land; and
            (2) if the acquisition of the land will substantially 
        improve, as determined by the Administrator, water quality for 
        an area (including by means of water storage, water treatment, 
        estuary restoration, or ecosystem restoration).
    (e) Federal Share.--The Federal share of the costs of any land 
acquisition assisted with a grant under subsection (b) shall not exceed 
50 percent.
    (f) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State'' means any 
governmental entity of the several States, the District of Columbia, or 
a territory or possession of the United States.
    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Administrator for each fiscal year $750,000,000 to 
carry out this section.
                                 <all>
```
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

July 30, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00491

- CR

Joel SOTO

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015CR8804 Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, C hief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice Irene Rios, Justice

Appellant has filed a pro se letter requesting a copy of his trial transcripts for purposes of filing a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus. This court has no jurisdiction over post

conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC . art. 11.07; In re Coronado , 98 0 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). Post

conviction writs of habeas corpus are to be filed in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained, and made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P R OC

. art. 11.07. In order to obtain a free copy of the record, appellant would need to file a motion in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained and demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous and that the record is needed to decide the issues presented. See United States v. MacCollom , 426 U.S. 317, 326 (1976); Escobar v. State , 880 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.). Appellant’s request is DENIED without prejudice to seeking relief in the proper court.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 30th day of July, 2018

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle Clerk of Court
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed May 22, 2019.

________________

Nos. 3D18-208 & 3D18-629

Lower Tribunal No. 14-4053

________________

GEICO Indemnity Company and GEICO General Insurance

Company,

Appellants,

vs.

Ricardo Perez and Luz Perez, etc.,

Appellees.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rodney Smith,

Judge.

Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Suzanne Youmans Labrit, B.C.S. (Tampa) and

Amy M. Wessel (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants.

The Powell Law Firm, P.A., and Brett C. Powell; Silverstein, Silverstein &

Silverstein, P.A., for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and HENDON, JJ.

CONFESSION OF ERROR
HENDON, J.

As the appellees properly concede, the attorney’s fees and costs judgments

at issue in these consolidated appeals must be reversed. In GEICO Indemnity Co.

v. Perez, 260 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), this Court reversed the underlying

final judgment as to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and remanded for a

new trial. Therefore, the attorney’s fees and costs judgments that were predicated

on the reversed final judgment cannot stand. See City of Hollywood v. Witt, 939

So. 2d 315, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (recognizing that “where an award of

attorney’s fees is dependent upon the judgment obtained, the reversal of the

underlying judgment necessitates the reversal of the fee award”); Marty v. Bainter,

727 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“Once a final judgment is reversed

and remanded by an appellate court, there can be no prevailing party for purposes

of an award of prevailing party attorney’s fees. Consequently, an award of

attorney’s fees and costs predicated on a reversed or vacated final judgment also

must be reversed”). 

Reversed.

2
#### William Robert FAYANT; Julie Lorraine Fayant, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. BANK, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35097

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*734Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 1, 2017

Jill J. Smith, Esquire, Attorney, Natural Resource Law Group, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Andrew H. Salter, Teton Law Group, Jackson, WY, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William Robert Fayant and Julie Lorraine Fayant appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Serra v. Lappin,*600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Fayants’ action as time-barred because the Fayants did not send a notice of rescission to defendant within three years of consummation of the loan. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); *Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); *Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,*309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit the Fayants’ contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
#### Edson MAITLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, Defendant-Appellee.

16-324-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 21, 2016

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Ed-son Maitland, pro se, Palm Coast, FL .

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Mitchell Boyarsky, Gibbons P.C., New York, N.Y.

PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Rosemary S. Pooler, Barrington D. Parker, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Edson Maitland, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Konica Minolta Business *654Solutions (“KMBS”), on his claims of discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 *et seq.-,*Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.;*the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq.;*the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 *et seq.;*and New York state law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review *de novo*a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Sousa v. Marquez,*702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Upon such review, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to KMBS. We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its thorough and well-reasoned January 25,2016 decision.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Maitland’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
449 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 300 Harrisburg, PA 17111-2302 E-mail: skellyloy@skellyloy.com Internet: www.skellyloy.com
U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, D.C. 20590
To Whom It May Concern: Phone: 717-232-0593 800-892-6532 Fax: 717-232-1799 October 19, 2015

Re: Docket FAA-2015-1364, Petition for Amendment to Exemption Number 12534 Skelly and Loy, Inc. received FAA Exemption Number 12534 on August 20, 2015, authorizing the use of the Trimble UX5 UAV for aerial mapping applications. This petition for amendment is to add the Trimble ZX5 and OJI Phantom 3 Professional rotorcrafts to Exception Number 12534. Copies of the user manuals for these aircraft are attached . Skelly and Loy will comply with all of the conditions set forth by Exemption 12534. Due to this, we request summary approval of this amendment by the FAA. The name and contact information for the applicant are list below. John W Gunnett P.G. Skelly and Loy, Inc. 449 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 300 Harrisburg, PA 17111 717-232-0593 jgunnett@skellyloy.com If you have any questions, please contact me.

Enclosure cc: Rick Johnston corr. File: USDOT _JWG.docx Office Locations: Pittsburgh, PA Morgantown , WV Sincerely yours, SKELLY and LOY, Inc.

# w.~ W. Gunnett, P.G . es dent, Chief Operating Officer

State College, PA Hagerstown, MD Hunt Valley, MD
United States Court of Appeals

	For the First Circuit

	____________________

No. 01-2353

PAUL GUNTER,

	Petitioner, Appellee,

	v.

	MICHAEL T. MALONEY,

	Respondent, Appellant.

	____________________

ERRATA SHEET 

	The opinion of this court, issued April 29, 2002, should be amended as follows:

page 5, line 14: 	replace "and" with ". . ."

page 16, line 19: 	add "1st Cir." before "1995"
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  The undersigned, Brian Cole, Chief Financial Officer of Play LA Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Play LA Inc. for the year ended  December  31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Play LA Inc.  Dated:  April 19, 2010     /s/ Brian Cole_______ Brian Cole   Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATION
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997  
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997    
<CASH>                                          44,017
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           3,906
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                62,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     96,899
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      1,201,624
<ALLOWANCE>                                     20,417
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,469,352
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,289,100
<SHORT-TERM>                                    55,803
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              5,378
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           28,750
<PREFERRED>                                      1,500
<COMMON>                                        13,378
<OTHER-SE>                                      72,715
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               1,469,352
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 70,320
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                8,367
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                78,687
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              37,729
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              39,686
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           39,001
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    2,134
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 477
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 40,737
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,700
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      10,700
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,305
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .94
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .91
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                     856
<LOANS-NON>                                     21,858
<LOANS-PAST>                                       422
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 2,152
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    200
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                18,747
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      932
<RECOVERIES>                                       298
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               20,417
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            20,417
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                         20,417
        

</TABLE>
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

June 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

133457 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 133457 

 COA: 264582 

Kalamazoo CC: 04-000543-FC 

ROBERT HENRY VANCE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 15, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

t0618 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

June 26, 2007 

 Clerk
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Certification of Chief
Executive Officer

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Pure Bioscience (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the fiscal quarter
ended April 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Michael L. Krall, Chief Executive Officer certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)       
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)       
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|              |                                                              
|------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------
|June 13, 2006 | /s/ Michael L. Krall
Michael L. Krall
Chief Executive Officer
## NUMBER 13

- 21

- 00 0 12

- CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

DYLAN NATHAN HAGERMAN , Appellant ,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

.

On a ppeal from the County Court at Law of Comal County, Texas.



## ORDER

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina Order Per Curiam

B efore the Court is appellant's pro se motion for access to the appellate record

.
On August 26 , 2021, a ppellant's counsel filed an Anders brief

, and appellant has been

unable to examine the record in order to file a pro se brief.

Accordingly, we GRANT appellant’s motion and it is hereby ORDERED that the

trial court ensure that appellant has the opportunity to fully examine the appellate record2 on or before fifteen ( 15 ) days from the date this order issues

. I t is FURTHER ORDERED

the trial court notify this Court as to the date upon which the appellate record was made

available to appellant

. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Furthermore, Appellant shall have thirty (30) days from the d ay the appellate

record is first made available to him to file his pro se brief with this Court

. The State shall

have twenty days thereafter to file its response, if any

.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 27 th day of September , 2021.
**Annual
      Statement of Compliance**





VIA:
      EMAIL





Merrill
      Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.


250
      Vesey
      Street


4
      World
      Financial Center, 10th Floor


New
      York,
      New York 10080





Wilshire
      Credit Corporation


14523
      SW
      Millikan Way


Suite
      200


Beaverton,
      Oregon 97005





Attention:
      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-RM5





Re:
      Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the "Agreement") dated as of October 1, 2006
      among Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., as depositor, Wilshire Credit
      Corporation, as servicer and LaSalle Bank National Association, as trustee,
      relating to Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
      Certificates, Series 2006-RM5





I,
      Barbara L. Marik, a First Vice President of LaSalle Bank National Association,
      as Trustee hereby certify that:





(1)
      A
      review of the activities of the Trustee during the preceding calendar year
      and
      of the performance of the Trustee under the Agreement has been made under my
      supervision; and





(2)
      To
      the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Trustee has fulfilled all
      its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such
      year or a portion thereof.











Date: February
      1, 2007





LaSalle
      Bank National Association, as Trustee







/s/
      Barbara L Marik


Barbara
      L. Marik


First
      Vice President