IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.F., :

Petitioner :

: 

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 728 C.D. 2023

Respondent : Submitted: August 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: October 1, 2024

J.F. (Petitioner) petitions for review of the June 14, 2023 order (BHA 

Order) of the Department of Human Services’ (Department), Bureau of Hearings 

and Appeals (BHA), that denied Petitioner’s appeal of his placement on the 

statewide ChildLine and Abuse Registry (ChildLine Registry)1as a perpetrator in an 

indicated report of child abuse. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The facts underlying this matter are straightforward and not in dispute. 

On August 4, 2021, the Department mailed Petitioner a letter advising him that he 

had been listed on the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in an indicated report of 

child abuse. See Adjudication and Recommendation dated June 14, 2023 

(Adjudication) at 3, Certified Record (C.R.) at 31; see also Letter from Department 

1 The ChildLine Registry is “[a]n organizational unit of the Department which operates a 

Statewide toll-free system for receiving reports of suspected child abuse established under section 

6332 of the [Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), 23 Pa.C.S. § 6332,] (relating to establishment 

of Statewide toll-free telephone number), refers the reports for investigation and maintains the 

reports in the appropriate file.” 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.
2

to Petitioner dated August 4, 2021, C.R. at 14-15. Petitioner timely appealed on 

August 18, 2021, seeking the expungement of the indicated finding (Expungement 

Appeal). See Adjudication at 3, C.R. at 31; see also Expungement Appeal received 

August 18, 2021, C.R. at 15. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing 

on the matter,

2 and the hearing record closed on August 23, 2022. See Adjudication 

at 3, C.R. at 31; see also March 10, 2022 Hearing Transcript, C.R. at 116-276; June 

24, 2022 Hearing Transcript, C.R. at 278-412. The ALJ issued the Adjudication on 

June 14, 2023, recommending the denial of the Expungement Appeal. See

Adjudication, C.R. at 30-43. Also on June 14, 2023, the BHA adopted the 

Adjudication in its entirety and issued the BHA Order denying the Expungement 

Appeal. See BHA Order, C.R. at 29. After the filing of multiple unsuccessful

petitions for reconsideration,

3 Petitioner timely appealed the BHA Order to this 

Court on July 12, 2023.

On appeal,4 Petitioner argues that the BHA violated his right to 

procedural due process by failing to comply with statutory time requirements for the 

issuance of a prompt decision regarding the Expungement Appeal. See Petitioner’s 

Br. at 3, 6-12. In support, Petitioner cites Section 6341(c.3) of the Child Protective 

2 The hearing occurred over two dates: March 10, 2022, and June 24, 2022. See

Adjudication at 3, C.R. at 31; see also March 10, 2022 Hearing Transcript, C.R. at 116-276; June 

24, 2022 Hearing Transcript, C.R. at 278-412. 

3 Petitioner filed three petitions for reconsideration on June 27, 2023, June 29, 2023, and 

June 30, 2023. The Department denied all three requests for reconsideration by order dated July 

7, 2023. 

4

“Our scope of review is limited to determining whether a legal error has been committed, 

whether constitutional rights have been violated, or whether the necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence.” T.W. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 38 A.3d 1067, 1076 n.8 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012); see also Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
3

Services Law (CPSL)5and relies on subsection (c.3) thereof, which provides a 45-

day time limit for the filing of a decision by an ALJ or a hearing officer. See 23 

Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.3). Specifically, Section 6341(c.3) of the CPSL provides:

Prompt decision.--The administrative law judge’s or 

hearing officer’s decision in a hearing under subsection 

(c.2) shall be entered, filed and served upon the parties 

within 45 days of the date upon which the proceeding or 

hearing is concluded unless, within that time, the tribunal 

extends the date for the decision by order entered of record 

showing good cause for the extension. In no event shall 

an extension delay the entry of the decision more than 60 

days after the conclusion of the proceeding or hearing.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.3). Based on this section of the CPSL, Petitioner argues that 

the delay in the issuance of the Adjudication and the BHA Order amounts to an 

unjustifiable violation of his right to reputation.6 See Petitioner’s Br. at 6-12. 

Petitioner does not challenge the substantive findings or determination of the 

Adjudication or the BHA Order, but instead asks this Court to vacate the BHA Order 

denying the Expungement Appeal based solely on the delay in the issuance of the 

BHA Order. See Petitioner’s Br. at 12. Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

The CPSL provides that a person named as a perpetrator in an indicated 

report of child abuse may request administrative review within 90 days after

notification of being named in an indicated report. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(A)(2). 

5

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6386.

6 Petitioner cites two fundamental rights as implicated in this matter: his right to reputation 

and his right to “liberty.” See Petitioner’s Br. at 5, 6, 9. However, while mentioning the right to 

liberty, Petitioner’s brief develops his argument only as to his right to reputation. See generally

Petitioner’s Br. For these reasons, we treat Petitioner’s claim as one implicating only his right to 

reputation.
4

Such a request triggers a right to a hearing, the closing of the record which in turn 

ostensibly triggers a 45-day time limitation (absent the entry of an order granting an 

up to 60-day extension for good cause shown) for the ALJ or hearing officer to file 

a decision. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.2) & (c.3).

As this Court has explained:

Due process is fully applicable to administrative hearings 

involving substantial property and/or liberty rights. Under 

both our federal and state constitutions, the basic elements 

of procedural due process are adequate notice, the 

opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself 

before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over 

the case. The United States Supreme Court has 

consistently held that “some form of hearing” is required 

before a final deprivation of a protected interest, although 

the exact nature and mechanism of the required procedure 

will vary based upon the unique circumstances 

surrounding the controversy. The fundamental requirement

of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

S.F. v. Dep’t of Hum. Serv., 298 A.3d 495, 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (internal 

citations, some quotation marks, and footnote omitted). Here, it is undisputed that 

Petitioner received adequate notice of the hearing on the Expungement Appeal, that 

the BHA conducted that hearing, and that Petitioner was afforded an opportunity at 

the hearing to be heard and to defend himself. Petitioner does not challenge that he 

was afforded these basic requirements of due process. Instead, Petitioner bases his 

procedural due process argument exclusively on the fact that the Adjudication and 

the BHA Order were issued beyond the 45-day prompt decision period provided in

Section 6341(c.3) of the CPSL for the issuance of decisions in matters like the 

Expungement Appeal. As it is also undisputed that the BHA issued the BHA Order 
5

outside of the 45-day period specified in Section 6341(c.3) of the CPSL,7the sole 

issue for this Court’s review is therefore whether the delay in the issuance of the 

BHA Order violated Petitioner’s due process rights.

Our Supreme Court has explained that “the amount of process that is 

due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the threepart balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 [] (1976).” 

Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 897 (Pa. 2020). 

This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private 

interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk 

of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of 

additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state 

interest involved, including the administrative burden the 

additional or substitute procedural requirements would 

impose on the state. 

Id.

Regarding the first prong of the Mathews test – the private interest 

affected by the government action – this Court has held that placement of an 

individual on the ChildLine Registry implicates the private interest of an individual’s 

right to reputation, which Pennsylvania’s constitution expressly protects as an 

inherent and indefeasible right. See S.F., 298 A.3d at 509; see also Pa. Const. art. I, 

§ 1.

8

 Our Supreme Court has concluded, however, that because “only a limited 

7 The final day of the Expungement Appeal hearing occurred on June 24, 2022. Because 

the BHA did not enter an order on the record extending the decision date, the Section 6341(c.3) 

prompt decision deadline would have elapsed 45 days later, or on August 8, 2022. 

8 Regarding the inherent rights of mankind, article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution states: “All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and 

indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, 
6

number of people in a limited set of situations have access to the confidential 

statewide [ChildLine] Registry[,]” persons placed on the ChildLine Registry are not 

“stigmatized in the eyes of the general public, and the adverse effects on [] reputation 

[are] very limited.” G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 91 A.3d 667, 672-73 (Pa. 2014)

(citing and discussing R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa. 1994)).

Indeed, for the most part, access to ChildLine Registry information is limited to 

discrete situations involving adoptive or foster parents, where an individual’s 

employment brings them in contact with children, or with persons licensed to 

provide child daycare in their residence, and the unauthorized release of such 

information carries possible criminal penalties. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6344, 6344.1, 

6344.2 & 6349. The evidence of record does not indicate that Petitioner is involved 

in any of the discrete scenarios whereby his ChildLine Registry status would be 

disclosed. Even if it did, such disclosure would be limited. See G.V.; 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 

6344, 6344.1, 6344.2 & 6349. Thus, the claimed reputational damages Petitioner 

claims would result from his placement on the ChildLine Registry does not weigh 

heavily in his favor under the first prong of the Mathews test.

The second prong of the Mathews test concerns the risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of process together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards. 

Again, Petitioner bases his procedural due process argument herein exclusively on 

the BHA’s failure to comply with the 45-day prompt decision deadline of Section 

6341(c.3). However, “[t]his [C]ourt has consistently held that provisions which 

impose time limitations on procedures before adjudicative tribunals are directory, 

rather than mandatory, even when phrased in mandatory language[.]” Winston v. 

possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” Pa. 

Const. art. I, § 1.
7

Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 675 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (listing cases). Where 

an administrative agency fails to act within a specified time period, the Court reviews 

a number of other factors to determine whether the failure to comply with the time 

period merits relief, including the prejudice suffered by the parties, the penalties 

specified for failure to comply with the specified time period, and the intent of the 

law to which the time period applies. See J.L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 575 A.2d 

643, 646-47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). 

In J.L., a petitioner challenged the timeliness of a hearing officer’s 

adjudication9 and the BHA’s order denying his request to expunge a report of 

indicated child abuse. See J.L., 575 A.2d at 645. The Court rejected the petitioner’s

contention that a nearly eight-month lapse between the date on which the hearing 

record was closed and the date on which the hearing officer filed his 

recommendation denied the petitioner’s right to a speedy decision. See id. The 

Court discerned no prejudice to the petitioner where the report of indicated child 

abuse was subsequently found to be substantiated by a final order of the BHA within 

three days of the filing of the recommendation. See id. at 646. Even more significant 

than the lack of prejudice to the petitioner, the Court noted the fact that no penalty 

attached as a result of a failure to comply with the specified time limitation at issue 

– meaning, for example, there were no provisions which required an appeal to be 

9

J.L. concerned a time limitation contained in Section 275.4(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania 

Code, which provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Final administrative action must be taken in hearings within the 

following time limits: . . . 90 days from the date of an appeal from 

an agency decision affecting cash assistance, medical assistance, or 

social service.

55 Pa. Code § 275.4(b)(1).
8

deemed granted on the basis of noncompliance. See id. at 646 & n.8. The Court 

explained that “[t]he absence of a penalty in the event of noncompliance certainly 

suggests that the time periods incorporated by reference in [the regulation in 

question] were, more likely than not, intended to be directory, as opposed to 

mandatory, in nature, despite the use of the word “must” in [the regulation.]” J.L., 

575 A.2d at 646-47. Ultimately, in consideration of the absence of prejudice to the 

petitioner and the absence of a penalty for noncompliance, the Court declined to 

strictly enforce the time limitation for the filing of the decision so as to render the 

merits of the decision ineffective. See id. at 647. The Court further noted that, to 

allow the vacation of a decision denying an expungement request on the merits on 

such a procedural argument “would visit an injustice upon the very party the [l]aw 

intended to protect.” Id. (noting that “[t]o sacrifice the safeguard afforded to [the 

p]etitioner’s daughter in the form of a filed, substantiated report of indicated child 

abuse solely on the basis of a procedural error committed by [BHA] would, for all 

practical intents and purposes, serve only to penalize the child”).

This Court relied on J.L. in denying a similar time limitation argument 

in Winston, a case in which an appeal hearing had occurred outside a 90-day time 

limitation specified in the Department of Public Welfare’s manual.10 See Winston, 

675 A.2d 374-77. As in J.L., the petitioner in Winston suffered no prejudice from 

the delay, and the authority containing the time limitation contained no provision 

requiring the granting of an appeal based on noncompliance, i.e., no penalty for 

noncompliance. See id. at 376-77. Therefore, the Court found the time limitation in 

10 Section 9003.11(F) of the Department of Public Welfare Manual, 7 Pa.B. 3268 (1977), 

provided that “[i]n no case shall the hearing be scheduled more than 90 days after the appeal has 

been taken.”
9

question to be directory, as opposed to mandatory. See id. As it had in J.L., the 

Court determined that a dismissal based on procedural grounds would

circumvent the primary objective of the regulations, 

namely, to provide standards to aid in protecting the 

health, safety and rights of children and to reduce risks to 

children in group child day care homes. Thus, to sacrifice 

the safeguards provided by these regulations solely on the 

basis of [the Department of Public Welfare’s] procedural 

error would serve only to penalize the children.

Id. at 377 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court followed 

J.L. and declined to strictly enforce the time period in question. See id. at 377.

The instant matter involves an ostensibly mandatory 45-day time 

period during which the ALJ/BHA was to have entered, filed, and served the 

Adjudication/BHA Order upon the parties. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.3). It is 

undisputed that the BHA Order was entered outside the time period specified in 

Section 6341(c.3) of the CPSL. However, because the report of indicated child 

abuse was subsequently found to be substantiated by the Adjudication and the BHA 

Order, Petitioner suffered no prejudice from the delay. Further, the CPSL contains 

no penalty for noncompliance with the time limitation, i.e. no provision for the grant 

of an appeal based on noncompliance. Thus, as in J.L., the 45-day time period for 

the entry of an order following the conclusion of the hearing on the Expungement 

Appeal is directory, as opposed to mandatory, despite the use of the word “shall” in 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.3). See J.L., 575 A.2d at 646-47. Accordingly, the second 

Mathews factor weighs against vacating the BHA Order based on any risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of process.
10

Regarding the third Mathews factor, the state interest involved, we 

observe that the CPSL’s express purpose is the protection of children from abuse.

11

 

As in previous cases addressing this issue, we observe that dismissal of the instant

matter on procedural grounds would circumvent the CPSL’s purpose and penalize 

only child victims or potential victims of abuse. See J.L., 575 A.2d at 647; see also 

Winston, 675 A.2d at 377. Thus, the third Mathews factor also weighs in favor of a 

finding that Petitioner received adequate process.

On balance, the Mathews factors discussed above weigh in favor of a 

conclusion that Petitioner received adequate procedural due process in the instant 

matter. Thus, for the above reasons, we find that BHA’s noncompliance with the

45-day time period contained in 23 Pa.C.S. § 634(c.3) did not violate Petitioner’s

11 Section 6302 of the CPSL outlines the CPSL’s purpose as follows:

(b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this chapter to encourage more 

complete reporting of suspected child abuse; to the extent permitted 

by this chapter, to involve law enforcement agencies in responding 

to child abuse; and to establish in each county protective services 

for the purpose of investigating the reports swiftly and competently, 

providing protection for children from further abuse and providing 

rehabilitative services for children and parents involved so as to 

ensure the child’s well-being and to preserve, stabilize and protect 

the integrity of family life wherever appropriate or to provide 

another alternative permanent family when the unity of the family 

cannot be maintained. It is also the purpose of this chapter to ensure 

that each county children and youth agency establish a program of 

protective services with procedures to assess risk of harm to a child 

and with the capabilities to respond adequately to meet the needs of 

the family and child who may be at risk and to prioritize the response 

and services to children most at risk.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b).
11

right to procedural due process and, accordingly, we affirm the BHA Order.

___________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

J.F., :

Petitioner :

: 

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, : No. 728 C.D. 2023

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st

 day of October, 2024, the June 14, 2023 order of the 

Department of Human Services’ Bureau of Hearings and Appeals is AFFIRMED.

 

___________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge