IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-09-00204-CR

GLORIA FLORES ROBLES,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 08-00730-CRF-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Gloria Flores Robles of possession of marihuana and the trial 

court sentenced her to five years in prison. She challenges: (1) the legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) the denial of her motion to suppress. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sergeant Shane Bush stopped a pick-up truck after the driver turned without 

properly signaling. The driver and passenger exited the truck. Bush testified that 

individuals normally remain in the vehicle, so these actions suggested an attempt by the 
Robles v. State Page 2

occupants to distance themselves from the vehicle or flee. Bush ordered the occupants

to sit inside the truck. The passenger complied, but the driver turned, spoke to the 

passenger, and began “messing with something in his waistband and at the front seat.” 

The driver suddenly fled. Officers later apprehended the driver, Evaristo Rodriguez.

As he approached the open passenger door of the truck, Bush smelled the 

“overwhelming” odor of raw marihuana. He found four grocery bags behind the 

driver’s seat. The bags held two one-pound and eleven quarter-pound individually 

packaged Ziploc bags of marihuana. The odor suggested that the marihuana was fresh. 

The passenger, Robles, told Bush that “Jose” was driving her to the store. She 

did not know Jose’s last name, but he was a friend whom she did not know well. 

Robles denied owning a purse that Bush found in the truck. When a Spanish-speaking 

officer arrived, Robles admitted ownership of the purse. The purse contained bags, but 

no marihuana. Robles denied any knowledge of the marihuana. Bush testified that the 

marihuana could be seen through the sides and tops of the grocery bags, but could not 

be reached from the passenger side of the truck. No drugs, contraband, or illegal items 

were found on Robles’s person.

Bush concluded that Robles was attempting to distance herself from Rodriguez 

and the truck, something individuals typically do when traffic stops involve a large 

amount of marihuana. Bush explained that the lack of marihuana or smoking 

instruments on Robles’s person indicates that she is not a user. He testified that users 

do not typically have five pounds of marihuana in their possession.
Robles v. State Page 3

Bush testified that dealers obtain marihuana by the pound. He explained that 

the thirteen packages found in the truck indicated that Robles and Rodriguez probably 

began with a five-pound load comprised of twelve quarter-pound packages and two 

one-pound packages, a quarter-pound of which had already been sold. He explained 

that dealers often buy five, ten, or fifteen pounds and then sell quarter-pounds, 

sometimes a pound, to other dealers. Based on his training and experience, Bush 

concluded that Robles and Rodriguez were mid-level dealers who had received a fivepound shipment, were trafficking marihuana, and were delivering to low level dealers.

Analyst Joel Budge testified that the marihuana weighed 4.62 pounds.

Lieutenant Carey White testified that “Jose Rodriguez” is an alias that Rodriguez 

uses. According to White, Robles had visited Rodriguez in jail on several occasions 

before her arrest in this case. Additionally, Robles’s own jail records list “Jose 

Rodriguez” as a visitor and her boyfriend.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

In point one, Robles contends that, under Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 

Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997), the evidence is legally insufficient to support her 

conviction because the underlying data of Sergeant Bush’s opinions is unreliable. In 

point two, Robles contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support her 

conviction because, absent Bush’s testimony, the remaining evidence is against the great 

weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Robles v. State Page 4

Applicable Law

A defendant commits unlawful possession of a controlled substance where he: 

(1) exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) knew the matter 

possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005). When the defendant is not in exclusive possession or control of the place where 

contraband is found, the State must affirmatively link the defendant with the 

contraband. See id. at 406.

Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must 

establish that the defendant’s connection with the drug was more than 

fortuitous. This is the so-called “affirmative links” rule which protects the 

innocent bystander--a relative, friend, or even stranger to the actual 

possessor--from conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity to 

someone else’s drugs. Mere presence at the location where drugs are 

found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or 

control of those drugs. However, presence or proximity, when combined 

with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g., “links”), may well 

be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, as 

the court of appeals correctly noted, not the number of links that is 

dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and 

circumstantial.

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Evans v. State, 185 

S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005)) (footnotes omitted). The Court of 

Criminal Appeals has cautioned against use of the term “affirmative links” as 

suggesting “an independent test of legal sufficiency” and chosen instead to use only the 

term “‘link’ so that it is clear that evidence of drug possession is judged by the same 

standard as all other evidence.” Id. at 162 n.9.

“[S]ome factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession’” include:
Robles v. State Page 5

(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the 

contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the 

accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the 

influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed 

other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant 

made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant 

attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) 

whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband 

or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or 

had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) 

whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether 

the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether 

the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Id. at 162 n.12 (quoting Evans, 185 S.W.3d at 36). “They are not a litmus test.” Id.

Analysis

Robles contends that Bush failed to provide evidence supporting his opinions 

that she was trafficking marihuana, dealers obtain marihuana by the pound, she and 

Rodriguez had received a five-pound load and sold a quarter-pound, and she and 

Rodriguez are mid-level dealers who probably received a five-pound shipment and 

were selling to other dealers. She further points to factors that do not link her to the 

marihuana: (1) no forensic evidence was presented; (2) she was not driving the truck; (3) 

the marihuana was found behind the driver’s seat; (4) the driver fled, but she followed 

Bush’s commands; (5) no cash, packaging materials, weapons, or drug paraphernalia 

were found; and (6) no evidence links her to the truck. Robles argues that, absent 

Bush’s testimony, the record contains no evidence linking her to the marihuana.

Assuming, without deciding, that Bush’s opinions are unreliable and insufficient, 

the record contains other links connecting Robles to the marihuana. First, Robles was 

present when the truck, being driven by her boyfriend, was stopped and searched. See
Robles v. State Page 6

Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162, n.12. Second, the marihuana was found in opaque grocery 

bags, but could be seen. See Grant v. State, 989 S.W.2d 428, 434-35 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Third, Bush testified that he smelled the odor of raw 

marihuana emanating from the open passenger door of the truck. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d 

at 162, n.12; see also McGee v. State, No. 07-08-00211-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1492, at 

*6-9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 6, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 

Fourth, Robles was riding in the truck, an enclosed space, with the marihuana. See

Cabrales v. State, 932 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1996, no pet.); see 

also McGee, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1492, at *6-9. Fifth, the truck held a large quantity of 

marihuana. See Cabrales, 932 S.W.2d at 657. Finally, Robles denied knowledge of 

Rodriguez’s last name, denied ownership of her purse, and claimed that she barely 

knew Rodriguez.1 See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162, n.12; see also McGee, 2009 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 1492, at *6-9. The absence of links directly connecting Robles to the marihuana is 

not evidence of innocence. See James v. State, 264 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d).

Even without Bush’s testimony labeling Robles as a dealer trafficking marihuana, 

the jury had evidence before it by which to determine Robles’s guilt. See Gant v. State, 

116 S.W.3d 124, 132-33 Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. ref’d); see also Lewis v. State, No. 10-

 

1 Robles contends that the “logical force of this evidence” is mitigated by the fact that Bush spoke 

little Spanish, another Spanish-speaking officer was brought to the scene, and Robles had a translator at 

trial. She further contends that no evidence was introduced at trial to show that the purse actually 

belonged to her. As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury bore the burden 

of deciding what to believe. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Wyatt 

v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In doing so, it could reasonably conclude that Robles 

made false statements, indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
Robles v. State Page 7

04-00225-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4260, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Waco June 1, 2005, no pet.) 

(not designated for publication); Irons v. State, No. 06-06-00192-CR, 2007 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 3538, at *7-10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 10, 2007, pet. ref’d) (not designated for 

publication). The jury bore the burden of evaluating the weight of the evidence. See 

Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could 

reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Robles committed the offense of 

possession of a controlled substance. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2000); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 

2d 560 (1979). The proof of guilt is not so weak nor the conflicting evidence so strong as 

to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Watson v. State, 204 

S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2000). Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict, we overrule points one and two. 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In point three, Robles challenges the denial of her motion to suppress.

Standard of Review

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to the denial of a motion to suppress. 

See Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet ref’d). First, we review 

the denial for abuse of discretion. See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999). Second, we conduct a de novo review of the law as applied to the facts. See Haas, 

172 S.W.3d at 49; see also Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); 
Robles v. State Page 8

Oles, 993 S.W.2d at 106. The court’s findings receive “almost total deference” and 

absent specific findings, we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the 

ruling. Haas, 172 S.W.3d at 49; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-328. The ruling will be 

affirmed if “reasonably supported by the record” and correct on any applicable legal 

theory. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Cisneros v. State, 165 

S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

Analysis

At the suppression hearing, Bush testified that, when the outside lane of traffic 

suddenly stopped, he looked ahead and saw a green pick-up truck activate its right turn 

signal about twenty feet before the intersection. He testified that this constitutes a 

traffic violation because a driver must activate a turn signal one-hundred feet before 

turning. Bush explained that he was in the left lane two to three cars behind the truck:

The truck was ahead of two other vehicles in the outside lane. I was in the 

inside lane. I could see the back of truck. I could see the other cars. I saw 

the car stopping. I changed lanes.

When I changed lanes to the outside lane, I could look around, and at that 

time saw the right turn signal was activated. That was within about 20 

feet of the intersection.

He explained that he has a different vantage point than the in-dash camera because the 

camera is facing straight ahead, but he was able to move and see the signal. He drove 

approximately twenty to forty feet before reaching the intersection himself.

Bush testified that when the pick-up was “within easily 100 feet of the 

intersection,” no signal had been activated. According to Bush, the vehicles behind the 

truck began “dipping down” as they applied their breaks, indicating that the drivers are 
Robles v. State Page 9

“stepping on it harder than usual” or “more suddenly than they would if they were 

stopping just regularly.” Bush opined that “the car that caused that reaction has either 

stopped suddenly or is making a turn unbeknownst to the other drivers around him.”

When asked if he could identify the truck on the videotape, Bush responded, “I 

believe it’s the one that is two ahead on the outside lane.” Defense counsel asked, 

“Would it be this one right here?” Bush responded, “I think so, yes, sir.” When asked 

to point to the truck, Bush responded, “I think it is this one right here.”

Citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) and Paulea v. State, 278 

S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d), Robles contends that 

Bush failed to provide specific, articulable facts supporting his conclusion that a traffic 

violation was committed.

2

In Ford, Trooper Andrew Peavy stopped Ford for following another car too 

closely and arrested Ford after findings drugs in the vehicle. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 

490-91. At a suppression hearing, Peavy testified that he saw Ford “following a white 

car, following too close.” Id. at 491. The Court of Criminal Appeals found this 

testimony insufficient to support reasonable suspicion:

The evidence before the trial court indicated only that in Peavy’s 

judgment, Ford was following another car too closely in violation of 

Transportation Code § 545.062(a). The State failed to elicit any testimony 

pertinent to what facts would allow Peavy to objectively determine Ford 

was violating a traffic law in support of his judgment. 

Id. at 494.

 

2

In her motion to suppress, Robles challenged the search of the vehicle. At the suppression 

hearing, without objection, she challenged the actual traffic stop.
Robles v. State Page 10

In Paulea, an officer arrested Paulea for outstanding warrants after observing 

Paulea’s unattended vehicle parked in a traffic lane. See Paulea, 278 S.W.3d at 862-63. A 

subsequent inventory of Paulea’s vehicle yielded evidence of controlled substances. Id.

at 863. At a suppression hearing, the officer testified that Paulea’s “unattended vehicle 

stopped in a moving traffic lane of a two-way, two-lane roadway.” Id. at 865. The 

Fourteenth Court held that this “meager testimony provided no evidence that any 

normal or reasonable movement of traffic, if any, was obstructed or otherwise 

impeded” in violation of section 545.363 of the Transportation Code. Id. Nor did the 

evidence support a violation of section 42.03 of the Penal Code, “especially in light of 

the officer’s uncontroverted testimony that he could ‘easily’ pass appellant’s car.” Id.

The “sparse evidence” failed to “provide the requisite factual support to give an officer 

probable cause to arrest” Paulea. Id. at 866.

This case involves section 545.104 of the Transportation Code, a different type of 

violation than the offenses addressed in Ford and Paulea. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 

545.104(a)-(b) (Vernon 1999) (Failure to signal within one-hundred feet of turning).

In Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), Castro was a passenger 

in a vehicle that was stopped for failure to signal a lane change, in violation of section 

545.104. See Castro, 227 S.W.3d at 739. Officers found a bag of narcotics and arrested 

Castro. Id. Deputy Bailey, who had been investigating Castro’s association with a drug 

lab, was called to the scene. Id. At a suppression hearing, Bailey testified that the 

vehicle was stopped for “failure to signal a lane change.” Id. Bailey did not witness the 
Robles v. State Page 11

driver’s actions. See id. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but the appellate 

court reversed. Id. at 740.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appellate court misapplied Ford:

The statute at issue in Ford, Transportation Code Section 545.062(a), lists 

factors to consider to determine whether a car is following too closely, 

including the speed of the vehicles, traffic, the conditions of the highway, 

and whether the driver could safely stop. Therefore, the statute makes the 

assessment of that violation a subjective determination. That is not the 

case here. Either a driver signals when changing lanes or he does not. 

Probable cause can be established by objective facts or subjective opinions. 

In the case of subjective opinions, we follow our holding in Ford, that the 

officer must give specific, articulable observations to support his opinion.

We acknowledge the difference between a conclusory statement and 

specific, articulable facts. However, in cases involving offenses such as 

failure to signal a lane change, a court can determine whether an officer’s 

determination that a driver committed a traffic violation was objectively 

reasonable without being presented with a detailed account of the officer’s 

observations. We agree with Ford that opinions are not an effective 

substitute for specific, articulable facts in a reasonable-suspicion analysis 

when the nature of the offense requires an officer to make a subjective 

determination. Following too closely, speeding, and being intoxicated, 

can be examples of such subjective determinations. Failure to signal a 

lane change is not. 

Id. at 742 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). “It was within the trial court’s 

discretion to believe or disbelieve the testimony and use it as a basis for the ruling on 

the motion to suppress.” Id. at 743. “[I]n the case of offenses requiring only an objective

determination of whether the offense was indeed committed, the court does not need to 

know the subjective details of the stop from the officer’s standpoint in order to find that 

the stop was reasonable.” Id.

In light of Castro, failure to signal more than one-hundred feet before turning is 

an objective, not a subjective, determination. See Castro, 227 S.W.3d at 743. It was 
Robles v. State Page 12

unnecessary for Bush to provide a detailed account of his observations. Either a driver 

signals more than one-hundred feet before turning or does not. Id. The trial court 

evidently believed Bush’s testimony that the driver of the truck signaled less than onehundred feet before turning, in violation of the law. Because “[i]t was within the trial 

court’s discretion to believe or disbelieve the testimony and use it as a basis for the 

ruling on the motion to suppress,” we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the motion to suppress. Id. We overrule point three.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FELIPE REYNA

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Reyna, and

Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 4, 2010

Do not publish

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