#### IN RE: Dustin Roger CHANTEL; Elizabeth Darlene Chantel, Debtors. Dustin Roger Chantel; Elizabeth Darlene Chantel, Appellants, v. William E. Pierce, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee.

No. 15-60054

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 18, 2017

Dustin Roger Chantel, Pro Se

Elizabeth Darlene Chantel, Pro Se

Terry A. Dake, Terry A. Dake, Ltd, Phoenix, AZ, for Appellee

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Chapter 7 debtors Dustin Roger Chantel and Elizabeth Darlene Chantel appeal pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order, following a two-day trial, determining that assets held in a trust belonged to the bankruptcy estate *724and denying the debtors a discharge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. *Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod),*611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly concluded that assets held in the trust were property of the bankruptcy estate because the trust’s assets were in the possession, custody or control of the debtors and the trust was used as the debtors’ “personal asset repository.” *See*11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Turner v. Cook,*362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (all legal or equitable interests of a debtor in property become property of the bankruptcy estate upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case).

The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining that the debtors knowingly and fraudulently made material false oaths when they failed to disclose in their bankruptcy schedules their interest in property purportedly held by the trust. *See Retz v. Samson (In re Retz),*606 F.3d 1189, 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (bankruptcy court’s factual findings reviewed for clear error, giving great deference to a bankruptcy court’s determinations about the credibility of witnesses). Thus the bankruptcy court properly denied the debtors’ discharge under ' 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). *See id.*at 1196-99 (requirements for denying a debtor a discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A)).

The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in finding that the debtors also concealed and transferred property of the estate with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, and hence properly denied the debtors’ discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), (B). *See id.*at 1200 (requirements for denying a debtor a discharge under § 727(a)(2)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We l’eject as unsupported by the record the debtors’ contention that the bankruptcy court demonstrated bias.

The debtors’ “motion to grant default judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55” (Docket Entry No. 20) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.