### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 87 -C R

______________________________ TREOL A HAWKI

NS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 202nd Judi cial District Court

Bow ie County , Texas Trial Court No. 07F 0146-202

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte rWe most recently addre ssed this issue in Au sti n v . S tat e , N o . 0 6

- 0 7
- 0 0 1 6 1

- CR , 2 0 0 8 T e x. 1 App. L EXI S 8630 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 18, 2008, no pet. h.) ( mem. op., not desig nated f or publication). 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Tr e ola Ha wk ins a pp e a ls f ro m he r c on vic tio n b y

a jur y fo r m ur de r. S he wa s se nte nc e d to thi rt y y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t sh e c a me ho me dr un k a nd be g an f ig hti ngwi th her long -ti m e companion. During the cour se of the f ight, she hit him wit h a hammer , then with a candle stick, and ultimately cut his arm with a box cutter. The c ut was dee p enoug h to sever a major arte ry , and he ble d to death. Hawkins c ontends that the court abused its di scre tion by order ing that she be shac kled during voir dire and during the t rial, wit hout adequate ca use. She also ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed by allowing a police of

fice r to testify

that the wounds to the v i ct i m's a rms appea

red to be defe nsive wounds. We aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. I. Shackl ing We first addre ss the shackling of the de fenda nt. We addresse d this constitut ional protec tion in detail in Zio lk

ows k i v . S tat e , 2 2 3 S
. W
. 3 d

6 4 0 ( T e x . A p p . — T e x ar k an a 2 0 0 7 , p e t
. r e f

' d )
. In 1 Ziolkowski , decide d April 3, 2007, we r eiterated the g uiding pr ece pts and rules g overningthe shackling of pri s o n er s wh en they are broug ht to court and found e rror , but concluded that it was harmless.3

The unde rly ing ba sis for the proc edura l requirements is the rec og nition that, when a de fe nd ant i s v ie we d by th e ju ry in h and c uf

fs or sh a c kle s, his or

he r p re su mpt ion

of inn oc e nc e is seriously infring ed. Lon g v . S

tat e , 823 S.W .2d 259, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only i n ra re circ umstances is shac kling c alled for , and in such event, the record must detail the g rounds for suc h action. Id .; Ma rq ue

z v . S tat e , 725 S.W. 2d

21 7, 22 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ); Ziolkowski , 223 S.W .3d
a t 642. Th e tr ia l court mus t set fo rt h with sp e c if

ic ity the re a so ns su

pp or tin g its de c isi on

to r e str a in the def endant. Coo k

s v . S tat e , 844 S.W .2d 697, 722 (Tex
. C ri m . Ap p . 1992) (c iting Long , 823 S
. W
. 2 d a t2 8 2; Marquez , 7 25 S.W. 2d a t 22 8) . O n a

pp e a l, t he ro le of

an a pp e llate c ourt

is t o deter mine whether

the trial court abused its discre tion in authoriz ing the restra int. Long , 823 S.W .2d at 282. The re cord shows that Hawkins is a for ty -one- y ear -old, five-f

oot-one-inc h fema le, with no prior fe lony

convictions who sough t t o b e place d on community supervision. Def

ense c ounsel objected at leng th, arguing that a leg brac e that the court order ed used, evidently regularly , was too larg e bec ause of her small statur e. Counsel pointed out that H awkins had no prior convic tions, had been in c ustody

for ne arly a y ear at the ti me of trial, and ha d exhibi ted no behavior during that entire time that could justify

the use of sha ckles. The trial c ourt stated that it was a war e of the brac e situation and insisted that pants could be used so that the shac kles would not be visible (but that, as a ta ctical matter , counsel ha d provided her w ith a dress for

the trial—thus improperly attempting to shift responsibility for any viewing of4

the unjustified restra ints to defense c ounsel). The court then opined t hat, because of the nature of the cha rg e, it i s a se ri ou s e no ugh of an i ssu e that c ourt ro om s e c ur ity

mus t a lw ay s b e ke pt i n mind, and that when I

weig h the nee d for c ourtroom sec urity as wel l as t he steps take n to e ns ur e tha

t th e jur y won't se e it, the Court

is s a tis fi e d th a t he r d

ue pr oc e ss rig hts are be ing pr otected a nd would encour ag e Ms. Haw kin s , o f cour se, to take ever y step that she can to see to it that they don' t see it by

keepingher le g s under the table. The trial c ourt did not make the finding s require d in or der to justi fy using sha ckles, a

nd there is no evidence that could support such a ruling . A mere statement that the off ense is violent is not sufficie nt. Long , 823 S.W .2d at 283. The trial court abused its discretion by shackling the defendant. This error is a constitutional one as it per

tains to the defe ndant' s presumption of innocenc e. Henc e, we must rever se unless we deter mine bey ond a re asonable doubt that the error did not contribute to her conviction. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(a). We rec og nize that a defe ndant' s rig ht not to be shackled a lso encompasse s: (1) the courtr oom's f

ormal dig nity ; (2) the r espec tful treatment of a def endant; (3) embar

rassment a

nd dis tr a c tio n to the de fe nd ant; (4 ) t he ph y sic a l bu

rd e n a nd pa in o f r e str a int s; a

nd (5 ) i nte rf e re nc e wi th
a d e f e n d an t' s th o u g h t p roce ss. Deck v . M iss ou ri , 544 U.S. 622, 626–27 (2005) (a lso stating that
ro uti ne sh a c kli ng is sp e c if ic a lly pr oh ibi te d) ; United States v. Durham , 2 87 F .3 d 1 29 7, 13 04 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 2) ; Br own v . S

tat e , 877 S.W .2d 869, 871 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no pet.).5

I n revie wing the i mplications of these issues in a harm a naly sis, the court has sug g ested that harm to a de fenda

nt who is restraine d during trial ca n be shown be cause : (1 ) of prejudice f elt by jurors who c onclude that, beca use a defe ndant i s shackle d, the court has already decide d that he or she is g uilty , dang erous, a nd untrustworthy ; (2) a r estraint may interfe re w ith the def

endant' s mental fac ulties and ability

to communicate with counse l dur ing tr ial; and (3) r estraints ar e an a ffr ont to a court and its procee dings. Cox v . S tat e , 931 S.W .2d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1996), pe t. dism'd, i mprovidently granted , 951 S.W .2d 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When perfor

ming a harm an al y s i s, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has he ld that the following fac tors are to be conside red: 1) the source of the e rror ; 2) the nature of the e rror ; 3) whe ther the err or was emphasized and its proba ble collater al implications; 4) the we ight a juror
wo u l d p ro b ab l y p l ac e o n t h e e rr o r; an d

5 ) w h et h er

d ec l ar i n g t h e e rr o r h ar m l e s s w o u l d en co u ra ge the S tate to repe at i t with impunity
. Or on a v . S tat e , 791 S.W .2d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). No sing le fa ctor is dispositive. I nstead, the exis tence and sever ity of these f actor s are indicative of th e h ar m c a u s e d b y th e im p r o p e r c onduct. W

il so n v . S tat e , 938 S.W .2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I n this case, only the first, sec on d , and fifth factors of the har m analy sis construct ar e imp lic a te d. Th e so ur c e of the e rr or wa s th e c ourt

its e lf . We have pr e vio us ly

state d, and

re ite rate here , that this a l o n e i s o f s u bstantial importance. See Ex parte W erne , 118 S.W .3d 833, 837–38We a g a in p oin t out to the tr ia l be nc h th a t th is i s a ri sk y pr a c tic e . I f t

he re is e vid e nc e that a 2 jury saw the r estraints, it very well might cause the jurors to conc lude the def endant wa s dang erous and g uilty , which in all l i k el ihood would require a re versa l of the convic tion, unless the situation invo l v ed the " rar e" case wher e a ne cessity for r estraint existed and the trial cour t specified suc h rea sons in the rec ord. 6 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; se e als o D av is v . S tat e , 1 9 5 S.W.3d 311 , 3 1 9 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2006, no pet.). The r e is n o d o u

b t th a t th e n a tu

r e o f th e e r

r o r is c o n s ti tuti o n a l—

th is e r r o r in volves the bedroc k of our jurisprude nce—the conce pt of due proc ess provides t h at no action shall be taken which will have the eff

ect of infring ing on the basic notion that a de fenda nt is pres u m ed t o be innocent until proven guilty bey ond a re asonable doubt. However , t h e re co rd does not show that jurors saw Hawkins in the legbrac e, and thus no
e vid e nc e wo uld

le a d th e jur

y to i nf e r t hat th e sh a c kle s we re a c omm e nt b y the tr ia l c ourt

on he r guil t, dang er, or untrustworthiness. Nor is the re any evidenc e or argument Hawkins was hamper ed in her ability to communicate with her

trial attorney
. There is no concr ete indication that the legbrac e wa s actua lly visible before the j ury . Thus, there is no indication of an off ense to the dig nity

and dec orum of the c ourtroom proce eding s. As a re sult, absent any evidenc e the jury

actua lly saw the le g brac e,
we c on c lud e , b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, t

hat H awk ins did

no t su ff e r h arm . 2 The fina l fac tor is whether we shoul d reverse this ca se to assure this error w ill not be repe ated. Our

judicial sy stem rests on our t rial courts' tim ely and correc t application of the law; not
mere ly the corr ection of err ors by superior courts. Since this is not the first time this i ssue has be en7

ra ise d f ro m th e same tr ia l c ourt , w e ha d c on c e rn tha t th is p ra c tic e ha d b e c ome a ro uti ne in t

hat c ourt
. I t is no w re pr e se nte d to us tha t th e pr oc e dure s in that c ourt

have be e n f

or ma lly c ha ng e d in or de r t o
c omp ly wi th t he con stitut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts on thi s is su e . With th a t a ssu ra nc e , w e fi nd

it i s
unnece ssary

to reve rse this ca se on the ba sis that an af firmanc e would lea d to a re petition of the
err or. We find the er

ror in this instance to be ha rmless. We overrule the contention of e rror . II. Im proper Expert Te stim ony Ha wk ins ne xt co nte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by a llo wi ng po lic e of fi c e r Ma rk Sill iva n to testif y ov e r o bje c tio n th a t w ound s o n th e arm s o f t he vic timwe re c on sis te nt w ithhim ra isi nghis
arms in a d e f

e n s iv e ma

n n e r . Si ll iv an h a d b e e n qu a li f ie d a s an e xp e rt in th e ar e a of cr ime scene investigation. On the night of the m urder , Sill ivan obs erve d and made photogr aphs of the w ounds found on the victim' s body
. On appe al, Haw kins arg ues that the testimony was specu l ative and outside the scope of Sill ivan' s exper tise pursuant to Rule 702 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. See T EX . R. E V ID . 702. We rev i ew a trial court' s decision to admit or exclude evidenc e for abuse of discretion. Alvarado

v . S tat e , 912 S.W. 2d 19 9, 21 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Da rli ng v . S tat e , No. 06-06-00150- CR, 2008 WL 3367553, at *3 (Te x . App.—Texarkana Aug . 13, 2008, pet. filed). I n this case , Sill ivan was proper ly qualified as a forensic and fing erpr int expert in reviewing
c ri me s c e n e s . A l t h o u g h t h e S t a t e s u g g e s t s t h a th i s qu a l i f i c a t i o n s ar e s u f

f i c i e n tt o j u s t i f

y h is8

testimony reg ardingthe phy sical aspe cts of injuries sustained dur ing th e course of a crime, our revie w of his qualifications does not revea l special c rede ntials to speak as an ex pert a bout wound patterns. B ut in proper instanc es, lay witnesses may

express opinion testim ony . T EX . R. E V ID . 701. L ay witnesses may

testify to their opinions or infere nce s wh i ch ar e (a ) rationally based on the per ception of the witness and (b) helpful to a c lear understandingof t he witness' testi mony or the deter mination of a fa ct in issue. Id
. A d ist inc t li ne c ann ot b e dr awn be tw een lay

op ini on and e xpe rt te sti mony

be c a us e a ll perc eptions are evaluated base d on experience s. Howeve r, as a g ener al rule, obse rvations which do not require signific ant expertise to interpre t and which a re not ba sed on a sc ienti fi c theor y can be
a dmi tte d a s la

y op ini on s if

the re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 70 1 are me t. Th is is tr ue e ve n w he n th e wi tne ss ha s e xpe ri e nc e or

tr a ini ng . A dd iti on a lly , e ve n e ve nts no t no rm a lly e nc ounte re d b y mos t pe op le in
ever y day life do not nec essari l y

require the testimony

of an e x pert. The persona l experience and kn ow le dg e of a lay wi tne ss may e sta bli sh that he or sh e is c a

pa ble , w ith ou t qu a lif

ic a tio n a s an e xpe rt , o f e xp r e s s in g ano p in io no na s u b je c t o u ts id e th e r e a lm

o f c o mm o nk

n o w le d g e. United States v. Paiva , 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989). I t is only when the fac t-finder may not fully understand the e vid e nc e or

be a ble to d e te rm ine the fact in i ssu e wi tho ut t he a ssi sta nc e of so me on e wi th specia liz ed knowledg e that a w itness must be qualified as a n expert. Os bo ur

n v . S tat e , 92 S.W .3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).9

He re , th e e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e d th a t Sill iva

n wa s a tr a ine d inve sti g a tor

of c ri me sc e ne s. Hi s t ra i n i n g i n cl u d edl at en tfi n ger p ri n tex am i n at i o n , fo re n s i c as p ec t s o f d ea t h i n v es t i gat i o n , s k et ch i n g, and the ha ndling of evidenc e. He further

testified that he has observed ot her instances of de fensive
wo un ds duri nghis c are e r. Hi s te sti mony was th at th e wo un ds on the vic timwe re c on sis te nt w ith other de fensive w ounds he had obse rved. We find t h i s observation did not require sig nificant expertise to interpret, did not re ly on a scie ntific theory , and wa s admissible under Rule 701 as lay opinion testim ony

even thoug h Sill ivan had some te chnica l training
. Se e id . Courts have a dmitted
a var iety of o p i n ion evidence from pea ce of fice rs and lay

persons whe n the evidenc e mee ts the require ments of Rule 701. See Ho lli s v . S tat e , 219 S.W .3d 446 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (t es t i m ony

of pea ce of

fice r that def

endant ha d blisters and discolorations on his hands indi cating
me tha mpe tha min e e xpos ur e ); W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 191 S.W .3d 242 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (off icer with some training allowed to g ive lay opinion that defenda

nt did not exhibi t signs of one wi th m e nta l he a lthiss ue ); In re J .C. , 892 S.W .2d 87 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.) (testimony of lay person that bruises appea red to be one day

old admissible since witness had re cent pe rsonal experience with bruising) . The trial c ourt did n o t ab use its discretion in allowing this testim ony . Even if this evidenc e had be en inadmissib l e, i t d i d n o t constitute rever sible err or. I n our revie w of nonc onstitut ional err or, we are to disre g ard err ors, def ects, irr eg ularities, or va

rianc es that do not af fe ct s u b s t an t i al rig hts of the ac cused. T EX . R. A PP . P. 4 4. 2( b) . A" su bs tanti a l r ig ht" is af fe ct edwh en t h e e rr o r h ada s u b s t an t i al an d i n

j u ri o u s ef fe ct o r i n fl u en ce i nd et er m i n i n g t h e j u ry 's10

verdic t. Kin g v . S

tat e , 95 3 S. W.2 d 2 66 , 2 71 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); see T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). I f, on the re cord a s a whole, it appears the err or " did not influence the jury , or had but a slight ef fec t,"
we m u s t conclude that the er ror wa s not harmful and a llow the conviction to stand. J ohnson v. Sta te , 967 S.W .2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Those wounds ha d previously been discussed in de tail by the patholog ist who had perf ormed the autopsy

of the victim' s body . She testified to the exist ence of two ver y small and very

superf icial lace rations on the victim' s left fore arm. In response to questions propounded by t h e State, she testified that the wounds could be considere d defe nsive based on the ir location, but one c ould not be sure
.Thus, we have a qualified expert testify ing that the lace rations wer e in the prope r location, and mig ht have be en def ens i ve wounds, a

nd a police of

fice r testifying similarly

that they wer e consistent with defe nsive wounds. Under this state of the rec ord, we do not f ind that the admission of testimony by the offic er that was ve ry simil ar to the patholog ist's testimony was such a s would aff

ect a "substantial r ight" of the de fe n d an t , i
. e. , one that had a substantial and injurious effe ct or influenc e on the jury when
rea ching its verdict. See King , 95 3 S. W.2 d at 27 1; see also T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b).11

We affir m the judgme nt.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: Dec ember 23, 2008 Date D ecide d: J anuar y 7, 2009 Do Not Publish