alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ms. Shawnte Anne LEVY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.; Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services; Mr. Gregg L. Hershberger, Commissioner; Mr. Frank B. Bishop, Warden, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-7661

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

*293Shawnte Anne Levy, Appellant Pro Se. Gina Marie Smith, MEYERS, RODBELL & ROSENBAUM, PA, Riverdale, Maryland; Dorianne Avery Meloy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Ap-pellees.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Shawnte Anne Levy seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying as moot her “motion for permission to approach the court” and motion for additional finding. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Levy seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Levy’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### Frank E. HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ACCREDITED HOME LENDERS, INCORPORATED; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Trust HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE1; HSBC Bank USA, N.A.; HSI Asset Securitization Corporation; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, a/k/a Mers; Does 1 Through 100, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1241

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 20, 2017

Decided: June 22, 2017

Frank E. Hampton, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel A. Glass, ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Frank E. Hampton appeals the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., HSBC Bank USA, National Association, HSI Asset Securitization Corp., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Ine. (“Moving Defendants”) and dismissing all claims against Moving Defendants. “[W]e have an independent obligation to verify the existence of appellate jurisdiction” and may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. *Porter v. Zook,*803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see*28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). “Ordinarily, a district court order is not final until it has resolved *all*claims as to all parties.” *Porter,*803 F.3d at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Regardless of the label given a district court decision, if it appears from the record that the district court has not adjudicated all of the issues in a case, then there is no final order.” *Id.*

In his complaint, Hampton alleged multiple causes of action against Moving Defendants, as well as Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (“Accredited”); the record reflects that Accredited was served but never filed an answer or a motion to dismiss. The district court granted Moving *785Defendants’ motion to dismiss but did not address any claims against Accredited. Thus, the court “never issued a final decision.” *Id.*at 699.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court. We express no view on the ultimate disposition of Hampton’s claims against Accredited. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED AND REMANDED*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 799 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 799

  To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to exclude certain bank 
               products from the definition of a deposit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                 May 12 (legislative day, May 1), 1995

 Mr. D'Amato (for himself and Mr. Dodd) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
                           and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to exclude certain bank 
               products from the definition of a deposit.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bank Insurance Fund and Depositor 
Protection Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF DEPOSIT.

    Section 3(l)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
1813(l)(5)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) any liability of an insured depository 
                institution that arises under an annuity contract, the 
                income on which is tax deferred under section 72 of the 
                Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by section 2 shall apply to any liability of an 
insured depository institution that arises under an annuity contract 
issued on or after October 6, 1994.
                                 <all>
```
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 5, 2018

No. 04-18-00703-CR

Marion Benavidez ROJAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR11882

Honorable Joey Contreras, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, Mario Rojas pled guilty to sexual assault of a child 

and was sentenced to twelve years in prison and a $1500.00 fine in accordance with the terms of 

his plea-bargain agreement. On August 28, 2018, the trial court signed a certification of 

defendant’s right to appeal stating that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO 

right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). After Rojas filed a notice of appeal, the trial 

court clerk sent copies of the certification and notice of appeal to this court. See id. 25.2(e). The 

clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See 

id. 25.2(d). 

“In a plea bargain case . . . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were 

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s 

permission to appeal.” Id. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, 

establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended 

by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a 

written motion filed and ruled upon before trial; nor does it indicate that the trial court gave its 

permission to appeal. See id. The trial court’s certification, therefore, appears to accurately 

reflect that this is a plea-bargain case and that Rojas does not have a right to appeal. We must 

dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been 

made part of the record.” Id. 25.2(d). 

This appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), 

unless an amended trial court certification showing that Rojas has the right to appeal is made part 
of the appellate record by November 5, 2018. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; Daniels v. State, 

110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order).

We ORDER all appellate deadlines be suspended until further order of the court.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of October, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
November 18, 2014
Kevin Schlemmer Office ofAviation Analysis US Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Ave SE Washington, D.C. 20590 SkyWestAirlines' Essential Air Service Termination Notice for Pueblo, CO
DearMr. Schlemmer: This letter will serve as SkyWest Airlines termination notice for turboprop air service between Pueblo, CO (PUB) and Denver, CO (DEN). The last day ofservice will be on January 31,2015. SkyWest will transition to an alljetfleet in 2015 and will eliminate the EMB-120 Brasilia from the SkyWest fleet. This turboprop aircraft is currently used in service from Pueblo, CO underthe Essential Air Service Program. This fleet change is driven in part by the additional challenges associated with the new FAR 117 flight and duty rules implemented in January 2014. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely,

Michael Thompson ChiefOperating Officer SkyWestAirlines
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James L. FORD, a.k.a. James Ford, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10441

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 27, 2017

Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX—Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James L. Ford, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

James L. Ford appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-*688plea conviction and ten-month sentence for. escape, in violation of 18 U.S.G. §§ 751(a) and 4082(a). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Ford’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We construe the letter submitted by Ford on September 19, 2017, as a pro se supplemental brief. No answering brief has been filed.

Ford waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. *See id.*at 988.

To the extent that Ford seeks to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we decline to address this issue on direct appeal. *See United States v. Rahman,*642 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2011).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Quintus RECORD, also known as Quint, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11274 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Quintus Record, Pro Se

Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Quintus Record has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Record has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with *361counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Abel YATES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-6785

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

William Abel Yates, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Michael Hamilton, Michael Francis Joseph, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*836PER CURIAM:

William Abel Yates seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. While this appeal was pending, Yates received a presidential commutation. The commutation renders Yates’ appeal moot. *See United States v. Surratt,*855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017) (dismissed as moot following en banc argument). Accordingly, we deny Yates’ motion to vacate and remand and dismiss this appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 600 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 600

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the taxation of 
                              hard cider.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 28, 2015

Mr. Blumenauer (for himself and Mr. Collins of New York) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the taxation of 
                              hard cider.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cider Industry Deserves Equal 
Regulation Act'' or the ``CIDER Act''.

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF HARD CIDER DEFINITION.

    (a) In General.--Section 5041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(g) Hard Cider.--For purposes of this section, the term `hard 
cider' means any wine--
            ``(1) the carbonation level of which does not exceed 6.4 
        grams per liter,
            ``(2) which is derived primarily from apples, apple juice 
        concentrate and water, pears, or pear juice concentrate and 
        water,
            ``(3) which contains no fruit product or fruit flavoring 
        other than apple or pear, and
            ``(4) which contains at least one-half of 1 percent and 
        less than 8.5 percent alcohol by volume.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (6) of section 5041(b) of such 
Code is amended by striking ``which is a still wine'' and all that 
follows through ``alcohol by volume''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to wine removed after December 31, 2015.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 35

ITEM 1123 CERTIFICATION

I, Laura Cawley, Vice President of U.S. Bank National Association
(the Servicer), hereby certify that:

(1) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the fiscal year covered by this annual
report on Form 10-K and of the performance of the Servicer under the Standard Terms for Trust Agreement, dated as of November 9, 2006, between the Servicer and the depositor (the Agreement) has been made under my supervision;

and

(2) To the best of my
knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period, or, if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any material respect, I
have specified below each such failure known to me and the nature and status thereof.



|                    
|--------------------
|Date: March 12, 2013
|                    
|/s/ Laura Cawley    
|Laura Cawley        
|Vice President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Ramiro RAMOS-MORENO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40853 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 18, 2017

*366Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Ramiro Ramos-Moreno, Pro Se

Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jose Ramiro Ramos-Moreno has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Ramos-Moreno has filed a response with an incorporated motion asking this court to vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing based on a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of Ramos-Moreno’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review. *See United States v. Isgar,*739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Ramos-Moreno’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, Ramos-Moreno’s motion is DENIED, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 USC. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10K of Vantage Energy Services, Inc. (the
"Company") for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Douglas G. Smith, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, that:



February 26,
2008

| |  | /s/DOUGLAS G. SMITH                                   
| |  | ------------------------------------------------------
| |  | Douglas G. Smith Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit
      32.A




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with this annual report of Opticon Systems, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sadruddin Currimbhoy,
      chief executive officer of the Company, certifies to the best of my knowledge,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.





/s/Sadruddin
                CurrimbhoySadruddin
                CurrimbhoyChief
                Executive Officer





October
      15, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5946 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5946

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 
  any prizes or awards won in competition in the Olympic Games or the 
                           Paralympic Games.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 7, 2016

  Mr. Dold (for himself and Mr. Farenthold) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 
  any prizes or awards won in competition in the Olympic Games or the 
                           Paralympic Games.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States Appreciation for 
Olympians and Paralympians Act''.

SEC. 2. OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC MEDALS AND USOC PRIZE MONEY EXCLUDED 
              FROM GROSS INCOME.

    (a) In General.--Section 74 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) Exception for Olympic and Paralympic Medals and Prizes.--
Gross income shall not include the value of any medal awarded in, or 
any prize money received from the United States Olympic Committee on 
account of, competition in the Olympic Games or Paralympic Games.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to prizes and awards received after December 31, 2015.
                                 <all>
```