## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

Citi zens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil C oal U.S.A. , 2012 IL 111286

Caption in S upreme Court: CI TI Z ENS OPPOSI NG P OL LUTI ON, Appellee
, v. EXXON MOBI L COALU.S.A. et al. , Appellants.

Docke t No. 111286

Filed Fe bruar y 2, 2012

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) A final administrative decision approving Mining Act permit revisi ons could not be challeng ed in circ uit court afte r expiration of the time period for administrative revi ew ; an d wher e it was alleg ed that environmenta l conditions violated the Mining Act, a citizen suit, which could be broug ht

as to nonpermitted activity or permit violations
, wa s barr ed as to the permitted ac tivity

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; hear d in that court

on appea l from the Circuit Court of Clint on County
, the Hon. Wil liam J

. Be cker , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Appellate court j u d gment aff irmed in part and reve rsed in part; circ uit court judg ment aff

irmed.Counsel on

Appea l J

. Timothy Eaton, of Chicag o (Shefsky & Fr oelich, Ltd., of counsel), and Kurt E. Reitz
, Peter S

. Strassner and Paul T. Sondereg g er, of Be lleville (Thomps on Coburn L L P, of counsel), for appellant Ex x onMobil Coal USA, Inc., d/b/a Montere y Coal Company

.

L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Br ian F. Ba rov, Assist an t Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o, of counsel), for ap p ellant I llinois Environmental Protection Ag ency

.

Penni S. L ivingston, of F airviewHeig hts, for appe llee.

Kather ine D. Hodg e, J ennife r M. Martin and Alison K. Hayden, of Hodg e Dwyer & Driver
, of Springf ield, for amicus curiae t h e I llinois Coal Association.

L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield (Jan e E linor Notz, Deputy Solicitor Gene ral, and Br ett E. L egn er, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o, of counsel), fo r a mi cus curiae the I llinois Depa rtment of Natural Resourc es.

J essica Dexter, o f C h i cag o, and Nathanie l Shoaff, of San Fr ancisc o, California, for amicus curiaethe I llinois Chapter of the Sierra

Club.

J ustices J USTI CE THEI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Kilbride and J usti c e s F r e e ma n , T h o ma s , G arma

n, Kar meier, and B urke c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 I n this appea l, we are asked to deter mine whether a citizen suit can be broug ht u n d er section 8.05(a) of the Surfac e Coal Mining L and Conservation and Reclamation Act (Mining Act) (225 I L CS 720/8.05(a) (West 2008)) to challeng e site con d itions at a coal mine

rec laimed in acc ordanc e with permits previously ap p ro v ed by the I llinois Depa rtment of Natura l Resource s (I DNR). We also must d et er mine whether the Water Use Act of 1983 (Water Use Act) (525 I L CS 45/1 et seq. (W es t 2 0 0 8 )) allows a private rig ht of action to challeng e ac tivity

authorized by

a mining pe rmit.

-2-¶ 2 Plai n tiff, Citi zens Opposing Pollut ion, broug ht a six -count amende d complaint in the 1 circ uit court of Clint on County ag ainst defe ndants Ex x onMobil Coal U.S.A., d/b/a Monterey Coal Company (Montere y ), and the I llinois Environm ental Protection Ag ency (I EPA), alleg ing violations of the Mining Act and the Water Use Act resulting from a coal mine

rec lamation at Monterey ’s M i n e No

. 2. The circ uit court dismiss ed plaintiff’s amende d complaint with prejudice

. T h e appellate court reve rsed the dismiss al as to all five counts direc ted aga inst Monterey and modi fied the circ uit court’s order dismissing the sole count ag ainst I EPA to be a dismiss al without prejudice

. 404 I ll. App. 3d 543. For the rea sons that follow, we aff

irm in pa rt and re verse in part the judg ment of the appellate court and aff irm the trial cour

t’s order

.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 I

n 1977, Monterey beg an surfa ce and underground coal mining operations at its Mine N o

. 2 in Cl i n t o n C o u n t y

. The Mining Act, which is administered by I DNR, require s that no person shall conduct mining operations without fi rs t o b t ai ning a permit from I DNR. 225 I L CS 720/2.01 (West 2008). Eac h perm i t ap p l i cation, and application for revision of a permit, must also contain a rec lamation plan or revised rec lamation plan t h at meets the require ments set forth by I DNR. 225 I L CS 720/2.03 (West 2008). Monterey operated at the site, rele vant to this appea l, two separ ately permitted coal ref use disposal a

rea s (RDAs). In 1984, the I llinois De p ar t m en t of Mines and Minerals approve d Permit No. 57, which authorized the cre ation of RDA-1. In 1986, the Depa rtment approve d Permit No. 183, which 2 authorized the cre ation of R DA-2. The two conjoined RDAs encompa ss a surfa ce are a of approximately 350 acr es and contain rock, g rave l, sand and other materia ls that are separ ated from the coal during coal processing

. In 1996, active, ongoingmining operations ended at Mine No. 2. Monterey then beg an working to p er m an en t l y close the mine and conduct

rec lamation work at the site, which included sealing the m i n e s hafts and removing coal mining fa cilities and equipment. ¶ 5 On Dec ember 21, 1999, I EPA, which impl em en t s the water quality provisions of the Environmental Protection Act (415 I L CS 5/1 et seq. (West 2008)), issued a violation notice to Monte rey

. The notice alleg ed that Monterey ’s coal mining waste disposal are as violated
g rou n d w a te r q u ality standards for total iron, mang anese , sulfate, chloride, and total dissolved soils. Wit hout admitting to the alleg ed violation, Monterey worke d with I EPA, and a

corr ective action plan whi ch included a groundwater manag ement zone to treat impacted
g roundwater under and around the two ref use di sposal are as wa s d ev eloped and approved by I EPA on J une 24, 2002. The plan require d, inter alia
, the installation of an underground bentonite barr ier wall and the construction of a treatment sy stem which routes impacted

Pla int if f is a not

- f

o r -pr ofi t ci ti zen group tha t was fou nde d by Don Langenh ors t in Ma y 1 2008

.

T he aut hor it y of the Depa rt m ent of Mi nes and Mi ner al s was tr ans fe rr ed to I DNR, ef fe ct ive 2 J uly 1, 1 995. See 20 ILCS 801/ 10- 5 ( We st 200 8).

-3-g roundwater from extraction wells throug h a trea tment are a befor e d i s charg ing it off site. Monterey was also require d to monitor g roundwater quality and provide annual repor ting to I EPA. ¶ 6 On Marc h 3, 2004, afte r a public hearing and comment period, I DNR approve d revisions
to Permit No. 57 and Permit No. 183, which incorporated the corr ective action plan with the
g roun d water manag ement zone, that allowed Monterey to implement and complete

rec lamation wo rk at Mine No. 2. The terms of t he permit revisions provided, in pertinent 3 part: (1) the two RDAs would rema in onsite and the interior which contained exposed coal ref use on the surfa ce would be rec laimed with a soil cover and veg etati o n ; (2 ) a detailed descr iption of the postrecla mation land use desig nations, which specifie d that the RDAs and the land immediately adjac ent to them would con s t i t u t e “pasture land” as define d in the administrative re gulations (see 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1701 app. A ( 2012)) a fter c ompletion of the require d rec lamation wo rk ; (3 ) the final contour of the land would approximate the premining site topogr aphy with the exception, in pertinent part, of the two RDAs; and (4) the

o p eration of the g roundwater manag ement zone was desig ned to preve nt or mitigat e an y materia l damag e to the hy drolog ic balance outsi de the proposed pe rmit area and minimiz e the disturbance within the boundarie s. Monterey repr esents that the rec lamation projec t was substantially completed in Dec ember 2006, and that it exp en ded more than $28 milli on to

com p l et e t h e RDA portion of the projec t alone, which included the construction of the
g roundwater mana g ement zone.

¶ 7 State and F eder al Administrative Appea ls ¶ 8 On M arc h 29, 2004, L ang enhorst filed a reque st for administ rative appea l with I DNR, challeng ing the depar

tment’s approva l of the revisions to the permits. L ang enhorst was later joined in his appea l by other Cli n t o n C o u n t y residents. They raised, among other issues, whether the proposed reme diation plan for the ref use disposal are as was ade quate in addre ssing contamination of the underly ing Pearl Sand aquife r. On May 25, 2005, a final administrative decision, which adopt ed the order of the hear ing office r g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Monterey and I DNR, was enter ed. Concerning the g roundwater issue, the hea ringoffice r had f

ound, in pertinent par

t: “Petitioners and their expert witness Robert J ohnson have admitted the revisions

as approve d preve nt materia l damag e to the hydrolog ic b al ance outside the mine
proper ty and min i m i ze the disturbance of the hydrolog ic balanc e within the boundarie s of the mine. That satisfies the regulatory requirem ents and require s summary judgme nt in favor of

the Depa rtment and Monter ey .” The petitioners did not seek revie w of this final administrative decision in the circ uit court, as allowe d under se ction 8.10 of the MiningAct (225 I L CS 720/ 8.10 (West 2008)). ¶ 9 In J une 2005, L ang enhorst filed a citizen c omplaint with the United States Depa rtment

T he re vised Per m it No. 57 and Per m it No. 183 exp ir ed on J anu ar y 8, 2005
, and Oct obe r 16, 3 2006 , re spe ct ively.

-4-of the Interior, Offic e of Surfac e Mining Reclamation and Enforc ement (OSM), pursuant to

section 1267(h) of the Surfac e Mi n i n g C o n t rol and Reclamation Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. § 1267(h) (2006))
, reque sting that OSM revie w the adequa cy of the rec lamation plan at Mine No. 2. OSM acc epted as his citizen complaint, among other i s s u es , whether there was a

4 fail u re to protec t the g roundwater at the mine site. OSM’s Alton Field Division (F ield Division) ultimately deter mined, in pertinent part , t h at since Monterey was appropr iately implementing the state-manda ted reme dial plan desig ned to bring about abate ment of the exis ting water v i olation, I DNR was taking appropriate action to continue enfor cing the

corr ective action plan and had g ood cause for not taking additional enfor ceme nt action. On April 10, 2006, OSM’s Reg ional Direc tor, Mid-Continen t R egi o nal Coordinating Center, aff irmed the decisio n o f the Field Division. L ang enhorst appea led that decision to the Interior Boa rd of L and Appea ls, an administrative appea ls board in the United States Depa rtment of the Interior. On Fe bruar

y 20, 2008, the Interior Boa rd of L and Appea ls aff

irmed the decisions of the Reg ional Direc tor and the F ield Division. ¶ 10 On J anuar

y 4, 2007, L ang enhorst filed a second state administrative appea l with I DNR. In Dec ember

2006, I DNR had a

pproved a n incidental boundary revision to Permit No. 57, which allowed for an additional parc el of land for an underground wastew ater discharg e pipeline that was nece ssary to implement the groundwater manag ement zone. L ang enhorst challeng ed whether this underground pipeline was a continuation of mining operations that would require Monterey to comply with additional mining statutory and regulatory require ments. On J uly

18, 2007, the hea

ringoffice r ente red summar y judgme nt in favor of M o ntere y and I DNR. The order also provided, in pertinent part, that “L ang enhors t ’s [s] ummary [j ]udgment [m ]ot ion is reple te with inacc urate statements and ref uted testimony

. *** The fac t that Mr. L ang enhorst is attempting to relitig ate issues alre ady decide d and
encompa ssed by a previous administrative appea l makes me inclined to c onsider sanctions
ag ainst Mr. L ang enhorst.” As with the first state administrative appea l, L ang enhorst did not seek r eview in the c ircuit court.

¶ 11 Current L awsuit ¶ 12 On August 8, 2008, plaintiff filed a n 18-count c omplaint ag ainst Monterey
, I EPA, and I DNR under the citizen suit provision contained in section 8.05(a) of the M ining Act. The complaint soug ht, in pertinent part, t o d ec l ar e that the rec lamation plan contained in the revised permits did not comply with the perf ormanc e s t an d ards of the Mining Act by allowingMonterey

to permane ntly

reta in the two impoundments of coa l mine waste at the site. Plaintiff soug ht to require Monterey to submit a permit rene wal application that would comply with all of the require ments of the Mining Act and I DNR’s regulations. In response to defe ndants’ motion s t o dismiss
, plaintiff filed motions for leave to file an amende d

I DNR has dir ect re spo nsi bil it y for the re view of coa l m ini ng and re cl amatio n pla ns in 4
I ll ino is

. See 225 I LCS 720/ 2.01
, 2.02
, 2.03 (W est 2008 ). OSM in an oversi ght rol e has the

re spo nsi bil it y of enf

orc ing the same st and ar ds o n a m ine

- by- m ine bas is if th e s ta te agency fa il s to do s o. Se e 30 U.S.C. § 127 1(a )( 1) (20 06)

.

-5-complaint and for the voluntary

dismiss al of I DNR. The tria l court g rante d the motions. ¶ 13 Plaintiff filed the instant six -count amende d complaint on Dec ember 22, 2008. In count I
, plaintiff alleg ed, in per

tinent part, that Monterey violated section 3.03 of the Mining Act by failing to re s t o re t h e land wher e the two RDAs wer e situated to a condition capa ble of supporting the same use or a highe r or better use than befor e mini n g. I n co u nt I I
, plaintiff alleg ed, in pertinent part, that M o n t er ey violated section 3.08(b) of the Mining Act by
perma nently reta ining impoundments of coal mine waste at the site. In count I I I
, plaintiff alleg ed, in pertinent part, that Monterey had perma nently g rade d Mine No. 2 in a manner that failed to restore the aff

ecte d land to its approximate orig inal contour, as require d by section 1.03(a) (2) of the Mining Act. In count I V, plaintiff alleg ed, in pertinent part, that Monterey disturbed the hydrolog ic balanc e and failed to p rot ect the quality and quantity of the
g roundwater by perma

nently reta ining the two impoundments of coal waste in violation of section 3.10(a) of the Mining Act. In count V, plaintiff alleg ed, in pertinent part, that I EPA

v i o l at ed section 4.09 of the Mining Act by developing and approving the g roundwat er manag ement zone beca

use it neg atively impacted the quality and quantity of the g roundwater at t h e s i t e. Finally
, in count VI
, plaintiff alleg ed, in pertinent part, that Monterey was not complying with the Water Use Act by failing to follow the rule of “r ea s o n ab l e use,” as provided in section 6 (525 I L CS 45/6 (West 2008)), by p u m p i n g excessive quantities of
g roun d wa t er from the Pearl Sand aquife r. Specifica lly
, plaintiff alleg ed that Monterey in order to comply with the corr ective action plan approve d by I EPA must pump 4 mil l ion
g allons of water fr o m t h e aq u ifer eac h wee k, which exceeds Monterey ’s fair share for the siz e of its fa cility

. ¶ 14 In all five counts ag ainst Monterey
, plaintiff soug ht injunctive relief to require Monterey
to remove the perma

nent impoundments known as RDA-1 and RDA-2 and to dispose of the
waste contained there in off site. In count V, plaintiff soug ht the immediate revoc ation of the
g roundwater manag ement zone and a ruling that any future groundwater manag ement zone develope d by I EPA for the site must comply with the Mining Act. In co u n t VI
, plaintiff
soug ht to require Monterey to develop and implement a written plan that limit s the extraction of groundwater at the site to no more than 100,000 g allons per day

. In all six counts, plaintiff
soug ht costs, fee s, and any other re lief the c ourt dee med appr opriate. ¶ 15 Monterey

moved to dismiss counts I throug h I V of the a mended c omplaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil P roce dure ( Code) (735 I L CS 5/ 2-619 (West 2008)) a nd
count VI pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2008)). I EPA moved to dismiss count V under sections 2-615 a

nd 2-619 of the Code

. ¶ 16 On April 28, 2009, the trial court dismiss ed plaintiff’s amende d complaint on all counts with prejudice and ente red a n order which provide d, in pertinent par t: “All parties ag ree that in order to operate the mine [Mont ere y ] had to and did obtain a permit from [I DNR]. All parties ag ree that the permi t d o es provide for a

rec lamation plan. Under the Act the permit and the rec lamation plan are not approve d unless I DNR finds that all statutory require ments are met. Plaintiff conce des that it has no evidenc e to show that either [Mont ere y ] or I EPA is violating the terms of the permit or the ter

ms of t he reclamation plan. *** [ Section 8.10 of the Ac t] provides

-6-that final administrative decisio n s o f [I DNR] shall be subject to judicial revie w pursuant to the Administrative Review L aw ***. Plaintiff c oncede s that the time to challeng e the pe rmit which included the r eclamation plan has expired, but plaintiff
argues t h at 8

. 0 5 (a) authorizes a suit for any violation of the Act by any ag g rieve d
person. The cour t d isagree s with plaintiff’s asser tion that 8.05(a) allows a suit to challeng e what I DNR has previously approve d throug h approva l of t he p er mit and

rec lamation plan. *** The court is persua ded b y I EPA’s argument that it is not a violator of the Act since at best it simply approve d a g roundwater manag ement zone that was incorpora

ted into the t er m s o f a permit rec lamation plan. The court’s understanding of [t he Act] is that I DNR issues permits, and that permits and permit revisions include rec lamation plans. To the extent that the g roundwater manag ement

zone approve d by I EPA is at all rele vant , i t i s o n l y rele vant within the context of I DNR’s approva l of the permit revision and rec lamation plan. *** [Mont ere y ’s] *** motion to dismiss count VI is g rante d. The Water Use Act provides no private rig ht of ac tion.” ¶ 17 The appellate court reve rsed the trial cour t and held that counts I

throug h I V and count VI ag ainst Monterey wer e allowed under section 8.05(a) beca use those counts alleg ed various ongoing violatio n s of t he Mi ning Act. The appellate court concluded that plaintiff

was not collater ally attacking permitted activity in those counts beca use there was no dispute that the permits had expired. As for count V, the appellate court conclude d that the alleg ation that I EPA violated the Mining Act by authorizing the g roundwa ter manag ement zone could also proce ed under section 8.05(a)

. The appellate court held, howeve r, that to the extent that portions of count V constitute a c ollatera l attack on the pr eviously issued permits, the t rial
court was corr ect in dismiss ing it. Concerning count VI
, without conducting any signific ant analy sis, the appellate court conclude d t hat the Water Use Act provides a private rig ht of action beca

use “sec tion 8.05 of the [Mi ning Act] specific ally allows such enfor ceme nt actions.” 404 I ll. App. 3d at 556. ¶ 18 The appellate court also reje cted defe ndants’ argument that plaintiff’s action was ba rre d by res judicata and collater al estoppel due to the state and fede ral ad m i n i s t ra t ive appea ls. The appellate court rea soned that “Exx on” was no t a p ar t y t o the previous litigation and plaintiff’s claims involved alleg ations of ong oing environmenta l conce rns. Additionally
, the appellate court reje cted defe ndants’ argument that I DNR was a nece ssary party to this c ase and conclude d that upon rema nd I DNR could be added by either Monterey or I EPA, or the depar tment could seek to intervene

. Consequently
, the appellate court reve rsed the dismiss al

as to the five counts ag ainst Monterey and modified the dismissal of the sole count ag ainst I EPA to be without prejudice. 404 I ll. App. 3d at 558. ¶ 19 Mo n t er ey an d I E P A both filed petitions for leave to appea l that wer e allowed by this court, which consolidated the case s. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). We also allowed I DNR and the I llinois Coal Association t o file amicus curiae briefs on be half of Monte rey and I EPA. In addition, we allowed the I llinois Chapter of the Sierra Club to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf

of plaintiff.

-7-¶ 20 ANALYSI S

¶ 21 Monterey

and I EPA contend that the appellate court err ed in r ever sing the dismiss al of
counts I t h ro ug h V of the amended complaint beca use t he citiz en sui t provision contained in section 8.05(a) of the Mining Act does not allow a party to challeng e the terms, conditions, and ac t i v i ties authorized in, and require d by
, a mining permit. They contend that under section 8.10 of the Mining Act, the Administrative Review L aw is the exclusive route for a citizen to obtain timely judicial revie w of a final permit decision by I DNR. Plaintiff counter s that section 8.05(a) allows a party to file a citizen suit at any time to enfor ce site conditions that do not comply with the require ment s o f t h e M i ning Act, reg ardle ss of whether those conditions confor

m to the t erms of the m i n ing permit. Plaintiff argues t hat t he subst antive provisions of the Mining Act “ca nnot be overr idden by the implementation of illega lly issued permits that leave the site out of compliance with the authorizing leg islation.” ¶ 22 Section 2-619(a ) of the Code o f Ci v il Procedur e allows dismiss al wher e, in pertinent pa rt, “the action was not commence d wi t hin the time limit ed by law” (735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (5) (West 2008)) and wher e “the claim asser ted ag ainst defe ndant is barr ed by other aff irmative
matter avoiding the leg al eff ec t of or defe ating the claim.” 735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (9) (West 2008). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2008)) challeng es only the leg al sufficie ncy of the complaint. W akulich v. Mraz
, 203 I ll. 2d 223, 228 (2003). Under either section of t h e C o d e, our revie w proce eds de novo

. Feltmeie r v. Feltmeie r , 207 I ll. 2d 263, 266 (2003). ¶ 23 The issue befor e us requires u s t o consi der the interplay betwee n section 8.05(a) and section 8.10 of the Mining Act, which constitutes a matter of statutory construction that we also revie w de novo

. Michigan Ave nue National Bank v. County of Cook
, 191 I ll. 2d 493, 503 (2000). The g oal of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the leg islature’s i n t en t

. In re Donald A.G.
, 221 I ll. 2d 234, 246 (2006). The best indication of this int en t

rema ins the languag e of the statute itself, which must be gi v en i t s plain and ordinary meaning

. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum
, 159 I ll. 2d 469, 479 (1994). I n interpre ting a statute, this co u rt presumes that the l eg islature did not intend absurdity
, inconvenienc e, or injusti ce. Hernon v . E.W

. Corrigan Construction Co. , 149 I ll. 2d 190, 195 (1992). ¶ 24 Under the doctrine of in pari materia
, two leg islative acts that addre ss the same subject

are considere d with r efe renc e to one a nother, so that they may be g iven harmonious eff ect. Land v. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago
, 202 I ll. 2d 414, 422 (2002). The doctrine is consistent with our acknowledg ment t h at one of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all of the pr ovisions of a statute as a whole. Id. ¶ 25 S ec tion 8.05(a) of the Mining Act contains the citizen suit provisio n re l i ed up o n b y plaintiff. It states as follows:
“Civil Actio n s

. (a ) Any person having an interest which is or may be adver sely aff ecte d may commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel compliance with this Act ag ainst any g overnme ntal instrumentality or age ncy which is alleg ed to be in violation of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, order or permit issued under this Act, or ag ainst any

other pe rson who is a lleg ed to be in violation of this Act or of any rul e, o rder or permit issued under this Act. No action may be commence d

-8-under this subsection (1) prior to 60 day s afte r the plaintiff has g iven notice in writing of the alleg ed violation to the Depa rtment and to any allege d v i o lator, or (2) if the State has commence d and is dili gen t l y p rosec uting a civil action to require compliance with the provisions of this Act, or any rule, order or permit issued under this Act.” 225 I L CS 720/ 8.05(a) (West 2008). ¶ 26 Section 8.10 of t h e M i n i ng Act, relied upon by defe ndants, provides for revie w of all final administrative decisions of I DNR u n d er the Administrative Review L aw. I t states as follows:
“Review under Administrative Review L aw. All final administrative decisions of the De partment under this Act shall be subject to judicial revie w pursuant to the Administrative Review L aw, as amende d, and the rules adopted under it, except that the reme dies cre ated by this Act are not excluded or impaired by any provision of the Administrative Review L aw.” 225 I L CS 720/ 8.10 (West 2008). ¶ 27 In construing the two statutory provisions at issue, we emphasize that the first clause of section 8.10 specific ally provides that “[a]ll final administrative decisions of the depar tment shall be subject to judicial revie w pursuant to the Administrati ve Rev iew Law .” (Emphasis added.) I t is undisputed that a fi n al ad m i nistrative decision by I DNR on a mining permit constitutes a final administrative decision of the depar tment that is subject to judicial revie w under section 8.10. In contra st, section 8.05(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a citizen suit
may be b ro u gh t to “compe l compliance with this Act” or to enfor ce compliance with a “per mit issued under this Act.” Consequently
, we ag ree with the t ri al court that section 8.05(a), re ad i n pari materia with section 8.10, require s that the administrative revie w proce ss is the exclusive route for circ uit court revie w of the terms of a mining permit issued by I DNR. Howeve r, an action to compel compliance with the Mining Act for nonpermitted activity
, or to enforc e complianc e with the ter ms of a permit, may be broug ht by way of an orig inal action in the cir cuit court unde r sec tion 8.05(a). ¶ 28 Plaintiff doe s not challeng e in its amende d complaint Monterey ’s compliance with any provision contained in the revised permits issued by I DNR. Instead, p l ai ntiff attacks the
terms of those permits under which the rec lamation work was completed as not c omplying with the Mining Act. As previously rec og nized, a final administrative decision by I DNR authorizing a mining permit is a final ad m inistrative decision of the depar tment that is subject to judicial revie w pursuant to the Administrative Review L aw. Section 3-103 of the Administr at i v e Review L aw provides that “[e]very action to revie w a final administrative decision shall be commence d by the fili n g o f a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 day s from the date t hat a copy of t he decision soug ht to be reviewe d was served upon the par

ty aff ecte d by the dec ision.” 735 I L CS 5/3-103 (West 2008). Section 3-102 of the Administrative Review L aw provides that “[u] nless revie w is soug ht of an administrative deci s ion within the time and in the manner here in provided, the parties to the proce eding b ef o re the administrative ag ency shall be barr ed from obtaining judicial revie w of s u ch administrative dec ision.” 735 I L CS 5/ 3-102 (West 2008). L ang enhorst did not seek timely judicial revie w of the provisions of the revised permits p u rsuant to the Administrative Review L aw afte r they wer e approve d in 2004, and the citizen group that he founded in 2008 cannot do so now unde r sec tion 8.05(a).

-9-¶ 29 Plaintiff asser ts that section 8.10 does not precl u d e i t fr o m b ri n gi n g its amended complaint under section 8.05(a) beca use the “except that” languag e contained in the second clause of section 8.10 authorizes a citizen suit to challeng e permitted activity whene ver site conditions do not comply with the Mining Act. We disag ree and construe the second clause of section 8.10 as allowing a citizen suit u nder section 8.05(a)
, such as to enfor ce the provisions of a permit, or to challeng e nonpermitted activity
, without being impaired by any of the require ments of the Administrative Review L aw. This interpre tation is consistent with

our obligation not to construe a statute in a way that makes one of its provisions redunda nt and superf

luous. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Human Rights Comm’n , 88 I ll. 2d 22, 28 (1981). Plaintiff’s construction of sec tion 8.10 would eviscerate and render meani n gl es s the “shall” provision contained in the first clause of t he st atute by making adher ence to the Administrative Review L aw entirely optional and nonbinding in the

case of a final permit deter mination by I DNR. This interpre tation would be inconsistent with the Administrative Review L aw, which specific ally require s prompt judicial revie w of such final administrative de cisions. ¶ 30 Our cons t ru ct i o n o f s ections 8.05(a) and 8.10 is also supported by the rea lities of the mining permit proce ss and judicial revie w of such regulatory decisions. I DNR’s authority in the permit proce ss, which the leg islature specifically deleg ated to the dep ar tment (see 225 I L CS 720/2.01, 2.02, 2.03 (West 2008)), would be undermined if we wer e to interpre t section 8.05(a) as allowing a party to file an orig inal cause of action in the circ uit court challeng ing the terms of a min i n g p er m i t

. The Mining Act stipulates that no permit or revised permit shall be issued unless the application aff irmatively demonstrates, and the department finds
, inter alia
, that: (1) the application is acc urate and complete and all requ irements of the Mining Act have been complied with; (2) the applicant has demonstrated the rec lamation can be acc omplished and complies with the perf ormanc e standards set forth in the statute; (3) the proposed mining operation has been desig ned to preve nt materia l damag e to the hydrolog ic balanc e outside the permit are a; and (4) the are a proposed to be mined is not included within

an are a desig nate d u n s u i table for surfa ce coal mining under the Mining Act. 225 I L CS 720/2.08(b) (West 2008). ¶ 31 Pla i n t i ff’s s u gges t ed const ruction of the statute would require the circ uit court to deter mine such h i ghly regulated mining operation and rec lamation issues without an administrative rec ord t o review. See 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1847.3 (2012) (per mit and related administrative hearings)

. A contra ry construction of the statute would also impact leg itimate relianc e by a permittee, and cre ate signific ant uncer tainty by allowing the terms of a permit
to be reope ned and rec onsidered at any time, even y ear s afte r a rec lamation projec t has been completed in acc ordanc e with a permit. We decline to conclude that the leg islature intended such an absurd result in enac ting section 8.05(a)
, which would not only call into question the finality of mining permit d ec i s i ons throug hout I llinois
, but would undermine the role of I DNR in the permit proc ess. ¶ 32 We n o t e, as d em o n strated by the state and fede ral administrative appea ls broug ht by L ang enhorst, that a p arty who may be adver sely aff ecte d by a mining permit decision is aff orded opportunities to raise objections at t he st ate level b ef o re I DN R and at t he federa l level befor e OSM. As rec og nized by I DNR in its amicus brief, any person having an interest

-10-which is or may be adver sely aff ecte d by a permit decision of the depar tment may file written objections to a permit application and reque st an informal confe renc e on the application with I DNR. 225 I L CS 720/2.04(d) (West 2008). I f no informal confe renc e is reque sted, or if the issues in question are not resolved by the informal confe renc e, a public hearing may be called
at wh i ch time the i ntere sted person has an opportunit y to submit oral or written t estim o n y and his or her views or arguments. 2 2 5 I L CS 720/2.04(d), (e) (West 2008); 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1773.14(d) ( 2012). An intere sted person ma y also reque st an adjudicatory hear ing to challeng e I DNR’s decision on a mining permit. 225 I L CS 720/2.11(c) (West 2008). After the interested pe rson is notified of the he aringoffice r’s re commended de cision, he or she may submit exceptions. 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1847.3(i) (2012). There afte r, the person m ay s ee k judicial revie w of the final permit decision pursuant to the Administrative Review L aw. 225 I L CS 720/8.10 (W est 2008); 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1847.3(l) (2012). Consequently
, our construction of the statute does not prec lude a party from raising objections to I DNR’s permit decisions and seeking judicial revie w there afte r. W e simply rec og nize that any objection
must be raised in a timely manner throug h the administrative revie w proce ss and may not be broug ht throug h an orig inal action in the cir cuit court unde r sec tion 8.05(a). ¶ 33 We further note that I DNR is require d to conduct periodic revie w of outstanding permits and may require rea sonable revision or modification of permit provisions during the term of such permit if nece ssary to insure that a coal mine complies with a ll of the require ments of the Mining Act. 225 I L CS 720/2.10 (W est 2008). Additionally
, under the administrative code, if I DNR rec eives information indicating that it improvidently issued a mining or

rec lamation permit, the depar tment is require d to revie w the circ umstances under which the permit was issued, and undertake reme dial measure s, including suspension or resc ission of the permit using the criter ia set forth in the reg ulations S ee 6 2 I l l

. Adm. Code 1773.20, 1773.21 (2012). ¶ 34 Plaintiff’s argument that section 8.10 does not apply beca use the revised permits expired

more than two year s befor e it filed its orig inal complaint does not chang e our deter mination. Pursuant to the administrative code, “[a] permittee nee d not rene w the per mit if no surfa ce coal mining operations will be conducte d under the permit and solely rec lamation activities

rema in to be done.” 62 I ll. Adm. Code 1773.11(a) (2012). The regulations further provide that “[o] bligations established under a permit continue until completion of su rf ac e coal mining and rec lamation operations, reg ardle ss of whether the authorization to conduct surfa ce coal mining opera tions has expired.” Id. Consequently
, there was no require ment for Monterey to rene w the permits beca use, as is undisputed, only rec lamation act i v i ties

rema ined to be completed af t er the permits expired in J anuar y 2005 and October 2006. Following the expiration of the permits, Monterey ’s obligation to complete the rec lamation work in acc ordanc e with the permits rema ined unchang ed and did not provide plaintiff with

a new basis to challeng e the ter ms of the re vised permits. ¶ 35 L ikewise, plaintiff’s relianc e on Old Ben Coal Co. v. Departme nt of Mines & Minerals
, 207 I ll. App. 3d 1088 (1991), is misplaced. In that case , the I llinois Depa rtment of Mines and Minerals b ro ught an enfor ceme nt action ag ainst a coal mine company that was operating under an interim permit that was issued prior to the state’s more stringe nt perma nent mining
regulations being implemented. Id. at 1089-90. The coal company argued that beca use it was

-11-operating under an interim permit it was not bound by the perma nent mining reg

ulations. Id.
at 1091. The appellate court reje cted this argument and conclude d that the statutory languag e that all operators “as a minimum ” must comply with th e Mining Act’s perf ormanc e standards did not exempt interim permittees from the perma nent regulations. Id. at 1091-92. The issue befor e this court is not related to the applicability of a new set o f regulations afte r the
approva l of the revised permits. Instead, this case involves the implementation of standards under the Mining Ac t which have not c hang ed since the revised pe rmits were approve d by I DNR in 2004. ¶ 36 Plaintiff appea rs to argue, in the alternative, that i t s am en d ed co m plaint should be allowed based upon a rig ht to a healthful environment contained in article XI of the I llinois Constit ution of 1970, which provides that “the duty of eac h person is to provide and maintain

a healthful environment for the benef it of this and future g ener ations.” I ll. Const. 1970, art. XI
, § 1. Article XI
, section 2, g ives private citizens the rig ht to “enf orce this rig ht ag ainst any p ar t y , g overnme ntal or private.” I ll. Const. 1970, art. XI
, § 2. As this court has p re v i o u s l y explained, howeve r, “[s] ection 2 of article XI does not cre ate any new cause s of action but, rathe r, does awa

y with the ‘spec ial injury ’ require ment ty pically employ ed in environmenta l nuisance case s.” City of

Elgin v. County of Cook
, 169 I ll. 2d 53, 85 (1995); see also Glisson

v. City ofMarion
, 188 I ll. 2d 211, 228 (1999). There fore
, althoug h plaintiff need not alleg e

a specia l injury to bring its environmenta l cla i m , there must never theless still exis t a cog nizable cause of ac tion. City of Elgin , 169 I ll. 2d at 85-86. ¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we find the trial cour t properly dismiss ed counts I throug h V of plaintiff’s amende d complaint with prejudice beca use those counts constitute a challeng e to the provisions of the revised permits authorized by I DNR and co u l d not be broug ht under section 8.05(a ) of the MiningAct. ¶ 38 As noted earlier in this opinion, the appellate court aff irmed the circ uit court’s dismiss al of count V, holdingthat to the extent portions of the count constitute a collater al attac k on the previously issued permits, the circ uit court was c orre ct in dismiss ing it. We agree with the appe llate cour

t’s aff irmance of the c ircuit court’s dismi ssal and thus aff irm that part of the appellate court’s judgme nt. Howeve r, the appellate court further modif ied the circ uit court’s dismiss al to be without prejudice and rema nded with direc tions t h at plaintiff be allowed to file an amende d count V. Be cause the circuit court properly dismiss ed count V with prejudice
, that part of the appellate court’s judgme nt which modified and rema nded the circ uit court’s orde r dismissing count V is re verse d. ¶ 39 Ba sed upon our deter mination that counts I through V could not be broug ht under se ction 8.05(a) of the Mining Act and thus wer e proper ly dismiss ed, there is no need for us to addre ss Monterey

and I EPA’s alternative argument that plaintiff’s cla ims are ba rre d under

res judicata and collat er al estoppel based on the state and fede ral administrative appea ls. There is also no need for us to consider Monterey ’s contention that the appellate court err ed in concluding that I DNR was not a nece ssary party to this case , or I EPA’s contention that it

was not a violator of the Mining Act by its approva l of the g roundwater manag ement zone. ¶ 40 Finally
, we consider whether the appellate court err ed in reve rsing the dismiss al of count VI of the amend ed complaint ag ainst Monterey

. This require s us to consider whether the

-12-Water Use Act authorizes a private rig ht of action to challeng e activity specific ally require d

by a per mit approved by

I DNR under the Mining Ac t. ¶ 41 The Water Use Act decla res it to be in the public interest to better manag e and conse rve water , to establish a mecha nism for restric ting withdrawa ls of g roundwa ter in emer g encie s, and to provide public notice of planned substantia l wa t er withdrawa ls from new points befor e water is withdrawn. 525 I L CS 45/2 (West 2008). The Water Use Act also follows the doctrine of rea sonable use for gro u n dwa ter withdrawa ls. 525 I L CS 45/6 (West 2008). Reasonable use means “the use of water to me et natura l w ants and a fair share for artificia l
wants. I t do es n o t i n clude water used wastef ully or maliciously .” 525 I L CS 45/4 (West 2008). The statutory fra

mework includes a limit ed complaint investigation and revie w proce ss manag ed by the Depa rtment of Agricultu re and local soil and water conser vation districts, an administrative hear ing and appea l proce ss, and a penalties provision. 525 I L CS 45/5.1, 7 (West 2008). ¶ 42 Plaintiff alleg ed in count VI
, in pertinent part, that Monterey failed to follow the rule of

rea sonable use as provided in section 6 of the Water Use Act beca use in order for Monterey
to comply with the corr ective action plan incorpora ted in the revised permit it must pump 4 milli on g allons of wa t er from the aquife r eac h wee k. Plaintiff soug ht injunctive relief to require Monterey to develop and implement a written plan that would require the extraction of less than 100,000 g allons of g rou n d wa t er p er day

. As in the other counts, plaintiff also
soug ht to require Monterey to remove the two RDAs from the site. Plaintiff there fore seeks the same injunctive relief in count VI that we h av e already deter mined in the other five
counts constitutes an attack on the terms of the permits that is not al l o we d u nder section 8.05(a) of the Mining Act. Simi lar to our deter mination u n d er s ec tion 8.05(a)
, we find no statutory basis to conclude that the Water Use Act allows a p ri v ate rig ht of action to challeng e conduct that is specific ally mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by I DNR. Se e Metzger v. DaRosa
, 209 I ll. 2d 30, 36 (2004) (implication of a private right of action from a statute is appropr iate if the plaintiff is a member o f t h e cl ass for whose benef it the
statute was enac ted; the plaintiff' s injury is one the statute was desig ned to preve n t ; i t is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and it is nece ssary in order to provide

an adequa te reme dy for violations of the statute). Plaintiff’s relianc e on Bridgman v. Sanitary District of Dec atur , 1 6 4 I l l

. App. 3d 287 (1987), is misplaced and does not inform our analy sis as that case did not conce rn a cause of action under the Water Use Act to challeng e permitted activity under the Mining Act. Consequently
, we find the appellate court also err ed in reve rsingthe dismissal of count VI of the amended c omplaint.

¶ 43 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 44 For t h e fo re g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the appellate court is aff irmed in part a

nd

reve rsed in par

t and the judg ment of the c ircuit court is af firmed.

¶ 45 Appellate c ourt judg ment aff irmed in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t; ¶ 46 circ uit court judg ment aff irmed.

-13-