alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jorge Humberto MENDEZ-GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

No. 16-14704 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 17, 2017)

William Junior Vasquez, Vasquez Law Firm, LLC, Smithfield, NC, for Petitioner

Craig Alan Newell, Jr., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, OIL, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Alfie Owens, DHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel — ATL, Atlanta, GA, for Respondent

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Humberto Mendez-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order that expedited his removal from the United States as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Mendez-Gonzalez argues that his prior conviction is not an aggravated felony and that the Department of Homeland Security violated his right to due process during his expedited removal proceedings. We dismiss in part and deny in part Mendez-Gonzalez’s petition.

We lack jurisdiction to review the finding that Mendez-Gonzalez’s prior conviction is an aggravated felony. Mendez-Gonzalez concedes that he never contested the classification of his prior conviction as an aggravated felony, although his notice of removal stated that he had ten days to respond and could obtain an extension of time for good cause. “[A]bsent a cognizable excuse or exception,” we “lack jurisdiction to consider a claim raised in a petition for review unless the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies.” *Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). We dismiss this part of Mendez-Gonzalez’s petition.

The Department did not violate Mendez-Gonzalez’s right to due process. To establish a violation of due process, an alien must prove that he was deprived of liberty without notice or an opportunity to respond and that he was substantially prejudiced by the alleged error. *Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*779 F.3d 1284, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015). Mendez-Gonzalez argues that he could not challenge the notice of removal because it was written in and explained to him in English, but we presume that the Department complied with a regulation requiring it to “provide ... a written translation ... or explain the contents of the Notice of Intent ... in a language that the alien understands,” 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2)(v). The record contains no evidence that Mendez-Gonzalez requested an interpreter, despite having received such assistance in two criminal proceedings. We deny this part of Mendez-Gonzalez’s petition.

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0608

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

BILLIE JO HENDERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including July 5, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and 

serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 29 2024

05/29/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0608
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0833 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0833

**2002/833/EC: Commission Decision of 22 October 2002 amending Decision 2000/672/EC laying down special conditions governing imports of fishery products originating in Venezuela (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 3902) **

*
Official Journal L 285 , 23/10/2002 P. 0022 - 0025 *

Commission Decision

of 22 October 2002

amending Decision 2000/672/EC laying down special conditions governing imports of fishery products originating in Venezuela

(notified under document number C(2002) 3902)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/833/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 laying down the health conditions for the production and the placing on the market of fishery products(1), as last amended by Directive 97/79/EC(2), and in particular Article 11(5) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Decision 2000/672/EC of 20 October 2000 laying down special conditions governing imports of fishery products originating in Venezuela(3), states that the "Servicio Autonomo de Recursos Pesqueros (SARPA) of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria" is to be the competent authority in Venezuela for verifying and certifying compliance of fishery and aquaculture products with the requirements of Directive 91/493/EEC.

(2) Following a restructuring of the Venezuelan administration, the competent authority for issuing health certificates for fishery products has changed to the "Instituto Nacional de la Pesca y Acuacultura (INAPESCA)". This new authority is capable of effectively verifying the application of the laws in force.

(3) Decision 2000/672/EC should therefore be amended accordingly.

(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2000/672/EC is modified as follows:

1. Article 1 is replaced by the following: "Article 1

The 'Instituto Nacional de la Pesca y Acuacultura (Inapesca)' shall be the competent authority in Venezuela for verifying and certifying compliance of fishery and aquaculture products with the requirements of Directive 91/493/EEC."

2. In Article 3, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. Certificates must bear the name, capacity and signature of the representative of the Inapesca and the latter's official stamp in a colour different from that of other endorsements".

3. Annex A is replaced by the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall apply from 7 December 2002.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 22 October 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 15.

(2) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 31.

(3) OJ L 280, 4.11.2000, p. 46.

ANNEX

"ANNEX A

>PIC FILE= "L_2002285EN.002403.TIF">

>PIC FILE= "L_2002285EN.002501.TIF">"
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 27, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00732

- CR

Eric Nathaniel REEL

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From th e 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR11077

Honorable Ray Olivarri, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On March 18, 2020, we ordered appellant to file a pro se brief by May 4, 2020 should h e

desire to file one. On April 24, 2020, appellant filed a motion requesting an extension of time.

After consideration, we GRANT appellant’s request for an extension and ORDER appellant’s

pr o se brief due by June 3, 2020.

_________________ __________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 27th day of April, 2020

.

___________________ _____ M ichael A. C ruz

, Clerk of Court
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Roderick Deone HALL, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-10665 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 4, 2017

Kathryn Rumsey, James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Christopher Allen Curtis, Assistant Federal Public Defender Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, David E. Sloan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Roderick Deone Hall appeals the district court’s decision to revoke his term of supervised release. He argues that the district court erred by failing to consider substance abuse treatment, in lieu of incarceration, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, p.s., comment, (n.6). He also argues that the district court erred by imposing a 24-month term of imprisonment, which was lower than the statutory maximum but above the guidelines range of 4 to 10 months of imprisonment.

As Hall did not raise these arguments in the district court, review is for plain error. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). In addition to failing drug testing, which would implicate the § 3588(d) exception, Hall violated the conditions of his supervised release by using and possessing cocaine and alcohol. Hall has failed to show any plain error. *See, e.g., United States v. Harper,*No. 01-10623, 2002 WL 494731, at *1-2 (5th Cir. March 15, 2002) (unpublished) (affirming revocation on similar grounds); see *also United States v. Guerrero-Robledo,*565 F.3d 940, 946 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It certainly is not plain error for the district court to rely on an unpublished opinion that is squarely on point.”).

Additionally, the record reflects that the district court considered the relevant statutory factors in its determination that a guidelines range sentence would be inadequate. *See*§ 3583(e) (setting forth appro*406priate 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that the district court may consider in the revocation context). Moreover, Hall’s disagreement with the decision does not demonstrate an abuse of the district court’s wide sentencing discretion. *See United States v. Miller,*634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 709 Engrossed in House (EH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 709

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To provide for the termination of employment of employees of the 
    Internal Revenue Service who take certain official actions for 
                          political purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prevent Targeting at the IRS Act''.

SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
              FOR TAKING OFFICIAL ACTIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (10) of section 1203(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 is amended to read 
as follows:
            ``(10) performing, delaying, or failing to perform (or 
        threatening to perform, delay, or fail to perform) any official 
        action (including any audit) with respect to a taxpayer for 
        purpose of extracting personal gain or benefit or for a 
        political purpose.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 15, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
114th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 709

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To provide for the termination of employment of employees of the 
    Internal Revenue Service who take certain official actions for 
                          political purposes.
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aldrick James LOTT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-11993 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 8, 2017)

Nicole D. Mariani, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Laura Thomas Rivero, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Carmen M. Lineberger, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Pierce, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Bonnie Phillips-Williams, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for De-' fendant-Appellant

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Aldrick James Lott raises three arguments aimed at demonstrating that the district court erred in sentencing him. He maintains the district court erred by (1) enhancing his sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he had no violent felo*890nies or serious drug offenses; (2) improperly relying on *non-Shepard*
      *1*
      **documents when sentencing him; and (3) improperly enhancing his sentence with convictions that were neither charged in the indictment nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, we affirm.

Mr. Lott concedes that this Court’s binding precedent forecloses the argument that his prior convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)) do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. *See United States v. Smith,*775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). He also acknowledges that his conviction for resisting arrest with violence (in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.01) qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA. *See United States v. Hill,*799 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Although Mr. Lott believes *Smith*and *Hill*were wrongly decided, we are bound by those decisions.

Binding precedent also bars Mr. Lott’s argument that the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence had to be charged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. *See, e.g., Smith,*775 F.3d at 1265 (“The Constitution does not require that the government allege in its indictment and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [a defendant] had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.”) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). So we reject that argument too.

Finally, there is no evidence supporting Mr. Lott’s contention that the district court improperly relied on non *-Shepard*documents at sentencing to determine whether his prior convictions qualified as predicates under the ACCA. This claim is predicated on the argument that this Court’s published cases wrongly concluded that his Florida convictions categorically qualify under the ACCA. *See*Hr. Tr., D.E. 69, at 6-11. The district court, however, merely followed these binding Eleventh Circuit cases.

AFFIRMED.

. *Shepard v. United States,*544 U.S, 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**


**and**


**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
      connection with the Annual Report of Loreto Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
      10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Magdalena Cruz, Chief
      Executive and Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that;





(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




/s/
                Magdalena Cruz
 Name:
              Magdalena
                  CruzTitle:
              Chief
                  Executive and Financial OfficerDate:
              March
                  31, 2008
#### Aror Ark O’DIAH, Appellant v. Richard CORDRAY, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Appellees

No. 17-5170

September Term, 2017

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed On: November 20, 2017

*6Aror Ark O’Diah, Pro Se

R. Craig Lawrence, U.S, Attorney’s Office, (USA) Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees

BEFORE: Kavanaugh and Millett, Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and the petition for judicial intervention, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s June 23, 2017 order be affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant’s case without prejudice on the ground that the complaint did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Appellant’s complaint did not contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for judicial intervention be denied. Appellant has shown no basis for granting the requested relief.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Royce NEWTON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11670 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 15, 2017

Royce Newton, Pro Se

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Royce Newton, federal prisoner # 25725-177, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment. Proceeding pro se, Newton challenges the district court’s denial of the Government’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)(1). He also moves for appointment of counsel.

As Newton acknowledges, he did not file a timely notice of appeal following the district court’s October 13, 2016 order denying the Government’s Rule 35(b)(1) motion. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Newton’s pro se motion requesting the district court to reconsider its denial of the Government’s Rule 35(b)(1) motion was filed more than 14 days after entry of the district court’s October 13, 2016 order. Thus, Newton’s pro se motion cannot serve as a motion to reconsider that judgment. *See United States v Greenwood,*974 F.2d 1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, to the extent that Newton appeals the denial of his pro se motion, he “has appealed from the denial of a meaningless, unauthorized motion” that had no jurisdictional basis. *See United States v. Early,*27 F.3d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1994).

Because a timely notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional prerequisite in criminal cases, *see United States v. Martinez,*496 F.3d 387, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2007), we can review the underlying order denying the Government’s Rule 35(b)(1) motion. However, Newton has failed to show that the *390district court’s decision was illegal “or a gross abuse of discretion.” *See United States v. Nerren,*613 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Newton’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Paul DOWNEY; Jeffry P. Downey, Defendants-Appellants

No. 16-11578 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed November 16, 2017

Benjamin M. Vetter, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, B. David Fraser, Senior Attorney, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Paul Downey, Pro Se

Jeffry P. Downey, Pro Se

Before PRADO, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Paul R. Downey and Jeffry P. Downey alleging that they violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Downeys appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC on the fraud allegations, arguing that the district court erred by denying their motion for extension of time to respond to the SEC’s motion and generally arguing that the court erred by granting the summary judgment motion. They move this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).

The district court denied the motion for extension of time finding that the certificate of conference contained in the motion failed to comply with a local civil rule because it failed to explain why it was not possible to confer with opposing counsel regarding whether he would oppose the Downeys’ motion. *See*N.D, Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(3). The Downeys have offered no reason, much less an impelling one, for finding that the district court abused its discretion in applying the local rules to their case. *See Victor F. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist.,*793 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1986). They have not shown that the denial of the motion for extension of time for failure to comply with the local rules was an inappropriate exercise of the district court’s discretion. *See id.*at 636. In addition, the Downeys have failed to adequately brief their argument that the district court erred by granting the SEC’s summary judgment motion; as such, they have abandoned the claim on appeal. *See Brink*
      *400
      *mann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Because the instant appeal is without merit and is therefore frivolous, IT IS ORDERED that the Downeys’ motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and their appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47,5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.