alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
2010 DEC - b P 2: 18 

,*•• »»•'•. •'-• V 

November 15,2010 

* • 

"1 

Kt^'v 

Hearing Docket 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Orville Wright Building 

800 Independence Avenue S. W., Washington D. C. 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC -430 

Wilbur Wright Building—Suite 2W1000 

Re: IntheMatterof Air Z Flying Service Inc. . ^ r> IA— f:i 

FAA Docket No. (to be assigned) : Case No. 2009SW910051 Qjpj D ^ W^ ^ 0 / (=f{[A 

2o;o'091V 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

Enclosed please FIND the answer of the respondent. Air Z Flying Service, to the above- referenced 

case: 

Sincerely, 

Laurence E. Rohl, 

President, Air Z Flying Service Inc. 

355 Richmond Rd. Hangar 5 

Richmond Heights, Ohio 

26300 Curtiss Wright Parlcway • Richmond Heights, Ohio 44143 

Phone (216) 261-2992 • Toll Free (866) 953-2992 • Fax (216) 261-2993 • www.airzflyingservice.com 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

In the matter of 

AIR Z FLYING SERVICE INC. 

FAA Docket No. CP (to be assigned) 

Case No. 2009 SW910051 

JUDGE: (to be assigned) 

Respondent Air Z Flying Service Inc., by and through its president, Laurence E Rohl, 

and states for its answer to the complaint as follows: 

The allegations of Section I are admitted. 

The allegations of Sections n responded to as follows: 

The allegations of paragraph 1 are admitted. 

The allegations of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint are denied for want of knowledge. 

The allegations of paragraph 6 are denied and denied for want of knowledge. 

The allegations of Section m are denied, and denied for want of knowledge. 

Affirmative Defenses: 

The complaint is barred by the statute of limitations 
The complaint is barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches and estoppel. 

The complaint is barred by intervening and superseding events of third parties over which 

respondent has no control 

The complaint is barred by the failure to join necessary and indispensible parties. 

Any allegations of the complaint not specifically admitted, are hereby denied. 

The respondent requests that the hearing be held in Cleveland, Ohio. 

Respectfijlly Submitted, 

Laurence E. Rohl, President 

Air Z Flying Service Inc. 

355 Richmond Rd. Hangar 5 

Richmond Heights, Ohio 44143 

216-261-2992 
Certificate of Service 

A copy of this answer to the complaint was served this 1-^ day of November 2010 by 

regular mail and certified mail on: 

1. Agnes Rodriguez, Senior Attorney, Enforcement Division, AGC-300, Federal Aviation 

i Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, 800 Independence Ave. S.W. Washington D. C. 20591. 

i 

I 2. Hearing Docket, Federal Aviation Administration, Orville Wright Building, 800 Independence 

I Avenue S. W., Washington D. C. 20591 

i 

i Laurence E. Rohl 

^ f 

a
From: Kenneth Winder [mailto:kwinder@mleainc.com] 

Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 9:55 PM 

To: Richard Parker 

Cc: Rosenstock, Steven; Christopher Bolduc; Eric.Petersen@aksteel.com; 

Aaron.Meyers@cooperindustries.com; adelaski@standardsasap.org; ahofmann@publicpower.org; Aris 

Marantan; artrosenfeld@gmail.com; august.esch@gmail.com; BermanEconomics@gmail.com; Brian 

Coffey; bruce.r.hirsch@bge.com; bsmith@federalpacific.com; Caitlin Johnson; carlos.gaytan@ge.com; 

carlosgsiqueiros@eaton.com; chad.kennedy@us.schneider-electric.com; charlied@uss.org; 

chuck.simmons@pgnmail.com; Cla_Silcox@nema.org; cstephens@neea.org; Daniel.Cohen@hq.doe.gov; 

dave.millure@metglas.com; DYoung@energy-solution.com; eduardorobles@eaton.com; gbf1@pge.com; 

gjrosenquist@lbl.gov; greg.coulter405@gmail.com; James.Lass@cleco.com; 

Jennifer.Tiedeman@hq.doe.com; Jeremiah.Freeman@ee.doe.gov; jerry.corkran@cooperindustries.com; 

jerry.schoen@aksteel.com; jhodge@howard-ind.com; Jim.creevy@nema.org; Jim.Raba@ee.doe.gov; 

jmauer@standardsasap.org; Joh_Caskey@nema.org; john.cymbalsky@ee.doe.gov; jrossetti@mlgw.org; 

kcoughlin@lbl.gov; maheshsampat@bellsouth.net; mark.stoering@xcelenergy.com; Matthew Nardotti; 

mhyland@appanet.org; Michael Rivest; mwaltner@nrdc.org; Paul.Ryan@hitmet.com; phil@pjharter.com; 

phopkinson@hvolt.com; pkumar@publicpower.org; Raymond.Polinski@atimetals.com; 

rgreeson@federalpacific.com; rick.anderson@faypwc.com; robert.saint@nreca.coop; rroy@nrdc.org; 

ScottB@lvmetals.com; snadel@aceee.org; tballo@earthjustice.org; Teckman@nwcouncil.org; 

thomas.patzner@us.schneider-electric.com; vijay.tendulkar@onyxpower.com; Zhimei Luo 

Subject: Re: More Pole Change-out Data 

Mr. Parker and Committee: 

 Two additional Cooperative estimates for the cost of a pole change-out are attached. They are 

respectively: 1. $1,703.86 for a pole in a three-phase line, and 2. $1,380.27 for a pole in a 

single-phase line and $2,944.91 for a pole in a three-phase line. 

 Additionally, a North Carolina Cooperative estimates $3,470 for change-out of a pole in a 

three-phase line. 

Ken 

-- 

Kenneth A. Winder, P.E.

Manager-Engineering

Moon Lake Electric Association 

800 W Hwy 40 

PO Box 278 

Roosevelt UT 84066

435.722.5406 Office

435.724.1539 Cell 

435.722.5466 Fax

E-Mail: kwinder@mleainc.com

Web Site: www.mleainc.com
Wind 

South Dakota 

Gov. Dennis Daugaard 

Chairman May 7, 2014 

Washington 

Gov. Jay Inslee 

Vice Chairman

The Honorable Gina McCarthy 

Administrator 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agcncy 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20460 

Dear Administrator McCarthy: 

As leaders of the Governors' Wind Energy Coalition, we want to express our support for wind 

energy as an eligible measure for states to utilize in achieving compliance under the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation of carbon emissions from existing power 

plants. We understand EPA is currently working on such rulemaking under section 111(d) of 

the Clean Air Act. Although some of our members do not agree with this proposed EPA 

action, we all urge you to consider wind energy as an effective andproven clean energy source 

for our consumers and businesses, as well as its positive impact on economic development in 

our states. 

There are now more than 60,000 megawatts of installed wind energy capacity in 39 states with 

an additional 12,000 megawatts under construction. In fact, wind energy makes up more than 

25 percent of the electricity generated in lowa and South Dakota, 12 percent in nine other 

states, and five percent in an additional 17 states. Moreover, regional grid operators and 

individual utility systems have effectively managed higher levels of wind energy penetration. 

Since 2005, wind power capacity in the U.S. has increased nine tinies over, supporting over 

80,000 jobs and driving a new manufacturing sector with over 550 facilities across the country. 

We urge the EPA to appropriately recognize wind energy and other renewable energy sources 

that can reduce carbon emissions. Additionally, EPA should give states flexibility in meeting 

EPA requirements, expedite approval of state plans, reduce state and federal administrative 

burdens, and provide credit for the clean energy investments that have already been made to 

improve our nation's energy future. 

On behalf of the coalition, we respectfully urge you to support wind energy's potential to 

further reduce carbon emissions while helping to maintain the reliability and affordability of 

the nation's electricity system. Thank you. 

Sincerely, 

4W.U4 G^ 

Dennis Daugaard Jay [nslee 

Chairman, Vice Chairman, 

Governor of South Dakota Governor of Washington 

cc: Members, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

Members, House Energy and Commerce Committee 

Honorable Ernest Moniz, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy
#### Joseph COPPOLA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Terry O’BRIEN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. Joseph Coppola, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Terry O’Brien, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7316, No. 17-6026

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 30, 2017

Decided: June 8, 2017

Joseph Coppola, Appellant Pro Se. Helen Campbell Altmeyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia; Erin K. Reisenweber, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee..

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Joseph Coppola, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting in part the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition without prejudice. Coppola also appeals the court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in either order. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Coppola v. O’Brien,*No. 3:15-cv-00096-GMG-RWT, 2016 WL 4702441 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 8, 2016; Dec. 7, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### Renard Truman POLK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dwayne DEAL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-17491

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 21, 2017

Renard Truman Polk, Pro Se

D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas), Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Renard Truman Polk, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio,*836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment); *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (failure to ex*616haust administrative remedies); *Jones v. Blanas,*393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (statute of limitations). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as untimely Polk’s claims arising from the alleged taking of Polk’s personal property in 2008, 2009, and 2010 because Polk filed' this action years after the statute of limitations had run. *See Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer,*753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Nevada is two years).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies Polk’s claims arising from the confiscation of his personal property because Polk failed to raise a genuine dispute of material facts as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion not required when administrative remedy is unavailable).

The district court properly dismissed Polk’s claim based on deductions from his inmate account for legal materials because the deductions were authorized by a valid act of the Nevada legislature, and the legislative process satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. *See*Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.246(3)('a)-(c) (authorizing deductions from an inmate’s personal account for postage, legal photocopies, legal supplies and other costs “related to litigation” that the prison incurs on behalf of the inmate); *Halverson v. Skagit County,*42 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[General notice as provided by law is sufficient.”).

Polk’s pending motion (Docket Entry No. 31) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Johnnie FRAZIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lt. JUNE; Ofc. Martinez; Lt. Kirkland; Lt. Marquez, Defendants-Appellees, and Michael McCall, Dir. of Programs; Ofc. Hunter; Sgt. Williams; Cpl. Wilson; Lt. Bowman; Sgt. Bozwell; Nurse Brown; Nurse Irving; Nurse Tomas, Defendants.

No. 16-6677

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 11, 2017

Johnnie Frazier, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa Arlene Thomas, THOMPSON & HENRY, PA, Conway, South Carolina, for Appel-lees.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Johnnie Frazier appeals the district court’s judgment following a jury trial on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action. On appeal, Frazier requests the trial transcript, asserts that the district court erred in allowing the introduction of prior bad acts evidence, and contends that he was *354not permitted to decontaminate following the guards’ use of pepper spray on him, a claim of excessive force.

An appellant proceeding on appeal in forma pauperis is entitled to transcripts at government expense only in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 758(f) (2012). Frazier’s general allegations fail to demonstrate “a substantial question warranting the production of a transcript at government expense.” *Williams v. Ozmint,*716 F.3d 801, 811 (4th Cir. 2013). Moreover, we will not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations, *United States v. Kivanc,*714 F.3d 782, 795 (4th Cir. 2013), so we will not disturb the jury’s verdict on the excessive force claim. Finally, as the events at issue occurred in a prison during a tussle with guards, we discern no prejudice from the admission of Frazier’s criminal or disciplinary record.

As no error appears on the record before us, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
**Exhibit
      32.2**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of GCA II Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-K for the period ending May 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael M. Membrado,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                Michael M. MembradoMichael
                M. Membrado
              Principal
                Financial Officer
              August
                29, 2008
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 782

To amend the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management

Relations Act, 1947, to permit additional remedies in certain unfair

labor practice cases, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 9 (legislative day, MAY 1), 1995

Mr. SIMON introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

A BILL

To amend the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor

Management Relations Act, 1947, to permit additional

remedies in certain unfair labor practice cases, and for

other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Labor Relations Rem5 edies Act of 1995’’.

6 SEC. 2. BOARD REMEDIES.

7 Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act

8 (29 U.S.C. 160(c)) is amended by inserting after the
2

•S 782 IS

1 fourth sentence the following new sentence: ‘‘If the Board

2 finds that an employee was discharged as a result of an

3 unfair labor practice, the Board in such order shall (1)

4 award back pay in an amount equal to three times the

5 employee’s wage rate at the time of the unfair labor prac6 tice and (2) notify such employee of such employee’s right

7 to sue for punitive damages and damages with respect to

8 a wrongful discharge under section 303 of the Labor Man9 agement Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C. 187), as amend10 ed by the Labor Relations Remedies Act of 1995.’’.

11 SEC. 3. COURT REMEDIES.

12 Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,

13 1947 (29 U.S.C. 187), is amended by adding at the end

14 the following new subsections:

15 ‘‘(c) It shall be unlawful, for purposes of this section,

16 for any employer to discharge an employee for exercising

17 rights protected under the National Labor Relations Act

18 (29 U.S.C. 158).

19 ‘‘(d) An employee whose discharge is determined by

20 the National Labor Relations Board under section 10(c)

21 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 160(c))

22 to be as a result of an unfair labor practice under section

23 8 of such Act may file a civil action in any district court

24 of the United States, without respect to the amount in

25 controversy, to recover punitive damages or if actionable,
3

•S 782 IS

1 in any State court to recover damages based on a wrongful

2 discharge.’’.

Æ
#### IN RE: Lamont Demetress BOLDEN, Petitioner.

No. 17-2202

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 16, 2017

Decided: November 20, 2017

Lamont Demetress Bolden, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lamont Demetress Bolden petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the district court’s docket reveals that the district court granted Bolden’s motion on October 11, 2017. Accordingly, because the district court has recently decided Bolden’s case, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We grant leave to proceed in forma pau-peris. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be*185fore this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
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EXHIBIT 4.7    
  


May 23,
2002 


Mr. Sandy
Tennant

Nefilim Associates, LLC

130 Atlantic Avenue

Swampscott, Massachusetts 01907 


RE:        Contract Status—Termination  


Dear
Sandy: 


        Per
our recent discussions of you contract, we will pay the additional draws of $20,000 that you have requested. You have indicated that we will have a "credit" on account for additional
business and any cash compensation that may be due to you in the future. 



        Regarding
option grants, you will find enclosed copies of the two stock option grants due under your contract. Each grant is for 6,250 shares. The first grant is at the closing market
price on the date before the grant, or $4.05 per share. The second grant is at the closing market price on the date before the grant, less ten percent, or $2.61. 


        On
additional options for the Blair funding, my view is that it is not reasonable to pay additional options for money invested by Marvin, Kris, or you. You received a substantial warrant
position as part of your investment and additional options were not intended to be paid on what is essentially our own money. 



        On
a go forward basis, we need to bring a laser focus to our business pursuits. Therefore, we need to terminate our contractual arrangement. To that end, in accordance with
paragraph 7 of our Independent Contractor Services Agreement dated December 3, 2001, we are hereby giving notice of cancellation. We will no longer reimburse expenses and will only pay
commissions—at a rate to be agreed upon—based upon actual transactions closed. 


        If
we do well, you do well on the SSP investment instruments that you hold. As you come across opportunities that fit with our business, it would make sense for us to discuss those with
you. We look forward to moving our business forward and generating substantial returns on your investments in SSP. 


Sincerely
yours, 


/s/  THOMAS E. SCHIFF      


Thomas
E. Schiff
 Chief Financial Officer


	Cc:
	Marvin
Winkler

Richard Depew

Kris Shah 









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EXHIBIT 4.7
#### Paul DEN BESTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick BULMER, AKA California Receivership Services, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-15612

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 27, 2017

*571Paul Den Beste, Pro Se

Steven Marc Olson, Attorney, Law Office of Steven M. Olson, Santa Rosa, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Paul Den Beste appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying a motion for rehearing of its order dismissing his bankruptcy appeal for failure to prosecute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for rehearing. *United States v. Fowler (In re Fowler),*394 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Den Beste’s motion for rehearing because Den Beste did not show that the district court erred in dismissing his appeal for failure to prosecute after it provided multiple opportunities to comply with its orders and warned Den Beste that a failure to do so would result in dismissal. *See*Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2); *Fowler,*394 F.3d at 1214-15 (a motion for rehearing must state with particularity each point of law or fact the court overlooked); *see also Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen),*31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A reviewing court will give deference to the district court to decide what is unreasonable because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.