alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Max MCDANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6716

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 10, 2017

Decided: October 19, 2017

Larry Max McDaniel, Appellant Pro Se. William Miller Gilmore, Roberto Francisco Ramirez, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Larry Max McDaniel seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motions as successive. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012); *Buck v. Davis,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 759, 773, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017); *Jones v. Braxton,*392 F.3d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appeal-ability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).

When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McDaniel has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In  connection  with the Annual  Report of Natural Gas Services  Group,
Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended  December 31, 2004, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Earl R. Wait,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the  Company,  hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.       The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2.       The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.



                                                          /s/  Earl R. Wait
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Earl R. Wait
                                                         Chief Financial Officer


                                                         May 3, 2005
#### INTERCOLLEGIATE BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Appellant v. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD and David S. Mao, Librarian of Congress, Appellees

No. 16-1198

September Term, 2016

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Filed: 12/29/2016

LOC-81FR31506

William R. Malone, Esquire, Law Office of William R. Malone, New Canaan, CT, for Appellant.

Sushma Soni, Mark Reiling Freeman, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant’s consent motion for voluntary dismissal, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted and this case be dismissed.

The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

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2 Case: 09-50957 Document: 00511222276 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/01/2010
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
        SOUTH SEAS PROPERTIES COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
CALCULATION OF WEIGHTED AVERAGE UNITS OUTSTANDING
                                                             EXHIBIT 99

The weighted average number of partnership units used in the computation
of earnings per unit is as follows:

                                                     Six Months
                                                   Ended June 30
                                                   1996         1997 
<S>                                                 <C>         <C>
  Actual number of units
   outstanding at the beginning of the
      period                                        4,308,568   4,426,568

     Weighted average number of units issued      
       during the period                               22,667            0

     Weighted average number of units 
      outstanding during the period                 4,331,235   4,426,568

</TABLE>
```

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 13370]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04992]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee; Notice of 
Meeting

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee (ETAAC) 
will hold a public meeting via ``Zoom'' on Wednesday, March 23, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Sean Parman, Office of National 
Public Liaison, at (202) 317-6247, or send an email to 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given pursuant to section 
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988), 
that a public meeting via conference call of the ETAAC will be held on 
Wednesday, March 23, 2022, from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. EDT. The purpose 
of the ETAAC is to provide continuing advice regarding the development 
and implementation of the IRS organizational strategy for electronic 
tax administration. ETAAC is an organized public forum for discussion 
of electronic tax administration issues such as prevention of identity 
theft and refund fraud. It supports the overriding goal that paperless 
filing should be the preferred and most convenient method of filing tax 
and information returns. ETAAC members convey the public's perceptions 
of IRS electronic tax administration activities, offer constructive 
observations about current or proposed policies, programs, and 
procedures, and suggest improvements. Please call or email Sean Parman 
to confirm your attendance. Mr. Parman can be reached at 202-317-6247 
or [email protected]. Should you wish the ETAAC to consider a 
written statement, please call 202-317-6247 or email: 
[email protected].

    Dated: March 3, 2022.
John A. Lipold,
Designated Federal Official, Office of National Public Liaison, 
Internal Revenue Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-04992 Filed 3-8-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
```
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-6148



# 
A RTHURW. P RIVOTT , a/k/a Big Bud,

Defendant-Appellant. 

# 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CR-98-5, CA-99-73-2-BO) Submitted: February 26, 2002 Decided: March 29, 2002 Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Arthur W. Privott, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION
PER CURIAM: Arthur W. Privott appeals from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001) motion, attacking his conviction and sentence for violating 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001). For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. Privott claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal following his sentencing. The district court rejected this claim, finding that Privott failed to show prejudice. This finding was erroneous, however, under this court’s decision in United States v. Peak , 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1993). In Peak , we held that counsel’s failure to pursue an appeal requested by a defendant constitutesineffective assistance of counsel regardless of the likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Thus, if counsel promises to note an appeal and then fails to do so, petitioner is entitled to relief in the form of a belated appeal. Id. ; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470 (2000). We note that this case differs from Peak in that the parties dispute whether Privott directed his counsel to file a notice of appeal. Further, the record is unclear as to whether or not Privott’s counsel consultedwith him regarding an appeal. Even if a defendant does not specifically instruct counsel to appeal, counsel may still have a duty to consult with his client about an appeal. Roe , 528 U.S. at 478. These issues must be addressed in the first instance by the district court. Accordingly, we grant a certificate of appealability and vacate the district court’s order and remand for compliance with this opinion, Peak , and Roe . We decline to address any other claims on appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentionsare adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED 2 U NITED S TATES v. P RIVOTT
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 1796

KATHERINE B. ROBINSON; DANA B. WILLIAMS , Plaintiffs

- Appellants ,

v. CHESAPEAKE BANK OF MARYLAND; PROCTOR FINANCIAL, INC. , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Catherine C. Blake , District Judge. ( 1:16

- cv
- 04119

- CCB )

Submitted : November 21, 2017 Decided: November 27, 2017

Before WYNN and THACKER , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Katherine B. Robinson, Dana B. Williams, Appellants Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Appellants seek to appeal the di strict court’s February 2017 order dismissing without prejudice their civil complaint against Defendants after Appellants failed to comply with the district court’s previous order directing that the complaint be supplemented

. However, Appellants previousl y appealed the district court’s dismissal
order to this court , and we dismissed that appeal

. See Robinson v. Chesapeake Bank of
Md. , 691 F. App ’ x 782 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17

- 1217 ). B ecause we have previously dismissed an appeal of this order , and since Appellants’ notice of appeal was filed beyond the 30

- day appeal period, s ee Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (providing that in civil cases in which the United States is a not party, parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judg ment or order to note an appeal) , we dismiss this appeal as duplicative and untimely. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the dec isional process.
DISMISSED

* To the extent that the notice of appeal could be construed as attempting to challenge the district court’s February 21, 2017 , return pleading order, the notice of appeal is untimely as to this order as well

.
#### John Claflin *et al,*Resp’ts, *v.*John F. Eagan *et al,*App’lts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed April 17, 1891.)*

Venue—Change of.

An action to set aside an assignment for creditors should be removed to the county in which all the transactions in question took place, where it appears that a large number of witnesses on the question of their good faith reside in said county, and the motion to change the venue to said county cannot be defeated by a stipulation by plaintiffs that they will not call any witnesses to contradict defendants' evidence if they will confine it to two i interested witnesses.

Appeal from an order entered upon a motion made by the defendants to change the place of trial from New York county to the county of Dutchess.

This action is brought to set aside an assignment for the benefit of creditors made by the defendants Eagan & Hunt to the defendant Wood. There was no real estate conveyed by the said assignment, so that the title thereto is not involved, and the motion is based solely on the ground of the convenience of witnesses.

The court below held that the motion should be denied upon plaintiffs making the stipulations specified in their affidavits.

The court, upon a former hearing, delivered the following opinion:

Per Curiam.-—The affidavits used upon the hearing of the motion fully justified the order which was made, sending this case to Dutchess county for trial, where the transactions occurred upon which its disposition depends.

The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

*Charles Morschauser,*for app’lts ; *Kneeland, Stewart & Epstein,*for resp’ts.

*7Van Brunt, P. J.

When this appeal was before the court upon a previous occasion, the court fell into the error of supposing that the motion to change the venue had been granted, and upon examination of the papers saw no reason why they should interfere with that supposed result.

It is supposed by the respondents, that by the stipulation which they have made, they have avoided the claim of the appellants in respect to the number of their witnesses.

The whole of the transactions which are the subject of this action occurred in Dutchess county, and their good faith depends upon the evidence which the defendants can offer in respect thereto, and they cannot be deprived of the right to such evidence by a stipulation upon the part of the plaintiffs that they will not call any witnesses to comradict the evidence of the defendants if they will confine it to two interested witnesses. It may be true that the stipulation might avoid the necessity of calling two or three of the defendants’ witnesses, but that is all. It is evident that the plaintiffs have amplified the number of witnesses beyond tbe number intended to be called, as is too usual in cases of this description.

We think that all these transactions having arisen in Dutchess county, and it being apparent that a large number of witnesses there residing must be called, the order appealed from should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted.

Daniels and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
#### The Farmers’ National Bank of Fort Edward, Respondent, *v.*Warren Leland et al., Appellants.

(Argued November 13, 1872;

decided November 19, 1872.)

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, affirming an order of Special Term striking out defendant’s answer as sham. The action was upon a promissory note, alleged to have been transferred to plaintiff, for value, before maturity. Defendants denied the transfer upon information and belief, and alleged if transferred it was after maturity, and set up as recoupment damages for breach of contract upon, which note was given. The motion to strike out answer was made upon affidavits, showing the transfer of the note before maturity, for a valuable consideration, without notice. The order appealed from was reversed upon authority of *Wayland*v. *Tyson*(45 N. Y., 281), and *Thompson*v. *Erie R. R. Co.*(id., 468).

*674
      *Pond do French*for the appellants.

*L.*21 *Forthrujp*for the respondent.

Order reversed; no opinion.
#### Flora ANTONIO DE VENEGAS, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-70441

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 20, 2017

James B. Rudolph, Esquire, Attorney, Rudolph, Baker & Associates, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner

Carlton Frederick Sheffield, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Flora Antonio de Venegas, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her motion to terminate removal proceedings and ordering her removed. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agen-cjfs factual findings and review de novo questions of law. *Ali v. Holder,*637 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on implausibility in Antonio de Venegas’ and her husband’s testimony, and inconsistencies between Antonio de Vene-gas’s testimony and information contained in the record of sworn statement. *See Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (adverse credibility determination supported under the totality of circumstances). Antonio de Venegas’s explanations do not compel a contrary result. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Antonio de Venegas is removable under 8 U.S.C. § U82(a)(6)(E)(i), for knowingly assisting another alien in seeking entry into the United States in violation of the law. *See Altamirano v. Gonzales,*427 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring an affirmative act of assistance in order to establish alien smuggling).

We reject Antonio de Venegas’ contention that the BIA failed to consider evidence. *See Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not write an exegesis on every contention); *Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner did not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,