#### Maria MOULTHROP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael SLAVIN, Lieutenant, Waterbury Police Department, City of Waterbury, in his individual and Official Capacities, David McKnight, Detective, Waterbury Police Department, City of Waterbury, in his Individual and Official Capacities, Orlando Rivera, Detective, Waterbury Police Department, City of Waterbury, in his Individual and Official Capacities, Vernon Riddick, Chief, Waterbury Police Department, City of Waterbury, in his Individual and Official Capacities, Neil O’Leary, Mayor, City of Waterbury, in his Official Capacity, Paul Guidone, Mary Ann Marold, Education Liaison, Waterbury Public Schools, City of Waterbury, in her Individual Capacity, Doreen Biolo, Business Office Manager, Waterbury Public Schools, in her Individual Capacity, Thomas Pannone, Frederick L. Dorsey, Defendant-Appellees, TD Bank, N.A., Defendant.

17-959-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 7, 2017

*76FOR APPELLANT: Norman Pattis, Pattis & Smith, Law Firm, New Haven, CT.

FOR APPELLEES: Joseph A. Mengac-ci, Esq., Office of the Corporation Counsel, Waterbury, CT.

PRESENT: Dennis Jacobs, Robert D. Sack, Barrington D. Parker, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Maria Moulthrop appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissing her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against certain municipal employees of Waterbury, Connecticut. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Moulthrop was placed on leave from her position as principal at Hopeville Elementary School in fall 2011 after the school district uncovered irregularities in student standardized testing. An internal investigation expanded into allegations of other improprieties, including mismanagement of funds allotted to Hopeville’s Parent Teacher Organization (PTO). A warrant for Moulthrop’s arrest was issued on the strength of an affidavit based on investigations by the Waterbury Police Department (the “Police defendants”). Statements of school employees (the “District defendants”) included allegations that the Hopeville PTO was long defunct, had no directives, and was operated solely by Moulthrop for her personal projects. The District defendants alleged unsanctioned fundraising and personal expenditures with school funds were siphoned into the PTO’s account. The affidavit also reflected a forensic accounting of the PTO’s account with TD Bank, which .uncovered, among other suspicious charges, a payment to repair Moulthrop’s personal car and purchases of a flat-screen television and a leafblower. See J. App’x at 115-17.

A magistrate judge signed the warrant and Moulthrop was arrested and charged with larceny. Moulthrop alleged a conspiracy by the teachers and police officers to remove her from her position by spinning stories about the mismanaged PTO. Without denying the TD Bank charges, she purportedly defended herself by explaining that most of the purchases were ultimately intended for the school and that the use of the PTO account for the car repairs had been an accident that she had attempted to correct with the merchant. The jury acquitted her of all charges.

Moulthrop’s suit against the city, the Police defendants, and the District defendants alleged, *inter alia,*false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and malicious prosecution. Count Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that Lieutenant Michael Slavin and Detective David McKnight knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the facts of her tenure as principal when they applied for the arrest warrant in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Count Three alleges that the District defendants “initiated” a malicious prosecution through their participation in the internal investigation that eventually led to the criminal prosecution. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Moulthrop appeals the dismissal of Counts Two and Three. “We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor *77of the plaintiff.” Trs. of the Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs PensionFund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016).

A plaintiff claiming false arrest under Section 1983 must show that the defendants intentionally confined her without consent and without justification. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). “The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Id. (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)); Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002). “Probable cause to arrest a person exists if the law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Valentine, 539 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008)(internal citations and quotations marks omitted). We consider the elements of the offense for which Moulthrop was arrested to assess the objective reasonableness of the officers’ belief. Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995).1

Moulthrop argues that the affidavit submitted by the police officers in support of the arrest warrant N contained material omissions and falsehoods from the teacher interviews jdiat, if corrected, vitiate the probable cause determination. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges an affiant knowingly or recklessly misrepresented information, she must show that “misstatements and omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)). “We assess the materiality of alleged misstatements in a warrant application by putting aside allegedly false material, supplying any omitted information, and then determining whether the contents of the ‘corrected affidavit’ would have supported a finding of probable cause” for the stated crime. Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1289 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As the district court concluded, probable cause would have existed solely on the basis of information in the affidavit that Moulthrop does not challenge, including that Moulthrop operated the PTO by herself, and bank records showing that the PTO paid Crestwood Ford more than $1,000 for repairs to Moulthrop’s car and bought a leaf blower not used at the school and a television and camera that were kept for a time at Moulthrop’s home. See State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn.App. 224, 991 A.2d 617, 624 (2010), aff'd 302 Conn. 340, 26 A.3d 75 (2011) (finding defendant guilty of larceny for issuing checks from a business account for personal use).

The “omissions” alleged by Moulthrop relate to the failures of the police defendants to conduct additional interviews as a part of their investigation (e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 102) and line-item details for particular transactions (e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 89). These items, if added to the affidavit would still not undermine probable cause to arrest Moulthrop for larceny. At best, her complaint can be read to offer partial ex post justification for what “a person of reasonable caution” may consider criminal activity-which does not negate probable *78cause. See Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (probable cause may still exist “where a police officer was presented with different stories from an alleged victim and the arrestee”).

A corrected affidavit would have supported a finding of probable cause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Moul-throp’s false arrest claim. And since a finding of “probable cause is a complete defense to a constitutional claim of malicious prosecution,” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014), Moulthrop’s remaining claims fail with it.

Finally, Moulthrop contends the district court abused its discretion in denying her leave to amend. See Cruz v. FXDirect-Dealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). As Moulthrop’s brief concedes, a “large universe of evidence [was] available to her from the [underlying] criminal proceedings” at the time she drafted her original and Amended Complaint. Appellant’s Br. 20. Moreover, probable cause existed purely on the basis of Moulthrop’s own concessions and undisputed facts, rendering futile any further amendments, to the pleadings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. The New York Times Co., 325 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2003).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Moulthrop’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

1

. Under Connecticut law, a conviction for larceny requires "(1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of the owner." State v. Chemlen, 165 Conn.App. 791, 140 A.3d 347, 369 (2016) (alterations in the original).