alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeal of

-- )

)

Southern Federal Pilot, Inc

. )

)

)

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Mr. Steven Par r ish

President

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Craig D. Jensen, Esq.

Navy Chief Trial Attorney

Henry D. Karp, Esq.

Trial Attorney

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: June 24 , 2020

MARK A. MELNICK

Administrative Judge

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 61119

, Appeal of Southern Federal

Pilot, Inc. , rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.

Dated: June 25, 2020 ASBCA No. 61119

Under Contract No. N68836

- 17

- D

- 0002

PAULLA K. GATES

- LEWIS

Recorder, Armed Services

Board of Contract Appeals
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 860

To require a General Accounting Office study of activities of the North/

South Center in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 25 (legislative day, MAY 15), 1995

Ms. SNOWE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To require a General Accounting Office study of activities

of the North/South Center in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY OF AC4 TIVITIES OF THE NORTH/SOUTH CENTER IN

5 SUPPORT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE

6 TRADE AGREEMENT.

7 (a) STUDY OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE NORTH/

8 SOUTH CENTER DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE NORTH

9 AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.—The Comptroller

10 General of the United States shall conduct a study on the
2

•S 860 IS

1 activities of the North/South Center located in Miami,

2 Florida that had the affect of encouraging Congress to

3 approve implementing legislation for the North American

4 Free Trade Agreement. This study shall include, but shall

5 not be limited to, consideration of whether any United

6 States Government funds were used for books (including

7 Assessments of the North American Free Trade Agree8 ment published in 1993), publications, or other activities

9 which had the affect of advocating congressional approval

10 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and wheth11 er such materials or activities violated any laws, regula12 tions, or guidelines on the use of Federal funds for lobby13 ing activities.

14 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than six

15 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comp16 troller General of the United States shall prepare and sub17 mit a report of the findings of such study to the Commit18 tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee on

19 International Relations of the House of Representatives.

Æ
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. WILLARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1190

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: August 23, 2017

Filed: September 5, 2017

W. Marcus (Marc) Ermine, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

David A. Willard, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.

Bruce E. Clark, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

David Willard appeals after the district court1 revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison with no additional supervised release. In counseled and pro se briefs, Willard challenges *770both the decision to revoke his supervised release and the resulting revocation sentence. We affirm.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Willard violated at least one condition of his supervised release, and we therefore further conclude that the revocation decision was proper. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (court may revoke supervised release if it finds by preponderance of evidence that defendant violated condition of supervised release); United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir. 2009) (for purposes of supervised-release revocation, factual findings are reviewed for clear error). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Willard, as his 24-month prison term did not exceed the statutory limit for his underlying Class C felony, it was within the undisputed advisory Guidelines range, and the court appropriately considered 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (maximum revocation prison term is 2 years if underlying offense is Class C felony; before revoking supervised release and imposing sentence, court must consider specified factors in § 3553(a)); United States v. Pe-treikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying presumption of substantive reasonableness to revocation sentence within Guidelines range); United States v. Merrival, 521 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Greg Kays, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6983 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, as the ‘‘Nell Patten 

Roquemore Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 11, 2024 

Mr. AUSTIN SCOTT of Georgia (for himself, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mr. 

BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia, Mr. MCCORMICK, Mrs. MCBATH, Mr. CLYDE, Mr. 

COLLINS, Mr. LOUDERMILK, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia, 

and Ms. GREENE of Georgia) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lakeland, Georgia, 

as the ‘‘Nell Patten Roquemore Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. NELL PATTEN ROQUEMORE POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 15 South Valdosta Road in Lake6 land, Georgia, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Nell 

7 Patten Roquemore Post Office’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6983 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Nell Patten 

5 Roquemore Post Office’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 10, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-50362 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ARNALDO RAFAEL VICENTE INFANTE-CABRERA, also known as Juan Santos, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-01-CR-1150-1-DB

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Arnaldo Rafael Vicente Infante-Cabrera appeals his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to import more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Infante-Cabrera argues that the district court did not adequately comply with F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11 at his guilty-plea hearing. He argues that the individual variances from the rule, as well as the cumulative effect of the individual variances,No. 02-50362 -2- were clear or obvious errors that affected his substantial rights. After reviewing the entire record, United States v. Vonn , 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 (2002), we have determined that none of the Rule 11 errors alleged by Infante-Cabrera affected Infante-Cabrera’s substantial rights or affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in this case. See United States v. Calverley , 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated in part , Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461 (1997). Infante-Cabrera’s “cumulative effect” argument is also without merit. We conclude from the record that it is not likely that, had the district court conducted an ideal Rule 11 plea colloquy, Infante-Cabrera’s willingness to plead guilty would have been affected. See United States v. Reyes , 300 F.3d 555, 559 (5th Cir. 2002). Infante-Cabrera also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at rearraignment and at sentencing. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not first been raised in the district court. United States v. Bounds , 943 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1991). Because the district court did not make any factual findings regarding the allegations of ineffective assistance, an analysis of these claims would require speculation by this court as to the reasons for counsel’s alleged acts and omissions. See United States v. Kizzee , 150 F.3d 497, 503No. 02-50362 -3- (5th Cir. 1998). We therefore decline to reach the merits of Infante-Cabrera’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to his right to present this matter to the district court via a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States

v. Route , 104 F.3d 59, 64-65 (5th Cir. 1997)

. AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.3

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                       OF

                      RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                          INTERNET CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

                  Internet Capital Group, Inc., a corporation organized and
existing under and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware (the "Company"), does hereby certify:

                  FIRST: At a meeting held on March 3, 2000 the Board of
Directors adopted a resolution setting forth a proposed amendment to the
Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to increase the authorized
number of shares of Common Stock by 1,700,000,000 shares to an aggregate of
2,000,000,000 shares. The resolution declares advisability of the proposed
amendment and directs that the proposed amendment be considered at the annual
meeting of shareholders. The proposed amendment deletes the first paragraph of
Article Four of the Restated Certificate of Incorporation and replaces it in its
entirety with the following:

                  4.       Authorized Capital. The aggregate number of shares of
         stock which the Corporation shall have authority to issue is
         2,010,000,000 shares, divided into two classes consisting of 10,000,000
         shares of Preferred Stock, par value $.01 per share ("Preferred
         Stock"), and 2,000,000,000 shares of Common Stock, par value $.001 per
         share ("Common Stock").

                  SECOND: That thereafter, pursuant to the resolution of the
board of directors, the proposed amendment was approved by a majority of
stockholders of the Company at an annual meeting held on May 31, 2000.

                  THIRD: That said amendment was duly adopted in
accordance with the provision of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law
of the State of Delaware.

<PAGE>

                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Certificate to
be executed by Henry N. Nassau, its Managing Director, General Counsel and
Secretary, this 9th day of June, 2000.

                                    By: /s/ Henry N. Nassau
                                        -------------------
                                        Name: Henry N. Nassau
                                        Title: Managing Director, General
                                               Counsel and Secretary
4650 John Carrell Rd. 

Denton Municipal Airport (KDTO) 

Denton, TX 76207 

November 9, 2012 

US Department of Transportation 

Docket Management System 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140 

Washington, DC 20590 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

www.longhornhelicopters.com 

valerie@longhornhelicopters.com 

1 r.,-

J<, 

. ~·- ""'( • ~, F 

~~ ~Longhorn 

Helicopters, Inc. 

Our company is requesting to extend our exemption from sections 14 CFR part 121, appendices I & J. 

Our business office is located at 10 Hayes Court 

Trophy Club, TX 76262 

Fax: 817-491-3636 

We prefer to keep both our drug and alcohol programs for Part 135 and 91.147 operations combined. We request this relief 

due to the fact that we are a small business and would prefer to have all employees in one program. This would benefit the 

public because all of our employee pilots will be tested regularly along with our Part 135 pilots/mechanics. If our extension 

is granted for this exemption, the safety of our operations would not be affected. 

We will not be exercising this privilege outside of the United States of America. 

~ar/u, 

-Jire~Mnt Longhorn Helicopters, Inc.
#### East Girard Savings & Loan Association, Appellant, *v.*Houlihan.

Argued April 21, 1953.

Before Stern, C. J., Stearne, Jones, Bell, Chidsey and Musmanno, JJ.

*582
      *Howard M. Kuehner,*for appellant.

*Gilbert Cassidy, Jr.,*for appellee.

May 25, 1953:

Opinion

Per Curiam,

In opening the judgment entered as of March Term, 1951, No. 4078, Judge Alessandroni of Common Pleas Court No. 5 of Philadelphia County, adopted the opinion filed by President Judge Bob: of- Court -of Common Pleas -No. ■ 6, Philadelphia County, as of March Term, 1951, No. 4079. Since the issues in both cases *583were identical even though different properties were involved, both orders affirming the judgments are affirmed on the opinion of President Judge Bok.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael WALKER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-1429

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed April 6, 2017

Gregory Allen Holloway, James C, Murphy, Office of the United States Attorney, District of Colorado, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Meredith B. Esser, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Districts of Colorado and Wyoming, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant

*718Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Per Curiam

This matter comes on for consideration of the defendant’s response to this court’s order of March 24, 2017, in which the defendant was ordered to show cause why the district court judgment should not be summarily affirmed in light of the Supreme Court decision in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding that the United States Sentencing Guidelines, including § 4B1.2(a), are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause). In response, the defendant states that “Undersigned counsel has failed to identify any legal argument refuting that *Bedeles*controls this case.” Response at p.l.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. 32.1.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Greenhaven Continuous Commodity Index Fund;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and
have:
     5.
    
    I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions);
   Date: March 27, 2009
    /s/ Ashmead PringleAshmead PringleChief Executive Officer
#### Vernon KING, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Bryan COLLIER; Warden Tony R. Chare; Warden Christopher Lacox; Warden Gheff H. Prestwood; Murray Owen, MBA; Julye Ernistine, M.D.; Mott Khara, M.D.; Eldon L. Monk; M. Henkemeyer, R.N.; J. Horns, Licensed Vocational Nurse; Boyce, Licensed Vocational Nurse; C. McCauley, Licensed Vocational Nurse; S. Madl, Licensed Vocational Nurse; Scott, R.N.; Russell, R.N.; Captain R. Cook; Major M. B. Crow; Lieutenant C. A. Applewhite; Sergeant J. Jackson; Officer S. Grant; Officer Henry, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-20262

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 10, 2017

Vernon King, Jr., Pro Se

Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Vernon King, Jr., Texas prisoner # 590316, moves this court for authorization to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) following the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. King has failed to show that he should be allowed to proceed IFP on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or that his appeal of the district court’s judgment presents a nonfrivolous issue. *See Banos v. O’Guin,*144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998); *Carson v.*Policy, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). King’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is denied.

The facts surrounding the IFP decision are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the appeal. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 *&*n.24 (5th Cir. 1997). The appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues and is dismissed as frivolous. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. King’s motion to stay proceedings is denied as moot.

IFP DENIED; STAY DENIED AS MOOT; APPEALS DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Miguel KERCHERVAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rafael ZUNIGA, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-15698

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 11, 2017

*992Miguel Kereherval, Pro Se

Karen A. Escobar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Fresno, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Miguel Kereherval appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see *Tablada v. Thomas,*533 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

Kereherval challenges the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) calculation of his term of imprisonment. Kereherval was taken into custody by the U.S. Marshals Service on October 18, 2006. On December 17, 2007, he was sentenced to an 87-month term of imprisonment in the District of Nevada. On November 19, 2008, he was sentenced to a concurrent 188-month term of imprisonment in the Eastern District of California. He was committed to BOP custody on December 23, 2008. Kereherval acknowledges that the BOP aggregated his sentences and credited him with 427 days that he served in custody prior to the imposition of his Nevada sentence. However, Kereherval argues that the time between imposition of his first sentence and the day he arrived at a BOP institution should be counted as pretrial detention credit toward his second sentence. Contrary to his argument, Kercherval’s Nevada sentence commenced when it was imposed, as did his Eastern District of California sentence. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Therefore, he is not entitled to receive any more pretrial credit than he did. *See*id.; *see also United States v. Wilson,*503 U.S. 329, 337, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### C. S. BLACK V. LUCINDA BLACK.

IN SUPREME COURT,

TYLER TERM, 1884.

*Susband and Wife.*— The wife can both institute and defend a suit when such action becomes necessary for the protection of herself or property, without the joinder of her husband.

Appeal from Titus County.

Under the special facts of this case, as disclosed by the record, *374there can be no question but that the wife can both institute and defend a suit when such action becomes necessary for the protection of herself or property, without the joinder of her husband. Ryan v. Bates & Co., et al. (unreported.)

The appellee was not a party to the judgment and decree obtained by the appellant against Hargrove and his wife for the foreclosure of the vendor’s lien on the land in controversy. Neither she nor her husband are named in or bound by the decree. Nor is the title or claim then admitted to be held by them, to the land in question, in the least degree affected by the proceedings had by the appellant against Hargrove and his wife, so far as is disclosed by the record now before us for consideration.

In cases of this character for the foreclosure of a deed of trust or a mortgage, or a vendor’s lien, or like claim oon real estate, it has been held repeatedly by this court that persons holding the relation to the subject matter in controversy sustained by the appellee and her husband in this suit, are in the very nature of things, necessary parties to the foreclosure suit and the decree there rendered. Beck v. Tarrant, 61 Texas 403; Slaughter v. Owens (unreported); Davis v. Rankin, 50 Texas 279; Schwarts v. Garey, 49 Texas 49; Lockhart v. Ward, 45 Texas 227. There are many more authorities of this court to the same effect.

Without their presence in this suit, the decree of foreclosure would be of no avail against them as they would still hold the legal title until divested of it in some mode known to the law.

The judgment and decree offered in evidence was not binding on appellee. She was a stranger to it. Neither she ¡¡nor her husband were parties to it and as an inevitable consequence are not bound by it.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

West, J.