UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TURNER O. WILEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 00-1465

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

William L. Osteen, District Judge.

(CA-99-236-1)

Argued: February 28, 2001

Decided: April 27, 2001

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Kathleen G. Sumner, LAW OFFICES OF KATHLEEN

G. SUMNER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Stricklin Cox, CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH, L.L.C., WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John J. Doyle, Jr.,

CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH, L.L.C., Winston-Salem, North

Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Turner Wiley filed an action in North Carolina Superior Court

against his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), alleging that

UPS had discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Specifically, Wiley

claimed that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate his disability

(back and shoulder ailments and frequent urination due to seizure

medication). UPS removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the

Middle District of North Carolina on federal question and diversity of

citizenship grounds. Thereafter, both parties moved for summary

judgment. On March 20, 2000, prior to ruling on the motions, the district judge met with the parties to discuss a possible settlement. The

settlement effort failed, however. On April 7, 2000, the district court

entered summary judgment in favor of UPS. The court held that UPS

fulfilled its duty to provide reasonable accommodations to Wiley. It

also concluded that Wiley’s accommodation demands were unreasonable and that he failed to engage in an "interactive process" with UPS

to identify suitable work arrangements to accommodate his disability.

Wiley appeals. 

After considering the joint appendix, the briefs, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are persuaded that the district court reached the

correct result. We therefore affirm substantially on the reasoning of

the district court. See Wiley v. United Parcel Serv., No. 1:

99CV00236 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2000). 

One new issue should be mentioned. Wiley argues for the first time

on appeal that the district judge should have recused himself once settlement discussions broke down. Essentially, Wiley claims that the

district judge’s participation in the settlement conference created an

appearance of partiality and therefore the judge should have recused

himself (on his own motion) before ruling on the parties’ cross

2 WILEY v. UPS
motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We review

the judge’s decision to retain the case for abuse of discretion, see

Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 781 (4th Cir. 1998), and we find that

the judge acted well within the bounds of propriety. 

Generally, a judge’s participation in a settlement conference does

not, by itself, create an appearance of partiality. See In re MartinezCatala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing that judicial

settlement conferences are "common occurrences" that are necessary

to facilitate the resolution of litigation). Here, the district court judge

simply conducted a settlement conference in an effort to achieve

agreement between the parties. Wiley has not alleged any facts that

would indicate that the judge’s conduct during the settlement conference created an appearance of partiality. The judge was not required

to recuse himself in these circumstances.

AFFIRMED

WILEY v. UPS 3