IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00532-COA TOMMY ANDERSON APPELLANT

v. CARRIE ANDERSON APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C. MICHAEL MALSKI COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BRIAN LEE STARLING ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JAK McGEE SMITH NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/31/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., TINDELL AND McDONALD, JJ. CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Carrie Anderson was granted a divorce f rom her husband, Tom m y ( T.J.) Anderson,

on the statutory grounds of adultery and habitual cruel and i nhum an treatm e nt. T.J. appealed the chancery court ’ s d e t e r mination of certain issues regarding real and personal property

. Finding no error, we af

f irm

. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. T.J. and Carrie were ma r r i e d o n J a n u a r y 1 2 , 2 008. The parties have two m inor children, Robert 1 ( born in 2 011) and Jane (born in 2014). On October 2, 2 015, Carrie f iled f or divorce in the Lee County Chancery Court on the ground of irreconcilable d if f erences.

1 F ictitio u s n am es are u s ed f o r th e m in o r ch i ld ren .Carrie later f iled two am ended com

plaints f or divorce on the s tatutory grounds of adultery and habitual cruel and inhum a n t r e a tm ent. T.J. f iled answers to C arrie’s f irst and second

am ended com

p laints f or divorce. He did not f

ile a counter-com

plaint seeking any

relief

. ¶3. The case was tried over a period of eight day s, b eginning in Novem b er 2 016 with the last d a y of trial on Novem ber 9 , 2017. On M arch 8, 2018, the chancery court entered a “Mem orandum Opinion and Final Judgm e n t” g r a n t i n g C arrie a divorce on the statutory grounds of

adultery

2 and habitual cruel and inhum a n treatm ent. 3 ¶4. In its opinion and f inal judgm ent, the chancery court addressed the num erous issues bef ore it, including custody of the couple’s two children, visitation, supp o rt, a nd related

m atters; property division; issues s u r r o u n d i n g T

. J

. ’ s c o n t e m

p t , i n t e n t i o n al m isrepresentations to the court, and retroactive child support; attorney ’s f ees; and the sale of

the hom estead. ¶5. T

. J. appealed f

ollowing the chancery court’s f inal judgm ent with resp e c t t o t h r e e issu e s : ( 1 ) the chancery court’s classif ication of f

if ty -nine acres deeded t o T.J. and Carrie f rom Carrie’s grandm other as non-m arital property a nd award of i t to Carrie; (2) the chancery
court’s determ i nation on the d i vision of fu r n i t u r e and appliances; and (3) the chancery court’s determ ination that T .J. m

ust reim burse his son’s s a vings account in the am ount of $14,000, plus i n t e r e st that would have a ccum ulated had t he f

unds not been withdrawn. W e now address the f

acts relating to these three issues.

2 T .J. ad m itted at trial to h av in g sev eral sex u al relatio n sh i p s d u rin g th e m arriag e.

3 We ad d ress th e ev id en ce relatin g t o th i s statu t o ry g ro u n d in co n n e ctio n w it h th e f acts relatin g to T .J.’s assertio n th at th e ch an cery c o u rt erred in classif y i n g f if ty

- n in e acres f ro m C arrie’s g r an d m o th er as n o n -m arital p ro p erty an d aw a rd in g it to C arrie. 2A. Issues
I. The Fifty -Nine Acres of Land ¶6. Carrie’s grandm other, Cly tee Hansberger, owned f

if ty -nine acres of unim

p roved real

estate in Pontotoc County , Mississippi. The record contains a Septem ber 2013 warranty deed f rom Mrs. Hansberger (through CH Farm s LLC) to Carrie and T.J. At trial, Carrie testif ied that the land was supposed to b e put in her nam e a nd t ha t t he property had “been in the f am ily a l ong tim e” and “would have m ost l ikely been given t o [ her] o nce [ h er] grandm other passed away .” ¶7. According to Carrie’s testim ony at trial, when Carrie a n d T.J. went to have the deed prepared b y the f

am ily lawy er, Jim m y Bingham , she “was af raid t hat [ T.J.] would be upset” if his nam e was not on the deed, so she had Bingham put his nam e on the d eed. W hen Carrie

w a s asked why she did not change the deed so t hat the property was in her n a me , a l o n e , Carrie testif

ied that she was too af

raid of T.J. to do so, as f

ollows:
T.J. w as standing right next to m e with J im m y Bingham and I w as s c a r ed of his reaction of what—I was scared of him . I was af

r aid what he would do if I asked Jim m y to do the deed just in m y nam e as it w as intended when I went to his of f ice. ¶8. Regarding Carrie’s f ear o f T.J., testim ony at trial ref l ects that T.J. atta c k e d C a r r i e, 4 punched num erous holes in the walls and doors in both their Tupelo and Senatobia hom es, 5

4 C arrie t estif

ied th at T .J. h ad p h y sically assau lted h er o n sev eral o ccasio n s. O n e o f C a rrie’s w itn e sses, B rittan i B o a t w r i g h t, testif i ed th at w h ile sh e w as an o v e rn ig h t g u est o f T

. J. an d C arrie, s h e w itn essed T .J. g rab C arrie, p u sh h er u p ag ain st th e f i rep lace, an d h it an d ch o k e h er.

5 C arrie testif

ied th at T

. J. w o u ld f

req u en tly lo se h is tem

p er, g o in to a rag e, an d p u n ch h o les in t h e w alls an d d o o rs o f t h eir h o u se. T h is testim o n y w a s co rro b o rated b y tw o o th er 3killed at least two of their dogs, 6 a nd f requently threatened and verbally abused Carrie. As noted above, the chancery court granted Carrie a divorce o n the statutory ground of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent (as well as on the ground of adultery ). ¶9. Neither Mrs. Hansberger nor Bingham testif ied at trial. The record ref lects that the property was debt-f

ree when it was deeded to Carrie and T.J., the parties m a de no f inancial contribution toward the property and its m aintenance, and the parties did n ot use i t. Carrie testif i ed that the property was under lease to two g entlem e n, which was set up through a trust with any m aintenance being paid through the trust.

II. The Furniture and Appliances ¶10. Carrie testif

i ed that her grandm other and other relatives had given her quite a bit of f urniture over the y ears or t hat s h e h a d f u rniture that had b een hers s i nce college. She adm itted that “every one [ in the f am ily ]” used the f

urniture. Carrie took som e of this f urniture f rom the m arital hom e to her grandm other’s hom e when she lef t T.J. Carrie testif

ied that she returned a num

ber of i tem s to the m arital h om e f or T.J.’s use. At trial, Carri e i ntroduced Exhibit No. 29 that s h owed w hat she took and what T.J. g ot f rom the d ivision of the m arital personal property

. ¶11. The record ref

lects that T.J. did not f

ile a counter-com

plaint asking f

or an equitable

w i tn esses.

6 A s a sid e j o b d u rin g th e m arriag e, T .J. w o u ld t rain h is o w n d o g s a s h u n tin g d o g s f o r sale. C arrie testif

ied t h at T .J. k illed at least tw o o f th e d o g s w h en T .J. w o u ld lo s e h is tem p er o r th e d o g d id n o t ap p ear to m eet T .J.’s ex p ectatio n s. S h e also testif ied th at T

. J. h it th e d o g s w i th a b a t w ith “en o u g h f o rce t o b reak b o n es” an d “p u t sh o ck co llars o n [ th e d o g s] an d tu rn it u p so h ig h th at th eir w h o le f ro n t b o d y w o u l d raise an d th ey w o u ld h av e . . . f o am in th eir m o u th an d th ey

w o u ld b e terrif

ied .” 4d i v i s i o n of the p ersonal p roperty

. At trial, T.J. m ade an objection t hat Carrie got valuable

f urniture and that the chancery court s hould have divided the f urniture and appliances. T.J. did not subm it a value f

or any o f the f

urniture or subm it a list of f urniture and appliances that he wanted. T.J. did not deny that he got the f

urniture listed in Exhibit No. 29.
III. Robert’s Savings Account ¶12. In 2013, Carrie’s g r andm other, Mrs. Hansberger, g ave $14,000 to T.J. a n d Carrie’s

son, R obert, as a college f u n d. Robert was only two y ears old at t h e t im e that Mrs. Hansberger gave him this college f und. T.J. put this m oney into a savings account in T.J.’s and Robert’s nam es. ¶13. During the m arriage, T.J. withdre w s u ms o f mo n e y o n d if f erent occasions f

rom Robert’s c ollege savings account until there was no m oney lef t in the account. T.J. testif ied

at t rial t hat Carrie was “generally aware” that he had w ithdrawn the m o ney . Carrie testif ied that she was not aware that T.J. had taken this m o ney until the parties separated and she f ound a passbook s avings account, which showed that T .J. had rem oved al l o f the m oney . T.J. adm itted at trial that he never put any of the m oney into the parties’ joint account. He testif i ed that he “paid bills with it” but was unable to specif ically account f

o r it.
B. Additional Procedural History ¶14. The chancellor stated on the record at trial that T.J. was “am ong the m o st dishonest individuals that I have had on the stand” in his y ears as a judge. It was brought out at trial that T.J., f

or exam ple, m i srepresented his em ploy m ent history , salary , and com m issions to the chancery court. In its opinion and f i nal judgm ent, the c hancery c ourt d eclined to

5“catalogue the egregious e xam ples of T .J.’s n um e r ous lies , ” but the court did describe an incident w here T.J. denied he had posted derogatory rem arks about Carrie on social m edia.
Later i n the trial, when Carrie’s lawy er arranged f or a “police c omp u t e r expert” to testif y , T.J. conf essed that he had in f

act sent the posting and had lied to the court about it. ¶15. As noted above, the chancery court e ntered its opinion and f inal judgm e nt on March 8, 2018, granting C arrie a divorce on two statutory g rounds: adultery a nd habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. T.J. f iled a “Motion f

rom Relief f

rom O rder” o n July 9, 2018, in which he p rim arily sought m odif ication o f his child s upport obligation, but he also requested in that

m otion that he “be credited to his judgm ent debt f or half the value of t he ma r i t a l p r o p erty

rem oved f

rom the m arital hom e by

[ Carrie].” ¶16. On July 11, 2018, the c hancery court entered i t s o r der on T.J.’s m otion, addressing certain child support calculations not at issue in this appeal. As to T.J.’s request regarding

a credit to his judgm ent debt f or alleged m arital p roperty rem oved f rom the hom e, the order provided that “all other provisions of the Court’s Mem orandum Opinion a nd F inal Judgm ent shall rem ain in f

ull f orce and ef

f ect unless m odif

ied herein.” The July 11, 2018 order also
p r o v ided that “[ u]pon e ntry of this order, the court’s Mem orandum Opinion and Fi n a l Judgm ent of March 7, 2018, shall be c onsidered a f inal judgm ent [ f

or] all purposes.” 7 T.J. appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶17. As the Mississippi Suprem e Court recently reiterated in W illiams v. W

illiams , 264 So.

7 T o av o id rep e titio n , th e p o rtio n s o f th e ch an cery co u rt’s o p in io n an d f i n a l j u d g m en t relatin g to th e issu es o n ap p eal w ill b e set f o rth in th e d i scu s sio n p o r tio n o f th is o p in io n . 63d 722, 725 (¶5) (Miss. 2019):

Thi s C o u r t will not d isturb a chancellor’s judgm ent when supported by substantial evide n c e unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was m anif estly wrong, c l e a r ly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Under this standard of review, our purpose is to determ ine whether the chancellor’s ruling was supported b y c r edible evidence, not whether we agree with that ruling. However, we review the chancellor’s interpretation and application of

the law de novo. (Citations and quotation m arks om itted).
DISCUSSION
I. The F if

ty-Nine Acres of

Land ¶18. The chancery court f o und that the f

if t y -nine acres f

r om Carrie’s grandm other jointly titled in Carrie’s and T.J.’s nam es was Carrie’s separate, non-m arital property , as f ollows:
W h il e s o me coercion m ay have b een placed on C arrie to have T.J.’s n am e place on the deed [ to the f i f ty -nine acres], even i f there had been no coercion, the Court would still f

ind t h e 59 acres to be Carrie’s separate, non-m arital property

. The property cam e f rom Carrie’s grandm other debt f ree. The parties never im proved the property

or put any

m oney into the property

. The chancery court r ecognized t hat “[ i]nter viv os gif ts and inheritances are considered

non-m arital property unless they have been c o m m ingled.” McDonald v. McDonald , 115 So. 3d 881, 885-86 ( ¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). The chancery court f ound that “[ t]he f

act that the 59 acres was jointly titled [ in this case] did not m ake it a m arital asset.” Id. at 886 (¶¶12- 14) ( f inding property purchased wi t h f u n d s inherited b y a husband was the husband’s separate property despite the property being jointly titled i n both t he husband and the wif e); see also Marter v. Marter , 95 So. 3d 733,737-38 (¶¶11-16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (f inding that property inherited by a wif e prior to m arriage and later jointly titled rem ained the wif e’s separate p roperty ); D elk v
. Delk , 41 So. 3d 738, 741-42 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)
7(recognizing that condom inium p roperty separate l y o w n e d b y a w if e prior to m arriage but later jointly titled did not becom e m arital property until t he couple began using the property

as t heir m arital h om e, and t hus the husband was n o t e n t i t l e d to a f ull half of the proceeds f rom the condom i nium )

. The chancery court e xpressly noted that “[ t]he parties never lived

on or im p roved the property

. There was absolutely no com m ingling with m arital property

nor was the property utilized f o r d om estic purposes.” Continuing, the chancery court f ound that the f if ty -nine acres did “not los[ e] its status as n onm arital property ,” a nd ordered that T.J. deed his interest in the tract of land to Carrie. ¶19. T

. J

. asserts that the chancery court c om m itted m a n if est error in this determi n a t i o n because t he property at i ssue in this case w as never Carrie’s s eparate p r o p e r t y i n t h e f irst place, and thus t he cases the c hancery court r elied upon in m a king its determ ination,
M c D o n a ld , Marter , and D elk , a re distinguishable. T

. J. argues that i n contrast to the circum stances in these cases, Carrie did not inherit the property , it w as not purchased with inherited m oney , and was it not p roperty Carrie owned prior t o the m arriage and later jointly titled. Rather, the property was acquired during the m arriage and t itled directly f rom Mrs. Hansberger to both T.J. and C a r r ie as an inter vivos gif t; theref ore, according t o T.J., it is

m arital property , and he is entitled to an equitable division of that property

. ¶20. Carrie, on the other hand, asserts t hat t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r ts the chancery court’s determ ination that the f

if t y -nine acres f

rom her grandm other is h er separate property and that under the cases r elied u

pon b y the chancery court, the m ere f a ct that the property

is jointly titled in both her and T.J.’s nam es does not, standing alone, convert the property to m arital property subject to equitable distribution. 8¶21. I n a d d r e s s i n g t his issue, we acknowledge that “[ a]ssets acquired or accum ulated during the course of a m a rriage are subject t o equitable d ivision unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are at t r i butable to one of the parties’ separate estates prior to the

m arriage o r outside the m arriage.” Hemsley v. Hemsley , 6 39 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss. 1994);

see generally Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 6.03[ 1][ a], at 139 (2d ed. 2011) (“Because o f the p resum p tion in f avor o f m arital p roperty , a spouse seeking separate classif ication bears the b u rden of p roof .”). Although, a s T.J. asserts, the record does contain the 2013 warranty deed f rom Mrs. H a n s b e r g e r to b oth T.J. and Carrie o btained by t hem during their m arriage, we f ind t hat the record a lso contains substantial, credible evidence supporting the chancery court’s determ ination that t his property is attri b u table to Carrie’s separate estate. ¶22. In particular, although neither M r s . H a n s b e rger nor the attorney who p repared the deed testif

ied at t r i a l , Carrie testif

ied that it was her grandm other’s intent that she (Carrie) hav e t h e property

. 8 Moreover, there was am ple evidence presented at trial that Carrie legitim ately f

eared f or her saf ety and welf

are if she did not have the land jointly titled, and thus she was essentially coerced into doing so. 9 Cf. Estate of Langston v. W illiams , 57 So.

8 A s d etailed in th e statem en t o f f acts, C arrie t estif

ied t h at th e lan d w as su p p o sed to b e p u t in h er n am e a n d th at th e p ro p erty h ad “b een in th e f a m ily a lo n g tim e ” an d “w o u ld h av e m o st lik ely

b een g iv e n to [ h er] o n ce [ h er] g ran d m o th er p assed aw ay .”

9 A s d e tailed in t h e statem en t o f f acts, C arrie testif

ied th at sh e w as to o af

raid o f T .J. to h av e t itle p laced in h er n am e alo n e. R e g ard in g th is f ear, th e reco rd ref

lects th at T .J. h ad a t t a c k e d C arrie, p u n ch ed n u m ero u s h o les i n th e w alls an d d o o r s in b o th th eir T u p elo an d S en ato b ia h o m es, k illed sev eral o f th eir d o g s, an d f req u en tly th reaten ed an d v erb ally ab u sed C a rrie. A s n o ted , th e c h an cery co u rt g ran ted C arrie a d iv o rce o n th e statu to ry g ro u n d o f h ab itu al cru el an d in h u m an treatm en t. 93d 618, 6 20-21 (¶10) (Miss. 2011) (describing the analogous concept of undue inf luence in the w ill context as u sing “ undue m ethods f or the purpose of overcom ing the f ree and unrestrained will of the testator so as to control his acts a n d to prevent him f rom being a f

ree agent”); Bailey v. Estate of Kemp , 955 So. 2d 777, 783 ( ¶23) (Miss. 2007) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e analogous concept of duress as requiring “(1) t hat th e d om inant party threatened to do

som ething which he had no legal right to do; and ( 2) that the wrongf ul threat overrode the volition of

the victim and caused him to enter an agreem ent against his f ree will”). ¶23. In short, there is substantial, credible eviden c e t h a t t h e property w as intended to be
C a r r i e ’ s p r o p e r ty and t hat her f ear of T.J. prevented her f rom having it titled in her nam e. T h e c h a n c ery court theref o r e was correct in r ely ing o n McDonald , 1 15 So. 3 d at 885-8 6 (¶¶12-14), in determ ining that “[ t]he f act that the 59 acres was j ointly t itled [ in this case] did

not m ake it a m arital asset.” See also Marter , 95 So. 3d at 737-38 (¶¶11-16); Delk , 41 So. 3d at 741-42 (¶17). The record ref lects that the property was debt-f ree, the parties m ade no f in ancial contribution toward the property or its m a intenance during the m a rriage, and the parties did not use it. W e f ind no m anif

est error in the chancery court’s determ ination on this issue, and we theref

ore f ind that T.J.’s f

irst assignm ent of

error is without m erit.
II. The Furniture and Appliances ¶24. T.J. asserts t hat t he chancery court erred because it did not address the allocation of certain appliances and f

urniture that had been in t he couple’s hom e. T.J. a c knowledges that Carrie testif

ied a t trial t hat the p ersonal property she took f rom the hom e when she lef t was given to her, alone, or consisted of i tem s she had bef ore she wa s ma r r i e d

. T

. J

. asserts, however, that Carrie also adm itted at trial that these item s were used by the f am ily

. For this 1 0reason, T.J. asserts that even if these item s were separate p r o p e rty a t one tim e, they

s u b s e q u e n t ly were com m ingled and becam e m arital property subject t o e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n . See Parsons v
. P arsons , 741 So. 2d 3 0 2 , 3 0 8 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (“[ W ]hen an individual com m ingles non-m arital assets with joint m arital assets, the non-m arital assets are

c o n v e r t e d into m arital assets, subject to an equitable distribution unless subject to an
agreem ent to the contrary

. ” (em phasis om itted) (quo t i n g Johnson v. Johnson , 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss.1994)). ¶25. Contrary

to T.J.’s assertion that the chancery court did not address the allocation of the f urniture a nd a

ppliances, our r eview of the c hancery court’s opinion a nd f inal j udgm ent shows t hat the court did address the division of the couple’s personal property , as f ollows: “The parties shall have the use, possession, a nd ownership of the v arious item s of personal property in their respective poss e s s i o n , e x c e pt that Carrie shall return to T.J. any and all f irearm s in her possession.” ¶26. The record ref

l ects that a list of household item s prepared by C arrie was adm itted at trial (Exhibit No. 29) that showed what she t o o k when she lef t and what T.J. got f

rom the division of the m arital p ersonal p roperty

. T.J. d id not deny that he got the f urniture listed on Exhibit No. 29. The record r ef lects that T.J. objected at trial, claim ing that Carrie took valuable f

urniture a nd that the chanc e r y court should divide t he f u rniture and appliances. Although the record ref

lects that T.J. did not f

i l e a c o u nter-claim requesting an equitable division o f this personal property , his “Motion f rom Relief f

rom O rder” f

iled on July 9, 2018, requests that he “be credited to his judgm ent debt f or half the value of

the m a rital property

rem oved f

rom the m a r i t a l h o me b y [ Carrie].” There is nothing in the record f rom T.J., 1 1however, listing or providing a valuation of the f u rniture and appliances he wanted. ¶27. Under these circum stances, we f ind n o a buse of discretion in t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r t’s allocation of this personal p r o p e r t y . In this Court’s decision in Kimble v. Kimble , 282 So. 3d 453 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), we reiterated the principles applicable here: The f oundational step to m ake an e quitable d istribution of m arital assets is to determ ine the value of those assets based on com petent proof

. It is incumbent u p o n the p arties, and n o t the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching o n matters p ertinent to the i ssues to be tried

. W

h e n a p a rty fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available. Id. at 456 (¶8) (em

p hasis added) (citations and quotation m a r ks om itted). ¶28. The only evidence the chancery court had relating to the particular personal property

at issue was t he list (Exhibit No. 2 9) Car r i e s u b mi t t e d. Under Kimble , it was T.J.’s responsibility to provide any additional inf

orm ation. Even when the chancellor asked T.J. if he had such inf

orm ation, T.J. did not subm it a list o r v aluation of the personal property that he wanted. W e f

i nd no abuse of discretion in the chancery court’s division of t his personal property because the court w as “entitled to p roceed on the best inf orm ation available.” Id.
W e theref ore f ind no m erit in this assignm ent of error. III. Robert’s Savings Account ¶29. On the issue regarding the depletion of Robert’s savings account, the chancery court f ound as f ollows: During their m arriage Carrie’s g randm other gave Carrie, T .J., and [ R o b ert] $14,000 to put into a savings accoun t f o r [ R o bert’s] college education. T .J. placed this m o ney in his nam e and in the nam e of the child. T.J. withdrew the m oney f ro m t his account. He claim s t hat C arrie knew of the withdrawal. W h ile the Court does not b elieve that Carrie knew that T.J. was withdrawing his son’s m oney , it would be of sm all consequence. Carrie knowing would not 1 2be justif ication f or the withdrawal. T.J. withdrew and used his s on’s m oney . T.J. will be responsible f or replacing any f

u n d s h e withdrew f

rom his son’s account in the approxim ate am ount o f $ 14,000 together w ith any interest those withdrawals would have generated. ¶30. T.J. asserts t hat the chancery court com m i tted m anif e s t error when it ordered that T.J. be f ully responsible f

or replacing the $14,000 re moved f rom Robert’s savings account, in addition to any lost interest attributable to the m issing f unds. Citing McLaurin v. McLaurin , 853 So. 2d 1279, 1286 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), T.J. argues that the m oney taken f rom that account was used to pay m arital debts, and thus Carrie “should be equally responsible f or replacing the m oney f

rom the account.” ¶31. W e f

ind no m erit in T.J.’s assertions. A s noted above, when Robert was two y ears

o l d , Carrie’s grandm o t her gave Robert $14,000 as a college f u nd, and T .J. put this m oney into a savings a ccount i n T.J.’s and Robert’s n am es. T he record ref lects t hat T .J. withdrew

sum s of m oney on dif

f erent o ccasions f

rom this account until there was no m oney lef t in the

account. At trial, T.J. testif ied that Carrie was “generally aware” that he h ad withdrawn the

m oney . Carrie, however, t estif ied that she did not know T.J. had taken this m oney until the parties separated and she f ound the passbook savings account showing that the m oney was

m issing. T .J. adm itted a t t r i a l t h at he did not put the m o ney i n the couple’s joint account. He testif ied that he “paid bills with it,” but he could not specif ically account f or it. ¶32. We f

i n d r e l e v a nt i n this analy sis that the record ref lects a num

b e r o f i n c i d e n t s ref lecting T.J.’s lack of candor with the chancery court. “[ T]he chancellor is vested with the sole authority and responsibility to assess witness credibility as no j u r y is present. The chancellor alone hears the testim ony and sees the dem e anor o f the witnesses.” Culumber v.

1 3Culumber , 261 So. 3d 1142, 1150 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (citations and internal

q u otation m arks om itted). In this case, the chancellor stated on the record t hat T

. J

. w a s “am ong the m ost dishonest individuals that [ he had] h ad on t he stand” in the chancello r’s nearly thirty y ears as a judge. Particular incidents a t t r i a l included T.J. substantially

m isstating his em

ploy m ent history and earnings and T.J. deny ing that h e p osted m essages on social m edia berating Carrie and calling her inappr o p r i a t e n a mes. As described in the chancery court’s opinion and f

inal judgm ent,
In Exhibit 43 C arrie was b erated and called vile nam e s . T

. J

. swore that he knew absolutely nothing a bout this posting. S e v e r a l m o n t h s later, af ter Carrie’s attorney had arranged f

or a police com

p uter expert to t estif

y , T.J. con f

essed that he had in f

act sent the posting and had lied to the Court about it. ¶33. I n l i g ht o f these circum stances and our lim ited s tandard of review, we f ind that the chancery court’s o rder that T.J. replace the f unds w ithdrawn f

rom Robert’s accoun t , p lus interest that would have been generated on those withdrawals, was based o n substantial, credible e v idence. W e theref o re f ind t hat T.J.’s a s signm ent of error on this issue is without

m erit. ¶34. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., J. WILSON, P.J., G REENLEE, WESTBROOKS, T I N D ELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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