1The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-2950

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Mildred Clark, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Kansas City Missouri School District, *

* Appeal from the United States

Defendant/Appellant, * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Linda Lollis; Benjamin Demps; Kansas *

City Missouri School Board; Helen J. *

Ragsdale; Lee Barnes, Jr.; Duane Kelly; *

Harriett Ann Plowman; Patricia Kurtz; *

Michelle S. Hensley; Albert Mauro, Sr.; *

Elma Warrick; Fifi Wiedman, *

*

Defendants. *

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 Submitted: March 10, 2004

 Filed: July 13, 2004

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Before RILEY and MELLOY, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSON,1

 District Judge.

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.
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Mildred Clark (Clark), a teacher in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District

(District), brought a section 1983 action against the District, alleging the District had

deprived Clark of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. A jury returned a verdict in Clark’s favor. The District subsequently

moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The district court denied

the District’s motions, entered judgment in Clark’s favor, and awarded Clark attorney

fees. The District appeals. Concluding the record does not support the District’s

employees deprived Clark of property by following an established procedure, and

Missouri law provides Clark with the adequate postdeprivation remedy of replevin,

we reverse the judgment, remand, and vacate the district court’s attorney fees award.

I. BACKGROUND

The District employed Clark as a science teacher at Southeast Middle School

(Southeast). Due to Southeast’s reorganization, the District transferred Clark to J.A.

Rogers Middle School (Rogers). After being transferred, Clark secured permission

from Southeast’s principal, Linda Lollis (Lollis), to remove her personal property

from her former classroom. Unable to pack and retrieve all of her personal property

due to high summer temperatures that day and the following day, Clark returned to

Southeast on August 29, 1996, two days after initially securing permission from

Lollis, to remove her personal property.

On August 29, Lollis escorted Clark to her former classroom. When Lollis

began removing materials from the boxes Clark had packed, Clark left the classroom

to call the District’s superintendent. Unable to contact the District’s superintendent,

Clark discussed the situation with the District’s attorney, who told Clark to have

Lollis call him. Upon returning to the classroom, two security guards were present.

Clark delivered the attorney’s message and informed Lollis that Clark owned the

materials in the boxes. At Lollis’s request, a security guard removed Clark from the

building.
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After being escorted out of the building, Clark drove to the District

superintendent’s office. After discussing with Assistant Superintendent Dr. Ida Love

(Dr. Love) what had occurred, Dr. Love returned to Southeast with Clark. Dr. Love

and Clark sorted through the materials, and discussed who owned the various

materials, with Clark showing Dr. Love “things that [Clark] knew did not belong to

Southeast.” Clark packed five boxes of materials into her vehicle, leaving other

materials at Southeast. Later in the day, Clark received a call informing her that

boxes with some of her materials were on the sidewalk outside Southeast. Clark

called the police and asked the police to meet her at Southeast. Clark returned to

Southeast, meeting the police she summoned. Notwithstanding that Clark recognized

the materials in the boxes on the sidewalk as her personal property, Clark did not

collect the boxes, because the police advised her not to touch the boxes. The boxes

were subsequently delivered to Clark at Rogers. Clark believed Southeast still

retained more of her materials.

Approximately one month later, Clark received an e-mail from Rogers’s

principal, Sally Newell (Newell). Newell’s e-mail stated:

I was notified today by Dr. Love that the materials that were being held

from [Southeast] were going [to be] returned to the school at the end of

the week unless some verification can be made as to ownership. . . .

Verification needs to be in the form of the production of [a] receipt for

any materials in question, or a statement from the company stating that

they were compensation for work.

The e-mail required Clark to deliver the verification to Dr. Love in three days. Clark

did not produce receipts or a statement from a company verifying her ownership.

Instead, Clark informed Newell she would have difficulty producing such evidence.

Clark did not request additional time to procure the necessary documents.
2We need not discuss the remaining steps in the grievance process because the

district court’s instructions only allow us to infer that Clark filed a grievance with

Newell. The district court instructed the jury that it must find in Clark’s favor if: (1)

Clark purchased materials for her classroom; (2) the District took the materials; (3)

“[Clark] filed a grievance asking that the items be returned to her; and [(4) the

District] failed to provide [Clark] with a hearing on said grievance.” We infer from

the jury’s verdict that Clark filed a written grievance with the principal, and the

principal did not provide her with a hearing. Drawing any further inferences would

require us to speculate about the jury’s assessment of Clark’s credibility. Clark

testified she attempted to invoke all five steps in the grievance process. Conversely,

District witnesses testified no record exists indicating Clark filed a grievance.

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Clark also attempted to invoke the grievance procedure outlined in the

District’s employee handbook (Handbook). The Handbook outlines a five-step

process to address an employee’s grievance. To invoke the process, the employee

must first orally present the grievance within three days to the employee’s

principal—in Clark’s case, Newell. The principal must orally respond to the

employee’s oral grievance within three days. If the grievance is not resolved, the next

step requires the employee to file a written grievance with the principal within three

days of receiving the principal’s oral decision. Upon receipt of the written grievance,

the principal must hold a hearing within three days and issue a written decision within

three days of the hearing. If the employee is not satisfied with the outcome, the

employee may subsequently appeal the decision through the District’s administrative

structure (steps three through five), culminating with an appeal to the District’s Board

of Education.2

On the day of the August 29 incident, Clark discussed what had occurred at

Southeast with Newell. Days later, Clark composed a letter to Newell describing the

incident and requesting relief. After waiting to deliver the letter personally, Clark left

it in a box in Newell’s office. Clark never received a hearing or a decision from

Newell.
3All other defendants except the District were dismissed by the last day of trial.

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On March 11, 2001, Clark sued the District, various District employees, and

the District’s Board of Education members,3 alleging she had been deprived of

personal property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

After a trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict in Clark’s favor. 

The District moved for post-verdict judgment as a matter of law and a new trial.

The district court denied the District’s motions, summarily dismissing the District’s

contentions. The district court entered judgment in Clark’s favor and awarded Clark

attorney fees. The District appeals, contending (1) the evidence was insufficient to

support a denial of due process and the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on Clark’s due process claim; (2) Clark’s claim is barred by a prior state court

lawsuit against Lollis; (3) the district court incorrectly instructed the jury; (4) the

district court’s questioning of witnesses and its statements during the trial unfairly

prejudiced the District; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in awarding

attorney fees. Because Clark’s due process claim fails as a matter of law, we decline

to address the remaining issues.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of [a] post-verdict motion for

judgment as a matter of law.” Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 357

F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original; citation omitted). We must

determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict. Id. We

examine “the evidence in the light most favorable to [Clark] and view all inferences

in [her] favor.” Id. “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the

evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining

[Clark’s] position.” Id. “‘A mere scintilla of evidence is inadequate to support a

verdict,’ and judgment as a matter of law is proper when the record contains no proof
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beyond speculation to support the verdict.” Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1452 (8th

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citation omitted).

To establish a violation of procedural due process, Clark must prove (1) the

District deprived Clark of “life, liberty, or property”; and (2) the District deprived

Clark of that “interest without sufficient ‘process.’” Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot.

Dist., 228 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 2000). Because the District concedes, for the

purposes of this appeal, the District deprived Clark of a property interest, we proceed

to determine if the District afforded Clark sufficient process.

Due process is a flexible concept, requiring only “such procedural protections

as the particular situation demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The fundamental

requirement of due process “is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,

552 (1965)). When a state employee’s unauthorized, random acts deprive a person

of property, the state employee’s acts do not violate “the procedural requirements of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981). This rule is

premised on “the states’ action . . . not [being] complete until and unless it provides

or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

However, when an established state procedure or a foreseeable consequence of such

a procedure causes the loss, an adequate postdeprivation remedy is of no

consequence, and we focus solely on the process afforded by the established

procedure. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982); Putman

v. Unknown Smith, 98 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving police and St.

Louis County).
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The unauthorized, random acts of the District’s employees, not an established

procedure, deprived Clark of property. Clark does not challenge the sufficiency of

any process offered by any established District procedure, but challenges Lollis’s, Dr.

Love’s, and Newell’s acts depriving Clark of property. As presented by Clark,

Lollis’s acts were unauthorized and random. Lollis had Clark removed from

Southeast, and attempted to prevent Clark from removing her materials from

Southeast by sifting through the boxed materials and removing materials from the

boxes. Clark presented no evidence Lollis acted pursuant to any established District

procedure. 

Dr. Love’s acts were unauthorized and random. Dr. Love accompanied Clark

back to Southeast after Lollis had Clark removed from Southeast. Dr. Love and Clark

sorted through the materials in the classroom, apparently separating Clark’s materials

from District materials. A month later, Dr. Love afforded Clark the opportunity to

establish ownership of the materials held at Southeast, but only provided Clark a twoday window in which to verify ownership. Clark produced no evidence Dr. Love

followed an established District procedure in carrying out any of these challenged

acts.

Newell’s failure to adhere to the grievance procedure was an unauthorized,

random act. Clark orally lodged and filed a grievance with Newell pursuant to the

Handbook’s grievance procedure. Newell never granted Clark a hearing as required

by the Handbook, and never provided Clark with a written decision. Clark presented

no evidence the District had an established procedure of not following the Handbook.

Quite the opposite is apparent. The District adopted the grievance procedure

anticipating the District’s employees would adhere strictly to the outlined procedures.

Newell’s disregard for the policy clearly evidences her acts were unauthorized and

random.
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Having determined Lollis, Dr. Love, and Newell committed unauthorized and

random acts, we next consider whether Missouri provides an adequate

postdeprivation remedy. Missouri law provides Clark with the postdeprivation state

law remedy of replevin. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01;see Allen v. City of Kinloch, 763 F.2d

335, 336-37 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding Missouri replevin law was an adequate

postdeprivation remedy to recover property, and explaining “where a random and

unauthorized act by a state employee results in a tortious taking of private property,

due process is satisfied if state tort law provides a meaningful post-deprivation

remedy”). Missouri law recognizes replevin as a remedy for a person claiming to be

the lawful owner of personal property held by another. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.01. In a

replevin action, the claimant may obtain immediate possession of the personal

property upon filing an affidavit and a bond with the court. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.03 &

99.06. Alternatively, a claimant may request in writing a “hearing [within ten days]

to determine the [claimant’s] right to possession of the property pending trial.” Mo.

R. Civ. P. 99.09. After a trial, if the court or jury determines the claimant is entitled

to possession, the claimant can have the property returned or have the claim reduced

to a monetary judgment. Mo. R. Civ. P. 99.12. Missouri law also allows the recovery

of damages for injury, taking, or detention of the property. Id. “Although the state

remedies may not provide [Clark] with all the relief which may have been available

if [she] could have proceeded under § 1983, [such as recovery of attorney fees,] that

does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of

due process.” Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.

Because the unauthorized, random acts of Lollis, Dr. Love, and Newell

deprived Clark of her materials and Missouri provides the adequate postdeprivation

remedy of replevin, Clark’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim fails as a

matter of law.
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B. Attorney Fees

A court may award the prevailing party attorney fees in a section 1983 action.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). Because we reverse the district court’s judgment in

Clark’s favor, Clark is no longer the prevailing party. Therefore, we vacate the

district court’s attorney fees award.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment in Clark’s

favor, remand to the district court to enter judgment in the District’s favor, and vacate

the district court’s attorney fees award.

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