alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven N. TAYLOR, a.k.a. Louis V, a.k.a. Nicky, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30273

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted September 26, 2017 *

Filed September 29, 2017

*925Kelly Cavanaugh, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, Jo Ann Farrington, Kevin Feldis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Frank V. Russo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Federal Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Elizabeth Wallace Fleming, Attorney, Elizabeth W. Fleming, Attorney, Kodiak, AK, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Steven N. Taylor appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 180-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Taylor contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to resolve his objections to the four-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a). He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the enhancement.

As an initial matter, we reject the government’s argument that this appeal should be dismissed. The appeal waiver in the applicable plea agreement was conditioned upon the court imposing a sentence within or below the guideline range corresponding to a total offense level of 27. Because the court imposed a sentence above that range, the waiver is unenforceable. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the issue of the leadership enhancement was not resolved by this court’s dismissal of Appeal No. 15-30272 because, contrary to the government’s argument, the enhancement was also predicated on Taylor’s conduct in this case.

With respect to the merits, the district court’s adoption of the facts in the presen-tence report and its statement that the facts therein were sufficient to support the enhancement satisfied Rule 32. *See United States v. Ingham,*486 F.3d 1068, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the enhancement. *See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz,*852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion); *Ingham,*486 F.3d at 1075 (four-level leadership enhancement is warranted where defendant’s role is “that of organizing or leading a drug distribution conspiracy”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Mark W. BROPHY; Susan A. Brophy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35141

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 1, 2017

Jill J. Smith, Esquire, Attorney, Natural Resource Law Group, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Frederick B. Burnside, Esquire, Frederick Haist, Esquire, Attorney, Hugh Robert McCullough, Attorney, Davis Wright Tre-maine LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges,

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Mark W. Brophy and Susan A. Brophy appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Serra v. Lappin,*600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Brophys’ action as time-barred because the Brophys did not send a notice of rescission to defendant within three years of consummation of the loan. *See*15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Je*sinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); *Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,*309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as supported by the record the Brophys’ contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

We reject as without merit the Brophys’ contention that their action is not frivolous and the district court erred in imposing Rule 11 sanctions.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and alle*733gations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                           5
<LEGEND>
Financial Data Schedule September 30, 2000
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                      0001005663
<NAME>          ITC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.



     This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from
financial  statements for the nine month period ended  September 30, 2000 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.

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<PERIOD-START>                                 Jan-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                              0
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<OTHER-SE>                                     59,935
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   67,621
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</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Fred Cox, Sr v. Allen Samuels Chevrolet and Allen Samuels

Appellate case number: 01-17-00973-CV

Trial court case number: 2016-82605

Trial court: 215th District Court of Harris County

Appellant Fred George Cox, Sr., who is self-represented, filed a notice of appeal that 

referenced an attached “Affidavit of Poverty.” Appellant has not made financial arrangements 

for the filing of the clerk’s record. 

In his affidavit, appellant claimed indigence based on his unemployment, his lack of 

regular income, his disability, his receipt of Social Security benefits, and his lack of assets. 

However, appellant’s submission does not conform to the form Statement of Inability to Afford 

Payment of Court Costs, nor does it otherwise completely satisfy Rule 145 of the Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

An appellate court may permit a party who did not file a Statement of Inability to Afford 

Payment of Court Costs in the trial court to proceed without payment of costs. TEX. R. APP.

P. 20.1(c). Within 30 days of the date of this order, appellant is ordered to file a Statement of 

Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs in form prescribed by the Supreme Court of Texas. 

See id. 

The form Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is attached to this 

order. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Michael Massengale

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: June 14, 2018
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 USC. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Transition Report on Form 10-K of Vantage Energy Services, Inc.(the “*Company*”) for the fiscal year ended June 30,2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “*Report*”), I, Paul A. Bragg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officerof the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2)         Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| September 26, 2007 | /s/ PAUL  A. BRAGG                |   |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                    | Paul A. Bragg                          |
|                    | *Chairman and Chief Executive Officer* |

 

----
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Motion of 

EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. 

d/b/a AMERICAN EAGLE 

DOT-OST-1996-

1587 

for confidential treatment under Rule 

12 (Form 41, Schedules B-7, B-43) 

MOTION OF EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. 

FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER RULE 12 

Communications with respect to this document should be sent to: 

PEDRO FABREGAS 

President 

Executive Airlines, Inc. 

American Eagle 

P.O. Box 38082 Airport Sta. 

San Juan, P.R. 00937-0082 

KATHLEEN SOLED 

Vice President & General Counsel 

American Eagle Airlines, Inc. 

P.O. Box 619616, MD 5494 

DFW Airport, Texas 75261 

(817) 967-1574 

kate.soled@aa.com 

March 20, 2013 

FRANCIS C. HEIL 

Senior Attorney 

American Airlines, Inc. 

1101 17th Street, N.W. 

Suite 600 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

(202) 496-5642 

francis.heil@aa.com 
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Motion of 

EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. 

d/b/a AMERICAN EAGLE 

for confidential treatment under Rule 

12 (Form 41, Schedules B-7, B-43) 

DOT-OST-1996-

1587 

MOTION OF EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. 

FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER RULE 12 

Executive Airlines, Inc., d/b/a American Eagle, under 14 

CFR 302.12, hereby moves that its Form 41, Schedule B-7 for 

4Q2012 and B-43 for YE2012 be accorded confidential treatment 

and withheld from public disclosure. The information for which 

confidential treatment is requested pertains to Executive's 

airframes and aircraft engine acquisitions and retirements. 

In accordance with the Department's Final Rule on Submitting Airline Data via the Internet, 75 Fed. Reg. 41580, 

41582, we are uploading our confidential report electronically 

to the following website: http://esubmit.rita.dot.gov 

On June 5, 1995, James W. Mitchell, Director, Office of 

Airline Statistics, the Department granted confidential treatment for a 10-year period to similar data filed by American 

Airlines. For the reasons stated in Mr. Mitchell's letter, the 

Department should grant the same relief here. 
2 -

WHEREFORE, Executive moves that the schedule referenced 

above be withheld from public disclosure under Rule 12 for a 

period of 10 years. 

March 20, 2013 

Respectfully submitted, 

FRANCIS C. HEIL 

Senior Attorney 

American Airlines, Inc. 

On behalf of Executive 

Airlines, Inc.
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications

  I, William Augustin IV, certify that:

  1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A and all reports on Form 10-D
     required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report
     on Form 10-K/A of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-4 the
     "Exchange Act periodic reports");

  2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
     whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
     to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
     light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
     misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
     information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
     covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
     reports;

  4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
     servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
     conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
     this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
     in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
     their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects;
     and

  5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
     criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
     reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
     asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in
     accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
     13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report,
     except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances
     of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in
     this report on Form 10-K/A.

     In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
     information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
     EMC Mortgage Corporation as Servicer.

     Dated: July 10, 2008

     /s/ William Augustin IV
     Signature

     Vice President
     (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master
     servicer)
Exhibit 34.3

**Reportof Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We have examined management’s assertion,included in the accompanying Report on Compliance with Applicable ServicingCriteria Pursuant to Item 1122 of Regulation AB under the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, that FDI Collateral Management (the “Company”), a wholly-ownedsubsidiary of Trivin, Inc., complied with the servicing criteria set forth inItem 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for thetitle servicing platform as of and for the year-ended December 31, 2006, exceptfor 1122(d)(1)(ii)-(iv), 1122(d)(2)(i)-(vii)(D), 1122(d)(3)(i)-(iv) and1122(d)(4)(iii)-(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable tothe activities performed by them with respect to the servicing platform coveredby this report. See Management’s Assertion for the asset backed transactionscovered by this platform. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliancewith those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion onmanagement’s assertion about the Company’s compliance with the servicingcriteria based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance withstandards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and,accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’scompliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such otherprocedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examinationincluded testing of less than all of the individual asset backed transactionsand securities that comprise the platform, testing of less than all of theservicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether theCompany processed those selected transactions and performed those selectedactivities in compliance with the servicing criteria. Furthermore, ourprocedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activitiesperformed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Ourprocedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurredeither prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balancesor amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered bythis report for the selected transactions or any other transactions. We believethat our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Ourexamination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliancewith the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management’s assertion that theCompany complied with the aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for theyear-ended December 31, 2006 for the title servicing platform is fairly stated,in all material respects.

Hartford, Connecticut
#### Craig Bruce MCKINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rick MARTINEZ, individually and as an officer of Fire Extinguisher Service Center, LLC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15620

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 1, 2017

Craig Bruce McKinney, Pro Se

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Craig Bruce McKinney appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of his action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Jones v. Blanas,*393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm.

*730The district court properly dismissed McKinney’s action as time-barred because McKinney failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations. *See Pincay v. Andrews,*238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (civil RICO claims have a four-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury underlying the action); *Grimmett v. Brown,*75 F.3d 506, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (civil RICO claims were not tolled during the pendency of a prior judicial action because the prior judicial action was not a perquisite to review in federal court).

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6438 

To extend the waiver of limitations with respect to excluding from gross 

income amounts received by wrongfully incarcerated individuals. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 5, 2016 

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas (for himself and Mr. LARSON of Connecticut) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the waiver of limitations with respect to excluding 

from gross income amounts received by wrongfully incarcerated individuals. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF WAIVER OF LIMITATIONS WITH 

4 RESPECT TO EXCLUDING FROM GROSS IN5 COME AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY WRONGFULLY 

6 INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 304(d) of the Protecting 

8 Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 is amended by 

9 striking ‘‘1-year’’ and inserting ‘‘2-year’’. 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6438 IH

1 (b) TECHNICAL CORRECTION.—Section 304(d) of 

2 such Act is amended by striking ‘‘application of this Act’’ 

3 and inserting ‘‘application of this section’’. 

4 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

5 this section shall take effect as if included in section 304 

6 of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015. 

Æ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### IN RE: Keith A. DAVIS, Petitioner. In re: Keith A. Davis, Petitioner.

No. 17-1726, No. 17-1892

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 24, 2017

Decided: November 7, 2017

Keith A. Davis, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Keith A. Davis petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to vacate its order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) motion. We conclude that Davis is not entitled to the relief requested.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

In this case, because mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal, *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007), the relief Davis seeks is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petitions and supplemental petition for writ of mandamus. We deny Davis’ motion to appoint counsel. We dispense .with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITIONS DENIED*
#### Clara Isabelle Curtis *et al.,*App’lts, *v.*Ann Murphy *et al.,*Resp’ts.

See 83 N. Y. State Rep., 799.

No papers.

Motion to advance granted, without costs.