2021 IL App (1st) 190840-U

Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

Order filed August 12, 2021 

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

MARSHALL SPIEGEL and CHICAGO TITLE TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee of Trust Number 8002351713, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

VALERIE HALL, LINDA MOSES, WILLIAM 

GASTERIS, JAMES WAITE, WILLIAM MCCLINTIC, 

WILLIAM HALL, MARK BELONGIA, JOHN 

SCHRIVER, DUANE MORRIS LLP, and MICHAEL 

KIM,

Defendants

(Valerie Hall, William Hall, James Waite, Marie 

Francoise Waite, William McClintic, Corrine McClintic, 

Duane Morris LLP, Michael Kim, and Michael Kim & 

Associates, Defendants-Appellees; and John Xydakis, 

Nonparty Respondent-Appellant). 

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1618 SHERIDAN ROAD CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

Consolidated Nos.

15 L 10817

15 CH 18825

16 L 3564

Honorable 

Margaret A. Brennan, 

Judge, presiding.
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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v. 

MARSHALL SPIEGEL, CHICAGO TITLE TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee of Trust Number 8002351713, 

and FIRST BANK AND TRUST OF EVANSTON,

Defendants

(Marshall Spiegel and Chicago Title Trust Company, as 

Trustee of Trust Number 4179, Defendants-Appellants). 

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MARSHALL SPIEGEL and CHICAGO TITLE TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee of Trust Number 8002351713, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

WILLIAM MCCLINTIC, CORRINE MCCLINTIC,

VALERIE HALL, JAMES WAITE, and MICHAEL KIM,

Defendants

(Suzanne Costello, Robert Costello and 1618 N. Sheridan 

Road Condominium Association, Nominal Defendants; 

and William McClintic, Corrine McClintic, Valerie Hall, 

James Waite, and Michael Kim, Defendants-Appellees).

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JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Reyes and Martin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the trial court granted, inter alia, awards of attorney fees and costs under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) against the appellants, 

appellants’ appeal of multiple trial court orders is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 

because the other parties timely filed petitions in the trial court to supplement their 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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requests for Rule 137 fees and costs and the record on appeal indicates that those 

petitions remain pending.

¶ 2 This litigation, which arose from multiple disputes among the residents of an eight-unit 

condominium building, consists of three consolidated circuit court cases. Two of the cases were 

filed by Marshall Spiegel and Chicago Title Trust Company, as trustee of trust Number 

8002351713 (the trust), against the condominium’s board members and residents, their legal 

counsel, and a property management company. One of the cases was filed by the condominium 

association against Spiegel, who was a resident of the building and former board member, and the 

trustee of the land trust that owned his condominium unit. 

¶ 3 After Spiegel and the trustee received leave several times to file amended complaints to 

correct pleading deficiencies, the trial court granted the other litigants’ motions to dismiss Spiegel 

and the trustees’ consolidated claims pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)). Subsequently, the trial court denied Spiegel and the 

trustee’s request for leave to file a fifth amended complaint, finding that the pleading still failed to 

allege a cause of action and was frivolous. Thereafter, the trial court granted the petitions of the 

condominium association, several condominium residents, and their legal counsel for sanctions

against Spiegel and his attorney John Xydakis for pursuing this harassing and frivolous litigation. 

The trial court also enjoined Spiegel from filing any additional actions against his neighbors and 

their counsel concerning the underlying claims of these consolidated cases.

¶ 4 On appeal, appellants Spiegel, the trustee and Xydakis argue that the trial court erred by 

(1) denying their motions to substitute and disqualify the trial court judge, (2) dismissing their 

amended complaint and denying them leave to replead, (3) granting the condominium association 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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a temporary restraining order against Spiegel, and (4) awarding the condominium association, a 

board member, and their legal counsel sanctions against Spiegel and Xydakis. 

¶ 5 On December 3, 2020, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. However, 

appellants timely filed petitions for rehearing that clarified their position on this court’s jurisdiction 

over this appeal. On August 9, 2021, this court granted their petitions for rehearing, which nullified 

our December 3, 2020 decision, and stated that a new decision would be issued forthwith. 

¶ 6 For the reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1

¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 8 This matter involves the residents of an eight unit building in Wilmette organized as the 

1618 Sheridan Road Condominium Association (Association). When the president of the 

Association’s board of directors (Board) resigned in the fall of 2015 for health reasons, Spiegel 

was serving on the Board as the secretary and Valerie Hall was serving as the treasurer. Spiegel 

declared himself acting president over Hall’s objection. 

¶ 9 In October 2015, Spiegel attempted to terminate the Association’s existing relationship 

with its legal counsel, Michael Kim, and his firm, without convening an open meeting of the Board 

and over Hall’s objection. Spiegel also attempted, over Hall’s objection, to terminate the services 

of the Association’s existing property management company and engaged the services of another 

property management company. Then Spiegel initiated the lawsuit at issue in this appeal on behalf 

of the Association despite Hall’s objection and without the authorization of the Board. 

Specifically, in October 2015, Spiegel’s attorney Xydakis filed the complaint in case No. 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), 

this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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15-L-10817 on behalf of Spiegel, individually and derivatively on behalf of the Association, and 

the trustee of his land trust against certain members of the Board for defamation, invasion of 

privacy and breach of contract. When the third amended complaint in this matter was filed in 

December 2015, the Association was deleted as a co-plaintiff. On February 8, 2016, the fourth 

amended complaint in this matter was filed on behalf of plaintiff Spiegel and the trustee of trust 

number 8002351713. 

¶ 10 For the majority of the time period relevant to this dispute, the Board members were Valerie 

Hall, James Waite, and William McClintic. During this litigation, Spiegel and the trustee added 

the Board members’ spouses as defendants to this litigation. The Halls were represented by 

John T. Schriver and Duane Morris LLP (Duane Morris). Eventually, Spiegel and the trustee added 

Schriver and Duane Morris as defendants to this litigation. Spiegel and the trustee also added 

attorney Kim and his firm as defendants to this litigation. 

¶ 11 Meanwhile, in December 2015, the Association filed a complaint for declaratory and 

injunctive relief, case No. 15-CH-18825, against Spiegel and the trustee. The Association sought 

declarations from the court that the members of the Board were unit owners and duly elected to 

the Board and that Spiegel acted wrongfully and without authority by seeking to take over the 

Board. The Association also sought to enjoin Spiegel from interfering with the functions of the 

duly elected Board. On January 11, 2016, the Association moved the court for a temporary 

restraining order (TRO) to stop Spiegel from continuing to prevent the Board from functioning. 

Spiegel was served with the complaint and TRO motion on January 11, 2016.

¶ 12 In January 2016, the trial court heard the Association’s TRO motion in case No. 

15-CH-18825. Spiegel was not present; although Xydakis was present, he informed the trial court 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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that he was not appearing on behalf of Spiegel in this matter. The Association presented evidence 

showing that one of its bank accounts was frozen after Spiegel, without authorization, attempted 

to substitute himself and his newly hired property management company as signatories on the 

account in place of Hall and the existing property manager. Further, the Association learned that 

its bank account at another bank also was frozen after Spiegel and Xydakis informed the bank that 

the account needed to be frozen due to this litigation. Meanwhile, the condominium unit owners 

and Board held meetings and elected James Waite as a new Board member and president. Then 

the Board voted to reengage attorney Kim and the property management company that Spiegel 

had fired. In November 2015, the Board held a special meeting and authorized the commencement 

of litigation to obtain injunctive relief against Spiegel. In December 2015, the unit owners voted 

at a special meeting and removed Spiegel from the Board and elected William McClintic to fill the 

vacant seat. The Association argued that Spiegel interfered with its ability to pay its bills and 

conduct elections, refused to abide by the decisions of the properly elected Board, caused the 

Association to incur significant expenses to defend itself and assert its lawful rights, and otherwise

threw the Association into complete disarray and prevented it from functioning. 

¶ 13 The trial court granted the Association a TRO that restrained Spiegel from claiming the 

authority to act as Board president and from engaging in any actions with third parties on behalf 

of the Association. The court found that the Association gave Spiegel proper notice of the TRO 

motion, made an overwhelming case that the requested relief was warranted, had a protectable 

interest to ensure it could carry out its valid functions, and established irreparable harm, 

no adequate remedy at law, and a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim. 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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¶ 14 In February 2016, two separate motions for substitution of judge as a matter of right (SOJ) 

were filed in case No. 15-L-10817 on behalf of Spiegel and his land trust. The trial court granted 

the motion for substitution on behalf of the trust and allowed Spiegel to withdraw his motion 

without prejudice. 

¶ 15 In April 2016, Spiegel and the trustee filed a complaint, case No. 16-L-3564, which raised 

the same or similar claims against many of the same parties that were raised in case No. 

15-L-10817. Specifically, Spiegel sought monetary relief from unit owners and others for alleged 

tortious actions, including battery and intrusion upon seclusion, and breach of contract. He alleged 

that, after the court awarded the Association the TRO against him, the Board was trying to remove 

him from the building by spying on him, accusing him of disturbing the peace and filing false 

police reports against him. Spiegel also sought declaratory relief, asking the court to declare that 

his challenged actions were authorized and in accordance with his capacity as a duly elected Board 

member and he was entitled to indemnification and records from the Association. 

¶ 16 In May 2016, the Association, Board, and other residents moved to consolidate case Nos. 

15-L-10817, 15-CH-18825 and 16-L-3564, arguing that the complaints in these cases revealed that 

all the allegations arose from and related to the relationships and conduct of the various parties as 

unit owners at the Association property. In September 2016, the trial court consolidated the 

Association’s case No. 15-CH-18825 and Spiegel’s case No. 16-L-3564 into case No. 15-L-10817. 

¶ 17 In June 2017, the trial court granted the motions of the Association, Board, unit owners 

and their attorneys to dismiss Spiegel and the trustee’s fourth amended complaint in case No. 

15-L-10817 pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code for failure to state a claim. The court stated that 

the allegations of the complaint were wholly conclusory and lacked specific and factual details 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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necessary to state a cause of action. The court also sua sponte struck Spiegel and the trustee’s 

complaint in case No. 16-L-3564. The trial court ordered Spiegel and the trustee to seek leave of 

the court to replead their amended complaint. 

¶ 18 In August 2017, Spiegel and the trustee sought leave to replead with their proposed fifth 

amended complaint, which contained 99 counts, 1436 paragraphs and was over 200 pages. Spiegel 

also moved for an SOJ. Spiegel’s SOJ motion was granted, and the case was reassigned. 

Thereafter, the court granted an SOJ motion by one of the Association parties, and the case was 

reassigned again. 

¶ 19 In September 2017, another SOJ motion was filed on behalf of Spiegel’s land trust. 

The trial court, however, denied that motion, finding that the trust had already received an SOJ. 

¶ 20 On February 8, 2018, the court denied Spiegel and the trustee leave to replead the 

complaint. The court stated that Spiegel and his attorney Xydakis had engaged in the “baffling” 

conduct of piling on further deficient and frivolous claims despite six opportunities to plead a cause 

of action and the court’s clear admonitions to correct the deficient and frivolous pleading. 

The court added that Spiegel and Xydakis’s act of simply restating the same allegations that the 

trial court had already determined were not good enough to state a cause of action was harassment. 

When Spiegel and the trustee moved the court to reconsider this denial of leave to replead, the trial 

court denied their motion to reconsider on July 11, 2018.

¶ 21 Meanwhile, on February 28, 2018, Spiegel and the trustee also filed a petition for recusal 

or substitution of the trial court judge for cause, alleging that the Association’s counsel, Gene 

Murphy, had engaged in multiple ex parte communications with the trial court. 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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¶ 22 In response, defendants filed the sworn affidavit of Murphy, who averred that all of his 

contacts were with judicial staff, not the judge, and were inquiries about either the scheduling of 

court dates or the court’s receipt of courtesy copies. Murphy averred that he did not engage in any 

ex parte discussions of the substance of the case with the trial court or judicial staff. 

¶ 23 Furthermore, the trial judge stated on the record: 

“I did not speak with counsel at all. I mean this is an allegation that you 

have made. But I did not speak with counsel at all concerning anything about this 

case. That I don’t know where you are coming from with this. But it’s the 

allegations that you have made and that’s why another judge will look at this. But 

I have not spoken with counsel about this. I have had conversations about various 

colleges my daughter is looking at and we talked about other things. But I don’t 

recall ever speaking with counsel about this case. I don’t do that. In my 16 years, 

counsel, on the bench, I have never done that. So, you know, I struggle with what 

you are trying to point to because it’s just not my nature to do that. So there we go.” 

¶ 24 Spiegel’s petition for recusal or disqualification of the judge was heard by another Cook 

County Circuit Court judge, who denied it in May 2018. Spiegel moved for reconsideration, and 

the trial court denied that motion. 

¶ 25 Between May and July of 2018, the parties filed four separate petitions for sanctions under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Specifically, Spiegel sought sanctions against 

Hall and her legal counsel; the Association, various unit owners and their counsel; and attorney 

Kim, his firm, and their counsel. Hall and her counsel sought sanctions against Spiegel and his 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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attorney Xydakis. The Association also sought sanctions against Spiegel and Xydakis. Kim sought 

sanctions against only Spiegel. 

¶ 26 Xydakis moved the court for an SOJ regarding the pending Rule 137 sanction petitions, 

arguing that the petitions initiated criminal contempt proceedings against him, the caselaw 

indicated that counsel may file his own SOJ motion when Rule 137 sanctions are sought against 

both counsel and his client, and Xydakis could not get a fair and impartial trial by the court. 

¶ 27 In November 2018, the trial court denied Xydakis’s SOJ motion, stating that the parties 

and the court had not initiated criminal contempt proceedings against him; he was attempting to 

reframe the petitions for Rule 137 sanction as a matter of criminal contempt to obtain a jury trial, 

seek discovery and petition once more for an SOJ; Rule 137 specifically provided that a sanction 

proceeding brought under the rule did not give rise to a separate civil suit; both of his two clients 

had already exercised their SOJ rights in this matter; and the motion was untimely because the 

statutory provision governing SOJs allows a party to exercise this right before the presiding judge 

has ruled on a substantial issue and court had already made several substantive rulings. 

¶ 28 Also in November 2018, the trial court denied Spiegel and the trustee’s motion for the trial 

court judge to disqualify herself from further proceedings in this matter or, alternatively, from 

ruling on the Rule 137 sanction petitions and disclose in open court what was said at nine purported 

ex parte communications. The trial court found no basis for recusal because Spiegel failed to attach 

the requisite affidavit to support an SOJ motion; Spiegel had already sought an SOJ, which was 

denied; this request was made six months after the alleged statements showing bias or prejudice; 

and Spiegel failed to show the requisite actual prejudice to support a motion to disqualify a judge 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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because the alleged ex parte communications were merely communications between opposing 

counsel and the court’s coordinator, but not the court’s law clerk, about scheduling matters.

¶ 29 Thereafter, Xydakis filed another SOJ motion, arguing that he was party to this action 

because a Rule 137 sanction petition that adds an attorney constituted a new claim filed against a 

new party. He also argued that he was a party because he had filed an appearance in October 2018 

in response to Valerie Hall’s counterclaim, which named him as a defendant. 

¶ 30 In December 2018, the trial court denied Xydakis’s SOJ motion, finding that (1) Hall’s 

counterclaim, which was withdrawn nearly two years ago, did not support Xydakis’s assertion that 

he was still a party, (2) an attorney against whom sanctions were awarded was a nonparty, 

(3) Rule 137 provides that a sanction proceeding under the rule does not give rise to a separate 

civil suit, and (4) Xydakis’s two clients already exercised their SOJ rights and the court had already 

made several substantive rulings in this matter. 

¶ 31 On February 6, 2019, the trial court stayed the filing of any further motions or petitions, 

except for the pending Rule 137 sanction petitions, until the court ruled on the parties’ four pending 

Rule 137 sanction petitions. 

¶ 32 On March 29, 2019, the trial court denied Spiegel’s petition for Rule 137 sanctions and 

granted the petitions for Rule 137 sanctions filed by Hall and her counsel, the Association, and 

Kim. In all four orders, the court repeatedly referred to Spiegel’s and Xydakis’s abusive litigation 

tactics of filing complaints filled with baseless accusations, misrepresenting case law by reversing 

or altering holdings, filing lawsuits for the sole purpose of harassment, increasing costs and delay, 

and filing objectively unreasonable motions to disqualify counsel and judges. The court ordered 

Spiegel and Xydakis to pay by May 1, 2019, (1) sanctions of $360,964 to Hall, (2) sanctions of 

$25,000 to her counsel Duane Morris, (3) $473,442.08 in attorney fees and $27,878 for increased 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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insurance costs to the Association, and (4) sanctions of $174,388.89 to Kim. Additionally, the 

court enjoined Spiegel from filing any additional actions against his neighbors and their attorneys 

concerning the underlying claims of these consolidated cases.

¶ 33 On April 22, 2019, Spiegel, the trust and Xydakis filed a notice of interlocutory appeal 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 304(b)(5) (eff. March 8, 2016) and 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 7, 

2017) regarding the trial court’s March 29, 2019 orders that imposed Rule 137 sanctions on them 

and enjoined them from litigation, and the court’s prior orders that denied their SOJ motions, 

disqualification motion and discovery motions regarding that disqualification. On April 29, 2019, 

they amended their notice of appeal to sever their Rule 307(a)(1) interlocutory appeal from their 

Rule 304(b)(5) appeal from a final judgment. Ultimately, in August 2019, this court consolidated 

these appeals.

¶ 34 In their brief on appeal, appellants Spiegel, the trustee and Xydakis argued that the trial 

court erred by denying their SOJ motions and motions to disqualify based on ex parte discussions, 

by dismissing their complaints and denying them leave to replead, by granting the Association’s 

request for the TRO against Spiegel, and by granting the Rule 137 sanction petitions of Hall and 

her counsel, the Association and Kim. Appellants also argued that the attorney fee awards did not 

comply with the standards of Rule 137, the sanction orders violated due process and failed to make 

specific findings, and clients generally are not liable for their counsel’s sanctionable act. 

¶ 35 Regarding this court’s jurisdiction, appellants stated that this court had jurisdiction of this 

appeal based on Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017)

because they were appealing final orders that (1) dismissed their fourth amended complaint on 

June 14, 2017, under section 2-615 of the Code, (2) denied them, on February 8, 2018, leave to 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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replead their complaint, (3) denied, on July 30, 2018, reconsideration of that February 2018 order, 

and (4) entered, on March 29, 2019, three Rule 137 sanction orders totaling $1,061,672.97 against 

Spiegel and Xydakis. 

¶ 36 Appellants also vaguely stated that, in the alternative, if the three March 2019 Rule 137 

sanction orders were not final because the trial court afterward “entered and continued three 

additional sanction petitions *** for fees sought before March 29, 2019 that would impose 

additional sanctions after a ruling on this appeal,” then the March 2019 Rule 137 sanction orders 

were appealable interlocutory orders under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 304(b)(5) (eff. March 8, 

2016) and 307(a)(1) because “they imposed and ordered payment of a contempt/penalty of 

$1,061,672.97 and enjoined a party from further litigation” and appellants filed the requisite and 

timely interlocutory appeal notices. 

¶ 37 The appellees’ brief made no statement regarding this court’s jurisdiction.

¶ 38 In their reply brief, appellants made a vague statement that this court would lack 

jurisdiction over this appeal if we decided that “the sanctions fall under Rule 137” instead of 

contempt findings under Rule 304(b)(5) because the trial court entered and continued three 

supplemental fee petitions. Appellants did not provide specific facts to support this statement, and 

their citations to the record referred to non-existent five-digit page numbers even though the 

highest page number in the electronically filed record on appeal was only four digits long.

Furthermore, most of appellants’ page references in their table of contents of the record did not 

coincide with the page numbers of the electronically filed record on appeal.

¶ 39 On December 3, 2020, this court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, which had 

ruled in favor of appellees and against appellants. 
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¶ 40 In January 2021, appellants moved to stay or extend the time to file their petitions for 

rehearing, alleging that Spiegel “filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy (No. 20-21625, N.D. Ill.)” on 

December 16, 2020. This court denied without prejudice the motion to stay and granted the 

extension request.

¶ 41 In their petitions for rehearing, appellants argued for the first time with any clarity that this 

court lacked jurisdiction because timely supplemental petitions for Rule 137 sanctions were 

pending in the trial court, which had reserved ruling on those petitions and did not make a finding 

under Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason for delaying appeal of the March 2019 Rule 137 

sanction orders. 

¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 43 A court of review is entitled to have briefs submitted that are articulate, organized, and 

present cohesive legal argument in conformity with our supreme court rules. Schwartz v. Great

Central Insurance Co., 188 Ill. App. 3d 264, 268 (1989). A reviewing court is also entitled to have 

issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and coherent arguments presented; arguments 

inadequately presented on appeal are forfeited. Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical 

Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389, 401 (1987); see also Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 

2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12 (the failure to provide proper citations to the record is a violation 

of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); In re Estate of Kunz, 7 Ill. App. 3d 

760, 763 (1972) (“Reviewing courts are entitled to have the issues clearly defined [and] to be cited 

pertinent authorities and are not a depository in which an appellant is to dump the entire matter of 

pleadings, court action, argument, and research as it were, upon the court.”). Here, appellants failed 

to apprise this court with clear statements regarding jurisdiction and accurate citations to the record
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about the appellees’ April 2019 supplemental Rule 137 petitions and the trial court’s decision to 

refrain from ruling on those supplemental petitions until after this court rendered its decision in 

this appeal. 

¶ 44 Nevertheless, we have a duty to examine our jurisdiction and dismiss an appeal if we find 

that jurisdiction is lacking. Heartland Bank & Trust v. Katz, 2020 IL App (1st) 182259, ¶ 11; 

In re Estate of Young, 2020 IL App (2d) 190392, ¶ 16. Appellants have the burden of establishing 

appellate jurisdiction. Shared Imaging, LLC v. Hamer, 2017 IL App (1st) 152817, ¶ 19. Whether 

a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. John G. Phillips & 

Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d at 337, 339 (2001); see also Thomas v. Weatherguard 

Construction Co., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 142785, ¶ 63 (under de novo review, the reviewing court 

performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform).

¶ 45 According to the record, after the trial court ruled on the four Rule 137 sanction petitions

on March 29, 2019, appellants, on April 22, 2019, filed their notice of interlocutory appeal of those 

March 29, 2019 orders and others. Then, on April 29, 2019, appellants amended their notice of 

appeal to sever their Rule 307(a)(1) interlocutory appeal from their Rule 304(b)(5) appeal from a 

final judgment. 

¶ 46 Also on April 29, 2019, Hall, the Association, and Kim moved to supplement their 

Rule 137 petitions for sanctions. Hall sought $26,871 in additional reimbursement for her attorney 

fees and costs incurred from January 1 through March 29, 2019. The Association sought over 

$80,000 in additional reimbursement for attorney fees and costs incurred through March 29, 2019.

Kim moved to supplement his Rule 137 sanction petition and modify the court’s March 29, 2019 

decision that denied him fees and costs for work-in-progress. Under Rule 137, Kim sought 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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$44,033.04 in additional reimbursement for fees and costs incurred from November 1, 2018, 

through March 29, 2019. 

¶ 47 On May 8, 2019, Spiegel and Xydakis objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction, arguing that 

they had already appealed the March 29, 2019 sanction orders, the court could not enter an order 

that would modify the order or judgment being appealed, the March 29, 2019 sanctions were final 

because more than 30 days had lapsed and the motions to supplement the Rule 137 petitions were 

not sufficient to toll that 30-day period because those motions were not postjudgment motions 

directed against the verdict.

¶ 48 On May 10, 2019, the trial court “entered and continued” the three pending Rule 137 

petition supplements “until the appellate court rules.”

¶ 49 Every final judgment in a civil case is appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301, and 

jurisdiction is vested in the appellate court to hear the appeal of that final judgment upon the filing 

of a notice of appeal. In re Application of County Treasurer v. Phoenix Bond and Indemnity 

Company, 208 Ill. App. 3d 561, 564 (1990). “A final judgment is one which fixes absolutely and 

finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit; it is final if it determines the litigation on the merits 

so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the 

judgment.” Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795, 799 (1993). 

¶ 50 The time for filing the notice of appeal is specified in Rule 303(a)(1). That rule provides in 

relevant part:

 “The notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 

30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial 

motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, 
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within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending 

postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order, irrespective of 

whether the circuit court had entered a series of final orders that were modified 

pursuant to postjudgment motions. A judgment or order is not final and appealable 

while a Rule 137 claim remains pending unless the court enters a finding pursuant 

to Rule 304(a). A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but 

before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date of and after 

the entry of the judgment or order.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 51 For purposes of Rule 303, “an order or judgment is final if it terminates the litigation 

between the parties on the merits of the cause or disposes of the rights of the parties either upon 

the entire controversy or upon some definite part thereof.” F.H. Prince & Co., Inc. v. Towers 

Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977, 982 (1994). 

¶ 52 When a final judgment or order does not dispose of all matters presented to the court, 

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) governs. That rule states:

“If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal 

may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that 

there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. Such a 

finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the 

court’s own motion or on motion of any party. *** In the absence of such a finding, 

any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities 

of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, 

rights, and liabilities of all the parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. March 8, 2016).

¶ 53 A “claim” under the terms of Rule 304 has been defined as “any right, liability or matter 

raised in an action. If an order does not resolve every right, liability or matter raised, it must contain 

an express finding that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal. Otherwise, the order is not 

appealable.” Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). 

A request for attorney fees is a claim within the meaning of Rule 304(a). 

¶ 54 A petition for sanctions under Rule 137 can be filed at any time during the 

litigation. Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2000) (the plain language of the rule does 

not preclude a party from filing a Rule 137 motion at an early stage but, rather, merely indicates 

that the motion must be brought within the civil action in which the pleading, motion or other 

document has been filed). Although it may be filed after entry of judgment, a claim for attorney 

fees is not a posttrial motion within sections 2-1202 and 2-1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1202, 

5/2-1203 (West 2016)) nor, even if viewed as a motion to modify the judgment, is it a posttrial 

motion “directed against the judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 303(a). Marsh, 

138 Ill. 2d at 462. 

¶ 55 Consequently, if a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a claim for fees, any other judgment 

entered in the case before the claim for fees is ruled upon is or becomes nonfinal and nonappealable when the claim for fees is made, unless the prior judgment contains the language set 

forth in Rule 304(a), that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. Any notice of 

appeal filed before or after the filing of a timely claim for fees is premature under Rule 301 while 
Nos. 1-19-0840, 1-19-0915, 1-19-0916 and 1-19-0917 (Consolidated)

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the claim for fees remains pending; and the appeal must be dismissed unless the otherwise final 

order being appealed from satisfies the requirements of Rule 304(a). Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 464. 

¶ 56 Applying the rules and case law to the facts in the instant case, it is clear that appellees’ 

three supplements to their petitions for Rule 137 fees were claims within the meaning of Supreme 

Court Rule 304(a). The March 29, 2019 orders, which granted attorney fees and costs through the 

dates those petitions were filed, could have been a final judgment for purposes of Supreme Court 

Rule 301 because it adjudicated all the requests for attorney fees and costs pending before the trial 

court at that time. However, the trial court had previously stayed the filing of any further motions 

until it ruled on those pending Rule 137 petitions. Even though appellants had already filed notices 

of appeal on April 22 and 29, 2019, the appellees’ supplements to their Rule 137 petitions for fees 

and costs incurred through March 29, 2019, were timely because they were filed within 30 days 

of the March 29, 2019 orders. Because those March 29, 2019 orders do not contain a finding under 

Rule 304(a) that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal, we conclude that appellants’ appeal 

must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

¶ 59 Appeal dismissed.