alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 32002R0032 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002R0032

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 32/2002 of 9 January 2002 correcting Regulation (EC) No 13/2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 713/2001 on the purchase of beef under Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 **

*
Official Journal L 006 , 10/01/2002 P. 0037 - 0038 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 32/2002

of 9 January 2002

correcting Regulation (EC) No 13/2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 713/2001 on the purchase of beef under Regulation (EC) No 690/2001

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2345/2001(2),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 of 3 April 2001 on special market support measures in the beef sector(3), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2595/2001(4), and in particular Article 2(2),

Whereas:

(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 13/2002(5) opened the purchase of beef under Regulation (EC) No 690/2001 in a number of Member States.

(2) An error has been discovered in the Annex to the abovementioned Regulation. The Regulation in question should therefore be corrected,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The Annex to Regulation (EC) No 13/2002 is replaced by the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply from 5 January 2002.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 9 January 2002.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21.

(2) OJ L 315, 1.12.2001, p. 29.

(3) OJ L 95, 5.4.2001, p. 8.

(4) OJ L 345, 29.12.2001, p. 33.

(5) OJ L 3, 5.1.2002, p. 36.

ANEXO/BILAG/ANHANG/ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ/ANNEX/ANNEXE/ALLEGATO/BIJLAGE/ANEXO/LIITE/BILAGA

Estado miembro/Medlemsstat/Mitgliedstaat/Κράτος μέλος/Member State/État membre/Stati membri/Lidstaat/Estado-Membro/Jäsenvaltiot/Medlemsstat

Belgique/België

Deutschland

Österreich

Nederland

Ireland

España

France

Portugal

Sverige

Luxembourg
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fernando A. NINO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-15230 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 15, 2017)

Roberta Josephina Bodnar, U.S. Attorney’s Office — FLM, Ocala, FL, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, Yvette Rhodes, Joseph K. Ruddy, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Orlando, FL, Mary A. Mills, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

All Kamalzadeh, appointed counsel for Fernando Nino in this appeal of the denial of Nino’s motion to reduce his sentence, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assess*713ment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the denial of Nino’s motion to reduce his sentence is AFFIRMED.
2nd STORY SOFTWARE, Inc. 2011 TAX SEASON PERFORMANCE BONUS PLAN



 Exhibit 10.5 
 2nd Story Software, Inc. 
 Tax Year 2011 Management Incentive Plan

 For JoAnn Kinzel, President (“Participant”) 

This Management Incentive Plan is effective for the 2011 Tax Year, as defined in the 2011 Tax Year Financial Plan (the
“Financial Plan”). If the EBIDTA Margin Percentage for the TaxACT business meets the Target EBIDTA Margin Percentage set forth in Financial Plan, Participant shall be entitled to earn one or both of the Revenue Bonus and the
Unit Growth Bonus, as set forth below. The measurements for the two bonus types are independent, and the Participant may earn one bonus without earning the other, or may earn both, up to a maximum bonus amount of $160,000. In addition, Participant
may earn the Retention Bonus set forth below, independent of whether the other bonus components are earned. The bonuses, if any, will be paid within a reasonable period of time after the end of the 2nd Story Software fiscal year. Defined terms that
are used but not defined in this Management Incentive Plan have the meaning assigned to them in the Financial Plan. 
 Revenue Bonus

 If Tax Year 2011 Revenue is at Target (as defined in the Financial Plan), then Participant shall earn a Revenue Bonus of
$20,000. For each whole $1M by which Tax Year 2011 Revenue exceeds Target, Participant shall be entitled to receive an additional $15,000, up to a maximum total Revenue Bonus of $80,000. If Tax Year 2011 Revenue is between Target and $2M below
Target, Participant shall earn a Revenue Bonus of $10,000. If Tax Year 2011 Revenue is below Target by more than $2M but not more than $5M, Participant shall earn a Revenue Bonus of $5,000. If Tax Year 2011 Revenue is more than $5M below Target,
Participant shall not earn a Revenue Bonus. 
 Unit Growth Bonus 
 The below table sets forth the levels of Unit Growth Bonus that will be awarded for achievement each of the Unit Growth Tiers set forth in the Financial Plan. As set forth in the Financial Plan, Unit
Growth will be measured against the percentage of overall year-over-year growth of DIY tax returns e-filed in 2011, as reported by the IRS. 
  

					
	 Unit Growth Tier
	  	Unit Growth Bonus	 
	 Tier 9
	  	$	80,000	  
	 Tier 8
	  	$	70,000	  
	 Tier 7
	  	$	60,000	  
	 Tier 6
	  	$	50,000	  
	 Tier 5
	  	$	40,000	  
	 Tier 4
	  	$	30,000	  
	 Tier 3
	  	$	25,000	  
	 Tier 2
	  	$	10,000	  
	 Tier 1
	  	$	0	  

 Retention Bonus 
 If Participant remains employed by 2nd Story Software, Inc. through the end of the 2011 Tax Year, Participant will receive an additional $50,000 Retention Bonus.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Renargo L. MARTIN, also known as Ricoh, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-1944

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: August 18, 2017

Filed: August 23, 2017

David H. Johnson, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Patrick C. Edwards, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, for appellee

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Renargo Martin directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to robbery charges, and the district court1 imposed a sentence consistent with Martin’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, which contained an appeal waiver. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. *1003California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), acknowledging the appeal waiver, and relaying Martin’s contentions that there was an insufficient basis for his conviction and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable. In particular, we note that Martin’s own statements at the change-of-plea hearing indicated that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and appeal waiver. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s representations during plea-taking carry strong presumption of verity).

As to the ineffective-assistance claim, we decline to consider it on direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that ineffective-assistance claims are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings where the record can be properly developed).

Furthermore, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we dismiss this appeal.

1

. The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
| (1) | the      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly period ended March 31,      2008 (the “Report”) which this statement accompanies fully complies with      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act      of 1934; and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Energy      King, Inc. |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:      November 13, 2008                                                     |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| /s/ Jeffrey R.      Hultman                                                            |   |
| Jeffrey      R. HultmanPrincipal      Financial Officer(Chief      Accounting Officer) |   |

----
# EUR-Lex - 32001R1413 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R1413

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 1413/2001 of 12 July 2001 amending for the sixth time Regulation (EC) No 785/95 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 603/95 on the common organisation of the market in dried fodder **

*
Official Journal L 191 , 13/07/2001 P. 0008 - 0008 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1413/2001

of 12 July 2001

amending for the sixth time Regulation (EC) No 785/95 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 603/95 on the common organisation of the market in dried fodder

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 603/95 of 21 February 1995 on the common organisation of the market in dried fodder(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1347/95(2), and in particular Article 18 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The third indent of Article 2(1)(a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 785/95 of 6 April 1995 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 603/95 on the common organisation of the market in dried fodder(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 676/1999(4), states that whole plants, harvested green with unripe grain, of the cereals listed in point 1 of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92(5) and having been cultivated on land which was not declared in the area aid application with a view to the aid for arable crops provided for in that Regulation are deemed to be "dried fodder" in order to prevent aid from being paid twice on the same parcels.

(2) Abovementioned Regulation (EEC) No 1765/95 was repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999(6).

(3) Regulation (EC) No 785/95 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(4) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Dried Fodder,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The third indent of Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 785/95 is replaced by the following: "- whole plants, harvested green with unripe grain, of the cereals listed in point I of Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999(7) and having been cultivated on land which was not declared in the area aid application with a view to the aid for arable crops provided for in that Regulation,"

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 July 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 63, 21.3.1995, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 131, 15.6.1995, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 79, 7.4.1995, p. 5.

(4) OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 40.

(5) OJ L 181, 1.7.1992, p. 12.

(6) OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 1.

(7) OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p.1.
[Civ. No. 2344.

Second Appellate District, Division One.

November 7, 1919.]

#### F. G. WOOD, Respondent, v. BERTHA M. DAILEY, Appellant.

[1] Findings — Omitted Issue — Appeal on Judgment-boll — Presumption.—Where an appeal is presented on the judgment-roll alone, the appellate court must assume that no evidence was produced. on an issue omitted from the findings of the trial court.

[2] Id.—Failure to Offer Evidence.—Where no evidence is offered in support of a given issue, the trial court is under no obligation to make a finding upon that issue.

*220
      [3] Id.—Instjeitciency ov Evidence—Faildbe to Find on Issue.— Failure to find on an issue is not ground for reversal where the record discloses no evidence on which a finding favorable to the complaining party could properly have been made.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order refusing to vacate and set aside the judgment and enter a judgment in favor of the defendant. Leslie R Hewitt, Judge.

Affirmed,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

•Slosson & Mitchell for Appellant.

Hyman Schwartz for Respondent.

CONREY, P. J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order refusing to vacate' and set aside the judgment and enter a judgment in favor of the defendant.

By her cross-complaint defendant sought to recover damages for the unlawful detention by the plaintiff of an automobile of the defendant from the first day of March to the eighteenth day of October, 1915. It was alleged that the reasonable value of the use of the automobile was the sum of ten dollars per day, and that defendant was damaged on account of the unlawful detention in the sum of $2,320. All of the allegations of the cross-complaint were denied by the answer thereto. The findings of fact were in favor of cross-complainant, except that the findings are silent on the issue as to reasonable value and amount of damages.

[1] Let it be assumed, as contended by appellant, that the findings of fact, if supplemented by a finding establishing the reasonable value of the use of the automobile and the amount of damages, would have entitled cross-complainant to judgment for the amount so determined; nevertheless, the judgment must be sustained. The appeal is presented on the judgment-roll alone. This being so, this court, in determining the appeal, must assume, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that no evidence was produced on the issue omitted from the findings. *[2]*If there was no such evidence, the court was not under obligation to make a finding upon that issue. [3] The failure to find on an issue is not ground for reversal where the record discloses no evidence on which a finding favorable to the complaining *221party could properly have been made. *(Maloof*v. *Maloof,*175 Cal. 571, [166 Pac, 330]; *Mohr*v. *North Rawhide Mining etc. Co.,*177 Cal. 264, [170 Pac. 600].)

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Shaw, J., and James, J., concurred.
#### John C. PARKINSON, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.

2015-3066

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

August 8, 2016

Kathleen M. McClellan, Jesselyn Alicia Radack, Esq., Whistleblower *&*Source Protection Program, ExposeFaets, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Tara K. Hogan, Esq., Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before Prost, Chief Judge, Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna,' Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, and Stoll, Circuit Judges.*

*

 The panel that heard the appeal included Senior Circuit Judges Plager and Linn, who did not participate in the en banc poll, but elect to sit on the en banc panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012).

ORDER

Per Curiam.

Respondent, the Department of Justice, filed a petition for rehearing en banc. A response was invited by the court and filed by Petitioner John C. Parkinson. The petition and response were considered by the panel that heard the appeal, Fed. Cir. R. 35 Practice Notes (“Petition for Rehearing En Banc Referred to Panel”), and thereafter referred to the circuit judges who are in regular active service. A poll was requested and taken, and the court decided that the appeal warrants en banc consideration.

Upon consideration thereof,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) Respondent’s petition for rehearing en banc is granted.

(2) The court’s opinion of February 29, 2016, is vacated, and the appeal is reinstated.

(3) The parties are requested to file supplemental briefs. The briefs should address the following issue:

> Whether a preference eligible employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation challenging an adverse employment action before the Merit Systems Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d) may *910raise whistleblower reprisal in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2B0B as an affirmative defense under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C).

Briefing should be limited to this issue.

(4) The supplemental en banc briefs shall be electronically filed in the ECF system, and thirty paper copies of each brief shall be filed with the court. Two paper copies of each en banc brief shall be served on opposing counsel. Petitioner’s en banc brief is due 45 days from the date of this or4er. Respondent’s en banc response brief is due within 30 days of service of Petitioner’s en banc brief. Petitioner’s reply brief is due within 15 days of service of Respondent’s response brief. Briefs shall adhere to the type-volume limitations set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 and Federal Circuit Rule 32.

(5) The court invites the views of amici curiae. Any such briefs may be filed without consent and leave of court, but otherwise must comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 and Federal Circuit Rule 29.

(6) The parties are directed to file with the court thirty paper copies of their original briefs and joint appendix within 17 days from the date of this order.

(7) This appeal will be heard en banc on the basis of the original briefs, the supplemental briefs ordered herein, and oral argument.

(8) Oral argument will be held at a time and date to be announced later.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 

 ** The Honorable Michael W. Mosman, District Judge for the District of 

Oregon, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GLACIER ELECTRIC 

COOPERATIVE, INC.;

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

THE ESTATE OF SCOTT SHERBURNE,

RON BIRD, and HERB GILHAM,

Individually and on behalf of Glacier

Construction, Inc.;

 Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-35216

D.C. No. CV-08-30-SEH

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Montana

Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 2, 2010 

Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MOSMAN, ** 

District Judge.

FILED

JUN 25 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 2 of 2

Glacier Electric Cooperative ("GEC") appeals the district court's decision to

grant summary judgment in favor of Appellees (collectively, "Glacier Construction").

At summary judgment, GEC argued that a tribal court judgment against GEC was void

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 1998, the issue of tribal subject matter

jurisdiction was fully litigated in the district court during a different but related lawsuit

between these same parties. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the doctrine

of res judicata precluded GEC from relitigating the tribal court's subject matter

jurisdiction in this proceeding.

Issue preclusion attached to the district court's 1998 decision. The issue of

subject matter litigation was actually litigated in 1998, determined by a valid and final

judgment on remand, and essential to judgment. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530

U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250

(1982)); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). Even

though the appeal of this case was ultimately resolved on grounds of due process, the

determination of subject matter jurisdiction made by the district court was never

disturbed. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he

existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry in virtually every federal

examination of a tribal judgment.").

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
            31.1
 Certification
            of Senior Officer in Charge of the Servicing Function
 of
            the
            Servicer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
            2002







**SERVICER
      CERTIFICATION**






I,
      Steven
      R. Lambert, certify that:




1.           I
      have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
      required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form
      10-K of Nissan Auto Lease Trust 2006-A (the “Exchange Act Periodic
      Reports”);




2.           Based
      on my knowledge, the Exchange Act Periodic Reports, taken as a whole, do not
      contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
      fact
      necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
      which
      such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered
      by
      this report;




3.           Based
      on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information
      required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report
      is
      included in the Exchange Act Periodic Reports;




4.           I
      am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the Servicer and based
      on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the Servicer
      compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation
      AB,
      and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act Periodic Reports, the Servicer
      has
      fulfilled its obligations under the Servicing Agreement (as defined in the
      related Indenture), as amended, in all material respects; and




5.           All
      of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
      asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment
      of
      compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to
      be
      included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
      Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
      report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material
      instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in
      this
      report on Form 10-K.




In
      giving
      the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided
      to me
      by the following unaffiliated party:  U.S. Bank National
      Association.




Date:        June
      29, 2007




By:/s/ Steven R.
      Lambert


Steven
      R.
      Lambert


President
      and Chief
      Executive Officer of


Nissan
      Motor
      Acceptance Corporation













31