In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00111-CR

No. 02-19-00112-CR

No. 02-19-00113-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 1507506D, 1550423D, 1561923R

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

JOEY ABRAHAM MOOSO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Joey Abraham Mooso entered open pleas of guilty to a count of 

second-degree-felony possession with intent to promote child pornography (Cause 

No. 1507506D), five counts of third-degree-felony possession of child pornography 

(Cause No. 1550423D), and two counts of second-degree-felony sexual assault of a 

child under the age of 17 (Cause No. 1561923R). See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 22.011(a)(2); 43.26(a), (e). In so doing, Mooso signed judicial confessions in each 

case that stated in relevant part, “I have read the indictment or information filed in 

this case and I committed each and every act alleged therein, except those acts waived 

by the State. All facts alleged in the indictment or information are true and 

correct.” [Emphasis added.] By the terms of the judicial confessions, Mooso agreed 

that the trial court took judicial notice of the confessions. See Davis v. State, 02-15-

00183-CR, 2016 WL 3452786, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2016, pet. 

ref’d) (holding judicial confession sufficient to support guilty plea that included a 

statement acknowledging trial court’s judicial notice of the same). 

Mooso did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictments against him, nor 

does he challenge them on appeal. Rather, Mooso argues in his sole issue that the 

State was required to introduce evidence into the record showing Mooso’s guilt

despite his signing the judicial confessions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 

(“[I]t shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing 

the guilt of the defendant . . . .”). In so doing, Mooso asks us to disregard the court 
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of criminal appeals’ decision in Dinnery v. State, in which the court reiterated that a 

judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty 

plea. 592 S.W.2d 343, 353, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (op. on reh’g) (“It 

should be remembered that a judicial confession does not require corroboration, and 

the cases cited did not hold that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to 

sustain the guilty plea provided there is other evidence in the record to also support 

the conviction.”). 

Because we are bound by the decisions of the court of criminal appeals, we 

decline Mooso’s invitation to disregard Dinnery. See Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (“[A]s an intermediate appellate court we 

are bound to follow the pronouncements of the court of criminal appeals.”). And, 

following Dinnery, we hold that Mooso’s written judicial confession was sufficient to 

meet the State’s burden under Article 1.15 in each case and overrule Mooso’s sole 

issue on appeal. See Davis, 2016 WL 3452786, at *2 (holding similarly). Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 24, 2019