alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12.1

Statement of Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

Company

PredecessorYear Ended
December 31,





Year Ended
December 31,Eleven Months
Ended
December 31,
2007(3)

One Month
Ended
January 31,
20072009

2008

2006

2005(4)(in 000's, except ratio amounts)Pre-tax income (loss) from continuing operations

$
(88,973
)
$
(39,466
)
$
(102,002
)
$
(62,518
)
$
49,310

$
214Income from equity investees


386


1,383


887








Fixed charges


95,384


93,507


80,929


5,819


55,842


54,769Amortization of capitalized interest











7


24


Capitalized interest














(515
)

(312
)Total earnings

$
6,025

$
52,658

$
(21,960
)
$
(56,692
)
$
105,691

$
55,295Interest expense(1)

$
14,474

$
12,999

$
15,420

$
5,345

$
49,637

$
49,097Estimated interest within rent expense(2)


80,910


80,508


65,509


474


5,690


5,360Capitalized interest














515


312Total fixed charges

$
95,384

$
93,507

$
80,929

$
5,819

$
55,842

$
54,769Ratio of earnings to fixed charges














1.89


1.01Deficiency of earnings available to cover fixed charges

$
(89,359
)
$
(40,849
)
$
(102,889
)
$
(62,511
)
$


$



(1)Includes
interest expense and amortization of premiums, discounts and capitalized expenses related to indebtedness.(2)Estimated
interest within rent expense includes one-third of rental expense, which approximates the interest component of
operating leases.(3)Includes
the operating results of Petro Stopping Centers, L.P. since our acquisition of Petro Stopping Centers, L.P., which was
completed on May 30, 2007.(4)In
connection with a refinancing our predecessor completed during 2005, our predecessor recognized expenses of $39.6 million.


---



QuickLinks
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 47 (Thursday, March 10, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13699-13700]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05074]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[B-72-2021]


Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) 93--Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; 
Authorization of Production Activity; BrightView Technologies, Inc. 
(Plastic Film), Durham, North Carolina

    On November 5, 2021, the Triangle J Council of Governments, grantee 
of FTZ 93, submitted a notification of proposed production activity to 
the FTZ Board on behalf of BrightView Technologies, Inc.,

[[Page 13700]]

within FTZ 93, in Durham, North Carolina.
    The notification was processed in accordance with the regulations 
of the FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including notice in the Federal 
Register inviting public comment (86 FR 62985, November 15, 2021). On 
March 7, 2022, the applicant was notified of the FTZ Board's decision 
that no further review of the activity is warranted at this time. The 
production activity described in the notification was authorized, 
subject to the FTZ Act and the FTZ Board's regulations, including 
Section 400.14.

    Dated: March 7, 2022.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-05074 Filed 3-9-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of AgriSolar Solutions, Inc., (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 (the "Report"), I, Arnold Tinter,  Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations.  /s/Arnold Tinter Arnold Tinter, Chief Financial Officer Date: July 14, 2011
[ex151002.gif]









CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM







We consent to the inclusion in the Registration Statement on Form 20-F of Play LA Inc. (a development stage company) of our report dated February 12, 2007, on our audit of the balance sheet of Play LA Inc. as of December 31, 2006, and the related statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for the year then ended, and for the cumulative period from September 27, 2005 (inception) through December 31, 2006.



Our report, dated February 12, 2007, contains an explanatory paragraph that states that Play LA Inc. has not commenced operations or generated revenue to date and has an accumulated deficit of $73,503 at December 31, 2006.  These conditions raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  Management's plan regarding those matters is also described in Note 1 to the financial statements.  The financial statements do not include any adjustment that might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.



We also consent to the reference in the registration statement to our Firm as experts.





/S/ PETERSON SULLIVAN PLLC





March 22, 2007

Seattle, Washington
**
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a)**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, GregoryR. Conley, certify that: 

 
1.
I have reviewed this Amendment No.1 on Form 10-K/A to the Annual Reporton Form 10-K of HFF, Inc.; and 

 
2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state amaterial fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. 

Dated: April 30, 2019 

 
By: 
/s/ Gregory R. Conley
 Gregory R. Conley 
*Chief Financial Officer*

*(PrincipalFinancial and Accounting Officer)*
**
#### Bonnie J. ANGLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. Bonnie J. Angle, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-70939, No. 16-70941

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 16, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed October 26, 2017

William Edward Taggart, Jr., Attorney, William E. Taggart, Jr. A Professional Corporation, Oakland, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant

Bruce R. Ellisen, Bethany B. Hauser, Esquire, Attorney, Douglas Campbell Ren-nie, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Washington, DC, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: HAWKINS and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KRONSTADT,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument.See Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The Honorable John A. Kronstadt, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner Bonnie J. Angle appeals the U.S. Tax Court’s denial of reasonable litigation costs under 26 U.S.C. § 7430. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7430(f), 7482(a)(1), and we affirm.

Litigation costs must be denied if Angle failed to establish that her net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time her action was filed. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)). Angle filed for relief as an innocent spouse on December 23, 2011. *See*26 U.S.C. § 6015.

The evidence shows that Angle’s net worth exceeded $2,000,000 at the time of filing. Net worth is calculated according to generally accepted accounting principles, and assets are valued at their acquisition cost. *Am. Pac. Concrete Pipe Co., Inc. v. NLRB,*788 F.2d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1986); *United States v. 88.88 Acres of Land,*907 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1990). At the time of filing, Angle’s assets included $3,608,009.47 owed to her on loans she had made to two corporations. Only by valuing these loans at $838,140 did Angle’s accountant conclude that her net worth did not exceed $2,000,000. Angle argues that the remaining loan amount of $2,669,869.47 is worthless, but the evidence does not support this. Angle also argues that the Tax Court was bound to accept the conclusions of her accountant, but the accountant neither audited nor attempted to verify the documents he relied upon in reaching these conclusions.

We decline to address Angle’s argument that she satisfied the “prevailing party” *704requirement because she has failed to meet the net worth requirement.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-11308 

Conference Calendar

 

BRETT C. NORRIS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:98-CV-1018-G

--------------------

June 16, 2000

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Brett C. Norris, Texas prisoner # 659410, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 28 § U.S.C. 2254 application

for a writ of habeas corpus, as barred by the one-year statute of

limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Norris argues that

the district court erred in failing to equitably toll the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA)

limitations period from April 24, 1996, the date that the AEDPA

became effective, until April 1, 1997, the date that the prison
No. 98-11308

-2-

law library received copies of the new habeas law. Norris is not

entitled to equitable tolling on that basis. See Felder v.

Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2000)(holding that a

prisoner’s actual ignorance of the AEDPA’s limitations period,

even if attributable to the newly-enacted statute’s complete

unavailability to inmates, does not serve as a basis for

equitable tolling). The district court’s judgment dismissing

Norris’s § 2254 application as time-barred is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.
#### Danita CHRISTIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark A. LESTER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-55982

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 21, 2017

Danita Christie, Pro Se

Jonathan Berres Cole, Esquire, Attorney, David B. Owen, Mark Schaeffer, Nemecek & Cole, LLP, Sherman Oaks, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Mark A. Lester, James G. Jones, Jones & Lester, LLP

Leah Capko, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Danita Christie appeals pro se from the district ■ court’s judgment dismissing Christie’s diversity action alleging malicious prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to strike under California’s anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Policy (“anti-SLAPP”) statute. *Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. County of San Diego,*665 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted defendants’ special motion under California’s anti-SLAPP statute to strike Christie’s malicious prosecution claims because Christie’s claims were based on protected activity and Christie failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits, as Christie did, not show defendants lacked probable cause for the breach of trust claim regarding trust distributions. *See Roberts v. McAfee, Inc.,*660 F.3d 1166, 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) (outlining two-prong test for anti-SLAPP motion, and explaining that lack of probable cause is a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim).

We reject as without merit Christie’s contention that the district court should have dismissed the Montana state court order.

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41373

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff-Respondent

,

v.

NICHOLAS DUDLEY, aka NICK

DUDLEY
,

Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 571

Filed: June 18, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Thomas J. Ryan , District Judge.

Order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State App ellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, fo r appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Nicholas Dudley was convicted of felony do mestic battery causing traumatic injury, I.C.

§§ 18

- 903, 18

- 918(2). The district court sentenced Dudley to a unified term of five years with a

minimum period of confinement of two years and retained jurisdiction

. Prior to Dudley’s

completion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and

ordered execution of Dudley’s sentence. Dudley filed an Idaho Crim inal Rule 35 motion, which

the district court denied. Dudley appeals.

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton , 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d2 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee , 115 Id aho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the

motion. State v. Huffman , 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our

review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we apply the same criteria used for

determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde , 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740

P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); Lopez , 106 Idaho at 449

- 51, 680 P.2d at 871

- 73. Upon review of

the record, including any new information submitted with Dudley’s Rule 35 motion, we

conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown. There fore, the district court’s order denying

Dudley ’s Rule 35 motion is affirmed.
|    |                                                                                                      |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |

|                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 |
| /s/  Michael J. Wortley                         |
| Michael J. Wortley                              |
| Chief Financial Officer of                      |
| Sabine Pass LNG-GP, LLC, the general partner of |
| Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.                           |
Order issued April 1, 2014.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

_______________

NO. 01-13-00674-CV

_______________

ROBERT S. “BOB” BENNETT, APPELLANT

V.

BROOCKS BAKER & LANGE, L.L.P., Appellee

______________________________

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2000-20780

______________________________

ORDER

This is a statutory interlocutory appeal from an order signed on July 2, 2013. 

An interlocutory appeal is an accelerated appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a). “[I]n 
2

an accelerated appeal, absent a [motion to extend time], the deadline for filing a 

notice of appeal is strictly set at twenty days after the judgment is signed, with no 

exceptions. . . .” In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005); see TEX. R. APP.

P. 26.1(b), 26.3. 

Bennett’s notice of appeal was due by July 21, 2013, yet he did not file it 

until August 1, 2013, making it untimely. See K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927. Bennett

did not file a motion to extend time to file his notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

26.3. Although we construe a notice of appeal filed beyond the time allowed by 

rule 26.1(a)(1), but within the 15-day period allowed under TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3, to 

imply a motion for an extension of time, it is still necessary for an appellant to 

offer a reasonable explanation for his failure to timely file a notice of appeal. 

Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). A reasonable explanation 

is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within 

the specified period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of 

inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.” Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 886 

(Tex. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
3

Unless within 15 days of the date of this order, appellant files an explanation 

reasonably explaining his failure to timely file his notice of appeal, we will dismiss 

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Coronado, 994 S.W.2d at 902; TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(a). This appeal is removed from the submission docket and, if dismissal is 

unwarranted, will be reset for submission at a later date.

It is so ordered.

Jane Bland

Acting individually
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Gensym
Corporation (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Lowell B. Hawkinson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
John M. Belchers, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

             (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
             13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

             (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
             material respects, the financial condition and results of
             operations of the Company.

                             /S/ LOWELL B. HAWKINSON
                             -----------------------
Dated: August 14, 2002       Lowell B. Hawkinson
                             Chief Executive Officer

                             /S/ JOHN M. BELCHERS
                             --------------------
Dated: August 14, 2002       John M. Belchers
                             Chief Financial Officer

                                       21
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**




**Certification
      of**


**Principal
      Financial and Accounting Officer**


**of
      Buckeye Ventures, Inc. Pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**




This
      certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) and accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
      (the “Form 10-QSB”) for the three months ended March 31, 2007, of Buckeye
      Ventures, Inc. (the “Company”).  I, Henry S. Leonard, Vice President
      Finance and Chief Accounting Officer, Principal Financial and Accounting
      Officer, of the Company, certify that, to the best of my knowledge:




(1)
            The
                Form 10-QSB fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
                or
                section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and




(2)
            The
                information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all
                material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.




The
      foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-QSB
      pursuant to Item 601(6)(32) of Regulation S-B and Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter
      63
      of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part
      of
      the Form 10-QSB for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended, and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the
      registrant, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any
      general incorporation language in such filing.




Date:
                May 15, 2007
            
            By:
            /s/
                Henry S. LeonardHenry
                S. LeonardChief
                Financial Officerand
                Chief Accounting Officer(Principal
                Financialand
                Accounting Officer)