* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 94-10763 

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BOBBY D. EDWARDS, also known as Oogie,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:94-CR-10-A

- - - - - - - - - -

(October 18, 1995)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Bobby D. Edwards has appealed the sentence he

received upon his guilty plea of distributing cocaine base

(crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He asserts that

the district court erred by increasing his base offense level by

four levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Edwards argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to

establish that he was a leader or organizer of relevant criminal
No. 94-10763

-2-

activity which involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive, as required by § 3B1.1(a). We affirm the

judgment.

"A district court's determination that a defendant is a

§ 3B1.1 leader or organizer is a factual finding, which we review

for clear error." United States v. Ronning, 47 F.3d 710, 711

(5th Cir. 1995). "A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if

it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole." United

States v. Valencia, 44 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1995). The

district court based its ruling principally on the factual

averments of Edwards's presentence report (PSR).

"In making factual determinations [relative to sentencing],

. . . a district court may draw [] inference[s] from a variety of

data, including information in the (PSR). . . . The PSR

generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be

considered as evidence by the district court in resolving

disputed facts [relative to sentencing]." United States v.

Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, "the court can adopt facts

contained in a PSR without inquiry, if those facts had an

adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present

rebuttal evidence." United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929,

943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 180 (1994).

The PSR states that Edwards had eight people working for

him, naming seven of them. Furthermore, he controlled the flow

of cocaine to the street level distributors selling cocaine at

Bad Boys Auto Detailing, in Arlington, Texas. That Edwards also
No. 94-10763

-3-

determined who would be permitted to sell cocaine at Bad Boys is

shown by the fact that he allowed Roy Lee Simpson to do so

although Simpson did not work for him. Edwards supplied all of

his employees with beepers, and he also supplied all of the drugs

sold at Bad Boys, except some of the drugs that Simpson sold. 

Two former employees divulged details of their experiences and

observations while they worked for Edwards, which included being

with him when he manufactured crack from regular cocaine. 

Furthermore, the large amount of crack, the firearms, including

an assault rifle and two sawed-off shotguns, the electronic

scales, and other items found at Edwards's residence, indicate

his leadership role in the Bad Boys drug-trafficking

organization. The factual averments contained in the PSR, which

Edwards has not disputed, amply support the four-level increase

pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). See United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d

544, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994).

AFFIRMED.