alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Maurice DANIELS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-16338 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(October 27, 2017)

Richard Carroll Klugh, Jr., Law Offices of Richard C. Klugh, Miami, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant

Sivashree Sundaram, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Lisa A. Hirsch, Anthony W. Lacos-ta, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Respondent-Appel-lee

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

*916PER CURIAM:

Maurice Daniels appeals the denial of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We issued a certificate of appealability to address whether Daniels is entitled to relief from his firearm convictions on the ground that *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), invalidated the “risk of force” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). We affirm the denial of Daniels’s motion.

Daniels’s argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in *Ovalles v. United States,*861 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2017). In *Ovalles,*we held “that Johnson’s void-for-vagueness ruling does not apply to or invalidate the ‘risk-of-force’ clause in § 924(c)(3)(B).” *Id.*at 1265. Because section 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague, Daniels is not entitled to relief from his convictions.

We AFFIRM the denial of Daniels’s motion to vacate.
II

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 742

To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to limit acquisition of land on

the 39-mile segment of the Missouri River, Nebraska and South Dakota,

designated as a recreational river, to acquisition from willing sellers,

and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 2 (legislative day, MAY 1), 1995

Mr. DASCHLE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

A BILL

To amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to limit acquisition

of land on the 39-mile segment of the Missouri River,

Nebraska and South Dakota, designated as a recreational river, to acquisition from willing sellers, and

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION OF ACQUISITION OF LAND ON

4 PORTION OF THE MISSOURI RIVER DES5 IGNATED AS A RECREATIONAL RIVER.

6 Section 3(a)22) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act

7 (16 U.S.C. 1274(a)(22)) is amended in the ninth sentence
2

•S 742 IS

1 by striking ‘‘owner:’’ and all that follows through the end

2 of the sentence and inserting ‘‘owner.’’.

Æ
To: Lydia Wegman/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Charlotte Bertrand/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Bridgid Curry/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Richard Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Ron 

Evans/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA 

From: "King, Heidi R." <Heidi_R._King@omb.eop.gov> 

Date: 01/22/2010 07:09PM 

cc: Nealson Watkins/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Scott Jenkins/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Karen 

Martin/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Lewis Weinstock/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Padmini 

Singh/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Sara Schneeberg/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, "Mancini, Dominic 

J." <Dominic_J._Mancini@omb.eop.gov> 

Subject: OMB has not recieved NO2 NAAQS language to conclude review 

Good evening, 

Just in case materials were sent to the wrong email address: OMB has not yet received 

language reflecting EPA’s edits. The final draft RIA has also not yet been received. If they have 

been sent, please do resend them as they’ve not been received. 

If they have not been sent: I understand EPA staff may be working hard to prepare these 

documents to conclude review – my apologies for interrupting your work. 

Best regards, 

heidi
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-06-00163-CV

Gary W. Gates, Jr., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN100925, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss his appeal. We grant the

motion and dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a).

__________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices B. A. Smith, Puryear and Waldrop

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: May 11, 2006
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie D. RAINEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6713

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: September 26, 2017

Decided: September 28, 2017

Ronnie D. Rainey, Appellant Pro Se. Jason Harris Cowley, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Evan Rikhye, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie D. Rainey appeals from the district court’s order denying his “Motion to Conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to Establish a Record for Judicial Review” as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We conclude, as did the district court, that Rainey’s motion is in substance a successive § 2255 motion; therefore, the order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certifi*785cate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Rainey has not made the requisite showing. Rainey’s motion challenged the validity of his conviction and therefore was properly construed as a successive § 2255 motion. *See United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A] motion directly attacking the prisoner’s conviction or sentence will [generally] amount to a successive application .... ”). In the absence of pre-filing authorization from this court, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a successive § 2255 motion. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(h) (2012).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal of the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Javier Santos GARCIA-HERNANDEZ Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-3546

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Filed: April 28, 2017

Jennifer D. Mammenga, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of South Dakota, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Javier Santos Garcia-Hernandez, Pro Se

Before RILEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. •

PER CURIAM.

Javier Santos Garcia-Hernandez (Garcia) directly appeals the judgment of the district court1 entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court sentenced Garcia at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range to 121 *588months in prison, and on appeal, he challenges the reasonableness of the sentence in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Following careful review, we find no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Harlan, 815 F.3d 1100, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review; a within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal). In addition, we found no nonfrivo-lous issue during our independent review in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of V2K International, Inc. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K for the year ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gordon E.
Beckstead, Interim Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.








Date:
      January 6, 2010
            /s/
      Gordon E. BecksteadGordon
      E. Beckstead, Interim Chief Financial OfficerPrincipal
      Financial Officer
Order entered May 15, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00622-CV

IN RE PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 101st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-06233

ORDER

Before Justices Lang, Fillmore and Brown

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY the petition for writ of mandamus. 

We DENY as moot relator’s request for emergency relief. We ORDER relator to bear the costs

of this original proceeding.

/s/ DOUGLAS S. LANG 

JUSTICE
<PAGE>
                                                                   Exhibit 3.1.2

                           CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                    TO THE

                         CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                     OF

                            DELTATHREE.COM, INC.

                    Pursuant to Section 242 of the General
                   Corporation Law of the State of Delaware

Deltathree.com, Inc., a Delaware corporation(hereinafter called the
"Corporation"), does hereby certify as follows:

        FIRST: Article FIRST of the Corporation's Certificate of
Incorporation is hereby amended to read in its entirety as set forth below:

        "FIRST:  The name of the corporation is deltathree, Inc. (hereinafter
    the "Corporation")."

        SECOND:  The foregoing amendment was duly adopted in accordance with
Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Certificate to be duly
executed in its corporate name this 11th day of December, 2000.

                                        DELTATHREE.COM, INC.


                                        By:
                                            ------------------------------
                                            Name: Andrew A. Fink
                                            Title: General Counsel
#### Tyrone ELLIS Plaintiff-Appellant v. Nwannem OBI-OKOYE, Doctor, Correct Care Solutions; Brett Butler, Doctor, Correct Care Solutions Defendants-Appellees Johnathan Simmons, Doctor, Correct Care Solutions Defendant Geraldine Campbell, Advanced Practice Nurse, Correct Care Solutions; Aric Simmons, Advanced Practice Nurse, Correct Care Solutions; Melissa Mansfield, Licensed Practical Nurse, Correct Care Solutions Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-3874

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 12, 2017

Filed: May 22, 2017

Tyrone Ellis, Pro Se

Brent J. Eubanks, Humphries & Odum, White Hall, AR, for Defendants-Appellees

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Tyrone Ellis appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which he alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Upon careful de novo review, see Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, *509598 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review), we conclude that summary judgment was proper because, as explained by the district court, Ellis failed to show that his skin rash was “serious,” or that any delay in treatment had a detrimental effect on his condition. See Fourte v. Faulkner Cty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Jackson v. Riebold, 815 F.3d 1114, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Beth Deere, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Javier OTTOGALLI, Also Known as Michael J. Ottogalli, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50831 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 19, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mark Randolph Stelmach, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*882Philip J. Lynch, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Under a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, Michael Ottogalli pleaded guilty of distribution of child pornography and was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release. Ottogalli contends that the district court erred in applying the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for distribution in exchange for a thing of value and in applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust. The government seeks enforcement of the appeal waiver. Ottogalli asserts that the waiver is unenforceable because the district court did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ll(b)(l)(N).

In determining the enforceability of an appeal waiver, we determine whether it was knowing and voluntary and “applies to the circumstances at. hand, based on the plain language of the agreement.” *United States v. Bond,*414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, the defendant must know that he has the right to appeal and that he is giving up that right. *United States v. McKinney,*406 F.3d 744, 746 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005). Because Ottogalli did not object in the district court to an alleged Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error, review is for plain error only. *See United States v. Oliver,*630 F.3d 397, 411 (5th Cir. 2011). Under that standard, Ottogalli must show a clear or obvious forfeited error that affected his substantial rights. *See Puckett v. United States,*556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. *See id.*

Ottogalli signed the plea agreement and indicated that he had read all of it, which included the appeal waiver. The district court told him that he would be waiving certain rights by pleading guilty under the plea agreement, including the right to appeal. Ottogalli does not show that the court committed clear or obvious error. *See Puckett,*556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (“[To be plain], the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”).

Because the appeal waiver was informed and voluntary, it bars Ottogalli’s sentencing claims, *See Bond,*414 F.3d at 544. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Araksi Seropovna TOKRAMADZHYAN, AKA Araksi Seropovna Tokramdzhyan, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 15-71369

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed October 26, 2017

Sassoun Nalbandian, Attorney, Nalban-dian Law, A Professional Corporation, Glendale, CA, for Petitioner

Dawn S. Conrad, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of

Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Araksi Seropovna Tokramadzhyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that she did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and thus is not entitled to relief from her reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. *See Martinez v. Sessions,*873 F.3d 655, 2017 WL 4552543 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2017). We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings, *Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch,*828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016), and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Tokramadzhyan failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution in Armenia on account of a protected ground. *See Hoxha v. Ashcroft,*319 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003) (to qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must show that it is more probable than not that she would suffer future persecution); *see also Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future persecution “too speculative”).

Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion" that Tokramadzhyan failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Armenian government. *See Andrade-Garcia,*828 F.3d at 836-37.

*729The government’s unopposed motion to supplement the administrative record (Docket Entry No. 14) is granted.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
-84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72 -70

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Source

★ at 38.90 N 76.65 W Meters AGL
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Martin VELASCO, also known as Slim, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-50791 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 5, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Martin Velasco, Pro Se

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Martin Velasco has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Velasco has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that .the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4,
#### Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World *v.*Norman.

No. 13227.

September 27, 1940.

Rehearing denied October 15, 1940.

*Plunkett <& Scarborough*and *Lewis H. Fowler,*for plaintiff in error.

*F. Joe Turner,*contra.

Atkinson, Presiding' Justice.

The case came to this court from the Court of Appeals on writ of certiorari. The defendant in certiorari made a motion in this court to dismiss the case, on the ground that the petition for certiorari failed to comply with rule 45 (Code, § 24-4549) with regard to the grant of writs of certiorari by this court. On examination of the assignments of error contained in the petition, after the grant of the writ and after argument in this court, it appears that the petition was improvidently granted.

(a) The petition offends rule 45, which provides: “Argument and briefs of authorities must not be included in the petition, but must be submitted separately.”

(b) The motion to dismiss the case is sustained, because the petition offends rule 45; and the writ of certiorari was inadvertently granted. *Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.*v. *Tomlin,*161 *Ga.*749 (132 S. E. 90) ; *Briesenick*v. *Dimond,*165 *Ga.*780 (142 S. E. 118).

*Writ of certiorari dismissed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Jenlcins, J., tdho dissents.*
CERTIFICATIONS




I, Andrew
Leszczynski, certify that:




1. I have
reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A and all reports on Form 10-D required to be
filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K/A of SACO I
Trust 2006-10 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);




2. Based
on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;




3. Based
on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information
required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is
included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;




4. I am
responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicers and based on
my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the servicer
compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB,
and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have
fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements; and




5. All of
the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance
with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in
this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as
otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance
described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form
10-K/A.




In giving
the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me
by the following unaffiliated parties: EMC Mortgage Corporation, as servicer;
LandAmerica Tax and Flood Services, Inc., as vendor; American Security Insurance
Company, Standard Guaranty Insurance Company, and Safeco Financial Institution
Solutions, Inc. (affiliates of Assurant Inc.), each as vendor; GMAC Mortgage,
LLC, as servicer; GMAC Bank, as vendor; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as
custodian.




Date:
July 22, 2008




LaSalle
Bank National Association, as Master Servicer




/s/ Andrew
Leszczynski


Andrew
Leszczynski


First
Vice President
#### ELEVEN ENGINEERING, INC., Eleven Engineering Game Control LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Defendant-Cross-Appellant

2016-2439

2016-2489

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

July 19, 2017

Brian Erik Haan, Lee Sheikh Megley & Haan LLC, Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by Christopher Lee, Ashley E. Lavalley, Richard Burns Megley, Jr.

John Winston Thornburgh, Fish & Richardson, P.C., San Diego, CA, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by Proshanto Mukherji, Boston, MA; Isabella Fu, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.

(Prost, Chief Judge, O’Malley and Chen, Circuit Judges).

JUDGMENT

Per Curiam

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.