UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CENTURA HEALTH, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 18-1188 

(D.C. No. 1:16-MC-00055-WJM-MLC) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Centura Health (“Centura”) appeals the district court’s orders enforcing in part 

an administrative subpoena issued to it by the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”). We affirm exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1

 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 See EEOC v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 985 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 

1993) (explaining that, for § 1291 purposes, “[a]n order of a district court directing 

the production of records described in an administrative subpoena is a final 

judgment”). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 28, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I 

When investigating charges of discrimination, the EEOC may obtain evidence 

that “relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under 

investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a). The EEOC is authorized to obtain such 

evidence by issuing a subpoena and seeking a court order enforcing it. § 2000e-9; 

McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 & n.1 (2017). The EEOC exercised 

those powers when it sought information from Centura, a multi-facility healthcare 

organization operating primarily in Colorado. Between February 2011 and October 

2014, eleven current or former Centura employees, working across eight Colorado 

locations, filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC. They alleged that Centura 

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by terminating their 

employment or refusing to allow them to return to work after medical leave. These 

employment decisions were allegedly made because of their disabilities or their 

requests for accommodations. 

After receiving the first charge in February 2011, the EEOC requested 

information from Centura related to that charge, including the employee’s personnel 

file and a list of all positions Centura had open at the time her employment ended. 

Centura provided the information. After three more charges had been filed, the 

EEOC informed Centura that its “investigation may include like and related 

allegations by other aggrieved individuals involving bases and/or issues not directly 

affecting the Charging Party, as well as those like and related issues not alleged in 

the charge.” The EEOC asked Centura for information about all employees from 
3 

January 2009 through the date of the request in February 2012 who had “requested 

and/or who were placed on non-[Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)]” or 

FMLA leave, or who had requested an accommodation for their disability. Centura 

responded that the request was overbroad and unduly burdensome and asked the 

EEOC to narrow the scope of its request. 

A month later, the EEOC sent Centura an identical request identifying multiple 

charges as the objects of its investigation. Centura provided some of the requested 

information but argued some requests were irrelevant to the charges at issue and 

contended the cases involved “unique and isolated circumstances at separate 

locations” that did not suggest a pattern of discrimination that might justify the 

EEOC’s broad request. As the remainder of the eleven charges were filed, the EEOC 

sent Centura more requests for information.2

 Centura provided information regarding 

each charging party but refused to provide further information, arguing the requests 

sought information irrelevant to the individual charges and were overly burdensome. 

The EEOC issued an administrative subpoena in December 2014. Subpoena 

items 9 and 18(e) requested identifying information for each employee who worked 

at the same facilities in Colorado as the eleven charging parties and who, between 

August 2009 and 2014, requested an accommodation due to a medical condition 

(item 9) or were identified as disabled (item 18(e)). Item 9 requested information 

about the identified employees’ accommodation requests, the outcome of those 

 2

 Those requests are referred to in the notices of the charges the EEOC sent to 

Centura, but we are unable to locate them in the appendix Centura filed. 
4 

requests, and any disciplinary action or separation from employment. Item 18(e) 

requested for each identified employee the type of medical condition at issue and 

information about discipline or separation from employment. 

Centura petitioned the EEOC to revoke or modify the subpoena. The EEOC 

denied the petition and directed Centura to provide the requested information. 

Centura refused, so the EEOC filed a subpoena-enforcement action in the district 

court. Centura challenged only parts of the subpoena, including items 9 and 18(e), 

arguing that compliance would be unduly burdensome and that the information 

sought was not relevant to the eleven individual charges within the meaning of 

§ 2000e-8(a). It alleged the information would only be relevant to a 

pattern-or-practice investigation, but the EEOC had not filed a pattern-or-practice 

charge. 

The district court issued an order enforcing the subpoena in part. The court 

ordered Centura to provide information it did not object to and ruled against Centura 

regarding the relevance of the information requested in items 9 and 18(e). The court 

determined the disputed information was relevant within the meaning of 

§ 2000e-8(a), “given the number of ADA charges the EEOC has received and the 

widespread geographic distribution of those charges.” The court noted that relevance 

is “generously construed” and that “it is crucial that the Commission’s ability to 

investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired.” It referred the 

undue burden question to a magistrate judge, who concluded producing information 
5 

related to items 9 and 18(e) would not be unduly burdensome and declined to take up 

Centura’s contention that the information was not relevant. 

The district court overruled Centura’s objections to the magistrate judge’s 

undue burden decision. The court construed Centura’s objections in part as a motion 

to reconsider the earlier ruling regarding relevance and determined this argument 

lacked merit.3

 The court therefore ordered Centura to comply with the magistrate 

judge’s order. Centura appealed. 

II 

 Centura now challenges only the district court’s relevance determination, not 

its undue burden ruling. We review a district court’s ruling on the enforceability of 

an EEOC subpoena for abuse of discretion. McLane Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1164. 

“[W]hether a district court employed the correct standard of relevance—as opposed 

to how it applied that standard to the facts of a given case—is a question of law,” and 

a district court “necessarily abuse[s] its discretion if it based its ruling on an 

erroneous view of the law.” Id. at 1168 n.3 (quotation and citation omitted). A 

district court also abuses its discretion if it “relies on clearly erroneous factual 

 3

 Centura pointed out that in an email it received from the EEOC after the 

district court had ruled on relevance, the EEOC said it wanted to use the disputed 

information to “determin[e] Centura’s usual policies and procedures regarding the 

provision of reasonable accommodation.” Centura argued this statement amounted to 

a concession that the request was an attempt “to pursue plenary discovery for a 

pattern and practice investigation, rather than prosecuting the claims of the 

individually named Charging Parties.” The district court rejected this argument 

because “procedures are as relevant to investigation of an individual charge as they 

are to a pattern-or-practice charge.” 
6 

findings, or where there is no rational basis in the evidence for its ruling.” Trentadue 

v. FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 806 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

 The EEOC has the authority to subpoena evidence that “relates to unlawful 

employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation.” 

§ 2000e-8(a). This limitation “is not especially constraining” and “afford[s] the 

Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations 

against the employer.” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984) (emphasis 

added). But courts must not “read relevancy so broadly as to render the statutory 

requirement a nullity.” EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 937 

(10th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). 

In the district court, the EEOC had the burden of establishing that the 

subpoenaed information is relevant to the charges under investigation. Id. The 

EEOC had to show: (1) “it has a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that 

the information requested will advance its investigation”; and (2) a “link between 

[its] investigatory power and the charges of discrimination.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the 

EEOC met its burden. The relevance standard under § 2000e-8(a) “sweeps more 

broadly than it would at trial.” EEOC v. McLane Co., 857 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 

2017). This is because “[a]t the investigative stage, the EEOC is trying to determine 

only whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists ‘to believe that the charge is true.’” Id. 

(quoting § 2000e-5(b)). And at the summary judgment stage of litigation, for 

example, evidence that an employer has a discriminatory policy “is potentially 
7 

relevant” to an individual charge. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 

1188 (10th Cir. 2007). Because evidence of a discriminatory policy is relevant to 

individual charges under the narrower relevance standard in a civil case, it follows 

that such evidence is relevant to individual charges under the broader standard of 

§ 2000e-8(a) because it “might cast light” on the charges under investigation. Shell 

Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 69; see also EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 

590, 604 (1981) (“Statistics and other information about an employer’s general 

practices may certainly be relevant to individual charges of discrimination[.]”); Blue 

Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969) (“[A]n employer’s 

pattern of action [is] relevant to the Commission’s determination of whether there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the employer has practiced racial discrimination” 

(quotation omitted)). 

That is not to say there are no limits. Our decisions in EEOC v. Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe Railroad, 669 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2012) and TriCore Reference 

Laboratories set some boundaries in cases in which the EEOC seeks 

pattern-or-practice evidence based only on individual charges. But the limits 

outlined in those cases do not require us to conclude the district court abused its 

discretion in this case. 

In Burlington Northern, we determined the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying a petition to enforce an administrative subpoena requesting 

nationwide pattern-or-practice information because it was not relevant to charges of 

racial discrimination filed by two employees in Colorado. 669 F.3d at 1159. 
8 

Because the information request referenced only the two individual charges and the 

EEOC did not refer to any other charging parties or otherwise “indicate that an 

additional charge [was] at issue,” id. at 1157, the EEOC had done nothing to 

“transcend the gap between the pattern and practice investigation and the private 

claims,” and the “wide deference” courts afford to the scope of EEOC subpoenas 

could not bridge that gap, id. at 1158 (quotation omitted). We did, however, suggest 

the subpoena might have been enforceable if it had been confined to Colorado 

positions and offices. Id. In this case, the EEOC’s subpoena was based on eleven 

charges and requested information pertaining only to the locations in Colorado where 

the charging parties worked. A subpoena adhering to the geographical scope of 

individual charges supports a determination that pattern-or-practice evidence is 

relevant to the investigation of individual charges. 

In TriCore Reference Laboratories, the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of 

an administrative subpoena it issued while investigating a single charge of 

discrimination. 849 F.3d at 929. While “a single discriminatory act does not, by 

itself, warrant a broader pattern-or-practice investigation,” id. at 939, in this case the 

EEOC based its request for pattern-or-practice information on eleven charges. 

Centura argues that in cases in which there is no pattern-or-practice charge, 

pattern-or-practice evidence is only relevant if there is a specific and substantial 

connection between the individual claims and the information requested, rather than a 

general possibility of finding patterns or practices. Centura contends the only 

common theme tying the requested information to the eleven individual charges is the 
9 

broad fact that all the charges alleged disability discrimination. Relatedly, Centura 

distinguishes cases the EEOC relies on where pattern-or-practice evidence was held 

relevant to individual charges, pointing out that each case related to the investigation 

of a policy more specific than some generic form of discrimination.4

 Centura’s 

representations of the disparate factual nature of the eleven charges is largely 

accurate, and we agree with the distinctions it draws regarding the EEOC’s cases. 

But Centura fails to persuade us that eleven charges of disability discrimination, most 

alleging a failure to accommodate across a handful of an employer’s facilities, are 

insufficient to warrant finding information regarding an employer’s pattern-orpractice relevant. 

Centura also faults the district court for relying on the statement in Shell Oil 

that it is important not to impair the EEOC’s ability to investigate systemic 

discrimination, 466 U.S. at 70, pointing out that in Shell Oil, there was a 

pattern-or-practice charge, see id. at 88-89. Given the absence of a pattern-orpractice charge against Centura, the district court’s reliance on this statement is 

questionable, but it is not enough to alter our relevance analysis. See Citicorp Diners 

Club, 985 F.2d at 1039 (“The EEOC seeks to vindicate the public interest, which is 

broader than the interest of the charging parties.” (quotation omitted)); Blue Bell 

 4

 Centura also makes much of the fact that the EEOC first sought

pattern-or-practice evidence based only on the first charge, and then, when Centura 

resisted, laid in wait for several years until it had amassed ten more charges to 

support what Centura views as the proverbial fishing expedition. But Centura has not 

pointed to any prohibition on the EEOC’s course, and our task is to assess the district 

court’s relevance determination based on the eleven charges. 
10 

Boots, Inc., 418 F.2d at 358 (“The Commission may, in the public interest, provide 

relief which goes beyond the limited interests of the charging parties,” and therefore 

“evidence concerning employment practices other than those specifically charged by 

complainants may properly be considered by the Commission in framing a remedy.”). 

 Finally, Centura argues that holding pattern-or-practice evidence can be 

relevant to individual charges renders superfluous Congress’ 1972 expansion of the 

EEOC’s powers to include investigating pattern-or-practice charges when such 

charges have been filed. See § 2000e-6(e). We disagree. The grant of authority to 

the EEOC to investigate patterns or practices of discrimination accompanied the 

transfer of that authority from the Attorney General. See § 2000e-6(c), (d); Gen. Tel. 

Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 328 (1980) (“The 1972 amendments [to Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964] . . . transferred to the EEOC the Attorney General’s 

authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits on his own motion.”). There is no 

evidence that in transferring that authority, Congress meant to limit the type of 

evidence the EEOC can obtain when investigating individual charges.5

 

 5

 Because we conclude the pattern-or-practice evidence is relevant to the 

investigation of individual allegations against Centura in this case, we need not 

address the parties’ arguments regarding whether the information might also allow 

the EEOC to identify comparators. 
11 

IV 

The district court’s orders enforcing the administrative subpoena are 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge