alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1


                                 Exhibit 4(d)




                                 July 21, 1997



Walter Stepan
President and CEO
Bacou USA, Inc.
10 Thurber Boulevard
Smithfield, RI  02917

      Re:   Citizens Bank of Rhode Island's Revolving Line of Credit Agreement
            dated May 21, 1997

Dear Mr. Stepan:

      I am writing to set forth our agreement with respect to a certain
Revolving Line of Credit Agreement by and between Uvex Safety, Inc. ("Uvex") and
Citizens Bank of Rhode Island (the "Bank") dated May 21, 1997 (the "Agreement").
In specific, I am writing to set forth our agreement with respect to amending
the definition of "Revolving Credit Termination Date", which definition appears
on Page 3 of the Agreement. As we have agreed, that definition is hereby amended
to read as follows:

      "Revolving Credit Termination Date." Revolving Credit Termination Date
      means April 30, 1998, unless extended in writing by Lender."

      Except as modified and amended hereby, the Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect and is in all other respects ratified and confirmed. Please
indicate your acceptance of this modification to the Agreement by signing where
indicated below.

                                   Sincerely,

                                   CITIZENS BANK OF RHODE ISLAND


                                   By: /s/ J. Bruce Hallworth
                                       ----------------------
                                       J. Bruce Hallworth
                                       Senior Vice President
<PAGE>   2
                                AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY:

                                UVEX SAFETY, INC.

                                By:  /s/ Walter Stepan
                                     -----------------------------------
                                     Walter Stepan
                                     President & Chief Executive Officer

                                Dated: 8/4/97


                                AGREED AND CONSENTED TO BY:

                                BACOU USA, INC., Guarantor

                                By:  /s/ Walter Stepan
                                     -----------------------------------
                                     Walter Stepan
                                     President & Chief Executive Officer

                                Dated: 8/4/97


                                By:  /s/ Philip B. Barr
                                     -----------------------------------
                                     Philip B. Barr
                                     Executive Vice President
                                     and Chief Financial Officer

                                Dated: 8/4/97


                                      -2-
#### Charles DAVILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David G. SMITH, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-16525

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 21, 2017

*638Charles Davila, Pro Se

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Charles Davila appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and disability discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Davila’s deliberate indifference claim because Davila failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Smith was deliberately indifferent to his medical issues. *See Hebbe v. Pliler,*627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

The district court properly dismissed Davila’s disability discrimination claim because Davila failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Smith discriminated against him because of a disability. *See Simmons v. Navajo County,*609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Davila’s state law claims after dismissing the federal claims. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); *Tritchler v. County of Lake,*358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review). However, the state law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice. *See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,*40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissal based on declining supplemental jurisdiction should be without prejudice). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment to the extent it dismisses Davila’s state law claims with prejudice and remand for the sole purpose of dismissing the state law claims without prejudice.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor CERVANTES, a.k.a. Tripps, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50183

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 15, 2017 *

Filed November 17, 2017

Andrew Richard Haden, Assistant U.S., Christopher Seth Askins, Assistant U.S., Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Nicole Ries Fox, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Victor Cervantes, Adelanto, CA, pro se.

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Victor Cervantes appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 120-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Cervantes’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Cervantes the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Cervantes waived his right to appeal his sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. *See United States v. Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. *See id.*at 988.

*641Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bruce BUNTING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roy A. COOPER, North Carolina Governor; UNC Medical Center; Dr. James Engleman, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-6839

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 31, 2017

Decided: November 9, 2017

*316Bruce Bunting, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Bruce Bunting appeals the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint and motion for an emergency injunction. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Bunting’s informal briefs do not challenge the bases for the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, we conclude that Bunting has forfeited appellate review of the issue. *See Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,*370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Bunting’s motion for an emergency injunction. *See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina,*769 F.3d 224, 235 (4th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We also deny as moot Bunting’s motion for reconsideration of this court’s order denying his Fed. R. App. P. 8(a) motion, and we deny Bunting’s petitions for a writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6010 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to require the Director of the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to establish a registry of 

women who are diagnosed during pregnancy as having been infected 

with Zika virus and the children of such women, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. PIERLUISI, Mr. POSEY, Mr. SIRES, Mr. 

CURBELO of Florida, and Mr. DIAZ-BALART) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to require the 

Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to establish a registry of women who are diagnosed 

during pregnancy as having been infected with Zika virus 

and the children of such women, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Zika Pregnancy and 

5 Infant Registry Act of 2016’’. 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6010 IH

1 SEC. 2. ZIKA VIRUS PATIENT REGISTRY. 

2 Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended 

3 by inserting after section 317T of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

4 247b–22) the following: 

5 ‘‘SEC. 317U. ZIKA VIRUS PATIENT REGISTRY. 

6 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Centers for 

7 Disease Control and Prevention (in this section referred 

8 to as the ‘Director’) shall establish and maintain a registry 

9 of— 

10 ‘‘(1) women who are diagnosed during preg11 nancy as having been infected with Zika virus (in 

12 this section referred to as the ‘registry’); and 

13 ‘‘(2) the children of such women. 

14 ‘‘(b) CONTENTS.—The registry— 

15 ‘‘(1) shall include the identity of women and 

16 children described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub17 section (a); and 

18 ‘‘(2) may include— 

19 ‘‘(A) any symptoms and other adverse 

20 events experienced by such women and children 

21 that may be associated with Zika virus; and 

22 ‘‘(B) other information pertaining to— 

23 ‘‘(i) the health of women described in 

24 subsection (a)(1) and monitoring and test25 ing of such women during pregnancy; 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 6010 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) the results of evaluation and 

2 testing at birth of children described in 

3 subsection (a)(2); and 

4 ‘‘(iii) the health and development of 

5 children described in subsection (a)(2) 

6 through the first five years of life or, at 

7 the Director’s discretion, longer. 

8 ‘‘(c) AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ONLY FOR RE9 SEARCH.—The Director may make information in the reg10 istry available only for research.’’. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie Gerald BELT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7546

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

Ronnie Gerald Belt, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Donald Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie Gerald Belt seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Belt’s 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012) motion and the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of. appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief bn the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Belt has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eldon Philip ANDERSON Defendant-Appellant United States of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Eldon Philip Anderson Defendant-Appellant

No. 17-1714, No. 17-3183

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 23, 2017

Filed: November 6, 2017

James Lackner, U.S, Attorney’s Office, Saint Paul, MN, Jeffrey S. Paulsen, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eldon Philip Anderson, Pro Se

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Eldon Anderson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s1 order revoking his supervised release, and also appeals the district court’s2 denial of his motion for release pending appeal. Anderson argues on appeal, inter alia, that the government failed to prove he violated the terms of his supervised release.

After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we reject Anderson’s challenge to the district court’s determination that he violated the terms of his supervised release. See United States v. Black Bear, 542 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding as to whether violation occurred is reviewed for clear error). We conclude that Anderson’s additional arguments are also unavailing, and therefore affirm the judgment revoking his supervised release. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We further dismiss as moot Anderson’s appeal from the denial of his motion for release pending appeal, and deny as moot his motion for an expedited appeal.

1

. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

2

. The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota,
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819

DCN: SE03538

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION (CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
Calendar No. 143

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 801

[Report No. 104–110]

A BILL

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power

purposes.electric projects in North Carolina, and for otherAct applicable to the construction of 2 hydroJULY 11 (legislative day, JULY 10), 1995

Reported without amendment
II

Calendar No. 143

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 801

[Report No. 104–110]

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act applicable to the construction of 2 hydroelectric projects in North Carolina, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 15, 1995

Mr. HELMS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

JULY 11 (legislative day, JULY 10), 1995

Reported by Mr. MURKOWSKI, without amendment

A BILL

To extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act applicable to the construction of 2 hydroelectric projects in

North Carolina, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE.

4 (a) PROJECT NUMBERED 10812.—
2

S 801 RS

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time

2 period specified in section 13 of the Federal Power

3 Act (16 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to

4 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission project

5 numbered 10812, the Commission may, at the re6 quest of the licensee for the project, and after rea7 sonable notice, in accordance with the good faith,

8 due diligence, and public interest requirements of

9 that section and the Commission’s procedures under

10 that section, extend the time period during which

11 the licensee is required to commence the construc12 tion of the project, under the extension described in

13 paragraph (2), for not more than 5 consecutive 2-

14 year periods.

15 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This subsection shall

16 take effect on the date of the expiration of the ex17 tension of the period required for commencement of

18 construction of the project described in paragraph

19 (1) that the Commission issued, prior to the date of

20 enactment of this Act, under section 13 of the Fed21 eral Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806).

22 (b) PROJECT NUMBERED 6879.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time

24 period specified in section 13 of the Federal Power

25 Act (16 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to
3

S 801 RS

1 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission project

2 numbered 6879, the Commission may, at the request

3 of the licensee for the project, and after reasonable

4 notice, in accordance with the good faith, due dili5 gence, and public interest requirements of that sec6 tion and the Commission’s procedures under that

7 section, extend the time period during which the li8 censee is required to commence the construction of

9 the project for not more than 5 consecutive 2-year

10 periods.

11 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This subsection shall

12 take effect on the date of the expiration of the pe13 riod required for commencement of construction of

14 the project under the license for the project.
From: Hodanbosi, Bob

Sent: Thursday, July 05, 2012 11:41 A M

To: Douglas Aburano

Cc: Dines, Jennifer

Subject: Infrastructure SIPs - PM2.5 Concentrations

Doug,

We have reviewed all Ohio historical ambient monitoring data for PM2.5 and we have confirmed that

observed 24

‐ hour PM2.5 concentrations have always been below 140 ug/m3 at all locations in Ohio.

Consistent with EPA's guidance, "Guidance on SIP Elements Required Under Sections 110(a)(1) and (2)

for the 2005 24

‐ Hour Fine Particle (PM2.5) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)" September

25, 2009, areas that have not observed PM2.5 concentrations above EPA's intended significant harm

level may opt to address emergency episode requirements by attesting that concentrations had always

been below 140 ug/m3. As a result, Ohio satisfies requirements for emergency episode planning even

without contingency plan requirements specifically tailored to PM2.5.

Bob Hodanbosi
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                             5
<LEGEND>
 Financial Data Schedule March 31, 2000
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                        0001005663
<NAME>            ITC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.



     This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from
financial  statements  for the three  month  period  ended March 31, 2000 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.

<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                  MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                              7,000
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                           0
<ALLOWANCES>                                            0
<INVENTORY>                                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    7,000
<PP&E>                                                  0
<DEPRECIATION>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    157,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              74,787
<BONDS>                                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                            7,686
<OTHER-SE>                                         76,777
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       74,527
<SALES>                                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        0
<CGS>                                                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       2,250
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (2,250)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (2,250)
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (2,250)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (.00)





</TABLE>