Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 21, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00657-CR

DANIEL MARRITT STALEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 08-04858

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant raises nine issues in this appeal from an adjudication proceeding. 

Broadly speaking, he asks us to consider whether the trial court erred by 

(a) denying a motion for new trial, (b) failing to take appropriate measures for the 

consideration of his disability, (c) interfering with the plea-bargaining process, and 

(d) ordering the payment of administrative fees. Finding no error, we overrule each 

of appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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BACKGROUND

The facts of this case involve two different trial causes, but the appeal is 

limited to just one. In cause number 08-04858, which is the focus of this appeal, 

appellant was indicted for assault on a public servant. The incident allegedly

occurred in 2008, and appellant pleaded no contest to the offense as charged. The 

trial court deferred an adjudication of guilt and placed him on community 

supervision for a period of six years.

In 2013, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, alleging that he had 

violated the terms of his community supervision by assaulting his own mother. 

Based on that same factual allegation, the State filed a separate indictment in cause 

number 13-16365, charging appellant with aggravated assault. Appellant pleaded 

true in response to the motion to adjudicate, and the trial court sentenced him to ten 

years’ imprisonment. In the other cause, appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated 

assault and received a plea-bargained sentence of six years’ imprisonment.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he was actually 

innocent of the aggravated assault against his mother. Appellant argued that he was 

suffering from a seizure at the time of the assault, which negated the requisite mens 

rea. Appellant requested an arrest of judgment in the assault case and a new trial on 

the motion to adjudicate. After conducting a single evidentiary hearing applicable 

to both cause numbers, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

In multiple issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion for new trial. We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for 

an abuse of discretion. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable view of the record 
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could support its decision. See McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012). As a reviewing court, we may not substitute our judgment for 

that of the trial court; instead, we may only determine whether the trial court’s 

decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling and presume that the court made all reasonable fact findings 

against the losing party and in favor of the prevailing party. See Colyer v. State, 

428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

During the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant’s mother testified 

that her son had a history of mental illness and that he did not intentionally assault 

her as the Stated had alleged. On the day of the alleged assault, the mother asserted

that she was sitting in the kitchen having breakfast when appellant came running 

down the hall, screaming that “the sky was crackling.” When appellant entered the 

kitchen, he experienced a grand mal seizure, causing him to move uncontrollably, 

foam at the mouth, and urinate on himself. The mother testified that appellant 

knocked over the table, which caused her to fall backwards in her chair. The 

mother said that she was injured by falling glassware in the process.

An officer with the Beaumont Police Department testified that he was 

dispatched to the scene after a neighbor reported that the mother had just run out of 

her home yelling, “Call the police. My son just assaulted me.” When the officer 

arrived at the home, he saw appellant walking calmly in the front yard. The officer 

interviewed the mother, who had a small cut on her chin and the bridge of her 

nose. The mother explained the situation and said there had been no assault. The 

officer left, having determined that no crime had been committed.

Later that day, the mother drove from her home in Beaumont to a hospital in 

Port Arthur, complaining of chest pains. Doctors there determined that she was 
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having a gallbladder attack. During one of the mother’s examinations, a nurse 

came to believe that the mother might have been stabbed. The hospital reported the 

possible stabbing to local police, and an officer from the Port Arthur Police 

Department came to the hospital to interview the mother. The Port Arthur officer 

testified that the mother did not want to talk to police, but that she eventually 

admitted that appellant may have stabbed her with a knife while he was having his

seizure.

To follow up on his earlier investigation, the Beaumont officer was also 

dispatched to the hospital. The Beaumont officer opined that it was unusual for the 

mother to have driven to Port Arthur when closer hospitals were available in 

Beaumont. The mother explained that she chose the Port Arthur hospital because it 

had shorter wait times and she was pleased with the treatment her grandson had 

received there on an earlier occasion. The mother denied going to Port Arthur as a 

means of avoiding the Beaumont police.

The Beaumont officer testified that he found appellant waiting in the 

hospital lobby after arriving in Port Arthur. The Beaumont officer placed appellant 

in handcuffs, read him his rights, and conducted a brief investigation at the 

hospital. According to the Beaumont officer, appellant made the following 

confession: “I got in an argument with my mama, pushed her on the ground, 

stomped her in the head a few times, and stabbed her with a knife.”

The trial court found that appellant had failed to demonstrate that he was 

actually innocent of assaulting his mother. We conclude that this finding is 

supported by the evidence. The trial court heard testimony from the Beaumont 

officer that appellant had admitted to assaulting his mother. This testimony was 

also corroborated by the Port Arthur officer, who said that the mother admitted that 

appellant might have used a knife to stab her. Even though the mother denied the 
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occurrence of an assault, the trial court was free to disbelieve her testimony and 

determine instead that she was merely trying to protect her son from conviction. 

The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for new trial. See 

Tollett v. State, 799 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (a court does not 

abuse its discretion when its decision is based on conflicting evidence).

DISABILITY CLAIMS

A. Competency Trial

In his first of two disability claims, appellant argues that he was incompetent 

to enter a plea of true and that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a formal 

competency trial. We begin our analysis with an overview of the statutory scheme 

relating to competency trials.

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks a sufficient present 

ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding, or if he lacks a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a). Any party 

may suggest that a defendant is incompetent, including the court on its own 

motion. See id. art. 46B.004(a). Upon a suggestion of incompetency, the court 

must determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any 

source that would support a finding of incompetency. See id. art. 46B.004(c). In 

making this determination, the court must consider only the evidence tending to 

show incompetency, “putting aside all competing indications of competency, to 

find whether there is some evidence, a quantity more than none or a scintilla, that 

rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency.” See Ex parte LaHood, 401 

S.W.3d 45, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 

613 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). If the court makes such a determination 
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after the informal inquiry, then it must conduct a formal competency trial. See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.005(a)–(b).

The trial court in this case conducted an initial inquiry into appellant’s 

competency to stand trial when it referred appellant to a psychiatrist. The 

psychiatrist conducted her examination and filed her reports within three weeks of 

appellant’s adjudication proceeding. The psychiatrist diagnosed appellant with 

“psychosis, not otherwise specified.” Despite this mental disease, the psychiatrist 

opined that appellant was competent to stand trial and that he did not suffer from 

an impairment that would impact his capacity to engage with trial counsel.

The psychiatrist explained that her finding of competency was based on 

several factors. The first factor referred to the results of a standardized competency 

test, for which appellant had received a passing score. Appellant was able to 

discern the locations and identities of courtroom participants, such as the judge, 

jury, and attorneys. Appellant was also able to answer basic questions regarding 

court personnel and procedure, such as the roles of each of the participants. When 

appellant was asked about how he could aid his attorney in his own defense, 

appellant stated, “Tell him the truth about what happened the day the event 

happened.”

The competency test also included a hypothetical scenario about a man who 

had robbed a convenience store. Appellant correctly identified what information 

the man should tell his attorney in preparation for his upcoming trial. Based on 

appellant’s responses, the psychiatrist found that appellant “had the ability to 

comprehend questions asked of him, follow instructions, and provide historical 

information.” He was also “able to relate to the examiner in a rational and 

controlled manner.”
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Among the other factors that were considered, the psychiatrist noted that 

appellant rationally understood the charges against him. Appellant was able to 

describe the events of the alleged assault, and he knew the potential consequences 

of the pending criminal proceedings. The psychiatrist further found that appellant 

was able to reason logically and testify if he so chose.

The trial court opened the adjudication proceeding by immediately referring 

to the psychiatrist’s reports. The court stated, “Let the record reflect that I have had 

[the psychiatrist] look at Mr. Staley and we have done a sanity report and a mental 

illness report. He is not mentally ill, and he is competent to stand trial, if my 

memory is right.” The trial court may have been mistaken on the question of 

mental illness, but neither side objected. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel 

appeared to agree with the trial court’s overall assessment on competency. There 

was no additional request for a formal competency trial.

Appellant argues that he was entitled to a competency trial because the 

record showed that he suffered from several handicaps, including psychosis, 

epilepsy, and other conditions raising a “suggestion” of incompetency. Appellant 

invokes the incorrect legal standard. A suggestion of incompetency is sufficient to 

trigger an informal inquiry, but not a formal competency trial. See id. art. 

46B.004(c-1). The fact that a defendant may be mentally ill does not show that he 

is incompetent or deserving of a competency trial. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 

385, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Evidence of mental impairment alone does not 

require that a special jury be empaneled where no evidence indicates that a 

defendant is incapable of consulting with counsel or understanding the proceedings 

against him.”).

As stated above, the trial court’s informal inquiry must yield “some evidence 

from any source” that the defendant is incompetent before the court is required to 
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conduct a competency trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(c); id. art. 

46B.005(a)–(b). The trial court’s inquiry did not yield any such evidence here, and 

appellant did not produce any other evidence before the adjudication proceeding. 

Based on the psychiatrist’s finding that appellant was competent to stand trial, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to conduct a formal competency 

trial. See Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (finding no 

fault in the trial court’s failure to conduct a formal competency trial following the 

initial evaluations of a psychologist and a psychiatrist, who both deemed the 

defendant to be competent, and where no request for a competency trial had yet 

been made); Rodriguez v. State, 816 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.—Waco 1991, 

pet. ref’d) (when a psychiatrist and a psychologist both conclude that the defendant 

is competent to stand trial, there is no indication, without additional evidence, 

demonstrating that the defendant’s competency should be put in issue in a formal 

competency trial).

B. Facilitator

Appellant argues next that the trial court erred by failing to appoint a 

facilitator who would “explain the proceedings to him” and make him “feel less 

confused.” Appellant asserts that the appointment of such a facilitator was 

mandatory under both the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “Act”) and the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 

524 U.S. 206 (1998). Appellant has not cited to any provision from the Act 

requiring such appointments, and the Yeskey case holds only that inmates in state 

prisons are covered by the Act, not that they are entitled to special facilitators 

during their criminal prosecutions.

Appellant received court-appointed counsel throughout the course of his 

proceedings. Defense counsel was available to appellant to explain the proceedings 
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and clarify any points that may have been confusing. In this function, defense 

counsel served as appellant’s “facilitator.” Appellant has not shown that the trial 

court reversibly erred by running afoul of the Act or by failing to appoint anyone 

else in addition to his lawyer.

PLEA BARGAINING

In his next two issues, appellant contends that the trial court improperly 

interfered with the plea-bargaining process. Appellant’s arguments focus 

exclusively on events arising in cause number 13-16365, which related to 

appellant’s guilty plea for aggravated assault, not his adjudication of guilt for 

assault on a public servant.

According to appellant, the plea hearing in cause number 13-16365 occurred 

on the same day as the adjudication proceeding in cause number 08-04858, but 

later in the afternoon. The transcript from the plea hearing has not been included in 

our record.

We know from our research that appellant filed a notice of appeal in cause 

number 13-16365. We previously dismissed that appeal, however, because the trial 

court entered a certification that appellant had no right of appeal in that case. See 

Staley v. State, No. 14-13-00658-CR, 2013 WL 4816441, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 10, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). We will not reopen any issues arising out of cause number 13-16365 

through an appeal in cause number 08-04858. Accordingly, we decline to address 

appellant’s complaints that the trial court improperly interfered with the pleabargaining process.
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ADMINISTRATIVE FEES

In his final two issues, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by assessing 

administrative fees against him without orally pronouncing those fees at the time 

of sentencing. The total administrative balance included $300 in supervision fees, 

$619 in court costs, and $376.84 in other fees denoted as “BMT CS” and “PREPSI.” The trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt does not reflect that a separate

fine was assessed, and there is no indication that any of the administrative fees 

represented a fine.

With few exceptions not applicable here, a trial court must orally pronounce 

the “sentence” in the defendant’s presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.13, 

§ 1(a). The sentence is “that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension 

of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into 

execution in the manner prescribed by law.” Id. art. 42.02. The sentence includes 

fines, which are punitive in nature, but not court costs. See Armstrong v. State, 340 

S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

In Armstrong, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that court costs “need 

neither be orally pronounced nor incorporated by reference in the judgment” 

because they are compensatory rather than punitive. See Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 

766–67. The administrative fees assessed in this case are likewise compensatory 

because they consist entirely of court costs and other fees that are non-punitive in 

nature. Following Armstrong, we conclude that the administrative fees did not need 

to be orally pronounced because they are not punitive or part of appellant’s 

sentence. Therefore, the trial court did not err by assessing those fees after the oral 

pronouncement.
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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 /s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).