alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Dominique LEE, a/k/a Anthony Lee, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Larry THOMPSON, Superintendent of Tabor Correctional Institution, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6281

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2017

Decided: June 27, 2017

Dominique Lee, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Dominique Lee seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability -will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lee has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
|              (i)   | the      accompanying report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal      quarter ended October 31, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the      requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|             (ii)  |  the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                               |   |                                                                                        |
|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:       December 10, 2009 | By:    | /s/      Michael L. Krall                                                                   |   |
|                               |   | Michael      L. KrallPresident      / Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive  Officer) |

----
#### IN RE: Daniel Johnson WILLIS, Petitioner.

No. 17-1185

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Daniel Johnson Willis, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Johnson Willis petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to file his civil complaints. *We*conclude that Willis is not entitled to mandamus relief. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal.**In re Lockheed Marlin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). The relief sought by Willis is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition and corrected petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

 The court has already reviewed, in 10-1740, the denial of leave to file a complaint in 4:10-mc-1. The motion for leave to file a complaint in 4:17-mc-2-H is still pending in the district court.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

PETER C. GNEHM and ROSA L. GNEHM

,

Appellant s

,

v.

STATE FARM BANK

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 14

- 2433

[ September 2, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County ; Howard H. Harrison, Senior Judge; L.T. Case No.

502010CA020463XXXXMB

.

Peter C. Gnehm, Lake Worth, pro se.

Kimberly Hopkins and Ronald M. Gache of Shapiro, Fishman &

Gache, LLP, Tampa, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee , 377 So. 2d

1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979).

C IKLIN

, C.J., G ERBER and L EVINE

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 44 (Monday, March 7, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 12752]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-04922]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE:  2 p.m. on Thursday, March 10, 2022.

PLACE:  The meeting will be held via remote means and/or at the 
Commission's headquarters, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

STATUS: This meeting will be closed to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:  Commissioners, Counsel to the Commissioners, 
the Secretary to the Commission, and recording secretaries will attend 
the closed meeting. Certain staff members who have an interest in the 
matters also may be present.
    In the event that the time, date, or location of this meeting 
changes, an announcement of the change, along with the new time, date, 
and/or place of the meeting will be posted on the Commission's website 
at https://www.sec.gov.
    The General Counsel of the Commission, or his designee, has 
certified that, in his opinion, one or more of the exemptions set forth 
in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3), (5), (6), (7), (8), 9(B) and (10) and 17 CFR 
200.402(a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9)(ii) and (a)(10), 
permit consideration of the scheduled matters at the closed meeting.
    The subject matter of the closed meeting will consist of the 
following topics:
    Institution and settlement of injunctive actions;
    Institution and settlement of administrative proceedings;
    Resolution of litigation claims; and
    Other matters relating to examinations and enforcement proceedings.
    At times, changes in Commission priorities require alterations in 
the scheduling of meeting agenda items that may consist of 
adjudicatory, examination, litigation, or regulatory matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:  For further information; please 
contact Vanessa A. Countryman from the Office of the Secretary at (202) 
551-5400.
    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552b.

    Dated: March 3, 2022.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-04922 Filed 3-3-22; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
#### IN RE: John F. CURRAN, III, Petitioner.

No. 17-1973

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 6, 2017

Decided: November 14, 2017

John F. Curran, III, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

John. F. Curran, III, petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we deny the mandamus petition. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented *282in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
|    |                                                                                                        |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |

|                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 |
|                                            |
| /s/ MEG A. GENTLE                               |
| Meg A. Gentle                                   |
| Chief Financial Officer of                      |
| Sabine Pass LNG-GP, LLC, the general partner of |
| Sabine Pass LNG, L.P.                           |
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nikki Kathleen WILLIAMS, a/k/a Nikki Williams, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-7495

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2017

Decided: April 4, 2017

Nikki Kathleen Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Grayson A. Hoffman, Jeb Thomas Ter-rien, Assistant United States Attorneys, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Craig Jon Jacob-sen, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge,

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Nikki Kathleen Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Williams’ motion to appoint counsel, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the *283materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dewayne Kevon MOORE, a.k.a. Lil Stuck, a.k.a. Dewayn Moore, a.k.a. Dewayne K. Moore, a.k.a. Dewayne Kevin Moore, a.k.a. Dewayne Kevon Walter Moore, a.k.a. Duwayne Moore, a.k.a. Stuck, a.k.a. Wayne, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50275

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Jean-Claude Andre, Joshua Mausner, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Terrence Mann, Sara B. Milstein, Ms, DOJ — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Michael Tanaka, Deputy Federal Public Defender, FPDCA — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Los Angeles), Los Ange-les, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dewayne Kevon Moore appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release. Because Moore has fully served his revocation sentence and is not subject to a term of supervised release, we dismiss this appeal as moot. *See Spencer v. Kemna,*523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); *United States v. Palomba,*182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### IN RE: John Francis CURRAN, III, Petitioner.

No. 17-1872

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 1, 2017

Decided: November 8, 2017

John F. Curran, III, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

John Francis Curran, III, petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed in acting on his civil action. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC., KYDDLF & RDLFGFT NO. 1, LLC.,

AND RANCHO VISTA DEL MAR

, Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES

, Defendant

- Appellant

.

______________________

2012

- 5066

______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No . 09

- CV

- 691, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

R OGER J. M ARZULLA , Marzulla Law, LLC, of Washin gton, DC, argued for plaintiffs

- appellees. With him on the brief was N ANCIE G. M ARZULLA

.

C ORINNE A. N IOSI , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litig ation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant

appellant. With her on the brief were S TUART F. D ELERY , Acting Assistant Attorney General, J EANNE E. D AVIDSON , Director, and B RYANT G. S NEE , Deputy Director.

______________________T HIS CAUSE HAVING BEEN HEARD AN D CONSIDERED , IT IS

O RDERED AND A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (N EWMAN , S CHALL , and W ALLACH , Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

January 28, 2013 /s/ Jan Horbaly Date Jan Horbaly Clerk
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to, and solely for the purposes of, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), each of the undersignedhereby certifies in the capacity and on the date indicated below that:

 

1.             TheAnnual Report of Rafaella Apparel Group, Inc. on Form 10-K for theperiod ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Rafaella Apparel Group, Inc.

 

 
| September 29, 2008 | By:    | /s/ Christa Michalaros                                                                  |
|-------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                    |   | Christa Michalaros  Chief Executive Officer and Director  (Principal Executive Officer) |
|                    |   |                                                                                    |
| September 29, 2008 | By:    | /s/ Chad J. Spooner                                                                     |
|                    |   | Chad J. Spooner  Chief Financial Officer  (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)  |

 

----
MEMORANDUM

DATE: November 20, 2014

TO: Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket ID: OAR-2013-0602

FROM: Rob Lawrence

EPA/Region 6/PD

SUBJECT: June 16, 2014 Call with the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of 

Environmental Quality regarding the Proposed Carbon Power Plan for Existing 

Power Plants

SUMMARY

A brief call was made by EPA to the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental 

Quality on June 16, 2014, to discuss the proposed Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, 

which was proposed on June 2, 2014. 

ATTENDEES

Participant: Peggy Hatch (LDEQ Secretary)

EPA Participant: Ron Curry (Regional Administrator)
#### Bobby Lee MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guy Louis TURNER, LVMPD Officer Badge No. 13518; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16878

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*770Submitted October 23, 2017 *

Filed November 9, 2017

Bobby Lee Montgomery, Pro Se

Craig R. Anderson, Esquire, Director, Micah S. Echols, Esquire, Attorney, Adele V. Karoum, Esquire, Attorney, Marquis Aurbaeh Coffing, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bobby Lee Montgomery appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Haupt v. Dillard,*17 F.3d 285, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1994). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because the record shows that Montgomery had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause in his prior state criminal action, and, thus, he is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue in this action. *See id.*at 288-90 (explaining that under Nevada law, a probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing provides a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue sufficient to support collateral estoppel in a subsequent § 1983 action).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Luis Enrique RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-40575 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 31, 2017

Amy Howell Alaniz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Luis Enrique Ramirez, Pro Se

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Luis Enrique Ramirez pleaded guilty to conspiring to transport illegal aliens, bringing illegal aliens into the- United States, bribery, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(l)(A)(v)(I) and (II), 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) and (C); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); and 18 U.S.C. § 2. His objections to the presentence investigation report resulted in the reduction of his offense level from 43 to 40, and the court granted a downward departure of approximately 40% on the Government’s motion. Ramirez was sentenced to 204 months for the drug offense and lesser concurrent sentences for the other crimes. He waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge the judgment.

Ramirez moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which retroactively lowered many drug-related base offense levels by two levels. *See United States v. Chapple,*847 F.3d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 2017). Through appointed counsel, Ramirez asked that his Guidelines sentencing range for the drug count be reduced to 141 to 175 months based on an offense level of 38 and. the same degree of downward departure that the court originally granted. The court declined to reduce the sentence. Ramirez proceeds *pro se*on appeal.

The court properly determined Ramirez was eligible for a reduction and, therefore, did not commit an error of law. *See Dillon v. United States,*560 U.S. 817, 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Nonetheless, the court concluded no reduction was warranted because the original “sen*370tence was and is appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), especially given the nature and circumstances of the offense and the nature and extent of the defendant’s involvement therein”. The court thus considered the relevant sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce the sentence. *See United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.