alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William C. Stow, Respondent, *v.*L. Middleditch Company, Appellant.

Submitted April 19, 1943;

decided May 20, 1943.

*766
      *Walter H. Bond*for motion.

*Maurice B. Gladstone*opposed.

Motion dismissed, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements on the ground that the court is without power to grant it (Civ. Prac. Act, § 589, subd. 1-b) and that the applicant has failed to comply with rule 21 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals.
Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Triangle Capital Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Steven C. Lilly, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ STEVEN C. LILLYSteven C. LillyChief Financial OfficerMarch 6, 2013
EXHIBIT 10.4



City Access Provider
(CAP) Preferred Partner Overview

Wednesday, May 02, 2001

Preferred Partner Information:

Name:                                                
My Personal Salon (MPS)

                                                           
5 West 31st. St., 10th. FL., New York, NY 10001

Phone:                                               
212-563-0574

Contact:                                            
Vince Hickman, CEO

 

Product Description:                       
Providing hair and make-up services and product sales to individuals and

                                                            
Corporations

Account Number:                            
Not Applicable

 

Order Process:                                   
CAP Relationship Managers to call (Vince Hickman or Andreas Bauer @

                                                             
212-563-0574) to place all orders. MPS to quote "retail" prices to
CAP's

                                                             
Relationship Managers

Payment:                                             
Bi-weekly invoice to be generated from MPS, reflecting CAP discount

 

As a Preferred Partner, CAP will
assist MPS in the following ways: 

	Assist in selling MPS products and
    services to CAP's member in New York City Market and other CAP markets, when
    applicable
	Assist in selling new products that
    MPS adds to their core offerings
	Promote MPS in CAP's monthly
    newsletter, holiday promotions and member alert services
	Increase the level of service to MPS
    VIP clients by offering CAP concierge services to them as part of a loyalty
    program


 CAP and MPS agreement details: 

	CAP to receive a 7.5% commission on
    MPS gift certificates
	CAP to receive a 7.5% commission on
    Redken products that are promoted in our member reminders, newsletter and
    through our customer service centers
	CAP to receive a 7.5% commission on
    MPS hair and makeup services that are promoted in our member reminders,
    newsletter and through our customer service centers
	If a "Package" consists of
    ex. Hair, Makeup and Product, CAP will receive a 7.5% commission based on
    the Package's total price, and not for each individual service performed as
    part of the package
	MPS will offer CAP services as
    added value to Redken and L'Oreal employees. CAP will waive the membership
    fee to our services, ($60/year).
	MPS will receive special CAP
    membership fees to offer CAP as added value to MPS clients. Offer them at
    $10 annual membership fee and MPS gets 50% or $5 per member.
	For top MPS clients, CAP will
    waive the membership fee (based on mutual agreement between MPS and CAP).


 CAP is excited to welcome MPS as a
preferred partner and to be part of CAP's network of services. In addition, CAP
looks forward to forging a long-term relationship with MPS. However, if at any
time either party is dissatisfied with the level of service, products or any
part of the above agreement, the relationship can be terminated at any time with
a 10 day notice or upon completion of outstanding orders. We look forward to
working with you!
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
consolidated  balance  sheets  and  consolidated  statements  of  income  and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS     
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1997  
<PERIOD-END>                                 SEP-30-1997 
<CASH>                                         6,885,601
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    135,810 
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       0 
<PP&E>                                        40,051,128 
<DEPRECIATION>                                         0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                51,898,125 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  0
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                               0
<OTHER-SE>                                    31,348,541 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  51,898,125 
<SALES>                                                0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               7,990,522
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  7,397,650
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 229,746
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               902,429
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  592,872
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              592,872 
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                     592,872
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       1.95
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       1.95
        


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Emiliano SAUCEDO-RIOS, also known as Bernardino Saucedo-Rios, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-51239 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 19, 2017

*883Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kristin Michelle Khnmelman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Emiliano Saucedo-Rios pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He argues that the district court reversibly erred in applying a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because his Texas conviction for aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(a), upon which the enhancement was based, does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force as an element of the offense and does not satisfy the generic definition of aggravated assault.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance because the issue raised on appeal is foreclosed by *United States v. Guillen-Alvarez,*489 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007), in which we held that the Texas offense of aggravated assault is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). We reaffirmed the continued validity of *Guillen-Alvarez*after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Mathis v. United States,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). *See United States v. Shepherd,*848 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2017).

Saucedo-Rios concedes that the sole issue raised on appeal is foreclosed by *Guil-len-Alvarez,*but he raises the issue to preserve it for further review. Accordingly, summary affirmance is appropriate. *See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,*406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0482 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0482

**2002/482/EC: Commission Decision of 21 June 2002 amending Decision 93/52/EEC recording the compliance by certain Member States or regions with the requirements relating to brucellosis (B. melitensis) and according them the status of a Member State or region officially free of the disease (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 2213) **

*
Official Journal L 166 , 25/06/2002 P. 0023 - 0024 *

Commission Decision

of 21 June 2002

amending Decision 93/52/EEC recording the compliance by certain Member States or regions with the requirements relating to brucellosis (B. melitensis) and according them the status of a Member State or region officially free of the disease

(notified under document number C(2002) 2213)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/482/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 91/68/EEC of 28 January 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in ovine and caprine animals(1), as last amended by Commission Decision 2002/261/EC(2), and in particular Annex A, Chapter 1.II thereto,

Whereas:

(1) In the Italian province of Bolzano, brucellosis has been a notifiable disease for at least five years and at least 99,8 % of the ovine or caprine holdings are officially brucellosis-free holdings.

(2) The province of Bolzano undertakes, furthermore, to comply with Annex A Chapter 1.II(2) to Directive 91/68/EEC.

(3) The province of Bolzano should consequently be recognised as officially free of brucellosis (B. melitensis).

(4) Commission Decision 93/52/EEC(3), as last amended by Decision 2001/292/EC(4), should therefore be amended accordingly.

(5) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Annex II to Decision 93/52/EEC is replaced by the text in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 June 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 46, 19.2.1991, p. 19.

(2) OJ L 91, 6.4.2002, p. 31.

(3) OJ L 13, 21.1.1993, p. 14.

(4) OJ L 100, 11.4.2001, p. 28.

ANNEX

"ANNEX II

In France:

Ain, Aisne, Allier, Ardèche, Ardennes, Aube, Aveyron, Cantal, Charente, Charente-Maritime, Cher, Corrèze, Côte-d'Or, Côtes-d'Armor, Creuse, Deux-Sèvres, Dordogne, Doubs, Essonne, Eure, Eure-et-Loire, Finistère, Gers, Gironde, Hauts-de-Seine, Haute-Loire, Haute-Vienne, Ille-et-Vilaine, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Jura, Loir-et-Cher, Loire, Loire-Atlantique, Loiret, Lot-et-Garonne, Lot, Lozère, Maine-et-Loire, Manche, Marne, Mayenne, Morbihan, Nièvre, Nord, Oise, Orne, Pas-de-Calais, Puy-de-Dôme, Rhône, Haute-Saône, Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Seine-Maritime, Seine-Saint-Denis, Territoire de Belfort, Val-de-Marne, Val-d'Oise, Vendée, Vienne, Yonne, Yvelines, Ville de Paris, Vosges.

In Italy:

Bolzano.

In Spain:

Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Las Palmas."
#### Ross JENKINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Marvin PLUMLEY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6556

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 31, 2017

Decided: November 3, 2017

*279Ross Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se. Robert L. Hogan, Shannon Frederick Kiser, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ross Jenkins seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting in part and denying in part his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jenkins has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Jenkins’ motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:



|(1) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333- 83975) pertaining to the 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.;
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333-58174) pertaining to 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.;
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(3) | Registration Statement (Form S-8, No. 333- 85468) pertaining to the 1998 Stock Plan of drugstore.com, inc.; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(4) | Registration Statement (Form S-3, No. 333-118667) of drugstore.com, inc.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------



of our reports dated March 16, 2005, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of drugstore.com, inc., drugstore.com, inc. managements
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of drugstore.com, inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended January 2, 2005.



/s/ Ernst & Young LLP



Seattle, Washington

March 17, 2005
#### Renee’ L. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16811

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 21, 2017

Renee’ L. Martin, Pro Se

Joshua R. Mino, Attorney, Houser & Allison, APC, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges..

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Renee’ L. Martin appeals pro se the district court’s decision to dissolve a preliminary injunction preventing the foreclosure of her residential property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Tracer Research Carp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co.,*42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dissolving the preliminary injunction because all claims challenging defendants’ interest in the subject property were dismissed. *See id.*(An order dissolving a preliminary injunction will be reversed “only where the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not err in executing the bond, following the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, because Martin did not rebut the presumption that defendants were entitled to have the bond executed in their favor. *See Nintendo of Am.,**534*Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.,*16 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “there is a rebuttable presumption that a wrongfully enjoined party is entitled to have the bond executed and recover provable damages up to the amount of the bond.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Martin’s challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her quiet title claim. *See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.,*661 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011).

Martin’s request to reinstate the preliminary injunction and return the bond proceeds, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6958 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6958

 To amend title 5, United States Code, to require cabinet officials to 
notify Congress in the event such an official is temporarily unable to 
   perform the functions and duties of their position, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 11, 2024

   Mr. Bean of Florida (for himself, Mr. Tony Gonzales of Texas, Ms. 
      Hageman, Mr. Miller of Ohio, Mrs. Luna, Mr. Ogles, and Mrs. 
 Harshbarger) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 5, United States Code, to require cabinet officials to 
notify Congress in the event such an official is temporarily unable to 
   perform the functions and duties of their position, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cabinet Accountability and 
Transparency Act''.

SEC. 2. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS IF CABINET OFFICER UNABLE TO PERFORM 
              FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF POSITION.

    Section 3349 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(c)(1) If an officer who is a member of the President's cabinet 
and whose appointment to office is required to be made by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is 
temporarily unable to perform the functions and duties of the office, 
such officer shall notify (in writing) Congress not later than 24 hours 
before such absence begins.
    ``(2) The employing agency of such officer shall submit the notice 
required under paragraph (1) in the event such officer is unable to 
submit such notice due to a medical emergency or any other unforeseen 
circumstance.''.
                                 <all>
```
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

**** SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITING  

The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27, 1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer. Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S. Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010. Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome. NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the full texts of the opinions after they have been released electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.

The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Fair, Appellant. [Cite as State v. Fair (1994), Ohio St. 3d .] Appellate procedure -- Application for reopening appeal from judgment and conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel -- Application denied when applicant fails to establish good cause for filing the application more than ninety days after the effective date of App.R. 26(B) and when no colorable issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel is found. (No. 94-1680 -- Submitted November 1, 1994 -- Decided December 30, 1994.) Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.

90AP-363. Appellant, Eddie J. Fair, was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and rape, and sentenced to thirty years to life. He appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the convictions. State v. Fair (July 6, 1991), Franklin App. No. 90AP-363, unreported. He asserts that on February 8, 1994 he filed a motion for delayed reconsideration (reopening) in the court of appeals based on "State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 60 [584 N.E. 2d 1204], and ** * by App.R. 26(B), as amended effective July 1, 1993," alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the presentation of issues concerning testimony of appellant's alleged common-law wife and a "jailhouse lawyer." The court of appeals held that appellant failed to establish good cause for filing the application more than ninety days after the effective date of App.R. 26 (B), and otherwise found no colorable issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and denied the application. Appellant appeals from that decision.

Michael Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joyce S. Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Eddie J. Fair, pro se.Per Curiam. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed for the reasons stated in its opinion. Judgment accordingly. Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.