alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 13.1




Certification


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


(subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code)




Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V. (the “Company”), does hereby certify to such officer’s knowledge that:




The annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2012 (the “Form 20-F”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: April 29, 2013

By: /s/ Porfirio González ÁlvarezName: Porfirio González ÁlvarezTitle: Chief Executive OfficerDated: April 29, 2013

By: /s/ José Luis Guerrero CortésName: José Luis Guerrero CortésTitle: Chief Financial Officer
#### Leslie REDMOND, Petitioner - Appellant, v. Warden ZYCH, Respondent - Appellee.

No. 15-6520

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 4, 2017

Decided: May 23, 2017

Leslie Redmond, Appellant Pro Se.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Leslie Redmond, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Redmond v. Zych,*No. 7:15-cv-00101-GEC-RSB (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument-would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                    ------------

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES -OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wireless Xcessories Group, Inc. ( the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report"), I Ronald E.
Badke, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

     (3)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (4)  The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


                                                    By /s/ Ronald E. Badke
                                                    ---------------------------
                                                    Ronald E. Badke
                                                    Chief Financial Officer
                                                    May 17, 2004
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


     In  connection  with  the   accompanying   Quarterly  Report  of  Concierge
Technologies,  Inc.  (the  "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March
31,  2005 (the  "Report"),  I, Allen E.  Kahn,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the
Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. ss.78o(d)); and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  May 18, 2005

                                             /s/ Allen E. Kahn
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Allen E. Kahn
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


     The above  certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.1350) and is not being filed as part of
the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.











                                                                      Exhibit 32
                                                                Page 1 of 1 Page
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Exhibit 10.1    
  


 
 

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT    
  


        We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement (333-65454) on Form F-3 of Petróleos
de Venezuela, S.A. and PDVSA Finance Ltd. of our report dated March 8, 2002 relating to the financial statements of PDVSA Finance Ltd. as of December 31, 2001 and 2000 and
for the years then ended, which report appears in the December 31, 2001 annual report on Form 20-F. 



	KPMG ALCARAZ CABRERA VÁZQUEZ
	
/s/  GUSTAVO GONZÁLEZ BRACHE      
 Gustavo González
Brache

Public Accountant

C.P.C. No. 476
	

Caracas, Venezuela

June 13, 2002




2









QuickLinks



Exhibit 10.1


INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT
#### Fenton L. TERRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leslie FLEMING, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-6262

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 20, 2017

Decided: July 24, 2017

*755Fenton L. Terry, Appellant Pro Se. Craig Stallard, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Fenton L. Terry seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of. appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on- the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Terry has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave- to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense "with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                        MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                              14,315
<SECURITIES>                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                             0
<INVENTORY>                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                    14,315
<PP&E>                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      14,510
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              249,197
<BONDS>                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0
<PREFERRED>                          4,000
<COMMON>                            56,723
<OTHER-SE>                       (295,410)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        14,510
<SALES>                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         0
<CGS>                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    25,768
<LOSS-PROVISION>                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   4,963
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          0
<INCOME-TAX>                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                          0
<CHANGES>                                0
<NET-INCOME>                      (30,731)
<EPS-BASIC>                       (0.0061)
<EPS-DILUTED>                     (0.0061)


</TABLE>
#### BERRY *v.*TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY *et al.*

No. 13441.

September 25, 1940.

*0. Lee White,*for plaintiff.

*Neely, Marshall & Greene*and *W. Neal Bawd,*for defendant.

Jenkins, Justice.

Whether an action as brought in a superior court, having both law and equitable jurisdiction, is one in equity, such as will give this court jurisdiction of a bill of exceptions from a judgment therein, is determinable by the allegations and prayers of the petition. *O’Callaghan*v. *Bank of Eastman,*180 *Ga.*812, 817 (180 S. E. 847); *Wallace*v. *Mize,*153 *Ga.*374 (3), 383 (112 S. E. 724). Although “the jurisdiction of this court is not limited to good cases in equitjr, but extends to bad ones also” *(Candler*v. *Bryan,*189 *Ga.*851, 855, 8 S. E. 2d, 81), yet “the petition is not to be treated as a case in equity merely because of general language so terming it, where the allegations of fact and the specific prayers do not support the general language used.” *Dobbs*v. *Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,*187 *Ga.*569, 571 (1 S. E. 2d, 672), and cit. “To make-a case in equity, the allegations of the petition must be applicable to the equitable relief prayed for, and there must be a prayer either for . . specific relief, or for general relief.” *Jasper School District*v. *Gormley,*184 *Ga.*756, 761 (193 S. E. 248), and cit. Under the preceding rules, where the petition in this case merely set forth alleged differences between certain provisions in a life-insurance certi ficate in favor of an employee and other provisions in the master-group policy from the insurance company to the employer, an alleged ambiguity in such provisions, and the contention that by reason of the non-delivery of a copy of the master policy to the insured employee, and the payment of *773premiums under the certificate, the provisions of the certificate should prevail; and where the petition sought only a money judgment on the certificate, and; merely as incidental to such judgment, prayed that "every part of said master policy be construed and ordered as applying only so far against plaifltiff as the' same does not conflict or vary the terms of [said]! certificate,” and certain specified provisions thereof, there is no fact- alleged which would remotely suggest a right to 'invoke the equitable remedy of cancellation based on fraud, accident, or mistake .in the execution of the contract, or other equitable remedy; but on the contrary the petition shows on its face that the rights of the plaintiff, if any 'exist, depend upon a legal construction of the certificate and master policy when taken together, which in fact is all that is asked by the prayers.

*Transferred to Court of Appeals.*

*All the Justices concur.*
PHHMC Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4

CERTIFICATION

I, Terence W. Edwards, certify that:

            1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on
Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report
on Form 10-K of the trust (the "Trust") created pursuant to the Pooling and
Servicing Agreement dated November 1, 2006 (the "Agreement") among PHH Mortgage
Capital LLC (the "Depositor"), PHH Mortgage Corporation (the "Master Servicer")
and Citibank, N.A. (the "Trustee") (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

            2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken
as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report;

            3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

            4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
Master Servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted
in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under
Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act
periodic reports, the Master Servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the
Agreement in all material respects; and

            5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities
required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of
Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as
an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any
material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been
disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

            In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
the information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: the
Trustee.



Date: March 30, 2007

/s/ Terence W. Edwards
---------------------------
Name:         Terence W. Edwards
Title:        President and Chief Executive Officer
Company:      PHH Mortgage Corporation
RECORD OF CONFERENCE CALL

DATE: May 26, 2011

EPA PARTICIPANTS: OAQPS/AQPD, OAQPS/SLPG, and OTAQ

OUTSIDE EPA PARTICIPANTS: None

SUBJECT: Presentation to management of the Regulatory Support Document final results and discussion 

on Proposed Rule for Determining Widespread Use of ORVR and Stage II Vapor Recovery Waiver.

DISCUSSION:

Meeting with upper management discussing the results of the Draft Regulatory Support Document. 

Results indicate a cost savings for decommissioning Stage II Vapor Recovery, yet the savings do not 

exceed $100 million annually. Presented Proposed rule preamble to management for review that 

indicates small edits and the addition of the Financial impacts section.

Copy of proposed rule preamble and draft Regulatory Support Document provided.
6-Mercapto-1-Hexanol

CAS Number: 1633-78-9

Formula: C6H14OS

Molecular Weight: 134.24

HO

SH
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 676 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                  S. 676

 For the relief of D.W. Jacobson, Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of 
            Grand Rapids, Minnesota, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 5, 1995

   Mr. Grams introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 For the relief of D.W. Jacobson, Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of 
            Grand Rapids, Minnesota, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RELIEF OF D.W. JACOBSON, RONALD KARKALA, AND PAUL BJORGEN.

    The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, out of any money in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $3,391,404.50 jointly to D.W. 
Jacobson, Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of Norwood Manufacturing, 
Inc. (now dissolved) of Grand Rapids, Minnesota, for damages incurred 
relating to the termination of a contract with the United States Postal 
Service for the manufacture of wooden pallets.

SEC. 2. SATISFACTION OF CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

    Payment under section 1 shall constitute full settlement of all 
legal and equitable claims by D.W. Jacobson, Ronald Karkala, and Paul 
Bjorgen of Norwood Manufacturing, Inc. (now dissolved) of Grand Rapids, 
Minnesota, against the United States.

SEC. 3. NO INFERENCE OF LIABILITY.

    Nothing in this Act shall infer liability on the part of the United 
States.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON ATTORNEY AND AGENT FEES.

    (a) In General.--Not more than 10 percent of the payment specified 
in section 1 may be paid to or received by an agent or attorney as 
consideration for a service rendered in connection with this Act.
    (b) Enforceability of Contract.--A contract that violates 
subsection (a) is unenforceable.
    (c) Criminal Penalty.--Violation of subsection (a) is a misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6929 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6929

  To appropriate funds for the Affordable Connectivity Program of the 
                   Federal Communications Commission.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 10, 2024

 Ms. Clarke of New York (for herself, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mrs. Torres of 
California, Mr. Lawler, Mrs. Dingell, Mr. D'Esposito, Mr. Soto, and Mr. 
  Molinaro) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To appropriate funds for the Affordable Connectivity Program of the 
                   Federal Communications Commission.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Affordable Connectivity Program 
Extension Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. APPROPRIATION FOR AFFORDABLE CONNECTIVITY PROGRAM.

    Section 904(i)(2) of division N of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2021 (47 U.S.C. 1752(i)(2)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``There is'' and inserting the following:
                    ``(A) Fiscal year 2021.--There is''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(B) Fiscal year 2024.--There is appropriated to 
                the Affordable Connectivity Fund, out of any money in 
                the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $7,000,000,000 
                for fiscal year 2024, to remain available until 
                expended.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin REAVES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10771 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(September 27, 2017)

Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, William T. Shockley, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Peter Vincent Birch, Federal Public Defender’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HULL, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

The Government’s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Appellant’s plea agreement is GRANTED. *See United States v. Bushert,*997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993) (sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily).
#### Ricardo LOPEZ-AGUILAR, AKA Calixto Benito Mendoza Cruz, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-71261

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Peter Hurtado, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner

Patricia Bruckner, Trial Attorney, OIL, Margaret Kuehne Taylor, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ricardo Lopez-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo due process claims and we review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Vilchez v. Holder,*682 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012). We deny the petition for review.

We reject Lopez-Aguilar’s contention that the agency violated his right to due process. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on due process challenge).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Lopez-Aguilar failed to establish that the harm he 'and his family suffered by gangs in Guatemala, even considered cumulatively, rose to the *911level of persecution. *See Hoxha v. Ashcroft,*319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that harassment, threats, and one beating did not compel a finding of past persecution); *see also Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales,*496 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (injuries to a family must be considered in asylum cases where the events alleged as the basis for past persecution were perceived when the petitioner was a child). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Lopez-Aguilar failed to establish that it is more likely than not he will be persecuted if returned to Guatemala. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future persecution “too speculative”).

In this case, because Lopez-Aguilar failed to establish eligibility for asylum, his claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails. *See Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Lopez-Aguilar’s CAT claim because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.