[Cite as Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol , 2020-Ohio-3231.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAYETTE COUNTY

JERRY MILLER, Appellant,

- vs -

OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, et al., Appellees. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO. CA2019-08-017

O P I N I O N 6/8/2020

CIVIL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CO UNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CVH20190120

James R. Willis, 1144 Rockefeller Bldg., 614 W. Superior Avenue , Cleveland, Ohio 44113, for appellant Ohio Attorney General, Dave Yost, Peter L. Jamison, Executive A gencies Section, 1970 West Broad Street, Suite 531, Columbus, Ohio 43223, for appelle es.

HENDRICKSON, P.J. {¶ 1} Jerry Miller appeals the decision of the Fayette County Common Pleas Court, which denied his petition requesting the return of his United S tates currency that was seized by the Ohio State Highway Patrol following a traffic stop. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms the common pleas court. {¶ 2} Affidavits in the record indicate that shortly after midnight o n April 6, 2019,Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 2 - Miller and a passenger w ere traveling southbound on I-71 in Fay ette County. Michael Ross, an Ohio State Highway Patrol ("OSHP") trooper, was travelling n orthbound on I-71 when he observed Miller's vehicle, a dark-colored SUV, speeding 87 m iles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. Trooper Ross turned around and proceeded to ini tiate a traffic stop. {¶ 3} Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper Ross observed furtive mov ements by Miller, who was driving, and Miller's passenger. Upon approach ing Miller, Trooper Ross detected the strong odor of marijuana and noticed Miller acted "distant" and would not maintain eye contact, repeatedly looking towards the vehicle's center console. Trooper Ross asked Miller if there was marijuana in the vehicle because of the smell, which Miller denied. Trooper Ross then removed Miller from the vehicle. Su bsequently, Miller admitted to the presence of a small amount of marijuana in the vehicle a nd said that it could be located in the front dash behind a screen. At this point, Troo per Ross also removed Miller's passenger from the car. {¶ 4} Trooper Ross searched the vehicle and recovered a small amount of marijuana where Mille r indicated he would find it. Subsequentl y, Trooper Ross discovered a large amount of United States currency located in the middle seats of the vehicle. The money was not "contained or packaged in any certain order. It was all thrown into bundles with rubber bands, some of it was opened, some of it was vacuum sealed, or in zip lock plastic bags." In addition to the money, Trooper Ross also fou nd an electronic money counter and three cellular pho nes. Upon questioning, Miller cl aimed that the currency was his. When asked to estimate how much was there, Miller respond ed "about 270" (meaning $270,000). {¶ 5} While searching the vehicle, Trooper Ross noticed two vehicles that slowed dramatically as they approached the traffic stop. Trooper Ross found this unusual and believed these might be "tail vehicles" so he requested that ba ckup rush to the scene.Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 3 - {¶ 6} Trooper Ross, based on his training and experience with drug in terdiction, the manner in which the currency was packaged, the electronic money counter, and the discovery of an active out-of-state warrant for Miller for drug possession, believed that the currency was related to a criminal enterprise. Trooper Ross de cided to seize the vehicle and its contents and had the vehicle towed to OSHP's Wilmington post, where Trooper Ross met with his commander and federal agents of the Departmen t of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). {¶ 7} At the post, the decision was made that the DEA would seize the currency in conjunction with a cri minal investigation into Miller and for a potential federal civil forfeiture case. Trooper Ross prepared a document listing the items he se ized, including the currency. This document indicated that the seized items were t ransferred to Task Force Officer ("TFO") Joseph Luebbers, a task force member of the DEA . TFO Luebbers signed the document indicating receipt of the seized items. {¶ 8} TFO Luebbers spoke with Miller and told him that the currency, two of the three cell phones, and the electronic money counting machine we re being seized as evidence and that a federal forfeiture action would likely be f iled. Another DEA agent provided Miller with a receipt on Department of Justice and DEA letterhead indicating that the DEA was in possession of the currency, phones, and money co unter. {¶ 9} Trooper Ross ticketed Miller for speeding and issued him a mino r misdemeanor marijuana possessi on ticket. Miller and his passen ger were then released. {¶ 10} The currency remained at the Wilmington post until April 8, 201 9, when it was retrieved by two DEA agents. On April 11, 2019, DEA agents too k the currency to a money counting facility, where it was determined that the total amoun t seized was $284,942. The funds were subsequently deposited into a federal bank account. {¶ 11} On April 11, 2019, Miller petitioned the Fayette County Common Pleas CourtFayette CA2019-08-017

- 4 - for the return of his money. The petition named OSHP, Trooper Ross, and Trooper Ross'

commander as defendants. 1 OSHP subsequently moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction based on the fe deral adoption of the seized

currency. {¶ 12} In support of the motion, OSHP filed the affidavits of Trooper Ross, TFO Luebbers, Trooper Ross' commander, and the DEA's forfeiture cou nsel. These affidavits incorporated various documents, including records documenting t he transfer of the currency from Trooper Ross to TFO Luebbers, a copy of a receipt from the DEA to Miller, and copies of the Department of Justice notices that were sent to Miller a nd others in May 2019, advising them of the federal seizure of currency and their righ t to file a claim to challenge

the seizure. {¶ 13} Miller opposed the motion but did not submit any competing evid entiary

materials. 2 The common pleas court granted the motion, reasoning that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to order the release of the currency due to the DEA seizure and that subject-matter jurisdiction was now in federal court. Miller a ppeals, raising five assignments

of error. {¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. I: {¶ 15} GIVEN THE INSUPERABLE TENET THAT POSSESSION OBTAINED

THROUGH AN INVALID SEIZURE NEITHER STRIPS THE FIRST COURT OF IT S JURISDICTION NOR VESTS IT IN THE SECOND COURT, IT FOLLOWS THE C OURT

ERRED WHEN IT RULED IT LACKED JURISDICTION.

1. For ease of reading, this court will refer to the defendant s collectively as "OSHP." 2. Miller did submit a blank form titled "Request for Adoption of State and Local Seizure," which appears to be an internal Department of Justice form required to be comple ted by both the local/state agency and the federal agency where the federal agency is adopting a state sei zure. Miller argued that OSHP had not demonstrated that the law enforcement agencies properly complet ed this form.Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 5 - {¶ 16} OSHP filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) an d 12(B)(6), asserting that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction or th at Miller had not stated a claim for which relief could be granted. The common pleas cour t granted the motion based upon Civ.R. 12(B)(1), finding that it lacked jurisdiction. {¶ 17} A trial court must grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss fo r lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction if the complaint fails to raise a cause of action cognizable by the forum. State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock , 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). In deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion, the trial court can consider evidence outside the compl aint. Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. , 48 Ohio St.2d 211 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. This court conducts a de novo review of a common pleas court's decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12 (B)(1). McKenzie v. Meijer,

Inc. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-09-061, 2017-Ohio-1495, ¶ 10. {¶ 18} In his first assignment of error, Miller argues that the common pleas court erred because exclusive jurisdiction over the seized currency v ested in the Fayette County Common Pleas Court from the moment OSHP seized the currency. M iller contends that

transfer of the seized assets to federal authorities was barred without a state judicial order. For this proposition, Miller cites United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van , 924 F.2d 120 (7th Cir.1991). C-20 Van , however, is an Illinois case involving an Illinois statute, w hich statute required court approval for a state agency to transfer seized property to a federal

agency. Id . at 122. {¶ 19} The civil forfeiture statutes of Ohio do not require a court or der for a law enforcement agency to seek federal adoption. R.C. 2981.14(A) p rovides: Subject to division (B) of this section, nothing in this chapte r precludes the head of a law enforcement agency that seizes property from seeking forfeiture under federal law. If the property is forfeitable under this chapter and federal forfeitu re is not sought, the property is subject only to this chapter.Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 6 - {¶ 20} In turn, R.C. 2981.14(B) provides that no state agency shall di rectly or indirectly transfer any seized property to a federal law enforc ement agency unless the "the value of the seized property exceeds one hundred thousand dolla rs * * * or the property is being transferred or referred for federal criminal forfeiture p roceedings." Here, the amount transferred to the DEA exceeded $100,000 and thus could be lawf ully transferred pursuant

to R.C. 2981.14. {¶ 21} Nonetheless, Miller claims that Oh io law requires a judicial or der before stateseized assets can be transferred to a federal agency. Miller a sserts that R.C. 2933.26 and

State v. Jacobs , 137 Ohio St. 363 (1940), read together, stand for this propos ition. Miller does not explain his argument any further other than to say tha t the two authorities must be read together and that a law enforcement officer must have spec ific and articulable facts pointing to criminal behavior before the officer can make a law ful seizure. {¶ 22} Chapter 2933 of the Revised Code addresses search warrants. R. C. 2933.26 provides: "[w]hen a warrant is executed by the seizure of prope rty or things described therein, such property or things shall be kept by the judge, cl erk, or magistrate to be used

as evidence." In Jacobs , the Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence confiscated by a la w enforcement officer without a warrant, for use in a criminal pr oceeding, is under the control and subject to the order of the court pursuant to certain Gener al Code statutory provisions.

Jacobs at 365. {¶ 23} Neither R.C. 2933.26 nor Jacobs is relevant to this civil forfeiture action. The underlying law enforcement activity that resulted in the seizur e in this case did not involve the execution of a search warrant and the currency was not seiz ed for evidence in any state criminal proceedings against M iller. Moreover, neither R.C. 29 33.26 nor Jacobs , whether read in conjunction or not, stand for the proposition that in r em jurisdiction vests exclusivelyFayette CA2019-08-017

- 7 - in Ohio courts upon a civil forfeiture seizure by a state law e nforcement agency pursuant to R.C. 2981.03(A)(2). Nor do these authorities stand for the pro position that a court order must be sought before a state agency can seek federal adoption pursuant to R.C. 2981.14. {¶ 24} Finally, Miller argues that the DEA was not on the scene of the initial seizure and thus could not possess specific and articulable facts justi fying its seizure of the currency. However, federal law permits the DEA to accept prope rty that "was lawfully seized by a State or local law enforcement agency * * *." 18 U .S.C. 981(b)(2)(C). {¶ 25} This court understands that Miller contests the lawfulness of t he seizure by OSHP. However, this is a matter that Miller can pursue in conj unction with his right to make a claim under 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(2). Accord United States v. $677,660.00 in United States Currency , N.D. Ohio No. 5:11 CV 770, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12948 (Feb. 2, 2012) (reviewing challenges to the lawfulness of a seizure of currenc y by the Twinsburg, Ohio police department, who requested that the DEA adopt the case an d wherein the DEA initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings). This court o verrules Miller's first assignment

of error. {¶ 26} Assignment of Error No. II: {¶ 27} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, WHEN IT SUMMARILY, INDEED WITHOUT MAKING A NY FINDINGS WHATSOEVER OF FAC T,

DISMISSED THE APPELLANT'S ACTION THAT WAS SEASONABLY LODGED HER EIN (AS AN ORIGINAL ACTION) UNDER F AVOR OF R.C. OF OHIO § 2981.03(A )(4). {¶ 28} Miller next argues the court abused its discretion in dismissin g his petition because of a lack of proof that the DEA had acquired "jurisdict ion" over the seized currency. Miller cites two cases involving civil forfeiture from the Eigh t District Court of Appeals. Harris v. Mayfield Hts. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95601, 2011-Ohio-1943 and Long v. State , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97044, 2012-Ohio-366.Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 8 - {¶ 29} In Harris , a city police department seized over $15,000 from the petitio ner during a traffic stop. Id . at ¶ 6-8. A police sergeant contacted a DEA agent, who indic ated that he would "be coming in on Tuesday, May 25, 2010 to pick up the U.S. currency that

was seized." Id . at ¶ 9. The next day, the police department completed a "Req uest for Adoption of State or Local Seizure form." Id . at ¶ 11. {¶ 30} Subsequently, the petitioner filed a complaint in replevin agai nst the police department, and a motion for the immediate return of the seized currency. Id . at ¶ 2. The department moved to dismiss, arguing that federal agents had ta ken possession of the currency and therefore the common pleas court lacked jurisdicti on to hear the case. Id . at ¶ 3. After briefing, the common pleas court agreed with the po lice department and

dismissed the case. Id . at ¶ 4. {¶ 31} The appeals court reversed, finding that the record lacked evid ence that the federal government had ever taken possession of the funds or ha d approved seizing the

funds. Id . at ¶ 11, 16. The court noted that the evidence only establis hed that the police department had seized the money and, two days later, completed a form requesting a federal adoption of the seizure. Id. at ¶ 11. {¶ 32} In Long , police officers and DEA agents executed a search warrant, recovering an undetermined amount of currency belonging to the petitioner. 2012-Ohio366 at ¶ 2. The petitioner moved the common pleas court for th e return of the seized property. Id . at ¶ 3. At a hearing, the state argued that the property had been seized by federal authorities and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Id . at ¶ 4. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction

. Id

. {¶ 33} In reversing, the court of appeals concluded that the record la cked evidence establishing whether either the state or federal agencies "main tained jurisdiction" over the seized property. Id . at ¶ 8. The court noted that the only documents in the recor d wereFayette CA2019-08-017

- 9 - DEA receipts listing the seized items, including an "undetermin ed" amount of currency. The receipts failed to establish whether the state or federal agenc y had maintained the property subsequent to its initial seizure. Id . The court found that it could not determine which agency seized the property, whether the seized property had bee n adopted by the federal authorities, or how the adoption was accomplished. Id. at ¶ 9. {¶ 34} This case does not suffer from a similar lack of proof as in Harris or Long

. OSHP submitted evidentiary materials, including multiple affida vits supported by exhibits, which indicated that Trooper Ross seized the currency and other items on behalf of OSHP on April 6, 2019. Later that morning, the DEA and OSHP decided that the DEA would adopt the seized currency. Accordingly, Trooper Ross prepared a docu ment ("Property Control document") transferring the property to the DEA via TFO Luebber s. The Property Control document indicated that the seized assets had been collected by Trooper Ross on April 6, 2019, at approximately 12:21 a.m., and were transferred to TFO Luebbers at 4:07 a.m. on the same date. The currency was removed from the vehicle and l oaded into DEA evidence bags. {¶ 35} TFO Luebbers' affidavit established that he was assigned to the DEA and was empowered to conduct federal investigations and to assist the D EA in connection with

federal civil forfeiture laws. TFO Luebbers averred that he de cided to seize Miller's currency on behalf of the DEA as part of a criminal investigation and fo r potential civil forfeiture. TFO Luebbers signed the Property Control document in order to take custody of the currency on

behalf of the DEA. {¶ 36} OSHP Commander Mark A. Gooding's affidavit stated that because of the timing of the seizure (it was a weekend), the currency was held for the DEA at OSHP's Wilmington post until the morning of April 8, 2019, when the cu rrency was retrieved by two DEA Agents. On April 11, 2019, the DEA took the currency to a counting facility in Louisville,Fayette CA2019-08-017

- 10 - Kentucky. The currency was eventually deposited into a bank ac count operated by the U.S.

Marshals Service. {¶ 37} Accordingly, there was evidence submitted to the common pleas c ourt that established that OSHP made the initial seizure, that OSHP and t he DEA decided that the DEA would adopt the seizure, and that the "transfer" or "turn o ver" for purposes of federal forfeiture law occurred on April 6, 2019. Miller filed his pet ition five days later. In opposing OSHP's motion to dismiss, Miller submitted no evidence that wou ld challenge any of the evidence submitted by OSHP demonstrating a valid transfer. {¶ 38} Miller also argues that the cour t ignored that OSHP failed to p rove that it and the DEA completed the "Request for Adoption of State and Local Seizure," a blank copy of which he attached to his memorandum in opposition. Miller poin ts to a section of the "Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual," which was not made a part of the rec ord but is apparently the policy manual of the Department of Justice concerning the Feder al Asset Forfeiture Program. The specific section cited by Miller indicates that t he federal authorities must report seizures from state agencies on this specific form, that no seizure should take place while the property is subject to the jurisdiction of a state co urt, and that when requesting adoption, the state agency must certify to the federal agency t hat the adoption complies

with state law. {¶ 39} Miller cites no state law applicabl e to civil forfeitures that would require OSHP to complete this form before it could transfer seized assets to a federal agency. As discussed above, R.C. 2981.14 gives the agency statutory author ity to seek forfeiture under federal law. Under 18 U.S.C. 981(b)(2)(C), a federal agency ma y seize property subject to forfeiture without a warrant if "the property was lawfully seiz ed by a State or local law enforcement agency and transferred to a Federal agency." (Emphasis added.)

"Transferred" is undefined and the statute does not indicate wh at steps are necessary toFayette CA2019-08-017

- 11 - complete a transfer between the state and federal agency. The federal notice provisions describe the transfer as when the property is "turned over": In a case in which the property is seized by a State or local l aw enforcement agency and turned over to a Federal law enforcement agency for the purpose of forfeiture under Federal law, notice shall be sent not more than 90 days after the date of seizure by the State or local law enforcement agency. (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(1)(A)(iv). {¶ 40} Under this court's interpretation of the relevant state and fed eral laws, a state transfer of seized assets to a federal agency under 18 U.S.C. 9 81(b)(2)(C) is proper where no state forfeiture proceedings or petitions filed pursuant to R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) have commenced and, with the agreement of the state agency, the fede ral agency takes some action to accept control or custody of assets lawfully seized b y the state agency. As discussed in response to the first assignment of error, the rec ord contains uncontroverted evidence that OSHP and the DEA agreed that the DEA would adopt the seized currency, which transfer TFO Luebbers completed when he signed a receipt for the seized currency and assumed constructive possession. Physical possession occur red two days later. Several days later, Miller filed his petition in Fayette County , which petition was served on OSHP several days later still. {¶ 41} Finally, Miller again argues that his petition for the return o f property was an action in rem, which vested the Fayette County Common Pleas Cou rt with exclusive jurisdiction over the seized currency. However, Miller's petit ion commenced after OSHP completed the transfer to the DEA. Such transfer deprived the state court of asserting in rem jurisdiction over assets under the control and custody of t he federal government. This court overrules Miller's second assignment of error. {¶ 42} Assignment of Error No. 3: {¶ 43} THE COURT, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENTFayette CA2019-08-017

- 12 - PROHIBITS ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, AND GIVEN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT BARS, IN THE WAKE OF ITS "TAKING CLAUSE," THE CONFISC ATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THE ABSENCE HERE OF

ANY FINDINGS THE COURT ERRED IN RULING DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY PROOF

IT LACKED JURISDICTION. {¶ 44} In his third assignment of error, Miller presents various argum ents challenging the lawfulness of the OSHP stop and seizure. In doing so, Mill er describes the hypothetical evidence he would have submitted at an evidentiary hearing chal lenging the legality of the stop and seizure, e.g., that he lacked any prior convictions, t hat the vehicle was his wife's rental vehicle, and that his wife would claim ownership of the marijuana recovered. {¶ 45} This court's review is limited to the record on appeal, which c onsists of "[t]he original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court * * *." App.R. 9(A)(1). This cou rt cannot consider argument based on evidence that was not presented to the trial court, much les s hypothetical evidence. As stated in response to the first assignment of error, Miller has a remedy through federal court to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure of the currency. {¶ 46} Miller also argues that the seizure was unlawful because the st ate forfeiture statutes require a seizure for civil forfeiture proceedings to be tied to the commission of a felony offense. Thus, his charge for misdemeanor drug possessi on would not justify the seizure that occurred in this case. However, the forfeiture st atutes provides that "[a] law enforcement officer may seize property that the officer has pro bable cause to believe is property subject to forfeiture." R.C. 2981.03(A)(2). Property subject to forfeiture includes "[p]roceeds derived from or acquired through the commission of an offense." R.C. 2981.02(A)(1)(b). The definition of "offense" includes "any ac t or omission that could beFayette CA2019-08-017

- 13 - charged as a criminal offense * * *." R.C. 2981.01(B)(10). {¶ 47} After seizure, the prosecutor may file a civil forfeiture actio n: against any person who is alleged to have received, retained, possessed, or disposed of proceeds, in an amount exceeding fifteen thousand dollars, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the proceeds were allegedly derived from the commission of an offense subject to forfeiture proceedings in violation of section 2927.21 of the Revised Code. R.C. 2981.05(D)(1). R.C. 2927.21 lists all the offenses subjec t to forfeiture proceedings. Among those offenses is drug trafficking. R.C. 2927.21(h). {¶ 48} OSHP submitted some evidence that could potentially support a f inding of probable cause for Trooper Ross to conclude that the currency f ound in Miller's vehicle was derived from or acquired through drug trafficking. This eviden ce included Trooper Ross's knowledge of drug interdiction law enforcement coupled with his observations at the stop, including furtive movements by Miller and Miller's passenger, M iller's behavior when spoken to, the presence of narcotics in the vehicle, the haphazard way the currency was bundled, the presence of an electronic money counter, three cellular pho nes, an out-of-state drug possession warrant, and suspicious slow-moving vehicle activity . Therefore, this court overrules Miller's third assignment of error. {¶ 49} Assignment of Error IV: {¶ 50} GIVEN THESE MONIES COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROPERLY SEIZED ON THE BASIS OF ANY AUTHORITY, OTHER THAN THAT PROVIDED THEM BY R. C. OF OHIO, §§ 2981.02 & 2981.03, GIVEN IN REM JURISDICTION IN THE ST ATE VESTED IN THE WAKE THEREOF, THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE T HE

SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FACTS. {¶ 51} In his fourth assignment of error, Miller reiterates some of th e arguments concerning Trooper Ross' alleged lack of probable cause that he asserted in earlierFayette CA2019-08-017

- 14 - assignments of error. Miller cites three cases but does not pr esent any argument as to the relevance of the holdings of these cases other than to generall y indicate they support his argument. 3 It is not the role of this cour t to make Miller's arguments f or him. {¶ 52} App.R. 16(A)(7) obligates Miller to give "reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the r ecord on which appellant relies." App.R. 12(A)(2) obligates Miller to separately ar gue each assig nment of error. This court overrules Miller's fourth assignment of error. {¶ 53} Assignment of Error No. 5: {¶ 54} WHEN PROPERTY, HERE (THE MONEY INVOLVED), WAS ORIGINALLY SEIZED IN THE WAKE OF A TRAFFIC STOP, WHICH PROVIDED THE ONLY P OSSIBLE PROBABLE CAUSE THAT EVEN ARGUABLY EXISTED, IF IT DID THAT BEFOR E THE SEIZURE UNDER THE LAW OF THIS STATE, JURISDICTION AUTOMATICALLY VESTED OVER ANY PROPERTY SEIZED. SO POSTURED, THE COURT ERRED W HEN

IT DISMISSED THIS CASE. {¶ 55} In his final assignment of error, Miller reiterates the argumen t presented in his first assignment of error, i.e., that in rem jurisdiction over the currency and other seized items vested exclusively in the Fayette County Common Pleas Cou rt immediately upon the seizure by OSHP. Miller also repeats the arguments from his se cond assignment of error concerning OSHP's failure to prove that the federal adoption of the seizure complied with the rules contained in the Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual. Thi s court overrules Miller's fifth assignment of error for the reasons set forth previously. {¶ 56} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.

3. Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania , 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246 (1965).