alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald Wayne HOWARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4679

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2017

Decided: April 24, 2017

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kimberly Furr Davis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Gerald Wayne Howard appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing Howard to 23 months in prison. Howard’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which he avers that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but suggests that we review the reasonableness of Howard’s sentence. Although advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental-brief, Howard has not done so. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” *United States v. Webb,*738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’ ” *Id.*(quoting *United States v. Crudup,*461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” *United States v. Thompson,*595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. *Crudup,*461 F.3d at 440. A sentence within the applicable policy statement range under Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines is presumed reasonable. *United States v. Padgett,*788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 494, 193 L.Ed.2d 360 (2015). Applying these standards, we readily conclude that Howard’s within-range sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district *290court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Howard, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Howard requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Howard. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 132313 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 132313 COA: 266069 Oakland CC: 1999-168299-FH CHARMAINE LATROSE MARION, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the September 15, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

d1218 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 29, 2006

Clerk
[Cite as Ballard v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 83, 2013-Ohio-2412.] 

BALLARD, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as Ballard v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 83, 2013-Ohio-2412.] 

Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded on the authority of 

Dunbar v. State. 

(No. 2012-1525—Submitted June 5, 2013—Decided June 13, 2013.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 97882, 2012-Ohio-3086. 

____________________ 

{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is 

remanded on the authority of Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

____________________ 

Samuel S. Riotte and David B. Malik, for appellee. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 

General, and Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Deputy Solicitor; and Timothy J. 

McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael A. Dolan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

________________________
#### Saltser & Weinsier, Inc., Appellant, *v.*Monroe Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. et al., Respondents, and Joseph Katz, Defendant.

Argued May 20, 1943;

decided June 18, 1943.

*905*Joseph Katz*and *David L. Raider*for appellant.

*Morris Eisenstein*and *Fred G. Morritt*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 9, 2010 

d0830 

Order 

 

September 9, 2010 

140501(45) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 140501 

 COA: 294407 

Wayne CC: 88-002394; 

DANNY RAY DUNLAP, 88-003080 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s June 28, 2010 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank James GODINO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1262

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: August 16, 2017

Filed: August 22, 2017

Michelle Nahon Moulder, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Springfield, MO (Laine *1002Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellant.

.James J. Kelleher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Frank Godino appeals the district court’s1 order revoking his supervised release and imposing a 10-month sentence. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief questioning the reasonableness of Godino’s revocation sentence.

We conclude from our review of the record that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Godino. See United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 2016) (appellate court reviews district court’s revocation sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 922-24 (8th Cir. 2006) (revocation sentence may be unreasonable if district court fails to consider relevant § 3553(a) factor, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment).

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel is granted leave to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western District'of Missouri.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-8519

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ZAMAN ASHRAF, a/k/a Pop, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:03-cr-00458-REP-3; 3:07-cv-00569-REP) 

Submitted: September 1, 2009 Decided: September 17, 2009 

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Zaman Ashraf, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Zaman Ashraf seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ashraf has 

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION
 CERTIFICATION OF W. RANDALL FOWLER, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
OF DEP HOLDINGS, LLC, THE GENERAL PARTNER OF
DUNCAN ENERGY PARTNERS L.P.
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
 /s/ W. Randall FowlerName:
    W. Randall FowlerTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer of DEP Holdings, LLC

on behalf of Duncan Energy Partners L.P.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 9, 2016

NO. 03-16-00503-CR

Trevin Darnell Alexander, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction signed by the district court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

district court’s judgment of conviction. Therefore, the Court affirms the district court’s

judgment of conviction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication 

of costs is made.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00198-CR

KEVIN WADE NOONKESTER APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Kevin Wade Noonkester was convicted of sexual assault of a 

child, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years’ confinement on April 18, 

2011. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial, so his notice of appeal was 

due May 18, 2011. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1) (providing that notice of 

appeal must be filed within thirty days of sentencing in the absence of a timely-

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

filed motion for new trial). He did not file his notice of appeal until May 31, 2011; 

thus, it was untimely.

Accordingly, we informed Appellant by letter on June 3, 2011, that this 

appeal was subject to dismissal unless Appellant or any party filed a response 

showing grounds for continuing the appeal on or before June 13, 2011. 

Appellant responded by filing a motion for extension of time to file his notice of 

appeal, but the motion for extension was filed on June 6, 2011, more than fifteen 

days after his notice of appeal was due.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3 (requiring 

party seeking to extend time to file notice of appeal to file both a notice of appeal 

and a motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal within fifteen days of 

the day the notice of appeal was due).

A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements of rule 26 is 

essential to vest this court with jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b), 26.2(a). The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly held that, without a timely filed 

notice of appeal or motion for extension of time, this court cannot exercise 

jurisdiction over an appeal. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996). Only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals may grant Appellant an out-of-

 

2

In his motion for extension of time, Appellant contends that his notice of 

appeal was timely because it was filed within thirty days of the trial court’s May 

20, 2011 nunc pro tunc judgment, but a nunc pro tunc judgment does not extend 

the time for filing under rule 26.2. See Velazquez v. State, No. 05-06-00781-CR, 

2007 WL 1041126, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (citing Rodarte v. State, 860 S.W.2d 108, 109 & n.1 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
3

time appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West Supp. 2010); 

Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 525 n.8; Cotton v. State, No. 02-10-00001-CR, 2010 WL 

520814, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication).

Because Appellant’s notice of appeal and motion for extension to file 

notice of appeal were untimely filed, we dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: June 30, 2011
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SCB COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, INC. FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
JULY 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,182,607
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               30,407,066
<ALLOWANCES>                                   125,000
<INVENTORY>                                    529,140
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,960,286
<PP&E>                                      42,363,709
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,901,965
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             137,024,490
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       19,570,931
<BONDS>                                     61,195,468
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       246,710
<OTHER-SE>                                  55,127,236
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               137,024,490
<SALES>                                     35,488,610
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            35,488,610
<CGS>                                       24,042,414
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               24,042,414
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,256,563
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             901,471
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,093,267
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,186,300
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            896,267
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   896,267
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.04
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.1**

**** 

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Stanley Louie, certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this report on Form 10‐K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of CorTS Trust VI for IBM Debentures (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

2.             Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.             Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4.             Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

5.             All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of non-compliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10K. 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee.

Date: March 18, 2011

/s/ Stanley Louie
---

EXHIBIT 99.13

VIA EDGAR

|TO: | United States Securities and
      Exchange Commission
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                       
|Re: | Asanko Gold Inc. (the
      "Company")                
|    | Annual Report on Form 40-F                            
|    | Consent of Expert                                     

This consent is provided in connection with the Company's
annual report on Form 40-F for the financial year ended December 31, 2016, and
any amendments thereto (the Annual Report), as filed by the Company
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Annual Report
incorporates by reference, among other things, the Companys Annual Information
Form for the financial year ended December 31, 2016 (the Annual Information
Form).

I, John Stanbury, DO HEREBY CONSENT, to:

- the use of my name and the disclosure of my involvement in the preparation
  of information that forms the basis for disclosure of a technical and
  scientific nature related to the Companys Asanko Gold Mine, contained in the
  Annual Information Form; and
- the inclusion and incorporation by reference of such information in the
  Annual Report.



Dated March 15, 2017



|/s/ J S Stanbury                  | 
|--------------------------------- | 
|J S Stanbury                      | 
|Pr Eng.                           | 
|Cresco Project Finance (Pty) Ltd. | 

---
f10k2011a1ex10xxxiv_yida.htm



Exhibit 10.34




 


[English Summary]







Mountain and Forest Land Lease Contract







Lessor/Party A: Bengbu City Lilou Town Dalu Village Committee


Lessee/Party B: Anhui Xingguang Investment Group Ltd.







Lease:


Party A agreed to lease the mountains land of approximately 1000 mu to Party B.







Term:


70 years from November 20, 2008 to November 20, 2078.







Rent and Payment:


40,000 RMB each year and payable annually. Such rent shall increase 10% for every ten years.







Restrictions:


Party B may conduct operations within the policies of the government. Party A shall assist Party B to obtain approval from relevant governmental agencies if Party B needs to construct houses (including roads) and other facilities.







Termination:


(1) Party A may terminate this Agreement if Party B cannot make payment of the rent on time and if Party B still not able to make payment within one month of written notice from Party A.


(2) This Agreement shall be terminated automatically and unconditionally in case of the expropriation of government planning and public construction needs of the mountain forest land. Party B shall be entitled to compensation of all its assets and possible benefits from expropriation party. Compensation of the mountain and forest land shall belong to Party A.


(3) Party A cannot reclaim the rental of land stipulated in this Agreement. If Party A terminates the Agreement other than described in this Agreement, Party A shall compensate to Party B all its economic losses resulting from termination of the Agreement.







Renewal:


Party A and B may negotiate renewal of the Agreement within 6 months of the expiration of the Agreement. If there is new lessee, Party B is entitled to the appreciation value of its invested assets, real estates and ground attachments on the mountain and forest lands, from the new lessee.







Breach of Contract:


Defaulting party shall pay liquidated damages of 10,000 RMB to the other party and compensate any economic losses to the other party. Observant party may terminate the Agreement unilaterally.


 




  





1











  











Dispute:


If there is any dispute between the parties, both parties shall resolve the dispute through compromise settlement. If the parties cannot reach the settlement, then either party can resolve the dispute by the court of competent jurisdiction.







Date of the Agreement:


November 20, 2008


 




2
# L_2012099DE.01003501.xml

| 5.4.2012 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 99/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.4.2012

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 99/35

---

Berichtigung der Richtlinie 2001/14/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 26. Februar 2001 über die Zuweisung von Fahrwegkapazität der Eisenbahn, die Erhebung von Entgelten für die Nutzung von Eisenbahninfrastruktur und die Sicherheitsbescheinigung

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften L 75 vom 15. März 2001
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften L 75 vom 15. März 2001

Seite 37 Artikel 14 Absatz 2:

anstatt:

„... so werden die in Absatz 1 genannten und in diesem Kapitel im weiteren dargelegten Aufgaben von einer entgelterhebenden Stelle wahrgenommen, ...“

muss es heißen:

„... so werden die in Absatz 1 genannten und in diesem Kapitel im weiteren dargelegten Aufgaben von einer Zuweisungsstelle wahrgenommen, ...“

---