alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0596 - EN

Avis juridique important

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# 32002D0596

**2002/596/EC: Council Decision of 19 July 2002 on the consequences of the expiry of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on the international agreements concluded by the ECSC **

*
Official Journal L 194 , 23/07/2002 P. 0036 - 0036 *

Council Decision

of 19 July 2002

on the consequences of the expiry of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on the international agreements concluded by the ECSC

(2002/596/EC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 133 in conjunction with Article 300(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Whereas:

(1) By virtue of Article 97 thereof, the ECSC Treaty will expire on 23 July 2002.

(2) A number of international agreements with third countries have been concluded by the ECSC.

(3) Those agreements do not provide for the eventuality of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty.

(4) The subject matter covered by the ECSC Treaty will, upon its expiry, be covered by the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC), including Article 133 thereof.

(5) The Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, have established that the EC is acceding to the rights and obligations flowing from the international agreements concluded by the ECSC(1).

(6) It is considered that it is in the interests of the EC to continue those international agreements beyond the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and that they should devolve on the EC.

(7) Some of these agreements may require technical amendments in order to make them compatible with EC rules.

(8) It will be necessary to inform the third countries concerned accordingly,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

As from 24 July 2002, the EC shall succeed to the rights and obligations flowing from the international agreements concluded by the ECSC with third countries.

Article 2

The Commission shall inform the third countries concerned of the succession of the EC to the ECSC's rights and obligations flowing from the agreements concerned. It shall furthermore undertake all necessary technical amendments in order to make the agreements compatible with EC rules, and shall, where appropriate, negotiate amendments to the agreements.

Article 3

This Decision shall take effect on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Decision shall apply as from 24 July 2002.

Done at Brussels, 19 July 2002.

For the Council

The President

T. Pedersen

(1) See page 35 of this Official Journal.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

June 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
133457 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 133457 COA: 264582 Kalamazoo CC: 04-000543-FC ROBERT HENRY VANCE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e February 15, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t0618 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 26, 2007

Clerk
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary WHITE, AKA Big J-Killa, AKA Big Killa, AKA JC, AKA James Cail White, AKA JC White, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50113

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 8, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed October 12, 2017

L. Ashley Aull, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mack Jenkins, Kevin M. Lally, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Scott Michael Lara, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ—Of-fice of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gary Paul Bureham, Burcham & Zug-man, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

1. “[T]he district court may not contradict an affirmative finding by the jury.” United States v. Pimentel-Lopez, 859 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (as amended). The district court here erred by sentencing White based on a higher drug weight than the jury found in its special verdict. See id. at 1140.

2. The district court also erred by relying on evidence outside the record without notifying White in advance. See United States v. Warr, 530 F.3d 1152, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008).

VACATED AND REMANDED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Patricia A. PRESCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION; Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia; Shapiro, Brown & Alt, LLP, f/k/a Shapiro & Burson; Logs Corporation; Gerald Shapiro, Principal; John Burson, Principal; Gerald Alt, Principal; Kristine Brown, Principal; Sprouses Corner, L.L.C.; J. Cabell Metts, III; R. Alan Anderson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1235

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Patricia A. Prescott, Appellant Pro Se. J.P. McGuire Boyd, Jr., WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond, Virginia; John MacDonald Robb, III, LECLAIR RYAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia; Lisa Hudson Kim, SAMUEL I. WHITE, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Patricia A Prescott appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Prescott v. PHH Mortgage Corp.,*No. 3:16-cv-00288-REP, 2017 WL 510449 (E.D. Va., Feb. 2, 2017). In light of our decision to affirm the judgment of the district court, we deny Appellee PHH Mortgage Corporation’s motion to dismiss. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### IN RE: Robert Franklin VAN ZANDT, Debtor. *543Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Parisi; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15515

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2017 *

Filed March 27, 2017

Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro, Pro Se

Lynn Searle, Attorney, Law Offices of Lynn Searle, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee William Parisi

Russell Dale Stanaland, Attorney, Sta-naland & Associates, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Edith Mazzaferri

Malcolm Leader-Picone, Barltett, Leader-picone & Young, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Lynn Searle, William Shea, Russell Dale Stanaland, Man-sueto Anthony Lenci

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, appellant’s request for oral argument, set forth in his motion to consolidate, is denied.

MEMORANDUM **

Ronald Spencer Mazzaferro appeals pro se from the district court’s orders affirming the bankruptcy court’s order sanctioning Mazzaferro and the district court’s order denying Mazzaferro’s motion to vacate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standard of review applied by the' district court. *In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525*F.3d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

We lack jurisdiction over the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order because Mazzaferro filed his notice of appeal more than thirty days after entry of the order. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 6(b). Mazzaferro’s untimely motion to vacate filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) did not extend the appeal period. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), 6(b)(1) (notice of appeal from district court decision must be filed within 30 days; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) does not apply in appeals governed by Fed. R. App. P. 6); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022 (motion for rehearing must be filed within 14 days to toll appeal period); *see also Theodore v. Daglas (In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc.),*42 F.3d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing bankruptcy appeal because untimely motion for rehearing did not extend period to appeal district court’s final order).

Though the notice of appeal was timely as to the district court’s order denying Mazzaferro’s motion to vacate, Mazzaferro does not address the order in his opening brief. As a result, he has waived any challenges to the order. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); *Greenwood v. FAA,*28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”).

*544Mazzaferro’s motion to consolidate (Docket Entry No. 27) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Advanced ID Corporation (the "Company"),
hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2009
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                 /s/Dan Finch
                                 ----------------------
                                 Dan Finch
                                 Chief Executive Officer

September 18, 2009

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Advanced ID Corporation (the "Company"),
hereby certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2009
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                 /s/Seymour Kazimirski
                                 ----------------------
                                 Seymour Kazimirski
                                 Chief Financial Officer

September 18, 2009
|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: March 31, 2011 | /s/ Liping Deng                                                           |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      | Liping Deng                                                               |
|                      |                                                                           |
|                      | Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) |

----
#### Aaron Erickson et al., Respondents, *v.*Mary A. Quinn, Appellant.

(Argued December 17, 1872;

decided December 24, 1872.)

Plaintiffs, as judgment creditors of one O’Malley, framed their complaint herein as in a creditor’s suit, alleging a fraudulent conveyance of certain lands by the judgment debtor to defendant, asking the appointment of a receiver and a sale of the property; and, after a first trial of the action and pending an appeal, they issued an execution upon their judgment against O’Malley, and advertised the property for sale. A motion was made to set aside the execution upon some ground *698undisclosed, but not that the two remedies were incompatible. It was stipulated that no sale should be had until after decision of the appeal. The judgment was reversed. Plaintiffs then caused the property to be sold, and became purchasers for the full amount of their claim. The action was then treated as one to remove obstructions to their judgment. Upon the second trial, the referee decided that the conveyance to defendant was fraudulent and void as against plaintiffs, and that their judgment was a lien upon the property. This judgment was affirmed by the General Term and by this court (41 N. Y., 410), and judgment perfected below upon remittitur. Defendant thereupon, and upon showing the fact of the sale above mentioned after commencement of the action, and his ignorance thereof, obtained an order setting aside that judgment, and judgment of Supreme Court, and the report of the referee, and giving leave to defendant to file a supplemental answer, setting up the facts claiming the sale satisfied the judgment upon which this action was based. This order was reversed by the General Term. *Held,*that plaintiffs had a legal as well as equitable right to the benefit of their original judgment and the fruits of that action, and were not bound to waive or abandon their lien and substitute the equitable lien under their *lis pendens*in this action of a later date; and that, under the facts disclosed on the motion, plaintiffs were entitled to the relief they obtained; that there was no fraud or legal irregularity in proceeding with the action, and, pending it, selling the property upon execution. Also, *held*as stated in memorandum next following.

*James G. Goohrcme*for the appellants.

*George F. Danforth*for the respondents.

Alleu, J.,

reads opinion for affirmance of order of General Term.

All concur, except Chueoh, Ch. J., not voting.

Order affirmed.
#### Joseph R. LEON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT; City of San Jose; Kevin McClure, Officer Badge #3979; Brian Loftus, Officer Badge #3965, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-15433

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*978Submitted April 21, 2017 * San Francisco, California

Filed May 11, 2017

Tiega Noel Varlack, Attorney, Varlack Legal Services, Hayward, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Clifford Scott Greenberg, Senior Litigating Attorney, Malgorzata Laskowska, Deputy City Attorney, San Jose City Attorney’s Office, San Jose, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and LOGAN,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Steven Paul Logan, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Appellant Joseph Leon (“Leon”) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees San Jose Police Department (“SJPD”) and Officers Kevin McClure and Brian Loftus on Leon’s § 1983 action alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. *Oliver v. Keller,*289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. A § 1983 claim brought in federal court is subject to principles of issue and claim preclusion by a prior state court judgment. *Allen v. McCurry,*449 U.S. 90, 94-95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The alleged violation of Leon’s Fourth Amendment rights was the identical issue decided by the state criminal court in his motion to vacate its judgment, it was necessarily decided in a final decision on the merits, and Leon was the same party against whom collateral estoppel is now invoked. *Lucido v. Superior Court,*51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1990). The requirements for collateral estoppel under California law were satisfied, and Leon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before the state court. *Haupt v. Dillard,*17 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 1994).

2. Summary judgment was also proper on Leon’s claim that the Appellees violated the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against him because of his race. To survive summary judgment on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s decision was racially motivated. *Serrano v. Francis,*345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). Leon’s complaint contained .no allegations supporting an equal protection claim, and none of the materials he proffered gave rise to a genuine issue that the Appellees acted with discriminatory intent in this case. *See Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach,*341 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2003).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

***

 xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Nadine ESPINOZA-HORIUCHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALMART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-1080

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Filed May 22, 2017

Nadine Espinoza-Horiuchi; Pro Se

John Mark Baird, Beth A. Doherty Quinn, Baird Quinn LLC, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellee

Before KELLY, MURPHY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Circuit Judge

Nadine Espinoza-Horiuchi sued Wal-mart, Inc. for employment discrimination. She appeals regarding two district court *592orders. We lack jurisdiction to review the first order because the notice of appeal was untimely. We affirm as to the second order because the issue has been inadequately briefed, and Ms. Espinoza-Horiu-chi has otherwise not shown a ground for reversal.

First, the district court granted summary judgment for Walmart and issued a final judgment on December 27, 2016. On January 9, 2017, the court struck Ms. Espinoza-Horiuchi’s motion for reconsideration from the docket. She filed her notice of appeal on February 28, 2017. Because she filed the notice more than 30 days from entry of the judgment, we lack jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 208, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

Second, on February 23, 2017, the district court issued a bill of costs for Wal-mart for $848.80. Ms. Espinoza-Horiuchi’s February 28, 2017 notice of appeal mentions the bill of costs and therefore was timely filed for our review of this issue. The bill of costs ($848.80) covered the “[cjosts incident to taking of depositions” totaling $792.00 and <([o]ther expenses” totaling $56.80. ROA at 262. The district court attached copies of materials supporting these costs. *Id.*at 263-64. Ms. Espinoza-Horiuchi’s brief argues only that the “records of me going to court which were/ are irrelevant to the case and expected me to pay for the Bill of Costs for these records.” Aplt. Br. at 4 (emphasis in original). The brief does not specify which “records” were irrelevant or why they were irrelevant, and does not show why they district court may have erred in issuing the bill of costs. The issue is therefore inadequately briefed. *See Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc.,*812 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 2015). Ms. Espinoza-Horiuchi has not otherwise demonstrated a ground for reversal.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss the appeal of the summary judgment decision for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the district court’s bill of costs.

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
#### Keith Alan LASKO, Reverend Doctor, Minister of Worldwide Ministries of Jesus Christ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William C. ROBERTS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15455

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*467Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 25, 2017

Keith Alan Lasko, Pro Se

Lindsay Demaree, Ballard Spahr LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Paul Lantieri, III, Ballard Spahr LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Defendant-Appellee

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Keith Alan Lasko appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing as duplicative his action alleging violations of federal and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, *Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs.,*487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), *overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell,*553 U.S. 880, 904, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, *Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP,*534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Lasko’s action was proper on the basis of issue preclusion because the issue of whether the allegedly defamatory statements were false was actually litigated and decided against Lasko in a prior action, *Lasko v. Am. Bd. of Surgery, Inc.,*No. 2:13-cv-01893-JAD-NJK (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 2015). *See Taylor,*553 U.S. at 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161 (setting forth elements of issue preclusion).

We reject as meritless Lasko’s contention that he was held to a higher pleading standard as a pro se litigant.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

 xhis disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.