The Honor able Thoma s A. W iseman, J r., S enior United States District J udg e for the Middle District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. Curry has leg ally chang ed his la st na me to Curr

y -El, but the Court w ill, for purposes of consistenc y 1 with the other filing s in this m atter, c ontinue to refe r to him as “Curry .” -1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0084n.06 No. 08-1732 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. ERI C CURR Y, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : BATCHEL DER, Chief J udg e; SUTTON, Circuit Judge; a nd WI SEMAN, District J udg e. * WI SEMAN, District J udg e. De fenda nt-Appellant Er ic J ames Curry challeng es the district 1 court’s de nial of his motion to m odify or re duce his s en t en ce p u rs uant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

. He a sks that this C ourt rema nd his case to the distr ict court with instructions that his moti on be g rante d

. B e c a

u s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt p r o p e r ly c o n c lu d e d th a t it h a d th e d is c r e ti o n to c o n s ider the mot ion , a nd did no t a bu se that di sc re tio n in

de nyingthe mot ion , w e a ff ir m. I. An initial indictment was issued J une 8, 2004, and a superse ding indictment issued J uly 15,No. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-2- 20 04 , c ha

rg ingCur ry wi th b e inga

fe lon in p os se ssi on

of thr e e dif fe re nt f ir e arm s ( Count O ne ); wi th possession of a cer

tain quantity of cra ck coca ine (Count T wo); and w ith being a felon in possession of anothe r fire arm (Count Three ). (Recor d on Appea l (“ROA” ) at 41–43.) Curry enter ed into a plea ag ree ment with the Gov er n m en t p ursuant to which he pleade d g uilty to Count Three of the superse ding indictment in exchang e for dismiss al of the othe r two counts. (ROA a t 49–55.) At sentenc ing, Curr

y stipulated that the total of

f e n s e le v e l i n d ic ated in the Pre sentenc e Report (“PSR”) wa s 27, his criminal history cate g ory was I I I , and the a

pplicable guideline rang e was 87–108 months of imprisonment. (Def.’ s Sentencing Mem., ROA at 59.) The PSR recommende d a sente nce of 102 months of incar cer ation plus 3 thre e y ear s of supervised rele ase, but District J udg e Gor don J . Quist imposed a sentenc e of 87 months imprisonme n t , at the ver y bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines ra

ng e, plus 3 y ear s of supervised rele ase. J udg e Quist specific ally stated on t he re cord that if the Guidelines had bee n advisory rathe r than mandatory , “then the se ntence would be 60 months.” (

Id. at 15:15–16.) Judgment was e ntere d on November 19, 2004. Curry promptly filed his Notice of Appe al, and the Sixt h Circuit, pursuant to a joint motion to r emand, vaca

ted the sentenc e and rema nded for rese ntencingin light of United States v. Book er , 54 3 U .S. 22 0 ( 20 05 ). At

Cur ry ’s fi rs t r e se nte nc ing , wh ic h to ok pla c e Oc tob e r 1 9, 20 05 , Jud g e Qu ist fi rs t no te d th a t he wa s n ot b ound by his state me nt at th e e arl ie r s e nte nc inghe ari ngthat he wo uld impose a 60-month prison sentenc e if it was late r dete rmined that the Guide lines were advisory

rathe r t ha n ma nd a tor y , a nd ind ic a te d tha t he ha d re c on sid e re d tha t posi tio n. He did , h ow e ve r, state that he would “depa

rt somewhat from the guidelines,” by just one y ear

(10/19/2005 Resentenc ingNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-3- Hr’gTransc ript at 18), and he explained that his decision to do so was base d upon his finding that the def endant wa s “making a good effort to ref orm himself, and we don’t see that very often he re.” ( Id. at 20.) He reduc ed the sentenc e from 87 to 75 months, pl us 3 y ear s of supervise d rele ase. The amende d judgme nt was ente red O ctober 21, 2005. Curry appea led that sentenc e as well, on re asonable ness g rounds; the Six th Circuit affirme d. On Fe bruar

y 25, 2 0 0 8 , howeve r, Curry filed a pr o s e Motion for Modification or Reduc tion of Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) , based on the application of Amendments 706 and 711 to the SentencingGuidelines (the “ Crack A mendments”), w hich wer e made retroa ctive as of Marc h 3, 2008. (ROA at 125.) J udg e Quist ref err ed this motion t o District J udg e Robert J. J onker. I n response to the motion, the Probation Offi ce prepa red a Sentence Modification Report (“SMR”); both Curry

and the Gove rnment submitted br iefs. The SMR not ed that Curry ’s orig inal SentencingGuidelines ra

ng e wa s 87 to 108 months based on an offe nse leve l of 27 and a criminal his tor y c a te g or y of I I I . I t in dic a te d a

n ame nd e d r ang e of

70 to 8 7 mo nth s b a se d o n a re vis e d o ff

e ns e level of 25 a

nd a cr i m i n al h istory

cate g ory of I I I , in rec og nition of the fac t that Curry ’s orig inal sentenc e for

being a fe lon in possession was im pacte d by the drug-qua ntity g uidelines, but did not

re c omm e nd

fu rt he r r e du c tio n of Curr

y ’s se nte nc e , a s th e se nte nc e he wa s c ur re ntl y se rv ingfe ll within the modified rang e. I n his Me mor and

um i n o pp os iti on

to t he SMR, Cur

ry ma int a ine d th a t th e SMR, in f a ili ngto

rec ommend a sente nce r eduction, “ig nore[d] the plain languag e of 18 U .S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and the U.S. Sentencing Guideline 1B 1.10.” ( Id. at 132.) He raised e ssentially the same a

rg uments heNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-4- reiter ates in his pres en t appea l, as discussed below, in support of a re duction. The Gove rnment argued both that a r eduction in sentenc e would not b e appropr iate pursua nt to U.S.S .G. § 1B 1

. 1 0 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( B ) , an d t h a t , e v e n i f C u r r y w e r e e l i g i b l e f

o r a s e n t e n c e r e d

u c t i o n , t h e c ou rtsh ou ld exercise its discre tion to deny the re quested re duction. No hea ring on the motion for re sentenc ing w as conducte d. On May 19, 2008, J udg e Jonker enter ed a ve ry

succi n ct o rder

declining to reduc e Curry ’s sentenc e any further , despite the Cra ck Cocaine amendments and the conseque nt r eduction in Curr y ’s base offe nse level. ( See ROA at 172 (5 /19 /20 08 Or de r) .) I t is fr om t hat or de r t

hat Curr y ’s pr e se nt a

pp e a l ari se s. II. Curry raises two dis t i n ct arguments in this appeal: first, that the district court a pplied an incorre ct leg al standard in c oncluding that a further reduc tion of sentenc e wa s n o t appropriate, ins of ar a s it fa ile d to re c og nize tha

t it ha d th e dis c re tio n to g ra

nt t he mot ion ; and , a lte rn a tiv e ly , to the extent the district court rec og n i z ed i t h ad the discre tion to consider the motion, it abused that discretion whe n it denied the motion without consideringall the re levant sente ncing fac tors when it denied the motion. We consider ea ch of the se ar g uments in turn. A. Ge ne ra lly sp e a kin g , o nc e a

c ourt has im po se d a

se nte nc e , it

do e s n ot h a ve the a

uth or ity to chang e or modify

that sentenc e unless such a uthority is ex pressly

g rante d by

statute. United States v. Houston , 5 2 9 F. 3 d

7 4 3 , 7 4 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . R os s , 2 45 F .3 d 5 77 , 5 85 (6 th Cir

. 20 01 ))

. Pur su ant to 18 U. S.C. § 35 82 , on e of the a uth or ize d e xce pti on s to the ru le aga ins tNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-5- modify ing a s en t ence is “in the ca se of a defe ndant who has be en sente nced to a term of imprisonment based on a se ntencin g rang e that has subse quently been lowe red by

the Sentencing Commi ssion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o),” in which case a court “may ” reduce a prison ter m “af ter considerin g t h e fa ct o rs set forth in sec tion 3553(a) to the e x tent that they are applicable , if such a reduc tion is consist ent with appli cable policy statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2). The statute and the G uidelines policy statements ar e re ad tog ether to mean that a pre viously

imposed sentence may

be re duced if

the g uideline ra

ng e originally applicable to the defe ndant was lowe red a s a re sult of a re troac tive amendment listed in § 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10( a)( 1). Amendme nt 7 0 6 t o t h e SentencingGuidelines, which w as made e ffe ctive Nove mber 1, 2007, reduc ed the base of fense level for

most crac k offe nses. U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 706. Amendment 706 is one of the re troac tive amendments listed in § 1B1.10. U n i t e d S t a t es v . P o o le , 5 3 8 F. 3 d 6 4 4, 645 (6th Cir. 2008). Ther e is no dispute that Curry ’s

se nte nc ingra

ng e fo r h is f

e lon -i n- po sse ssi on

c ha rg e wa s c omp ute d b a se d up on a c ro ss- re fe re nc e to the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e a pp lic a ble to c ra c k- c oc a ine of

fe ns e s. Reg ardle s s o f

a d e f e n d a nt’s elig ibilit y

for r esente ncing , the district court’s de cision to modify a sente nce under § 3582(c) (2) is discretionar y and, as such, i s revie wed by this Court for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter , 5 00 F .3 d 4 86 , 490 (6 th Cir . 200 7)

. “ A dis tr ic t cou rt a bu se s it s discretion when it r elies on clea rly err oneous finding s of fa ct, or whe n it improperly applies the law

or uses a n err oneous leg al standar d.” Un ite d S tat es e xre l. A+ Ho me c ar e, I

nc . v . M e ds ha re s M gm t. Group, Inc. , 4 0 0 F. 3 d

4 2 8 , 4 5 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g To mp kin v. Phili p Morris USA, Inc. , 362No. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-6- F .3 d 8 82 , 8 91 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ). I f, ho we ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt do es no t si mp ly

de c lin e to u se its authority under § 3582( c)( 2) but instead conc ludes that it lacks the author ity to reduc e a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e under the statute, the district c ourt’s deter mination that the defe ndant is ine ligible for a sentenc e reduction is a question of l aw that is reviewe d de novo

. United States v. J ohnson , 569 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2009). B. I n the pre sent ca se, Curry first argues t hat t he dis trict court’s denial of his motion to m odify his sentence should not be revie wed for s imple abuse of discretion, bec ause, he contends, the c ourt’s decision appe ars to have been unduly influence d b y a misapprehe nsion of the policy statement contained in Sentenc ing G uideline § 1B 1.10(b)( 2)(B ). In response , the Gover nment argues that the second sentenc e of § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ) establishes a presumption that a fur ther re duction “would not [have bee n] appropriate” in this case beca use Curry had alre ady rec eived a “non-guidelines sentenc e [determined] pursuant to § 3553(a) a nd Booke r .” (A

ppellee’ s Br ief at 14.) Thus, the issue pre sented here is w hether and to w hat extent the second sentenc e of § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ) may limit a sente ncing

c ourt ’s dis c re tio n to re se nte nc e a de fe nd ant. I n that reg ard, a s p re v i o usly indicated, r esente ncing is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2) only i f t h e d ef endant wa s orig inally

sentenc ed “ba sed on a se ntencingrang e that has subsequently

been lowe red by

the Sentencin g C o m m i s s i o n.” I f that hurdle is met, a nd the amendment ha s been ma de re troac tive, the district court ha s the discre tion to re duce a prison term “af ter c onsidering the fa ctors set for th in section 3553(a) t o the extent that they are applicable , if suchNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-7- a re duction is consistent with applicable poli cy statements i ssued by the SentencingCommi ssion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

. Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e § 1B 1. 10 inc or po rate s poli c y state me nts that are to b e c on sid e re d in

any re sen tenci ngde c isi on . T he “ po lic y state me nt” that ha s se rv e d to c a us e c on fu sio n in

thi s c a se state s a s f oll ow s: I f the orig inal term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment p ro v i d ed b y t h e gu i d el i n e ra n ge ap p l i cab l e t o t h e d ef en d an tat t h e t i m e o f s en t en ci n g, a re duction compar ably

less than the ame nded g uideline ra ng e dete rmined under subdivision (1) of this subsection m ay be appropriate. H oweve r, if the or igina l term of imprisonment constituted a non-gui d eline sente nce de termined pursua nt to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) a

nd United States v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a further reduc tion g ener ally would not be appr opriate. U. S.S. G. § 1B 1. 10 (b )( 2) (B ). Th e pa rt ie s disa g re e a s to how the fi rs t and se c on d sen te nc e s of this provision should be construed in c onjunction with the other. The Gove rnment interpr ets the first sente nce of subsection (B ) to ref

er to sente nces w here a “dow nwar d depar

ture” expressl y au t h orized under the Guidelines was g rante d at the initial sentenc ing. I n making this arg ument, the Gover nment distinguishes betwe en departures , still made pursuant to the Guidelines the mselves, and a variance from the Guide lines under Booke r . See United States v. J

ohnson , 5 4 4 F

. 3 d

6 5 6 , 6 7 1 n . 1 2 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 8 ), ce r t

. denied , 129 S. Ct . 1382 (2009) ( “A se ntence outside the Guidelines based on Chapter 5 of the Guide lines is a ‘depa rture’ or ‘G uid e lin e de pa

rt ur e ,’ wh e re a s a

se nte nc e ou tsi de the Gu ide lin e s b a se d o n th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s is a ‘va rianc e’ or ‘non-Guide line depar

ture.’” ), qu ote d in Appellee ’s B rief at 15–16. I n this case, Curr

y

rec eived a sentenc e that was below his orig inal Guideline ra ng e base d on Booke r . The Gove rnmentNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

I n United States v. Blue , 557 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2009) , this Court cited the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 2 in United States v. Blue , 453 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006), but did not go so fa r as to ag ree with the S e v e n t h C i r c u i tt h a td e p artu r e s u n d e r t h e G u i d e l i n e s h a v e b e e nr e n d e r e d “ o b s o l e t e ” b y Booke r . Blue , 557 F.3 d at 6 8 6 n . 1 (6 t h Cir.) (noting that the term “ ‘[o] bsolete’ may be a bit strong– a depar ture de scribed in the G uidelines, thoug h now only advisory , exemplifies a specia l discretion b ec au s e i ti s an t i ci p at edb y t h e G u i d el i n es C o m m i s s i o n ” ( ci t i n g Blue , 453 F.3d at 952 (7th Cir.)).

-8- ther ef o re ar gues that Curry ’s situation is ex actly the ty pe desc ribed in the sec ond sentenc e of § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ) in which a further reduc tion in sentence w ould ge nera lly not be appr opriate. I n his r eply brief, Curry points out that § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ) itself make s no mention of either de pa rt ur e s or vari anc e s, and fu

rt he r ar g ue s tha t, p os t- Booke r , there is no longe r any substantive leg al distinction betwee n varia

nces and depar

tures for sentenc ing pur

poses. Cf. United States v. Blue , 557 F.3d 682, 685–86 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting the waningsignific ance of “the depar tures desc ribed in Chapter 5 ” of

the Guidelines in lig ht of Booke r , and observing that the Seventh Circuit has g one

so far as to de scribe “g uideline depar tures” a s “obsolete” ), c ite d in Re ply B ri e f at 5. No ne the le ss,

2

a lth ou g h th e de fe nd ant i s li ke ly c or rect th at, in t

he po st- Booke r

ag e of se ntencing , the distinction betwee n a var iance and a depar ture has become less signific ant, this Court cannot rea d as immaterial the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e sit uatio ns de sc ri be d in the fi rs t se nte nc e of § 1B 1. 10 (b )( 2) (B ) a nd tho se de sc ri be d in

the se c on d s e nte nc e . O the r c ourt s, too , h a ve str ug g le d w iththe dis tin c tio n, wi th s ome

a pp e ari ngto c on c lud e that in sit uatio ns de sc ri be d by the se c on d se nte nc e the y ha d no dis c re tio n to

rese ntence
. S

e e, e.g. , Un i t ed States v. Sipai , 582 F.3d 994 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (af firming the district court’s c onclusion that it lacked a uthority to resentence in a

situation that appear s to have be en a

v ar i an c e c o v e r e d b y t h e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e o f t h at p r o v i s i o n )

. O t h e r s h a v e r e a c h e d the op po sit eNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

Other c ourts have f

ound that wher e the orig inal sentenc e alre ady incorporated a va

rianc e fr om the 3 otherwise a

pplicable Guide lines rang e base d upon th e d is tric t c o u r t’ s ta k in g in to c o nsideration, under Booke r , the disparity

betwee n cra ck coc aine a nd p o wd er co caine sentenc es prior to the Cra ck Amendments’ a ctually

taking eff ect, further reduc tion a fter adoption of the Cra ck Amendme nts was not w arr anted under § 3582( b)(2)

. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tat es v . R e id , 566 F . Su

pp . 2 d 8 88 (E .D . Wis

. 2008). The Courts of Appe al ar e in ac cord that sentence reduc tion i s not authorized where the orig inal 4 sentenc e wa s not “based on” a sente ncing rang e that wa s subsequently lowere d. S

e e, e.g. , United States v. P er d

ue , 572 F.3d 288 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (af firming district court’s de nial of def endant’ s mot ion fo r r e se nte nc ingin l ig ht o f t he Cr a c k A me ndme nts wh e re th e defe nd ant w a s o ri g ina lly se nte nc e d b a se d o n th e c are e r- of fe nd e r guid e lin e and

no t th e c ra c k c oc a ine g uid e lin e ); United States v . Ca ra ba llo , 552 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (same ), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 1929 (2009); United States v. Thomas , 5 24 F .3 d 8 89 (8 th C ir . 2 00 8) (p e r c ur iam) (s a me ); United S t ates v. Sharke y , 543 F.3d 12 36 (1 0th

Cir . 2 00 8) (s a me ); Un ite d S tat es v . M oo re , 541 F.3d 1323 ( 11th Cir. 2008) (same)

. -9- conclusion. See, e .g. , United States v. J ohnson , 318 Fe d. App’x . 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (conc luding that the district c ourt had prope rly conclude d that Guidelines § 1B 1.10(b)( 2)(B ) did not “mandat[ e] a specif

ic re sult”). District cour

ts within this Circuit have likew ise g ener ally conclude d that they have disc retion to reduc e a se ntence which was alre ady the subject of a varia nce, a nd have exercised it to g rant fur

ther sente nce r eductions under Amendment 706, whe re the initial sentencing used the c rac k coca ine g uidelines and did not incorpora te any reduc tion in sentence ba sed upon the disparity betwee n cra ck and powde r coc aine se ntence s. See, e .g. , United States v. Allen , No. 2:05-cr

13 0, 20 09 WL15 85 79 3 ( S.D . O hio June 4, 20 09 ); U n i t e d S t a t es v . B e n

j a m in , No

. 3 : 06-CR-154, 2008 WL 972698 (E.D. Te nn. April 7, 2008). 3 De s p i t e t he conf

usion surrounding § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ), two thing s appea r to be c lear : (1) Court s are on ly a

uth or ize d to r e du c e se nte nc e s th a t are “ ba se d o n” a se nte nc ingra

ng e su bs e qu e ntl y l o we re d b y an am en d m en tt o t h e G u i d el i n es t h at h as b ee n m ad e re t ro ac t i v e; an d (2 ) t h e l an gu age 4No. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-10- of the sec ond sentenc e of § 1B 1.10(b)( B) does not serve to remove the sentenc ing c ourts’ discre tion to reduc e a se ntence wher e the or igina l sentence was, in fa ct, “based on” a subsequently

lowere d g uid e lin e ra

ng e , e ve n if

the se nte nc e ori ginal ly

imp os e d w a s b e low

the oth e rw ise -a

pp lic a ble g uideline ra

ng e, whe ther pursua

nt to a depar

ture or a variance

. The distinction betwee n a sente nce in which the district cour t applies a va

rianc e fr om the rec om m en ded g uideline ra ng e base d upon Bo ok e r and the § 3553(a) fac tors but the sentenc e is none theless “base d on” the Guidelines, and one wh e re the se nte nc e is n ot “ ba se d o n” the Gu ide lin e s at a ll m ay ind e e d b e su

btl e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt s, howeve r, ar e fully

capa ble of makingthat distinction and determining w hether a fur ther re duction is appropriate, re g ardle ss of whethe r the orig inal sentenc e incor porate d a var iance or depa rture f rom the Gu ide lin e s. I n light of the fore g oing discussion, this C ourt conc ludes that the sentenc ing c ourt reta ined the discre tion to rese ntence Curry in this case , beca use there is no dispute that the 75-month sentence imp os e d b y

Judg e Qu ist

a t th e po st- Booke r

sentenc ing w as still to s ome ex t en t “base d on” the Guideline per

tai n i ng to cra ck coc aine of fense s, and that Judge Quist did not take into ac count the d is p ar it y b e tw e e np o w d e r

an d c r a c k c o c a in e s e n te n c e s in

im p o s in g th e r e d

u c e d s e n te n c e . T h e n e xt issue, then, is whether

the cour t rec og nized that it retained such discr etion. I n th a t r e g ard , th e recor d is c le ar t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re c og nize d th a t it

did , b ut t

hat it exercised that discretion to de ny the motion. I n the orde r deny ing Curr y ’s motion, the district court specific ally

stated that it found “in its discretion, that no reduc tion in sentenc e wa s warr anted on the fa c ts o f t his c a se .” (R OA a t 172 (5 /19 /20 08 Or de r) .) Con tr ary to C ur ry ’s a sse rt ion s, the re is s imp lyNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-11- no implication that J udg e Jonker believed he lacke d the authority further to reduc e Curry ’s sentenc e. That conc lusion is bol stered by the Sentence Modification Report, which a lso indicated t h at the defe ndant was e ligible f

or a r eduction but did not rec ommend a fur ther re duction: I n th is c a se , a

re du c tio n o f s e nte nc e is c on sis te nt w iththe po lic y state me nts
. Be cause the Court imposed a sentenc e of 75 months pursua nt to a varia

nce f rom the g uideline ra

ng e, the U.S. Probation Office rec ommends no modification of sentenc e. Th e Court fo un d tha t a sen te nc e ou tsi de the g uid e lin e ra ng e wa s warr ante d, and

a ll statut ory sen te nc ingfa c tor s w e re c on sid e re d in c ho os ingthe po st- Booke r sentenc e of imp ri so nme nt. (SMR at 5.) I n sum, the district court applied the c orre ct leg al standar d when it conc luded that it had the dis c re tio n to e nte rt a in C ur ry ’s mot ion

on the me ri ts. C. Curry further argues, however, that the district c ourt abused its discre tion by not providing

mor e sp e c if

ic re a so ns in s up po rt of its de nia l of the mot ion fo r re se nte nc ing

. Th e Court dis a g re e s. Pur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 82 (c )( 2) , th e dis tr ic t c ourt may re du c e a pr e vio us ly imp os e d sen te nc e if the statutory

require ments, discussed above , are met. Section § 3582 does not cr ea t e a rig ht to a reduc ed sentenc e, howe ver. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. bac kg round (noting that a re duction under § 1 B 1. 10 is d isc re tio na

ry and “ do e s not en tit le a de fe nd ant to a re du c e d ter m of impr iso nme nt as a matter of rig ht”). When de termining whether a defe ndant should rec eive a sentenc e re duction, the dis tr ic t c ourt mu st

(“shal l ”) c onsider both the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac tors and “the nature and seriousness of the dang er to any person or the communi ty that may be posed by a re duction in the defe ndant’s ter

m of imprisonment,” and “ may consider post-se ntencingconduct of the def endant.”No. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-12- U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt

. n . 1(B ) (e mphasis added) . Howeve r, “pr ocee dings unde r 18 U.S.C. [ §] 3582(c) (2) a

nd [§ 1B1.10] do not constitute a full re sentenc ing of the def endant.” § 1B1.10( a)( 3). I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c on du c t a he ari ng on Cur ry ’s mot ion , a

nd did not expressly

consider a ll the § 3553 fac tors that might have been r eleva nt. Cur ry ar gu es that the district court abused its discr etion in denying the motion withouteither spe cifica lly articulating the

rea sons f or doing so or identifying fac tors in Curr y ’s particula

r rec ord that justified the denial. The only case Curry

cites in support of his argument that the lack of specific ity

constituted an abuse of dis c re tio n is U

n it e d S ta te s v . W il liams , 5 5 7 F. 3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009). (Appe llant’s Br ief at 2.) Th a t c a se , b e sid e s b e ingfr om the El e ve nth Cir c uit , do e s no t a dv anc e Cur ry ’s c a us e , a s it sim ply he ld that w hil e a

dis tr ic t c ourt

“ ‘m us t consider

the fa ctors listed in § 3553(a) ’ whe n deter mining whe ther to reduc e a de fenda

nt’s orig inal sentenc e . . . [,] t h e district cour t is not required to ar

ticulate the applicability

of ea ch fa ctor, ‘a s long a s the rec ord as a whole demonstrates that the per tinent fac tors

wer e take n into account b y t h e d istrict court.’” W illiams , 557 F.3d at 1256 (emphasis adde d) (q u o t i n g U

n it e d S ta te s v. Vautier , 1 4 4 F. 3 d

7 5 6 , 7 6 2 (1 1 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Eg ge rsd or f , 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 ( 11th Cir. 1997)). I n Eg ge rsd or f , the El eventh Ci rcuit found, in the contex t of revie wing the denial of a motion for r esente ncing under § 3582( c)( 2), that the district c ourt’s orde r, thoug h short, was “ based on the

rec ord as a

whole” a

nd “enunc iated suff

icient re asons for its orde r deny ing r esente ncing .” Eg ge rsd or f , 126 F.3d at 1 3 2 2. There , althoug h the district court ha d not specifica lly weig hed the § 3553(a) fac tors, the Eleve nth Circuit held that the lower c ourt had not abused its discretion and ha dNo. 08-1732

Un ite d S tat es o f A me ric a v . Cu rry

-13- provided suff

icient reasons for its decision t o deny rese ntencing , “[e]specially consideringthat the district court’s fina l order spe cifica lly ref ere nced the Gover

nment’s Opposition, which in turn cited specific elements that we re r eleva nt to the necessar

y section 3553(a ) inquiry

and that we re suppor

ted by the re cord. . . .” Id. at 1323. The same principles apply here . Clearly , the district court’s or der de ny ing Curr y ’s motion to r esente nce was c ursory at best. Howe ver, a s in Eg ge rsd or f , the re cord ha d been a

mply develope d befor e the r esente ncing motion at i s s u e h ere was f iled. J udg e Quist had a lrea dy considere d the rele vant factors i n some depth at the original sentencing and the first resente ncing under Booke r , at which time he imposed a (then) be low-g uidelines sentenc e of 75 months. J udg e Jonker indicated he ha d r e vie we d th e e nti re re c or d, inc lud ingthe pa rt ie s’ re c omm e nd a tio ns , an d ha d c on sid e re d a ll the re levant § 3553(a ) fa ct o rs an d the SentencingGuidelines in making his decision. Under the circ umstances, this Court cannot conclude that he abuse d his discretion in denying the defe ndant’s motion for further

modification of his sentenc e.III

. F or the re a sons art ic ulate d h e re in, we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the mot ion

to modify or re duce Curr

y ’s sentenc e.