### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 7, 200 5

BRIA N L . WO ODS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for DyerCounty No. C01-137 LeeMoore , Judge

No. W2004-02220-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Augu st 31, 2005

The Appe llant, Bria n L . Woods, appeals the Dy er County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f. On app e a l, Wood s ar g ue s tha t he wa s den ie d his Si xth A me nd me nt rig ht t o the e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l. A ft e r r e vie w o f the re c or d, we affi rm th e de nia l of po stconviction re lief.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and T HOMAS T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Ti mothy B oxx, Dy e rs bu rg , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, B ri a n L . Wo od s.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Phi llip Bivens, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

I n April of 2002, the Appellant was convicted by a Dy er County jury of the sec ond deg ree murder of L amar J ohnson. He is currently serving a twenty -four

y ear Depa rtment of Corre ction sentenc e as a

result of this conviction. On dire ct appe al, this court found no e rror and af firmed the Appellant’s c onviction and sentenc e. State v. Brian L. W oods , N o. W20 02 -0 18 31 -C CA -R 3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, O ct. 6, 2003).
The proof at trial, as r ecited on dir ect a ppeal, e stablished:

On Fe bruary

12, 2001, around 7:10 p. m

. , the Appellant “ was wa lking on Wil son Circle,” on the west side of Dy ersbur g , when “he noti ced a m aroon c ar, a nd a g e n tl e me n in th e c ar

. . . f ir e d a g u n a t h im a n d

. . . s tr u c k h im in th e b a c k

. ” The-2-

Appellant advise d office r Mar k Rey nolds that Devon Wigg ins, a/k/a “De e-D ee,” was the man who shot him. The Appellant wanted to sign a war rant a g ainst Wi g g ins and proce eded to the c lerk’s of fice to do so. The Appellant did not indicate that any other individual was involved in the shooting at this t ime.

Acc ording to Re y nolds, w hile he and the Appe llant were at the cle rk’s off ice,

“ I didno tic e a

sma ll h ole in the ho odof the [Ap pe lla nt’ s] jacket

. Aft e r I g ot t o looking at the hole in the hood, it’s pr etty close to w here his injury was on his back. I beg an to examine the hole and r ecove red a round fr om the hole.” Althoug h there

wa s n o b ro ke n s kin , th e Ap pe lla nt h a d a se ve re “ dim e -s ize d” br

uis e on his ba c k w ith “a little blood to the surfa ce of the skin” and “ a litt l e s we l l i n g around” the wound. He de c lin e d me dic a l tr e a tme nt. Af te r th e Ap pe lla nt l e ft

the c le rk ’s of

fi c e , h e tol d Kelvin Tay lor, the co- defe ndant in this case, that two persons known as “ Dee -De e”

a nd“ Ma r- Ma r, ” a /k/ a L a mar Joh ns on , th e vic tim in this c a se , h a d s ho t a t hi m.

Th a t sa me e ve nin g , th e Ap pe lla nt w e nt t o th e e a st sid e of tow n to th e ho me of Ka ren Smith. At some point during the evening , he obtained a SKS assault rifle. Acc ording to S i err a Smith, the daug hter of K are n Smit h, when the A ppellant saw J ohnson, he said, “I ’m fix in’ to g o g et t hat ni g g er,” left t he porch, and we nt behind the house. As J ohnson was standing in front of a neig hboring home, the Appe llant fired at l ea s t twelve shots at the victim. The victim was struc k twice, onc e in the back and once in the le ft hip, and di ed as a result of his wounds. Upon e x amination of the body , a pistol was found unde rneath J ohnson’s body near his feet. The

wea pon’s safe ty

was set, the ma g azine was full, and it appea red that the wea

pon had

no t be e n r e c e ntl y fi re d. At tr ia l, the Ap pe lla nt t e sti fi e d th a t he sh ot Joh ns on be c a us e he believe d J ohnson was shoot ing at him and “they was c onstantly

ag g ravating me.” Additionally , subsequent ballistics tests reve aled that the bullet r ecove red f rom the A p p e l l a n t ’ s j a c k e tw a s n o tf i r e d f r o mt h e p i s t o l f

o u n d u n d e r

J o h n s o n ’ s b o d y.

Id

. The proof at t he post -convic tion hearing established t hat i t was W igg ins who fired the bullet wh ic h lod g e d in the Ap pe lla nt’ s ja c ke t. Wig g ins wa s ind ic te d fo r a g g ra vate d a ssa ult a ndple d g uil ty to assault prior to the Appe llant’s trial.

I n April of 2004, the Appe llant filed a pro s e petition f or post-conviction relief

alleg ing that he re ceive d the ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel. An evidentiary hearing w as held on July30, 2004, and the post-conviction court denied relief by written order on Aug ust 18, 2004. T h i s ap p eal followed.-3- Ana lys is

On app eal , th e Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s th a t tria l c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n w a s d e fi c ie nt b e c a us e counsel failed to call Devon Wig g ins to testifyat trial. To succ ee d on a cha lleng e of ine ffe ctive

a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l, the Ap pe lla nt b e ars the bu rd e n of es ta bli sh ing the a lle g a tio ns se t f orth i n h is petition by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). The Appe llant must demonstrate that counse l’s repr esentation fel l b el ow the ra ng e of c ompetence demande d of attorney s in criminal case s. Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), the Appellant must establish (1) defic ient perf

ormanc e and (2) prejudice re sulting fr om the defic iency . The pe titioner is not entitl ed to th e benef

it of hindsight, may

not second-g uess a r easona bly based tria l strateg y , and cannot

c ri tic ize a so un d, bu t un su c c e ssf

ul, ta c tic a l de c isi on ma de du ri ng the c ou rs e of the pr oc e e din g s. Ad k ins v . S tat e , 911 S.W .2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). This de fer ence t o t h e t ac t i cal de c isi on s o f t

ri a l c ou ns e l is de pe nd a nt u po n a sh ow ing that th e de c isi on s w e rema de a ft e r a de qu a te prepa ration. Coo

pe r v . S tat e , 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
I t is unnecessa

ry for a court to addr ess def

iciency and pre judice in any

particula r orde r, or even to a ddress both i f the pe titioner makes an insuff icient showing on either. Strickland , 4 66 U. S.

a t 69 7, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 69 . In o rd e r t o e sta bli sh pr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r mus t est abli sh a “ re a so na ble probability

that, but for counse l’s u n p rofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en differ ent. A re asonable probability is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf id en ce in the outcome.” State v. Burns
, 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 5 3
, 4 6 3 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Strickland
, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068) (c itations omi tted).

The is s u e s o f d e f

ic ie n t p e r f

o r man c e b y c o u n s e l a n d p o s s ib le p r e ju d ic e to th e d efe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct. Id . at 46 1. “ [A] tria l c ou rt ’s findings of fact underlying a

claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel are revie wed on appea l under a de novo sta nd ard , a c c omp a nie d w ith

a presumption that those finding s are corr ect unless the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Fi e lds v . S tat e , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 58 (T e nn . 2 00 1) (c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; He nle y v . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ). Howe ver, conclusions of law ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption that the post-conviction court’s f indings a re c orre ct. Id

.
Atth e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n h e ar i n g , tr i a l c o u n s e l t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s i n i t i a l tr i a l s tr a t e g y wa s to inf orm th e jury

that Wig g ins ha d p le a d g uil ty to a ssa ult ing the Ap pe lla nt andthat he int e nd e d to c a ll Wigg ins as a witness to esta b l i s h t h at W igg ins and J ohnson were the ag g ressors w ho set the fatal

e ve nts int o mo tio n. Tria l c ou ns e l c on ta c te d Wig g ins , a ndWig g ins to ld hi m, “ y ou do n’ t w a nt m e
as a w itness . . . because I ’m g onna say that . . . [t he Appe llant] shot at me and Mar Mar [J ohnson] first down there on the circ le and t h at ’s wh y we shot back at him and the bullet ended up in [the Appellant’s] coat.” At that point, tria l c ounsel decide d ag ainst calling Wigg ins a s a witness. Trial counsel testified, “I ’m not g onna put any witness in the s tand who’s g onna put a g un in my client’s hand whe n our whole the ory of the c ase w as dela y ed self- defe nse.”-4-

At the post-conviction hea ring
, Devon W igg ins was c alled as a witness and verified that the Appellant had shot at him and the victim after the victim had “almost ra n [ t h e Appe llant] over.” Wigg ins ex plained that seve ral da y s later, the two e ncounter ed the Appe llan t aga in, and the Appellant shot at them a se cond time. At that point, Wig g ins te stified, “I jumped out w ith the g un I had and shot ba ck.”

I n d ism iss ing the pe tit ion , th e po st c on vic tio n c ou rt c on c lud e d:

. . . [T ]he de c isi on of

wh e the r o r n ot t o c a ll M r. Wig g ins a s it app e ars to the Cou rt

in

a n y e v e n t i s a

t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n o f
, d e a l i n g w i t h yo u r tr i a l t a c t i c s a n d q u i t e f

r a n k l y I think that it was a very g ood tactica l decision based on what we’ve heard from Mr. Wigg ins today

.
The Petitioner has f

ailed to prove ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. This w as not - - failure to call this witness was not a defec tive perf ormanc e on the pa

rt of Mr. L anier

. And there ’s obviously

the proof from Mr. Wigg ins today would show no prejudice even if it had been.
We find nothing in the re cord to pre p o n d er at e ag ainst the finding s of the post-convic tion

c ou rt . Q ue sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, th e wei ght a ndva lue g ive n to the ir te sti mon y , a ndthe fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y the e vid e nc e are to b e res ol ved by the tr ie r o f f

a c t. Henley
, 960 S.W .2d at 579. We will not reweig h or re evaluate the evide nce or substitut e our infere nces f

or those draw n by the post-conviction court. Id. at 579-80. The rec ord establishes that the post-conviction court acc redited tria l counse l t e s ti mo n y th at D e v o n Wigg ins would not have bee n
a fa vo ra ble wi tne ss f

or the de fe ns e . M or e ov e r, the re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t a t th e Ap pe lla nt’ s tria l,

co u n s el i n fo rm e d t h e j u ryt h at W i ggi n s h ad p l ed gu i l t y t o as s au l t i n g t h e A p p el l an tt h ro u gh stipulations with the S tate and was able to introduce Wig g ins’ prior criminal hist ory throug h other witnesses. Thus, trial counse l was in larg e part succe ssful in p re s en t i n g his defense without incurring the re sidual damag e of Wig g ins’ testimony . I n this reg ard, w e note that the A ppellant was indicted for f

irs t d egre e murde r and c onvicted of se cond deg ree murder. We a g ree that neither defic ient perf

ormanc e nor pr ejudice ha s been e stablished.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the fore g oing, we aff irm the dismiss al of the petition for post-convic tion relief by the Dy er County

Circuit Count.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE