alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

|   | 1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, S.A.B. de C.V.; |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 3. | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 4. | The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have: |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 5. | The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: April 29, 2013 |   |                                    |   |
|----------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|
|                 |   |                                    |   |
|                 | By:    | /s/ Porfirio González Álvarez |   |
|                 |   | Porfirio González Álvarez     |   |
|                 |   | Chief Executive Officer                 |   |

----
#### Jason Andrew SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHAL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15252

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed June 1, 2017

Jason Andrew Smith, Pro Se

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jason Andrew Smith, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations in connection with his shoulder injury. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Wilhelm v. Rotman,*680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); *Watison v. Carter,*668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under *89628 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s deliberate indifference claims against defendants Johal, Zepp, and Klang because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to Smith’s shcjulder injury and pain. *See Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; a difference of medical opinion concerning the course of treatment, negligence, or medical malpractice does not amount to deliberate indifference).

However, dismissal of Smith’s deliberate indifference claim against defendant Yous-sef was premature because Smith’s allegations regarding the delay in his physical therapy, liberally construed, are “sufficient to warrant ordering [this defendant] £o file an answer.” *Wilhelm,*680 F.3d at 1116. We vacate the dismissal of Smith’s deliberate indifference claim regarding the delay in his physical therapy as to defendant Yous-sef, and remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
II

★(Star Print)

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 698

To designate the Federal building at 33 College Avenue in Waterville, Maine,

as the ‘‘George J. Mitchell Federal Building’’, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 6 (legislative day, APRIL 5), 1995

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Ms. SNOWE) introduced the following bill; which

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To designate the Federal building at 33 College Avenue

in Waterville, Maine, as the ‘‘George J. Mitchell Federal

Building’’, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF GEORGE J. MITCHELL FED4 ERAL BUILDING.

5 The Federal building at 33 College Avenue in

6 Waterville, Maine, shall be known and designated as the

7 ‘‘George J. Mitchell Federal Building’’.

8 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

9 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

10 paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal
2

S 698 IS1S

1 building referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be

2 a reference to the ‘‘George J. Mitchell Federal Building’’.

Æ
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ada McFall BENNETT, Appellant.

No. 10644.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 3, 1966.

Decided Oct. 7, 1966.

W. Douglas Parrish, Winston-Salem, N. C. (Court-appointed counsel), for appellant.

William H. Murdock, U. S. Atty. (H. Marshall Simpson, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before BOREMAN, BRYAN and BELL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ada McFall Bennett (hereinafter Mrs. Bennett) was tried and adjudged guilty by the District Court, sitting without a jury, on an indictment charging her and one Carter with robbing, by force and violence, a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of 18- U.S.C. § 2113(a). On appeal she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction.

The evidence discloses that Carter, the co-defendant, was transported to the bank by Mrs. Bennett in her automobile which she then parked in a parking space at the rear of the bank while Carter entered the bank and perpetrated the-robbery; he carried Mrs. Bennett’s large empty pocketbook when entering the bank and he emerged from the bank by a rear door, carrying the pocketbook and a canvas bank bag, both filled with currency in the total sum of $33,512.00. Mrs. Bennett immediately drove her car from the parking area when she observed Carter leaving the bank and into a nearby street. Carter traveled on foot across the parking area and into the *575street, all the while in the direction of the moving automobile and reentered the car which had halted. The two then drove away and were quickly apprehended while in the car when they were stopped by the police who had been notified of the robbery.

 Mrs. Bennett denies all knowledge that Carter planned to rob the bank and contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove any intent on her part to participate in the robbery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government1 we hold that the facts and circumstances clearly shown by the evidence fully support the inferences and conclusions of the trial court. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) whoever aids or abets in the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal. The judgment below will not be disturbed.

Affirmed.

1

. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).
# EUR-Lex - 32002D1011(01) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D1011(01)

**Council Decision of 23 September 2002 appointing members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers **

*
Official Journal C 245 , 11/10/2002 P. 0001 - 0003 *

Council Decision

of 23 September 2002

appointing members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers

(2002/C 245/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community(1), and in particular Article 82 thereof,

Having regard to the lists of candidates submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States,

Whereas:

(1) By its Decision of 28 February 2000(2) the Council appointed the members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers for the period 28 February 2000 to 27 February 2002;

(2) Members and alternate members of that Committee should be appointed for two years,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The following are hereby appointed members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers for the period 23 September 2002 to 22 September 2004:

I. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

>TABLE>

II. TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES

>TABLE>

III. REPRESENTATIVES OF EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATIONS

>TABLE>

Article 2

The Council will appoint the members not yet nominated by Greece and Italy at a later date.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published, for information, in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Done at Brussels on 23 September 2002.

For the Council

The President

M. Fischer Boel

(1) OJ L 149, 5.7.1971, p. 2. Regulation last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1945/93 (OJ L 181, 23.7.1993, p. 1).

(2) OJ C 69, 10.3.2000, p. 2.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 19, 2014

t1112 

# Order

Clerk November 19, 2014

149599

BANK OF AMERICA, NA,

Plaintiff

- A ppellant,

v SC: 149599

COA: 307756

Oakland CC: 2010

- 112606

- CK

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE

COMPANY, PATRIOT TITLE AGENCY, KIRK

D. SCHIEB, WESTMINSTER ABSTRACT

COMPANY, WESTMINSTER TITLE AGENCY,

INC., PRIME FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,

VALENTINO M. TRABUCCHI, PAMELA S.

NOTTURNO, f/k/a PAMELA S. SIIRA,

DOUGLAS K. SMITH, JOSHUA J. GRIGGS,

STATE VALUE APPRAISALS, LLC, NATHAN

B. HOGAN, and CHRISTINE D. MAYS,

Defendants

- Appellees,

and

FRED MATSON, MICHAEL LYNETT, JO KAY

JAMES, and PAUL SMI TH,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 27, 2014

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall

include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether a separate contract between the

lender and the closing agent existed outside of the closing protection letters; (2) whether

there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the closing agent’s violation of the

terms of the lend er’s written closing instructions; and (3) whether the full credit bid rule

of New Freedom Mortgage Corp v Globe Mortgage Corp , 281 Mich App 63 (2008), is a

correct rule of law and, if so, whether it applies to this case.

Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this

case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

SZ/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JOSE SERAFIN RAMIREZ-DE LA

CRUZ,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-30147

D.C. No. 3:07-CR-00448-ALH

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 15, 2009** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Jose Serafin Ramirez-De La Cruz appeals from the 57-month sentence

imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry, in violation of 

FILED

JAN 04 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SZ/Research 2 09-30147

8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm,

but remand to correct the judgment.

Ramirez-De La Cruz contends that his sentence is unreasonable because: (1)

it is based on a 16-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A),

which is an inherently flawed Guideline; (2) application of the 16-level

enhancement resulted in a Guidelines’ range that was greater than necessary to

achieve the purposes of sentencing; (3) the district court failed to consider the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; and (4) the district court failed to consider his

argument regarding the 16-level increase and his argument in favor of a departure

based on assimilation. The record indicates that the district court did not

procedurally err and that Ramirez-De La Cruz’s sentence is substantively

reasonable. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc); cf. United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1054-58 (9th Cir.

2009).

In accordance with United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062

(9th Cir. 2000), we remand the case to the district court with instructions that it

delete from the judgment the incorrect reference to § 1326(b)(2). See United States

v. Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding sua sponte to

delete the reference to § 1326(b)).
SZ/Research 3 09-30147

AFFIRMED; REMANDED to correct the judgment.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alexander William FETTERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-35165

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Timothy John Racicot, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USMI — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee

David F. Ness, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT — Federal Defenders of Montana (Great Falls), Great Falls, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral ar*g*ument.

*876MEMORANDUM **

Alexander William Fetters appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion, *see United States v. Manzo,*675 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.

Fetters contends that his sentence as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 is unconstitutional because *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), invalidated U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause, and therefore his prior criminal endangerment convictions no longer qualify as predicate crimes of violence. Fetters’s argument is foreclosed. *See Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 895, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness”).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0890 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0890

**2001/890/EC: Commission Decision of 13 December 2001 on the recognition of the "Hellenic Register of Shipping" in accordance with Article 4(3) of Council Directive 94/57/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2001) 4218) **

*
Official Journal L 329 , 14/12/2001 P. 0072 - 0072 *

Commission Decision

of 13 December 2001

on the recognition of the "Hellenic Register of Shipping" in accordance with Article 4(3) of Council Directive 94/57/EC

(notified under document number C(2001) 4218)

(Only the Greek text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2001/890/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 94/57/EC of 22 November 1994 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administration(1), as last amended by Commission Directive 97/58/EC(2), and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

Having regard to the letters dated 3 and 30 August 2001 from the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine, requesting the recognition of the "Hellenic Register of Shipping" (hereafter "HRS") as per Article 4(3) (limited recognition),

Whereas:

(1) The three year limited recognition under Article 4(3) of Directive 94/57/EC is a recognition granted to organisations (classification societies) which fulfil all criteria other than those set out under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the section "General" of the Annex, but which is limited in time and scope in order for the organisations concerned to further gain experience.

(2) With a view to recognition, the Commission's assessment of HRS was carried out between 4 and 6 September 2001 at the head office in Piraeus, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the Greek administration and HRS. The Commission assessment also took into consideration findings of other recent visits to HRS offices, namely between 26 and 30 March 2001 in Piraeus and on 2 April 2001 at the regional office in Nicosia, Cyprus. On the basis of all the evidence gathered it was verified that HRS meets all the criteria of the Directive other than those set out under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the section "General" of the Annex.

(3) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee set up under Article 7 of Directive 94/57/EC,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The "Hellenic Register of Shipping" is recognised pursuant to Article 4(3) of Directive 94/57/EC for a period of three years as from the date of adoption of this Decision.

Article 2

The effects of this recognition are limited to Greece.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 13 December 2001.

For the Commission

Loyola De Palacio

Vice-President

(1) OJ L 319, 12.12.1994, p. 20.

(2) OJ L 274, 7.10.1997, p. 8.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          13,110
<SECURITIES>                                     4,731
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,671
<ALLOWANCES>                                       345
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                27,932
<PP&E>                                          10,041
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (7,686)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  31,478
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,510
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            65
<OTHER-SE>                                      19,903
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    31,478
<SALES>                                         18,108
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                18,108
<CGS>                                            4,375
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,375
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,016
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     51
<INCOME-TAX>                                        50
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  1
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         1
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00
        

</TABLE>
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22

- BG

- 181

IN RE MICHAEL S. ARIF

, 2021 DDN 171

A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 391415

BEFORE: Beckwith and Deahl , Associate Judges, and Washington , Senior Judge.

O R D E R (FILED

— June 2, 2022)

On consideration of the certified order from the state of Virginia revoking respondent’s license to practice law in that jurisdiction by consent ; this court’s April 5, 2022 , order directing respondent to show cause why reciprocal discipline in the

form of disbarment should not be imposed; and the state ment of Disciplinary Counsel; and it appearing that respondent has not filed a response or his D.C . Bar R. XI, § 14(g) affida vit, it is

ORDERED that Michael S. Arif is hereby disbarred from the practice of law

in the District of Columbia. See In re Sibley , 990 A.2d 483, 487 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of imposition of identical

disci pline and exceptions to this presumption should be rare); In re Fuller , 930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline applies to all cases in which the respondent does not participate) ; In re Laibstain

, 841 A.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C. 2004) (explaining that the equivalent sanction for

revocation in the District is disbarment)

. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement, respondent’s

disbarment will not begin to run until such time as he files an affidavi t that fully complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

PER CURIAM