alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
On appeal, appellant argues that granting summary judgment 

to LVMPD was improper for a variety of reasons. But in this case we are 

compelled to affirm the district court's summary judgment based on 

appellant's failure to provide this court with an adequate record to support 

the arguments that he raises on appeal. 

It is well established that an appellant has a duty to provide 

this court with an adequate record on appeal and that we "generally 

cannot consider matters not contained in the record." Cuzze v. Univ. & 

Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007); see 

also NRAP 30(b)(3) (providing that appellant's appendix "shall include 

those . . . portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised 

in appellant's appeal"). Here, while appellant has provided this court with 

a copy of the district court's order, the minutes pertaining to that order, 

and a transcript of the hearing on the summary judgment motion, he has 

failed to provide copies of respondent's motion for summary judgment, his 

opposition to that motion, or respondent's reply to the opposition. 

To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving 

party must set forth specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists for trial. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 732, 

121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). Absent copies of the parties' summary 

judgment motion practice, especially appellant's opposition to that motion, 

this court cannot determine whether appellant demonstrated the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment 

because, among other things, it is not clear what, if any, evidence 

appellant relied on for this purpose. While appellant's appendix includes 

certain responses to interrogatories, deposition transcripts, and 

administrative hearing documents, without appellant's opposition to the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1.947A ea 
J. 

summary judgment motion, we cannot assess whether these documents 

were relied on in opposing summary judgment and, if so, what arguments 

appellant may have presented based on these materials. Thus, because 

appellant has failed to provide this court with any of the pertinent motion 

practice pertaining to the district court's grant of summary judgment, "we 

necessarily presume that the missing portion[s of the district court record] 

support[ ] the district court's decision" that appellant failed to 

demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that 

precluded summary judgment and that summary judgment was 

warranted on this basis. Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135; see also 

Wood, 121 Nev. at 732, 121 P.3d at 1031. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Parraguirre 

J. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge 

Israel Kunin, Settlement Judge 

Kirk T. Kennedy 

Olson, Cannon, Gormley, Angulo & Stoberski 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K (the “Report”) of NanoViricides, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014,
the undersigned Eugene Seymour, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge and
belief:



| | (1) | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: September 29, 2014



| | /s/ Eugene Seymour             
| | -------------------------------
| | Name: Eugene Seymour, M.D.     
| | Title: Chief Executive Officer,
| | (Principal Executive Officer)
#### Bobbie Eugene GLENN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 10619.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 5, 1966.

Decided Oct. 10, 1966.

Don B. Davis, Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed counsel), for appellant.

Wm. Medford, U. S. Atty. (William M. Styles, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, BOREMAN and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Glenn was convicted by a jury upon an indictment charging him with the theft of merchandise from an interstate shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659. Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and oral arguments of counsel we find no error in the trial.

As one of his assignments of error on appeal Glenn seeks to attack the court's instructions to the jury as erroneous and incomplete. No objection to the instructions was offered below as required by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This court could, under Rule 52(b), notice plain error affecting substantial rights even in the absence of objection in the District Court but we find no such error here. The judgment below will be

Affirmed.
#### Sam Bruno, Appellant, *v.*Rockwell’s Bakery, Inc., Respondent.

Argued January 7, 1943;

decided February 25, 1943.

*580
      *Louis E. Schwartz, Irving Hoffman*and *Hyman Sommer*for appellant.

*Charles F. Bachmann, Thomas F. Keane, George A. Kuittinen*and *John P. Smith*for respondent.

Judgments reversed and a new trial granted with costs to the appellant to abide the event on the ground that questions of fact were presented by the record both as to defendant’s negligence and as to plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose SANTILLAN-MORALES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10430

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 8, 2017

Erica McCallum, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU — Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jose Santillan-Morales, Pro Se

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Santillan-Morales appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 16-month sentence for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Santillan Morales’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Santillan-Morales the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

*566Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v.*Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: 2011-NM-232-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
#### Pardon Brightman *versus*Charles Grinnell.

A private individual who impounds a beast taken damage-feasant, in a town pound, is not liable for any injury which such beast may receive from cattle confined in the same pound.

Trespass for taking and impounding the plaintiff’s cow.

At the trial, in the Common Pleas, before *Williams*J., i was admitted that the cow was taken damage-feasant, and impounded by virtue of *St.*1788, c. 65, § 3. The plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove, that after the taking, the cow was bruised and injured ; and he contended that this abuse made the defendant a trespasser *ab initio.*The defendant proved that the cow was impounded in the town pound, and offered evidence tending to prove, that if the cow was injured while in custody, it was by being gored by other cattle then restrained in the pound by other persons, without the fault, and against the will of the defendant. The evidence was submitted to the jury, with instructions, that if the cow was injured or abused by the defendant or his agents or servants, whether by negligence or actual violence, while in custody, the defendant would be answerable for damages in this action ; but if she was so in jured by other cattle then restrained in the pound, without any negligence or fault of the defendant, the verdict should be in his favor.

The jury found a verdict for the defendant ; whereupon the plaintiff filed exceptions to the instructions of the judge. "

Coffin,

in support of the exceptions, said that it was the defendant’s duty to know whether the pound was a suitable place for impounding the cow, and if other cattle were there, to see that they were so secured that they could not injure her. He cited *Jenner*v. *Joliffe,*9 Johns. R. 381.

Warren, for the defendant,

cited Noy’s Maxims, *p.*43.

*Per Curiam.*

It is clear that the action cannot be sustained. The defendant was authorized to put the cow into this inclosure, which was under the care of a pound-keeper, and he is not liable for consequences happening without his agency or knowledge.1

*Judgment of C. C. P. affirmed.*

1

 See *Adams*v. Adams, 13 Pick. 384.
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 201 3 - 0019 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 201 3 - CE - 0 4 5 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. No 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, lis t latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR- M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: **ASE** Printed Name **: Date** 

**Branch M anager**  **Date**
Exhibit B

Tarot 680mm (ZYX-M)

Frame: Tarot 680

Flight Controller: ZYX-M -25

Motors: DJI 3508

Props: DJI 1242

Battery: 8000mah 25c 6s

ESCs: Castle Creations 35
#### IN RE: Manuel R. SUAREZ-JIMENEZ, Respondent

No. 15-8022

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Entered: February 3, 2017

Manuel R. Suarez-Jimenez, Pro Se.

Before Torruella, Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

*649ORDER OF COURT

Petitioner seeks rehearing based on his claim that the per curiam opinion did not address his argument that Puerto Rico’s code of professional ethics could not be applied to him because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution preempts any Commonwealth rule that conflicts with the rules of Florida adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The per curiam opinion rejected this “due process violation” as exceeding the scope of due process protections afforded to the respondent in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In any event, the argument is without basis in law or fact. Petitioner neither entered an appearance nor was authorized to appear or practice in Florida. Plus, he points to no pertinent conflict between the Florida and Puerto Rico rules of conduct, presumably because the pertinent rules in all relevant U.S. jurisdictions allow for suspensions for, among other things, gross negligence and misleading clients. The petition for rehearing is denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001005407
<NAME> CHIREX INC
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           3,511
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,805
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     20,286
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,003
<PP&E>                                         128,878
<DEPRECIATION>                                  71,504
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 122,247
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,647
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           108
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      84,266
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   122,247
<SALES>                                         49,298
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,128
<CGS>                                           41,580
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   41,580
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,724
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 589
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,197)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,254
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (9,451)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (9,451)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00
        

</TABLE>
#### Bruce Dwain COPELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-56321

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 25, 2017

Bruce Dwain Copeland, Pro Se

Tuan V. Uong, Kasey Curtis, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of America, N.A.

Tuan V. Uong, Kasey Curtis, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Elena 0. Gekker, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Recontrust Company

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bruce Dwain Copeland appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action alleging claims of intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd.,*531 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Copeland failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Bank of America had knowledge of an economic relationship between Copeland and his tenant and whether Bank of America interfered with that relationship. *See id.*at 774 (elements for intentional interference with contracts under California law); *Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,*389 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under California law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to consider Copeland’s unauthenticated documents as evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. *See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA,*285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and stating that “unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment”).

We reject as meritless Copeland’s arguments that the district court was biased against him, held him to a higher pleading standard, and improperly considered Bank of America’s summary judgment evidence after denying its motion to compel.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFRIMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: FROM: Phone call to Maryland Department ofEnvironment 

# ./ VanessaHinkle, Environmental Scientist 

## V fL.-LA.?W

# -4~JC TO: EPA Region 8MontanaRegional Haze FIP Docket DATE: June 11,2012 I spoke to Justin Hsu, Maryland DepartmentofEnvironment (MDE) on June 6, 2012 regarding the detached plume at Holcim's Hagerstown, Maryland facility. Mr. Hsu said that the Hagerstown kiln was using selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) and that during the winter months there is a visible plume. He saidthat Holcim was trying to find a solution for that problem. Mr. Hsu transferred me to Rob Hall who he said would knowmore about the issue. Mr. Hall said that SNCRwas required as part ofthe state implementation plan under a consent order and that Holcim was required to reduce NOx emissions to 5.1 

### lb/ton clinker. He also said thatthere was a year-long study going on and that the study would probably have to be extended longer. I asked Mr. Hall whetherhe thought the Hagerstown facility's S02 emissions had any effect onthe plume and I stated that Holcim'sTrident kiln might have lower sulfur emissions. Mr. Hall said that ifthe Tridentkiln was a wetkiln, that that might help scrub the sulfur. He said that Holcim was varying the ammoniafeed rate to control the visible plume and that they may be able to vary the feed rate to control the plume and achieve an emission rate of5.1 

### lb/ton clinker. Mr. Hall saidthat the plume forms after the opacity monitor, but the opacity could probably be visually read. He saidthat the consent order exempts Holcim from their opacity requirement. Mr. Hall saidthat it is cold in the morning when they have had the problem, but as it warms up in the day, there is no problem.
**Exhibit 31.2**

** **

**WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP.**

** **

**RESTATED OFFICER’S CERTIFICATE**

 

I, Thomas G. Lehmann, certify that:

 

1.         I have reviewed this report on Form 10–K and all reports on Form 10–D required to be filed in respect of theperiod covered by this report on Form 10–K of Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series 2006-HE4 Trust (the ‘‘Exchange Act periodic reports’’);

 

2.         Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement ofa  material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.         Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form10–D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.         Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB,and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement(s) in all material respects; and

 

5.         All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their relatedattestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a–18 and 15d–18 have been included as anexhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10–K. 

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  LaSalle BankNational Association.

 

 

Date:  As of March 15,2007

|   |   | /s/ Thomas G. Lehmann                                                                        |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Name:  ThomasG. Lehmann                                                                 |
|   |   | Title:   President and Senior Officer in Charge of Securitization of the Depositor |