[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-13978

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00421-SCJ-LTW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSEPH ORLANDO HOOD, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(February 18, 2021)

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Before WILSON, LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Joseph Hood appeals from his convictions and 468-month total sentence for 

Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), discharging a firearm in furtherance of a 

crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and brandishing a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Prior to the 

commencement of trial, the district court ordered that Hood be placed in leg irons 

to protect the safety and decorum of the courtroom. It also ordered the irons to be 

taped and the counsel tables to be draped with white cloths. At trial, the 

government introduced evidence regarding Hood’s flight from the scene of a 

robbery for which he was not charged and his attempted escape from a hospital

room after his flight. The two incidents occurred within a week of the robberies 

that he was charged with but prior to the filing of his indictment. The government

also introduced expert fingerprint evidence. 

On appeal, Hood argues that: (1) the district court abused its discretion in 

ordering him to wear leg irons during his trial; (2) the district court abused its 

discretion in determining that the government’s expert fingerprint evidence, which 

relied on a method known as ACE-V, was sufficiently reliable under Daubert v. 

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); (3) the district court abused its 

discretion in allowing the government to present the evidence of his flight from the 

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robbery scene and his attempted escape from the hospital room as evidence of his 

guilt; and (4) his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

I.

We review the district court’s decision to require a defendant to wear leg 

irons at trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1219

(11th Cir. 1998). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect 

legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes 

findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 

1293 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Leg irons should be used “as rarely as possible” because they may 

undermine the presumption of innocence, confuse the defendant, impair the 

defendant’s ability to confer with counsel, and affect the defendant’s trial strategy. 

United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). The decision to 

require leg irons “must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny to determine if there 

was an essential state interest furthered by compelling a defendant to wear shackles 

and whether less restrictive, less prejudicial methods of restraint were considered 

or could have been employed.” Id. Essential state interests include providing 

physical security, preventing escape attempts, and protecting courtroom decorum. 

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628 (2005); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 

(explaining that courtroom security is a competing interest that may justify 

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requiring a defendant to wear leg irons). The district court must place its reasons 

for requiring security measures, including leg irons, on the record. Durham, 287 

F.3d at 1304. If the district orders a defendant to wear leg irons “without adequate 

justification,” the shackling is presumptively prejudicial unless the government 

proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. 

Deck, 544 U.S. at 635. 

In deciding whether to require leg irons, the district court must assess the 

particular circumstances of the case. Id. at 632. In doing so, the district court may 

consider a number of factors that reasonably bear upon the security of the 

courtroom or the danger of escape, including the defendant’s history and 

background, the nature of the charges and whether the charges include violent 

conduct, and prior instances where the defendant disrupted judicial proceedings. 

United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 

grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). The district court may also 

consider the expertise and experience of a U.S. marshal, although it may not rely 

solely on a marshal’s recommendation without independently considering the facts 

and circumstances of the case. Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1226. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Hood to be 

placed in leg irons during his trial. As an initial matter, a party abandons an issue 

by failing to prominently raise it in his initial brief, by only raising it in a 

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perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority, or by making 

only “passing references to it that are background to other arguments or [are] 

buried within other arguments, or both.” United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 

1043 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

party also abandons an issue by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. 

United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Here,

Hood has abandoned his argument regarding the discrepancies between the district 

court’s oral and written orders by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. For 

the same reason, he has also abandoned his argument regarding the government’s 

unsubstantiated claim of his prior escape attempt from a courtroom holding cell. 

We also find no abuse of discretion because the district court’s shackling 

order furthered the interests of protecting courtroom security and decorum. To 

protect those interests, it considered a number of factors that this court has 

determined to be relevant, including: (1) Hood’s criminal history; (2) the nature of 

Hood’s charges, which involved a series of violent armed robberies; (3) Hood’s 

escape attempt from the hospital after his arrest; and (4) Hood’s escape attempt 

from custody while awaiting a judicial proceeding, which the government 

proffered at the sidebar. It was proper for the district court to also consider the 

marshal’s recommendation, which reflected the marshal’s experience, because it 

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did not rely solely on that recommendation without independently considering 

Hood’s circumstances. 

Because the district court’s shackling order was adequately justified, this 

court does not need to address whether the order was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 635. We therefore find no abuse of discretion and 

affirm. 

II. 

We review the district court’s rulings as to the admissibility of expert 

testimony and the reliability of an expert opinion for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a qualified expert whose 

knowledge is helpful to the trier of fact may testify if: (1) her “testimony is based 

on sufficient facts or data”; (2) her “testimony is the product of reliable principles 

and methods”; and (3) she “has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 

facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The district court has “wide latitude” in 

deciding how to determine an expert’s reliability under Rule 702. Abreu, 406 F.3d 

at 1307. However, a court generally will consider a number of the factors 

enumerated in Daubert, which include: “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and 

has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and 

publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific 

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technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific 

community.” Id. at 1306–07. 

The district court serves a “gatekeeping function” in deciding whether 

scientific or technical evidence is admissible. Id. at 1306 (internal quotation mark 

omitted). Thus, “it is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions 

as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” United States v. Barton, 909 

F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2018). Further, the appropriate safeguards against 

“shaky but admissible evidence” are cross-examination, presentation of contrary 

evidence, and careful instruction as to the burden of proof. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 

596.

We have previously upheld the admission of fingerprint evidence as being 

sufficiently reliable under Daubert. Abreu, 406 F.3d at 1307. We reasoned that 

(1) other federal circuits had determined that such evidence was sufficiently 

reliable under Daubert; (2) district courts in general are given broad latitude in 

deciding how to determine reliability; and (3) the district court had considered 

information provided by the government regarding the uniform practice followed 

by fingerprint examiners and the error rate of fingerprint identification. Id. 

Moreover, a number of federal courts of appeal have determined that 

fingerprint evidence that relies on the ACE-V method is sufficiently reliable. See, 

e.g., United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484–87 (7th Cir. 2013) (determining 

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that “responsible” fingerprint identification under ACE-V is admissible, even 

though the method is subjective and is less scientifically rigorous than DNA 

evidence); United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009)

(determining that fingerprint evidence based on ACE-V was admissible in light of 

the consensus among federal courts that the method satisfies Daubert despite 

concerns with the method’s subjectivity); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 

989–92 (10th Cir. 2009) (expressing concern as to ACE-V’s subjectivity, but 

noting its “overwhelming acceptance” by experts in the fingerprint industry). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 

expert fingerprint evidence was sufficiently reliable under Daubert, which is the 

only element of Daubert that Hood properly challenges on appeal. In determining 

that the evidence was reliable, the district court acted in accordance with our 

caselaw and the decisions of other circuits that have upheld such evidence as 

reliable under Daubert, notwithstanding the subjective nature of the ACE-V 

method. In addition, Hood was able to attack the expert’s methodology through 

cross-examination at trial, and the district court instructed the jury as to the burden 

of proof and the nature of expert testimony. Accordingly, we affirm as to this 

issue. 

III.

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We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence of a defendant’s 

flight for abuse of discretion, and that decision will not be overturned “absent a 

showing of clear abuse.” United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 

1992). 

“Evidence of flight is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and 

thereby guilt.” Id. at 1000. The probative value of a flight evidence depends on 

the extent to which it allows for the factfinder to make inferential steps: “(1) from 

the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; 

(3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime 

charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to 

actual guilt of the crime charged.” United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325

(11th Cir. 1982). Inferences from a defendant’s flight must be “made cautiously 

and with a sensitivity to the facts of the particular case.” Id.

The probative value of flight evidence is diminished if the defendant was not 

aware at the time of his flight that he was the subject of a criminal investigation for 

the particular crime that he was charged with. Id. at 1325–26. It is also diminished 

if there is a significant time delay, such as a period of several months, between the 

time when the defendant becomes aware that he is the subject of a criminal 

investigation and the time of his flight. Id. at 1326. 

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Also in Borders, we determined that neither concern was present where the 

evidence showed that a conspirator fled a hotel shortly after he learned that law 

enforcement wished to interview him, was informed that it would be advisable to 

have counsel present during the interview, and learned that a co-conspirator had 

been arrested in connection with the subject of the interview. Id. at 1323–24, 

1326–27; see also United States v. Beard, 775 F.2d 1577, 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 

1985) (determining that flight evidence was admissible where the defendants, after 

observing a law enforcement officer, engaged in a four-mile car chase until they 

were ultimately pulled over and arrested). 

In United States v. Ramon-Perez, we determined that flight evidence was 

admissible where, after being indicted and released on bond, the defendant 

transferred ownership of his car, quit his job, and moved to another state a little 

over a month after his indictment had been filed and shortly before a scheduled 

hearing. 703 F.2d 1231, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). We reasoned 

that, although “many other reasons other than a flight from justice” could have 

motivated the defendant’s move, he offered no alternative explanation, and the 

flight occurred several days before the scheduled hearing. Id. at 1233. While the 

time delay between the defendant’s indictment and his flight and his careful 

preparations regarding his car and job lessened the evidence’s probative value, 

those circumstances did not render it inadmissible. Id. 

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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence 

of Hood’s flight from the robbery scene and attempted escape from the hospital as 

evidence of his consciousness of guilt. It is unclear whether Hood was under 

investigation at the time of the two incidents. Further, his indictment had not yet 

been filed. However, the jury could have inferred his consciousness of guilt based 

on the temporal proximity of the incidents to the charged robberies and the 

presence of several distinctive items that he possessed at the time of his flight from 

the robbery scene that tied him to the charged robberies. Therefore, we affirm. 

IV.

In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we apply an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 

party challenging the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence 

is unreasonable in light of the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United 

States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). 

In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider whether the 

district court committed any significant procedural error. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We

next consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, taking into account the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. On substantive reasonableness review, we will

vacate the sentence only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that 

the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) 

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factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences 

dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). While we do not presume that a within-guideline sentence is 

reasonable, we typically expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United States v. 

Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Also, the fact that a sentence falls well 

below the statutory maximum is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. United 

States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). 

The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a) is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The statutory maximum term of 

imprisonment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) or (iii) is life. Id.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). 

The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), 

which include reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the 

law, providing just punishment, affording adequate deterrence, protecting the 

public from the defendant’s further crimes, and providing the defendant with 

appropriate correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must 

also take into consideration the “nature and circumstances” of the offense and the 

“history and characteristics” of the defendant. Id. § 3553(a)(1). In addition, the 

statute directs the district court to consider the types of sentences available, the 

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applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing 

Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to 

provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(3)–(7). A defendant’s criminal history 

“fits squarely” into the § 3553(a) category that requires the district court to 

consider the history and characteristics of the defendant. United States v. Williams, 

526 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

The district court may “determine, on a case-by-case basis, the weight to 

give the Guidelines, so long as that determination is made with reference to the 

remaining section 3553(a) factors that the court must also consider in calculating 

the defendant’s sentence.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1217. The weight accorded to any 

one § 3553(a) factor is a matter “committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court,” and it may attach “great weight” to one factor over others. Rosales-Bruno, 

789 F.3d at 1254. However, a district court’s unjustified reliance on a single 

§ 3553(a) factor may be a “symptom” of unreasonableness. United States v. Pugh, 

515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion and 

imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it “(1) fails to afford 

consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error 

of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The 

district court is not required to explicitly address each of the § 3553(a) factors or 

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all of the mitigating evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th 

Cir. 2007). 

Hood’s sentence is substantively reasonable. The fact that his sentence falls

well below the statutory maximum applicable to four of his convictions and below 

his guideline imprisonment range indicates as much. The district court 

demonstrated that it properly applied several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in 

exercising its discretion to vary downward from Hood’s guideline imprisonment 

range, including by considering his difficult upbringing, his lack of remorse for his 

offense, his extensive and violent criminal history, the impact that his offense had 

on its victims, the violent nature of his offense, and the danger that he posed to the 

public. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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