alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Samuel Robert QUEEN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Conrad GRABER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-35154

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed July 3, 2017

Samuel Robert Queen, Jr., Pro Se

Natalie K. Wight, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

**The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Samuel Robert Queen, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition for failure to prosecute. We dismiss.

In denying Queen’s motion for reconsideration, the district court granted Queen leave to file an amended petition within 30 days. Rather than filing an amended petition, Queen immediately filed a notice of appeal. Because the district court’s order denying Queen’s motion for reconsideration granted Queen leave to amend his petition, the order was not a final decision and we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1291; *WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller,*104 F.3d 1133, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (when a district court expressly grants leave to amend, it is plain that the order is not final).

The Clerk is directed to send a courtesy copy of this decision directly to the cham-. bers of the Honorable Ann L. Aiken.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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Cite as: Opinion No. 00-032 (December 18, 2000) (unpublished)

G AMING ) B INGO ) C HARITABLE O RGANIZATION M UST O BTAIN P ERMIT TO C ONDUCT C HARITABLE B INGO E VENT IN C ALVERT C OUNTY

December 18, 2000

Mr. Emanuel Demedis, Esquire County Attorney for Calvert County

Mr. Robert B. Riddle, Esquire State’s Attorney for Calvert County

You have requested our opinion as to whether a volunteer fire department, or a fraternal, civic, war veterans’, religious, or charitable organization or corporation must obtain

a permit from the Board of County Commissioners before conducting a charitable bingo event in Calvert County. In your letter, a copy of which is attached, you state your opinion that such an organization must obtain a permit.

We have carefully reviewed the matter and agree with your analysis and conclusions. We have also reviewed the legislative history of the two statutes referenced in your letter. Briefly, in 1969 the Legislature amended Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27, §255, to authorize charitable organizations in Calvert County to conduct carnivals, bazaars, or raffles and to award prizes “by such devices as ... bingo.” Chapter 617, Laws of Maryland 1969. No permitting process was established at that time. The next year, the Legislature enacted Article 27, §259A, which created a licensing regime for commercial bingo in Calvert County, but excluded charitable organizations “authorized by law to operate any such game,” presumably referring to the legislation passed the previous year. Chapter 575, Laws of Maryland 1970. Finally, in 1989 the General Assembly added the permitting process for charitable gaming events in Calvert County that now appears in Article 27, §255(i). Chapter 198, Laws of Maryland 1989. There was no explicit exception in that bill (House Bill 442) of bingo operated by a charitable organization. Although there is a brief reference in the floor report for that bill to the licensing provisions for commercial bingo in Article 27,1 In your letter you note that bingo operated by charitable organizations has historically

been exempted from the permitting process in Calvert County, but that you have been unable
to ascertain the reason for that practice. Should you obtain more information concerning the origin of the past practice, we would consider that information in our evaluation of the issue, although it would not necessarily affect the conclusion. §259A, there is no indication in the legislative file that the General Assembly intended to exempt charitable bingo from the permit process that the legislation established. 1

We note that this analysis does not apply to other political subdivisions in the State, because the laws regulating bingo and other forms of gaming differ among various jurisdictions.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General

Robert N. McDonald Chief Counsel Opinions & Advice

For a copy of the attachment email:opinions@oag.state.md.us
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JAMES ROBERT ELLIOT,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 13

- 00034

- CR

Appeal from the

432nd District Court

of Tarrant County, Texas

(TC#1274489D)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the written judgment of

conviction should be modified to conform with the trial court’s oral pronouncement imposing a

sentence of thirty years’ confinement. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court as

modified. This decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2014.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.

Rivera, J., not participating
#### William S. SMITH, Jr., also named as William S Smith; Sue K. Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, named as Internal Revenue Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15820

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

William S. Smith, Jr., Pro Se

Sue K. Smith, Pro Se

Bridget Maria Rowan, Attorney, Karen G. Gregory, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William S. Smith, Jr., and Sue K. Smith appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their tax refund action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Reynoso v. United States,*692 F.3d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because the Smiths failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they are entitled to a refund for the 2009 tax year. *See United States v. Janis,*428 U.S. 433, 440, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (taxpayer bears burden of proving amount he or she is entitled to recover); *Vukasovich, Inc. v. Comm’r,*790 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that Congress intended to “to tax all gains except those specifically exempted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the computerized records of the Internal Revenue *884Service (“IRS”). *See Hughes v. United States,*953 F.2d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and holding that IRS documents certified under seal are self-authenticating under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(1)).

We reject as without merit the Smiths’ argument that the district court erred in relying on the IRS’s statement of facts supporting summary judgment.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Defendant’s motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

LS/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD GAYER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 08-17122

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00799-NVW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 11, 2010** 

Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Richard Gayer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

for lack of standing his action seeking to revoke the tax exempt status of his

FILED

JAN 22 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LS/Research 2

neighborhood association. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo, Rattlesnake Coal. v. U.S. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.

2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Gayer lacked standing to

challenge the association’s tax exempt status because he failed to show an injury in

fact, that the tax exempt status caused the alleged injury, and that a favorable

decision revoking the tax exempt status would likely redress the alleged injury. 

See DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 465 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006)

(stating the three requirements for constitutional standing); see also Thomas v.

Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring the plaintiff to have suffered

an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest).

Contrary to Gayer’s contention, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)

does not establish standing to bring this action. See DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. P’ship, 465

F.3d at 1038 (explaining that to establish standing to sue under the APA, a party

must first meet constitutional standing requirements and also show that the injury

falls within the zone of interests of the statute). 

Moreover, the district court’s decision to dismiss the action without leave to

amend was proper. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv.

Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal without
LS/Research 3

leave to amend where plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure

deficiencies and amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2



Written Statement of Executive Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906

of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)



The
undersigned, the Executive Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (the Authority), hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, on the date hereof:



| | (a) |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Authority for the Quarter and Nine Months Ended June 30, 2003 filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) |  | information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Authority.
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    JEFFREY E.
HARTMANNJeffrey E. Hartmann Executive
Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer August 7, 2003




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Authority and will be retained by the Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Carlos Tramell RUSSELL, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-31077 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed May 26, 2017

Carol Mignonne Griffing, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Carlos Tramell Russell, Pro Se

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos Tramell Russell has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 *825L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Russell has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Russell’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Code      of Ethics**

| ·   | Honest                and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or                apparent                conflicts of interest between personal and professional                relationships; |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | Full,                fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports                and                documents that we file with, or submit to, the SEC and in other public                communications made by Maxlife; |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | Compliance                with applicable governmental laws, rules and                regulations; |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | The                prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appropriate                person or persons identified in the code;                and |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | Accountability                for adherence to the code. |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
#### Commonwealth, Appellant, *v.*Roher.

Argued March 31, 1953.

Before Stern, C. J., Stearne, Jones, Chidsey, Musmanno and Arnold, JJ.

*410
      *Randolph C. Ryder,*Deputy Attorney General, with him *Robert B. Greer, Jr.,*and *Robert E. Woodside,*Attorney General, for appellant.

No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.

April 22, 1953:

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne,

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the court of common pleas setting aside a suspension by the Secretary of Revenue of an operator’s license for operating a motor vehicle. The offense charged was speed on a public highway at seventy miles per hour where the maximum lawful speed limit was fifty miles per hour.

What we said in *Commonwealth v. Emerick,*373 Pa. 388, 96 A. 2d 370, relating to legal principles and the construction of The Vehicle Code, has similar application to the facts in the present case.

George W. Roher, defendant, was charged by a state policeman with traveling on a state highway on May 25, 1951, at 12:30 p.m., at seventy miles per hour. Defendant’s car was stopped at a' red light, with the state police car and two others in line behind him. Some one called from defendant’s car, “Do you want to race”? Upon the change of light defendant raced along the highway, ignoring and passing through a thirty-five-mile-an-hour speed' sign, and was “clocked” at' 70 miles per hour. Defendant was twenty-six years of age, married, with two children, and had been licensed for nearly 11 years. The reason he assigns for the violation was “to gét to work.” He testified that-he had -never- been *411arrested before. He said he was not watching the speedometer bnt did pass “a lot of cars.”

The learned court below revoked the Secretary of Revenue’s order of suspension solely upon the ground of economic hardship. In the order the court said: “. . . it appears that the petitioner has been a licensed operator for better than ten years, and that the present speeding charge is the sole violation on his driving record.

“The testimony further discloses that there was no accident at the time of the speeding charge.

> “It further appears from the testimony that the petitioner is a married man with children and is the operator of a sawmill, and that he would be unable to operate his business without a driver’s license.”

Such an order, in the circumstances of this case, constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion.

The order is reversed at the cost of the appellee.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Exhibit 27

                      Financial Data Schedule

 "This schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from September 30, 1999 10QSB and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements."
</LEGEND>

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                  SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                        20,923
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 256,752
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   11,299,404
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        49,937
<DEPRECIATION>                (173,872)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                10,204,480
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         0
<BONDS>                       16,300
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   1,312
<COMMON>                      48,217
<OTHER-SE>                    9,972,772
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  10,204,480
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              0
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 61,635
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (185,507)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (185,507)
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  (185,507)
<EPS-BASIC>                 .000
<EPS-DILUTED>                 .000


</TABLE>
# EUR-Lex - 32001D0475 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D0475

**2001/475/EC: Commission Decision of 12 June 2001 on the inventory of wine production potential presented by Italy pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 (notified under document number C(2001) 1581) **

*
Official Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0032 - 0032 *

Commission Decision

of 12 June 2001

on the inventory of wine production potential presented by Italy pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999

(notified under document number C(2001) 1581)

(Only the Italian text is authentic)

(2001/475/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine(1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2826/2000(2), and in particular Article 23(4) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 provides for the presentation of an inventory of wine production potential. Access to the regularisation of unlawfully planted areas, the increase in planting rights and support for restructuring and conversion are subject to prior presentation of this inventory.

(2) Article 19 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1227/2000 of 31 May 2000 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine, as regards production potential(3) sets out details of the information to be included in the inventory.

(3) By letters of 31 July 2000, 28 September 2000, 20 November 2000, 18 December 2000, 12 and 29 January 2001, 10, 13, 23 and 24 April 2001 and 2 May 2001, Italy sent the Commission the information referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999. Examination of this information shows that Italy has compiled the inventory for the regions listed in Article 1.

(4) This Decision does not entail recognition by the Commission of the accuracy of the information contained in the inventory or of the compatibility of the legislation referred to in the inventory with Community law. It is without prejudice to any future Commission decision on these points.

(5) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Commission notes that Italy has compiled the inventory referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 for the following regions and autonomous provinces:

1. Abruzzo

2. Basilicata

3. Calabria

4. Campania

5. Emilia-Romagna

6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia

7. Lazio

8. Liguria

9. Lombardy

10. Marche

11. Molise

12. Piedmont

13. Apulia

14. Sardinia

15. Sicily

16. Tuscany

17. Trento

18. Umbria

19. Veneto

20. Valle d'Aosta

21. Bolzano.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic.

Done at Brussels, 12 June 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 179, 14.7.1999, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 328, 23.12.2000, p. 2.

(3) OJ L 143, 16.6.2000, p. 1.