IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2015-CP-00069-COA ELLE ADAMS A/K/A ELLE AQUILERA A/KA ELLIE ADAMS A/K/A ELLE AGUNDIS APPELLANT

v. JOHN LEON RICE APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/23/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DOROTHY W INSTON COLOM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELLE A. ADAMS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MARK G. W ILLIAMSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: VISITATION AND JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY GRANTED DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/28/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ. JAMES, J., FOR THE COURT:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶1. John Rice and Elle Adam s m et in 2011 on a dating website. Thereaf ter, they m et in
person at Books-A-Million i n Colum bus, Mississippi. At that tim e, Rice was em ploy ed as

a police of

f i cer with the Colum

bus Police Departme n t

. According to Rice, he and Adam s began dating, and h e eventually m oved in with Adam s and h er two daughters. Her d aughters

were ages three a nd f

i f teen. A dam s gave R ice a key to the h om e, and Rice claim ed that he of ten kept Adam s’s two c hildren. Adam s, however, denies ever dating Rice and livingtogether. Adam s c laim ed that Rice would of t e n com e over, uninvited and intoxicated. Adam s did adm it that she gave R ice a key , but she testif ied t hat she asked Rice t o return the key and e v e n contacted his em p loy er to have it returned. A ccording to Adam s, Rice was violent, neglectf

ul, and an alcoholic. ¶2. Rice and Adam s’s relationship, n e v e r t h e l e ss, resulted i n t he birth of their son on Septem ber 19, 2013. Rice claim ed that he continued to l ive with Adam s until their son was about a m o nth old. According to Rice, they b egan t o have problem s once he ref used to m arry Adam s . Rice claim e d that A dam s threatened to take the child to M exico and “adopt the child out.” Rice testif

ied that h e m oved out of Adam s’s hom e shortly thereaf ter. Adam s, on other hand, testif

ied that their son was the result of Rice raping her. ¶3. On Decem

ber, 3 0 , 2013, Rice f

iled a petition to e stablis h p a t e r n i t y , custody , and support of their son in t he C hancery Court of O ktibbeha County , Mississippi. Rice initially wanted c u s t o d y , but that issue was later narrowed down to visitation privileges. On Septem ber 3, 2014, Adam s f

iled a counterclaim f

or custody , child support, and the m edical

costs incurred in the birth of the c hild. The trial was held on S eptem ber 4, 2 014. At that t im e the child was eleven m onths old. ¶4. At trial, Rice called t hree w it n e s s e s t o testif y on his behalf

. Two testif

ied that they had been to the hom e that Rice and Adam s shared and had observed their relationship. One witness also testif

i ed t hat Rice had brought Adam s’s y oungest daughter to her of f ice, and the child appeared to be c om f ortable with Rice. The chancellor f o u n d all three witnesses’ testim o ny to be credible.

2¶5. The c hancellor also f ound that the three witnesses’ stateme nts were highly relevant because A dam s claim ed that Rice’s visitation sh o u l d b e s u pervised if a warded. Adam s testif i ed t hat any visits R ice m ade to his f riends w hile he had h er y ounger daughter were done without her perm ission. Adam s also accused Rice of having a strong attachm ent to “y oung girls.” A dam s’s o ldest daughter and two of her daughter’s f riend s t estif

ied on Adam s’s behalf . The chancellor, however, f ound that their testim ony lacked credibility

. ¶6. The chancellor, theref ore, awarded both parties joint l egal custody of the child, with phy sical custod y r em aining with Adam s. T he chancellor e stablished a v isitation schedule and ordered Rice to pay child support. The c hancellor ordered Rice to pay one-half of the hospital m edical expenses associated with the birth of t he c hild. She a lso o rdered Rice to pay f if teen hundred dollars t o Starkville W om en’s C linic f or services in connection with the birth of the child. Adam s now appeals to this Court. DISCUSSION ¶7. As with m ost issues concerning c hildren, our s tandard of review is lim ited. Floyd v. Floyd , 9 49 So. 2 d 2 6, 28 (¶5) (Miss. 2007). T he chancery court is granted b road discretion in m aking its d eterm i nation o f what is in t he best interest of the child. Ellis v. Ellis , 840 So. 2d 806, 812 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). A c c o r d i ngly , “this Court will not reverse a chancery court' s f

actual f indings

. . . where t h e r e is substantial evidence in the record supporting [ them ].” Floyd , 949 So. 2d at 28 (¶5) (citations om itted). ¶8. W e f

irst note that A dam s’s brief is largely incoherent and l acks proper citations to the record. According t o Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 8(a)(6), “the argum ent shall

3contain the contentions of [ the] appellant with respect to the issues presented, a n d the reasons

f or those contentions, with citations to the a u thorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” T his Court is not r equired to review any i ssues t h at are not properly supported by

reasons a n d a u t h o r i t y . O’Hara v. Robinson , 904 So. 2d 1 110, 1111 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). N evertheless, because this appeal touches on the welf are of a m i nor child, we review the m erits of

this action. 1. Visitation and Joint Legal Custody ¶9. Adam s argues that the chancery cou r t e r r e d b y g iving Rice unsupervised visitation and joint legal custody

. W e f

ind that it did not. The chancellor’s param o unt concern m ust be the best interest of

the child, but t he c hancellor also should alway s be attentive to the rights of the noncustodial parent, recognizing the need to m aintain a healthy , loving re l a t i o n ship between the child and the noncustodial parent. Ellis , 840 So. 2d a t 812 (¶24). The chancery

court has great discretion in m a king a determ ination of what is in the b est interest of the child

as it relates to v isitation issues. Id

. The law is well settled that a noncustodial parent is reasonably entitled to m ore than lim ited and short periods of v i s i t a t i o n ; restrictions o n a noncustodial parent’s visitation privileges should only be ordered on a l im ited b asis. Fields v. Fields , 830 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). ¶10. There was conf

l icting testim ony as to w hy it w ould be in the best i nterest of the child

t h a t R ice’s visitation schedule be supervised. The chancellor determ ined that these i s s u e s of f act f a vored Rice based on the evidence bef ore the court. ¶11. Likewise, t he award of joi n t l e g a l c u s t o dy was within the chancellor’s discretion.

4Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-24(3) (Rev. 2013). Contrary t o Adam s’s argum ent, the chancellor

did not abuse her discretion i n not considering the Albright f actors. 1 “[ T]he Albright f actors

are r equired only where phy sical cu s t o d y i s a t issue; the chancellor’s decision as to the child’s best interest as t o legal custody alone is less regim ented.” Palculict v. Palculict , 22 So. 3d 293, 298 (¶20) (Miss. C t. A pp. 2009). Adam s f ailed to of

f er credible corroboration that Rice was a threat to the child or could not provide care and support f or the child. The chancellor also determ ined that Adam s harbored hostility towards Rice and Rice only wanted

a viable r elationship with his c hild. Thus w e f ind no abus e o f d i s c retion in this case, and these issues are without m e rit. 2. Guardian ad Litem ¶12. Adam s next argues that the chancellor com m itted reversible e r ror because she did not appoint a guardian ad l i t em . I n support of her argum ent Adam s cites Floyd, 949 So. 2 d at 278 (¶8). Floyd , however, is not applicable to this c ase. In F loyd , t he chancery court, acting

on its own m otion, appointed a g uardian ad litem af ter the child m ade a llegations of abuse. The case at hand is not f

a ctually sim ilar to Floyd

. ¶13. There i s nothing i n t h e r e c o r d i ndicating that either party asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed or t hat the chancery court, acting o n its own m otion, appointed a guardian ad litem

. W hile Adam s did accuse Rice of abusing h er, she n ever a c cused Rice of abusing their child, and the c h a n cellor, theref ore, was not o bligated to appoint a guardian ad litem under Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-121(1) (Rev. 2 015). Adam s cannot now

1 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 , 1 0 0 5 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 ). 5com

plain of m atters she f

ailed to r aise at trial. A party is not allowed t o raise an issue f or the f irst tim e on appeal. Luse v
. Luse , 992 So. 2d 6 59, 663 (¶12) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2 008) (citations

om itted). Accordingly , this issue is procedurally barred. 3. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcem e n t Act (UCCJEA) ¶14. Adam s argues that the chancery cou r t e r r e d i n deny ing her m o tion t o dism iss f or f orum non conveniens. “A c ourt of this state which has juris d i c t i o n u n d e r this chapter to

m ake a child custody determ ination m a y d ecline t o exercise its jurisdiction at any tim e if it determ ines that it i s an inconvenient f orum unde r t h e c i rcum stances and that a court of another state is a m ore appropriate f orum .” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-207(1) (Rev. 2013). Adam s quotes sections of the UCCJEA but provides this Court with no explanation as to why the chancellor should have decline d j u risdiction. Likewise, Adam s f ails to cite any case authority to support her argum ent. Adam s m erely concludes that one f actor weighs in her f avor. ¶15. We are w ell aware that the chancery c ourt could have declined jurisdi c t i o n u n d e r section 93-27-207, but that still does not explain why that would have been necessary in this

case. First, the record shows that t h is action began when Adam s w as still a resident of Mississippi, and Adam s was served at her hom e in Mississippi. 2 Accordingly , under section 93-27-201(1)(a) o f the M ississippi Code Ann o tated (Rev. 2 013), the c hancery court had jurisdiction bec a u s e M i s s i s s ippi was the h om e state of the child on the d ate of the

2 W e can n o t d ete r mi n e h o w lo n g A d am s r esid ed in A lab am a b e f o re t h e trial o n S ep tem b er 4 , 2 0 1 4

. A d am s, h o w e v er, d id m o v e to A lab am a so m e t im e af ter sh e w as serv ed at h er h o m e in C o lu m

b u s, M ississip p i , o n Jan u ary 2 3 , 2 0 1 4

. 6c o mmencem ent of the proceedings. Secondly , the record shows that all of the witnesse s ,

including two of Adam s’s witnesses, resided in the s tate of Mississippi. Additionally , all of the issues that were raised in both parties’ claim s occurred in Mississippi. Lastly , the m otion

to dism iss f

or f o rum non conveniens was m a de on the day of trial, when both parties and their witnesses were present and ready to proceed. The c h ancellor had personal jurisdiction

over the parties and did not err in exercising jurisdiction over this m atter, because Mississippi was the m ost convenient f o r um . This issue is without m erit. ¶16. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E C H A N C E R Y C O U R T O F O K T I B B E H A C O U N T Y IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEA L A R E ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C .J., IRVING A N D G R I F F I S , P . J J., ISHEE, C ARLTON, FAIR, W ILSON AND G REENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., C ONCURS IN P ART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

7