alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3.1

                  AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED BY-LAWS
                                       OF
                             SUPERIOR SERVICES, INC.

       Effective  July 27, 1999,  the Board of  Directors of Superior  Services,
Inc. has amended its By-laws (the "By-laws")  adopted as of November 29, 1995 as
follows:

1.     Section  3.01 of the  By-laws  is  amended  to read  in its  entirety  as
       follows:

              ss. 3.01. General Powers; Number, Tenure and Qualifications.

                     All  corporate  powers  shall be  exercised by or under the
              authority of, and the Corporation's  business and affairs shall be
              managed under the direction of, the Board of Directors.

                     The  number  of  directors  shall be fixed by a  resolution
              adopted  by a majority  of the  directors  then in  office,  or by
              amendment  of these  By-laws,  but in no event shall there be less
              than five (5) directors, and a decrease in the number of directors
              shall not  shorten  the term of office of an  incumbent  director.
              Each director  shall hold office until the next annual  meeting of
              shareholders and until his or her successor shall has been elected
              and, if necessary,  qualified, or until there is a decrease in the
              number of directors which takes effect after the expiration of his
              term, or until his or her prior death, resignation or removal.

2.     Section  3.12 of the  By-laws  is  amended  to read  in its  entirety  as
       follows:

              3.12. Vacancies.

                     Any vacancy occurring on the Board of Directors,  including
              a vacancy created by an increase in the number of directors, shall
              be filled by the Board of Directors. If the directors remaining in
              office  constitute  fewer  than a quorum  of the  Board,  then the
              vacancy shall be filled by the  affirmative  vote of a majority of
              all directors  remaining in office.  Any director  elected to fill
              such vacancy shall serve as a director  until the next election of
              directors,  and until his or her  successor  shall be elected  and
              qualified.




                                      -1-
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-150-CV

DAVID IRVIN, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR APPELLANT

OF ESTATE OF W. RAY IRVIN, JR.

V.

LORETTA PARKER, AS ADMINISTRATOR APPELLEE

WITH WILL ANNEXED OF ESTATE 

OF NOMA BISHOP IRVIN

----------

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.1 OF WICHITA COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered the “Agreed Motion To Dismiss Appeal And Joint

Motion For Nonsuit/Dismissal Of Under-Lying Suit.” Because all of appellant’s

claims were fully and finally adjudicated by the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment, that judgment cannot be vitiated by way of a non-suit.

Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995).

Accordingly, we deny the parties’ request for a non-suit.
Nonetheless, the parties have jointly requested that this court dismiss this

appeal with prejudice. It is therefore the court’s opinion that the motion should

be granted. This appeal is dismissed with prejudice. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.1(a)(2), Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by the party incurring the same, for

which let execution issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN and GARDNER, JJ.

DELIVERED: September 18, 2008
#### Raymond Concrete Pile Company, Respondent, *v.*Federation Bank and Trust Company, Appellant.

Reargued January 19, 1943;

decided March 4, 1943.

*Horace R. Lamb*for plaintiff-respondent on reargument.

*John W. Davis, Morris Buchter, Sidney Abrams*and *Harold M. Hoffman*for defendant-appellant on reargument.

Upon reargument, the court adheres to its original decision, *viz:*Judgment of Appellate Division reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division. No opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ.
#### Tanyitaku Clovis NWANNA, a/k/a Clovis Tanyi Taku; Marcelene Forton Ebangha, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-2238

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 4, 2017

Decided: June 14, 2017

William Payne, PAYNE *&*ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jesse Lloyd Busen, Office *757of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before TRAXLER and KEENAN, • Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tanyitaku Clovis Nwanna and Marcel-ene Forton Ebangha, natives and citizens of Cameroon, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying their motion to reopen. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

Before this court, the Petitioners seek to challenge the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination and the agency’s underlying denial of their applications for relief. Only the Board’s denial of the Petitioners’ motion to reopen is properly before us, however, as the Petitioners failed to timely petition this court for review of the Board’s decision of May 20, 2016. The Petitioners had 30 days from the date of this initial decision to timely file a petition for review. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2012). This time period is “jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to [its] terms.” *Stone v. INS,*514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). The filing of a motion to reopen with the Board does not toll the 30-day period for seeking review of an underlying decision. *Id.*at 394, 115 S.Ct. 1537. Accordingly, we now limit our review to the propriety of the Board’s denial of the Petitioners’ motion to reopen, and we dismiss the petition for review to the extent the Petitioners challenge the earlier decision.

Turning to the Board’s denial of the Petitioners’ motion to reopen, we have reviewed the Petitioners’ claims in conjunction with the administrative record and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2016); *Mosere v. Mukasey,*552 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in part for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Nwanna*(B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART*
#### Christopher Lee CALLAHAM, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold CLARKE, Director, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-7658

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

Christopher Lee Callaham, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lee Callaham seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find *815that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). “When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85,120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Callaham has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Callaham’s motion for a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. '

*DISMISSED*
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 6679 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to aliens who 

carried out, participated in, planned, financed, supported, or otherwise 

facilitated the attacks against Israel. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 7, 2023 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect 

to aliens who carried out, participated in, planned, financed, supported, or otherwise facilitated the attacks 

against Israel. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Immigration Bene5 fits for Hamas Terrorists Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 6679 IH

1 SEC. 2. ALIENS WHO CARRIED OUT, PARTICIPATED IN, 

2 PLANNED, FINANCED, SUPPORTED, OR OTH3 ERWISE FACILITATED ATTACKS AGAINST 

4 ISRAEL. 

5 (a) PARTICIPANTS IN HAMAS TERRORISM AGAINST

6 ISRAEL.—Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Na7 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended— 

8 (1) in subparagraph (B)(i), in the matter fol9 lowing subclause (IX)— 

10 (A) by inserting ‘‘Palestinian Islamic 

11 Jihad, or Hamas’’ after ‘‘Palestine Liberation 

12 Organization’’; and 

13 (B) by inserting ‘‘member,’’ after ‘‘rep14 resentative,’’; and 

15 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

16 ‘‘(H) PARTICIPANTS IN HAMAS TERRORISM

17 AGAINST ISRAEL.—Any alien who carried out, 

18 participated in, planned, financed, afforded ma19 terial support to, or otherwise facilitated any of 

20 the attacks against Israel initiated by Hamas 

21 beginning on October 7, 2023, is inadmissible.’’. 

22 (b) INELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF.—Section 241(b)(3) 

23 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

24 1231(b)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the fol25 lowing: 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
3 

•HR 6679 IH

1 ‘‘(D) INELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF.—An 

2 alien who carried out, participated in, planned, 

3 financed, afforded material support to, or other4 wise facilitated any of the attacks against Israel 

5 initiated by Hamas beginning on October 7, 

6 2023, shall be ineligible for relief under the im7 migration laws, including under this section, 

8 section 208, and section 2242 of the Omnibus 

9 Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Ap10 propriations Act, 1999 (and any regulations 

11 issued pursuant to such section).’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 15

                     INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REVIEW REPORT

The Board of Directors and Stockholders
NCS HealthCare, Inc. and Subsidiaries


We have reviewed the accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheet of NCS
HealthCare, Inc. and subsidiaries (the Company) as of December 31, 1997, the
related condensed consolidated statements of income for the three-month and
six-month periods ended December 31, 1997 and 1996 and the condensed
consolidated statements of cash flows for the six-month periods ended December
31, 1997 and 1996. These financial statements are the responsibility of the
Company's management.

We conducted our reviews in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review of interim
financial information consists principally of applying analytical procedures to
financial data, and making inquiries of persons responsible for financial and
accounting matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, which will be performed
for the full year with the objective of expressing an opinion regarding the
financial statements taken as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an
opinion.

Based on our reviews, we are not aware of any material modifications that should
be made to the accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements referred
to above for them to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.

We have previously audited, in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, the consolidated balance sheet of NCS HealthCare, Inc. and
subsidiaries as of June 30, 1997, and the related consolidated statements of
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the year then ended, not
presented herein, and in our report dated August 1, 1997, we expressed an
unqualified opinion on those consolidated financial statements. In our opinion,
the information set forth in the accompanying condensed consolidated balance
sheet as of June 30, 1997 is fairly stated, in all material respects, in
relation to the consolidated balance sheet from which it has been derived.


Cleveland, Ohio                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
January 28, 1998


                                      14
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 
the Company's 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements. 
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             28
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   2,750
<ALLOWANCES>                                       32
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    0
<PP&E>                                              5
<DEPRECIATION>                                      2
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  3,524
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               0
<BONDS>                                         2,610
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                        482
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    3,524
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  109
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      24
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    5
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    4
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 45
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    31
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                20
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                       20
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of AgriSolar Solutions, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 (the "Report"), I, Liang Chao Wei, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations. /s/Liang Chao Wei Liang Chao Wei, Chief Executive Officer  Date: July 14, 2011
#### Avinash B. KULKARNI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55132

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed June 30, 2017

Avinash B. Kulkarni, Pro Se

David Pinchas, USLA—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Avinash B. Kulkarni appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) action arising out of his request for documents relating to his son’s passport application. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo. *Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,*836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Kulkarni failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant did not establish that the withheld documents were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of FOIA. *Sexe*5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (explaining that FOIA does “not apply to ... personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); *Cameranesi v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,*856 F.3d 626, 637-39 (9th Cir. 2017) (in determining whether Exemption 6 applies, courts first “evaluate the personal privacy interest at stake to ensure that disclosure implicates a personal privacy interest that is nontrivial or more than de minimis,” and then balance any such privacy interest with the “public interest in disclosure” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alternations omitted)). To the extent that Kulkarni challenges the sufficiency of the search for documents, we reject Kulkarni’s challenge as unsupported by the record. *See Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*797 F.3d 759, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth requirements for demonstrating adequacy of search for documents).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kulkarni’s motion for sanctions because Kulkarni failed to identify any conduct warranting sanctions. *See Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp.,*606 F.3d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review).

We reject as meritless Kulkarni’s contention that the district court committed legal error in not addressing his challenge to the then-operative FOIA regulations.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *897*See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Kulkami’s motion to review and enjoin (Docket Entry No. 29) and motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 32) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### David ARENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jen FONTAINE; Arshad Tariq, Dr., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15419

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

David Arenberg, Pro Se

Michael E. Gottfried, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Jen Fontaine

Catherine Mitsuld, Asuncion, Jeffry A. Miller, Attorney, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Diego, CA, Venus Booth, Counsel, James K. Kloss, Attorney, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Ar-shad Tariq

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Former Arizona state prisoner David Arenberg appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Tariq because Arenberg failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tar-iq was deliberately indifferent to Aren-berg’s rashes. *See id.*at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

To the extent Arenberg contends that he alleged a separate First Amendment retaliation claim, we reject this contention as unsupported by the record.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.