Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CC-239 | November 7, 2018 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Curtis Pearman

Naples, Florida

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

John R. Maley

Leah L. Seigel

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Curtis Pearman, d/b/a Forest 

Park-Pearman,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Rande Martin and R.L. Martin 

Associates, Inc. d/b/a 

Management Recruiters of 

Richmond,

Appellees-Plaintiffs

November 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CC-239

Appeal from the Wayne Superior 

Court

The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

89D02-1508-CC-524

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CC-239 | November 7, 2018 Page 2 of 16

[1] Curtis Pearman d/b/a Forest Park-Pearman (Pearman) leased commercial 

property to Rande L. Martin and R.L. Martin Associates, Inc. d/b/a 

Management Recruiters of Richmond (collectively, Martin). Pearman, pro se, 

appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Martin.

On appeal, Pearman presents nine issues, which we consolidate and restate as

the following two: 

1. Did the trial court err in concluding that Martin did not 

exercise the option to extend the lease agreement between 

the parties?

2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the status of 

Martin’s holdover tenancy at the time of termination was 

month-to-month and that therefore, Martin provided 

sufficient notice for terminating his tenancy of the leased 

premises?

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts & Procedural History1

[3] In April of 2006 Martin was a commercial tenant in the Forest Park Building 

when it was purchased by Pearman. In January 2008, the parties entered into a 

 

1

Pearman’s statement of facts consists of a list; it is not presented in narrative form as required by Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(c). Spanning nearly fifteen pages, Pearman’s statement of the case is more akin to a 

statement of facts, albeit that it is not stated in accordance with the standard of review and it includes 

argument and facts not pertinent to the issues on appeal. Pearman also did not set out the course of 

proceedings, see App. R. 46(A)(5), nor did he include the chronological case summary in his appendix as 

required by Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(a). We remind Pearman that pro se litigants are held to the same 

legal standards as licensed attorneys and are bound to follow the established rules of procedure. See Evans v. 

State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CC-239 | November 7, 2018 Page 3 of 16

written lease agreement (the Lease) whereby Martin leased office space located 

in the Forest Park Building from Pearman. The Lease was for a period of 

thirty-eight months, running from February 1, 2008 through March 31, 2011. 

The Lease also contained provisions to automatically adjust the base rent rate 

annually to account for inflation and cost of living changes. The parties agreed 

that annual increases in rent would be tied to the Non-Seasonally Adjusted 

Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI) and that, utilizing the 

November CPI number, an increase in rent for the upcoming year would take 

effect in January. Section 4 of the Lease provided that the Lease could be 

extended beyond the initial term:

The Lessee shall have the option to extend the term of this lease 

for one (1) additional five (5) year period upon the same terms, 

conditions and provisions contained herein, including the 

payment of minimum annual rent indexed to the CPI[] base. ... 

[Martin] must give [Pearman] written notice of its intention to 

exercise the option to extend the term of this lease one hundred 

eighty (180) days prior to the expiration of the initial term herein. 

Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 4 at 3. Martin did not provide the required 180-day 

notice to extend the lease term.

[4] In February 2011, Pearman inquired as to whether Martin intended to remain 

as a tenant beyond the expiration of the Lease on March 31, 2011. Martin 

responded, “Our preference is to remain in our current space. However, we

cannot sustain present cost levels and are exploring other options.” Appellant’s 

Appendix Vol. 5 at 27. Martin indicated that he desired a rent reduction, a 
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reduction in other maintenance expenses, and a renewal term of three years 

rather than the five years provided for in Section 4 of the Lease. 

[5] Thereafter, the parties exchanged emails regarding possible changes to the 

Lease going forward or an entirely new lease. On March 28, 2011, Pearman 

sent a message to Martin offering to reduce the rent by $100.00 per month. 

Martin did not respond to Pearman’s reduced rent offer. After the Lease 

expired, Martin remained in the office space and continued paying rent under 

the terms of the Lease, including the annual increase based on the CPI. 

[6] The parties continued to negotiate lease terms through an exchange of emails. 

Martin continued to seek a reduction in rent and other expenses and a shorter 

extension period, and Pearman indicated that he would consider Martin’s 

requests, but that it would “be on an addendum.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 4 at 

41. Martin responded that he “would prefer a new lease agreement” but would 

accept the changes through an addendum if they could reach an agreement. Id. 

at 13. According to Martin, he and Pearman were close to an agreement in 

June 2011 that called for a rent reduction of $175 per month, but they could not 

agree on a renewal term.

[7] On July 15, 2011, Pearman sent a message and attached for Martin’s signature 

an “Addendum” that provided for a reduction to Martin’s rent.2 Id. at 15. In a 

subsequent email to his property manager, Pearman indicated that he had not 

 

2 The Addendum is not in the record, but Pearman summarized the contents in the body of his email.
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yet provided “a new written Lease” to Martin. Id. at 16. On August 31, 2011, 

Pearman indicated in yet another email to his property manager that there was 

“not yet a new Lease” with Martin and that a “new agreement including his 

reduction in rent was offered contingent upon him being current” with his lease 

payments. Id. at 17. 

[8] On November 1, 2011, Pearman stated in an email to Martin, “I have finally 

found the time and energy to prepare the lease that I promised to get to you”. 

Id. at 18. In the body of the email, Pearman noted that the new lease 

agreement included a rent reduction and that, per Martin’s request, the term 

length had been “reduced”. Id. Martin did not sign the new proposed lease 

agreement because he wanted to further discuss some of the provisions with 

Pearman. 

[9] On January 4, 2012, Pearman sent an email to Martin, noting that the 

“proposed lease offer expired when [he] did not receive [Martin’s] timely 

acceptance of that proposal.” Id. at 40. Pearman further pointed out that he 

had “already temporarily both decreased [Martin’s] rent and waived . . . late 

payment fees, absorbed several costs such as HVAC service/repairs” and 

incurred additional building expenses, a portion of which Martin should have 

been responsible for as a tenant. Id. Pearman informed Martin that he would 

not consider “any further concessions to the terms of our existing lease 

agreement. So, the remaining approximate 4 years of the lease can stay as it is 

currently configured.” Id. No further discussions were had between the parties. 
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[10] On January 24, 2012, Pearman’s property manager sent a letter to Martin 

advising him of the annual increase in rent as calculated in the same manner as 

prior years under the terms of the Lease. Thereafter, Martin paid the increased 

amount and remained in possession of the leased premises throughout 2012. 

On April 27, 2013, Martin sent a letter to Pearman in which he provided notice 

that he was going to vacate the premises as of May 31, 2013. Pearman was 

unsuccessful in finding a new tenant for the commercial space previously rented 

by Martin. 

[11] On August 12, 2015, Pearman filed suit against Martin. Both sides moved for 

summary judgment.3 The trial court held a hearing on the cross-motions for 

summary judgment on August 4, 2016. In an order dated November 14, 2016, 

the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Martin, noting that 

“[t]here really is no dispute between the parties as to the relevant facts” and that 

Martin “did not exercise the option to renew the [Lease].” Appealed Orders at 5, 

9 (emphasis in original).

4 Pearman filed a motion to correct error. After a 

hearing, the trial court issued an order in which it rejected Pearman’s argument 

that Martin exercised the option to extend the Lease by paying the annual 

increased rent. 

 

3

Pearman did not include the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment and their respective 

responses, their designations of evidence, or any briefs in support of their positions in his appendix. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f) (“[t]he appellant’s Appendix shall contain . . . pleadings . . . that are necessary for 

resolution of the issues raised on appeal). 

4

Pearman filed the trial court’s orders under separate cover, titled Appellant’s Appealed Orders, but did not 

sequentially number the pages within this volume. Where necessary, we cite to the electronic page number.
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[12] The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the nature of 

Martin’s holdover tenancy. The trial court held a hearing to consider these 

motions on December 7, 2017. In an order dated December 21, 2017, the trial 

court granted Martin’s motion for summary judgment and denied Pearman’s 

motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the trial court determined that 

where a tenant holds over following a multi-year lease, the result is a fixed, oneyear tenancy. Further, the court determined that any subsequent holdover after 

the one-year term creates a general, month-to-month tenancy that can be 

terminated with thirty days’ notice. The court therefore concluded that Martin 

gave adequate notice and that thereafter, “no further lease term existed and no 

further rent [was] due and owing” from Martin to Pearman. Appealed Orders at 

20. The court entered final judgment in favor of Martin. Pearman now 

appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[13] We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, in the same way as the trial 

court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). We will affirm such 

a ruling only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the designated evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Id. It is a desirable tool to allow courts to dispose of cases, like the instant 

case, where only legal issues exist. Id.

Lease Extension
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[14] The relevant facts in this case are undisputed and our consideration of this 

appeal involves legal issues arising in the area of landlord-tenant law. We begin 

by noting that there is no dispute that Martin did not provide the 180-day 

written notice required by Section 4 of the Lease to extend the lease term. 

Relying upon Norris Ave. Prof’l Bldg. P’ship v. Coordinated Health, LLC, 28 N.E.3d 

296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, Pearman argues that the lease term was 

nevertheless extended for the five-year period when he accepted without 

reservation Martin’s continued rent payments. Martin asserts that he 

undertook no affirmative acts that could be viewed as an acceptance of the fiveyear extension; to the contrary, he maintains that he declined the option to do 

so and sought to negotiate new lease terms. 

[15] In Norris, the tenant agreed to lease certain real property for an initial term of 

two years. The lease agreement provided for two “option terms” of five years 

each. In order to exercise either of the option terms, tenant was to give written 

notice at least sixty days prior to the end of the term of its intent to exercise the 

option. Although the tenant did not provide such notice, the tenant remained 

in possession of the premises after the expiration of the initial lease term and 

continued to pay increased rent equivalent to the amounts specifically set forth 

in the terms governing the option.

5

 After the expiration of the first option, the 

 

5 Rent for the original term was $2250 per month, increasing to $2300 per month for the first year of the 1st 

five (5) year option, $2350 per month for the 2nd year, $2400 for the 3rd year, $2450 for the 4th year, and 

$2500 for the fifth year. The lease agreement provided further monthly increases if the second five-year 

option was exercised.
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tenant again stayed in possession of the leased premises and continued paying 

the increased rent. As a result, the tenant paid about $9000 more than it would 

have paid pursuant to the terms of the initial agreement. 

[16] This court held that where a lease agreement requires notice to the lessor of an 

intention to exercise an option and no notice is provided, the mere holding over 

and payment of rent is insufficient to establish that the lessee has exercised the 

option. Id. Rather, in lieu of the written notice, the lessor must accept another 

affirmative act by the lessee. Id. Applying this rule to the facts, the court 

concluded:

[Tenant] demonstrated its intent to exercise the lease agreement’s 

option terms and, as such, [the tenant] is bound by those terms. 

Although [the tenant] did not satisfy the condition precedent of 

providing the contractual notice to exercise the option terms, it 

manifested its intent by its affirmative act of paying the option 

terms’ rent payments, which were materially different than the 

initial term’s rent payments. And Norris waived the condition 

precedent when it accepted those payments in lieu of the notices. 

Norris, 28 N.E.3d at 303. 

[17] In finding that Martin did not exercise the five-year extension, the trial court 

relied on Norris, but reached a conclusion contrary to that asserted by Pearman. 

The trial court explained:

Here, unlike in Norris, no prior options to renew were ever 

exercised by [Martin]. [Martin] at no time indicated a 

willingness to pay a higher rent and, in fact, the contrary is true. 

[Martin] specifically made it clear that it did not want to or in 
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any manner agree to pay a higher rental amount during the 

option period nor did it want to or in any manner agree to 

remain a tenant for five (5) more years as provided in the written 

option. Finally, and, perhaps, most importantly, the increased 

rent required under the option term was never paid by [Martin]. 

None of the affirmative acts of [the tenant] in the Norris decision 

are present in the matter presently before this court. Importantly, 

Pearman cites this court to no affirmative acts within his 

designated evidence. 

Appealed Orders at 8. 

[18] In a motion to correct error, Pearman pointed to Martin’s continued payment 

of rent after the CPI adjustment as affirmative conduct by Martin evidencing his 

intent to exercise the option. The trial court rejected Pearman’s argument and 

clarified its summary judgment order as follows:

It is true that under the terms of the lease agreement, a CPI 

increase in rent occurred on February 1, 2011 –that date being 

two (2) months prior to the end of the original lease term – which 

[Martin] did pay. To the extent the Court was unclear in its 

summary judgment order to this effect, such matter is corrected 

hereby. The rent did increase –not as a true increase in the base 

rental amount – but only because of a CPI increase that went into 

effect before the expiration of the lease agreement and not 

because of a renegotiated increase in the base rental amount after 

the lease had expired and during the renewal period.

This CPI increase in rent – prior to the expiration of the lease 

term – is not the kind of increase in rent contemplated under 

Indiana law that gives rise to a finding that a tenant has, by such 

action, exercised an option to renew.
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Id. at 11-12. We agree with the trial court. The CPI adjustment was an annual, 

automatic increase in rent that was provided for in the Lease. Martin’s 

payment of the CPI-adjusted rent payments was not materially different than 

the rent paid over the course of the original lease term. Further, the increase in 

Martin’s rent was not brought about by Martin’s holding over. In short, Martin 

merely held over and paid rent in accordance with the terms of the Lease. 

Martin undertook no other affirmative conduct indicating his intent to exercise 

the five-year extension. To the contrary, the record is clear that Martin was 

unwilling to pay an increased rent to stay on the premises for the five-year 

period required by the option. The trial court did not err in granting partial 

summary judgment with regard to Martin’s exercise of the option.

Holdover Period

[19] The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the nature of 

the tenancy created after expiration of the Lease and whether Martin provided 

sufficient notice to terminate such tenancy. As noted above, Martin paid rent 

to Pearman for more than two years after the original lease term expired, at 

which point, Martin gave Pearman one-month’s notice of termination. 

[20] Relying upon Walsh v. Soller, 191 N.E. 334 (Ind. 1934), opinion on reh’g, the trial 

court concluded that after the expiration of the original lease term, Martin’s 

holdover created one one-year tenancy and that any subsequent holdover 
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created a general tenancy that could be terminated with one month’s notice.6 

The trial court also cited Ind. Code § 32-31-1-2, which relates to general 

tenancies, in support of its position. Having determined that the status of the 

tenancy was month-to-month and that Martin gave one month’s notice, the trial 

court concluded that “no further lease term existed and no further rent is due 

and owing.” Appealed Orders at 20. Pearman argues that the one-year tenancy 

created by holding over after the expiration of a multi-year lease could not 

“magically” transition into a month-to-month tenancy for the subsequent 

holdover. Appellant’s Brief at 38. 

[21] When a lessee under a lease for a definite term holds over after the expiration of 

that term, the lessor has the option of treating the lessee as a tenant or a 

trespasser. Mooney-Mueller-Ward, Inc. v. Woods, 371 N.E.2d 400, 403 n. 1 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1978); Burdick Tire & Rubber Co. v. Heylmann, 138 N.E. 777, 778 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1923). In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, when a tenant 

holds over beyond the expiration of the lease and continues to make rental 

payments, and the lessor does not treat the tenant as a trespasser by evicting 

him, the parties are deemed to have continued the tenancy under the terms of 

the expired lease. Marshall v. Hatfield, 631 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1994); City of Bloomington v. Kuruzovich, 517 N.E.2d 408, 411, (Ind. Ct. App. 

1987), trans. denied; Myers v. Maris, 326 N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 

 

6

Pearman does not dispute that a month-to-month tenancy can be terminated with a one-month notice.
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When the original lease was for a year or more, the renewal lease is for a year at 

a time. Marcus v. Calumet Breweries, 73 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1947); see also 

Houston v. Booher, 647 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

[22] In Walsh, supra, the parties entered into a multi-year lease agreement that

terminated at the expiration of the term. The tenant held over for a number of 

years following the expiration of the original lease term with the consent of the 

landlord and without any change in the terms of occupancy. The Indiana 

Supreme Court recognized well-settled law that 

where the duration of the tenancy is definitely fixed by the terms 

of the agreement under which the tenant goes into possession of 

the premises which he is to occupy, and he continues to occupy 

after the close of the term without a new contract, the rights of 

the parties are controlled by the terms and conditions of the 

contract. 

Walsh, 191 N.E. 334 (citing Harry v. Harry, 26 N.E. 562 Ind. 1891)). The Court 

further noted that, “[t]he mere fact that a tenant holds over after the expiration 

of his lease does not create a tenancy from year to year.” Id. (quoting Habich v. 

Univ. Park Bldg. Co., 97 N.E. 539, 542 (Ind. 1912)). With this in mind, the 

Court held that “attendant conditions create a new tenancy, not general or from 

year to year, but certain in point of time—one year—so fixed by the agreed 

notice to quit.” Walsh, 191 N.E. at 335.

[23] Here, the trial court interpreted Walsh to stand for the proposition that only a 

single one-year tenancy is created by holding over after the expiration of a 
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multi-year lease and that any subsequent holding over beyond that one-year 

tenancy created a general tenancy. We read Walsh differently. 

[24] First, we note that the language quoted above is from the Court’s opinion on 

rehearing. In the original Walsh opinion, 190 N.E. 61, 63 (Ind. 1934), the Court 

noted that the tenant’s holding over after the expiration of the original term 

with the consent of the landlord created “in effect, a tenancy from year to year” 

that was subject to the same terms as the original lease agreement, including the 

provision that provided for termination of the tenancy upon expiration. The 

Court held that when the landlord gave notice to quit effective one month prior 

to the end of what would be a one-year tenancy, such notice “amounted to a 

mere reminder of the termination of the lease” as provided by the terms of the 

original lease that remained applicable to the subsequent one-year tenancies 

created by the holding over. Id. Further, in the opinion on rehearing, the Court 

noted that “each holding over was subject to the same terms as to occupancy 

and termination.” Walsh, 191 N.E.at 335. 

[25] We find nothing in the Walsh opinion that stands for the proposition that there 

can only be a single one-year tenancy created after a holding over following the 

expiration of a multi-year lease. To the contrary, the Court acknowledged that 

successive one-year tenancies were created. Id; see also Marcus, 73 N.E.2d at 604 

(citing Walsh for the general rule that “where the term is a definite one for a 

year or more and the tenant holds over after the expiration date and pays rent, 

the lease is extended for successive new terms of tenancy for a year at a time” 

(emphasis supplied)).
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[26] We also disagree that I.C. § 32-31-1-2 supports the trial court’s finding that 

holdovers that continue past a one-year term become general month-to-month 

tenancies. That provision provides that “[a] general tenancy in which the 

premises are occupied by the express or constructive consent of the landlord is 

considered to be a tenancy from month to month.” In Marcus, supra, the court 

specifically stated that the “statute (sec. 3-1615, Burns’ 1933)[7]relating to 

general tenancies does not apply.” 73 N.E.2d at 352 (emphasis supplied). The 

Houston court noted the same. 647 N.E.2d at 20. 

[27] Applied to the facts of this case, the original lease term expired on March 31, 

2011. Martin remained in possession of the premises and continued to make 

rent payments that Pearman accepted without reservation. This created a oneyear tenancy. After the expiration of this one-year tenancy, Martin again 

remained in possession and paid rent that Pearman accepted without 

reservation, thereby creating another one-year tenancy. When Martin 

continued to pay the rent after this tenancy expired, a third one-year tenancy 

commenced. Martin terminated this tenancy and vacated the premises two 

months later and with ten months remaining. The trial court erred in finding 

that “no further lease term existed and no further rent is due and owing” from 

Martin to Pearman. Appealed Orders at 20. The trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Martin on this issue is reversed. Because the trial court did 

 

7 The statute relating to general tenancies was recodified at I.C. § 32-7-1-2 and then replaced by I.C. § 32-31-

1-2 in 2002.
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not reach the issue of damages, we remand to the court to make such 

determination. 

[28] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 

Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.