PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4975

JUVENILE MALE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4977

JUVENILE MALE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.

(CR-03-408-RDB; CR-03-368-RDB)

Argued: September 30, 2004

Decided: October 29, 2004

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Widener and Judge Luttig joined. 
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sherri Lee Keene, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. Jane Frances

Nathan, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender for the District of

Maryland, Kelli C. McTaggart, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United

States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. 

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: 

Two juveniles, W.C. and R.M., were separately charged, tried, and

convicted of petty offenses (Class B misdemeanors, for which the

maximum term of imprisonment was six months, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3559(a)) committed on lands in the District of Maryland administered by the National Park Service. Their trials were conducted by a

magistrate judge. Following their convictions, the juveniles filed

motions to dismiss their cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

challenging the authority of the magistrate judge under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3401(g) to conduct their trials without having received from the

Attorney General of the United States the certification of federal

interest "referred to" in 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The magistrate judge

denied the juveniles’ motions, and the district court affirmed. Because

we construe § 3401(g), in this case of first impression, not to require

the certification referred to in § 5032 for trials before magistrate

judges involving Class B and Class C misdemeanors committed

within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States, we affirm. 

I

In May 2002, U.S. Park Police stopped a motor vehicle on the

Baltimore-Washington Parkway in Maryland for traffic violations.

2 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE
During the stop, the park police discovered marijuana on W.C., a passenger who was 17 years old at the time. W.C. pleaded guilty before

a magistrate judge to violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.35(b)(2) (prohibiting

possession of a controlled substance in areas under the jurisdiction of

the National Park Service), a Class B misdemeanor, see 36 C.F.R.

§ 1.3(a), and the magistrate judge sentenced W.C. to 12 months’ probation. When W.C. subsequently violated his probation, the magistrate judge sentenced him to 90 days’ home detention and drug

testing. 

In November 2002, the U.S. Park Police apprehended R.M., who

was 14 years old at the time, on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway

in Maryland. R.M. had been observed driving at a high rate of speed

on the parkway and had attempted to flee police after an officer began

to pursue him in a marked cruiser. After crashing what was later discovered to be a stolen motor vehicle into a wooden median, R.M.

attempted to flee on foot before he was apprehended. R.M. was

charged with the unsafe operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of

36 C.F.R. § 4.22; reckless driving, in violation of Maryland Code,

Transportation Article § 21-901.1(a); speeding, in violation of 36

C.F.R. § 4.21(c); fleeing to elude, in violation of Maryland Code,

Transportation Article § 21-904; receiving stolen property, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.30(a)(5); and driving without an operator’s

license, in violation of Maryland Code, Transportation Article § 16-

101(a). Each of these offenses is a Class B misdemeanor. Pursuant to

a plea bargain, R.M. pleaded guilty to one count of speeding and one

count of possession of stolen property, and the magistrate judge sentenced R.M. to two years of supervised probation and 150 hours of

community service. 

During the course of these two proceedings before the district

court, each juvenile filed a motion to dismiss his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the magistrate judge did not

have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) to try him without first

having received from the Attorney General of the United States the

certification referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Under § 5032, juveniles

charged with certain federal offenses must be transferred to appropriate state authorities, unless the Attorney General of the United States

certifies, after investigation, that the State does not have or refuses to

assume jurisdiction over the juvenile or the State does not have availUNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 3
able programs adequate for the needs of juveniles. The government

contended that because the juveniles were charged with Class B misdemeanors committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States, no certifications were required by the terms of § 5032. The

magistrate judge agreed, as did the district court. 

Each juvenile has appealed, and the two appeals have been consolidated. 

II

The juveniles contend simply that under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) "a

magistrate court cannot proceed against a juvenile on a petty offense

unless the certification ‘referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 5032’ has been

filed at the time of the juvenile’s arraignment." They argue that

because the requirements of § 3401(g) are jurisdictional, see 28

U.S.C. § 636(a)(3), and the government in these cases failed to comply with the certification requirement, the federal court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over their prosecutions. 

The juveniles’ argument, however, is more subtle because § 5032

provides for certifications only in cases charging juveniles with felonies and Class A misdemeanors, not in Class B misdemeanors as are

involved here. The juveniles observe that the statute conferring jurisdiction on magistrate judges to try them, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g), was

enacted in 1979 when it was clearly understood that the government

was required to file certifications in all juvenile prosecutions. Section

3401(g) authorized magistrate judges to try juvenile prosecutions only

if "the certification referred to in § 5032 of this title has been filed in

open court at the time of the arraignment," and at that time, in 1979,

§ 5032 required a certification in every juvenile prosecution proceeding in federal court, whether before a magistrate judge or a district

judge. 

In 1984, Congress amended § 5032 to provide that the certifications theretofore required were no longer to be required in cases

involving petty offenses (including Class B misdemeanors) committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the

United States. The juveniles note, however, that in 1984 Congress

failed to amend the language of § 3401(g). They argue that because

4 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE
the statute conferring jurisdiction on magistrate judges was not

amended, the magistrate judges’ power remained unchanged and that

therefore it follows that the certification (which had been required in

all cases) was still required for all cases before magistrate judges.

They maintain that while Congress limited the certification under

§ 5032 to felonies and Class A misdemeanors in 1984 for prosecutions before district judges, it deliberately left the previous requirement of certification for cases before magistrate judges unamended in

order to accommodate, as they argue, the "more circumscribed setting

of the magistrate court." 

Additionally, the juveniles argue that the use of the word "referred"

in the phrase "the certification referred to in § 5032" is distinct from,

and indeed less specific than, a word such as "required," and that had

Congress used "required," the changes to § 5032 would have also

applied to prosecutions before magistrate judges. But Congress did

not make any change to use a word such as "required" and, so they

argue, deliberately left in the word "referred" to accommodate its

intent to leave § 3401(g) as it had been before the 1984 amendment

to § 5032. 

Finally, the juveniles argue that the last sentence of § 3401(g),

which states that a magistrate judge may not proceed "unless the certification referred to in § 5032" has been filed, relates back to and

therefore provides an exception to the first sentence of the subsection

which, as a general matter, confers on magistrate judges the same

power as that conferred on district judges for juvenile prosecutions.

The government contends that the 1984 amendment to § 5032, narrowing the circumstances for certification, also amended § 3401(g)

because § 3401(g) explicitly refers to the certification in § 5032. This

construction, it argues, is the natural and unambiguous meaning of the

language. Thus, the government argues, the 1984 amendment to

§ 5032 "effectively narrowed § 3401(g)" to the extent that § 3401(g)

had, before 1984, required certifications in all cases involving juvenile petty offenses. 

The government also contends that if § 3401(g) were to be read in

the expansive manner advocated by the juveniles, all petty offenses

would effectively have to be prosecuted before district judges, imposUNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 5
ing a new and unnecessary burden on federal courts. The "thousands"

of juvenile petty offenses charged "every month" in Maryland and

other states would either have to go through the cumbersome process

of obtaining certifications from the Attorney General or be tried

before district judges. Either course, the government asserts, would

effectively "make it impossible for the government to prosecute juveniles who garner such charges." 

To resolve these conflicting interpretations of the statutory language, our inquiry must begin with the language itself. See Faircloth

v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996); see also

United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that

we must begin "by examining the statutory language, bearing in mind

that we should give effect to the legislative will as expressed in the

language"). 

Section 3401(g) grants magistrate judges the power to hear petty

offenses involving juveniles. In such cases, magistrate judges may

"exercise all powers granted to the district court" under the Federal

Juvenile Delinquency Act, but "no such case may proceed unless the

certification referred to in § 5032 of this title has been filed in open

court at the arraignment." 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g). The "certification

referred to in § 5032" is described in § 5032 as follows: 

A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile

delinquency, other than a violation of law committed within

the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the

United States for which the maximum authorized term of

imprisonment does not exceed six months, shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the

Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile

court or other appropriate court of a State does not have

jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency,

(2) the State does not have available programs and services

adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense

charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense

described in § 401 of the Controlled Substances Act . . . ,

6 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE
and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or

the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. 

18 U.S.C. § 5032 (emphasis added). 

A natural reading of §§ 3401(g) and 5032 indicates that the § 5032

certification exception for petty offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States also applies to magistrate judges.

Section 3401(g) does not call for an absolute certification; nor does

it call for a special, different certification mandated only by

§ 3401(g). Instead it requires, in a proceeding before a magistrate

judge, the filing of the certification referred to in § 5032, specifically

identifying the certification described in that section. Because "the

certification referred to in § 5032" issues only for juvenile proceedings in which felonies and Class A misdemeanors are charged, specifically excluding Class B and Class C misdemeanors, no certifications

are required for the cases before us. 

If we were to construe § 3401(g) to require a certification in every

juvenile proceeding before a magistrate judge, including one in which

the juvenile is charged with a petty offense, we would trample the

language of § 3401(g). Instead of requiring the filing of the certification referred to in § 5032, the language would be transformed to mean

"the certification referred to in § 5032 except that the limitations for

issuance of the certification in § 5032 do not apply." When Congress

amended the nature and scope of the certification in § 5032, limiting

its issuance to juvenile cases in which felonies and Class A misdemeanors are charged, it, of necessity, amended any other statutory

provision that incorporated "the certification referred to in § 5032." 

Moreover, the context in which §§ 3401(g) and 5032 function provides additional support for this construction. Under the juveniles’

purported reading of these statutes, juveniles could be brought to trial

before district judges on petty offenses without the filing of a certification, but they could not be brought before magistrate judges, except

with a certification. Yet, under the statutory scheme, trials of juveniles for petty offenses are in the main to be conducted by magistrate

judges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (giving a juvenile the option to elect

to be tried by a district judge only when a Class A misdemeanor is

filed). And the government has confirmed this scheme in practice,

UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 7
noting that the thousands of petty offenses committed each month in

the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States

are tried before magistrate judges. If Congress intended to have virtually all petty offenses tried before magistrate judges, then the 1984

amendment to § 5032, which excludes the requirement of a certification in petty offenses committed in the territorial jurisdiction of the

United States, would have been meaningless because district judges

— to whom the 1984 amendment was made applicable, according to

the juveniles’ argument — were not trying the petty offense cases. In

short, Congress would have accomplished nothing by eliminating the

certification requirement in petty offense prosecutions while, at the

same time, retaining the requirement to have certifications filed in all

petty offense cases tried before magistrate judges. 

We believe that the timing of the enactments of the two statutes

also supports our reading of § 3401(g). The current version of

§ 3401(g) was enacted in 1979, while the current version of § 5032

— with the then-newly-added certification exception — was enacted

in 1984. That the last sentence of § 3401(g) has not been modified

since 1984 accounts for the generic reference to "certification" in

§ 3401(g) and supports the conclusion that the last line of § 3401(g)

was merely intended to incorporate the whole of the certification

scheme in § 5032. 

At bottom, we find the language of § 3401(g) clear and unambiguous in providing that the certification referred to in § 5032 includes

the limitations of that certification set forth in § 5032. Accordingly,

we need not resort to an examination of the statute’s legislative history. Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 653. Moreover, because this statutory

scheme is perfectly "coherent and consistent," our inquiry may terminate with the construction drawn from the statute’s natural reading.

Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the district court

denying the juveniles their motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED

8 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE