alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
31.1
 Certification
of Principal  Executive
Officer and Principal Financial Officer
 Pursuant
to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 and
Securities and Exchange Commission Release 34-46427
 
 I, Ralph
Porretti, certify that:
 
 1. I have
reviewed this Annual report on Form 10-KSB of Tia IV, Inc.;
 
 2. Based
on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;
 
 3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
 
 4. The
registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 
 a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
 
 b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation;
 
 c)
disclosed in this report any change in registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting the occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;
and
 
 5. The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 
 a) all
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and
 
 b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.
 
 Date:
      January 9, 2008Ralph
      PorrettiCEO
      and
Director
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Landec
Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 28, 2010
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Gary T. Steele, Chief Executive Officer and President of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.





Date:  January 6, 2011





/s/ Gary T. SteeleGary T. SteeleChief Executive Officer and
      President(Principal Executive
    Officer)





*
            The
      foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section
      1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed
      as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure
    document.
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0987 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002D0987

**2002/987/EC: Commission Decision of 13 December 2002 on the list of establishments in the Falkland Islands approved for the purpose of importing fresh meat into the Community (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 4988) **

*
Official Journal L 344 , 19/12/2002 P. 0039 - 0040 *

Commission Decision

of 13 December 2002

on the list of establishments in the Falkland Islands approved for the purpose of importing fresh meat into the Community

(notified under document number C(2002) 4988)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2002/987/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 72/462/EEC of 12 December 1972 on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine, ovine, and caprine animals, and swine, fresh meat or meat products from third countries(1), as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1452/2001(2), and in particular Articles 4(1) and 18(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Establishments in third countries may only be authorised to export fresh meat to the Community if they satisfy the general and special conditions laid down in Directive 72/462/EEC.

(2) Following a Community mission, it appears that the animal health situation in the Falkland Islands compares favourably with that in the Member States, particularly as regards disease transmission through meat, and that the operation of controls over the production of fresh meat is satisfactory.

(3) For the purpose of Article 4(3) of Directive 72/462/EEC, the Falkland Islands has forwarded details of the establishment which should be authorised to export fresh meat to the Community.

(4) A Community inspection has shown that the hygiene standards of that establishment are satisfactory and that it may therefore be included on the first list of establishments, to be drawn up in accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 72/462/EEC, from which imports of fresh meat may be authorised. Imports of fresh meat from the establishment set out on the list in the Annex continue to be subject to provisions already laid down, the general provisions of the Treaty and in particular the other Community veterinary regulations regarding health protection.

(5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1. The establishment in the Falkand Islands as listed in the Annex is hereby approved for the purposes of exporting fresh meat to the Community.

2. Imports from this establishment shall remain subject to the Community veterinary provisions, and in particular those concerning health protection.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 December 2002.

For the Commission

David Byrne

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 302, 31.12.1972, p. 28.

(2) OJ L 198, 21.7.2001, p. 11.

ANNEX

Country: The Falkland Islands

>TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anne Marie CHAMBERS, a/k/a Sugar, a/k/a Anne Marie Jack, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6176

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2017

Decided: June 27, 2017

Anne Marie Chambers, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Daniel Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, David Vincent Har-bach, II, Brian R. Hood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anne Marie Chambers seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion as successive and unauthorized. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012), A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Chambers has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, William J. Fox, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this
report on Form 10-K of the Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates, J.C. Penney Debenture-Backed Series 2006-1 Trust (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of
Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing, or similar, agreement in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an
exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Based on my knowledge there were no material instances of noncompliance described in such reports.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee.

Date: March 30, 2012



|    |  |                                                               |  |                            
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------
|By: |  | /s/ William J. Fox                                           
|    |  | Name:                                                         |  | William J. Fox             
|    |  | Title:                                                        |  | Chief Financial Officer and
|    |  |                                                               |  | Executive Vice President   
|    |  | (Senior Officer in charge of securitization of the Depositor)
#### William A. OWENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tracy RAY; Harold Clarke, Director, Respondents-Appellees,

No. 16-7675

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

William A. Owens, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William A. Owens seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85,120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Owens has not *816made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although we grant Owens’ motion to amend his' informal brief, we deny a certifí-cate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Patrick COUCH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16361 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 15, 2017)

Christopher B. Brinson, Adam W. Over-street, Christopher John Bodnar, Kenyen Ray Brown, Deborah A. Griffin, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jackson Roger Sharman, III, Jeffrey Paul Doss, Robert J. Sewell, Lightfoot Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Arthur T. Powell, III, Arthur T Powell III, PC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

John Patrick Couch, M.D., filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the reversal of the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate several pretrial warrants, arguing that the government improperly seized certain of his assets. After Dr. Couch filed his appeal, his case proceeded to trial. Dr; Couch was ultimately convicted of several conspiracy and narcotics charges related to a scheme to distribute controlled substances under the guise of maintaining a pain management facility. Following his convictions, Dr. Couch and the government entered into a forfeiture agreement stipulating that Dr. Couch was voluntarily forfeiting the related assets and that the government had established the necessary connection between the forfeited assets and his illegal acts. The district court subsequently entered a preliminary order of forfeiture.

Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and their responses to our latest jurisdictional question, we agree with the parties that this appeal is now moot. As a result, we dismiss Dr. Couch’s appeal. *See United States v. Serrapio,*754 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th. Cir. 2014) (“A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”) (quoting *Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000,*567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012)).

APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-10823 

Conference Calendar

 

JOHN ALDRIDGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES ROSSOTTI,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:00-CV-131-R

- - - - - - - - - -

February 21, 2002

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Aldridge appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) complaint against the

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). See 5 U.S.C. § 552.

Aldridge contends that the IRS did not investigate or create

an adequate record in response to his 1999 fraudulent-document

complaint. Such claims are not cognizable under the FOIA. See

Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press,

445 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980) (agency does not improperly

“withhold” records that it does not possess); Goldgar v. Office
No. 01-10823

-2-

of Admin., Executive Office of the President, 26 F.3d 32, 34-35

(5th Cir. 1994) (FOIA applies only to information kept in record

form). In addition, Aldridge waived, by failing to argue, any

challenge to the district court’s conclusion that the IRS was not

improperly withholding agency records. See American States Ins.

Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 1998) (failure to

provide legal or factual analysis of issue results in its

waiver). There was an adequate factual basis for the district

court’s conclusion, and, consequently, the district court

correctly held that it was divested of jurisdiction. See

Goldgar, 26 F.3d at 34; see also Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34, 36

(5th Cir. 1988) (FOIA dismissal reviewed for clear error).

To the extent Aldridge challenges any of the magistrate

judge’s orders, those rulings are not directly appealable to this

court. Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 379 (5th

Cir. 1989). We decline to consider Aldridge’s untimely argument

that the magistrate judge should have recused himself. See Clay

v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.

Sanford, 157 F.3d 987, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1998).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

All motions are DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 744 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 744

  To authorize minors who are under the child labor provisions of the 
 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and who are under 18 years of age to 
    load materials into balers and compacters that meet appropriate 
     American National Standards Institute design safety standards.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                  May 2 (legislative day, May 1), 1995

   Mr. Craig introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To authorize minors who are under the child labor provisions of the 
 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and who are under 18 years of age to 
    load materials into balers and compacters that meet appropriate 
     American National Standards Institute design safety standards.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Compacters and Balers Safety 
Standards Modernization Act''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORITY FOR MINORS TO LOAD MATERIALS INTO BALERS AND 
              COMPACTORS.

    In the administration of the child labor provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, minors under 18 years of age shall be 
permitted to--
            (1) load materials into baling equipment that is in 
        compliance with the American National Standards Institute 
        safety standard ANSI Z245.5 1990, and
            (2) load materials into a compactor that is in compliance 
        with the American National Standards Institute safety standard 
        ANSI Z245.2 1992.
                                 <all>
```
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 767 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reform and reset the 

excise tax on beer, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 5, 2015 

Mr. WOMACK (for himself, Mr. KIND, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. WESTERMAN, Mr. 

YOUNG of Indiana, Mr. MARINO, Mr. COLLINS of Georgia, Mr. BOST, Mr. 

LUETKEMEYER, Mr. GRAVES of Missouri, Mr. BUCK, Mr. JOLLY, Mr. 

AMODEI, Mrs. LUMMIS, Mr. ZINKE, Mr. WELCH, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. 

CA ́RDENAS, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. GRIJALVA, Ms. MOORE, Mr. DANNY

K. DAVIS of Illinois, and Mr. SMITH of Missouri) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reform 

and reset the excise tax on beer, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fair Brewers Excise 

5 and Economic Relief Act’’ or the ‘‘Fair BEER Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RATE OF TAX ON BEER. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5051(a)(1) of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows: 


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2 

•HR 767 IH

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A tax is hereby imposed on 

2 all beer brewed or produced, and removed for con3 sumption or sale, within the United States, or im4 ported into the United States during the calendar 

5 year. Such tax shall be— 

6 ‘‘(A) $0 on so much of such beer as does 

7 not exceed 7,143 barrels, 

8 ‘‘(B) $3.50 per barrel on so much of such 

9 beer as exceeds 7,143 barrels but does not ex10 ceed 60,000 barrels, 

11 ‘‘(C) $16 per barrel on so much of such 

12 beer as exceeds 60,000 barrels but does not ex13 ceed 2,000,000 barrels, and 

14 ‘‘(D) $18 per barrel on so much of such 

15 beer as exceeds 2,000,000 barrels. 

16 Such tax shall be imposed with respect to every bar17 rel containing not more than 31 gallons and at a 

18 like rate for any other quantity or for fractional 

19 parts of a barrel.’’. 

20 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 5051(a) of 

21 such Code is amended by striking paragraph (2) and re22 designating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). 

23 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

24 this section shall take effect on January 1, 2016. 

Æ 


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