alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ruth MARKOWITZ, Individually; and David Lee Markowitz, a minor, by his next friend and mother, Ruth Markowitz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, and The State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 79-3405.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 11, 1981.

Decided July 6, 1981.

Evan I. Ginsburg, Great Neck, N. Y., for plaintiffs-appellants.

John C. Gemmill, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.

Before GOODWIN and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and HALBERT*, District Judge.

*

 Honorable Sherrill Halbert, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Ruth Markowitz, individually, and as next friend and mother of David L. Markowitz, a minor, sued the United States and the State of Arizona in federal court to recover money damages for the injury suffered by David as a result of a dive into a body of water in Lake Havasu State Park *206in Lake Havasu, Arizona. The claim against the United States is based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act and is not at issue here. The district court dismissed the action as against the State of Arizona on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., certification of this action was given and this appeal followed. We affirm.

The appellants argue that Arizona has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court. To support this contention appellants note that Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-821, which authorizes tort and contract suits against the state, does not explicitly require that these suits be bought in state courts as did the 1913 version of the statute. The appellants also rely on the abolition of sovereign immunity from tort claims accomplished by the Arizona Supreme Court in *Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission,*93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). Finally, to avoid the importance attached by *Edelman v. Jordan,*415 U.S. 651, 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1358, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), to whether the damages will be paid from state funds, the appellants argue that any damages recovered by them will come from insurance carriers rather than the State of Arizona.

We are not persuaded. The circumstances and authorities on which appellants rely neither singly nor in combination amount to the clear and express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity required by *Edelman v. Jordan, id.*at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with our decision in *Riggle v. California,*577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978). The source of any damages to which the appellant might become entitled would be state funds even if paid by an insurance carrier. Such carriers would pay only because of premiums paid by the state. The Eleventh Amendment immunity should not be made to turn on whether or not the state is a self-insurer.

Affirmed.
#### IN RE: Catherine Denise RANDOLPH, Appellant. In re: Catherine Denise Randolph, Appellant.

No. 17-1211, No. 17-1381

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Catherine Denise Randolph, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

*755Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Catherine Denise Randolph appeals the district court’s orders returning her complaints because they were not in compliance with the preñling injunction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeals. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### John WEIYMANN and Hubert Mitchell, Appellants, v. J. Wayne ALLGOOD, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 23496.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 26, 1966.

Teddy W. Airhart, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, La., Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., State of Louisiana, Jodie W. Stout, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before RIVES, THORNBERRY and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the denial of petitions for writs of habeas corpus by appellants who are in Louisiana State custody. A plenary hearing was held, after which the court in an exhaustive and well-considered opinion held that the several contentions of petitioners were unfounded and that their constitutional rights had been fully protected during all stages of the proceedings against them. We agree with the findings and conclusions of the trial judge, and, accordingly, the judgment denying petitions for writs is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6984 Reported in House (RH)]

<DOC>

                                                  House Calendar No. 98
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6984

                          [Report No. 118-815]

To designate the Federal building located at 300 E. 3rd Street in North 
 Platte, Nebraska, as the ``Virginia Smith Federal Building'', and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 11, 2024

     Mr. Smith of Nebraska (for himself, Mr. Bacon, and Mr. Flood) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure

                            December 5, 2024

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the Federal building located at 300 E. 3rd Street in North 
 Platte, Nebraska, as the ``Virginia Smith Federal Building'', and for 
                            other purposes.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. VIRGINIA SMITH FEDERAL BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The Federal building located at 300 E. 3rd Street 
in North Platte, Nebraska, shall be known and designated as the 
``Virginia Smith Federal Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal building 
referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
``Virginia Smith Federal Building''.
                                                  House Calendar No. 98

118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 6984

                          [Report No. 118-815]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To designate the Federal building located at 300 E. 3rd Street in North 
 Platte, Nebraska, as the ``Virginia Smith Federal Building'', and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            December 5, 2024

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
```
Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)   In connection with the Annual Report of Okana Ventures, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the Company), on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Michael Upham, President/Secretary/Treasurer/CEO/CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to my knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.    /s/ Michael Upham Michael Upham President, Secretary, Treasurer, CEO, CFO  Dated:  March 31, 2009
#### D. H. SNYDER et. al., vs. WILEY & PORTER.

SUPREME COURT,

AUSTIN TERM, 1883.

*Corporation Trustees*— Ifo *individual judgment against*— Judgment cannot be rendered against trustees of a corporation in their individual capacity, unless they undertake to beeomo personally liable for the debt of the corporation.

Appeal from Williamson County.

*James U. Robertson*for appellants.

Opinion by

West, J.

The court,having foun 1 correctly under the facts that the appellees were not entitled to enforce the lien claimed, should have proceeded no further in the case.

The amount not being of itself sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, the only ground, upon which the power to retain the case *366could rest, was that the appellees were entitled to foreclose the lien set out in their pleadings, having failed to establish this right and there being no other feature in this case that would authorize the court to proceed further, the suit should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Bonner vs. Watson 6 Tex., 173. Giradin vs. Dean 49 Tex., 248.

From the av'erments of the petition it would seem that the appellants have been, in accordance with law, elected trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Round Rock.

Such an organization was then and is now a body politic and corporate with powers defined by statute. Hart Dig. Art. 3241. Pasch. Dig. Arts.486 & 6000. Rev.Stats.Arts. 637 & 638. In such caseseven if the amount itself were within thejurisdiction of the district court it has no power to render a judgment against the trustees in their individual capacity,unless they undertake to become liable,personally,for the debt of the corporation. It would be often difficult to find persons who would act as trustees for churches, school houses or other religious and educational corporations of this character if upon a contract like the present,made in their corporate capacity, they should be held to be individually bound. Dyer vs. Sullivan 18 Tex., 773. The judgment is reversed and the cause is dismissed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIQUE RAQUEIM BAINES,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 576 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2021, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### Donald LELLA, Appellant, v. MUSICIANS PROTECTIVE UNION, LOCAL 373 A.F. of M. and American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.

No. 15799.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Sept. 27, 1966.

Decided Oct. 26, 1966.

Godfrey P. Schmidt, New York City, for appellant.

Stephen C. Vladeck, New York City (Vladeck, Elias, Frankie & Vladeck, Sheldon Engelhard, New York City, on the brief), for appellee.

Before KALODNER, HASTIE and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

On review of the record we find no error. The Order of Dismissal of the District Court will be affirmed.
EXHIBIT 35.2
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                               GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC
              RAMP SERIES 2006-RS6 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of GMAC Mortgage,  LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer")  pursuant to the applicable  servicing  agreement,  does hereby
certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      ------------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title: Executive Vice President
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE 

EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0819 

DCN: SE03538

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT 

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 

(CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31,1999 AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 OF CARIBINER
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AS SET FOURTH IN THIS FORUM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           8,718
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  134,315
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,157
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               171,328
<PP&E>                                         207,265      
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (96,817)      
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 726,198
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          110,015
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           236
<OTHER-SE>                                     171,529
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   726,198
<SALES>                                        203,696
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               203,696
<CGS>                                          146,913
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  146,913
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                35,224
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,581
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,146
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (2,458)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,146
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,688
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.16
        


</TABLE>
#### Gregory C. BONTEMPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOTAK, Dr.; Smith, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16275

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted September 15, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed October 19, 2017

Joshua Adam Matz, Associate, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Robert L. Chalfant, Esquire, Attorney, Wendy Motooka, Esquire, Attorney, Creg-ger & Chalfant LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Sotak, Dr.

Misha Igra, Esquire, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Wendy Motooka, Esquire, Attorney, Cregger & Chalfant LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Smith

Before: SCHROEDER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

*654MEMORANDUM **

Appellant Gregory Bontemps, a California State prisoner, appeals the district court’s decision revoking his right to proceed *in forma pauperis*(“IFP”) in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two prison physicians, Defendants-Appellees Drs. Sotak and Smith. The magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that Bontemps had filed three cases in federal court while incarcerated that were dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus had three “strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, disqualifying him from IFP status unless he could allege an imminent danger of serious physical harm. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiffs argument that a dismissal for failure to prosecute can never count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) is foreclosed by our recent decision in *Harris v. Mangum,*863 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017). The record reflects, however, that at least one of the dismissals cannot be characterized as having been made for any of the grounds set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The dismissal in *Bontemps v. Kramer,*2:06-Civ-02580 (E.D. Cal.) *(Kramer II),*was ordered after Bontemps received the only relief he sought in the action, and the case was therefore dismissed as moot. The court was without jurisdiction over any claim. A dismissal for mootness was not a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1916(g). *See Moore v. Maricopa Cty, Sheriff’s Office,*667 F.3d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissals for lack of jurisdiction do not count as strikes).

The district court’s order revoking Bon-temps’s IFP status must be VACATED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Naum Osmary MEDINA-RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41380 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U,S, Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Naum Osmary Medina-Ramos, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Naum Osmary Medina-Ramos has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Medina-Ramos has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivo-lous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir, R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 12
 
                    CASE CREDIT CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
 
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                             (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                      THREE
                                                                     MONTHS
                                                                      ENDED
                                                                    MARCH 31,
                                                                   ------------
                                                                   1998   1997
                                                                   -----  -----
<S>                                                                <C>    <C>
Net income........................................................ $  19  $  22
Add:
  Interest expense................................................    29     22
  Amortization of capitalized debt expense........................   --     --
  Portion of rentals representative of interest factor............   --     --
  Income tax expense and other taxes on income....................    11     10
  Fixed charges of unconsolidated subsidiaries....................   --     --
                                                                   -----  -----
    Earnings as defined........................................... $  59  $  54
                                                                   =====  =====
Interest expense.................................................. $  29  $  22
Amortization of capitalized debt expense..........................   --     --
Portion of rentals representative of interest factor..............   --     --
Other income......................................................   --     --
                                                                   -----  -----
    Fixed charges as defined...................................... $  29  $  22
                                                                   =====  =====
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges................................  2.03x  2.45x
                                                                   =====  =====
</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dexter Darnell HEWITT, Also Known as Dexter Curnell Hewitt, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50456 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 5, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Dexter Darnell Hewitt, Pro Se

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Dexter Hewitt, federal prisoner # 83401-180, seeks to proceed *in forma pauperis*(“IFP”) on appeal of the denial of his self-styled motion “to recall [the] mandate pursuant to Rule 32(i)(3)(B)” of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. By *222moving to proceed IFP, Hewitt is challenging the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

According to Hewitt, the district court violated Rule 32 and denied him due process by failing to rule on his request for a downward variance at sentencing. He also contends that the court erred in determining that he was a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Hewitt does not address the district court’s determination that it lacked authority to grant relief on his motion. Because he does not contest the district court’s reasons for denying the motion and certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith, he has abandoned any challenge to the certification decision and has failed to show that the appeal raises a nonfrivolous issue. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); *Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983).

The motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh,*117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.