alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Temesgen Teshome ABDISSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCK CORPORATE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1079

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 18, 2017

Decided: May 24, 2017

Temesgen Teshome Abdissa, Appellant Pro Se. Jason Vincent Federmack, Ted N. Kazaglis, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Temesgen Teshome Abdissa appeals the district court’s order and judgment dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Abdissa v. Merck Corporate,*No. 5:15-cv-00393-BO (E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year endedJanuary 1, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Shane Evangelist, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2. The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Date: March 16, 2011
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 651 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 651

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 30, 2015

     Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 820 Elmwood Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, as the ``Sister Ann 
                          Keefe Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SISTER ANN KEEFE POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 820 Elmwood Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Sister Ann Keefe Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sister Ann 
Keefe Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 29, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Cynthia W. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-17632 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(September 1, 2017)

Walter Douglas Adams, Law Office of Walter Douglas Adams, Brunswick, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Norman Daniel Lovein, William Mann, Hall Booth Smith, PC, Brunswick, GA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Cynthia Taylor appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Georgia Power Company (GPC), in her action alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Taylor alleges that GPC failed to conduct a reasonable investigation under 15 U.S.C. *631§ 1681s-2(b) on a disputed debt that GPC reported to Equifax. The district court determined that GPC’s investigation was reasonable. After review,1 we affirm the -district court.

The FCRA places distinct obligations on three types of entities: consumer reporting agencies, users of consumer reports, and furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681m, 1681s-2. It is undisputed that GPC is a furnisher of information and must comply with the duties imposed on furnish-ers by the FCRA. The FCRA requires a furnisher of credit information to investigate information disputed by a consumer after receiving notice of a dispute from a credit rating agency. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).

We evaluate a furnisher’s compliance with its duty to investigate according to the “reasonableness” of the investigation. *Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,*827 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016). “What constitutes a ‘reasonable investigation’ will vary depending on the circumstances of the ease.” *Id.*Where, as here, “a furnisher reports that disputed information has been verified, the question of whether the fur-nisher behaved reasonably will turn on whether the furnisher acquired sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the information was true.” *Id.*at 1303.

The district court did not err in concluding that. GPC conducted a reasonable investigation. The undisputed facts show that GPC reviewed all the information it had in its possession as the account holder. GPC verified Taylor’s name, birth date, social security number, and the amount owed on the account, before verifying the debt with Equifax. Taylor provided no evidence this investigation was unreasonable other than her statement that she once told a GPC employee that she did not owe on the account. GPC verified the account was indeed Taylor’s with the information it had and that a debt was owed on the account. The record contains no evidence that GPC unreasonably investigated her dispute.

AFFIRMED.

1

, “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc.,*764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014).
#### Stella Engwarli TEKU, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 16-2058

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 16, 2017

Decided: June 14, 2017

Ronald D. Richey, LAW OFFICE OF RONALD D. RICHEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director, S. Nicole Nardone, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Stella Engwarli Teku, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her motion to reopen. We have reviewed the administrative record and Teku’s claims, and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2016); *Mosere v. Mukasey,*552 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 2009).* We further find Teku’s due process claim to be without merit. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re Teku*(B.I.A. Aug. 18, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

To the extent Teku seeks to challenge the Board’s decision declining to reopen her proceedings sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review that aspect of its decision. *Mosere,*552 F.3d at 400-01.
#### Scott Douglas PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN BROAD RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent-Appellee, and State of South Carolina, Respondent.

No. 17-6168

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 26, 2017

Decided: July 10, 2017

*736Scott Douglas Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Alphonso Simon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DIAZ and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Scott Douglas Parker seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Parker has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00165-CR

Shawn David McCu lley, Appel lant v. The State of Texas , Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LAMPASAS COUNTY, 27TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 7062, HO NORABLE JO E CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury fou nd

appe l l an t Sh aw n D av i d M cCul l ey gui l ty of arson, for whi

ch the di strict courtass ess ed pu

nish men t of i m pri sonm en t for s i xtee n y ears . Se eTex. Pen. Code An n. § 28.02 (West Supp. 2002). We wi ll modify the judgm

ent and af fi rm as modifi ed. Appellant’s co ur t - ap po int ed at t o rne y filed a b r ief c o nc lud ing t ha t t he ap pe al is fri volous an d w i th out m eri t. Th e br ief mee t s t he r eq uir eme nt s o f Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967 ), by presenti ng a profes si onal

evalua t ion o f the r ec o r d d emo nst r at ing wh y t he r e a r e n o ar gu ab le grounds to be ad

va nc ed. See also Pens on v. Ohio , 488 U.S . 75 (19 88) ; High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 78) ; Curr ie v. State , 516 S.W.2d 684 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 74) ; Jackson v. State , 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 197 2); Gainous v. State , 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 69 ). A copy of cou n se l ’s b rief wa s del i v er ed to appella

nt, and appel

la nt was advise d o f his right to exam in e the appel

la te recor d and to file

a pro se brie f. No pro se bri ef h as been fi le d.2 We have r eviewe d t he record and counsel ’s b rief and agree that the appeal

is fri volous i ns ofa r as n o reve rsi bl e error is sh

own. C ouns el ’smotion

to with draw i s gra nted . We do find no nr ev er sible er ro r in t he judg ment. The judg ment re cite s t hat app ellant wai ved t r ial b y ju ry an d p lea de d g ui lt y. I n fa ct , ap pe llan t wa s c o nvi ct ed by a jury aft er plead ingnot gu ilt y. The j udgmen t sha llbe mo difie d t o so r efle ct . As mo difie d, t he jud gme nt o f co nvic t io n is aff irm ed.

__________________________________________ Lee Yeakel, Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Modif ie d and, as Modi fi

ed, Af fi rmed File d: Decem

ber 13, 2001 Do No t Publis

h
#### ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. PANHANDLE AND SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 23035.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 24, 1966.

L. W. Anderson, Dallas, Tex., for appellant.

A. B. Hankins, Simpson, Adkins, Fullingim & Hankins, Amarillo, Tex., for appellee.

Before JONES, COLEMAN and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The appellant, Argonaut Insurance Company, issued a compensation insurance policy to Gibbens & Slentz, Inc. It was in the well servicing business, primarily in Oklahoma but to some extent in Texas. The policy covered the operation of the insured in both states. Four employees of the insured were sent to a job in Texas. At the end of a work day, the employees started to return from Texas to their homes in Oklahoma in a pick-up truck owned by the insured, their employer. . While still in Texas, the vehicle in which they were riding collided with a train of the appellee, Panhandle and Santa Fe Railroad Company, and all four employees were killed. Those entitled under the compensation laws filed claims under the Oklahoma law and awards were made to the claimants. Having paid the sums awarded under the Oklahoma Act, Argonaut brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against Panhandle and Santa Fe, asserting a right of subrogation under the Texas statute. No right of subrogation exists under the Oklahoma compensation act. The Texas statute' provides for subrogation to indemnify the insurer, but only where compensation is claimed under the Texas compensation law. The district court held that since the compensation claims were asserted and paid by Argonaut under the Oklahoma compensation law, which bars any right of subrogation in a death claim, no recovery could be had. A summary judgment was entered for Panhandle and Santa Fe. The judgment of the district court was correct and is

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2361
DAVID FRANKLIN BLACK, in propria persona, qui tam, a legally adjudicated total and permanent physically disabled American veteran, in forma pauperis, a custodial single parent, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versusKERRY NEWCOMBE, authorized representative Commonwealth of Virginia, Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) Department of Social Services, Winchester, VA; KATHLEEN GRIFFIN, DCSE; DIANE DEVINE, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Chief District Judge. (CA-95-763-A) Submitted: December 26, 1996 Decided: January 24, 1997 Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David Franklin Black, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).23 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for appointment of counsel. We have reviewed the record andthe district court's order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Black v. Newcombe , No. CA-95-763-A (E.D. Va. June 8, 1995); see Equipment Fin. Group, Inc. v. Traverse Computer Brokers , 973 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing appellate review of premature appealsunder the doctrine of cumulative finality). We note that Appellant's failure to note an appeal of the district court's March 19, 1996, order deprives us of jurisdiction to consider that order. Wedeny Appellant's renewed motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 84

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 4, 1996

Referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a

certificate of documentation and coastwise trade endorsement for the vessel BAGGER, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CERTIFICATE OF DOCUMENTATION.

4 Notwithstanding sections 12106 through 12108 of

5 title 46, United States Code, and section 27 of the Mer6 chant Marine Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. App. 883), the Sec7 retary of Transportation may issue a certificate of docu8 mentation and coastwise trade endorsement for the vessel
2

S 84 RFH

1 BAGGER, hull identification number 3121125, and State

2 of Hawaii registration number HA1809E.

Passed the Senate July 29, 1996.

Attest: GARY SISCO,

Secretary.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilson Angelo GRAHAM, Jr., a.k.a. Nu Nee, a.k.a. Noony, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17235 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 27, 2017)

Yvette Rhodes, Daniel Michael Baeza, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Orlando, FL, Dionja Dyer, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Aliza Hoehman Bloom, appointed counsel for Wilson Graham, Jr. in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Graham’s conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Exhibit 27

                      Financial Data Schedule

 "This schedule contains summary financial information extracted
from June 30, 1999 10QSB and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements."
</LEGEND>

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                        24,179
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 56,752
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   10,358,198
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        49,937
<DEPRECIATION>                (1,820,683)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                9,256,989
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         0
<BONDS>                       16,300
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   1,212
<COMMON>                      48,013
<OTHER-SE>                    9,022,862
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  9,072,087
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              0
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 310,299
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (310,299)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (310,299)
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  (310,299)
<EPS-BASIC>                 .000
<EPS-DILUTED>                 .000


</TABLE>
#### Karen Ovely Tejeda REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas HOMAN, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-6245

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 26, 2017

Decided: November 9, 2017

Ivan Yacub, YACUB LAW OFFICES, LLC, Woodbridge, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Kimere J. Kimball, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Karen Ovely Tejeda Reyes, a native and citizen of Honduras who is not detained and whose 2005 expedited removal order has not been reinstated since she returned to the United States, appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) petition for lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *312
      *Reyes v. Homan,*No. 1:16-cv-00734-CMH-JFA (E.D. Va., Jan. 10, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*■AFFIRMED*
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###### Department of Veterans Affairs

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, that a meeting of the Veterans' Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation (hereinafter the Committee) will be held virtually Wednesday, April 6 and Thursday, April 7, 2022, from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. EST on both days. The meeting sessions are open to the public.

The purpose of the Committee is to provide advice to the Secretary of VA on the rehabilitation needs of Veterans with disabilities and on the administration of VA's Veteran rehabilitation programs. The Committee members will continue to receive briefings on employment programs and services designed to enhance the delivery of services for the rehabilitation potential of Veterans and discuss recommendations to be included in the Committee's following annual comprehensive report.

                    Although no time will be allocated for receiving oral presentations from the public, members of the public may submit written statements for review by the Committee to Latrese Thompson, Designated Federal Officer, Veterans Benefits Administration (28), 810 Vermont Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20420, or via email at                     *Latrese.Thompson@va.gov.*                     In the communication, writers must identify themselves and state the organization, association, persons or persons they represent.                

                    For any members of the public who wish to attend virtually, please use the Microsoft Teams Meeting link:                     *https://teams.microsoft.com/​l/​meetup-join/​19%3ameeting_​YjZmZmIyZDAtYzFlYi00OGUxLTk3ZTMtNDhmN2IyMWRjMjlk%40thread.v2/​0?​context=​%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22e95f1b23-abaf-45ee-821d-b7ab251ab3bf%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%228252bbc1-b123-48c8-aa1c-6f43c7d548c7%22%7d*.                

Or call in (audio only) +1 872-701-0185, 377848130# United States, Chicago.

*Phone Conference ID:*                     377 848 130#.                

Dated: March 2, 2022.

LaTonya L. Small,

Federal Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 2022-04730 Filed 3-4-22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P