14006 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2022 / Notices 

providers of advanced communications 

services. See Public Law 116–260, 

Division N-Additional Coronavirus 

Response and Relief, Title IX-Broadband 

internet Access Service, §§ 901, 906, 134 

Stat. 1182 (2020). The Commission has 

interpreted the term ‘‘provider of 

advanced communications service’’ to 

mean ‘‘facilities-based providers, 

whether fixed or mobile, with a 

broadband connection to end users with 

at least 200 kbps in one direction.’’ 

Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 

at 14332, para. 111. Participation in the 

Reimbursement Program is voluntary 

but compliance with the new 

information collection requirements is 

required to obtain Reimbursement 

Program support. The Commission 

adopted a Third Report and Order on 

July 13, 2021, implementing the 

amendments to the Secure Networks 

Act by the CAA for the Reimbursement 

Program. See Protecting Against 

National Security Threats to the 

Communications Supply Chain Through 

FCC Programs, WC Docket No. 18–89, 

Third Report and Order, FCC 21–86 (rel. 

July 14, 2021) (Third Report and Order). 

Separate from the Reimbursement 

Program, the Secure Networks Act 

requires all providers of advanced 

communications service to annually 

report, with exception, on whether they 

have purchased, rented, leased or 

otherwise obtained covered 

communications equipment or service 

on or after certain dates. 47 U.S.C. 

1603(d)(2)(B). The Second Report and 

Order adopted a new information 

collection requirement to implement 

this statutory mandate. See Secure 

Networks Act § 5. If the provider 

certifies it does not have any covered 

equipment and services, then the 

provider is not required to subsequently 

file an annual report, unless it later 

obtains covered equipment and services. 

Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 

at 14370, at para. 215. 

The Commission therefore propose to 

revise this information collection, as 

well as Form 5460, to reflect this new 

requirement contained in the Public 

Notice released by the Bureau on 

August 3, 2021. This Public Notice, 

among other things, requires providers 

participating in the Reimbursement 

Program to notify the Commission of 

ownership changes using the FCC Form 

5640 to ensure the accuracy of 

information on file for program 

participants when there is a change in 

ownership. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05120 Filed 3–10–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

[PS Docket No. 22–90, FCC 22–18; FRS 

75229] 

Secure Internet Routing 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Request for comments. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC or 

the Commission) seeks comment on 

vulnerabilities threatening the security 

and integrity of the Border Gateway 

Protocol (BGP), which is central to the 

Internet’s global routing system, its 

impact on the transmission of data from 

email, e-commerce, and bank 

transactions to interconnected Voiceover Internet Protocol (VoIP) and 9–1– 

1 calls, and how best to address them. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

April 11, 2022; and reply comments are 

due on or before May 10, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by PS Docket No. 22–90, by 

any of the following methods: 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically by accessing ECFS at 

https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. 

• Paper Filers: Paper filings can be 

sent by hand or messenger delivery, by 

commercial overnight courier, or by 

first-class or overnight U.S. Postal 

Service mail. 

• People with Disabilities: To request 

materials in accessible formats for 

people with disabilities (braille, large 

print, electronic files, audio format), 

send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call 

the Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202– 

418–0432 (tty). 

For detailed instructions for 

submitting comments and additional 

information on this proceeding, see the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

additional information on this 

proceeding, contact James Wiley of the 

Cybersecurity and Communications 

Reliability Division, Public Safety and 

Homeland Security Bureau, at 

james.wiley@fcc.gov or (202) 418–1678 

or Minsoo Kim of the Cybersecurity and 

Communications Reliability Division, 

Public Safety and Homeland Security 

Bureau, at minsoo.kim@fcc.gov or (202) 

418–1739. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Notice of 

Inquiry, FCC 22–18, released February 

28, 2022. The full text of this document 

is available at https://www.fcc.gov/ 

document/fcc-launches-inquiryinternet-routing-vulnerabilities. 

Ex Parte Rules. This proceeding shall 

be treated as a ‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ 

proceeding in accordance with the 

Commission’s ex parte rules. Although 

the rules do not generally require ex 

parte presentations to be treated as 

‘‘permit but disclose’’ in Notice of 

Inquiry proceedings, the Commission 

exercises its discretion in this instance, 

and finds that the public interest is 

served by making ex parte presentations 

available to the public, in order to 

encourage a robust record. Persons 

making ex parte presentations must file 

a copy of any written presentation or a 

memorandum summarizing any oral 

presentation within two business days 

after the presentation (unless a different 

deadline applicable to the Sunshine 

period applies). Persons making oral ex 

parte presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentation must (1) list all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made, and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 

presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda, or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with Rule 

1.1206(b), 47 CFR 1.1206(b). 

Participants in this proceeding should 

familiarize themselves with the 

Commission’s ex parte rules. 

Confidentiality. The Commission 

recognizes that some comments could 

contain information that the submitter 

believes should not be made available to 

the general public because of 

commercial or national security reasons. 

Parties may request that such 

information be kept confidential, 

identifying the specific information 

sought to be kept confidential, 

providing the reasons for the request, 

and otherwise following the procedures 

set forth in section 0.459 of the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2022 / Notices 14007 

Commission’s rules. If a party requests 

confidential treatment of a comment, it 

must file an original and one copy of the 

confidential version of the comment on 

paper, following the procedures below, 

and a public version of the filing that 

omits only the confidential information 

and is otherwise identical to the 

confidential version, using either the 

electronic filing or the filing-by-paper 

procedures below. 

Comment Filing Procedures. 

Interested parties may file comments 

and reply comments on or before the 

dates indicated on the first page of this 

document. Comments may be filed 

using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by 

paper. All filings must be addressed to 

the Commission’s Secretary, Office of 

the Secretary, Federal Communications 

Commission. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. Paper filings can 

be sent by hand or messenger delivery, 

by commercial overnight courier, or by 

first-class or overnight U.S. Postal 

Service mail. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission. 

• Effective March 19, 2020, and until 

further notice, the Commission no 

longer accepts any hand or messenger 

delivered filings. This is a temporary 

measure taken to help protect the health 

and safety of individuals, and to 

mitigate the transmission of COVID–19. 

See FCC Announces Closure of FCC 

Headquarters Open Window and 

Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public 

Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2788 (2020), https:// 

www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closesheadquarters-open-window-andchanges-hand-delivery-policy. 

• Commercial overnight mail (other 

than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail 

and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, and Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

Availability of Documents. 

Comments, reply comments, and ex 

parte submissions will be publicly 

available online via ECFS. These 

documents will also be available for 

public inspection during regular 

business hours in the FCC Reference 

Information Center, when FCC 

Headquarters reopen to the public. 

People with Disabilities. To request 

materials in accessible formats for 

people with disabilities (braille, large 

print, electronic files, audio format), 

send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call 

the Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202– 

418–0432 (tty). 

Synopsis 

1. The Commission plays an 

important role in protecting the security 

of America’s communications networks 

and critical infrastructure. The 

Commission, in tandem with its federal 

partners, has urged the communications 

sector to defend against cyber threats, 

while also taking measures to reinforce 

our Nation’s readiness and to strengthen 

the cybersecurity of vital 

communications services and 

infrastructure, especially in light of 

Russia’s escalating actions inside of 

Ukraine. Today, the Commission builds 

on those efforts. With this Notice of 

Inquiry (Notice), the Commission seeks 

comment on vulnerabilities threatening 

the security and integrity of the Border 

Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is 

central to the internet’s global routing 

system, its impact on the transmission 

of data from email, e-commerce, and 

bank transactions to interconnected 

Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and 

9–1–1 calls, and how best to address 

them. 

2. BGP is the routing protocol used to 

exchange reachability information 

amongst independently managed 

networks on the internet. These 

independently managed networks (also 

termed ‘‘domains’’) loosely map to one 

or more ‘‘Autonomous Systems’’ (so 

termed because the administration of 

the network is the sole responsibility of 

a single, independent entity). BGP’s 

initial design, which remains widely 

deployed today, does not include 

security features to ensure trust in the 

information that it is used to exchange. 

BGP was designed at a time when the 

number of independently managed 

networks on the internet was low and 

the trust among them was high. As a 

result, a bad network actor may 

deliberately falsify BGP reachability 

information to redirect traffic to itself or 

through a specific third-party network, 

and prevent that traffic from reaching its 

intended recipient. When a bad actor 

directs traffic to be dropped in this way, 

it is commonly referred to as a 

‘‘blackhole.’’ These ‘‘BGP hijacks’’ 

expose U.S. citizens’ personally 

identifiable information, enable theft, 

extortion, and state-level espionage, and 

disrupt otherwise-secure transactions. 

The Commission uses the term ‘‘BGP 

hijacking’’ to refer to any deliberate 

injection of routing information away 

from the optimal (or most secure) route, 

including both false route origination 

and path interception attacks. 

3. Congress created the Commission, 

among other reasons, ‘‘for the purpose 

of the national defense [and] for the 

purpose of promoting safety of life and 

property through the use of wire and 

radio communications.’’ To obtain 

‘‘maximum effectiveness from the use of 

radio and wire communications in 

connection with the safety of life and 

property,’’ the Communications Act of 

1934, as amended, directs the 

Commission to ‘‘investigate and study 

all phases of the problem and the best 

methods of obtaining the cooperation 

and coordination’’ of such systems.’’ 

4. The Commission has taken targeted 

steps to protect the nation’s 

communications infrastructure from 

potential security threats. Most recently, 

the Commission encouraged 

communications companies to review 

cybersecurity practices to defend against 

threats to critical infrastructure, sought 

comment on how the Commission can 

leverage its equipment authorization 

program to encourage device 

manufacturers to consider cybersecurity 

standards and guidelines, and acted in 

the public interest to deny and revoke 

the section 214 authority of certain 

carriers to provide telecommunications 

service in the United States. 

5. Independently managed networks 

are essential to the daily functioning of 

critical infrastructure such as 

transportation, gas and electric power, 

water, and financial markets. These 

networks can be vulnerable to attack if 

they deploy a version of BGP at their 

borders that cannot verify the integrity 

or authenticity of routing information. 

These vulnerabilities have two main 

causes: (1) Validating a route’s origin; 

and (2) securing and validating the 

correct BGP path to a given destination. 

BGP’s vulnerabilities allow a network 

operator to accidentally or maliciously 

misconfigure its BGP routers to falsely 

advertise that its network contains the 

intended destination for certain internet 

traffic, or is on the path to that 

destination. By advertising incorrect 

routing information, a bad actor could 

spread incorrect information to other 

networks and cause traffic intended for 

the advertised destination to be 

misrouted to, or through, the bad actor’s 

network. Causing internet traffic to 

depart from its most efficient path is 

termed ‘‘BGP hijacking.’’ Although BGP 

hijacking can occur anywhere on the 

global internet, the Commission has an 

interest in minimizing or eliminating 

opportunities for it within its 

jurisdiction because it can potentially 

harm U.S. citizens, commerce, and 

public safety operations. 

6. Russian network operators have 

been suspected of exploiting BGP’s 


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vulnerability to hijacking, including 

instances in which traffic has been 

redirected through Russia without 

explanation. In late 2017, for example, 

traffic sent to and from Google, 

Facebook, Apple and Microsoft was 

briefly routed through an internet 

service provider in Russia. That same 

year, traffic from a number of financial 

institutions, including MasterCard, Visa, 

and others was also routed through a 

Russian government-controlled 

telecommunications company under 

‘‘unexplained’’ circumstances. 

7. Over the past two decades, internet 

stakeholders have developed new 

standards, specifications, and best 

practice recommendations intended to 

address the security risk that BGP poses. 

The Internet Engineering Task Force 

(IETF), the principal authority 

responsible for internet standards, has 

finalized several standards to reduce 

BGP vulnerabilities, including BGPsec, 

an extension to BGP that provides 

security for the path through which 

reachability information passes. The 

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) has released a 

practice guide proposing a method of 

validating routes’ origins and 

recommendations for resilient exchange 

between independently managed 

networks. In 2017, the Internet Society 

launched Mutually Agreed Norms for 

Routing Security (MANRS), an 

organizational initiative with 

membership including over 700 

network operators, Internet Service 

Providers, and enterprises, which aims 

to reduce or prevent route hijacking and 

denial of service attacks by requiring 

network operators to implement 

available tools and applicable IETF Best 

Common Practice standards. MANRS 

focuses on improving routing security 

by filtering routing advertisements to 

include only those likely to be relevant 

to the customer BGP router; enabling 

source IP address validation for 

customer networks; coordinating and 

sharing contact information for network 

operations center contacts through 

regional internet registries, and enabling 

routing information to be validated on a 

global scale. MANRS offers a tool called 

‘‘MANRS Observatory’’ that aggregates 

data from trusted sources into a 

dashboard to help network operators 

improve the security of their networks. 

Similarly, the Commission’s 

Communications Security, Reliability, 

and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) 

has reported on best practices and 

recommendations to improve the 

security of BGP. The roman numerals 

following the name of federal advisory 

committee, ‘‘CSRIC,’’ enumerate the 

successive years during which the 

Commission has chartered CSRIC to 

provide recommendations on selected 

topics. CSRIC III recommended that 

network operators ensure that BGP 

routers’ internet routing registries are 

accurate, complete, and up-to-date, and 

that network operators use a standardsbased approach for providing 

cryptographically secure registries of 

internet resources and routing 

authorizations, a Resource Public Key 

Infrastructure (RPKI). In this 

connection, the FCC sought comment on 

the implementation and effectiveness of 

the CSRIC III recommendations and/or 

alternatives that stakeholders have 

developed since the time of the CSRIC’s 

original work to address these 

challenges. CSRIC VI recommended that 

network operators support MANRS and 

IETF Best Common Practice standards. 

Notwithstanding this work, available 

information suggests that the voluntary 

adoption and deployment of such 

measures has been such that many of 

the independently managed networks 

that comprise the internet remain 

vulnerable because they have not taken 

advantage of these measures. 

8. Scope of Inquiry. In this Notice, the 

Commission seeks comment on any 

steps that the Commission should 

consider taking to help protect and 

strengthen the nation’s communications 

network and other critical infrastructure 

from vulnerabilities posed by BGP, and 

how the Commission can best facilitate 

the implementation of industry 

standards and best practices to mitigate 

the potential harms posed by these 

vulnerabilities. In order to better 

understand the BGP ecosystem, the 

Commission seeks comment on the 

extent to which Internet Service 

Providers, public Internet Exchange 

Providers, and providers of 

interconnected VoIP service have 

deployed BGP routers in their networks. 

Do content delivery networks, and 

providers of cloud services operate BGP 

routers in their networks as well? What 

other types of entities operate BGP 

routers? The Commission recognizes 

that there are entities that do not operate 

BGP routers, but that are otherwise well 

positioned to support the development 

and implementation of BGP security 

practices. For example, there are several 

regional, national, and local internet 

registries that manage the allocation and 

registration of internet number 

resources, and support RPKIs. As an 

example, one such regional internet 

registry, the American Registry for 

Internet Numbers (ARIN) supports the 

roles of a digital certificate authority 

and acts as a repository for routing 

information and as a validator of RPKI 

data. Additionally, the Internet 

Corporation for Assigned Names and 

Numbers (ICANN), through its affiliate, 

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 

(IANA), has responsibility for 

coordinating the internet’s unique 

identifiers. The Commission seeks 

comment on what role these and other 

entities, including vendors of BGP 

routers or other networking equipment, 

have in supporting the development and 

implementation of BGP security 

practices. What threats to internet 

routing should the Commission 

consider within the scope of this 

inquiry in addition to BGP hijacking? 

For example, to what extent could BGP 

security measures prevent pervasive 

monitoring? 

9. Measuring BGP Security. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

industry has defined metrics for 

identifying BGP routing security 

incidents and for quantifying their 

scope and impact. To what extent are 

available tools, such as NIST’s RPKI 

Monitor, Automatic and Real-Time 

dEtection and Mitigation System 

(ARTEMIS), BGPstream, BGPMon, 

Kentik, and Traceroute, able to rapidly 

and accurately detect BGP hijacks or 

router misconfigurations? To what 

extent do these tools distinguish 

malicious routing changes from 

accidental ones? Do artificial 

intelligence and machine learning tools 

promise advancements in this area? 

10. Deployment of BGP Security 

Measures. The Commission seeks 

comment on the security measures that 

have been developed and deployed by 

industry to secure BGP. In addition to 

the measures recommended by CSRIC 

III and VI (RPKI, MANRS, and 

applicable IETF Best Common Practice 

standards), BGPsec, and the NIST 

practice guide, what other standards, 

specifications, or best practices have 

been developed to address potential 

attacks that exploit BGP vulnerabilities? 

The Commission seeks comment on the 

extent to which network operators have 

implemented any of the available BGP 

security measures developed by 

industry. How effective are these 

measures in practice? The Commission 

seeks comment on how to assess, 

measure, demonstrate, or increase the 

effectiveness of these security measures. 

To the extent that network operators 

have not implemented security 

measures, the Commission seeks 

comment on why such measures have 

not been implemented. To the extent 

that network operators have 

implemented security measures, how 

effective have they been at mitigating 


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the vulnerability? What obstacles have 

prevented them from doing so? 

11. The Commission seeks comment 

on the extent to which RPKI, as 

implemented by other regional internet 

registries, effectively prevents BGP 

hijacking. To what extent do network 

operators take advantage of the RPKI 

services that regional internet registries 

offer by implementing RPKI in their 

networks? To what extent, if any, do 

network operators’ service level 

agreements affect the ability of network 

operators to drop traffic that RPKI 

deems invalid? How do regional 

internet registries maintain the 

certificate authority for the RPKIs in a 

way that mitigates the risk of a single 

point of failure vulnerable to distributed 

denial of service attacks? How do 

regional internet registries prevent 

conflicts among distributed RPKI trust 

anchors? 

12. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether and to what extent network 

operators anticipate integrating BGPseccapable routers into their networks. The 

specification for the BGPsec extension 

to BGP became available in 2017, but it 

appears that BGPsec has not been 

widely deployed despite BGP’s known 

vulnerabilities. Why have network 

operators not taken more aggressive 

steps to adopt BGPsec? What particular 

obstacles or concerns about BGPsec 

have slowed their adoption? To what 

extent does the introduction of BGPsec 

routers potentially introduce 

compatibility issues among managed 

networks or introduce delays? 

13. For network operators that 

currently participate in MANRS and 

comply with its requirements, including 

support for IETF Best Common Practice 

standards, the Commission seeks 

comment on the efficacy of such 

measures for preventing BGP hijacking. 

To what extent do the network operators 

that participate in MANRS support both 

its required and recommended routing 

security actions, as well as applicable 

IETF Best Common Practice standards 

on which those actions are based? To 

what extent do network operators 

participate in MANRS’ various 

programs, including its equipment 

vendor program, launched in 2021, 

which aims to enable routing security 

features on network equipment and 

provide support and training guidance 

to use them, or take advantage of the 

MANRS Observatory. 

14. Commission’s Role. Ensuring 

continued U.S. leadership requires that 

the Commission explores opportunities 

to spur trustworthy innovation for more 

secure communications and critical 

infrastructure. The Commission has 

sought to promote the security of U.S. 

networks and network equipment both 

by drawing attention to available 

resources and through exercise of its 

regulatory authority. Other federal 

agencies are engaged in cybersecurity 

and specifically BGP security, including 

NIST, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and the National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration. The Commission seeks 

comment on steps the Commission, in 

coordination with other federal 

agencies, could take to prevent BGP 

hijacking or otherwise promote secure 

internet routing. The Commission seeks 

comment on whether the Commission 

has a role in helping U.S. network 

operators deploy BGP security 

measures. If so, how can the 

Commission be most helpful? The 

Commission seeks comment on its 

authority to promote the security of 

internet routing through regulation, 

including as it may apply to wireless 

and wireline Internet Service Providers, 

Internet Exchange Providers, 

interconnected VoIP providers, 

operators of content delivery networks, 

cloud service providers, and other 

enterprise and organizational 

stakeholders. The Commission seeks 

comment on whether regulatory clarity 

could help network operators prioritize 

investments in the security of their 

networks. 

15. The Commission seeks comment 

on the extent to which other nations’ 

telecommunications regulators and 

multistakeholder organizations have 

issued rules, guidance, or otherwise 

encouraged network operators, network 

security organizations, and equipment 

vendors to implement BGP security 

measures and on any lessons learned 

from those endeavors. The Commission 

seeks comment on the extent to which 

the effectiveness of BGP security 

measures may be related to international 

participation and coordination. 

16. Costs and Benefits. The 

Commission seek comments on the onetime and ongoing costs of implementing 

the BGP security measures discussed 

herein. What capital and operational 

expenditures attend their 

implementation? Does the availability of 

a protocol for RPKI keep 

implementation costs low? Would 

network operators need to replace 

existing routers to support the BGPsec 

extension? Could support be enabled 

through a software upgrade, particularly 

for routers that are not considered to be 

‘‘end-of-life’’? To what extent can 

network operators support MANRS’ 

required and recommended actions by 

updating their policies and practices, 

and without equipment replacement or 

software updates? What costs would 

consumer likely experience from BGP 

security implementations, such as 

higher service costs or speed 

reductions? 

17. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether the Commission should 

encourage industry to prioritize the 

deployment of BGP security measures 

within the networks on which critical 

infrastructure and emergency services 

rely, as a means of helping industry to 

control costs otherwise associated with 

a network-wide deployment. Would this 

or another phased or gradual 

implementation of BGP security 

measures be effective and help network 

operators to plan for and control 

implementation costs? 

18. The Commission also seeks 

comment on the national security, 

economic, and public safety benefits of 

more secure internet routing, both 

within the U.S. and globally. What 

entities are particularly affected by 

threats to BGP security? To what extent 

would the security measures discussed 

herein be effective in mitigating BGP 

hijacking? What is the potential impact 

of mitigating BGP hijacking on U.S. 

national security and the U.S. economy? 

Have stakeholders attempted to quantify 

the benefits that secure internet routing 

could convey by protecting critical 

infrastructure, sensitive 

communications, and personally 

identifiable information? Have 

stakeholders attempted to quantify the 

benefits of secure internet routing in 

terms of the potential loss of Intellectual 

Property, communications delays, or 

disruptions that BGP’s unmitigated 

vulnerability represents? Have 

stakeholders attempted to measure or 

quantify the extent to which BGP 

hijacking poses a threat to life and 

property by disrupting 9–1–1 calls 

carried by providers of interconnected 

VoIP service? What other benefits could 

potentially accrue from this inquiry? 

19. Digital Equity and Inclusion. 

Finally, the Commission, as part of its 

continuing effort to advance digital 

equity for all, including people of color, 

persons with disabilities, persons who 

live in rural or Tribal areas, and others 

who are or have been historically 

underserved, marginalized, or adversely 

affected by persistent poverty or 

inequality, invites comment on any 

equity-related considerations and 

benefits (if any) that may be associated 

with the proposals and issues discussed 

herein. Section 1 of the 

Communications Act of 1934 as 

amended provides that the FCC 

‘‘regulat[es] interstate and foreign 

commerce in communication by wire 

and radio so as to make [such service] 

available, so far as possible, to all the 


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people of the United States, without 

discrimination on the basis of race, 

color, religion, national origin, or sex.’’ 

The term ‘‘equity’’ is used here 

consistent with Executive Order 13985 

as the consistent and systematic fair, 

just, and impartial treatment of all 

individuals, including individuals who 

belong to underserved communities that 

have been denied such treatment, such 

as Black, Latino, and Indigenous and 

Native American persons, Asian 

Americans and Pacific Islanders and 

other persons of color; members of 

religious minorities; lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, transgender, and queer 

(LGBTQ+) persons; persons with 

disabilities; persons who live in rural 

areas; and persons otherwise adversely 

affected by persistent poverty or 

inequality. Specifically, the Commission 

seeks comment on how its proposals 

may promote or inhibit advances in 

diversity, equity, inclusion, and 

accessibility, as well the scope of the 

Commission’s relevant legal authority. 

20. Authority for this Notice of 

Inquiry may be found in sections 1, 4(i)– 

(j), 4(n), 7, and 403 of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)–(j), 

154(n), 157 and Section 1.430 of the 

Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.430. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene H. Dortch, 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05121 Filed 3–10–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

[FR ID 76259] 

SES Performance Review Board 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: As required by the Civil 

Service Reform Act of 1978, 

Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel has 

appointed the following executives to 

the Senior Executive Service (SES) 

Performance Review Board (PRB): 

Trent Harkrader 

Debra Jordan 

Holly Saurer 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Katura Jackson, 

Federal Register Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2022–05229 Filed 3–10–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

[OMB 3060–1298; FR ID 75434] 

Information Collection Being Reviewed 

by the Federal Communications 

Commission Under Delegated 

Authority 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: As part of its continuing effort 

to reduce paperwork burdens, and as 

required by the Paperwork Reduction 

Act (PRA) of 1995, the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC or 

the Commission) invites the general 

public and other Federal agencies to 

take this opportunity to comment on the 

following information collection. 

Comments are requested concerning: 

Whether the proposed collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

Commission, including whether the 

information shall have practical utility; 

the accuracy of the Commission’s 

burden estimate; ways to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information collected; ways to minimize 

the burden of the collection of 

information on the respondents, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology; and ways to 

further reduce the information 

collection burden on small business 

concerns with fewer than 25 employees. 

The FCC may not conduct or sponsor a 

collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid control 

number. No person shall be subject to 

any penalty for failing to comply with 

a collection of information subject to the 

PRA that does not display a valid Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) 

control number. 

DATES: Written PRA comments should 

be submitted on or before May 10, 2022. 

If you anticipate that you will be 

submitting comments, but find it 

difficult to do so within the period of 

time allowed by this notice, you should 

advise the contact listed below as soon 

as possible. 

ADDRESSES: Direct all PRA comments to 

Nicole Ongele, FCC, via email PRA@

fcc.gov and to nicole.ongele@fcc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

additional information about the 

information collection, contact Nicole 

Ongele, (202) 418–2991. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

OMB Control No.: 3060–1298. 

Title: Volunteer Service Agreement 

Form, FCC Form A–384. 

Form No.: FCC Form A–384. 

Type of Review: Extension of a 

currently approved collection. 

Respondents: Individuals or 

households. 

Number of Respondents and 

Responses: 140 respondents and 140 

responses. 

Estimated Time Per Response: 0.25 

hours. 

Frequency of Response: One-time 

reporting requirement. 

Obligation to Respond: Mandatory. 

The statutory authority to collect this 

information derives from 5 U.S.C. 3111, 

Acceptance of volunteer service. 

Certification of compliance with 

COVID–19 vaccine requirements for 

Federal workers derives from several 

sources, including most recently 

Executive Order 13991, Protecting the 

Federal Workforce and Requiring MaskWearing; Executive Order 14043, 

Requiring Coronavirus Disease 2019 

Vaccination for Federal Employees; and 

OMB Memorandum M 21–15, COVID– 

19 Safe Federal Workplace: Agency 

Model Safety Principles (Jan. 24, 2021), 

as amended. 

Total Annual Burden: 35 hours. 

Total Annual Cost: No Cost. 

Privacy Act Impact Assessment: Yes. 

Records of current and former Federal 

employees as defined in 5 U.S.C. 2105, 

including volunteers, grantees, and 

contract employees on whom the agency 

maintains records, are covered by 

OPM’s governmentwide System of 

Records Notice (SORN) OPM/GOVT–1 

General Personnel Records, posted at 

https://www.opm.gov/informationmanagement/privacy-policy/sorn/opmsorn-govt-1-general-personnelrecords.pdf. The Privacy Impact 

Assessment (PIA) for the Electronic 

Official Personnel Folder is posted at 

https://www.opm.gov/informationmanagement/privacy-policy/privacypolicy/eopf-pia.pdf. 

Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: 

As Privacy Act-protected records, these 

records are kept confidential and will 

not be disclosed except under 

applicable Privacy Act exceptions, 

including the routine uses identified in 

the OPM/GOVT–1 SORN. 

Needs and Uses: The Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978 authorized Federal 

agencies to establish programs designed 

to provide educationally related work 

assignments for students in a non-pay 

status. The Act provides that heads of 

agencies may accept, subject to 

regulations issued by the Office of 

Personnel Management, volunteer 

service for the United States if the 

service (1) is performed by a student, 


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