alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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|EXHIBIT 32.1                                 
|                                             
|                                             
|                                             
|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                    
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Golden Century
Technologies Corporation (the "Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June,
2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Hong Yang the Principal Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

| | /s/Hong Yang                      
| | ----------------------------------
| |                                   
| |                                   
| | Hong Yang                         
| |                                   
| | President, Secretary and Treasurer
| | Director                          
| | (Principal Executive Officer)     
| | Dated: October 12, 2007           

---
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

I, William Fox, certify that:

 

1.                                                    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of the Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates, J.C. Penney Debenture-Backed Series 2006-1 Trust (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2.                                                    Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.                                                    Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.                                                    Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing, or similar, agreement in all material respects; and

 

5.                                                    All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee.

 

Date: July 28, 2009

 
| /s/ William Fox                                                                                                            |                                                     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:                                                                                                                      | William Fox                                              |   |
| Title:                                                                                                                     | Chief Financial  Officer, Controller  and Vice President |   |
| (Senior Officer in charge of securitization of Select Asset Inc., as Depositor for the Trust (the “Registrant”)) |                                                     |

 

----
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-520- CV

In re Daniel J. Barre ra, Re lator

ORI GINAL P ROCEEDI NG F ROM TRAVIS CO UNTY

O R D E R
P ER CURIAM

Relator Daniel J
. Ba

rre ra has filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an emer g ency motion for temporar

y relief
. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8, 52.10. We g rant rela tor’s emer g ency motion for temporar

y re l i ef and stay the trial court’s order g ranting the rea l party in interest’s motion to compel, which was signe d on Aug ust 18, 2014, pending further order o f t h is Court. The Court order s the rea l party

in interest to file a r esponse to the petition f or writ of mandamus on or bef ore Aug ust 29, 2014.

I t is so ordered on A ug ust 22, 2014.

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and F ield
Michael Idrogo, Public Servant, Stale of Texas.

Plaintiff/Relator/Appellant,

v.

Sarah Giirrahan, el alia (in official and

individual capacities)! and others yet to be

named, Defendana/Respondents,

STATE OF TEXAS

4lh COURT OF APPEALS

COUTYOFBEXAR

Disi. Court Case No. 2010-CI-12389

Jury Trial Demand; demand for immediate

suspension of county personnel

pending trial

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

In the interest of justice. Michael Idrogn. Public Servant candidate, State of Texas, Movani AppeNani/Plaintilf/Relator filed this

Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Michael Idrogo is unable to afford costs of the Appeal.

PREGO ORATTO'NEM (PRAYER)

Plaintiff/Rel tor/Appellant, in !he interest of justice and as a matter of law, prays lor granting of judgment in

Plaintiff/Relator/Appcllant's favor and thai Plflintiff/Rclaior/Appellani have such other and further relief to which

Pla intiff/Relator/Appellant may show justly entitled.

Declared to the best of my belief, pursuant I"/14'" Amend .Bill of Rights. U.S. Const., TX Const., laws enforcing.

without prejudice U.C.C. Filed on this date by mailbox.

Michael Idrogo. Plaintiff/Relator. deputized Federal Court 1>)K!), Public Servant, State of Texas (candidate for Federal office):

Navy commander veteran of foreign wars

317 West Rosewood Avenue

San Antonio, Texas 78212

copy: Attorney General of the United States, Federal authorities. State authorities

AFFIRMATION

STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF BEXAR

I. petitioner. Michael (drogo, do declared and affirm the above is correct lo the best of my observation, recollection, belief.

Declared to the best of my belief, pursuant P'/M'^Amend.. Bill of Rights. U.S.Const., TX Const.. lews enforcing, without

prejudice U.C

,., 'i

Daic Michael Idrogo, Plaintiff/Re] ator. Public Servant. State of Texas, (candidate for Federal office)

to
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■■

£71

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0)

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7^

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JO (.0

3£

jj
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6304 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

501 North Main Street in Florence, Arizona, as the ‘‘Adolfo ‘Harpo’ 

Celaya Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 14, 2016 

Mr. GOSAR (for himself, Mrs. KIRKPATRICK, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, Ms. SINEMA, 

Mr. SALMON, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GALLEGO, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, and 

Ms. MCSALLY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 501 North Main Street in Florence, Arizona, 

as the ‘‘Adolfo ‘Harpo’ Celaya Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ADOLFO ‘‘HARPO’’ CELAYA POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 501 North Main Street in Flor6 ence, Arizona, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Adolfo ‘Harpo’ Celaya Post Office’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 6304 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Adolfo ‘Harpo’ Celaya 

5 Post Office’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
  CERTIFICATION
    PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
    SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   Form 10-K
  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of
    Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934, as amended; and(2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and results of
    operations of the Company.  Charles
    F. Dunleavy
       SIGNATURES
       By:   Chief Executive Officer
    Signature

Title

DateGeorge
    W. Taylor

Director, Chief Executive
    Officer
    (Principal Executive Officer)

July 27, 2007Seymour
    S. Preston III

Chairman of the Board of Directors

July 27, 2007Charles
    F. Dunleavy

Director, Chief Financial
    Officer,
    Senior Vice President, Treasurer and 
    Secretary (Principal Financial Officer
    and Principal Accounting Officer)

July 27, 2007
#### Elissa RUBENSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WHITTIER POLICE DEPARTMENT, official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Harrison, Officer, Whittier Police Department, individual capacity; et al., Defendants.

No. 16-55818

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Elissa Ann Rubenstein, Pro Se

James Touchstone, Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Elissa Rubenstein appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from her arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. *Szajer v. City of Los Angeles,*632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly determined that Rubenstein’s action was time-barred because all claims accrued more than two years before Rubenstein filed her complaint, and Rubenstein did not establish that she was entitled to tolling. *See Canatella v. Van De Kamp,*486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations and tolling provisions for personal injury actions); *see also*Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352(a) (tolling of the limitations period for insanity); *Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp.,*259 Cal.App.2d 562, 66 Cal.Rptr. 659, 664-65 (1968) (commitment to a mental health facility is not conclusive of insanity for the purposes of § 352(a)).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”). Rubenstein’s motions to supplement the record (Docket Entry Nos. 10 and 12) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent-except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
# EUR-Lex - 32002R0467 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002R0467

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 467/2002 of 15 March 2002 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables **

*
Official Journal L 075 , 16/03/2002 P. 0007 - 0008 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 467/2002

of 15 March 2002

establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1498/98(2), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in the Annex thereto.

(2) In compliance with the above criteria, the standard import values must be fixed at the levels set out in the Annex to this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 shall be fixed as indicated in the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 16 March 2002.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 March 2002.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 337, 24.12.1994, p. 66.

(2) OJ L 198, 15.7.1998, p. 4.

ANNEX

to the Commission Regulation of 15 March 2002 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

>TABLE>
#### ENDOTACH LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. COOK MEDICAL LLC, Defendant-Appellee

2015-1357

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 6, 2016

Jonathan Tad Suder, Glenn Schuyler Orman, Brett Michael Pinkus, Friedman, Suder & Cooke, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dominic P. Zanfardino, Esq., Jeffry M. Nichols, Jason Wayne Schigelone, Attorney, Brinks Gilson & Lione, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before DYK, MOORE, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Per Curiam.

It Is Ordered That:

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana is affirmed with respect to U.S. Patent No. 5,122,154 on the ground that the court did not err in concluding that laches precluded recovery. In light of our decision in No. 15-1784 affirming the invalidation of U.S. Patent No. 5,593,417, we need not reach the issue of non-infringement with respect to that patent.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6344

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JOHNATHAN CLAYTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00056-RMG-1)

Submitted: October 14, 2021 Decided: October 18, 2021

Before DIAZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeremy A. Thompson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. M. Rhett Dehart, Acting 

United States Attorney, Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Johnathan Clayton appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for 

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have reviewed the 

record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clayton’s 

motion. See United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating standard 

of review). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# EUR-Lex - 32001D1218(01) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001D1218(01)

**Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol's mandate to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention **

*
Official Journal C 362 , 18/12/2001 P. 0001 - 0001 *

Council Decision

of 6 December 2001

extending Europol's mandate to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention

(2001/C 362/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention)(1), and in particular Article 2(2) thereof,

Having regard to the initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Sweden(2),

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(3),

Having regard to the preparatory work on this issue performed by the Europol Board, in particular regarding the budgetary and staffing implications for Europol,

Whereas:

(1) One of the Union's objectives is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police cooperation.

(2) The effectiveness of the cooperation within the framework of the Europol Convention would be enhanced if Europol, within certain prioritised areas, could perform its tasks in respect of all aspects of international organised crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention.

(3) Prioritised areas should be defined on the basis of the continuous collection of data on trends in crime in the territories of the Member States.

(4) This Decision is without prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and the European Central Bank.

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Europol is hereby instructed to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention.

Article 2

1. On a proposal from the Europol Management Board, the Council shall unanimously lay down which serious forms of international crime are to be given priority.

2. The Director shall regularly update the Europol Management Board on the impementation of these priorities.

3. The general report on Europol's activities referred to in Article 28(10), first subparagraph, point 1 of the Europol Convention shall make explicit reference to, and reflect, these priorities and their implementation.

Article 3

1. This Decision shall take effect on 1 January 2002.

2. As from 1 January 2002, the Council Decision of 29 April 1999 extending Europol's mandate to deal with forgery of money and means of payment(4) shall be repealed.

Article 4

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Done at Brussels, 6 December 2001.

For the Council

The President

M. Verwilghen

(1) OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 2.

(2) OJ C 176, 21.6.2001, p. 26.

(3) Opinion delivered on 12 November 2001, not yet published in the Official Journal.

(4) OJ C 149, 28.5.1999, p. 16,
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Edward DICKERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4832

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 25, 2017

Decided: May 30, 2017

Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Christopher D. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Edward Dickerson pled guilty without a written plea agreement to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). The district court sentenced Dickerson to 70 months in prison. On appeal, Dickerson contends that the court erred in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.

Dickerson asserts the district court miscalculated the Guidelines range by erroneously finding that his prior South Carolina conviction for strong arm robbery qualified as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) (2015), thereby impacting his base offense level. Dickerson argues that, following *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), his strong arm robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime of violence under either the Guidelines’ force clause contained in § 4B1.2(a)(l) or the residual clause contained in § 4B1.2(a)(2).

*814Dickerson’s claim is unavailing. Dickerson acknowledges, as he did at sentencing, that this court held in *United States v. Doctor,*842 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1831, 197 L.Ed.2d 773, 2017 WL 1079626 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2017), that South Carolina strong arm robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). Thus, Dickerson’s strong arm robbery conviction necessarily qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ force clause. *See United States v. Hemingway,*734 F.3d 323, 337 n.13 (4th Cir. 2013); *United States v. Jarmon,*696 F.3d 228, 231 n.* (4th Cir. 2010). Despite Dickerson’s assertion that *Doctor*was wrongly decided, “[i]n this circuit, we are bound by the basic principle that one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel.” *United States v. Williams,*808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In any event, Dickerson’s strong arm robbery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause, which is not constitutionally infirm, as the Supreme Court stated in *Beckles v. United States,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) (holding Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under Due Process Clause). Thus, any *Johnson*challenge is meritless.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*