alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Estela Maria Hernandez DE MONTES, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-72065

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued July 12, 2017

Resubmitted August 22, 2017 San Francisco, California

Filed August 24, 2017

Inna Lipkin, Esquire, Counsel, Law Offices of Inna Lipkin, Redwood City, CA, for Petitioner

Nancy Ellen Friedman, Trial Attorney, OIL, Gregory A. Pennington, Jr., Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent

Before: GRABER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MARSHALL,* District Judge.

*

The Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation,

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Estela Maria Hernandez De Montes petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals denying Petitioner’s third motion to reopen to reapply for asylum, for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, and to reapply for cancellation of removal (the “Motion”). The Motion sought relief based on Petitioner’s husband’s then-existing medical condition—“end stage renal failure awaiting availability of an organ transplantation,” which “requires hemo-dialysis three (3) times per week.” Petitioner’s husband has since received a kidney transplant.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. See Pilate v. Burrell (In re Burrell), 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A case is moot if the issues presented are no longer live and there fails to be a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III of the Constitution.”); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The court must be able to grant effective relief, or it lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.”).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Armando Despaigne ZULVETA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TC UNLIMITED INCORPORATED; Tim Case, Defendants-Appellees, and State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company; Philpot Law Firm, PA; Steadman Hawkins Clinic of the Carolinas; Wilson Jones Carter & Baxley PA; Robert P. Restrepo, Jr.; Stephen R. Bruner; Irvin H. Philpot, III; Curtis Elliot; Wesley J. Shull, Defendants. Armando Despaigne Zulveta, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TC Unlimited Incorporated; Tim Case, Defendants-Appellees, and State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company; Philpot Law Firm, PA; Steadman Hawkins Clinic of the Carolinas; Wilson Jones Carter & Baxley PA; Robert P. Restrepo, Jr.; Stephen R. Bruner; Irvin H. Philpot, III; Curtis Elliot; Wesley J. Shull, Defendants.

No. 17-1129, No. 17-1707

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 31, 2017

Decided: August 14, 2017

Armando Despaigne Zulveta, Appellant Pro Se. Timothy Alan Domin, CLAWSON & STAUBES, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

These two appeals are consolidated for our consideration. In No. 17-1129, Armando Despaigne Zulveta seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his first Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 motion, filed before entry of final judgment and in regard to nonfinal orders. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Zulveta seeks to appeal in this appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In No. 17-1707, Zulveta appeals the district court’s order denying his second Rule 60 motion, which Zulveta filed after entry of final judgment. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. *See Aikens v. Ingram,*652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (identifying standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Zulveta v. TC Unlimited Inc.,**929No. 6:15-cv-02880-HMH-KFM (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2017).*

Although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis in these appeals, we deny Zulveta’s request to transfer venue and his motions to recuse. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

No. 17-1129 *DISMISSED*

No. 17-1707 *AFFIRMED*

*

 In his informal brief, Zulveta also seeks a writ of mandamus. We reject this request because a writ of mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. *Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,*346 U.S. 379, 383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953).
#### Cyril H. Moore, Jr., on Behalf of Himself and All Other Similarly Situated Employees of the State of New York Who Are Members of the New York State Health Insurance Plan under Major Medical Expense Group Policy 18250-G, Plaintiff, *v.*Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

August 21, 1972.

*Stephen R. Shestakofsky*for plaintiff. Friend,- *Post é Hopkins (John G. Paré*and *Edward T. Post*of counsel), for defendant.

Francis J. Bloustein, J.

In. tliis action upon a group health insurance policy it is not contested that plaintiff received treatment from a certified and registered psychologist. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for this expense upon the basis of section 221 (subd. 5, par. [e]) of the Insurance Law, effective September 1, 1969, as amended July 6, 1971. Plaintiff further contends that the policy, in effect, is renewed each year and thus is modified by said section. The import of the section is that if a policy provides for treatment by a physician for emotional disorders, then registered, certified psychologists are also to be included.

Defendant’s contention that its policy, issued in 1957, is one complete policy and thus unaffected by section 221 of the Insurance Law is rejected. “Where an insurer has the absolute right to terminate a policy on its anniversary date *(Western N. Y. Med. Plan*v. *Wikler,*8 A D 2d 988) * * * each renewal of the policy is deemed the issuance of a new policy ” *(Gladstone*v. *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,*66 Misc 2d 656, 657).

Furthermore, defendant has failed to exclude specifically reimbursement for emotional or nervous disorders from its definition of illness or injury or covered medical expenses.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
#### Jaymar Stanton ADAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; Russell Holsopple, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-15230

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*581Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 24, 2017

Jaymar Stanton Adams, Pro Se

Susan B. Gray, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jaymar Stanton Adams appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment on his petition for writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego,*670 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-motions for summary judgment); *Kildare v. Saenz,*325 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (denial of mandamus). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Adams’s petition for writ of mandamus because Adams failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his claim was “clear and certain” and whether there was “no other adequate remedy” available. *See Lowry v. Barnhart,*329 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements for mandamus relief).

Adams’s request to transfer this matter to the District of South Dakota, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### IN RE: Daniel Johnson WILLIS, Petitioner.

No. 17-1326

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

*757Daniel Johnson Willis, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Johnson Willis petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to file his civil complaint. We conclude that Willis is not entitled to mandamus relief. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988).

Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). The relief sought by Willis is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis,-we deny the petition and corrected petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rafael NIEBLAS-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10140

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 11, 2017

Krissa Marie Lanham, USPX — Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rafael Nieblas-Cruz, Pro Se

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rafael Nieblas-Cruz appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 27-month sentence for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Nieblas-Cruz’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided Nieblas-Cruz the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Nieblas-Cruz waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. *See United States v, Watson,*582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. *See id.*at 988.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**Exhibit 31.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a)**

 

I, Andrew J. Rebholz, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of TravelCenters of America LLC; and

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 
| Date:    March 6, 2018 | /s/ Andrew J. Rebholz |                    |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                       | Andrew J. Rebholz          |                    |
|                                       |                       | Chief Executive Officer |
|                                            |                            |                         |  |

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Terrell Jamar HOUSTON Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4340

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

FILED: June 12, 2017

Anthony Joseph Enright, Assistant U. S. Attorney, Jill Westmoreland Rose, U. S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Charlotte, NC, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant U. S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Asheville, NC, for Plaintiff-Appellee

John Parke Davis, Ann Loraine Hester, Federal Defender, Ross Hall Richardson, Acting Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of Western North Carolina, Inc., Charlotte, NC, Joshua B. Carpenter, Federal Defenders of Western North Carolina, Inc., Asheville, NC, for Defendant-Appellant

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court denies the petition for rehearing en banc.

Statement of Senior Circuit Judge Davis Respecting Denial of En Banc Rehearing

The Court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc should not give rise to a *752conclusion that the issues presented are unimportant or undeserving of timely consideration by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the recent filing of a petition for *certiorari*in a similar case arising in the Third Circuit, *see United States v. Byrd,*679 Fed. Appx. 146, 2017 WL 541405 (3d Cir. 2017), *pet. for cert. filed,*No. 16-1371 (May 11, 2017), reflects that the issues are recqrring and worthy of plenary consideration.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando MARAVILLA-BRISENO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41055 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed April 11, 2017

Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Armando Maravilla-Briseno, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Armando Maravilla-Briseno *305has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Maravilla-Briseno has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*6th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *305the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Lewis MADISON, Jr., a.k.a. Blue, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-16934 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(May 22, 2017)

David Charles Waterman, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, Robert Edward Bodnar, Jr., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Orlando, FL, Mary A. Mills, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Ocala, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Adeel Bashir, appointed counsel for Charles Madison, Jr. in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Charles Madison, Jr.’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
** **

 

**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofCytoGenix, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 1O-Q for the period endingJune 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the "Report"), I, Lawrence Wunderlich, Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of myknowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Lawrence Wunderlich |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Lawrence Wunderlich     |
| Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

August 14, 2002

** **

 

----
No: 04-16-00286-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS SITTING AT SAN ANTONIO

MARGARET LANDEN SAKS and PHILIP M. ROSS, Appellants,
V. MARCUS P. ROGERS, A. CHRIS HEINRICHS, J. BARRETT SHIPP and HEINRICHS & DE GENNARO, P.C., Appellees.
On Appeal from

Probate Court No. One, Bexar County, Texas Honorable Kelly Cross, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2011-PC-3466-B

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS: COMES NOW, MARGARET LANDEN SAKS (“Landen”) and the undersigned counsel, (“Appellants”), by and through undersigned counsel, and file this certificate of conference, and in support thereof would show:

1 ACCEPTED 04-16-00286-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 10/11/2016 4:06:35 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERKOn or about October 10, 2016, the attorneys for the parties co nferred

regarding Appellants’ motion for leave to file their amende d docketing statement and supplement to Appellants’ brief. There was no objection to Appellants’ motion for leave to file their amended docketing statement a nd supplement to Appellants’ brief.
Respectfully submitted, Philip M. Ross SBN 17304200 1006 Holbrook Road San Antonio, Texas 78218 Phone: 210/326-2100 Email: ross_law@hotmail.com By: / s/ Philip M. Ross Philip M. Ross Attorney for Margaret Landen Saks

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE I hereby certify that I conferred with attorneys Michael B. J ohnson and Royal B. Lea, III, attorneys for the Defendants by email by ag reement on October 10, 2016, and there was on objection to Appellants’ motion fo r leave to file their amended docketing statement and supplement to Appel lants’ brief. /s/ Philip M. Ross Philip M. Ross

2CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document was served on a ttorneys Michael B. Johnson, Mark Nawfal and Royal B. Lea, III, attorne ys for the Defendants by email by agreement on October 11, 2016. /s/ Philip M. Ross Philip M. Ross

3
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tanisha PHELPS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30205

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

Jack Haycock, 'Assistant U.S. Attorney, USPO—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Poca-tello, ID, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Matthew Kinghorn, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders Eastern Washington and Idaho, Pocatello, ID, Melissa D. Winberg, Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, ID, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tanisha Phelps appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Phelps contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain the sentence and by failing to consider the sentencing factors. We review for plain error, *see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,*608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered the sentencing factors and thoroughly explained its reasons for imposing the above-Guidelines sentence. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Phelps next contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the minor nature of her violation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Phelps’s sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the *708public. *See Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
MANDATE

THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE 45TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on July 19, 2017, the cause upon appeal to revise 

or reverse your judgment between

Service Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant

V.

Trinity Mesa Real Estate Services, LLC, Appellee

No. 04-17-00295-CV and Tr. Ct. No. 2016-CI-05243

was determined, and therein our said Court of Appeals made its order in these words:

Appellant’s petition for permissive appeal is DENIED. This appeal is 

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. We order that appellees 

recover their costs of this appeal.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth 

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of 

Texas, with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on September 27, 2017.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

____________________________

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DISTRICT, AT SAN ANTONIO

No. 04-17-00295-CV

Service Life & Casualty Insurance Company

v.

Trinity Mesa Real Estate Services, LLC

(NO. 2016-CI-05243 IN 45TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

MOTION FEE

MOTION FEE

FILING

SUPREME COURT CHAPTER 51 

FEE

INDIGENT

STATEWIDE EFILING FEE

MOTION FEE

$10.00

$10.00

$100.00

$50.00

$25.00

$30.00

$10.00

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

CHELSEA MACDIARMID

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Balance of costs owing to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF 

TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of 

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and 

payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of the COURT OF APPEALS for 

the Fourth District of Texas, this September 27, 2017.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

____________________________

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853