1

Filed 12/17/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

WILLIAM RILEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A156407

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG15791353)

Vehicle Code section 17004.71 provides a public agency immunity from liability

for collisions involving vehicles being pursued by peace officers if the agency “adopts 

and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an 

annual basis for, vehicular pursuits . . . .” (§ 17004.7, subd. (b)(1); see also Ramirez v. 

City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995, 997 (Ramirez).) Plaintiff and appellant William 

Riley (Riley) was injured when a car being pursued by officers employed by defendant 

and respondent Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff) ran a red light and collided 

with Riley’s motorcycle. The trial court granted the Sheriff summary judgment under 

section 17004.7. On appeal, Riley contends the court erred, arguing the Sheriff’s policy, 

promulgation of the policy, and training did not comply with section 17004.7. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Because our decision does not turn on the circumstances of the underlying 

incident, we provide only a brief summary. On October 29, 2014, Riley was riding a 

 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
2

motorcycle through a green light on High Street at International Boulevard in Oakland, 

when he was struck by a car fleeing from Sheriff’s deputies in marked cars.2 The 

suspects in the car that struck Riley were suspected of theft and the car had been reported 

as stolen. Riley traveled on the hood of the car for some distance, until the car crashed. 

Riley suffered serious bodily injury.

In October 2015, Riley filed suit against the Sheriff, individual deputies, and the 

suspects and other persons associated with them. In February 2016, Riley filed his 

Second Amended (and operative) Complaint (Complaint). In June 2016, defaults were 

entered against the suspects and others associated with them. In July 2016, the trial court 

sustained the Sheriff’s demurrer without leave to amend as to three of the causes of 

action in the Complaint. The court also dismissed the individual officers from the action.

In April 2018, Riley filed a motion for summary adjudication, and, in May, the 

Sheriff filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. In December, the trial 

court granted the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Riley’s motion, 

concluding the Sheriff is entitled to immunity under section 17004.7.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Riley contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the 

Sheriff’s pursuit policy, promulgation of the policy, and training did not comply with 

section 17004.7. We reject his contentions.

I. Summary of Section 17004.7

“ ‘Except as otherwise provided by statute,’ a ‘public entity is not liable for an 

injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public 

employee or any other person.’ (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) [S]ection 17001 creates a 

statutory exception to public entities’ general tort immunity: ‘A public entity is liable for 

death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act 

 

2 Riley does not dispute the deputies had been directed to terminate the pursuit before the 

collision, but he argues the evidence shows the deputies did not discontinue pursuit. The 

factual dispute is not relevant to the issues on appeal.
3

or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public entity 

acting within the scope of his employment.’ ‘Section 17004.7 in turn limits the liability 

that . . . section 17001 otherwise permits by affording immunity to public agencies that 

adopt and implement appropriate vehicle pursuit policies.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th 

at p. 999.)

Subdivision (b) of section 17004.7 provides: “(1) A public agency employing 

peace officers that adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and 

periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits complying with subdivisions 

(c) and (d) is immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or death of 

any person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated 

by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she 

is being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by a peace officer employed by the 

public entity. [¶] (2) Promulgation of the written policy under paragraph (1) shall include, 

but is not limited to, a requirement that all peace officers of the public agency certify in 

writing that they have received, read, and understand the policy. The failure of an 

individual officer to sign a certification shall not be used to impose liability on an 

individual officer or a public entity.”

Subdivision (c) of section 17004.7 contains “detailed requirements” for pursuit 

policies. (Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 999, fn. 1.) The section specifies twelve 

“minimum standards” that “[a] policy for the safe conduct of motor vehicle pursuits by 

peace officers shall meet . . . .” (§ 17004.7, subd. (c).) As relevant in the present case, 

minimum standard number seven is “Determine the factors to be considered by a peace 

officer and supervisor in determining speeds throughout a pursuit. Evaluation shall take 

into consideration public safety, peace officer safety, and safety of the occupants in a 

fleeing vehicle.” (Ibid.) And minimum standard number eight is “Determine the role of 

air support, where available. Air support shall include coordinating the activities of 

resources on the ground, reporting on the progress of a pursuit, and providing peace 

officers and supervisors with information to evaluate whether or not to continue the 

pursuit.”
4

Subdivision (b) of section 17004.7 requires a public agency to provide “regular 

and periodic training” regarding its pursuit policy, and section 17004.7, subdivision (d), 

defines that as “annual training that shall include, at a minimum, coverage of each of the 

subjects and elements set forth in subdivision (c) and that shall comply, at a minimum, 

with the training guidelines established pursuant to Section 13519.8 of the Penal Code.” 

Penal Code section 13519.8 provides that the Commission on Peace Officer Standards 

and Training (POST Commission) “shall implement a course or courses of instruction for 

the regular and periodic training of law enforcement officers in the handling of highspeed vehicle pursuits.” (See also Pen. Code, § 13500, subd. (a); Ramirez, supra, 5

Cal.5th at p. 999, fn. 1.) Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (b), provides that “The 

course or courses of basic training for law enforcement officers and the guidelines shall 

include adequate consideration of” 15 specific subjects, including “speed limits.”3

Penal Code section 13519.8, in addition to providing for development of the 

training guidelines referenced in Section 17004.7, subd. (d), also provides for the 

development of vehicle pursuit guidelines (Guidelines). Thus, section 13519.8, 

subdivision (a)(1) of the Penal Code states, “The commission shall implement a course or 

courses of instruction for the regular and periodic training of law enforcement officers in 

the handling of high-speed vehicle pursuits and shall also develop uniform, minimum 

guidelines for adoption and promulgation by California law enforcement agencies for 

response to high-speed vehicle pursuits. The guidelines and course of instruction shall 

stress the importance of vehicle safety and protecting the public at all times, include a 

regular assessment of law enforcement’s vehicle pursuit policies, practices, and training, 

and recognize the need to balance the known offense and the need for immediate capture 

 

3 The subjects listed in Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (b), include: “(1) When 

to initiate a pursuit. (2) The number of involved law enforcement units permitted. (3) 

Responsibilities of primary and secondary law enforcement units. (4) Driving tactics. 

(5) Helicopter assistance. (6) Communications. (7) Capture of suspects. (8) Termination 

of a pursuit. (9) Supervisory responsibilities. (10) Blocking, ramming, boxing, and 

roadblock procedures. (11) Speed limits. (12) Interjurisdictional considerations. (13) 

Conditions of the vehicle, driver, roadway, weather, and traffic. (14) Hazards to 

uninvolved bystanders or motorists. (15) Reporting and postpursuit analysis.”
5

against the risks to officers and other citizens of a high-speed pursuit. These guidelines 

shall be a resource for each agency executive to use in the creation of a specific pursuit 

policy that the agency is encouraged to adopt and promulgate, and that reflects the needs 

of the agency, the jurisdiction it serves, and the law.” The POST Commission’s 

Guidelines are available online; they were published in 1995 and most recently revised in 

February 2007.4 Section 17004.7, subdivision (e) references the Guidelines, stating “The 

requirements in subdivision (c) are consistent with the 1995 California Law Enforcement 

Vehicle Pursuit Guidelines developed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards 

and Training pursuant to Section 13519.8 of the Penal Code that will assist agencies in 

the development of their pursuit policies.”

“The requirement of adoption of a written policy [that] complies with section 

17004.7, subdivision (c) obviously was intended to provide entity control over the 

pursuing officers during a pursuit. [Citation.] The requirement of entity control, we 

believe, in turn was intended to reduce the number and frequency of unreasonably 

dangerous pursuits and the resulting accidents.” (Payne v. City of Perris (1993) 12 

Cal.App.4th 1738, 1747 (Payne); see also McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 

Cal.App.4th 537, 542 (McGee) [“The immunity is designed to encourage police 

departments to adopt express safe pursuit guidelines, thereby reducing the frequency of 

accidents.”].)

In 2005, section 17004.7 was amended to its current form, partially in response to 

a court of appeal decision that observed that the statute granted “a ‘get out of liability free 

card’ to public entities that go through the formality of adopting such a policy. There is 

 

4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the Guidelines, available at 

<<https://post.ca.gov/Portals/0/post_docs/publications/Vehicle_Pursuit.pdf?ver=2019-07-

16-141238-590>> (as of Dec. 12, 2019). (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); see also People v. 

Dawkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 565, 570–571 [taking judicial notice of POST 

Commission materials]; Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 

872, 887 [“subdivision (c) [of Evidence Code section 452] ‘enables courts in California 

to take notice of a wide variety of official acts . . . . [and] an expansive reading must be 

provided to certain of its phrases [and] included in ‘executive’ acts are those performed 

by administrative agencies . . . .’ ”].) 
6

no requirement the public entity implement the policy through training or other means. 

Simply adopting the policy is sufficient under the current state of the law.” (Nguyen v. 

City of Westminster (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1168 (Nguyen); see also Ramirez, 

supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 999–1000; Stats. 2005, ch. 485, § 11, pp. 3825–3827 [Sen. Bill 

719 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.)]; Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 719, as 

amended May 5, 2005, at p. 7 [discussing Nguyen]; Sen. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Analysis 

of Sen. Bill 719, as amended May 19, 2005, at p. K [same].) In Ramirez, at page 1000, 

the California Supreme Court observed that “The current section 17004.7 does contain 

requirements that the public entity implement the policy through training and other means 

to ensure it is not a mere formality.” The 2005 amendments also substantially expanded 

the list of minimum standards in Section 17004.7, subdivision (c). (Stats. 2005, ch. 485, 

§ 11, pp. 3825–3827.)

II. Standard of Review

A trial court must grant a summary judgment motion when the evidence shows 

that there is no triable issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) We apply a de novo standard in 

reviewing a grant of summary judgment. (Aguilar, at p. 860.) In making this 

determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

(Id. at p. 843.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of producing 

evidence showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be 

established or, as in the instant case, that there is a complete defense to the cause of 

action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851, 

854–855.) Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce specific 

facts showing a triable issue as to the cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.) Section 17004.7, subdivision (f), provides that 

“[a] determination of whether a public agency has complied with subdivisions (c) and (d) 

is a question of law for the court.”
7

Where the issues on appeal turn on statutory interpretation, the applicable 

principles are clear. “ ‘[O]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent 

so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] The well-established rules for 

performing this task require us to begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a 

plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory 

language in isolation; rather, we look to the statute’s entire substance in order to 

determine its scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question 

in context, keeping in mind the statute’s nature and obvious purposes. [Citation] We 

must harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory 

framework as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its 

plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable 

construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be 

achieved and the legislative history.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation

Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1106–1107

(Alameda Produce).)

III. The Sheriff’s Pursuit Policy

In April 2014 the Sheriff adopted a revised version of General Order 5.01, the 

Sheriff’s policy on vehicle pursuits (Policy). The Policy is ten single-spaced pages in 

length. The stated “PURPOSE” of the Policy is “[t]o establish guidelines for sworn 

members during vehicle pursuits.” The stated overall “POLICY” statement is as follows: 

“It shall be the policy of this agency to apprehend law violators at every opportunity. 

Deputies engaged in vehicle pursuits of actual or suspected violators shall proceed in a 

manner consistent with the safety and well being of all persons. It is recognized that all 

pursuit situations are different and actions taken during any pursuit may reasonably and 

necessarily vary. When circumstances are such that the safety of any person is gravely 

endangered because of the pursuit, it shall be terminated in all but the most exigent 

circumstances. In all cases, a supervisor, if available, shall monitor and control the 

pursuit.”
8

After the statements of purpose and policy, the Policy defines various relevant 

terms and describes relevant Vehicle Code provisions, including section 17004.7. The 

Policy makes clear that its intent is to comply with section 17004.7, asserting that “This 

General Order meets the criteria set forth in [section 17004.7,] subdivision (c)” and that 

the minimum standards described therein “are clearly outlined in this order.”

The Policy then specifies “PROCEDURES” applicable to vehicle pursuits, 

including, for example: continuous operation of lights and sirens, broadcast of 

information to dispatch, notification of a supervisor to monitor the pursuit, determination 

of availability of air support, and limitations on the number of pursuit vehicles. The 

Policy contains a section entitled “AIRCRAFT SUPPORT PROCEDURES.” It states, 

“Fixed wing and/or helicopter aircraft may be utilized to support ground operations 

during a vehicle pursuit.” The Policy explains that aircraft personnel are responsible for 

reporting “observations concerning the progress and conduct of the pursuit” to be 

“utilized by responding units and monitoring supervisors for the effective deployment 

and situational analysis necessary to evaluate whether the pursuit should continue or be 

terminated.” The Policy then lists the “types of information” the aircraft personnel may 

relay, including information relevant to determining the safety risks of continuing pursuit. 

The Policy directs that “The monitoring Sergeant and Watch Commander will closely 

monitor the supporting aircraft communications to assist in deciding whether or not to 

continue the pursuit.”

A section of the Policy called “GUIDELINES FOR INITIATING, CONTINUING 

OR TERMINATING PURSUITS” lists 17 “factors [that] should be considered to 

determine whether a pursuit should be initiated, continued, or terminated.” The factors 

include, “[t]he seriousness of the originating incident or violation, and the relationship to 

community safety;” “[s]afety of the public in the area of the pursuit;” “[s]afety of the 

pursuing deputies;” “[v]olume of vehicular traffic;” “[v]olume of pedestrian traffic;” 

“[s]peeds involved;” “[t]ime of day;” “[w]eather conditions;” “[r]oad conditions;” “[t]ype 

of area, e.g., rural, urban, suburban, schools, business, residential, etc;” “[f]amiliarity of 

the deputy and supervisors with the area of the pursuit;” “[q]uality of radio 
9

communications;” “[t]he capability of the patrol vehicle;” “[t]he capability of the deputy 

driving the patrol vehicle;” “[l]ength of the pursuit;” “[p]resence of a hostage in the 

vehicle being pursued;” and suspect identification such that “later apprehension can be 

accomplished.” The Policy directs that “A pursuit will be terminated when the factors 

listed above present an unreasonable risk to deputies and/or the public and outweigh the 

need for apprehension of the violator.”

The Policy provides that “Supervisory and management control will be exercised 

over all motor vehicle pursuits.” The Policy also contains sections addressing arrest 

procedures, use of force, multi-jurisdictional pursuits, reporting procedures, post-pursuit 

critique, and annual analysis of pursuits to identify areas for improvement in training and 

policy.

With respect to training, the Policy states, “The Sheriff’s Office shall provide 

regular and periodic training on an annual basis for all sworn personnel in the handling of 

high-speed vehicle pursuits. The instruction will be commensurate with the high-speed 

vehicle pursuit training developed by the [POST Commission] as required by Penal Code 

Section 13519.8. The training shall be conducted by the Regional Training Center 

through the use of the ‘Pursuit Policy Training Attestation Form’ . . . .”

The version of the Policy in effect in October 2014 was adopted by the Sheriff 

through an October 2013 update. The Sheriff uploaded the Policy into the agency’s 

electronic Document Management System (DMS) pursuant to procedures set forth in the 

Sheriff’s General Order 2.01. When the Policy was uploaded into the DMS, all peace 

officers employed by the Sheriff automatically received electronic notice of the Policy. 

General Order 2.01 directs that all disseminated General Orders, such as the Policy, “will 

be reviewed in a timely manner and signed off electronically in the DMS” by all officers. 

The electronic sign-off screen states, “Enter your Username and Password in the spaces 

provided below. The entry of your Username indicates that you have read and 

understood this document.”

General Order 2.01 also states that “Commanding Officers and/or Unit 

Commanders shall also be responsible for ensuring that every Agency member under 
10

their command electronically signs for each such [policy] issuance. The [Regional 

Training Center5] will notify Unit Commanders regarding employees that have not 

reviewed their DMS mailbox in a timely manner. Each affected employee must 

electronically sign for the document, indicating he/she is responsible for reviewing and 

following the applicable Policy and Procedure.” The Sheriff’s records show that, at the 

time of the pursuit at issue in the present case, approximately 80% of the agency’s peace 

officers had completed the electronic certification for the Policy.

6

IV. The Trial Court Properly Held the Sheriff is Immune Under Section 17004.7

Riley contends the trial court erred in granting the Sheriff immunity under section 

17004.7. First, he argues the Policy was not properly promulgated within the meaning of 

section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2). Second, he argues the Policy fails to satisfy the 

speed and air support minimum standards in section 17004.7, subdivisions (c)(7) and 

(c)(8). Finally, he argues the Sheriff has not shown it provides the training required 

under section 17004.7, subdivision (d). Riley’s claims fail.

A. Promulgation Requirement

As noted previously, Section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2) provides, “Promulgation 

of the written policy under paragraph (1) shall include, but is not limited to, a 

requirement that all peace officers of the public agency certify in writing that they have 

received, read, and understand the policy. The failure of an individual officer to sign a 

certification shall not be used to impose liability on an individual officer or a public 

entity.” The details of the Policy and its promulgation are set forth above. Riley 

contends the Policy failed to meet the promulgation requirement for various reasons. 

Riley’s contentions are without merit.

 

5 General Order 2.01 uses the acronym RTC without defining it, but it appears to refer to 

the Regional Training Center. (See <<https://www.sheriffacademy.com/>> (as of Dec. 

12, 2019).)

6 Riley cites to deposition testimony that 792 peace officers completed the electronic 

certification before the October 2014 pursuit. He asserts the Sheriff employed 979 peace 

officers at the time, although that information is not at the record citation he provided. In 

any event, the parties agree approximately 80% of the officers had completed the 

certification.
11

Riley first argues the Policy fails to satisfy section 17004.7 because the Policy 

does not contain the officer certification requirement. He points to a statement in 

Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at page 1001, that the “plain meaning” of the certification 

requirement “is that the policy must contain the requirement.” However, although the 

policy in Ramirez happened to contain the certification requirement, the issue there was 

whether “every peace officer must meet the requirement,” not whether the requirement 

must be contained within the four corners of the pursuit policy itself. (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, Ramirez does not stand for that proposition. (California Building Industry

Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 [“It is axiomatic 

that cases are not authority for propositions that are not considered.”].)7 Riley points to 

nothing in the language of section 17004.7 providing that the certification requirement 

must be stated in the pursuit policy itself. Instead, section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2) 

merely specifies that “Promulgation of the written policy . . . shall include . . . a 

requirement that all peace officers of the public agency certify in writing that they have 

received, read, and understand the policy.” In the present case, the Sheriff presented 

evidence showing that the requirement is contained in General Order 2.01, which requires 

peace officers to sign off on all policies, including the Policy at issue in the present case. 

That is not contrary to the section 17004.7 promulgation requirement.8

Riley argues there is no evidence the Sheriff required officers to certify they read 

and understood the Policy. General Order 2.01 required that the Policy be “reviewed in a 

timely manner” and “signed off electronically in the DMS.” As noted previously, the 

 

7 Contrary to Riley’s assertions on appeal, the court in Morgan v. Beaumont Police Dept.

(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 144, disapproved of by Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th 995, did not 

address the issue. In Morgan, the court of appeal merely concluded that electronic 

acknowledgement of “receipt” of a policy was insufficient to satisfy the requirement that 

officers certify they “received, read, and understand the policy.” (Morgan, at pp. 161–

163.)

8 Riley complains that the Sheriff failed to timely produce General Order 2.01 during 

discovery, but he does not contend the trial court abused its discretion in considering 

General Order 2.01 in ruling on the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. Any such 

contention has been forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 

784–785.)
12

DMS electronic sign-off screen states, “Enter your Username and Password in the spaces 

provided below. The entry of your Username indicates that you have read and 

understood this document.” Riley argues the screenshot in evidence showing the 

language accompanying the sign off is from August 2017, well after the October 2014 

pursuit in the present case. However, the Sheriff submitted a declaration from the 

Sheriff’s employee responsible for the DMS in which he averred that the electronic 

certification page had not been changed in that respect since the date of the pursuit. 

Accordingly, the 2017 screenshot was evidence that officers were required to certify at 

the time of the pursuit that they “received, read, and understand” (§ 17004.7, subd. 

(b)(2)) the Policy.9

We also reject any contention that the Sheriff failed to comply with section 

17004.7 because General Order 2.01 does not use the word “certify” and does not state 

that “signing off” includes a certification that an officer read and understood the policy at 

issue. The Sheriff’s evidence showed that prior to the pursuit in this case the Sheriff’s 

peace officers were required to acknowledge that they “received, read, and understood” 

the Policy by entering their username and password. That constitutes the certification 

required by section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2). Riley points to nothing in the statute 

stating that the certification requirement must be spelled out; the statute only specifies 

that certification must actually be required.

Riley also argues the Sheriff’s electronic sign off procedure does not constitute 

certification “in writing” within the meaning of section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2). 

Riley points to nothing in the statute that supports his contention, nor authority from 

other contexts defining the meaning of a “writing.” As the Sheriff points out, Evidence 

Code section 250 provides that “ ‘Writing’ means handwriting, typewriting, printing, 

 

9 Riley asserts in passing that the Sheriff’s document showing which officers completed 

the electronic certification is inadmissible hearsay. He also asserts in passing that the 

2017 screenshot of the electronic certification page was inadmissible. However, those 

contentions have been forfeited, because Riley failed to provide reasoned argument with 

citations to authority why the trial court abused its discretion in considering the 

documents. (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784–785.)
13

photostating, photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic mail or facsimile, 

and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form of communication 

or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations 

thereof, and any record thereby created, regardless of the manner in which the record has 

been stored.” If the Legislature intended “writing” to refer only to handwriting on paper, 

it would have so required.

In support of Riley’s assertion that an electronic certification is not “in writing,” 

Riley points to an attestation form prepared by the POST Commission, which the 

Legislature entrusted to establish vehicle pursuit training guidelines. (Ramirez, supra, 5 

Cal.5th at p. 1002; Pen. Code, § 13519.8.) As described by the court of appeal in 

Morgan, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at page 159, the Commission’s FAQs state, “ ‘[p]eace 

officers must also sign an attestation form (doc) that states they have “received, read, and 

understand” the agency pursuit policy. The agency must retain this form.’ ” (See also 

<<https://post.ca.gov/Vehicle-Pursuit-Guidelines-FAQs>> (as of Dec. 12, 2019).) The 

POST Commission’s attestation form is one way to comply with the requirement of 

certification in writing. However, the Commission cannot create a paper certification 

requirement not present in the statute. We reject Riley’s contention that section 17004.7,

subdivision (b)(2) requires a certification on paper.10

Finally, Riley argues the Policy was not promulgated within the meaning of 

section 17004.7, subdivision (b)(2) because the Sheriff’s evidence shows approximately 

20% of officers failed to complete the electronic certification. Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th

995, addressed a related issue. There, the question was “whether a public agency may 

receive section 17004.7’s immunity only if every peace officer it employs has, in fact, 

provided the written certification.” (Ramirez, at p. 997.) The court held “that the 

agency’s policy must require the written certification, but 100 percent compliance with 

 

10 Riley is also misplaced in relying on another portion of the bill that enacted the 

promulgation requirement, which authorized the California Highway Patrol to “develop 

and approve a paper or electronic form” regarding vehicle pursuit data. (Stats. 2005, 

ch. 485, § 9, p. 3823; § 14602.1, subd. (a).) Both paper and electronic forms are “in 

writing.”
14

that requirement is not a prerequisite to receiving the immunity.” (Ibid.) The court 

reasoned that the plain meaning of the statutory language “is that the policy must contain 

the requirement, not that every peace officer must meet the requirement.” (Id. at pp. 

1000–1001.) The court left open the question of “when a lack of compliance with the 

certification requirement or meaningful implementation of the pursuit policy indicates 

that an agency is not satisfying the statute’s requirements.” (Id. at p. 1002.)

We note that both parties misunderstand the state of the record in Ramirez, supra, 

5 Cal.5th 995. In that case, the defendant was only able to produce written certifications 

from 64 of the 92 officers, but the custodian of records testified that “ ‘all City officers 

employed at the time of the incident completed such forms, but some forms might have 

been lost during the police department’s move to a new station.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 5 

Cal.5th at p. 998.) The court of appeal granted summary judgment on the basis that an 

agency does not need to prove total compliance with the certification requirement for 

immunity under section 17004.7, and the Supreme Court affirmed. (Ramirez, at p. 998.) 

On appeal, Riley asserts all officers in Ramirez complied with the certification 

requirement. However, that was a disputed issue of fact in the case; otherwise, the 

Supreme Court would have had no occasion to consider whether the failure to obtain 

100% compliance led to loss of immunity. On the other hand, the trial court below and 

the Sheriff on appeal assert that in Ramirez there was an even worse compliance rate than 

the 20% in the present case because about 30% of written certifications were missing; but 

in Ramirez there was also testimony that all officers had signed certifications but some of 

the copies had been lost in a move. Accordingly, it appears the Ramirez decision was 

premised on an assumption that one or more of the officers, but substantially fewer than 

30%, failed to complete the certification required by section 17004.7.

In the present case, we conclude Riley has not shown there is a triable issue of 

material fact on this aspect of the promulgation issue. Riley emphasizes a passage in 

Ramirez in which the court pointed out the absurdity of interpreting section 17004.7 to 

require 100% compliance. (Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1001.) The Supreme Court 

quoted the court of appeal in observing, “Plaintiff’s interpretation would impose a heavy 
15

burden on public agencies, especially large ones. ‘[R]equiring 100 percent compliance as 

a condition of immunity could potentially result in the absurd circumstance that the 

failure of a single officer to complete a written certification in an agency employing 

thousands could undermine the agency’s ability to claim immunity, even though the 

agency conscientiously implemented its pursuit policy.’ ” (Ibid.)

11

 However, there is no 

basis to conclude that the Supreme Court in quoting that passage meant to suggest that 

promulgation under section 17004.7 requires a showing that all but one or two officers 

certified they received, read, and understood the pursuit policy. To the contrary, the 

Supreme Court expressly left that question open as “outside the scope of the issue 

presented for our review.” (Ramirez, at p. 1002.)

The Sheriff presented evidence showing it “conscientiously implemented its 

pursuit policies” (Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1001), and made an extensive effort to 

disseminate the Policy and obtain responses from officers. All officers were notified of 

the Policy by the DMS, and General Order 2.01 required the officers to certify they read 

and understood the Policy. Additionally, General Order 2.01 required commanding 

officers to ensure compliance with the electronic certification requirement, and the order 

required the Regional Training Center to notify the commanding officers about noncompliance. Further, the Sheriff submitted a declaration from the employee responsible 

for the DMS averring that, “The general practice throughout the units is that the unit 

commander or the designee of the unit commander would either request an audit of the 

DMS for the unit, or perform the audit him or herself to determine if officers had any 

items in their DMS inbox [that] needed to be signed off on. Unit commanders would 

discuss sign offs during shift briefing known as ‘muster.’ They would instruct officers to 

review and sign off on unsigned items.”

 

11 Riley points to the POST Commission’s page of “Frequently Asked Questions” 

regarding the Guidelines where the Commission states that “the law . . . requires all peace 

officers to receive the training annually in order to qualify for immunity.” (See 

<<https://post.ca.gov/Vehicle-Pursuit-Guidelines-FAQs>> (as of Dec. 12, 2019).) To the 

extent that can be construed as requiring a law enforcement agency to show 100% 

compliance to obtain immunity, it is contrary to Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 997.
16

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion the Sheriff made a “prima facie” 

showing it has “a system in place that is reasonably designed to apprise all peace officers 

of the” Policy. The Sheriff presented evidence that compliance with the certification 

requirement was required of all officers, and that unit commanders followed up with 

officers who had not complied. Riley did not respond to that showing with evidence that 

such follow-up did not occur. Further, Riley points to nothing in the record showing the 

Sheriff in any way concealed the Policy, suggested it was unimportant, indicated 

certification was optional, or otherwise undermined compliance with the certification 

requirement. Although the Sheriff’s failure to obtain certifications from approximately 

20% of the officers suggests there are ways the Sheriff can improve its follow-up process, 

there is no basis in the record to conclude that there was such a failure to implement the 

policy that its adoption was “a mere formality.” (See Ramirez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 

1000 [characterizing promulgation obligation in section 17004.7 as “requirements that 

the public entity implement the policy through training and other means to ensure it is not 

a mere formality”].)12

The trial court properly concluded there is no triable issue of material fact as to 

Riley’s claim the Sheriff failed to promulgate the Policy within the meaning of section 

17004.7, subdivision (b)(2).

B. Section 17004.7, Subdivision (c) Requirements

“In order for the immunity to apply under section 17004.7, a public entity must 

adopt a pursuit policy that clearly and with specificity sets forth standards to guide 

 

12

 The approximately 80% compliance with the certification requirement, combined with 

the evidence of the Sheriff’s extensive efforts to obtain compliance and the absence of 

evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to show promulgation. Therefore, we need not and 

do not address the Sheriff’s contention that “after the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Ramirez, all that is required in order to demonstrate the ‘promulgation’ component of 

section 17004.7 is evidence that the agency’s policy required its officers to provide 

written certification of the pursuit policy.” Further, we need not address whether a higher 

rate of noncompliance with an agency’s certification requirement than occurred here 

would show lack of promulgation, despite that agency’s extensive efforts to obtain 

compliance. 
17

officers in the field. [Citation.] A pursuit policy must do more than simply advise 

pursuing officers to exercise their discretion and use their best judgment in initiating, 

conducting, and terminating a pursuit. [Citation.] Whether a pursuit policy is sufficient 

under the statute is a question of law for the trial court, subject to independent review on 

appeal.” (Alcala v. City of Corcoran (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 666, 674–675.) In the 

present case, Riley argues the Policy fails to satisfy two of the “minimum standards” in 

section 17004.7, subdivision (c), relating to determination of speed and air support. We 

reject the claim.

1. Speed

As noted previously, minimum standard number seven directs that pursuit policies 

should “[d]etermine the factors to be considered by a peace officer and supervisor in 

determining speeds throughout a pursuit. Evaluation shall take into consideration public 

safety, peace officer safety, and safety of the occupants in a fleeing vehicle.” (§ 17004.7, 

subd. (c)(7).)

As Riley points out, there is no portion of the Policy that expressly states “factors 

to be considered . . . in determining speeds throughout a pursuit.” (§ 17004.7, subd. 

(c)(7).)

13

 Instead, the most relevant portion of the Policy is entitled “GUIDELINES FOR 

INITIATING, CONTINUING OR TERMINATING PURSUITS.” It lists 17 “factors 

[that] should be considered to determine whether a pursuit should be initiated, continued, 

or terminated.” The factors include, “[t]he seriousness of the originating incident or 

violation, and the relationship to community safety;” “[s]afety of the public in the area of 

the pursuit;” “[s]afety of the pursuing deputies;” “[v]olume of vehicular traffic;” 

“[v]olume of pedestrian traffic;” “[s]peeds involved;” “[t]ime of day;” “[w]eather 

conditions;” “[r]oad conditions;” “[t]ype of area, e.g., rural, urban, suburban, schools, 

business, residential, etc;” “[f]amiliarity of the deputy and supervisors with the area of 

 

13 Riley cites to deposition testimony from witnesses for the Sheriff in which they admit 

the Policy does not articulate factors an officer should use in determining speed during a 

pursuit. That testimony appears to reflect the lack of express language to that effect in 

the Policy, but the determination of compliance with section 17004.7 is a question of law 

for the courts based on the Policy itself. (§ 17004.7, subd. (f).) 
18

the pursuit;” “[q]uality of radio communications;” “[t]he capability of the patrol vehicle;” 

“[t]he capability of the deputy driving the patrol vehicle;” “[l]ength of the pursuit;”

“[p]resence of a hostage in the vehicle being pursued;” and suspect identification such 

that “later apprehension can be accomplished.”

The trial court concluded that, “[a]lthough the [Policy] does not include a section 

specifically regarding speed, a fair reading of the [P]olicy shows that it directs officers to 

consider appropriate factors, including speed, when making a decision to initiate, 

continue, or terminate a pursuit. A Pursuit Policy does not need to set a maximum limit 

on pursuit speed in order to be valid . . . . The Court fails to see a material difference 

between (1) directing officers to consider speed among the safety factors . . . when 

determining whether to continue a pursuit and (2) directing officers to consider other 

safety factors as part of a decision regarding the speed [with] which to continue or 

discontinue pursuit. Both ways of structuring a pursuit policy channel the officer’s 

discretion by directing him to consider the 16 other factors in making decisions regarding 

speed and pursuit.”

We agree with the trial court. A deputy could not fail to understand that the 

factors listed in the Policy for determining when to initiate, continue, or terminate 

pursuits should also be used to determine the manner in which they conduct the pursuit, 

including their speed. In particular, when a deputy is determining whether to initiate, 

continue, or terminate a pursuit, the most critical question is whether it is safe to achieve 

or maintain the speed necessary for pursuit. Accordingly, by listing the factors relevant 

to determining whether to initiate, continue, or terminate a pursuit, the Policy is in effect 

directing deputies to consider those same factors in determining speed.

We find instructive on this point the POST Commission Guidelines, adopted 

pursuant to Penal Code section 13519.8. In Ramirez v. City of Gardenia (2017) 14 

Cal.App.5th 811, at page 815, footnote 3, the Court of Appeal observed that “the 

requirements of section 17004.7, subdivision (c) are modeled” on the Guidelines. The 

court based that statement on section 17004.7, subdivision (e), which states that “[t]he 

requirements in subdivision (c) are consistent” with the Guidelines. Unlike the Policy, 
19

the Guidelines do expressly list factors to consider in determining speed of pursuit. 

(Guidelines, at pp. 1-13 to 1-14.) The Guidelines list 19 such factors, which are the exact 

same factors listed in the Guidelines to be considered in initiating, continuing, or 

terminating pursuit.14 (Guidelines, at p. 1-2.) Furthermore, the 17 factors listed in the 

Policy with respect to initiating, continuing, or terminating pursuit heavily overlap with 

the 19 factors in the Guidelines for determining both speed and for determining whether 

to initiate, continue, or terminate pursuit. The Policy uses different language, but the 

listed factors encompass 15 of the 19 factors listed in the Guidelines.15 When viewed in 

light of the Guidelines, it is clear that the Policy’s only failing is the omission of the two 

words “speed and” in the sentence “The following factors should be considered to 

determine [speed and] whether a pursuit should be initiated, continued, or terminated.”

We conclude the Policy does effectively “control and channel the pursuing 

officer’s discretion” in determining the speed of pursuit. (Payne, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1747; see also Ramirez v. City of Gardena, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 826–827 

[“courts have found public agencies’ policies sufficient under section 17004.7 when they 

provide guidance to officers concerning factors to consider, even if they also leave room 

for the exercise of individual discretion in particular cases”]; McGee, supra, 56 

 

14 The Guidelines expressly acknowledge the factors are identical, stating, “Factors which 

may be considered by the officer(s) and supervisor(s) to determine reasonable speeds, in 

view of the circumstances and environment of each pursuit, may be referenced in 

Guideline 1: When to Initiate a Pursuit, and Guideline 8: Continuation or Termination of 

a Pursuit.” (Guidelines, at p. 1-13.)

15 The 15 Guidelines factors that are included in the Policy factors include: “Public 

safety,” “Nature of offense and apparent circumstances,” “Officer safety,” “Pedestrian 

and vehicular traffic patterns and volume,” “Other persons in or on pursued vehicle,” 

“Location of the pursuit,” “Time of day,” “Speed of fleeing suspect,” “Weather and 

visibility,” “Road conditions,” “Identity of offender (if known)/offender can be located at 

a later time,” “Capabilities of law enforcement vehicle(s),” “Ability of officer(s) driving,” 

“Officer’s/supervisor’s familiarity with the area of the pursuit,” and “Quality of radio 

communications.” (Guidelines, at pp. 1-13 to 1-14.) The only four Guidelines factors 

not among those listed in the Policy are “Vehicle Code requirements,” “Passenger in 

officer’s vehicle,” “Availability of additional resources,” and “Whether supervisory 

approval is required.” (Ibid.)
20

Cal.App.4th at p. 543 [noting prior decisions concluded pursuit policies were deficient 

where they allowed for “ ‘ “what is effectively unbridled officer discretion” ’ ”]; Payne, 

at p. 1747 [“A policy which merely memorializes the unfettered discretion to initiate or 

terminate a pursuit or which allows each officer to use his or her own subjective 

standards for determining when a pursuit should be initiated, continued or terminated 

fails to provide any entity control.”].) To deny the Sheriff immunity under section 

17004.7 due to the Policy’s failure to expressly state the listed factors that should be 

considered in determining speed would elevate form over substance, without furthering 

the Legislature’s goal of encouraging fewer and safer pursuits.

2. Air Support

Section 17004.7, subdivision (c)(8) requires pursuit policies to “Determine the role 

of air support, where available. Air support shall include coordinating the activities of 

resources on the ground, reporting on the progress of a pursuit, and providing peace 

officers and supervisors with information to evaluate whether or not to continue the 

pursuit.” Riley contends the Policy “fail[s] on its face” to satisfy that requirement. The 

claim requires little discussion. As detailed previously, the Policy states that air support 

“may be utilized to support ground operations during a vehicle pursuit” and specifies, 

among other things, the information to be provided by air support and how the 

information should be used by the Sheriff’s units on the ground. Riley asserts that the 

Policy gives “unfettered discretion” to officers in determining whether to request air 

support. However, elsewhere the Policy specifies that Emergency Services Dispatch 

“will determine if air support is available.” 

Riley suggests the Policy is inadequate because it does not address each of the 

“Factors to Consider” in determining the role of air support listed in the POST 

Guidelines, including “Illumination (use of spotlight),” “Surveillance tactics,” “Weather,” 

“Number of air units,” and “Aircraft Safety.” (Guidelines, at p. 1-6.) In fact, the Policy 

addresses some of those matters. For example, the Policy covers surveillance tactics and 

weather by specifying five categories of information that the aircraft flight crew can relay 

to ground personnel, including information about the pursued vehicle, road conditions, 
21

weather, and other hazards. The Policy states that “[t]he monitoring Sergeant and Watch 

Commander will closely monitor the supporting aircraft communications to assist in 

deciding whether or not to continue the pursuit.” The circumstance that the Policy does 

not address illumination, the number of air units, and aircraft safety is not determinative 

because the Guidelines are clear that they are only “a resource for each executive to use 

in the creation of a specific policy the agency will adopt that reflects the needs of the 

agency, the jurisdiction it serves, and contemporary law.” (Guidelines, at p. vii.) Viewed 

as a whole, the Policy is actually substantially more detailed than the Guidelines on the 

topic of air support, and the Policy plainly complies with the language of section 

17004.7, subdivision (c)(8).

C. The Sheriff Has Shown Compliance with the Training Requirement

Section 17004.7, subdivision (b) mandates that agencies provide “regular and 

periodic training on an annual basis” regarding pursuit policies, and section 17004.7, 

subdivision (d) specifies that such training “shall include, at a minimum, coverage of 

each of the subjects and elements set forth in subdivision (c) and that shall comply, at a 

minimum, with the training guidelines established pursuant to Section 13519.8 of the 

Penal Code.” Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (b) provides that “[t]he course or 

courses of basic training for law enforcement officers and the guidelines shall include 

adequate consideration of each of” 15 subjects, including “speed limits.” On appeal, 

Riley contends the Sheriff’s training failed to include consideration of speed limits.

The evidence regarding the Sheriff’s training was introduced pursuant to a 

declaration from Kerri Hansen, a deputy sheriff who was responsible for developing the 

Sheriff’s “curriculum for driver training,” including the training to comply with section 

17004.7. She explained in her declaration that the section 17004.7 training was provided 

in a training video that is updated annually. She averred, “These training videos cover 

each of the subjects and elements set forth in [section 17004.7, subdivision (c)] and 

comply with the training guidelines pursuant to Penal Code section 13519.8.” A copy of 

the 2014 training video was attached to Hansen’s declaration.
22

This court has viewed the 2014 training video. The instructional portion of the 

video lasts 25 minutes. The video does not use the phrase “speed limits” or discuss any 

specific numerical speeds that should not be exceeded in any particular circumstances. 

Instead, like the Policy itself (see Part IV(B)(1), ante), the video lists the factors that 

should be considered in deciding whether to initiate, continue, or terminate a pursuit, 

including “speeds traveled.” Like the Policy, we interpret that portion of the training 

video as providing guidance to deputies in determining speed, because those factors 

effectively aid deputies in determining whether it is safe and appropriate to drive fast 

enough to maintain pursuit. Additionally, later in the video on-screen text cautions 

“SLOW DOWN!” and “CHECK YOUR SPEED,” while the narrator describes law 

enforcement fatalities resulting from “single vehicle collisions”—the narrator observes 

that accidents can happen in any conditions and states “we’re driving too fast for the 

conditions.” Finally, at one point a trainer makes a passing reference to “monitoring our 

speed for the current conditions.” After the 25 minutes of instruction, there are two “case 

studies,” consisting of recordings of exchanges between Sheriff’s dispatchers and 

deputies during actual past pursuits. After each case study, on-screen text directs that the 

playback be paused for a 10 minute debrief regarding the pursuit, but the record contains 

no information about what matters were covered during those discussions.16

 

16 The only document in the record related to the Sheriff’s pursuit training that references 

“speed limits” is a September 17, 2014, “Training Bulletin.” The bulletin is entitled 

“ANNUAL HIGH SPEED VEHICLE PURSUIT TRAINING Penal Code 13519.8.” The 

bulletin references the Sheriff’s training video and explains that part of the video may be 

viewed by deputies on their own and that there is a “Case Studies” portion that “should 

be viewed as a group” with “facilitated discussion held by a supervisor to ensure that all 

staff understands the [Sheriff’s] written directives related to pursuits . . . . The facilitated 

portion of the training provides an opportunity for staff to ask questions and seek 

clarification.” The facilitated discussion should last “approximately 30 minutes.” The 

bulletin continues, “Supervisors facilitating the Pursuit Update training video portion 

should ensure students have an understanding of” 21 listed topics and sub-topics. “Speed 

limits” is listed as a sub-topic under the topic “Consideration of law enforcement vehicle 

pursuit issues.” But the record contains no evidence from supervisors regarding any steps 

taken to ensure students understood the listed topics.
23

Our determination of the legal adequacy of the Sheriff’s training video turns on 

our construction of the phrase “speed limits” in Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision 

(b). Appellant effectively argues “speed limits” requires the training to specify numeric 

or relative limitations on speed, even though that is beyond what is required by section 

17004.7, subdivision (c)(7). As we concluded previously (Part IV(B)(1), ante), the 

Sheriff’s Policy does comply with that minimum standard requirement. Because the 

content of the training video is essentially equivalent to the content of the Policy, the 

video itself is also adequate, unless “speed limits” requires that the training cover a 

matter that the Policy itself need not address.

We must construe the reference to “speed limits” in Penal Code section 13519.8, 

subdivision (b), in harmony with the remainder of the Penal Code provision as well as 

with section 17004.7. (See Alameda Produce, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1107 [“We must 

harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the statutory 

framework as a whole.”].) At the outset, we note that the Penal Code provision does not 

suggest there are substantive differences between the scope of the training and the policy

guidelines. Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (a), provides that the POST 

Commission “shall implement a course or courses of instruction for the regular and 

periodic training of law enforcement officers in the handling of high-speed vehicle 

pursuits and shall also develop uniform, minimum guidelines for adoption and 

promulgation by California law enforcement agencies for response to high-speed vehicle 

pursuits. The guidelines and course of instruction shall stress the importance of vehicle 

safety and protecting the public at all times, include a regular assessment of law 

enforcement’s vehicle pursuit policies, practices, and training, and recognize the need to 

balance the known offense and the need for immediate capture against the risks to 

officers and other citizens of a high-speed pursuit.” Even more to the point, Penal Code 

section 13519.8, subdivision (b), states that “The course or courses of basic training for 

law enforcement officers and the guidelines shall include adequate consideration of each 

of the following subjects . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, the Penal Code provision at issue 

suggests that the policy guidelines and training must address the same subjects.
24

Section 17004.7 is consistent. Section 17004.7, subdivision (d) references both

the minimum standards and the Penal Code section 13519.8 training requirements in 

defining “ ‘Regular and periodic training’ ” to mean “annual training that shall include, at 

a minimum, coverage of each of the subjects and elements set forth in subdivision (c) and 

that shall comply, at a minimum, with the training guidelines established pursuant to 

Section 13519.8 of the Penal Code.” The list of subjects in Penal Code section 13519.8, 

subdivision (b), essentially covers the minimum standards listed in section 17004.7, 

subdivision (c), albeit with some different language and ordering. That is, it appears that 

all of the issues that must be given “adequate consideration” in trainings (Pen. Code,

§ 13519.8, subd. (b)) are encompassed by the “minimum standards” listed in section 

17004.7, subdivision (c). That makes sense: it is logical that trainings would cover the 

topics in the policies and vice versa. To accept appellant’s interpretation of “speed 

limits” would require this court to conclude that the Legislature intended trainings to 

impose specific numeric or relative limitations on speed, even though policies are not 

required to contain such limitations to comply with section 17004.7. We can think of no 

reason the Legislature would have decided not to require policies to address a matter that 

trainings are mandated to address, particularly in light of the absence of any indication in 

the statutory scheme that the policies and trainings were intended to cover different 

topics.

The section 17004.7 legislative history is consistent with this understanding of the 

statutory scheme. Section 17004.7 was amended by Senate Bill 719 in 2005 to impose

more detailed minimum policy standards, including that related to determination of

speed. (Stats. 2005, ch. 485, § 11, at pp. 3825–3827.) The legislative history does not 

explain the use of “speed” versus “speed limits,” but it does appear the Legislature 

understood the policy and training requirements to be co-extensive. For example, a 

Senate Committee on Public Safety analysis stated, “This bill provides that each law 

enforcement agency shall adopt, promulgate, and require regular and periodic training

consistent with an agency’s specific pursuit policy that at a minimum, complies with the 

guidelines created by POST.” (Sen. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 719
25

(2005–2006 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 21, 2005, at p. D.) Later, the bill analysis 

states, “This bill provides that an agency will only get immunity if they not only adopt a 

policy but also promulgate it and provide regular and periodic training on the policy.” 

(Id. at p. J; see also Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 719, as 

amended May 19, 2005 at p. 4.) Thus, the required training is to be regarding the pursuit 

policy, rather than on additional matters not covered in the policy.

The legislative history is also clear the 2005 amendments were motivated in part 

by the concern expressed in Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at page 1168, that the then 

current version of section 17004.7 “simply grants a ‘get out of liability free card’ to 

public entities that go through the formality of adopting [a pursuit] policy. There is no 

requirement the public entity implement the policy through training or other means.” 

(See Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 719 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.), as 

amended May 5, 2005, at p. 7 [discussing Nguyen]; Sen. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Analysis 

of Sen. Bill 719 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.), as amended May 19, 2005, at p. K [same].) 

Viewed in light of Nguyen, the training requirement is intended to implement an agency’s 

pursuit policy, not to require training on subjects beyond the scope of the policy. In sum, 

the statutory language and legislative history do not support construing “speed limits” in 

Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (b) to require training on matters not required to 

be included in the pursuit policy under the section 17004.7, subdivision (c), minimum 

standards.17

 

17 The phrase “speed limits” was included in Penal Code section 13519.8 upon its 

enactment in 1993. (Stats. 1993, ch. 340, §1.) Nothing in the legislative history to the 

enactment defines the phrase, although it is interesting to observe that as introduced the 

bill required training on “[a]bsolute speed limits.” (Sen. Bill 601 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) 

as introduced Mar. 2, 1993.) It is not clear whether the Legislature omitted the word 

“absolute” in the final enactment because its meaning was unclear or because the 

Legislature did not intend to require law enforcement agencies to impose any “absolute” 

restrictions on speed. The former view of the legislative history is consistent with our 

construction of “speed limits,” and the latter view strongly supports our construction of 

the phrase.
26

Moreover, it is reasonable to construe “speed limits” as used in Penal Code section 

13519.8, subdivision (b), to require guidance about determination of speed but not the 

specification of numeric or relative limits. Section 22350, which is the generally 

applicable basic speed law, provides, “No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at 

a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the 

traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which 

endangers the safety of persons or property.” Section 22350 is effectively a speed limit 

provision, requiring drivers not to exceed speeds that are safe for road and traffic 

conditions. Similarly, the Sheriff’s training—by exhorting deputies to slow down and by 

listing factors to consider in initiating, continuing, and terminating pursuit—effectively 

provides deputies guidance in determining when speed of pursuit is excessive due to the 

road and other conditions.

Appellant points out that Deputy Hansen testified in her deposition that the 

training did not cover the subject of speed limits. Specifically, Riley’s counsel asked her, 

“In the 12 months prior to 10-29-2014, did the [Sheriff’s] training consider or instruct on 

any limits on speed, either initially or, for that matter, throughout a pursuit?” Hansen 

responded, “No, sir.” Shortly thereafter, Riley’s counsel asked her a second time, “did 

the training in the . . . 12 or 24 months prior to the October 29th, 2014 incident -- address 

in any way the issue of speed limits?” Again, Hansen responded, “No, sir.” It appears 

that in that exchange Deputy Hansen understood “speed limits” to require a specific 

numeric limitation on speed, but we have concluded to the contrary as a matter of 

statutory interpretation.

In conclusion, because the Sheriff showed that deputies were trained in accordance 

with the Policy, the Sheriff showed that the training included adequate consideration of 

speed limits as required by Penal Code section 13519.8, subdivision (b).

18

 The trial court 

 

18 Riley also argues the Sheriff’s Policy fails to require its officers to receive annual 

training. However, the Sheriff presented evidence it issued annual training bulletins 

notifying officers they were required to undergo annual pursuit training. Riley also 

alleges the Sheriff failed to use an attestation form to document completion of training, 
27

did not err in granting the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication on the 

basis of immunity under section 17004.7.19

V. Riley’s Requests for Judicial Notice Are Denied

On April 9, 2019, at the time of filing his opening brief, Riley requested that this 

court take judicial notice of pursuit policies adopted by 24 other California law 

enforcement agencies, to compare the language of those policies to the Sheriff’s Policy. 

Riley also asked this court to take judicial notice of California Highway Patrol vehicle 

pursuit statistics he alleges show the Sheriff has reported a much higher number of 

pursuits than other agencies.

We deny Riley’s requests for judicial notice as “unnecessary to resolution of the 

issues on appeal.” (Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC (2015) 234 

Cal.App.4th 1270, 1276, fn. 5.) As explained above, the Sheriff’s Policy and training 

comply with section 17004.7 as a matter of law (as to the aspects challenged by Riley on 

appeal). The alleged circumstance that other jurisdictions have pursuit policies that are 

more detailed than the Sheriff’s Policy, or more restrictive in authorizing high speed 

pursuits, would not show the Policy and training fail to comply with section 17004.7. 

Similarly, the alleged circumstance that Sheriff’s deputies engage in many more pursuits 

would not show that the Policy and training fail to comply with section 17004.7. If 

section 17004.7 is insufficiently prescriptive to achieve its statutory ends, that is a matter 

for the Legislature to consider.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.

 

but he cites no authority use of such a form is required for immunity under section 

17004.7.

19 Because we affirm on the basis of section 17004.7 immunity, we need not address the 

Sheriff’s argument in the alternative that it did not owe a legal duty of care to Riley, 

where a third-party was the direct cause of Riley’s injuries.
28

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JONES, P.J.

BURNS, J.

(A156407)
29

Superior Court of Alameda County, No. RG15791353, Hon. Ioana Petrou, Judge.

Timothy P. Rumberger and Law Offices of Timothy P. Rumberger, for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Haapala, Thompson & Abern, Rebecca S. Widen, Jody Struck, and Christopher M. 

Wolcott, for Defendant and Respondent.