### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 14, 200 5 S es sio n

IN TH E MA TTEROF : C .M .C ., C. L.C ., and D .A .M

.

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for G ree ne County

No. 16386 Thomas J. Wr ight, Jud ge

No. E2005-00328-COA- R3-P T - F ILED AUGU ST 3, 2005

The trial c ourt terminated Mothe r’s pa renta l righ t s based on a bandonment, substantial noncomplia

n c e w it ha p e rma n e n cy plan, per sistence of

conditions, and a finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother appea ls. W e re verse

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t R e ve r se d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S
., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

M. Brent Hen sl ey , Gr eenev il le, Ten nes see, forth e app ell ant , S AF.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter , and Sharon G . Hutchins, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the Petitioner/Appellee , State of Tenne ssee, De partment of Children’ s Services.

OP IN ION

On Dec ember

31, 2002, the trial court removed C.M.C. (born 5/4/1 992), C.L .C. (born 7/11/1995), and D.A.M. ( born 7/1/1999) (c ollectively , “the c hildren”) from Mother’ s custody upon

a pe tit ion fo r t e mpo ra

ry c us tod y fi le d b y the De pa rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ice s (“ DC S” ). I n it s petition, DCS alleg ed that Mother ha d been e victed fr om her home, had a history of substance abuse, and wa s living with a m an , Bill y McClain (Mr. McClain), w ho was known by DCS to have bee n

abu siv e to M oth e r. DC S f urthe r a lle g e d th e c hil dren were de pe nd e nt andsu ff e ri ng fr om n e g le c t. The c hildren we re r eturne d to Mother’s custody in May 2003 for a 90-day trial period. In its order g ra nti ng the tr ia l pe ri od , th e tr ia l c ou rt or de re d Mo the r t o h a ve no c on ta c t w ith Mr . M c Cla in. I n July 2003, the childre n wer e returned to DCS custody afte r DCS alleg ed that Mother ha d left them in Mr. McClain’s company

. Following an August hearing , in October 2003 the trial court entere d an orde r fi nd ing Mo the r to be in co nte mpt fo r v iol a tin g the no c on ta c t or de r a ndor de ri ng Mo the r t o p a y c hil d support of $75.00 per

month to the Chi ld Support Receiving Unit.T he f athe rs o f t he ch i l d ren ha ve no t ap p ea l ed t erm i na t i o n o f t he i r p are ntal ri gh t s. 1

-2- On Aug ust 24, 2004, DCS petit ioned to terminate the rig hts of Mother and the fathe rs of the children. The trial court hear d the matter in D ece mber 2004 and terminated Mother’ s rig hts based on the statutory

g rounds of abandonme nt, substantial noncompliance w ith a perma nency plan, and persistenc e of c onditions and upon finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal to this Court. W e re verse

. 1

Stan dard of Revie w

Ou r s ta nd ardof

re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt

sit tin g wi tho ut a

jury is de novo upo n the re cord. W rig ht v . Ci ty of K

nox v ill e , 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn.1995) . There i s a pre sumption of

corr ectne ss as to the trial court’s finding s of fa ct, unless the prepondera nce of evidenc e is otherwise

. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). How ever , no presump t i o n o f co rre ctness attac hes to a trial c ourt’s conclusions on issues of law. Bo wde n v . W ar d , 275 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn.2000) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-1- 113 g overns the te rmination of pare ntal rig hts. The code pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

(c ) T e rm inatio n o f p are nta l or g ua rd ia ns hip ri g hts mus t be ba se d u po n: (1) A f inding by the court by

clea r and convincing evidenc e that the gr ounds for termination or pare ntal or g uardia nship rights ha ve bee n established; and (2 ) Th a t te rm inatio n of the pa re nt' s o r g ua

rd ia n' s r ig hts is i n th e be st i nte re sts of the c hild.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( c)( 2001). This se ction also provides the g rounds on whi ch p ar ental ri g hts ma y

be te rm inate d. Th e e xiste nc e of a ny statut ory g ro un d for te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts wi ll sup po rt the tr ia l cou rt ’s de c isi on to te rm inate tho se ri g hts

. In re Vale ntine
, 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

.

A court’s determination to terminate pare ntal rig hts must be supported by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Id. Clear and convincing evidenc e is “e vidence in which there is no serious

or substantial doubt about the corr ectne ss of the conclusions draw n from the evidenc e.” Id. (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof

& Co.
, 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n. 3 (Tenn.1992) ). I n describing what constitutes clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, this Court has stated:

[a] lthough it does not re quire a s much ce rtainty as the “ bey ond a re asonable doubt” standar d, the “c lear and convinc ing e vidence ” standa rd is more e x acting than the “pr eponder ance of the evidenc e” sta ndard. O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. A pp. 1 9 9 5 ); Brandon v. W

right
, 8 3 8 S

. W

. 2d 532, 536 (Tenn. A pp. 1992). I n order to be clea

r and convincing , the evidenc e must eliminate any s er i o u s o r subs tantial doubt about the

corr ectne ss of t he conclusions to be drawn from the evidenc e. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.
,-3-

83 3 S. W.2 d 8 96 , 9 01 n. 3 (Tenn. 1 99 2) ; O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d at 188. Such

e vid e nc e sh ou ld p ro du c e in the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s min d a fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n a s to the truth of the a lleg ations sought to be e stablished. O’ Da n i el v. Messier , 905 S.W .2d at 188; W iltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W .2d 407, 411 (Tenn. A pp. 1985). I n contra st to the pr e po nd e ra nc e of

the e vid e nc e sta nd ard , cle ar an d c on vin c ing e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e mon str a te that the truth of the f

acts asserted is “hig hly probable ” as oppose d to merely “more probable ” than not. Lettner v. Plumme r , 5 59 S.W. 2d 78 5, 78 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 7) ; Go lds mi th v . R ob e rts , 622 S.W. 2d43 8, 44 1 ( Te nn . A pp . 1 98 1) ; Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d at 536.

I n r e C

. W. W.
, N

. W. W.
, Z

. W. W.
, & A

. L

. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Anal y sis

We beg in ou r ana ly sis by reiter ating that “a pa

rent ha s a funda mental rig ht to the car e, custo d y an d control of his or he r child.” Sta nle y v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). F urther, “[f]ew conseque nces of

judicial action ar e so g rave as the seve ranc e of natural fa milyties.” Santosky v. Kramer
, 455 U.S. 745, 787 (1982)(Rehnquist, J., di ssenting) . I n light of the fundame ntal nature of pa re nta l r ig hts a ndthe g ra vit y of the te rm inatio n o f tho se ri g hts , “ [t]he fe de ra l a ndstate

c on sti tut ion s r e qu ir e the op po rtun ity fo r an ind ivi du a lize d de te rm inatio n tha t a par e nt i s e ith e r u nf it or will cause substantial harm to his or her c hild before the funda ment al rig ht to care and custody of the c hild can be ta

ken aw ay .” In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999). A par ent’s rig ht to the car e, custody , and contr ol of his or her child may

be terminated only

if clea r and c onvincing evidenc e justifies termination under the applica

ble statutes. Santosky v . Kramer
, 455 U.S. at 769.

The T e n n e s s e e Co d e p r o v id e s th e f o ll o w in g g r o u n d s o n w h ic h p ar e n ta l r ig h ts maybe
te rm inate d:

(1) Aba ndonment by the par ent or g uardia n, as def ined in § 36-1-102, ha s

oc c ur re d; (2 ) T he re ha s b e e n s ub sta nti a l no nc omp lia nc e by the pa re nt or g ua

rd ia n w ith the state me nt o f r e sp on sib ili tie s in a pe rm a ne nc y pla n or a pla n o f c a

re pu rs ua nt t o the pr ov isi on s o f t itl e 37 , c ha pte r 2 , p art

4; (3)( A) The child has bee n remove d from the home of the par ent or g uardia n by or de r o f a

c ou rt fo r a pe ri odof six ( 6) mon ths a nd : (i) The conditions w hich led to the child' s removal or other c onditions which in a ll r e a so nable pr ob abil ity wo uldc a us e the c hil d to be su bje c te d to fu rthe r a bu se or neg lect and w hich, there fore, p re v en t t he child' s safe return to the c are of the pa re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (i i) Th e re is l itt le lik e lih oo d th a t th e se c on dit ion s w ill be re me die d a t a n e arl y date so that the child can be safe ly returne d to the pare nt(s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar future; a nd-4- (i ii) Th e c on tin ua tio n o f the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndc hil d r e la tio ns hip g re a tly diminis hes the c hild's c hance s of ea rly integ ration i nto a saf

e, stable a nd perma nent home. (4 ) T h e p ar e n t o r g u ar d i a n h a s b e e n f o u n d t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d s e v e re c hil d abuse as define d in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is f oun d b yt he

c ou rt he ari ng the pe tit ion to t e rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts or

the pe tit ion fo r a do pti on to have committed sever e child abuse ag ainst the child who is the subject of the petition

or ag ainst any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or any other child re s iding
te mpo ra ri ly or pe rm a ne ntl y

in the ho me of

su c h p are nt o r g ua

rd ia n; (5 ) T he pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n h a s b e e n s e nte nc e d to mor e tha n tw o ( 2) y e ars ' imprisonment for conduc t a g ainst the child who is the subject of the pe tition, or for conduct a g ainst any

sibling or ha lf-si bling of the child or a ny

other c hild residing temporarily

or permanently

in the home of such pare nt or g uardia n, which has be en found under

any prior orde r of a

court or w hich is fo u n d b y t h e court hearing the pe tit ion to b e se ve re c hil d a bu se , a s de fi ne d in § 3 7- 1- 10 2( b) (2 1) . U nle ss o the rw ise stated, for purposes of this subdivi sion, "sente nced" shall not be construe d to mean that th e pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n mu st h a ve a c tually se rv e d mo re tha n tw o ( 2) y e ars in confine ment, but shall onlybe construe d to mean that the co u rt h ad imposed a

se nte nc e of

tw o ( 2) or

mor e y e ars up on the pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n; (6) The pare nt ha s been confine d in a corr ectional or

detention fa cility

of any type, by order of the c ourt as a r esult of a c riminal act, under a sentenc e of ten (10) or more y ear s, and the c hild is under eig ht ( 8) y ear s of ag e at the time the se ntence is entere d by

the court. (7) The pare nt has bee n convicted of or found c ivillyliable for the intentional and wr ong ful dea th of the child' s other par ent or leg al g uardia n.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(1) -(7) (Supp. 2004). I n this case, the trial court terminated Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts pursuant to sections 36-1-113( g )(1) , (2) a nd (3)( A).

Aba ndo nment

We f ir s t tu r n to w h e th e r c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e s u p p o r ts te r mi n a ti o n o f Mother’s pa re nta l r ig hts ba se d o n ab a nd on me nt u nd e r s e c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 1) . T he Te nn e sse e Cod e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

(1)( A) "Aba ndonment" means, for purposes of te rminating the par ental or g uardia n ri g hts of pa

re nt( s) or g ua

rd ia n( s) of a c hil d to tha t chi ld in or de r to m a ke that c hil d

a va ila ble fo r a do pti on , th a t: (i) F or a p er i o d of four

(4) c onsecutive months immediately prec eding the filing of a proc eeding or plea ding to terminate the par ental rig hts of the par ent(s) or g uardia n(s) of the child who i s the s ubject of the petit ion for termination of pare ntal ri g hts or a do pti on , th a t th e pa

re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) e ith e r ha ve wi llf

ull y fa ile d to vis it-5-

or ha ve wi llf

ull y faile d to su pp ort or ha ve wi llf

ull y fa ile d to make re a so na

ble pay ments toward the support of the child; (i i) Th e c hil d h a s b e e n r e mov e d f ro m th e ho me of the pa

re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s)

a s th e re su lt o f a

pe tit ion fi le d in the juv e nil e c ou rt in wh ic h the c hil d wa s f ou ndto be a de pendent and negle cted c hild, as defined in § 37- 1-102, and the child was place d in the custody

of the de partment or a

licensed c hild-placing ag ency , that the juv e nil e c ou rt fo un d, or the c ou rt wh e re the te rm inatio n of pa re nta l ri g hts pe tit ion is fi le d fi nd s, that the de pa

rt me nt o r a

lic e ns e d c hil d- pla c ing a g e nc y ma de re a so na

ble ef fo rt s t o p re v en tre m o v al o f t h e c h i l d o r t h at t h e c i rc u m s t a n ce s o f t h e c h i l d 's situa tio n p re ve nte d r e a so na ble e ff orts f ro m be ing ma de pr ior

to the c hil d' s r e mov a l; and for a period of four (4) months following the re moval, the depa rtment or ag ency has made rea sonable e fforts to assist t he par ent(s) or g uar d i an (s) to establish a suitable h o me for the child, but that the pare nt(s) or g uardia n(s) ha ve made no

rea sonable e fforts to provide a suitable home a nd h av e d em o nstrated a lack of

c on c e rn fo r the c hil d to su c h a de g re e that it app e ars un lik e ly that the y wi ll b e able to provide a suitable home for the c hild at an ea rly date; (i ii) A b iol og ic a l or

le g a l fa the r ha s eithe r wil lf ull y fa ile d to vi sit

or wi llf ull y failed to ma

ke rea sonable pay ments toward the support of the c hild's mother during the four ( 4) months immediately prec eding the birth of the

c hil d; pr ov ide d, that in no ins ta nc e sh a ll a fi na l or de r t e rm inatin g the pa re nta l r ig hts of a pa re n ta s d e t e r m i n e d p u r s u a n tt o t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n ( i i i ) b e e n t e r e d u n t i l a tl e a st thirty (30) da y s have e lapsed since the date of the child' s birth; (iv) A p ar e n t o r g u ar d ia n is in c ar c e r a te d a t th e ti me o f th e in s ti tu tion of an action or pr ocee ding to de clar e a c hild to be an ab an d o n ed child, or the pare nt or g ua rd ia n h a s b e e n in c arc e rate d d ur ing a ll o r pa rt of the fo ur (4 ) m on ths imm e diate ly prec eding the institut ion of such action or proce eding
, and either has willfully

failed
to v isi t or ha s w ill full y

fa ile d to su pp ort or

ha s w ill fu lly

fa ile d to make re a so na

ble pay ments toward the support o f the child for f our (4) consec utive months immediately

prec eding such par ent' s or gu ardian' s incarc eration, or the pare nt or g uardia n has eng ag ed in co n d u ct prior to incar cer ation which exhibits a wa nton disreg ard f

or the we lfare of the c hild; or (v) The child, as a newborn infant age d seventy -two (72) hours or less, was voluntarily left at a fa cility by such infant' s mother pursuant to § 68-11- 255; and, for

a pe ri odof thi rt y (3 0) da y s a ft e r the da te of vo lun tary de liv e ry , the mothe r f a ile d to visit or seek conta ct with the infant; and, for a period of thirty (30) da y s after

notice was g iven under

§ 36-1-142( e), and no less than ninety (90) da y s cumulatively , the mother fa iled to seek c ontact with the infant throug h the department or to revoke her

vo lun tary de liv e ry of the inf a nt. (B ) F or purpose s of t h i s s ubdivision (1), "toke n support" me ans that the support, under the circ umstances of the individual case, i s insignifica nt give n the pa re nt' s me a ns ; (C) F or purpose s of this subdivis ion (1), " token visitation" mea ns that the visitation, under the circ umstances of the individual c ase, c onstitut es nothing more-6-

than per functory

visitation or visi tation of such an inf reque nt nature or of such short duration as to mer ely

establish minimal or insubst antial contac t with the child; (D) F or purpose s of this subdivis ion (1), " willfull y fa i l ed to support" or "w illfullyfailed

to ma k e rea sonable pa y ments toward suc h child' s support" me ans the willful failure, f

or a pe riod of four

(4) c onsecutive months, to provide moneta ry support or the willful fa ilure to provide more than token payments toward the support of the c hild; (E) For purposes of t his subdivision (1), "willfully failed to visit" mea ns the willful failure, f

or a period of four (4) consec utive months, to vi sit or eng ag e in more than token visitation; (F ) Aba ndonment may not be repented of by resuming visitation or support subsequent to the filing of any petition seeking to terminate pa renta l or g uardia nship rights or se eking the adoption of a child; and (G) " Abandonment" and "aba ndonment of an infant" do not have a ny other definition except t h at wh i ch is set forth in this section, it being the intent of the g ener al assembly to e stablish the only g rounds for abandonme nt by s t atut ory d ef inition. S pecif

ically , it shall not be require d that a par ent be shown to ha ve evince d a settled purpose to fore g o all pare ntal rig hts and responsibili ties in order for

a deter mination of abandonme nt to be made. Dec isions of any court to the c ontrary

are here by

leg islatively

overr uled;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (Supp. 2004).

The trial c ourt in this case found a bandonment base d o n wi l l ful failure to visit and willful fa ilu re to su pp ort . T he tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t Mo the r h a d f

a ile d “ wi tho ut g oo d c a us e or e xcu se , to

make re a so na

ble a nd c on sis te nt pa y me nts fo r the su pp or t of the c hil dr e n in ac c or da nc e wi th the c hil d support gu i d el i n es p ro m u l gat ed b y t h e T en n es s ee De p ar t m en to f H u m an S er v i ce s p u rs u an tt o T.C.A. 36-5-101" and “to se ek re asonable visitation with the children, and if visi tation has bee n g rante d, has failed to visit altoge ther or ha s eng ag ed i n only token visitation as defined in T.C.A. 36-1- 102(1)( D).”

The e lement of willfulness is essential to the court’s determination of aba ndonment. See I n re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999) . Although w illfulness in the contex t o f t he statutes g overning the termination of pare ntal rig hts doe s not require a finding of malice or ill will, i t does

re qu ir e c le ar a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e of c ho ic e of a c tio n, fr e e fr om c oe rc ion , ma de by a fr e e a g e nt. In re Adoption of Kleshinski , No

. M 2 0 0 4 -0 0986-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1046796, at *18 (Te nn. Ct. App. May

4, 2005)( no perm. app. filed )(c itations omitted). A custodial pare nt’s or third party ’s conduc t e xc u s e s a p ar e n t’ s w il lf u l f a il u r e to v is it o n ly w h e r e th a t c o n d u c t a c tu a ll y p r e v e n ts or signific antly hinders the pare nt from doing s o. In re DM D , No. W2003-00987-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 1359046, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 17, 2004).

I n this c ase, the revised perma nency plan dated Dec ember 11, 2003, states that Mother “ ha[d] made se vera l reque st[ s] t o visit wit h her c hildren” de spite visitation being at the disc ret i o n of the-7-

foster pa rents and despite reque sts f rom two of the children for no contac t. Mr. M., DAM’s pate rnal g randf ather and foster car e provider, testified that Mother visited w ith DA M in the spring of 2004

a nd that Mo the r ha d sp ok e n to DA M wh e n he a ns we re d the te le ph on e thr e e or fo ur mon ths pr ior

to the De c e mbe r 2 00 4 h e ari ng . M r. M. a lso te sti fi e d tha t Moth e r ha d tel e ph on e d two or thr e e tim e s in the three months prior to the Dec ember hearing to inquire about DAM, but that she had not aske d to see him. As Mr. M. further testified, howeve r, Mother was under a court order to have no c ontact with her c hildren fr om the date of the pre vious review he aring of April 20, 2004.

The tech n i ca l re co rd i n this case r efle cts that the trial court held a hea ring to “re view the prog ress of the parties” on Ap ri l 2 0
, 2004, and that it order ed that “the children a re to ha ve no contac t with the Mother.” This orde r wa s entere d by the trial court on J un e 2
, 2004, but the no

co n t ac t o rd er ap p ar en t l y wa s u n d er s t o o d b y t h e pa rt i es t o b e ef fe ct i v e fr o m t h e da t e of

t h e h ea ri n g. The pe tition t o terminate Mother ’s par ental rights was f iled on Aug ust 24, 2004, four months subsequent to the trial c ourt’s no conta ct orde r.

“[T] he willful failure to visit, support, or m ake rea sonable pay ments toward the support of the child must h av e o cc u rr ed in t he four months im mediately

prec eding the filing of the pe tition

cu rr en t l y b ef

o re the court.” In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 366 (Tenn. 2003) . I n light of the trial court’s no contac t or der of April 2004, we can hardly ag ree that Mother willfully failed to visit her ch il dr e nin

the four months immediately prec eding the filing of the Aug ust 2004 termination petition. I ndeed, Mothe r would have bee n i n contempt of c ourt had she attempted to contact he r childre n during this period. I t is undisput ed, howe ver, tha t Mother contac ted both Mr. M

. and DCS to inquire about the welfare of her

children. Mr . J ames De nney (Mr. De nney ), the DCS county case manag er who manag ed this case from its ince ption in Dec ember 2002, testified that Mother ha d telephoned his office s on a number of occasions reque sting visi tation prior to the no contact order and that she ha d c on tin ue d to c on ta c t hi s o ff ic e fo llo wi ng e ntry

of the Ap ri l no c on ta c t or de r. Mo reo ve r, it i s undisputed that prior to the no conta ct orde r, Mother’ s visitation wit h her c hildren wa s at the discretion of D CS and the foster care providers. I n light of the foreg oing, we reverse the finding of abandonme nt based on the w illful failure to visit.

We next turn to whether the re cord supports a finding of aba ndonment based on the willful failure to support. This Court rece ntly has noted that,

[t ]erminating pa

renta l ri gh t s b ased on f

ailure to support pre supposes (1) tha t the pare nt is a w ar e o f

h is o r h e r d u ty to s u p p o r t, ( 2 ) th a t th e p ar e n t i s ab le to p r o vide financ ial support, either throug h income fr om private em p l o y ment or qualification fo r g ov e rn me nt b e ne fits
, and (3 ) tha t th e pa re nt h a s v olu nta

ri ly a ndint e nti on a lly chosen not to provide f

inancial support without a justifiable e x cuse.

I n re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Me re ly de mon str a tin g that a

pa re nt fa ile d to pr ov ide su pp ort is no t su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh willful failure to support. Id. at 655. As this court repea tedly has held, a parent’s failure to support-8-

the ir c hil d b e c a us e he or

sh e is f ina nc ia lly un able to d o s o d oe s n ot c on sti tut e a wi ll ful fai lu re t o support. E.g., O'Daniel v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995); In re Adoption of Kleshinski , No. M2004-00986-COA- R3CV, 2005 W L 1046796, at *18 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 04, 2005)( no perm. app. fi led). F urther, w here a child has be en plac ed in DCS custody pursuant to a depende nt-neg lect proc eeding
, the duty to support may

be esta blished by

external fac tors, including the per manenc y plan for the child or by a court order defining the support obligation. In re M .J.B.
, 140 S.W .3d at 655. Howe ver a third party ’s i nterfe renc e with a parent’s a ttempts at visit ation does not excuse the pare nt from hi s o b l i gat ion to support the child financia lly

. In re DM D , No. W2003-00987-COA-R3PT, 2004 WL1359046, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 17, 2004)

.

I n her brief to this Court, Mother’s arg ument, as we perc eive it, is that she was unsur e of he r child support obligation and that she wa s unable to pay child support becau s e “among other

rea sons[ ,]” she had a history of seizures and w as unable to work af ter a seizur e i n J u l y

2004. Howeve r, following a hea ring on Aug ust 26, 2003, in Oc tober 2003 the trial court ordere d Mother to pay child support of $75 per

month to the Chi ld Support Receiving Unit. Mother testified to being

awa re of the court’s order

and to having failed to pa y child support for the f

our months prec eding the De c e mbe r h e ari ng

. Thus , a ny a sse rt ion by

Mo the r tha t sh e wa s u ns ur e of he r o bli g a tio n is wi tho ut m e ri t.

I t is undisputed that Mother failed to pay the child support order ed by the court and spec ified

on the revised perma nency plan for DAM. We must determine, howeve r, whe ther Mother ’s fa ilure
to pay child support for the four months prec eding the fil ing of the petit ion to terminate he r par ental rig hts was will ful. Whether a pa rent’s f ailure to support wa s willful must be dete rmined under the parti cu l ar facts a nd circ umstances of eac h case

. See I

n re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 184-85 (T e nn .1 99 9) . A dd iti on a lly , w he n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a par e nt h a s w ill fu lly fa ile d to su pp ort hi s

c hil d, we mus t c on sid e r the fo ur mon ths imm e diate ly

pr e c e din g the fi lin g of

the pe tit ion c ur

re ntl y befor e the c ourt. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 366 (Tenn. 2003)

.

Mother asse rts that she wa s unable to work following the onset of seizures on J uly 28, 2004. Mother testifi ed t hat, prior to experienc ing se izures, she had be en doing “tre e wor k” and “ pulling brush” a nd that she had he r first se izure on the job on J uly 28. She further

testified that she ha d

wo rk e d in “ pr ob ably

Ma rc h may be ” of 20 04 a ndha d a

pp lie d f or so c ia l se c ur ity dis abil ity be ne fi ts following her Julyseizure. The Socia l Sec urity Administration approved Mother ’s application for disabilitybenef

its on October 25, 2004.

The burden is on DCS to prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e that Mother had the means but willfullyfailed to support he r childre n in the four months immediately prec eding the termination pe tit ion c ur

re ntl y be fo re the c ou rt . A lth ou g h M oth e r t e sti fi e d th a t, pr ior to he r f ir st s e izur e on July 28, 2004, she worke d intermittently doing “ tree work” in 2004, the rec ord does not re flec t how much Mother ac tually

earned in the four

mon ths prece ding the Aug ust 2004 petition t o terminate he r pare ntal rig hts. As DCS observes, M other also testified t hat s he earne d $125 per w eek ove r a thre e or four -month period in t h e later part of 2003 or

ear ly 2004 and that, for

the two-y ear

period pr e c e din g the te rm inatio n h e ari ng , s he ha d li ve d in he r s ist e r’ s h ome c on tr ibu tin g on ly fo odsta mps ,-9-

so me fo od , a ndho us e ho ld c ho re s to the ho us e ho ld. F urthe r, a s DCS als o ass e rt s in its brie f t o th is Cou rt , it is u nd isp ute d th a t, d e sp ite int e rm itt e nt e mpl oy me nt a nd virtua lly no ho us e ho ld e xpe ns e s, Mother made littl e or no ef fort to fulfill any

of her child support obligation as order ed by the court in O c tob e r 2 00 3. Ho we ve r, it i s th e fo ur mon th p e ri od of April 2 4 to Au g us t 24 , 2 00 4, that is rele vant to our inquiry

here

.

The trial c ourt found that Mother ma de no child support pay ments during this period. Mr. Denne y , howeve r, testified that, a lthough he had a “har d time” rea ding the computer print out report in the rec ord, it appea

red that Mother made two support pay ments totaling $85 in June 2004. Mother testified that she made at least one pay ment during this period. Additionally
, in the absenc e of a ny evidenc e re g arding what Mother a ctually earned in this period, we cannot dete rmine that a pay ment of $85 wa s not reasona

ble considering Mothe r’s income during the four mont h s p re ceding the termination petition. Moreover , it is undi sputed that the Social Security Administration determined that Mo the r w a s u na

ble to wo rk a nd be c a me e lig ibl e fo r, bu t had no t y e t r e c e ive d, dis abil ity be ne fi ts following the on-set of

seizures in J u l y 2 0 0 4

. T hus, Mother’s fa ilure to support clea rly was not willful after

J uly 28, 2004.

I n light of the fore g oing, w e cannot say that clea r and convincing evidenc e esta blishes that Mother had the ability to f ulfill he r child support oblig ation but willfullyfailed to do so during the fo ur mon ths imm e diate ly pr e c e din g the Au g us t 24 , 2 00 4, pe tit ion to t e rm inate he r p are nta l r ig hts

. DCS simply

has fa iled to car

ry its burden of proof

on this iss ue. Ac cording ly , we r ever se the trial

c ou rt ’s fi nd ing of

g ro un ds ba se d o n w ill fu l a ba nd on me nt.

Subs tantial Noncom

pliance with the Perm anency Plan

The trial court found that g rounds exist ed for termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts based on substantial noncompliance w ith the require ments of the permanency plan. I n order to determine that a par ent has not substantially complied with the re quirements of a permanency plan, the trial
court must find that the re quirements ar e “r easona ble and r elated to r emedying the conditions which

nece ssitate foster c are place ment” as r equire d by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403( a)( 2)(C). In re Valentine , 7 9 S. W.3 d 5 39 , 5 47 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he se c on dit ion s in c lud e c on dit ion s “ re la te d b othto the c h i l d ’s removal and to family reunific ation.” Id. Further, a pare nt’s noncompliance must be “substantial.” Id. a t 548. “ I n the c on te xt of the re qu ir e me nts of a pe rm a ne nc y

pla n, the re a l w orth and importanc e of nonc ompliance should be me asure d by both the deg ree of noncomplianc e and the weig ht assigne d to that require ment.” Id. Substantial noncompliance is a que stion of law which we revie w de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Id.

I n th e abs e nc e of

lim ite d c ir c ums ta nc e s n ot p re se nt i n th is c a se , D CS mu st m a ke “ re a so na ble eff orts” to ma

ke it “ possible f

or the child to r eturn” safe ly to the child' s home. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-166( a)( 2),-166( g )(2) . Additionally , DCS may delay termination proce eding s if it has not had

su ff ic ie nt o pp ortun ity

to m ake re a so na

ble e ff orts t o p ro vid e se rv ic e s w hic h w ou ld e na ble the c hil d
to r e turn h ome sa fe ly

. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 36 -1 -1 13 (h )( 2) (C ). DC S ha s ma de “ re a so na ble e ff orts”-10-

wh e re , “ in the e xer c ise of re a so na ble c are a nd di lig e nc e ” it h a s “ pr ov ide [d] se rv ic e s r e la te d to meeting the nee ds of the child and the family .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 166(g )(1)

.

Wh e th e r D CS h a s ma d e r e a s o n ab le e f f o r ts to p r o v id e s e r v ic e s to e n ab le a c h il d to r eturn safe ly to the home must be decide d on a case -by -ca se basis in lig ht of the circ umstances of the ca se. When determining whether DCS has made re asonable eff orts, the court may consider fac tors such

a s:

(1) the r easons f

or sepa rating the par ent from his or he r ch i l d or childre n, (2) the pare nt's phy sical and me ntal abilities, (3) the re source s available to the pare nt, (4) the pare nt's eff

o rt s to remedy

the conditions that require d the sepa ration, (5) the

resour ces a vai l ab l e t o the Depa rtment, (6) the duration of the pa rent' s remedia l eff orts, and (7) the closene ss of the fit betwee n the conditions that led to the initi al

se pa ratio n, th e re qu ir e me nts in the pe rm a ne nc y pla n, a ndthe De pa

rt me nt' s e ff

orts.

In re C.M.M

. & S.D.M., No. M2003-01122-COA- R3-PT, 2004 W L 438326, at * 7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004) ( no perm. app. filed ). Ce rt a inl y , p are nts m us t a lso make re a so na ble e ff orts t o substantially

comply with t h e requirements of the perma nency plan. DCS, however , bear s the burden of provi n g, b y clear and c onvincing evidenc e, substantial noncompliance despite DCS’s

re a so na ble e ff orts t o p ro vid e app ro pr ia te se rv ic e s. Te nn . C od e An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( C) ; e .g . I n re C.M.M. & S.D.M., No. M2003-01122-COA- R3-PT, 2004 W L 438326, at * 7.

As noted above , DCS stated in its Dec ember 2002 petition for tempora ry custody that it was seeking rem o v al o f t he childre n from Mother be cause Mother had a history of alc ohol abuse a nd beca use the fa milyhad bee n evicted from i ts home and was li ving in an unsafe environment with Mr. McClain, who was know n by DCS to be abusive to Mother. The g oal of the initial permanenc y plan of January

2003 was the r eturn of the child re n to Mother. The pla n require d Mother to: continue

c ou ns e lin g to h e lp h e r a dd re ss h e r i ssu e s a ndfo r c op ing ; ob ta in a ndma int a in e mpl oy me nt f or a t le a st four months; obtain clea n, safe , adequate housing ; a ttend and participa te in pa renting classes at one of t he local ag encie s that offe rs classes; submit to alcohol and drug assessment and c omply with the results of the a ssessment and submit to random drug scre ens; obtain reliable transportation which would permit her to me et her obligations a nd maintain employ ment. Mother wa s not present whe n the permanenc y

plan was de veloped, but sig ned it at a permane ncy hearing he ld on Febr

uary 18, 2003. Additionally , in A ug ust 2003 Mother was order ed to ha ve no contac t with Mr. McClain as a condition of a

90-day trial home plac ement.

Mr. Denne y

testified that Mother ha d obtained housing by Spring 2003 a nd that during the p er i o d o f F eb ru ar y

t o M ay , 2 0 0 3
, s h e w as i n co m p l i an ce wi t h t h e p er m an en cyp l an , w a s “d o i n g a

rea l good job,” and “ma

king some strides.” He testified that “she showed a g enuine care and conc ern for he r childre n” at this time. The c hildren we re r eturne d to Mother for a 90-day trial period in May 2003, but were returne d to DCS custodyon J uly 28 beca use, according to Mr. Denney , Mother “w as maintain in g a r e la

ti o n s h ip w ith a g e n tl e ma n w h o m s h e w a s c o u r t o r d e r e d to s tay a w a y f r o m, and throug h verific ation with the Sheriff’ s Depa rtment and throug h a co- worke r wh o was on c all that-11-

night, t hey

picked the c hildren up at the Sheriff’s De partment, a nd the Sheriff ’s Depa rtment indicated that they

had bee n left alone at the boy friend’ s home.”

A re vised perma nency

plan was de veloped in De cember 2003. This plan re vised the perma nency

g oal t o “exit custody to live with rela tive.” I n April 2004, the goal was ag ain re vised to “adoption.” The g oal of a doption was handwritten on th e De ce mber plan. The revised perma nency

plan included no r equire ments for Mother and wa s not signed by

her.

At the De c e mbe r 2 00 4 he ari ng , Mo the r te sti fi e d that sh e wa s liv ing in a thr e e be dr oo m ho me with her sister a nd her sister’s family

. She testified that she planned to obtain indepe ndent housing fo r h e rs e lf a nd he r ch ild re n onc e the y we re re turne d to he r c are . A lth ou g h s he ha d ma int a ine d o nly intermittent empl o y ment, Mother had suc cessf ully secur ed disability

benef its from the Social Security Administration. The rec ord does not ref lect, however, the amount of these be nefits or whe n the y we re to c omm e nc e . A lth ou g h M oth e r h a d b e e n g ive n a c ar b y Mr . M., it had be e n s e ve re ly damag ed by fr i ends i n a bra wl. Howeve r, the re cord r efle cts that Mother ha d completed a n educational prog ram in par enting skills t aug ht by the Univer sityo f

T e n n e s s e e A g ric ultural Ext ension Se rv ic e in Jun e 20 03 ; had so ug ht an d re c e ive d tre a tme nt, inc lud ing pr e sc ri pti on me dic a tio n f orbipolar disorde r, fr om the Nolachuc key -Holston Ar ea M en tal Hea lth Center; had re ceive d and continues to rece i v e co u n seling and ther apy at the Church Stre et Pavillion; and had rec eived

c ou ns e lin g fr om m e nta l hea lth -c are pr of e ssi on a ls at the No la c hu c ke y -H ols ton Ar e a Me nta l H e a lth Center approximately ten times in 2004. Additionally
, Mother testified that she had attende d sever al AA mee tings but that she c ould not “g et any body to sign [her] paper ” and stopped g oing a fter f ive or six meeting s.

Mr. Denne y , on the ot her hand, testified t hat he had no knowledg e of whether Mothe r had attended pa

renting classes, tha t he had ne ver se en Mother intoxicated, and that he had not aske d her to submit to drug scre ens. He further test i fied that he did not know any thing a bout her housing

c on dit ion s a ft e r Jul y

20 03 , a ndthat he ha d n o k no wl e dg e of wh e the r s he wa s h ome le ss at th e tim e of the De c e mbe r 2 00 4 h e ari ng . H e a lso te sti fi e d that he did no t re c a ll wh e the r M oth e r h a d to ld h im she wa s living on Hemlock Drive wit h her sist er, despite the fact that Mother pre viouslyhad g iven the Hemlock D rive a ddress in court. Mr . Denne y testified that he wa s awa

re tha t Mother had be en

rec eiving counseling at Church Stree t Pavilli on, althoug h he did not rec all ex ac t ly what the counseling entailed. He testified that he rec alled discussing Mother’s AA mee tings with her and that h e d i d n o tt e l l h e r

t h a ta t t e n d i n g t h e m e e t i n g w o u l d n o tb e s u f f i c i e n tf o r a s s e s s m e n t

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Mr. Denne y

testified that he did not rec all telling Mother about age ncies a nd resour ces w hich might be a va ila ble to h e r f

or c ou ns e lin g or

dr ug a nda lc oh ol a sse ssm e nt. Mr . D e nn e y te sti fi e d th a t,

a lth ou g h M oth e r h a d te le ph on e d n ume ro us tim e s, he didnot doc ume nt a ll o f h e r c a lls bu t w ou ld “sometimes” try to return her calls. He also testified that he had not see n Mother since Aug ust 26, 2003. Finally , Mr. Denne y testified that, re g arding Mother’s r elationship with M r. McCl ain, he knew “ only

[knew] what [ he] heard thr oug h rumors.”

Th e tria l c o u r t d e te r mi n e d th a t M o th e r h a d c h o s e n n o t to a v a il h e r s e lf o f s o c ia l se rvice s which would have helped he r to addre ss her substanc e abuse prog rams. Howe ver, upon r eview of-12-

the pe rm a ne nc y

pla ns a nd the te sti mon y in the re c or d, we a g re e wi th M oth e r tha t sh e wa s g ive n li ttl e in the way

of g uidelines or advic e on how or wher e to r ece ive the re quired ser vices, how of ten she
was to re ceive them, or wha t was expected in the w ay of sati s fa ctory

completion. The re cord contains neither

testimony

nor docume ntary

evidenc e of se rvice s or assistance provided by DCS.

I t is clear to this Court that DCS made very littl e ef fort to assist Mother to av ai l h erse lf of

ne c e ssa ry se rv ic e s o r t o r e un if

y thi s fa mil y

. As we ha ve no te d, re a so na ble e ff or ts o n th e pa

rt of DC S

“ e nta il m or e tha n s imp ly

pr ov idi ng pa

re nts wi th a

lis t of se rv ic e pr ov ide rs a ndse nd ing the m on the ir way .” In re C.M.M

. & S.D.M., No . M 20 03-01 12 2-C OA -R 3- PT, 20 04 WL 43 83 26 , a t *7 . I n th is

case , DC S failed to even provide Mothe r with a list. Essentially , DCS tol d Mother to g et a job, a home, and counseling but g ave her no g uidance or assist ance on how to comply or wha t resourc es might be a vailable to her . After J uly 2003, moreove r, DCS made no attempt to assist Mother and virtua lly no a tte mpt

e ven to re turn h e r t e le ph on e c a lls . T he e vid e nc e simply do e s n ot s up po rt

a f i n d i n g o f s u b s t a n t i a l n o n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a p e r m a n e n c y p l a n d e s p i t e r e a s o n ab l e e f f o r t s

. C e r t a i n l y, it d oe s n ot s up po rt

su c h a fi nd ing by

c le ar a ndc on vin c ing e vid ence. Acco rdi ng ly , w e re ve rs e termination of Mother’ s par e n ta l rights ba sed on substantial noncompliance with a permanenc y plan.

Pe rsi ste nc e of Cond iti ons
As this Court p reviously has noted, the e fforts of DCS to assist a par ent to corr ect the conditions which led to the re moval of his or her child is often intertwined w ith the likelihood of the pare nt’s succe ss. In re C.M.M . & S.D.M., No. M2003-01122-COA- R3-PT, 2004 W L 438326, at *9. As noted above , in t h i s ca s e, DCS appar ently made ve ry

littl e ef fort to assist Mother. No tw ith sta nd ing DC S’ s lac k o f e ff ort, the e vid e nc e su pp orts a fi nd ing that Mo the r w a s n ot h ome le ss

a t th e tim e of

the he ari ng of th is matter , b ut h a d b e e n li vin g wi th h e r s ist e r f or ne arl y tw o y e ars

. Ce rt a inl y , c le ar a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e do e s n ot s up po rt a fi nd ing that Mo the r w a s h ome le ss i n light of Mr . Denne y ’s testimony that he had not spoken with Mothe r and did not know whether she was homele ss. Additionally , it is undi sputed that Mother will have at l east some means to support her c hildren financ ially

throug h social security disability pay ments. Although a drug scre en take n on the day of t he ter mination hearing was positive for be nzodiaz epines a nd opiates, there was ne ither evidenc e nor sug g estion that this re sult wa s not c aused by Mother’s pr escription medication. On the
contra ry , Mr. Denne y

testified that Mother ha d diffi cu l t y wi t h alcohol and not ill eg al drug s. The breathaly zer monitor for alc ohol reg istered 0.0.

We finally

turn to the prese nce of

Mr. McClain in Mothe r’s life. Mother’s c onnection to Mr. McClain, and ce rtainly

any potential contac t betwee n Mr. McClain and the c hildren, appe ars to have been of considera

ble conc ern to the tria l court. Mother doe s not dispute that she violated the trial

c ou rt ’s or de r b y

permi tting c on ta c t be tw e e n M r. Mc Cla in a ndthe c hil dr e n d ur ing the tr ia l ho me place ment in Spring 2003. Howeve r, it is undisputed that Mother secur ed an o rd er o f protection

a g a ins t Mr . M c Cla in i n A pr il 2 00 4, a ndsh e te sti fi e d to no lon g e r a sso c ia tin g wi th him

. Mo the r a lso testified that she a g ree d Mr. McClain was not a n appropriate p erson to have in the children’ s company . Additional l y , we note tha t there is nothing in the rec ord to support a finding that Mr. McClain was a

busive toward the children, a nd Mr. Denney testified that all he kne w about Mother’ s-13-

rela tionship wit h Mr. McClain was “ throug h rumors.” Spec ulation based on ru m o r clea rly is not clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. We re verse termi n at i o n o f Mot her’ s pare ntal rig hts based on persistenc e of c onditions.

Hol din g

I n light of the fore going, w e re verse the judg ment of the trial c ourt terminating Mother’s pare ntal rig hts to C.M .C., C.L .C., and D.A.M. DCS h as failed to prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e the ex istence of any statutory g rounds for te rmination. Be cause DCS has failed to ca rry its burden to prove g rounds, we do not r eac h the questi o n of whe ther termination of Mother’s pare ntal rig hts is in the best interests of the c hildren. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed to the Appellee
, the Sta te of

Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE