alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 09-4520 E XCELL W HITNEY , A PPELLANT , V . E RIC K. S HINSEKI , S ECRETARY OF V ETERANS A FFAIRS , A PPELLEE . Before HAGEL, MOORMAN, and LANCE, Judges. O R D E R On April 29, 2010, the Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On June 7, 2010, the appellant filed a timely motion for reconsidera tion or, in the alternativ e, for a panel decision pursuant to Rule 35 of the Court's Rules of Practice and Procedures. On consideration of the foregoing, and the parties' prior pleadings, it is ORDERED, by the single judge, that the motion for reconsideration is denied. It is further ORDERED, by the panel, that the motion for a panel decision is denied. DATED: July 26, 2010 PER CURIAM.

Copies to: Excell Whitney VA General Counsel (027)
Exhibit
31.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
 
 I, Naeem
Tyab, certify that:
 
 1.         
   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Mogul
Energy International, Inc.;
 
 2.         
   Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to date a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
annual report;
 
 3.      
      Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods
presented in this annual report;
 
 4.        
    The small business issuer's other certifying officers
and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) and
15(d)-15(f) for the small business issuer and have:
 
 (a)         designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
 
 (b)         evaluated
the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 (c)         disclosed
in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent
fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial
reporting; and
 
 5.           
The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):
 
 (a)         all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and
 
 (b)         any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal controls and
procedures for financial reporting.
 
 Date:
              April
      15, 2008
 
 /s/ Naeem
Tyab
 Naeem
Tyab
 President
 (Principal
Executive Officer )
#### Kayla THOMAS, Joan Raney, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Nancy BUCKNER, in her Personal Capacity and in her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Kim Mashego, in her Personal Capacity and in her Official Capacity as Director of the Shelby County Department of Human Resources, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16142 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(September 27, 2017)

James V. Green, Jr., Law Office of James V. Green, Jr., Alabaster, AL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Larry A. Lynn, Jr., James Edward Long, Alabama Department of Human Resources, Montgomery, .AL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before MARCUS, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kayla Thomas and Joan Raney were notified by letter from The Shelby County Department of Human Resources that an investigation had been concluded and that as a result their names would be listed on a state registry as persons who committed child abuse. They then filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various constitutional claims, as well as state law claims, against Kim Mashego, Director of The Shelby County Department of Human Resources, and Nancy Buckner, Commissioner of The Alabama Department of Human Resources. Thomas and Raney sought damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Before the case went to trial, the district court granted Defendants’ Motion to Stay. The stay was granted because the Defendants offered Thomas and Rainey an administrative hearing to challenge their indication on the state registry as child abusers. The administrative law judge (ALJ) sided with Thomas and Rainey, ruling that there was not sufficient evidence to support the indication on the registry. After the administrative proceeding, the district court dismissed Thomas and Rai-ney’s claims as moot. They filed a motion for attorney’s fees which the district court denied. Thomas and Rainey appeal that denial.

Whether a party is a prevailing party for attorney’s fees is a legal question that we review de novo. *Church of Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater,*2 F.3d 1509, 1513 (11th Cir. 1993). To be a prevailing party there needs to be a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” *See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,*532 U.S. 598, 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). There needs to be a “judicial *imprimatur*on the change.” *Id.,*121 S.Ct. at 1840. Thomas and Rainey allege that the ALJ’s decision provided the necessary judicial imprimatur.1 However, the ALJ’s de-*683cisión did not grant relief on their § 1983 claim; they obtained no judicially sanctioned change as to the claim. Therefore, they are not prevailing parties under § 1983.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Thomas and Rainey did not raise the argument in front of the district court that the Motion to Stay constituted the judicially sanctioned changed. That argument is waived on *683appeal. *See Access Now, Inc. v.*Sw. *Airlines Co.,*385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 09-3071 September Term, 2014

1:05-cr-00367-RMC-1

Filed On: February 6, 2015

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Jaron Brice, also known as Jay Bird, also

known as Daddy, also known as Bird, also

known as Jay,

Appellant

BEFORE: Garland, Chief Judge; Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Brown,

Griffith, Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins, 

Circuit Judges; Williams and Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judges

O R D E R

Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc and the response thereto were

circulated to the full court, and a vote was requested. Thereafter, the call for a vote was 

withdrawn. In light of the foregoing, and in the absence of a request by any member of

the court for a vote, it is 

ORDERED that the petition be denied. 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

BY: /s/

Jennifer M. Clark 

Deputy Clerk
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brandon Wayne BULLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-17380 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(August 4, 2017)

Adam W. Overstreet, Kenyen Ray Brown, George F. May, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges. '

PER CURIAM:

Arthur J. Madden, III, appointed counsel for Brandon Bullock in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Bullock’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
[Cite as State v. Scroggins, 2015-Ohio-4742.]

8 

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-05-083 

 : D E C I S I O N 

 - vs - 11/16/2015 

 : 

PETER E. SCROGGINS, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2014-10-1562 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, OH 45011-6057, for plaintiff-appellee 

Haughey & Niehaus, LLC, Neal D. Schuett, 121 West High Street, Oxford, Ohio 45056, for 

defendant-appellant 

 Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript of 

the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. 

{¶ 2} Counsel for defendant-appellant, Peter Scroggins, has filed a brief with this 

court pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) 
Butler CA2015-05-083 

 - 2 - 

indicates that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any 

errors by the trial court prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of 

error may be predicated; (2) lists four potential errors "that might arguably support the 

appeal," Anders, at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record 

independently to determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and 

without infringement of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw 

as counsel for appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that 

a copy of both the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶ 3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason that 

it is wholly frivolous. 

S. POWELL, P.J., RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-03-235-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.R. AND S.R., CHILDREN		

	------------

	FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Following a bench trial, appellant L.R.’s parental rights were terminated to her children, A.R. and S.R.  In a single point, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to extend the dismissal date under section 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code.  We need not address the merits of this argument because appellant has failed to preserve her complaint for our review.  We affirm.  

	In this case, the trial court appointed the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services  temporary managing conservator of the children on August 28, 2002.  On July 9, 2003, appellant filed a motion for extension of dismissal date under section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401 (Vernon 2002).  On July 15, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, but the hearing was not recorded.  The trial court denied the motion on July 22, 2003, and signed the order of termination on July 23, 2003.  This appeal followed.2  

	Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion3 in denying her motion for extension of dismissal date.  The trial court’s order denying the motion to extend recites that the trial court heard evidence and argument of counsel; however, no record was made of the hearing.  The record on appeal, therefore, contains no competent evidence to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.  See In re Guardianship of Berry, 105 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (“Absent a reporter’s record of the trial, however, we must presume that the missing record supports the trial court’s ruling.”).  Appellant has preserved nothing for our review.  See Evans v. Hoag, 711 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).  We overrule appellant’s single point and affirm the trial court’s judgment.  

								SAM J. DAY

								JUSTICE

PANEL B:	DAUPHINOT and HOLMAN, JJ.; and SAM J. DAY, J. (Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

DELIVERED: January 8, 2004
Appeal of-- ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS ) ) ABB Enterprise Software, Inc., f/k/a Ventyx) ) Under Contract No. NOOl74-05-C-0038 ) APPEARANCES FORTHE APPELLANT:

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA No. 60314

Jeanne A. Anderson, Esq.

Washington, DC Jeffrey M. Young, Esq.

ChiefCounsel Raleigh, NC Craig D. Jensen, Esq.

Navy ChiefTrial Attorney Henry Karp, Esq. Rachel J. Goldstein, Esq.

Trial Attorneys OPINION BYADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE KINNER It is the Board's decision, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. §§ 7105(e), 7108(b), and the parties' stipulation and agreement, thatthe appeal is sustained. In the nature ofa consentjudgment, the Board makes a monetary award to appellant in the amount of $600,000.00. This amount is inclusive ofinterest. No further interest shall be paid. Dated: July 11, 2018

(Signatures continued) Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContract AppealsI concur 

# ~-$~

Administrative Judge Chairman Armed Services Board ofContractAppeals OWEN C. WILSON Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Opinion and Decision ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60314, Appeal ofABB Enterprise Software, Inc., f/k/a Ventyx, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

2 JEFFREY D. GARDIN R.ecorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
General Term—Second Department.

Filed May 11, 1891.

#### Matter of Estate of Simeon Watts, Deceased.

Appeal dismissed and order affirmed, with costs, for not filing papers according to stipulation.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7019 

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to address disclosures by 

directors, officers, and principal stockholders of foreign private issuers, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 17, 2024 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER (for himself and Mr. SHERMAN) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to address 

disclosures by directors, officers, and principal stockholders of foreign private issuers, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Holding Foreign Insid5 ers Accountable Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES BY DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND 

7 PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities 

9 Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78p(a)(1)) is amended 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 7019 IH

1 by inserting ‘‘(including any such security of a foreign pri2 vate issuer, as that term is defined in section 240.3b–4 

3 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 

4 regulation)’’ after ‘‘pursuant to section 12’’. 

5 (b) EFFECT ON REGULATION.—If any provision of 

6 section 240.3a12–3(b) of title 17, Code of Federal Regula7 tions, or any successor regulation, is inconsistent with the 

8 amendment made by subsection (a), that provision of such 

9 section 240.3a12–3(b) (or such successor) shall have no 

10 force or effect. 

11 (c) ISSUANCE OR AMENDMENT OF REGULATIONS.— 

12 Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 

13 Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall issue 

14 final regulations (or amend existing regulations of the 

15 Commission) to carry out the amendment made by sub16 section (a). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Attachment 23

Stabilizer Compositions
#### Laura Solomon, Respondent, *v.*Charles Solomon, Appellant.

Submitted December 6, 1943;

decided January 6, 1944.

Motion for reargument denied (See 290 N. Y. 337).
118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6960 

AN ACT 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize the 

Emergency Medical Services for Children program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 6960 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Emergency Medical 

3 Services for Children Reauthorization Act of 2024’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF GRANTS FOR EMERGENCY 

5 MEDICAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN. 

6 Section 1910(d) of the Public Health Service Act (42 

7 U.S.C. 300w–9(d)) is amended by striking ‘‘and 

8 $22,334,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024’’ 

9 and inserting ‘‘$22,334,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 

10 through 2024, and $24,334,000 for each of fiscal years 

11 2025 through 2029’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 15, 2024. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 6960 

AN ACT 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to reaudren program. thorize the Emergency Medical Services for Chil-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       6,662,000
<SECURITIES>                                 3,263,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,128,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (129,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,671,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            17,597,000
<PP&E>                                     116,085,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            (36,093,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             109,441,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,564,000
<BONDS>                                     43,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                (13,945,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               109,441,000
<SALES>                                     87,388,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            87,388,000
<CGS>                                       86,176,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               86,176,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                17,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           8,015,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,195,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,195,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              2,084,000
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (889,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.20)
        

</TABLE>
#### Aaron L. STRIBLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. MOTT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16562

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 11, 2017

Aaron L. Stribling, Pro Se

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Aaron L. Stri-bling appeals pro se from the district *960court’s-judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc.,*356 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). We vacate and remand.

Because the record shows that Stribling stood on his complaint, the district court abused its discretion in converting its 28 U.S.C. § 1915A screening dismissal with leave to amend into a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failing to comply with a court order. *See Edwards,*356 F.3d at 1064-65 (dismissal under Rule 41(b) is not appropriate where the plaintiff makes an affirmative choice not to amend the complaint).

Moreover, the district court improperly determined that Stribling failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, because Stri-bling alleged he had grieved his claims but could not complete the process because he had not received a timely response to his second level appeal. *See Jones v. Bock,*549 U.S. 199, 204, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (exhaustion is an affirmative défense that ordinarily should be raised and proved by the defendant); *Albino v. Baca,*747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (the state bears the burden of proving that a prisoner did not exhaust available administrative remedies); *see also Sapp v. Kimbrell,*623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not required where administrative remedies are “effectively unavailable” because an appeal is improperly screened). Because an exhaustion defense is not obvious from the face of Stribling’s complaint, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Stribling’s motion (Docket Entry No. 6) is denied as moot.

VACATED and REMANDED.

***

 xhis disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.