United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-20516

____________

Deepa Krishna, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Life Insurance Company of North America; Honeywell 

International, Incorporated Accidental Death and 

Dismemberment Plan; Honeywell International, 

Incorporated; Steven Jacobs; Honeywell 

International, Incorporated Benefit Plan, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:21-CV-1813 

______________________________

Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Deepa Krishna brought this suit under the 

Employees Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 USC § 1001, et seq.

(“ERISA”) after her husband Karthik Balakrishnan died in the crash of a 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 21, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

relatively small private airplane on which he was a passenger. Recovery was 

denied under ERISA because of an express exclusion of death or injury 

incurred as a passenger in such an aircraft. Krishna appeals the denial of 

summary judgment regarding her claim for benefits under ERISA § 

502(a)(1)(B) against Defendants-Appellees Life Insurance Co. of North 

America (“LINA”), Honeywell International Inc. Accidental Death and 

Dismemberment Plan, Honeywell International, Inc., Steven Jacobs, Vice 

President of Compensation and Benefits for Honeywell International Inc., 

and Honeywell International Inc. Benefit Plan (collectively “Honeywell”). 

Krishna also appeals the district court’s grant of LINA and Honeywell’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the district court’s judgment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Deepa Krishna is the widow of Karthik Balakrishnan and the 

mother of their young daughter. Balakrishnan began working at Honeywell 

International, Inc. in August 2019 and became a participant in the Honeywell 

International, Inc. Benefit Plan (“the Plan”), which is governed by ERISA.

That plan provided Balakrishnan with accidental death and dismemberment 

(“AD&D”) benefits totaling $1,881,000 under Group Accident Policy No. 

OK 980358, which was underwritten by LINA (“the Policy”). 

On October 25, 2020, Balakrishnan died when in the crash of a 

privately-owned, single-engine airplane in which he was a passenger. Krishna 

filed a claim under the Honeywell International, Inc. Benefit Plan, and LINA 

approved her claim for life insurance benefits in the amounts of $297,000 and 

$1.58 million on December 1, 2020. On December 31, 2020, however, LINA 

denied her claim for accidental death benefits, citing the Policy’s Common 

Exclusions that include “[a] loss caused by or resulting from flight in an 

aircraft is specifically excluded from coverage . . . . except in the case where 

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an insured is traveling as a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled 

commercial airline.” Krishna appealed, but LINA denied her appeal on 

March 23, 2021 for the same initial reasons.

On June 4, 2021, Krishna sued LINA and Honeywell seeking 

accidental death benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) or, alternatively, 

equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty, 

misinformation, equitable estoppel, and surcharge based on summary plan 

description deficiencies. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3). On February 10, 

2022, Krishna moved for summary judgment on her § 502(a)(1)(B) claim

only. LINA filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment

regarding the § 502(a)(1)(B) claim, in which Honeywell joined. After those 

motions were filed, Krishna moved for voluntary dismissal of her § 502(a)(3) 

claim in its entirety “to avoid the further stress and anxiety of reliving painful 

events.” 

On August 11, 2022, the magistrate judge issued a memorandum and 

recommendation (“the Recommendations”) which recommended that

Krishna’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding § 502(a)(1)(B) be 

denied and LINA and that Honeywell’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

be granted. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s conclusions de 

novo and adopted the Recommendations, dismissing Krishna’s § 502(1)(B) 

claim with prejudice. The district court also granted Krishna’s motion for 

partial voluntary dismissal, dismissing § 502(a)(3) claim without prejudice.

Krishna timely filed an appeal regarding the rulings on the motions for 

summary judgment. 

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’ssummary judgment rulings de novo. Tolson 

v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing FDIC v. 

Myers, 955 F.2d 348, 349 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Whether the district court 

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employed the appropriate standard in reviewing an eligibility determination 

made by an ERISA plan administrator is a question of law.” Lynd v. Reliance 

Standard Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 979, 980–81 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Chevron 

Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union 4–447, 47 F.3d 139, 

142 (5th Cir. 1995)). “When an ERISA plan lawfully delegates discretionary 

authority to the plan administrator, a court reviewing the denial of a claim is 

limited to assessing whether the administrator abused that discretion.”

Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 884 F.3d 246, 247 (5th Cir. 

2018) (en banc) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 

(1989)). When a plan lacks a valid delegation clause, “a denial of benefits 

challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) must be reviewed under a de novo

standard.” Firestone, 489 U.S. at 102.

III. Law and Analysis

On appeal, Krishna asserts that (1) LINA was never vested with 

discretionary authority over the Policy; (2) LINA considered a summary plan 

document that was not operable at the time of Balakrishnan’s death; (3) as 

plan administrator, LINA’s interpretation of the flight exclusion was an 

abuse of discretion; (4) LINA’s interpretation of the flight exclusion was 

legally incorrect under this circuit’s multifactor test; and (5) Honeywell and 

LINA violated ERISA regulations during the claims process, depriving 

Krishna of a full and fair review. We examine each contention in turn.

A. Whether the operative Plan documents vested LINA with 

discretionary authority

Krishna asserts that LINA was never vested with discretionary 

authority under ERISA to determine her accidental death benefits claim. 

Central to this and her other contentions is a dispute regarding which

coverage-related documents were operative from the time of Balakrishnan’s

start of employment on August 19, 2019, through his death on October 25, 

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2020. The parties agree that the AD&D components of his benefits plan were 

insured through the Policy, but disagree as to whether a 2003-dated

document displaces the alleged 2019 version of that document. Krishna also 

alleges that various documents were never produced to Balakrishnan during 

his employment or to her during the claims process. We first determine 

which documents were operative during the relevant time period and then 

whether such documents vested LINA with discretionary authority.

i. Which documents were operative during the relevant 

timeframe? 

Krishna agrees that the Policy was operative at all relevant times but 

contends that the Plan and the Summary Plan Description (“the 2019 

SPD”), should be disregarded as nonoperative. Krishna alleges that she did 

not gain possession of the Plan and the 2019 SPD until after this litigation was 

initiated, so they cannot be determinative of her claim. Krishna asserts that a 

document dated January 1, 2003 (“the 2003 Honeywell SPD”) was provided 

to her in January 2021, during the claims process, and again in November 

2021, through Honeywell’s administrative record production. Moreover, 

Krishna claims that her husband was given the 2003 SPD shortly after he 

began employment at Honeywell. Krishna therefore alleges that the 2019 

SPD and the Plan should be disregarded as related to her claim.

On the other hand, LINA and Honeywell assert that the Plan and the 

2019 SPD form one operative “Wrap Plan Document,” which, along with 

the Policy, govern Krishna’s claim. LINA and Honeywell claim that the Plan 

and the 2019 SPD are dated January 1, 2019, so that any previous versions of 

those documents were no longer operative during the relevant timeframe.

LINA points to the declaration of Kristine Vandergriff, which was attached 

to LINA and Honeywell’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Vandergriff, 

who has served as the Senior Benefits Manager at Honeywell since 2021, 

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identified the Plan, the 2019 SPD, and the Policy as the operative documents 

related to Krishna’s AD&D claim. LINA further contends that Krishna has 

not established the origin of the 2003 Honeywell SPD and that any failure to 

produce Plan-related documents was Honeywell’s—not LINA’s—

responsibility. LINA asserts that, even if this had been its own responsibility, 

Krishna has failed to show how missing the 2019 SPD would deny her a full

and fair review of her claim. LINA notes that Krishna “was admittedly in 

possession of the Policy, the actual governing Plan document upon which 

LINA’s determination was based.” 

The magistrate judge considered all of the coverage-related 

documents at issue, including the Policy, the Plan, the 2019 SPD, and the 

2003 SPD, concluding that the Policy, the Plan, and the 2019 SPD were 

effective during the relevant timeframe and validly delegated discretionary 

authority to LINA. The magistrate judge did not engage in a specific analysis 

of whether the 2003 SPD was operative during the relevant timeframe and 

thus displaced the 2019 SPD. The magistrate judge only explained that the 

2003 SPD “is silent regarding discretion to decide claims.” 

We first resolve the dispute regarding which documents were 

operative from August 19, 2019 to October 25, 2020. The Plan and the 2019 

SPD speak for themselves. The Plan is titled “Honeywell International Inc. 

Benefit Plan and Summary Plan Description (As Amended and Restated 

Effective January 1, 2019).” The Plan clarifies that “it consists of this 

document including any Appendices attached hereto and incorporated 

herein by reference.” Included in these appendices are various Benefit 

Booklet-Certificates, such as the Policy. Moreover, the Group Accident 

Certificate, which is part of the 2019 SPD, specifically references the Policy 

by number. We next note that Vandergriff’s declaration credibly identifies 

the Policy, the Plan, and the 2019 SPD as the relevant, operative documents

and explains that “[a]ny earlier version of a SPD . . . was not the applicable 

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SPD during August 2019 through October 2020.” Krishna has not shown 

how the 2003 SPD—which is dated January 1, 2003, and does not even 

reference the Policy—displaces the 2019 SPD. Although the 2003 SPD is 

part of the administrative record that LINA produced, it appears to have been 

produced as part of Krishna’s submission on appeal, rather than as a benefitsrelated document. Therefore, the 2019 SPD should not be disregarded in 

favor of the 2003 SPD. The Plan, the Policy, and the 2019 SPD were 

operative documents during the relevant time frame.

ii. Did the operative documents vest LINA with discretionary 

authority?

Krishna acknowledges that the 2019 SPD “has adequate language to 

vest LINA with discretion,” but contends that the 2019 SPD “should not 

even be consulted as the operative SPD, as it was never treated as such by 

Honeywell.” Krishna asserts that, even if the 2019 SPD were consulted, the 

Policy language alone governs and the 2019 SPD cannot waive or alter any of 

its terms. 

LINA and Honeywell, on the other hand, assert that the Plan, the 2019 

SPD, and the Policy clearly delegate claim adjudication authority from 

Honeywell, as Plan Administrator, to a named fiduciary, such as LINA. 

LINA and Honeywell note that the Plan states that the “Plan Administrator 

has the authority, in the Plan Administrator’s sole discretion, to interpret the 

Plan and resolve ambiguities therein ... and to make factual determinations.” 

They further note that the 2019 SPD states “[t]he Plan Administrator 

[Honeywell] has appointed the Insurance Company [LINA] as the named 

fiduciary for adjudicating claims for benefits under the Plan, and for deciding 

any appeals of denied claims.” Honeywell and LINA also observe that the 

Policy contains nearly the same language: “[t]he Plan Administrator has 

appointed the Insurance Company [LINA] as the named fiduciary for 

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deciding claims for benefits under the Plan, and for deciding any appeals of 

denied claims.” LINA and Honeywell also note that, under this circuit’s 

precedent, the language in these documents is sufficient to delegate 

discretionary authority under ERISA.

The district court, through the magistrate judge’s Recommendations, 

held that the language of the Policy, the Plan, and the 2019 SPD validly 

delegated discretion to LINA. Those Recommendations concluded that the 

language used in the documents “is consistent with language the Fifth 

Circuit has found sufficient to confer discretion.”1 The district court 

explained that the Policy’s language neither directly conflicts with nor 

invalidates the delegation of discretion contained in the 2019 SPD. That

court acknowledged that “[w]hile the language in the Policy itself may not be 

sufficient to confer on LINA full discretionary authority to interpret the 

Policy. . . the language in the 2019 SPD and Insurance Certificate clearly is.” 

The district court considered the 2003 SPD but noted that it “is silent 

regarding discretion to decide claims.” Concluding that LINA was properly 

vested with discretionary authority, the district court applied an abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review to LINA’s denial of Krishna’s claim. 

ERISA defines “fiduciary” as one who “exercises any discretionary 

authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan or 

exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of 

its assets.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). A fiduciary also has “authority to 

control and manage the operation and administration of the plan,” § 

1102(a)(1), and must provide a “full and fair review” of claim denials, § 

1133(2). The Fifth Circuit does not require the use of “discretion” or other

_____________________

1 See Batchelor v. Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers Loc. 861 Pension & Ret. Fund, 877 F.2d 

441, 443 (5th Cir. 1989); Dowden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 126 F.3d 641, 644 

(5th Cir. 1997).

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“magic words” to validly delegate discretionary authority to a fiduciary. 

Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Block 

v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). “Rather, the 

Supreme Court directed lower courts to focus on the breadth of the 

administrators’ power—their ‘authority to determine eligibility for benefits 

or to construe the terms of the plan.’” Jimenez v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of 

Canada, 486 F. App’x 398, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted in 

original). In doing so, courts must “read the plan as a whole” to see whether 

it satisfies the criteria promulgated by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & 

Rubber Co. v. Bruch. Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 636–37. As this circuit has 

recognized, “[a] different standard of review will sometimes lead to a 

different outcome, but there will also be many cases in which the result would 

be the same with deference or without it.” Ariana M., 884 F.3d at 257. 

We conclude that the Policy, the Plan, and the 2019 SPD vested LINA 

with discretionary authority to adjudicate Krishna’s AD&D claim. First, the 

2019 SPD and the Plan’s key language cited by LINA and Honeywell clearly

permits the delegation of discretionary authority to a fiduciary such as LINA. 

That language encompasses the authority to make both factual and legal 

determinations under the Plan, as required by ERISA and by this circuit’s 

precedent. See Jimenez, 486 F. App’x at 405. The Policy contains nearly 

identical language to that found in the 2019 SPD regarding the delegation of 

discretionary authority. When read “as a whole,” the language of the Policy, 

the Plan, and the 2019 SPD demonstrate that LINA, as the named fiduciary, 

was vested with discretionary authority. The district court thus correctly 

applied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review to LINA’s denial of 

AD&D benefits. We now determine whether LINA, in its authority as named 

fiduciary, abused its discretion in denying Krishna’s claim. 

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B. Whether LINA’s interpretation of Exclusion 6 was an abuse of 

discretion

Exclusion 6 in the Policy’s “Common Exclusions” section is central 

to this dispute because LINA relied on that exclusion when it denied 

Krishna’s claim. The relevant section states:

In addition to any benefit-specific exclusions, benefits will not be paid 

for any Covered Injury or Covered Loss which, directly or indirectly, 

... is caused by or results from any of the following...: 

* * *

6. flight in, boarding or alighting from an Aircraft or any craft 

designed to fly above the Earth’s surface:

a. except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled 

commercial airline;

b. being used for:

i. crop dusting, spraying or seeding, giving and 

receiving flying instruction, firefighting, sky 

writing, sky diving or hang-gliding, pipeline or 

power line inspection, aerial photography or 

exploration, racing, endurance tests, stunt or 

acrobatic flying; or 

ii. any operation that requires a special permit from 

the FAA, even if it is granted (this does not apply 

if the permit is required only because of the 

territory flown over or landed on);

c. designed for flight above or beyond the earth’s 

atmosphere;

d. an ultra-light or glider;

e. being used for the purpose of parachuting or skydiving;

f. being used by any military authority...

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As a preliminary matter, Krishna asserts that the 2003 SPD’s 

“Common Exclusions” section displaces Exclusion 6 in the Policy.2 As

explained above, we disagree because Krishna has not shown that the 2003 

SPD was the operative document during the relevant time period. Krishna 

alternatively contends that if Exclusion 6 governs, it should be strictly 

construed in favor of the insured because it is ambiguous. Krishna asserts that 

Exclusion 6’s poor construction leaves it open to more than one reasonable 

interpretation, such as “6.b.-f. as explanation of what exactly is excluded if 

one is not a commercial airline passenger excepted from exclusion by 6.a.” 

Although Krishna contends that de novo review is appropriate here, she 

asserts that LINA’s interpretation of the Policy was also an abuse of 

discretion. Krishna contends that LINA abused its discretion because its

interpretation of Exclusion 6 was legally incorrect, as more fully explained 

below. 

According to LINA and Honeywell, Exclusion 6 excludes AD&D 

benefits for a death caused by flight in, boarding, or alighting from an aircraft 

_____________________

2 The 2003 Honeywell SPD excludes many of the same items that the Policy 

excludes, but with relevant differences. The Honeywell SPD excludes:

• Travel in an aircraft (including getting on or off the aircraft) if the aircraft is 

being used:

• For test or experimental purposes; or

• By or for any military authority, including aircraft flown by the U.S. 

 Military Airlift Command (MAC) or similar service of another

 country); or

• For travel, or is designed for travel, beyond the earth’s atmosphere; or 

• By or for the Employer, whether owned, leased, operated or controlled 

 by the Employer, including chartered aircraft; or 

• Travel in an aircraft (including getting on or off the aircraft) if you or a 

 Dependent is:

• Serving as pilot or crew member (or student taking a flying lesson) and

 is not riding as a passenger; or 

• Hang-gliding; or 

• Parachuting unless necessary for self-preservation ... 

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in general unless the insured was a passenger on a regularly scheduled 

commercial airline. LINA and Honeywell insist that the subparts listed under 

Exclusion 6 are merely illustrative examples—not specific exclusions. In 

other words, LINA reads the phrase preceding Exclusion 6 to be the

preamble, with each subpart—(a)-(f)—independently following to create a 

complete sentence that states: “benefits will not be paid for any ... Covered 

Loss which, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, is caused by or results 

from ... flight in, boarding or alighting from an Aircraft ... except as a 

passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial airline.” LINA insists that 

Krishna cannot show that this interpretation was “legally incorrect” because 

(1) “LINA has applied its interpretation uniformly for at least a dozen 

years,” (2) “there would be unanticipated costs to the Plan from privateflight losses like Krishna’s,” and (3) “LINA’s interpretation—confirmed as 

unambiguously correct by multiple federal judges—was a fair reading of the 

Plan’s text.” 

The magistrate judge’s Recommendations concluded that LINA’s 

interpretation of Exclusion 6 was legally correct and therefore was

“consistent with a fair reading of the Plan.” The magistrate judge endorsed

LINA’s view that the structure of the “Common Exclusions” section is a 

“preamble, followed by numbered paragraphs 1-11, which in turn contain 

indented subparts (such a 6(a) through 6(f)).” Referencing a text authored 

by Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner,3 the magistrate judge agreed that 

Exclusion 6 may be read as one continuous sentence, starting with the 

preamble and ending with subpart (f). The magistrate judge explained that 

“[t]his reading is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the words in the 

_____________________

3 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 156 (2012) (discussing the scope of 

subparts canon).

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provisions as well as the ‘scope of subparts canon’ of contract construction,” 

which provides that “[m]aterial within an indented subpart relates only to 

that subpart; material contained in unindented text relates to all the following 

or preceding indented subparts.”4 The magistrate judge further explained 

that the structure of this provision prevents the ambiguity that Krishna 

claims to exist “by reading subparts (a)-(f) as a whole.” The 

Recommendations ultimately conclude that LINA’s interpretation was not 

an abuse of discretion under this circuit’s precedent. 

“Interpretations of policy provisions in ERISA-regulated plans are 

governed by federal common law.” Talamantes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 3 F.4th 

166, 169 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Ramirez v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 872 

F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 2017). Federal common law rules of contract 

construction and interpretation incorporate ordinary rules of contract 

construction. See Green v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 754 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 

2014). “When construing ERISA plan provisions, courts are to give the 

language of an insurance contract its ordinary and generally accepted 

meaning if such a meaning exists . . . [o]nly if the plan terms remain 

ambiguous after applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation are 

we compelled to apply the rule of contra proferentum and construe the terms 

strictly in favor of the insured.” Talamantes, 3 F.4th at 169.

A plan administrator/fiduciary may abuse its discretion by denying 

claims on either legal or factual grounds. Ariana M., 884 F.3d at 248. “Legal 

grounds” refers to the interpretation of a plan’s terms, while “factual 

grounds” refers to the application of a plan’s terms. Rittinger v. Healthy All. 

Life Ins. Co., 914 F.3d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). For legal 

disputes—that is, disputes about a plan’s meaning—the abuse-of-discretion 

_____________________

4 Id.; see also Matter of Pirani, 824 F.3d 483, 495 (5th Cir. 2016)).

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analysis has “two steps.” Encompass Off. Sols., Inc. v. La. Health Serv. & 

Indem. Co., 919 F.3d 266, 282 (5th Cir. 2019). The first step asks whether the 

administrator’s reading is “legally correct.” Id. To determine if a decision is 

legally correct, a court considers “(1) whether the administrator has given 

the plan a uniform construction, (2) whether the interpretation is consistent 

with a fair reading of the plan, and (3) any unanticipated costs resulting from 

different interpretations of the plan.” Porter v. Lowe’s Cos., Inc.’s Bus. Travel 

Acc. Ins. Plan, 731 F.3d 360, 364 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013). The second consideration 

is the more critical. Id. If the decision is deemed legally correct, “the inquiry 

ends, and there was no abuse of discretion.” Id. But if not, we proceed to step 

two, which employs several factors to decide whether the administrator’s 

legally erroneous interpretation of the plan’s terms still falls within the 

administrator’s discretion. See id. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, 

the court must uphold the plan administrator’s decision if it “fall[s] 

somewhere on a continuum of reasonableness – even if on the low end.” 

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 878 F.3d 478, 483; see also Gonzales v. ConocoPhillips 

Co., 806 F. App’x 289, 291 (5th Cir. 2020).

Here, the district court, through its adoption of the magistrate judge’s 

Recommendations, correctly determined that LINA did not abuse its 

discretion in interpreting Exclusion 6 of the Policy. LINA denied Krishna’s 

claim on legal rather than factual grounds, so we must engage in this circuit’s 

two-step test to determine whether LINA’s interpretation was “legally 

correct.” Porter, 731 F.3d at 364 n.8. The Recommendations noted that the 

parties’ briefing did not fully address whether LINA applied a uniform 

interpretation or whether Krishna’s interpretation would create 

unanticipated costs. Instead it focused on whether LINA’s interpretation 

was consistent with a fair reading of the Plan. We do the same.

First, applying “ordinary rules of contract construction,” we 

conclude that LINA’s interpretation is consistent with a fair reading of the 

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Plan. Reading Exclusion 6 and its preamble as one continuous sentence aligns 

with the “scope of subparts canon of contract construction,” which we have 

previously endorsed.5 We also agree that the structure of the Common 

Exclusions section prevents the ambiguity that Krishna insists is created by 

reading subparts (a)-(f) as a whole. We have previously held that overlapping 

or even redundant exclusions do not necessarily render a policy exclusion 

ambiguous. See Const. State Ins. Co. v. Iso-Tex Inc., 61 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 

1995). There, we pointed out that “[g]iven the strict rules of construction 

against a drafter, an insurance provider would be motivated to draft 

overlapping and redundant clauses which exclude coverage for the same 

conduct.” Id.

On at least two occasions, federal courts have upheld LINA’s 

interpretation of substantially similar flight exclusions.6 Weber v. Life Ins. Co. 

_____________________

5 Pirani, 824 F.3d at 495.

6 The language of the flight exclusions at issue in those cases was nearly identical 

to Exclusion 6 but with the addition of a subsection 6b. They read: 

6. flight in, boarding or alighting from an Aircraft or any craft designed to fly 

above the Earth's surface:

a. except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial airline;

b. being flown by the Covered Person or in which the Covered Person is a 

member of the crew;

c. being used for:

i. crop dusting, spraying or seeding, giving and receiving flying 

instruction, fire fighting, sky writing, sky diving or hang-gliding, 

pipeline or power line inspection, aerial photography or exploration, racing, endurance tests, stunt or acrobatic flying; or

ii. any operation that requires a special permit from the FAA, 

even if it is granted (this does not apply if the permit is required 

only because of the territory flown over or landed on);

d. designed for flight above or beyond the earth's atmosphere;

e. an ultra-light or glider;

f. being used for the purposes of parachuting or skydiving;

g. being used by any military authority, except an Aircraft used by the Air 

Mobility Command or its foreign equivalent.

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of N.A., 836 F. Supp. 2d 427 (W.D. Va. 2011), aff'd, 492 F. App’x 444 (4th 

Cir. 2012); Toohey v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 727 

F. Supp. 2d 978 (D. Or. 2010). In Weber, the district court for the Western 

District of Virginia held that the ordinary meaning of Exclusion 6’s language 

was unambiguous. The Weber court explained that “subparagraphs (b) 

through (g) stand as additional, independent grounds of exclusion that 

address plausible factual scenarios not presented in this case.” 836 F. Supp. 

2d at 435. As we see no reason to depart from this well-founded view, we hold

that this interpretation is legally correct and that LINA did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Krishna’s claim. 

C. Whether Honeywell violated ERISA regulations

Krishna contends on appeal that Honeywell and LINA violated 

ERISA’s procedural regulations by supplying a deficient 2019 SPD and by 

withholding various documents during the claims process. Both of these 

contentions are unavailing because (1) Exclusion 6 in the Policy is 

unambiguous; (2) Krishna waived her claims regarding any deficiencies in 

the 2019 SPD; and (3) Krishna also waived her claims regarding LINA and 

Honeywell’s failure to produce documents during the claims process. 

Krishna first contends that because of Exclusion 6’s alleged 

ambiguity, the 2019 SPD must be consulted for its AD&D exclusion 

language. Krishna asserts that, when thus consulted, the 2019 SPD’s 

applicable language violates ERISA’s requirement that an exclusion be 

expressed with clarity. Krishna further asserts that 2019 SPD violates 

ERISA’s requirement that the “[t]he description or summary of restrictive 

plan provisions need not be disclosed in the summary plan description in 

close conjunction with the description or summary of benefits, provided that 

_____________________

Weber, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 433; Toohey, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 984–45.

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adjacent to the benefit description the page on which the restrictions are 

described is noted.” 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102–2. Finally, Krishna alleges that 

the 2019 SPD violates ERISA’s requirement that a “summary plan 

description must not have the effect to misleading, misinforming or failing to 

inform participants and beneficiaries.” 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102. 

Krishna next asserts that LINA and Honeywell violated ERISA § 

1024(b) and its corresponding regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(5), by 

failing to furnish the 2019 SPD to Balakrishnan or to Krishna during the 

claims process. Section 2560.503-1(b)(5) requires that “claims procedures 

contain administrative processes and safeguards designed to ensure and to 

verify that benefit claim determinations are made in accordance with 

governing plan documents.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(5). ERISA § 1024(b) 

requires that the plan administrator provide a copy of the summary plan 

description within 90 days after an employee’s enrollment in a benefits plan 

or on written request from any participant or beneficiary. 29 U.S.C. § 

1024(b)(1)(A), (b)(4). In support of this contention, Krishna references 

January 2021 emails between herself and Denise Cherney, Honeywell’s HRS 

Benefits Analyst, in which Cherney represented that “full plan 

documentation, summary plan description and policy have been provided.” 

Krishna also cites to Cherney’s deposition testimony and a January 2021 

email exchange between Cherney and LINA regarding Krishna’s claim. 

Krishna asserts that these documents show that LINA and Honeywell were 

both aware that the 2003 SPD was the operative SPD during the relevant 

time frame and that they knowingly failed to produce Plan-related documents 

when requested. 

We have already determined that Exclusion 6 is unambiguous. 

Therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the 2019 SPD for deficiencies as they 

relate to the claims process. Even if Exclusion 6 were ambiguous, “claims for 

injuries relating to SPD deficiencies are cognizable under ERISA § 502(a)(3) 

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and not ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).” Manuel v. Turner Indus. Grp., L.L.C., 905 

F.3d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 2018). On the second page of her brief, Krishna clearly 

states that her ERISA § 502(a)(3) cause of action “was voluntarily dismissed 

and is not at issue here.” Krishna has thus waived any claims related to 

regulatory deficiencies associated with the 2019 SPD.

Krishna has also waived her claims related to LINA and Honeywell’s 

withholding of particular Plan-related documents, in violation of ERISA § 

1024(b) and corresponding ERISA regulations. In her second amended 

complaint, Krishna asserted these claims under ERISA § 502(a)(3), “as it 

relates to deficiencies in Summary Plan Description duties, disclosures and 

deficiencies.” Krishna clarified that her § 502(a)(3) cause of action was 

pleaded “only in the alternative to, and completely independent of” her 

cause of action under § 502(a)(1)(B). 

As noted above, Krishna expressly stated in her brief that her § 

502(a)(3) cause of action “was voluntarily dismissed and is not at issue 

here.” Indeed, in her motion for summary judgment, which is now before 

this court, Krishna clarified that the “motion only involves only Plaintiff’s 

first cause of action” under § 502(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, any arguments 

related to her § 502(a)(3) claim were not before the court when the 

magistrate judge made the Recommendations. Although we review the

summary judgment record de novo, we will not consider evidence or 

arguments that were not presented to the district court for its consideration 

in ruling on the motion. See Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–

16 (5th Cir. 1992); John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 710 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Krishna has therefore waived any claims that are cognizable under ERISA §

502(a)(3). 

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

denial of Krishna’s motion for summary judgment and its grant of Honeywell 

and LINA’s cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal is therefore 

DISMISSED. 

Case: 22-20516 Document: 00516828965 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/21/2023