In The Matter Of: 

SERVED: MARCH 30, 2015 

U.S. ·nEP ARTMENT OF TRANSPORT A TIO~. ~S.'{T~{f:~:n.,Q:-1 OFFICE OF HEARINGS · /:7 - .. ~_: . ..:.;_..L,. . . ' \ t- -- ~ t . WASHINGTON, DC .. I "'• _.,,·;· ·,_·, 

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Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE 

AND ENGINEERING SERVICES 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Respondent ) 

Case No. 20 ll S0290032 

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

On January 30, 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment ("Motion"). That same day, on January 30, 2015, the Respondent, Airborne 

Maintenance and Engineering Services ("Responde~t") also filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment ("Cross-Motion"). 

On February 11, 2015, an Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Exclude, and 

Granting/Denying Other Relief was filed. 

On February 18,2015, the FAA filed the FAA's Response in Opposition to Respondent's 

Motion for Summary Judgment ("FAA Response"). That same day, on February 18,2015, the 

Respondent filed its Answer in Opposition to Complianant's [sic] Motion for Summary 

Judgment ("Respondent's Response"). 

On February 27, 2015, the FAA filed the FAA's Reply in Support of Motion for 

Summary Judgment ("FAA Reply"). That same day, on February 27,2015, the Respondent filed 

the Reply of Respondent to FAA's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 

("Respondent's Reply"). 

On March 5, 2015, the parties convened by telephone for a Summary Judgment Motion 

Conference, and presented oral arguments on the FAA's Motion and the Respondent's CrossMotion. 
On March 16,2015, the FAA filed a Supplemental Submission on Motion for Summary 

Judgment. The next day, on March 17, 2015, ·the Respondent filed Respondent's Supplemental 

Submission. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 

As ou.tlined above, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on January 30, 

2015. It is well established that "[b]oth parties may seek summary judgment in the same action" 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( a). Steven Baicker-McKee, eta!., Federal Civil 

Rules Handbook, 1120 (West Publishing 2012). Even when cross-motions are filed,the review 

under Rule 56 remains the same: 

Each cross-motion must be evaluated on its own merits, with the court viewing all · 

facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. 

Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1127. 

To ensure a clear understanding of the Court's rulings, this Order addresses only the 

Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order will issue on the FAA's 

Motion. 

B. Complaint and Proposed Civil Penalty r. .. 

On or about June 22, 2013, the Regional Counsel for the FAA's Southern Region filed a 

Complaint with the U.S. Department ofTransportation's Office ofHearings. The FAA's 

Complaint alleged that the Respondent, a certificated aircraft repair station, performed improper 

maintenance on three different Boeing B-727 aircraft (identified as N899AA, N898AA, and 

N287SC) on or about August 2009, October 2009, and March 2010, respectively. The three 

Boeing B-727 aircraft were owned and operated by another company, Capital Cargo 

International Airlines ("CCIA"), which was a Part 121 aircraft operator. At the time the 

maintenance was performed, the Respondent and CCIA were owned by the "same parent 

company." (Reply, Exh. 2, 194.) 

The FAA asserted that the Respondent's improper maintenance on the three Boeing B727s occurred when it removed and replaced the Main Landing Gear ("MLG") on each of the 

Page 2 of 21 
aircraft. The Respondent's MLG maintenance included "reinstalling and rigging the landing gear 

doors." (Complaint, 2 ~ 4.) The FAA alleged that maintenance on the MLG had been improper, 

and that each time the Respondent had performed maintenance on the B-727 aircraft, it had 

violated three of the FARs: 14 C.F.R. § 145.205(a); 14 C.F.R. § 43.13(a); and 14 C.F.R. 

§ 43.13(b). This resulted in a total ofnine (9) alleged violations (i.e., 3 violations x 3 aircraft= 9 

violations). Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)-(d), the FAA proposed a total penalty of$61,875 

for all nine (9) alleged violations. 

C. Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 

The Respondent's Cross-Motion seeks dismissal of all nine (9) alleged violations of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs"), as well as dismissal ofthe FAA's proposed total civil 

penalty of $61,875 for these violations. (Cross-Motion, I.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.218, a party may file motio~s, including a motion for a 

decision on the merits, in advance of a hearing when a party asserts that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact in dispute. Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.2l8(f)(5), any motion for a decision on the 

merits prior to a testimonial hearing is analogous to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Horizon Air Industries, Inc., FAA Order No. 96-24, 

n.3 (Aug. 13, 1996); Stebbins Aviation, Inc., OMS No. FAA-2000-7576-16, n.3 (Aug. 30, 2004) 

(Initial Decision).The purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate, and then terminate, claims 

and defenses that are factually .unsupported." Baicker-McKee, et aL, supra, at 1122. 

Pursuant to Rule 56( a), a summary judgment motion may be granted if "the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." See, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); 

Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In addition, pursuant to Rule 56(f), 

summary judgment may also be granted to a non-moving party, after all parties have had notice 

and a reasonable time to respond. 

A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the substantial outcome ofthe litigation. 

Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is "genuine" if the 

Page 3 of 21 
evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

See, Scott v. Harris, 5550 US 372, 380 (2007); Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 US at 248, Holcomb, 433 

F.3d at 895. 

On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. However, a non-moving party (e.g., the FAA 

herein answering the Respondent's Cross-Motion) rp.ay not rest upon mere denials or allegations 

in the pleading~. Pursuant to Rule 56( c), (d), and (e), a non-moving party who wishes to proceed 

to trial must respond to the motion for summary judgment, and set forth specific facts sufficient 

to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 ( 1986). See 

also, Citizens State Bank of Big Lake. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 815 F.Supp. 309 (D. Minn. 

1993); Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1133-34 (a non-moving party may produce materials, 

and/or cite to materials produced or not produced by the movant in resisting the summary 

judgment motion). 

Pursuant to Rule 56(c)(l)(A), specific facts alleged by either party may be asserted by 

submitting or citing to a variet~ of documents and declarations. Materials submitted during 

summary judgment proceedings must be capable of being offered at trial in an admissible form. 

See, Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1135. Once the moving party has established a prima facie 

case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show, by affidavit or otherwise, that a genuine . i l 

dispute of material fact remains for the fact-finder to resolve. !d. at 1134 

On a summary judgment motion, the court does not rule on the weight of the evidence. 

See !d. at I 1'25 (The court never weighs the evidence, evaluates credibility or makes findings on 

disputed facts in summary judgment proceedings). 

III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 

A. Respondent's Factual Evidence in Support of Cross-Motion 

In support of its Cross-Motion, the Respondent submitted sixteen (16) Exhibits, identified 

as Exhibits 1 through 16. As part of its Reply, the Respondent also submitted an additional eight 

(8) Exhibits, which the Respondent proffered as Exhibits 1 through 8. At the March 5, 2015 

Motion Conference, the Court held that the Respondent's Reply Exhibits would be identified as 

Page 4 of 21 
Exhibits 1-R through 8-R, to avoid duplication with the Respondent's earlier proffered CrossMotion Exhibits l·through.8. 

At the March 5, 2015 Motion Conference, Respondent Exhibits t:-2, 4-16, 1-R, 3-R 

through 5-R, and 8-R were admitted without objection. However, the FAA objected on various 

grounds to the admission of these five (5) Respondent Exhibits: 3, l-R, 2-R, 6-R, and 7-R. The 

FAA's objections to Exhibits 6-R and 7-R were sustained, and Exhibits 6-R and 7-R were not 

admitted or considered. 

The FAA's objections to Exhibits 3, 1-R, and 2-R were limited in scope, 1 specifically to 

any expert testimony offered by the declarant, Mr. Jeffrey Becker, regarding aircraft . 

maintenance. The FAA argued that Mr. Becker could not qualify as an expert in aircraft 

maintenance (FAA Response, 1-2), and, even if he 'was found to have expertise, he had not been 

timely or properly disclosed as an expert (FAA Response, 2). The Respondent agreed that Mr. 

Becker had not been disclosed as an expert on or before May 1, 2014, but argued that the FAA's 

objections were without merit. 

The FAA's objections to Exhibits 3, 1-R, and 2-R were reserved, and the Respondent was 

given an opportunity to supplement the record to show that Mr. Becker had been previously 

disclosed as a general expert witness (instead of only as a reburial expert to the FAA's lateproffered expert, Inspector Christensen) and that the Respondent had asserted this position to the 

court in an earlier mo~ion (in response to the FAA's Motion to Exclude). 

On March 17, 2015, the Respondent filed Respondent's Supplemental Submission, in 

which it reasserted that Mr. Becker qualified as an expert. (R's Supp., 2.) The Respondent agreed 

that it first identified Mr. Becker as an expert on December 12, 2014, but.argued (among other 

things) that this late disclosure occurred only because_ the FAA had not identified Inspector 

Lipinski as an expert until December 1, 2014. (R's Supp., 3.) 

1 It is well-established that if a moving party introduces new evidence in a Reply brief, the non-moving party should 

be given an opportunity to respond. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1143. In t~is proceeding, bot~ parties filed new 

evidence with their Replies. At the March 5, 2015 Motion Conference, the part1es agreed that the 1ssues ~ad been 

fully briefed and there was no need to file additional responses to Reply evidence in either the FAA Mot1on or the 

Respondent's Cross-Motion. 

Page 5 of 21 
I. Mr. Becker's Expert Qualifications 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness may be qualified to serve as an 

expert ifs/he is shown to have "specialized knowledge" in a subject. Fed. R. Evid. 702. The 

witness may be qualified by "knowledge, skill, exp~rience, training, or education." /d. As part of ! ·• . " 

its objection, the FAA argued that Mr. Becker was not now, and had never been, a certified 

Airframe and Powerplant mechanic, had never performed maintenance work on any B-72 7, and 

therefore did not have the necessary expertise to testify about aircraft maintenance or repair 

issues. In response, the Respondent pointed out (among other things) that Mr. Becker held an 

Aeronautical Engineering degree and had substantial work experience as a Design and Flight 

engineer for various aircraft. (Exh. 1-R, ~A-C.) Mr. Becker had also worked in flight 

engineering and aircraft maintenance management-which included developing aircraft repair 

instructions and training aircraft inspectors. (Exh. 1-R, ~ D-E.) 

The FAA's objection to Mr. Becker as an expert on the basis of qualification is overruled. 

There is no regulation in the F ARs that requires an expert witness to hold an Airframe and 

Powerplant certification in order to testify about aircraft maintenance and repair issues. The 

question of expert qualification in a subject is not based on who is best qualified to testify or 

what 4'precise" qualifications are offered, but rathe{whether a witness is competent to offer 

specialized knowledge in a certain subject. I McCormick On Evid. § 13 (7th ed. 2015); 

American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc., No. 4:11CV00305 AFG, 2014 WL 859760 E.D. 

Mo., March 5, 2014) (expert permitted to offer testimony within the bounds of his 

qualifications); Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975) (witness 

allowed to testify about machinery design principles, even though he had not previously 

manufactured or designed machines). 

Based on the evidence presented, Mr. Becker has demonstrated by education and work 

experience that he is qualified to serve as an expert witness in the fields of aircraft engineering 

and design, as well as in the subjects of instructions for airplane maintenance and repair, 

oversight of FAA-compliant aircraft maintenance, and aircraft inspection training. 

2. Requested Exclusion of Mr. Becker as an Expert 

The FAA objected to the presentation of exp.ert testimony by Mr. Becker on multiple 

grounds, including: a) Mr. Becker had not been timely identified as an expert; and b) the 

Page 6 of 21 
Respondent had failed to meet its reliability burden in Mr. Becker's purported expert testimony. 2 

At the March 5, 2015 Motion Conference, in response tothe FAA's objections to Mr. 

Becker's exp·e~ testimony, the Respondent asserted that Mr. Becker's expertise had been 

generally known. In addition, the Respondent had always intended to utilize Mr. Becker to r . 

"rebut" the testimony of all the FAA's disclosed expert witnesses. 

A review of the record shows that the Respondent did assert, in an earlier motion, that 

Mr. Becker was offered "to rebut any expert testimony offered by the FAA's late-disclosed 

expert witnesses." ( 115115 Respondent Answer to Complainant's Motion to Compel and 

Exclude, 7.) However, at the time of this assertion, the Respondent had withdrawn its motion to 

exclude the "late-disclosed" expert testimony of Inspector Lipinski, Inspector Evans, and l 

Inspector Gasche (12/16114 Respondent's Rule 37 Declaration and Renewal of Motion for 

Sanctions, 2 fn. 2). Thus, the court addressed only the testimonial consequences of calling Mr. 

Becker as a "rebuttal" witness to FAA Inspector Christensen in its February II, 2015 Order. 3 

The issue of timely disclosure of experts was addressed comprehensively in the February 

11,2015 Order, and will not be fully repeated here. In essence, timely expert witness disclosures 

increase the quality of trials by allowing attorneys to better analyze their case, and to prepare for 

cross-examination. 8A Fed. Pr~c. & Proc. Civ. § 2031.1 (3d ed. (2015). The duty to timely_ 

disclose a witness as an expert is not excused when a witness who will testify as a fact witness 

and as an expert witness is disclosed only as a fact witness. !d. A party may not evade expert · 

witness disclosure::'by simply calling an expert witness under the guise of a layperson." !d. Nor 

r 

may a party avoid timely expert disclosure by asserting that a witness in the party's case-in-chief 

2 Among other things, the FAA adopted by reference the arguments it previously had made about Mr. Becker's 

testimony in its February 18, 2015 Cross-Motion Response (Reply, 4.) For example the FAA argued that Mr. 

Becker's expert testimony was not reliable because portions were based on a speculative "telephone" game of 

hearsay (FAA Response, 2), implausible suppositions and "short cuts" (FAA Response, 6), problematic, unverifiable 

maintenance record entries (FAA Response, 8), and by ignoring facts and data in the. record (FAA Response, 9-12). 

The FAA also asserted that Mr. Becker's testimony was unreliable because it was inconsistent with his own deposed 

testimonial statements (FAA Response, 15) and his prior admissions to the FAA (FAA Response, 22). 

3 The record in this proceeding shows that on February II, 2015 an Order Granting Respondent's Motion to 

Exclude and Granting/Denying Other Motions was filed. Among other things, this Order excluded Inspector 

Christedsen as a witness, and deemed the FAA's December 19, 2014 Motion ,~o Exclu~e ~r. Becker as an ~xpert 

witness a moot issue, since the Respondent had offered Mr. Becker only as a rebuttal \\ ttness to Mr. Chnstensen. 

(Order, 10, 3(a) and 14 (6).} Neither party filed for reconsideration of this February 11, 2015 Order. 

Page 7 of 21 
is merely a "rebuttal" witness.4 

In the case herein, the FAA is correct that the Respondent did not timely disclose Mr. 

Becker as an expert witness. At the same time, the Respondent is correct that the FAA did not \ 

timely disclose Inspector Lipinski, Inspector Evans, and Inspector Gasche as expert witnesses. 

Instead, each party timely disclosed these witnesses as fact witnesses, but failed to also timely 

identify them as expert witnesses. 

In short, both parties erred in the timing of their expert disclosures. Nevertheless, both 

parties had access to these four witnesses early in the proceedings, and both Inspector Lipinski 

and Mr. Becker were deposed during discovery. The record also demonstrates that the FAA was 

aware of Mr. Becker's potential expert status, since Mr. Becker's October 29, 2014 discovery 

deposition included FAA inquiry about Mr. Becker's specialized education and work history, as 

well as inquiry regarding his opinions on the issues of aircraft maintenance and repair, which is a 

topic of expertise. 

The problem, however, is that the Respondent produced Mr. Becker for the FAA . . 

discovery deposition as a Rule 30(b)(6) company representative, not as an expert witness. It also 

appears undisputed that Mr. Becker has never provided an expert report, which was required and 

due no later than December 12,2014. (9/30/14 Order.) As of the date ofthis Order, it is still 

unclear the exact scope of expert testimony the Respondent seeks to ultimately offer through Mr. 

Becker at hearing, or what "reliable principles and methods" under Rule 702(d) might support 

4 In assessing whether a party may use an expert witness, who had not been previously identified as an expert to 

rebut the opposing party's expert, courts must consider whether the witness is truly a "rebuttal" witness. Rebuttal 

must be kept in perspective; it is not to be used as a continuation of the case-in-chief. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1991). In Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Companies, 606 F.2d 554 (5th 

Cir. 1979), the pretrial schedule required disclosure of all witnesses except rebuttal witnesses. At trial the defendant 

attempted to introduce the testimony of an unidentified witness as "rebuttal" to the plaintiffs witness. The court 

held that "a defense witness whose purpose is to contradict an expected and anticipated portion of the plaintiffs case 

in chief can never be considered a 'rebuttal witness."' !d. at 556; see also, Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 410 

F.3d 1052, I 060-61 (9th Cir. 2005) (district court appropriately excluded expert identified late because "the 

necessity of the witness" could have "been reasonably anticipated at the time the lists were exchanged"); Coastal 

Fuels ~/Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182,202-03 (1st Cir. 1996) (exclusion is proper 

for experts identified late as "rebuttal"). Previously undisclos~d "rebuttal" expert testimony is "limited to new 

unforeseen facts brought out in the other side's case." ln re Pfesident's Casinos, Inc .. No. 02-53005-659, 2007 WL 

7232932, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. May 16, 2007) (quoting Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685 (5th 

Cir. 1991 )). 

Page 8 of 21 
his proffered expert opinions. 

a) Four Factor Test 

Federal courts have often applied the following four factor test to "determine whether 

exclusion of evidence is the appropriate sanction for failures to comply with discovery duties: 

'(I) the prejudice or surprise of the party against whom the excluded evidence would have been 

admitted; (2) the ability of the party to cure that prejudice; (3) the extent to which allowing the 

evidence would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in the court; and 

( 4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with a court order or discovery obligation.'" In re 

Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (NO. IV), No. 09-CV-74351, 2012 WL 661673, at *2 

(E.D.Pa. Feb. 8, 2012) (quoting Nicholas v. Pa. Sta{e Univ., 227 F.3d 133 (3d. Cir. 2000); see 

also, La nard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 3 75 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir. 201 0) (citing David v. 

Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851,857 (7th Cir. 2003)). Each ofthese four factors is addressed 

below. 

b) Test Factors Applied 

ill Factor No. I (Surprise or prejudice): 

Clearly the FAA would not be surprised if Mr. Becker was limited to the testimony he 

provided in his October 29, 2014 deposition. The FAA would be surprised and prejudiced, 

however, if Mr. Becker was allowed to expand on this testimony, since the FAA has not received 

an expert report (identifYing the facts and opinions upon which Mr. Becker relies in giving 

expert evidence), and the FAA has not had a chance to depose Mr. Becker as a proffered expert. 

[ill Factor No. 2 (Possible Cure(s): 

Could the prejudice to the FAA _for late, disc~osure be cured? One option is to allow the 

Respondent to offer Mr. Becker's deposition testimony only as lay testimony, since Mr. Becker's 

deposition was taken as a fact witness. Another option would be to direct Mr. Becker to produce 

an expert report, and allow the FAA an opportunity tore-depose Mr. Becker as an expert. A third 

option would be to force the FAA to respond to Mr. Becker as an expert, without the benefit of 

an expert report or an expert deposition. Given the lack of time before the scheduled Hearing, 

these options lead into the third test factor. 

Page 9 of 21 
(iii) Factor No. 3 (Disruption to the trial proceedings): 

Would curing the prejudice to the FAA disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of this case? 

The hearing is currently set to begin on May 5, 201S, which is approximately one (1) month 

from the date of this Order. Even if the Respondent produced an expert report within two (2) 

days of this Order·, the parties would still need to coordinate their calendars, hire a court reporter, 

and potentially travel to a deposition site so that the FAA could take Mr. Becker's deposition as a 

proffered expert. Once the deposition was taken, the FAA would need to reassess its trial 

material, and make a determination about what, if any, additional expert testimony or 

documentation would be needed for its own case-in-chief or rebuttal. Even if it is assumed all 

this could be done within three weeks of the hearing date, it is extraordinarily disruptive to trial 

preparation for both sides, and certainly unfair to demand of any party so close to the hearing 

date. The other option would be to continue the hearing date into the year 201 6, which does not -

in any way - serve the interests of the efficient administration of this case. 

(iv) Factor No. 4 (Bad Faith or Unwillingness): 

The record demonstrates that both parties in._this case have failed to meet certain courtordered deadlines. There has also been a continuing practice by both parties to identify witnesses 

as fact witnesses and fail to identify the same witnesses as experts. There is no evidence that bad 

faith was involved in this action. 

c) Rule 702 Expert Exclusion Granted 

It should be noted that much of Mr. Becker's proffered deposition testimony (Exhs. 3 and 

2-R) was fragmented, difficult to follow, and did not clearly identify or attach the deposition 

exhibits or data that Mr. Becker was reviewing. Substantial portions of Exhibit 3 did not offer 

expert testimony or analysis, but instead offered fact witness testimony, fact opinion, general 

assumptions or suggestions, and speculation. In addition, although Mr. Becker did offer 

technical opinions about various topics, he did not provide them in cqnjunction with a discussion 

of general industry standards or methods, to demonstrate that he had "reliably applied the 

principles and methods" of expert knowledge and analysis to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 

702(c) and (d).) 

. It was undisputed that Mr. Becker was deposed on October 29, 2014 as a Rule 30(b )( 6) 

company representative. The discovery deposition was scheduled as a "fact witness" deposition. 

Page 10 of 21 
During. the deposition, the Respondent's attorney made objections to some FAA inquiry as being 

outside the scope of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (e.g., Exh. B, 40.) He also objected to the FAA 

examining Mr. Becker on some topics of expertise, and stated to Mr. Becker: "I don't know that 

your understanding of what a mechanic would do is relevant, but if you can, answer the 

question." (Ex h. 1, 113.) Mr. Becker did. answer one question utilizing his "engineering 

background" (Ex h. 1, 87), but a majority of his responses appeared based on his work duties as 

the Respondent's Director of Quality Assurance and Training, which included his review, 

analysis: and opinions regarding company investigations and aircraft maintenance records. The 

selected portions of Exhibit 3, 1-R, and 2-R do not contain any information about the "reliable 

principles and methods," Fed. R. Evid. 702(d), Mr. Becker is required to utilize in order to 

present reliable expert testimony. 5 

Based on the totality of the record herein, the FA A's objections to allowing Mr. Becker 

testimony to be admitted as expert testimony in the Respondent's Cross-Motion are sustained. 

d) Deposition Testimony Allowed under Limited Rule 701 Lay Opinion Exception 

Nevertheless, it is clear that Mr. Becker, as the Respondent's Rule 30(b)(6) fact 

representative, provided some deposition testimony that involved technical expertise, and the 

FAA has had an opportunity to consider and respond to that testimony. 

In the year 2000, in response to a split in court rulings, as well as the discussion and 

decision in Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Engineering, 57 F.3d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1995), the 

Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules ofEvidence amended Rule 701 to limit lay opinion 

testimony to common knowledge matters. Testimony "cannot be admitted under Rule 701 if it is 

based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." (3-

701 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual,§ 701.02). 

sIn addition to expert qualifications, Rule 702 requires that an expert's tes_timony be deemed reliable be:ore it is 

admitted and considered. The expert's testimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data" (Fed. R. Ev1d. 702(b)), 

be the product of"reliable principles and methods," Fed. R. Evid. 7?,2 (c), and t~e expert must show that s/he has 

"reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. ~ed: R. Ev1d. 702(~). Pursu~nt_t? Rule 702 and 

104, the proponent of the proffered testimony has the burden of estabhshmg that t~e pertment ~ehabllny 

requirements are met, by a preponderance of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 

Amendments. I McCormick on Evid. § 13 {7th ed. 20 15). 

Page 11 of 21 
In the amendment notes, however, the Advisory Committee left open a limited exception, 

that allowed a lay witness with some specialized knowledge, by virtue of his or her daily 

activities, to still provide "lay" opinion testimony about such specialized knowledge, so long as 

such opinion was based on knowledge and a reasoning process typically utilized by that lay 

witness in his/her daily activities. Thus, the "common knowledge" lay witness could testify, on a 

limited basis, to some specialized daily activities that did not rise to the level of expert 

knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701. Advisory Committee Notes (2000 Proposed Rules) (e.g., a 

business owner may testify about the projected profits of his business). 

Based on the record herein, Mr. Becker's deposition testimony may be admitted as lay 

opinion testimony under the limited exception of Rule 701, which was offered in his capacity as 

Respondent's Director of Quality Assurance and Training. 

B. FAA's Factual Evidence in Opposition to Cross-Motion 

As part of its Response, the FAA submitted ,six (6) Exhibits, identified as Exhibits JJ 

through 00. At the March 5, 2015 Motion Conference, FAA Exhibits KK through 00 were 

admitted without objection. However, the Respondent objected on various grounds to the 

admission of Exhibit JJ. The Respondent's factual objections to Exhibit JJ were overruled, and 

Exhibit JJ was admitted for consideration. 

After conclusion ofthe March 5, 2015 Motion Conference, additional extensive review of 

the FAA's Response showed that the FAA had also incorporated by reference Exhibit HH 

(Response, 22), which it had previously filed as part of its February 2, 2015 Motion. It was 

undisputed that Exhibit HH was admissible, since it was a letter authored on March 21,2011 by 

Mr. Becker, the Respondent's representative, and sent to the FAA in response to an FAA 

investigation inquiry. The Respondent had also offered Mr. Becker's March 21, 201 I Letter as 

Exhibit 8-R in its Reply. Thus, FAA Exhibit HH is also deemed admitted and considered as part 

ofthe FAA's Response to the Respondent's Cross-Motion. :J •• 

IV. ALLEGED REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 

As previously noted, the FAA alleged that the Respondent's MLG maintenance had 

included improperly "reinstalling and rigging" the main landing gear doors on three Boeing BPage 12 of 21 
727 aircraft on or about the following dates: August 2009 (N899AA), October 2009 (N898AA), 

and March 2010 (N287SC). (Complaint.) The FAA alleged that on each occasion of aircraft 

maintenance, the Respondent had violated'three ofthe FARs: 14 C.F.R. § 145.205(a); 14 C.F.R. 

§ 43.13(a); and 14 C.F.R. § 43.13(b). 

Section 145.205(a) states: 

(a) A certificated repair station that performs maintenance, preventive 

maintenance, or alterations for an air carrier or commercial operator that has a 

continuous airworthiness maintenance program under part 121 or part 13 5 

must follow the air carrier's or commercial operator's program and applicable 

sections of its maintenance manual. 

14 C.F.R. § 145.205(a) (2014). 

During the March 19, 2015 Motion Conference, this Court noted that Section 145.205(a) 

appeared to be the primary regulatory violation regarding the three (3) alleged improper 

maintenance incidents in this case, since Section. 145.20S(a) contained both Specific language not 

included in either Section 43.13(a) or (b), as well as broad language that addressed the safety 

requirements contained in both Section 43.13(a) or (b). 

For example, the maintenance manual requirement contained in Section 145.205(a) 

requires a repair station to "follow the air carrier's ... applicable sections of its maintenance 

manual." The first part of Section 43.13(a) also requires "each person"6 who performs 

maintenance to follow the applicable maintenance manual or manufacturer's instructions: r 

(a) Each person performing maintenance, alteration, or preventive 

maintenance on an aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance shall use the 

methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the current manufacturer's 

maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness prepared by 

its manufacturer or ... 

14 C.F.R. § 43.13(a) (2014) (emphasis added). 

As noted earlier herein, the parties agreed that CCIA had a CAMP that the Respondent 

was required to follow. This CAMP utilized Boeing's B-727 maintenance manuaL Thus, the 

applicable regulatory language in Section 43.13(a) mir:ored the regulatory requirements of 

6 Both Section 43.1 3(a) and Section 43. I 3(b) refer to "a person" performing maintenance. The. ~ord "person" is 

broadly defined by the FARs, and includes a company or a corporation. 14 C.F.R. §I. I (Definitions). 

Page 13 of 21 
Section 145.205(a), and the alternative contained in'Section 43.13(a) was not applicable to this 

proceeding. 7 

In addition, Section 43 .13(b) provides: 

(b) Each person maintaining, or altering, or performing preventive maintenance, 

shall do that work in such a manner and use materials of such quality, that the 

condition of the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance worked 

on will be at least equal to its original or properly altered condition (with regard to 

aerodynamic function, structural strength, resistance to vibration and 

deterioration, and other qualities affecting airworthiness. 

14 C.F.R. § 43.13(b) (2014). 

Neither party addressed the language of this regulation. In the absence of discussion, it 

is reasonable to assume that the aircraft's "original" condition is the aircraft's manufactured 

condition. Assuming subsequent maintenance on the original aircraft was performed pursuant to 

the manufacturer's maintenance manual, the maintained or repaired aircraft would then remain 

airworthy and functional in a "properly altered" condition. Thus, the requirements of Section 

43.13(b) also appear to be included within the scope of Section 145.205(a). This is consistent 

with the FAA's general position in this proceeding, since is it not seeking a civil penalty per 

violation, but rather on a "per aircraft" basis.8 As a result, the primary discussion in this Order 

will focus on the regulatory language contained in Section 145.205(a). 

V. DISCUSSION 

All evidence and arguments have been considered. Because of the volume of materi'als 

submitted, only certain matters will be highlighted and discussed. 

7 The alternative language in Section 43.13(a) addressed incidents where no maintenance manual or instructions are 

available. This alternate language states that a person may also perform maintenance as follows: 

(a) ... or [by using) other methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the Administrator, exce.pt as 

noted in §43.t6:He shall use the tools, equipment, and te~t'apparatus necessary to assure complet1~n 

of the work in accordance with accepted industry practices. If special equipment or test apparatus IS 

recommended by the manufacturer involved, he must use that equipment or apparatus or its equivalent 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

Section 43.13(a) (2015). 

s In its own Motion, the FAA explained that "[i]n this case, viewing the situation on a per-aircraft basis, there are 

only three acts of violation."). (Motion, 24.) 

Page 14 of 21 
A. Undisputed Facts 

Most of the facts regarding the Respondent's compliance with Section l45.205(a) were 

not in dispute. The Respondent admitted that it was a certificated repair station (Answer, I 'II 2). 

The three (3) identified B-727 aircraft had been manufactured by Boeing. On or about the dales 

alleged, the Respondent performed maintenance on the three (3) identified B-727 aircraft 

manufactured by Boeing. (Answer, l-2 'II 3(a), (b), and (c).) At the time the maintenance was 

performed, each Boeing B-727 aircraft had been owned and operated by a Part 121 aircraft 

operator, Capital Cargo International Airlines ("CCIA"). (!d.) 

CCIA had a Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program ("CAMP") which the 

Respondent was supposed to utilize and follow in performing maintenance. (Answer, 3, 'II 5.) 

CCIA's CAMP required that Boeing's B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual ("AMM") be 

followed in performing maintenance on CCIA's B-727 aircraft. (Cross-Motion, 27; Exhs. 1, 5 

and 6.) The maintenance performed on each of the three different Boeing B-727 aircraft 

(identified as N899AA, N898AA, and N287SC) on or about August 2009, October 2009, and 

March 2010 had involved replacing the Main Landing Gear C'MLG"). This MLG maintenance 

included "reinstalling and rigging the landing gear doors." (Answer, 2 'II 4(a), (b), and (c); CrossMotion, 11-12.) 

B. Disputed Issue 

The substantive law (i.e. 14 C.F.R. §§ 145.205(a)) identifies the four material facts that 

are critical: 1) whether the Respondent was a certificated repair station; 2) whether the 

Respondent performed maintenance on. the aircraft; 3) whether the maintenance was performed 

for an air carrier that has a CAMP under part 121; and 4) whether the Respondent used and 

followed Boeing's B-72? Aircraft Maintenance Manual ("AMM") in performing that 

maintenance. The first three facts are undisputed. 

Thus, the only issue in dispute is the fourth material fact: whether the Respondent had 

complied with CCIA's "program and applicable sections of its maintenance manual," (14 C.F.R. 

§ 145.205(a)), when it had reinstalled and rigged the MLG doors on each Boeing B-727 aircraft 

in August 2009, October 2009, and March 2010. 

Page 15 of 21 
C. Short Review of Movant's Burden of Proof 

The Respondent asserted in its Cross-Motion that the FAA had the burden of proof to 

support its accusations with "reliable, probative, and substantial" evidence. (Cross-Motion, 7.) 

In Response, the FAA argued that the Respondent had misunderstood its evidentiary obligations 

in making the Cross-Motion, and had failed to even meet its initial burden of proof as the moving 

party. (Response, 1.) 

There is no doubt the Respondent correctly identified the FAA's burden of proof for 

hearing, when the FAA-as the moving party-presents its evidence first. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.223 

and § 13.224(a). But in a pre-hearing, summary judgment motion, the initial burden of proof is 

on the moving party-in this case, the Respondent. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.218(f)(5) and 13.224(b). 

In essence, it is the movant's initial burden in a summary judgment motion to present 

sufficient evidence to show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of l~w." G::iv. R 56( a). In the alternative, the movant 

may show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case" when the 

non-moving party is the plaintiff at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 

If the movant (i.e., the Respondent herein) asserts that the opponent (i.e., the FAA who 

bears the burden at trial) lacks proof to establish an element of its case, the movant must show 

the absence of facts. Alternatively (or additionally), the movant may acknowledge the existence 

of facts and evidence in support of an element of the non-movaht's case, and then provide 

evidence to show that no genuine dispute exists because no reasonable decision_maker, applying 

the applicable standard of proof, could find in favor of the non-movant at hearing. See BaickerMcKee et al., supra, at 1122. 

If the movant for summary judgment satisfies its initial burden of proof, then-and only 

then-does the burden shift to the non-moving party to submit (or point to) sufficient evidence 

that may defeat the summary judgment request. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1121. 1!1 

addition, all the facts deemed material and considered in a summary judgment motion must be 

viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (i.e., the FAA herein). !d. at 1133-34. 

D. Analysis 

As noted earlier herein, each cross-motion for summary judgment must be evaluated on 

Page 16 of 21 
its own merits. Thus, the eviden~e presented by both parties in the Respondent's Cross-Motion is 

limited to the exhibits marked, admitted, and deemed material as part of this Cross-Motion. Any 

testimonial or documentary evidence presented by the parties in the FAA's Motion, which was 

not also submitted (or referenced) as part of the Respondent's Cross-Motion, was not considered. 

Evidence was deemed material if it was reliable and addressed the issue in dispute. 

1. Short Review of Respondent's "No [MaterialJ Facts" Evidence 

The Respondent first asserted that there wer~ "no set of [material] facts" plead in the 

FAA's Complaint that would allow it to prevail on any of the alleged regulatory violations. 

(Cross-Motion, 1.) 

In support of this theory, the Respondent argued that it had fully complied with Boeing's 

AMM requirements when it had initially performed the MLG maintenance qn each Boeing B727 aircraft. (!d. at 25-27.) It argued that "without a doubt" the damage observed on the MLG 

when the FAA inspected each of the three (3) Boeing B-727 aircraft in May 2010 had been 

caused by wear and tear (and/or in one instance, intervening maintenance). (/d. at 2-4, 19.) The 

Respondent also argued that the passage of time between when it had performed 'the MLG 

maintenance, and the date the FAA discovered the damage, weighed against any finding of 

violation, particularly given CCIA's continued use of each aircraft during the intervening time 

period. (Jd. at 8-13.) 

However, it quickly became apparent in revii:wing the Respondent's proffered evidence 

that there were mahy facts in dispute. Some of these proffered facts were material to the disputed 

issue. Taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, these facts proved the FAA's 

allegations. Thus, the Respondent failed to meet its initial burden of proof to show that there 

were "no [material) facts" in dispute and that the Respondent was entitled to dismissal as a 

matter of law . 

. 2. Short Review of Respondent's Alternate "Insufficient Facts" Evidence 

The Respondent agreed that certain damage had been found on each of the three aircraft 

during the FAA's May 2010 inspection but alternatively argued that the circumstantial facts were 

insufficient to find that any violations had occurred. In support of this position, the Respondent 

proffered a variety of evidence, including selected portions ofF AA Inspector Lipinski's 

Page 17 of 21 

' l 
Enforcement Investigative Report ("EIR"), and selected portions of Mr. Becker's October 29, 

2014 deposition testimony. 

Inspector Lipinski asserted in his EIR that an inspection of all three aircraft during May 

25-28, 2010, ~onducted by himself and a CCIA management team member, "revealed that all 

three aircraft had all Flying Doors (Inboard [sic) and outboard) installed incorrectly." (Exh. 1, 1.) 

The improper Flying Doors? installations resulted in doors damage, doors attach 

fittings damage, airframe damage, flap track fairing damage, and door attach 

fitting covers damage. Associated structures included the inboard fJap track 

fairings, Flying Doors attach fittings covers, and wheel well fairings .... The 

MLG Doors were all obviously out of rig. 

(Inspector Lipinski, Exh. 1, 1-2.) 

Mr. Becker, the Respondent's Director of Quality Assurance, confirmed that he and the 

Respondent's Director of Maintenance ("DOM") (name not provided), met with Inspector 

Lipinski at the inspection site on May 25, 2010 to discuss the problem. (Exh. I, 2; Exh. 3, 70). 

Inspector Lipinski reported that during this May 25, 2010 meeting, neither Mr. Becker nor the 

Respondent's DOM could demonstrate a working knowledge about the Boeing B-727 AMM's 

door rigging procedures. (Exh. I, 2.) 

[They) could not show ... [me] the correct section of the AMM to use for door 

rigging ... [or] where the references in the MLG replacement instructions require 

the doors to be rigged and inspected. 

(Inspector Lipinski, Exh. I, 2.) 

In contrast, Mr. Becker testified that he only "vaguely remembered" the meeting. (Exh. 3, 

70.) He also couldn't recall ifhe looked at more than one of the three aircraft. (!d.) 

After the aircraft inspection and meeting with Mr. Becker and the DOM, Inspector 

Lipinski reviewed the Respondent's MLG work packages regarding the MLG installations of 

each aircraft. This review showed that the Respondent had failed to use CCIA' s approved 

maintenance manual, which was the Boeing AMM. (Exh. 1, 2.) Although the work packages 

had required Rll inspection sign-offs, the wrong AMM references had been cited, and no AMM 

door rigging references had been used. According to Inspector Lipinski, this indicated either a 

lack of inspection or a flawed inspection, which was corroborated by the "ensuing damage from 

Page 18 of 21 
improper maintenance actions." (Exh. 1, 3.) 

Inspector Lipinski emphasized that all of the discrepancies found on the aircraft during 

the May 25, 2010 inspection "were all, without exception, attributable to the original work that 

was done" by the Respondent. ((Exh. 2, 204.) Inspector Lipinski agreed that the Boeing B-727 

AMM was "archaic," had not been adequately rev_ised, and thus required qualified mechanics to 

either make assumptions about what was needed, or simply "know" as a "727 individual" what 

sections to access. (Exh. 2, 31-34.) Nevertheless, an aircraft technician was still required to 

know the contents of the AMM and properly utilize it. 

The Respondent raised multiple possibilities to suggest these facts should not be believed, 

as well as a variety of alternate explanations for the damage to the aircraft. In addition, the 

Respondent appeared to argue that this Court should deem all the admitted factual evidence as 

material, weigh the value ofthe selected proffered evidence against the value of the proffered 

Inspector Lipinski material, assess the 7omparative credibility of various declarants,9 and make 

various assumptions regarding the evidence. 10 

3. The Respondent Failed to Meet its Burden of Proof 

As noted earlier herein, the purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate, and then 

terminate, claims and defenses that are factually unsupported." Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, 

Federal Civil Rules Handbook, 1122 (West Publishing 20 12) (Rule 56). The mere existence of 

disputed facts does not defeat summary judgment. The facts in dispute must be material, i.e., 

capable of affecting the substantial outcome ofthe litigation. Holcomb, supra, 433 F.3d at 895; 

See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. In addition, facts presented-but which are not 

supported by the evidence--do not create a genuine issue of material fact. 

9 For example (not inclusive), the Respondent argued that the bulk of Inspector Lipinski's report (Exh. I) was 

"exaggerated" and "biased" (Cross-Motion, 5), and should be viewed as less credible (or not_ credible at all) because 

the Inspector had demonstrated a "prejudicial attitude" towards the Respondent. (Cross-Motton, 5 and 21; Exhs. 15 

and 16). 

IO For example (not inclusive), the Respondent _assert~d that t~e "?ap [_in time] between t~e orig_inal maintenance ~nd 

the FAA's subsequent inspection of the three atrcraft m questton ts far too great ... [for tt to] stmply be assumed 

that wear and tear had not played a part in the MLG damage. (Cross-Motion, 2-3.) The Respondent_ further_as~erted 

that "there can be no denying that the flying doors ... operate in a hostile envirqnme~t and are subJe:t to st~ntticant 

wear and tear." (Cross-Motion, 3.) However, the Respondent did not provide any rehable expert testtmony m 

support of such arguments. ·'!!· 

Page 19 of 21 
In ruling on motions for summary judgment federal courts have held that a fact or facts 

are material if they constitute a l'egal defense, or if their existence or nonexistence might 

affect the result of the action, or if the resolution of the issue they raise is so essential that 

the party against whom it is decided cannot prevail. 

lOA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2725 (3d ed. 2014) (footnotes 

and citations omitted). 

The Respondent's arguments ignored its own burden of proof, and as well as the standard 

for court review on summary judgment motions. Facts admitted and deemed material may not be 

weighed, nor should the court make credibility assessments regarding opinions on material facts 

proffered by declarants whose testimony is deemed reliable. Instead, the focus of the court in 

summary judgment proceedings is whether: 1) the admitted evidence shows that no genuine 

dispute-as to any material fact exists and supports disposition as a matter of law, or 2) whether 

the admitted material evidence shows that a hearing• is required because there remain genuine 

issues of mat.erial fact in dispute. Baicker-McKee, et al., supra, at 1121. See also, 1 OA Fed. Prac. 

& Proc. Civ. § 2725 (3d ed. 2014). 

The alternate evidence presented by the Respondent demonstrated that material facts 

existed that supported th~ FAA's case in chief, particularly when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the FAA, the non-moving party. The Respondent's evidence did not show -as it 

needed to - that a reasonable decisionrnaker, applying the applicable standard of proof, could not 

find in favor of the FAA at hearing. See Baicker-McKee et al., supra, at 1 122. 

In short, the Respondent's proffered Cross-Motion evidence included material facts that 

supported the FAA's allegations. As a result, the Respondent failed to meet its initial burden of 

proofto show that there were "insufficient [material] facts" to support the FAA's allegations at a 

hearing, and that the Respondent was entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. 

E. Short Summary of FAA's Opposition Position 

In its Response in Opposition to the Cross-Motion, 11 the FAA submitted multiple 

exhibits-including Mr. Becker's March 21, 2011 Letter to the FAA (Ex h. HH), Inspector 

Lipinski's February 17, 2015 declaration (Exh. JJ), and selected portions of Mr. Jeffrey Becker's 

11 In the FAA's February 18, 2015 Response, it presented both a responsive argument to the Cross-Motion, but also 

arguments in support of its own Motion for Summary Judgment (see, e.g., Response, 4.) Only the FAA's responsive 

arguments to the Cross-Motion have been considered for this ruling. 

Page 20 of 21 
October 29, 2014 discovery Deposition (Exh. KK}---challenging the Respondent's assertion that 

no facts, or insufficient facts, existed to support the FAA's charged violations. The FAA also 

asserted that the Respondent had failed to meet its cross-motion burden of proof. Given the 

court's finding that the Respondent did ·not meet its· initial burden of proof, the FAA's responsive 

evidence in this Cross-Motion will not be further discussed. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(5) and Civ. R. 56, all ofthe parties' admissible 

Exhibits were considered, as well as the applicable pleadings and documents. After having heard 

oral argument on the Cross-Motion, and having reviewed all relevant caselaw, decisions, 

regulations, statutory authority, motions, pleadings, and being fully advised; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. The Respondent has failed to meet its burden of proof as the moving party, and it's 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and request for dismissal of the action is denied. 

2. A separate order will issue on the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

3. For clarifications of this order or questions with regard to the procedures to be followed 

in this case, please contact Mr. Cody L. Smith, Attorney-Advisor, at the Office of · 

Hearings (202-366-6941 ). 

Attachment: Service List 

Page 21 of 21 
SERVICE LIST 

FDMS No. FAA-2013-0716 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue, S. W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WI00012 

Mr. Christopher R. Stevenson 

Complainant's Counsel 

Federal Aviation Administration 

ONE COPY 

Office of the Regional Counsel, AS0-7 Southern Region 

P. 0. Box 20636 

AtlarJta, GA 30320 

TEL: 404-305-5200 

FAX: 404-305-5223 

Mr. Robert P. Silverberg 

Respondent's Counsel 

Silverberg, Goldman & Bikoff, LLP 

Georgetown Place, Suite 120 

1101 301h St., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20007 

TEL: 202-944-3300 

FAX: 202-944-3306 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

US. Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M:.20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

12 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 lndependence Avenue, S. W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W I 000, Washington, 

DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.