alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Evan Williams, certify that:

1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Border Management,
Inc;

2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;

3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the Small Business Issuer ("registrant") as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;

4.The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and have:

A)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
Such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

B)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(a)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and

5.The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's
board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: July 13, 2007

/s/ Evan Williams
-------------------------------
Evan Williams
Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 By The Chief Executive Officer,

As Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002.

I, Gerald L. Storch, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | 1. | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Toys R Us, Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended July 31, 2010 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|September 10, 2010                  
|                                    
|/s/    Gerald L.
Storch             
|Gerald L. Storch                    
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
|(Principal Executive Officer)
Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Advanced ID Corporation (the "Company"), hereby
certifies, to such officer's knowledge, that the Company's Amended Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2008 (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                 /s/Sudeep Bhargava
                                 ----------------------
                                 Sudeep Bhargava
                                 Interim Chief Financial Officer

August __, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 0 8

- 2477

_____________ LORENZO JOHNSON, Appellant
v. NEAL MECHLING, SUPERINTENDENT; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________ On Appeal from the Uni ted States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 4

- 04

- cv - 01564 ) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III Argued September 30, 2009
Re

- Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 23, 2012 On Remand f rom the United State s Supreme Court (No. 11

- 1053)
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge , CHAGARES , and NYGAARD , Circuit Judges

.

____________ JUDGMENT ORDER

____________ On July 19, 2004, appellant Lorenzo Johnson filed a petition for a writ o f habeas

corpus pu rsuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction s for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder in Pennsylvania state court

. The District Court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability with respect to appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions . In adivided opinion, this Court reversed the Distri ct Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Supreme Cou rt of the
United States reversed this Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion, Coleman v. Johnson , 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) , it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGE D that this Court’s not precedential opinion, filed October 4, 2011, is hereby VACAT E D and t he judgment of the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania , entered on March 31, 2008, is hereby AFF IRMED. A ppellant’s motion for briefing and recon sideration of this Court’s
denial of a certificate of a ppealability with respect to appellant’s Brady claim , filed July 23, 2012, is hereby DENIED. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate upon the filing
of this judgment order. By the Court,
/s/ Michael A. Chagares Circuit Judge
Attest:
/s/Marcia M. Waldron Clerk
DATED: A pril 17, 2013
#### Wallace H. Reeder et al., Respondents, *v.*Board of Education of the City of New York, Appellant.

Argued April 9, 1943;

decided May 27, 1943.

*830
      *Thomas D. Thacher, Corporation Counsel (Paxton Blair*and *Charles F. Murphy*of counsel), for appellant.

*Francis J. Nicosia, Hillard Schulberg*and *Anthony Bocco*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway and Desmond, JJ. Taking no part: Finch, J.
# Oklahoma Corporation Commission

Oil and Gas Conservation Division

Tim Baker, Director Mike Moore, Hydrologist

# Waste Material Practices Reference Chart 

# OAC165:10 - 7- 24 (b) Waste Materials (54) (c) Disposal Options (22)165:10 - 7 - 24. Waste management practices reference chart

(a) Scope. (b) Waste materials and disposal options. (1) Produced water: Options 1, 7 & 9 (2) Weighted water: Options 1 & 7 (3) Used treatment fluids, frac sand, and other flowback wastes: Options 1, 2, 5 & 7 and, for

. frac sand only, options 3 & 20 (4) Water based mud: Options 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 19 (5) Water based mud cuttings: Options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 & 19 (6) Oil based mud: Options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 & 22 c) Disposal options and rule reference guide. The following waste disposal options are

referenced in of this Section: (1) Reclaim and/or recycle. (2) Burial (in accordance with 165:10 - 7- 16). (3) Landfills regulated by the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality. (4) Road applications by County Commissioners (in accordance with 165:10 - 7- 22 and 165:10 - 7- 28). (5) Noncommercial pits (in accordance with 165:10 - 7- 16). (6) Commercial mud disposal pits (in accordance with 165:10 - 9 - 1). (7) Underground injection (in accordance with 165:10 - 5 - 1 through 165:10 - 5 - 14). (8) Land application (in accordance with 165:10 - 7- 19 and 165:10 - 7- 26). (9) Discharge (in accordance with 165:10 - 7- 17).

# Waste Material (1) 

# Produced water: Options 1, 7 & 9

# Produced Water Disposal Options (1) Reclaim and/or recycle. 

# (7) Underground injection (in accordance with 165:10 - 5 - 1 through 165:10 - 5 - 14). (9) Discharge to land, 165:10 - 7- 17

# Produced Water Disposal Option (1) Reclaim and/or recycle.

# Reverse Osmosis

# Produced Water Disposal Option (7) Underground injection See: 165:10 - 5 - 1 through 165:10 - 5 - 14. PHOTO UIC Well

# Produced Water Disposal Option (9) Discharge to land, 165:10 - 7- 17(d)

# Produced Water may not stored in a pit

# Produced Water May Be Stored In Temporary Aboveground Tanks

# Portable Unregulated Tank

# Above Ground Tanks are Treated like Frac Tanks

 

# There are no monitor wells required

 

# Sampling is not necessary

# Future Costs?

# Future Events What could cause a large portable container to fail?

# Above Ground Tank Failure
#### Harold D. HARDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOBORO; Brown, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15328

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 8, 2017 *

Filed May 11, 2017

Harold D. Harden, Pro Se

*991D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV — Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas), Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and access-to-courts claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. *Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego,*670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harden’s due process claim arising from an alleged unlawful deprivation of property because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he lacked an adequate postdeprivation remedy under Nevada law. *See*Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.031, 41.0322, 209.243; *Hudson v. Palmer,*468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harden’s access-to-courts claim because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim. *See Lewis v. Casey,*518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 354-55, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury requirement).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in appellant’s opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sean Patrick SCHRAMMECK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30171

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 11, 2017 *

Filed April 19, 2017

Tara Elliott, USMI — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee

Katherine Ruth Stack, Stack & Kottke, PLLC, Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Sean Patrick Schrammeck, Pro Se

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sean Patrick Schrammeck appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 60-month-and-one-day sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ -841(a)(1) and 846. *438Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Schrammeck’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have considered Schrammeck’s pro se supplemental brief, which the Clerk is instructed to file. No answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 76, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief as to Schrammeck’s conviction. We accordingly affirm Schrammeck’s conviction.

Schrammeck waived the right to appeal his sentence. Because the record discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the sentencing waiver, we dismiss Schram-meck’s appeal as to his sentence. *See United States v. Watson,*682 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009).

In his pro se supplemental brief, Schrammeck contends that his trial coun-: sel provided ineffective assistance. Schrammeck’s claim, which is based on an alleged conflict of interest arising out of trial counsel’s bar membership, is merit-less.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. Schrammeck’s pro se motion for appointment of new counsel and to stay these proceedings pending appointment of new counsel is DENIED.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Bilal AHDOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S. LOPEZ, Chief Medical Officer at Kern Valley State Prison; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16831

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*846Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 31, 2017

Bilal Ahdom, Pro Se

Kathleen Jane Williams, Attorney, Williams *&*Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee S. Lopez

Lucas L. Hennes, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees M. Araich, M. Spaeth, C. Chen, Shittu

Edgar Nield, Gabrielle DeSantis Nield, Esquire, Nield Law Group, APC, Encini-tas, CA, for Defendant-Appellee S. Schae-fer

Colin H. Walshok, Attorney, Wingert Grebing Brubaker & Juskie LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Ashby

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Bilal Ahdom appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion. *Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int'l, Inc. v. Scott,*869 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ahdom’s requests for preliminary injunctive relief because Ahdom failed to demonstrate that he would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief. *See id.*(“[A]n injunction cannot issue merely because it is possible that there will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff; it must be likely that there will be.” (citation omitted)); *Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,*240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Ahdom’s various contentions regarding alleged perjury committed by defendant Dr. Ashby.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
From: Jones, Danielle
To: Cogliano, Gerain Subject: Summary from the RMP Interagency Meeting
Date: Tuesday, February 16, 2016 2:55:08 PM
Attachments: RMP Interagency Meeting Summary v1.docx

Gerain,

Please use this version for the docket.

Thanks,
Danielle

Danielle Y. Jones Policy Analyst
Office of Management and Budget
Phone: (202) 395

- 1741 | djones@omb.eop.govAttachment: RMP Interagency Meeting Summary v1.docx

RMP Interagency Meeting Summary January 29, 2016

• EPA will remove the chemical quantities req uirement from public disclosure, however,
the EPA believes that the chemical name and SDS should be made available to the public.

• For after action reports, EPA will take public comment on the level of information provided in the reports.

• EPA will be seeking public comment on the three remaining items (chemical name, SDS, and LEPC contact information) under public disclosure.

• EPA will work with DHS and other inte rested interagency representatives to develop solutions or potential options regarding the public disclosure public comments, prior to
the final rule review by the interagency

. EPA will also provide a rough timeline to the

group.

• There is concern with the term feasibility, which is a unique concept under O SH Act and there is concern that there might be confusion. EPA agreed to seek comment on feasibility vs. practical.

• EPA stated that they would not be accepting S T AA reports, in part due to lack of

resource s.

• EPA’s rationale for excluding waste water treatment plants is that this sector has the lowest level of incidences. The wastewater treatment facilities has the highest rate of implementing IST out of the various NACIS codes.

• The third party audits is be ing resolved in the SBAR Panel process, with request for public comments.
#### ESTATE OF Colton PETERSON; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. David KRUEGER, Missoula Police Detective, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Missoula, Montana; et al., Defendants.

No. 14-35682

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2017 Portland, Oregon

Filed March 30, 2017

Quentin M. Rhoades, Attorney, Nicole L. Siefert, Robert D. Erickson, Attorney, Rhoades, Siefert & Erickson, PLLC, Mis-soula, MT, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Estate of Colton Peterson, Juliena Darling, William Darling

Brendon J. Rohan, Esquire, Attorney, Poore, Roth *&*Robinson, P.C., Butte, MT, for Defendant-Appellant

Before: FISHER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Detective David Krueger challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the district court’s decision denying qualified immunity and hold that Krueger is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the violation.

1. The district court denied Krueger’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding that the contours of the law were sufficiently clear that Krueger may be said to have been on notice that his conduct was unlawful. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated “the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law* should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’ ” *White v. Pauly,*— U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 548, 552, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam) (citing *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,*563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). “[T]he clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” *Id.*(citing *Anderson v. Creighton,*483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The district court erred in failing to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as Krueger was held to have violated the Fourteenth *632Amendment. Instead, the district court relied on *Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Department,*227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), *Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield,*439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006), and *Patel v. Kent School District,*648 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011), which lay out the state-created danger exception in markedly different circumstances and are applicable to this case only at a high level of generality. Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was warranted because the law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. *See White,*137 S.Ct. at 552.

2. Because we hold that Krueger is entitled to qualified immunity, we do not consider whether the alleged conduct constituted a constitutional violation.

REVERSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.