alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      23.1





**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT**


REGISTERED
      PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
      FIRM








We consent
      to the incorporation by
      reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (File No. 333-109495)
      and
      Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-34156 and 333-122242) of our report, dated March 10,
      2007, relating to the financial statements of Deltathree, Inc.
      appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Deltathree, Inc. for the
      year ended December 31, 2006.







/s/
      Brightman Almagor & Co.


Certified
      Public Accountants


A
      member
      firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu




Tel
      Aviv,
      Israel


April
      1,
      2007
# EUR-Lex - 32001R2022 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32001R2022

**Commission Regulation (EC) No 2022/2001 of 15 October 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No 1623/2000 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine with regard to market mechanisms **

*
Official Journal L 273 , 16/10/2001 P. 0017 - 0017 *

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2022/2001

of 15 October 2001

amending Regulation (EC) No 1623/2000 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine with regard to market mechanisms

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine(1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2826/2000(2), and in particular Article 33 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Article 63 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1623/2000 of 25 July 2000 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine with regard to market mechanisms(3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1660/2001(4), provide for the introduction of an aid scheme for the distillation of potable alcohol from wine. That scheme was first introduced for the 2000/01 wine year. Changes are required in line with experience gained in the first year of application. In particular, to ensure a more stable procedure over the course of the year, distillation should be opened in several separate tranches.

(2) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Wine,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The following subparagraph is added to paragraph 1 of Article 63 of Regulation (EC) No 1623/2000: "For the 2001/02 wine year distillation shall be opened for the period 16 October to 15 November. The maximum quantity for which the contracts or declarations referred to in Article 65 may be concluded is 7 million hl. The Commission shall subsequently open additional quantities during one or more periods to be defined in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 75 of Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999."

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 October 2001.

For the Commission

Franz Fischler

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 179, 14.7.1999, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 328, 23.12.2000, p. 2.

(3) OJ L 194, 31.7.2000, p. 45.

(4) OJ L 221, 17.8.2001, p. 8.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7006 

To prohibit natural asset companies from entering into any agreement with 

respect to land in the State of Utah or natural assets on or in such land. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 17, 2024 

Mr. CURTIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To prohibit natural asset companies from entering into any 

agreement with respect to land in the State of Utah 

or natural assets on or in such land. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—A natural asset company may not 

5 enter into any agreement with respect to land in the State 

6 of Utah or natural assets on or in such land. 

7 (b) NATURAL ASSET COMPANY DEFINED.—In this 

8 section, the term ‘‘natural asset company’’— 

9 (1) has the meaning given that term under the 

10 notice of the Securities and Exchange Commission 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 7006 IH

1 titled ‘‘Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York 

2 Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed 

3 Rule Change To Amend the NYSE Listed Company 

4 Manual To Adopt Listing Standards for Natural 

5 Asset Companies’’ (88 Fed. Reg. 68811; published 

6 October 4, 2023); and 

7 (2) includes any company that is substantially 

8 similar to a company described under paragraph (1). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-21-00042-CV

CITY OF FLORESVILLE, TEXAS, and Marissa Ximenez, Gloria E. Martinez, Juan Ortiz, 

Gloria Morales Cantu, Monica Veliz, and Jade Jimenez, in their official capacities,

Appellants

v.

Nick NISSEN, David Johns, and Paul W. Sack, 

Appellees

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas

Trial Court No. CVW-19-00897

Honorable Lynn Ellison, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order granting 

appellees’ motion for summary judgment is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that 

Appellees Nick Nissen, David Johns, and Paul W. Sack take nothing on their claims against 

Appellants City of Floresville, Texas, and Marissa Ximenez, Gloria E. Martinez, Juan Ortiz, Gloria 

Morales Cantu, Monica Veliz, and Jade Jimenez, in their official capacities. This cause is 

REMANDED for the trial court to consider the appellants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs.

Costs of appeal are taxed against Appellees Nick Nissen, David Johns, and Paul W. Sack. 

SIGNED June 29, 2022.

_____________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        (.00)
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</TABLE>
AMENDMENT TO ACCOUNTS
RECEIVABLE FINANCING AGREEMENT





This AMENDMENT, dated as of November
24, 2008, is by and between DESKTOP ACQUISITION SUB, INC. D/B/A INTERCLICK, INC.
(“Client”) and CRESTMARK COMMERCIAL CAPITAL LENDING LLC
(“Crestmark”).





RECITALS





A.           Client
and Crestmark (the “Parties”) are parties to a certain Accounts Receivable
Financing Agreement, dated as of November 12, 2008 (the
“Agreement”).





B.           The
Parties have agreed to amend the Agreement pursuant to the terms
hereof.





NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties hereby agree as
follows:




AGREEMENT





1. Amendment of
Agreement.  Section 1.18.2 is hereby deleted in its entirety
and replaced with the following:





1.18.2  or
any portion thereof, for which payment has not been received by Crestmark, for
any reason, within one-hundred five (105) days of the date of
invoice;




2.           Effect of this
Agreement.  Except as modified pursuant hereto, the Agreement
is specifically ratified, restated and confirmed by all parties thereto as of
the date hereof.  To the extent of any conflict between the terms of
this Amendment and the Agreement, the terms of this Amendment shall
control.





3.           Counterparts.  This
Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, all of which taken
together shall constitute one agreement, provided that, this
Amendment shall not become effective until all counterparts hereof have been
executed by all parties hereto.





The parties hereto have caused this
Amendment to be duly executed and delivered by their respective officers
thereunto duly authorized as of the date first above written.





DESKTOP
      ACQUISITION SUB, INC.D/B/A
      INTERCLICK, INC.BY:
                /s/ Michael MathewsMICHAEL
      MATHEWS, CEOCRESTMARK
      COMMERCIAL CAPITAL LENDING LLCBY:
                /s/ Patrick M. HaneyPATRICK
      M. HANEY, President
March 21, 2012 

Ms. Jennifer K. Lawson 

6440 South 120th West Avenue 

Sapulpa, OK 74066 

Dear Ms. Lawson: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from 

part 147 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process 

your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your March 2, 2012, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2012-0237), 

but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does not comply 

with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you 

must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the relief 

you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption would 

provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you seek an 

exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described earlier 

to reach us within 30 days. We will consider the docket on your request open during this time. 

Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at least 120 days 

before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you further. 

If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-4059. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

James Crotty 

Acting Manager 

 Aircraft and Airport Rules Division 

Enclosure
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Marlon Dewayne BAKER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-11218 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marlon Dewayne Baker, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Marlon Dewayne Baker has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Baker has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Baker’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents *813no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, Baker’s motion to proceed pro se is DENIED, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Proposed Rule: Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas EmissionsMeeting Documentation: Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)DateStaff Contact Information(Name, email, phone #)Name of Organization(Attach list of allattendees names andemails if possible)Summary of Discussion(e.g., applicability,reporting requirements, etc.)WrittenCommentsProvided?Did they alsosubmit toDocket?Date sent toEPA- CCDMay 19, 2010Kirsten Cappel(202) 343-9556cappel.kirsten@epa.gov• Outside participantsidentified below.• EPA Climate ChangeDivision and EPAcontractors: KirstenCappel, EPA; ScottBartos, EPA; DeborahOttinger, EPA; DebHarris, ICFInternational; JeremyScharfenberg, ICFInternational.Participants discussed their commentson the proposed rule, ElectronicsManufacturing (subpart I). Highlightedconcerns included: gas consumptiontracking; burden and cost ofapportioning gas consumption toseparate process categories; uncertaintyanalysis doesn’t support using 9process categories over Tier 2bemission factors; POU abatementcharacterization and trackingrequirements vs. DRE of 60%;underestimated compliance costs; andinformation on gas emissions forseparate processes categories is highlysensitive.All PowerPoint Presentations providedat meetings are included in the docket.SIA submittedcomments tothe docket.Outside Participants:Julie Hatcher, Latham and Watkins, julia.hatcher@lw.com; Laura Mendicino, Freescale, laura.mendicino@freescale.com;Cynthia Johnson, TI, ckjohnson@TI.com; Tom Diamond, SIA, tdiamond@sia-online.org; Reed Content, Global Foundries;Laurie Beu, Consultant to ISMI, Laurie.Beu@ismi.sematech.org; Stephen Harper, Intel, stephen.harper@intel.com;Tim Higgs, Intel, tim.g.higgs@intel.com;Bob Hearn, Micron, whearn@micron.com; Jeff Davidson, Analog Devices; MatthewBrewer, Latham and Watkins, matthew.brewer@lw.com;On the telephone: Tim Yeakley, TI, t-yeakley@ti.com; TinaGilliland, TI; and Jay Dietrich,IBM, jdietric@us.ibm.com.1
#### John B. Mayenborg, Appellant, *v.*Stephen Haynes, Respondent.

The declaration of A. to B., not made with the purpose or belief that it . would be communicated to C. or would influence his action, constitutes no estoppel upon A., although 0. afterwards hears of it and acts upon it.

(Argued November 15, 1872;

decided November 19, 1872.)

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in the City Court of Brooklyn and granting a new trial.

The action was upon a promissory note made by defendant. *676The defence was that it was an accommodation note and was received by plaintiff after maturity. The note was made for the accommodation of one Hopke, who transferred it to one Kugeler as security for an antecedent debt. The latter transferred it to plaintiff after maturity. Kugeler testified that when the note became due he presented it to defendant for payment, who replied in substance that , he would see about it in two or three days. This conversation whs related to plaintiff when he purchased the note, and the latter testified that he supposes he would not have taken the no,te if this had not been stated to him. The court below charged that if defendant promised to pay the note, and that fact was communicated to plaintiff and he took the note upon the strength of the communication, believing it to be true, it would constitute an estoppel. Defendant’s counsel excepted to that portion of the charge, *“*that if the plaintiff made any advances on the faith of the representations made to him at the time he took the note, then, I think, it would constitute estoppel.” The appellant’s counsel claimed that this was not a sufficient exception to the charge. *Held,*that the exception brought to the attention of the court the matter complained of and was sufficient, that the declaration of defendant to Kugeler constituted no estoppel and the charge was error.

*J. T. Marecm*for the appellant.

*Samuel Hand*for the respondent.

Fólgeb, J.,

reads opinion for affirmance.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
American Wagering, Inc. Financial Data Schedule Required under: Appendix A to
Item 601(c) of Regulation S-B Commercial and Industrial Companies Article 5 of
Regulation S-X
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
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</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel KNOWLES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10177 Non-Argument Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 24, 2017)

Ricardo A. Del Toro, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Andrea G. Hoffman, George M. Karavet-*743sos, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Samuel Knowles, Pro Se

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Samuel Knowles, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an error in the record, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. On appeal, Knowles contends that Rule 36 permits an alteration of the drug amount in his presentence investigation report (“PSI”). After thorough review, we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s application of Rule 36 to correct its judgment at sentencing. United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2004). Rule 36 instructs that a district court “may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. However, Rule 36 may not be used by a court to make a “substantive alteration” to a defendant’s sentence. Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Whittington, 918 F.2d 149, 151 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 36 was inapplicable when a court order “fundamentally changed the sentence appellant had earlier received”). Instead, Rule 36 is a remedy for errors that are “minor and mechanical in nature.” Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1165.

Here, the district court did not err in denying Knowles’s Rule 36 motion. In the Rule 36 motion, Knowles requested that the paragraphs in his presentence investigation report (“PSI”) detailing uncharged conduct be removed from the PSI—in other words, he specifically sought to alter the court’s drug amount calculation, which served as the basis of his base offense level and his guideline calculations. Altering the drug amount, and ultimately the base offense level in Knowles’s PSI, would fundamentally change the proceedings underlying the sentence he received. He is not seeking to correct a clerical error. Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164. Because he requested a substantive, not clerical, change to his PSI, Rule 36 does not apply. See id,; Whittington, 918 F.2d at 151.

Moreover, the district court could not have construed Knowles’s motion under a different rule to provide relief. Indeed, the court lacked jurisdiction to construe Knowles’s Rule 36 motion as a § 2266 motion because he previously filed a § 2255 motion that was denied with prejudice, and he had not obtained authorization from this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive § 2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this Court). Accordingly, we affirm,

AFFIRMED.