alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jorge Armando MIRELES-IBARRA, also known as Jose Morales, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41681 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 10, 2017

John Richard Berry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Kathryn Shephard, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Jorge Armando Mireles-Ibarra pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States. His 34-month, within-Guidelines sentence included an eight-level enhancement because the district court determined that, prior to his first deportation in 2007, Mireles-Ibarra had “sustained a conviction for a felony offense for which the sentence im*970posed was two years or more.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)(B). Specifically, Mireles-Ibarra’s 2007 deportation followed his conviction and 10-year probationary sentence, under Texas law, for burglary of a habitation. After he returned illegally in 2011, Mireles-Ibarra violated his probation, and the state court adjudicated him guilty of burglary and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. On appeal, Mireles-Ibarra contends that the district court reversibly erred by applying the challenged enhancement because, contrary to the mandate of § 2L1.2, his two-year custodial sentence on the 2007 Texas burglary conviction was not imposed until after he “was ordered deported or ordered removed from the United States for the first time.” § 2L1.2(b)(2).

Even assuming without deciding that the district court erred, we conclude that any error was harmless. *See United States v. Martinez-Romero,*817 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2016). The record indicates that the basis for Mireles-Ibarra’s 34-month sentence was not the applicable guidelines range, but instead was the inadequacy of the 30-month sentence he had recently served on a prior illegal reentry conviction, which the district court determined warranted a “slightly higher” sentence in this case. *Cf. United States v. Ibarra-Luna,*628 F.3d 712, 718-19 (5th Cir. 2010). The court explained that such a sentence was “necessary” to satisfy the ends of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), notwithstanding any guidelines error. *Cf. United States v. Bonilla,*524 F.3d 647, 656-57 (5th Cir. 2008). The error does not warrant vacating the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6251 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6251

  To promote transparency by permitting the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board to allow its disciplinary proceedings to be open to the 
                    public, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 28, 2016

 Mr. Garrett introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To promote transparency by permitting the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board to allow its disciplinary proceedings to be open to the 
                    public, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``PCAOB Enforcement Transparency Act 
of 2016''.

SEC. 2. OPEN MEETINGS AUTHORIZED.

    Section 105(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 
7215(c)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) Public hearings.--Hearings under this section shall 
        be open to the public unless the Board, on its own motion or 
        after considering the motion of a party, orders otherwise.''.

SEC. 3. PUBLICATION OF DETERMINATIONS.

    Section 105(d)(1)(C) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 
7215(d)(1)(C)) is amended by striking ``(once any stay on the 
imposition of such sanction has been lifted)''.
                                 <all>
```
# EUR-Lex - 32002D0614 - EN

Avis juridique important
|

# 32002D0614

**2002/614/EC: Commission Decision of 22 July 2002 amending Decision 97/467/EC as regards Slovakia for rabbit meat (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002) 2730)**
*Official Journal L 196 , 25/07/2002 P. 0058 - 0059*

Commission Decision of 22 July 2002 amending Decision 97/467/EC as regards Slovakia for rabbit meat (notified under document number C(2002) 2730) (Text with EEA relevance) (2002/614/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Decision 95/408/EC of 22 June 1995 on the conditions of drawing up, for an interim period, provisional lists of third country establishments from which Member States are authorised to import certain products of animal origin, fishery products or live bivalve molluscs(1), as last amended by Decision 2001/4/EC(2), and in particular Article 2(1) thereof, Whereas: (1) Provisional lists of establishments producing rabbit meat and farmed game meat have been drawn up pursuant to Commission Decision 97/467/EC of 7 July 1997 drawing up provisional lists of third country establishments from which the Member States authorise imports of rabbit meat and farmed game meat(3), as last amended by Decision 2001/396/EC(4). (2) Slovakia has sent a list of establishments producing rabbit meat which have been certified by the competent authority as being in accordance with Community rules. (3) A provisional list of establishments producing rabbit meat can thus be drawn up for Slovakia. (4) Decision 97/467/EC should therefore be amended accordingly. (5) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The text in the Annex to this Decision is added to Annex I to Decision 97/467/EC. Article 2 This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 22 July 2002. For the Commission David Byrne Member of the Commission (1) OJ L 243, 11.10.1995, p. 17. (2) OJ L 2, 5.1.2001, p. 21. (3) OJ L 199, 26.7.1997, p. 57. (4) OJ L 139, 23.5.2001, p. 16. ANEXO/BILAG/ANHANG/Î ÎÎ¡ÎÎ¡Î¤ÎÎÎ/ANNEX/ANNEXE/ALLEGATO/BIJLAGE/ANEXO/LIITE/BILAGA PaÃ­s: Eslovaquia/Land: Slovakiet/Land: Slowakei/ÎÏÎ¬ÏÎ¿Ï: Î£Î»Î¿Î2Î±ÎoÎ ̄Î±/Country: Slovakia/Pays: Slovaquie/Paese: Slovacchia/Land: Slowakije/PaÃ­s: EslovÃ¡quia/Maa: Slovakia/Land: Slovakien >TABLE> SH: Matadero/Slagteri/Schlachthof/ÏÏÎ±Î3ÎμÎ ̄Î¿/slaughterhouse/abattoir/Macello/slachthuis/Matadouro/teurastamo/Slakteri CS: AlmacÃ©n frigorÃ­fico/KÃ ̧le-/frysehus/KÃ1⁄4hllager/ÏÏÎoÏÎ1ÎoÏÏ ÏÏÏÎ¿Ï Î±ÏÎ¿Î ̧Î®ÎoÎμÏÏÎ·Ï/cold store/entreposage/Deposito frigorifero/koelhuis/ArmazÃ©m frigorÃ­fico/kylmÃ¤varasto/Kyl- eller fryshus a: Conejo/kanin/Kaninchen/ÎoÎ¿ÏÎ1⁄2Î­Î»Î1/rabbit/lapin/Coniglio/konijnenvlees/Coelho/kani/kanin
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</TABLE>
#### Mary E. Lyons FELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GATES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-1287

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 20, 2017

Decided: June 22, 2017

Mary E. Lyons Felton, Appellant Pro Se. John D. Leidy, HORNTHAL, RILEY, ELLIS & MALAND, LLP, Elizabeth City, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Mary E. Lyons Felton appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Gates County Board of Education on Felton’s retaliation claim, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). We have reviewed the record and discern no reversible error. We thus affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Felton v. Gates Cty. Bd. of Educ.,*No. 2:15-cv-00020-BR, 2017 WL 420156 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2017). We deny as moot the Gates County Board of Education’s motion to file a surreply brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Andrew William Cox, * From the 91st District Court

of Eastland County,

Trial Court No. 25524.

Vs. No. 11-22-00191-CR * March 14, 2024

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Williams, J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-30130

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Thomas A. Nelson, Jr., 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 3:16-CV-782

Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit 

Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Thomas A. Nelson, Jr. moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 on the basis that constitutionally ineffective counsel caused him to 

reject a plea offer and to stand trial. The district court denied Nelson’s 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 3, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-30130 Document: 00515846256 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/03/2021
No. 19-30130

2

motion, finding that he did not show prejudice from any alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel.1 We granted a certificate of appealability on this claim. 

Whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective is a mixed question 

of law and fact that we review de novo. United States v. Phea, 953 F.3d 838, 

841 (5th Cir. 2020). We “independently apply[] the law to the facts found 

by the district court, as long as the district court’s factual determinations are 

not clearly erroneous.” Ramirez v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 2005). 

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Nelson must show that his 

counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency caused prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Because Nelson alleges 

that deficient counsel caused him to reject a plea agreement, to show 

prejudice he must demonstrate that: (1) but for the ineffective counsel, there 

is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea; (2) the court 

would have accepted its terms; and (3) the conviction or sentence would have 

been less severe. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012). 

The district court made a factual finding that Nelson would have 

insisted on going to trial regardless of his attorney’s advice. After 

considering the parties’ briefs, record, and oral arguments, we conclude that 

the record supports this factual finding. Because there is no reasonable 

probability that Nelson would have pled guilty, he failed to show prejudice.

See id. We may affirm on that basis without evaluating whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

AFFIRMED.

1 The district court also denied relief on the basis that the conviction was invalid 

under McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). At oral argument, Nelson’s 

counsel withdrew his claims under McDonnell.

Case: 19-30130 Document: 00515846256 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/03/2021
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Aaron Lamonte MILES, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-4510

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: August 29, 2017

Filed: October 19, 2017

*861Melisa K. Zaehringer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Aaron Lamonte Miles, Pro Se

Before COLLOTON, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Aaron Lamonte Miles pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender. His written plea agreement included an appeal waiver that applied to his conviction but not to his sentence. In this appeal, Miles’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), challenging the reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the District Court.1

We conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion by varying upward from the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines range. See Gall v. United States, 562 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (discussing appellate review of sentencing decisions). The court discussed several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, considered Miles’s sentencing arguments, and thoroughly explained its disagreement with the parties’ joint recommendation of a lower sentence. See United States v. Mangum, 625 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a sentence is not unreasonable if the district court makes “an individualized assessment based on the facts presented” and addresses “the defendant’s proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors” (citations to quoted cases omitted)).

We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the appeal waiver.

We affirm the judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
#### William JAMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15287

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2017 *

Filed May 30, 2017

*486. William James, Pro Se

Van Longyear, Attorney, Amanda L. McDermott, Esquire, Attorney, Longyear, O’Dea & Lavra, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William James appeals pro se from the district court’s order sua sponte dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to comply with the district court’s order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, *Pagtalunan v. Galaza,*291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing James’ action after James failed to comply with court orders and meet deadlines. *See id.*at 642-43 (setting forth the factors to consider before dismissing for failure to comply with a court order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James’ motion for appointment of counsel because James failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. *See Cano v. Taylor,*739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July 18, 2018 **KENNETH CAGE v. HARRIS E. DOWLEN Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County**  **No. 17C -** **2772 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge** 

**___________________________________ No. M2018**  **- 01119**  **- COA** **- R3**  **- CV** 

**___________________________________** This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on March 12, 2018
. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

**Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dism issed**  F RANK G. C LEMENT, JR., P.J ., M.S., RICHARD H. D INKINS and W. NEAL M CB RAYER, JJ. Harris E. Dowlen , Old Hickory, Tennessee, pro se . Frank E. Mondelli , Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kenneth Cage
. **MEMORANDUM OPINION 1**  The appellee, Kenneth Cage , has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. The appellant, Harris E. Dowlen , has not filed a response in opposition to the motion. According to the unopposed motion and the other documents before this court, the trial court entered its final judgment on March 12, 2018
. Under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) , a party must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment. Mr. Dowlen was thus required

1 Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10 states: This Court, with the

c oncurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential va lue. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any rea son in any unrelated case.- 2
-

to file his notice of appeal on or before April 11, 2018. Mr. Dowlen did not file his notice of appeal until June 15, 2018, more than three months after entry of the judgment. The time limit for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Albert v. Frye , 145 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Tenn. 2004); Binkley v. Medling, 117 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tenn. 2003). This court can neither waive nor extend the time period. Tenn. R. App. P. 2 and 21(b); Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); Jefferson v. Pneumo Serv. Corp. 699 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). The failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter. Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d at 869. The appeal is hereby dismissed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PER CURIAM
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1146 

(Serial No. 10/064,380) 

IN RE MICHAEL L. BEIGEL, NATHANIEL POLISH, 

STEVEN R. FRANK, and ROBERT E. MALM 

Robert E. Malm, Robert E. Malm Law Offices, of Pacific Palisades, California, for 

appellant. 

Nathan K. Kelley, Associate Solicitor, Solicitor’s Office, United States Patent and 

Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, for appellee. With him on the briefs were 

Stephen Walsh, Acting Solicitor, and Thomas W. Krause, Associate Solicitor. 

 

Appealed from: United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals 

 and Interferences 

 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 2007-1146 

(Serial No. 10/064,380) 

IN RE MICHAEL L. BEIGEL, NATHANIEL POLISH, 

STEVEN R. FRANK, and ROBERT E. MALM 

 JUDGMENT 

ON APPEAL from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 

In CASE NO(S). Serial No. 10/064,380 

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36 

Per Curiam (NEWMAN, RADER, and DYK, Circuit Judges). 

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

DATED: October 18, 2007 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Jan Horbaly, Clerk