SLIP OP. 99-109

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

JAMES L. WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE 

 

DAIMLER CHRYSLER CORP., :

 

 : COURT NO. 99-03-00178

Plaintiff, (Complaint File) 

v.

 :

UNITED STATES, 

 :

Defendant.

 :

 Dated: October 14, 1999

Barnes, Richardson & Colburn (Lawrence M. Friedman and Robert F. Seely, Esqs.) for

plaintiff. 

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department

of Justice; Joseph I. Liebman, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office (Saul Davis,

Senior Trial Counsel), for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WATSON, SENIOR JUDGE:

 In this civil action, plaintiffs contest the denial by the United States Customs Service of

American Goods Returned treatment pursuant to subheading 9802.00.80 of the Harmonized

Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS") for certain sheet metal components exported to

Mexico from the United States and used in the assembly of motor vehicles. The action is before

the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).

Currently before the court is plaintiff’s motion to stay discovery by defendant pending
Court No. 99-03-00178 Page 2

defendant’s answer to the complaint and the resolution of an anticipated motion for summary

judgment. 

From the papers before the court, it appears that plaintiff filed a complaint on July 30,

1999, which has not yet been answered by defendant, as required by the court’s rules.. It further

appears that on August 25, 1999 defendant served plaintiff with extensive discovery

interrogatories and request for production of documents. 

 Plaintiff by its current motion seeks to stay responding to defendant’s discovery (for

various period s depending upon several possible scenarios), because without defendant’s

answer, plaintiff may not file a motion for summary judgment and cannot assess the relevance of

certain facts sought to be discovered by defendant’s interrogatories, and because at this juncture

the factual issues to be litigated in this case are not defined by an answer to the complaint. 

Plaintiff further alleges that while the precise issue in this case was previously resolved in two 

cases, both decided against plaintiff (Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 19 CIT 353 (1995), aff’d

86 F.3d 1173 (1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 823 (1996); and General Motors Corp. v. United

States, 976 F.2d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), its motion for summary judgment will rely on the more

recent decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 119 S. Ct. 1392

(1999). Plaintiff posits that Haggar "has clarified the law with respect to the proper interpretation

of tariff item [sic] 9802.00.80 to such a degree that this case may be resolved on a motion for

summary judgment."

Defendant states that it served pre-answer discovery on plaintiff because, while it

recognized that the issues appeared identical to those previously litigated in the above-cited

Chrysler case, defendant wished to determine whether there were any distinguishing material
Court No. 99-03-00178 Page 3

facts in this case. However, defendant admits that it now knows those counts and contentions of

the complaint that its does not dispute and those contained in the complaint that are in dispute,

for which it now wishes to seek discovery before filing an answer. Significantly, however,

defendant, neither states that it would be unable file an answer to the complaint without first

engaging in the discovery now sought with regard to the disputed matters, nor shows how a

delay in discovery until after the case is at issue would be prejudicial in any manner.

While defendant clearly has a right to conduct discovery with regard to the matters raised

in the complaint that it disputes, defendant has not established any need for the discovery now

sought in order to file its answer to the complaint. An answer by defendant may significantly

help to clarify what material and relevant facts, if any, are still in dispute with respect to the

application of subheading 9802.00.80, HTSUS, to the subject merchandise, and the extent to

which the discovery presently sought by defendant is relevant to the legal issues or any factual

issues. Fundamentally, stays of proceedings are within the sound discretion of the court. See

Eastalco Aluminum Co. v. United States, 15 CIT 32,33, 757 F. Sup. 1422, 1423-24 (1991). 

Under all the facts and circumstances, particularly the prior litigation of virtually

identical issues now before the court and no showing of prejudice to defendant by a delay in

discovery, the court concludes that a stay of discovery is warranted pending an answer to the

complaint, issuance of a post-assignment scheduling order pursuant to USCIT Rule 16(b),

and/or a discovery conference and order pursuant to USCIT Rule 26(f), after which discovery by

the parties would proceed in accordance with such orders as the court may enter.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York 

 October 14, 1999 James L. Watson, Senior Judge