Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 62A05-1606-JP-1431 | February 17, 2017 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Bryan L. Ciyou

Darlene R. Seymour

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Walter R. Hagedorn II

Tell City, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christen Hartsock,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Donald Fulkerson,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 17, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

62A05-1606-JP-1431

Appeal from the Perry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Lucy Goffinet, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

62C01-1310-JP-252

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Christen Hartsock (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order modifying child 

custody. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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awarding Donald Fulkerson (Father) physical custody of the parties’ daughter, 

K.L.F. (Child). 

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to Child in May 2013. An agreed paternity order was 

entered on January 3, 2014, at which time Mother was living with Child in 

Indianapolis and Father was living in Cannelton. Pursuant to the agreed order,

Mother and Father shared joint legal custody and Mother was granted primary 

physical custody. Although Child was less than a year old, Father was granted 

parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines for a 

child three years old and over, although he was not awarded midweek visitation 

due to the distance between Mother’s and Father’s homes. Father exercised

parenting time on alternating weekends and four nonconsecutive weeks of 

extended visitation per year. 

[4] Father owns a home in Cannelton and has lived there for approximately three 

years. Father shares the home with his fiancée, Tasha Durcholz, who he has 

been dating for nearly three years. At the time of the hearing in this matter, 

Father and Durcholz’s wedding was scheduled for October 22, 2016. Father 

works as a welder and shortly before the hearing, he took a new job making less 

money so that he could spend more time with Child. 
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[5] For most of her life, Child has lived with Mother at Mother’s parents’ home in 

Indianapolis. Around Child’s first birthday, Mother began dating Kylen Asher, 

and in 2015, Mother and Child moved into an apartment in Danville with 

Asher. Mother’s relationship with Asher was volatile and included instances of 

physical violence. Sometimes Asher broke things when he was angry and he 

once threw a remote control at Mother, causing bruising to her hand. Mother 

and Asher also sometimes got into verbal altercations in Child’s presence, and

on one occasion Asher punched Mother’s car while Child was inside. Mother

nevertheless allowed Asher to be around Child every day and sometimes left 

Child alone with him. Asher also regularly sent antagonizing and threatening 

text messages to Father. Despite this, Asher accompanied Mother nearly every 

time she met with Father to exchange Child for parenting time, and Mother 

disregarded Father’s requests that Asher not be present.

[6] Mother has had several different jobs during Child’s life. She has worked at a 

restaurant, a retail store, and a gym. For a little over a year prior to the hearing 

in this case, Mother worked as a propane sales administrator. On August 24, 

2015, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate, in which she indicated she 

wished to move to Chandler, Arizona with Child to pursue a new job 

opportunity. The job was with a company run by Asher’s stepmother and it 

would have required Mother to travel on the weekends to work at various trade 

shows. Mother stated that she had planned to bring Child with her on these 

trips and for Child—who was two years old at the time—to sit with her in a
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booth for approximately eight hours per day. Upon moving to Arizona, 

Mother intended to live with Asher in a home owned by Asher’s parents.

[7] Less than two months after Mother filed her notice of intent to relocate, the job 

opportunity in Arizona fell through. Shortly thereafter, Mother and Asher 

broke up following the incident in which Asher punched her car, and Mother 

and Child moved back in with Mother’s parents. Meanwhile, Father had filed 

an objection to Mother’s relocation and a separate petition to modify custody in 

which he requested physical custody of Child. 

[8] A hearing was held on the pending matters on April 11, 2016. At the outset of 

the hearing, Mother withdrew her notice of intent to relocate, and a hearing 

proceeded on Father’s petition to modify custody. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On May 21, 2016, 

the trial court entered its order granting Father’s petition to modify custody. 

Father was granted primary physical custody and Mother was granted 

parenting time pursuant to the Guidelines. It was further ordered that the 

parties would continue to share joint legal custody. Mother now appeals. 

Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

Discussion & Decision

[9] As an initial matter, we note that the trial court in this case entered special 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A). Our 

review of such findings and conclusions is two-tiered. In re Paternity of D.T., 6 

N.E.3d 471, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). First, we consider whether the evidence 
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supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. The trial court’s findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are 

clearly erroneous—that is, where a review of the record leaves us with a firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In conducting our review, we will 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Instead, 

we will consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id.

[10] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying custody. 

Our standard of review in such cases is well settled:

When reviewing a custody determination, we afford the trial 

court considerable deference as it is the trial court that observes 

the parties’ conduct and demeanor and hears their testimonies. 

Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006). We review custody modifications for an abuse of 

discretion “with a preference for granting latitude and deference 

to our trial judges in family law matters.” Werner v. Werner, 946 

N.E.2d 1233, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. 

J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009)), trans. denied. We will not 

reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. 

Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d at 946. Rather, we will reverse the trial 

court’s custody determination based only upon a trial court’s 

abuse of discretion that is “clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom.” Id. “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might 

support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the 

conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis 

for reversal.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) 

(quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 

(1965)).

In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
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[11] Pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6, a trial court may modify a child custody 

order only upon a showing that modification is in the child’s best interests and 

that there has been a substantial change in one or more of the factors that the 

court may consider under I.C. § 31-14-13-2. I.C. § 31-14-13-2 provides that the 

court “shall consider all relevant factors,” including specifically:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parents;

(B) the child’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the 

child’s best interest.

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either 

parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

[12] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there 

had been a substantial change in circumstances as is required to support the 

modification of custody. Contrary to Mother’s arguments, however, the trial 
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court’s finding of changed circumstances was not based solely on Mother’s 

cohabitation with a significant other or on her changes of residence, nor was it 

based on a finding that Father could provide a better home. In its order 

modifying custody, the trial court expressed concerns regarding Mother’s 

judgment when it comes to Child’s welfare and Mother’s ability to provide a 

stable environment. A review of the record reveals these concerns to be wellfounded. 

[13] Despite having a volatile relationship with Asher, Mother chose to move in 

with him and to allow him to have unsupervised contact with Child. During 

the relationship, Asher would sometimes break things when he was angry and

he threw a remote at Mother, striking her and causing a bruise. Mother and 

Asher also had verbal altercations in Child’s presence. Additionally, Mother 

allowed Asher to accompany her to nearly every parenting time exchange, even 

after Father asked Mother not to bring Asher because Asher had sent 

threatening and antagonizing text messages to Father. Despite this history, 

Mother made plans to move Child across the country to live with Asher in a 

place where Mother had no family and would have been dependent on Asher’s 

family for a job and place to live. Mother’s relationship with Asher did not end 

until after an argument during which Asher punched Mother’s car while Child 

was inside.

[14] There was also testimony that Mother’s older brother, Joshua Foxworthy, had 

been incarcerated for neglect of a dependent after an incident in which 

Foxworthy’s month-old child sustained a broken arm. At the time of the 
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hearing in this matter, Foxworthy had recently been released to community 

corrections, and he had seen Child on three separate occasions while she was in 

the care of Mother’s seventy-two-year-old grandmother, who babysat Child two 

times per week while Mother worked. Mother was aware of this, but she did 

not tell her grandmother that Child was not to be around Foxworthy. Although 

Mother testified that she would not allow Child to be alone with Foxworthy, 

Mother’s mother—who babysat Child three times per week while Mother 

worked—testified that she saw no problem with allowing Foxworthy to see 

Child unsupervised because she did not view him as a threat. 

[15] The trial court also noted Mother’s testimony that if she had gotten the job in 

Arizona, she would have brought Child with her to trade shows on the 

weekends and required Child to sit with her in a booth for approximately eight 

hours per day. Mother also testified that she had taken Child, who was two 

years old at the time, to a concert at Banker’s Life Fieldhouse in Indianapolis, 

and sat with her in the second row. 

[16] With respect to Mother’s ability to provide a stable environment for Child, the 

trial court noted not only Mother’s volatile relationship with Asher, but also 

Mother’s move from her parents’ home and into an apartment with Asher, and 

then back into Mother’s parents’ home, all within a relatively short time period 

and with Child in tow. But for her relationship with Asher ending and her job 

opportunity in Arizona falling through, Mother would have moved Child 

again, this time across the country and away from all family support. Mother 

also testified that she intended to move again in the near future to a house in 
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Indianapolis. Mother has also changed jobs a number of times during Child’s 

short life, and although she had held her current job for over a year prior to the 

hearing in this case, she testified that she would take another job out of state if 

the pay was better. Mother was unable to name any preschools in the 

Indianapolis area that she was considering for Child. 

[17] Father, on the other hand, owns a home where he has lived continuously since 

Child was less than a year old. He is a trained welder, and although he had 

changed jobs shortly before the hearing so that he would be available to spend 

more time with Child, he did not have a history of frequently changing jobs and 

he testified that he had no plans to leave his current job any time soon. Father

had been dating Durcholz for nearly three years, and they planned to be 

married in October 2016. Child has a good relationship with Durcholz and 

Father’s extended family. Father has also made arrangements for Child to be 

cared for while he is at work,1 and he has selected a preschool and physician for 

Child and signed her up for swim lessons. 

[18] The trial court’s findings, which are supported by the evidence, demonstrate 

that the trial court considered the applicable statutory factors, as well as other 

relevant factors, to reach its conclusion that there had been a substantial change 

in circumstances and that a modification of custody was in Child’s best interest. 

 

1 Mother’s argument that Father should not have been awarded custody because he will rely on Durcholz 

and his mother to care for Child while he is at work is unpersuasive given that Mother has relied on her 

mother and grandmother to care for Child while she worked.
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We reiterate that trial courts are afforded deference and latitude in family 

matters, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Mother’s appellate arguments are, at bottom, simply a request to 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. As we explained above, 

however, it is not enough that the evidence might support another conclusion; it 

must positively require it. Because there is evidence supporting the trial court’s 

findings that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that 

modification was in Child’s best interests, we must affirm.

[19] Judgment affirmed.

[20] Crone, J., concur.

[21] Riley, J., dissent with opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christen Hartsock,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Donald Fulkerson,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No.

62A05-1606-JP-1431

Riley, Judge dissenting

[22] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s 

order, granting Father physical custody of the parties’ minor daughter (Child). 

In a petition to modify custody, the noncustodial parent bears the burden of 

overcoming the custodial parent's right to continued custody and must make a 

showing of a decisive change of conditions in the custodial home or a change in 

the treatment of the children in the custodial home which necessitates removal. 

Swonder v. Swonder, 642 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). The trial 

court judge must consider the evidence with the best interest of the children 

uppermost in his or her mind as the paramount concern. Id. It is the effect 

upon the children which renders any particular change substantial or 
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inconsequential. Id. “[A] change in circumstances must be judged in the 

context of the whole environment, and the effect on the child is what renders a 

change substantial or inconsequential. Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1193 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We require this strict showing to prevent the disruptive 

effect of moving children back and forth between parents. Swonder, 642 N.E.2d 

at 1380. 

Father, as noncustodial parent, failed this burden of proof. In his petition, filed 

September 11, 2015, Father claimed that “[c]onditions and circumstances have 

changed so substantially and continuing in nature that the [provisions of the 

paternity order] relating to child custody, parenting time and support with 

respect to the parties’ minor child are now unreasonable.” (Appellant’s App. p. 

30). The hearing and Father’s appellate brief indicate that Father’s strategy1 

focused on three areas: (1) Mother’s changes in residence; (2) Mother’s 

unhealthy relationship; and (3) Father has a plan for Child. 

[23] The record reflects that for the majority of her life, Child has lived with Mother 

at the maternal grandparents’ residence, except for a brief six-month period—

from April 2015 until October 2015—when she and Child lived with Mother’s 

ex-boyfriend. Throughout the proceedings, Mother admitted to a failed, 

unhealthy relationship with her ex-boyfriend. She testified that she had argued 

with him on a few occasions, that he had thrown a remote at her and broke her 

 

1 Unlike the majority and the trial court, I will disregard all evidence reflecting on the petition to relocate as 

Mother withdrew her petition prior to the hearing.
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phone. Ultimately, when these verbal arguments became physical and the exboyfriend punched Mother’s car with the Child inside, Mother ended the 

relationship. At the time of the hearing, this six-month relationship had been 

over for almost a year. Father failed to establish that at any point during this 

relationship, the Child’s welfare was in such danger as to warrant a 

modification of custody. Rather, the Child is bonded with Mother such that 

she even wants to stay with her during parenting time exchanges. 

[24] During the hearing, Father emphasized his own situation believing that he can 

provide a better home for the Child, indicated that he is involved in a long-term 

relationship, has steady employment, and has a support system close-by. 

Although Father claims that he recently changed employment to spend more 

time with Child, the evidence belies otherwise. Father works evenings from 

4:30 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. Monday through Thursday and Fridays from 2:00 

p.m. until 10:00 p.m. He is unable to personally pick up the Child for parenting 

time on Friday evenings and instead, paternal grandmother picks up Child and 

keeps her until Father gets off work at 10:00 p.m. Based on Father’s schedule, 

Father would be unable to have dinner with Child or put her to bed. Since 

Father commences work in the afternoon and does not return home until the 

early hours of the next morning, the Child would be cared for by others and 

would spend at least two hours at daycare, thereby again reducing the time 

Father is able to spend with the Child. Even during the weekend, when Father 

is off work, Father takes Child to the restaurant where his fiancé works so the 

Child spends time with his fiancé. On the other hand, Mother has been 
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employed by the same employer for over a year, with a regular 8 to 5 schedule. 

While Mother is at work, maternal grandmother and great-grandmother watch 

the Child. Great-grandmother is a retired teacher and works with the Child on 

educational activities. 

[25] Father presented evidence that Mother allowed her half-brother, Joshua, who 

has been convicted of child neglect, to be around the Child. While Father is 

correct that Joshua had been present in the house with the Child, greatgrandmother was also in the residence. Mother testified that she would not 

permit Joshua to be alone with the Child.

[26] In its order, the trial court noted that “Father has proven that he is capable of 

providing the minor child with a loving and stable environment,” and that 

“Father has proven that he will be a responsible parent by researching reputable 

daycare and school options.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11). However, a 

noncustodial parent’s improvement in lifestyle is not a basis for modification. 

See Joe v. Lebow, 670 N.E.2d 9, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[27] Rather than establishing specific evidence of a substantial change warranting a 

modification of the Child’s custody, Father presented general statements 

picking apart Mother’s life choices while focusing on self-serving statements 

bolstering his argument that he is the better parent. A single decision made by a 

young mother, as well as her mature admission of the unhealthy relationship 

and consequential break-up, are merely reflective of a young person trying to 

grow up. Isolated acts of a custodial parent do not warrant modification of 
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custody. Simons v. Simons, 566 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). While I 

agree that some changes have occurred in the lives of both Father and Mother, 

none of these are substantial to warrant the uprooting of a very young child. As 

Father did not carry his burden of proof and all reasonable inferences drawn 

from the evidence lead to a conclusion other than that reached by the trial 

court, I would reverse the trial court’s modification of custody.

[28]