1

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the 

Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the 

Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

Arthur G. Whelan v. Armstrong International, Inc.

(A-40/41/42/43/44/45/46-18) (081810)

Argued November 19, 2019 -- Decided June 3, 2020

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

The Court considers whether defendants who manufacture or distribute products 

that, by their design, require the replacement of asbestos-containing components with 

other asbestos-containing components during the ordinary life of the product have a duty 

to give adequate warnings to the ultimate user.

Plaintiff Arthur Whelan filed suit against the seven present defendants, who 

allegedly manufactured or distributed products integrated with asbestos-containing 

components. Whelan claims he was exposed to asbestos dust while working on those 

products, including their original asbestos-containing components or asbestos-containing 

replacement components. Defendants contended that Whelan could not establish that his 

exposure to asbestos was the result of any product they manufactured or distributed. 

They disclaimed any liability for Whelan’s exposure to asbestos-containing replacement 

parts that they did not manufacture or distribute, even though the parts were incorporated 

into their products. Whelan countered that it made no difference whether he was exposed 

to defendants’ original asbestos-containing components or a third party’s asbestoscontaining components -- defendants’ duty to warn and liability attached to both.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court 

concluded that defendants could not be held liable for asbestos-containing replacement 

components later incorporated into their products unless those components were 

manufactured or distributed by defendants. And the court found that Whelan could not 

establish that he was exposed to asbestos-containing components that defendants 

manufactured or distributed, as opposed to third-party replacement components.

The Appellate Division reversed, determining that defendants had a duty to warn 

about the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement components necessary for the 

continued functioning of their products and that defendants can be held strictly liable for 

the failure to do so, provided Whelan suffered sufficient exposure to the replacement 

components to contribute to his disease. See 455 N.J. Super. 569, 599, 606-08 (App. 

Div. 2018).
2

After Whelan appealed, the Appellate Division issued Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton 

Co., in which the defendant manufactured pumps whose component parts included 

asbestos-containing materials. 435 N.J. Super. 326, 332, 341-42 (App. Div. 2014). 

Those component parts were replaced regularly as part of routine maintenance with other 

asbestos-containing materials. Id. at 332. The Hughes court held that the defendant had 

a duty to warn, regardless of who manufactured the replacement components, because the 

“asbestos-containing gaskets and packing posed an inherent danger in the pumps as 

originally manufactured” and because “it was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the gaskets 

and packing would be replaced regularly with gaskets and packing that contained 

asbestos.” Id. at 341. But the Hughes panel upheld the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment because the plaintiffs failed to establish medical causation. Id. at 346.

Writing for the Appellate Division panel in this case, Judge Currier rejected the 

ultimate conclusion reached by the Hughes court -- that a defendant manufacturer or 

distributor could not be held strictly liable in a failure-to-warn lawsuit for exposure to a 

third party’s asbestos-containing replacement components installed as part of the regular 

maintenance of the defendant’s integrated product. 455 N.J. Super. at 579-80, 597. In 

contrast to the Hughes court, the Whelan panel concluded that defendants could be held 

strictly liable for the failure to warn about a third party’s asbestos-containing replacement 

components essential to the functioning of the product, provided that Whelan established 

medical causation. Id. at 597-606. To show medical causation, Whelan must prove that 

his exposure to the third party’s asbestos-containing replacement components sufficiently 

contributed to his contracting mesothelioma. Id. at 605-06.

The Appellate Division found that Whelan had “presented sufficient evidence 

detailing his exposure to asbestos,” either from defendants’ original or replacement 

components or from a third party’s replacement components, to withstand summary 

judgment. Id. at 580. Thus, the Whelan panel reversed the summary judgment order and 

left the disputed issues of fact to be resolved by a jury. Id. at 580, 607-08.

The Court granted each defendant’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 358-62 

(2019).

HELD: Manufacturers and distributors can be found strictly liable for failure to warn of 

the dangers of their products, including their asbestos-containing components and a third 

party’s replacement components, provided a plaintiff can prove the following: (1) the 

manufacturers or distributors incorporated asbestos-containing components in their 

original products; (2) the asbestos-containing components were integral to the product 

and necessary for it to function; (3) routine maintenance of the product required replacing 

the original asbestos-containing components with similar asbestos-containing 

components; and (4) the exposure to the asbestos-containing components or replacement 

components was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating the plaintiff’s disease.
3

1. In a common law, strict-liability, failure-to-warn action, a plaintiff must prove that 

(1) without warnings or adequate warnings, the product was dangerous to the foreseeable 

user and therefore defective; (2) the product left the defendant’s control in a defective 

condition (without warnings or adequate warnings); and (3) the lack of warnings or 

adequate warnings proximately caused an injury to a foreseeable user. That standard 

encompasses two criteria that must be satisfied in a strict-liability, failure-to-warn case: 

product-defect causation and medical causation. Medical causation requires proof of an 

exposure of sufficient frequency, with a regularity of contact, and with the product in 

close proximity to the plaintiff. (pp. 22-26)

2. Any failure-to-warn analysis requires an inquiry into the reasonableness of the 

defendant’s conduct, either in forgoing a warning or in crafting the warning. Beginning 

with the assumption that the manufacturer or distributor knows the nature of its product 

and its injury-producing potential, the issue then becomes whether the manufacturer or 

distributor acted in a reasonably prudent manner in providing warnings adequate to put 

the user on notice of the dangers and safe use of the product. New Jersey courts presume 

that a worker who receives adequate warnings about the dangers of a product will follow 

the instructions and take whatever precautionary steps the warnings advise. That 

rebuttable heeding presumption accords with the manufacturer’s basic duty to warn and 

fairly reduces the victim’s burden of proof. (pp. 26-27)

3. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the Court rejected the “state of the art” 

defense and allowed for strict liability to be imposed against the defendant manufacturers 

“for failure to warn of dangers which were undiscoverable at the time” they 

manufactured their products. 90 N.J. 191, 205 (1982). The Court determined that “[t]he 

burden of illness from dangerous products such as asbestos should be placed upon those 

who profit from its production and, more generally, upon society at large, which reaps the 

benefits of the various products our economy manufactures.” Id. at 209. (pp. 28-29)

4. At this summary-judgment stage, the Court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Whelan and accept certain provisional conclusions: (1) defendants’ products 

were designed to function with asbestos-containing components; (2) the manufacturers 

and distributors designed their products so that during the life of those products the 

asbestos-containing components would have to be replaced with similar asbestoscontaining components for the products to function; (3) without Whelan’s use of 

protective gear, the replacement process, which led to the release of asbestos dust, was a 

dangerous and potentially injury-producing activity; (4) Whelan’s replacement of the 

asbestos-containing components during routine maintenance created asbestos dust, which

substantially contributed to his contracting mesothelioma; (5) the asbestos-containing 

original components and replacement components necessary for defendants’ products to 

function were no less dangerous whether manufactured or distributed by defendants or 

third parties; and (6) had defendants placed warnings on their products, Whelan would 

have heeded those warnings and donned protective gear. (p. 30)
4

5. In determining whether defendants owed a strict-liability duty to provide warnings on 

their products for foreseeable users, like Whelan, who replaced asbestos-containing 

component parts with similar asbestos-containing components, the Court’s analysis is 

informed by principles enunciated in Beshada and general common law jurisprudence. 

Typically, in determining whether one party owes a duty to another, courts weigh several 

factors -- the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity 

and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution. In addition, 

foreseeability of harm is a significant consideration in determining whether to impose a 

duty. (pp. 31-32)

6. Here, the relationship is between a manufacturer and the ultimate user of the product. 

A manufacturer’s duty to a foreseeable user of its products has long been recognized. 

Manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products obviously have the ability 

to act reasonably -- to exercise due care. They can place proper warnings on their 

products, making those products safer “at virtually no added cost and without limiting 

[the product’s] utility.” See id. at 201-02. Warnings about the dangers of the original 

asbestos-containing components could easily encompass the dangers of the required 

asbestos-containing replacement components integrated into the product during routine 

maintenance at later times. The public has a clear stake in the proposed solution in light 

of the well-known risks attendant upon exposure to asbestos dust. Foreseeability, 

knowledge of the dangers inherent in the asbestos-containing components here, is 

imputed to defendants. See id. at 202. The risks inherent in a product containing 

asbestos components can “be reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its 

utility” with the attachment of proper warnings. See id. at 201. Last, considering that 

asbestos-related illnesses are borne by workers and their families, manufacturers are 

generally in the best position to “spread the cost of losses caused by [their] dangerous 

products.” See id. at 205-06. (pp. 33-34)

7. Given the summary-judgment record before it, the Court concludes that imposing 

liability on a manufacturer or distributor of a product for failing to provide adequate 

warnings about the danger of incorporating required asbestos-containing replacement 

components into the product during routine maintenance satisfies an abiding sense of 

basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.

Here, the products were dependent on asbestos-containing replacement parts, whether 

manufactured or distributed by defendants or third parties. That is the way the products 

were designed. Defendants had a duty to provide warnings given the foreseeability that 

third parties would be the source of asbestos-containing replacement components. 

Warnings on defendants’ products would have provided a reliable form of protection for 

the ultimate user. The lack of warnings rendered the products defective. (pp. 35)

8. The Court reviews relevant cases from other jurisdictions and notes that some have 

imposed a duty to warn under similar circumstances while others have not. The Court 

concludes, however, that New Jersey’s evolving common law jurisprudence in the field 
5

of failure-to-warn, strict-liability cases involving asbestos-containing products leads to a 

result that aligns with similar decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court, the 

New York Court of Appeals, and the Maryland Court of Appeals, which have recognized 

a strict-liability duty to warn of the dangers of necessary replacement components. Like 

those courts, the Court rejects the position taken by the Hughes court that the product is 

one thing for product-causation and adequate-warning purposes (defendants’ products 

and asbestos-containing component parts) and another thing for medical-causation 

purposes (asbestos-containing component parts required for the product to function). The 

Court disagrees that its holding here alters the requirement for proving medical causation 

related to defendants’ products and observes that plaintiffs still have a strong incentive to 

identify asbestos-containing component manufacturers, if they can, because those 

manufacturers are another source for the payment of damages. (pp. 36-42)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is 

REMANDED to the trial court.

JUSTICE PATTERSON, dissenting, expresses the view that the majority has 

substantially altered the test for medical causation that has governed New Jersey’s 

asbestos litigation for decades and stresses that New Jersey has never adopted “theories 

of collective liability” or other alternative forms of proof as a substitute for product 

identification in cases such as this. Justice Patterson explains that under longstanding 

precedent, plaintiffs were required to make a prima facie showing of sufficient intensity 

of exposure to that specific defendant’s product -- as contrasted with another 

manufacturer’s product or a generic class of toxic exposures -- to support a finding of 

proximate cause by a reasonable jury. Justice Patterson views the majority opinion to 

erode the core element of a plaintiff’s burden of proof in an asbestos case, to unfairly 

impose upon defendants liability premised on products that they neither manufactured 

nor sold, and to discourage the product-identification discovery that ordinarily leads to an 

equitable allocation of fault.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, SOLOMON, and 

TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE PATTERSON filed a 

dissent, in which JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA joins.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-40/41/42/43/44/45/46 September Term 2018

081810

Arthur G. Whelan,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Armstrong International Inc.; 

Burnham LLC; Carrier Corp., individually,

d/b/a and as successor to Bryant

Heating & Cooling Systems; CleaverBrooks Inc.; Crown Boiler Co., f/k/a

Crown Industries Inc.; Ford Motor Co.; 

Johnson Controls Inc., individually,

d/b/a and as successor to

Evcon Industries Inc. and Coleman

Heating and Air Conditioning

Products, Inc.; NIBCO Inc.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

A.O. Smith Corp.; Aaron & Co.;

AMG Industries Inc., d/b/a and as 

successor to Akron Metallic Gasket

Co.; Automatic Switch Co.; Automotive

Brake Co.; A.W. Chesterton Co.; BASF

Corp.; Bergen Industrial Supply Co.;

Bethlehem Dynatherm, a/k/a Dynatherm

Boiler Manufacturing Inc.; Binsky &

Snyder LLC, individually, d/b/a and

as successor to Binsky & Snyder Co.;

Bonland Industries Inc.; BorgWarner

Morse Tec Inc., as successor to 
2

Borg-Warner Corp.; Briggs Industries Inc.;

Carlisle Companies Inc.; CBS Corp.,

f/k/a Viacom Inc., successor by

merger to CBS Corp., f/k/a

Westinghouse Electric Corp.; Central

Brass Co. Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to Central Brass 

Manufacturing Co. and Central Brass & 

Fixture Co.; Central Engineering & 

Supply Co. Inc.; Chicago Faucet Co.;

Chicago-Wilcox Manufacturing Co.

Inc.; Colfax Inc., individually and 

as successor to Warner Electric Brake

& Clutch Co.; Crane Co.; Crosstown

Plumbing Supply Inc.; Dana Companies

LLC; DAP Inc.; Ductmate Industries

Inc.; Dunham-Bush Inc.; Dunphey &

Associates Supply Co. Inc.; Duro Dyne

Corp.; ECR International Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Utica Boilers Inc., Utica Radiator

Corp., Dunkirk Boilers, Pennco Inc.,

and Olsen Technology Inc.; Essex

Plumbing Supply Inc.; Fisher 

Scientific International Inc.;

Fortune Brands Home & Security Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor 

to Moen Inc.; Foster Wheeler LLC;

General Electric Co.; Georgia-Pacific 

LLC; The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; 

Goulds Pumps Inc.; Graco Inc.;

Grundfos Pumps Corp.; H.B. Smith Co.

Inc.; Hilco Inc., individually and as 

successor to Universal Supply Group 

Inc. and Amber Supply Co.; Honeywell

International Inc., f/k/a Honeywell

Inc., Allied Signal Inc. and Bendix Corp.;

Interline Brands Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to J.A. Sexauer Inc.; International 
3

Business Machines Corp.; ITT Corp.;

Kaiser Gypsum Co. Inc.; Kantor Supply

Inc.; Kohler Co., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to Sterling Faucet

Co.; Lennox Industries Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Armstrong Furnace Co.; Magnatrol

Valve Corp.; Manhattan Welding Co.

Inc.; Maremont Corp.; Meritor Inc.,

individually and as successor to

Rockwell International Corp.; Mestek

Inc., individually, d/b/a and as 

successor to H.B. Smith Co., Smith

Cast Iron Boilers and Mills Boilers;

Mueller Industries Inc.; National 

Automotive Parts Association Inc.;

New Jersey Boiler Repair Co.; NCH

Corp., as successor to Creed Co. and 

Daniel P. Creed Co. Inc.; NMBFIL

Inc., f/k/a Bondo Corp.; OwensIllinois Inc.; Peerless Industries

Inc.; Pneumo-Abex LLC, individually

and as successor to Abex Corp.; Price 

Pfister Inc.; The Prudential 

Insurance Co. of America; Rheem

Manufacturing Co.; Riley Power Inc., 

f/k/a Riley-Stoker Corp.; Robertshaw

Controls Co., individually and as

successor to Fulton Sylphon Co.; Sid

Harvey Industries Inc.; Slant/Fin

Corp.; Sloan Valve Co.; SOS Products 

Co. Inc.; Speakman Co.; Superior

Boiler Works Inc.; Sur-Seal Corp.;

Taco Inc.; Trane U.S. Inc.,

individually and as successor to

American Standard Inc. and American

Radiator Co.; Turner Construction

Co.; Unilever United States Inc.;

Uniroyal Holding Inc.; Verizon New

Jersey Inc., individually and as
4

successor to New Jersey Bell 

Telephone Co.; Victaulic Co.;

Wallwork Bros. Inc.; Wal-Rich Corp.;

Weil-McLain, a division of the

Marley-Wylain Co., a wholly-owned

subsidiary of the Marley Co. LLC;

W.V. Egbert & Co. Inc.; York

International Corp.; Zurn Industries 

LLC, individually, d/b/a and as 

successor to Erie City Iron Works and

Zurn Industries Inc.; AII Acquisition 

LLC, individually, as successor to,

f/k/a, and d/b/a Holland Furnace Co.,

Athlone Industries Inc., T.F.C.

Holding Corp. and Thatcher Furnace 

Co.; American Premier Underwriters,

individually and as successor to 

Hydrotherm Corp.; August Arace & Sons

Inc.; Honeywell Inc.; Rockwell

Automation Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to Sterling Faucet

Co.; Rockwell Collins Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Sterling Faucet Co.; TriMas Corp., 

individually, d/b/a and as successor 

to NI Industries Inc.; Wilmar

Industries Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to J.A. Sexauer Inc.; 

BASF Catalysts LLC; TriMas

Corp., individually and as successor

in interest to Norris Industries

and/or NI Industries Inc.; York

International Corp., individually and

as successor to The Coleman Company 

Inc., a/k/a Coleman Heating and Air

Conditioning Products Inc.,

Defendants. 
5

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at

455 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div. 2018).

Argued

November 19, 2019

Decided

June 3, 2020

Sean Marotta argued the cause for appellant Ford Motor 

Co. (Hogan Lovells US and K&L Gates, attorneys; Sean 

Marotta, Joseph F. Lagrotteria, and Adam G. Husik, on 

the briefs).

Karen J. Stanzione-Conte argued the cause for appellants 

Cleaver-Brooks Inc. and Crown Boiler Co. (Reilly, 

McDevitt & Henrich, attorneys; Karen J. StanzioneConte and Michelle B. Cappuccio, on the briefs).

Jeffrey S. Kluger argued the cause for appellant 

Armstrong International Inc. (McGivney, Kluger & 

Cook, attorneys; Jeffrey S. Kluger and Christopher M. 

Longo, on the briefs). 

Meghan C. Goodwin argued the cause for appellant 

Burnham LLC (Clyde & Co. US, attorneys; Jeffrey 

Fegan, of counsel and on the briefs, and Meghan C. 

Goodwin and Daren S. McNally, on the briefs). 

Patrick K.A. Elkins submitted a brief on behalf of

appellant Johnson Controls Inc. (Morgan, Lewis & 

Bockius, attorneys; Patrick K.A. Elkins and Bryan M. 

Killian of the District of Columbia and Connecticut bars, 

admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). 

Sara K. Saltsman submitted a brief on behalf of appellant 

Carrier Corp. (Mayfield, Turner, O’Mara & Donnelly, 

attorneys; Sara K. Saltsman, on the briefs).
6

Christopher M. Placitella argued the cause for respondent 

Arthur G. Whelan (Cohen Placitella & Roth and The 

Lanier Law Firm, attorneys; Rachel A. Placitella and 

Shannon K. Tully, on the briefs). 

Amber R. Long argued the cause for amicus curiae New 

Jersey Association for Justice (Levy Konigsberg, 

attorneys; Amber R. Long and Moshe Maimon, on the 

brief).

Michael E. Waller submitted a brief on behalf of amicus 

curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 

America (K&L Gates and U.S. Chamber Litigation 

Center, attorneys; Michael E. Waller, Tara L. Pehush, 

Michael B. Schon (U.S. Chamber Litigation Center), of 

the Arizona and the District of Columbia bars, admitted 

pro hac vice, Nicholas P. Vari (K&L Gates), of the 

Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, Michael J. Ross

(K&L Gates), of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac 

vice, and Jake D. Morrison (K&L Gates), of the 

Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). 

Anita Hotchkiss submitted a brief on behalf of amicus 

curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 

(Goldberg Segalla, attorneys; Anita Hotchkiss and H. 

Lockwood Miller III, on the brief).

Phil S. Goldberg submitted a brief on behalf of amicus 

curiae Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. (Shook, Hardy 

& Bacon, attorneys; Phil S. Goldberg and Mark A. 

Behrens, of the Virginia and the District of Columbia 

bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).

Christopher J. Dalton submitted a brief on behalf of 

amicus curiae Washington Legal Foundation (Buchanan 

Ingersoll & Rooney, attorneys; Christopher J. Dalton and 

Linda P. Reig, on the brief).
7

Thomas Comerford submitted a brief on behalf of amicus 

curiae Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization (Weitz 

& Luxenberg, attorneys; Thomas Comerford, of counsel 

and on the brief, and Jason P. Weinstein, of the New 

York bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). 

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Exposure to asbestos is a known cause of a deadly form of cancer called

mesothelioma. Defendants manufactured or distributed products integrated

with asbestos-containing components. In this common law, failure-to-warn

product-liability action, plaintiff Arthur Whelan alleges that he contracted 

mesothelioma while working on defendants’ products and, in particular, their

asbestos-containing components or the asbestos-containing replacement 

components manufactured or supplied by third parties, who are not named as 

defendants. He contends that defendants’ products were designed to be used 

with later-incorporated third-party asbestos-containing replacement 

components, which were necessary for the continued functioning of those

products.

Whelan claims that defendants had a duty to provide warnings about the 

dangers presented by exposure not only to the asbestos-containing components

integrated into their products, but also to the required asbestos-containing 

replacement components. Defendants counter that they had no duty to warn
8

about the dangers of asbestos-containing replacement components 

manufactured or supplied by third parties and incorporated into their products 

after those products left their control.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant. 

The court found that, although defendants had a duty to warn about the 

dangers of their products’ original asbestos-containing components, they could 

not be held liable for the replacement components manufactured or distributed 

by third parties -- even if those components were similar to the asbestoscontaining components originally integrated into their products.

The Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment order. The

Appellate Division determined not only that defendants had a duty to warn

about the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement components 

necessary for the continued functioning of their products, but also that 

defendants can be held strictly liable for the failure to do so, provided Whelan

suffered sufficient exposure to the replacement components to contribute to his 

disease. See Whelan v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 569, 599, 606-

08 (App. Div. 2018).

We now affirm. In this strict-liability case, the product at issue is the

aggregation of all its component parts. For failure-to-warn purposes, no 

distinction is made between the original asbestos-containing components and 
9

the asbestos-containing replacement components necessary for the continued 

operation of defendants’ integrated products -- even though the replacement 

components are manufactured or distributed by a third party. Our developing 

common law jurisprudence, guided by principles of public policy and equity, 

dictates that defendants who manufacture or distribute products that, by their 

design, require the replacement of asbestos-containing components with other 

asbestos-containing components during the ordinary life of the product have a 

duty to give adequate warnings to the ultimate user.

The purpose of warnings is to allow a worker, like Whelan, the 

opportunity to take the necessary precautions, such as donning protective gear, 

to protect against the inhalation of deadly asbestos fibers or dust. The 

manufacturer or distributor of the integrated product is best situated to provide 

those warnings. Here, defendants provided no warnings at all.

We hold that manufacturers and distributors can be found strictly liable 

for failure to warn of the dangers of their products, including their asbestoscontaining components and a third party’s replacement components, provided

a plaintiff can prove the following: (1) the manufacturers or distributors

incorporated asbestos-containing components in their original products; (2) the

asbestos-containing components were integral to the product and necessary for 

it to function; (3) routine maintenance of the product required replacing the
10

original asbestos-containing components with similar asbestos-containing 

components; and (4) the exposure to the asbestos-containing components or

replacement components was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating 

the plaintiff’s disease.

We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

I.

A.

Plaintiff Whelan filed suit against defendants Armstrong International, 

Inc., Burnham LLC, Carrier Corp., Cleaver-Brooks Inc., Crown Boiler Co., 

Inc., Ford Motor Co., and Johnson Controls Inc., who allegedly manufactured 

or distributed products with asbestos-containing components integral to the 

functioning of the products.

1

 Whelan claims that he was exposed to asbestos

dust while working on those products, including their original asbestoscontaining components or asbestos-containing replacement components. 

According to Whelan, replacement components, whether manufactured or 

distributed by defendants or third parties, were required for the continued 

functioning of those products. Although Whelan worked on replacing 

1

 These are the only defendants on the case caption who appeared before the 

Appellate Division and petitioned this Court for certification.
11

asbestos-containing components long after the original products left 

defendants’ control, he contends that the failure to warn of the dangers of both 

the original and replacement asbestos-containing components renders 

defendants strictly liable under our common law.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Whelan 

could not establish that his exposure to asbestos was the result of any product, 

including original component parts, manufactured or distributed by defendants. 

They disclaimed any liability for Whelan’s exposure to asbestos-containing

replacement parts that they did not manufacture or distribute, even though the 

parts were incorporated into their products. Whelan countered that it made no 

difference whether he was exposed to defendants’ original asbestos-containing 

components or a third party’s asbestos-containing components -- defendants’ 

duty to warn and liability attached to both.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The 

court concluded that defendants could not be held liable for asbestoscontaining replacement components later incorporated into their products 

unless those components were manufactured or distributed by defendants. In 

dismissing Whelan’s complaint, the court found that Whelan could not 

establish that he was exposed to asbestos-containing components in 

defendants’ original products or replacement components that defendants 
12

manufactured or distributed, as opposed to replacement components a third 

party manufactured or distributed.

It is not the charge of this Court to resolve material facts disputed by the 

parties; that is an undertaking reserved for a jury. Murray v. Plainfield Rescue 

Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012). Because the trial court entered summary 

judgment in favor of defendants, this Court must give Whelan, the non-moving 

party, the benefit of all favorable evidence and inferences presented in the 

record. See id. at 584-85; see also Smith v. Fireworks by Girone, Inc., 180 

N.J. 199, 214 (2004).

Cast in that light, we agree with the Appellate Division that there is 

sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Whelan was 

exposed either to (1) asbestos-containing components in defendants’ original 

products; (2) asbestos-containing replacement components manufactured or 

distributed by defendants; or (3) asbestos-containing replacement components 

manufactured or distributed by third parties. At this stage, we must also accept 

the opinions offered by Whelan’s experts -- that his exposure to asbestos dust 

from working on a regular basis on defendants’ original integrated products or 

on those products with their asbestos-containing replacement components 

substantially contributed to Whelan contracting mesothelioma. In reaching 
13

those results, we rely on the Appellate Division’s extensive analysis of the 

record. Whelan, 455 N.J. Super. at 579-92.

B.

Over a forty-year period, at various times, Whelan did work on 

defendants’ products while performing tasks as a residential and commercial

plumber and automobile mechanic. Here is a brief summary of the evidence 

viewed in the light most favorable to Whelan.

1.

In the 1950s, Whelan worked on approximately twenty of Armstrong’s 

steam traps. In cleaning the traps, Whelan either replaced the traps’ original

asbestos-containing gaskets or replaced gaskets identical to the original ones

that were necessary for the functioning of the steam trap.

2

 During the 

cleaning, Whelan brushed and scraped off the asbestos gaskets.

2.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Whelan installed twenty to thirty Burnham 

packaged boilers, which contained asbestos insulation under the boilers’ metal 

jackets. The process of removing the insulation generated gray dust, which 

Whelan inhaled. Whelan also cleaned the fireboxes of approximately twelve 

2

 “A steam trap is placed on the end of a boiler’s steam line to prevent the 

steam from going back into the boiler.” Id. at 581 n.3. A gasket is a seal used 

for the steam trap to function. Id. at 581 n.4.
14

Burnham boilers, which contained asbestos components that came loose during 

the cleaning process.3

Between 1959 and 1968, Whelan installed, repaired, or cleaned more 

than a dozen Carrier “Bryant” boilers, which incorporated asbestos-containing 

components, such as “jacket insulation” and “rope gaskets.” Those processes 

required disturbing asbestos that generated visible dust that Whelan inhaled.

Similarly, during the 1950s, Whelan worked on Cleaver-Brooks boilers

and, from 1959 to 1968, on Crown boilers -- work that generated asbestos dust. 

Whelan could not identify the manufacturers of the asbestos-containing 

materials in those boilers.

3.

As an auto mechanic in the 1950s, during a six- to seven-month period, 

Whelan replaced asbestos-containing brake systems on approximately three 

Ford automobiles and, during a six-month period, did machine work on a 

multitude of asbestos-containing Ford brake drums. The process of carrying

out those tasks generated asbestos dust. In the 1990s, Whelan also performed 

personal repairs on Ford automobiles, including the installation of new brake 

systems that created asbestos dust. Ford brake drums originally equipped with 

3

 “Fireboxes were constructed of cement brick put together with an asbestosbased refractory cement.” Id. at 583 n.7.
15

asbestos linings also required asbestos-lining replacements to function 

properly.

4.

While working as an employee of a company, between 1978 and 1996, 

Whelan repacked Johnson Control steam valves. The packing contained 

asbestos, and the repacking process exposed Whelan to asbestos dust. 

Although Whelan could not identify the manufacturers of the packing, the 

steam valves were designed to be used with asbestos components.

II.

A.

As noted earlier, the trial court ultimately determined that Whelan did 

not know whether he was working on defendants’ original asbestos-containing 

components or replacement components, or a third party’s replacement 

components. On that ground, the court dismissed Whelan’s complaint because 

of his failure to show with specificity that he was exposed on a regular and

frequent basis to asbestos products actually manufactured or distributed by 

defendants. Whelan appealed.

B.

Two weeks later, a panel of the Appellate Division issued Hughes v. 

A.W. Chesterton Co., 435 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 2014), a decision that, in 
16

large part, supported the legal theory advanced by the trial court in this case

for granting summary judgment.

In Hughes, the defendant manufactured pumps whose component parts 

included asbestos-containing gaskets and packing. Id. at 332, 341-42. Those 

component parts were replaced regularly as part of routine maintenance with 

other asbestos-containing gaskets and packing. Id. at 332. The plaintiffs 

worked in proximity to the defendant’s pumps after the original gaskets and 

packing had been replaced, but the identities of the manufacturers or suppliers 

of the asbestos-containing replacement components were unknown. Id. at 332, 

334. In a failure-to-warn lawsuit, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 

manufacturer was strictly liable for the asbestos-related diseases they 

contracted from exposure to the pumps’ asbestos-containing components. Id.

at 331-32. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit on summary 

judgment because the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant had 

manufactured or distributed an asbestos-containing product to which they had 

been exposed. Id. at 334. The Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 347.

The Hughes court nevertheless held that the defendant had a duty to 

warn, regardless of who manufactured the replacement components, because 

the “asbestos-containing gaskets and packing posed an inherent danger in the 

pumps as originally manufactured” and because “it was reasonably foreseeable 
17

. . . that the gaskets and packing would be replaced regularly with gaskets and 

packing that contained asbestos.” Id. at 341. The Appellate Division 

concluded that imposing a duty to warn “would be reasonable, practical, and 

feasible” given that “the risk of [asbestos] exposure continued and was perhaps 

increased by the replacement process” and that warnings would allow for the 

provision of “safeguards for workers who made the replacements.” Id. at 343.

The Hughes panel, however, upheld the grant of summary judgment 

because the plaintiffs failed to establish medical causation -- that is, the 

plaintiffs did not “produce evidence they had any contact with friable asbestos 

in replacement parts that were manufactured or sold by [the defendant].” Id. at 

346 (citing Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. Super. 8, 29 (App. Div.

1989)). That ruling effectively rendered unenforceable the duty to warn about 

the defendant’s pumps’ inherently dangerous replacement components.

C.

Writing for the panel in Whelan, Judge Currier rejected the ultimate 

conclusion reached by the Hughes court -- that a defendant manufacturer or 

distributor could not be held strictly liable in a failure-to-warn lawsuit for 

exposure to a third party’s asbestos-containing replacement components 

installed as part of the regular maintenance of the defendant’s integrated 

product. Whelan, 455 N.J. Super. at 579-80, 597.
18

The Whelan panel, like the Hughes court, determined that defendants’

“duty to warn extend[ed] to any danger created by those replacement parts” 

necessary for their products to function, regardless of whether a third party

manufactured or distributed the replacement parts. See id. at 580, 592-605. In 

contrast to the Hughes court, the Whelan panel concluded that defendants 

could be held strictly liable for the failure to warn about a third party’s 

asbestos-containing replacement components essential to the functioning of the

product, provided that Whelan established medical causation. Id. at 597-606. 

To show medical causation, Whelan must prove that his exposure to the third

party’s asbestos-containing replacement components sufficiently contributed 

to his contracting mesothelioma. Id. at 605-06.

The Appellate Division in Whelan expressed its fundamental differences 

with the Hughes court. To the Hughes panel, the product “was only the 

manufacturer’s pump, and did not include its component parts.” Id. at 597 

(citing Hughes, 435 N.J. Super. at 345-46). The Whelan panel found such a

“limited definition of ‘product’ . . . inconsistent with deep-rooted principles of 

product liability.” Ibid. To the Whelan panel, “[t]he ‘product’ is the complete 

manufactured item as delivered by the manufacturer to the consumer, not just 

the asbestos contained in one of the product’s components.” Id. at 598. It 

maintained, moreover, that a product containing asbestos components when 
19

first supplied by the manufacturer without warnings “remains in substantially 

the same defective condition” when replaced by asbestos-containing 

components years later by a worker. Id. at 597-98.

The Whelan panel articulated a governing rule for strict-liability, failureto-warn cases like this one:

[A] manufacturer will have a duty to warn in strict 

liability if a plaintiff can show: 1) the manufacturer’s 

product as marketed to the end user contained asbestoscontaining components; 2) the asbestos-containing 

components were integral to the function of the 

product; and 3) the manufacturer was reasonably aware 

its product would require periodic and routine 

maintenance involving the replacement of the asbestoscontaining component parts with other asbestoscontaining component parts.

[Id. at 599.]

On that basis, the Appellate Division found that Whelan had “presented 

sufficient evidence detailing his exposure to asbestos,” either from defendants’ 

original or replacement components or from a third party’s replacement 

components, to withstand summary judgment. Id. at 580. Thus, the Whelan

panel reversed the trial court’s summary judgment order and left the disputed 

issues of fact to be resolved by a jury. Id. at 580, 607-08.
20

D.

We granted each defendant’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 358-62 

(2019). We also granted the motions of (1) the Chamber of Commerce of the 

United States of America, (2) the Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., (3) the 

Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., (4) the Washington Legal Foundation

-- organizations supporting defendants’ position -- and (5) the Asbestos 

Disease Awareness Organization, and (6) the New Jersey Association for 

Justice -- organizations supporting Whelan’s position -- to participate as amici 

curiae.

III.

A.

Defendants and their amici supporters generally advance the same 

arguments, which, in many ways, are aligned with the decision in Hughes. 

They contend that the “product” for failure-to-warn purposes is the injuryproducing component part, not the completed product in which it is 

incorporated. Defendants concede that they have a duty to warn of the dangers 

related to asbestos-containing components that are integrated in a completed

product that they have manufactured or distributed. They submit, however, 

that they have no duty to warn of the dangers associated with asbestoscontaining components that they did not manufacture or distribute -- that is, 
21

third-party component parts incorporated into their completed products, 

sometimes many years after those products have left their control.

Defendants also fault the Appellate Division for introducing negligence 

concepts -- a defendant’s reasonable awareness of the need for replacement 

components -- that they say conflict with the strict-liability jurisprudence of

Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982), and for 

overturning the summary-judgment order without requiring proof that Whelan 

was exposed with frequency and regularity to asbestos-containing components 

that they manufactured or distributed, citing Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 29.

B.

Whelan’s and his supporting amici’s arguments, for the most part, echo 

the Appellate Division’s reasoning in Whelan. He contends that “the ‘product’ 

. . . is the complete manufactured item as delivered by the manufacturer to the 

consumer.” Here, according to Whelan, the products were defective because 

they did not have warnings about the health dangers of the components that 

contained asbestos or about the asbestos-containing replacement components 

necessary for the products to continue to operate. Whelan submits that 

defendants are subject to strict liability for their failure to warn because 

(1) their products contained asbestos components, (2) the normal use of the 

products required the replacement of those components with substantially 
22

similar asbestos-containing components, and (3) the replacement process 

exposed unsuspecting workers to the injurious hazards of inhaling asbestos 

dust. In Whelan’s view, the Appellate Division correctly overturned the 

summary-judgment order because he presented sufficient proofs that he was 

exposed to asbestos on a regular and frequent basis from defendants’ products’

original components or third-party replacement components.

IV.

The parties do not dispute that defendants had a duty to warn about any 

dangers inherent in their completed products, including component parts, when 

those products left their control. They do contest whether the duty to warn 

extended to a third party’s replacement components incorporated into 

defendants’ products many years after leaving defendants’ control and whether 

defendants should be held strictly liable for any harm caused by Whelan’s 

exposure to those replacement components. Those issues are critical to the 

parties because Whelan worked on some of defendants’ products many years 

after those products entered the stream of commerce and he cannot recall who 

manufactured or distributed the asbestos-containing replacement parts.

A.

The resolution of these issues is guided by common law principles 

governing product-liability jurisprudence, not the New Jersey Product Liability 
23

Act (PLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -11.

4

 James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 

155 N.J. 279, 295-96 (1998); see also Becker v. Baron Bros., 138 N.J. 145, 

151 (1994). Asbestos claims “by and large” involve “workplace exposure to 

contaminated ambient air” and are therefore deemed to be environmental torts. 

In re Lead Paint Litig., 191 N.J. 405, 439 (2007); see also Stevenson v. Keene 

Corp., 254 N.J. Super. 310, 322 (App. Div. 1992), aff’d, 131 N.J. 393 (1993). 

The PLA by its explicit terms does “not apply to any environmental tort 

action.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-6. Because the asbestos claims here fall within the 

PLA’s environmental tort exception, we look to the common law. 5

The standard in a failure-to-warn case is no different, whether the action 

is considered under the PLA or our common law jurisprudence. See Zaza v. 

Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 49 (1996) (“[U]nder the [PLA], as under 

the common law, the ultimate question to be resolved in . . . failure-to-warn 

cases is whether the manufacturer acted in a reasonably prudent manner 

. . . .”).6 The Legislature clearly did not intend the PLA to “effect a doctrinal 

4

 The PLA provides a cause of action against manufacturers whose products 

fail to include “adequate warnings or instructions.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2.

5

 At common law, a product-liability action could rest “on grounds of 

negligence, strict liability, or both.” James, 155 N.J. at 296. Here, we are 

concerned only about a strict-liability action.

6

 Compare Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 403 (1982) 

(common law definition of adequate warning), with N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 (PLA 
24

change in the common law,” and “generally ‘leaves unchanged the . . . theories 

under which a manufacturer . . . may be held strictly liable for harm caused by 

a product.’” Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 131 N.J. 375, 384 (1993) (omissions in 

original) (quoting Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 94 

(1990)).

“[A] manufacturer has a duty to ensure that the products it places into 

the stream of commerce are safe when used for their intended purposes.” 

Zaza, 144 N.J. at 48. Many products require adequate instructions on the 

proper use of the product to render them safe, and therefore the lack of 

adequate warnings about the product’s inherent dangers will constitute a defect 

in the product itself. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 450 (1984);

see also Becker, 138 N.J. at 151-52 (“A failure to warn, or a failure to warn 

properly, can constitute a defect in a product sufficient to support an action in 

strict liability.”); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 243 (1981) 

(“[A]n adequate warning is one that includes the directions, communications, 

and information essential to make the use of a product safe.”). In short, “the 

definition of adequate warning). See generally Assemb. Ins. Comm. Statement 

to S. Comm. Substitute for S. 2805 1-3 (L. 1987, c. 197) (June 22, 1987) 

(stating that the PLA does not “affect existing statutory and common law rules 

concerning . . . matters not expressly addressed by this legislation” and 

explaining that the PLA sets forth only “a general definition of an adequate 

warning”); Sponsor’s Statement to S. 2805 4-6 (L. 1987, c. 197) (Nov. 17, 

1986) (same).
25

absence of a warning to unsuspecting users that the product can potentially 

cause injury” is a product defect. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 593-

94 (1993).

“The focus in a strict liability case is upon the product itself,” not on the 

conduct of the manufacturer. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 

N.J. 386, 394 (1982). “Knowledge of a product’s dangerous characteristics is 

imputed to the defendant,” and therefore “the defendant’s lack of fault is 

irrelevant.” Id. at 394-95. Nevertheless, in a failure-to-warn case, the element 

of reasonableness, which is generally a negligence principle, comes into play 

in determining whether a manufacturer failed to give a necessary warning or 

an adequate warning. See Feldman, 97 N.J. at 451.

7

In a common law, strict-liability, failure-to-warn action, a plaintiff must 

prove that (1) without warnings or adequate warnings, the product was

dangerous to the foreseeable user and therefore defective; (2) the product left 

7

 Decisions in other jurisdictions, discussed later in this opinion, similarly 

recognize this principle. See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 

458, 469 (N.Y. 2016) (“[F]ailure-to-warn claims grounded in strict liability 

and negligence are functionally equivalent, as both forms of a failure-to-warn 

claim depend on the principles of reasonableness and public policy at the heart 

of any traditional negligence action.”); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 

A.3d 984, 998 (Md. 2015) (recognizing “the intersections between strict 

liability and negligent failure to warn claims” and concluding “that a 

manufacturer has a duty to warn of asbestos-containing replacement 

components that it has not placed into the stream of commerce in strict liability 

in the same narrow circumstances as in negligence”).
26

the defendant’s control in a defective condition (without warnings or adequate 

warnings); and (3) the lack of warnings or adequate warnings proximately 

caused an injury to a foreseeable user. Zaza, 144 N.J. at 49; Feldman, 97 N.J.

at 449; see also Clark v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 179 N.J. 318, 336 (2004).

That standard encompasses two criteria that must be satisfied in a strictliability, failure-to-warn case: product-defect causation and medical causation. 

See James, 155 N.J. at 297. For product-defect causation, the plaintiff must 

show that the defect in the product -- the lack of warnings or adequate 

warnings -- was a proximate cause of the asbestos-related injury. Coffman, 

133 N.J. at 594. For medical causation, the plaintiff must show that the injury 

was “proximately caused by exposure to defendant’s asbestos product,” ibid., 

that is, “the exposure [to each defendant’s product] was a substantial factor in 

causing or exacerbating the disease,” James, 155 N.J. at 299 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 30-31). Medical causation 

requires proof of “‘an exposure of sufficient frequency, with a regularity of 

contact, and with the product in close proximity’ to the plaintiff.” Id. at 301 

(quoting Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 28).

Any failure-to-warn analysis requires an inquiry into the reasonableness 

of the defendant’s conduct, either in forgoing a warning or in crafting the

warning. See Feldman, 97 N.J. at 451. Beginning with the assumption that the 
27

manufacturer or distributor knows the nature of its product and its injuryproducing potential, the issue then becomes whether the manufacturer or 

distributor “acted in a reasonably prudent manner” in providing warnings 

adequate to put the user on notice of the dangers and safe use of the product. 

See ibid.; cf. N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4 (“An adequate product warning or instruction 

is one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances 

would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates 

adequate information on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into 

account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the 

persons by whom the product is intended to be used . . . .”).

Under our failure-to-warn jurisprudence, we presume that a worker who 

receives adequate warnings about the dangers of a product will follow the 

instructions and take whatever precautionary steps the warnings advise. 

Coffman, 133 N.J. at 602-03. The “heeding presumption in failure-to-warn 

cases furthers the objectives of the strong public policy that undergirds our 

doctrine of strict products liability.” Ibid. It “accords with the manufacturer’s 

basic duty to warn” and “fairly reduces the victim’s burden of proof.” Id. at 

603. To rebut the heeding presumption, the defendant must produce evidence 

that the worker would not have “heeded” adequate warnings. Ibid.
28

B.

In Beshada, our Court set forth certain governing principles to guide

failure-to-warn cases involving asbestos-containing products. 90 N.J. 191. In 

that case, the plaintiff workers and workers’ survivors filed a strict-liability, 

failure-to-warn lawsuit against the defendant manufacturers, alleging that their

exposure to the defendants’ asbestos products caused them to contract various 

asbestos-related illnesses. Id. at 196. The defendants asserted the “state of the 

art” defense to explain the decades during which the “defendants’ products 

allegedly contained no warning of their hazardous nature.” Id. at 197. In 

short, the defendants claimed that “no one knew or could have known that 

asbestos was dangerous when it was marketed.” Ibid.

To advance the public policy goals of our strict-liability jurisprudence, 

we rejected the “state of the art” defense and allowed for strict liability to be 

imposed against the defendant manufacturers “for failure to warn of dangers 

which were undiscoverable at the time” they manufactured their products. Id.

at 205. Beshada articulated three rationales for that approach. Id. at 205-08.

Under the “Risk Spreading” rationale, “spreading the costs of injuries 

among all those who produce, distribute and purchase manufactured products 

is far preferable to imposing it on the innocent victims who suffer illnesses and 

disability from defective products.” Id. at 205-06. Under the “Accident 
29

Avoidance” rationale, “imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to 

discover hazards [creates] an incentive for them to invest more actively in 

safety research” and thus “‘minimize the costs of accidents.’” Id. at 206-07

(quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173 (1979)). 

Last, under the “Fact [F]inding [P]rocess” rationale, as a matter of fairness,

manufacturers should “not be excused from liability because their prior 

inadequate investment in safety rendered the hazards of their product 

unknowable.” Id. at 207-08.

The analysis in Beshada concluded with the simple notion that without 

warnings, the users of potentially dangerous products are “unaware” of the 

products’ hazards and therefore cannot “protect themselves from injury.” Id.

at 209. In that light, the Court determined that “[t]he burden of illness from 

dangerous products such as asbestos should be placed upon those who profit 

from its production and, more generally, upon society at large, which reaps the 

benefits of the various products our economy manufactures.” Ibid.8

8

 Our courts recognize that “asbestos-containing products are not uniformly 

dangerous and . . . courts should not treat them all alike.” Becker, 138 N.J. at 

160. “[T]he term ‘asbestos-containing products’ describes a variety of 

materials with differing amounts of asbestos and different built-in safeguards.” 

Ibid. The “focus [is] on the specific product.” Id. at 159. Therefore, we do 

not assume “that all asbestos-containing products without warnings are 

defective as a matter of law.” Id. at 166. Having said that, no one claims that 

the products before us are not defective without an adequate warning.
30

C.

At this summary-judgment stage of the proceedings, we must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Whelan and therefore accept certain

provisional conclusions: (1) defendants’ products were designed to function

with asbestos-containing components; (2) the manufacturers and distributors

designed their products so that during the life of those products the asbestoscontaining components would have to be replaced with similar asbestoscontaining components for the products to function; (3) without Whelan’s use 

of protective gear, the replacement process, which led to the release of 

asbestos dust, was a dangerous and potentially injury-producing activity; 

(4) Whelan’s replacement of the asbestos-containing components during 

routine maintenance created asbestos dust inhaled by Whelan, which, 

according to his experts’ testimony, substantially contributed to his contracting 

mesothelioma; (5) the asbestos-containing original components and the later 

asbestos-containing replacement components necessary for defendants’

products to function were no less dangerous whether manufactured or 

distributed by defendants or third parties; and (6) had defendants placed 

warnings on their products, Whelan would have heeded those warnings and 

donned protective gear.
31

Whether a defendant manufacturer can be held strictly liable for the 

failure to warn of foreseeable dangers of a third party’s asbestos-containing

replacement components later integrated into its product during routine 

maintenance is an issue of first impression for this Court. Both the Hughes

and Whelan panels of the Appellate Division agreed that the manufacturer 

owed a duty to warn of the dangers of the required replacement components, 

regardless of who manufactured the components. Both agreed that the failure 

to provide adequate warnings constituted a product defect.

The panels diverged on the issue of medical causation. The Hughes

panel concluded that a defendant manufacturer or distributor, regardless of its 

duty to warn, cannot be held strictly liable for a third party’s injury-causing

replacement component incorporated into the product after the product leaves 

the defendant’s control. 435 N.J. Super. at 346. We do not accept the legal 

theory advanced in Hughes that a duty to warn, once recognized, has no real 

consequences -- that a violation of the duty is essentially meaningless. It 

makes little sense to impose a duty to warn if the violation of the duty leads to 

a tortious injury for which there is no remedy. Under our jurisprudence, we 

presume that had adequate warnings been given, Whelan would have heeded 

those warnings and taken steps to protect himself from exposure to the 
32

asbestos dust in defendants’ products and the products’ replacement 

components.

Therefore, the question we must answer is whether imposing liability for 

the violation of a duty to warn “satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness 

under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.” See 

generally Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993).

In determining whether defendants owed a strict-liability duty to provide 

warnings on their products for foreseeable users, like Whelan, who replaced 

asbestos-containing component parts with similar asbestos-containing 

components, our analysis is informed by the principles enunciated in Beshada

and our general common law jurisprudence. See Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 435.

Typically, in determining whether one party owes a duty to another, we weigh 

“several factors -- the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant 

risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the 

proposed solution.” Ibid. In addition, “foreseeability of harm is a significant 

consideration” in determining whether to impose a duty. See Carvalho v. Toll 

Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996).9

9

 Despite the strict-liability principles generally governing product-liability 

cases, mentioned earlier, the concept of reasonableness enters into the analysis 

of whether a warning is needed or adequate. See Feldman, 97 N.J. at 451.
33

Here, the relationship is between a manufacturer and the ultimate user of 

the product. A manufacturer’s duty to a foreseeable user of its products has 

long been recognized. Michalko, 91 N.J. at 394. “The overriding goal of strict 

products liability is to protect consumers and promote product safety.” Fischer 

v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 657 (1986).

The attendant risk of exposure to asbestos dust from asbestos-containing 

products -- the contracting of serious and often deadly asbestos-related 

illnesses, such as asbestosis and mesothelioma -- is well known and needs no 

extended discussion. See, e.g., Beshada, 90 N.J. at 197-98; Stevenson, 254 

N.J. Super. at 320-22.

Manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products 

obviously have the ability to act reasonably -- to exercise due care. They can 

place proper warnings on their products, making those products safer “at 

virtually no added cost and without limiting [the product’s] utility.” See

Beshada, 90 N.J. at 201-02. Warnings about the dangers of the original 

asbestos-containing components could easily encompass the dangers of the

required asbestos-containing replacement components integrated into the 

product during routine maintenance at later times. See Air & Liquid Sys. 

Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 986, 994-95 (2019).
34

The public has a clear stake in the proposed solution. Exposure to 

asbestos can cause serious diseases and even death. Reducing the number of 

workers subject to the ravages of asbestos-related illnesses is an obvious 

societal benefit on many different levels. The public also has an interest in 

limiting the extent of individual suffering and the devastating consequences 

that illnesses have on families as well as on the health-care system.

Foreseeability, knowledge of the dangers inherent in the asbestoscontaining components here, is imputed to defendants. See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 

202 (quoting Freund, 87 N.J. at 239 (“[W]hen a plaintiff sues under strict 

liability, there is no need to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have 

known of any dangerous propensities of its product -- such knowledge is 

imputed to the manufacturer.”)).

The risks inherent in a product containing asbestos components can “be 

reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its utility” with the 

attachment of proper warnings. See id. at 201. “Experience demonstrates that 

an asbestos-related product is unsafe because a warning could have made it 

safer at virtually no added cost and without limiting its utility.” Becker, 138 

N.J. at 166 (quoting Campolongo v. Celotex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 261, 264 

(D.N.J. 1988)). Last, considering that asbestos-related illnesses are borne by 

workers and their families, manufacturers are generally in the best position to 
35

“spread the cost of losses caused by [their] dangerous products.” See Fischer, 

103 N.J. at 657; Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205-06.

Given the summary-judgment record before us, we conclude that 

imposing liability on a manufacturer or distributor of a product for failing to 

provide adequate warnings about the danger of incorporating required

asbestos-containing replacement components into the product during routine 

maintenance “satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the 

circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.” See Hopkins, 132 

N.J. at 439. The manufacturer or distributor knows that the product’s 

profitability depends on the length of the product’s useful life and that the 

availability of replacement components is inextricably related to the product’s 

continued functioning and overall value. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 

N.E.3d 458, 474-75 (N.Y. 2016). Here, the products were dependent on 

asbestos-containing replacement parts, whether manufactured or distributed by 

defendants or third parties. That is the way the products were designed. 

Defendants had a duty to provide warnings given the foreseeability that third 

parties would be the source of asbestos-containing replacement components. 

Warnings on defendants’ products would have provided a reliable form of 

protection for the ultimate user. See id. at 472. The lack of warnings rendered 

the products defective.
36

D.

Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion in similar 

scenarios.

In New York City Asbestos Litigation, the New York Court of Appeals

addressed a manufacturer’s duty to warn when its product is combined with a

third party’s asbestos-containing component. Id. at 463. The New York high 

court held that a product manufacturer “has a duty to warn of the danger 

arising from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product in 

combination with a third-party product which, as a matter of design, mechanics 

or economic necessity, is necessary to enable the manufacturer’s product to 

function as intended.” Id. at 463. The Court of Appeals came to that 

determination for a number of reasons, a few of which bear mentioning. The

product manufacturer (1) “has the knowledge and ability to warn of the 

dangers of the joint use of the products, especially if the other company’s 

product is a ‘wear item,’” id. at 472; (2) “derives a benefit from the sale of the 

essential third-party [component part]” because the component part is 

necessary for the product’s function and its ultimate sale, id. at 474; and

(3) “typically is in the best position to guarantee that those who use the two 

products together will receive a warning” because “the end user is more likely 

to interact with [its product],” id. at 472. Thus, the Court of Appeals 
37

concluded that “it would be unfair to allow a manufacturer to avoid the 

minimal cost of including a warning about the perils of the joint use of the 

products when the manufacturer knows that the combined use is both 

necessary and dangerous.” Id. at 474.

The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 

exercising its authority as a federal “common-law court” in a negligencebased, product-liability maritime tort case. See DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at 991. In 

DeVries, the Supreme Court held that a manufacturer has “a duty to warn 

when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows 

or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for 

its intended uses.” Id. at 993-94. In reaching that determination, the Court 

emphasized that “the product manufacturer will often be in a better position 

than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger from the integrated product.” 

Id. at 994. Additionally, the Court reasoned that because “[m]anufacturers 

already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products,” requiring 

those manufacturers to also warn that the “required later-added part is likely to 

make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses should not 

meaningfully add to that burden.” Id. at 994-95.10

10

 The Court limited its holding to the maritime context. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 

at 995.
38

Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 

strict liability could not be imposed on a pipe manufacturer for failing to warn 

of the dangers of later-installed third-party asbestos-containing components 

necessary for the defendant’s pipes to function. May v. Air & Liquid Sys. 

Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 998 (Md. 2015). The Maryland high court imposed on a 

manufacturer a strict-liability duty to warn of the dangers of a third party’s 

asbestos-containing replacement components, provided:

(1) [the manufacturer’s] product contains asbestos 

components, and no safer material is available; 

(2) asbestos is a critical part of the pump sold by the 

manufacturer;

(3) periodic maintenance involving handling asbestos 

gaskets and packing is required; and

(4) the manufacturer knows or should know of the risks 

from exposure to asbestos.

[Ibid.]

E.

To be sure, other jurisdictions have reached different conclusions, 

finding that a manufacturer does not owe a duty to warn of a third party’s 

asbestos-containing replacement components later integrated into its product. 

See e.g., Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 504 (Wash. 2008)

(holding that “a manufacturer has no duty . . . to warn of the dangers of 
39

exposure to asbestos in products it did not manufacture and for which the 

manufacturer was not in the chain of distribution”); Davis v. John Crane, Inc., 

836 S.E.2d 577, 584 (Ga. 2019) (same). California takes a modified approach. 

See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012) (holding “that a 

product manufacturer may not be held liable in strict liability or negligence for 

harm caused by another manufacturer’s product unless the defendant’s own 

product contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant participated 

substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products” (emphasis 

added)). We conclude, however, that our evolving common law jurisprudence 

in the field of failure-to-warn, strict-liability cases involving asbestoscontaining products leads to a result that aligns with similar decisions rendered 

by the United States Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals, and the 

Maryland Court of Appeals.

In summary, imposing a duty to warn about the dangers of asbestoscontaining replacement components, regardless of who manufactured those 

components, adds hardly any further burden or cost to the product 

manufacturers, who already have a duty to warn of the dangers of the original 

asbestos-containing components. The manufacturers are in the best position to 

know the useful life -- the wear and tear -- of the asbestos-containing 

components in the product in which they operate, and the user of the product is 
40

likely to be more alert to a warning on the product than one that comes with 

the component part. It is only fair that the defendant manufacturers, who 

profit because the replacement components extend the life of their products, 

bear and spread the cost of the harm they caused. That is not to say that the 

third-party manufacturers of asbestos-containing replacement components do 

not have an equivalent duty to warn of the dangers of their products. But 

component-part manufacturers are not defendants or third-party defendants in 

this action.

V.

Despite the dissent’s suggestion otherwise, this opinion represents 

nothing more than a reasonable and logical extension of our evolving common 

law jurisprudence in asbestos cases. See post at ___ (slip op. at 5). This Court 

is not breaching any of its precedents, but merely resolving a case of first 

impression that comes to us from conflicting decisions of panels in the 

Appellate Division. Our asbestos-related jurisprudence has not been static, as 

is evident from decisions ranging from Beshada to Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, 

Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 404-05 (2006), where we held that a defendant’s “duty to 

workers on its premises for the foreseeable risk of exposure” to asbestos 

similarly extends “to spouses handling the workers’ unprotected work clothing 

based on the foreseeable risk of exposure.” “One of the great virtues of the 
41

common law is its dynamic nature that makes it adaptable to the requirements 

of society at the time of its application . . . .” State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505 

(1957). The approach we take here is the same modest one advanced by the 

United States Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals, and the 

Maryland Court of Appeals.

Like the Hughes court, the dissent takes the position that the product is 

one thing for product-causation and adequate-warning purposes (defendants’ 

products and asbestos-containing component parts) and another thing for 

medical-causation purposes (asbestos-containing component parts required for 

the product to function). We reject that approach, as have other courts cited in 

this opinion.

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, this opinion does not alter in any way 

the requirement for proving medical causation related to defendants’ products, 

including the required asbestos-containing replacement components that are 

integral to the functioning of those products. Whelan must establish that 

exposure to the asbestos-causing replacement component was of “‘sufficient 

frequency, with a regularity of contact, and with the product in close 

proximity’ to the plaintiff,” James, 155 N.J. at 301 (quoting Sholtis, 238 N.J. 

Super. at 28), and that the exposure “was a substantial factor in causing or 
42

exacerbating [his] disease,” id. at 299 (quoting Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 30-

31).

In addition, plaintiffs still have a strong incentive to identify asbestoscontaining component manufacturers, if they can, because those manufacturers 

are another source for the payment of damages. In turn, defendants have an 

incentive to identify asbestos-component manufacturers to share in bearing the 

cost of damages. To be sure, plaintiffs are not entitled to double recoveries.

VI.

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, for many of the 

reasons set forth in its thoughtful and comprehensive opinion reversing the 

order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. As a matter of law, 

we hold that defendant manufacturers and distributors can be found strictly 

liable for the failure to warn of the dangers of their products, including their 

own asbestos-containing components and a third party’s replacement 

components. To succeed in his failure to warn action, Whelan must prove that 

(1) the manufacturer or distributor incorporated asbestos-containing 

components in its original product; (2) the asbestos-containing components 

were integral to the product and necessary for it to function; (3) routine 

maintenance of the product required replacing the original asbestoscontaining components with similar asbestos-containing components; and 
43

(4) the exposure to the asbestos-containing components or replacement 

components was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating Whelan’s

disease.

The facts in dispute must be resolved by a jury. We remand to the trial 

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, SOLOMON, 

and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE PATTERSON filed 

a dissent, in which JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA joins.
Arthur G. Whelan,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Armstrong International Inc.; 

Burnham LLC; Carrier Corp., individually,

d/b/a and as successor to Bryant

Heating & Cooling Systems; CleaverBrooks Inc.; Crown Boiler Co., f/k/a

Crown Industries Inc.; Ford Motor Co.; 

Johnson Controls Inc., individually,

d/b/a and as successor to

Evcon Industries Inc. and Coleman

Heating and Air Conditioning

Products, Inc.; NIBCO Inc.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

A.O. Smith Corp.; Aaron & Co.;

AMG Industries Inc., d/b/a and as 

successor to Akron Metallic Gasket

Co.; Automatic Switch Co.; Automotive

Brake Co.; A.W. Chesterton Co.; BASF

Corp.; Bergen Industrial Supply Co.;

Bethlehem Dynatherm, a/k/a Dynatherm

Boiler Manufacturing Inc.; Binsky &

Snyder LLC, individually, d/b/a and

as successor to Binsky & Snyder Co.;

Bonland Industries Inc.; BorgWarner

Morse Tec Inc., as successor to 

Borg-Warner Corp.; Briggs Industries Inc.;

Carlisle Companies Inc.; CBS Corp.,

f/k/a Viacom Inc., successor by

merger to CBS Corp., f/k/a
2

Westinghouse Electric Corp.; Central

Brass Co. Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to Central Brass 

Manufacturing Co. and Central Brass & 

Fixture Co.; Central Engineering & 

Supply Co. Inc.; Chicago Faucet Co.;

Chicago-Wilcox Manufacturing Co.

Inc.; Colfax Inc., individually and 

as successor to Warner Electric Brake

& Clutch Co.; Crane Co.; Crosstown

Plumbing Supply Inc.; Dana Companies

LLC; DAP Inc.; Ductmate Industries

Inc.; Dunham-Bush Inc.; Dunphey &

Associates Supply Co. Inc.; Duro Dyne

Corp.; ECR International Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Utica Boilers Inc., Utica Radiator

Corp., Dunkirk Boilers, Pennco Inc.,

and Olsen Technology Inc.; Essex

Plumbing Supply Inc.; Fisher 

Scientific International Inc.;

Fortune Brands Home & Security Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor 

to Moen Inc.; Foster Wheeler LLC;

General Electric Co.; Georgia-Pacific 

LLC; The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; 

Goulds Pumps Inc.; Graco Inc.;

Grundfos Pumps Corp.; H.B. Smith Co.

Inc.; Hilco Inc., individually and as 

successor to Universal Supply Group 

Inc. and Amber Supply Co.; Honeywell

International Inc., f/k/a Honeywell

Inc., Allied Signal Inc. and Bendix Corp.;

Interline Brands Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to J.A. Sexauer Inc.; International 

Business Machines Corp.; ITT Corp.;

Kaiser Gypsum Co. Inc.; Kantor Supply

Inc.; Kohler Co., individually, d/b/a
3

and as successor to Sterling Faucet

Co.; Lennox Industries Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Armstrong Furnace Co.; Magnatrol

Valve Corp.; Manhattan Welding Co.

Inc.; Maremont Corp.; Meritor Inc.,

individually and as successor to

Rockwell International Corp.; Mestek

Inc., individually, d/b/a and as 

successor to H.B. Smith Co., Smith

Cast Iron Boilers and Mills Boilers;

Mueller Industries Inc.; National 

Automotive Parts Association Inc.;

New Jersey Boiler Repair Co.; NCH

Corp., as successor to Creed Co. and 

Daniel P. Creed Co. Inc.; NMBFIL

Inc., f/k/a Bondo Corp.; OwensIllinois Inc.; Peerless Industries

Inc.; Pneumo-Abex LLC, individually

and as successor to Abex Corp.; Price 

Pfister Inc.; The Prudential 

Insurance Co. of America; Rheem

Manufacturing Co.; Riley Power Inc., 

f/k/a Riley-Stoker Corp.; Robertshaw

Controls Co., individually and as

successor to Fulton Sylphon Co.; Sid

Harvey Industries Inc.; Slant/Fin

Corp.; Sloan Valve Co.; SOS Products 

Co. Inc.; Speakman Co.; Superior

Boiler Works Inc.; Sur-Seal Corp.;

Taco Inc.; Trane U.S. Inc.,

individually and as successor to

American Standard Inc. and American

Radiator Co.; Turner Construction

Co.; Unilever United States Inc.;

Uniroyal Holding Inc.; Verizon New

Jersey Inc., individually and as

successor to New Jersey Bell 

Telephone Co.; Victaulic Co.;
4

Wallwork Bros. Inc.; Wal-Rich Corp.;

Weil-McLain, a division of the

Marley-Wylain Co., a wholly-owned

subsidiary of the Marley Co. LLC;

W.V. Egbert & Co. Inc.; York

International Corp.; Zurn Industries 

LLC, individually, d/b/a and as 

successor to Erie City Iron Works and

Zurn Industries Inc.; AII Acquisition 

LLC, individually, as successor to,

f/k/a, and d/b/a Holland Furnace Co.,

Athlone Industries Inc., T.F.C.

Holding Corp. and Thatcher Furnace 

Co.; American Premier Underwriters,

individually and as successor to 

Hydrotherm Corp.; August Arace & Sons

Inc.; Honeywell Inc.; Rockwell

Automation Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to Sterling Faucet

Co.; Rockwell Collins Inc.,

individually, d/b/a and as successor

to Sterling Faucet Co.; TriMas Corp., 

individually, d/b/a and as successor 

to NI Industries Inc.; Wilmar

Industries Inc., individually, d/b/a

and as successor to J.A. Sexauer Inc.; 

BASF Catalysts LLC; TriMas

Corp., individually and as successor

in interest to Norris Industries

and/or NI Industries Inc.; York

International Corp., individually and

as successor to The Coleman Company 

Inc., a/k/a Coleman Heating and Air

Conditioning Products Inc.,

Defendants. 

JUSTICE PATTERSON, dissenting.
5

This Court has long declined to “‘lightly alter one of [its] rulings’ 

because consistent jurisprudence ‘provides stability and certainty to the law.’” 

Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 328 (2017) (quoting Pinto v. Spectrum 

Chems. & Lab. Prods., 200 N.J. 580, 598 (2010)). “Stare decisis ‘carries such 

persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be 

supported by some special justification,’” Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 

N.J. 191, 208 (2011) (quoting State v. Brown, 190 N.J. 144, 157 (2007)), such 

as “when experience teaches that a rule of law has not achieved its intended 

result,” Pinto, 200 N.J. at 598.

In today’s decision, the majority substantially alters the test for medical 

causation that has governed our state’s asbestos litigation for decades. The 

majority does not base its revision of the standard on any showing that the 

existing rule deprives asbestos plaintiffs of a remedy. Indeed, the specific 

issue addressed in this appeal has been raised in only two published decisions 

-- one of them the Appellate Division’s decision in this very case -- among the 

tens of thousands of asbestos claims that our courts have handled over 

generations. See Whelan v. Armstrong Int’l Inc., 455 N.J. Super. 569, 596-97 

(App. Div. 2018); Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 435 N.J. Super. 326, 338, 

343-46 (App Div. 2014). Moreover, even in this matter, there is no dispute

that plaintiff Arthur Whelan can seek to recover against some of the many 
6

defendants named in this action under the law that has governed until today. 

There is no flaw in our product liability law demanding the change that the 

majority makes, much less a special justification warranting a departure from 

precedent.

I view the majority opinion to erode the core element of a plaintiff’s 

burden of proof in an asbestos case, to unfairly impose upon defendants

liability premised on products that they neither manufactured nor sold, and to 

discourage the product-identification discovery that ordinarily leads to an 

equitable allocation of fault. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I.

A.

Over forty years of jurisprudence, this Court has acted to remove 

significant barriers facing asbestos plaintiffs. Based in part on its judgment 

that trial proofs should be simplified, the Court held that plaintiffs in asbestos 

cases need not demonstrate that the defendant had actual or constructive 

knowledge of a product’s dangers at the time of manufacture. Beshada v. 

Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207-09 (1982). In aggregated cases

overseen by experienced judges, asbestos litigants are afforded broad productidentification discovery, given access to proofs from cases around the country,

and allowed to amend their pleadings to pursue claims against a vast array of 
7

manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products. In many 

settings in which the corporate entity that manufactured the product is

unavailable to satisfy a judgment, asbestos plaintiffs may sue successor entities 

under the expansive “product line” test for successor liability adopted by this 

Court in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 343-47 (1981) and 

Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 368-70 (1981). In those and 

other respects, this Court has acted to ease the burden on asbestos plaintiffs as 

they seek to prove their claims at trial.

With respect to the critical element of causation in the toxic-tort setting, 

however, this Court and the Appellate Division have sought to strike a careful 

balance between the interests of plaintiffs and those of defendants. Our courts 

have established a two-part test for causation in a toxic-tort claim based on an 

alleged failure to warn. 

First, a plaintiff must establish “product-defect causation” -- that the 

product “was defective for some reason, the reason in occupational exposure 

cases usually being failure to warn, and that the defect caused harm.” Dreier, 

Karg, Keefe & Katz, Current N.J. Products Liability and Toxic Tort Law

§ 33:3 (2020). By virtue of the “heeding presumption” imposed by this Court 

in plaintiff’s favor in Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 597-603 (1993), 

the burden imposed on plaintiffs to prove product-defect causation in a failure 
8

to warn claim is “not an onerous one,” James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 

N.J. 279, 297 (1998). 

Second, “a plaintiff must prove what is known as ‘medical causation’ 

-- that the plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by exposure to the 

defendant’s product.” Id. at 299. That second component of the causation 

requirement is at the center of this appeal.

The “medical causation” requirement was adopted by the Appellate 

Division in the asbestos setting in Sholtis v. American Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. 

Super. 8, 25-31 (App. Div. 1989), and by this Court in toxic-tort cases 

generally in James, 155 N.J. at 299-304. First in Sholtis and then in James, the 

courts grappled to address the “extraordinary and unique burdens facing 

plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation,” James, 155 N.J.

at 299 (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 433 (1991)), in 

a manner that was also fair to defendants. In both cases, the courts adopted a 

test of proximate cause that eased the plaintiff’s burden, but strictly limited 

liability to those defendants whose products actually contributed to the 

plaintiffs’ harm. Id. at 299-304; Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 28-31.

Rejecting market-share and other collective-liability theories for 

asbestos cases, the Appellate Division adopted in Sholtis the “frequency, 

regularity and proximity” test, which requires that “a plaintiff prove an 
9

exposure of sufficient frequency, with a regularity of contact, and with the 

product in close proximity.” 238 N.J. Super. at 28. The Appellate Division 

viewed that standard to strike a “fair balance between the needs of plaintiffs 

(recognizing the difficulty of proving contact) and defendants (protecting 

against liability predicated on guesswork).” Id. at 29. Under that test, to 

defeat summary judgment, “a plaintiff only need produce evidence from which 

a fact-finder, after assessing the proof of frequency and intensity of plaintiff’s 

contacts with a particular manufacturer’s friable asbestos, could reasonably 

infer toxic exposure.” Ibid.

In James, the Court observed that the Sholtis test “is not a rigid test with 

an absolute threshold level necessary to support a jury verdict.” James, 155 

N.J. at 302 (quoting Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 420 (7th Cir. 

1992)). Nonetheless, the Court expressly mandated that plaintiffs prove 

exposure to a product manufactured by the defendant against which the 

plaintiff sought to recover: 

We stress that the “frequency, regularity and 

proximity” test bears no relationship to theories of 

collective liability that some courts have adopted in 

contexts where the specific tortfeasor or tortfeasors that 

caused the plaintiff’s injury cannot be identified. The 

“frequency, regularity and proximity” test assigns 

liability only to those defendants to whose products the 

plaintiff can demonstrate he or she was intensely 

exposed. 
10

[Id. at 302-03.]

The Court found in James that the plaintiff presented the required proofs 

specific to each defendant manufacturer, noting that the plaintiff had “provided 

substantial evidence that James was frequently, regularly and proximately 

exposed to petroleum-based products of each of the petroleum defendants.” 

Id. at 305. It thus upheld a fundamental requirement imposed on plaintiffs 

seeking to defeat a given defendant’s summary judgment motion: a prima 

facie showing of sufficient intensity of exposure to that specific defendant’s 

product -- as contrasted with another manufacturer’s product or a generic class 

of toxic exposures -- to support a finding of proximate cause by a reasonable 

jury. Id. at 302-06. 

That defendant-specific requirement has been routinely imposed in the 

asbestos litigation. See, e.g., Estate of Brust v. ACF Indus., LLC, 443 N.J. 

Super. 103, 125 (App. Div. 2015) (requiring proof, assessed under the test of 

Sholtis and James, that the plaintiff’s “exposure to the defendant’s asbestos 

products was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing the disease”); Provini v. 

Asbestospray Corp., 360 N.J. Super. 234, 238 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that 

the evidence presented by the plaintiff fell short of the required “proof of 

frequency and intensity of plaintiff’s contacts with a particular manufacturer’s 

friable asbestos”); Kurak v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 298 N.J. Super. 304, 
11

314, 322 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs’ product-identification 

and causation evidence was insufficient to defeat summary judgment as to one 

defendant but finding, as to another defendant, that the evidence established 

that the plaintiffs were exposed to that defendant’s asbestos product in “close 

proximity, with regularity, and frequency”); Goss v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 278 

N.J. Super. 227, 236-37 (App. Div. 1994) (noting the plaintiffs’ burden to 

show “not only that Porter Hayden’s asbestos-containing products were used at 

American Cyanamid, but also that each of them [was] exposed to the asbestos 

from those specific products frequently, on a regular basis, and with sufficient 

proximity so as to demonstrate the requisite causal connection between the 

exposure and plaintiffs’ illnesses”).

The requirement that a plaintiff identify the relevant asbestos-containing 

products and their manufacturers and establish proof of sufficient exposure to 

a specific defendant’s product is not a matter of semantics. Notwithstanding 

our courts’ longstanding commitment to eliminating procedural obstacles 

facing asbestos plaintiffs, New Jersey has never adopted “theories of collective 

liability” or other alternative forms of proof as a substitute for product 

identification in cases such as this. James, 155 N.J. at 302. As leading 

commentators on product liability law have observed, “Sholtis is 

distinguishable from various collective liability theories that have been 
12

rejected by New Jersey courts . . . and only assigns liability to those 

defendants to whose products plaintiff can demonstrate he was intensely 

exposed.” Dreier, Karg, Keefe & Katz, § 33:3. Instead, recognizing that not 

every plaintiff will be able to prove the liability of every defendant against 

whom he or she seeks to recover, our courts have mandated that plaintiffs 

identify the asbestos-containing product, sue the responsible manufacturer or 

its successor, and meet the modest burden imposed by the test of Sholtis and 

James. James, 155 N.J. at 299-304; Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 28-31.

B.

The medical-causation standard of Sholtis and James was the foundation 

for the court’s reasoning in Hughes, 435 N.J. Super. at 337-38, 343-46. 

Hughes arose from four plaintiffs’ occupational exposure to pumps 

manufactured by defendant Goulds Pumps, Inc., the majority of which, “until 

1985[,] contained asbestos in their gaskets and packing.” Id. at 332. It was 

undisputed that during the period in which the plaintiffs were exposed to the 

Goulds pumps, “the original gaskets and packing had been replaced, and it is 

unknown who manufactured or supplied the replacement gaskets and packing.” 

Ibid.

Goulds moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs had 

failed to produce evidence that they were exposed to asbestos-containing 
13

products manufactured by Goulds, “let alone with frequency, regularity and 

proximity” sufficient to prove medical causation under Sholtis. Id. at 333. 

On appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Goulds, the Appellate Division held that, with no non-asbestos gaskets and 

packing available on the market, “it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time the 

pumps were placed into the marketplace, that the gaskets and packing would 

be replaced regularly with gaskets and packing that contained asbestos.” Id. at 

341. The court concluded that “it would be reasonable, practical, and feasible 

to impose a duty to warn upon Goulds under the facts here.” Id. at 343. 

The Appellate Division then turned to the separate question of medical 

causation, noting that proof of causation is “the most difficult problem for 

plaintiffs in toxic tort cases.” Ibid. Applying the medical-causation standard 

of Sholtis and James, the Appellate Division held that “[i]ndustry should not 

be saddled with . . . open-ended exposure based upon ‘a casual or minimum 

contact.’” Id. at 345 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 

29). The court rejected the Hughes plaintiffs’ contention that liability for the 

unknown manufacturers’ replacement gaskets and packing could be predicated 

solely on their contact with Goulds pumps. Id. at 345-46. The Appellate 

Division recognized the distinction between the elements of breach of a duty to 
14

warn and medical causation, holding that a finding in plaintiffs’ favor in the 

former does not obviate the need for plaintiffs to prove the latter: 

We do not agree that plaintiffs may prove causation by 

showing exposure to a product without also showing 

exposure to an injury-producing element in the product 

that was manufactured or sold by defendant. If that 

were the case, a manufacturer or seller who failed to 

give a warning could be strictly liable for alleged 

injuries long after the product entered the marketplace 

even if the injury-producing element of the product no 

longer existed. The imposition of liability based upon 

such proofs would rest upon no more than mere 

guesswork, and would fail to limit liability “only to 

those defendants to whose products the plaintiff can 

demonstrate he or she was intensely exposed.”

[Id. at 346 (quoting James, 155 N.J. at 302-03) (citing

Provini, 360 N.J. Super. at 238).]

The Appellate Division accordingly affirmed the grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendant Goulds. Ibid.

As it expanded a manufacturer’s duty to warn to encompass the dangers 

of required or reasonably foreseeable substitution of replacement asbestoscontaining component parts for the originals, the Appellate Division in Hughes

faithfully applied the test of Sholtis and James. Id. at 344-46. The court 

acknowledged that New Jersey’s standard of medical causation in asbestos 

failure-to-warn cases -- a standard widely recognized to be among the nation’s

most hospitable to the claims of injured plaintiffs -- nonetheless imposes on 

those plaintiffs the obligation to prove sufficient exposure to a specific
15

defendant’s products in order for liability to be imposed on that defendant. 

Ibid.

C.

In the Appellate Division decision affirmed today, the panel concurred 

with the Hughes panel with respect to the scope of a manufacturer’s duty to 

warn of hazards associated with asbestos-containing replacement parts. 

Whelan, 455 N.J. Super. at 596-97. The Whelan panel, however, “part[ed] 

ways and disagree[d] with” the Hughes panel’s analysis of the question of 

medical causation. Id. at 597. 

In Whelan, the panel acknowledged that “our courts assess a 

manufacturer’s liability for a defective product by the condition of the product 

when it left the manufacturer’s control.” Ibid. (citing Michalko v. Cooke 

Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 400 (1982)). Notwithstanding that 

fundamental tenet of New Jersey product liability law, the court concluded that 

the original manufacturer should be held liable for the dangers posed by 

replacement parts made by unidentified nonparties, based on the failure of 

those replacement parts to eliminate the dangers of the original product:

A defect that existed when the product left the 

manufacturer’s control is neither ameliorated nor 

diminished when it arises from a component that has 

been replaced with a component that contains the 

identical injury-producing element. That wellestablished principle governs our definition of a 
16

product for purposes of determining a manufacturer’s 

liability for an asbestos-containing replacement part.

[Id. at 604.]

The panel supported its expanded definition of a manufacturer’s 

“product” to include replacement parts not made by that manufacturer 

-- indeed, most likely unknown to it -- by analogizing the post-sale 

replacement of the manufacturer’s component part with another asbestoscontaining component part to the “foreseeable misuse” of a product that in 

certain settings gives rise to liability. Id. at 598-99 (citing Jurado v. W. Gear 

Works, 131 N.J. 375, 386 (1993); Brown v. U.S. Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 169 

(1984); Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J. Super. 53, 68 (App. Div. 1996), 

aff’d in part, modified in part, 155 N.J. 544 (1998)).

The Whelan court altered the test of Sholtis and James to eliminate the 

requirement that the plaintiff prove sufficient exposure to an asbestoscontaining product manufactured by the specific defendant. Whelan, 455 N.J. 

Super. at 604-05. It reformulated that test to require that the factfinder assess 

whether there is an inference of toxic exposure based on “proof of frequency 

and intensity of plaintiff’s contacts with a particular manufacturer’s asbestoscontaining product, including all necessary component or replacement parts” --

despite the fact that the specific defendant did not manufacture or sell those 

component or replacement parts. Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added). Noting that 
17

the “[p]laintiff must also show his or her exposure was more than casual or 

minimal” and demonstrate the presence of asbestos-containing component 

parts and the plaintiff’s use of asbestos-containing replacement parts, the 

Whelan panel was satisfied that its “ruling . . . remains consistent with the 

proofs required under Sholtis and James.” Id. at 605. It reversed the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers. 

Id. at 607-08.

II.

A.

Affirming the decision of the Appellate Division panel, the majority 

focused its analysis on the scope of the duty to warn. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 

22-29, 31-35). As did the Appellate Division panels in Hughes and Whelan, 

the majority imposed on the manufacturer of products with asbestos-containing 

component parts integral to the product and necessary to its function, which 

must be replaced during routine maintenance, a duty to warn about the dangers 

of the replacement parts. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 42-43). On the question of 

the duty to warn, the majority relied in part on several cases from other 

jurisdictions recognizing a duty in similar settings and declined to follow cases 

reaching a contrary result. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 36-40).
18

The majority addressed the question of medical causation only briefly. 

Rejecting the holding of the Appellate Division in Hughes that the plaintiff 

could not meet the medical-causation test of Sholtis and James, the majority 

declined to “accept the legal theory advanced in Hughes that a duty to warn, 

once recognized, has no real consequences -- that a violation of the duty is 

essentially meaningless.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 31).

The majority thus rejects the holding of Hughes for a single reason: the 

Appellate Division adhered in Hughes to the requirement of Sholtis and James

that the plaintiff in that case prove contact with friable asbestos in replacement 

parts manufactured by the defendant. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 31-32) (citing 

Hughes, 435 N.J. Super. at 346). The majority reformulates the medical

causation standard to require proof only that “the exposure to the asbestoscontaining components or replacement components was a substantial factor in 

causing or exacerbating Whelan’s disease.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 42-43). 

That represents a material departure from the holding of James, in which the 

Court eased the plaintiff’s burden of proof but expressly declined to hold one 

defendant responsible for harm caused by a product that it neither 

manufactured nor sold. James, 155 N.J. at 302-04; Sholtis, 238 N.J. Super. at 

28-31. Although the majority contends that it “does not alter in any way the 

requirement for proving medical causation related to defendants’ products,” 
19

ante at ___ (slip op. at 42), its very explanation reveals that it does exactly 

that. The majority redefines “defendants’ products” to include “the required 

asbestos-containing replacement components that are integral to the 

functioning of those products,” thus attributing to a given defendant a product 

that a different entity manufactured.

Significantly, the majority’s new standard requires no showing that the 

plaintiff has made the slightest attempt to identify the proper defendant. Ante

at ___ (slip op. at 31-32, 42-43). Instead, it disincentivizes litigants from

undertaking the product-identification discovery -- long routine in asbestos 

litigation -- that could reveal the identity of the replacement part’s actual 

manufacturer. The standard raises the specter of duplicative liability for the 

identical exposure, given the majority’s suggestion that “the third-party 

manufacturers of asbestos-containing replacement components” have a duty to 

warn “equivalent” to that imposed on the original product’s manufacturer. 

Ante at ___ (slip op. at 40). The majority, in short, has not demonstrated that 

its new standard provides a fair and workable rule.

B.

In New Jersey asbestos litigation, as in product liability cases generally, 

this Court has on occasion amended the common law when it perceived a 

fundamental imbalance between the rights of plaintiffs and defendants that 
20

prevents a fair adjudication of the claims. See, e.g., Coffman, 133 N.J. at 597-

603 (identifying trial fairness and other reasons for imposing a heeding 

presumption in an asbestos failure-to-warn claim); Beshada, 90 N.J. at 207-08 

(stating that the requirement that plaintiffs prove the defendant’s knowledge of 

the asbestos hazard imposed substantial obstacles to a fair trial). 

No such fundamental unfairness is suggested -- much less demonstrated 

-- with respect to the issue here. In the decades in which the medical causation 

standard of Sholtis and James has governed, the skilled and seasoned judges 

and lawyers involved in the asbestos litigation have resolved tens of thousands 

of cases by settlement and trial. Apart from Hughes and this appeal, the 

parties have identified no matter in which a plaintiff claimed that his or her 

remedy against the manufacturers of asbestos products was inadequate because 

the existing medical causation standard required proof of exposure to a 

specific defendant’s product. Four decades into the asbestos litigation, there is 

nothing to justify the majority’s realignment of the interests of plaintiffs and 

defendants. 

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s suggestion that if a duty to 

warn is imposed, but a plaintiff cannot meet the requirement of proving 

causation as to a given exposure and thus cannot recover based on that discrete 

exposure, an injustice has somehow occurred. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 31-
21

32). Proximate cause, consisting of product-defect causation and medical 

causation, constitutes a separate element of a toxic-tort plaintiff’s burden, 

distinct from the breach of a duty to warn. That element is not satisfied 

whenever a court recognizes a duty; to the contrary, it requires “(1) factual 

proof of the plaintiff’s frequent, regular and proximate exposure to a 

defendant’s products; and (2) medical and/or scientific proof of a nexus 

between the exposure and the plaintiff’s condition.” James, 155 N.J. at 304. It 

is that test -- not the policy considerations that drive a duty analysis -- that has 

long served as a fair and practical standard of medical causation. 

In my view, there is no wrong to be righted here. I consider the 

majority’s decision to effect an unwarranted change in the longstanding 

standard for the medical causation element of an asbestos failure to warn 

claim. I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, and I

respectfully dissent.