alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Juan A. CRESCIONI, Petitioner, v. Dr. R. O. SETTLE, Warden, Respondent.

No. 13722-2.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, W. D.

Feb. 6, 1962.

GIBSON, District Judge.

Petitioner has filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” This document is, to a large extent, incoherent. Petitioner indicates that proceedings of some sort were had against him in the United States District Court in New York, New York, but he does not indicate the nature of the proceedings. Petitioner is apparently presently incarcerated in the United States Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri, although for what reason, it is impossible to tell.

Whether he has been tried, whether he is there pending a sanity hearing to determine if he is competent to stand trial, or whether he has already been adjudged incompetent to stand trial, and is in Springfield awaiting transfer to a state institution, appears nowhere in the petition.

Apparently petitioner wishes this Court to determine his competency.

It is incumbent upon the applicant for a writ of habeas corpus to state sufficient facts which if true, would entitle him to relief. It is not the problem of the Court to make an intensive investigation into each factual situation upon a general application for relief alleging only in generalities a violation of constitutional rights.

 This Court has no jurisdiction to determine the sanity of petitioner; that jurisdiction being solely in the New York District Court that made the commitment. Sections 4244 and 4245, Title 18 U.S.C., which Sections regulate procedures to determine mental competency before and after trial, clearly indicate that the *trial*Court, or the Court in which the proceedings originated, is the one in which all questions involving a defendant’s sanity are to be decided. See, also, Higgins v. McGrath, D.C., 98 F. Supp. 670. It is the duty of the committing Court to make periodic inquiry as to the mental condition of the petitioner in order to determine whether or not the petitioner’s status as a ward should continue.

*869For the reasons above stated, the “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” is denied.

It is so ordered.
#### John Lester COX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C/O SAYWERS, Floor officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-35370

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 2017 *

Filed July 17, 2017

John Lester Cox, Pro Se

Candie M. Dibble, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Corrections Division, Spokane, WA, Jerry Patrick Scharosch, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Spokane, WA, for Defendants-Appellees C/O Saywers, Counselor Southwick, Counselor Kerr, Sergeant Bolinger, Brenda De-shazer

Jerry Patrick Scharosch, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee Maggie Miller-Stout

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

John Lester Cox, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary'judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Brodheim v. Cry,*584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Saywers and Kerr because Cox failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was an absence of legitimate correctional goals for defendants’ conduct. *See Pratt v. Rowland,*66 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] successful retaliation claim requires a finding that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Barnett v. Centoni,*31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (preserving institutional order and discipline are legitimate peno-logical objectives).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Southwick because Cox failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Southwick took any adverse action. *See Watison v. Carter,*668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (adverse action required for prisoner retaliation claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and alle*709gations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 11

- 00185

- CV

RICHARD L. PEMBERTON D/B/A

PEMBERTON FINE CUSTO M

HOMES, LLC AND RICHA RD L.

PEMBERTON APPELLANTS

V.

VICK COX AND JACKIE COX APPELLEES

------------

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

------------

We have considered the parties’ “ Joint Motion To Dismiss .” It is the court = s

opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the appeal. See

Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)( 1 ), 43.2(f).

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by the party incurring the same, for which

let execution issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: January 19, 2012
#### Susan Mae POLK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey A. BEARD; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56884

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*939Submitted June 26, 2017 *

Filed July 3, 2017

Susan Mae Polk, Pro Se

Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Susan Mae Polk appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment' dismissing for failure to comply with a court order her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. *McHenry v. Renne,*84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Polk’s action because, after the magistrate judge identified the deficiencies in her prior complaints and provided two opportunities to amend, Polk’s second amended complaint did not comply with the court’s order directing her to file a complaint in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). *See id.*(affirming dismissal under Rule 8 of plaintiffs complaint because it failed to set forth simple, concise and direct aver-ments); *see also Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t.,*530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) (in deciding whether a district court abused its discretion by dismissing under Rule 41(b), “we must necessarily consider the legal question of whether the district court correctly dismissed without prejudice the original complaint on Rule 8 grounds”). Contrary to Polk’s contentions, the magistrate judge considered each of the relevant factors, including the availability of less drastic sanctions, before recommending that the action be dismissed with prejudice. *See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,*963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth factors to consider before dismissing an action for failure to comply with a court order).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Polk’s motion to substitute appellee Beard is denied, because Polk sued Beard in his official and individual capacities. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 13987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-05228]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR SEVERELY DISABLED


Procurement List; Proposed Deletions

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled.

ACTION: Proposed deletions from the Procurement List.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Committee is proposing to delete product(s) from the 
Procurement List that were furnished by nonprofit agencies employing 
persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before: April 10, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled, 1401 S Clark Street, Suite 715, Arlington, Virginia, 22202-
4149.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information or to submit 
comments contact: Michael R. Jurkowski, Telephone: (703) 785-6404, or 
email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7f3c322b3a391a1b2d1a183f3e1d1613160b0630111a51181009"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1d5e5049585b78794f787a5d5c7f7471746964527378337a726b">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 
U.S.C. 8503 (a)(2) and 41 CFR 51-2.3. Its purpose is to provide 
interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed 
actions.

Deletions

    The following product(s) are proposed for deletion from the 
Procurement List:

Product(s)

NSN(s)--Product Name(s):
    MR 13047--Container, Leakproof, On-the-Go, Clear, Lunch
    MR 13048--Container, Leakproof, On-the-Go, Clear, Salad
    MR 13036--Herb Keeper, Green Saver, Large, 2.8 Qt
Designated Source of Supply: CINCINNATI ASSOCIATION FOR THE BLIND 
AND VISUALLY IMPAIRED, Cincinnati, OH
Contracting Activity: Military Resale-Defense Commissary Agency

Michael R. Jurkowski,
Acting Director, Business Operations.
[FR Doc. 2022-05228 Filed 3-10-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6353-01-P


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THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE 9/27/98
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Nelson ALVERADO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41679 Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 18, 2017

Carmen' Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Nelson Alverado, Pro Se

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Nelson Alverado has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Alverado has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Jesus CAMACHO, surviving spouse of Stacey Camacho, LeJean Nichols, as Administratrix of the Estate of Stacey Camacho, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-14225

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

(July 7, 2017)

Brandon Graham Cathey, Swope Ro-dante, PA, Tampa, FL, Richard Dolder, James N. Sadd, Slappey & Sadd, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Darrell Hinson, Swope Ro-dante PA, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiffs-Ap-pellees Jesus Camacho, LeJean Nichols

Michael P. Kenny, Bryan Lutz, Tiffany Lynne Powers, Andrew Jacob Tuck, Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Ruth Tyler Bryant, Stephanie Feingold Glickauf, Goodman McGuffey Lindsey *&*Johnson, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Robert M. Darroch, Goodman McGuffey Lindsey & Johnson, LLP, Sarasota, FL, for Defendant-Appellant

William V. Custer, IV, Bryan Cave, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae Georgia Chamber of Commerce

John David Hadden, Turkheimer & Hadden, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Caleb F. Walker, McArthur Law Firm, Macon, GA, for Amicus Curiae Georgia Trial Lawyers Association

Jeffrey Dale Diamond, Diamond Law Office, Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae United Policyholders

David M. Atkinson, Jonathan J. Kandel, Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae Georgia Defense Lawyers Association

Before JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Kathleen M. Williams, of the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

This case is before us on defendant-appellant Nationwide’s appeal of the dis*986trict court’s final order entered on May 25, 2016 denying Nationwide’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entering final judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellees, as well as on Nationwide’s appeal of several other intermediate orders and rulings made by the district court.

We have carefully reviewed the record, the briefs, Nationwide’s supplemental authority filed on July 3, 2017, and all orders and rulings, including the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned final order. Based on that review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court did not err. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment in this case.
**Exhibit 31**

** **

**WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP.**

** **

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATE**

 

I, Thomas G. Lehmann, certify that:

 

1.         I have reviewed this report on Form 10–K and all reports on Form 10–D required to be filed in respect of theperiod covered by this report on Form 10–K of Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates, WMABS Series 2006-HE4 Trust (the ‘‘Exchange Act periodic reports’’);

 

2.         Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement ofa  material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.         Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form10–D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4.         Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB,and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement(s) in all material respects; and

 

5.         All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their relatedattestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a–18 and 15d–18 have been included as anexhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10–K. 

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  LaSalle BankNational Association.

Date:  March 15, 2007

 

  /s/ Thomas G. Lehmann_________Name:  Thomas G. LehmannTitle:    President

** **
#### Thomas EBRON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Karen D. BROWN, Chair, VA. Parole Board; Virginia Parole Board, Members, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-6622

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: September 26, 2017

Decided: September 28, 2017

Thomas Ebron, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Ebron appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § .1983 (2012) complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). Ebron claims that the Virginia Parole Board violated his due process rights in denying him discretionary parole by not permitting him to review his file, failing to consider certain factors, and violating certain notice and review procedures. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

The parole board complied with the due process requirement of providing Ebron with a statement of reasons for the parole denial, *Burnette v. Fahey,*687 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2012), and Ebron does not have a protected liberty interest in the parole procedures themselves, *Hill v. Jackson,*64 F.3d 163, 170 (4th Cir. 1995). While Ebron complains that the district court failed to give notice before dismissing his complaint, the district court was not required to do so under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. *See*28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a), (b) (2012). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
# EUR-Lex - 32002L0050 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 32002L0050

**Commission Directive 2002/50/EC of 6 June 2002 adapting to technical progress Council Directive 1999/36/EC on transportable pressure equipment (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 149 , 07/06/2002 P. 0028 - 0028 *

Commission Directive 2002/50/EC

of 6 June 2002

adapting to technical progress Council Directive 1999/36/EC on transportable pressure equipment

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 1999/36/EC of 29 April 1999 on transportable pressure equipment(1), and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Commission Directive 2001/2/EC(2) has amended the certification procedures provided for in Directive 1999/36/EC as regards the combination of the modules to be followed for the conformity assessment of new receptacles and new tanks.

(2) Those modules should be changed in order to ensure better coherence between them.

(3) Annex IV to Directive 1999/36/EC should, therefore, be amended accordingly.

(4) The measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on transport of dangerous goods,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1

In Annex IV Part I, in module D, point 1, first sentence, point 3.1, second subparagraph, third indent and point 3.2, first subparagraph, the words "EC type-examination certificate" are replaced by the words "EC type-examination certificate or EC design-examination certificate".

Article 2

Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 January 2003. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.

When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.

Article 3

This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Article 4

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 June 2002.

For the Commission

Loyola De Palacio

Vice-President

(1) OJ L 138, 1.6.1999, p. 20.

(2) OJ L 5, 10.1.2001, p. 4.